ABSTRACT
The Boomerang Pattern: Verification and Modification
When Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink published Activists Beyond Borders in 1998, they offered the emergent field of Human Rights History the first clear model of the relatively new phenomenon ofinternational human rights activism. Termed the Boomerang Pattern, the model demonstrates how NGOs of the (predominantly) Third World work with international NGOs to address human rights violations in their own countries. A document from the archival collection of Amnesty International USA, created in the 1980s butonly available to the public since 2007, verifies the accuracy ofthe Boomerang Pattern in describing the transnational human rights activism. However, the Boomerang Pattern primarily describes how activism is designed to work, rather than present the complications and difficulties that NGOs encounter in their international campaigns. This paper complicates the Boomerang Pattern in order to more accurately describe transnational human rights activism by drawing on examples from the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran human rights movements of the 1980s.
BIOGRAHICAL STATEMENT
David Bassano is an Instructor of History at Brookdale Community College in Lincroft, NJ. His specialization is Human Rights History with a particular focus on human rights NGOs.
The Boomerang Pattern: Verification and Modification
By David Bassano, Department of History, Brookdale CommunityCollege
In Activists Beyond Borders, Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink
create a visual representation of human rights transnational
2
advocacy networks called the Boomerang Pattern. This model
demonstrates how Third World NGOs, prevented by their own
governments from campaigning for justice, work with international
NGOs to influence the global North. This influence causes
governments of the global North to apply pressure to the
offending Third World state, thus forcing social changes that the
Third World NGOs could not accomplish on their own.
Activists Beyond Borders is generally highly-regarded; Thorsten
Benner of UC Berkeley calls it “a pioneer work in the field of
transnational activist networks and a major contribution to the
literature on transnational relations.”1 The Boomerang Pattern
has become one of the most oft-referenced theories in the nascent
field of Human Rights Studies, invoked in dozens of articles and
books to explain the relatively new power of international human
rights advocacy networks. Its explanatory power is such that it
is even used to visualize international networks outside of the
human rights networks that Keck and Sikkink originally examined.
The pattern has been used to describe environmental networks,
such as the global anti-whaling movement,2 and international AIDS
advocacy.3 It has also influenced International Relations
3
studies, with some commentators (most notably Keohane and Nye)
using the theory to demonstrate that the sovereign power of the
nation-state, the core of Realpolitik, is no longer above challenge.
Given its popularity and the complexity of the phenomenon it
describes, the Boomerang Pattern has of course received
considerable scrutiny and criticism. The theory does not “analyze
power relations within NGOs and between NGOs and their partners,”
according to one reviewer;4 others believe that it does not
adequately describe why the international human rights norms
leveraged by activists create pressure on target governments,5 or
that it does not address the role of gender in transnational
activism.6 Even critics of the theory, however, acknowledge its
general utility and believe that it should be further
investigated and developed rather than discarded. This paper is a
contribution to the literature on the Boomerang Pattern, offering
to verify the model’s basic utility as well as complicate and
problematize it.
This paper has three purposes. The first is to demonstrate
the veracity of the Boomerang Pattern by comparing it to a model
from the recently-opened collection of Amnesty International USA
4
(AIUSA). The second is to demonstrate that the interactions
between the local and international NGOs represented in the
pattern flow both ways between the domestic and international
NGOs, not just one-way from the global South as presented in the
Boomerang Pattern. The third is to complicate the model by
representing the global North as not just a source of political
pressure, but rather as a field of conflict. The last two points
will be illuminated through the example of the Nicaraguan and
Salvadoran human rights movements of the 1980s, in which
thousands of local and international NGOs sought to protect the
victims of predominantly right-wing terror. The complications
presented in this paper are meant for students of international
human rights advocacy and social movements, offered in the hope
that it will assist their studies by presenting new explanatory
possibilities for phenomenon they encounter in their own
research.
The Boomerang Pattern – Verification
5
The Boomerang Pattern demonstrates the interaction between
domestic human rights NGOs in countries with abusive governments
and their allies in the international sphere. As Figure 17 shows,
domestic NGOs try to petition their own government (State A) to
stop committing human rights violations. However, due to the
authoritarian nature of the government and the relative weakness
of civil society in the country, the NGOs do not have sufficient
power to influence the government, and may even be targets of
repression themselves; this is diagramed as the “blockage” in the
pattern. The domestic NGOs (or individual activists in some
cases) therefore petition international human rights NGOs for
assistance. The international NGOs have greater freedom of
action, as they generally operate from the global North where
they benefit from stronger civil societies. The domestic NGOs
provide information to the international NGOs about the human
rights situation in the country. The international NGOs – which
often collaborate with each other, as the diagram indicates –
petition the government of their own country (State B), and
intragovernmental organizations such as the UN or OAS, to apply
pressure to the abusive government. Such pressure is possible
6
because State A often needs State B (which is probably wealthier,
as it is generally in the global North) for various forms of
financial and military assistance. By petitioning State B,
whether directly or through a popular movement and in the media,
the international NGOs hope to dissuade State B from providing
assistance to State A. As statesmen do not wish to be viewed as
supporters of human rights abusers, State B may respond by
threatening to withdraw support to State A. In response to this,
State A may modify its behavior to comply with human rights laws
and norms and thus safeguard its aid from State B.
Intragovernmental organizations with power of their own can apply
pressure as well, threatening to ostracize State A. Thus, the
domestic NGOs from State A can apply indirect pressure to their
government by working with international NGOs to petition foreign
governments and intragovernmental organizations.
Pressure
XXX BLOCKAGE XXX
Information
Pressure
STATE B
Intn’l.NGO
DomesticNGO
DomesticNGO
Intragov.
Orgs.
STATE A
7
FIGURE 1 – The Boomerang Pattern
A document from the archival collection of AIUSA (FIGURE 2)
confirms the value of the Boomerang Pattern in describing
international human rights activism. The author is unknown
and the document undated; but the box containing the document
holds records up to 1996, and the document is included among
others from 1983. The diagram in the document describes the
Boomerang Pattern quite clearly, and must have been drawn before
Keck and Sikkink proposed the pattern in Activists Beyond Borders in
1998; nor could Keck and Sikkink have used the document in
formulating the Boomerang Pattern, as the AIUSA collection at
Columbia University was not publicly available before October
2007. The diagrams thus represent independent attempts at
describing international human rights activism.
Intn’l.NGO
Collaborat
8
FIGURE 2 – AIUSA document describing the Boomerang Pattern8
The circles on the left of the diagram are the various
countries in which human rights violations are being committed
according to AI. Information about violations comes from these
countries to “AI HQ” (the International Secretariat in London).
Although the diagram does not specifically show it, the
information would come from domestic NGOs, AI research teams
visiting the countries, and the media. The International
Secretariat (IS) sends the information to the various national
sections of AI, in this case AIUSA. The national office of AIUSA
in New York then disseminates the information to local chapters
around the country, with suggested campaign actions (“what to do”
9
in the diagram). The information is also sent to “opinionmakers”
in the media, government, special interest groups, and “organized
America.” This last may refer to labor unions, churches, or other
human rights NGOs. Also among the targets of AIUSA influence are
“unorganized interested folks,” or civil society in general. The
result of all this is that AIUSA can “bring pressure to bear” on
the countries accused of violating human rights. The diagram also
shows another “boomerang” of interest to an NGO: “money and
feedback” coming back to the organization.
Thus, the document corroborates the Boomerang Pattern in
describing international human rights activism. Neither Keck and
Sikkink’s nor AIUSA’s Boomerang Patterns, however, demonstrate
the conflict which occurs in State B or intragovernmental
organizations to determine whether or not pressure is brought to
bear on State A. The success of the Boomerang Pattern is not
assured. Both diagrams show how the pattern is designed to work,
but are not very detailed about how it actually does work. The
main aspect lacking in both of these diagrams is that they do not
represent the international NGOs or State B as fields of conflict
which determine whether or not pressure is applied to State A.
10
The AIUSA diagram comes closer to doing so because it represents
the various actors in State B, some of which struggle with each
other to determine whether or not pressure will boomerang back on
State A.
The Boomerang Pattern – Modifications
As this paper utilizes the example of the Salvadoran and
Nicaraguan human rights movement of the 1980s to demonstrate the
usefulness of modifying the Boomerang pattern, some background on
the topic is required.
Nineteen-eighty was a watershed year in Central America. In
El Salvador, leftist forces launched a civil war against the
ruling elites and their military allies in response to increasing
economic inequality and decreasing democratization. In Nicaragua,
the Sandinistas attempted to consolidate their revolution after
11
Somoza’s departure, but were unable to compromise with surviving
right-wing elements in Nicaragua. The Carter, and later Reagan,
administrations responded with sanctions against the Sandinistas,
the provision of arms and military advisors to the Salvadoran
junta, and eventually by organization, arming, and training the
contra rebels of Nicaragua. The subsequent fighting left over one
hundred thousand dead in Central America and displaced millions
more. Most independent human rights NGOs affirmed that the lion’s
share of human rights abuses committed in this period were
attributable to U.S.-backed right-wing forces. A loose coalition
of over 2,500 U.S. and international NGOs launched a movement to
protect human rights in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and elsewhere in
Central America, leading to intense political debate within
Congress over U.S. policy.
The human rights campaigns of the 1980s clearly demonstrate
and verify Keck and Sikkink’s Boomerang Pattern of international
activism; this is particularly true of the Salvadoran campaign.
The domestic NGOs of El Salvador, such as Socorro Juridico,
attempted to address the governmental human rights abuses in
their country but were blocked from access to political power by
12
the authoritarian government in San Salvador. They instead worked
with international NGOs, including Amnesty International, to
bypass the blockage. They passed information to international
NGOs and sent speakers to the global North to assist the
international NGOs’ campaigns. The international NGOs used the
information to motivate various actors in the global North,
governmental or otherwise, to pressure the government of El
Salvador to stop the abuses.
At this point, however, a more detailed version of the model
is required to chart not just the Central American campaigns but
most other international human rights campaigns as well. The
purposes of a modified version of the Boomerang Pattern are to
complicate the interactions between domestic and international
NGOs and to problematize the situation in the global North, where
the results of NGO activism are hardly predetermined. To address
the second purpose, the model can be improved by rendering both
State B and international NGOs as fields of conflict which may or
may not bring pressure to bear on State A. This of course comes
as no surprise to experienced activists, but may prove useful to
students of human rights or social movement history who wish to
13
use a fine-grain version of the model to examine and more clearly
represent the international human rights campaigns they are
studying.
Figure C – Modified Boomerang Pattern
The first modification to the model is the addition of an
arrow from the international NGOs back to the domestic NGOs,
indicating that the relationship between them is not merely a
one-way flow of information to the global North. Information,
XXX BLOCKAGE XXX
DomesticNGO
Intn’l.NGO
Intragov.
Orgs.
Intn’l.NGO
STATE A:
JuntaMilitary
Paramilitaries
Executive
STATE B:
ExecutiveLegislati
veJudicial
Contingent Pressure
Contingent
Response
DomesticNGO
Information and
14
material support, technical assistance, volunteers, and witnesses
move from North to South as well.
In the case of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran human rights
movements, the most important exchange between North and South
was human. Solidarity organizations brought activists and other
spokespersons for Central American rights to the United States on
speaking tours. To hear about human rights abuses from a direct
witness is a powerful experience; the abolitionist movement
understood the influence and support that a speaking tour by a
former slave could generate. In 1981, CISPES (Committee in
Solidarity with the People of El Salvador) sponsored speaking
tours by at least a dozen Salvadorans, giving them the
opportunity to speak to audiences across the United States. About
half of the speakers were from educational organizations opposed
to the junta’s policies. They included Armando Olivia, Professor
of Engineering at University of El Salvador and member of the
Independent Movement of Salvadoran Professionals and Technicians
(MIPTES); Mauricio Duarte, a medical student and executive member
of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students
(AGEUS); and Marta Castenon, a primary school teacher and
15
Director of International Relations of the National Association
of Salvadoran Educators (ANDES). The religious community of El
Salvador was represented by Father Jesus Nieto, a Catholic priest
and founder of the Council of Christian Base Communities of El
Salvador. 9 The tours lasted from one to two months.
That same year, CISPES also began hosting visits by members
of the FDR (Frente Democrático Revolucionario, the political arm of the
main Salvadoran rebel group, the FMLN) to commemorate the one-
year anniversary of the founding of the rebel organization. The
program was no doubt facilitated by official CISPES support for
the organizations, something which the nonpartisan AIUSA would
never have granted. These speaking tours were much shorter,
rarely longer than a week. Speakers included Ricardo Melara,
Arnoldo Ramos, Salvador Martinez, Carlos Vela, Jose Escobar, and
Mario Velazquez, all spokesmen for the FDR. The speakers
participated in a wide range of events: panel discussions, press
conferences, radio and TV interviews, question-and-answer
sessions, and lectures to activists, students, religious groups,
and the public at large.10 Overall, the program was deemed a
success, having drawn good press coverage.11
16
However, the number of Central American speakers visiting
the United States was dwarfed by the number of Northern activists
visiting El Salvador and, in particular, Nicaragua. Witness for
Peace facilitated visits by hundreds of activists to El Salvador
and Nicaragua to bear witness to the horrors of the wars and
report them when they returned.12 Many other NGOs sent
“delegations,” as they were termed, to investigate human rights
abuses and monitor elections in Central America in the 1980s. The
People-to-People Exchange Program (PTP) at CISPES was designed to
create personal connections between activists in El Salvador and
the United States. The program ran tours of Salvadoran activists
in the United States; the activists came from Salvadoran NGOs and
were sponsored by participating CISPES chapters.13 The campaign
sponsored 3 or 4 tours per year. The program also sponsored
delegations of 8 or 10 people – lawyers, priests, psychologists,
and human rights activists.14 These delegations had access to
Salvadoran government officials and facilities and were often
accompanied by members of the U.S. Embassy.15 During their
visits, the delegates were treated to tours of prisons and police
stations, with extensive propaganda speeches from Salvadoran
17
officials. The fact that Salvadoran officials dedicated such time
to trying to convince CISPES delegates that the human rights
situation in El Salvador was improving is a strong indication
that they believed CISPES was an influential organization in the
United States. Delegation members were not naïve, however; during
their trips they also visited refugee camps as well as domestic
NGOs such as Socorro Juridico and Tutela Legal, the members of
which told them a very different story of human rights in El
Salvador.16
The National Lawyers Guild (NLG), a progressive U.S. bar
association, also sent delegations throughout the 1980s. The
first week of September, 1980, a delegation of five legal
professionals from the National Lawyers Guild, National
Conference of Black Lawyers, and La Raza Legal Alliance traveled
to El Salvador and met government officials, human rights
activists, and refugees. The delegation was a result of
discussions with Socorro Juridico activist Roberto Cuellar during
his NLG speaking engagement in San Francisco.17 The Salvadoran
junta tried to present itself as a moderate force for reform to
such delegations, but subsequent reports from independent NGOs
18
were usually incriminating. The Salvadoran junta, after one
particularly scathing NLG report, denounced the delegates as
“paid mercenaries.”18 Refusing visas to such delegations would
have been an easy option for the junta, but to do so would have
been an admission that the government had something to hide at a
time when it was insisting that the human rights situation in the
country was improving. The junta preferred to attempt to
influence the delegations instead.
Other activists from the global North included volunteers to
work on development programs in Nicaragua, teaching English as
part of the Sandinistas’ literacy program or assisting with
infrastructure projects. The most famous of these volunteers was
Ben Linder, a young U.S. engineer who was killed by the contras
while working on a hydroelectric project in Nicaragua.
Linder had traveled to Nicaragua in early 1984 to offer his
engineering talents to the Sandinista government. After three
months in the country he was offered a position with the state-
run National Institute of Energy in Managua. Soon he was working
on a small hydroelectric dam in El Cua in northern Nicaragua. The
community of 2000 people had no electricity, no running water or
19
sanitation system, nor even sufficient food for everyone.19 For
an idealistic American engineer who wanted to use his skills to
change the world, it was the perfect place to be, except for the
lethal problem of counter-revolution. The contras had been
operating in the area, destroying infrastructure and terrorizing
the people. As an engineer on a hydroelectric project, Linder
realized that he was a prime target for the contras. It was not
enough to shake his commitment. On April 28, Linder and six of
his Nicaraguan compatriots were killed by the contras as they
went about their work in El Cua.20 There was an outcry by
activists in the United States, and Linder’s family publicly
accused the Reagan Administration of causing his death.21 Vice-
President Bush, White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, and
Assistant Secretary of State Eliot Abrams all stated publicly
that Linder had brought it on himself by working for the
Sandinistas.22 Northern activists in Central America often took
the same risks as their Southern compatriots, creating the most
intimate link in the Boomerang Pattern.
International NGOs can also provide material assistance to
NGOs and other actors in the global South. In the 1980s, New El
20
Salvador Today (NEST) sponsored development projects such as
farms, ranches, fishing installations, and other simple,
grassroots projects in the country. A shoe factory was the most
sophisticated of them.23 Donating NGOs not only raised money from
northern activists, but also from other northern NGOs. By
November 1984, CISPES donations to NEST projects alone totaled
over $53,000.24 The Central America Task Force (CATF) of the NLG
also collected and sent material aid to Nicaragua. In December
1988, Nicaragua was struck by a massive hurricane which
devastated the country. CATF announced an emergency campaign to
collect donations for “building supplies, medicines, blankets,
clothing, and flashlights.”25 In two months, CATF raised over
$10,000 for relief in the country.26 As a bar association,
however, the NLG was particularly interested in helping Nicaragua
improve its legal system. The Guild contributed $5000 to the
construction of a legal aid clinic in Managua.27 It also donated
computers, printers, and photocopy machines to lawyers’
associations, the National Assembly, and the Supreme Court of
Nicaragua, which was still writing out its laws by hand.28
21
Finally, CAFT sent basic school supplies to law school students
in Leon.29
Interestingly, the most important benefit from the exchanges
of activists between the North and South was an increased
dedication on the part of the Northerners. “Nothing activates
people more than delegations!” claimed a CATF newsletter.30
Indeed, it was a visit to Nicaragua which inspired NLG members
Barbara Dudley and Michael Ratner to run for national office of
the NLG and turn the NGO towards Central American concerns.
Dudley remembered:
They [the Sandinistas] were in the process ofwriting a constitution, setting up courts, and generally rebuilding society from the ground up. I don't remember who exactly we met with, but it was very exciting to see a country emerging from a dictatorship and trying to write new rules. And it did cause me to get more involved…in trying to stop ourown government from interfering illegally with what the Nicaraguan people were doing intheir own country.31
When Dudley and Ratner returned from Nicaragua, they decided
to run for national Guild office and then “get it focused on
Central America.”32 At the 1982 NLG national convention in Santa
22
Fe, Ratner ran for President and Dudley for Vice President.
Ratner gave a talk at the convention about the recent Crockett v.
Reagan case, in which movement lawyers challenged U.S. military
aid to El Salvador. As Ratner saw it, involvement in Central
America was “the wave of the next period, and the Guild wanted to
go that way.”33 Consequently, they were both elected to national
office at the convention. Clearly, Ratner and Dudley rode a wave
of interest in Central America that already existed within the
Guild; once in positions of national leadership, however, they
helped the NLG give concrete expression to this interest and keep
the Guild’s Central America programs strong in the early 1980s.
Many other activists, reflecting on their motivations for joining
the movement of the 1980s, cite their Central American
experiences as critical factors in solidifying their dedication
to the cause of peace in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
Another interesting issue about the connections between the
global North and South, domestic and international NGOs, is that
the governments of the nations concerned did not forbid
communication or travel between them in the 1980s. As the
Boomerang Pattern demonstrates, southern and northern NGOs need
23
at least to communicate; they also often send researchers and
delegates. Although opposed to the movement, the Reagan
administration never attempted to prevent travel to Nicaragua, as
it did in the case of Cuba, although INS officers often harassed
those who did travel. The Salvadoran junta did not prevent
northern activists from entering the country, nor did the United
States government uniformly forbid Salvadoran activists from
entering the country for speaking tours (although it did
sometimes deny them visas.) The junta did attempt to suppress the
domestic NGOs, but failed to do so, due to international pressure
and the perseverance of the activists. The offices of Salvadoran
human rights NGOs were constantly raided or closed, and the
activists detained; during one inspection tour, an NLG delegation
found that their visit to the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission
was cancelled because the office was bombed just before their
arrival.34 If the junta and Reagan administration had managed to
either disrupt communications between the Salvadoran activists
and the international NGOs, or intimidate Southern activists into
silence, it would have disrupted the Boomerang Pattern by
breaking the linkages and political pressure between the North
24
and South. While telephones, FAX machines, and cheap airfares are
factors in these linkages, the example of Salvadoran activists
braving torture and death demonstrates the courage and moral
fortitude necessary for the Boomerang Pattern to function. It
also highlights the tenuous nature of international activism. The
linkages between North and South depend mainly on human courage,
not technology. If courage fails, the Boomerang Pattern is
broken.
The reason Reagan and his Salvadoran allies never tried to
completely sever contact between North and South was most likely
the potential damage to their credibility and subsequent loss of
political capital at a time of intense debate in Congress over
aid to the Salvadoran junta and the Contras. The Reagan
administration and the junta both spent most of the 1980s
claiming that the left was committing human rights abuses in El
Salvador and Nicaragua. If that were so, it would have behooved
the conservatives to allow observers, both activists and
journalists, into those countries so that they could observe and
confirm the truth of it. Forbidding travel to those countries
could have been interpreted as an admission of guilt. Also,
25
Barbara Dudley asserted that, with Congress as divided as it was
over Central American issues, congressional support for a blanket
visa denial would have been almost impossible to implement.35
Furthermore, NGOs like AI operated from outside the United
States, in countries with governments which did not necessarily
share Reagan’s assessment of the Central American communist
threat. They could not be prevented from visiting El Salvador or
Nicaragua. Finally, the National Immigration Project at the NLG
launched the Visa Denial Project (VDP) to counter what was
perceived as political interference in granting visas. The VDP
published instructions for legal challenges, ran seminars for
lawyers in visa denial litigation, counseled NGOs, and educated
congressmen and other officials on the issue.36 Due to all these
factors, and the perseverance of the southern activists, the
connective tissue of the Boomerang Pattern held firm.
The second modification of the Boomerang Pattern suggested
by this paper is the complication of events in State B, where the
results of activism are anything but certain. The first
complication is the use of the term “contingent response” to
demonstrate that international NGOs may not choose to support
26
domestic NGOs in State A, or may qualify that support. Two
examples of this from the Central America human rights movement
of the 1980s were AIUSA’s stand on U.S. arms to El Salvador and
the controversy at NLG over support to the Sandinista government.
AI had been involved in the issue of human rights
considerations in arms transfers and economic aid since the ICM
(International Committee Meeting) of 1978. Expanding into the
area of arms control represented a case of widening the AI
mandate beyond the original scope of prisoners of conscience, and
the 1978 meeting made certain this expansion would not jeopardize
AI’s nonpartisan stance. The ICM decided that “AI refrains from
drawing political conclusions and from proposing sanctions
against those governments who are guilty of human rights
violations.”37 By doing so, the NGO hoped to remain free from
political taint and partisanship.
From 1981 to 1983, the Solarz Amendment, passed by Congress,
required the Reagan administration to certify that the Salvadoran
military was complying with international human rights laws in
order to continue receiving military aid; by doing so,
representatives hoped that they could assist the Salvadorans in
27
defeating the leftists without being seen as supporters of war
crimes in Central America. The certification process was largely
a sham because the power to certify the Salvadoran military was
granted to the president himself. Twice in 1980, AIUSA approached
the United States State Department with its concerns about arms
sales to El Salvador. AIUSA blamed Salvadoran government forces,
not the opposition, for most of the abuses in El Salvador and
therefore asked the State Department to reconsider the aid. It
concluded:
Given all this it is indeed reasonable to expect that assistance intended to improve the operational capabilities of the Salvadoran security system, including training and material assistance, will contribute to worsen the human rights situation in that country…we wish to concludeby urging very strongly that your government reconsider its proposed military and securityassistance to El Salvador.38
The wording of the letter is important in light of a
controversy which arose the next year over AI policy towards arms
transfers to El Salvador. The controversy involved whether or not
the wording of this letter constituted AI “opposition” to U.S.
arms transfers to El Salvador, thus violating the AI mandate of
28
nonpartisanship. Although AIUSA asked its members to write to
their congressional representatives to express their concern, it
explicitly told members that AI’s “neutrality” mandate prevented
the NGO from outright opposition to military aid. It was not
enough to prevent confusion and conflict within the organization
over the issue.
AIUSA continued to press the issue with Congress. In August
1980, the CACG (Central America Coordination Group) announced
that the proposed $5.5 million in U.S. aid would contribute to
human rights violations in El Salvador.39 The CACG recommended
that members write letters to express their “concern” about the
transfers to their congressmen and senators, especially members
of key Congressional committees; the letter included a list of
key congressional members provided by the Coalition for a New
Foreign and Military Policy.40
When the FMLN (Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional, the
unified rebel command in El Salvador) launched a major offensive
in 1980, AI announced to its national sections that, given the
Reagan Administration’s assertion that the insurgents were
receiving foreign military aid, “we think it inappropriate…to
29
press US for suspension of military aid…”41 Although the memo did
not bluntly state as much, the inference was that it would be
unfair to ask Salvadoran junta to defend itself against the FMLN
without military assistance, especially since the United States
claimed that the FMLN was receiving foreign aid. This position
was necessary because of AI’s nonpartisan stance: it could not
appear to support any political faction in the conflict, but only
to oppose any human rights abuses which occurred while the
conflict was being fought. This brought a strong negative
response from several national sections which thought that this
represented a new AI stance towards arms transfers which had been
taken unilaterally by the IS.42 The statement claimed that the
new strategy did not represent a change in AI policy towards the
arms exchanges, but rather that “it seemed unwise to press the
point for the time being.”43
It was not without reason that many groups, within AIUSA and
the rest of AI, were confused about AI policy towards arms
transfers. Local groups within several different national
sections called on the IS to press the Reagan administration for
a cessation of aid to El Salvador. All the requests were
30
denied.44 AI’s June 24 1980 letter to the Secretary of State
stated that AI opposed arms transfers where the arms were likely
to be used in human rights violations; it also claimed that
Salvadoran forces were using U.S. arms to commit human rights
abuses.45 The letter, however, did not state that AI opposed the
arms transfers, but only asked that the United States
“reconsider” arms transfers to El Salvador. The logical fallacy
of this did not escape AI activists. If AI opposed arms transfers
where they contributed to human rights abuses, and the
transferred arms were being used in abuses in El Salvador, then
AI must oppose U.S. arms transfers to El Salvador. The IS,
however, felt that this stance violated AI’s nonpartisan mandate.
Therefore, AI only asked the United States to “reconsider” its
aid.
The issue of arms transfers to El Salvador demonstrates the
limits of nonpartisanship in human rights. In order to take a
stance on human rights and maintain nonpartisanship, AI was
forced into a confusing case of doublespeak. As Refugee Committee
Chair Patricia Weiss-Fagen put it: “Welcome to the world of…
31
delicate political maneuvering of organizations that want to be
credible on all sides.”46
AIUSA constantly strove to clarify to the American public,
as well as to its own membership, its position on U.S. arms to El
Salvador and the certification process. In a March 1982 column in
Amnesty Action, the AIUSA member newsletter, Executive Director
Jack Healey stated that there were many issues around El Salvador
which AI would not address, “such as whether U.S. military aid to
El Salvador should be cut off or continued; what type of
government El Salvador should have; or what influence other
Central American governments are asserting over events in El
Salvador.”47 He concluded, “Sometimes AI members become
frustrated or confused by the limits of our mandate. We must
never forget, though, what these limits are if we want to
maintain the credibility we’ve painstakingly built up over the
years.”48
Apparently the frustrated parties were in the national
section headquarters itself. In a December 10 1982 letter to the
IS, Jack Healey said that the AIUSA Board of Directors, at its
December meeting, had passed a resolution asking the IS for two
32
things. First, it requested all information the IS had on the
human rights situation in El Salvador since July 1982 be
delivered by early January; second, that “AI consider the grounds
cited for Presidential certification required by law and if
judged to be contradictory to AI information, take a public stand
on them and on the certification process itself.”49 However, the
IS reported that the Washington DC office of AIUSA had asked the
IS not to take a stand on the certification, because the office
felt that it would strain their relations with the United States
government. At least some leaders at AIUSA, it appeared, were
keen to protect what they took to be a useful relationship with
that government, even at the expense of the arms issue.
On July 13, the IS sent an internal memo to all national
sections to clarify AI’s stance towards U.S. arms transfers to El
Salvador. After once more asserting that AI did not oppose U.S.
arms transfers to El Salvador, but only asked that the United
States “reconsider” its aid in light of the human rights
situation in that country, it then recounted a short history of
United States-AI communications on the matter. The memo then
noted that, perhaps out of confusion, several AI sections and
33
even an IS circular had misstated AI’s position. Groups in AIUSA
as well as the Canadian section had sent letters to the Secretary
of State asking him to end military aid to El Salvador, even
though this was not AI policy.50 The IS made it clear that such
breaches of policy could not be tolerated. “It is imperative,"
stated the IS, “that the movement speak with one voice and is
seen to be doing so. The chain of authority and the procedures to
be followed throughout the organization need to be clear,
specific, and carefully adhered to.”51
Despite AI’s careful maneuvering to protect its reputation
for nonpartisanship, its relationship with conservative elements
in the United States government was strained. AI’s reporting
countered the image of El Salvador which the administration
sought to project: that of a nation under attack from worldwide
communism. Even if AI did not directly attack the Reagan
administration’s arms transfer policy, attacking the
administration’s representation of El Salvador could be just as
damaging, since it meant attacking the foundations on which the
policy was built. In any case, the point of arms transfers was
moot by the end of 1983; Reagan allowed the human rights
34
certification program to terminate by pocket veto, removing all
congressional oversight of arms transfers to El Salvador.
Simultaneously, another debate ignited within NLG over the
NGO’s support of the Sandinistas. Reports were spreading in the
United States that the Sandinistas were abusing the indigenous
Miskitu population of the Nicaraguan Atlantic Coast. After the
Sandinista revolution, some members of the Miskitu community
joined with other indigenous groups in Nicaragua to form
MISURSATA, a political group to press claims for greater
political autonomy within the state. However, the Sandinistas
believed that one of the MISURSATA leaders, Steadman Fagoth, was
fomenting a counter-revolution against the government. In 1981 he
was arrested, but in a show of good faith the Sandinistas
released him. He went into exile in Honduras, taking 1000
Miskitus with him, and formed an anti-Sandinista guerilla unit
allied with the FDN, the main contra group.52 Afterward, rumors
and reports of Sandinista atrocities and forced relocations
against the Miskitu population began to spread and were quickly
picked up by the Reagan administration as part of its propaganda.
In 1983, the reports of Sandinista atrocities became of topic of
35
debate within the Guild. While many in the movement put such
reports down to CIA propaganda, some in the NLG – particularly
those who worked mainly on indigenous rights issues – vehemently
protested NLG support for the Sandinistas.53 It is clear that by
mid-1983 a heated debate had erupted between different committees
of the NLG as well as with the Indian Law Resource Center (ILRC).
The debate centered on the Guild’s relationship with, and policy
towards, the Sandinista government. The ILRC, represented in this
matter by Steven Tullberg and Robert Coulter, wanted the NLG to
ask the Sandinistas to investigate the alleged abuses of Miskitu
Indians in Nicaragua, believing that the Guild had some influence
with that government.54
Neither NLG President Michael Ratner nor Vice President
Barbara Dudley wanted the Guild to take up the issue. The first
problem was the CIA misinformation campaign, which both believed
was at least partly responsible for reports of abuses by the
Sandinistas. Neither Americas Watch nor Amnesty International
believed that the reports of Sandinista atrocities were true.
Ratner apparently also felt that the ILRC was supporting
MISURASATA and was therefore in the anti-Sandinista camp.55 He
36
also recognized that some Miskitus were pro-Sandinista. Myrna
Cunningham, for example, was the main plaintiff in the NLG case
of Sanchez / Espinoza v. Reagan; she was a Miskitu Indian doctor who
had been raped by the Contras. She supported the Sandinistas, and
to this day is still a parliamentarian in Nicaragua.56 In
Ratner’s view, the ILRC was using CIA disinformation, possibly in
support of anti-Sandinistas, and misrepresenting the entire
Miskitu community as anti-Sandinista.
A second problem was that the NLG, at the Santa Fe
conference, had passed a resolution in support of the Sandinista
government. Some within the Guild – Ratner and Dudley among them
– felt that to support the ILRC in its claims against the
Sandinistas would go against the resolution and give more
ammunition to the Reagan Administration.
Despite considerable debate within the NLG on not only the
NGO’s position on the Sandinistas, but also on its policy-setting
procedures, the NLG never reversed its policy of supporting the
Sandinista government. The cases of AIUSA and NLG demonstrate the
contingent nature of international NGOs’ response to reported
human rights violations. Clearly, the international NGOs make
37
their own decisions and do not necessarily follow the Boomerang
Pattern.
The second modification of the Boomerang Pattern is the
representation of both states as fields of conflict which may or
may not result in pressure on State A as a result of NGO
activism. The various actors in this conflict are listed
individually and linked together in the modified model because
the conflict between them determines government policy and thus
the outcome of the activism. In State B – in the case of the
Central America human rights movement, the United States -- it
was the three branches of government, plus the media and civil
society, which engaged in the struggle (civil society here
referring to the “various unorganized folks” of the AI model).
This model could be rendered as detailed as a researcher might
require, showing the numerous actors who eventually determine
government policy. State A is also rendered as a field of
conflict. In the case of El Salvador, certain segments of the
state could have opposed governmental abuses. For example, the
civilian members of the junta quit the government in 1981 to
protest the lack of support for reforms; President Duarte also
38
favored reforms such as land redistribution. However, the
oligarchy, military, and paramilitaries were generally too
powerful and resisted nonviolent pressure for change.
Intergovernmental organizations such as the UN and OAS were also
involved in the conflict and their decisions were also the result
of conflict between various actors. For example, a legal struggle
led to the International Court of Justice’s decision that the
United States had violated international law by mining
Nicaragua’s harbors. The case of Nicaragua v. United States, brought
before the ICJ in 1984, found that the United States had acted
contrary to international law by supporting the contra rebels who
were, among other things, mining Nicaraguan harbors.57 The Reagan
administration refused to accept the authority of the ICJ and did
not comply with the findings. However, the finding did affect the
peace process in Central America, because it leant credibility to
the Nicaraguan government and gave the Sandinistas the
opportunity to sue Honduras at the ICJ, since that country was
providing the contras with staging bases in its territory.58 This
increased international clout helped spur the participation of
Central American governments in the regional peace process.
39
During the 1980s, it was primarily the struggle between the
Reagan Administration and its opponents in the Legislative Branch
which determined whether or not pressure was applied to State B
(El Salvador). Many NGOs in the movement carried out campaigns to
influence representatives on points of Central America policy.
CISPES specialized mainly in populist activism – that is,
activism based on large-scale participation by the masses, such
as protests, congressional pressure, and teach-ins. Throughout
the 1980s, CISPES attempted to influence congressional
representatives on votes on aid to the contras and Salvadoran
military. For example, the final major CISPES campaign of the
1980s was called Days of Decision, launched in August 1987. The
“decision” was whether or not the U.S. government would support
the Esquipulas II peace treaty, signed by the Contadora group on
August 7 1987, or try to stymie the process and continue the war
through aid to El Salvador and the contras.59 The Reagan
administration was not satisfied with Esquipulas because it
allowed leftist forces to participate in the political process in
Central America. The Days of Decision campaign was active
throughout the entire congressional debate over Central America
40
aid until December 1987. A campaign report claimed that from the
start of the campaign to the beginning of November, members had
carried out over 350 delegation visits to congressional
representatives, made over 5000 phone calls, and sent them over
100,000 letters and postcards.60 Across the country, members held
vigils with, on average, about 100 people attending each of
them.61 The campaign was unsuccessful in preventing U.S. support
to the Salvadoran military or the contras.
The conflict was also played out in the Judicial Branch as
the NLG and Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed cases to
stop the administration from carrying out its Central America
program. The first legal challenge to the Reagan administration
was in May of 1981, when the CCR filed a lawsuit against the
Reagan Administration on behalf of Congressmen George W. Crockett
and 28 other Congressional representatives. Although CCR was the
lead NGO in the lawsuit, the NLG was deeply involved as well. The
suit, filed in Federal Court in Washington DC, asked the court
“to issue an order requiring the President to withdraw all U.S.
armed forces from El Salvador and end all military aid to the
ruling junta.”62 The suit claimed that Reagan had sent at least
41
56, and possibly more, U.S. military personnel to El Salvador,
along with $25 million in military aid.63 The suit was based on
two pieces of legislation: The War Powers Resolution and the
Foreign Assistance Act.
The suit first claimed that Reagan’s military assistance to
El Salvador was a breach of the War Powers Resolution of 1973.
The Resolution was passed at the end of the U.S. war in Vietnam,
and was designed to remove from the White House the sole power to
wage war.64 It was felt that, by placing war-making power in the
hands of Congress, the United States could avoid involvement in a
war which did not serve the public interest. The Resolution
therefore required that the President “can only send military
personnel into a country at war for a period of sixty days unless
Congress specifically approves those military personnel remaining
for a longer period.”65 By the time the suit was launched, U.S.
military personnel had been in El Salvador for about three months
– perhaps thirty days past the deadline under the War Powers
Resolution.
The second claim of the suit was that the intervention
violated the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. This act prevented
42
the United States from providing military aid to any country
found guilty of gross human rights violations.66 As evidence that
the Salvadoran government was responsible for grievous violations
of human rights, the plaintiffs submitted reports from Amnesty
International, the Legal Department of the Archdiocese in El
Salvador, the annual report of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights at the OAS, and the El Salvador Human Rights
Commission.67
On the face of it, the suit was a failure. In 1983, Judge
Joyce Green ruled that the case for a violation of the War Powers
Resolution presented “unmanageable standards” for the court,
because the number of U.S. personnel in El Salvador was so small.
NLG attorney Michael Ratner explained that, had there been
thousands of U.S. troops in El Salvador, the situation would have
been obvious; but with only a few dozen personnel in the country,
Judge Green claimed that she was unable to assess the situation,
thus creating unmanageable standards for the court.68 The count
of violation against the Foreign Assistance Act fared no better.
Ratner noted that, “with regard to the human rights claims, Judge
Green held that the plaintiffs’ dispute was really with fellow
43
members of Congress” and not within the court’s authority.69 The
NLG and CCR filed several other complaints in federal court
during the 1980s over Reagan’s Central America policy, but none
succeeded in preventing the administration from carrying out its
aims. The cases did, however, bring Central American abuses to
the public’s attention through the media coverage the cases
invoked.
The Nicaraguan case was different in that the primary
abuser, as far as the movement was concerned, was the U.S. –
supported contra insurgency. In this case, the international NGOs
were protesting the actions of a paramilitary force essentially
run by the Reagan administration; therefore, the U.S. government
was the primary target of the activism. Protesting the abuses
perpetrated by one nation against another is not unheard of in
international human rights activism; AI protested against Israeli
actions in Lebanon, for example. While such activism does not
exactly match the Boomerang Pattern, it is still made on behalf
of those who are unable to effectively defend themselves from
abuse: civilians in a combat zone.
44
NGO pressure may not bring about the desired results and
close the Boomerang Pattern. In the case of the Central America
human rights movement in the 1980s, the movement produced, at
best, ambivalent results. The movement never prevented the U.S.
government from providing aid to either the Salvadoran military
or the contras, even after the Iran / Contra scandal. It may have
reduced the amount of aid provided at certain points, but it
never succeeded in its goal of halting U.S. aid to human rights
violators. The movement was more successful in assisting Central
American refugees in the United States by defending their rights
under U.S. immigration law. Immigration lawyers helped many
refugees remain in the country while their cases dragged on for
years. Only about 3 percent of the 500,000 Salvadoran refugees in
the United States in the 1980s were granted political asylum.70
As asylum seekers returned to El Salvador were being abused or
even killed by security forces, legal assistance to help the
refugees remain in the United States while their claims were
being processed, and their asylum denials challenged, saved them
from facing possible extrajudicial execution in El Salvador.
Michael Ratner claims that the NLG helped “hundreds of thousands”
45
of refugees settle in the United States.71 Furthermore, by
protecting the Sanctuary movement and helping it continue to
operate, the NLG contributed to the safety of the refugees under
Sanctuary’s protection. Such activism, however, is not part of
the Boomerang Pattern. This demonstrates that the Boomerang
Pattern does not represent all aspects of international human
rights activism.
Conclusion
The three aims of this article have been to prove the
general utility of the Boomerang Pattern by comparing it to a
similar model produced by Amnesty International, to complicate
the flow of information, people, and support between northern and
southern activists, and to problematize the Boomerang Pattern by
representing the global North as a field of conflict between
activists and the government, as well as within NGOs themselves.
As such, it resonates with the views of most commentators by
proving the veracity of the model while using historical examples
to complicate the theory and improve its usefulness.
46
When this paper was first presented at the 7th Spring
Academy at the Heidelberg Center for American Studies in March
2010, participants suggested many other ways that the Boomerang
Pattern model could be modified. During the 1980s, there must
have been debate within intragovernmental organizations over
Central America, making their responses as contingent as those of
the United States government or the NGOs; should this be
represented in the model? Since the Reagan administration was
trying to counter the reporting of the international NGOs, does
that warrant another “blockage” in the pattern? Did the domestic
NGOs of El Salvador directly petition the government of the
United States, and should this be represented in the model? Given
the intricacies of international human rights activism, the
Boomerang Pattern could be complicated to an impractical degree.
The actors involved in supporting or resisting international
campaigns constantly seek new pathways to power and ways to
influence events and discourses; the records of AIUSA, NLG, and
CISPES from the 1980s contain thousands of documents suggesting
new projects and campaigns to support the NGOs’ goals in Central
America, often demonstrating great creativity and a keen
47
understanding of both activism and politics. Perfectly charted, a
fine-grain reading of an international human rights campaign
would resemble an explosion of exchanges and influences as the
actors try to leverage every opportunity available – in short,
arrows all over.
Creating a model to fit every international human rights
campaign would be impossible. The point of the model is to
challenge researchers in their understandings of particular
movements, goading them into deeper investigation of the
exchanges and problems inherent in transnational activism. It may
also present researchers with a way to account for phenomenon
they encounter in their studies of particular movements. Accuracy
in modeling is not as important as general utility or, better
still, in provoking questions. As Michel Foucault put it: “I
would like my books to be a kind of tool-box which others can
rummage through to find a tool which they can use however they
wish in their own area...I don't write for an audience, I write
for users, not readers.”72 If the users happen to be activists,
then the toolbox of the Boomerang Pattern might assist them in
clarifying and leveraging means to power in protecting human
48
rights worldwide. For too many people in the world, such concerns
are not theoretical, but rather immediate matters of life and
death.
1 Thorsten Benner, “Margaret E. Keck, Kathryn Sikkink, Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 28 (1), page 188.2 Gloria Yolanda Guevara, 2008. Assessing the effectiveness of transnational activism: an analysis of the anti-whaling and anti-sealing campaigns. PhD diss, University of Southern California.3 Eduard Grebe, “Networks of Influence: A theoretical review and proposed approach to AIDS treatment activism,” aids2031 Working Group.4 Jan Aart Scholte, “Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by Margaret E. Keck; Kathryn Sikkink.” International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2 (April 1999), page 394.5 Darren Hawkins, “Transnational Activists as Motors for Change; Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by Margaret E. Keck; Kathryn Sikkink.” International Studies Review, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring, 1999), pp. 119-122.6 Karen Beckwith, “Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics by Margaret E. Keck; Kathryn Sikkink; Women Transforming Politics: An Alternative Reader by Cathy J. Cohen; Kathleen B. Jones; Joan C. Tronto.” Signs, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Winter, 2001), pp. 602-606.7 Adapted from Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink , Activists Beyond Borders (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 13.8 Undated notes; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG XI, SS 2.4, Box 406, Folder 10; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.9 Evaluation of CISPES Tours, Northwest Region, Undated, page 11; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador: M94-308, Box 6, Folder: CISPES Tours 1981; Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society.10 Evaluation of CISPES Tours, Northwest Region, Undated, page 1.11 Evaluation of CISPES Tours, Northwest Region, Undated, page 3.12 Christian Smith, Resisting Reagan: The US Central America Peace Movement (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 70.13 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 1; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador: M94-308, Box 2, Folder E: Internal DiscUSsion Papers, 1984; Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society.14 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 15.15 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 23.16 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 15.17 “Application for NLG Development Fund Grant”, November 24, 1980, pg. 1; NationalLawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 73; Folder 10; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.18 Central America Newsletter, December 1988, page 3; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 68; Folder 25; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.19 Jules Lobel, Success Without Victory: Lost Legal Battles and the Long Road to JUStice in America (NY: NYU Press, 2006), 214.20 Lobel, 222. 21 Lobel, 225.22 Lobel, 222.23 People-to-People Exchange Program Report for NAC, December 1984, page 12.24 Ibid.
25 Letter from Debra Evanson to Guild Members, November 1, 1988; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 68; Folder 25; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.26 Central America Newsletter, December 1988, page 3.27 Ibid.28 Ibid.29 Ibid.30 Central America Newsletter, AugUSt 1989, page 6; National Lawyers Guild Records;TAM 191; Box 68; Folder 25; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, ElmerHolmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.31 Barbara Dudley, e-mail to author, July 21, 2010.32 Ibid.33 Michael Ratner, interview with author, February 12, 2010.34 “Lawyers Delegation Reports on Effects of Violence in El Salvador on the Legal System”, Sept. 22, 1980, pg. 2; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 73; Folder 10; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.35 Barbara Dudley, e-mail to author, July 21, 2010.36 Memo from Daniel A. Katz to NIP Steering Committee re: CARDF Report for SteeringCommittee Meeting of 12/87, Nov. 21, 1987, p. 11; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 76; Folder 20; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, ElmerHolmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.37 Memo re: International Meeting on Military, Economic, and Cultural Relations andMilitary, Security, and Police Transfers, 15 March 1983, page 2; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG II, Series 3, Box 23, Folder for Meeting on MEC and MSP; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.38 Ibid.39 CACG to CASA Groups, “US Military Assistance to El Salvador,” AugUSt 1980, pg. 1; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG IV, S. 1, SS3 (Maurer), Box 8; Folder: Co-Groups and CASA, 1 of 2, 1980-1982; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.40 “US Military Assistance to El Salvador,” pg. 2.41 Ibid.42 Internal memo from the Campaign Unit / Secretary General’s Office to all National Sections, July 13, 1981, page 6; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG IV, S. 1, SS 3 (Maurer), Box 10; Folder: Co-Groups and CASA, 1 of 2, 1980-1982; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.43 Ibid.44 International MEC Bulletin, January 1983, page 2; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG II, Series 3, Box 26, Folder: 1983 Background Material; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.45 Letter of 24 June 1980 to Secretary of State Edmund MUSkie;” Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RG IV, S. 1, SS 3 (Maurer), Box 8; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.46 Patricia Weiss-Fagen, interview with the author, June 29 2010.47 From the Executive Director: Amnesty Action Column, March 11, 1982, page 1; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RGII, Box 4,
Folder B; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.48 From the Executive Director: Amnesty Action Column, March 11, 1982, page 2.49 Telegram from Jack Healey to Thomas Hammarberg, December 10, 1982; Amnesty International of the USA, Inc.: National Office Records, RGII, Box 4, Folder B; Rare Book and ManUScript Library, Columbia University Library.50 Internal memo from the Campaign Unit / Secretary General’s Office to all National Sections, July 13, 1981, page 8.51 Internal memo from the Campaign Unit / Secretary General’s Office to all National Sections, July 13, 1981, page 10.52 Holly Sklar, Washington’s War on Nicaragua (Cambridge, MA: South End Press, 1999), 102.53 Letter from Robert T. Coulter to Michael Ratner, June 30, 1983, page 1; NationalLawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 77; Folder 5; Tamiment Library/Robert F. WagnerLabor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.54 Letter from Steven M. Tullberg to Michael Ratner, July 7, 1983, page 1; NationalLawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 77; Folder 5; Tamiment Library/Robert F. WagnerLabor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.55 Letter from Robert T. Coulter to Michael Ratner, June 30, 1983, page 1.56 Ibid.57 Sklar, 169.58 Johanna Oliver, “The Esquipulas Process: A Central American Paradigm for Resolving Regional Conflict,” Ethnic Studies Report, Vol. XVII, No. 2 (July 1999), 153.59 “The Winds of Peace in Central America?” undated, page 1; Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador: M94-308, Box 8, Folder 9 (Days of Decision); Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society.60 Letter from National Staff of Days of Decision Campaign to members, November 9, 1987, page 7.61 Ibid.62 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 3; National Lawyers Guild Records; TAM 191; Box 4; Folder: Americas – El Salvador -- 1981; Tamiment Library/Robert F. Wagner Labor Archives, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University Libraries.63 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 4.64 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 5.65 Ibid.66 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 7.67 Letter from Michael Ratner to Gerhard Elston, AugUSt 18, 1981, page 6.68 Michael Ratner, interview with author, February 12, 2010.69 Center for Constitutional Rights, Crockett v. Reagan, http://ccrjUStice.org/ourcases/past-cases/crockett-v.-reagan (November 23, 2010).70 “Judge Approves Plan Blocking Deportation,” New York Times, February 1 1991, A1.71 Michael Ratner, interview with author, February 12 2010.72 Michel Foucault, “Prisons et asiles dans le mécanisme du pouvoir,” in Dits et Ecrits vol. 11, (Paris: Gallimard, 1974), 523-4. Trans. by Clare O'Farrell.
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