The Application of Transit Passage Regime in Straits Used for International Navigation: A Study of...

The Application of Transit PassageRegime in Straits Used forInternational Navigation: A Study ofthe Straits of Malacca and Singapore

Mohd Hazmi bin Mohd RusliFaculty of Syariah and LawUniversiti Sains Islam Malaysia

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 (LOSC) prescribes the appli-cation of the transit passage regime for vessels navigating via straits that connect onepart of the high seas/exclusive economic zone (EEZ) to another part of the high seas/EEZ. The Straits of Malacca and Singapore fulfill this criterion if they are considered asone strait. Nevertheless, if both straits are considered as separate, then the situationwould be different. This article discusses the types of navigational regimes in straits asprescribed by the LOSC and ventures into the potential legal and political implicationsthat may arise should transit passage regime cease to apply in critical straits like theStraits of Malacca and Singapore. Indeed, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore areimportant sea lines of communication, and any interference with shipping would obvi-ously disrupt the well-being of the global economy, particularly that of the Asia-Pacificregion.

Key words: law of the sea, navigational rights, Straits of Malacca and Singapore, transit passage

The Straits of Malacca and Singapore are located between two main oceans ofthe world—the Indian Ocean in the west via the Andaman Sea and the

Pacific Ocean in the east via the South China Sea. The straits form a watercourselinking these two parts of the world together (George, 2008, pp. 5–8; Raymond,2009, pp. 35–36; Tiwari, 1999; Zubir, 2005). In terms of maritime navigation, thestraits have always been regarded as a single strait, even though the watercourseis formed by two different straits, namely the Strait of Malacca and the Strait ofSingapore.1 Part III of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982(LOSC) prescribes the navigational regimes applicable to all vessels navigatingthrough straits, namely the nonsuspendable innocent passage regime and thetransit passage regime.

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Asian Politics & Policy—Volume 4, Number 4—Pages 549–569© 2012 Policy Studies Organization. Published by Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Navigational Regimes Through Straits

The Innocent Passage RegimeThe regime of innocent passage is categorized into two forms, that is, the right

of innocent passage and the right of nonsuspendable innocent passage. The firstcategory of innocent passage is exercisable by foreign vessels in the territorialsea of a coastal state not forming straits that are used for international naviga-tion, as provided in Part II, Section 3 of the LOSC. Customary international lawhas long dictated this regime, as reflected in the case of Corfu Channel, wherebythe court held that navigation of warships in time of peace through straits usedfor international navigation connecting two parts of the high seas without pre-vious authorization of the coastal state, provided the passage is innocent, ispermissible (George, 2008, p. 29). The navigational regime of innocent passage isdefined in Article 17 of the LOSC, which reads that “ships of all States, whethercoastal or land-locked, enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorialsea.”2

The LOSC also prescribes that innocent passage shall be continuous and expe-ditious,3 and any acts committed by the vessel that could compromise the peace,good order, or security of the coastal state would remove the “innocent” status ofthat vessel.4 Submarines and other underwater vessels are required to surfacewhile navigating through the territorial sea of states other than the state whoseflag they are carrying.5 As Article 18(1)(a) and (b) of the LOSC do not mentionanything about overflight rights, innocent passage applies only to maritime navi-gation and does not include the right of foreign aircraft to fly in the airspace of theterritorial sea belonging to another country (Oxman, 1983, pp. 156–160). Article18(1) of the LOSC reads:

Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of (a) travers-ing that sea without entering internal waters or calling at a roadstead or portfacility outside internal waters; or (b) proceeding to or from internal waters or a callat such roadstead or port facility.

The coastal state, on the other hand, is under a duty not to hamper innocentpassage of any vessels unless the passage ceases to be innocent or the coastal statefears that the passage would undermine its security interests.6 In addition, tollsand charges cannot be levied upon foreign ships by reason only of their passagebut may be levied for other specific services rendered to the ship.7 It is not clearwhether general services such as the maintenance of navigational aids fall withinthe scope of Article 26(2) of the LOSC (Kagami, 2008, pp. 45–46). In enhancingnavigational safety in its territorial sea, the coastal state may designate sea-lanesand traffic separation schemes (TSS) for navigating vessels. The creation of thesea-lanes must be based on recommendations of the competent internationalorganization, in this case generally regarded as the International Maritime Orga-nization (IMO).8

The Nonsuspendable Innocent Passage RegimeThe right of nonsuspendable innocent passage applies in straits of the type

prescribed in Article 45(1)(b) and (2) of the LOSC.9 Article 45(1)(b) and (2) have

550 Asian Politics & Policy

their origins from Article 16(4) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea(TSC), which reads:

There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign ships throughstraits which are used for international navigation between one part of the highseas and another part of the high seas or the territorial sea of a foreign state.

This provision was particularly relevant pre-LOSC, as innocent passage wasthen the only navigational regime in customary international law and could besuspended. Schachte (1992) asserted:

The regime of non-suspendable innocent passage under current customary law ofthe sea is extremely limited in application. It has in almost all cases been super-seded by the transit passage regime applying to straits connecting one part of thehigh seas or an exclusive economic zone with another part of the high seas or anexclusive economic zone. The dead end strait exception is only applicable in thosefew geographic instances in which high seas or exclusive economic zone areasconnect with a territorial seas area of one state by means of a strait bordered by oneor more States. (p. 12)

From this assertion, it is clear that Article 16(4) TSC was included to protect theinterests of a foreign state that was cut off from the high seas by the territorial seasof other states. When the LOSC was created in 1982 and came into force in 1994,it superseded the 1958 TSC, and this provision was included in Article 45(1)(b)and (2) of the LOSC.10

Unlike the first category of right of innocent passage, which is subject totemporary suspension as mentioned in Article 25(3) of the LOSC, vessels thatexercise the nonsuspendable form of innocent passage are not subject to havingtheir passage suspended by the coastal state (Pharand, 1980, pp. 114–115). Inrelation to other navigational features, the nonsuspendable innocent passageregime is similar to the right of innocent passage governed by Part II, Section 3of the LOSC. Therefore, it is important to note that the right of nonsuspend-able innocent passage applies only to ships and does not include overflight rightsof foreign aircraft. In addition, submarines and other underwater vehicles flyingthe flag of a state other than the coastal state must surface while exercising thisright.

With the introduction of the transit passage regime, the concept of nonsus-pendable innocent passage has thus lost much of its relevance as far as straitsused for international navigation that connect two parts of the high seas/exclusive economic zone (EEZ) are concerned. The application of nonsuspend-able innocent passage may apply in dead-end straits, as discussed in subsequentparts of this article.

Transit Passage RegimeThe navigational regime of transit passage is explained in Part III of the LOSC.

The transit passage regime is applicable in straits used for international naviga-tion between one part of the high seas or an EEZ and another part of the high seasor an EEZ11 that have been completely amalgamated into the territorial seas ofthe bordering states, with the result that there is no EEZ or high seas corridorthrough them (Bateman, 2000, pp. 94–98; Okuwaki, 2008, pp. 17–19).

A Study of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore 551

This regime of passage through straits used for international navigation estab-lished by Part III of the LOSC applies only to ensure smooth navigation of allships, vessels, and aircraft and does not in any way affect the legal status of thewaters forming such straits and the coastal state’s exercise of sovereignty over thestraits.12 Article 38(1) of the LOSC reads, “In straits referred to in article 37, allships and aircraft enjoy the right of transit passage which shall not be impeded”(emphasis added). Unlike the regimes of innocent passage and nonsuspendableinnocent passage, this regime includes both rights of all types of foreign ships oraircraft to navigate or to fly above straits used for international navigation, eventhough the straits may form part of the territorial sea of another state.13 This isconfirmed by Article 38(2) of the LOSC: “Transit passage means the exercise inaccordance with this Part of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for thepurpose of continuous and expeditious transit” (emphasis added).

Submarines and other underwater vehicles can transit in their normal sub-merged mode (Nandan & Anderson, 2001, p. 77). States bordering straits mayalso prescribe sea-lanes and TSS in straits used for international navigation tofacilitate safe shipping. However, unlike the regime of innocent passage, thedesignation of the said sea-lanes and TSS in straits must be referred to thecompetent international organization, generally accepted as being the IMO, forendorsement.14 In exercising the right of transit passage through straits used forinternational navigation, ships and aircraft must proceed without delay andrefrain from activities that may compromise the security of the coastal state.15

States bordering straits are neither permitted to hamper such a passage16 nor toformulate any laws or regulations that will have the practical effect of impedingthe right of transit passage.17

As far as the meaning of the phrase “proceed without delay” is concerned, theLOSC does not provide the exact meaning of it (Nordquist, 1993, p. 341). Never-theless, it is generally understood that vessels should transit a strait at a reason-able speed depending on the weather, traffic, and existence of navigationalhazards along the waterways, without loitering or stopping unless by forcemajeure or distress (Nandan & Anderson, 2001, pp. 77–78). Navigating vesselsare required to comply with internationally accepted regulations relating to safenavigation and prevention, reduction, and control of pollution from ships asendorsed by the IMO.18 Aircraft are similarly bound by international rules onsafety measures while flying over straits used for international navigation.19 Nor-dquist (1993) contends that the language used in Article 38(2) of the LOSCcorresponds to Articles 58(1) and 87(1)(a) and (b) of the LOSC, implying thatthe “right of transit passage” is comparable with the “freedom of navigationand overflight” in the EEZ and the high seas. Beckman (2004) describes transitpassage as the exercise of a freedom rather than a right, as flights and vessels havefreedom to traverse and fly over straits. Nevertheless, these contentions may notbe entirely accurate.

First, although vessels and aircraft have freedom to navigate or fly over straitsused for international navigation, they are bound to follow rules and regulationsprescribed by states bordering straits, which are based on the provisions of theLOSC, while exercising transit. This is not comparable to the freedom of naviga-tion regime in the high seas or to the freedom of navigation that may be exercisedby vessels in the EEZ. For example, in the high seas, vessels may transit the


waters without having to do so expeditiously or without having to follow adesignated traffic lane.

Second, even though Article 38(2) of the LOSC states that transit passage meansthe freedom of navigation and overflight,20 Articles 38(1)21 and 38(3)22 suggest thatit might also be regarded as a right. In addition, the employment of the wordright instead of freedom makes Article 38 of the LOSC distinct from Articles 5823

and 8724 of the LOSC, the two articles that deal with the application of freedomof navigation and overflight in the EEZ and the high seas.

Going back to Part III of the LOSC, in order to ensure that the marine environ-ment of their coasts is protected from vessel-source of marine pollution, statesbordering straits are permitted to impose applicable international rules andregulations relating to these matters25 and may designate sea-lanes within thestraits for transit purposes by submitting a proposal of a designation of TSS to theIMO to be duly approved.26 These regulations must be observed by vessels,27 andthe designated sea-lanes must be respected by ships exercising transit passagein the strait.28 States bordering straits are also permitted to foster cooperationwith the user states of the strait to improve navigational safety and to controlpollution from vessels sailing through the strait.29 The regulatory powers of statesbordering straits over shipping in straits used for international navigation arevery restricted, so much so that they can only interfere with the passage of vesselsif they have committed major damage to the marine environment of the straits.30

To date, the term “major damage” has yet to be judicially interpreted and stillremains vague (George, 2008, pp. 73–84). In addition, Part III of the LOSC doesnot mention in clear terms that transit passage can be suspended in the interest ofthe preservation of the good order of the marine environment of straits.

The Application of the Transit Passage Regime in the Straits ofMalacca and Singapore

As stated earlier, together, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore form an impor-tant maritime route linking East Asia with the Middle East, Africa, and Europe.

Based on Map 1, when the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are regarded as asingle strait, these waterways therefore fit the definition of a strait used forinternational navigation as specified in Articles 3731 and 38(1)32 of the LOSC.Hence, the transit passage regime is applicable in these straits and inevitablyopens them up to international shipping traffic, with the burden falling on thelittoral states to accommodate unlimited shipping traffic (Van Dyke, 1997, pp.319–321; Rusli, 2011d, pp. 122–130).33 Furthermore, the powers of the littoralstates to regulate shipping have also been made limited, as they can only makelaws by giving effect to applicable international regulations. In fact, the increasingshipping traffic that goes through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore hasdirectly and indirectly affected the well-being of the marine environment of thestraits.

The Impacts of Shipping on the Marine Environment of the Straits ofMalacca and Singapore

Oil spills and discharge of wastes are typical of modern shipping activities.With high navigational traffic of more than 74,000 transits in 2010 (as shown


in Table 1), there is always a high risk of maritime incidents involving acciden-tal oil spills in the waters of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore (Mandryk,2008).

There were 888 accidents reported to have occurred in the Straits of Malaccaand Singapore in the 25-year period of 1978–2003 (Basiron & Hooi, 2007,pp. 15–16). Between the years of 2005–2010, there were 24 accidents reported tohave taken place in the TSS area of the straits (Ibrahim, 2011). Oil spill incidentsinevitably result in adverse impacts on the marine environment. They contribute

Map 1. Both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are straits that connect one part of the highseas/EEZ to another part of the high seas/EEZ

Source: Modified from Google Maps.

Table 1. Shipping Traffic in the Strait of Malacca, 2000–2010 (With the Year2020 Projection)

Year Number of Vessels

2000 55,9572001 59,3142002 60,0342003 62,3342004 63,6362005 62,6212006 65,6492007 70,7182008 76,3812009 71,3592010 74,1332020 (Projection) 150,000

Source: Marine Department of Malaysia (Ibrahim, 2011).


to the deterioration of the health and environmental integrity of the marineand coastal environment through destruction and damage to marine species,ecosystems, and habitats. An oil slick has devastating effects on everythingthat it touches, whether farther out to sea or in the coastal areas (Rusli, 2012,pp. 79–94).

This was illustrated by the 1997 MT Evoikos and MT Orpin Global collision in theStrait of Singapore (Petroleum Industry of Malaysia Mutual Aid Group, 1998).The collision caused an oil spill that later formed a slick flowing from the collisionsite toward the Malaysian side of the Strait of Malacca. As a result, the whole westcoast of Peninsular Malaysia from Johor to Selangor was exposed to the pollutionthreat. This oil slick posed hazards not only to the marine environment but alsoto the mangrove swamps and jungles, fish and prawn farms in coastal areas, andbeach resorts along the southwestern coast of Peninsular Malaysia. In addition,the costs of cleaning up are not cheap. The Diego Silang 1976 oil spill cleanup costUS$1,086,421, and the Nagasaki Spirit oil spill incident in 1993 incurred a cleanupexpenditure amounting to US$1,506,160 (Rusli, 2011b, pp. 506–507).

Due to the busy nature of the straits, maritime accidents continue to take placealong these waterways. The most recent accident that took place in the Strait ofMalacca involved a collision between a Liberian-registered tanker, MT FormosaProduct Brick and an Isle of Man–registered tanker, MV Ostende Max, on August19, 2009, in waters off Port Dickson, Malaysia (“No Oil Spills,” 2009). Fortunately,after extensive monitoring work, the Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agencydetermined that neither naphtha nor oil spills had taken place (Ahmad, 2009). In2010, a Malaysian-registered tanker identified as MT Bunga Kelana 3 collided withthe bulk carrier MV Waily in Malaysian waters off the coast of Singapore, result-ing in an oil spill (“Collision off Singapore,” 2010). The MT Bunga Kelana 3, whichwas ferrying 63,054 tonnes of light crude oil from Bintulu to Malacca, suffereddamage to one of its cargo tanks, spilling an estimated 2,000 tonnes of oil into theStrait of Singapore (Basiron, 2010, p. 39). Despite assurances by the local authori-ties that the utmost efforts were being taken to contain the spill, some oil didreach the shores of Johor and Singapore, prompting a public outcry and claims ofloss of livelihood by fishermen.

As a result of the heavy shipping activities in the strait, coral reef developmentis recorded to be among the lowest in this region (Emran, 2007, pp. 15–16). Inaddition, the well-being of the mangrove ecosystem along the coast borderingthe Strait of Malacca is also threatened due to constant soil erosion (Basiron, 2008,pp. 120–123), such as has occurred along the coast of the southwestern tip ofJohor, which is an area with high shipping transits where the Strait of Malaccaconverges with the Strait of Singapore.

Apart from oil, modern seafaring vessels discharge other types of contami-nants as well, such as butyltin. Butyltin is normally concentrated in areas withsignificant boating activities, ports, and dockyards. The high concentration ofthis chemical substance can harm marine life, the environment, and humanhealth. Furthermore, shipping may also injure the marine environment throughthe introduction of invasive species that originate from a vessel’s ballast waterexchange, such as the toxic algae dinoflagellates (Bahe et al., 2007, p. 18). Thiscreature can survive for years in ballast tanks. When introduced to new environ-ments, it can poison shellfish, which, if then consumed by humans, may be fatal.


In addition, shipping also discharges other types of pollutants such as marinedebris, sewage, hazardous and noxious substances, noise emissions, and airpollution (O’Brien, 2009). All these substances and impacts from the high volumeof shipping that transits the straits annually have constant, deleterious effects onthe marine environment of the straits (Rusli, 2012, pp. 79–94).

The Separation of the Straits of Malacca and SingaporeThe International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), however, considers both

the Straits of Malacca and Singapore as two separate straits and defines the limitsof these straits differently. Map 2 shows the limits of the Strait of Malacca whileMap 3 illustrates the limits of the Strait of Singapore as stipulated by the IHO(International Hydrograhic Organization, 1953).

If the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are not treated as one single strait,transit passage regime would no longer apply to foreign vessels plying the Strait

Map 2. Limits of the Strait of MalaccaSource: Modified from Google Maps.

Map 3. Limits of the Strait of SingaporeSource: Modified from Google Maps.


of Malacca (Rusli, 2011a, pp. 45–46). As shown in Map 4, the Malaysian side of theStrait of Malacca, if considered separately from the Strait of Singapore, wouldfulfill the requirement needed for nonsuspendable innocent passage regime toapply as provided in Articles 45(1)(b) and (2) of the LOSC.34 The Indonesian sideof the Strait of Malacca, too, if considered separately from the Strait of Singapore,would be a strait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZ to the territorial seaof Singapore. However, it could also be argued that the Indonesian side of theStrait of Malacca, if it is not presumed to form one single strait with its Sin-gaporean counterpart, would be a strait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZ to the territorial seas of both Singapore and Indonesia as well as to thearchipelagic waters of Indonesia. The LOSC is silent on the navigational regimeapplicable in a strait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZ to the archipe-lagic waters of another state.

Under this new interpretation, the Strait of Singapore would be a straitthat connects the South China Sea, which forms one part of the high seas/EEZ,to the territorial waters of Malaysia and Indonesia in the Strait of Malacca.Therefore, nonsuspendable innocent passage would likely be the navigationalregime applicable in the Strait of Singapore. Nevertheless, it may also beasserted that since there is an EEZ in the Strait of Malacca, transit passagewould still be the navigational regime applicable in the Strait of Singapore,as it is still legally a strait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZ ofthe South China Sea to another part of the high seas/EEZ of the Strait ofMalacca.35

Putting these assertions aside, it could rightly be argued that if the Strait ofMalacca and the Strait of Singapore are considered as separate straits, the Straitof Malacca may be considered a strait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZto the territorial sea of a foreign state, and therefore, nonsuspendable innocent

Map 4. Strait of Malacca treated separately from the Strait of SingaporeSource: Modified from Google Maps.


passage would apply in the Strait of Malacca instead of transit passage (Rusli,2011c).

The Application of Nonsuspendable Innocent Passagein the Strait of Malacca

Legal and Political ImplicationsIf Malaysia and Indonesia, as states bordering the Strait of Malacca, sup-

ported such an interpretation of the strait’s status, the navigational regime in theStrait of Malacca would be viewed differently by these states, which wouldcontend that foreign vessels would cease to have the right to exercise transitpassage in the strait (Rusli, 2011c, pp. 69–82). The application of nonsuspendableinnocent passage would allow both Malaysia and Indonesia to impose moreshipping control mechanisms on ships and aircraft transiting the strait (Rusli,2011a, pp. 39–48). Under the nonsuspendable innocent passage regime, subma-rines are required to travel on the surface while exercising innocent passage36

and foreign aircraft would have no freedom of overflight over the Strait ofMalacca.37

Article 233 of the LOSC contains a provision relating to enforcement jurisdic-tion of states bordering straits on environmental safeguards with respect to straitsused for international navigation (Molenaar, 1965, pp. 295–298). Under Article233, states bordering straits are entitled to take enforcement measures againstships in transit passage provided such ships have committed a violation of thelaws and regulations stipulated in Articles 42(1)(a) and (b) of the LOSC whichthereafter may cause or threaten to cause major damage to the marine environ-ment of the straits (IMO, 2008, p. 64). The first part of Article 233 reads, “Nothingin sections 5, 6 and 7 affects the legal regime of straits used for internationalnavigation.” It is clear from this provision that Article 233 applies to straits usedfor international navigation. It is to be noted that there are two types of straitsused for international navigation, namely straits where transit passage appliesand straits where transit passage does not apply. However, the LOSC does notspecify explicitly the types of straits used for international navigation that aresubject to Article 233. There is also no clear nexus that links both Article 233 andPart III of the LOSC together (George, 2008, pp. 73–77). The LOSC is silent on thisinterpretation.

The second part of Article 233 reads:

However, if a foreign ship . . . has committed a violation of the laws and regula-tions referred to in article 42, paragraph 1(a) and (b), causing or threatening majordamage to the marine environment of the straits, the States bordering the straitsmay take appropriate enforcement measures. (emphasis added)

From the wording of the second part of Article 233, it could be said that thereis, however, a relation between Article 233 and Part III of the LOSC. Article 233expressly mentions the application of Article 42(1), which forms one of the legalprovisions of Part III. Article 42(1) provides that “subject to the provisions of thissection, States bordering straits may adopt laws and regulations relating to transitpassage through straits.”


Article 42(1), as cited above, specifically provides that it applies in straits usedfor international navigation where the transit passage regime is applicable. Assuch, it may also be contended for that reason, neither Article 42(1) nor Article233 applies to straits where nonsuspendable innocent passage is exercisable byforeign vessels. Assuming that Article 233 only applies to straits used for inter-national navigation that are subject to the transit passage regime, the littoral statesof the Strait of Malacca supporting a nonsuspendable innocent passage regime inthe strait would not consider themselves bound by the enforcement limitationson marine pollution incidents as embodied particularly in Article 233 of Part XIIof the LOSC. This is because in straits used for international navigation wherenonsuspendable innocent passage applies, the navigational regime in that straitwould be governed by the regime of innocent passage in accordance with Part II,Section 3 of the LOSC.38 The littoral states could also apply Sections 5, 6, and 7 ofPart XII of the LOSC on enforcement and procedural powers in cases where theyhave evidence that ships have breached their marine pollution laws (Rusli, 2011a,pp. 45–46).

With Article 42(1) of the LOSC no longer binding upon the littoral states of theStrait of Malacca, the littoral states of the strait may then employ laws andregulations outside the scope permitted by Article 42(1). Both Malaysia andIndonesia may formulate laws and regulations on the protection of the marineenvironment of the strait that are not restricted only to matters pertaining tosafety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic.39 Furthermore, thelittoral states may no longer need to enact laws and regulations by giving effectto applicable international regulations regarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes,and other noxious substances in the strait.40

Under the transit passage regime, states bordering straits are conferred withlimited enforcement powers, as reiterated by Beckman (2004):

If a vessel exercising the right of transit passage violates obligations underArticle 39(2), but the vessel in question does not come into port, and the violation inquestion does not cause or threaten major damage to the marine environment of the straits,the rights of the littoral State are more limited. (emphasis added; pp. 249–250)

The replacement of transit passage with nonsuspendable innocent passageregime means that the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia may take appro-priate enforcement measures against any ships that have violated their marinepollution laws without having to wait for an actual incident to take place that maycause or may threaten to cause major damage to the marine environment of thestrait.

Moreover, in straits where transit passage is applicable, states bordering straitsare permitted to enact laws and regulations governing marine pollution based onthe requirements set in Articles 42(1)(a) and (b) as well as Article 42(2) of theLOSC. Article 42(2) reads, “Such laws and regulations shall not discriminate inform or in fact among foreign ships or in their application have the practical effectof denying, hampering or impairing the right of transit passage.” Therefore,given that the transit passage regime may no longer be applicable for foreignvessels in the Strait of Malacca under this new legal interpretation, the littoralstates may consequently formulate laws and regulations outside the guidelinesstipulated in Article 42(2). Nevertheless, as the LOSC has provided that the


nonsuspendable innocent passage regime is not suspendable, it will not be toosimplistic to state that under the LOSC, the littoral states are not permitted toexercise the same degree of regulatory powers they possess within their territo-rial waters not forming a strait used for international navigation in regulatingshipping in the Strait of Malacca.41 To a certain extent, it is undeniable that theapplication of a nonsuspendable innocent passage regime would ultimatelystrengthen the regulatory powers of the littoral states, which are more limitedunder the transit passage regime. However, this does not in any way mean thatthe littoral states could hamper or impair the passage of vessels plying the Straitof Malacca without any valid or compelling reasons to do so.

Potential Opposition and RebuttalsThis new legal interpretation would be highly contentious among other states.

Given the fact that the nonsuspendable innocent passage regime is less liberalthan that of transit passage, this may likely incite various mixed reactions, par-ticularly among the states that are heavily dependent on the Strait of Malacca. Inrejecting this new interpretation of the legal status of the strait, the opposingstates may contend that the Strait of Malacca is a strait used for internationalnavigation of global standing and that the littoral states have, over the years,acquiesced in the application of transit passage to the strait.42 This supports theview that the customary international law position is that transit passage appliesin both the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

The proposed new interpretation of the legal status of the Strait of Malacca mayalso be seen as violating the earlier acknowledgment declared in the 1971 JointStatement of the Governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore on theMalacca Straits (Republic of Indonesia, 1971; hereafter 1971 Joint Statement). Asquoted in Leifer (1978), the three littoral states agreed in the 1971 Joint Statementthat

(1) the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore is the respon-sibility of the coastal States concerned;

(2) a tripartite co-operation on the safety of navigation in the two straits is to beestablished;

(3) a body of co-operation to co-ordinate efforts for the safety of navigation in theStraits of Malacca and Singapore be established as soon as possible and thatsuch body should be composed of only the three coastal States concerned;

(4) the problem of the safety of navigation and the question of internationaliza-tion of the straits are two separate issues;

(5) the Governments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that theStraits of Malacca and Singapore are not international straits, while fullyrecognising their use for international shipping in accordance with the prin-ciple of innocent passage. The Government of Singapore takes note of theposition of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and of Malaysia onthis point.

(6) On the basis of this understanding, the three Governments approved thecontinuation of the hydrographic survey. (p. 204)

During the ministerial meeting that led to the issuance of the 1971 JointStatement, the three littoral states agreed for the purposes of safety of navigationand environmental protection of the straits to treat the Straits of Malacca andSingapore as one single strait (Djalal, 1999, pp. 459–463). This agreement achieved


in the 1971 Joint Statement formed the basis of the establishment of the TripartiteTechnical Experts Group (TTEG) in 1977, which has worked together for nearlyfour decades until now to maintain the well-being of the straits. Japan hasassisted the littoral states by promoting cooperation between the Malacca StraitsCouncil and the Nippon Foundation with the TTEG. In fact, the subsequentcooperation scheme that exists between the littoral states and other user statesand organizations—such as the United States, South Korea, Australia, China, andGermany, as well as the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners(INTERTANKO) and the Middle East Navigation Aids Service—was officiallyformalized through the recently established Co-operative Mechanism, a mecha-nism developed considerably by the TTEG with the assistance of the IMO, asprovided by Article 43 of the LOSC (INTERTANKO, 2006).43

If Malaysia and Indonesia went ahead with their plan to reinterpret the legalstatus of the straits by separating them, the existing cooperation mechanism mayend up with frustration, with user states likely to be reluctant to participate asthey could no longer enjoy the unimpeded right of transit passage through theStraits of Malacca and Singapore. This reinterpretation of the legal status ofthe Strait of Malacca may also be seen as defeating the purpose of Article 43 ofthe LOSC.

However, the littoral states could argue in response that though it is true thatthe three governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore have previouslyagreed to treat both straits as one entity, that was essentially just an agreement.The 1971 Joint Statement was agreed upon over 40 years ago, at a time when thequantity of shipping traffic that goes through the Strait of Malacca was not ashigh as it is now. Between the years 1970 to 1986, the average number of shipp-ing transits was not more than 50,000 per year (Ahmad, 1997, p. 188; Naidu, 1997,pp. 33–34). As shown in Table 1, at present there are about 74,000 transits peryear, an increase of about 26.74% from the number of transits the straits accom-modated nearly a decade ago.

This figure is anticipated to reach up to 150,000 transits per year by the year2020 (Beckman, 2009a, pp. 234–235; Rusli, 2011d). Indeed, the agreement madevia the 1971 Joint Statement was never meant to be treated as a treaty, andtherefore, given the increasing volume of shipping traffic, the littoral states mayhave the option to consider reviewing this previous agreement.

The contention that the replacement of the transit passage regime with non-suspendable innocent passage would impede the free flow of international tradepassing through the straits is, in fact, not entirely accurate. This is because vesselsand ships would continue to enjoy nonsuspendable innocent passage throughthe Strait of Malacca. As mentioned earlier, the application of this navigationalregime would not impede or hamper free passage of shipping because there is noright of suspension, even for security purposes, on the part of the littoral states(Pharand, 1980, pp. 114–115). If ships complied with accepted international rulesand did not commit any acts in violation of the marine pollution laws of thelittoral states, then the littoral states would not interrupt such passage. Withuser states enjoying nonsuspendable passage through the Strait of Malacca, thedevelopment of the cooperation mechanism existing between the littoral statesand the users of the straits would unlikely be dampened. Unlike Iran, which hasin the past closed down the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping, the littoral


states of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, namely Malaysia, Indonesia, andSingapore, do not possess such a reputation (Khan, 2009, pp. 1–11; Luke, 2010,pp. 1–5). In fact, the littoral states have worked together particularly through theTTEG to make sure the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are always open and safefor international shipping activities (INTERTANKO, 2000).

The question of the validity of the replacement of transit passage with non-suspendable innocent passage in the Strait of Malacca may still be arguableby observing the conduct of the littoral states during the United NationsConference on the Law of the Sea III (UNCLOS III). Article 233 of the LOSCwas drafted to satisfy the needs of states bordering straits in safeguarding themarine environment of their territorial straits. Article 233 has been regarded bymany as Malaysia’s brainchild (George, 2008, pp. 71–79). During the negotiationprocess at the UNCLOS III, Malaysia sent a letter to the president of theUNCLOS III containing a statement on how Article 233 should take effect in theStraits of Malacca and Singapore. Malaysia contended that the littoral states maytake enforcement measures as provided in Article 233 against offending vesselsthat have violated its laws on TSS and the minimum under keel clearance of 3.5meters (United Nations, 1982, pp. 250–251). This statement was subsequentlysupported and corroborated by letters sent by the Singaporean and Indonesiandelegations (United Nations, 2000a, 2000b). This conduct signified that Malay-sia, Indonesia, and Singapore have acknowledged and acquiesced to the appli-cation of transit passage in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. Based on thisfact, if Malaysia and Indonesia, being the littoral states of the Strait of Malacca,went ahead with the proposed measure to reinterpret the legal status of thestrait, the reaction and response anticipated from other states, particularly majormaritime states that possess interests in the straits, would unlikely be a positiveone.

On this, the littoral states, principally Malaysia and Indonesia, may converselyassert that they have been supporting the application of innocent passage and nottransit passage regime in straits used for international navigation since before theUNCLOS III was convened. Statement 4 of the 1971 Joint Statement reads, “TheGovernments of the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia agreed that the Straitsof Malacca and Singapore are not international straits, while fully recognisingtheir use for international shipping in accordance with the principle of innocentpassage” (emphasis added). In fact, during the UNCLOS III, Malaysia and Indo-nesia, alongside other states bordering straits, namely Spain, Yemen, the Philip-pines, and Greece, have always acknowledged and supported the idea that straitsbe dealt with as one entity with the territorial sea (Ghosh, 2001, pp. 51–56;Nandan & Anderson, 2001, pp. 70–73; United Nations, 1992, pp. 75–76). Never-theless, the acceptance of transit passage regime via the letters sent by the del-egations of the littoral states to the president of UNCLOS III and through thecurrent practice of the exercise of transit passage regime by both the littoral statesand user states in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore would generally beconsidered as overriding that earlier acknowledgment.

In addition, opposing states may also contend that Articles 45(1)(b) and (2) ofthe LOSC should only be applied to a strait that connects one part of the high seasor an EEZ to territorial waters of a foreign state in an enclosed sea area ordead-end straits such as the Strait of Tiran and the Strait of Georgia (Martin,


2010). The Strait of Tiran links the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aqaba, an enclosedmaritime passageway shown in Map 5.

The Strait of Georgia, as shown in Map 6, is also a dead-end strait, as itconnects the Pacific Ocean to the territorial waters of Canada in an enclosedmaritime area. As explained earlier in this article, the nonsuspendable innocentpassage has its basis in Article 16(4) of the 1958 TSC. Schachte (1992) argued thatthe nonsuspendable innocent passage regime was introduced in the LOSC toensure states located at the end of the cul-de-sac in a landlocked maritime areawould have access to the sea. Therefore, it is not too simplistic to argue that thenonsuspendable innocent passage regime as provided in Articles 45(1)(b) and (2)

Map 5. Strait of TiranSource: Modified from Google Maps.

Map 6. Strait of GeorgiaSource: Modified from Google Maps.


should only apply to dead-end straits. As the Straits of Malacca and Singaporeare not considered dead-end straits, it may be asserted that the nonsuspendableinnocent passage regime is not a viable navigational regime that should apply inthese straits. Transit passage is therefore exercisable for all vessels navigating theStraits of Malacca and Singapore.

Nevertheless, Malaysia and Indonesia could rebut this argument by statingthat Part III of the LOSC does not specifically state that it applies to a strait thatconnects one part of the high seas or an EEZ to territorial waters of a foreign statein an enclosed sea or dead-end straits. Articles 45(1)(b) and (2) of the LOSCstipulate as follows:

Article 45(1) The regime of innocent passage . . . shall apply in straits used for international

navigation: (b) between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zoneand the territorial sea of a foreign State.

(2) There shall be no suspension of innocent passage through such straits.

Article 45(1)(b) merely states that the regime of innocent passage applies in“straits that connect one part of the high seas or an EEZ to a territorial sea of aforeign state.” There is nothing in the wording of Article 45(1)(b) or Article 45(2)of the LOSC indicating that they apply to a dead-end strait. Therefore, the newlegal interpretation that the Strait of Malacca should in fact be considered as astrait falling under the same category as the Strait of Tiran and the Strait ofGeorgia may be seen as not entirely inaccurate.

ConclusionPart III of the LOSC prescribes the navigational regimes exercisable by foreign

vessels navigating through straits used for international navigation. Hydro-graphically, the Strait of Malacca and the Strait of Singapore are regarded as twodifferent straits. Nevertheless, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore have beenconsidered as a single strait as agreed upon by the littoral states via the 1971 JointStatement. This position was also confirmed by a number of academic commen-tators who reiterated the status of the straits as one single waterway. When theyare regarded as together, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are straits that linkone part of the high seas/EEZ (Andaman Sea to the west) and another part of thehigh seas/EEZ (South China Sea to the east), hence fitting the definition given inArticle 37 of the LOSC for transit passage to apply. The transit passage regime isa liberal navigational right given to transiting vessels that could not be hamperedor impaired by the littoral states. Under this regime, the littoral states’ regulatorypowers to regulate shipping in the straits are made limited.

However, the increasing shipping traffic has adversely affected the well-beingof the marine environment of the straits. If Malaysia and Indonesia, as states thatborder the Strait of Malacca, make a declaration that the Strait of Malacca isseparate from its Singaporean counterpart, the Strait of Malacca would then be astrait that connects one part of the high seas/EEZ to the territorial waters ofSingapore. This fits the definition of Articles 45(1)(b) and (2) of the LOSC on theapplication of nonsuspendable innocent passage regime. Even though bothtransit passage and nonsuspendable innocent passage are liberal navigational


regimes that cannot be impaired by the littoral states, the latter is less liberal inapplication than the former. In other words, the application of nonsuspendableinnocent passage would strengthen the regulatory powers of the littoral states toregulate shipping traffic that goes through the Straits of Malacca and Singapore.

This new legal interpretation may be seen as highly contentious, as it mayviolate the spirit of the LOSC. It is to be remembered that the provision onnonsuspendable innocent passage prescribed in Articles 45(1)(b) and (2) of theLOSC has its origins from Article 16(4) of the 1958 TSC to secure the right of astate located at the end of a landlocked maritime area to have access to the sea.Without this right, the state would be landlocked with a territorial sea leadingnowhere. It is true that the LOSC is silent on whether or not the nonsuspendableinnocent passage regime applies solely to dead-end straits. Nevertheless, it couldalso be contended that it is actually a commonsense interpretation of Articles45(1)(b) and (2) that it applies to dead-end straits.

Looking at the current political and world trade situation, there is little pros-pect that the application of nonsuspendable innocent passage regime in the Straitof Malacca would be acceptable to the majority of the international community.This is justified by the fact that the Strait of Malacca now has become indispens-able to global shipping and trade, and any measures that may be seen to likelyimpede free flow of navigation would be objected to and criticized. Indeed, theStraits of Malacca and Singapore are critical shipping ways, and any interferenceto shipping would definitely affect the global economy.

On the other hand, the increasing shipping traffic would also continuouslythreaten the marine environment of the straits. Therefore, in order to balanceshipping and protection of the marine environment, the littoral states, the userstates, and the IMO should continue to work together and cooperate via theCo-operative Mechanism to further protect and preserve the sensitive marineenvironment of the Straits of Malacca and Singapore from unwarranteddegradation caused by heavy shipping activities.

Notes1Koh (1999) stated that “the Straits of Malacca and Singapore, which are interconnected . . . should

be treated as one watercourse” (p. 293). This view was also shared by Beckman (2009b), who con-tended that “the Malacca Strait and the Singapore Strait are connected. They are treated by the threelittoral States of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, and by the IMO, as a single strait, which isreferred to as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore” (pp. 167–169). There is also a view that the Straitsof Malacca and Singapore are actually one watercourse, with the Strait of Singapore forming thenarrowest part of the waterway, which represents the real choke point (Hamid, 2006, pp. 155–179). TheStraits of Malacca and Singapore connect to each other, making one single stretch of navigationalchannel extending approximately 521.39 nautical miles in length. Therefore, these straits should beregarded as together in terms of maritime navigation (Kamaruzaman, 1998, pp. 469–470).

2See 1982 LOSC Article 17.3See 1982 LOSC Article 18(2).4See 1982 LOSC Article 19(1) and (2).5See 1982 LOSC Article 20.6See 1982 LOSC Article 24(1)(a) and (b).7See 1982 LOSC Article 24(1)(a) and (b).8See 1982 LOSC Article 22(1) and (3)(a).9Article 45(1) of the LOSC reads, “The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II,

section 3, shall apply in straits used for international navigation: (a) excluded from the application ofthe regime of transit passage under article 38, paragraph 1; or (b) between a part of the high seas oran exclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State.” As explained by George (2008),


an example of a strait explicated in Article 45(1)(b) is the Strait of Georgia, which connects one partof the high seas/EEZ (the North Pacific Ocean) to the territorial sea of another state, Canada. Article45(2) of the LOSC further stipulates that the exercise of innocent passage through straits underlinedin Article 45(1) is not subjected to suspension.

10Article 311(1) of the LOSC states that the present convention, that is, the LOSC, shall prevail asbetween state parties over the Geneva Convention on Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone concludedin 1958.

11See 1982 LOSC Article 37.12See 1982 LOSC Article 34(1).13See 1982 LOSC Article 38(1).14See 1982 LOSC Article 41(1), (3), and (4).15See 1982 LOSC Article 39(1)(a) and (b).16See 1982 LOSC Article 44.17See 1982 LOSC Article 42(2).18See 1982 LOSC Article 39(2)(a) and (b).19See 1982 LOSC Article 39(3)(a) and (b).20Article 38(2) of the LOSC reads, “Transit passage means the exercise in accordance with this Part

of the freedom of navigation and overflight solely for the purpose of continuous and expeditioustransit.”

21Article 38(1) of the LOSC reads, “In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy theright of transit passage.”

22Article 38(3) of the LOSC states, “Any activity which is not an exercise of the right of transitpassage through a strait remains subject to the other applicable provisions of this Convention.”

23Article 58(1) of the LOSC stipulates that “in the exclusive economic zone, all States, whethercoastal or land-locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the freedomsreferred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight.”

24Article 87(1) of the LOSC reads, “The high seas are open to all States, whether coastal orland-locked. Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by this Conventionand by other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia both for coastal and land-locked States:(a) freedom of navigation; (b) freedom of overflight.”

25See 1982 LOSC Article 42(1)(a) and (b); Plant (1990) is of the view that the word applicable in thecontext of Article 42(1)(b) should be taken to mean as “applicable” by virtue of the rules of interna-tional law, or in other words, the standards must represent the standards of customary law adheredto by most states.

26See 1982 LOSC Article 41(1).27See 1982 LOSC Article 41(4).28See 1982 LOSC Article 41(7).29Article 43 of the LOSC reads, “User States and States bordering a strait should by agreement

co-operate: (a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safetyaids or other improvements in aid of international navigation; and (b) for the prevention, reductionand control of pollution from ships.”

30See 1982 LOSC Article 233.31Article 37 of the LOSC mentions that transit passage applies to “straits which are used for

international navigation between one part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and anotherpart of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.”

32Article 38(1) of the LOSC reads, “In straits referred to in article 37, all ships and aircraft enjoy theright of transit passage, which shall not be impeded.”

33Article 44 of the LOSC provides that “States bordering straits shall not hamper transit passage andshall give appropriate publicity to any danger to navigation. . . . There shall be no suspension oftransit passage” (emphasis added).

34Article 45(1)(b) of the LOSC reads, “The regime of innocent passage, in accordance with Part II,section 3, shall apply in straits used for international navigation between a part of the high seas or anexclusive economic zone and the territorial sea of a foreign State.” The difference between thisnavigational regime and that of innocent passage in Part II of the LOSC is that this regime isnonsuspendable. This is reiterated in Article 45(2) of the LOSC.

35The Strait of Singapore is collectively bordered by Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore. UnlikeMalaysia and Indonesia, since UNCLOS III, Singapore has always been a keen supporter of freedomof navigation for vessels navigating through straits used for international navigation. As an importantinternational maritime hub, the transit passage regime is crucial for the well-being of Singapore’sthriving shipping industry. Looking from this perspective, it is likely that Singapore and othermaritime states would not support any attempts to reinterpret the legal status of the Strait ofSingapore. As such, transit passage would likely still be applicable in the Strait of Singapore regard-less of the change of the legal status of the Strait of Malacca (Leifer, 1978, pp. 3–5).


36Article 20 of the LOSC reads, “In the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehiclesare required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag.”

37Unlike transit passage, innocent passage regime only confers passage rights to ships, not aircraft(Boczek, 2005, pp. 313–314; Churchill & Lowe, 1988, p. 105; Oxman, 1983, pp. 156–160).

38See 1982 LOSC Article 45(1)(b).39Article 42(1) stipulates that “subject to the provisions of this section, States bordering straits may

adopt laws and regulations relating to transit passage through straits, in respect of all or any of thefollowing: (a) the safety of navigation and the regulation of maritime traffic. . . .”

40Article 42(1)(b) allows states bordering straits to adopt laws and regulations relating to “theprevention, reduction and control of pollution, by giving effect to applicable international regulationsregarding the discharge of oil, oily wastes and other noxious substances in the strait” (emphasisadded).

41The right of innocent passage is the strictest type of navigational regime applicable to foreignvessels. Under the regime of innocent passage, the coastal state may suspend temporarily the passageof a foreign vessel under the pretext of upholding the security of the coastal state, as provided inArticle 25(3) of the LOSC. Under this regime, the passage of the vessel may also be suspended if thepassage is no longer innocent. This is a right not possessed by a state bordering a strait, as thenavigational regimes applicable in straits used for international navigation are different from those ofterritorial sea (Pharand, 1980, pp. 114–115).

42Forbes (2009) contends that the Strait of Malacca has been regarded not only as one of the world’sgreat international seaways, but also as an international strait of global standing. Most maritime states,namely China, Japan, and the United States, and shipping organizations like INTERTANKO haveconsidered transit passage as the most appropriate regime to be applicable in the Strait of Malacca(Ho, 2009, pp. 233–247). One of the reasons for the introduction of Article 43 of the LOSC on voluntarycooperation between states bordering straits and the user states was as an inducement for statesbordering straits to accept transit passage as the applicable navigational regime in straits used forinternational navigation. Currently, there is a cooperation mechanism developing under the ambit ofArticle 43 as far as the Straits of Malacca and Singapore are concerned. Therefore, this ongoingcooperation directly or indirectly shows that the littoral states have accepted the status of boththe Straits of Malacca and Singapore as straits subject to the transit passage regime (Djalal, 1999,pp. 457–469).

43Article 43 of the LOSC reads, “User States and States bordering a strait should by agreementcooperate (a) in the establishment and maintenance in a strait of necessary navigational and safetyaids or other improvements in aid of international navigation; and (b) for the prevention, reductionand control of pollution from ships.”

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