The cosmic role of the Logos, as conceived from

Heraclitus until Eriugena

Vladimir de Beer

Abstract

In this article the cosmological and metaphysical dimensions of

the Logos concept in the Hellenic and Patristic traditions are

explored. Heraclitus initially depicted the logos as the

ontological link between the One and the many, with the logos

thus serving as the foundation of both rational discourse and

natural law. This concept was elaborated and modified by a

number of eminent Hellenic and Christian thinkers. Among them

count Plato, Philo of Alexandria, the New Testament authors

John and Paul, Plotinus, Athenagoras, Justin Martyr, Clement of

Alexandria, Augustine of Hippo, Dionysius the Areopagite,

Maximus the Confessor and John Scottus Eriugena.

Introduction

Prior to embarking on a discussion of any philosophical or

theological concept, one should take cognizance of its

etymology. Being related to the Greek verb legō, meaning to

relate, speak, or say, the noun logos primarily means the word

by which the inward thought is expressed and also the inward

thought or reason itself. From this basis further meanings of

word, story, or reason are derived (Liddell and Scott 2004,

408, 416). By the fifth century B.C. the term logos had obtained

the additional meanings of cause, ratio, and proportion, and by

the next century also those of general principle and definition

(McKirahan 1994, 133). Finally, in the New Testament the Logos

signifies both Word and Reason (Liddell and Scott 2004, 417).

In view of the lasting relevance of the Logos concept in both

the Hellenic and Christian traditions, we will provide a brief

survey of its origins and development.

Philosophical foundations

The Logos concept was introduced into Western thought by the

enigmatic yet brilliant thinker Heraclitus of Ephesus (ca. 540-

480 B.C.). Heraclitus outlined the dimensions and functions of

the Logos and its corollaries as follows (quoted in Richard

McKirahan’s translation, with the fragment numbers in

parentheses):

This logos holds always but humans always prove unable to

understand it, both before hearing it and when they have

first heard it. For though all things come to be in

accordance with this logos, humans are like the

inexperienced when they experience such words and deeds as

I set out, distinguishing each in accordance with its nature

and saying how it is (1).

For this reason it is necessary to follow what is common.

But although the logos is common, most people live as if

they had their own private understanding (2).

What is opposed brings together; the finest harmony

(harmonia) is composed of things at variance, and

everything comes to be in accordance with strife (8).

Things taken together are whole and not whole, [something

which is] being brought together and brought apart, in tune

and out of tune; out of all things there comes a unity, and

out of a unity all things (10).

The kosmos, the same for all, none of the gods nor of

humans has made, but it was always and is and shall be: an

ever-living fire being kindled in measures and being

extinguished in measures (30).

The turnings of fire: first, sea; and of sea, half is

earth and half fiery waterspout … Earth is poured out as sea,

and is measured according to the same ratio (logos) it was

before it became earth (31).

You would not discover the limits of the soul although you

travelled every road: it has so deep a logos (45).

Listening not to me but to the logos it is wise to agree

that all things are one (50).

War is the father of all and king of all, and some he

shows as gods, others as humans; some he makes slaves, others

free (53).

God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace,

satiety and hunger, but changes the way [fire], when mingled

with perfumes, is named according to the scent of each (67).

They are at odds with the logos, with which above all they

are in continuous contact, and the things they meet every

day appear strange to them (72).

It is necessary to know that war is common and justice is

strife and that all things happen in accordance with strife

and necessity (80).

To God all things are beautiful and good and just, but

humans have supposed some unjust and others just (102).

The soul has a self-increasing logos (115).

From Fragments 1 and 2 we can deduce the basic meaning of the

logos for Heraclitus, namely that it is constant; it unfolds as

the ‘together’ in beings; and everything that happens is in

accordance with this constant ‘together’ (Heidegger 2000, 135).

Since the logos provides a hermeneutical key for understanding

the whole of reality, understanding the logos is the most

important of all human activities. Furthermore, the logos is

common, because it applies everywhere and is an objective

reality (McKirahan 1994, 130, 133). Due to the presence of the

logos, reality displays both unity and plurality (Fragments 10

and 50). For the Ephesian thinker there could be no harmony

without differentiation, since harmony is a relation among

different things (Fragment 8). To humans strife appears

destructive, but in reality strife is responsible for the

generation of things (Fragments 53 and 80). The activity of the

logos guarantees that all things are one and one thing is all

(McKirahan 1994, 134-135). Evidently, for Heraclitus the logos

is the ontological link between the One and the many, that is

to say between cosmic unity and plurality.

Due to the presence of the logos, Heraclitus contends, the

becoming and change that characterise the world do not occur in

a chaotic way. The manner in which the logos rules the cosmos is

by determining the conflict between opposites, thereby

providing a deeper unity and harmony underlying the changes

flowing from the conflict (Fragment 67). The logos is therefore

the ground of all that exists, and it rules the cosmos through

divine law. Heraclitus ostensibly viewed fire as the material

form of the logos, and as such fire is also subject to the law

of the logos (Dreyer 1976, 42). However, it has been

persuasively argued that for Heraclitus, as with the rest of

the Ionian thinkers, fire (or water for Thales and air for

Anaximenes) does not signify the material element only, but

rather symbolises the metaphysical reality of Universal

Substance (the Prakriti of Indian philosophy) that underlies the

world of empirical phenomena (Schuon 1984, 71). This

metaphysical caveat should be kept in mind during the remainder

of this discussion.

In a marked theological advance on polytheism, Heraclitus

declared the logos to be the only god, with the entire cosmos

standing under its law. That is to say, the logos is the law of

nature, determining all changes in the physical cosmos. In this

way the logos provides the primeval rationality and order of the

cosmos, so that god, nature, and humans form a deep-lying unity

(Dreyer 1976, 43). In addition, just as the cosmos has positive

connotations of goodness and beauty, for Heraclitus the logos

has rational connotations linking it with justice, law, and

soul (McKirahan 1994, 142). The logos is therefore the cosmic

principle that establishes rational order in the world

(Blackburn 2008, 215). It could be stated that the kosmos

displays rationality and intelligibility due to the active

presence of the logos.

Furthermore, the logos enables us to apprehend the principles

(logoi, the plural of logos) of things, thus making rational

discourse possible (Blackburn 2008, 215). Although logos and

legein (to speak) are related, discourse is not the essence of

logos, Martin Heidegger asserts, which is rather the

‘gatheredness of beings themselves’. In other words, logos is

the constant gatheredness of beings that stand in itself, i.e.

Being, and therefore phusis and logos are the same (Heidegger

2000, 137-138). Nonetheless, in the Hellenic conception

language is a reflection of reality, as is suggested by the

etymological link between logos, legō and legein. The logos thus

entails both epistemological and ontological dimensions, with

the former deriving its reality from the latter. This link also

provides the reason for the Ephesian philosopher’s celebrated

predilection for paradoxical expressions, since reality is

complex in nature (McKirahan 1994, 133). As Heraclitus declared

in Fragment 123, ‘Nature loves to hide.’ It is therefore not

surprising that the father of the Logos concept became known

among later generations as ho skoteinos – the dark or obscure one

(Dreyer 1976, 40).

Heraclitus conceived the first principles (archai, the plural of

archē) of the cosmos to be fire, water, and earth (Fragment

31). Interestingly, he omits air, which had figured so

prominently as archē in the thought of some of his Ionian

predecessors (notably Anaximenes). Among the three elements

fire is granted priority by Heraclitus, on account of its

having an active and controlling role in the cosmos. Likewise

in the human individual the soul gives life and direction to

its bearer, and therefore fire and soul are used

interchangeably. Fire is also identified with the logos,

according to which all things happen (McKirahan 1994: 138-140,

144). It is clear that Heraclitus did not conceive of fire in

the material sense only, but primarily in the metaphysical

sense.

According to the testimony of Sextus Empiricus, Heraclitus

connected intelligence (or mind, nous) with the logos, since

what surrounds us is rational (logikos) and intelligent

(noētikos). Accordingly, humans become intelligent by drawing in

the divine logos through breathing. However, during sleep our

intelligence is separated from natural contact with its

surroundings by means of the passages of perception; and when

we awaken to commence the new daily cycle, we again become

sensible (McKirahan 1994, 146, 147). This notion implies that

human intelligence is dependent upon the indwelling presence of

the logos, through which humans have the potential to

participate in the Divinity.

Heraclitus’ teaching on the primacy of the divine logos, and the

contrast between the unstable world of appearance and the

rational order underlying it, would be continued by Plato and

the Stoics (Blackburn 2008, 164). Plato introduces his

cosmology in the dialogue Timaeus with a fundamental

differentiation (which is not to be confused with metaphysical

dualism): ‘As I see it, then, we must begin by making the

following distinction: What is that which always is and has no

becoming, and what is that which always becomes but never is?

The former is grasped by understanding (noēsis),1 which involves

a reasoned account (logos). It is unchanging. The latter is

grasped by opinion (doxa), which involves unreasoning sense

perception (aisthēsis alogos). It comes to be and passes away, but

never really is’ (Timaeus 27d-28a). In other words, for Plato

there exists a realm of eternal, unchanging being (i.e. the

intelligible world) which is grasped by rational understanding,

as well as a realm of ephemeral, mutable becoming (i.e. the

sensible world) which is grasped by sense perception. This

metaphysical notion would exert lasting influence on Western

philosophy and theology.

1 The noun noēsis could also be translated as thought or intelligence;

Liddell and Scott, Lexicon, 466.

In Plato’s cosmology the world of sensible phenomena, that is

to say the realm of becoming, is interposed between the

extremes of true being (i.e. the Forms, which are outside time

and space) on the one hand and non-being (which is equivalent

with empty space) on the other. The material realm of sensible

objects is conceived as simultaneously real, on account of

participating in the Forms, and unreal, on account of existing

in non-being. For Plato the participation of matter in the

Forms is made possible by the World-soul, which as the bearer

of reason (logos) is situated between the Forms and matter

(Dreyer 1976, 100). Therefore each existing thing has its own

logos, through which it participates in an intelligible

archetype, or Form.

Further development of the Logos concept occurred in the Stoic

philosophy that became prominent in the Hellenic-Roman world

from the third century B.C. onwards. The Stoic cosmology was

based on the notion of the logos spermatikos, the ‘seminal reason’

which is the source of cosmic order (Blackburn 2008, 215). The

logos spermatikos is thus the active principle operating in

lifeless matter. From this is derived the Latin notion of the

anima mundi, the soul of the world, since soul is that which

gives life. Accordingly, humans are also viewed as possessing a

portion of the divine logos (Tripolitis 2002, 38). The role of

the multiple logoi indwelling the natural world is therefore

analogous to that of Plato’s Forms.

Building on the ontological concepts developed by Plato and the

Stoics, the Neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus distinguished

between four modes of being: the One, the Intellect, the Soul,

and matter. The first three modes of being are intelligible and

named hypostases (hupostaseis),2 comprising a divine trinity

(Oosthuizen 1974, 57-58, 83). As stated by Plotinus, ‘There is

the One beyond Being; next, there is Being and Intellect; and

third, there is the nature of the Soul’ (Enneads, V.1.10). The

relation between the three hypostases is vividly depicted by

Plotinus: ‘Intellect is the primary activity from the Good and

the primary essence from that which remains in itself. But

Intellect is active around the Good, in a way living around it.

2 The plural of hupostasis, literally ‘that which is set under, a support’,

from which is derived ‘reality’ or ‘substance’ (Liddell and Scott, 2004,

743); that is to say, the equivalent of the Latin term substantia.

Soul dances outside this looking at it and, in contemplating

its interior, looks at God through itself’(Enneads I.8.2).

Borrowing Stoic terminology, Plotinus reasons that through the

contemplation of the One via the Forms, the Intellect produces

the logoi spermatikoi (‘seminal reasons’) that serve as the

productive power of the Soul, which is the active or generative

principle within Being (Enneads V.9.6-7; Moore, Plotinus). The

level at which the Soul becomes fragmented into individual,

embodied souls, Plotinus continues, is nature (phusis). Since

the purpose of the individual soul is to maintain order in the

material realm, and since the essence of the soul is one with

the highest Soul, there will necessarily occur in the sensible

realm a type of order (doxa) that is a pale reflection of the

order (logos) prevailing in the intelligible realm (Moore,

Plotinus). This Neoplatonic notion implies that due to the

presence of soul via the logoi, the natural order displays a

measure of intelligibility.

Throughout the Enneads Plotinus employs the term logos, in the

meaning of ‘expressed principle’, to indicate the image of the

higher as it is found in the lower. The active presence of the

logos in nature is outlined as follows: ‘In fact, the underlying

and worked-upon matter comes to form bearing these [hot or

cold], or becomes such when the expressed principle, though it

itself does not have the property, works on it; for it is not

necessary for fire to be added in order for matter to become

fire, but rather an expressed principle [to be added], which is

not an inconsiderable sign of both the fact that in living

beings and in plants the expressed principles are the

producers, and the fact that nature is an expressed principle,

which makes another expressed principle, a product of it,

giving something to the underlying subject, while it is itself

static’ (Enneads III.8.2). In this way Plotinus refers to the

rules or laws in the World-soul which are manifested in the

‘body’ of nature (Dillon and Gerson 2004, 37). The notion of

‘laws of nature’ was hereby provided with a firm metaphysical

foundation, namely the activity of the logos in the physical

world.

Early Judeo-Christian reception

An unequivocally theistic understanding of the logos was

provided by Philo of Alexandria. In his seminal synthesis of

Hebrew theology and Hellenic philosophy, the Platonic

distinction between the intelligible and sensible worlds is

maintained. The link between God and the world is the eternal

Ideas, or Forms, which are the thoughts of God. With this

insight the Alexandrian thinker became the first in a long line

of thinkers to identify the intelligible Forms of Plato with

the divine thoughts. First among the Ideas is the Logos, whom

Philo calls the first-born Son of the uncreated Father

(Chadwick 1967, 142). It could not have been problematic for

the early Church to effect the transition from Philo’s

depiction of the Logos as the ‘first-born of God’ to the

Christian doctrine that the Logos, identified with Jesus

Christ, is the ‘only-begotten Son of God’ (i.e. the Father).

Furthermore, for Philo the Logos is the mediator through which

God creates the cosmos. As commented by Edward Moore, ‘Thus we

see Philo linking the cosmos to the intellectual realm by way

of a mediating figure rather like the Platonic World-Soul.

Borrowing a term from Stoic philosophy, Philo calls the

thoughts of the Logos “rational seeds” (logoi spermatikoi), and

describes them as having a role in the production of the cosmos

which, he insists, was brought into being out of non-being by

the agency of God’ (Moore, Middle Platonism). In this way Philo

affirmed that the transcendent God does not directly interact

with the world as its creator, but through the operation of the

Logos. Since the divine Logos is the creator of the world, Philo

continues, it is also the ontological link between all the

components of the world. That is to say, the various levels of

being that constitute the cosmic hierarchy are held together by

the power of the Logos (Chadwick 1967, 143). As the Alexandrian

thinker declared, ‘the Logos of the living God is the bond of

everything, holding all things together and binding all the

parts, and prevents them from being dissolved and separated’

(Friedlander 1912, 114-115).

In the New Testament the term logos is used numerous times, in

the majority of cases indicating a spoken word, story, or

message. The only exceptions to this meaning of logos occur in

the prologue of the Gospel of John (1:1-14), where the Logos is

depicted as a pre-existent divine Being (En archē ēn ho logos, kai ho

logos ēn pros ton theon, kai theos ēn ho logos: ‘In the beginning was the

Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God’); in the

first epistle of John (5:7), where the Logos is mentioned

together with the Father and the Spirit (i.e. in a Trinitarian

sense); and in the book of Revelation (19:13), where Christ is

referred to as the Logos of God (Strong’s Concordance). In the

light of these scriptural affirmations, it is imperative for

Christians that the incarnate Logos should primarily be

worshipped as the cosmic Christ and not only as the self-

sacrificing preacher of righteousness from Galilee.

It has been suggested by Kitty Ferguson that since logos can

better be translated as ‘reason’ or ‘rationality’ instead of

‘word’, the prologue of John could be rendered in Pythagorean

and Platonic terms as follows: ‘In the beginning was Reason.

And Reason was with God, and Reason was God. Reason was with

God in the beginning. Through Reason all things were made;

without Reason nothing was made that has been made. In Reason

was life, and that life was the light of men... Reason became

flesh and lived among us’ (Ferguson 2011, 204). Such a

rendering would indeed be an elegant and theologically sound

depiction of Christ as divine intermediary between the mind of

God (i.e. the Father) and the created order.

In early Christian theology the cosmic role of Jesus Christ is

depicted by the Apostle Paul in virtually identical terminology

to that of Philo. Thus Paul wrote to the church in Colossus:

‘He [i.e. Christ] is the image (eikōn) of the invisible God, the

first-born over all creation. For by Him all things were

created that are in heaven and that are on earth, visible and

invisible… And He is before all things, and in Him all things

consist’ (Colossians 1:15-17; New King James Version). The

latter phrase could also be rendered as ‘in Him all things hold

together’ (ta panta en autō sunesthēken), as in the Revised Standard

Version. This apostolic teaching accordingly represents a

Christian version of Philo’s notion of the divine Logos as

cosmic ontological nexus.

The early Christian appropriation of the Logos concept has not

escaped the notice of latter-day critics. According to Martin

Heidegger, for instance, it was with Christianity that the

misinterpretation of Heraclitus and his teaching on the logos

began. Thus in the New Testament, notably the prologue of the

Gospel of John, logos does not mean the Being of beings, but one

particular being, namely the Son of God. This Christian notion

is correctly attributed by Heidegger to Philo, who saw the logos

as the mediator (mesitēs) between God and creation. In this way

Christ came to be seen as the logos of salvation and of eternal

life. It is suggested by the German philosopher that this

understanding is far removed from that of Heraclitus, in whose

thought nature (phusis) and logos comprise a unity (Heidegger

2000, 133, 143). However, we suggest that Heidegger’s criticism

does not invalidate the Logos concept of Christian theology,

since the latter is based on divine revelation as expounded by

means of reason (Greek dianoia) and not on the precepts of

Hellenic philosophy as such – however valuable these have

proven in the Patristic exposition of Christian theology.

Patristic development

In the second century of the Christian era Justin Martyr

continued the Johannine Gospel’s identification of the Logos

with Jesus Christ. For Justin this notion entails both

ontological and epistemological dimensions, as is the case with

the logos of Heraclitus. In his First Apology Justin modifies the

Stoic notion of spermatikos logos to indicate the divine Word sown

as seeds of truth among ‘all people’ (para pasi). This universal

presence of the Logos is evident when the Hellenic poets and

philosophers spoke of matters such as the immortality of the

soul, punishments after death, and the contemplation of

heavenly things (Bouteneff 2008, 60). For Justin the divine

Logos is thus the Reason that inhabits all things. This is

particularly the case with the rational creation, so that

rational beings such as Socrates and Abraham could be viewed as

Christians before Christ. Each rational being participates in

the universal Logos, and the reason why philosophers differ

among each other is that each has a degree of access to the

truth, whereas Christ is the fullness of truth (Chadwick 1967,

162).

Justin accepted the Platonic doctrine that the transcendent God

is too elevated to interfere with this world. The Lord God

(Yahweh Elohim) of the Hebrew scriptures therefore refers to the

Logos, which is the Son of God (Chadwick 1967, 163).

Accordingly, Justin maintained Philo’s identification of the

Logos with the Angel of the Lord, begotten from God as a

rational power before all creatures: ‘I shall give you another

testimony, my friends, from the Scriptures, that God begot

before all creatures a Beginning, [who was] a certain rational

power [proceeding] from Himself, who is called by the Holy

Spirit, now the Glory of the Lord, now the Son, again Wisdom,

again an Angel, then God, and then Lord and Logos’ (Dialogue with

Trypho, Chapter 61). Evidently, Philo conceived of Jesus Christ

as the Logos who reveals God to humankind in various ways: in

the words of the sacred scriptures, in the theophanies therein,

and ultimately in the Incarnation (Bouteneff 2008: 58). The

Logos was thus viewed by some of the earliest Christian

theologians as divine intermediary from the onset of God’s

dealings with humankind.

In his Apology, addressed to the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius,

the early Christian philosopher Athenagoras continues Justin’s

identification of the Son of God with the Logos, through which

the universe is created. After mentioning elements of truth

concerning God and the cosmos in the teachings of the

Pythagoreans, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, Athenagoras

depicts the relation between God the Father, the Logos, and the

material world as follows: ‘But the Son of God is the Logos of

the Father, in idea and in operation; for after the pattern of

Him and by Him were all things made, the Father and the Son

being one. And, the Son being in the Father and the Father in

the Son, in oneness and power of spirit, the understanding and

reason (nous kai logos) of the Father is the Son of God... He

[i.e. the Son] is the first product of the Father, not as

having been brought into existence (for from the beginning,

God, who is the eternal mind (nous), had the Logos in Himself,

being from eternity instinct with Logos (logikos)); but in as

much as He came forth to be the idea and energizing power of

all material things, which lay like a nature without

attributes, and an inactive earth, the grosser particles being

mixed up with the lighter.’ The creative activity of the Logos

extends to the angels and ministers, Athenagoras asserted,

‘whom God the Maker and Framer of the world distributed and

appointed to their several posts by His Logos, to occupy

themselves about the elements, and the heavens, and the world,

and the things in it, and the goodly ordering of them all’

(Apology, in Dembski et al 2008, 22-23). Therefore, since God

created all things through the Logos, the universe reflects

reason (logos) (Dembski et al 2008, 18). The rational structure

of the cosmos is thus attributed by Athenagoras to the creative

activity of the divine Logos.

Regarded as the most important theologian of the second

century, Irenaeus of Lyons virtually identified the Logos with

God the Father: ‘But God being all Mind, and all Logos, both

speaks exactly what He thinks, and thinks exactly what He

speaks. For His thought is Logos, and Logos is Mind, and Mind

comprehending all things is the Father Himself. He, therefore,

who speaks of the mind of God, and ascribes to it a special

origin of its own, declares Him a compound Being, as if God

were one thing, and the original Mind another’ (Against Heresies,

in Dembski et al 2008, 49). Another theologian among the

second-century Apologists, Theophilus of Antioch, affirmed the

emerging Patristic consensus that having brought forth his

Logos and his Spirit, God (i.e. the Father) creates the world

through the Logos. The Genesis statement regarding God’s

creation of humankind, ‘Let us make’, is understood by

Theophilus as indicating the Logos and the Spirit as the

creative hands of God. The reference to God walking around (in

the paradise narrative) is read as the Logos assuming the role

of the Father (Bouteneff 2008, 69, 71). With this

interpretation Theophilus continues the Christian doctrine

regarding the transcendence of God the Father towards the

created order, which in turn necessitates the Logos as

intermediary between God and creation.

The earliest of the justly famous Alexandrian theologians,

Clement, continued the reconciliation of reason and revelation

suggested by Philo and Justin. Just as music, arithmetic and

astronomy prepares the mind for philosophy, so does philosophy

prepare the soul for theology which rests on revelation. Faith

and knowledge therefore goes hand in hand, since all truth and

goodness derive from God. For Clement the Logos, which is

Christ, is the principle uniting the fragments of knowledge

(Chadwick 1967, 168-170). This appreciative stance towards

‘pagan’ learning represents a marked contrast to that of

Clement’s Latin contemporary Tertullian, who notoriously

argued: ‘What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What

concord is there between the Academy and the Church? What

between heretics and Christians?’ (On Prescription against Heretics,

5.1, in Ciholas 1978). Alas, Tertullian’s dismissive attitude

towards Hellenic philosophy has over the past five hundred

years been continued by much of Protestant theology with its

insistence on sola scriptura, thereby misunderstanding the

mediating role of the Logos between God and humankind.

In a remarkable display of religious universalism (which should

not be confused with doctrinal egalitarianism), Clement

reasoned that human knowledge of God existed ever since it was

granted to Adam and Eve. Consequently, monotheism was common

among early humans, before the Law was given to the Hebrews and

philosophy to the Greeks, and prior to monotheism degenerating

into polytheism. The Alexandrian theologian held further that

the Incarnation of Christ was a special case of divine

immanence by the Logos, since the transcendent God (i.e. the

Father) does not have direct contact with the world. Continuing

Philo’s notion of cosmic mediation, Clement taught that Christ

is the Logos who descended from heaven to mediate between

Creator and creation. Christ is also the head of the cosmic

hierarchy of being which is kept together by the Holy Spirit.

Moreover, for the Alexandrian theologian the Incarnation of the

Logos is the central event in the divine economy, through which

humankind can be educated and restored (Chadwick 1967, 176-

178). In this way Clement adapted the Logos concept obtained

from Hellenic philosophy in the light of scriptural teachings –

an approach that was followed by most of the Patristic

thinkers.

Although Plotinus did not explicitly ascribe the term Logos to

the second hypostasis of his divine Trinity, his theology was

influential on the Latin Patristic thinker Marius Victorinus, a

fourth-century convert from Neoplatonism. Victorinus

distinguished between the Logos interior to God and the Logos

related to the world by means of creation and salvation

(Theological Treatises on the Trinity, in Clark 1981, 25). This notion

could be regarded as a transposition onto the theistic-cosmic

level of the distinction made by Philo between the logos

prophorikos and the logos endiathētos, or the ‘uttered word’ and the

‘word within’ (Kamesar 2004, 163-181).

The leading theologian of the Latin Patristic tradition,

Augustine of Hippo, continued the Logos Christology of his

predecessors. In an exegesis of the opening verses of Genesis,

the North African bishop reasoned that God created the world by

means of His eternal Logos, since there was no physical voice

or time yet. Therefore, ‘in the beginning’ means ‘in the co-

eternal Word’ (The Confessions, Book 11, Chapters 6-9). Augustine

continued Philo’s notion that the Logos contains the eternal

Forms as divine thoughts. Furthermore, the Latin theologian

affirmed the creation of the world by the Logos with the Stoic

and Neoplatonic notion of ‘seminal reasons’ (Latin rationes

seminales). Thus Augustine asserted that the unfolding of all

natural kinds was due to their creation in seminal form at the

beginning. Even miraculous deviations from the ordinary course

of nature are due to the seminal reasons implanted by God in

the created order. Similarly, all human beings were contained

seminally in Adam, while their individual forms only came to be

later. Therefore God is the ultimate creator of all new beings,

Augustine affirmed (Knuuttila 2001, 104).

According to some of the Greek Patristic theologians, human

rationality corresponds to the rationality in nature that is

established by the divine Logos (Nesteruk 2003, 21). However,

according to Athanasius of Alexandria the rationality of the

created order is ontological rather than epistemological. In

his work Against the Gentiles, Athanasius rejects the Stoic and

Neoplatonic notion of seminal reasons (logoi spermatikoi),

suggesting instead that the logoi in the created order represent

the indwelling Logos. Thus the cause of rationality in nature

is the Logos, implying that both the sensible and intelligible

realms are embedded in Christ (Nesteruk 2003, 23-25).

Furthermore, in his On the Incarnation the Alexandrian theologian

criticises the ‘Gentiles’ for ridiculing the Incarnation of the

Logos in a human body, although they confess ‘that there is a

Word of God, that He is the Governor of all things, that in Him

the Father wrought the creation, that by His providence the

whole receives light and life and being, and that He is King

over all, so that He is known by means by the works of His

providence, and through Him the Father.’ Athanasius then

expresses his agreement with the Greek philosophers when they

say that the universe is a great body, of which every part is

inhabited by the Logos. Therefore the Incarnation follows as a

logical corollary: ‘But if it is right and fitting for Him

[i.e. the Logos] to enter into the universe and to reveal

Himself through it, then, because humanity is part of the

universe along with the rest, it is no less fitting for Him to

appear in a human body, and to enlighten and to work through

that’ (On the Incarnation, in Dembski et al 2008, 212-213). This

reasoning by Athanasius is surely one of the most elegant

arguments concerning the Incarnation of the divine Logos.

Contrary to the materialistic reductionism of the Cartesian-

Newtonian scientific paradigm, and in a striking anticipation

of quantum physics, Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor

viewed matter as a fact of energy. In terms of this dynamic

notion of matter, the world and everything in it is the

effected word (logos) of God (Yannaras 1991, 40). On account of

the theistic rationality of the natural order, the human reason

in its encounter with nature meets another reason. In other

words, the human knowledge of nature is dialogical (Yannaras

1991, 41). This ontological-epistemological link (ultimately

deriving from Heraclitus, as we have noted) also serves as

indictment of the human encounter with the natural realms,

which has for the most part assumed the form of a thoughtless

monologue enforced by technology.

Another Cappadocian theologian, Gregory of Nazianzus, declared

in his Fourth Theological Oration that each created thing has its own

essential reason (logos). Since the divine Logos grants

ontological reality to the whole of the created order, nothing

can exist if it is not grounded in the Logos. This affirmation

implies that God does not create wilfully, but with a reason

(Lossky 1978, 56). In other words, the logos of each created

thing, including living beings, is a micro-reflection of the

divine Logos. For the Greek Patristic thinkers in general, the

creative role of Christ is that of the eternal Logos that

articulates all creatures into being. In this way each creature

is called by the Logos out of the abyss of non-being into the

reality of being (Kuraev 2001).

It is not surprising that the leading exponent of Patristic

mystical theology, Dionysius the Areopagite (also known as the

Pseudo-Dionysius), contributed to an explication of the role of

the Logos. In his cosmology the principles (logoi) of all things

live as patterns (paradeigmata) in the divine nature, from where

it proceeds into the intelligible and sensible worlds. As the

indwelling logoi in creation they are the means by which the

intelligible and sensible worlds return to their Creator, so

that the logoi may also be viewed as ascensions (epistrophai), the

Areopagite reasoned (Divine Names IV, 4; V, 8; VII, 3; Sheldon-

Williams 1967, 462-463). In this way Dionysius continues the

Neoplatonic notion of a procession (proodos) from the One to

the many and a return (epistrophē) of the many to the One.

The Greek Patristic concept of the logoi was extensively

developed by Maximus the Confessor, building on the earlier

contributions by the Cappadocian theologians, Dionysius the

Areopagite and Evagrius of Pontus (Nesteruk 2003, 251). In the

cosmology of Maximus, ‘Each created thing has its own logos, or

principle, which derives from God and makes each thing what it

is. Humans can contemplate the logoi in creation and thereby

attain knowledge of God. These created logoi participate in the

Divine Logos’ (Dembski et al 2008, 505). The Confessor taught

that the divine Logos holds together the eternal logoi of

created things. These logoi cannot be detected empirically or

mentally, but can be contemplated through the purified

intellect, or nous (Nesteruk 2003, 25-26). Continuing Origen’s

concept of multiple incarnations of the Logos, Maximus viewed

the Logos as the supreme divine mediator. A variety of

‘incarnations’ are ascribed to the Logos, ranging from the logoi

of the world, the spiritual meanings of the scriptures, the

virtuous life of believers, and supremely in Jesus Christ

(Blowers 2003, 21).

Based on this all-pervading presence of the Logos, Maximus

postulated the existence of three universal laws, namely the

natural law, the scriptural law, and the law of grace. In his

Letter to Thalassius these laws are summarised as follows: ‘In

short, then, the law of nature is the natural reason seizing

control of the senses in order to rid them of the irrationality

from which arises division among human beings who share the

same nature. The scriptural law is the natural reason, after it

has ridded the senses of irrationality, acquiring a spiritual

desire as well, a desire for mutual solidarity with others

sharing the same nature. The law of grace consists in a

supernatural reason, and transforms nature, without violating

it, unto deification. It also displays, beyond comprehension,

the supernatural and superessential Archetype in human nature,

as in an image, and exhibits the permanence of eternal well-

being’ (Ad Thalassium 64, in Blowers et al 2003, 169). Thus the

universal laws established by the Logos embrace the natural,

the spiritual, and the supernatural realms.

For Maximus, the reason (logos) of a created thing is the point

of contact between itself and the Godhead. Simultaneously, the

logos of a thing is also the end or purpose (telos) towards which

it aspires (Lossky 1991, 98). Or, stated in terms of

Aristotelian metaphysics, the logos of an organism or an object

is not only that which grants existence, but is also the final

cause of that which exists. Since the totality of the logoi is

contained in the divine Logos, Maximus reasoned in his Difficulties

(known in Latin as the Ambigua), the logoi are the principles

that pre-exist eternally in the divine Mind. An important

distinction is made by the Confessor, namely that the logoi do

not represent the divine nature, but they are in reality the

divine volitions. Viewed from different perspectives the logoi

are simultaneously one and many: they are one in actuality as

the Being of the trinity being, well-being, and eternal well-

being; and they are many in potentiality as the unfolding of

this trinity (Sheldon-Williams 1967, 497-498). In this way the

Greek theologian relates the Logos concept to the Aristotelian

teaching that God is pure actuality, whereas formless matter is

pure potentiality and therefore requires actualisation into

substance by means of the logoi.

Maximus taught further that the logoi are mysteriously hidden

under the surface of created being. An antinomy has been

pointed in this regard out by Alexei Nesteruk: the logoi are

both transcendent, being pre-existent in God, and immanent,

manifesting the divine presence in creation (Nesteruk 2003,

102). Furthermore, although the logoi are realised in the

existence of things, they are not part of the created order –

instead, they manifest the existential purpose (telos) of

things. The logoi are rooted in the divine Logos, as Maximus

asserted, but they are not dissolved in it and therefore retain

their individuality. To illustrate the relationship between the

Logos, the logoi, and the created order in the Patristic

understanding, the Neoplatonic analogy of the circle could

meaningfully be employed: its centre is the Logos, its radii

are the logoi, and its circumference is the created order, both

sensible and intelligible (Nesteruk 2003, 103).

The universal presence of the logoi also confirms the

providential care of God over the created order, Maximus

reasoned. With characteristic metaphysical acumen the Confessor

states the case for the logoi of providence as follows: ‘For the

permanence of what is, and its order and position and movement

and the consonance of the extremities with the middle, the

agreement of the parts with the wholes, and the union

throughout of the wholes with the parts, and the unblurred

distinction of the parts one from another in accordance with

the individuating difference of each, and the unconfused union

in accordance with the indistinguishable sameness in the

wholes, and the combination and distinction of everything with

everything else (not to limit myself to particulars), and the

eternally preserved succession of everything and each one

according to form, so that the logos of each nature is not

corrupted by confusion or blurring – all this shows clearly

that everything is held together by the providence of the

Creator God’ (Difficulty 10, in Dembski et al 2008, 512-513).

Moreover, by relating the logoi to the divine energies and not

the divine essence, Maximus preserves the fundamental Greek

Patristic distinction between the transcendent essence of God

and the immanent energies of God. In this understanding, God’s

creative activity in the world manifests through the divine

energies and are described through words (another meaning of

logoi). These energeiai, or alternatively logoi, form and sustain

all visible and invisible things in the world. In this way a

similarity exists between the Confessor’s notion of the logoi

and the concept of divine energeiai as expounded by Gregory of

Nyssa, Dionysius the Areopagite and Gregory Palamas (Nesteruk

2003, 101-102).

The grand synthesis: Eriugena

In his magisterial ninth-century synthesis of Greek and Latin

Patristic theology with Neoplatonic philosophy, as presented in

the Periphyseon (subtitled On the Division of Nature), John Scottus

Eriugena ascribed a pivotal cosmic role to the divine Logos,

which is identified with Jesus Christ. In his cosmology the

Irish-Carolingian scholar depicted all of the created order,

both intelligible and sensible, as partaking of a double

movement. This represents a Christian version of the

Neoplatonic scheme of a procession (Latin exitus) of all things

out of God and a return (reditus) of all things to God. These

movements should not be viewed as separate processes, Eriugena

asserted, since they are linked by the human reason that

ponders them. Moreover, the Logos is the link between the

cosmic ebb and flow of procession and return (Periphyseon Book

II 526, Book III 642; Carabine 2000, 29, 53). A close link

between the ontological and the rational is thus affirmed, in

continuation of both the Hellenic and Patristic traditions.

Eriugena postulates that God creates the world of sensible

phenomena through the primordial causes (Latin causae

primordiales), which are infinite in number and not finite like

the Platonic Forms (Moran 1989, 263-264). It is argued in Book

III of the Periphyseon that since the Logos is eternal, the

primordial causes are eternal in their nature. Also, as the

Logos is infinite, so the primordial causes reach into infinity

in their effects. In Book IV of the same work Eriugena contends

that just as the primordial causes are one in the Logos, so

their effects are one in the human reason (Sheldon-Williams

1967, 527-528). Employing the terminology of Dionysius the

Areopagite, the Irish scholar identified the primordial causes

with the Greek Patristic prototypes (prōtotupa), predestinations

(proorismata), divine volitions (thea thelēmata), and the

principles (logoi) of all things. All visible and invisible

things exist through participation in the logoi, Eriugena

continues, while the latter participate in the one Cause of the

divine Trinity (Periphyseon Book II, 15, 205). The Platonic

doctrine of participation is discernible in this reasoning,

although Eriugena deviates therefrom by extending participation

to the intelligible world in addition to the sensible world.

In view of the foregoing, the whole of reality could be viewed

as a theophany, or God-appearance. Eriugena approvingly

mentions Maximus the Confessor’s dictum that a theophany

entails a descent of the Logos onto human nature through divine

grace, and a simultaneous ascent of human nature to the Logos

through love. Through this double movement in which divine and

human love meet, theophany arises (Periphyseon Book I, 449). In

this way the Irish thinker grounded the human experience of the

cosmos in the reciprocal action between divine and human love,

mediated by the Logos.

However, Eriugena differed from the Greek Patristic consensus

by postulating the primordial causes as created (representing

his second division of reality, after God as Creator), whereas

the divine energies are conceived as uncreated. This divergence

has been explained by Vladimir Lossky as due to an attempt by

the Irish scholar to maintain the substantial character of the

divine Ideas (i.e. the primordial causes), so that they become

the first created essences instead of the uncreated energies

(Lossky 1991, 96). Nonetheless, although the primordial causes

are said to be eternally present in the divine Word (or Logos),

Eriugena do not view them as co-essential with God the Father,

who precedes all things made in the Word (Carabine 2000, 54).

It appears that with his notion of primordial causes through

which God creates the sensible world, Eriugena fused the

Hellenic Ideas and logoi with the Patristic divine energies or

volitions. Accordingly, these creative causes are viewed as

both eternal, being contained in the Logos, and temporal when

they are mixed with matter to constitute the physical cosmos

(Periphyseon Book III, 636).

As could be expected from such a profound thinker, the Logos

concept was also applied by Eriugena to his anthropology. He

reasoned that human nature consists of two trinities,

reflecting the divine Trinity. Thus essence and intellect

indicate the highest part of human nature, power and reason

(logos) indicate the middle part, and operation and perception

indicate the lowest part (Periphyseon Book II, 568). A

teleological implication of Eriugena’s anthropology is that the

human reason (logos) is enabled to perceive the intelligibility

in the natural world (for example, as beauty and design) on

account of the presence of the divine Word (Logos), through

whose logoi the world comes into being.

Conclusion

In the final analysis, the Greek Patristic concept of the logoi

indwelling the created order is broadly similar to the notion

of seminal reasons as developed by Augustine. However, the

Augustinian concept differs from the Patristic stance in that

the latter conceive of the logoi as uncreated, since they

originate in the Logos. Yet both seminal reasons and logoi can

be perceived due to the intelligibility of the created world

(Nesteruk 2003, 36, 251). We contend that the same argument

applies to the primordial causes of Eriugena, since they are

the creative means by which the Logos grants both being and

intelligibility to the created order.

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