Social axioms and values: a cross-cultural examination

Social Axioms and Values: A Cross-Cultural Examination

KWOK LEUNG1*, AL AU2, XU HUANG3, JENNY KURMAN4, TOOMAS NIIT5

and KAISA-KITRI NIIT 5

1City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong2University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong

3Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Hong Kong4University of Haifa, Israel

5Tallinn University, Estonia

Abstract

The relationships between social axioms, general beliefs that people hold about the social

world, and values, defined as desirable goals for life, were examined in five cultural groups.

Results show that the correlations between social axioms and Schwartz’s (1992) values are

generally low, suggesting that they represent two distinct types of construct. Based on a

structural equation modelling approach, results further show that generally speaking, the

five axiom dimensions are related to the value types in a meaningful and interpretable

manner, and that these relationships are generally similar across the five cultural groups.

Implications of these results and directions for future research are discussed. Copyright#2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Key words: social axioms; Schwartz’s values; culture

INTRODUCTION

In the study of culture, two approaches are prominent. Cultural psychology and indigenous

approaches focus on culture-specific processes and meaning systems, whereas cross-

cultural psychology focuses on universal or etic processes across cultures (Greenfield,

2000; Shweder, 2001). Both approaches are useful and complement each other. Perhaps the

most obvious example of an etic approach is the identification of cultural dimensions for

characterizing diverse cultures in the world. Most dimensions of culture are based on

values, such as the now classic dimension of individualism–collectivism (Hofstede, 1980).

To provide an alternative conceptualization, Leung, Bond, and their associates (Leung

et al., 2002) have turned to general beliefs, or social axioms, for characterizing culture and

its psychological manifestations.

European Journal of Personality

Eur. J. Pers. 21: 91–111 (2007)

Published online 3 January 2007 in Wiley InterScience

(www.interscience.wiley.com) DOI: 10.1002/per.615

*Correspondence to: Kwok Leung, Department of Management, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong.E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Received 14 October 2005

Revised 8 October 2006

Accepted 9 October 2006

A FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL AXIOMS

Social axioms refer to context-free beliefs and assume the following form: A is related to B.

A and B can be any constructs, and people’s belief in a belief statement is reflected by their

perceived likelihood of the relationship. For instance, for the belief ‘competition leads to

progress’, some people may see a strong link between competition and progress, while

others may think that the two are unrelated. In contrast, values refer to the importance or

desirability that people attach to a construct, such as religion or power. We use the label

‘axiom’ to reflect the axiomatic nature of these general beliefs, because a person assumes

their validity without meticulous evaluation and scrutiny. The term ‘social’ is used to refer

to the assumption that these axioms are acquired through social experiences.

With social axiom items culled from theWestern psychological literature as well as from

interviews and cultural materials from China and Venezuela, five pan-cultural axiom

dimensions were identified across forty cultural groups (Leung & Bond, 2004). Briefly put,

Social Cynicism indicates a generally negative view of people and social institutions, and

the extent to which actors expect negative outcomes from their engagements with life,

especially with more powerful others. Social Complexity indicates an actor’s judgements

about the variability of individual behaviour and the number of influences involved in

determining social outcomes. Reward for Application indicates how strongly a person

believes that challenges and difficulties will succumb to persistent inputs, such as relevant

knowledge, exertion of effort or careful planning. Religiosity indicates an assessment about

the positive, personal and social consequences of religious practice, along with the belief in

the existence of a supreme being. Note that religiosity is sometimes defined as a personal

value, but our definition is based purely on general beliefs about religions and has nothing

to do with one’s own religiosity values. In the present study, we measured religiosity with

belief items based the social axioms framework. Fate Control indicates the degree to which

important outcomes in life are believed to be fated and under the control of impersonal

forces, but are predictable and alterable. These five dimensions are identifiable in a wide

range of cultural groups (Leung & Bond, 2004), even with the adoption of stringent

statistical procedures (Cheung, Leung, & Au, 2006). Although cultures can be

rank-ordered according to these five axiom dimensions, we do not assume that social

axioms are highly consensual in a given society. This feature differentiates social axioms

from mathematical axioms, which are endorsed by all mathematicians.

To validate the meaning of these five axiom dimensions, Leung and Bond (2004)

correlated the average axiom scores of a cultural group, its citizen scores, with a diverse

range of variables at the culture level.Manymeaningful relationships are found, supporting

the validity of these axiom dimensions. For instance, Social Cynicism is related to lower

life satisfaction; Social Complexity is related to higher voter turnout and stronger interest

in politics; Reward for Application is related to more working hours per week; Religiosity

is related to higher agreeableness and more church attendance; and Fate Control is related

to a higher heart disease death rate.

At the individual level, a number of studies have also found meaningful relationships

with a wide range of variables (see Leung & Bond, 2004 for a review). For instance, in a

study involving Hong Kong Chinese, Bond, Leung, Au, Tong, and Chemonges-Nielsen

(2004a) found that Reward for Application was related to the conflict resolution style of

accommodation; Social Cynicism was related to a lower tendency to use collaborative and

compromising styles; Social Complexity was related to the use of compromise and of

collaboration; and Religiosity was related to both accommodation and competition

Copyright # 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Pers. 21: 91–111 (2007)

DOI: 10.1002/per

92 K. Leung et al.

positively. Fate Control was significantly related to distancing, a coping style characterized

by being passive and the avoidance of thinking about difficulties.

Singelis, Hubbard, Her, and An (2003) found that, among American college students,

Social Cynicism correlated negatively with interpersonal trust and cognitive flexibility;

Social Complexity correlated positively with cognitive flexibility, and feeling comfortable

with talking to strangers and speaking one’s mind even if it may hurt others’ feelings;

Reward for Application was related to trying harder the next time when unsuccessful;

Religiosity correlated positively with traditional Christian beliefs, and with seeking advice

from a spiritual adviser, praying and reading scriptures; Fate Control correlated positively

with external locus of control, negatively with traditional Christian beliefs, and positively

with spiritual beliefs, supernatural beliefs and belief in precognition.

SCHWARTZ’S THEORY OF VALUES

Schwartz (1992) has developed a theory of values that consists of 10 value types organized

in the form of a circumplex. Schwartz used smallest space analysis to examine the spatial

relationships among a broad range of values, and found that the optimal solution is a

two-dimensional representation, with the values organized in the form of a circle:

Stimulation (e.g. exciting life), Self-Direction (e.g. independent), Universalism (e.g. world

of beauty), Benevolence (e.g. forgiving), Conformity (e.g. self-discipline), Tradition (e.g.

respect for tradition), Security (e.g. social order), Power (e.g. authority), Achievement (e.g.

successful) and Hedonism (e.g. enjoying life). For a schematic representation, see Figure 1.

Figure 1. A schematic representation of Schwartz’s theory of values (based on Schwartz, 1994b).


DOI: 10.1002/per

Social axioms and values 93

Schwartz (1992) further proposed that his 10 value types can be organized into two pairs

of opposing higher-order categories. In one contrast, some values reflect the motivation to

enhance the self (power and achievement), and other values reflect the motivation to

transcend the self (universalism and benevolence). In the other contrast, some values reflect

the motivation for conservation (tradition, conformity and security), and other values

reflect the motivation for openness to change (self-direction and stimulation). Hedonism

is the only value type that lies between two higher-order categories: openness to change

and self-enhancement. Schwartz’s theory has been validated in a wide range of cultures

(Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). Many meaningful relationships between

his value types and other variables have been reported, such as those with worries

(Schwartz, Sagiv, & Boehnke, 2000) and with voting behaviour (Barnea & Schwartz,

1998).

SOCIAL AXIOMS AND VALUE TYPES

As described before, some research has examined the joint effects of social axioms and the

Schwartz value types on various dependent variables. Bond et al. (2004a) found that social

axioms and the Schwartz values do not correlate highly among Hong Kong Chinese college

students. Kurman and Ronen-Eilon (2004) found that social axioms were more predictive

of the adaptation of immigrants in Israel than were values. Nonetheless, a systematic

investigation of their relationships has not been conducted, which is the major objective of

the present paper.

An exploration of the relationships between social axioms and the Schwartz value types

is important for two reasons. First, social axioms and values are different constructs, and a

systematic investigation of their inter-relationships will shed light on how to integrate them

for a better understanding of preferences and behaviours. For instance, in the expectancy

model, valence and expectancy are jointly used to predict specific behaviours (Vroom,

1964). Values may be regarded as generalized valences, and social axioms, generalized

expectancies. The examination of how values are related to axioms can help us better

understand and predict general patterns of social behaviours (Leung & Bond, 2004).

Second, while the cross-cultural validity of the Schwartz values is well established, social

axioms as relatively novel constructs require more evidence for their cross-cultural

generality. If some meaningful relationships between social axioms and values can be

established, the validity and universality of social axioms can be further strengthened.

Howmay social axioms relate to the Schwartz value types? Before we delve into specific

predictions, two issues should be addressed. First, values signal one’s priorities in life, and

are often ascribed a motivational function in guiding people to focus their effort on goals

deemed as important (e.g. Rokeach, 1972; Schwartz, 1996). In contrast, axioms are

judgements about the social world, which are not based on self-description and

self-perception. Although axioms and values both serve as general guidelines for choices

and behaviours, these two types of construct differ in the way they operate. Values provide

the ‘what’ answer, in a sense that they define what one should pursue, be it wealth or social

justice. Axioms provide the ‘how’ answer, because how one construes the social world bear

on the strategies and actions adopted for goal achievement. Viewed in this perspective,

social axioms should be distinct from and independent of values. However, motivational

and cognitive processes are not isolated, and they exert mutual influence upon each other

(e.g. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Strack &Deutsch, 2004). It is well known


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94 K. Leung et al.

that values provide a lens through which people perceive and interpret social reality, and

that people who endorse certain values are likely to see the world in a specific way. For

instance, Goodwin, Nizharadze, Luu, Kosa, and Emelyanova (2001) found that values

predicted people’s perceived availability of social support in three post-Communist

nations. Reciprocally, cognitions also influence the goals that people pursue. For instance,

self-efficacy, the general assessment of one’s ability for goal attainment, has been shown to

influence goals, such as academic goals (Zimmerman, Bandura, & Martinez-Pons, 1992)

and career goals (Kahn & Scott, 1997). The reciprocal influence between values and beliefs

suggests that although social axioms and values are distinct constructs, some meaningful

linkages between these two types of construct should be detectable.

The second issue is that values are organized in a circumplex structure, which implies

that if the data fit the model perfectly, a variable should relate to the 10 value types in the

form of a sinusoid function (Schwartz, 1992). Most adjacent values would show similar

relationships with a variable, but occasionally some adjacent values may show opposite

relationships with a variable. This pattern is possible because if the data are perfect,

the sinusoid curve should pass through the X-axis twice, and a predictor would show

opposite relationships with two adjacent values if the curve passes through the X-axis

between them.

PREDICTIONS ABOUT THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN

VALUES AND AXIOMS

We now discuss the expected relationships between axioms and values. In the absence of

previous research, our analysis is by necessity speculative. Obviously, the ideal way to

generate predictions is to rely on a coherent theoretical framework, but unfortunately such

a framework has yet to be developed. We instead adopt an empirical approach and rely on

findings based on constructs that are related to social axioms to generate some predictions.

We note that a number of studies examined specific values rather than value types, and we

therefore have to rely on these specific values to generate predictions for the value types to

which they belong. In a nutshell, the current research should be viewed as the first step to

develop a coherent theoretical framework for linking social axioms and values.

Social Cynicism involves a negative view of people and social institutions, and it is

likely to correlate negatively with universalism, and positively with power. Mistrust is a

core component of Social Cynicism, and we draw upon the research on mistrust to support

these speculations. Mistrust in co-workers is related negatively to a universalistic as

opposed to a particularistic orientation in personnel practices (Pearce, Branyiczki, &

Bigley, 2000), suggesting a negative relationship between Social Cynicism and

Universalism. People high in Social Cynicism should also see Power as important

because it can be used to protect their well being against the potential exploitation by

others. Consistent with this argument, perceived powerlessness is related to mistrust (Ross,

Mirowsky, & Pribesh, 2001). People high in Social Cynicism may also have a deficiency

need with regard to power (Bilsky & Schwartz, 1994).

Reward for Application involves the belief in the effectiveness of effort and hard work,

and it should correlate positively with Achievement, and negatively with Hedonism.

Consistent with these speculations, Protestant work ethic, which involves the belief in hard

work, is related to achievement motivation positively (Furnham, Kirkcaldy, & Lynn, 1994),

the provision of good service to customers (Tang&Weatherford, 1998), and to an emphasis


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on leisure negatively (Hirschfeld & Feild, 2000). We note that Achievement and Hedonism

are adjacent values types in Schwartz’s model, and we predict that Reward for Application

will show opposite relationships with them. In other words, we expect that the sinusoid

curve will pass through the X-axis between these two value types.

In addition, we expect Reward for Application to correlate with Conformity positively,

since conformity involves the restraints of actions and impulses that violate social norms

and expectations, which seem conducive to perseverance. In line with these arguments,

Feather (1984) found that Protestant Ethic value is correlated positively with obedience and

self-control, which are definers of Conformity.

Social Complexity is associated with a complex view of people and social events, as well

as openness to diverse views and pluralism. We therefore expect it to correlate with

Tradition and Conformity negatively, both of which emphasize adherence to social and

moral norms. We also expect it to correlate positively with Self-Direction, which

emphasizes independence, and with Universalism, which emphasizes understanding,

tolerance and protection for the welfare of people and nature. Our predictions are based on

results associated with the openness dimension of the five-factor model of personality,

which also involves beliefs that emphasize openness to experience and imaginativeness.

Openness has been found to correlate negatively with Tradition and Conformity, and

positively with Self-Direction and Universalism (Roccas, Sagiv, Schwartz, & Knafo,

2002). Using a lexical approach based on the German language, Renner (2003) reported

that openness correlated negatively with values associated with conservation (e.g. national

identity and tradition), but positively with values associated with balance (e.g. human

kindness, human rights and human dignity). The finding with regard to balance seems to

suggest that Social Complexity may correlate with Benevolence. It seems possible that the

pluralistic view espoused in Social Complexity may encourage a benign relationship with

other people.

Fate Control is associated with the belief in fate and the possibility of altering fate to

one’s benefit. Fate Control is likely to relate to Tradition positively, as traditional values

often involve fatalistic elements, and to Self-Direction negatively. Consistent with this

argument, Unger et al. (2002) found that fatalism, which is characterized by perceived

uncertainty and uselessness of planning, correlated positively with such traditional values

as filial piety and machismo (male dominance). Their findings show that fatalism also

correlated positively with collectivism, which is characterized by high interdependence

with friends, and seems opposite to Self-Direction.

Finally, Religiosity is likely to relate to Tradition and Conformity positively, as religions

are part of the tradition of most cultures and they require conformity to religious practices.

Religiosity should also relate to Benevolence positively, as religions are typically

associated with the advocacy of selfless love and sacrifice, and to Hedonism, Stimulation

and Self-Direction negatively, as religions typically de-emphasize enjoyment, pleasure and

excitement, and instead emphasize restraint, other-worldliness and subjugation to a divine

being. These speculations are confirmed by a meta-analysis of the relationships between

the Schwartz values and religiosity, defined as a general personal orientation, with 21

independent samples from 15 different countries. The findings generally show that

religious people tend to endorse Tradition, Conformity and Benevolence, and reject

Hedonism, Stimulation and Self-Direction (Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004).

Table 1 summarizes our predictions.

We believe that the relationships between social axioms and values are universal and are

relatively unaffected by cultural context. To test this general hypothesis, the relationships


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96 K. Leung et al.

between axioms and values were examined in a diverse group of cultures: Hong Kong,

mainland China, the Netherlands, Israel and Estonia.

METHOD

Participants

The five cultural groups studied vary on many cultural dimensions. Dutch, Israelis and

Estonians are individualistic and low in power distance, whereas the two Chinese groups

(Hong Kong and mainland China) are collectivistic and high in power distance (Hofstede,

2001). Schwartz (1994a) has analysed his values at the culture level, with culture as the unit

of analysis, and obtained dimensions that are different from the individual-level value types

described before. With regard to his culture-level value framework, Hong Kong, mainland

China, Israel and Estonia (urban) are in the top half regarding conservatism, while the

Netherlands is in the lower half. The five cultural groups also span across the dimension of

hierarchy with mainland China near the top and Estonia (urban) near the bottom. The

Netherlands is very high in egalitarian commitment, Estonia (urban) in the middle, while

Hong Kong, Israel and mainland China are in the bottom half. As for the culture-level

dimensions of social axioms (Bond et al., 2004b), the Netherlands and Israel are relatively

lower in societal cynicism and dynamic externality, which refers to a belief constellation

defined primarily by an emphasis on effort and the positive consequences of religions,

while mainland China, Hong Kong and Estonia are relatively higher in these two

dimensions. In addition, these cultural groups have different dominant religions (e.g.

Protestantism, Judaism and Buddhism). Different socio-political-economic systems

are represented. Hong Kong, the Netherlands and Israel are capitalistic, mainland China is

Table 1. Predictions of the relationships between social axioms and values

Social Axioms Hypothesized relationwith Schwartz’s values

Social Cynicism Power (þ)Universalism (�)

Reward for Application Achievement (þ)Conformity (þ)Hedonism (�)

Social Complexity Self-direction (þ)Universalism (þ)Benevolence (þ)Conformity (�)Tradition (�)

Fate Control Tradition (þ)Self-direction (�)

Religiosity Tradition (þ)Conformity (þ)Benevolence (þ)Hedonism (�)Stimulation (�)Self-Direction (�)


DOI: 10.1002/per


characterized by market-oriented socialism, and Estonia is a former communist society.

Hong Kong, Israel and the Netherlands are relatively wealthy, and mainland China and

Estonia have relatively lower GDP per capita. In summary, if a consistent pattern emerges

across these diverse cultural groups, the generality of the relationships is compelling.

There were a total of 912 participants from the five cultural groups, and Table 2 presents

the sample characteristics. Participants either received course credit for the participation or

participated voluntarily. The mainland Chinese sample was collected specifically for this

paper, but the social axiom data for the Netherlands, Israel and Estonia have been reported

in both Leung and Bond (2004) and Bond et al. (2004b), and the social axiom data for Hong

Kong were reported in Bond et al. (2004a). The value data have not been reported before,

except for the value data of Hong Kong, which were reported in Bond et al. (2004a). The

data set was comprised of predominately college students with the exception of mainland

China and Israel, in which adults were also included. However, the heterogeneity in age

should not be a problem because both the axiom and value constructs had been validated

with students and adults (Leung & Bond, 2004; Schwartz, 1992). To be certain, we

calculated partial correlations between axioms and values controlling for age in these two

cultures to assess the importance of age. Among the 100 axiom-value pairs (50 for each

culture), the average absolute difference between simple and partial correlations was 0.006

for mainland China and 0.01 for Israel. We therefore conclude that age was not important

and did not consider its impact in subsequent analyses.

Measures and procedure

For all questionnaires, local languages were used, and back translation was used to assure

fidelity in translation. Participants completed the 82-item or 60-item version of the Social

Axioms Survey (Leung et al., 2002). The response scale used five points, with ‘Strongly

disbelieve’ and ‘Strongly believe’ as labels for the two end points. Sample items included

‘Powerful people tend to exploit others’ (Social Cynicism), ‘There are various ways to

achieve a goal’ (Social Complexity), ‘Onewill succeed if he or she really tries’ (Reward for

Application), ‘Good luck follows if one survives a disaster’ (Fate Control), and ‘Religious

faith contributes to good mental health’ (Religiosity).

Except for the Israeli sample, all participants completed the 57-item version of the

Schwartz Value Survey (SVS, Schwartz, 1994b), which consisted of the 10 value types.

Participants responded to value phrases such as ‘Equality [equal opportunity for all]’

(Universalism) and ‘Indulge myself [self-indulgence]’ (Hedonism) on a 9-point scale

ranging from ‘opposed to my values’ (-1), ‘not important’ (0), to ‘of supreme importance’

(7). The Israeli participants completed the 40-item Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ),

which is an alternate and less abstract form of the original value survey and was validated

with participants from four countries: South Africa, Uganda, Italy and Israel (Schwartz

Table 2. Sample information

Hong Kong Mainland China The Netherlands Israel Estonia

Sample size 180 229 170 89 244M 90 93 65 41 80F 90 134 105 48 164Mean age 20.2 26.1 23.1 35.1 20.5

Note: Two respondents in the mainland Chinese sample did not report their gender.


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98 K. Leung et al.

et al., 2001). PVQ can be regarded as an indirect measure of respondents’ endorsement of

various value types because they are asked to compare themselves to a specific person

possessing a particular value described in each item. PVQ consists of the same 10 value

types, and sample items include ‘He thinks it is important that every person in the world be

treated equally. He believes everyone should have equal opportunities in life’

(Universalism) and ‘Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him. He likes to ‘‘spoil’’

himself’’’ (Hedonism). Participants responded to a 6-point scale ranging from ‘not like me

at all’ to ‘very much like me’. In validating the PVQ, Schwartz et al. conducted a

multitrait-multimethod analysis by asking the same group of respondents to complete both

the SVS and the PVQ in a counterbalanced order. Results showed that the

single-trait-multimethod correlations were all significant and sizeable, and were larger

than the multitrait-multimethod correlations. Thus, we regard the two methods as

equivalent and did not differentiate them in our data analysis.

Participants received the anonymous survey instrument from an administrator in groups.

They were briefed about the content of the survey and the confidentiality of the data

collected. The time required to complete the survey was about 15 to 25 minutes.

Analyses

The pan-cultural structures of the axiom and value constructs have been validated with a

wide range of cultures, and these structures were used to ensure valid cross-cultural

comparisons. As a result, only 39 items from the 60 axiom items and 46 from the 57 value

items were included in the analyses (see Leung & Bond, 2004; Schwartz, 1992; Schwartz

& Boehnke, 2004). For the PVQ, all 40 items were included. Scale composites in the form

of averages (sum of all items in a scale divided by the number of items) were used in the

main analysis. Schwartz (1992) suggested that his value survey should reveal the value

priorities of a person and individual differences in response styles may confound the value

profile of a person (see also Leung & Bond, 1989). To overcome this problem, value scores

were within-subject centred for each respondent by subtracting the overall mean of all his

or her value items from each value item. As a result of this within-subject centring

procedure, the sum of all the value scores of a respondent is zero, thus allowing the

individual value scores to reveal the value priorities of the person. No within-subject

centring was conducted for axioms because it is unclear whether a comprehensive set of

axioms has been identified.

RESULTS

Cronbach alphas of both axiom and value scales for the five cultural groups are shown in

Table 3, and the reliability of quite a number of the scales is below 0.70. For Social

Complexity and Fate Control, reliabilities are relatively low across the samples, but these

reliabilities obtained are comparable to those reported in Leung and Bond (2004). For

values, reliabilities for Self-Direction, Tradition and Security are relatively lower, but they

are also similar to the values obtained in Schwartz et al. (2001), where they speculated that

it was due to the small number of items used for each value type as well as the broad

coverage of concepts by each value type. To assure whether subsequent analysis was

meaningful in the face of some low reliabilities, confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) was

conducted separately for axioms as well as values to check whether our data fitted the


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Table

3.

Descriptivestatistics

andreliabilityofthemeasures

Scale

No.ofitem

Raw

mean

SD

Alpha

HongKong

MainlandChina

TheNetherlands

Israel

Estonia

Social

Axioms

Social

Cynicism

11

2.99

0.51

0.72

0.72

0.69

0.75

0.62

Rew

ardforApplication

93.64

0.51

0.64

0.67

0.49

0.66

0.66

Social

Complexity

64.16

0.37

0.59

0.49

0.60

0.39

0.46

FateControl

62.79

0.56

0.48

0.42

0.46

0.72

0.51

Religiosity

72.95

0.66

0.77

0.69

0.73

0.73

0.65

Schwartz

values

Hedonism

3(3)

4.14(4.07)

1.48(1.20)

0.76

0.61

0.71

0.86

0.64

Stimulation

3(3)

3.40(3.82)

1.62(1.22)

0.78

0.70

0.75

0.75

0.85

Self-direction

5(4)

4.70(4.94)

0.90(0.77)

0.54

0.55

0.58

0.62

0.59

Universalism

8(6)

4.07(4.57)

1.00(0.82)

0.71

0.74

0.73

0.75

0.75

Benevolence

5(4)

4.56(4.64)

0.97(0.76)

0.76

0.74

0.70

0.67

0.74

Tradition

5(4)

2.36(2.99)

1.24(1.16)

0.59

0.53

0.77

0.75

0.65

Conform

ity

4(4)

3.81(3.95)

1.14(1.10)

0.67

0.58

0.59

0.77

0.69

Security

5(5)

4.03(4.43)

1.10(0.92)

0.64

0.57

0.64

0.68

0.63

Power

4(3)

2.77(3.43)

1.51(1.11)

0.76

0.67

0.72

0.65

0.71

Achievem

ent

4(4)

4.22(4.32)

1.19(1.10)

0.68

0.60

0.73

0.80

0.62

Note:Numbersin

parentheses

referto

theitem

sin

theportraitvaluequestionnaire

answ

ered

bytheIsraelirespondents.


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100 K. Leung et al.

prescribed structures reported in previous studies. We applied the technique of item

parcelling to reduce the model complexity because many items were involved. We also

centred the responses within each culture prior to the analysis to control for possible

cultural differences in response sets. This procedure also allowed us to perform a

pan-cultural analysis, in which the five cultural groups were merged into a single data set

(Leung & Bond, 1989). In particular, for axioms, three parcels were formed for each of the

axiom dimensions by randomly assigning items to each parcel. The number of items in

each parcel ranged from two to four. A five-factor structure was fitted, and the CFA results

suggested an acceptable fit: x2 (df¼ 125)¼ 479.8, p< 0.001, with x2/df¼ 3.84,

CFI¼ 0.934, IFI¼ 0.935, SRMR¼ 0.041, RMSEA¼ 0.059. For values, two parcels

were formed due to the smaller number of items in some of the value types. For Hedonism

and Stimulation, which consist of only three items, a two-item parcel and the remaining

item were used as the two indicators for each value type. The number of items in each

parcel ranged from two to four, and the CFA results also suggested a good fit for a 10-factor

structure: x2(df¼ 80)¼ 244.4, p< 0.001, with x2/df¼ 3.06, CFI¼ 0.921, IFI¼ 0.922,

SRMR¼ 0.046, RMSEA¼ 0.047. In sum, the universal structures of axioms and values

reported before were confirmed with the present data set, suggesting that the low

reliabilities of some scales were not too problematic. The unreliability issue is also

addressed in subsequent analyses.

Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between axioms and values for the five cultural

groups. As expected, most of the correlations are low and within the range of 0.25 and

�0.25, and the highest correlation scored is 0.54, which is between Religiosity and

Tradition in the Israeli sample. In fact, Religiosity yields most of the larger correlations.

We may conclude from these correlations that the overlap between axioms and values is

indeed small. Generally speaking, we expect sinusoid relationships between an axiom

dimension and values because the values are based on a circumplex model (Schwartz,

1992). Social Cynicism is correlated most positively with Power, and most negatively with

Self-Direction. For Reward for Application, the most positive correlation is with

Achievement, and the most negative correlations are with Hedonism and Tradition. For

Social Complexity, the most positive correlation is with Self-Direction, and the most

negative correlation is with Tradition. For Fate Control, the most positive correlations are

with Tradition and Power, and the most negative correlation is with Benevolence. For

Religiosity, the most positive correlations are with Tradition, Conformity and

Benevolence, and the most negative correlation is with Hedonism. The sinusoidal shape

is quite clear for Religiosity, and moderately clear for Social Cynicism, Social Complexity

and Reward for Application. There is no obvious pattern for Fate Control in its correlations

with values. We conclude that the pattern of correlations generally supports our

expectation.

A formal test was conducted to evaluate whether the correlations between axioms and

values are equivalent across the five cultural groups. Given that the structure of axioms and

values has been validated across diverse cultures, our focus is on testing the equality of the

axiom-value correlation coefficients across the five cultural groups. Procedures like those

proposed by Olkin and Finn (1995) for testing correlation coefficients across samples or by

Hunter and Schmidt (1990) for meta-analysis can be used, but these procedures are

designed to assess a pair of correlations at a time across different samples. For our purpose,

we need to assess 50 correlations (5 axioms� 10 values) across 5 samples, and these

procedures become tedious and inefficient. Recently, Cheung and Chan (2004) propose

that the equality of a set of correlations across several samples can be tested efficiently by


DOI: 10.1002/per


Table

4.

Correlationsbetweenaxiomsandvalues

Social

Cynicism

Rew

ardforApplication

Social

Complexity

FateControl

Religiosity

HK

CN

NE

ISES

HK

CN

NE

ISES

HK

CN

NE

ISES

HK

CN

NE

ISES

HK

CN

NE

ISES

Hedonism

0.09

0.14�

�0.01

�0.20

0.05

�0.16��0

.08

�0.17�

�0.26�

0.06

�0.02

0.06

0.02

0.15

0.02

0.11

0.03

�0.05

�0.09

0.05

�0.35��

0.05

�0.34��

�0.22�

�0.17��

Stimulation

�0.09

0.03

0.03

�0.19

0.08

0.00

0.08

0.07

�0.20

0.10

0.03

0.09

0.02

0.15

0.05

�0.13

�.01

0.05

�0.11

0.09

�0.19��

0.01

�0.07

0.01

�0.28��

Self-direction

�0.02

�0.09

�0.02

�0.26�

�0.27��

0.04

0.09

�0.05

�0.02

�0.15�

0.14

0.12

0.09

0.05

0.30��

�0.16��0

.09

�0.02

�0.13

�0.09

�0.25��

�0.06

�0.20��

�0.25�

�0.03

Universalism

0.01

�0.22��

�0.07

�0.12

�0.07

0.07

�0.08

�0.21��

�0.04

�0.05

0.00

�0.04

0.00

0.12

0.19��

�0.07

�0.11

�0.08

�0.14

0.07

0.15�

0.05

�0.10

�0.18

0.14�

Benevolence

�0.10

�0.18��

�0.14

�0.08

�0.02

0.07

0.08

�0.12

�0.02

�0.13�

0.08

�0.13

0.07

0.17

0.18��

�0.04

�0.06

�0.21��

�0.21��0

.13�

0.25��

�0.03

0.26��

0.24�

0.10

Tradition

�0.06

�0.07

�0.04

0.30��

0.00

0.04

�0.21��

�0.09

0.06

�0.25��

�0.10

�0.11

�0.26��

�0.25��0

.24��

0.05

0.23��

�0.05

0.26��0

.02

0.45��

0.31��

0.41��

0.54��

0.22��

Conform

ity

�0.02

�0.03

0.00

0.21

0.24��

0.07

0.10

0.09

0.17

0.18��

�0.02

�0.12

0.09

�0.04

�0.21��

�0.04

�0.09

0.03

�0.02

0.10

0.31��

�0.16�

0.19�

�0.05

0.11

Security

0.05

0.02

0.04

0.03

0.06

�0.08

�0.05

0.03

0.09

0.06

0.02

0.10

0.08

�0.16

�0.16�

0.10

�0.09

�0.01

0.09

�0.03

0.08

�0.14�

�0.15�

0.00

0.03

Power

0.10

0.27��

0.13

0.10

0.04

�0.08

�0.00

0.19�

0.03

0.16�

�0.09

�0.03

�0.02

�0.10

�0.22��

0.14

0.13�

0.16�

0.20

�0.04

�0.27��

�0.04

�0.06

�0.07

�0.14�

Achievem

ent

0.02

0.11

0.11

0.05

�0.09

0.04

0.17�

0.34��

0.13

0.13�

0.03

0.05

0.02

�0.00

0.07

�0.02

�0.03

0.18�

0.00

0.00

�0.20��

�0.15�

�0.0.04

�0.14

�0.10

HK¼HongKong(n¼180);CN¼mainlandChina(n¼229);NE¼theNetherlands(n¼170);IS

¼Israel

(n¼89);ES¼Estonia

(n¼244).

� p<0.05.

��p<0.01.


DOI: 10.1002/per

102 K. Leung et al.

structural equation modelling (SEM). Specifically, a multiple group SEM model is set up,

in which the relevant covariance paths that correspond to the correlations under

examination are constrained to be equal across groups. If the fit statistics are acceptable, we

then conclude that the correlations are equivalent across groups (see Cheung & Chan, 2004

for technical details). Their approach allows us to test the cross-cultural equivalence of all

axiom-value correlations in a single omnibus test.

We extended Cheung and Chan’s (2004) approach to 50 correlations across five samples.

We first fitted a model in which each of the 10 axiom-value correlations was set to be

equivalent across the five cultural groups with EQS 6.1 (Bentler & Wu, 2004). This

package is preferable because it provides a LagrangeMultiplier test function for improving

model fit by relaxing the equality constraints placed on the 50-covariance paths using a

data-driven approach. In this model, there are 15 latent variables for each cultural group,

representing the five axiom dimensions and the 10 value types. For each latent variable, the

composite score of the corresponding axiom or value dimension was regarded as an

observed variable.

Following Cheung and Chan (2004), the factor variance of the latent variables was set as

1, and the error variance of the observed variables was set as zero. A full matrix of the

covariance paths was constructed based on the 15 latent variables, but correlation matrices

of the five samples were actually input as covariance matrices. This ‘trick’ led to the

display of correlation coefficients in the covariance paths, and the end result was a saturated

SEM model with zero degree of freedom. To test for cross-cultural equivalence, we

imposed an equality constraint on each of the 10 axiom-value pairs across the five cultural

groups. Each set of constraints had 4 degrees of freedom, and the final model had

200 degrees of freedom because we had 50 axiom-value correlations.

An omnibus test was then performed on this model, which assumes all axiom-value

correlations to be congruent across the five cultural groups. The SEM test statistics were: x2

(df¼ 200)¼ 380.07, p< 0.001, with x2/df¼ 1.90, which rejected the cross-cultural

equivalence of all axiom-value pairs. This result is not surprising, because the chi-square

statistic is very sensitive in a large sample. Thus, we also examined various fit indexes to

evaluate the fit of the model: CFI¼ 0.975, IFI¼ 0.976, SRMR¼ 0.072 and

RMSEA¼ 0.032. Using the criteria recommended by Hu and Bentler (1998), the model

achieved a very good fit except for SRMR, which is slightly larger than the criterion of

0.06. Table 5 shows the SEM estimates of the pooled correlation coefficient estimates. All

Table 5. Pooled correlation coefficient estimates from the SEM results

SocialCynicism

Reward forApplication

SocialComplexity

FateControl Religiosity

Hedonism �0.03 �0.05� 0.02 �0.03 �0.14��

Stimulation �0.02 0.02 0.05 �0.04 �0.10��

Self-direction �0.09�� 0.01 0.11�� 0.07� �0.15��

Universalism �0.04 �0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01Benevolence �0.04 �0.02 0.09�� 0.05 0.14��

Tradition 0.01 �0.13�� 0.19�� 0.07� 0.33��

Conformity 0.08�� 0.07� �0.05 0.02 0.10��

Security 0.02 �0.02 0.01 �0.02 �0.05Power 0.08�� 0.07� �0.08�� 0.04 �0.10��

Achievement 0.02 0.15�� 0.05 0.01 �0.11��

�p< 0.05; ��p< 0.01; ��p< 0.001.


DOI: 10.1002/per


correlations fall within the range of �0.2 to 0.2, with the exception of the correlation

between Tradition and Religiosity (0.33). Out of the 18 predictions presented in Table 1,

15 are supported. The three unsupported predictions include: Social Cynicism with

Universality, and Social Complexity with Universalism and Conformity. A total of seven

unpredicted correlations are significant, but only three are from a value type that is not the

neighbour of a predicted value type: Power with Social Complexity and Religiosity, and

Conformity with Social Cynicism. In addition, the correlation between Reward for

Application and Tradition was negative. Although Tradition is a neighbour of a predicted

value type, the sign was opposite to our expectation. In other words, a total of four

significant correlations deviated drastically from our original predictions. The unsupported

predictions and the major deviations are explored in the Discussion. Finally, the sinusoidal

curve pattern is clear for Religiosity, and vaguely discernable for Social Cynicism, Social

Complexity and Reward for Application. No obvious pattern was found for Fate Control

(see Figure 2).

Despite the acceptable fit provided by the equality model, we used the Lagrange

Multiplier (LM) test to improve the model fit. This procedure first identified the most

problematic case among all the equality constraints, and relaxed this constraint. The next

most problematic constraint was then identified, and the procedure repeated until all the

200 cases were being evaluated. We first examined the results of the univariate LM test to

assess the improvement of relaxing each of the 200 equality constraints. Ten cases reached

the 0.01 level of significance, and were all concerning Religiosity and one of the value

types across Hong Kong and Estonia. In other words, relaxing each of these 10 equality

constraints would result in a significantly better model fit. We then conducted the

Figure 2. Pooled correlation coefficient estimates based on the SEM results.


DOI: 10.1002/per

104 K. Leung et al.

cumulative multivariate LM test to identify the next constraint that would yield the largest

improvement after the most problematic constraint was relaxed. It should be noted that

results of the univariate and multivariate LM tests may not be identical, and we used both

tests to identify problematic constraints. After relaxing the equality constraint associated

with the largest improvement in model fit (the religiosity-stimulation pair), Dx2¼ 20.96

(df¼ 1), p< 0.01, none of the remaining nine cases remained significant in the cumulative

multivariate LM test. We therefore concluded that in general the axiom-value correlations

were similar across these five cultural groups.

As mentioned before, the reliability of some scales is low, so that the estimated

correlations from the model may have been attenuated and do not reflect the true

population correlations accurately. To explore this possibility, we followed a modelling

procedure that takes into account scale unreliability by the use of latent variables with only

one indicator (Netemeyer, Johnston, & Burton, 1990). The model configuration was

identical to the model described before, but latent variables were used instead, with one

indicator for each latent variable. The use of single indicators is particularly useful in

complex models when the focus is on structural paths (e.g. Carlson & Perrewe, 1999;

Zacharatos, Barling, & Iversion, 2005). The error variance was fixed at

(1�alpha)� variance of an indicator, and the inclusion of the error variance in the

model is equivalent to a correction for unreliability. The factor variance of each of the latent

variable was fixed at 1, which was for model identification purposes as well as for setting

the estimated covariance paths to be equal to correlations after correction for attenuation.

Covariance matrices rather than correlation matrices were used as data input. As before,

equality constraints on the 200 axiom-value covariance paths across the five groups were

set. The SEM results obtained for this model were comparable to those of the model

reported before, x2 (df¼ 200)¼ 373.38, p< 0.001, x2/df¼ 1.87, CFI¼ 0.976, IFI¼ 0.977,

SRMR¼ 0.071, and RMSEA¼ 0.031.

As expected, due to correction for attenuation, the average of the absolute magnitude of

the 50 correlations was 0.105, which was larger than the average based on uncorrected

correlations (0.066). To assess whether the pattern of the correlations between axioms and

values was similar across the two sets of SEM results, Spearman rank correlation

coefficients were computed based on the two sets of axiom-value correlations for each

axiom, and was found to have an average value of 0.98, with Cynicism and Reward for

Application being the highest (1.0), and Fate Control being the lowest (0.95). We therefore

conclude that the low reliability of some scales somewhat attenuated the axiom-value

correlations, but it did not have much effect on the pattern of the correlations between

axioms and values.

DISCUSSION

Relationships between axioms and values

Despite the inclusion of five diverse cultural groups and both college students and adults as

respondents, and the use of two different instruments to measure Schwartz’s values, the

results show considerable convergence. The results support two major predictions we

made. First, consistent with previous results (Bond et al., 2004a), the overlap between

social axioms and Schwartz’s values is small, even when the unreliability of the scales is

taken into account. It is well known that values are related to a wide range of preferences

and behaviours, but the observed relationships are usually not strong (e.g. Bardi &


DOI: 10.1002/per


Schwartz, 2003). Social axioms, which are distinct from values, provide a different

perspective that adds to our understanding and prediction of preferences, judgements and

behaviours.

Second, social axioms show some meaningful relationships with values, which are

similar across the cultural groups studied. We made 18 predictions, and 15 were confirmed.

These meaningful correlations with values support the validity and cross-cultural

generality of the axiom dimensions. The rationale for the confirmed predictions is

described in the introduction, and we briefly review it in the following. A total of seven

unpredicted correlations are significant, but only three are from a value type that is not the

neighbour of a predicted value type, and these significant deviations are also discussed

below. We note again that in the absence of previous research, our account is obviously

speculative. We also note that we use some specific values of a value type to illustrate our

arguments, and it does not mean that we regard these specific values as key drivers of the

value-axiom relationships observed. It should be emphasized again that among the

significant axiom-value pairs, some relationships are weak (e.g. reward for application with

hedonism). We regard these significant but weak relationships as indicative of associations

between distinct concepts, because the relationships between distinct concepts may vary

from weak to strong.

Social Cynicism is correlated positively with Power, and a likely explanation is that

people with a cynical view desire power as a countervailing resource to avoid being abused

and used. The predicted negative correlation between Social Cynicism and Universalism

was not found, and people high in Social Cynicism do not reject such universalistic values

as wisdom and broadmindedness. It seems that the belief in a malevolent social world is not

related to the rejection of self-transcendence values. Not predicted, Social Cynicism

was also correlated with Conformity positively and Self-Direction negatively. These

correlations are interesting because people high in Social Cynicism view social institutions

and authority figures as untrustworthy, but they endorse Conformity and de-emphasize

Self-Direction. Perhaps they see Conformity and low Self-Direction as instrumental for

avoiding rejection and punishment from other people.

Reward for Application is correlated positively with Achievement and Conformity, and

negatively with Hedonism. It is easy to understand that the belief in hard work and effort is

related to the desire for success and the de-emphasis of pleasure. The relationship with

Conformity, however, is less straightforward. Conformity is defined by such values as

self-discipline, politeness and obedience. Self-discipline is obviously needed for working

hard, and it is interesting that people who believe in hard work also value politeness and

obedience. Perhaps hard work is often associated with taking instructions from authority

figures and working within rules, which explains the importance of politeness and

obedience. Not predicted, Reward for Application correlated negatively with tradition (e.g.

humble, moderate and accepting my portion in life) and positively with power. The

negative correlation with Tradition is interesting, and one likely explanation is that people

high in Reward for Application strive to achieve their goals and break away from their

current status position, a tendency that is opposite to traditional values. In other words,

people high in Reward for Application work within rules and obey authorities (high

endorsement of conformity), but they would like to go up the social ladder (low

endorsement of tradition). Future research is needed to explore the psychological processes

associated with this paradoxical finding. Finally, the correlation with power is

straightforward, because people high in Reward for Application pursue not only

achievement, but also power.


DOI: 10.1002/per

106 K. Leung et al.

Social Complexity is correlated positively with Self-Direction and Benevolence, and

negatively with Tradition. People who subscribe to a pluralistic view of the world endorse

independence, curiosity, helpfulness and honesty, which are major definers of

Self-Direction and Benevolence. People high in Social Complexity seem to emphasize

a caring world that allows individuality, and they resist the constraints of Tradition (e.g.

humble and accepting my portion in life). Contrary to our prediction, Social Complexity

did not correlate with Universalism and Conformity. People high in Social Complexity do

not particularly emphasize such universalistic values as wisdom and broadmindedness, nor

do they reject Conformity (e.g. polite and obedient). Not predicted, Social Complexity was

correlated negatively with Power. People high in Social Complexity seem to reject power

and dominance over others. Taken as a whole, these findings suggest that people high in

Social Complexity place much emphasis on the individual self and endorse a benign social

world in which people help each other and are not dominated by others.

Fate Control correlates with Tradition positively and Self-Direction negatively as

predicted. It is noteworthy that for Fate Control, the usual sinusoidal relationship with

values is not evident, which suggests that Fate Control is related to values in a somewhat

haphazard way. Fate Control seems more distant from values, which requires further

exploration in future research.

As predicted, Religiosity correlates positively with Tradition, Conformity and

Benevolence, and negatively with Hedonism, Stimulation, and Self-Direction. Not

predicted, it also correlates negatively with power and achievement. This pattern of results

is quite similar to the meta-analytic results of Saroglou et al. (2004), who reported some

relationships between religiosity as a personal orientation and Achievement and Power,

and weak relationships between religiosity as a personal orientation and Security and

Universalism. Taken as a whole, this pattern suggests that people high in the axiom

dimension of Religiosity are low in openness to change and self-enhancement values,

which are expected given that Religiosity is associated with the observance of religious

teachings and the subjugation of the self to a divine being. These people also endorse

conservation values except for Security, and self-transcendence values except for

Universalism. These two exceptions are noteworthy, and one way to explain them is that

people high in Religiosity are indifferent to Security (e.g. family and national security) and

Universalism (e.g. wisdom, social justice and equality) because of their belief that a benign

divine being will protect their well being and guide them with wisdom and justice.

It is interesting to note that Religiosity is the only axiom dimension that shows sizable

correlations with values. As described before, Religiosity as an axiom dimension is based

on general beliefs about religions and its operational definition has nothing to dowith one’s

religiosity values. Nonetheless, previous research finds religiosity and values to be

intertwined, and most if not all religions have strong value components and proffer

prototypes of human values (e.g. Rokeach, 1969; Schwartz & Huismans, 1995). Our results

echo these earlier conclusions despite the fact that Religiosity is entirely based on general

beliefs about religions in the social axioms framework.

Different functions of axioms and values

As discussed before, social axioms are about social truths and values are concerned with

goals. Values define what people strive for, and axioms shed light on how to achieve

important goals. Leung and Bond (2004) argued that people need a general understanding

of the social world to decide on effective courses of action, giving rise to the universality of


DOI: 10.1002/per


social axioms. For instance, Social Cynicism provides the basis for choosing between

trusting and self-protective behaviours in dealing with others. Reward for Application

provides the basis for deciding how much effort should be exerted for task

accomplishments. Social Complexity provides the basis for deciding whether or not to

search for the single best solution or asserting that there is only one solution. Fate Control

provides the basis for deciding whether one should adapt to events that cannot be easily

altered or engaging in practices judged effective in counteracting fateful outcomes. Finally,

Religiosity provides the basis for accepting a divine being and acting in a religious manner.

The major difference in how axioms and values shape behaviour can be illustrated by

conflict-handling behaviour. As described before, Bond et al. (2004a) found that Social

Cynicism was related to a lower preference for collaborative and compromising styles.

Social Cynicism is associated with a negative view of people, and because collaboration

and compromising are based on mutual trust, it is obvious why these two strategies are not

preferred by people high in Social Cynicism. In other words, one’s standing on Social

Cynicism shapes one’s views with regard to how conflict can be resolved effectively. In

contrast, values are appropriate for explaining why people prefer some goals over others in

handling a conflict. For instance, Ohbuchi, Fukushima, and Tedeschi (1999) provided

evidence to show that in conflict situations, the collectivistic values of Japanese led them to

emphasize relationship goals (to maintain a positive relationship with others), whereas the

individualistic values of Americans led them to emphasize justice goals (to restore justice).

In other words, values provide a motivational account of why some goals are salient in a

conflict situation for a particular cultural group.

Although values and axioms influence people’s preferences and behaviours through

different processes, because of the mutual influence of values and cognitions on each other,

our findings point to some overlap between them. To continue with our conflict example,

Self-Direction, a key marker of individualism, shows a negative correlation with Social

Cynicism. Thus, people who endorse Self-Direction are more likely to emphasize justice

goals in their conflict handling behaviour. Because they tend to have lower Social

Cynicism, they are also more likely to use compromising and collaborative strategies to

resolve a conflict. Obviously, we are not in a position yet to theorize about the complex

interplay of axioms and values because of the nascent nature of this line of work.

Nonetheless, this paper helps stimulate more research on how to integrate these two

constructs into a coherent framework.

Limitations and directions for future research

The present study has several limitations, and they are discussed in the context of

identifying some directions for future research. First, we claim that our results are

universal, but the generality of our results needs to be evaluated with more cultural groups.

A related issue is that our samples are based mostly on college students, and it is useful to

evaluate the relationships between axioms and values with adults from diverse walks of

life.

Second, we adopt a cross-cultural approach in our research, which emphasizes universal

relationships across diverse cultures. On the other hand, culture-specific processes are

definitely important, and are best examined by cultural and indigenous approaches

(Greenfield, 2000; Shweder, 2001). For instance, there is some culture-specific research on

values in Estonia (Aavik & Allik, 2002), and future research should integrate our findings

with results based on cultural and indigenous approaches.


DOI: 10.1002/per

108 K. Leung et al.

Third, we adopt a liberal definition of cross-cultural equivalence, which does not

demand perfect congruence in a statistical sense, but instead is based on a high degree of

similarity across cultures. This strategy is commonly adopted in large-scale cross-cultural

projects because the range of these projects makes it almost impossible to obtain perfect

cross-cultural congruence (Leung & Bond, 2004). Nonetheless, when we accumulate more

knowledge about the specific relationships between axioms and values, fine-grained,

meaningful cultural differences in the relationships between axioms and values may be

identified and meaningfully interpreted.

Forth, despite the low reliability of Social Complexity and Fate Control, these two

dimensions are clearly identifiable across diverse cultural groups, and with college students

as well as with adults (Leung & Bond, 2004). The lower reliability of these two dimensions

does not seem to be too problematic for the present study for three reasons. First, the

confirmatory factor analysis supports the proposed structures of both axioms and values,

suggesting that the low reliability of some scales does not lead to a high level of noise.

Second, the structural equation modelling approach adopted corrects for unreliability, and

compensates for the low reliability of some scales. We also note that for axiom dimensions

with an alpha �0.65, the relationships with values are not much stronger. For instance,

social cynicism generally has good reliability, but it does not show strong relationships

with values. This observation suggests that the negative impact of the low reliability of

some scales is perhaps small. Third, the alphas we obtain are comparable to those reported

in previous studies, in which meaningful results were obtained (e.g. Bond et al., 2004a). In

sum, the totality of the results suggests that the issue of low reliability should not be a

serious problem, but it is desirable to develop more reliable measures for evaluating the

axiom-value relationships in future research.

Finally, we have provided some speculations to explain the significant relationships

between social axioms and values, and at this point it is uncertain whether axioms affect

values, or values affect axioms, or they exert mutual influence on each other. We are only

beginning to understand the relationships between axioms and values, and these complex

issues await future evaluation.

‘‘In truths dependent on our personal action, then, faith based on desire is certainly a

lawful and possibly an indispensable thing.’’

William James, The will to believe

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Barnea, M., & Schwartz, S. H. (1998). Values and voting. Political Psychology, 19, 17–40.Bentler, P. M., & Wu, E. J. C. (2004). EQS 6.1 for Windows [Computer software]. Encino, CA:Multivariate Software.

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Social axioms and values: a cross-cultural examination

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