ABSTRACT

The Boomerang Pattern: Verification and Modification

When Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink published Activists Beyond Borders in 1998, they offered the emergent field of Human Rights History the first clear model of the relatively new phenomenon ofinternational human rights activism. Termed the Boomerang Pattern, the model demonstrates how NGOs of the (predominantly) Third World work with international NGOs to address human rights violations in their own countries. A document from the archival collection of Amnesty International USA, created in the 1980s butonly available to the public since 2007, verifies the accuracy ofthe Boomerang Pattern in describing the transnational human rights activism. However, the Boomerang Pattern primarily describes how activism is designed to work, rather than present the complications and difficulties that NGOs encounter in their international campaigns. This paper complicates the Boomerang Pattern in order to more accurately describe transnational human rights activism by drawing on examples from the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran human rights movements of the 1980s.

BIOGRAHICAL STATEMENT

David Bassano is an Instructor of History at Brookdale Community College in Lincroft, NJ. His specialization is Human Rights History with a particular focus on human rights NGOs.

The Boomerang Pattern: Verification and Modification

By David Bassano, Department of History, Brookdale CommunityCollege

In Activists Beyond Borders, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink

create a visual representation of human rights transnational

2

advocacy networks called the Boomerang Pattern. This model

demonstrates how Third World NGOs, prevented by their own

governments from campaigning for justice, work with international

NGOs to influence the global North. This influence causes

governments of the global North to apply pressure to the

offending Third World state, thus forcing social changes that the

Third World NGOs could not accomplish on their own.

Activists Beyond Borders is generally highly-regarded; Thorsten

Benner of UC Berkeley calls it “a pioneer work in the field of

transnational activist networks and a major contribution to the

literature on transnational relations.”1 The Boomerang Pattern

has become one of the most oft-referenced theories in the nascent

field of Human Rights Studies, invoked in dozens of articles and

books to explain the relatively new power of international human

rights advocacy networks. Its explanatory power is such that it

is even used to visualize international networks outside of the

human rights networks that Keck and Sikkink originally examined.

The pattern has been used to describe environmental networks,

such as the global anti-whaling movement,2 and international AIDS

advocacy.3 It has also influenced International Relations

3

studies, with some commentators (most notably Keohane and Nye)

using the theory to demonstrate that the sovereign power of the

nation-state, the core of Realpolitik, is no longer above challenge.

Given its popularity and the complexity of the phenomenon it

describes, the Boomerang Pattern has of course received

considerable scrutiny and criticism. The theory does not “analyze

power relations within NGOs and between NGOs and their partners,”

according to one reviewer;4 others believe that it does not

adequately describe why the international human rights norms

leveraged by activists create pressure on target governments,5 or

that it does not address the role of gender in transnational

activism.6 Even critics of the theory, however, acknowledge its

general utility and believe that it should be further

investigated and developed rather than discarded. This paper is a

contribution to the literature on the Boomerang Pattern, offering

to verify the model’s basic utility as well as complicate and

problematize it.

This paper has three purposes. The first is to demonstrate

the veracity of the Boomerang Pattern by comparing it to a model

from the recently-opened collection of Amnesty International USA

4

(AIUSA). The second is to demonstrate that the interactions

between the local and international NGOs represented in the

pattern flow both ways between the domestic and international

NGOs, not just one-way from the global South as presented in the

Boomerang Pattern. The third is to complicate the model by

representing the global North as not just a source of political

pressure, but rather as a field of conflict. The last two points

will be illuminated through the example of the Nicaraguan and

Salvadoran human rights movements of the 1980s, in which

thousands of local and international NGOs sought to protect the

victims of predominantly right-wing terror. The complications

presented in this paper are meant for students of international

human rights advocacy and social movements, offered in the hope

that it will assist their studies by presenting new explanatory

possibilities for phenomenon they encounter in their own

research.

The Boomerang Pattern – Verification

5

The Boomerang Pattern demonstrates the interaction between

domestic human rights NGOs in countries with abusive governments

and their allies in the international sphere. As Figure 17 shows,

domestic NGOs try to petition their own government (State A) to

stop committing human rights violations. However, due to the

authoritarian nature of the government and the relative weakness

of civil society in the country, the NGOs do not have sufficient

power to influence the government, and may even be targets of

repression themselves; this is diagramed as the “blockage” in the

pattern. The domestic NGOs (or individual activists in some

cases) therefore petition international human rights NGOs for

assistance. The international NGOs have greater freedom of

action, as they generally operate from the global North where

they benefit from stronger civil societies. The domestic NGOs

provide information to the international NGOs about the human

rights situation in the country. The international NGOs – which

often collaborate with each other, as the diagram indicates –

petition the government of their own country (State B), and

intragovernmental organizations such as the UN or OAS, to apply

pressure to the abusive government. Such pressure is possible

6

because State A often needs State B (which is probably wealthier,

as it is generally in the global North) for various forms of

financial and military assistance. By petitioning State B,

whether directly or through a popular movement and in the media,

the international NGOs hope to dissuade State B from providing

assistance to State A. As statesmen do not wish to be viewed as

supporters of human rights abusers, State B may respond by

threatening to withdraw support to State A. In response to this,

State A may modify its behavior to comply with human rights laws

and norms and thus safeguard its aid from State B.

Intragovernmental organizations with power of their own can apply

pressure as well, threatening to ostracize State A. Thus, the

domestic NGOs from State A can apply indirect pressure to their

government by working with international NGOs to petition foreign

governments and intragovernmental organizations.

Pressure

XXX BLOCKAGE XXX

Information

Pressure

STATE B

Intn’l.NGO

DomesticNGO

DomesticNGO

Intragov.

Orgs.

STATE A

7

FIGURE 1 – The Boomerang Pattern

A document from the archival collection of AIUSA (FIGURE 2)

confirms the value of the Boomerang Pattern in describing

international human rights activism. The author is unknown

and the document undated; but the box containing the document

holds records up to 1996, and the document is included among

others from 1983. The diagram in the document describes the

Boomerang Pattern quite clearly, and must have been drawn before

Keck and Sikkink proposed the pattern in Activists Beyond Borders in

1998; nor could Keck and Sikkink have used the document in

formulating the Boomerang Pattern, as the AIUSA collection at

Columbia University was not publicly available before October

2007. The diagrams thus represent independent attempts at

describing international human rights activism.

Intn’l.NGO

Collaborat

8

FIGURE 2 – AIUSA document describing the Boomerang Pattern8

The circles on the left of the diagram are the various

countries in which human rights violations are being committed

according to AI. Information about violations comes from these

countries to “AI HQ” (the International Secretariat in London).

Although the diagram does not specifically show it, the

information would come from domestic NGOs, AI research teams

visiting the countries, and the media. The International

Secretariat (IS) sends the information to the various national

sections of AI, in this case AIUSA. The national office of AIUSA

in New York then disseminates the information to local chapters

around the country, with suggested campaign actions (“what to do”

9

in the diagram). The information is also sent to “opinionmakers”

in the media, government, special interest groups, and “organized

America.” This last may refer to labor unions, churches, or other

human rights NGOs. Also among the targets of AIUSA influence are

“unorganized interested folks,” or civil society in general. The

result of all this is that AIUSA can “bring pressure to bear” on

the countries accused of violating human rights. The diagram also

shows another “boomerang” of interest to an NGO: “money and

feedback” coming back to the organization.

Thus, the document corroborates the Boomerang Pattern in

describing international human rights activism. Neither Keck and

Sikkink’s nor AIUSA’s Boomerang Patterns, however, demonstrate

the conflict which occurs in State B or intragovernmental

organizations to determine whether or not pressure is brought to

bear on State A. The success of the Boomerang Pattern is not

assured. Both diagrams show how the pattern is designed to work,

but are not very detailed about how it actually does work. The

main aspect lacking in both of these diagrams is that they do not

represent the international NGOs or State B as fields of conflict

which determine whether or not pressure is applied to State A.

10

The AIUSA diagram comes closer to doing so because it represents

the various actors in State B, some of which struggle with each

other to determine whether or not pressure will boomerang back on

State A.

The Boomerang Pattern – Modifications

As this paper utilizes the example of the Salvadoran and

Nicaraguan human rights movement of the 1980s to demonstrate the

usefulness of modifying the Boomerang pattern, some background on

the topic is required.

Nineteen-eighty was a watershed year in Central America. In

El Salvador, leftist forces launched a civil war against the

ruling elites and their military allies in response to increasing

economic inequality and decreasing democratization. In Nicaragua,

the Sandinistas attempted to consolidate their revolution after

11

Somoza’s departure, but were unable to compromise with surviving

right-wing elements in Nicaragua. The Carter, and later Reagan,

administrations responded with sanctions against the Sandinistas,

the provision of arms and military advisors to the Salvadoran

junta, and eventually by organization, arming, and training the

contra rebels of Nicaragua. The subsequent fighting left over one

hundred thousand dead in Central America and displaced millions

more. Most independent human rights NGOs affirmed that the lion’s

share of human rights abuses committed in this period were

attributable to U.S.-backed right-wing forces. A loose coalition

of over 2,500 U.S. and international NGOs launched a movement to

protect human rights in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in

Central America, leading to intense political debate within

Congress over U.S. policy.

The human rights campaigns of the 1980s clearly demonstrate

and verify Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern of international

activism; this is particularly true of the Salvadoran campaign.

The domestic NGOs of El Salvador, such as Socorro Juridico,

attempted to address the governmental human rights abuses in

their country but were blocked from access to political power by

12

the authoritarian government in San Salvador. They instead worked

with international NGOs, including Amnesty International, to

bypass the blockage. They passed information to international

NGOs and sent speakers to the global North to assist the

international NGOs’ campaigns. The international NGOs used the

information to motivate various actors in the global North,

governmental or otherwise, to pressure the government of El

Salvador to stop the abuses.

At this point, however, a more detailed version of the model

is required to chart not just the Central American campaigns but

most other international human rights campaigns as well. The

purposes of a modified version of the Boomerang Pattern are to

complicate the interactions between domestic and international

NGOs and to problematize the situation in the global North, where

the results of NGO activism are hardly predetermined. To address

the second purpose, the model can be improved by rendering both

State B and international NGOs as fields of conflict which may or

may not bring pressure to bear on State A. This of course comes

as no surprise to experienced activists, but may prove useful to

students of human rights or social movement history who wish to

13

use a fine-grain version of the model to examine and more clearly

represent the international human rights campaigns they are

studying.

Figure C – Modified Boomerang Pattern

The first modification to the model is the addition of an

arrow from the international NGOs back to the domestic NGOs,

indicating that the relationship between them is not merely a

one-way flow of information to the global North. Information,

XXX BLOCKAGE XXX

DomesticNGO

Intn’l.NGO

Intragov.

Orgs.

Intn’l.NGO

STATE A:

JuntaMilitary

Paramilitaries

Executive

STATE B:

ExecutiveLegislati

veJudicial

Contingent Pressure

Contingent

Response

DomesticNGO

Information and

14

material support, technical assistance, volunteers, and witnesses

move from North to South as well.

In the case of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran human rights

movements, the most important exchange between North and South

was human. Solidarity organizations brought activists and other

spokespersons for Central American rights to the United States on

speaking tours. To hear about human rights abuses from a direct

witness is a powerful experience; the abolitionist movement

understood the influence and support that a speaking tour by a

former slave could generate. In 1981, CISPES (Committee in

Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) sponsored speaking

tours by at least a dozen Salvadorans, giving them the

opportunity to speak to audiences across the United States. About

half of the speakers were from educational organizations opposed

to the junta’s policies. They included Armando Olivia, Professor

of Engineering at University of El Salvador and member of the

Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals and Technicians

(MIPTES); Mauricio Duarte, a medical student and executive member

of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students

(AGEUS); and Marta Castenon, a primary school teacher and

15

Director of International Relations of the National Association

of Salvadoran Educators (ANDES). The religious community of El

Salvador was represented by Father Jesus Nieto, a Catholic priest

and founder of the Council of Christian Base Communities of El

Salvador. 9 The tours lasted from one to two months.

That same year, CISPES also began hosting visits by members

of the FDR (Frente Democrático Revolucionario, the political arm of the

main Salvadoran rebel group, the FMLN) to commemorate the one-

year anniversary of the founding of the rebel organization. The

program was no doubt facilitated by official CISPES support for

the organizations, something which the nonpartisan AIUSA would

never have granted. These speaking tours were much shorter,

rarely longer than a week. Speakers included Ricardo Melara,

Arnoldo Ramos, Salvador Martinez, Carlos Vela, Jose Escobar, and

Mario Velazquez, all spokesmen for the FDR. The speakers

participated in a wide range of events: panel discussions, press

conferences, radio and TV interviews, question-and-answer

sessions, and lectures to activists, students, religious groups,

and the public at large.10 Overall, the program was deemed a

success, having drawn good press coverage.11

16

However, the number of Central American speakers visiting

the United States was dwarfed by the number of Northern activists

visiting El Salvador and, in particular, Nicaragua. Witness for

Peace facilitated visits by hundreds of activists to El Salvador

and Nicaragua to bear witness to the horrors of the wars and

report them when they returned.12 Many other NGOs sent

“delegations,” as they were termed, to investigate human rights

abuses and monitor elections in Central America in the 1980s. The

People-to-People Exchange Program (PTP) at CISPES was designed to

create personal connections between activists in El Salvador and

the United States. The program ran tours of Salvadoran activists

in the United States; the activists came from Salvadoran NGOs and

were sponsored by participating CISPES chapters.13 The campaign

sponsored 3 or 4 tours per year. The program also sponsored

delegations of 8 or 10 people – lawyers, priests, psychologists,

and human rights activists.14 These delegations had access to

Salvadoran government officials and facilities and were often

accompanied by members of the U.S. Embassy.15 During their

visits, the delegates were treated to tours of prisons and police

stations, with extensive propaganda speeches from Salvadoran

17

officials. The fact that Salvadoran officials dedicated such time

to trying to convince CISPES delegates that the human rights

situation in El Salvador was improving is a strong indication

that they believed CISPES was an influential organization in the

United States. Delegation members were not naïve, however; during

their trips they also visited refugee camps as well as domestic

NGOs such as Socorro Juridico and Tutela Legal, the members of

which told them a very different story of human rights in El

Salvador.16

The National Lawyers Guild (NLG), a progressive U.S. bar

association, also sent delegations throughout the 1980s. The

first week of September, 1980, a delegation of five legal

professionals from the National Lawyers Guild, National

Conference of Black Lawyers, and La Raza Legal Alliance traveled

to El Salvador and met government officials, human rights

activists, and refugees. The delegation was a result of

discussions with Socorro Juridico activist Roberto Cuellar during

his NLG speaking engagement in San Francisco.17 The Salvadoran

junta tried to present itself as a moderate force for reform to

such delegations, but subsequent reports from independent NGOs

18

were usually incriminating. The Salvadoran junta, after one

particularly scathing NLG report, denounced the delegates as

“paid mercenaries.”18 Refusing visas to such delegations would

have been an easy option for the junta, but to do so would have

been an admission that the government had something to hide at a

time when it was insisting that the human rights situation in the

country was improving. The junta preferred to attempt to

influence the delegations instead.

Other activists from the global North included volunteers to

work on development programs in Nicaragua, teaching English as

part of the Sandinistas’ literacy program or assisting with

infrastructure projects. The most famous of these volunteers was

Ben Linder, a young U.S. engineer who was killed by the contras

while working on a hydroelectric project in Nicaragua.

Linder had traveled to Nicaragua in early 1984 to offer his

engineering talents to the Sandinista government. After three

months in the country he was offered a position with the state-

run National Institute of Energy in Managua. Soon he was working

on a small hydroelectric dam in El Cua in northern Nicaragua. The

community of 2000 people had no electricity, no running water or

19

sanitation system, nor even sufficient food for everyone.19 For

an idealistic American engineer who wanted to use his skills to

change the world, it was the perfect place to be, except for the

lethal problem of counter-revolution. The contras had been

operating in the area, destroying infrastructure and terrorizing

the people. As an engineer on a hydroelectric project, Linder

realized that he was a prime target for the contras. It was not

enough to shake his commitment. On April 28, Linder and six of

his Nicaraguan compatriots were killed by the contras as they

went about their work in El Cua.20 There was an outcry by

activists in the United States, and Linder’s family publicly

accused the Reagan Administration of causing his death.21 Vice-

President Bush, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, and

Assistant Secretary of State Eliot Abrams all stated publicly

that Linder had brought it on himself by working for the

Sandinistas.22 Northern activists in Central America often took

the same risks as their Southern compatriots, creating the most

intimate link in the Boomerang Pattern.

International NGOs can also provide material assistance to

NGOs and other actors in the global South. In the 1980s, New El

20

Salvador Today (NEST) sponsored development projects such as

farms, ranches, fishing installations, and other simple,

grassroots projects in the country. A shoe factory was the most

sophisticated of them.23 Donating NGOs not only raised money from

northern activists, but also from other northern NGOs. By

November 1984, CISPES donations to NEST projects alone totaled

over $53,000.24 The Central America Task Force (CATF) of the NLG

also collected and sent material aid to Nicaragua. In December

1988, Nicaragua was struck by a massive hurricane which

devastated the country. CATF announced an emergency campaign to

collect donations for “building supplies, medicines, blankets,

clothing, and flashlights.”25 In two months, CATF raised over

$10,000 for relief in the country.26 As a bar association,

however, the NLG was particularly interested in helping Nicaragua

improve its legal system. The Guild contributed $5000 to the

construction of a legal aid clinic in Managua.27 It also donated

computers, printers, and photocopy machines to lawyers’

associations, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court of

Nicaragua, which was still writing out its laws by hand.28

21

Finally, CAFT sent basic school supplies to law school students

in Leon.29

Interestingly, the most important benefit from the exchanges

of activists between the North and South was an increased

dedication on the part of the Northerners. “Nothing activates

people more than delegations!” claimed a CATF newsletter.30

Indeed, it was a visit to Nicaragua which inspired NLG members

Barbara Dudley and Michael Ratner to run for national office of

the NLG and turn the NGO towards Central American concerns.

Dudley remembered:

They [the Sandinistas] were in the process ofwriting a constitution, setting up courts, and generally rebuilding society from the ground up.  I don't remember who exactly we met with, but it was very exciting to see a country emerging from a dictatorship and trying to write new rules.  And it did cause me to get more involved…in trying to stop ourown government from interfering illegally with what the Nicaraguan people were doing intheir own country.31

When Dudley and Ratner returned from Nicaragua, they decided

to run for national Guild office and then “get it focused on

Central America.”32 At the 1982 NLG national convention in Santa

22

Fe, Ratner ran for President and Dudley for Vice President.

Ratner gave a talk at the convention about the recent Crockett v.

Reagan case, in which movement lawyers challenged U.S. military

aid to El Salvador. As Ratner saw it, involvement in Central

America was “the wave of the next period, and the Guild wanted to

go that way.”33 Consequently, they were both elected to national

office at the convention. Clearly, Ratner and Dudley rode a wave

of interest in Central America that already existed within the

Guild; once in positions of national leadership, however, they

helped the NLG give concrete expression to this interest and keep

the Guild’s Central America programs strong in the early 1980s.

Many other activists, reflecting on their motivations for joining

the movement of the 1980s, cite their Central American

experiences as critical factors in solidifying their dedication

to the cause of peace in El Salvador and Nicaragua.

Another interesting issue about the connections between the

global North and South, domestic and international NGOs, is that

the governments of the nations concerned did not forbid

communication or travel between them in the 1980s. As the

Boomerang Pattern demonstrates, southern and northern NGOs need

23

at least to communicate; they also often send researchers and

delegates. Although opposed to the movement, the Reagan

administration never attempted to prevent travel to Nicaragua, as

it did in the case of Cuba, although INS officers often harassed

those who did travel. The Salvadoran junta did not prevent

northern activists from entering the country, nor did the United

States government uniformly forbid Salvadoran activists from

entering the country for speaking tours (although it did

sometimes deny them visas.) The junta did attempt to suppress the

domestic NGOs, but failed to do so, due to international pressure

and the perseverance of the activists. The offices of Salvadoran

human rights NGOs were constantly raided or closed, and the

activists detained; during one inspection tour, an NLG delegation

found that their visit to the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission

was cancelled because the office was bombed just before their

arrival.34 If the junta and Reagan administration had managed to

either disrupt communications between the Salvadoran activists

and the international NGOs, or intimidate Southern activists into

silence, it would have disrupted the Boomerang Pattern by

breaking the linkages and political pressure between the North

24

and South. While telephones, FAX machines, and cheap airfares are

factors in these linkages, the example of Salvadoran activists

braving torture and death demonstrates the courage and moral

fortitude necessary for the Boomerang Pattern to function. It

also highlights the tenuous nature of international activism. The

linkages between North and South depend mainly on human courage,

not technology. If courage fails, the Boomerang Pattern is

broken.

The reason Reagan and his Salvadoran allies never tried to

completely sever contact between North and South was most likely

the potential damage to their credibility and subsequent loss of

political capital at a time of intense debate in Congress over

aid to the Salvadoran junta and the Contras. The Reagan

administration and the junta both spent most of the 1980s

claiming that the left was committing human rights abuses in El

Salvador and Nicaragua. If that were so, it would have behooved

the conservatives to allow observers, both activists and

journalists, into those countries so that they could observe and

confirm the truth of it. Forbidding travel to those countries

could have been interpreted as an admission of guilt. Also,

25

Barbara Dudley asserted that, with Congress as divided as it was

over Central American issues, congressional support for a blanket

visa denial would have been almost impossible to implement.35

Furthermore, NGOs like AI operated from outside the United

States, in countries with governments which did not necessarily

share Reagan’s assessment of the Central American communist

threat. They could not be prevented from visiting El Salvador or

Nicaragua. Finally, the National Immigration Project at the NLG

launched the Visa Denial Project (VDP) to counter what was

perceived as political interference in granting visas. The VDP

published instructions for legal challenges, ran seminars for

lawyers in visa denial litigation, counseled NGOs, and educated

congressmen and other officials on the issue.36 Due to all these

factors, and the perseverance of the southern activists, the

connective tissue of the Boomerang Pattern held firm.

The second modification of the Boomerang Pattern suggested

by this paper is the complication of events in State B, where the

results of activism are anything but certain. The first

complication is the use of the term “contingent response” to

demonstrate that international NGOs may not choose to support

26

domestic NGOs in State A, or may qualify that support. Two

examples of this from the Central America human rights movement

of the 1980s were AIUSA’s stand on U.S. arms to El Salvador and

the controversy at NLG over support to the Sandinista government.

AI had been involved in the issue of human rights

considerations in arms transfers and economic aid since the ICM

(International Committee Meeting) of 1978. Expanding into the

area of arms control represented a case of widening the AI

mandate beyond the original scope of prisoners of conscience, and

the 1978 meeting made certain this expansion would not jeopardize

AI’s nonpartisan stance. The ICM decided that “AI refrains from

drawing political conclusions and from proposing sanctions

against those governments who are guilty of human rights

violations.”37 By doing so, the NGO hoped to remain free from

political taint and partisanship.

From 1981 to 1983, the Solarz Amendment, passed by Congress,

required the Reagan administration to certify that the Salvadoran

military was complying with international human rights laws in

order to continue receiving military aid; by doing so,

representatives hoped that they could assist the Salvadorans in

27

defeating the leftists without being seen as supporters of war

crimes in Central America. The certification process was largely

a sham because the power to certify the Salvadoran military was

granted to the president himself. Twice in 1980, AIUSA approached

the United States State Department with its concerns about arms

sales to El Salvador. AIUSA blamed Salvadoran government forces,

not the opposition, for most of the abuses in El Salvador and

therefore asked the State Department to reconsider the aid. It

concluded:

Given all this it is indeed reasonable to expect that assistance intended to improve the operational capabilities of the Salvadoran security system, including training and material assistance, will contribute to worsen the human rights situation in that country…we wish to concludeby urging very strongly that your government reconsider its proposed military and securityassistance to El Salvador.38

The wording of the letter is important in light of a

controversy which arose the next year over AI policy towards arms

transfers to El Salvador. The controversy involved whether or not

the wording of this letter constituted AI “opposition” to U.S.

arms transfers to El Salvador, thus violating the AI mandate of

28

nonpartisanship. Although AIUSA asked its members to write to

their congressional representatives to express their concern, it

explicitly told members that AI’s “neutrality” mandate prevented

the NGO from outright opposition to military aid. It was not

enough to prevent confusion and conflict within the organization

over the issue.

AIUSA continued to press the issue with Congress. In August

1980, the CACG (Central America Coordination Group) announced

that the proposed $5.5 million in U.S. aid would contribute to

human rights violations in El Salvador.39 The CACG recommended

that members write letters to express their “concern” about the

transfers to their congressmen and senators, especially members

of key Congressional committees; the letter included a list of

key congressional members provided by the Coalition for a New

Foreign and Military Policy.40

When the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, the

unified rebel command in El Salvador) launched a major offensive

in 1980, AI announced to its national sections that, given the

Reagan Administration’s assertion that the insurgents were

receiving foreign military aid, “we think it inappropriate…to

29

press US for suspension of military aid…”41 Although the memo did

not bluntly state as much, the inference was that it would be

unfair to ask Salvadoran junta to defend itself against the FMLN

without military assistance, especially since the United States

claimed that the FMLN was receiving foreign aid. This position

was necessary because of AI’s nonpartisan stance: it could not

appear to support any political faction in the conflict, but only

to oppose any human rights abuses which occurred while the

conflict was being fought. This brought a strong negative

response from several national sections which thought that this

represented a new AI stance towards arms transfers which had been

taken unilaterally by the IS.42 The statement claimed that the

new strategy did not represent a change in AI policy towards the

arms exchanges, but rather that “it seemed unwise to press the

point for the time being.”43

It was not without reason that many groups, within AIUSA and

the rest of AI, were confused about AI policy towards arms

transfers. Local groups within several different national

sections called on the IS to press the Reagan administration for

a cessation of aid to El Salvador. All the requests were

30

denied.44 AI’s June 24 1980 letter to the Secretary of State

stated that AI opposed arms transfers where the arms were likely

to be used in human rights violations; it also claimed that

Salvadoran forces were using U.S. arms to commit human rights

abuses.45 The letter, however, did not state that AI opposed the

arms transfers, but only asked that the United States

“reconsider” arms transfers to El Salvador. The logical fallacy

of this did not escape AI activists. If AI opposed arms transfers

where they contributed to human rights abuses, and the

transferred arms were being used in abuses in El Salvador, then

AI must oppose U.S. arms transfers to El Salvador. The IS,

however, felt that this stance violated AI’s nonpartisan mandate.

Therefore, AI only asked the United States to “reconsider” its

aid.

The issue of arms transfers to El Salvador demonstrates the

limits of nonpartisanship in human rights. In order to take a

stance on human rights and maintain nonpartisanship, AI was

forced into a confusing case of doublespeak. As Refugee Committee

Chair Patricia Weiss-Fagen put it: “Welcome to the world of…

31

delicate political maneuvering of organizations that want to be

credible on all sides.”46

AIUSA constantly strove to clarify to the American public,

as well as to its own membership, its position on U.S. arms to El

Salvador and the certification process. In a March 1982 column in

Amnesty Action, the AIUSA member newsletter, Executive Director

Jack Healey stated that there were many issues around El Salvador

which AI would not address, “such as whether U.S. military aid to

El Salvador should be cut off or continued; what type of

government El Salvador should have; or what influence other

Central American governments are asserting over events in El

Salvador.”47 He concluded, “Sometimes AI members become

frustrated or confused by the limits of our mandate. We must

never forget, though, what these limits are if we want to

maintain the credibility we’ve painstakingly built up over the

years.”48

Apparently the frustrated parties were in the national

section headquarters itself. In a December 10 1982 letter to the

IS, Jack Healey said that the AIUSA Board of Directors, at its

December meeting, had passed a resolution asking the IS for two

32

things. First, it requested all information the IS had on the

human rights situation in El Salvador since July 1982 be

delivered by early January; second, that “AI consider the grounds

cited for Presidential certification required by law and if

judged to be contradictory to AI information, take a public stand

on them and on the certification process itself.”49 However, the

IS reported that the Washington DC office of AIUSA had asked the

IS not to take a stand on the certification, because the office

felt that it would strain their relations with the United States

government. At least some leaders at AIUSA, it appeared, were

keen to protect what they took to be a useful relationship with

that government, even at the expense of the arms issue.

On July 13, the IS sent an internal memo to all national

sections to clarify AI’s stance towards U.S. arms transfers to El

Salvador. After once more asserting that AI did not oppose U.S.

arms transfers to El Salvador, but only asked that the United

States “reconsider” its aid in light of the human rights

situation in that country, it then recounted a short history of

United States-AI communications on the matter. The memo then

noted that, perhaps out of confusion, several AI sections and

33

even an IS circular had misstated AI’s position. Groups in AIUSA

as well as the Canadian section had sent letters to the Secretary

of State asking him to end military aid to El Salvador, even

though this was not AI policy.50 The IS made it clear that such

breaches of policy could not be tolerated. “It is imperative,"

stated the IS, “that the movement speak with one voice and is

seen to be doing so. The chain of authority and the procedures to

be followed throughout the organization need to be clear,

specific, and carefully adhered to.”51

Despite AI’s careful maneuvering to protect its reputation

for nonpartisanship, its relationship with conservative elements

in the United States government was strained. AI’s reporting

countered the image of El Salvador which the administration

sought to project: that of a nation under attack from worldwide

communism. Even if AI did not directly attack the Reagan

administration’s arms transfer policy, attacking the

administration’s representation of El Salvador could be just as

damaging, since it meant attacking the foundations on which the

policy was built. In any case, the point of arms transfers was

moot by the end of 1983; Reagan allowed the human rights

34

certification program to terminate by pocket veto, removing all

congressional oversight of arms transfers to El Salvador.

Simultaneously, another debate ignited within NLG over the

NGO’s support of the Sandinistas. Reports were spreading in the

United States that the Sandinistas were abusing the indigenous

Miskitu population of the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. After the

Sandinista revolution, some members of the Miskitu community

joined with other indigenous groups in Nicaragua to form

MISURSATA, a political group to press claims for greater

political autonomy within the state. However, the Sandinistas

believed that one of the MISURSATA leaders, Steadman Fagoth, was

fomenting a counter-revolution against the government. In 1981 he

was arrested, but in a show of good faith the Sandinistas

released him. He went into exile in Honduras, taking 1000

Miskitus with him, and formed an anti-Sandinista guerilla unit

allied with the FDN, the main contra group.52 Afterward, rumors

and reports of Sandinista atrocities and forced relocations

against the Miskitu population began to spread and were quickly

picked up by the Reagan administration as part of its propaganda.

In 1983, the reports of Sandinista atrocities became of topic of

35

debate within the Guild. While many in the movement put such

reports down to CIA propaganda, some in the NLG – particularly

those who worked mainly on indigenous rights issues – vehemently

protested NLG support for the Sandinistas.53 It is clear that by

mid-1983 a heated debate had erupted between different committees

of the NLG as well as with the Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC).

The debate centered on the Guild’s relationship with, and policy

towards, the Sandinista government. The ILRC, represented in this

matter by Steven Tullberg and Robert Coulter, wanted the NLG to

ask the Sandinistas to investigate the alleged abuses of Miskitu

Indians in Nicaragua, believing that the Guild had some influence

with that government.54

Neither NLG President Michael Ratner nor Vice President

Barbara Dudley wanted the Guild to take up the issue. The first

problem was the CIA misinformation campaign, which both believed

was at least partly responsible for reports of abuses by the

Sandinistas. Neither Americas Watch nor Amnesty International

believed that the reports of Sandinista atrocities were true.

Ratner apparently also felt that the ILRC was supporting

MISURASATA and was therefore in the anti-Sandinista camp.55 He

36

also recognized that some Miskitus were pro-Sandinista. Myrna

Cunningham, for example, was the main plaintiff in the NLG case

of Sanchez / Espinoza v. Reagan; she was a Miskitu Indian doctor who

had been raped by the Contras. She supported the Sandinistas, and

to this day is still a parliamentarian in Nicaragua.56 In

Ratner’s view, the ILRC was using CIA disinformation, possibly in

support of anti-Sandinistas, and misrepresenting the entire

Miskitu community as anti-Sandinista.

A second problem was that the NLG, at the Santa Fe

conference, had passed a resolution in support of the Sandinista

government. Some within the Guild – Ratner and Dudley among them

– felt that to support the ILRC in its claims against the

Sandinistas would go against the resolution and give more

ammunition to the Reagan Administration.

Despite considerable debate within the NLG on not only the

NGO’s position on the Sandinistas, but also on its policy-setting

procedures, the NLG never reversed its policy of supporting the

Sandinista government. The cases of AIUSA and NLG demonstrate the

contingent nature of international NGOs’ response to reported

human rights violations. Clearly, the international NGOs make

37

their own decisions and do not necessarily follow the Boomerang

Pattern.

The second modification of the Boomerang Pattern is the

representation of both states as fields of conflict which may or

may not result in pressure on State A as a result of NGO

activism. The various actors in this conflict are listed

individually and linked together in the modified model because

the conflict between them determines government policy and thus

the outcome of the activism. In State B – in the case of the

Central America human rights movement, the United States -- it

was the three branches of government, plus the media and civil

society, which engaged in the struggle (civil society here

referring to the “various unorganized folks” of the AI model).

This model could be rendered as detailed as a researcher might

require, showing the numerous actors who eventually determine

government policy. State A is also rendered as a field of

conflict. In the case of El Salvador, certain segments of the

state could have opposed governmental abuses. For example, the

civilian members of the junta quit the government in 1981 to

protest the lack of support for reforms; President Duarte also

38

favored reforms such as land redistribution. However, the

oligarchy, military, and paramilitaries were generally too

powerful and resisted nonviolent pressure for change.

Intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and OAS were also

involved in the conflict and their decisions were also the result

of conflict between various actors. For example, a legal struggle

led to the International Court of Justice’s decision that the

United States had violated international law by mining

Nicaragua’s harbors. The case of Nicaragua v. United States, brought

before the ICJ in 1984, found that the United States had acted

contrary to international law by supporting the contra rebels who

were, among other things, mining Nicaraguan harbors.57 The Reagan

administration refused to accept the authority of the ICJ and did

not comply with the findings. However, the finding did affect the

peace process in Central America, because it leant credibility to

the Nicaraguan government and gave the Sandinistas the

opportunity to sue Honduras at the ICJ, since that country was

providing the contras with staging bases in its territory.58 This

increased international clout helped spur the participation of

Central American governments in the regional peace process.

39

During the 1980s, it was primarily the struggle between the

Reagan Administration and its opponents in the Legislative Branch

which determined whether or not pressure was applied to State B

(El Salvador). Many NGOs in the movement carried out campaigns to

influence representatives on points of Central America policy.

CISPES specialized mainly in populist activism – that is,

activism based on large-scale participation by the masses, such

as protests, congressional pressure, and teach-ins. Throughout

the 1980s, CISPES attempted to influence congressional

representatives on votes on aid to the contras and Salvadoran

military. For example, the final major CISPES campaign of the

1980s was called Days of Decision, launched in August 1987. The

“decision” was whether or not the U.S. government would support

the Esquipulas II peace treaty, signed by the Contadora group on

August 7 1987, or try to stymie the process and continue the war

through aid to El Salvador and the contras.59 The Reagan

administration was not satisfied with Esquipulas because it

allowed leftist forces to participate in the political process in

Central America. The Days of Decision campaign was active

throughout the entire congressional debate over Central America

40

aid until December 1987. A campaign report claimed that from the

start of the campaign to the beginning of November, members had

carried out over 350 delegation visits to congressional

representatives, made over 5000 phone calls, and sent them over

100,000 letters and postcards.60 Across the country, members held

vigils with, on average, about 100 people attending each of

them.61 The campaign was unsuccessful in preventing U.S. support

to the Salvadoran military or the contras.

The conflict was also played out in the Judicial Branch as

the NLG and Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed cases to

stop the administration from carrying out its Central America

program. The first legal challenge to the Reagan administration

was in May of 1981, when the CCR filed a lawsuit against the

Reagan Administration on behalf of Congressmen George W. Crockett

and 28 other Congressional representatives. Although CCR was the

lead NGO in the lawsuit, the NLG was deeply involved as well. The

suit, filed in Federal Court in Washington DC, asked the court

“to issue an order requiring the President to withdraw all U.S.

armed forces from El Salvador and end all military aid to the

ruling junta.”62 The suit claimed that Reagan had sent at least

41

56, and possibly more, U.S. military personnel to El Salvador,

along with $25 million in military aid.63 The suit was based on

two pieces of legislation: The War Powers Resolution and the

Foreign Assistance Act.

The suit first claimed that Reagan’s military assistance to

El Salvador was a breach of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.

The Resolution was passed at the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam,

and was designed to remove from the White House the sole power to

wage war.64 It was felt that, by placing war-making power in the

hands of Congress, the United States could avoid involvement in a

war which did not serve the public interest. The Resolution

therefore required that the President “can only send military

personnel into a country at war for a period of sixty days unless

Congress specifically approves those military personnel remaining

for a longer period.”65 By the time the suit was launched, U.S.

military personnel had been in El Salvador for about three months

– perhaps thirty days past the deadline under the War Powers

Resolution.

The second claim of the suit was that the intervention

violated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act prevented

42

the United States from providing military aid to any country

found guilty of gross human rights violations.66 As evidence that

the Salvadoran government was responsible for grievous violations

of human rights, the plaintiffs submitted reports from Amnesty

International, the Legal Department of the Archdiocese in El

Salvador, the annual report of the Inter-American Commission on

Human Rights at the OAS, and the El Salvador Human Rights

Commission.67

On the face of it, the suit was a failure. In 1983, Judge

Joyce Green ruled that the case for a violation of the War Powers

Resolution presented “unmanageable standards” for the court,

because the number of U.S. personnel in El Salvador was so small.

NLG attorney Michael Ratner explained that, had there been

thousands of U.S. troops in El Salvador, the situation would have

been obvious; but with only a few dozen personnel in the country,

Judge Green claimed that she was unable to assess the situation,

thus creating unmanageable standards for the court.68 The count

of violation against the Foreign Assistance Act fared no better.

Ratner noted that, “with regard to the human rights claims, Judge

Green held that the plaintiffs’ dispute was really with fellow

43

members of Congress” and not within the court’s authority.69 The

NLG and CCR filed several other complaints in federal court

during the 1980s over Reagan’s Central America policy, but none

succeeded in preventing the administration from carrying out its

aims. The cases did, however, bring Central American abuses to

the public’s attention through the media coverage the cases

invoked.

The Nicaraguan case was different in that the primary

abuser, as far as the movement was concerned, was the U.S. –

supported contra insurgency. In this case, the international NGOs

were protesting the actions of a paramilitary force essentially

run by the Reagan administration; therefore, the U.S. government

was the primary target of the activism. Protesting the abuses

perpetrated by one nation against another is not unheard of in

international human rights activism; AI protested against Israeli

actions in Lebanon, for example. While such activism does not

exactly match the Boomerang Pattern, it is still made on behalf

of those who are unable to effectively defend themselves from

abuse: civilians in a combat zone.

44

NGO pressure may not bring about the desired results and

close the Boomerang Pattern. In the case of the Central America

human rights movement in the 1980s, the movement produced, at

best, ambivalent results. The movement never prevented the U.S.

government from providing aid to either the Salvadoran military

or the contras, even after the Iran / Contra scandal. It may have

reduced the amount of aid provided at certain points, but it

never succeeded in its goal of halting U.S. aid to human rights

violators. The movement was more successful in assisting Central

American refugees in the United States by defending their rights

under U.S. immigration law. Immigration lawyers helped many

refugees remain in the country while their cases dragged on for

years. Only about 3 percent of the 500,000 Salvadoran refugees in

the United States in the 1980s were granted political asylum.70

As asylum seekers returned to El Salvador were being abused or

even killed by security forces, legal assistance to help the

refugees remain in the United States while their claims were

being processed, and their asylum denials challenged, saved them

from facing possible extrajudicial execution in El Salvador.

Michael Ratner claims that the NLG helped “hundreds of thousands”

45

of refugees settle in the United States.71 Furthermore, by

protecting the Sanctuary movement and helping it continue to

operate, the NLG contributed to the safety of the refugees under

Sanctuary’s protection. Such activism, however, is not part of

the Boomerang Pattern. This demonstrates that the Boomerang

Pattern does not represent all aspects of international human

rights activism.

Conclusion

The three aims of this article have been to prove the

general utility of the Boomerang Pattern by comparing it to a

similar model produced by Amnesty International, to complicate

the flow of information, people, and support between northern and

southern activists, and to problematize the Boomerang Pattern by

representing the global North as a field of conflict between

activists and the government, as well as within NGOs themselves.

As such, it resonates with the views of most commentators by

proving the veracity of the model while using historical examples

to complicate the theory and improve its usefulness.

46

When this paper was first presented at the 7th Spring

Academy at the Heidelberg Center for American Studies in March

2010, participants suggested many other ways that the Boomerang

Pattern model could be modified. During the 1980s, there must

have been debate within intragovernmental organizations over

Central America, making their responses as contingent as those of

the United States government or the NGOs; should this be

represented in the model? Since the Reagan administration was

trying to counter the reporting of the international NGOs, does

that warrant another “blockage” in the pattern? Did the domestic

NGOs of El Salvador directly petition the government of the

United States, and should this be represented in the model? Given

the intricacies of international human rights activism, the

Boomerang Pattern could be complicated to an impractical degree.

The actors involved in supporting or resisting international

campaigns constantly seek new pathways to power and ways to

influence events and discourses; the records of AIUSA, NLG, and

CISPES from the 1980s contain thousands of documents suggesting

new projects and campaigns to support the NGOs’ goals in Central

America, often demonstrating great creativity and a keen

47

understanding of both activism and politics. Perfectly charted, a

fine-grain reading of an international human rights campaign

would resemble an explosion of exchanges and influences as the

actors try to leverage every opportunity available – in short,

arrows all over.

Creating a model to fit every international human rights

campaign would be impossible. The point of the model is to

challenge researchers in their understandings of particular

movements, goading them into deeper investigation of the

exchanges and problems inherent in transnational activism. It may

also present researchers with a way to account for phenomenon

they encounter in their studies of particular movements. Accuracy

in modeling is not as important as general utility or, better

still, in provoking questions. As Michel Foucault put it: “I

would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can

rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they

wish in their own area...I don't write for an audience, I write

for users, not readers.”72 If the users happen to be activists,

then the toolbox of the Boomerang Pattern might assist them in

clarifying and leveraging means to power in protecting human

48

rights worldwide. For too many people in the world, such concerns

are not theoretical, but rather immediate matters of life and

death.

1 Thorsten Benner, “Margaret E. Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28 (1), page 188.2 Gloria Yolanda Guevara, 2008. Assessing the effectiveness of transnational activism: an analysis of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns. PhD diss, University of Southern California.3 Eduard Grebe, “Networks of Influence: A theoretical review and proposed approach to AIDS treatment activism,” aids2031 Working Group.4 Jan Aart Scholte, “Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by Margaret E. Keck; Kathryn Sikkink.” International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (April 1999), page 394.5 Darren Hawkins, “Transnational Activists as Motors for Change; Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by Margaret E. Keck; Kathryn Sikkink.” International Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 119-122.6 Karen Beckwith, “Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by Margaret E. Keck; Kathryn Sikkink; Women Transforming Politics: An Alternative Reader by Cathy J. Cohen; Kathleen B. Jones; Joan C. Tronto.” Signs, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 602-606.7 Adapted from Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink , Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 13.8 Undated notes; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG XI, SS 2.4, Box 406, Folder 10; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.9 Evaluation of CISPES Tours, Northwest Region, Undated, page 11; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador: M94-308, Box 6, Folder: CISPES Tours 1981; Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society.10 Evaluation of CISPES Tours, Northwest Region, Undated, page 1.11 Evaluation of CISPES Tours, Northwest Region, Undated, page 3.12 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 70.13 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 1; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador: M94-308, Box 2, Folder E: Internal DiscUSsion Papers, 1984; Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society.14 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 15.15 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 23.16 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 15.17 “Application for NLG Development Fund Grant”, November 24, 1980, pg. 1; NationalLawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 73; Folder 10; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.18 Central America Newsletter, December 1988, page 3; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 68; Folder 25; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.19 Jules Lobel, Success Without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long Road to JUStice in America (NY: NYU Press, 2006), 214.20 Lobel, 222. 21 Lobel, 225.22 Lobel, 222.23 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 12.24 Ibid.

25 Letter from Debra Evanson to Guild Members, November 1, 1988; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 68; Folder 25; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.26 Central America Newsletter, December 1988, page 3.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Central America Newsletter, AugUSt 1989, page 6; National Lawyers Guild Records;TAM 191; Box 68; Folder 25; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, ElmerHolmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.31 Barbara Dudley, e-mail to author, July 21, 2010.32 Ibid.33 Michael Ratner, interview with author, February 12, 2010.34 “Lawyers Delegation Reports on Effects of Violence in El Salvador on the Legal System”, Sept. 22, 1980, pg. 2; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 73; Folder 10; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.35 Barbara Dudley, e-mail to author, July 21, 2010.36 Memo from Daniel A. Katz to NIP Steering Committee re: CARDF Report for SteeringCommittee Meeting of 12/87, Nov. 21, 1987, p. 11; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 76; Folder 20; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, ElmerHolmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.37 Memo re: International Meeting on Military, Economic, and Cultural Relations andMilitary, Security, and Police Transfers, 15 March 1983, page 2; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG II, Series 3, Box 23, Folder for Meeting on MEC and MSP; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.38 Ibid.39 CACG to CASA Groups, “US Military Assistance to El Salvador,” AugUSt 1980, pg. 1; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG IV, S. 1, SS3 (Maurer), Box 8; Folder: Co-Groups and CASA, 1 of 2, 1980-1982; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.40 “US Military Assistance to El Salvador,” pg. 2.41 Ibid.42 Internal memo from the Campaign Unit / Secretary General’s Office to all National Sections, July 13, 1981, page 6; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG IV, S. 1, SS 3 (Maurer), Box 10; Folder: Co-Groups and CASA, 1 of 2, 1980-1982; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.43 Ibid.44 International MEC Bulletin, January 1983, page 2; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG II, Series 3, Box 26, Folder: 1983 Background Material; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.45 Letter of 24 June 1980 to Secretary of State Edmund MUSkie;” Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG IV, S. 1, SS 3 (Maurer), Box 8; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.46 Patricia Weiss-Fagen, interview with the author, June 29 2010.47 From the Executive Director: Amnesty Action Column, March 11, 1982, page 1; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RGII, Box 4,

Folder B; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.48 From the Executive Director: Amnesty Action Column, March 11, 1982, page 2.49 Telegram from Jack Healey to Thomas Hammarberg, December 10, 1982; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RGII, Box 4, Folder B; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.50 Internal memo from the Campaign Unit / Secretary General’s Office to all National Sections, July 13, 1981, page 8.51 Internal memo from the Campaign Unit / Secretary General’s Office to all National Sections, July 13, 1981, page 10.52 Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), 102.53 Letter from Robert T. Coulter to Michael Ratner, June 30, 1983, page 1; NationalLawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 77; Folder 5; Tamiment Library/Robert F. WagnerLabor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.54 Letter from Steven M. Tullberg to Michael Ratner, July 7, 1983, page 1; NationalLawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 77; Folder 5; Tamiment Library/Robert F. WagnerLabor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.55 Letter from Robert T. Coulter to Michael Ratner, June 30, 1983, page 1.56 Ibid.57 Sklar, 169.58 Johanna Oliver, “The Esquipulas Process: A Central American Paradigm for Resolving Regional Conflict,” Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (July 1999), 153.59 “The Winds of Peace in Central America?” undated, page 1; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador: M94-308, Box 8, Folder 9 (Days of Decision); Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society.60 Letter from National Staff of Days of Decision Campaign to members, November 9, 1987, page 7.61 Ibid.62 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 3; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 4; Folder: Americas – El Salvador -- 1981; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.63 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 4.64 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 5.65 Ibid.66 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 7.67 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 6.68 Michael Ratner, interview with author, February 12, 2010.69 Center for Constitutional Rights, Crockett v. Reagan, http://ccrjUStice.org/ourcases/past-cases/crockett-v.-reagan (November 23, 2010).70 “Judge Approves Plan Blocking Deportation,” New York Times, February 1 1991, A1.71 Michael Ratner, interview with author, February 12 2010.72 Michel Foucault, “Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir,” in Dits et Ecrits vol. 11, (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), 523-4. Trans. by Clare O'Farrell.