The Assessment of Existing Government Interventions in Alleviating Urban Poverty

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The Assessment of Existing Government Interventions in Alleviating Urban Poverty A Policy Paper by Jess Christian D. Ramirez Political Science 14 Prof. Alicor L. Panao, PhD. May 2014

Transcript of The Assessment of Existing Government Interventions in Alleviating Urban Poverty

The Assessment of Existing Government Interventions in

Alleviating Urban Poverty

A Policy Paper by

Jess Christian D. Ramirez

Political Science 14

Prof. Alicor L. Panao, PhD.

May 2014

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Poverty is defined as an individual’s lack of resources or

opportunities necessary to sustain just, sufficient, and suitable

living conditions. In economics, several tools are utilized in

order to measure poverty. One is through poverty incidence, a

mechanism wherein the income of the general population is

censured and classified as poor or not based on a standard called

the poverty threshold (Institute for Research in Poverty 2012).

Urban Poverty on the other hand is defined as the kind of poverty

that can be found in the urban areas of a country or state.

Division of the poor as to being part of the urban poor or rural

poor is deemed necessary because the knowledge of the

demographics of the poor will assist lawmakers and administrators

of programs to alleviate poverty in tailor fitting programs that

will be applicable for each type.

In the Philippines, poverty is addressed though a form of

conditional cash transfer (CCT) called the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino

Program (4Ps). Its concept was based on the Bolsa Familia in Brazil,

Familias en Accion in Colombia and OPORTUNIDADES in Mexico. Its

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structure is claimed to be both a welfare program and a method of

breaking the intergenerational cycle of poverty (DSWD 2014).

Its constitutionality was based from Article 2, Section 9 of the

Constitution which provides that:

“The State shall promote a just and dynamic

social order that will ensure the prosperity and

independence of the nation and free the people from

poverty through policies that provide adequate social

services, promote full employment, a rising standard of

living, and an improved quality of life for all.”

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Having a basic mechanism similar to any conditional cash transfer

program, beneficiaries of the 4Ps will be given cash in exchange

of certain requirements, in this case, to ensure the health of

pregnant women and the education of children until certain age of

maturity.

The Department of Social Work and Development (DSWD) is the lead

executing agency of this program. On the other hand, the National

Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB) is responsible for

conducting surveys through Small Area Estimate – a statistical tool

for estimating poverty incidence by combining survey and census

data of cities and municipalities. The benefits that will be

received by the 4Ps beneficiaries are as follows: health grant of

P500/month (or P6000/year), P300 per children enrolled (in either

preschool, elementary or high school) or P3600/year per children,

with a maximum of 3 children per household (Defensor-Santiago,

2010).

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Households that are classified as Extremely Poor, those that have

an individual earning of P 27.20 per day or P830.00 per month,

will be prioritized in the program. Poor households, on the other

hand, will be prioritized right after the Extremely Poor

households. Poor households are those that are able to provide

for their nutritional needs but are not able to provide their

other basic needs, such as clothing, shelter, and health. Based

on the NSCB data, a family that is poor earns P41.40 per day or

P1242 per month (Defensor-Santiago 2010).

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All beneficiaries of the 4Ps must comply with the conditions set

by the DSWD. Children 3-5 years of age must enroll in a daycare

program or preschool and children 6-14 years of age must enroll

in school. Both age groups must attain 85% attendance of the

required school days. Children 0-5 years of age must complete all

vaccines provided by the Department of Health (DOH) through their

respective municipal or barangay health centers. Pregnant women

must also ensure the local government officials or health workers

that they have completed their pre-natal checkups which are done

monthly or as frequent as they were required by the doctor.

Lastly, parents and guardians must attend Parenting Workshops and

Seminars conducted by the DSWD. Failure to comply with these

conditions may lead to suspension or revocation of the benefits

from the 4Ps as addressed by the Grievance Redress System

(Defensor-Santiago 2010).

On the other hand, the crafting of the Presidential Commission

for the Urban Poor (PCUP) has roots that can be traced from

Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod (KPML) which was a

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product of the dialogue with then President Corazon Aquino in

1986, set into landmark by means of Executive Order 82. Its main

function is to organize, support and lead the Urban Poor. Its

organization is headed by the PCUP Chairman/CEO then followed by

five PCUP Commissioners. Area Coordinators will also be assigned

throughout the designated areas order to ensure proper

implementation of PCUP’s programs and services (PCUP 2013).

PCUP’s programs and services can be summarized into three basic

types. First is Urban Poor Organization (UPO) Accreditation which

can either be occupation-based or community-based. This is due to

the fact that the PCUP serves as the official link of the urban

poor to the

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government and NGOs which can open to opportunities such as

partnerships and community development programs. Second, is

increasing the urban poor’s access to land and housing. And

third, in coordinating, monitoring, evaluating and promoting the

rights of the urban poor especially on shelter-related cases

(PCUP 2013).

The analysis of the effectiveness of the two existing measures

can be summed up into five arguments that would be presented in

this policy paper. These five arguments would serve as the core

of the paper and will address the strengths and weaknesses of the

existing government programs in targeting the problem of urban

poverty and poverty in the general context. The arguments also

aims to lay the frameworks for possible solutions that may either

be derived from existing methods or a completely new concept

addressing the flaws of current solutions being implemented. In

line with these, the threats and opportunities that would be

encountered while laying the proposed solutions will also be

discussed in order to further elaborate on the issues at hand.

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The first argument revolves around the issue regarding the scope

of urban poverty – it is not merely confined to the boundaries of

the metropolitan areas, but is linked to poverty incidence in

rural areas as well (PCUP Poverty Statistics 2013) [1]. It can be

reflected all throughout this material that the analysis of urban

poverty is not separated from the analysis of poverty in general

mainly because of the tendency of people in the rural areas who

experience poverty to

migrate to urban regions. This contributes to the bubble of

poverty incidence in the urban setting. The table given by the

PCUP shows two crucial points, one is that the people who are

considered “poor” and “extremely poor” based on the national

poverty incidence resides mostly along the rural areas, and the

other is that migrants to the Metros are amongst those who came

from these poorest rural areas. Therefore, in order to

efficiently provide a solution to urban poverty, administrators

and implementers of programs should not isolate the problem

within the confines of the metros but rather, they should1 See Table 1 of Figures and Tables

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consider the trend of poverty and migration on the outskirts of

the urban areas, more importantly in the poorest of the poor

rural areas. Failure to address the poverty incidence in these

rural areas, in effect, contributes to the endless cycle of

failure in addressing the poverty incidence in the urban region.

Second, in support of the aforementioned point, it is argued that

the centralization of key projects in Metro Manila (NCR) and

other key cities entices migration of people from the provinces

(Dumaraog et al 2012) resulting to an unbalanced number of

migrants and job opportunities, wherein migrants exceed the

number of jobs available, resulting to an increase in

unemployment in these cities (Maquito 2012). In Metro Manila

alone, people from Region V ranked first in internal migration,

has moved from the rural areas to the NCR (Dumaraog et al 2012).

The migrant bubble reflected by this figure can be equated to the

bubble of urban poverty. In the recently conducted job fair (ABS-

CBN News 2014) for Metro Manila, only 116,000 job vacancies were

offered, a figure which is less than half the number of

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unemployed in Metro Manila alone (Ambanta 2013). Aside from the

depleting opportunities for migrants to get work, this scenario

can be worsened by the job mismatch (Waga 2014) wherein there is

a disparity

between the requirements set by employers and the skills set and

educational attainment of migrant applicants, leading to a

condition called “underemployment”.

Setting a cap on government spending and allocation of funds,

such as Internal Revenue Allotment, for first class cities and

municipalities will decentralize key projects in these

progressing areas; at the same time, providing greater allotment

for lower level municipalities in the rural areas. Given the

existing structure for the allocation of the IRA, fund

distribution is determined only through land area and population

(DBM Reports 2013). Capping on the IRA allotment of key cities

will give opportunities to low level municipalities to develop

more programs for its development through the raise in allocation

that will be given (Quitasol 2013). On the other hand, political

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watchdog groups and agencies that ensure proper spending of

government funds should be strengthened in order to police

possible acts of corruption through the said raise.

The next argument that should be taken into account is that the

commissioning of the PCUP establishes a wide span of control

among government agencies that employ measures to lessen the

incidence of poverty. It is clear that whenever urban poverty is

raised, PCUP is not the first agency that comes to mind but

rather the more renowned cabinet positions such as the National

Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the Department of Social

Welfare (DSWD) or the National Census and Statistical

Coordination (NSCB) for statistical figures and values. Thus,

commissioning the PCUP created another arm to take care of the

Urban Poor.

The welfare and interaction mechanism employed by the PCUP is

through Community Development of the urban poor through

accreditation of Urban Poverty Organizations (UPO) and then

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establishing links for the UPOs to NGOs and local and national

government, interfering with the functions of the DSWD as the

chief department assigned for development and community building

(DSWD 2010). The PCUP, as the chief liaison of the urban poor to

the local and national government, is also tasked to the draft

proposals and projects that will benefit the UPOs in general,

which requires them to conduct tedious research and census

amongst the urban poor community. These actions might interfere

with the tasks of the NEDA and NSCB which reside upon economic

analysis (Ang Misyong NEDA 2010) and censure (The Philippine

Statistical Act 2013). These cited overlapping of the tasks of

the PCUP with the DSWD, NEDA and NSCB can be a cause of

misinformation among the general public especially when it comes

to annual reports of poverty incident or poverty threshold, for

example.

A good case in point to consider is the contradictory values

given by the NEDA and NSCB as cited in one of the interviews to

the recent NEDA chief that came a few months after the NSCB has

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prepared its Filipino Nutritional Cookbook which entails daily

meals that ranges from P50-P100 for the breakfast, lunch and

dinner. According to him, it takes P1000/day per family for them

to live decently, a figure ten times larger than the one provided

by the NSCB. Finally, when it comes to the issue of urban poor,

the commissioning of another arm might lead to pointing fingers

as to whether which arm or department has the responsibility of

taking care of the urban poor sector. Drawing clear lines between

the organizational charts of the three agencies will eliminate

overlapping of functions between the three agencies and thus

allowing them to focus on whichever task should be done by their

respected arm.

Also, despite the proposed statistical measure by the DSWD in

locating the “poorest of the poor,” the identification of CCT

beneficiaries can lead to a lot of conflict. There is no

mechanism for checks and balances for the selection process done

by the DSWD. As the executive implementing agency of the program,

all the work and power allocated in the selection of the

beneficiaries is vested upon the DSWD. No appeals, inquiries and

other similar can be address to a different department or

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committee and thus collusion amongst official and employees of

the DSWD may result to an incompetent selection resulting to

ghost, incompetent and unqualified beneficiaries. The creation of

an inquiry body that is outside the DSWD might be able to provide

checks for whatever decision done by the DSWD regarding the

awarding of the benefits of the program, at the same time, the

clause that allows local executives to be in aid of the DSWD

personnel in seeking for the beneficiaries may lead to

politicking – a concretization of which would be the boom of

registration of the 4Ps happening around 2011 and 2012 (Ordinario

2012), which is very close to the local elections done last 2013.

A probable amendment to this is to limit or to close the

registration upon a certain period before and after election.

This is effect will dissolve the patronage system, wherein the

entitlement of becoming a 4Ps beneficiary will be given to

supporters of local executives.

Lastly, the conditional cash transfer framework of the Pantawid

Pamilyang Pilipino Program (4Ps) of the DWSD will not necessarily

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solve the problem of poverty. Despite providing incentives to

families that ensure attendance of children to schools and

routine checkups of pregnant mothers, the 4Ps does not gear

implementing agencies such as the Department of Education and

Department of Health in providing these social services as

evident with the lack of classrooms, seats, books, teachers and

medication. Now that the DSWD boast its one million

strong in terms of beneficiaries, the expenditure of the DSWD for

these beneficiaries can be allotted to the lack of facilities and

materials mentioned above. With one million beneficiaries who get

a premium of up to P1400 per month, expenditure amounts to P16.8

Billion per year. The said amount, at a price of P5000/square

meter (Yamsuan 2011), can provide up to 168,000 classrooms in one

year alone. This value is greater than the total shortage of

classrooms in public schools which sums up to 76,700 high (Romero

2013). Or, if the annual budget for the 4Ps is allotted for the

salary of teachers, a higher compensation of P23,000 monthly

(Mendez 2013) to 62,000 teachers (Casayuran 2013), the listed

figure of the lack of teachers from the DepEd. Given the ratio of

one classroom to thirty students just like in private schools,

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the budget that will be used for the construction of the new

classrooms will benefit up to more than 5,000,000 students. On

the other hand, 16.8 Billion can also provide for up to more than

2,000,000 pregnancy vitamin sets, at P900 per month (GNC Women's

Prenatal Program 2013) or P8100 per pregnancy cycle. Both

computations provide a larger number of benefitted Filipinos as

compared to the one million strong boasted by the DSWD.

Evident in the arguments presented above is the fact that there

are a lot of inefficiencies and ironies involved in addressing

poverty incidence in the Philippines – that while these programs

and government institutions exist, poverty incidence is not

halted but is simply allowed to expand through time. The

disparity of the effects of these programs to their objectives

says a lot about the bureaucracy – that while it manages to

identify what the problem to be addressed is, the line on how to

address it and how to allocate the resources for it is unclear.

Alleviating poverty requires constant, systematic and relevant

solutions from the government, and while there are a lot of it

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proposed at present, the problem does not stop simply after

policies and policy implementation methods are laid out.

What determines the success of these said projects is not the

aesthetic aspect of the plan it was based from, but rather, on

how it was felt by the very people it aims to provide help for.

As Mahatma Gandhi states, “poverty is the worst form of

violence,” and engaging in a continuous but inefficient struggle

to alleviate it through the existing parliamentary solutions

simply condones the problem. At the end of the day, what

quantifies the greatness of the methods spearheaded by government

institutions is not the promises they make, but rather, how their

benefits were trickled down to the masses – because programs only

make sense, when they fill the gap between “what it is” and “who

it is for,” without the latter, it is deemed meaningless and a

waste of time. Without considering the latter, poverty is only

addressed conceptually, feigning government irresponsiveness and

incompetence through facades provided by programs, when funds can

simply be allocated through better means. Without the latter,

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violence becomes imminent as poverty becomes immortalized time

and time again.

Tables and Figures

AREA

POVERTY THRESHOLDPhilippine Peso

POVERTYINCIDENCE

%Families

MAGNITUDEOF 

POVERTY#FamiliesALL 

AREAS URBAN RURAL

Philippines 15,057 17,035 14,123 26.9 4,677,305National Capital Region (NCR) 20,566     7.1 167,316Cordillera Admin Reg'n (CAR) 16,810 17,316 15,895 28.8 878,050Ilocos Region (Region I) 15,956 16, 284 15,699 26.2 248,443Cagayan Valley (Region II) 13,791 15, 450 12,973 20.5 126,726Central Luzon (Region III) 17,298 17, 589 15,474 16.8 320,109CALABARZON (Region IV a) 17,161 17,779 16,771 16.7 374,952MIMAROPA (Region IV b) 14,800 15,420 14,184 43.7 238,489Bicol Region (Region V) 15,015 18,493 14,027 41.8 422,278Western Visayas (Region VI) 14,405 14,759 14,515 31.1 425,571Central Visayas (Region VII) 13,390 14,482 12,741 30.3 391,484Eastern Visayas (Region VIII) 13,974 14,420 13,325 40.7 331,426Zamboanga Peninsula(Region IX) 13,219 16,160 12,898 40.2 250,696

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Northern Mindanao (Region X) 14,199 15,805 13,687 36.1 285,054Davao Region (Region XI) 14,942 17,221 13,860 30.6 257,554SOCCKSARGEN Region(Region XII) 14,225 16,783 12,878 33.8 253,009Caraga (Region XIII) 15,249 17,270 14,059 45.4 201,929ARMM (Region XIV) 15,533 16,491 14,528 55.3 295,220

Table 1. PCUP 2006 Poverty Situation in the Philippines

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