The Doha Round Negotiations:

A Prolonged Series of Unfortunate

Events

By T’Vaughn Lewis

Summary

Negotiations in the international realm of high politics is often laced with unwavering

national interests, preconceived agendas and unflinching positions. But as the world

continues to become increasingly interdependent in almost every manner conceivable,

one has seen the static positions of nation states forced to concede and adapt.

Negotiations often include common interests and conflicts over those same interests.

Successful negotiations employ the use of principles over positions, peoples over

problems, mutual gains over zero sum conditions and good faith over skullduggery-

This is the embodiment of Principled Negotiations by Fisher and Ury. The concepts and

issues involved in the Doha Round are discussed under this model whilst highlighting

where negotiations faltered. Implications and recommendations are made for this

round and further rounds of negotiations in the future.

Introduction

Why do we need negotiations? Are they necessary at all? The fact

is that we are all negotiators in some form or fashion. Whether

it’s bargaining with a merchant at the market stall over produce,

a child making his case to his parents to have the new

PlayStation 4, a young lady trying to get a discount on a dress

or a student trying to make a defense for a grade, the simple

fact is we do negotiate. This idea of negotiating is even the

same at the international system when states come together to

sign treaties, accords, agreements and even bilateral and

multilateral agreements1.1 Depending on the school of thought (Realist, Liberalist, Neo-realist, Neo-Liberalist, Marxist, Constructivist or even Feminist), the view and definition of negotiations can change subtly or drastically. For a classical realists, negotiations is simply not possible. Man is inherently mistrustful and seeks his own interests. Therefore negotiations to bridge these interests is not possible since either party

The Doha Round of negotiations is such an example of negotiating

in the international system. An amalgam of one hundred and fifty

seven states, through the World Trade Organization2, have

initiated talks since November 2001 to reduce trade barriers

throughout the international system and thereby create increased

welfare for all. This round of negotiations focused primarily on

agricultural subsidies, non-tariff barriers, services and long

standing trade issues. Major contentions have been sparked

between developed and developing countries. Some of the most

outcries stems from the BRICS3 economies who state that these

negotiations are simply an extension of US-European trade policy.

They see these negotiations as only serving the developed nations

of the North at the expense of the Global South.

The key idea of the Fisher-Ury model4 of negotiations is to

ideally arrive at a ‘win-win’ situation-The Doha Round seems to

be staggering in this regard. “Virtually all observers concur

may want to benefit at the expense of the other. A neo-realist however, sees negotiations as possible if it stands to have more gains for them relative to the other party. They agree that co-operation is possible through international organizations and regimes but the sovereign state has the last say as to whether it will or will no co-operate.2 Refer to the appendix “A Brief History of the World Trade Organization” for the development of this term.3 BRICS refer to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.4 The Fisher-Ury model referred to here is the Principled Negotiations model.

that the Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations in the

World Trade Organization is faltering badly…The Doha Round may

thus become the first major multilateral trade negotiation to

fail since the 1930s” (Bergsten 2005). The author is one among

many who share the same sentiments. The Doha Round negotiations

will be analyzed using the Fisher-Ury model to assess where

things went wrong and how they can be improved.

Negotiation- Definition or Definitions?

Like many English words, there is a Latin equivalent and the term

“negotiation” is no exception. The word stems from the Latin term

negotiatus which is the past participle of negotiare. The expression

originated in the 17th century and conveys the idea “to carry on

business”. Other authors define it as:

...to communicate in search of mutual agreement. In the

sense of "tackle successfully" (1862), it at first meant "to

clear on horseback a hedge, fence, or other obstacle" and

"originated in the hunting-field; those who hunt the fox

like also to hunt jocular verbal novelties" (Gowers 1965)

There has to date been no unanimous decision on a standard

definition of the term negotiations. The following authors below

give a multitude of definitions that convey more or less the same

idea. These definitions range from:

“Negotiation is a basic means of getting what you want from

others. It is back-and-forth communication designed to reach an

agreement when you and the other side have some interests that

are shared and others that are opposed.” (Fisher and Ury 1983)

“a process in which explicit proposal are put forward ostensibly

for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the

realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are

present.” (Iklé 1964)

“A process in which divergent values are combined into an agreed

decision, and it is based on the idea that there are appropriate

stages, sequences, behaviors, and tactics that can be identified

and used to improve the conduct of negotiations and better the

chances of success.” (Zartman and Berman 1982)

One common thread between all the definitions is that they all

see negotiations as a process of getting one’s interests served.

Out of all the definitions, Zartman and Berman give a quite

holistic representation. They view the process as an “agreed

decision” between opposing views which must go through a

specified process to achieve success.

The Fisher-Ury Model not often played out in the real world. Most

times people see negotiations as being hard or soft. Fisher and

Ury explain both extremes of negotiation by the following

quotation:

People find themselves in a dilemma. They see two ways to

negotiate: soft or hard. The soft negotiator wants to avoid

personal conflict and so makes concessions readily in order

to reach agreement. He wants an amicable resolution; yet he

often ends up exploited and feeling bitter. The hard

negotiator sees any situation as a contest of wills in which

the side that takes the more extreme positions and holds out

longer fares better. He wants to win; yet he often ends up

producing an equally hard response which exhausts him and

his resources and harms his relationship with the other

side. (1983)

Fisher and Ury acknowledge that there are a series of

negotiations types in between both extremes but the model that

will be used in this study would be there Principled Negotiations

model. They explain the model succinctly and aptly by their

following words,

Principled negotiation…suggests that you look for mutual gains

wherever possible, and that where your interests conflict,

you should insist that the result be based on some fair

standards independent of the will of either side. The method

of principled negotiation is hard on the merits, soft on the

people. Principled negotiation shows you how to obtain what

you are entitled to and still be decent. (Fisher and Ury

1983)

The Doha Round Explained- The Fisher-Ury Model Application

The Fisher-Ury model posits a five step approach to analyzing

negotiations. These steps include:

1. The Problem

2. Separate the people from the problem

3. Focus on interests, not positions

4. Invent options for mutual gain

5. Insist on using objective criteria

The Problem

One of the key issues that has led to the decline of the Doha

Round negotiations is positional negotiating5. Key actors in the

international system like the United States, Europe and the

emerging BRIC economies are all vehemently standing their ground

on their agendas6. More so, we are seeing very realpolitik events

playing off between the US and the other actors in the Doha

Round. The US, along with other self-interested nation states,

are seeking their interest first and foremost before anything

else. These interests surprisingly lie outside the negotiations

of the Doha Round but are progressively affecting the round.

The main problems that undermine the prospects for a

successful Doha Round…lie outside the negotiations

themselves. Three factors stand out: the massive current

account imbalances and currency misalignments pushing trade5 The Fisher-Ury model notes that positional negotiating is even more detrimental whenthere are multiple parties involved. The WTO consists of 157 members all of whom are trying to get their agendas met. Since this is the scenario it goes without saying whythe Doha Round has stalled indefinitely. The model also does not espouse this type of negotiations since its inefficient, strains relationships, is a zero sum game and produces unwise agreements.6 The divergent agendas of the developed and developing world has been problematic in the Doha Round. The US and Europe are concerned with their domestic issues of financial reforms following the 2008 crisis, currency appreciation and rising trade deficits. The developing world however is concerned with accessing differential treatment from developed states, removal of US and European agricultural subsidies andfair market prices for their primary products on the international commodity markets.

politics in dangerously protectionist directions in both the

United States and Europe…strong and growing

antiglobalization sentiments…and the absence of a compelling

reason for the political leaders of the chief holdout

countries to make the necessary concessions to reach an

agreement (Bergsten 2005)7

These very state centric and positional issues, though not

initially associated with the Doha Round itself, are causing the

round to falter. The US and Europe are primarily concerned with

reigning in their current account deficits, currency evaluations

and trade deficits with China before they enter into any other

concessional agreements in the Doha Round. Many states like

Europe and the US are suffering from the onslaughts that

globalization has brought on. The “specter of "Polish plumbers"

and "cheap Chinese products" ”have been diffused throughout

Europe and has been met with mixed reviews in the face of job

losses and factories folding up.

Separate the people from the problem

7 For a clear understanding on how negotiations are stalling at the Doha Round review the section “A Brief History of the WTO”. This section explains consensus is the decision modus operandi for this international organization. Though consensus can be good at times, it has proved to the anathema to efficiency.

International negotiations is entangled with personal and

entrenched relations alongside the substance of the negotiations.

Most negotiating teams may have some ‘history’ with the other

party and this can cloud negotiations many times. This is

evidently one of the major reasons why majority of the parties in

the Doha Round cannot reach a consensual agreement.

The Doha round is an ambitious trade round for two reasons.

First, the number of participating members is by far the

largest ever. Second, negotiations comprise nine areas

within the ‘single undertaking’‖ format, which implies that

any issue can be revisited until everything is agreed. These

areas are agriculture (including cotton), market access for

manufactured or non-agricultural products (NAMA), services,

rules (including antidumping, non-agricultural subsidies and

countervailing measures, and fisheries subsidies), trade

facilitation, trade-related aspects of intellectual property

rights (TRIPS), environmental goods and services, and

development (mainly comprising revision of Special and

Differential Treatment provisions across WTO agreements).

(International Monetary Fund 2011)

The above quote outlines the substance of the negotiations but the

relationships are much more implicit. Developed and developing

countries are finding it progressively more difficult to arrive

at some level of consensus. The emerging markets are especially

rigid in their stance that they do not want to open their markets

any further given the fact that the US and Europe still maintain

‘unfair’ non-tariff barriers on the agricultural markets. The

BRICS have also clamored for the US and Europe to review and stop

dumping and adhere to environmental codes. These tenuous

relations are one of the many factors that caused the Doha Round

to stall.

Focus on interests, not positions

“Interests motivate people; they are the silent movers behind the

hubbub of positions. Your position is something you have decided

upon. Your interests are what caused you to so decide.” (Fisher

and Ury 1983). The essence of negotiations as Fisher and Ury

imply is interests. They are what cause actors to make decisions

and more importantly to stick to them. Rather than focus on

positions which can result in hard or soft negotiating, interest

based negotiating tends to leave both parties satisfied. The Doha

Round is no exception. The multiplicity of parties, interests and

positions makes negotiations more complex. The issue here is that

states are insistent on their positions and not really interests.

The US and Europe are trying to re-stabilize themselves after a

disastrous financial crisis of 2008 and are not willing to

relinquish their non-tariff barriers without commensurate gains.

The emerging markets, however, are adamant to hold their ground

on further liberalization in the name of ‘welfare gains’. They

see these neo-liberal trade policies as an extension of developed

world’s foreign policy that simply will not benefit them.

Invent options for mutual gain

Most negotiations at times is involved in agreements that, from

the onset, may look advantageous to both parties involved but

most times is truly in favour of one side.

There seems to be no way to split the pie that leaves both

parties satisfied… One lawyer we know attributes his success

directly to his ability to invent solutions advantageous to both his

client and the other side. He expands the pie before dividing it.

Skill at inventing options is one of the most useful assets

a negotiator can have.”8 (Fisher and Ury 1983)

One of the challenges of the negotiators at the Doha Round would

be to invent options that are mutually beneficial to all one

hundred and fifty seven states in the WTO. This would definitely

involve tradeoffs between the developed and developing states to

reach maximum welfare. “Doha could lead to considerable global

welfare gains… in relative terms…new market access created by

Doha compares favorably with past trade rounds…Doha would

considerably increase security in international trade

relationships…” (International Monetary Fund 2011) Inventing

options for mutual gains in the Doha Round could take the form of

global security regimes that ensure fair prices for primary

8 Fisher and Ury in this extract are alluding to two strands of negotiation: Distributive vs Integrative. Distributive negotiations involves looking at the“pie” as fixed. In such a scenario, one party may stand to gain more from the agreement than another. It is also viewed as competitive or zero sum negotiating because the resources at hand are finite and both parties must battle for the best portion. Integrative distribution seeks to expand options for both parties. It’s a “win-win” type of negotiations where both parties’ needs and interests are met- No one is left to feel cheated. It expands the “pie” first before dividing it to the parties. It promotes absolute gains overrelative gains.

commodities in emerging markets whilst providing the developed

world with their intermediate products and market access to the

developing world. In such a case, the option is advantageous to

both sides.

Insist on using objective criteria

In instances where all of the above fail, Fisher and Ury insist

on an objective criteria approach.

The more you bring standards of fairness, efficiency, or

scientific merit to bear on your particular problem, the

more likely you are to produce a final package that is wise

and fair. The more you and the other side refer to precedent

and community practice, the greater your chance of

benefiting from past experience. (Fisher and Ury 1983)

This is one area that the Doha Round is severely lacking in. One

example proves this point: The US has been charged many times

with antidumping policies that are disguised as protectionism.

These policies make it difficult for developing countries’

products to enter in the US and other developed states. How has

the developing world responded? “…many developing countries are

now using antidumping actions themselves, which may goad some

countries to reexamine the necessity for discipline” (Fergusson

2011). The lack of fairness in the international sphere has

forced some states to “play the game” as it were. If states were

to insists on international rule, law and best practices when

neither side seems to benefit, a generally acceptable and fair

agreement can be attained based on objective criteria.

The Way Forward

“…I am in blood

Stepped in so far that, should I wade no more,

Returning were as tedious as go o'er.”

Macbeth: Act 3, Scene 4

The Doha Round of negotiations is best characterized by the quote

from Macbeth. States are so “stepped” into these negotiations

(approximately fourteen years of it!) that it is more expedient

and beneficial to continue with them based on the premise that

states use the Fisher-Ury model of negotiations to arrive at a

mutually beneficial agreement to all. This round of negotiations

is much more than simply a round- It speaks volumes to whether or

not the WTO can feasibly engage states now and in the future to

co-operate for the greater good. After all, if these negotiations

were to fail what are the ramifications for all? Is it prudent to

walk away at this late stage and return to the proverbial

starting point Macbeth alluded to? Or is it wiser to wade further

in and explore the options?

Implications and Recommendations

There are many expected implications if the Doha Round were to

fail, but for simplicity, I will focus on the economic and

political aspects. Without a doubt, the loss of economic gain and

welfare would be unimaginable if after fourteen years of work the

Doha Round were to be abandoned. Advancement in the area of

agricultural reform would be of naught; development issues

between the global north and south would be left suspended in

thin air and possibly greater trade disparities may be formed.

Though the progress of the Doha Round has been painstakingly

slow, there has been some progress. States, primarily emerging

market states, have been able to voice their concerns with

current trade practices and norms. Revisions of policies (the

addition of intellectual property as a tradeable and differential

treatment) and other documents have been made to smoothen and

distribute the gains from international trade more equitably.

Political ramifications can be just as or even worse than the

economic consequences. Breakdown of talks at the Doha Round can

spark deterioration of foreign relations between states.

Interestingly, some states are already seeing this as an after

effect of stalled negotiations. This is highly evident between

the BRIC economies and the US and Europe. The US and Europe see

these emerging markets as threats to their established trade

routes and practices. At the same time, the emerging markets are

progressively putting pressure on US and Europe to change their

policies on trade, development and ICT that is more equitably for

all, especially the developing world.

There is room for better negotiation in the Doha Round at

present. But one must acknowledge that fourteen years of

incremental gains is quite difficult to lose given that the

alternatives to Doha negotiations are quite scant. If the Fisher-

Ury model is implemented probably we could see an amicable

resolution of these round of negotiations for all states.

References

Bergsten, C. Fred. 2005. "Rescuing the Doha Round." Foreign Affairs,

WTO Special Edition.

Fergusson, Ian F. 2011. World Trade Organization Negotiations: The Doha

Development Agenda. Congressional Report, Washington:

Congressional Research Service.

Fisher, Roger, and William Ury. 1983. Getting to YES Negotiating an

agreement without giving in. New York: Penguin Book Ltd.

Gowers, Ernest. 1965. Online Etymology Dictionary. Accessed May 30,

2015. http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?

search=negotiation&searchmode=none).

Iklé, Fred Charles. 1964. How Nations Negotiate. New York: Kraus

Reprint Company.

International Monetary Fund. 2011. The WTO Doha Trade Round—

Unlocking the Negotiations and Beyond. The Strategy, Policy, and

Review Department.

Zartman, William, and Maureen R. Berman. 1982. The Practical

Negotiator. New Haven,CT: Yale University Press.

Appendix

A Brief History of the World Trade Organization

The World Trade Organization (WTO) is the youngest of the Bretton

Woodsi institutions. The predecessor of the WTO was the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade which became effective on January

1st 1948. The WTO developed out of the need to assist the other

two Bretton Woods, notably the World Bank and the International

Fund, organizations with the growing needs and concerns for

arbitration in international tradeii. Prior to the formulation of

the WTO, the International Trade Organization (ITO) was formed to

deal with international trade matter; this organization never got

off the ground because the US and a few other states did not

ratify the treaty.

As the years passed the ITO tried to establish rules and

regulations governing free trade that was meant to ‘level’ the

international arena- this saw the introduction of trade

liberalization, tariff reduction, opening economies and the

demise of preferential trading agreements. From 1947-1994, the

GATT sought to formally establish the ITO as the official body on

trade (they sought to set up in Havana, Cuba) but these talks led

to nothing. As such the GATT had to transform itself into a de

facto international organization governing trade until the WTO was

born on January 1st 1995iii.

When the WTO took operations on in 1995, the GATT became its

umbrella treaty governing goods, services and intellectual

property. These rules and regulations were revised under the

Uruguay round in 1994, but the heart of the WTO still remains the

GATT. The WTO prides itself as being different from its sibling

Bretton Woods institutions in the sense that decisions are made

on the notion of consensus and not voting rights.

The WTO mission was extended beyond the scope of the GAT which

primarily focused on goods; it covered services, traded

creations, designs and intellectual property. It sought “to

ensure that trade flows as smoothly, predictably and freely as

possible” through the lowering of trade barriers and the

provision of an equitable platform for trade negotiations. This

organization is guided by six principles: non-discrimination, more

openness, predictability and transparency, more competitiveness, more benefits

for less developed countries (LDC’s) and protection of the environmentiv.

The WTO is broken up into the Ministerial Conference, Dispute

Settlement Body, General Council and Trade Policy Review Body.

The General Council is further divided into the Trade

Negotiations Committee, Council for Trade in Goods, Council on

Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and Council

for Trade Servicesv. The main daily functions of the WTO are

governed by the Ministerial Conference, Dispute Settlement Body,

General Council and Trade Policy Review Body- These bodies

consist of the same membership of the WTO but each operate

different rules and chairpersons.

i There are three Bretton Woods institutions today: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) which were established in BrettonWoods, New Hampshire, United States. The Bretton Woods Agreement was signed in July 1944 which gave rise to the first two institutions the IMF and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the WB). Although it was not under the purview of the Bretton Woods Agreement at that time, the delegates foresaw the need for a third institutionto complement the activities of the IMF and WB wholly in terms of trade.ii The predecessor to the WTO was the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). This institution was developed after World War II. An institution called to International Trade Organization (ITO) was formed and its intent was to be a specialized agency of the UN to notonly deal with trade issues and barriers but all trade matters that directly or indirectly affected trade itself.iii The WTO came to fruition at end of the Uruguay round in Marrakesh, Morocco. The WTO came after almost a half century of failed attempts to construct an international entity to be atthe helm of trade. There were seven rounds of talks under the GATT- The most important of these were the Kennedy, Tokyo and the Uruguay round. These spanned from 1964-1994…at the endof this rounds the WTO was borniv It must be noted that these principles embody the neo-liberal agenda. It seeks to encourage development by bringing the LDC’s state up to par with the developed world over a period of time. Enshrined in this is the possibility of the WTO granting LDC’s more time to adjust to the trade climate of the international arena.v The main arm of the WTO is the General Council. This is where majority of the decision making is done. It is comprised of all the nation states and is headed by a chairman. All decisions made in this forum are settled by consensus. The General Council is divided in The Council for Trade in Goods which is sub-divided into 11 sub bodies, with the Textiles Monitoring Body is separate