Super PAC vs. Candidate Ads: The Influence of Sponsorship and Involvement on Candidate Affect

Running Head: SUPER PAC VS. CANDIDATE ADS IN CAMPAIGN 2012

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Super PAC vs.Candidate Ads:

The Influence of Sponsorship and Involvementon Candidate Affect

David Lynn Painter, Ph.D.Full Sail [email protected]

Paper submitted to the 2014 Meetings of the Association of Educators in Journalism and Mass

mailto:[email protected]

Running Head: SUPER PAC VS. CANDIDATE ADS IN CAMPAIGN 2012

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Communication

SUPER PAC VS. CANDIDATE ADS IN CAMPAIGN 2012

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Abstract

This investigation uses a two- (candidate vs. super PAC

sponsorship) by three- (Republicans, Democrats, Independents)

experimental design (n = 554) to parse the influence of ad

sponsorship and enduring involvement on viewers’ changes in

affect toward Obama and Romney. The results suggest Independents’

changes in affect toward both candidates were greater after

viewing the Super PAC ads, but partisans’ changes in affect

toward the opposition party’s nominee were greater after viewing

the candidate sponsored ads.


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Super PAC vs.Candidate Ads:

The Influence of Sponsorship and Involvement on Candidate Affect

The 2012 presidential campaign surpassed all preexisting

fundraising and spending records, with approximately $1 billion

spent on campaign advertising alone (Nyczepri, 2012). Even more

remarkable, third party groups spent more on ad buys than did

the presidential candidates in this first presidential election

after the Citizens United v. FCC (2010) decision (WSJ, 2012).

Specifically, 266 Super PACs spent $546.5 million, Barack Obama

(D) spent $333 million, and Mitt Romney (R) spent $147 million

on 2012 campaign advertising (LA Times,

2012). This shift in ad sponsorship was not the only noteworthy

element of the 2012 campaign. In addition to the campaign spots

more likely to be sponsored by groups such as “Restore Our

Future” or “Priorities USA” than the candidates, the

overwhelmingly negative tone of the 2012 ads was also

unprecedented (Fowler & Ridout, 2012). Third-party groups

contributed to this negativity since 78% of the Super PACs ads

focused on attacking the opponent rather than promoting their

preferred candidate (Washington Post, 2012). Although outside

groups historically aired higher proportions of negative ads


4than did candidates (Kaid & Dimitrova,

2005; Kaid & Johnston, 1991), 85% of Barack Obama’s ads and

91% of Mitt Romney’s ads were also negative, making the tone

of 2012 campaign both predominantly and abysmally negative

(Wihbey, 2013).

The primary goal of negative or attack advertising is to

lower viewers’ relative affect toward the opponent of the

candidate on whose behalf the spot was produced and aired

(Kaid,

2004). By providing negative information about one of the

electoral choices in the contest, attack ads are intended to

suppress support for the target among those predisposed to vote

for him or her; to swing undecided voters away from the opposing

candidate; and to activate voters with


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preexisting negative attitudes toward the target. Thus, largely

dependent on the viewers’ partisanship, conceptualized as

enduring involvement in this study, negative advertising

strategies are designed to improve viewers’ relative affect

toward the candidate on whose behalf they were produced (Dowling

& Wichowsky, 2014).

The purpose of this investigation is to parse the influence

of negative ads on changes in viewers’ affect toward the

candidates based on sponsorship identification and viewers’

enduring involvement levels, or partisanship. Prior research

presents limited and somewhat mixed results on the influence of

ad sponsorship on affect toward presidential candidates after

sponsor identification requirements were mandated (BCRA, 2002)

and Super PACs were legitimized Citizens United v. FCC, 2010).

Nevertheless, we expect viewers to find negative ads sponsored by

unfamiliar and ambiguously named groups such as Restore Our

Future, American Crossroads, and Priorities USA will exert more

influence on viewers’ changes in candidate affect than will those

sponsored by the candidates. We also expect to find a main effect

of enduring involvement levels, or partisanship, on viewers’

changes in affect toward the candidates. Specifically, we expect

partisans, or those with high levels of enduring involvement in


6politics, to be more stable than Independents in their affective

responses to the negative ads, especially toward their own

political party’s nominee. Finally, we expect to find an

interaction between sponsorship and enduring involvement, with

Independents exposed to the negative Super PAC ads reporting the

greatest changes in affect toward the candidates.

Sponsorship Influence on Candidate Affect

The rationale for studying changes in viewers’ affect

toward the candidates after exposure to negative advertising is

supported by research showing attitudes toward a candidate are

an important predictor of voting decisions (Arcuri, et al,

2008; Miller, Wattenberg, &


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Malanchuk 1986). Rather than solely cognitive or emotional

responses to political information, research indicates attitudes

toward the candidates are based on affective intelligence

processes, or a combination of political socialization,

information-processing, and attitudinal variables that shape

political judgments (Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Redlawsk,

Civettini, &

Emmerson, 2010). The influence of candidate affect on voting

behavior has also been verified by research indicating voters’

affect toward the candidates summarizes these electoral

judgments, accounting for half the variation in voting decisions

(Rahn, Aldrich, Borgida, & Sullivan, 1990).

Most negative political advertising research focuses on the

effects of candidate-sponsored messages on specific sets of

cognitive, attitudinal, and behavioral variables (for summary,

see Kaid, 2004). This body of research provides compelling

evidence that negative candidate- sponsored messages may

negatively influence viewers’ affect toward the target (Cundy,

1986; Lang, 1991; Marcus, Neuman, & MacKuen, 2000; Tinkham &

Weaver-Lariscy, 1993; West,

1993). Since candidates risk incurring negative responses to

their own candidacy, or a backlash effect when attacking


8opponents in political advertising, the affective effects of

negative advertising are not necessarily simple and

straightforward (Dowling & Wichowsky, 2014; Jasperson & Fan,

2002; Lemert, Wanta, & Lee, 1999; Merritt, 1984; Sonner, 1988).

To avoid a backlash effect, many campaigns in the 2012

primaries used their attendant Super PACs to sponsor negative

advertisements targeting Republican candidates and the

Democratic president (Brooks & Murov, 2012; Naylor, 2012).

Continuing the trend of increasingly negative candidate-

sponsored advertising, Obama and Romney actually aired higher

percentages of negative ads than did the Super PACs in the

2012 general election campaign (Washington Post, 2012). Clearly,

the perception that negative ads work, regardless of sponsor,

is the predominant wisdom among campaign operatives when


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formulating their advertising strategies (Brader, 2005; Green, 2013; Thurber & Nelson, 2000). In

2012, however, there was a clear divergence in campaign

advertising strategies between the two major party candidates and

their attendant Super PACs. That is, the Obama campaign spent

more than twice the total of the Romney campaign on advertising,

but the pro-Romney Super PACS outspent the pro-Obama Super PACs

by nearly the same margin, evening the playing field, but using

different sponsor identifications in the ads (Beckel & Choma,

2012). This difference in advertising sponsorship strategies is

also reflected in academic research on the influence of negative

ad sponsorship on viewers’ relative affect toward both the target

and the sponsor.

The results of research on the differential effects of

negative advertising dependent upon whether it was sponsored by a

candidate or a third-party group are equivocal. Some research

indicates third-party attacks may allow sponsoring candidates to

avoid backlash effects, thus they are more effective than

candidate-sponsored negative ads in lowering relative preference

for the target (Garramone, 1985; Shen & Wu, 2002). Some research

indicates viewers may perceive candidate-sponsored negative ads

as more credible than third-party ads, making them more effective


10than third-party sponsored negative ads (Jasperson & Fan, 2002;

Meirick, 2005). Still other research found no differential main

effect on relative candidate affect based on

sponsorship, but did find significant sponsorship

interactions with viewers’ partisan group memberships

(Brooks & Murov, 2012; Pfau, Holbert, Szabo, & Kaminski,

2002).

Although negative advertising spurred a great deal of

research when it began dominating the airwaves over the past

several decades, only four major published studies were conducted

after the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) mandated clear ad

sponsorship requirements. The first of these studies compared

candidate- versus political party-sponsored advertising in the

2008 election (Meirick & Nisbett, 2011). Although Meirick and Nisbett (2011) found


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participants were more likely to vote for the candidate in the

candidate- versus political party- sponsored condition, the

association between Obama and McCain and their respective

political parties in this hyper-partisan campaign environment

may have limited their results (Dowling & Wichowsky, 2014;

Weber, Dunaway, & Johnson, 2012).

In another study conducted after BCRA, and the first after

the Citizens United (2010) decision, Brooks and Murov (2012)

compared the differential effects of a single image-based attack

ad on a fictional State Assembly candidate and manipulated source

attribution. Contrary to Meirick and Nisbett’s (2011) findings,

Brooks & Murov (2012) found a single attack ad focused on a

fictional candidate’s image characteristics and sponsored by a

fictional independent group was more influential on net candidate

favorability ratings than when it was attributed to a competing,

fictional candidate, but these effects were dependent on other

individual-level characteristics. Similarly, Dowling and

Wichowsky (2012) found that a single, negative ad against a

fictional State Assembly candidate was more effective if

attributed to an interest group than a candidate or party.

Finally, Weber, Dunaway, and Johnson (2012) also used a single

negative ad and manipulated attribution as a stimulus in their


12experiment testing the effects of

this campaign spot on viewers’ candidate ratings in a fictional,

state-level race that had already occurred. The results of the

Weber Dunaway, and Johnson (2012) study also indicated the ad

was more persuasive when it was sponsored by an unknown interest

group, but the effects were

mixed and limited when examining the main and interaction

effects of ad sponsorship, candidate and viewer partisanship.

Since the 2012 election was the first presidential campaign

after the Citizens United (2010) decision, the literature on the

effects of Super PAC advertising is understandably limited.

Thus, this exploratory investigation finds its place in the

literature by using a series of negative


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issue ads from the two major party candidate campaigns and the

four highest spending Super PACs in the 2012 election. This

approach was selected to maximize external validity since the

vast majority of negative ads focus on issues, not images

(Joslyn, 1980; Kaid, 2004; West, 2014). Further, viewers, and

especially those in battleground states, were much more likely to

see a series of negative ads attacking both candidates rather

than a single ad attacking only one

fictional candidate during a commercial television break (Fowler

& Ridout, 2012). We also chose to focus on a presidential

general election campaign with its attendant higher involvement

levels and distinct agendas that may limit the explanatory power

of analyses focused on fictional state-level races (Houston &

Rothschild, 1978; Zaichkowsky, 1985). Finally, instead of

analyzing simple effects such as comparing posttest candidate

preference scores or summing affect changes across candidates,

this investigation uses a pretest to control for preexisting

attitudes towards the candidates and focuses the analysis on the

differential influence of ad sponsorship on changes in affect toward

the two candidates among participants with varying levels of

involvement.

Although research on the differential effects of ad


14sponsorship in the post-Citizens United (2010) political world is

still emerging, there is compelling evidence that negative

campaign advertising may lower evaluations of targeted candidates

(Garramone, 1985; Kaid & Boydston,

1987; Walkosz, 2003). Further, research also indicates negative

ads attributed to third parties are frequently more effective

than those sponsored by candidates (Brooks and Murov, 2012;

Garramone & Smith, 1984; Shen & Wu, 2002; Dowling & Wichowsky,

2014; Weber, Dunaway,

& Johnson, 2012). Thus, we pose our first hypothesis to test for

a main effect of ad sponsorship on viewers’ changes in affect

toward the candidates.

H1: Negative Super PAC ads will exert greater influence on

affect changes toward the candidates than will

candidate-sponsored negative ads.


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Enduring Involvement: Partisanship

Scholars have long known that partisans (Democrats and

Republicans) have emotional attachments to their respective

groups that significantly influence their processing of

political messages (Campbell, Gurin, & Miller, 1954; Campbell,

et al, 1960; Iyengar & Simon, 2000), including negative

advertising (Kahn & Kenny, 1999; Stevens, Sullivan, Allen, &

Alger, 2008). Compared to nonpartisans, partisans are more

interested in and knowledgeable about the candidates and issues

at stake in the election; they participate in the political

process more; and they sustain higher levels of involvement in

politics over time (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996). Thus,

partisans may be classified as having higher levels of enduring

involvement in politics than nonpartisans.

Although widely regarded as an influential variable, there

is no consensus or uniformity in the operationalization of

involvement (Roser, 1990). These conceptualization differences

resulted in mixed findings, but classifications of involvement

as either a physical, enduring, or a situational variable

facilitate more nuanced analyses (Houston & Rothschild, 1978;

Zaichkowsky, 1985). Some researchers have adopted a physical

conceptualization of involvement determined by the level of the


16election: local, state, and national. The results of these

investigations reveal that greater knowledge gains occur among

those in the low involvement (lower-level contest) condition

(Rothschild, 1978). Other researchers have

classified involvement in terms of an individual’s levels of

particular interest in politics: whether it is enduring, or

sustained over a long period of time, or whether it is

situational, or more immediate in nature. Research results

operationally defining involvement in both enduring and

situational terms indicate both of these variables significantly

influence the effects of exposure to negative advertising

(Hofstetter & Buss, 1980; Patterson & McClure, 1974; Faber &

Storey,


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1984; Garramone, 1984a, 1984b; Painter, 2013).

Although previous research indicates negative advertising

may decrease evaluations of targeted candidates, viewers in

battleground states are exposed to series of ads containing

negative information about all of the candidates. In these

presidential elections, partisans’ responses to the ads are

expected to be more stable than those without such attachments

to a political party, or enduring involvement levels (Sears &

Funk, 1999). Since they do not “have a team in the game,”

Independents are conceptualized as less involved in politics

than are partisans, and their affect toward the candidates may

be more volatile than that of partisans (Green, Palmquist, &

Schickler, 2002, p. 209). Therefore, the second hypothesis

predicts:

H2: Independents will report greater changes in affect

toward the candidates than will partisans.

To specifically identify the group among whom the

greatest effects of exposure to negative Super PAC ads

occurs, the theoretical mechanisms underlying both of the

previous hypotheses converge to form the prediction in the

third hypothesis:

H3: The greatest changes in affect toward the


18candidates will occur among

Independents exposed to negative Super PAC ads.

Method

Participants and Design

A two- (ad sponsorship) by-three (partisanship) pretest-

posttest experimental design was used to test the hypotheses.

Participants were 554 students from a large southeastern

research institution who completed the project between October

16 and October 25, 2012, during the “hot phase” of the general

election campaign. Although all participants in this study were

undergraduates, the results of meta-analysis indicate there are

no significant differences between


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student and non-student samples when investigating the effects oftelevised political advertising

(Benoit, Leshner, & Chattopadhyay, 2007).

Procedure and Manipulation

Participants in all conditions completed a pretest

questionnaire that included demographic and political party

affiliation items, and measurements of affect toward the

candidates. Upon completion of the pretest questionnaire,

Qualtrics software randomized the order of the stimuli ads in

each condition and would not advance until each embedded

advertisement played in full, forcing exposure to the

advertisements. After exposure to the stimuli, participants were

directed to the posttest questionnaire that included items

reassessing affect toward the candidates and political parties.

Stimuli

Six of the most frequently aired negative television

advertisements in the 2012 general election campaign were used

as stimuli (Washington Post, 2013). Those in candidate-sponsored

negative ad condition watched six negative ads, three each from

the Obama and Romney campaigns. Those in the Super PAC negative

ad condition watched six negative ads from the highest spending

Super PACS, with three attacking Obama and three attacking


20Romney. Both conditions watched six ads for 240 seconds. Please

see the Appendix for a list of the ads. Independent Variable

Measurement

Enduring Involvement. The pretest questionnaire included a

seven-point item anchored by “Strongly Republican” and “Strongly

Democrat” asking participants, “Generally, how would you describe

your identification with the political parties in the United

States?” Participants responding that they were strongly or

weakly affiliated with either the Republican or Democratic Party

were coded as either Republicans or Democrats. Those responding

that they were strongly


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Independent or an Independent who leaned toward one of the two parties were coded as

Independents.

Dependent Variable Measurement

Affect toward Candidates and Political Parties. The pretest

and posttest questionnaires included feeling thermometers ranging

from 0 to 100 points to assess participants’ affect towards Mitt

Romney and Barak Obama. This thermometer is similar to the one

used by the NES to measure affect toward the candidates

(Rosenstone, Kinder, Miller, & NES, 1997).

Results

The first hypothesis investigated the main effect of ad

sponsorship on changes in affect toward the candidates and

political parties. To calculate the affect change variable,

several steps were completed. First, participants’ pretest and

posttest feeling thermometer scores were compared. As shown in

Table One, the results of a series of paired-samples t-tests

revealed participants’ posttest affect toward Obama (M = 57.36,

SD = 30.77) was lower than their pretest levels (M = 58.16, SD =

30.37), and this difference was significant, t(554) = 2.10, p <

.05. Similarly, participants’ posttest affect toward Romney (M =

39.85, SD = 30.50) was lower than their pretest levels (M = 43.19,


22SD = 29.13), and this difference was significant, t(554) = 7.60,

p < .01. Finally, participants’ pretest feeling thermometer

scores for Obama and Romney were subtracted from their posttest

scores to create an affect change variable for each political

actor. Once these variables were calculated, the main and

interaction effects of ad sponsorship and partisanship on

affect change toward the political actors were investigated.

The first hypothesis predicted negative Super PAC ads would

exert greater influence on affect toward the candidates and

political parties than would negative candidate-sponsored

negative ads. The results of an analysis of variance revealed

that the differences in affect change


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toward Obama and Romney between those exposed to negative Super

PAC ads or negative candidate-sponsored ads were not

significant, p > .05. Thus, hypothesis one was not supported

because negative candidate-sponsored ads were equivalently

effective as negative Super PAC ads in lowering viewers’ affect

toward the target.

The second hypothesis tested for main effects of enduring

involvement, or partisanship, on changes in affect toward the

political actors. Specifically, the second hypothesis predicted

Independents would report greater changes in affect toward the

candidates than would partisans. As shown in Table Two, the

results of an analysis of variance revealed the differences in

affect change toward Obama among Independents (M = -1.40, SD =

11.15), Democrats, (M = -0.72, SD = 6.80), and Republicans (-2.03,

SD = 9.53) were significant, F(2, 551) = 5.11, p < .01. To test for

differences among specific groups, a post hoc comparison using

the Tukey HSD test revealed Independents’ affect change toward

Obama was not greater than Democrats or Republicans (p. > .05),

but the decrease in affect toward Obama was greater among

Republicans than among Democrats, p < .01. In regard to Romney,

the results of an analysis of variance revealed that the

differences in affect change among Independents (M = -8.17, SD =


2411.90), Democrats (M =-2.73, SD = 9.10), and Republicans (M = -

0.37, SD = 9.10) were significantly different, F(2, 551) = 26.37,

p < .01. Further, the results of a post hoc comparison using the

Tukey HSD test revealed Independents’ affect change toward

Romney was greater than that of Democrats and Republicans, p <

.01. These results indicate there was a main effect of

partisanship on changes in affect toward Romney and Obama, but

the overall results are not as clear-cut when comparing

Independents to partisans. Although Independents’ decrease in

affect

toward Romney was significantly greater than that of Democrats and Republicans, Independents’


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affect change toward Obama was not greater than that of

Democrats or Republicans. Thus, since the results were

candidate-dependent, they provide limited support for the second

hypothesis.

The third hypothesis explored interaction effects between ad

sponsorship and enduring involvement, or partisanship, on affect

change toward the candidates. Specifically, the third hypothesis

predicted Independents exposed to negative Super PAC ads would

report the greatest changes in affect toward the candidates. The

results of a factorial analysis of variance revealed the

interaction between ad sponsorship and partisanship exerted

significant effects on affect change toward Obama, F(5, 553) =

8.85, p < .01. As shown in the first row of Table Three,

Republicans’ affect change toward Obama was significantly less

among those exposed to negative Super PAC ads (M =-0.44, SD =

7.03) than among those exposed to negative

candidate-sponsored ads (M = -3.87, SD = 11.54), F(1, 192) = 6.41,

p < .01. Alternately, Democrats’ affect change toward Obama in

the negative Super PAC condition (M = 0.41, SD =

4.90) was statistically equivalent to their affect change in the negative candidate-sponsored (M =

-1.00, SD = 8.19) condition, p > .10. Independents’ affect change


26toward Obama, however, was significantly greater among those

exposed to negative Super PAC ads (M -4.03, SD = 11.34) than

among those exposed to negative candidate-sponsored ads (M =

0.80, SD = 10.56), F(1,

143) = 7.02. p < .01.

The interaction between ad sponsorship and partisanship also

exerted significant effects on affect change toward Romney, F(5,

553) = 26.46, p < .01. As shown in the second row of Table Two,

Republicans’ affect toward Romney in the negative Super PAC (M =

-0.44, SD = 7.03)

and negative candidate-sponsored (M = -0.40, SD = 8.92) conditions was statistically equivalent,

p > .10. Comparable to the partisan effect for Obama, however,

Democrats’ affect change toward Romney was significantly greater

among those exposed to negative candidate-sponsored


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ads (M = -6.10, SD = 10.33) than among those exposed to negative

Super PAC ads (M = 0.36, SD = 6.45), F(1, 213) = 30.62, p < .01.

Alternately, Independents’ affect change toward Romney was

significantly greater among those exposed to negative Super PAC

ads (-12.76, SD = 14.75) than among those exposed to negative

candidate-sponsored ads (M = -4.34, SD = 6.90), F(1,143) = 7.02, p

< .01. Thus, the effects of negative candidate ads on partisans’

affect toward the opposing candidate notwithstanding, these

results provide strong support for the third hypothesis because

negative Super PAC ads exerted the greatest influence on

changes in affect toward the candidates among Independents.

Further, these results also indicate affect change toward the

candidates among Republicans and Democrats was greatest toward

the opposition party’s nominee among those exposed to negative

candidate-sponsored ads.

Discussion

Consistent with previous research, the results of this

study indicate exposure to negative ads in the 2012 campaign

exerted significant effects on viewers’ affect toward the


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candidates. Although the analysis in this investigation focused

on differences in viewers’ changes in affect toward the

candidates, it is important to note that viewers’ affect toward

both candidates significantly decreased after exposure to the

ads across the sample. Although this result failed to provide

support for the prediction that attack ads sponsored by groups

with names such as “Restore Our Future” or “Priorities USA”

were more effective across the sample than candidate-sponsored

ads, testing for the influence of viewers’ enduring involvement

levels revealed more nuanced effects.

The results of testing the second hypothesis provide

support for a main effect of enduring involvement, or

partisanship, on viewers’ affect change toward the candidates.

When examining the differences in affect change between

candidates and among partisanship categories, however, the

results indicate our prediction that Independents would report

significantly greater changes in affect is candidate-

dependent. Specifically, Independents’ affect change toward

Obama was not greater than that of Democrats or Republicans,

but the decrease in affect toward Obama was greater among


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Republicans than among Democrats. In fact, Democrats’ and

Independents’ affect toward Obama in the pretest was not

significantly different from their posttest scores.

Republicans, on the other hand, reported significantly lower

posttest affect toward Obama (M = 26.53, SD = 23.12) than in the

pretest (M = 28.56, SD =25.76), t(194) = 2.97, p < .01.

When examining the main effect of enduring involvement,

or partisanship, on affect change toward Romney, the results

provide strong support for the prediction in the second

hypothesis. Specifically, Independents reported the greatest

changes in affect toward Romney, but it is also interesting

to note that Democrats also reported significant, but less

dramatic decreases in affect toward Romney, while

Republicans affect toward Romney in the posttest was

equivalent to that in their pretest. Altogether, these mixed

results present strong evidence of a main effect of enduring

involvement in viewers’ changes in affect toward the

candidates. This result indicates viewers’ partisanship not

only summarized their level of enduring involvement in

politics, but also the direction of their involvement in terms


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of in-group or out-group candidates. Put simply, partisans’

affect toward their in-group political party’s nominee was

stable, but their affect toward the out-group or opposition

party’s nominee decreased significantly after viewing the

ads.

Finally, the third hypothesis tested for interactions

between ad sponsorship and enduring involvement that influenced

viewers’ affect change toward the candidates. The results

provided strong support for the prediction that Independents

exposed to the negative Super PAC ads would report the greatest

changes in affect toward the candidates across this

investigation’s six conditions. These results not only bolster

the argument that those with lower levels of enduring

involvement will report greater changes in affect after viewing

negative ads, but they also indicate ad sponsorship

significantly influences this effect. Indeed, while

Independents exposed to Super PAC ads reported the greatest

changes in affect toward the candidates, partisans’ affect

toward the candidates was essentially stable after exposure to

the same Super PAC spots. In fact, partisans’ changes in affect


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toward the candidates were significant only toward the

opposition party’s nominee - and only when exposed to

candidate-sponsored ads. Thus, the only significant change in

affect reported by Republicans was toward Obama among those

exposed to candidate- sponsored ads. Similarly, the only

significant affect change reported by Democrats was toward

Romney among those exposed to candidate-sponsored ads.

In sum, the results of this investigation indicate

negative Super PAC ads are effective at lowering the relative

affect toward their target among Independents. Moreover, the

results also suggest negative candidate-sponsored ads are

effective at lowering Republican and Democrats’ relative

affect toward the targeted opposition party’s candidate. By

parsing the influence of negative ad sponsorship

identification and viewers’ enduring involvement, the results

of this investigation suggest presidential campaigns may not

only make strategic decisions about campaign spot content and

ad buy tactics, but they may also consider the purpose of

these ads and their target audience when making strategic

decisions. That is, to reinforce partisans’ relative attitudes


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toward the candidates and to activate in-group supporters,

campaigns may be more effective when using candidate-sponsored

ads because voters may use this sponsorship identification as

a heuristic cue or mental shortcut when processing the

information (Chaiken, Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Goodmane &

Murray, 2007; Mondack, 1993; Rahn, 1993). Should the campaigns

strategically focus on Independents in a specific market,

however, negative Super PAC ads sponsored by groups such as

“American Crossroads” or “Priorities USA” may be more

effective in lowering relative affect toward the target. Since

recent judicial decisions ruled televised political

advertising is a form of protected speech (Citizens United,

2010; SpeechNOW, 2010), the candidates and their attendant

Super PACs are only limited by their budgets and sponsorship

identification in the production and airing of spot ads. Thus,

based on market research determining the political

characteristics of specific markets and the potential

influence of viewer’s voting behavior on electoral outcomes,

presidential campaigns make strategic decisions about the

spots’ content, sponsorship and ad buy tactics (Kaid, 2012;


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Lau & Pomper, 2002; Skaperdas & Grofman, 1995; Theilman &

Wilhite, 1998).

Theoretically, this investigation suggests negative

advertising in the 2012 election achieved its purpose by

lowering affect toward the target, especially among

Independents exposed to Super PAC ads. Although not predicted,

the results also indicate partisans’ affect toward the

opposition party candidate was significantly influenced by

negative candidate- sponsored ads, but not the Super PAC ads.

This interaction between ad sponsorship and viewers’ enduring

involvement indicates both source attribution and individual

characteristics influence viewers’ information processing.

Indeed, viewers may have used the sponsorship identification in

the ads as a heuristic device determining whether the

information comes from an in-group, out-group, or unfamiliar

source. Previous research indicated Super PAC-sponsored ads,

especially when the source identification was ambiguous and

unfamiliar, were more effective in lowering relative affect

toward the target than candidate-sponsored ads (Brooks & Murov,

201; Dowling & Wichowsky, 2014; Weber, Dunaway, & Johnson,


34

2012). These investigations, however, used fictional

candidates, so the viewers’ association between the candidates

and their political party may not have functioned as a

heuristic cue as it would in a presidential election.

The results of this study notwithstanding, there were some

limitations that must be noted. First, the participants were

college students. A meta-analysis of experimental research on

political advertising, however, reveals that effect sizes in

studies using student samples were not significantly different

from effect sizes in studies using non-student participants

(Benoit, Leshner, & Chattopadhyay, 2007). Second, the stimuli

in this investigation were actual ads, so control over content

was sacrificed to maximize external validity. That said,

differences in the content of the negative ads may have

influenced the results. Third, the conceptualization of

partisanship as enduring involvement focused on levels of

involvement, and not direction. Thus, future research on group

identities and attitudes among Republicans, Democrats, and

Independents as well as how individual self-categorization

triggers these processes and influence responses to partisan


35

cues may better specify their heuristic value. Future research

on viewers’ responses to Super PAC names, which are generally

ambiguous and unfamiliar to viewers, could provide insight into

how they influence credibility and information processing.


36

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Appendix

Candidate-sponsored Condition: 240 seconds and order randomized

1. Negative Obama Ad: Policy (30 seconds)

2. Negative Obama Ad: Cameras (60 seconds)

3. Negative Obama Ad: Firms (30 seconds)

4. Negative Romney Ad: Give Me a Break (30 seconds)

5. Negative Romney Ad: Broken Promises (60 seconds)

6. Negative Romney Ad: Failing American Families (30 seconds)

Super PAC-Sponsored Condition: 240 seconds and order randomized

1. Anti-Obama (Restore Our Future) Ad: Doing Fine (30 seconds)

2. Anti-Obama (Restore Our Future) Ad: Flatline (30 seconds)

3. Anti-Obama (American Crossroads) Ad: Obama’s War on Women (60 seconds)

4. Anti-Romney (Priorities USA) Ad: Stage (60 seconds)

5. Anti-Romney (Priorities USA) Ad: Heads or Tails (30 seconds)

6. Anti-Romney (AFSCME) Ad: Greed (30 seconds)


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Table 1: Affect Change toward the CandidatesPretest Posttest Affect Change df t p

Obama (D)

Romney (R)

58.16*

(SD =

30.37)

43.19

(SD =29.13)

57.36*

(SD =

30.77)

39.85

(SD =30.50)

-0.80 553 2.10 .04

-3.33** 553 7.60 .00

*Affect toward Obama higher than Romney, p < .01.**Affect change toward Romney greater than toward Obama, p < .01.


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Table 2: Main Effect of Enduring Involvement on affect change toward candidatesRepublicans

Democrats

Independents

df F p

n = 194 n = 215 n = 145

Obama (D) -2.03* -0.72 -1.40

2 5.11 .00

Romney (R)

-0.37

-2.73** - 8.17***

2 26.37

.00

*Republicans affect change toward Obama greater than Democrats, p < .01.**Democrats affect change toward Romney greater than Republicans, p < .01**Independents’ affect change toward Romney greater than Democrats or Republicans, p < .01.


54

Table 3: Effects of Sponsorship and Enduring Involvement on Affect Change toward Candidates

GOP

Super PACAdsN =282DEM

IND GOP

CandidateAdsN =272DEM

IND F df p

n = 104

n = 112 n = 66 n = 90

n = 103

n = 79

Obama -0.44 -1.00 -4.03* -3.87* -0.41 -0.80 8.85 5 .00

Romney 0.36 0.72 -12.76**

0.40 -6.09 -4.34 26.46 5 .00

*Affect change toward Obama interaction among Independents in Super PAC and GOP in candidate ad conditions.**Affect change toward Romney interaction among Independents in Super PAC condition.

Super PAC vs. Candidate Ads: The Influence of Sponsorship and Involvement on Candidate Affect

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