The Brunei Revolt

Haajima Degia

1

The Brunei Revolt

Introduction

Brunei has long been a backwater in the political history of

Southeast Asia and is arguably the least studied country in that

region. Nevertheless, a major factor which has underpinned much

of the trajectory of Brunei’s political history is its

geographical position. Indeed, historically, its location close

to the Limbang River and the South China Sea allowed it to assume

geo-political significance as a trading entrepot for the Chinese,

Arabs and then the Europeans. Each of these territories have, in

turn influenced Brunei’s society and politics in complex ways,

and thus, the political economy and social structure of

contemporary Brunei has been shaped by myriad legacies, not least

among them, Islam, British colonialism and the ideology of

nationalism.

Furthermore, the geopolitical significance of tiny Brunei

was heightened during the Cold War as the dynamics of regional

2

The Brunei Revolt and international politics directly influenced the national

politics of the Sultanate. While the Brunei revolt in itself was

a miniscule rebellion, it was significant mainly because it

embodied the incipient tensions between Indonesia and Malaysia,,

and ultimately led to the former’s call to ‘Ganyang

Malaysia’(crush Malaysia). Indeed, the trajectory of political

events which unfolded from 1959-1966 in Brunei, and by extension,

Southeast Asia were stirring and were punctuated with astonishing

dips and turns.

It is thus the purpose of this paper to trace the trajectory

of events which led to the Brunei rebellion, and furthermore, to

discuss the various nuances underpinning the rebellion,

especially in light of the fact that: “the causes of the revolt

had little relationship to the outcome.” (Mackie, 1974, p119).

Additionally, an oblique but related analysis surrounds the

questions of Bruneian identity, political survival and viability.

Indeed, these issues dominated the thinking and actions of the

various actors embroiled in the turmoil which culminated in the

Brunei revolt. It might be fair to state therefore, that the

3

The Brunei Revolt impetus for the revolt may have come from endogenous factors, but

it was the international relations of the region which determined

the far-reaching consequences of an ill-defined, hastily quelled

rebellion.

4

The Brunei Revolt

Country Profile

Brunei is a new nation, but an old state which attained full

independence in 1984.  The reigning monarch, His Majesty Sultan

Haji Hassanal Bolkiah, is the 29th ruler in an unbroken line of

succession established in the mid-14th century.  A vast kingdom

in the 16th century, the Sultanate’s hegemony extended over large

parts of coastal Borneo, and extended to the Sulu islands and the

Southern Philippines.  However, by the 18th and 19th centuries,

due to internal squabbles and external threats exacerbated by the

arrival of Europeans in the region, the Brunei Empire declined

and in 1841, Sarawak was ceded to James Brooke, a British

adventurer, and in 1888, Brunei became a British Protectorate.

Brunei is located on the North-west coast of the island of

Borneo, and covers a land area of 5, 7675 square kilometers. (See

Figure 1) However, its land boundaries are somewhat unusual. The

country consists of two separate tracts embedded within the East

Malaysian state of Sarawak. (See figure 2)The two sections of

Brunei are separated from each other by a narrow portion of5

The Brunei Revolt Malaysian territory approximately 20 miles wide. This area of

land, known as the Limbang district, was formerly part of Brunei,

and its loss to Sarawak was never officially acknowledged.

Figure 1

Figure 2

Background to the Revolt

Political consciousness and nationalism.

The Brunei Revolt of 8 December 1962 can be located within

the nationalist anti-colonialist ethos which was sweeping

Southeast Asia at that time. No overt nationalist sentiment was

witnessed in Brunei before 1953. However, after the defeat of the

Japanese in 1945, British administrative experiments to more

efficiently manage the colonies of Sarawak, Malaya and Brunei

6

The Brunei Revolt inadvertently led to an increasing nationalist awareness in these

colonies. This became apparent after Britain’s attempts at

creating efficiency in the management of her colonies deflated

Brunei’s status compared with that of its neighbors under British

dominations. (Singh, 1984, p129).

In this regard therefore, in 1948, the post of Governor-

General of Malaya was abolished and the post of “commissioner-

general for the United Kingdom in southeast Asia” was created.

(Singh, 1984). As a consequence, an agreement was signed with

the government of Brunei on 1 May 1948 by which the sultanate

agreed to accept Sarawak officers to advice in the running of the

administration in Brunei. However, Bruneians regarded this change

as a threat to their Protected State status and also feared that

they would be under Sarawak domination, especially since Sarawak

had, for some time been viewed with considerable distrust by the

Brunei Government.

In addition, it is clear that grievances stemming from the

social structure and political authoritarianism within Brunei

fueled a growing political awareness. Between 1906 and 1959, the

7

The Brunei Revolt Sultan exercised absolute power although he was bound by The

Supplementary Protection Agreement of 1906, which placed Brunei

under the Residential System. In theory the agreement stipulated

the duties of the British Resident merely as Adviser to the

Sultan in all matters excepting religion. However, in practice,

the administration of the State was conducted by the British

Resident, and the Sultan had a high position in the whole

hierarchy.

Moreover, Arnold Brackman in South-East Asia’s Second Front

states that the list of grievances for the people of Brunei was

long, and thus vitiated any continued political passivity. These

complaints included the economic disparity between the pengirans

and the people, the issue of oil-exploitation and the unfair

distribution of oil wealth, and the nascent desire to return to

Brunei’s past glories. (1966, p 136) It is clear therefore, that

the political, economic and social reality of Brunei manifested

all the symptoms of colonial unrest, and that the foundation for

an incipient nationalist sentiment was already laid by the 1950s.

The Partai Ra’ ayat Brunei

8

The Brunei Revolt

A manifestation of the nationalist trend was the formation

in 1956, of the Partai Ra’ayat Brunei (PRB) which was the first

political party to be formed in Brunei, and was led by Shaikh

Ahmad Azhari. Azhari had been involved in the Indonesian

independence struggle against the Dutch and had contributed to

the Indonesian struggle by setting up an intelligence network in

Purawakarta to monitor Dutch activities. (Hussainmiya, 1995).

Azhari became an admirer of Indonesia’s Sukarno, especially his

ideology and symbolism under Guided democracy, and it is no

surprise therefore, that the PRB’s basic aims were “to oppose all

forms of colonialism, in the political, economic and social

sphere.”

In addition, the PRB sought independence and the reunion of

Kalimantan Utara (northern Borneo) under the Brunei Sultan.

According to A.V.M Horton, the nationalists hoped for a return to

the “Golden Age” in the 16th century, before the incursions of

the Spanish and English colonialists; and pride was taken in the

way the Spanish had been resisted in 1578 and 1580. (Horton,

1984, p. 52).

9

The Brunei Revolt

The afore-mentioned point raises an issue, albeit covert,

but which still has implications for the general thrust of the

analyses of this paper. Although a cursory reading of Brunei’s

history leads one to believe that there was an ideological schism

between the Sultan and the PRB, an in-depth analysis of the

nuances circumscribing political history of Brunei shows that a

pronouncement of a dichotomous relationship between the two

would be too simplistic an analysis.

Indeed, various accounts seem to think that Azhari still

professed loyalty to the Sultan; (Mackie, 1974) and further, that

azhari acknowledged the importance of the Brunei monarchy as the

symbol of Malay unity. ( Hussainmiya, 1995). Perhaps, as his

mentor Sukarno dreamed of an ‘Indonesia Raya,’ (greater

Indonesia), so too did azhari venerate the past glories of the

Brunei sultanate, and therefore yearned for a return to the

‘golden empires.’ Through azhari’s romanticized lens, the Brunei

sultan would be the ceremonial head of state of Kalimantan Utara,

while he, Azhari would be the Prime Minister. It is for that

reason that Mackie (1974) argues that the Brunei revolt was not

directed against the sultan and his autocratic power, for:10

The Brunei Revolt “azhari believed that the sultan would support him; it was directed against Malaysia

and against British dominance, in favor of a unified North Borneo..” (p116)

Within one year, the PRB had succeeded in winning over

16,000 members, a remarkable statistic for a country then with a

population of less than 80,000. Beyond strong support in Kampong

Ayer, (where the largest concentration of the indigenous Malay

population was centered) and among Kedayan farmers, however, the

Party had little appeal among non-Muslim indigenous people and

Chinese. It is clear however, that improved education and growing

awareness of the political occurrences in Indonesia and Malaysia

heightened political responsiveness of the Brunei people, and

contributed to the large following of the PRB. (Horton,19)

Contesting ideologies

Self-government and Constitutional Change

As decolonization became the catchphrase of the

international scene during the 1950s, so too did calls for

independence in Brunei, no doubt fuelled by the activities of

11

The Brunei Revolt the PRB and the achievement of independence by the Federation of

Malaya in August 1957. Additionally, an

increase in independent states in the immediate geopolitical

sphere of Brunei produced a feeling among both the PRB and groups

loyal to Sultan Omar that Brunei’s position as a Protected State

did not fit with the political ethos of Southeast Asia of the

1950s.

However, two rival power groups came into collision over the

questions of self-government, democracy and the possible merger

of Brunei with either the Borneo states, or eventually Malaysia.

One the one side stood the “monarchist-aristocratic” group led by

Sultan Omar and the pengirans, and on the other hand stood the

‘nationalist’ group led by Azhari. Sultan Omar stood for

“paternalistic enlightened despotism” while the PRB stood for

rapid democratization. (Singh, 1984). The two sides disagreed not

with the ends of aggrandized power, but rather with the means. Of

course, neither wanted to see Brunei further diminished either at

the hands of the British or the Malays, but their political

12

The Brunei Revolt wrangling centered over how to attain the ends, and further, in

whose hands should power be concentrated.

Given that the political climate of this time period did not

lend itself to the perpetuation of colonial ties, the Sultan was

actually embarrassed by PRB demands for Merdeka (independence)

and commented that “Brunei is not a British colony.” (Gunn, 1997)

It might be fair to argue therefore, that the Sultan’s

embarrassment, coupled with an appeasement policy, hastened the

introduction of constitutional changes in Brunei. Speaking about

the proposed constitution in a New Year Speech over Radio Brunei,

the Sultan stated that constitutional development represented:

“big changes which were in line with the wishes of the people and

were in accordance with the times.” (The Borneo Bulletin, 1959;

quoted in Singh, 1984)

However, it is clear that the Sultan’s attempts at

democracy, although they represented an admirable shift, were in

no way revolutionary and took a Hobbeisan view of political

representation. It would appear as if he attested to Hobbes’

views that the common people needed the great power of the13

The Brunei Revolt Leviathan to provide direction and leadership. Hobbes believed in

the rule of a king because he felt a country needed an authority

figure to provide direction and leadership. Because the people

were only interested in promoting their own self-interests,

Hobbes believed democracy – allowing citizens to vote for

government leaders – would never work. Hobbes wrote, “All mankind [is

in] a perpetual and restless desire for power… that [stops] only in death.”

Consequently, giving power to the individual would create a

dangerous situation that would start a “war of every man against every

man” and make life “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” In this regard,

for the Sultanate, "voice of the people," meant that

nationalism had to come from the Pengirans (royalty), who, by

virtue of their elevated status, could express the wishes of the

people.

The Sultan and the British sought a gradual approach to

representative government and in 1956 the state Council passed

the Local Council Enactment with the aim of decentralizing power

to local districts. Thus, in 1959, a new constitution was

written, declaring Brunei a self-governing state and provisions

were made for a partially elected Legislative council. However,14

The Brunei Revolt matters to do with Brunei’s foreign affairs, security, and

defense remained the responsibility of the United Kingdom, now

represented by a High Commissioner.

It is clear therefore, that the British had granted internal

self-government to the sultan, not to the people. There was no

elective majority on the Legislative Council, and no direct

election to the Council. As a result, while Sultan Omar promoted

the Constitution as a move towards Parliamentary democracy, the

PRB denounced the arrangement as a ‘colonial set-up’ and declared

that the only achievement that had occurred was a shift to ‘self-

administration’, not ‘self-determination.’ Azhari, mirroring the

ideological rhetoric of Indonesia’s Sukarno, maintained that the

gradualist approach was a colonial imperialist ploy by the

British to procure the resources of Brunei, especially from the

oilfields at Seria.

Accordingly, after the promulgation of the Constitution,

Azhari gave new attention to the creation of an independent

Kalimantan Utara (North Borneo Federation ), comprising Brunei

Sabah and Sarawak. He saw this federation as a step towards

15

The Brunei Revolt independence and commented that federation was: “only a small

issue in politics…every nation… is striving for independence.”

(North Borneo news, 1960; quoted in Singh, 1984)

It must be noted however, that there were some inherent

incongruities to this proposal. Azhari’s concept of a North

Borneo Federation saw Brunei playing a leading role. Ironically

therefore, in this expression of Brunei nationalism, Azhari had

more in common with the Sultan, (i.e, in relation to the quest to

revive the Brunei empire of old) since his objective was to see

Brunei play a leading role in a federation, with the Sultan as

monarch. For azhari, however, it would have been an arrangement

whereby constitutional government would have lessened the

authority of the Sultan while allowing him, Azhari, a leading

role as head of the federation. (Saunders, 2002).

For the Sultan however, it was inconceivable that he would

allow his monarchy and his status in it to be subsumed by some

larger political arrangement. It is for that same reason that the

Sultan had rejected the British machinations for a Bornean

federation in 1953. In addition, his disinclination to the Borneo

16

The Brunei Revolt idea stemmed in part from the feeling that a closer union with

Sarawak and North Borneo would increase Chinese influence, while

the Malays within such a federation would be outnumbered by the

combined Chinese and non-Malay indigenous people. (Saunders,

2002).

The Proposal for a Malaysian Federation

It was in this political ethos that the Malayan Prime

Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman, during an address to the Foreign

Correspondents Association of South-East Asia in Singapore on 27

May 1961, presented one of the most contentious statements of his

career, the idea of the formation of Malaysia.

Noordin Sopiee (1974) proposes a ‘security theory’ to

explain the reasoning behind the Tunku’s effort. He states that

the Tunku’s main consideration was the danger of Singapore

turning Communist. Indeed, disturbances in Singapore could also

threaten the security of Malaysia where the state of emergency

declared at the outbreak of the communist insurgency of 1948 was

not officially lifted until 1962. There was also the fear that

17

The Brunei Revolt the communist insurgency in Singapore would be an incentive to

the PRB to make Brunei communist.

Furthermore, for Malaya, a federation with Brunei would

augur well, since issues of race, religion, language and custom,

posed no vitiating factors to a closer union. Indeed, Brunei had

the highest percentage of Malays of any component state in the

proposed federation, Malay was the official language of Brunei

and moreover, the people of both Brunei and Malaysia were

accustomed to Sultans as heads of states. (Brackman, 1966).

British Machinations

In addition, the Tunku’s proposal meshed well with British

preoccupations. For one, it would solve Britain’s colonial

burdens, but most importantly, it would stem the communist threat

involving Singapore. Communist political forces were regarded as

a threat to the political stability of the island, and hence a

threat to British military bases and commercials interests there.

However, hesitancy on the part of the British stemmed from

the economic factor since they had interests in Brunei’s

18

The Brunei Revolt oilfields at Seria, and would not have wanted Malaysia to have

access to Brunei’s resources. Notwithstanding the above however,

a federation comprising British Borneo, Singapore, Brunei and

Malaya appealed to both British and Malaya pragmatism.

Reactions to the Proposal

It is important to note, however, that the Sultan’s first

reaction was rather subdued. No doubt, if Brunei was incorporated

into a greater Malaysia, then the sultan’s power would be

considerably lessened. He thus stated that it was up to the

British government to make the first move in relation to Brunei’s

position in Malaysia. (Hussanmiya). Furthermore, evincing his

nonchalance about the Malaysian proposal, the Sultan, in his

address to the Legislative Council, ‘accepted Malaysia in

principle,’ but give no final verdict on his decision.

(Mackie,1974).

However, the question of Brunei’s viability on the world

scene as an independent nation became the Tunku’s bargaining tool

and he maintained that Brunei’s independence could come only

19

The Brunei Revolt after the formation of a confederation, since, the ‘place Brunei

itself is something like Perlis or smaller than that.”

The Tunku paid a visit to Brunei in July 1961 on a 4 day

visit, ostensibly to woo the Sultan to his proposal. However, he

showed an ignorance of Borneo and a lack of sensitivity to Borneo

feelings. He assumed that Brunei would want to become part of

Malaysia because of its inability to survive as an independent

nation. Moreover, his insensitive statements that: “the sultan of

Brunei is a very enlightened ruler and one who feels that Brunei is identified with other

states of the Federation,” and further, his prognosis that: “if the Brunei

government were asked if they wanted to join they would say, yes;” fuelled the

conflagration between the Sultan, the PRB, and the people of

Brunei.

In Brunei, the feelings of antagonism and mutual resentment

flared, especially among the members of the lower echelons of

Brunei society. The Tunku’s statements aggravated an already

volatile situation arising from Bruneians’ antipathy to the

presence of so many Malayan officers in the Brunei civil service.

These Malayan officers had been selected by the sultan to replace

20

The Brunei Revolt several key British personnel after the relinquishing of power to

the Sultan in 1959, and were viewed as occupying positions that

they themselves aspired to.

Meanwhile, Sultan Omar was under tremendous pressure by

Malaysia and Britain to act decisively on the Malaya issue, not

merely to accept it ‘in principle’ as he had earlier stated, but

to accept in practice. Furthermore, after the release of the

Cobbold Commission Report on 1 August 1962, Brunei’s inability to

survive as a result of small size became the new impetus by which

Malaysia pressed for Brunei’s acceptance of the proposal. The

Cobbold Commission was assigned to ascertain the wishes of the

people of Sarawak and Saba vis-à-vis the Malaysian Federation.

The release of the report divulged that the people wished to be

part of the Malaysian Federation.

Following the release of the Cobbold report, an Inter

governmental committee(IGC) was formed that included

representatives from Sarawak, Britain, North Borneo, and

Singapore. Hence, on September 26, 1962, the North Borneo and

Sarawak legislative councils unanimously approved a motion to

21

The Brunei Revolt establish Malaysia by 31 August1963. Brunei followed suit by

sending an official delegation to seriously negotiate terms with

the Malayan government, although the sultan had still not

committed up to November.

One reason for the Sultan’s procrastination could have

been that did not want his absolute power subsumed under a

federation, especially since the Tunku demanded that the only

arrangements for a merger that could be made with Brunei, would

be a Federation. However, the sultan seemed to have the idea that

he would be the Yang di-Pertuan Agong (titular head of state) of

Malaysia. (Mackie,1974)

In this light therefore, the Sultan’s attempts to have

Limbang restored to Brunei appears as a desperate measure to

retain his power and to extend Brunei’s sphere of influence

beyond the geographical boundaries of Brunei. The claim to

Limbang brought to the fore one of the long-standing demands of

the Bruneian people since Charles Brooke, one of the ‘white

rajas,’ had unjustly annexed the territory in 1890. Had the

sultan been successful in reclaiming Limbang, his popularity

22

The Brunei Revolt would have been greatly enhanced at a time when the PRB was

splitting the people of Brunei . However, legal loopholes

vitiated Brunei’s claims, and J Holloway, under the auspices of

the British Office stated on 11 January 1961, that: “there is no

question, I would think, of handing Limbang back to Brunei, and if the issue is raised

we can only fall back on the arguments put forward in 1890, with the added argument

that Limbang has been part of Sarawak for over 70 years. Initially, however, the reply

might be that the matters were thoroughly investigated in 1891 and that H.M.G. is

unable to re-open the matter now.”

Therefore, it appeared as if the sultan had no choice but to

let Brunei become part of the Federation of Malaysia. However,

the PRB vehemently opposed the entry of Brunei into Malaysia,

and advocated, instead, the establishment of Kalimantan Utara,

and the granting of merdeka (independence). Indeed, Azhari felt

that the realization of nationalism was being frustrated by the

gradualist approach of the British and the sultanate. The

intensity of Azhari’s opposition to the Malaysia idea obviously

stemmed from his romantic ambitions of the revival of the Brunei

empire. Hence, his dreams of Kalimantan Utara would atrophy in

the face of a Malaysian federation, especially since, as Noordin23

The Brunei Revolt Sopiee (1974) states: the concepts of a Greater Brunei and of

Malaysia were irreconcilable.”

The Revolt

Karl Marx once made the point that events may be developing

so slowly as to be almost imperceptible over time and then the

essence of these developments may suddenly become apparent over a

short period of time. Writing to his friend Engels, he said: “In

such great developments, twenty years are but as one day and the

essence of twenty years.” (Lenin, 1936)

Certainly, Marx’s statement aptly captures the political

developments which took place in Brunei from 1959-1963.

Indeed, a number of events collided and produced

irreconcilable tensions in Brunei. One of the issues (besides the

aforementioned) which circumscribed the PRB’s decision to resort

to force was the perceived exclusionary policies of the

Sultanate. Azhari accused the Sultan of proposing racist and

exclusionary policies, especially after the National Enactment of

1960. The objective of the National Enactment was to gauge an

24

The Brunei Revolt accurate register of voters, and one of the major proposals of

the enactment was that all those born in the state, and who were

also members of the indigenous recognized races were deemed

subjects of the Sultan. However, all others were considered as

non-citizens.

This proposal rankled the PRB’s members who felt that the

local Dayaks should have been included in the list of indigenous

races. Azhari attacked the requirement of 20 years permanent stay

for citizens for citizenship eligibility, arguing that the

requirement would make many Indonesians and Chinese stateless. In

this regard, the PRB accused the Tunku of being racist in trying

to unite the Malays of the 3 Borneos and labeled him as a tool of

the colonialists.

A number of events propelled the PRB to take up arms against

what it considered the colonial tactics of the Sultanate.

Foremost among these was the non-recognition of the Brunei-Malaya

Commission by the Sultan. In January 1962, Azhari had been

appointed to a special Brunei-Malaya Commission in order to

ascertain the views of the Brunei people with regards to the

25

The Brunei Revolt Malaysia federation. The hearings of the Brunei-Malaya Commission

disclosed strong opposition to Malaysia in Brunei, and support

for a Borneo Federation. However, the results were not made

public, and the Brunei government instead sent observers to the

Malaysia Solidarity Consultative Committee talks in Singapore in

February 1962, thus giving the impression that the people

accepted Malaysia in principle

Moreover, the issue of the Malaysia Federation became a

hotly contested issue in the election which was held on 30

August, 1962. There were direct elections to fifty-five district

council seats, after which sixteen representatives would be

chosen by and from the district councils to sit in the

Legislative Council The PRB went into the election on a program

which included independence for Brunei, the rejection of Malaysia

the formation of Kalimantan Utara. The PRB won a landslide

victory, capturing twenty-two of twenty-three seats. However the

Sultan postponed the first meeting of the new Legislative

Council, while Brunei officials went to Kuala Lumpur to hold a

final round of talks with the Malayan government.

26

The Brunei Revolt

More fuel was added to the fire when the Legislative Council

met on December 5 1962, and the PRB submitted three motions to

the Brunei government to be tabled. The motions demanded that the

British government return Sarawak and Borneo to the sovereignty

of the sultanate of Brunei, and further, that the British

government keep Brunei out of Malaysia and grant it independence.

However the Speaker disallowed these motions, and moreover, the

Legislative Council sessions were postponed on two occasions.

This political turmoil coincided with the Malaysia proposal

and as Brackman (1966) states, the opposition to Malaysia

developed so rapidly in Brunei, that the choice became merdeka or

susah (trouble.) The military wing of the PRB, Tentera Nasional

Kalimantan Utara (TNKU), was catapulted into resorting to force,

especially since the postponements of the Legislative Council

sessions were interpreted by the PRB as rejections of its

motions.

The rebellion broke out on the morning of December 8 1962.

It was well planned and quickly spread to the whole of Brunei and

to the districts of Limbang and Lawas of Sarawak. The fighting

27

The Brunei Revolt was mainly done by the underground military arm of the PRB. The

rebels began co-ordinated attacks on the oil town of Seria,

targeting the Shell oil installations and attacks on police

stations and government facilities around the protectorate.

The revolt was not directed at the sultan but against

Malaysia and British dominance. In fact, according to Mackie, :

“loyalty to the sultan remained a deeply ingrained instinct of

the Brunei ra’ayat.” (p121) Strangely enough, Azhari had the idea

that the sultan would be the monarch of Kalimantan Utara, and

thus, speaking from Manila, he declared himself as Prime Minister

of the Unitary State of North Borneo which had been unified under

the Sultan. He falsely stated that the sultan had himself raised

the flag of the new republic.

Perhaps the American political analyst Gayl.D. Ness was

justified in dubbing the rebellion a ‘teapot rebellion’(1962),

for it was crushed within a week as the Sultan invoked the 1959

British-Brunei treaty and received immediate British military

aid. The town of Seria was under rebel control when two Gurkha

Rifle companies began to clear the area of rebels. Soon

28

The Brunei Revolt afterwards the Queen's Own Highlanders landed at Anduki Airfield

and met up with 1/2 Gurkha Rifles. The ill-equipped, ill-led

rebels( Azhari was in Manila and the rebellion was led by Yassin

Affandi) were no match for the British troops.

The Outcome

Consolidation of Sultan’s power

The Brunei revolt fueled wider conflicts in the geopolitical

sphere of Brunei and embroiled Britain in Indonesia’s Konfrontasi

against Malaysia. Within Brunei however, the revolt served to

arrest any prospect of further change towards parliamentary

democracy. (Leifer, 1978.) Moreover, after the uprising, the

constitution was suspended, effectively leading to the

consolidation of the Sultan’s power.

Nevertheless, political activity revived for a time and two

smaller parties merged to form the Brunei Alliance Party in

January 1963, and in December 1963, the sultan declared

elections. The composition of the Legislative Council did mark a

slight forward. There were to be direct elections to ten seats in

29

The Brunei Revolt the twenty-one member Legislative Council; there would be six ex

officio members and five would be nominated by the Sultan.

Interestingly enough however, sultan Omar Ali abdicated on 4

October 1967 in favor of his eldest son, Hassanal Bolkiah. It was

a well timed political strategy and allowed the sultan to abort

constitutional change while retaining the absolute power of the

sultanate. Rather than break his word for constitutional change ,

Omar Ali bestow leadership on his son; the latter had not made

any promise to the people about constitutional change, so a

disaster had been averted, and “a constitutional and diplomatic

crisis had been neatly circumvented.” ( Saunders, 2002)

Rejection of Malaysia

After the rebellion, the sultan vacillated between showing

outright support for the Malaya federation, and rejecting it.

When negotiations began in Kuala Lumpur in February , the talks

dragged on for a month. Serious differences developed between the

two governments, and on 15 June, Brunei announced that it would

wait for a more opportune time to join Malaysia unless Malaya

considered offering better terms. (The Brunei delegation had set30

The Brunei Revolt down the condition that in joining Malaysia, Brunei had to be

allowed to retain its very substantial accumulation of

investments and rich oil reserves.) Furthermore, the Sultan

wanted assurances that the special position of the Sultanate of

Brunei would not be compromised. (Malayan Times, 17 June 1963,

quoted in Hussanmiya)

In spite of the belief that the sultan would become a

signatory to the Malaysia Federation the scheduled 8 July meeting

in London, the Sultan stayed away at the eleventh hour in a

spectacular show of defiance. The same factor that had rendered

the Borneo federation proposal in the late 1950s unworkable also

undermined the Malaysia proposal. That factor stemmed from the

sultan’s refusal to be party to surrendering any of Brunei’s

interests, including his own dynasty. As Ranjit Singh notes: “

bearing in mind the proud historical heritage of having preserved

the identity of their kingdom for centuries, the Brunei

authorities did not feel inclined to reduce the status of their

country to a mere state in the large Federation of Malaysia…All

in all Brunei would be the loser by joining the Federation of

Malaysia. “(p197)31

The Brunei Revolt Konfrontasi

Indonesia interpreted the Brunei revolt as a neo-colonialist

plot by which British forces would maintain its presence in

south-east Asia. One has to remember that after 1960, Sukarno’s

foreign policy became increasingly militant in his alignment with

the Afro-Asia world and Communist China. Indeed, there was a

definite shift from a non-alignment ideology to a two-camp

doctrine of inexorable conflict between ‘new’ and ‘old’ forces.

By 1963, New Emerging Force became a key guideline circumscribing

Indonesia’s foreign policy. Indeed, “ the prominence of ideology

in the Sukarno regime is directly relevant to the Malaysia story

because Confrontation came to be most complete manifestation fo

the doctrine of the New Emerging Forces and continuing revolution

against the neo-colonialist enemy.” (Mackie, p88)

To this end therefore, the Brunei revolt assumed an

ideological importance, strengthening Sukarno’s theory of the

struggle against neo-colonialism by the New Emerging Forces.

Moreover, it corroborated Indonesia’s image of the Tunku as a

mere political lackey of the British. The Indonesians

32

The Brunei Revolt characterized the revolt as: “a natural and spontaneous

manifestation by the subject peoples of the three British

dependencies to break away form the colonial chains which had

held them in bondage for decades.”

British troops were soon involved in combating a rising in

Sarawak by the largely Chinese Communist Organization (CCO)

supported by incursions from Indonesian forces. Thus, Indonesia

used the Brunei revolt and the CCO uprising as evidence to

support its contention that Malaysia was a neo-colonialist plot

by which Britain would maintain its presence in Southeast Asia.

In addition, Sukarno was able to use the press to venerate

the Brunei revolt and Malaysia was presented in a considerably

unfavorable light. After a war of words, Indonesia declared on

January 20 1963 that “we cannot but adopt a policy of

confrontation against Malaysia because at present they represent

themselves as accomplices of the neo-colonialists and neo-

imperialists pursuing a hostile policy towards Indonesia.”

Sukarno announced a campaign to confront the British over

the forced inclusion of the North Borneo States into the new33

The Brunei Revolt union of Malaysia, calling the campaign by the Dutch term

“Konfrantisi,” and making a clarion call to ‘ganyang malaysia’

(crush Malaysia.) Furthermore, in 1963, Sukarno announced his

opposition to the federation of Malaysia and withdrew Indonesia

form the United Nations in 1965 after Malaysia took its seat on

the Security Council.

Konfrontasi imbibed Sukarno’s dream of a ‘greater Indonesia’

in which the North Borneo territories, Singapore and Malaya would

all be united under the standard of ‘Indonesia raya’(greater

Indonesia). Furthermore, there were also fears on the part of

Indonesia’s Sukarno that a federation of Malaysia would

undermine the unity of his NASAKOM ideology. Given

Malaysia’s anti-communist stance and its support for Sumatran

regionalists, Sukarno felt that an economically triumphant

Malaysia could become an ally for separatists. (Weatherbee, 2004.

p 67)

The Konfrontasi was to last, with ebbs and flows, for the

next three years. An attempted communist coup late in 1965 led to

34

The Brunei Revolt military takeover in Indonesia by General Suharto, leading

eventually to the demise of the PKI.

The Philippine claim to Sabah

The Brunei revolt also affected incipient tensions between

the Philippines and Malaysia. President Diosdado Macapagal of

Philippines officially laid claim to Sabah in 1962 after the

Sultan of Sulu gave the government the authority to pursue the

claim. The Indonesian government encouraged the Philippine

government in its prosecution of the Sabah claim and therefore,

there was a unity of opposition to the Malaysian federation idea.

Conclusion

The Brunei revolt was not a revolt in the strictest sense of

the term, mainly because it did not create any lasting

revolutionary changes in the internal political economy of

Brunei, and it was only in 1984 that Brunei gained full self-

35

The Brunei Revolt government. In spite of its not creating any drastic political

changes within Brunei itself, the ill-defined rebellion was

certainly a catalyst for wider developments in Southeast Asia,

and was the rallying point for Sukarno’s celebration of the

struggle between the colonialists and the New Emerging Forces.

Moreover, the failure to entice Brunei into the Malaysia

Federation was a blow to both British and Malaysian scheming,

indeed, the Malaysia that was created did not match the one

proposed by Tunku Abdul Rahman in 1961. Also, Malaysia had to

contend with the loss of Brunei’s resources.

Interestingly enough, the scheming worked against Britain

and Malaysia. In urging the sultan to participate in the

federation, the British has assured their continuing support in

the form of British protection for the sultan and his throne and

for Brunei in general. However, the sultan succeeded in

accomplishing what he wanted since the Malaysia proposal had been

articulated. His words corroborated his thinking in this regard:

“If Malaya does not accept Brunei into Malaysia through no fault

of Brunei, I believe and greatly hope the British government will

36

The Brunei Revolt continue to honor the existing agreement for the defense of

Brunei.”

Thus, for the next two decades, Brunei remained a British

Protectorate, effectively dealing with its fears of a lack of

viability because of its small size. In the final analysis: “it

was the sultan of Brunei who had emerged a clear winner over all

of his opponents and even against invincible British diplomacy.”

(Hussainmiya)

37

The Brunei Revolt

References

Brackman, A. C. (1966) South-east Asia’s second front: The powerstruggle in the Malay archipelago. New York: Frederick A. Praeger.

Burns, E. (1936) The teachings of Karl Marx: A handbook ofMarxism.

Gunn, Geoffrey. C. (1997) Language, power, & ideology in BruneiDarussalam. Ohio: Centre for International Studies. Ohio University.

Horton, A.V.M. The British Residency in Brunei, 1906-1959.Occasional Papers. No. 6. The University of Hull: Centre for Southeast AsianStudies.

Hussainmiya, B.A. (1995) Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III andBritain: The making of Brunei Darussalam. New York: Oxford University Press.

Leifer, Michael. (1978). Decolonization and international status;the experience of Brunei. International Affairs. 54-2.

38

The Brunei Revolt Mackie, J. A. C. (1974). Konfrontasi   : The Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, 1963-1966. Kuala Lumpur : Oxford University Press.

Ness, Gayle D. Brunei’s tea-pot rebellion. (1962) Institute ofCurrent World Affairs.

Ongkili, J.P. (1967) The Borneo response to Malaysia, 1961-1963. Singapore: Donald Moore Press.

Robinson, D & Groves, J. (2003). Introducing PoliticalPhilosophy. Icon Books.

Saunders, G. (2002) A history of Brunei. New York:Rouledgecurzon.

Singh, Ranjit. (1984) Brunei 1839-1983: The problems of politicalsurvival. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sopiee, M. N. (1974) From Malayan union to SingaporeSeparations, political unification in the Malaysia region 1945-1965. KualaLumpur: Penerbit Universati Malaya.

Weatherbee, D.E. (2005). International relations in SoutheastAsia: The struggle for autonomy. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

39