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I. Introduction

The introduction of the Euro on Janu-ary 1, 2002 was a defining moment formany people in the participating coun-tries. The new currency has drawn atten-tion to the European Union (EU) andstimulated the debate on the future ofthe Union. It has become clear that afterthe introduction of the Euro the nextbig project which EU members will haveto deal with is the admission of a numberof new members.

The enlargement of the EU, which willprobably begin in 2004, creates manyopportunities for the European conti-nent. Officials in European capitals hopethat it will lead to the peaceful resolution

Security Implications of EU EnlargementBy Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach*

of conflicts, the democratization of statestructures, and the modernization ofeconomies and societies.1 However, the�old� member states do not yet seem tobe fully aware of the challenges that comewith the entry of 12, perhaps even 18new members.2 The debate in the gen-eral public has largely focused on finan-cial issues.

The accession of the new members willhave not only economic and financialconsequences, but will also affect securitypolicy. The following analysis concentrateson the implications of EU enlargementin the field of security policy. In particu-lar, it will highlight some of the prob-lems that may arise in a Union consistingof up to 33 members.

II. Political Aspects

The Treaty on European Union

The Treaty of Amsterdam, which cameinto force on 1 May 1999, referred for thefirst time to the territorial integrity of theEU and the preservation of its externalborders. According to Article 11, paragraph1 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU),the Union shall define and implement acommon foreign and security policy(CFSP), whose objectives include:

�- to safeguard the common values,fundamental interests, independence andintegrity of the Union in conformity withthe principles of the United NationsCharter; (...)

* Dr. Gerd Föhrenbach, Research Fellow, Bundeswehr Office for Studies and Exercises. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.

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- to preserve peace and strengthen in-ternational security, in accordance withthe principles of the United NationsCharter, as well as the principles of theHelsinki Final Act and the objectives ofthe Paris Charter, including those on exter-nal borders (...).�3

This comes close to an at least indirect�definition of the Union as a securityspace�.4

Furthermore, EU member states havecommitted themselves to solidarity. Arti-cle 11, paragraph 2 TEU stipulates thatthe members �shall support the Union�sexternal and security policy actively andunreservedly in a spirit of loyalty andmutual solidarity�. EU members �shallrefrain from any action which is contraryto the interests of the Union or likely toimpair its effectiveness as a cohesive forcein international relations.�

These provisions do not of course havethe same value as the Article 5 mutual as-sistance clauses of the treaties of the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) andthe Western European Union (WEU). Nev-ertheless, the principle of territorial in-tegrity might have �very serious conse-

quences�5 after enlargement, as a task forceof the European Parliament has pointedout. It remains to be seen to what extentEU member states will comply with theprinciple of solidarity in an enlarged Un-ion if - to give but one example - rela-tions between Russia and the Baltic Stateswere to sharply deteriorate.

Another source of friction in case of acrisis might be the different membershipstructures of the EU and the WEU. Onlyten of the fifteen EU states are currentlyfull members of the WEU; five countries(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland andSweden) have partly strong reservationsabout military co-operation with the EU.A transferral of the Article 5 military as-sistance commitment of the WEU treatydoes not presently seem to be politicallyfeasible although a common defencewould provide a good basis for co-opera-tion in crisis management operations.

Co-operation mechanisms

The remarkable progress achieved inthe field of the European security and

defense policy (ESDP) since 1999 shouldnot obscure the fact that the national in-terests of the EU member states still differsignificantly. The more members the EUhas in the future, the more difficult thetask of fashioning a coherent foreignpolicy for the Union will be. The neces-sity of making most decisions unani-mously has proved to be a time-consum-ing procedure, which hampers quick po-litical action. Despite this, barely anyprogress was made in Nice by the EU�sheads of states and governments towardsextending qualified majority voting. Ar-ticle 23 TEU states that decisions withmilitary and defense implications will betaken unanimously by the Council.6 Thissystem of decision-making will continueto provide individual member states withthe option of vetoing the majority�s in-terests.7

In the future, it will thus be absolutelynecessary to renounce the narrow, nationalperspectives in the field of foreign andsecurity policy in order to find forms offlexible integration. It is widely acknowl-edged that an EU consisting of 25, 30 or

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even more states cannot be governed withthe mechanisms created for the six found-ing members. There are already severalmodes of differentiation existing in to-day�s EU: the Schengen agreement (towhich only 13 of the 15 members ac-ceded), the economic and monetary un-ion (only 12 of the 15), the WEU mu-tual military assistance commitment (only10 of the 15), a number of �opt-out�clauses and other exceptions such as inenvironmental policy.8 In principle, theproposals for the formation of a �coreEurope� (as espoused by German Chris-tian Democratic politicians WolfgangSchäuble and Karl Lamers), a �centre ofgravity� (German Foreign MinisterJoschka Fischer) or an �avantgarde�(French President Jacques Chirac) all pur-sue the same objective: the preservationof the ability to act effectively in an en-larged Union. EU members must createthe necessary conditions which will allowthe process of integration to continue, ifneed be on several tracks and in differentvarieties.

The Future of Integration

However, there is an ongoing contro-versy between the old members as to thefuture of the EU. Between Berlin andParis, the two self-proclaimed �engines�of the EU, profound differences existabout the direction which the Europeanproject should take.9 In an open letterpublished in October 2001, JacquesDelors, Felipe Gonzalez, Helmut Kohl andJacques Santer criticized �continuing ma-jor weaknesses�10 within the EU whichcould be exacerbated by enlargement:

�Divided over Economic MonetaryUnion as well as over defence, Europe canagree neither on the objectives and meth-ods of integration, nor on what more isneeded in order to make a success of en-largement.�11

The entry of new EU members mightwell deepen the differences. Those newmembers in Central and Eastern Europewhich until 1991 belonged to the �East-ern bloc� are likely to defend vigorouslytheir still young national sovereignty. It

often appears that it is mainly the EU�sprosperity which has attracted the candi-dates, not the notion of co-operation andintegration (although this is a key pre-requisite for the EU�s economic success).Brussels�s demands for an improvementof the co-operation among the states ofSouth-Eastern Europe, for example, aresometimes regarded in that region, occa-sionally even by high government offi-cials, as a �dirty trick�12 to keep the Bal-kans away from Europe. In none of thecandidate countries can a �sense ofsupranational eros�13 be observed, asWerner Weidenfeld said, �the candidatestates do not comprehend the WesternEuropean founding notion - gaining com-mon sovereignty by relinquishing nationalsovereignty.�14

Against this background, an increas-ing number of voices can be heard de-manding a consolidation of the Unionbefore enlargement takes place. HelmutSchmidt, a former German chancellor, andValéry Giscard d�Estaing, a former Frenchpresident, have been warning that �[h]asteto enlarge the Union can lead it into a

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sequence of severe crises in the first dec-ade of the new century.�15 Full integra-tion is not a realistic goal for 30 coun-tries that are very different in their po-litical traditions, culture and economicdevelopment, the two elder statesmenmaintain. They conclude that �[t]o attemptintegration with that many countries canonly lead to complete failure.�16

Furthermore, scepticism towards�Brussels� is growing among the popula-tion in the current member states. Onaverage, only 48% of EU citizens supporttheir country�s membership. Merely 41%of EU-Europeans say they tend to trustthe Union�s institutions and bodies; al-most the same percentage of people (40%)say they tend not to trust it.17 A declinein support for the EU can even be ob-served in some of the candidate countries.

To sum up, it seems possible that en-largement might lead to a weakening ofthe Union, with far-reaching negativeconsequences for all members. It is by nomeans certain that the EU success storycan be continued after enlargement. AsJean-Claude Juncker, the Prime Minister

of Luxemburg, said after the lengthy ne-gotiations at the European Council inNice, �Never before have I realized soclearly how fragile Europe is.�18

III. Security Aspects

Alongside the political ramifications ofenlargement, the EU will face a range ofsecurity challenges.

Cyprus

The accession of the Republic of Cy-prus will most likely pose serious diffi-culties. Despite a slight easing of tensionsbetween Greece and Turkey over recentmonths, the EU entry of the Greek-Cyp-riot part of the island might exacerbatethe problems there, rather than help tosolve them. In November 2001, TurkishPrime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who or-dered the invasion of Cyprus in 1974,threatened to annex the Turkish-occupiednorthern bit of the country if Cypruswere to join the EU. Officials in the U.S.

Department of Defense believe that Tur-key might even try to blockade the is-land.19

If, as most observers expect, no settle-ment on the future of the country can bereached before the conclusion of the en-largement negotiations, the EU will finditself in a complicated position. If no agree-ment has been reached, the accession ofthe Greek part is likely to trigger a crisis.The possibility of a war between the twoNATO allies cannot be excluded either.However, if the EU were to decide topostpone extending membership to Cy-prus, Brussels might run the risk thatGreece will stymie the entire enlargementprocess. Although the European Commis-sion seems to anticipate the entry of thedivided island, it remains unclear whatthe EU will eventually do.20

The Balkans

In the context of the 1999 air campaignagainst Yugoslavia, the EU held out theprospect of membership to states inSouth-Eastern Europe, which, in the words

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of EU Commissioner Günther Verheugen,�would otherwise have had to wait long[for such an offer].�21 The well-intendedaim of the �Stability Pact for South-East-ern Europe� has been to discourage thepeoples in the Balkans from the use ofviolence by showing them the way to Eu-rope. The EU is now facing the challengeof having to deal with huge, often exag-gerated expectations and the disappoint-ments which accompany them.

A significant improvement of the secu-rity conditions in the Balkans, whichwould - at least in the medium term - allowthe termination of the West�s military pres-ence, has yet to occur.22 There is a certaindanger that the EU might be overwhelmedby the complexity of the Balkan quandary.Javier Solana, the EU�s high representativefor foreign and security policy, admits, �Myworry is whether we can solve the prob-lems in the Balkans (...).�23

A part of the overall picture is whathas been called one of the �unfortunatetraditions� of Western policy towards theBalkans, namely �to pursue grand objec-tives without firm determination and with

unrealistically low expenditures�.24 To betrue, considerable amounts of money havealready flowed into the region. But eventhe European Council had to recognize�the need to provide support in a muchmore co-ordinated, coherent fashion�.25

If the effort to stabilize the region is tobe eventually successful, it has to remaina very important issue on the West�s po-litical agenda. Diminished attention to theneed to re-build South-Eastern Europemight result in developments which couldlead to the Balkanization of Europe in-stead of the Europeanization of the Bal-kans.26

Relations with Russia

Due to its size, its nuclear arsenal andthe minorities living in many Central andEastern European states, Russia must stillbe considered an element of considerableuncertainty for Europe. It thus made per-fect sense to concentrate on Russia in thefirst �common strategy� that the EU de-vised in 1999 in the framework of theCFSP.27

Moscow�s position towards the EU andthe enlargement process has by and largebeen positive. The Russian �Medium-TermStrategy for Development of Relationsbetween the Russian Federation and theEuropean Union (2000-2010)�28 is aimedat, inter alia, the mobilization of �the eco-nomic potential and managerial experi-ence of the European Union to promotethe development of a socially orientedmarket economy of Russia�. During theperiod under review, Russia does not in-tend to join the EU. Moscow is seeking�to ensure pan-European security by theEuropeans themselves without both iso-lation of the United States and NATOand their dominance on the continent�.The European Security and Defense Policy(ESDP) is seen as an instrument whichcould counterbalance the �Nato-centrism�in Europe.

Against this background, the cautionof some officials in Central and EasternEuropean capitals in their stance towardsESDP becomes understandable. In Poland,Hungary, the Czech Republic and theBaltic States a sense of unease can be dis-

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cerned with regard to the possibility thatESDP might weaken NATO and its secu-rity guarantee.29

One may assume that a more distinctlymilitary profile of the EU is likely to al-ter relations with Russia. Moscow maydecide to take a tougher stance vis-à-visBrussels if, for example, the future EUrapid reaction force were to be deployedin what Russia regards as its �near abroad�or if the EU were to develop a nuclearstrategy (see below).30 However, a substan-tial deterioration of Russia�s relations withthe EU seems improbable since links tothe largest integrated economic area ofthe world are indispensable to Moscow.

Currently, the struggle against terror-ism forms the basis of a possible re-orien-tation of relations between the West andRussia. Nevertheless, the actions of theKremlin will be decisive, not its rhetoric.It is widely known that Russia maintainsclose links to states such as Libya, Iranand Iraq which have supported interna-tional terrorism.31 Moscow also plays adubious role in several of the conflictson the southern rim of the former So-

viet Union. The involvement of theKremlin in the future development of theEU will in any case be important, but thequality of mutual relations will be deter-mined by Moscow�s domestic and foreignpolicy.

ESDP

According to the German foreign of-fice, the creation of a common EuropeanSecurity and Defense Policy is a �keyproject for the realization of PoliticalUnion�.32 The objective is to �render theEU capable of independent action (...) inthe whole spectrum of non-military andmilitary crisis management�.33 The effec-tive combination of civilian and militarymeans is to become the �hallmark� of theEU in the 21st century. In the militarysector, EU members have agreed to be ca-pable of deploying 50-60,000 troops within60 days and sustaining forces for at leastone year by the year 2003 (European Head-line Goal). The forces will be charged withthe implementation of the so-calledPetersberg tasks.34 As to civilian crisis

management, by 2003 the EU intends tobe able to provide, inter alia, up to 5,000police officers, up to 2,000 civil protec-tion specialists and up to 200 civil admin-istration experts for international missions.Their task will be to strengthen the rule oflaw, administrative structures and civilprotection in countries outside the EU.

Despite the progress that has beenachieved in the field of ESDP over thelast two years, some important aspects haveto be clarified if the European defenseefforts are to be successful in an enlargedUnion. Firstly, there is the issue of geo-graphical limits. Where will EU forces bedeployed? So far, EU members have beenunable to agree on where the Union�sinterests and responsibilities stretch. Prob-ably not all political players are aware thatthere is hardly a part of the world whichis not linked with one or several EU mem-ber states by defence relationships. Opin-ions among the members of the Unionalso differ with regard to the legitimacyof force, risk-taking, acceptance of casual-ties and the legal problems in multina-tional units.35 Presumably none of these

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problems will be any easier to solve in anexpanded Union.

A second question is which EU coun-try would be able to provide major troopcontingents were the mission to take placein an area other than the regions whereEU and NATO members are alreadymilitarily involved? British soldiers, forexample, are presently deployed in Cy-prus, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Gulfregion, southern Turkey, Sierra Leone, theFalkland Islands and East Timor. The Brit-ish Ministry of Defence has thereforemade the reduction of overstretch its �firstpriority�.36 In the German Bundeswehr,too, the reservoir of forces for the currentmissions is �still far to small�,37 says Gen-eral Harald Kujat, the Chief of the Ger-man Federal Armed Forces Staff and in-coming Chairman of NATO�s MilitaryCommittee. This means apparently, to besuccinct, that major EU missions can onlybe accomplished if the necessary troops aredrawn from other crisis operations, whichwould in turn put those missions at risk.

Thirdly, the issue of military capabili-ties has to be mentioned. As shown at

the so-called Capabilities CommitmentConference38 in November 2000, EUmembers have considerable deficienciesin their capabilities (examples are strate-gic sea- and air-lift, interoperability andcommand and control systems). In viewof the budgetary pressures in all Euro-pean countries, major improvements willbe very hard to achieve. NATO Secre-tary-General Lord Robertson said inmid-2001 about the ESDP efforts of theEuropeans, �They�ve accomplished onlyabout half the agreed-on projects forstrengthening defense capacities, and theywere only the easier ones.�39 The newEU member states, whose societies andeconomies are all undergoing a difficulttransformation process, are unlikely tobe able to make significant contributionsto the improvement of the EU�s mili-tary capabilities. Since the requirementsfor the accomplishment of difficult mis-sions will not be given in the mediumterm, military operations under the ae-gis of the EU will for a longer time belimited to the lower end of thePetersberg spectrum.

Relations with the U.S. and NATO

The commitment of NATO and itsleading power America is indispensablefor security and stability on the Euro-pean continent. Europe and the U.S. sharecommon values, which have provided thefoundation for those structures that havepreserved peace, freedom and prosperityin the North Atlantic region for manydecades. Furthermore, the presence of theU.S. in the Old World serves as a safe-guard against the reawakening of Euro-pean rivalries and thus helps to maintainthe balance of power on the continent.

Tensions are nevertheless visible in thetransatlantic relationship, which mainlystem from different geostrategic perspec-tives. The U.S. is both politically andmilitarily active almost all over the globe.By contrast, the Europeans usually con-fine themselves to their home region andadjacent regions. The defence of the com-mon interests of the West - access to theoil reserves in the Persian Gulf, securingthe openness of the international ship-

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ping lanes, to give but two examples - ismostly left to the Americans. At the sametime, Washington has to realize that quiteoften the EU�s ESDP rhetoric is notmatched by the Europeans� willingness toinvest in the modernization of theirforces. It remains to be seen whether theterrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 willlead to a fundamental re-orientation.

Of course, there is a certain contradic-tion between Washington�s demand forimproved military capabilities on the onehand and its anxiety about losing influ-ence on the other. This requires, firstly,the development of a transatlantic securityand defense identity.40 EU members haveto understand that the protection of theirworld-wide interests necessitates a sustainedpolitical as well as financial and militarycommitment. For its part, America shouldbear in mind that, since the internationalsystem is prone to crises, the future rapidreaction force of the EU will be a sourceof support for NATO and will thus addvalue to the transatlantic relationship.41

Secondly, the EU has to acknowledgeits limits. Europe will not be capable for

a long time of conducting a military op-eration similar to the 1999 air campaignagainst Yugoslavia without the Americans.It is therefore self-evident that NATO andthe EU have to reach a �complementarydivision of military tasks�42 on a case-by-case basis.

Expectations of Germany

The EU candidate countries have highexpectations regarding Germany�s role inEurope. Due to the size of its economyand population, the Federal Republic isconsidered the principal EU power by theaspirant states. In an enlarged Union,Germany will, even more so than in thepast, have to play a leading role - in thepolitical and economic field, but also insecurity and defence policy. This offersmuch opportunity but it also requires theGermans to assume responsibility and toset good examples.

Over the last decade, however, tenden-cies have become apparent in German se-curity and defence policy that have givencause for concern. One aspect relates to

the weight of the country within NATOand the EU. Berlin�s influence dependson numerous factors, including the abil-ity to co-operate successfully with its al-lies and partners. In this respect, observ-ers say difficulties have been growing be-cause Germany apparently lacks the will-ingness to allocate sufficient funding tomeet the commitments it has made to theAlliance.43 Senior military officers inNATO are worried that Berlin�s positionon NATO and ESDP �could increasinglybe confined to rhetorical approval�.44

Such a policy could lead in the longerterm to a decline in influence in bothdecision-shaping and decision-making.

Another aspect is the strength of theGerman armed forces. According to the�Cornerstones� paper of the Federal Min-ister of Defence, the Bundeswehr mustbe capable of sustaining one major op-eration or two medium-size operationsover a longer period of time.45 Yet itsmissions in the Balkans, which are com-parable to two medium-size operations,are already posing serious challenges tothe Bundeswehr. A major crisis elsewhere

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requiring a military response would putthe armed forces in a very difficult posi-tion.46 Without jeopardizing other mis-sions, Germany would probably not beable to provide a major contingent in caseof, say, an Article 5 attack on Turkey. Ifthere is one lesson that can be learnedfrom the events of 11 September 2001,however, it should be the realization thatnumerous unpredictable risks continue toexist in the world. The Bundeswehr hasto have the forces and the capabilities tocombat these risks and threats. As Ger-man Defence Minister Rudolf Scharpingsaid, �Europe has global responsibility�.47

Not only the candidate countries expecta corresponding sense of responsibilityfrom the largest EU member.

Nuclear Strategy

In the medium term, the EU�s defenceefforts might raise the issue of a Euro-pean nuclear concept. In fact, over recentyears it has become ever less plausible toimagine a British or French nuclearpolicy which would, in the event of a cri-

sis, act totally independently and withoutapproval of the European partners.48 Allthe same, nuclear strategy is a topic thatmost EU governments are reluctant to takeup because of the general public�s deep-seated aversion towards nuclear matters.Article 17 TEU, however, states that thecommon foreign and security policy shallinclude �all questions relating to the secu-rity of the Union� (although ESDP cur-rently only refers to the Petersberg tasks).Provided that the process of integrationcontinues after enlargement, a debate onthe nuclear facets of ESDP would thus bepart of the logic of integration.49 Ger-many and France already agreed in 1996to start talks on the �role of nuclear de-terrence in the context of European de-fence policy�,50 but contacts have not beenintensified.

IV. Conclusions

The end of the Cold War has opened a�window of opportunity� of historic di-mensions. More than half a century afterWorld War II, the enlargement of the EU

offers the opportunity to finally overcomethe politically, economically and cultur-ally injustified division of Europe. Theco-operative structures which the formerenemies developed in the framework ofthe European Economic Community and,subsequently, the European Union haveprovided essential prerequisites for un-heard-of prosperity and lasting stabilityin Western Europe. There are many rea-sons to believe that enlargement will helpto achieve similar successes in the candi-date countries.

Nonetheless, enlargement will funda-mentally change the Union. The assertionthat the EU has stepped into a �strategictrap�51 by promising to accept new mem-bers is probably an exaggeration. But themultitude of challenges the EU is facingwill require sustained efforts to continuethe success story of the Union. The objec-tive of this analysis was to examine someof the political and security problemswhose resolution will be crucial for thefuture of the EU.

As to the political aspects of enlarge-ment, it has to be noted that the EU will

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become more heterogeneous, which willnecessitate the introduction of new, moreflexible mechanisms for co-operation. Toattempt to govern the Union with therules of the Fifteen, which essentially origi-nate from the six founding members, willprove unfeasible. Fundamental reformsare necessary. These should focus in par-ticular on the voting procedures andshould allow a broadening of qualifiedmajority voting. In areas where this can-not be attained, changes would be desir-able to prevent individual member statesfrom blocking other countries. Further-more, the rights of the European Parlia-ment must be strengthened.

Since the institutional framework forESDP has largely been established, the nextbig step in the field of security policywould be to define a common securitystrategy. As yet, there is no European stra-tegic culture. Efforts should be made tofind common answers to questions suchas to the wider interests of the EU and acorresponding military concept. The goalcould be the publication of a Europeanwhite book.

Beside these conceptual issues, aboveall two factors are crucial for a commonforeign and security policy. Firstly, therehas to be a sincere willingness to co-op-eration on the part of both the currentand the future members of the EU. In acrisis as well as during �normal� times se-curity policy requires the ability to actefficiently and effectively. It should be inthe interest of all members to pursue thisobjective. Secondly, adequate resources areneeded in order to meet the defence-re-lated commitments that EU members havemade. Only a Union which has convinc-ing political, civil and military means atits disposal will become a credible andsuccessful player in security policy.

1 See Wolfgang Wessels, �Zukunftsfähig? DieEuropäische Union à 27�, Internationale Politik,vol. 56, no. 2/2001, pp. 13-22; here: p. 14f.

2 Currently the EU is conducting accession ne-gotiations with Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithua-nia, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia,the Czech Republic, Hungary and Cyprus. Tur-key is considered a candidate country althoughthe beginning of accession negotiations has beenlinked to some political criteria. Furthermore,Albania, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Yugoslavia, Croatia

and Macedonia were given a prospect of accedingin the framework of the Stability Pact.

In 1993, EU heads of states and governmentslaid down several economic and political criteriawhich have to be fulfilled for membership, the so-called Copenhagen criteria. See Copenhagen Eu-ropean Council, Presidency Conclusions, 21/22June 1993.

3 Italics G.F.4 Elfriede Regelsberger/Mathias Jopp, �Die

Stärkung der Handlungsfähigkeit derGemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik�,Mathias Jopp/Andreas Maurer/Otto Schmuck(eds.), Die Europäische Union nach Amsterdam:Analysen und Stellungnahmen zum neuen EU-Vertrag,Bonn 1998, pp. 155-171; here: p. 159 (Institut fürEuropäische Politik, Analysen zur Europapolitik,vol. 13) (translation G.F.).

5 European Parliament, The Common Foreignand Security Policy and Enlargement of the Euro-pean Union, Briefing no. 30, Luxemburg, 14 March2000, p. 8.

6 Exceptions include the CFSP instruments ofjoint action and common position, about whichdecisions can be made by a qualified majority(Article 23 paragraph 2 TEU). In political prac-tice, decisions have seldom been taken by major-ity voting. See Elfriede Regelsberger, �DieGemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach�Nizza� - begrenzter Reformeifer und außervert-ragliche Dynamik�, Integration, vol. 24, no. 2/2001,pp. 156-168; here: p. 158.

7 See Martin Kremer/Uwe Schmalz, �Nach Nizza- Perspektiven der Gemeinsamen Europäischen

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Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik�, Integration,vol. 24, no. 2/2001, pp. 167-178; here: p. 172.

8 Nonetheless, it has to be kept in mind thatthese forms of differentiation were decided onunanimously even by those members who didnot wish to participate. In an EU of 28 or 30members still depending on unanimous decisions,problems may arise insofar as one or several coun-tries might reject a specific form of differentiationfor itself while simultaneously trying to block therealization of the project by the others.

9 See, for example, Jochen Hehn, �Jospin weistdeutsche EU-Visionen zurück�, Die Welt, 29 May2001, p. 8 and ��Flötenspieler� Fischer: Védrinehält wenig von den Europavisionen seinesdeutschen Kollegen�, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,21 November 2000, p. 10.

10 Groupement d�études et de recherches NotreEurope, A Wake-Up Call for Europe, 15 October2001, in: Internet http://www.notre-europe.asso.fr/appel-en.htm.

11 Ibid.12 Udo Bergdoll, �Nur einig nach Europa�,

Süddeutsche Zeitung, 5 September 2001, p. 1 (trans-lation G.F.).

13 Werner Weidenfeld, �Die EuropäischeZeitenwende�, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2 De-cember 2000, p. 8 (translation G.F.).

14 Ibid.15 Valéry Giscard d�Estaing/Helmut Schmidt,

�Time to Slow Down and Consolidate Around�Euro-Europe��, International Herald Tribune, 11April 2000.

16 Ibid.

17 See European Commission, Eurobarometer: Pub-lic Opinion in the European Union, Report No. 55,Brussels, October 2001, pp. 11 and 34.

18 Quoted in: Michaela Wiegel, �Versprechengehalten, Vertrauen gebrochen�, FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, 13 December 2000, p. 3 (trans-lation G.F.).

19 See Joseph Fitchett, �Turkey�s Warning onCyprus Vexes Western Allies�, International HeraldTribune, 9 November 2001, p. 5 and �Crisis Ahead�,The Economist, 8 September 2001, p. 36/37.

20 See �Die EU rechnet mit Aufnahme einesgeteilten Zypern�, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,14 November 2001, p. 6.

21 Günther Verheugen, Interview with theSüddeutsche Zeitung, 19 September 1999, quotedin: Johannes Varwick, �Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg: Ein überforderter Stabilitätsanker?�, JoachimKrause (ed.), Kosovo - Humanitäre Intervention undkooperative Sicherheit in Europa, Opladen 2000, pp.185-200; here: p. 186 (translation G.F.).

22 See R. Jeffrey Smith, �Rule of Law Elusive asUN And NATO Run Kosovo�, International Her-ald Tribune, 30 July 2001, p. 10 and Justin L. C.Eldridge, �Kosovo: Land of Uncertainty�, Euro-pean Security, vol. 10, no. 2 (Summer 2001), S. 34-66.

23 ��Das ist eine Reifeprüfung für die EU��, In-terview with Javier Solana, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 18/19 November 2000, p. 12 (translation G.F.).

24 Berthold Kohler, �Was die NATO riskiert�,Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 23 August 2001, p. 1(translation G.F.).

25 Lisbon European Council, Presidency Con-clusions, 23/24 March 2000, paragraph 54.

26 See Varwick, �Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg�,p. 187.

27 See Cologne European Council, CommonStrategy of the European Union for Russia, 4June 1999.

28 See Medium-Term Strategy for Developmentof Relations between the Russian Federation andthe European Union (2000-2010), Internet http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/russia/russian_medium_term_strategy/ (see ibid. for thefollowing quotations).

29 See Peter van Ham, Europe�s New Defense Ambi-tions: Implications for NATO, the US, and Russia, TheMarshall Center Papers, no. 1, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, 30 April 2000, p. 25f.

30 See ibid., p. 30f.31 See Patrick E. Tyler, �U.S. and Russia Escalate

War of Words Over Arming Rogue States�, Inter-national Herald Tribune, 21 March 2001, p. 4 and�Poacher Turned Gamekeeper�, The Economist, 22September 2001, p. 32.

32 German Foreign Office, A New Chapter inthe CFSP: The European Security and DefencePolicy (ESDP), December 2000, Internet http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/eu_politik/gasp/esvp_html.

33 Ibid.34 Humanitarian, rescue, peacekeeping and peace-

making missions.35 Alyson J. K. Bailes, �European Defence: An-

other Set of Questions�, RUSI Journal, February2000, p. 38-43; here: p. 38f.

36 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, WhitePaper 1999, paragraph 70.

18

37 Harald Kujat, Rede anlässlich des Sicherheits-und Verteidigungspolitischen Kongresses desWehr- und Sicherheitspolitischen Arbeitskreisesder CSU, München, 22 September 2001 (transla-tion G.F.).

38 See European Union, Military CapabilitiesCommitment Declaration, Brussels, 20 Novem-ber 2000, Internet http://ue.eu.int/pesc/military/en/CCC.htm.

39 Quoted in: John Vincour, �EconomicSlowdown Forces Europe to Scale Back Ambi-tions�, International Herald Tribune, 10 July 2001, p.1/6; here: p. 1.

40 See Holger H. Mey, Internationale Entwicklungenam Beginn des dritten Jahrtausends, unpublishedmanuscript, Bonn, 30 June 2000, p. 77.

41 See Kremer/Schmalz, �Nach Nizza - Pers-pektiven der Gemeinsamen EuropäischenSicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik�, p. 170.

42 Ibid. (translation G.F.).43 See Karl Feldmeyer, �Von den Kosten des

Sparens�, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 26 June2001, p. 1.

44 General (rtd.) Klaus Reinhardt, ��Wo bleibteure Zuverlässigkeit im Bündnis?��, Die Welt, 16August 2001 (translation G.F.).

45 See The Federal Minister of Defence, TheBundeswehr - Advancing Steadily into the 21st Century:Cornerstones of a Fundamental Renewal, Bonn 2000,paragraph 54.

46 See Karl Feldmeyer, �Auf dem Balkanüberfordert�, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 13 July2001, p. 1

47 Rudolf Scharping, �Europa hat globaleVerantwortung�, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24March 2001, p. 12 (translation G.F.).

48 See André Dumoulin, �L�Identité européennede sécurité et de défense et la dissuasion nucléaire�,Défense Nationale, vol. 56 (2000), no. 8/9, pp. 20-37;here: p. 25.

49 See Peter Schmidt, �Braucht eine europäischeVerteidigungspolitik ein Nuklearkonzept?Dimensionen der Bewertung�, Erich Reiter (ed.),Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik 2000, Wien2000, pp. 301-319; here: p. 307f.

50 Gemeinsames deutsch-französisches Sicher-heits- und Verteidigungskonzept, Nürnberg, 9December 1996, paragraph 3.1 (translation G.F.).

51 Varwick, �Die EU nach dem Kosovo-Krieg�,S. 199 (translation G.F.).

19

his article will briefly cover three ar-eas - firstly the European security situ-

ation, secondly the changed world afterthe tragedy of the 11th of September andlastly the importance of a defence collegefor the fostering of fundamental values asdemocracy and other common values.

The Baltic Sea area is one of the areasin Europe where the security architecturehas not been finally settled. This will onlybe done when the European Union (EU)has expanded to include the present can-didates, when the Baltic States have reachedtheir security goals, and when Russia�s tieswith the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty

The Baltic States, the 11th of Septemberand the Baltic Defence College

By His Excellency the Minister of Defence of the Kingdom of Sweden Mr. Björn von Sydow*

Organization (NATO) have grown to in-clude much more substance than now. TheBaltic region is part of a larger Euro-At-lantic context.

The security situation in the Baltic Searegion has never been so positive as it isnow. The sub-regional co-operation isprofound and intense. The volume of thepractical co-operation is incomparable toother regions. We find co-operation bi-laterally, as well as in many multilateralformats; the Nordic, the inter-Baltic, theframework of the Baltic Security Assist-ance Group and the Partnership for Peaceframework. Not the least is the impor-tant inter-Baltic co-operation. The Baltic

Defence College is a result of this fruitfulco-operation.

But, despite this favorable situation inour corner of the world, things havechanged dramatically since the 11th of Sep-tember. The acts of terror in the UnitedStates of America were an attack on all ofus. Democracy has been attacked. But myfirm belief is that democracy will with-stand this onslaught. The terrorist attackon the USA was a crime against interna-tional peace and security. We can and will,never accept terrorism as a way of destroy-ing the idea of democracy.

We live in an open world. We havegotten used to being able to travel freely,

* Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

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to visit other states and cultures, to ex-change knowledge and experience, to es-tablish contacts and ties of friendshipacross national frontiers, to freely expressour ideas and thoughts. This gives us fan-tastic possibilities. And that is the worldthat we want.

We have been reminded of how vul-nerable our open world is. How vulner-able our own democracies are, when facedwith forces that are prepared to challengethe very core of democracy - the inviola-ble worth of the human individual.

One thing is clear: if democracy is notable to put a stop to terrorism, then ter-rorism will put a stop to democracy. Whatis needed now is unity. All the forces ofdemocracy in the world must form a com-mon front against terrorism.

We have seen that threats against ourdemocracy can appear domestically as wellas externally. States� defence forces nor-mally handle external threats. Officers andsoldiers, among many others are in thissense guardians of democracy.

The Baltic Defence College fosters fun-damental values as democracy and other

common values, but also a number ofmore or practical issues. Democracy andcommon values are enormously impor-tant to all of us - young and old, men andwomen. For me as representing a support-ing state it is a firm belief that in thisarea the Baltic Defence College plays andwill play an important role.

The first years of the Baltic DefenceCollege have been challenging. But wehave seen, as expressed in the ValidationReport from the U.K. Joint Services Com-mand and Staff College, that the qualityof the Course is admirable. This is ofcourse a result of many factors workingin the same direction. Let me only men-tion some of them; the important inter-Baltic co-operation, the Host Nation Sup-port of Estonia, the contribution fromSupporting States as well as hard work byteachers, staff members and students. It ismy firm belief that the Baltic DefenceCollege will play an important role in thedevelopment of the Armed Forces, butalso for the entire society in Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania.

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et me start by underlining that sofar no invitation has been extended

to Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. I havehowever accepted to speculate on the pos-sible consequences of an invitation.

This article will be divided into threeparts: the consequences of the 11th of Sep-tember, the experiences from the integra-tion of the Czech Republic, Hungary andPoland and the challenges for Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania.

NATO and the Baltic preparations afterinvitation to join the Alliance

By Lieutenant General Ove H.-G. Hoff*

The attacks on the11th of September 2001

Since early 2000 the Alliance has dis-cussed the emerging asymmetric threats.Asymmetric because they do not conformto the symmetry known during the coldwar, where the conventional and nuclearforces of the Warsaw Pact and the NorthAtlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)balanced one another. Asymmetric alsobecause conventional forces are notstructured to handle drug trade, terror-

ism, and chemical, biological or nuclearthreats by terrorist organisations orrogue states.

The 11th of September brought the fullreality to the world of the first exampleof an asymmetric attack with a global di-mension. While the American led coali-tion responds to this, we can only guesswhat will be the outcome.

It is my opinion that the 11th of Sep-tember attacks initiated a development thatmay well be a change of paradigm in Eu-ropean and global security. It would there-fore be ludicrous to deal with Baltic mem-

* Lieutenant General O. H.-G. Hoff from the Danish Army has been Commander Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST since 2000. From 1996-2000 he wasChief of Staff at the Headquarters of the Chief of Defence, Denmark.Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

22

bership of NATO without taking thisdevelopment into consideration.

Assuming that it will be possible toisolate the present conflict to a questionof terrorism and preventing it from de-veloping into a religious war an examplehas however still been set - an examplethat may well be followed by tens, hun-dreds or even thousands of young fanat-ics. This makes it a problem of extremeimportance for every state.

Terrorism in a global scale is multidi-mensional. With the resources that couldbe made available to terrorist organisa-tions and regimes there will be no limitsto the weapons and delivery methods tobe used. It will almost always be possibleto exploit the advantage of surprise hav-ing no limitations on human sacrifices,collateral damage or civilian losses.

Therefore, it is of utmost importancefor all people, who want to enjoy peaceand stability, to stand together and iso-late these small fundamentalist groups.Then the primary means to unveil plansand prevent terrorist actions are the in-telligence services. Collecting and dissemi-

nation of information on their structures,organisations, non-military networks,training facilities and ways of recruitmentwill require a continuous collective na-tional and multinational effort by mili-tary and non-military intelligence. This isnecessary to dissect and destroy the struc-tures of the terrorist organisations.

As the Alliance has decided that the11th of September attack on the USA fallswithin the Article 5 on collective defenceof the Atlantic Charter it is relevant tolook into the means that the Alliance hasat hand to deal with asymmetric threats.The answer is discouraging. NATO hasneither the means nor the structure todeal with asymmetric threats. It is ratherthe opposite. Police and police intelligenceis purely national and no state would leaveit to an international organisation to beresponsible for dealing with internal ter-rorist problems on their soil. Militaryintelligence is also a very sensitive issueand regarded as a purely national area. Asit is well known from KFOR and SFORstates are extremely reluctant to share in-telligence and we are currently taking the

first steps in the right direction to over-come this problem. Without the full ac-cess to intelligence it would not be possi-ble for the NATO Command Structureto be responsible for a counter-terrorismoperation.

To this comes that terrorism as we seeit now tends to be global in nature. Itwill therefore go well beyond the bordersof the Alliance. It is therefore with goodreason that the present and possible fu-ture campaigns against asymmetric threatsare and will be managed by coalitions ofwilling states.

This is not to say that NATO cannotplay an important role. But as we haveseen it will mainly be indirect supportsuch as moral backing and co-ordinationof national contributions to the coalitionand advice on alert measures to be takenfor the protection of states. The Alliancecan, however, play an important role inthe future through advising on the de-velopment of national defence structuresin the Defence Planning Process andthrough improving procedures for col-lection, analysis and distribution of in-

23

telligence. The European Union (EU) canand must play an equally important rolewithin the area of police intelligence asthis is already formalised within theSchengen Agreement. We may well expe-rience that intelligence assets will requirean increased priority in national spend-ing.

The threats of terrorist actions havebrought national security into focus. Forevery state high priority has been givento analysing the vulnerability of nationalinfrastructure being it power plants, fooddistribution, bridges, tunnels, prepared-ness of rescue and health capabilities, gov-ernment installations, etc. In the Nordicstates the Total Defence Concept, whichwas the tool to mobilise the total resourcesfor defence during the cold war, has hada second birth. The Total Defence Con-cept is an extremely valid instrument alsoto co-operate initiatives within nationalsecurity from local to government level.Also within this area the Alliance can playan important role in promoting the de-velopment of total defence structuresthrough the defence planning process.

There is no doubt that for Alliancemembers the number one priority for thecoming years will be the war against theemerging asymmetric threats. It is there-fore obvious that national priority in thenear future will tend to focus on meansto handle these risks. Due to the globalnature of terrorism this may well be atthe expense of NATO unless the Alliancemakes itself an important player in theco-ordination of national contributions.

Another area of major strategic impor-tance is the relationship with the RussianFederation.

NATO and the Russian Federation

NATO is first and foremost a frame-work for collective defence. This was thecase during the cold war and this is thesituation today. The international secu-rity situation allows the Alliance toprioritise other tasks such as Peace Sup-port Operations and partnership co-op-eration. But collective defence remains thecore of Alliance tasks. No major conven-tional threat faces NATO today. Only

Russia would in the longer term be ableto mount such a threat. The big questionis therefore whether the 11th of Septem-ber makes any difference. Looking at thelast few years Russia has been an extremelyreluctant partner for the Alliance. Russiahas mainly worked to obtain advantagesand influence in the strategic partnershipwith the Alliance without giving anythingin return (apart from the Balkans). NATOis extremely unpopular in Russia, andnothing is done from the Russian side tochange this. The NATO representation inMoscow has still not been established, andwe see only extremely limited participa-tion in Partnership for Peace activities ifat all.

Since the 11th of September this seemsto be changing. Russia has decided to lineup with the global alliance against terror-ism, and statements from PresidentVladimir Putin and Foreign Minister IgorIvanov recently indicated that Russia isconsidering major changes in its positiontowards the USA and NATO. Whether thisin the longer term may include Russianmembership of NATO as indicated in the

24

medias is much too early to tell, but asenlargement is generally regarded a wid-ening of stability nothing should be con-sidered impossible in this sense. The re-cent co-operation about the nuclear sub-marine �Kursk� is a small sign in the samedirection. It will probably not be easy forRussia to find a satisfactory role withinthe Alliance, and it will probably not beeasy for the present Alliance to extend theArticle 5 guarantee to cover the entireRussian territory including the Far East.Should Russia therefore continue thispath of co-operation with the USA andNATO it is likely that there will be a re-quirement for totally redefined West Eu-ropean security structures. Who knows,perhaps we may in 10 years� time experi-ence a redefinition of the Triple Crownconcept to be a EU-Russia-USA strategicalliance. It will be most interesting to fol-low the Russian decisions in this sense inthe coming years. Seen from the JointHeadquarters NORTHEAST one impor-tant benchmark will be whether Russia willdecide to join and support a closer part-nership co-operation in the coming years.

And especially whether the Russian mili-tary hierarchy will adhere to a policy ofclose co-operation. Until that materialiseshowever the collective defence will con-tinue to be the corner stone of the Trans-Atlantic co-operation.

It is against these major changes andtrends in defence and security policy thatthe question of Baltic NATO membershipshould be assessed. Such an assessmentcould have the following consequences forthe Alliance Command Structure, for theAlliance Force Structure and for the na-tional defence planning:

It is not likely that new headquarterswill be established in new member states.We saw this in the Czech Republic, Hun-gary and Poland and the existing com-mand structure will also in the next en-largement have the inherent flexibility anddeployability to accommodate the require-ments of command and control of anenlarged NATO.

The Supreme Allied Command Atlan-tic and the Northern Region CombinedJoint Task Force Headquarter will still bethe primary means for the conduct of

Alliance Out of Area Operations. Nationalcontributions to the command structurewill form the core of the Combined JointTask Force staff, while the land compo-nent and maritime component will mostlikely be formed on the basis ofmultinationally manned high readinesselements of the force structure. NATOForce Planning will most likely continueto focus on high readiness assets for cri-sis response operations. Assets with lowerreadiness should have a sustainment capa-bility for Peace Support Operations.

Anticipating an increased role for theEU in crisis response operations EU mem-ber states and states aspiring for EU mem-bership should make their high readinessassets as well as those with lower readinessavailable for the EU also.

The reduced focus on collective defencemakes it appropriate to seek opportuni-ties for task sharing and specialisation ofnational force structures.

Now before discussing Estonia, Latviaand Lithuania it might be interesting tosee what can be learned from the last en-largement process.

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The experiences from theintegration of the Czech Republic,

Hungary and Poland

At the Madrid Summit in July 1997the Czech Republic, Hungary and Polandwere invited to begin accession talks, theysigned the Accession Protocols in Decem-ber 1997. At the Summit in May 1999 theaccession was endorsed and by Novem-ber 1999 we saw the first Polish officer inthe Joint Headquarters NORTHEAST inKarup, Denmark. Today we have 30 Polishand Czech personnel in the Headquarters.

The preparation for accession is a com-prehensive process that will require sometwo years of intense planning. The timewill to some extent depend on thenumber of states concerned. Of primeimportance is the command of the Eng-lish language. This covers both thoseinvolved in the discussions with theNATO teams and those expected to fillfunctions in the NATO command struc-ture. A participation in NATO-led head-quarters like KFOR and SFOR might be

helpful. But as integration develops it isalso important that soldiers and Non-Commissioned Officers master the Eng-lish language.

Important is also the states� ability toreach the required NATO security stand-ards. Lack of compliance may be a diffi-cult obstacle in the process. To this comesthe Command and Control InformationSystem connectivity, which must be inplace if a seamless command system shouldbe able to function. This is particularlyimportant within the air defence area, asthe Supreme Allied Commander Europefrom the accession date will take over re-sponsibility for the air defence. This mayrequire legislative adjustments in the threeBaltic States. It is also very important thatthe applicant understands the proceduresrelated to the Capability Package processand the costing and budgeting process ofinfrastructure.

To accommodate the integration proc-ess following the accession NATO hasdeveloped a number of Target Force Goals.For the Polish and Czech Land Forcesthis was the following:

�By end of 2002 all Main Defence Forcesare trained to conduct defensive and offensiveoperations at the operational and tactical levelin accordance with ATP 35(B) Land ForcesTactical Doctrine�.

Similar Target Force Goals were devel-oped for other areas and services.

In order to deal with the Target ForceGoals Implementation Working Groupswere established within the commandstructure and with representation of therelevant national headquarters. Minimummilitary requirements were agreed uponwithin the areas of security, air defence,infrastructure, force contributions andCommunication and Information System.

The Joint Headquarters NORTHEASTis involved in the integration of the 1st

Polish Corps and the Polish Navy. Theaim is for the national force structure toreach full operational capability at somedefined time. For the 1st Polish Corpsthis is 2004, so as it can be seen, this is acomprehensive process. From invitationto Full Operational Capability may wellbe 5�7 years, but it requires resources andefforts from the first day on.

26

During this process numerous work-shops and training activities are plannedand executed. An integration meeting withthe Polish Navy supported by the Dan-ish and German naval staffs has been heldand Membership Action Plan Exerciseswith the staff of 1st Polish Corps has beenconducted. For the navies it is importantto address the maritime Command andControl structure, procedures and com-munication capabilities. During the proc-ess the force structure will have a possi-bility to be tested both during Article 5and Non-Article 5 exercises.

The Baltic States and theenlargement of NATO

Turning to the three Baltic States - Es-tonia, Latvia and Lithuania: Without dis-regarding national differences it wouldfrom a military and operational point ofview be preferable to look at the BalticStates as one geographical entity. Doingthis I will not go into a political discus-sion on whether each individual state orall states will or should become members

of NATO. But let me address the ques-tion of NATO accession in a general way.Let me also mention that the Joint Head-quarters NORTHEAST is not involved inthe Membership Action Plan process. If Itherefore happen to present what mayseem as conflicting advice please judge foryourself. In the process it will be foundthat sometimes the advice given from statesor NATO does not reflect the reality thatthe Baltic States find themselves in. Thismay be financial issues, legislative issues,conscription, training systems, procure-ment or balancing requirements for Arti-cle 5 against Non-Article 5. Each of theBaltic States will have to decide what isbest for the individual state and whereeach state find that it will get the mostbangs for the buck.

The three Baltic States will be invitedto join the NATO command structure.Their share will probably be relative totheir share of the military budget. It isimportant that the Baltic States preparededicated, well-trained and linguisticallyskilled officers and Non-CommissionedOfficers to fill positions in the command

structure. This is a heavy process, as theywill most likely have to take over posi-tions from NATO colleagues. It is impor-tant that each state make its own priori-ties as to where it want to be representedand at which level. The Baltic States shouldvery carefully consider where they couldhave flag positions as the influence veryoften follows these. The number of thesewill be very limited. Denmark holds two2/3 star functions on a permanent basis. Itcould be an advantage for the three statesto do this together, so that they hold thesefunctions on a rotational basis.

The three Baltic States will also want tobe represented in the International Mili-tary Staff and in the Supreme Headquar-ters Allied Powers Europe, as these are theheadquarters in Mons, Belgium, where theconceptual work is done. Representationat the Regional Headquarters Allied ForcesNorth Europe in Brunssum, the Nether-lands, is also advantageous as this is wherethe land based Combined Joint Task Forceis embedded. Looking for land advice thethree Baltic Stats could turn to the Reac-tion Corps Centre in Heidelberg, Ger-

27

many, but the relevant land advice forthe Baltic level of forces could be foundat the Multinational Corps Northeast inSzczecin, Poland. For maritime expertisethe Baltic States should look to the AlliedNaval Forces North in the United King-dom, but it would also be relevant forstaff officers to join the Danish TaskGroup or an equivalent structure with theGerman Navy if the three states couldmake a bilateral arrangement on this. Airadvice should be sought in the Allied AirForces North in Ramstein, Germany, buta Combined Air Operations Centre po-sition would also be very relevant. Thenof course the Baltic States should be rep-resented in the Joint HeadquartersNORTHEAST in Karup, Denmark. TheHeadquarters primary focus is on theBaltic Sea Area and we anticipate a primerole in the integration process. To fill staffpositions abroad is very expensive so atough prioritisation will be required.

The Baltic States might want to con-tribute to the high readiness forces of theAlliance; Allied Command Europe Mo-bile Force Land or the Allied Command

Europe Rapid Reaction Corps. This isrelevant but a proposal could be to focusinitially on the build up of the nationalstructures for home defence and to makethis a longer-term goal. A relevant sugges-tion would also be to focus on a small,specialised asset, perhaps a Baltic asset setup between the three states. Benefits couldof course be harvested from the workdone on the Baltic Battalion and co-op-eration with the Danish Reaction Brigadecould be considered as an idea. The Bal-tic Battalion would then be a contribu-tion for the Allied Command EuropeRapid Reaction Corps through the bri-gade, which is part of the 1st UK Divi-sion. But there are many other possibili-ties. And these would of course not keepany state from continuing provision offorce contributions to the ongoingNATO operations in the Balkans. For thenavies participation from time to timein the Mine Counter Measures ForceNorth-Western Europe would be relevant.Should the thoughts on a Baltic Sea StandBy Formation come through that mightalso be a possibility. But at the moment

the focus in this sense is on multilateralexercise in the spirit of Partnership forPeace.

It is important that the three BalticStates find ways of linking their armiesto the NATO force structure. The landformations of the NATO force structureare made up of national, (1st and 2nd PolishCorps), bilateral (German/US, German/Dutch and US/German Corps) and mul-tilateral corps (Eurocorps and Multi-national Corps Northeast). These corpsmade up of national divisions. Lookingat this it is important to realise that theAlliance first and foremost is an integra-tion project. The Joint HeadquartersNORTHEAST was originally created tointegrate the Danish and German navies.The former Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland was originally cre-ated to integrate the Danish and Germanarmies in the Schleswig-Holstein area. Laterthis grew into a project of integrationfor the Polish Army or at least integra-tion of the 12th Polish Division. That iswhy the Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland changed into the

28

Multinational Corps Northeast. This co-operation is extremely important for thedevelopment of common doctrine andoperational procedures. It is also the ba-sis for training in war fighting within anoperational framework. A suggestionwould be that the Baltic States in a gen-eral sense look towards the MultinationalCorps Northeast as the overall co-opera-tion partner for the Baltic armies, andthat the Baltic States initially develop orif already there, assign a brigade from eachof the three states for one of the divi-sions in the Multinational Corps North-east. It could be a link between the IronWolf Brigade and 12th Polish Division, aLatvian structure and the 14th GermanDivision and an Estonian structure andthe Danish Division. This could be sup-plemented by partnership arrangementsbetween brigade structures and brigadesfrom the Danish, German and Polish di-visions. In the longer term these traininglinks and this co-operation might give theBaltic States the background for bring-ing their brigades together in a commonBaltic division structure.

For the navies linking to the NATOforce structure is not that complicated. Itis important that the Baltic States furtherdevelop their relations with the Danish,German and Polish navies and that theycontinue to participate in their trainingand draw on their expertise. Shortfallswithin Command and Control and com-munications should urgently be addressedand the Baltic States would benefit fromdeveloping a common - that is Baltic -recognised maritime picture. The BalticNaval Squadron seems to be a valuablenaval contribution to the force structurein the Baltic Sea area. It would howeverbe necessary for the three Baltic States toconsider the consequences of moving froma partnership co-operation to the NATOforce structure.

With respect to air defence the BalticStates have some major problems. As men-tioned before, the Supreme Allied Com-mander Europe holds the overall respon-sibility for the air defence of NATO Eu-rope. The three states will for many yearsnot be able to contribute to this and willnot be able to maintain air sovereignty

and do air policing. Radars for the BalticAir-Surveillance Network are urgentlyneeded and the Baltic States would haveto make bilateral or multilateral agree-ments with other states on covering theBaltic air space. It could be consideredtraining pilots in the Danish, German orPolish air force and letting the Baltic pi-lots do exchange training in these airforces. The Baltic States might have tochange legislation to cater for this. Thiswould give the advantage of training pi-lots and perhaps even flying in their ownair space without having to invest inunaffordable airframes.

Host nation support for external rein-forcements is essential. The Baltic Statesshould therefore within the national de-fence structures develop the necessary HostNation structures. All these requirementswill have to be balanced towards the in-creased focus on intelligence and nationalsecurity as mentioned during the discus-sion on the consequences of the 11th ofSeptember.

Recognizing that the first steps have tobe taken by Supreme Headquarters Allied

29

Powers Europe and the Estonian, Latvianand Lithuanian Ministry of Defence, I wantbriefly to mention the support that theJoint Headquarters NORTHEAST couldprovide for the integration of Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania into NATO:

Expand seminars/workshops on theNATO Operational Planning Process in-cluding Contingency Planning, Intelli-gence and Logistics matters, the future ofthe Combined Joint Task Force concept,NATO Command Structure, NATOForces Structure, etc.;

Optimise the assistance in exercise plan-ning activities especially �Exercise Coop-erative Jaguar 2003� and the related Bat-tle Staff Training;

Promote �On the Job training� at vari-ous NATO headquarters like it has beenthe case in the Joint Headquarters NORTH-EAST since the Headquarters now have anEstonian officer in the staff, who will beheavily involved in the preparation of�Exercise Strong Resolve 2002�; theHeadquarter would welcome Latvian andLithuanian officers for this purpose too.

Assist in adapting national doctrines,procedures, Standard Operating Proce-

dures, Operational Plans, etc., to theNATO structure Standardisation Agree-ments and Military Committee documents.

Assists in the preparation of Opera-tion Evaluation teams;

Conduct seminars and Host NationSupport.

As can be heard the NATO commandstructure and the Joint HeadquartersNORTHEAST could play an extremelyimportant role in the Baltic integrationinto the Alliance. One last questions thatcould be raised is therefore how the inte-gration process could go hand in handwith the many projects within the BalticSea Steering Group. It can be said thatmoving from the status of partner stateto that of invited NATO member or ac-tually a NATO member fundamentallychanges the basis for maintaining theBaltic Sea Steering Group. Most of theBaltic projects will find their natural lifewithin the NATO integration plan and itwill be difficult to keep straight lines be-tween the two. It can because of that besuggested that the Baltic States considerthis issue once the decision is taken.

30

he French Minister for Foreign Af-fairs, Hubert Vedrine, divides the

world into five categories of states: a�hyper power�; powers with �world-wideinfluence� (France, Great Britain, Ger-many, Russia, China, Japan and India);�mere powers� (e.g. Egypt, Spain, Italy andPoland); �powerless states� or �mere states�(Belgium, Sweden, Portugal, etc.) and�pseudo-states� (much of Africa, Asia andEastern Europe). According to this classi-fication - a paradigmatically realist one -the Baltic States unquestionably belongto the group of �pseudo states� as they�have no means of influencing the situa-tion around them�1 . Considered fromthis point of view, they can only be of

Lithuania and NATO EnlargementBy Doc. dr. Gra�ina Miniotaite*

some interest in the context of the strate-gic calculations relevant to the Russianrelations with the West.

Evidently, if we want to treat the Bal-tic case as a serious subject of analysis weneed a different, more refined theoreti-cal perspective. In will in my article tryto answer the question - How can NATObest integrate the Baltic States in the Al-liance in the period following the invi-tation and after accession � and whatmust the three states do? I will attemptto identify Lithuania�s security problemsfrom within, analysing them as a case ofinternational socialization, as enteringinto the NATO security community canbe seen as that.

According to Karl W. Deutsch, secu-rity communities arise out of a processof regional integration characterized bythe development of transaction flows,shared understanding and transnationalvalues. What Deutch called a �we feeling�or shared identity also characterizes a se-curity community. Lithuania belongs tothe Northeast European region. The re-gion is composed of ten states; with fourof them being NATO members, three as-pirants for membership and four mem-bers of the EU plus Russia with theKaliningrad enclave. The region is a kindof historical laboratory where new prin-ciples of international relations are beingformed and put to the test. What kind of

* Doc. dr. Gra¿ina Miniotait´ is with the Lithuanian Institute of Philosophy and Sociology.Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

31

security community could be formed inthe region?

The history of the region gives us twomodels of initiating a security commu-nity; Hans Mouritzen defines them as theNordic method (Bottom Up) and the EUmethod (Top Down). �Bottom up meansthat mutual sympathies and trans-nationalties develop spontaneously over a longtime at the popular level�2 . The begin-ning of the Nordic security communitygoes back to the 19th century, the securitycommunity emerged about 1905; whereasthe institutions were not created until thepost World War II period. The top downmethod starts with security visions fromabove, a common project and commoninstitutions. It is the case of the Euro-At-lantic Security community. An importantprecondition for the emergence of the se-curity community is a strong civil society.

Lithuania as well as the other BalticStates represents the second case of enter-ing the security community. It is a statewith a socialist past and with an intentionof �returning to Europe�. In such circum-stances we can talk about top down method

of forming the security community. How-ever, in contrast to the western membersof the security community, Lithuaniastarted out with no close regional ties withother states and no independent civil soci-ety. In addition, long-standing civilizatio-nal and cultural ties, historical myths, sym-bols and images (the Battle of Zalgiris(Grünwald), the crusader as an ancient en-emy, the myths surrounding the Dukedomof Vytautas, etc.) constituting the histori-cal component of national identity, pushin the opposite direction. The attitudestowards the West are far from uniform.

Thus integration of Lithuania intoNATO is not only a problem of militaryinteroperability, but also the problem ofinteroperability of norms and values. Orin other words it is a problem of interna-tional socialization. According to JohnG. Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchansocialization is �the process through whichnational leaders internalize the norms andvalue operations espoused by the hegemonand, as a consequence, become socializedinto the community formed by the he-gemon and other nations accepting its

leadership position�3 . The goal of thesocialization is to achieve argumentativeconsensus with the other members of thecommunity and not to push throughone�s own worldview and moral values.

From this point of view NATO andEU can be defined as constitutive institu-tions that contribute to shaping actors�identities, values and interests by impos-ing definitions of member characteristicsand purposes upon the governments ofmember states. At an institutional level, asuccessful internalisation of an applicantstate is indicated by the integration ofthe fundamental community norms intothe state constitution and their transla-tion into (stable) domestic laws. Thus, theenlargement process can be analysed as aprocess of teaching and learning commu-nity values and norms.

The NATO enlargement is a delibera-tive project, based on certain normativeprinciples, with stated ways of its imple-mentation and supervision of the wholeprocess.

The main normative documents defin-ing the Alliance�s principles for accessing

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new members are the Partnership for PeaceFramework Document (1994) and theStudy on NATO Enlargement (1995). Theyare based on a broad concept of security,�embracing political and economic, as wellas defence components�. The Study alsospecifies some problematic areas whichshould be of particular concern for thoseseeking membership of the Alliance: �Stateswhich have ethnic disputes or externalterritorial disputes, including irredentistclaims or internal jurisdictional disputesmust settle those disputes by peacefulmeans in accordance with OSCE princi-ples. Resolution of such disputes wouldbe a factor in determining whether toinvite a state to join the Alliance�. Animportant condition is also applicantstates� military capability to contribute toNATO�s collective defence.

Now let us consider briefly how Lithua-nia�s Euro-Atlantic integration shapes statepractices by establishing, articulating, andtransmitting norms that define what con-stitutes acceptable and legitimate state be-haviour. In the article I will examine onlyone issue � �external territorial disputes�,

or � good neighborly relations. Lithuaniahas signed border agreements with allneighboring states. However, the sea bor-der agreement with Latvia, signed not un-til 1999, is not yet ratified by Latvia. Theborder agreement with Russia, signed in1997, is not ratified by the Duma.

The detailed analysis of the Baltic States�border disputes leads to the conclusionthat integration processes and the require-ments for membership in NATO and EUusually prompt positive changes. One caneasily discern the connection betweenNATO summits and the Baltic States� at-tempts at solving their border disputes.The 1994 NATO Brussels Summit encour-aged the revision of Lithuanian-Polish re-lations. The 1997 NATO Madrid Summitwas a stimulus to Estonia and Latvia todrop their demands of including the trea-ties of 1920 in their border agreementswith Russia. The 1999 NATO WashingtonSummit was a stimulus for Lithuania andLatvia to sign the sea border agreement.The conclusion is equally valid in relationto the ethnic disputes in Latvia and Esto-nia.

The delay to ratify the border agree-ment by Russia is a more complicated case.It is namely Lithuania�s quest for NATOmembership and the related problem ofthe Kaliningrad region (transit, visas) thatultimately stands in the way of the ratifica-tion. However in the 10 years of independ-ence there have been considerable changesin the treatment of the Kaliningrad prob-lem in Lithuania - from the view of it as adirect threat to Lithuania�s security to theview that it is a common problem of theBaltic Sea region, to the solution of whichLithuania might contribute a great deal.

However, this conclusion is too opti-mistic and definitely is simplifying theprocess of enlargement and the securitycommunity building. Top down methodof building the security community hasits problematic points. One of them isthat there exists a gap between the politi-cal elite and the population. We have to-tal support of the NATO enlargement bythe political elite and a hesitating attitudeto the issue by the population.

On one hand, on the 23rd of May 2001eleven parliamentary parties in Lithuania

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concluded agreement on the defencepolicy for 2001-2004. According to theagreement, �Lithuania can secure long-term and stable security only by being apart of the NATO collective defence sys-tem�. The parties have agreed on the es-sential directions and priorities as to thedevelopment of the National DefenceSystem and have committed themselves tomaintain defence spending at the level of2% of the Gross Domestic Product.

On the other hand, as public opinionsurveys show, popular attitudes towardsmembership in NATO are far from set-tled. A public opinion survey on secu-rity issues conducted in Lithuania, Latviaand Estonia in March 1998 showed thatLithuania�s population was mostly sup-portive of the state�s efforts to join NATO:55% of Lithuania�s, 47% of Latvia�s and54% of Estonia�s population fully sup-ported or rather supported these efforts,

In 1999 with an upsurge of anti-West-ern propaganda in Lithuania (related tothe Kosovo events) and with actionsagainst the increase of public spendingon defence, popular support for Lithua-

nia�s integration with NATO decreased.E.g. in Lithuania, according to the sur-vey by �Vilmorus� in May 1999, those�against NATO� outnumbered for the firsttime those �for NATO� (32% and 31%,accordingly). Popular attitudes towardsNATO became again more favourable af-ter the Kosovo issue was closed. An influ-ential, if not the dominant, factor in theBaltic States was Russia�s mass media in-terpretation of the Kosovo events present-ing NATO�s involvement as a violationof international law and an encroachmenton Yugoslavia�s sovereignty. This showsthat a substantial part of the Baltic States�population consider NATO primarily asa defence alliance ensuring member states�sovereignty rather than collective Euro-pean security.

In September 1999 the Lithuanian gov-ernment initiated a programme on in-forming the population about the Lithua-nia�s integration into NATO. The pro-gramme is included in the MembershipAction Plan. Perhaps because of the pro-gramme in January 2000 a survey by�Baltijos tyrimai� showed that Lithuania�s

efforts to join NATO were fully approvedby 38,6% of the respondents, totally dis-approved by 14,3%, rather disapprovedthan approved by 30,7%, and 16,3% ofthe respondents had no opinion on theissue. The public opinion polls conductedin August and December 2000 indicatedthe rise of support for Lithuania�s mem-bership of NATO from 42% to 49%, thenumber of opponents decreased from25,7% to 22,3%,

According to a later survey by �Baltijostyrimai� (January 2001), membership inNATO was approved by 46% and disap-proved by 35% of the respondents. Itshould be noted that after the terroristassaults of the 11th of September the per-centage of those favourable to Lithuania�smembership of NATO increased sharply.Now two thirds, or 63,1%, of the popu-lation are favourable to membership inNATO, compared with 46% in early 2001.

In general, the response of the appli-cant states to the terrorist attacks againstthe United States of America is a litmustest that shows the level of their interna-tional socialization, an attitude to the

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western security community values, normsand rules. Lithuania has by official lettersexpressed its strong support to the USpolicy.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Re-public of Lithuania Antanas Valionis hasin his letter addressed to Colin L. Powell,Secretary of State of the United States ofAmerica once assured the USA that Lithua-nia is ready to extend political, diplomaticand practical support for the USA in thefight against terrorism. The letter indi-cates that the Lithuanian Government hasalready granted permanent diplomaticclearance for the over flight of US aircraftsin the Lithuanian airspace. Currently theNational Action Program on combatingterrorism is being prepared as well as tri-lateral Baltic co-operation on developingjoint measures in response to terroristattacks against the USA is being intensi-fied. As a partner and firm ally of theUnited States of America Lithuania isready to take all the necessary means inaddressing global challenges. Lithuaniasupports the NATO decision on possibleapplication of the Article 5 of the Wash-

ington Treaty to the terrorist attacksagainst the USA.

By the results of a public opinion pollsconducted by �Gallup International� in30 states immediately in the aftermath ofthe terror acts in the USA on the 11th ofSeptember Lithuania was the most pro-American of all European states. Morethan 50% of the Lithuanian respondentsbelieve that US foreign policy has a posi-tive influence on Lithuania. The worldpopulation opinion average on this ques-tion is 31,78%. In Estonia it is 42%. How-ever, less than the sixth of its populationwould welcome US military strikes againstthe states harbouring terrorists. Only 15%of the population agree that US govern-ment should launch a military attackagainst the states sheltering the organiz-ers of the terrorist assaults in New Yorkand Washington. This is close to the aver-age percentage across the world, namely14,73%. Thus we are, so to say, averageEuropeans.

Thus in trying to find an answer tothe question �How can NATO best inte-grate the Baltic States in the Alliance in

the period following the invitation andafter accession � and what must the threestates do?� I have stressed the problemsrelated to the processes of internationalsocialization or joining the western secu-rity community.

First of all, it should be noted that theexpansion of the western security com-munity is a process that involves andchanges all its participants, not only theapplicant countries.

As already noted, the Baltic States� join-ing the western security community canbe defined as a top-down case. HansMouritzen has aptly expressed its nature:�If you don�t follow our norms and rules,you will be deprived of future benefits,and /or the option of NATO (EU) mem-bership will vanish�4 . That is, the top downmethod is related to power projection.

The problematic point of the methodis the rivalry between the applicant statesthat is inevitably generated. And this issure an obstacle to the formation of a sta-ble security community. Possibly this cir-cumstance, not merely that of cultural dif-ferences, that explains why despite the grow-

35

ing co-operation between the Baltic Statesit does not transform into a shared iden-tity, or �we feeling�. Latvia, trying to meetthe norms and rules of NATO member-ship, will probably ratify the treaty by2002, the year of NATO summit.

It is evident that in the process of in-tegration with Euro-Atlantic structuresLithuania will have to deal with a numberof very practical issues: Revoking the en-trance-free regime with the Kaliningradregion of Russian Federation; reviewingRussia�s commercial and military transitto the region (most of it is throughLithuania; electricity supplies to the re-gion are also mediated by Lithuania);protecting Lithuanian investments in theregion constituting a major part of allinvestment there; and there is also the is-sue of the future facing the ethnic Lithua-nian minority of 20.000 in the region.

The new international situation thathas emerged in the aftermath of the eventsof the 11th of September gave a new impe-tus to NATO attempts at bringing Russiacloser to the western security community.Russia can play an important role in fight-

ing international terrorism. That stimu-lates more active attitude to Russia inLithuania. The Lithuanian PresidentValdas Adamkus in his address to the�Vilnius-10� Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria in2001 emphasized that Lithuania and theother Baltic States have a vision and astrategy of further developing their co-operation with Russia. This vision in-cludes four points: First, �we are preparedto build on our successful cooperationwith the neighbouring regions of Russiaand make it a priority�. Second, �togetherwith Russia we have a common interestin regional and economic growth andprosperity�. Third, �we are committed topromote cooperation between Russia andthe Euro-Atlantic institutions even afterNATO and the EU expands�, and finally,�Russia should come into peace with itshistory, and we are ready to help it inthis uneasy process�.

However, both the rhetoric of someLithuania�s politicians and the publicopinion polls show that the role of NATOas a security guarantor is mainly associ-ated with territorial defence and, in the

case of Lithuania, defence against poten-tial threats from Russia.

Thus, the rapprochement of the valueattitudes of NATO states and the appli-cant states is to remain an urgent task forall members of the security communityeven after the acceptance of new NATOmembers.

I suppose that both for the memberstates and for the Baltic States it is impor-tant to stimulate public and research ac-tivities that help answer the followingquestion: Under which conditions are theEU community norms, rules and valuesinternalised in the domestic practices ofthe Baltic States and how they influencepolitical and social change?

1 Hubert Vedrine, The New York Review of Books,12th of April 2001, Vol. XLVIII, No. 6, p.18.

2 Hans Mouritzen, �Security Communities inthe Baltic Sea Region�, Security Dialogue, Vol. 32,No. 3, 2001, p. 304.

3 Ikenberry, John G. and Kupchan, Charles A.,�Socialization and Hegemonic Power�, Interna-tional Organizations, 44 (3), p. 289.

4 Hans Mouritzen, �Security Communities inthe Baltic Sea Region�, Security Dialogue, Vol. 32,No. 3, 2001, p. 308.

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e live in a constantly changing geo-strategic environment. The recent

crises in Kosovo, Macedonia and the ter-rorist attacks against the USA demonstratethe new challenges to NATO. AlthoughNATO is, first and foremost, for collec-tive defence, it is no longer an ordinarymilitary Alliance. The missions of NATOare no longer limited to traditional mili-tary security. The international securitysituation prompts the alliance to steadilyexpand into other important functionalareas such as crisis management or com-bating international terrorism. The Sep-tember 11th terrorist acts, being the firstexample of an asymmetric attack with aglobal dimension, have brutally exposed

Lithuanian National Plans and Prioritiesbefore the Prague Summit

the new challenges to the world commu-nity. They reminded us of how vulner-able our open world is, how vulnerableour democracies are, when faced withforces that are prepared to seek the de-struction of our societies, values and hu-man lives. More and more often we haveheard that free trade, global interdepend-ence, and economies without borders de-creased relevance of national security anddefence. The terrorist attacks have broughtnational security into focus again. Forevery nation, a high priority has beengiven to analysing and diminishing thevulnerability of national infrastructuresuch as power plants, bridges, tunnels,government installations, industrial sites

as well as to revising the preparedness ofrescue and health services.

The terrorist attacks against the USAhave changed the NATO alliance. First ofall, September 11th brought to an endthe post-Cold War era and increased in-terdependence between the USA and Eu-rope. NATO, and particularly the USA,is preoccupied with the anti-terrorist cam-paign and how to deal with asymmetricthreats, which is a brand new challengefor the Alliance. As of today, NATO en-largement is not a top priority on theNATO agenda. But at the same time, thereare clear positive signals that the Septem-ber 11th events by no means will slowdown or disturb the process of NATO

By H.E. Mr. Linas Linkevicius, Minister of National Defence of the Republic of Lithuania*

* Prepared for a seminar held at the Baltic Defence College, Tartu, Estonia on October 16, 2001.

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expansion. Quite the opposite, these newchallenges have reinforced the relevanceof the enlargement project. Acts of aggres-sion serve as a direct proof that the NATOenlargement, aimed at expanding the zoneof stability and predictability and enhanc-ing common security, should proceedeven more actively.

The U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powellin his letter to the Lithuanian Ministerof Foreign Affairs has stressed that recentevents �have not deterred the United Statesfrom the purpose to forge a Europe trulywhole, free and secure�. NATO SecretaryGeneral George Robertson said at theSummit of NATO aspirant countries (theVilnius Group) in Sofia, Bulgaria: �theenlargement process will not be held hos-tage by any terrorism or individual ter-rorists. We are not going to be deflected�.In a message from the U.S. PresidentGeorge W. Bush, sent to Sofia Summit, itwas stated that his Administration is morestrongly committed than ever to the east-ward enlargement of NATO in the lightof the September 11th attacks against theUSA. �The United States will be prepared

to make concrete, historic decisions withour Allies at the Summit in Prague�, hepledged.

The freedom Consolidation Act,adopted on November 7 by the U.S.House of Representatives, is the unprec-edented step of approving security assist-ance funds (55 mill. USD) for the coun-tries that aspire to join NATO. The threeBaltic States were earmarked as recipientsalong with four other applicant countries(Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria)from the Vilnius Group. This legislation�spolitical significance is fourfold:

� It demonstrates substantially broadAmerican support for NATO enlargement;

� The share of the Baltic States in theoverall funding are proportionally higherthan the share of the other four coun-tries, which reflects both the Baltic effortin preparing for NATO membership andpolitical backing for their candidacies.

� The timing of the vote, on the eveof the U.S.-Russia summit, was helpful indissuading the Russian President VladimirPutin from trying to place NATO�s Bal-tic enlargement on the bargaining table.

� This level of political support in-creases the U.S. power to lead the Euro-pean Allies towards admitting the BalticStates into the Alliance next year. It sug-gests, moreover, that a more comprehen-sive round of admissions is a politicallyrealistic goal for the next year�s summit.

A big debate is going on with regardto Russia�s softening stance towards NATOenlargement. Is it a turning point in theU.S.-Russia relations? Is it likely that a newNATO-Russia partnership is emerging?There is no single answer to those ques-tions. Looking at the last few years, Rus-sia has been an extremely reluctant part-ner of NATO, mainly working to obtainadvantages and influence from its strate-gic partnership with NATO, without giv-ing anything in return. What we can seenow, is that Russia has decided to line upwith the global coalition against terror-ism. Statements by President Putin andForeign Minister Igor Ivanov have recentlyindicated that Russia is considering ma-jor changes in its position towards theUSA and NATO. Whether this will in-clude a Russian NATO membership in

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the longer term is too early to tell. Dur-ing his meeting with Lord Robertson,Putin made it plain that while he did notlike the idea of the Baltic States joiningNATO, he was not going to invest politi-cal capital in attempting to stop it. Theenlargement is generally regarded as wid-ening of stability: a larger NATO means amore stable region, and Russia is comingto appreciate the benefits of stability onat least some of its borders. It is increas-ingly preoccupied with the turbulent Is-lamic south and, in a longer term, withChina. Putin now appears to feel that thebenefits of close relations with the Westoutweigh the drawbacks. The most impor-tant point is that the major problem ofall the discussions is not an enlargementitself but NATO co-operation with Rus-sia. Putin backed a NATO proposal to setup a new body for deepening and widen-ing the relations between Moscow andBrussels. This is an invaluable opportu-nity to deeply involve Russia in resolv-ing broader security issues.

It is against these major changes andtrends in international security environ-

ment that the question of the Baltic NATOmembership should be assessed. NATOenlargement will help to create an allianceof democracies sharing and defendingcommon ideals. It is particularly relevantto the realities of today. Lithuania wel-comes the Alliance�s decision to furtherpursue the enlargement and extend newinvitations at the NATO Summit in Praguein 2002 to those countries that have com-pleted their membership preparations.The readiness to assume membership ob-ligations by the aspirant countries hasbeen and remains a pivotal ingredient inthe considerations over who is to be in-vited to join the Alliance.

Lithuania�s preparations formembership

The current state of security affairs inLithuania is arguably the best everachieved in history. The country enjoyspeace, relative prosperity, sustained eco-nomic growth and co-operative relationswith foreign partners. Integration intoNATO is one of the most important tools

in achieving that. Lithuania�s eligibilityfor NATO membership is being strength-ened through a successful implementationof the Membership Action Plan (MAP),issued to the candidate countries at theWashington Summit in 1999. Lithuaniais actively taking part in this process, andis currently in the third MAP cycle for2002. The achievements over the last twoyears clearly confirm that the MAP hasbeen a major success and a proper instru-ment of preparations for membership.NATO feedback on our progress throughthe MAP constitutes a vital input and areality check for our further work.

In retrospect, if to compare the threeMAP cycles, the first one was a learningprocess for both NATO and the aspir-ants, as one would expect with any newprogramme. During the second cycle,NATO streamlined the process and pro-vided a set of genuine assessments. TheLithuanian Progress Report of the 2ndcycle of the MAP helped Lithuania toappreciate that the national plans, as wellas undertaken international commitments,were more ambitious than resources per-

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mitted. It was really �down-to-earth� assess-ment of which goals were affordable andwhich were not. The 3rd round outlineshow the revised plans, prepared in linewith the Progress Report of 2001, will beimplemented. In Lithuania, the third cy-cle is regarded as playing a critical role inthe next enlargement decision to be madein Prague.

Parliamentary and public support

The MAP process has positively influ-enced the growth of the inter-ministerialco-ordination within Lithuania and hasbecome increasingly important tool forour government to build parliamentarysupport for necessary resources, as well aspublic support for NATO membership.Lithuania remains committed to allocate2% of its GDP for national defence. TheLaw on the National Defence FinancingStrategy sets the defence expenditure levelof 1.95-2% of the GDP for the year 2001.The continuity of Lithuania�s foreign, se-curity and defence policy was declared lastMay by all our parliamentary parties by

concluding the Defence Policy Agreement,covering the period until 2004. The par-ties expressed their support for NATOintegration and defence reform andobliged themselves to support maintain-ing defence spending at the level of 2 %of the GDP. The general public endorsedthis agreement. The Public Relations Pro-gramme, launched by our Governmenttwo years ago, has already yielded encour-aging results. According to the opinionpolls, support for NATO membership rosefrom 49% at the beginning of 2001 tothe 64% by the end of the year.

The perspective that the budgetaryconstraints will not hamper the practicalimplementation of the MAP is based onencouraging economic figures. Over thepast years, the Lithuanian economy hasbeen showing clear signs of recoveringfrom the Russian crisis of 1998. The Min-istry of Finance estimates a 4% GDPgrowth in 2001, while the estimated an-nual growth rate of GDP for the year2002-2007 is 4.7-5%. Moreover, the for-eign trade with the European Union (EU)has reached new heights and comprises

45,6% of all foreign trade. Finally, at thebeginning of 2001, the EU authoritiescredited Lithuania�s economy as being afunctioning market economy. These posi-tive developments prove that the coun-try is set on a track of prosperity andsustainable economic development.

Political issues:Priorities of foreign policy

Lithuania�s key foreign policy priori-ties, closely related to integration intoNATO, are promoting good neighbourlyrelations and contributing to regionalsecurity and stability. Lithuania fully en-dorses the broad approach to securityoutlined in NATO�s revised StrategicConcept and takes the principles of thisConcept as a departure point in formu-lating the objectives of its defence andsecurity policies. Lithuania supports theAlliance�s goals of reinforcing Euro-Atlan-tic security and stability and preservingthe transatlantic link, and directs its secu-rity policy to promoting good relation-ship with all countries in the Euro-Atlan-

40

tic region. As a result, for instance, allstate border and national minority issueshave been settled to the satisfaction of allinterested parties.

This fully applies to Lithuania�s rela-tions with the Russian Federation. Themain trend in this area has been buildingtransparency and mutual trust, based onthe principles of equality, reciprocal ben-efit and openness. By means of dialogue,Lithuania makes best of effort to demon-strate to Russia that the course towardsNATO membership and all other elementsof Lithuania�s security and defence policyare in no way directed against the legiti-mate security interests of Russia. Lithua-nia�s co-operation with the KaliningradRegion of the Russian Federation, in theframework of regional co-operation, is asuccess story. It is being continuouslyemphasised that the Kaliningrad exclaveshould be further demilitarised and re-ceive new economic impetus. Over therecent years, Lithuania has been workingto make the Kaliningrad Region a �win-dow of opportunity� and model for awider co-operation between Russia and

the expanding European Union. Thus al-ready today Lithuania forges its relationswith Russia as an integral element ofNATO-Russia and EU-Russia partnershipand co-operation. It is in Lithuania�s in-terest to contribute to a smooth develop-ment of the region by engaging it in theco-operative projects, regional and cross-border activities, and people-to-peoplecontacts. It would also help to allay theemerging Russian fears that the regionmight become closed or isolated as a con-sequence of the EU and NATO enlarge-ment.

It has always been Lithuania�s constantwish to have transparency and predict-ability in the defence-related dialoguewith Russia. In 2001, a bilateral agree-ment was reached on additional Confi-dence and Security Building Measures(CSBMs). The countries exchanged ex-tra quotas for the evaluation visits un-der the OSCE Vienna Document�99, andagreed to exchange information on mili-tary forces in Lithuania and Kaliningradin the format of the CFE Treaty. TheRussian military observers are also in-

vited to the biggest military exercises inLithuania (e.g. Baltic Challenge, AmberHope) on a regular basis. Meanwhile, theRussian military transit is proceedingwithout any major problems. Russia es-sentially complies with the rules set byLithuania. The legal framework for themilitary transit currently in place alsoleaves more latitude for Lithuania to en-sure that it does not become an obstacleto the EU or NATO integration.

In its relations with Belarus, Lithuaniacontinues pursuing a so-called policy of�selective engagement�, which implies main-taining pragmatic relations that cannotbe interpreted as a political recognitionof the legitimacy of the regime establishedby President Alexander Lukashenko.Lithuania does not want Belarus to beisolated on the international arena, as itwould not help its eventual democratisa-tion. In the military realm, similar CSBMsas with Russia have been agreed upon withBelarus, which puts substance into theoverarching principle of �selective engage-ment�. �Selective engagement� also includessending and receiving military observers

41

to the military exercises and practical co-operation between the border guards incombating illegal trafficking of people andgoods as well as co-operation between theNGOs and other activities.

Defence co-operation with NATOand Partner countries

Lithuania has developed a robust net-work of regional defence-related co-opera-tion with many NATO and Partner Na-tions. Increasing involvement in the ac-tivities of the German-Polish-Danish de-fence co-operation triangle, two strategicpartnerships (with the USA and Poland),bilateral co-operation with partners inEurope, including, but not limited to,NATO�s major European Allies, the Nor-dic countries, and the new NATO mem-bers serve as the most prominent exam-ples. Internationally supported Baltic de-fence co-operation projects with Latviaand Estonia deserve special mentioning.Along with the combined Lithuanian-Polish Battalion, the entire complex ofBALT-projects will become a natural ex-

tension of the NATO Integrated MilitaryStructure in the region, once Lithuaniaand other two Baltic States have been ac-cepted to NATO.

Since 1994 Lithuania has been contrib-uting to the UN and NATO-led peace sup-port operations: UNPROFOR II inCroatia, IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina, KFOR in Kosovo, andAFOR in Albania. Today, the Lithuaniantroops are deployed in Bosnia andHerzegovina (SFOR) together with theDanish contingent, and in Kosovo(KFOR) together with the Polish unit.Lithuania is also providing a transportaircraft to NATO, operating from the airbase in Naples (Italy), to perform tacticalairlift support for KFOR/SFOR missions.With a view of increasing its ability to ef-fectively react to international crisis, Lithua-nia is developing the National Crisis Re-sponse System compatible with NATO. Bymeans of such practical contributionLithuania demonstrates its political soli-darity with the Alliance�s policy in the re-gion and the readiness to act jointly withNATO forces. Under the same banner of

contributing to building security in Eu-rope, Lithuania also continues active in-volvement in the OSCE dialogue and par-ticipation in long-term missions in Geor-gia, Kosovo and Moldova.

Lithuania pursues the parallel coursetowards the EU accession and makes acontribution to the development of theEuropean Security and Defence Policy(ESDP). In Lithuania�s view, strengthen-ing ESDP does not mean duplication ofor competition with NATO structures.NATO remains the fundamental organi-sation for European security. Creation ofthe European Rapid Reaction Forces isaimed at contributing to strengtheningof the Euro-Atlantic link and sharing theburden of costs and responsibility. Lithua-nia continues to promote American in-volvement in the European security ar-chitecture and closer co-ordination be-tween NATO and the EU, the latter hav-ing access to the infrastructure and assetsof the former, where NATO as a whole isnot engaged. In the EU Capabilities Pledg-ing Conference, Lithuania offered to con-tribute to the EU capabilities with the

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same pool of forces that has been identi-fied for the Adapted Planning and Re-view Process (PARP). Lithuania proposedoperational assets that include the Lithua-nian components of the Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian battalion BALTBAT andLithuanian-Polish battalion LITPOLBAT,as well as a motorised infantry battalionof Paneve¿ys, two naval vessels, one heli-copter and two transport aircraft. Lithua-nia set a special focus on adding small-size land Explosive Ordnance Disposal(EOD) and military medical supportunits. This is meant as a menu list, fromwhich the EU will be able to pick neces-sary assets. The bulk of the Lithuaniancontribution is expected to meet theHeadline Goal deployability andsustainability requirements by 2003. Inaddition, Lithuania offers, with the im-mediate effect, to the EU two of its na-tional training grounds for the EUtroops training purposes. The overviewand update of these proposed assets waspresented during the EU CapabilitiesImprovement Conference (CIC) in Brus-sels in November 2001.

Legal issues

In the legal sphere, Lithuania attachesgreat importance to the creation of nec-essary legal framework for integration intoNATO. The Government Commission onNATO Integration has screened theLithuanian national legislation and estab-lished that the major legal acts, startingwith the Constitution, were not in con-flict with any obligations, which Lithua-nia would have to undertake under thebody of international agreements relatedto its future membership in NATO.

Lithuania�s Progress Report providedsome critical remarks concerning legal as-pects of Lithuania�s future participationin both collective defence operations inaccordance with the Article 5 of the Wash-ington Treaty and in Non-Article 5 �out-of-are� operations, as legal and proceduralbarriers existed to deploy forces in a timelymanner. On the request of LithuanianMinistry of National Defence, the Dan-ish experts prepared a study, reviewingLithuanian legislation in force and con-

ducting its comparative analysis in thelight of the experience of different West-ern partners. Taking into account remarksby the Alliance experts and the Danishanalysis, simplified and more transparentprovisions of the Law on InternationalOperations, Military Exercises and otherArrangements have been prepared andapproved by the Seimas (Parliament). Inaddition, Lithuania�s legal framework fordefence procurement, prohibiting long-term contracts, drew some criticism. As aconsequence, the Seimas approved anupdated law that would permit 3-yearcontracts.

The development of a system of na-tional laws providing the framework fora national security and defence policy hasalso been completed. This includes theNational Security Concept, the laws onOrganisation of the National DefenceSystem and Military Service, on Compul-sory Service, on Total Defence and resist-ance to Aggression, on Intelligence, onProtection of Classified Information andothers. The national Security Strategy willbe in place by the beginning of 2002. In

43

2001, the State Defence Council approvedthe Lithuanian Military Defence Strategy.This Strategy was the missing link in thehierarchy of conceptual documents guid-ing Lithuania�s security and defencepolicy. However, it is a living documentand some changes will inevitably be in-troduced in order to reflect the constantlychanging strategic environment and en-sure that defence-planning staffs have thebest available basis to assess the defencepriorities.

Defence / military issues

During the second MAP cycle, Lithua-nia has made progress in developing com-mand, control and communication sys-tem, new force structure, professionalmilitary education, training and doctrine,logistics, infrastructure, airspace surveil-lance and control, and the quality of lifefor the military. At this stage, the need toprioritise in developing the national de-fence system became an imperative.Lithuania�s highest priority in implement-ing the Partnership Goals (PGs) is the need

to provide realistic and resource basedtasks in the Annual National Plan. TheNorth Atlantic Council (NAC) ProgressReport has been immensely helpful in re-viewing our defence development plansand modifying priorities. We found PARPhelpful in our force planning; the PGswere especially useful in aligning resourcesamong competing priorities.

The main goal of Lithuania�s defencereform is to find the best balance betweenthe capabilities required for the defenceof the state, carrying out peace time mis-sions, present and future internationalcommitments and the resources availableto support and sustain these capabilities.Key words for the new structure of ourarmed forces are realistic and achievable.Lithuanian armed forces are being pre-pared for self-defence and will be capableof engaging in the full spectrum of theAlliance�s missions: to conduct Host Na-tion Support (HNS) operations, trainingfor international crisis response/ PeaceSupport Operations and Article 5 collec-tive defence operations. The priority hasbeen given to the development of the ef-

ficient, reliable, and mobile GroundForces and small, mission tailored AirForces and Navy. The Progress Reportcriticised the previous Lithuanian defenceplans for four combat brigades as tooambitious.

The adjusted plans envisage a fully op-erational Reaction Brigade tailored for amission of reinforcement of our territo-rial forces and fighting in potential Arti-cle 5 operations on Lithuanian soil orimmediate neighbourhood under NATOcommand deployed by the end of 2006.Already by November 2002 Lithuania willprovide a battalion-size NATO compat-ible unit to be deployed for Article 5operations as a part of the Allied forceoutside the Lithuanian territory. Mean-while, Lithuania continues its participa-tion by company-size contingents inNATO-led international crises responseoperations on a rotational basis. Underthe revised plans, a unified and effectivechain of command can be best assuredwith an organisation consisting of twomilitary regions (Western & Eastern) withthe elements of mobile (regular) and ter-

44

ritorial forces (the National Defence Vol-unteer Forces - NDVF) and one mobileReaction Brigade for reinforcement in thedirection of a possible conflict. In thisrespect, integration of the NDVF intoregular forces is a paramount task. Terri-torial defence forces will be under thecommand of the military regions. Oncereorganisation has been completed, thepeacetime strength of Lithuanian Armedforces will be over 16.000 (active reserve -no more then 25.000). It is worth men-tioning that recently the Ground ForcesCommander has been appointed. He hasfull command over the Ground Forcesincluding the NDVF. In wartime, theGround Forces Commander would assumeresponsibility of the overall OperationalCommander.

Among other objectives in the devel-opment of the national defence systemthere are:

� Establishment of an effective reservetraining and mobilisation system;

� Preparation of infrastructure, per-sonnel and procedures for HNS opera-

tions (reception of possible partner rein-forcements):

� To ensure defence of the 1st Air Basefrom air threats and continue formationof the Air Defence Battalion;

� To develop infrastructure of 1st and2nd Air Bases;

� To prepare the Navy infrastructurefor HNS.

� A further development of a central-ised logistics system:

� Ensuring participation of militaryunits up to a company size in NATO-ledcrises response operations and, fromNovember 2002 onwards, participationof military units up to a company size incollective defence operations outside theLithuanian territory;

� To enhance logistic support of theterritorial forces.

� Development of the training and edu-cation system:

� Development of an effective air spacemonitoring and control system:

� To integrate BALTNET into NATOAir Space Surveillance and Defence Sys-tem;

� To implement the 3D medium rangeair surveillance radar procurement project.

These objectives constitute the core ofthe national plans and are central for theLithuanian ANP and PARP. The PARP isthe principal tool of implementing theMAP and developing Lithuania�s defenceforces to meet NATO standards and, par-ticularly, to prepare for the Alliance�s col-lective defence planning practices.

Resource issues

The ability to finance the future plansand programmes and to ensure that themost cost-effective resource options arechosen is a precondition for the estab-lishment of efficient Armed Forces, capa-ble of undertaking the assigned tasks. Re-source management is being carried outthrough the Planning, Programming andBudgeting System (PPBS), which includesstrategic planning, resource allocation ac-cording to the programmes, financialmanagement and performance evaluation.The PPBS ensures that maximum defencecapability is achieved in the most efficient

45

and cost effective manner. In accordancewith the PPBS, all of the defence objec-tives are covered by nine long-range StateSecurity Enhancement Programmes andaccompanied by the performance criteriain five areas: manpower (individual train-ing), collective performance, armamentand equipment, deployability andsustainability. These criteria are appliedto the Land Forces, Air Forces, Navy andlogistics to evaluate both the quantitativeand qualitative progress in achieving ob-jectives. From these defence objectivesprogramme co-ordinators derive theirspecific tasks and undertake activities tobe completed in support of them.

The enlargement process continues toplay a vital role in shaping the progres-sive transformation of military establish-ments of Central and Eastern Europe. Boththe MAP and PARP have helped to createa structure of defence reform and inter-departmental co-ordination. Lithuaniahas an affordable plan, is resourcing itand is implementing it to build its cred-ible defence forces and be ready to as-sume international commitments includ-

ing those under the Article 5. To quoteone NATO official, �NATO enlargementis a political decision but military reformwill result in a political message�.

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NATO-Russia versusUS-Russia relations

The creation of the Permanent JointCouncil (PJC) in Paris in May 1997 isthe best indication that an attempt wasmade to formalize to a certain degreeNATO-Russia relations, which in effectmeans a clear separation from US-Russianbilateral relations.

This helps (but does not always suc-ceed) in ensuring that no linkage is madebetween issues that are respectively of US

NATO-Russia relations and NATOenlargement in the Baltic Sea Region

By Frederic Labarre, MA*

and NATO jurisdiction. While this wasnot the immediate intent, the creation ofthe PJC tentatively resolved an asymme-try in two regimes of relations. For thefirst time in history, Russia had a �voice�in NATO, while its favourite means ofdiplomacy, bilateralism1 , was maintainedand untainted by other matters dealt sepa-rately with the US.

The PJC is a forum for consultationand consensus building with Russia.2 Itis not (nor ever was meant to be) for-mally institutionalised. Except for bi-an-nual Ministerial meetings, regular ambas-

sadorial contact and the capacity to setup working groups and committees3 ,there never was evidence of the desire toturn these into a structure resembling atrans-Atlantic security council. It is truethat it represented a breakthrough in post-Cold War relations with Russia, and whilethere were many successes to celebrate4 ,the PJC hit a serious snag by spring 1999.

This is when the Kosovo air campaignerupted. It may be construed that there isno difference between Russian relationswith the US and NATO because Russiaused the opportunity to withdraw from

* Mr. Frederic Labarre, MA, is a Fellow of the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Nova Scotia, Canada and advisor to the Ministry of Defence of Estonia. Thearticle was prepared for �Enlargements in Europe: An outlook from a Nordic Perspective�, 2nd to 3rd of November 2001, Karlberg Castle, Sweden.

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the PJC. Then Prime Minister YevguenyiPrimakov signified his disagreement withthe decision to go ahead with the air warby returning straight back to Moscowwhile en route to Washington. But thissnub cannot have meant anything pastinitial disdain. Russia has a relationshipof financial dependence on the UnitedStates. It counts on Congress to free fundsto its benefit (mostly funds that help itrepay the huge Soviet-era sums it owes toGermany and Special Drawing Rights tothe International Monetary Fund), andtherein lies the principal difference. TheUnited States is essential to Russian inter-ests, and have greater leverage than NATO.As a result, Russia has cut off its ties withNATO in March 19995 , but resumed acertain level of dialogue with the US es-pecially after Yeltsin�s abdication.

Another indication that serves to showthe difference between the two regimesof relations is the question of missile de-fence. The prodigal �son of Star Wars� re-emerged as an issue of US-Russian ten-sion in the closing months of the Clintonadministration.

�In the spring of 1999 the combinedimpact of NATO�s Kosovo operation andthe American push to deploy a nationalmissile defence resulted in a sharp increasein reliance on nuclear weapons. The warin Kosovo sharply increased the percep-tion of a potential threat emanating fromNATO, which could not be deterred byconventional weapons alone. The still-lin-gering concern over NATO expansion in1997 made this perception particularlyacute: since the summer of 1999 the Rus-sian Army has regularly trained to defendagainst a large scale, �Kosovo-style� air-attack. For its part, the National MissileDefence (NMD) can, theoretically, renderthe Russian nuclear deterrent impotentin ten or so years, making the countrymore vulnerable to conventional attack�.6

Implicit in this declaration is the in-herent separation between NMD andNATO�s capabilities as two differentthreats to Russia, needing to be dealt withseparately. The two are related in the Rus-sian perception, but they cannot be linkedin terms of diplomacy because of the ex-istence of the PJC, which allows Russia to

express its concerns (when it participates)to some NATO members who would per-haps share its position on other matterslike NMD.

Similarly, NATO�s nuclear arsenal be-ing in fact that of the USA, it has no realauthority to deal with such matters uni-laterally. So the two items are in fact sepa-rated, leading to two different approaches.It follows that relations are different fromRussia towards NATO and towards theUSA. Hence for the purpose of our re-search we can safely concentrate on thefate of NATO-Russia relations withoutexaggerating the place that US-Russia re-lations may take in the debate.

Other elements affectingNATO-Russia relations

This discussion has allowed us to high-light issues of extreme importance whenone considers NATO enlargement to theBaltic States. Since NATO enlargementand Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) areboth priorities of the new Bush adminis-tration, there were fears that Russia might

48

force a trade that would be detrimentalto the Baltics, namely, that Russia wouldsomehow �allow� the BMD to go aheadin exchange for NATO stopping its en-largement drive.7

This is unlikely to materialize because,as the excerpt above demonstrates, whenRussia�s national security perception isconcerned, it is NATO�s capabilities andthe US anti-missile capability that arethreatening, not the enlargement itself.Russia therefore needs to neutralize boththreats. With the projection capability ofNATO, it matters little whether BMD hasbeen dropped, or vice-versa. Enlargement,in this sense, only offers a tactical advan-tage, and does not represent the geo-stra-tegic imbalance that Russia sometimespresents it to be. This is why Russia haslately been reiterating8 the opinion thatno NATO bases should be located on itsborders (while vociferously remainingopposed to enlargement). Furthermore,this exchange scenario would involve over-ruling the opinion of some (or all) of theNATO members, perhaps endangering theAlliance. In any case, the Bush adminis-

tration, in true meritocratic style, seemsdetermined to reach both goals. A recentSurvival essay seems to add weight to thisnotion, claiming that a broad consensusconcerning the NMD debate is beingreached.9 If this were occurring �in theback� of the Baltic States, the question oftheir membership into NATO would rap-idly disappear from political debate.

What the preceding debate has yieldedis that elements unrelated to enlargementcan affect Baltic perceptions, which in turnpropel the debate further, as if in an ever-accelerating upward spiral. These are notthe only events that have served to en-venom the relationship between Russiaand NATO; the resumption of the war inChechnya re-ignited the second bid forNATO membership by the Baltics.10

�When one sees what is happening inChechnya, one should make the conclu-sion that Russia is at high level of mili-tary readiness and poses a potentialthreat...�11

As a result of this and of the BalticStates� �bitter experience of relations witha neighbouring country�, it comes as no

surprise that there is a desire to joinNATO.

One philosophical/psychological factorthat may reveal inconsistencies in the ac-cession discourse of the Baltic States isthe gap between the idealism that NATOembodies since its transformation from acommon defence to a collective securityinstrument12 , and the inherent realism ofthe Baltic States� flight away from Mos-cow�s sphere of influence. The necessityto become �like-minded� with NATOmembers, implemented by virtue of thecondition posed at the April 1999 NATOSummit in Washington to maintain har-monious relations with neighbours13 ishijacked by historical and geopoliticalrealities, and made even worse by the per-ceived insistence of Moscow at keepingtensions high to disqualify the Baltic Statesfor membership.

Interestingly, as NATO-Russia relationsunravel, the 1999 conditions as outlinedin the Membership Action Plan (MAP)process are less and less emphasized, al-though the Baltic States themselves con-tinue to make efforts in the direction of

49

closer ties with their former �occupier�.In the articles I have collected throughmy internet search, results have yieldedonly one article where this necessity isreiterated by a Western official.14 As longas there are tensions between NATO andRussia, thus, the Baltics� claim for mem-bership is consistent with their percep-tion of Russia.15 As soon as NATO-Rus-sia relations improve, they run the riskof demonstrating that they seek member-ship for common defence rather thancollective security purposes, thereby in-creasing the mindset gap between them-selves and NATO, and enhancing Russiafears that NATO enlarges against it.

Having raised all these issues, we arebetter prepared to examine the positionsof NATO and Russia concerning enlarge-ment since the autumn of 1999.

NATO and Enlargement

In all fairness to NATO�s extraordinaryrise and staying power in the post-ColdWar era, we cannot discuss its enlargementafter Kosovo without putting the debate

briefly in context. The question of en-largement prior to Kosovo needs to besummarized and there are three pointsthat should be made clear.

The first point is that the Article 10 ofthe Washington Treaty allows for the ad-mission of new members. The controversyobviously revolves around the fact thatenlargement is occurring in the absenceof the threat that spawned NATO in thefirst place.

The second point is that the 1995 En-largement Study set precise guidelines forany state hopeful of admission into theAlliance. The peace and quiet enjoyed inCentral and Eastern Europe is without adoubt owed to this policy, requiring statesto settle outstanding disputes peaceably,resolve border differences, care for theirminorities, and declare genuine good re-lations with neighbours. These conditionscontinue to exist.

The third point is the fact that whilethe first round of enlargement was cau-tious, the second round is taking place ata snail�s pace, yet seems even more certainthan the first one. The difference is that

this time, there is a possible escape routefor NATO, should it choose not to en-large. The Membership Action Plan, un-veiled at the April 1999 Washington Sum-mit, basically sets the direction of the re-form of the aspiring states in defence andmilitary terms, while emphasizing certainpolitical requirements, described in the1995 Enlargement Study. This way NATOcan adjust the speed of enlargement with-out invoking Russia as a cause of slowsdowns (or accelerations). All the burdenof adaptation is placed on the shouldersof new applicants, and they know it. De-spite their apparent weakness, they havenevertheless succeeded in affecting thediscourse on enlargement, as we shall see.

These points now clear, we can bettermonitor the evolution of the enlargementdebate within NATO through its Secre-tary General�s declarations.

When Lord Robertson of Port Ellentook the NATO office in the fall of 1999,he outlined five goals for the coming years.First was the contribution of NATO tothe Stability Pact of South East Europe.The second was the Defence Capabilities

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Initiative (DCI) followed closely (becauseit is somewhat related) to the EuropeanSecurity and Defence Identity (ESDI). Onlyfourth came close co-operation with Rus-sia. Finally, closer links between NATO andits partners were advocated, mostly througha strengthening of the Partnership for Peace(PfP) and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Coun-cil (EAPC) processes.

Enlargement was mentioned only enpassant as part of this last point, and oc-curring �early in the next century�.16

It seemed that at the time, and cor-rectly, the most urgent task on the agendawas the Balkans. One may be tempted toadvance the theory that as the enlargementdebate took over centre stage in the fol-lowing months, it deflected energies fromthat priority and may have negativelyhelped the eruptions in the Former Yu-goslav Republic of Macedonia(FYROM).17

One cannot academically prove that theway the priorities were outlined indicatedan order of importance. However, beliefin the notion that the priorities were linedup in order of importance can be inferred

by the fact that the Balkans were indeedthe central piece occupying all efforts, andNATO-Russia relations were clearly lowerbecause Russia�s withdrawal from the Per-manent Joint Council meant that any re-newal of relations had to be initiated byMoscow. But Brussels clearly had a partto play, and this may be why there is onlya cursory reference to enlargement, as away to induce Russia to come back.

It is also evident that references to en-largement will vary in frequency and in-tensity depending on the audiences.Therefore it is not surprising to see otheraspects emphasized as priorities in LordRobertson�s speech of 15 November 1999at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly inAmsterdam.

What is conspicuous in that speech isthe total absence of any reference to Rus-sia, and a corresponding increase in thequestion of enlargement�s status, wordedthus:

��[O]ne of my key responsibilities willbe to prepare NATO for the next roundof enlargement. NATO�s Heads of Stateand Government have committed to con-

sider further enlargement no later than2002� The door to NATO will remainopen as an important part of [the MAP]process�.18

So the link with partners was beingupgraded through the common desire ofall member states. It is important here tostress that this is the aggregate policy ofthe members, and not of NATO. Implicitin this remark is that Russia has some-how changed in the perception of theAllies. This shift cannot be blamed onRussia�s evasion of the PJC, but on itsrenewed adventures in Chechnya. Russia�ssimple return to the PJC could not bethe end of NATO�s attempt to re-estab-lish ties with Russia. Acknowledging rap-prochement with Russia at a time when itstarted waging a brutal and inexplicablewar in Chechnya may have exposedNATO to inconsistencies with its recentintervention in Serbia (indeed, the con-tradictions were highlighted several timessince then in academic circles).19

Lord Robertson devoted a significantpart of his subsequent speech at the SirFrank Roberts Memorial lecture on Feb-

51

ruary 2nd 2000. A refrain that would catchso many Baltic ears was then uttered forthe first time; NATO enlargement is partof the ongoing process of the �comple-tion of Europe� through its deepeningand widening. But the responsibility ofthe success of this widening remained withthe applicants, as the MAP process wasdescribed as the tool to maybe achievemembership.20 Lord Robertson�s declara-tion underscored the necessity to achievethis widening in the context of improv-ing NATO-Russia relations.

The intellectual point that the MAPfostered security by giving hopefuls theincentive to carry out reforms by settlingoutstanding disputes was not lost to Rus-sia. Many in the Baltics claim that Russiais being difficult for the simple sake ofmultiplying obstacles on the way toNATO. In other words, there is no Rus-sian will for improved relations with theBaltic States since this would open thedoor to NATO even wider. For this rea-son, it is impossible for NATO to ignoreRussia while proceeding with enlargement.Lord Robertson outlined the basics of a

policy of renewed relations with Russiabecause the enlargement is as much theplan of the NATO members as it is thedesire of applicants. Russia could not beleft out in the cold. Lord Robertson ad-vocated a role for NATO that would be,at minimum

��persistent engagement. To claim aleading role [for NATO] is clearly notrealistic. Other institutions may well beable to offer more to Russia at this stageof Russia�s difficult transition� If Rus-sia�s successful transition is in our inter-est, we must help that transition succeed�That is why I am determined to get theNATO-Russia relationship back ontrack�.21

The other institutions Lord Robertsonspoke of, and the �stage� at which Russiawas, were the Council of Europe, theOrganization of Security and Coopera-tion in Europe (OSCE) and Russia�s trou-bles in Chechnya respectively. Henceforth,NATO would keep silent on the Chechenquestion (not that it said much previously)and leave wrangling on that subject tothese institutions.

A week later, Lord Robertson spokebefore the Bulgarian National Assemblyand unsurprisingly devoted a large partof his address on the topic of enlarge-ment. For the first time in his tenure, heassured that �others will follow� Poland,the Czech Republic and Hungary intoNATO.22 But more significantly, he out-lined in no uncertain terms what was ex-pected of applicants.

�They must be ready to make the re-forms which are needed. They must tacklethe crucial issues, such as defence reform,without delay. They must not shy awayfrom taking tough and painful decisionsand must allocate sufficient resources totheir reforms. Fine words are not enough.They must be backed by deeds.�23

A few months later, in May the exactsame words were spoken at the JointWilton Park/Atlantic Council Conferencein Slovenia.24 There, Lord Robertson in-dicated that the relationship between ap-plicants and NATO in the framework ofthe MAP would become more �interac-tive�.25 Later at the Slovak Foreign PolicyAssociation, he reiterated the applicants�

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responsibilities with the twist that Russiaoccupied a larger part of the debate witha common desire between Moscow andBrussels to re-ignite the PJC.26

In this last respect, the Secretary Gen-eral�s speech gave credit to PresidentVladimir Putin for the rapprochement,but he took care of giving certain initiallimits to co-operation, revolving aroundsuch topics as nuclear safety, peacekeep-ing, and counter proliferation.27 As a re-sult, Robertson felt safe enough at the endof May 2000 to claim that Russia andNATO were �overcoming the Kosovosyndrome�.28 As Russia gradually reinte-grated the PJC, two achievements of notewere celebrated: The agreement to openthe NATO information office in Moscowas soon as possible and an agreement on awork plan for the remainder of 2000.29

All this would seem to shift the focusexclusively on the process of getting theNATO-Russia relationship back on trackat the expense of other priorities, mainlythe enlargement issue, but this is not thecase. All the while reports were given aboutthe status of the MAP process, in other

words, of the enlargement itself. The MAPprocess and the NATO-Russia relationshipbecame priority by mid 2000, and alteredsignificantly the order of the agenda thatLord Robertson had set himself ninemonths earlier. Enlargement and NATO-Russia relations reigned supreme beforethe Parliamentary Assembly�s very eyes.

One of the reasons for this refocusingcomes after the publication of the Rus-sian military doctrine and of the NationalSecurity Concept of the Russian Federa-tion in April 2000, themselves formed bythe events of 1999.

�The transition of NATO to the useof force (military force) beyond the zoneof its responsibility and without the sanc-tion of the UN Security Council, whichhas been elevated to the level of a strate-gic doctrine, is fraught with thedestabilisation of the strategic situationin the world.�30

The Russian military doctrine came tothe support of the national security con-cept by adopting a decidedly more asser-tive tone, indeed, says Dr. S. J. Main, amore �interventionist� one. One omi-

nous sign, is that the final version, adoptedin April 2000, omits to mention thatRussia would abide by the provisions ofthe UN Charter, the Helsinki Agreementsor the Paris Charter31 , just as NATO hasrefused to go through the UN SecurityCouncil for Kosovo, one hears Russianplanners sarcastically adding in theirthoughts. The initial October 1999 ver-sion of the Russian military doctrine didnot fail to mention these internationaldocuments.

A more worrying trend is that someparts of the Doctrine can be interpretedas Russia being willing to intervene infavour of its citizens in what is rapidlybeing forgotten as its �near-abroad�. Thisis indeed a trend that would seem at oddswith the desire expressed by Brussels toget closer to Moscow, and one that hasdefinite consequences for the future ofrelations between NATO and Russia (andalso with the West in general).

In July musings of Russia one day join-ing NATO were uttered, but LordRobertson was careful to say that this wasnot a priority for a long time to come.

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But he did reiterate that the PJC was thereto regulate NATO-Russia encounters in amanner that defined the areas of discus-sion in basically the same way as his pre-vious speech in Bratislava in May.32 SoNATO-Russia relations were as important� and as stalled � as ever. By September,however, indications were that the rela-tionship was back on track, and the Sec-retary General was close to declaring un-mitigated success. Yet, there was no men-tioning of the enlargement. Instead, is-sues of importance to the Supreme AlliedCommander Atlantic (SACLANT) � (it wasa SACLANT Symposium, after all) wereemphasized, such as lifting capability.33

Enlargement was back in the news atthe speech to the Atlantic Club of Bul-garia the following month. On this date,expectations of NATO membership weremitigated when Lord Robertson said thatthe decision as to the �who� and �when�would be �based on many factors.�34

Compliance to the MAP was an impor-tant part of the assessment, leading tobelieve that some other considerations,presumably the requirements of the 1995

Study, would also count.35 Hitherto,MAP participants had been lulled to be-lieve that the MAP was the only criterion.NATO did not divulge (nor does it in-tend to divulge) the �who�, but alludedto the �when� by saying that the processof enlargement would be �reviewed nolater than 2002�.36 Furthermore, the topicof enlargement preceded the necessity toreinvigorate NATO-Russia relations.

This minute shift is the result of appli-cants� pressure, applied mostly throughthe press. As time went by, NATO seemedto volunteer more and more informationabout what will happen at the 2002 Sum-mit. Yet, implicit in the insistence of keep-ing NATO-Russia relations on track (inexpectation of the future round of en-largement), is its exclusive linkage withthe addition of new members from theformer Soviet sphere. This is inevitable.NATO�s policy of engagement is impos-sible in parallel with enlargement. The lat-ter will destroy the former.

Another shift in the debate in favourof the enlargement track came at the endof October 2000. In speaking of the �Six

Levels of Partnership�, Lord Robertsonimplied that partners, sooner or later,would become full members, provided thatthey meet the necessary requirements, andachieve successful transition and integra-tion. This sparked cautious optimism insome former Soviet Republics who saw inthat the notion that their turn would comesince �membership is simply the logicalconclusion of partnership.�37 Even moresignificant, the Secretary General said thatfor the others �we cannot promise a time-table for accession nor guarantee theirmembership. But we will not keep onehalf of Europe at arm�s length forever.�38

A conscious differentiation betweenwhat NATO considers to be historical orgeographical Europe was being made fromthose other partners who were not partof the MAP process. These words weredirectly intended for the MAP countries,the �Vilnius Nine� of Estonia, Latvia,Lithuania, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia,Slovenia, Albania and the Former Yugo-slav Republic of Macedonia.39 WhileNATO-Russia relations remained behindthe MAP process in importance, they were

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nevertheless improved, as NATO wasmoving beyond simple engagement.

�Getting back to the status quo beforeKosovo is not enough. We should aimhigher. We should aim for a relationshipwhere a disagreement in one area does[not] lead to a breakdown of our entireco-operation.�40

So towards the end of 2000, a notice-able improvement in the quality of theNATO-Russia relationship could be wit-nessed. In addition, the prospect for in-clusion of some (or all) of the VilniusNine was becoming clearer. So clear, infact, that responsibility for enlargementwas beginning to be shared by NATObecause it is �serious about enlargement,and [that is] why the Alliance is givingfocused feedback to each of the nine as-pirants.�41

Three days later, he confirmed that aSummit would take place in 2002, onewhere �further invitations� would be�considered�.42 Meanwhile, enlargementwas the number one topic on the agenda,with NATO-Russia relations as a close sec-ond. In that last respect, Lord Robertson

called ever more confidently for the cri-sis-resilient relationship that could �sur-vive disagreement over single issues, suchas enlargement or Kosovo�.43 In a way,that was a signal to Russia that it had noveto over enlargement. More substantially,however, it is the first time that NATOfelt confident enough to mention the K-word and enlargement in the context ofimproving relations. While there is theimplicit understanding by NATO thatpushing too much on unilateral �Out-of-Area� intervention or enlargement issuesmay prove damaging, Russia is given tounderstand that she has no say in Alli-ance policies.

A week later, the Secretary General metwith the Parliamentary Assembly with astrong message about DCI and Euro At-lantic ties, and the question of Parliamen-tary consent to enlargement was brieflydiscussed.44 This topic is important, be-cause with improving NATO-Russia ties,there is a possibility that Moscow maytry to influence member States individu-ally to stymie the consensus over enlarge-ment without incurring defeats in NATO-

Russia relation or bilateral relations. Cer-tainly, one can rightly be fearful of thiseventuality when one looks at the unequaltreatment given to the subject by Germanofficials.45

Strangely enough, it is Germany�s lateManfred Wörner who was the earliest ad-vocate of enlargement (after all, he pre-sided over the reunification and NATOintegration of his own state in 1990). Thisis why it is bizarre to see his countrymendisplaying apparent second thoughts. Thisis because Germany has immense stakesin good relations with Russia, namely, therepayment of Soviet era debts to theamount of some $40 billion. The issueof the Kaliningrad enclave � once part ofthe German Empire � is of interest to Rus-sia as well, and Moscow may have foundtherein the tools it needs to stall enlarge-ment by enrolling Germany. While thisis a very remote possibility, Germanybeing undeniably stronger than Russia allby itself at the present time, speaking withGerman diplomats, one gets the feelingthat Moscow�s voice carries a lot of weightin Berlin.

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Robertson kept his cards to himselfregarding enlargement stressing the proc-ess of �review� and mentioning Prague asthe venue for the NATO Summit, but nodate. NATO-Russia relations became a casefor celebration; �Russia is coming to real-ize that NATO is here to stay, and thatwe need a modus vivendi with each other.�46

In the same breath, Robertson said, inanticipation of the opening of NATO�sMoscow information centre, that �NATOneeds to be more effective at conveyingto the Russians what the Alliance is, whatit does and why�because Russians needto understand more clearly that NATO isnot, nor does it want to be, a threat totheir security.�47

At this juncture, a new internationalevent had come to rock the Baltic scene;that of the alleged presence of tacticalnuclear weapons in Kaliningrad, a ques-tion we will delve into in the next part.Lord Robertson is right in saying thatNATO is misunderstood, but by whom?Certainly, the public ignorant of whatNATO really is may be puzzled48 , butthere is no doubt that the Russian leader-

ship understands where the allies comefrom and can recognize a defensive bodywhen they see one. Furthermore, they cancertainly read that the new strategic con-cept of the Alliance does not treat Russiaas a threat.

What Lord Robertson downgrades asa simple misunderstanding is vastly dif-ferent to Russian leaders. To them, resist-ance to NATO is trench warfare. Theyhave dug in and are refusing to give upany ground on the subject, although wewill see later that they in fact have. Immo-bility is a matter of principle. LordRobertson could not make them movesimply on the merits of a new NATO,but on the acknowledgment of Russia�score interests, cryptic for �give us some-thing in return�. This is something thatdeeply worries the Baltic, shaken by theirMolotov-Ribbentrop experience. Whenthe Alliance says that enlargement �is notabout encircling or excluding Russia�49 ,the Russian leadership knows this.

Proceeding with the ongoing MAPprocess, Lord Robertson beseeched theNine to orient their defence reform away

from Cold War structures, and more to-wards interoperable, modern, small butcapable forces, adding that he would�rather be tough in 2001 than apologeticin 2002�50 , implying that something con-crete regarding enlargement would hap-pen. Some days later, at the Mountbattenaddress, Lord Robertson went a step fur-ther by saying �every democratic countrymust have a free right to choose its ownsecurity arrangement.�51 Repeating thisOSCE mantra has since been the main ac-tivity of spokesperson from Tallinn toLjubljana, as if it could ward off their fearof Russia�s veto on their membership.

Saying that Russia has no veto doesnot mean automatic acceptance. It justmeans that Russia will not be the reasonfor rejection. Furthermore, what appli-cants forget at their peril is the fact that,as NATO enlarges, the Alliance membersare choosing their �security arrangement�too. In other words, the choice is notone-sided. The character of the Alliancemust not be changed by the addition ofmembers, regardless of their origin, butneither must applicants delude themselves

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into thinking that they are de facto alliesbecause some of the actual NATO mem-bers may not �choose� a 28 state strongAlliance. This choice too, is legitimate.

Yet, the Nine and the Baltic States inparticular have reasons to remain hope-ful: NATO concedes that �when a Euro-pean democracy is able and willing to makea real contribution to Euro Atlantic secu-rity, then the Alliance has an obligation toconsider their [sic] application for mem-bership.�52 Once again, emphasis is puton European, but the term obligation is cer-tainly good news for the Baltic States andthe rest of the Nine, despite the �home-work� that remains to be done.53

Meanwhile in March, a �State of theAlliance� address by the Deputy SecretaryGeneral opined that the NATO-Russiafreeze was a thing of the past.54 To un-derscore this achievement, Lord Robertsonfelt compelled to base much of hisErasmus University speech on the NATO-Russia relationship, insisting on thebroadening dialogue within the PJC to-wards crisis-resilient co-operation thateven included theatre missile defence.55

By the middle of 2001, there could beno doubt that NATO had achieved a sig-nificant breakthrough in its relations withRussia. While these improvements couldnot lead to believe that Russia would actu-ally welcome enlargement56 , NATO felt thatthe time had come to produce more signsof its willingness to enlarge by holding aParliamentary Assembly in Vilnius. But ifRussia had accepted to anchor its relation-ship with NATO in the PJC, it remainedthat it kept a free hand in most everythingelse. This is why no Russian representativewas sent to the NATO Parliamentary As-sembly held in Vilnius in late May 2001.57

While the venue acted as a message untoitself, Lord Robertson pointed to the factthat Allies stood ready to give assistanceto NATO hopefuls, but steering clear ofthe trap of naming names of possible newmembers, he indicated that the requisitesof the 1995 Study had largely been met,and that relevant efforts (and the subse-quent evaluation for membership) mayhinge more on MAP performance.58

This section can be confidently con-cluded by quoting Lord Robertson�s June

20th speech where he announced that�NATO hopes and expects, based on cur-rent and anticipated progress by the as-piring members, to launch the process ofenlargement at the Prague Summit in2002.�59 No more �reviews� or �consid-eration�, the �zero option� out, NATOwill enlarge in 2002. Had Lord Robertsondivulged any more information as to the�who� of the process, the progress inmeeting Partnership Goals (PGs) andStandardization Agreements (STANAGs)would have stopped. This is a telling in-dication that the decision to accept newmembers is not necessarily only political,but is based more and more on the actualcontribution that �aspiring members� canmake. Baltic-Russia relations are less impor-tant in the decision, and therefore, so areNATO-Russia relations. One has to remem-ber that aspiring members (itself a termpregnant with meaning) from the Balticare fleeing their former occupier but arealso limited in their military capabilitiesand are short on resources. This means thatthe impetus that NATO is trying to fightoff�the desire to reap the benefits of Arti-

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cle 5 while not contributing more to ef-fective and interoperable self-defence�would take over as Baltics� scarce resourceswould be automatically shifted to meetdomestic and EU urgencies.

It needs to be said that these efforts,conditions for membership, were notsuffered by the three previous invitees,and this is why more and more, Balticleaders are pointing to the West�s moralobligation to accept the Baltic States asmembers. In effect, the latest members aremodernizing at the same time as �aspir-ing members� but the Baltics are doing itwith the issue of national survival as chiefmotivator.

The preceding analysis has shown thatas time went on, enlargement occupiedmore and more space and became NATO�snumber one priority, never outdone bythe parallel need to restore the NATO-Russia relationship. The enlargement de-bate evolved in favour of the Baltic Statesand other MAP participants in the con-text of improving relations with Russia.This would therefore give us reason tobelieve that the next round of enlarge-

ment, which is sure to come in 2002, willproceed without a hitch. But this conclu-sion counts without Russia�s position,which we examine in the next section.

Russia and enlargement

When using media debate as the basisfor analysis, it is useful to remind thereader of certain aspects of contemporarydiplomacy and negotiation. Because thenation-state is no longer the sole actor ofinternational relations, �our changingworld demands that we broaden our con-ceptual framework.�60 The tools in exist-ence to initiate processes ever increasingin complexity, such as diplomacy and theuse of force, are no longer sufficient dueto the high degree of interdependencebetween States. Reliance on unofficial dia-logue is extremely important in contem-porary international politics. It allows thesides to gauge each other�s position with-out incurring political losses or commit-ting to risky endeavours such as discus-sion of sensitive issues, which are not ripeto be addressed. Such unofficial dialogue

corresponds broadly to what Fred Ikletermed �side-effects negotiations�61 , ornegotiations aimed at keeping the sidestalking until new developments determinea more official course of action. This iswhy analysis of media sources is useful inthis case, because it may help to indicateprogression and relative importance of adebate.

Early in October 1999, the questionof Baltics accession to NATO was stilllinked to the situation of ethnic minori-ties living in the Baltic States. In the caseof Lithuania, Russia made exception be-cause of the generous provisions that statehad granted to its Russian minority.Granting equal rights to Russians livingin Lithuania was comparatively easierthan for Estonia and Latvia who fearedthat an ethnic vote might constitute a fifthcolumn that would nullify their independ-ence. Yet even for Lithuania, Moscow stillopposed NATO enlargement, and wilfullytried to disqualify it from membershipby refusing to ratify a border agreement.62

Russia�s position was that it did notmind �Lithuania�s aspiration of integra-

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tion into the [EU]�, but �disapproved ofits NATO aspirations.�63 Inherent in thechosen wording is the explicit intent todeflect from NATO membership by sug-gesting that Russia has a say in regionalaffairs. This is why the Baltics fear beingrelegated into a grey zone64 where theyare at the mercy of Russia, effectivelythreatening their independence.

Until May 25th 2000, Russia had issued�sharply worded statements against theenlargement of NATO.�65 This phrase bestillustrates the position of Russia concern-ing the matter and the limits of its activi-ties in trying to prevent the enlargementfrom happening. But in mid 2000, theWest extended an olive branch. GeneralRainer J. Jung expressed the view (repro-duced by Interfax) that enlargement �mustnot ignore Russia�s interests.�66

It is not an accident that this statementfollows the publication of the Russianmilitary doctrine by less than a month.Ever since that moment, Germany hascooled off her enthusiasm for NATO en-largement. It did not prevent the BalticStates from expressing dismay at Russia�s

new stance in international affairs, andfor good reason.

It disquieted the Baltics because therhetoric was thus formalized as the ��ab-sence of understanding between our coun-tries on security in the Baltic region anddisrespect for Russia�s concerns over NATOenlargement plans.�67 References to Russia�sconcerns have never left the debate since.

Acknowledgement of Russian interestsbegs reciprocity. It also propels the de-bate further by adding the element of�concerns� and forces a discussion onthat level. In other words, bouncing state-ments for and against enlargement oneither side of the net like a badmintonsparrow soon proves sterile. The debatewas enriched by the addition of the term�concern�. It forced all sides to elevatediscussion on this new terrain. While thisanalysis would seem to make sense, it can-not account for the occasional spiceadded by veiled and open threats com-ing mostly from people in lower levelsof responsibility: �[Russia considers] thefurther spread of NATO military infra-structure to Russia�s borders a threat to

[its] security.�68 The statement goes onto say that if NATO enlarges further �Rus-sia reserves the right to draw the corre-sponding conclusions and take steps toguarantee its own security.�

These �steps� could include Russianreconnaissance mission on Baltic�s terri-tories as Dmitri Rogozin, Chairman ofthe Duma�s Committee on InternationalAffairs muses.69 Such threats, whetheropen or veiled, have been made fre-quently, but they are an indication ofinter-agency rivalries within the Russianbureaucracy, rather than a difference inperception or approaches to the prob-lem. In that respect, the author of severelyhawkish statements towards the West,Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, is ex-pected to lose his job, partly due to astructural shake-up, partly due to his per-sonal stance on NATO enlargement.70

The best estimates of Russia�s capabili-ties, in conjunction with Russia�s com-mitments regarding the Treaty on Con-ventional Forces in Europe (CFE) from1990, do not lend any credence to theverbal threats.

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Should these words be dismissed? No,but added emphasis should be put on themore constant statements of higher levelRussian officials. As it turns out, the at-tention should be turned to SergeyIvanov, now Defence Minister and closeto President Vladimir Putin. His state-ments implement the reciprocation al-luded to earlier and gives an indicationthat the debate is moving in the direc-tion of disdainful acceptance of NATOenlargement. This shift is important be-cause officially, it does not attempt toprevent Baltic membership, and moves thedebate a step further by ruling out theuse of force to prevent Baltic member-ship, although it would bring an �addi-tional reaction�, he added that �the pres-ence of only one military-political group willnot bring security.�71

The emphasis on the presence of �onegroup� is consistent with the militarydoctrine and national security concept ofRussia. Ivanov�s statements represent animportant nuance in the debate. Russiamay still advocate the abolition of NATO,but it recognizes that it may be here to

stay. As a result, a modus vivendi must befound. This is why early in 2001, Rus-sia�s position was that it was

�Against NATO becoming the sole�the sole�basis for providing all Europeansecurity. At the same time, we recognizethat NATO is an integral part of this se-curity. However, it should not be allowedto dictate the rules of the game and deter-mine literally all European security.�72

Soon thereafter, Ivanov was appointedDefence Minister. An important memberof President Putin�s entourage, his wordscan be taken as Russia�s official position.Ivanov is not alone with this new percep-tion. A former deputy Foreign Ministryofficial, Andrey Fiodorov, explained that�NATO is just one of the components ofinternational security and overvaluing itsrole might have an unfavourable influ-ence upon relations with the Baltic coun-tries.�73 From his mouth comes the mosteloquent and powerful shift in positionyet. Such a shift, some feel, should havebeen reciprocated in turn by NATO andit has been in some respect at the Bush-Putin Presidential Summit in Ljubljana,

Slovenia in mid June 2001. PresidentBush, by effecting a close rapprochementwith President Putin, reinforced Putin�sdomestic position (and some would say,damaged his own) contributing to thesilencing of the army critics in Russia.

While this would indicate an upwardtrend in NATO-Russia relations leadingto a hopeful conclusion of the next roundof enlargement at Prague, events such asthe discovery of tactical nuclear weaponsin the Kaliningrad enclave have taintedthe debate because of the proximity toBaltic interests. For lay people, there islittle difference between tactical and bal-listic missiles. What counts is the �nuclear�nature of the weapon, which brought backPresident Bush�s BMD priority tempo-rarily on the front burner. This had theeffect of unnerving the Baltic States as thenotion of a possible trade-off betweenNATO enlargement and BMD could bemade at their expense. The Baltic addi-tion to the tactical nuclear weapons de-bate briefly envenomed relations betweenNATO, the USA and Russia. Whatever theconsequences, the possibility of a trade-

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off of NATO enlargement for Russian bless-ing over BMD was too serious to remainignored by the Baltics. While the most vocalneighbour concerning the Kaliningradcontroversy remained Poland, her rheto-ric soon cooled down74 when it dawnedthat raising the issue of nuclear weaponsin Kaliningrad would soon be linked tothe presence of US weapons of the sametype elsewhere in Europe (and the corre-sponding need to remove them).75

While the Baltic States were clearlyworried about reports that contradictedRussia�s pledge to keep the Baltic nuclear-free, they were even more of the possibil-ity that the leak had been engineered togive added incentive not to accept BalticStates into NATO.76 Yet all levels of Rus-sian officialdom have vehemently deniedthe presence of the weapons in the en-clave.77 So the leak was not engineered bythem to embarrass the Americans. Whenthe author tried to get a sense of the sourceof that leak to Bill Gertz, who publishedthe story in the Washington Times, noindication as to the origin of the infor-mation was given.

For Baltic Ministers, the event was en-tirely political. With the whirlwind ofspeculation caused by the �nuclear leak�,the linkage made automatically with BMDhas prompted some political leaders inthe Baltic to warn against turning BalticNATO membership into a bargainingchip. Lithuanians are of the opinion that�[if] the US gets mixed up in negotia-tions on both issues at the same time, thereis the possibility of mutual concessions.Russian diplomats may soften their posi-tion on missile defence by asking to post-pone an invitation for the Baltic Statesto join NATO.�78

The Latvian Foreign Minister soughtto reassure but could not fail to raise theMolotov-Ribbentrop spectre as a histori-cal torn in the side of the Baltic States. Inhis own way, he cautioned the Westagainst a trade-off by saying that �the bestprovocation would be setting up a greyzone [aut.: what a trade-off would actu-ally achieve] in the Baltic region whichwould undermine stability.�79

When in Warsaw, Poland, PresidentBush put these fears to rest by saying,

�we will not trade away the fate of freeEuropean people.�80 This gave the signalto the Baltic States that they need not fearfor their future, that enlargement wouldtake place as it advances �the cause of free-dom�. It sent the message to Moscow thatBMD and the enlargement were unrelatedissues, to be dealt separately. And if oneunderstands the premium put on winningin Beltway politics, these are two issueswhere the President of the United Statesof America intends to prevail.

Since then, Russia�s position was modi-fied once more. An article in Eesti Ekspressof July 12th 2001 spells out how it viewsenlargement now. What Russia actuallyopposes, predictably, is the installation ofbases or military hardware close to itsborders. And in this, the authority inDefence, Ivanov, agrees, because he saidthat the approach of military bases toRussian borders �would require an addi-tional reaction��.81

All this leaves the academician�and thereader�with the same sense of unease asthe Baltic leaders concerning the enlarge-ment of NATO and Russia�s possible re-

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action to it. Yet the progression of thedebate shows that enlargement from be-ing a �global mistake�, has been largelyaccepted through Russia�s acquiescence ofOSCE principles that any and all stateshave the legitimate right to determine theirown security. At the same time, the secu-rity concept of Russia says that itsoverarching goal is to stymie US influ-ence and the enlargement of militaryblocks. Therefore Ivanov tells the truthwhen he says he opposes a single determi-nant for European security.

That he has succeeded many times inexpressing this view without finding anecho in the West may be taken as testi-mony to the fact that NATO enlargementis not aimed at Russia, and that her goalsare recognized as legitimate. This does notmean that NATO�s program and the USpriority of BMD will be put on the backburner. Yet Moscow has modified its stanceby objecting to the military hardware closeto its lines. This seems to be a Russian con-cession, but any lengthy negotiations onthe subject of NATO enlargement wouldhave yielded that position. Common sense

would demand of NATO that it not con-tradict the rhetoric by making the realityon the ground different with NATO bases.And it has never been said anywhere thatbases would automatically follow enlarge-ment. Thus NATO�s position � that it isnot an enemy � holds.

In the end, the bombast that came fromirresponsible sources can be taken as bluff,but the fact that the threats, open andveiled, have not been condemned by highranking officials, but merely passivelycontradicted by people like Yegorov(Governor of Kaliningrad) and Ivanov.These lend credence to the notion thatthere is a limit whither Russia can bepushed. In that context, the evolution ofthe debate over NATO-enlargement is notat odds with the recent successes and im-provements in NATO-Russia relations.

Russia is limiting its opposition toNATO enlargement to verbal attacks inthe press, while the two parallel tracks ofimproved NATO-Russia and US-Russiarelations are explored. In this respect, itis important to muster the maximumamount of relaxation of tensions possi-

ble. Should Russia implement her �addi-tional reaction� in the event of a Big Bangtype of enlargement, it will be extremelydifficult for it to attempt rash moves af-ter months of improving relations andpublic �disdainful acceptance� of enlarge-ment. We leave it to the conclusion toharmonize the preceding debates and tooutline Russia�s options.

Conclusion

What the preceding argument has dem-onstrated is that on the one hand, with-out naming names, NATO has decidedthat it would enlarge at the 2002 PragueSummit. This admission comes aftermonths of cultivated doubt, but it leavesno room for supposition.

After the enlargement debate andNATO-Russia relations have shot up theSecretary General�s priority ladder, we seethat enlargement may take place withoutundue stress on the NATO-Russia relation-ship. What has in fact happened, to thecredit of both NATO and Russia, is thatthe relationship between the two has im-

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proved since Kosovo, partly becauseChechnya is not discussed officially inNATO circles, partly because the issue ofenlargement was decoupled from the gen-eral regime of relations desired by bothsides.

As we have said, this rosy picture can-not be left as such. It needs to accountfor Russia�s independent position. In thatcase, we see that Russia was dead set againstenlargement in late 1999, without supply-ing more information as to her position.This position, despite some hiccups, haschanged in parallel with Russia�s improv-ing NATO relations. There is no moretalk of unilateral opposition, but rather,Russia�s policies have been screened toleave the essential: Moscow refuses to leaveEuropean security to the care of NATOalone, and frowns on the establishmentof bases on its borders.

What both debates have suggested isthat only in the case where military hard-ware would be put near Russia would itreact in an unpredictable fashion. Apartfrom the outlandish statements of vari-ous �officials�, there is no indication that

violence will precede or follow NATOenlargement. Of course, writing a yearand a half prior to the Prague Summit,it is difficult to make prognostics of thatsort with a reliable degree of certainty.Nevertheless, the discourse surroundingthe enlargement to Baltic States can givea hint to possible outlet of Russian dis-approval.

1) Strengthening of the Kaliningradregion.82 This would occur in the pros-pect of a NATO-EU �encirclement� of theregion, and would partly take place to pre-vent any prospective separation83 of theenclave from Russia proper. It would takeplace in response to NATO enlargement,and may signify the abandonment or theviolation of the CFE Treaty commitments.

2) A military union with Belarus.84 Aswe have said, this is already in the worksand together with a strengthening ofRussian ties to Commonwealth of Inde-pendent States (CIS) states, may effectivelyspell the creation of a �competing� secu-rity block.

3) Retreat from Europe, abandonmentof a number of confidence and security

building measures and agreements.85 Thiswould be at odds with calls to preservesuch treaties as the 1972 ABM Treaty.

But already, some water must be pouredinto the wine. A strengthening of theKaliningrad region cannot go unnoticedby neighbouring states, and would alarmstates, such as Poland and Germany, whohave demonstrated good-neighbourly re-lations with Russia. In fact, Russia has anincentive not to alarm Germany in par-ticular, in view of the large amounts ofmoney the latter is owed. Furthermore,the region�s governor has often noted thathe did not envision a revision of plannedcutbacks,86 and looks forward to construc-tive relations with the NATO and EUneighbourhood. In the end, however, thestatus of forces in Kaliningrad remainsMoscow�s decision.

With regards to the military unionwith Belarus, recent criticism may pointthat it is more a hindrance than an advan-tage. But one of the solutions advocated isabsorption of Belarus.87 In view of Presi-dent Alexander Lukashenko�s hubris onpower, it is quite likely that Belarus too

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will seek to evade Russia and so it wouldseem that this prospect, despite recent hos-tile war games towards the Lithuanian bor-der,88 would not be viable for it wouldalmost certainly be resisted by Minsk. Onthe other hand, Lukashenko may feel thatNATO is being enlarged against Belarus,89

and not against Russia.As for isolationism, it seems that all

the Russian calls for the avoidance of �redlines� indicate the need for interdepend-ence and contact with the West. The nu-ance here � and this is relevant for an-other essay � is whether Russia would useits contacts benevolently, or would try topressure its surroundings. In the begin-ning of this paper, we pointed out thatimproved relations with the USA andNATO does not mean that Russian hab-its of statecraft have changed. Reliance onbilateralism does not preclude good rela-tions on one hand and nostalgic hegemo-nism on the other. There is the dangerthat the West can be lulled to sleep byassociating tension-free exchanges withRussia as a fundamental change in men-tality. Russia can maintain good relations

with the West in the face of certain en-largement while it reasserts pressure inwhat is left of its �near abroad� in Cen-tral Asia and the Caucasus.

It seems in the end that Russia has noother option but to accept NATO�s en-largement and swallow that bitter pill. Itdoes not look like Russia is in a politicalposition to affect the outcome, or to pro-duce a reaction that would be politicallybeneficial. Still, observers note that �ratherthan just blathering on as Boris Yeltsindid, Putin would be able to find adequateresponses in prevention and reprisal.�90

Epilogue

Early in July, a strange conjuncturedeveloped to allow for a serious debateabout the inclusion of Russia into NATO.Deutsche Presse Agentur interpreted thewords of White House spokesman Rich-ard Boucher, in the wake of the Bush-Putin Slovenian Summit, as lifting the USobjections to Russia joining NATO.Spokesman Boucher made it quite clearthat the Bush administration was making

sure that Russia continued to be orientedtowards Europe, and that there was a quali-tative change (although he did not com-ment on the exact nature of that change)with regards to the question of Russia�seventual membership.91 Considering Mr.Boucher�s word in a vacuum leaves theimpression, indeed, that nothing haschanged from the academic reality andtheoretical possibility that Russia may oneday be part of NATO.

What affects the context significantlyis the near simultaneous article publishedby long-time russophile CharlesKupchan, member of the Council onForeign Relations and Georgetown Uni-versity professor, who co-wrote an arti-cle that outlined the advantages of theRussia in NATO option.92 Coupled withthe fact that President Bush was briefedby Russia-friendly Michael McFaul fromthe Carnegie Endowment for Interna-tional Peace (CEIP), and you have a cock-tail that clearly delineates a new US policytowards Russia. The CEIP advocates post-poning NATO enlargement until 2005and maintaining the ABM situation as

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it is.93 Undoubtedly, a lot of what Presi-dent Bush confided to Mr. Putin inSlovenia might have caught a very recep-tive ear in that new context.

So the debate of Russia in NATO isnot academic anymore. Ever since theGerman Chancellor has envisioned thatRussia should be in NATO sooner orlater,94 President Putin was quick to seizethe occasion to at least test the waters bysaying that NATO should either disband,reform, or alternatively, accept Russia inits midst.

�NATO was created to defend againstcommon threats and reduce conflictsamong its members, so what better wayto prevent a new Cold War or somethingworse than to extend to Russia the pros-pect of NATO membership?� 95

It is beyond the purpose of this paperto argue what would happen to NATOshould Russia join as a member. It is asafe bet, however, that NATO, as we knowit would cease to exist. What matters withthis debate is that it shows that NATOenlargement will not worsen the relation-ship between Russia and the Alliance and

neither will it envenom the relationshipwith the US. Further good news for theBaltic States is that this seems to indicate,in pure logic, that if Russia maintains itsprincipled opposition to the enlargement,it does not view it as a tragedy anymore,since the inclusion of Russia into NATO,should Russia wish it, is more than amental exercise based on legal facts. Al-though a long way off in the distance, itis a distinct possibility, provided the con-ditions are right.

The fact remains that the transforma-tion of the Alliance would be so funda-mental that it would nullify the ambitionsof the Baltic States who are not afterNATO so much as after Article 5. WithRussia as a member, this clause is sure todisappear.

So while the debate of Russia in NATOis the final proof that there is little likeli-hood of the most dire Russian predic-tions (warnings/threats) ever materializ-ing, it remains to be seen what kind oftrack NATO transformation will take fromnow on. As Rudolf Scharping confided:�a new security system to include North

America, Europe and Russia is inevitablein the next 10 years.�96

For the millions who have sufferedunder Soviet tyranny, it is not impossi-ble that their political representatives willdemand that Russia meet extraordinaryconditions before joining, in addition tothe �usual� NATO conditions of good-neighbourly relations, democratic leader-ship of the military, reform of the armedforces, etc. Whether meeting these condi-tions and being part of a NATO devoidof its Article 5 guarantees will mean thesame amount of security to them as ifRussia was still out is speculation.

This new European security architec-ture that seems to be looming in the dis-tance will require serious thought. Cru-cial questions need addressing: should aneed for a common defence inclusive ofRussia be needed, for how big a Europe?For what missions? Against whom? Doesthe inclusion of Russia signify a thinningout of NATO? Will Baltic security be bet-ter served by having Russia in NATO?What kind of capability will NATO re-quire then?

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1 Author�s notes from a conference on BalticSecurity held in Tallinn, 15 December 1999 at theEstonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. St. PetersburgUniversity lecturer Stanislav Katchenko revealedthat the system of relations that Moscow wasfavouring was akin to that of the XIX century;Machiavellian and bilateral.

2 NATO: �NATO Handbook 2001�, Brussels,NATO Office of Information and Press, January2001, www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/130202.html

3 Peter TRENIN-STRAUSSOV: �The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council in 1997-1999:Anatomy of a Failure�, Berlin Information Centeron Transatlantic Security (BITS), #99.1, July 1999,www.bits.de/public/researchnote/nr99-1.html

4 Klaus-Peter KLAIBER: �The NATO-Russia re-lationship a year after Paris�, Brussels, NATOReview, autumn 1998, p.17-18: �In late April [1998],Ambassadors discussed nuclear weapons issuesfor the first time, including doctrine and strategyand nuclear safety. This meeting demonstratedthat Russia and NATO do not shy away fromexchanging views on sensitive matters. In May,we consulted on strategy, defence policy, the mili-tary doctrines of NATO and Russia, and budgetsand infrastructure development programmes.�See also TRENIN-STRAUSSOV: Op.Cit.

5 TRENIN-STRAUSSOV: Op.Cit.6 Nikolai SOKOV: �A New Old Direction in

Russia�s Nuclear Policy�, Disarmament Diplo-macy #50, September 2000, http://www.acronym.org.uk/50newold.htm

7 �Latvian Foreign Minister Believes no Russia-US Deal at Baltic Cost Possible�, Riga, BNS, 13June 2001 (via FBIS). The Minister�s belief aremore anchored in his belief in NATO members�morality and common sense rather than theirsound evaluation of what Russia�s challenges are,however.

8 This was a condition of the creation of thePermanent Joint Council in 1997.

9 Ivo H. DAADLER & Christopher MAKINS:�A Consensus on Missile Defence?�, in Survival,Volume 43 #3, Autumn 2001, pp.61-66.

10 �Latvian President: Latvia Ready for Dialogwith Russia�, Moscow, Interfax, November 181999, (via FBIS). ��Latvia is anxiously followingthe situation in the North Caucasus.�

11 �Latvian President: Russia Potential MilitaryThreat�, Moscow, Interfax, December 1, 1999, (viaFBIS).

12 For a thorough discussion of this transfor-mation, see David S. YOST: �NATO Trans-formed�, Washington DC, USIP Press, 1998.

13 NATO: �NATO Handbook 2001�, Brussels,NATO Office of Information and Press, January2001, §3, web version, www.nato.int/docu/hand-book/2001/130202.html

14 �Estonia must keep good relations with Rus-sia�NATO Deputy Secretary General�, Tallinn,ETA News Agency, 9 February 2001, (via FBIS).

15 For example, Estonian Defence Minister JüriLuik�s speech at the 10th PfP Seminar in Tartu,on 13 June 2001, where he said that the West hada moral obligation to include new applicants,while those same applicants� desire to join was

simple realism. Mr. Luik reconciles the differingdrives by saying that Baltic States principles wouldmatch Europe�s only if the �Second World Warwas brought to an end� by the factual admissionof the Baltic States.

16 �Remarks to the Press by Lord Robertson,NATO Secretary General, upon his arrival atNATO�, 14 October 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991014a.htm

17 Turkey recognizes Macedonia under its con-stitutional name.

18 �Speech by NATO Secretary General LordRobertson at the Annual Session of the NATOParliamentary Assembly, Amsterdam, Nether-lands�, 15 November 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s991115a.htm

19 Russian academics have pointed to the West�smoral failure to denounce Moscow�s actions inChechnya at the occasion of the ISODARCO 13thWinter Seminar on �Greater European Securityin the Aftermath of Kosovo�, held in January2000, in Andalo, Italy.

20 �The Expanding Europe and its Relevancefor both the British and the Germans� - LordRobertson�s Sir Frank Roberts Memorial Lecture,Lancaster House, London, 2 February 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000202a.htm

21 Ibid.22 �Speech by Secretary General at the Bulgarian

National Assembly�, Sofia, Bulgaria, 10 Febru-ary 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000210a.htm

23 Ibid.

66

24"NATO in Southeast Europe in the 21st Cen-tury� Secretary General�s Speech at the Joint WiltonPark/Atlantic Council Conference Brdo Castle,Slovenia 11 May 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000511a.htm

25 Ibid.26 �The New NATO in the New Europe�, Secre-

tary General�s speech to the Slovak Foreign PolicyAssociation, Bratislava, Slovakia, 11 May 2000,ht tp ://www.nato . int/docu/speech/2000/s000511b.htm

27 Ibid.28 �Speech by NATO Secretary General, Lord

Robertson, to the NATO Parliamentary Assem-bly�, Budapest, Hungary, 30 May 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000530a.htm

29 Ibid.30 �National Security Concept�, approved by

Presidential Decree 1300 of December 17, 1999;issued in Presidential Decree 24 of January 10,2000, Disarmament Diplomacy #43, January-Feb-ruary 2000, http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd43/43nsc.htm

31 Dr S. J. MAIN: �Russia�s Military Doctrine�,Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst, UK,http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/OB77-SJM.htm

32 �NATO in the 21st Century�, speech by theSecretary General to the Millenium Year LordMayor�s Lecture, London, UK, 20 July 2000, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000720a.htm

33 �NATO�s New Agenda: More progress thanmeets the eye� Remarks by the Right Honourable

Lord George Robertson of Port Ellen, SecretaryGeneral of NATO, SACLANT Symposium, Rey-kjavik, Iceland, 6 September 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s000906a.htm

34 �NATO�s Partnerships�, speech by LordRobertson, Secretary General of NATO, at theAtlantic Club of Bulgaria, Sofia, 12 October 2ooo,www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001012a.htm

35 Yet, a Canadian representative at NATO saidthat the question of minority rights would nolonger be considered a factor in the Baltic Statesmembership ambitions.

36 Ibid.37 �The Six Principles of Partnership�, speech

by Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, atthe ATA General Assembly, Budapest, Hungary,31 October 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001031a.htm

38 Ibid.39These countries developed the �Big Bang�

theory of enlargement at a meeting in Vilnius in2000. http://balticsww.com/meri_nato.htm Onecan dispute the wisdom of employing the word�Bang� in speaking of NATO enlargement.

40 �NATO and the Challenges of Security in theEuro-Atlantic Area�, speech by Lord Robertson,NATO Secretary General, Vienna, Austria, 2 No-vember 2000, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001102b.htm

41 �Security in the Wider Europe�, speech by theSecretary General, Centre for European PolicyStudies, Brussels, Belgium, 10 November 2ooo,www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001110a.htm

42 �NATO�s Challenges�, European Policy Cen-tre Breakfast, Brussels, Belgium, 14 November 2001,www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/14.htm

43 Ibid.44 Speech by Secretary General Lord Robertson

to the Annual Meeting of the Parliamentary As-sembly, Berlin, Germany, 21 November 2000,www.nato.int/docu/speech/2000/s001121a.htm

45 �German Speaker Expresses Measured Sup-port for Latvia�s NATO bid�, Riga Leta, 24 May2001, (via FBIS). See also the strange discrepancybetween the positions of German ChancellorGerhard Schröder in �German Chancellor BacksAdmission of Baltic States into NATO�, Mos-cow, Interfax, 6 June 2000, and on the very sameday �German Chancellor �reserved� about Baltics�Wish to Join NATO�, Tallinn, BNS, 6 June 2000(both via FBIS).

46 �NATO in the New Millenium�, speech byNATO Secretary General Lord Robertson,Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture, KonradAdenauer Stiftung, Berlin, Germany, 25 January2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010125a.htm

47 Ibid.48 �Russian Poll Shows Over Half Afraid of

Baltic States� NATO Membership�, Tallinn, BNS,26 May 2001, (via FBIS).

49 Speech by NATO Secretary General LordRobertson, Conference on Security Policy, Mu-nich, Germany, 3 February 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010203a.htm

50 Ibid.

67

51 �NATO in the New Millenium�, SecretaryGeneral�s Mountbatten Lecture, University ofEdinburgh, Scotland, 15 February 2001,www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010215a.htm

52 Ibid.53 Ibid.54 �The State of the Alliance - a Good News

Story� - Speech by the Deputy Secretary Generalat the 11th International Antalya Conference onSecurity and Cooperation, Antalya, Turkey, 30March 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010330a.htm

55 �Communicate� - Speech by Lord Robertson,NATO Secretary General at the Erasmus Univer-sity, Rotterdam, Netherlands, 23 April 2001,www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/a010423a.htm

56 Ibid.57 �NATO PA Secretary General regrets Russian

Duma Decision to Boycott Session�, Tallinn, BNS,26 May 2001, (via FBIS). See also: �NATO Parlia-mentary Forum Disappointed with Russia�s nonparticipation�, Moscow, Interfax, 28 May 2001,(via FBIS), and �Russia Duma to Boycott NATOPA in Vilnius�, Tallinn, BNS, 17 May 2001, (viaFBIS).

58 Speech by NATO Secretary General, LordRobertson at the NATO Parliamentary Assem-bly Spring Session in Vilnius, Lithuania, 31 May2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010531b.htm

59 �NATO � Managing the Challenges of To-day, and Tomorrow� - Speech by the SecretaryGeneral at the Mayflower Hotel, Washington DC,

20 June 2001, www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010620a.htm

60 Harold H. SAUNDERS: �Prenegotiation andcircumnegotiation�, in Managing Global Chaos,Chester Crocker et al Eds., Washington DC, USIPPress, 1999, p. 423

61 See: Fred Charles IKLE: �How Nations Nego-tiate�, New York, Random House, 1964.

62 �Lithuanian Foreign Ministry FormulatesNew Russia Policy�, Vilnius, BNS, 22 December2000, (via FBIS). See also �Primakov Disapprovesof NATO Integration�, Vilnius, BNS, 2 Novem-ber 1999, (via FBIS).

63 �Primakov Disapproves of NATO Integra-tion�, Vilnius, BNS, 2 November 1999, (via FBIS).

64 �Latvia: Russia Wants to Retain Baltic AsGray Zone�, Tallinn, BNS, 2 November 1999, (viaFBIS). See also �Latvia: President Rules Out Rus-sian Tutelage Ever Again�, Moscow, BNS, 4 April2000, (vis FBIS) and Yevghenyi VOSTRUKHOV:�Latvia is Being Prepared for Total Defence�,Moscow, Obshchaya Gazeta, 24 May 2000.

65 �Russia Sees Estonia As Serious EconomicPartner�, Tallinn, BNS, 29 May 2000, (via FBIS).

66 �NATO General: Expansion Must RecognizeRussia�s Interests�, Moscow, Interfax, 25 May 2000,(via FBIS).

67 �Russian Official Criticizes Latvia�s NATOBid and Attitude to Minorities�, Moscow, Interfax,16 June 2001, (via FBIS). See also �Russian De-fence Chief Sees Positive Signs in Ties WithNATO�, Moscow, Interfax, 5 February 2001, (viaFBIS).

68 �Russia May Retaliate if NATO EastwardExpansion Continues: Army Official�, Moscow,Interfax, 16 February 2001, �Russia RemainsOpposed to Lithuania�s NATO Bid�, Vilnius, BNS,23 March 2001, �Russia Not To Attend VilniusSession of NATO Parliamentary Assembly�,Vilnius, Interfax, May 24 2001, and �Russian Se-curity Council Secretary: No Former USSR Re-publics Must Join NATO�, Moscow, ITAR-TASS,6 June 2001, (all via FBIS).

69 �Russia Parliament Official Says EstonianNATO Bid to Ruin Relations�, Tallinn, BNS, 16February 2001, (via FBIS).

70 �RUSSIA�S IVASHOV EXPECTED TO LOSEHIS JOB� , Moscow, AP, 3 July 2001.

71 �Russia Rules Out Force to Stop Baltics Join-ing NATO�, Moscow, Interfax, 29 May 2000, andalso Pavel KORYASHKIN: �Russia Said to StillOppose NATO Expansion�, Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 29 May 2000, (both via FBIS).

72 �Russian Security Council Chief in �RareInterview��, BBC Monitoring, 13 February 2001,www.russiatoday.com/news.php3?id=288724&brief=text

73 �Baltic States Seek Russian Assurance ofKaliningrad Peace�, Warsaw, PAP, 11 April 2ooo,(via FBIS).

74 �Poland�s Foreign Minister Plays Down Rus-sian Missiles Reports�, Warsaw, PAP, 4 January2001, (via FBIS).

75 Viktor LITOVKIN: �We and the World Com-munity: A Dish for Reheating�, Moscow,Obshchaya Gazeta, 18 January 2001, (via FBIS).

68

76 �Baltic States Anxious About KaliningradWeapons�, Cracow, PAP, 7 January 2001, (viaFBIS).

77 �Kaliningrad Governor Denies Deploymentof Nuclear Arms in Region�, Interfax NW, 5 Janu-ary 2001, �Russian Foreign Minister Denies Ru-mours of Nuclear Weapons Deployment�, Mos-cow, Interfax, 6 January 2001, �Russian Embassyin Riga Denies Reports of Nuclear Weapons Re-deployment�, Riga Leta, 8 January 2001, AnatolyiYURKIN: �Academic Dismisses Allegations AboutKaliningrad Nuclear Weapons�, Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 8 January 2001, and LITOVKIN, Op. Cit.,(all via FBIS).

78 �Lithuanian Politician Warns Baltic NATOMembership Bargaining Chip for Russia�, Vilnius,BNS, 14 May 2001, (via FBIS).

79 �Latvian Foreign Minister Believes No Rus-sia-US Deal at Baltic Cost Possible�, Riga, BNS,13 June 2001, (via FBIS).

80 �President Bush Speaks to Faculty and Stu-dents at Warsaw University, 15 June 2001,www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/in-dex-htm

81 �Russia Rules Out Force to Stop Baltics Join-ing NATO�, Moscow, Interfax, 29 May 2000, (viaFBIS).

82 �Lithuania Wants Continued CooperationWith Russia�, Tallinn, BNS, 17 February 2000,(via FBIS). See also �Baltic States Seek RussianAssurance of Kaliningrad Peace�, Warsaw, PAP,11 April 2ooo, (via FBIS), but mostly �RussianOfficial Warns Against Turning Kaliningrad into

�besieged fortress��, Kaliningrad, ITAR-TASS, 24March 2001, (via FBIS) and �Russia to Step UpSecurity if Baltic States Join NATO�, Moscow,Interfax, 19 February 2001, (via FBIS).

83 �Primakov: Russia Faces Threat to TerritorialIntegrity�, Kaliningrad, ITAR-TASS, 4 November1999, (via FBIS).

84 Sergei OSTANIN: �Russia, Belarus ContinueEfforts to Set Up Joint Army Unit�, Moscow,ITAR-TASS, 12 April 2000, (via FBIS).

85 �Former Soviet President Warns Russia WillRetaliate if Baltics Join NATO�, Moscow, ITAR-TASS, 28 February 2001, (via FBIS).

86 �Russia Will Cut Its Troops in KaliningradRegion by 2003- Governor�, Kaliningrad, ITAR-TASS, 14 February 2001, (via FBIS). See alsoVladimir SLUZHAKOV and Aleksey CHICHKIN:�Interview with Governor Vladimir Yegorov ofKaliningrad�, ISP, 22 March 2001, (via FBIS), seealso �Kaliningrad Leaders See Benefit of Poland�sNATO Entry- Lithuanian MP�, Vilnius, BNS, 5March 2001, (via FBIS).

87 �They Call This an Equal Rights Union�,Moscow, Obshchaya Gazeta, 21 June 2001, (viaFBIS).

88 �Lithuanian ruling party to probe reportsabout unfriendly exercises in Belarus�, Vilnius,BNS, 8 September 2000, (via FBIS).

89 �Latvia has no intention to turn against neigh-bours - Foreign Minister�, Riga, BNS, 7 May 2001,(via FBIS), and �Belarus Regards NATO Enlarge-ment As �Historical Mistake��, Minsk, Interfax,23 March 2000, (via FBIS).

90 �Russian Experts Warn of Tensions WithNATO Over Baltic�, Rome, ANSA, June 5 2000,(via FBIS).

91 U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMANON RUSSIA & NATO: U.S. Department of State,Daily Press Briefing Index, 2 July 01. Below is aportion of the exchanges with emphasis.

QUESTION: In terms of building this partner-ship, the Russians over the past few years havebeen consistently raising the issue of joiningNATO. President Putin referred to it, even in thepress conference, the joint press conferencewith the President in Ljubljana. We rememberthat the previous administration basically rejectedthe idea, at least the Secretary of State MadeleineAlbright did. So I would like to ask whether any-thing has changed, what is the attitude of thiscurrent Administration to that issue?

Mr. BOUCHER: Well, I think if you look at thepress conference in Slovenia, you will see thatPresident Bush addressed the issue as well there.The position has always been that NATO mem-bership remains open to European countries whoare ready and willing to shoulder the burdensand responsibilities of membership. The treatyitself provides that NATO members, by unani-mous agreement, may invite any other Europeanstate in a position to further the principles of thetreaty and to contribute to the security of theNorth Atlantic area to accede to the treaty. So thedoor is open to anyone who is ready and willingto assume the burdens and responsibilities ofmembership.

69

I would say whatever Russia�s particular deci-sion and then and/or NATO�s particular deci-sion on this point, we have made quite clear, thePresident has made quite clear, that we want Rus-sia to continue to look to Europe. The Secretarysaid it, I think a couple weeks ago, that we believethat Russia�s future lies as part of an enlargedEurope, and that that is the goal, thegeneral policygoal, whatever happens with regard to specificinstitutions.

QUESTION: But when you look at it, nothinghas changed from the previous administrationto this one.

Mr. BOUCHER: No, I don�t think I wouldprecisely say that. Without trying to characterizethe view of the previous administration, I wouldsay that this Administration believes that the doorshould be open, and that Russia�s destiny is clearlyin Europe. And we intend to work with Russia tosee � to help them fulfill that destiny.

92 James CHACE & Charles KUPCHAN: �BringMother Russia Into the Fold�, LA Times, 1 July2001.

93 �An Agenda for Renewal: US-Russia Rela-tions� Washington, DC, CEIP, 2000.

94 �Schoreder Does Not Rule Out EventualRussian NATO Membership�, Berlin, AFP, 8August 2001, via Russia Today. http://www.euro-p e an in t e rn e t . c om/ru s s i a /n ew s . php3 ? i d=583782&section=default

95 Peter BAKER: �Russia in NATO? For Now,Just Talk. Larger Debate Surrounds a Non Issue�,Washington Post, 12 August 2001, staff writer

Steven Mufson contributed to this report. See alsoJonathan RAUCH: �Putin is Right: Russia Be-longs in NATO The Potential Prize is Breathtak-ing; the Erasure, Once and For All, of Divisionsin Europe� National Journal, 04 August 2001.

96 Arnaud De BORCHGRAVE: �Room forRussia in NATO?�, Washington Times, 17 Au-gust 2001.

73

uring the past the human generated�earthquake events� normally had

their epicentre in Europe, even if the larg-est part of the world�s human populationlives elsewhere. Only two happened inAmerica.

The first event was the testing of thefirst nuclear weapon in the New Mexicandesert in the summer of 1945. It confirmedthe entry of the U.S. on the world stageas a superpower. The collapse of the willof the challenging superpower, the SovietUnion, became evident in Europe, withthe fall of the Berlin Wall.

The second was the attacks on 11th Sep-tember against symbolic centres of the nowonly remaining superpower. Since the1989-1991 events in Europe, U.S. foreign

After 11th SeptemberBy Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen (DA A)*

policy might be characterised as a lowpriority policy area, by inertia in facing-up to the changed situation, as well asconfusion with shifting focus and vary-ing will to sustain commitments. All thishas now changed with the direct terroristattack against the American �heart�. Theresponses to the attacks have been focusedunder the heading the �War against Ter-ror�, determined and comprehensive.However, the elements of the response arelikely to be revolutionary for many partsof the world.

In some fields, however, the reactionto the attacks just brought an existingdevelopment to its next logical phase. Sincethe end of the Cold War and especiallysince the televised disaster in Somalia, the

U.S. has only accepted the subordinationof its troops to a foreign UN commanderonce: to a Danish commander of the UNPreventive Deployment Force(UHPREDED) in the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia. The U.S. totallydominated all military operations in the1990-91 Gulf War. To make the IFOR andSFOR deployments of U.S. troops accept-able, it took place under U.S. NATO com-manders and thus under close control ofthe national U.S. Command Authority.However, during the Kosovo conflict,Washington felt unhappy with this levelof control. The Pentagon felt irritated andconstrained by the alliance framework �it did not control directly and effectively.This unhappiness led to the premature

* Michael H. Clemmesen is the Commandant of the Baltic Defence College.

74

retirement of the responsible SACEUR,General Wesley C. Clark. The control ofoperations in Afghanistan has totally ex-cluded non-U.S. influence on importantstrategic, operational, and tactical deci-sions. The American command chain mayhave been open to � mainly British � goodadvice, but the choice of whether to ac-cept the advice or not, seems to have beencompletely American.

The abject weakness of potential alliesto influence the outcome of any likelyfuture conflict (with Israel as the onlyexception) means that American supportwill depend on accepting de facto full U.S.control. If this is a correct observation,the European allies have been placed in asituation where the future developmentof NATO, will be even less balanced thanhitherto. The U.S. NATO allies must clearlyunderline �Out of Area Operations� evenmore in the alliance strategy as well as inthe command and force structure devel-opment to remain relevant to the U.S.decision-makers � and thereby keep NATOfrom withering away by neglect. However,there is even a lesser chance now than hith-

erto, that the U.S. will accept more thansymbolic non-U.S. influence on opera-tions. In order to make it interesting forthe U.S., not to choose complete inde-pendent action, states will have to be readyto make forces available in much the sameway, as the British Dominions did toGreat Britain in the two world wars. Onlya common and massive European effortto develop a balancing independent large-scale intervention capability, might leadto a different future.

The strength of the U.S. position andthe willingness to use it is clear in otherareas as well. The U.S. sought and gotRussian support for its use of the CentralAsian republics, as platforms for its warin Afghanistan. By doing this, a new plat-form for U.S.-Russian relations was estab-lished. However, the alternative was inreality non-existing, as resistance wouldhave placed Russia as de facto protectorof the terrorists. Russia basically had thesame options as Pakistan, and the choicewas the same. This, however, does not giveRussia any major credit that can be usedin other policy areas. That you do the

right thing in one situation does not giveyou rights to block other necessary devel-opments in other U.S. high priority ar-eas, such as the development of a BallisticMissile Defence system or the enlargementof NATO with states that belong in theorganisation in American eyes.

That the American Bush administra-tion perceives the war against terrorismas a general campaign against terrorism,is becoming clearer and clearer every day.The signs come in different areas. One isthat the Al Qaeda prisoners, taken dur-ing the war in Afghanistan, have initiallybeen denied the formal position andrights of Prisoners of War according tointernational conventions. They are de-tained and treated as suspected criminalsin very much the same way as the UnitedKingdom treated Northern Irish terror-ists, during a phase in the campaign there.

The American decision to redefinenearly all elements of its foreign and na-tional security policies after 11th Septem-ber is having important effects all overthe world. Just the most obvious exam-ples:

75

In the Middle East, the Palestinians andtheir supporters in the region have to findother tools than terrorism in their war ofliberation, if they want to get effective in-ternational support for their cause. It isdoubtful that the PLO leadership has thefreedom of action, to conduct such a fun-damental change in its strategies.

Pakistan has helped terrorists in theIndian state of Jammu and Kashmir todestabilise the province by, provoking abrutal Indian repression campaign. As themilitarily weaker state in relation to In-dia, terrorism was the only available toolin its revisionist foreign policy. However,as we now have a situation where the U.S.and its allies define even a �freedom fighter�that uses terrorism, as just a terrorist, thesituation is fundamentally changed. As thecampaign in Afghanistan is almost con-cluded, the U.S. dependence on Pakistanisupport and bases is nearly over.

Pakistan is not the only state that facesa new situation. States on the Horn ofAfrica and in the Middle East, which haveused or sheltered terrorists, are quicklyadjusting to the new situation.

The different Irish terrorist organisa-tions face serious difficulties. It is prob-ably only a matter of time, before the U.S.can intensify its support for anti-terror-ist campaigns in Latin America. BothRussia and China are benefiting from thenew situation by getting freer hands intheir campaigns against separatists inChechnya and Sin-kiang.

The effects on the world political frame-work are so substantial, because the U.S.armed forces were able to adapt theirforces and procedures to the very diffi-cult situation in and around Afghanistan,where the traditional American forcestructure profile would be unavailable orineffective: Naval sea control forces withan amphibious assault capability, massiveair power for winning air superiority andfor precision attacks on key infrastruc-ture, and heavy land forces with an ap-propriate logistic tail linked to a massiveforward deployed base establishment.

The new successful combination oflong-range air force assets and light land-force elements, presents a threat to mostof the potential target states and organi-

zations. The force mix maintains a cleartechnological superiority over all otherarmed forces, it has a reconnaissance pack-age of satellites and un-manned aircraftswith long times in the target area, it iscapable of the flexible use of all aircraftcarrier combat aircraft (including air de-fence fighters), it is willing to employ landmobile special operations forces and otherland forces in harms way, given fire sup-port by effective direct combat air sup-port with precision and area munitionsfrom long range heavy bomber aircrafts.

The post-11th September events havemade brutally clear how totally dominantthe U.S. has become on the world stage,and how willing she has become to useher military and diplomatic muscles insupport of well defined interests, if neces-sary unilaterally. The Baltic States are ben-efiting initially due to the clear U.S. sup-port for their NATO membership. When,however, they have gained their member-ship of NATO and the EU, they will facethe dilemma: Europe�s position in increas-ingly unipolar world � the same dilemmaas all other European states face.

76

eptember 11th, 2001 has become thedate used most frequently by the

media, diplomats, politicians, the military,academics and ordinary citizens across theworld in discussing current affairs or try-ing to anticipate what the future holds.The horrendous terrorist attacks againstthe United States, perpetrated on that day,have profoundly shocked the world com-munity. The destruction of the WorldTrade Centre in New York and a part ofthe Pentagon building in WashingtonD.C. with the loss of 3,000 lives, were thefirst attacks on the United States since theJapanese offensive against Pearl Harboron December 7th, 1941 and were even

The World After September 11th:Change and Continuity

By Assistant Professor Tomas Jermalavicius, Deputy Director of Strategy and Political Studies Department,Baltic Defence College

more outrageous given that the absolutemajority of the casualties were civilians.Just as in the wake of Pearl Harbor, theSeptember atrocities set the United Stateson the path of war. This time against theglobal terrorist network al Qaeda led bypariah Saudi dissident Osama bin Laden,who allegedly masterminded these atroci-ties and rendered support to their execu-tion, as well as against the regimes whichharboured or sponsored the terroristgroups.

Soon after the attacks, the United Stateshaving secured backing of a broad inter-national coalition and assisted by its al-lies, launched a multidimensional cam-

paign with the aim of disrupting al Qaeda,capturing Osama bin Laden and dissuad-ing the so-called �rogue states� from fur-ther pursuit of policies of supportinginternational terrorism. The Taliban re-gime in Afghanistan, which has been host-ing bin Laden and his training camps forseveral years, became the first target ofthe war on terrorism as the USA employedits formidable air force against the Talibanmilitary assets and infrastructure and, inconjunction with the offensive of theAfghan opposition on the ground, suc-ceeded in evicting the Taliban frompower. The war goes on and probably willcontinue on different fronts and in dif-

77

ferent theatres for a long time to come.Its outcome and effects remain to be seen.However, although bearing in mind theuncertainty that war brings into theworld affairs, the implications of theSeptember 11th events can already beassessed and generalised with a measureof confidence.

This article will explore the ways thatSeptember 11th has already influenced andstill can affect the world politics in thefuture. It will attempt to provide someperspectives on what these events havebrought or can possibly bring into theinternational relations and what the im-plications are to the international systemas a whole and to the processes within it.The major aim of such an effort is toclarify whether September 11th should beconsidered as a new departure point inworld politics where one can start talkingof different characteristics of the interna-tional system, new dynamics of processesin this system and new nature of interna-tional relations, than of those prior toSeptember 11th. The reason for address-ing this issue is that the developments in

the aftermath of the terror acts in theUnited States have led many to believethat September 11th heralds a dawn of anew era in international relations and thata completely new world order is likely totake shape as a result.1 Significant shiftsin the policies of the major actors such asthe USA or Russia, as well as ensuing revi-sions of security policies may indeed jus-tify this interpretation. By some accounts,worrying isolationist connotations of theU.S. foreign policy, especially with regardto regional conflicts across the globe, andthe unilateral instincts of the U.S. admin-istration arguably have been replaced withthe policies of deep engagement andmultilateralism. At the same time Russiahas made an impressive u-turn from be-ing more or less antagonistic vis-à-vis theWest towards seeking rapprochementwith, if not lasting integration into it.These are just a few aspects of the devel-opments which have taken place since theterrorist attacks, provoking thoughtsabout fundamental change. The psycho-logical shock also adds to the tendency ofadopting a stand where the world is be-

ing looked upon through different lensesthan before the attacks.

Legitimate as it may seem, however,interpreting September 11th as a new de-parture point for the whole functioningof the international system and conductof international relations can prove to bea too radical and, at the same time, a some-what simplistic way of conceptualising theimportance of the September 11th events.While acknowledging the fresh facets ofworld politics, brought about by the ter-rorist attacks, the paper will argue thattheir impact should rather be assessed inthe light of developments preceding themand dating back to the end of the ColdWar when the bipolar international sys-tem collapsed and the new world orderstarted taking shape. This would entailSeptember 11th being the most instruc-tive and the sharpest symptom reflectingthe characteristics of the post-Cold Warinternational environment that we haveexperienced so far, rather than a triggerof the entirely new processes leading todisintegration of the current architectureof world politics. To a certain extent Sep-

78

tember 11th has removed some of theambiguities about the world we are fac-ing, at the same time bringing other un-certainties in, which are reinforced by thewar on terrorism and the results it mayproduce. In addition, it will be suggestedto supplement this conceptual approachwith interpreting the September 11th at-tacks as the event accelerating and catalys-ing the processes which have been inmotion for some time already. In accom-plishing this task, the inquiry will com-pare post-September 11th developments,frequently cited as an indication of theupcoming dramatic changes, with the set-ting which has emerged since the end ofthe Cold War. It will address the majorunderlying questions such as: to what ex-tent have the characteristics of a post-ColdWar international system been altered (ornot affected) by September 11th? Is thepost-September 11th pattern of interac-tion between the actors in this systemindiscernible prior to the attacks andtherefore completely new? Have any sig-nificant modifications been made in away that the nature of conflict within the

system is understood? It is these threeinterrelated areas - international system,international relations and internationalconflict - which will constitute an organ-ising analytical framework for dealing withthe task.

By looking for the connections be-tween the post-September 11th events andthe processes before the attacks, the paperwill largely ignore the strategic issues ofthe ongoing war on terrorism, althoughthe already visible effects of the war willcome into play in the discussion. Themilitary realm as such remains beyond thescope of this inquiry, just as more or lessconspicuous shifts in domestic politics andsocial attitudes in the USA or its allies atthis war, caused by September 11th. Omit-ting from the analysis the latter certainlymakes this effort less comprehensive.However, it rests on the assumption thatas profound as their effects might be,domestic developments do not translatedirectly into change of the internationalenvironment, although they can facilitateit and serve as one of the sustaining fac-tors for a specific mode of international

relations. Finally, the effects of the ter-rorist attacks upon the prevailing secu-rity paradigm will not be examined on apremise that the September 11th eventsare not inducing any significant changesin this area, since terrorism and relatedthreats such as proliferation of weaponsof mass destruction have been alreadyincorporated into the notion of compre-hensive security, which obviously will notbe revisited.

The first part of the paper will pro-vide an overview of the post-Cold Warinternational setting prior to September11th. The argument that the internationalsystem became unipolar after the collapseof the Soviet Union and that the USAhas been acting as a hegemon in the in-ternational system ever since will be cen-tral and lay ground for placing Septem-ber 11th into a broader context. The majorlines of international conflict in the post-Cold War environment will be elaboratedhere, including some discussion of amodel suggested by Samuel Huntingtonand known as a theory of the �clash ofcivilisations�. This account will build a

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basis for the second part, where the ef-fects of the terrorist attacks on the uni-polar structure of the international sys-tem will be appraised, where the reactionsof the USA and the rest of the world willbe taken to support the argument thatunipolarity has been strongly but notunequivocally underlined. For obviousreasons, the focus will be set on the USAand its foreign policy. Shifts in the waysthat the USA perceives and is likely toshape its hegemonic posture in interna-tional relations will be analysed and it willbe argued that though the United Statesis becoming a mature hegemon, the ex-pectations of multilateralism in the U.S.foreign policy are not likely to be ful-filled. The post-September 11th rap-prochement between the USA and Russiawill be dwelt upon to emphasise continu-ity in international relations and the ac-celerating impact of the terrorist attackson the processes already on track beforeSeptember 11th. Finally, the effects uponthe major strands of international con-flict will be assessed in this part, arguingthat only one of them has been at least

temporarily inactivated and that theHuntingtonian vision of the �clash of civi-lisations� remains inapplicable but poten-tially plausible.

I. The post-ColdWar setting

The post-Cold War international sys-tem, which has been evolving during the1990s, has several key features built intoit and discernible quite well in the fluidinternational environment. This is neces-sary in the effort to detect changes of sig-nificance to the whole system after Sep-tember 11th. First of all, it is unipolarity,which replaced bipolar world of confron-tation between the two superpowers, theUnited States and the Soviet Union. Theywere at the centre of the two conflictingblocks of states and acted as their consoli-dating forces, as well as drivers of the in-ternational conflict generated by the ideo-logical differences. The United States, byvirtue of its economic, military and po-litical power, has been the only superpower

in world affairs for the last decade, sincedisintegration of the Soviet Union. Thus,almost by default, the USA emerged asthe hegemonic state in the internationalsystem, capable of promoting its valuesand interests across the globe with un-precedented efficacy and virtually with-out any serious resistance from the sys-tem. The ideological dimension, built intothe US post-Cold War foreign policy andcentred on the issues of human rights andfreedoms as well as free markets, has beenboth appealing and intrusive. A numberof countries, previously not renowned fordemocratic practices, have chosen thedemocratic path of development, associ-ating themselves with the worldview pro-moted by the hegemonic power. Thoseremaining outside this trend have beensubjected to a strong external pressure,orchestrated by the USA and rangingfrom diplomatic and economic sanctionsto military intervention. The last elementof the American hegemonic position wasa ring of credible and loyal allies, associ-ating their security with the U.S. guaran-tees and ability to project military power

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globally and directing their foreign poli-cies in such a way as to ensure continu-ous U.S. presence and commitment. Thus,America has firmly established itself at thecore of the international system, exercis-ing significant influence on its processesand serving as the arbitrator, seeking sta-bility of the system. The phenomenon wasgiven the name of a new Pax Americana inthe early 1990s by a number of authors(William Odom, Charles Krauthammer,etc.).2

Being in a position to pursue unilat-eral solutions as well as wielding enormousinfluence, it nevertheless remained reluc-tant to explicitly adopt and exercise itshegemonic posture in the internationalrelations, especially with respect to theregional conflicts requiring a prolongedmilitary commitment and involvement inpost-conflict reconstruction. Althoughhaving been conspicuous in the MiddleEast and Northern Ireland conflict reso-lution efforts as well as restoring democ-racy in Haiti in 1994, it was hesitant tobe fully involved in the Balkans in theearly 1990s. This feature of avoiding the

role of the �global policeman�, which canbe seen as being tailored to the hegemonicposture, was further reinforced by thefailure of intervention in Somalia in 1993and led to ignoring the genocide inRwanda in 1994. At the same time, evensuch a selective or even half-hearted U.S.engagement, sustaining its hegemonic sta-tus and unipolar structure of the interna-tional system, evoked unfriendly andsometimes hostile reaction from some ofthe system�s actors. To a higher or lesserdegree anti-American policies have becomea determining characteristic of a numberof states. An interesting aspect of this re-action is that some states, such as Russiaor China, showed displeasure not aboutthe U.S. power per se, but about the uni-polarity that this power created. Enter-taining the concept of multipolarity,where the international system was envis-aged as organised around several balanc-ing each other power centres possessingtheir own spheres of influence, theymoved to challenge the USA not on thebasis ideology, but for the global scopeof its hegemonic outreach. At the same

time, another group of states, mostly char-acterised as undemocratic, felt a far big-ger threat from being exposed to the val-ues and ideology that accompanied theU.S. hegemony than to the hegemony it-self and saw resistance as a prerequisitefor survival of their regimes and ideolo-gies. These two types of anti-Americanmotivation can be discovered in mixtureas the case of China suggests. However,the latter motivation produced one ofmost sustainable lines of the internationalconflict during the last decade � the UnitedStates and its allies versus so-called �roguestates� such as Iran, Iraq, Syria, Cuba,North Korea, Sudan or Libya. Contain-ment of the rogue states, which are em-barking on policies of acquiring weap-ons of mass destruction and sponsoringterrorism, has occupied a large propor-tion of the US foreign and military policyagenda since the Gulf War in 1991, al-though the policy itself dates back to theyears of the Cold War. Then overshad-owed by and subordinated to the con-frontation with the Soviet Union, thisconflict has become one of the major pri-

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orities in the post-Cold War era. In addi-tion, it falls into a more general trend ofconflict between the democracies andundemocratic regimes, which has re-as-serted itself during the last decade. Deriv-ing legitimacy of its hegemony from thecause to spread human rights andfreedoms and also by virtue of represent-ing those values most robustly, the UnitedStates has appeared at the front-end ofthis standoff, reserving the right to inter-vene, on behalf of the international com-munity and with its support, in internalconflicts where human right violationswere leading to the spread of violence andhumanitarian disasters. The air campaignof NATO against Yugoslavia to stop theethnic cleansing in its separatist provinceof Kosovo in 1999 heralded the full ma-turity that this doctrine had reached.Moreover, once the destabilising effectsof internal conflicts to the internationalsystem have been acknowledged, the hu-manitarian justification of interventionto a great extent overlapped with the com-pelling need to prevent internationalisa-tion of the domestic conflicts. In this re-

spect, interventions into so-called �failedstates�, where the central government wasbarely functioning or not functioning atall and the hostilities between various fac-tions or warlords led to massive humanrights violations as well as regional insta-bility, became yet another element woveninto the broader framework of post-ColdWar international conflict. Bosnia, Soma-lia and Sierra Leone stand out as the mostprominent examples during the last dec-ade. Failure in Somalia has made theUnited States lukewarm to this kind ofinterventions, especially if regional insta-bility did not directly threaten the U.S.interests and humanitarian considerationsprevailed. The Clinton Doctrine, articu-lated in 1994 by the U.S. President BillClinton, specifically argued for the pres-ence of national interests to bring the USAinto such conflicts.3 As a result, othernations had to take the lead in such mis-sions (the UK in Sierra Leone, Australiain East Timor), which testifies both theselective use of the hegemonic power bythe USA and the US ability to set a stand-ard for addressing challenges to the inter-

national system to be followed by others.These three interweaving and overlappingfacets of international conflict, with theUnited States more or less at their centrebecause of the unipolar nature of the in-ternational system, are supplemented withthe friction, generated by the globalisationprocess and its consequences. It manifestsitself as a social protest against theglobalising world, when disaffected groupschallenge the social groups and commer-cial structures, considered winners of arapid technological, economic and socio-political transformation, as well as the stategovernments and international institu-tions, viewed as tools facilitatingglobalisation. Globalisation, perceived asa threat to identities, welfare and valuesof some groups, provokes backlash whichsometimes turns into violence (e.g. theanti-globalisation movement protests dur-ing the World Trade Organisation sum-mit in Seattle in 1999 or during theGenoa summit of G8 in 2001). It canhardly be called an international conflictin a strict classical sense, since the chal-lenge that brought about the conflict

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emanated not from the state actors, butfrom societies. However, born within thestates, it transcended their borders by tar-geting foreign governments, internationalorganisations and even other societies.Furthermore, it had a propensity of trans-lating itself into the inter-state rivalrybetween the rich, developed states and thepoor, less developed countries vulnerableto the pressures of globalisation and hav-ing large segments of their societies un-able to adjust to and capitalise on thisprocess. In geographical terms it has be-come common to draw the line of con-flict between the North and the South(the rich North versus the poor South),which has replaced the East-West axis ofthe Cold War confrontation. The UnitedStates emerged as the biggest beneficiaryof globalisation and, to a certain extent,its strongest driving vehicle through thepromotion of free trade and throughcompetitive advantage stemming from itstechnological leadership. According toPeter Van Ham, ��the swell of economicand cultural globalisation is often seen asthe USA�s ultimate soft-power resource.�4

Hence one of the most prominent targetsof the social discontent over globalisationand a scapegoat for the plight of the un-derdeveloped states of the South.

The post-Cold War picture of interna-tional conflict presented above is neitherexhaustive nor attempting to incorporatea vast array of theoretical approaches for-mulated in the last decade or so. Sincethe end of the Cold War a number ofconceptual visions on how the future in-ternational conflict will look like have beencompeting for recognition. In the cur-rent context, the one espoused by SamuelHuntington is worthwhile mentioning.In the early 1990s he argued that the ideo-logical confrontation between the twosuperpowers for a number of reasons wasbeing gradually replaced by the �clash ofcivilisations�. He argued that ��the prin-cipal conflicts of global politics will oc-cur between nations and groups of dif-ferent civilizations.�5 Huntington definedcivilisations primarily as cultural entitiesand argued that there was an inherent fric-tion between them, leading to violentconflicts in the regions where civilisations

overlapped or came into a direct geo-graphical contact with each other. Armedconflicts in the Balkans, Trans-Caucasus,the Middle East, Kashmir and other placeswere explained in these terms. TheHuntingtonian model has been criticisedand contested on various grounds, espe-cially for a not so much reliable criteriaof defining civilisation as well as for thetendency to see the clash of civilisationswhere it was absent in the origins ofsome particular cases of conflict. How-ever, Huntington�s observations retainvalidity in what is perceived as a conflictbetween the West and the rest of theworld. He argues that �the West in effectis using international institutions, mili-tary power and economic resources torun the world in ways that will maintainWestern predominance, protect Westerninterests and promote Western politicaland economic values.�6 This behaviourprovokes responses from the non-West-ern states and societies unwilling to ac-cept and internalise Western values andbeliefs such as liberal democracy or hu-man rights. The four lines of conflict,

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outlined previously, can easily fit intothis notion as its different strands. Forinstance, Huntington essentially explainsthe existence of �rogues states� as one ofthe forms of response to Westerncivilisational hegemony and expansion.Yet again putting the dominant trendunder the title �the West versus the Rest�can pose difficulties in analysing specificcases. But, flawed as it may be, Hunting-ton�s theory provides some valuableinsights into the dynamics of internationalconflict and brings to the attention ofthe academic discourse cultural differencesas one of the ingredients feeding into thedynamics of international conflict. �TheWest versus the Rest� aspect encapsulatesquite well what has been taking place inthe unipolar international system underthe hegemonic sway of the United States,although it does not necessarily carry theexplanatory power sufficient to under-stand and explain all the frictions andconflicts in international relations. Cul-tural differences should not be viewed asthe primary cause of conflicts despite thefact that they do play their part in exacer-

bating the tensions over which conflictserupt.

International relations have been evolv-ing within the parameters of the unipo-lar international system and under theinfluence of the aforementioned tensionsin it for the last decade. This rough out-line of how the world looked like priorto September 11th does not suggest, how-ever, the presence of clarity and simplic-ity, conducive to rational and effectivedecision-making necessary to address chal-lenges and threats, as it may seem. Themultidimensional character of the inter-national conflict inevitably produced flu-idity and ambiguity, making it difficultto prioritise policies and to come to gripswith the whole complexity of the post-Cold War world and the direction it hasbeen heading to. For the USA in particu-lar it raised a number of questions onwhat the nature of its hegemonic policyshould be, whether the unipolarity couldbe sustained in a long term, where the USnational interests and priorities lie andwhat the major sources of threats to themare. As a result, the U.S. policy seemed to

lack coherence and, in many instances, wasreactive rather than proactive. Its remark-able feature was that the U.S. reluctant andselective engagement in the world affairshad continuously aroused fears among theU.S. allies over the possibility that thetremendous U.S. power would allow it toretreat into self-isolation from the worldaffairs in order to reduce the costs ofbeing the world hegemon and, at the sametime, seek and impose unilateral solutionsonce the vital U.S. interests were threat-ened or challenged. The policies of thenew administration of President GeorgeW. Bush, who took office in the begin-ning of 2001, aggravated these concerns,as the administration was clearly inclinedto pursue the unilateralist policy schemes.The plans to deploy the National MissileDefence (NMD) system, designed to pro-tect the continental USA from the missileattacks by the hostile regimes, emerged asthe ultimate manifestation of the �go-it-alone� approach. A string of decisions notto co-operate or even to undermine mul-tilateral efforts in various fields, perceivedas inconsistent with the U.S. national in-

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terests (such as the Kyoto Protocol onthe greenhouse gas emissions, strengthen-ing the verification regime of the Bio-logical and Chemical Weapons Conven-tion, ratification of the ComprehensiveTest-Ban Treaty, etc.) seemed to confirmthese worrying trends and stirred fur-ther controversies over the gap betweenthe actual U.S. behaviour and the respon-sibilities inherent to the role of the glo-bal hegemon as perceived by the rest ofthe world. In this respect, the September11th events have indeed introduced moreclarity on how the hegemon should be-have and what kind of challenges shouldbe given a higher priority. However itcan be easily noticed that the post-ColdWar international system has not beenshocked to an extent, as to start shiftingaway from unipolarity, although it is lesscertain whether this pattern will endurein a long term, as it will be suggestedlater. These observations as well as thetrends in international relations and thecharacteristics of international conflictwill be elucidated in the second part ofthe article.

II. The September11th attacks and

their impact

The attacks perpetrated against thehegemonic power of the unipolar worldare inevitably set to reverberate throughthe whole international system. Septem-ber 11th was the first time in the post-Cold War era when the United States waschallenged with such destruction and hitat the heart of its financial and militarypower. Dramatic as it is, the attack shouldnot be assessed as the focal point at whichthe previous international system to-gether with the dynamics of internationalrelations and international conflict builtinto it have ceased to exist and some-thing entirely new have replaced them.A strong case can be made to suggest thatSeptember 11th should be analysed interms of continuity rather than drasticchange.

Unipolarity highlightedbut not unequivocal

First of all, the international systemremains fundamentally unipolar. The at-tacks have done nothing to underminethe U.S. power (economic, financial, po-litical and military), the ability to projectit globally or dependency of the rest ofthe world upon the United States, even ifit was the original motive behind them.On the contrary, this characteristic hasbecome more significant, as the strongincentive for the United States to exploitmore vigorously its unique position inthe international system has appeared. Astrong assertion of unipolarity is notice-able behind the words of President Bush,aired during his address to the Congressin the aftermath of the attacks, where heframed the imperative for the world com-munity by saying that �every nation, inevery region, now has a decision to make.Either you are with us, or you are withthe terrorists.�7 Thus little choice has beenleft for the rest of world but to rally be-

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hind the USA or bear the consequencesof either indecision or opposition. Theworld reaction to the terrorist attacks fol-lowed this imperative word by word. TheU.S. allies, driven by moral repulsion ofthe atrocities and a strong commitmentto support the USA as well as by com-mon threat perception, offered all possi-ble assistance, as evocation of the Article5 of the NATO founding treaty on col-lective defence demonstrates. Some states,such as Russia or China, responded alongsimilar lines, but more out of expedienceand pragmatic considerations, hoping toreap benefits such as legitimisation of theirdomestic policies (Russia�s war in a breaka-way republic of Chechnya, for instance),more favourable treatment by the USAin the areas of trade and finance and, inthe case of Russia, the U.S. assistance indealing with the threats to its nationalsecurity. Even some countries featuringon the list of the �rogue states�, such asSudan, Libya and Iran, felt compelled tocondemn the attacks against their ideo-logical enemy and if not to co-operate,then at least to avoid obstructing in any

way the U.S. response.8 All this revealsthe extent to which the U.S. policy hasbecome central to the world affairs andto which the world has become depend-ent on the United States. It can be con-cluded, therefore, that September 11thevents have become yet another landmark,accentuating the unipolar nature of theinternational system.

On the other hand, certain connota-tions appeared after September 11th whichused to underpin the bipolar structureof the international system, as the historyof the Cold War shows, and which mayupset the above account. Firstly, it is thesense of the overwhelming threat to secu-rity and value system of the Americansociety, echoing perception of the Sovietthreat of the Cold War years. The terrorof September 11th has created the samesense of profound insecurity, vulnerabil-ity and uncertainty as the fear of nuclearattack by the Soviet Union, and the ef-fort to redress this threat equally domi-nates the U.S. security and foreign policyagenda. Furthermore, a strong and pow-erful sense of the U.S. mission ensues both

from the need to respond and from thefreshly acute realisation of the U.S. posi-tion in the international system as theonly nation capable of delivering thatresponse to protect the status quo. At theAsian-Pacific Economic Co-operation(APEC) summit in Shanghai, PresidentBush succinctly defined this new sense ofmission claiming that �this conflict is afight to save the civilised world�.9 Onecan easily draw parallels with the Cold War,when the United States acted on behalf ofthe free world to fend off the communistideological expansion. Yet another facetresembling the bipolar confrontation isthe renewed usage of the word �contain-ment� to shape and define the U.S. strat-egy, only this time aimed at containingthe terrorist threat in general rather thanthe state actor.10 The impression of a non-coincidental parallel with the Cold Warcontainment strategy is being strengthenedby the warnings of the U.S. leadershipthat the USA as well as the allies should bepreparing for a long haul in this struggleto contain terrorism.11 To push the par-allel even further, it is obvious that the

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war on terrorism, just as the Cold War,will not see a continuous and sustainedmilitary action. Intelligence operations,covert action, financial and law enforce-ment measures will probably be moreimportant tools employed to cope withthe threat. Finally, it is obvious that Sep-tember 11th will be followed by a deepU.S. engagement and global activism as itis being realised that any unresolved re-gional conflicts or continued existence ofthe �failed� states will be a breeding groundfor extremism and the terrorist activitiesand that eventually the United States willbecome their ultimate target yet again.Having dismissed the U.S. role in stateand nation building prior to September11th, the U.S. administration seems to berevising this approach as campaign inAfghanistan draws to a close. The emerg-ing U.S. determination not to leave anyvacuum for extremism to thrive thor-oughly resembles the effort to be activelypresent in all regions as a part of the anti-Soviet strategy. The only element missingin this picture to complete the bipolarstructure is the second pole of the inter-

national system. However, the pole couldbe conceptually constructed if one definesit not as an equally powerful hostile statewith its sphere of influence, but as anamorphous structure, comprised of theterrorist networks, �rogue states� and evenlarge segments of some societies exercis-ing strong anti-American sentiments, allunited by ideology. President Bush hasalready showed determination to add stateactors along the terrorist networks to theadversary�s profile by declaring that �anynation that continues to support terror-ism will be regarded by the United Statesas a hostile regime�,12 although carefullyavoiding any allusions to the social di-mension of the conflict. In such a case,the notion of an asymmetric confronta-tion would apply, where one side is easilyidentifiable, well structured, organised andhas an obvious leader (the USA), whilethe other side remains more or less elu-sive, complex and without the centre ofgravity inherent to the opponent, butnevertheless capable of inflicting signifi-cant damage to the interests of the adver-sary as well as keeping him mobilised and

insecure and commanding the level ofindividual and social loyalties that are tobe reckoned with. This account wouldcertainly be a huge departure from theconventional and modest assessment of theconsequences of the September 11th eventsto the international system. However, tran-sition from the unipolar to bipolar worldis a possibility rather than the currentreality and can materialise only if the newdefinition of what constitutes the pole inthe international system is universally ac-cepted and if the U.S. resources becomeso overstretched as to lead to the worldless dependent upon the USA as an arbi-ter and the source of security and whereloyalty to the U.S. hegemonic leadershipis easily traded and shed. The latter possi-bility has already been noted by the U.S.Deputy Secretary of Defence PaulWolfowitz, who observed that �one of thedifficult things in the next few months isgoing to be establishing which of our al-lies of convenience�can become real al-lies over the longer term�and which onesare going to just switch sides.�13 It is alsoimportant to note, that application of thestrategies of the bipolar system can be

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carried out in the unipolar world all thesame, as the containment of the �roguestates� through the mechanisms of interna-tional sanctions during the 1990s shows.This may especially be the case given, thatthe key policymakers of the Bush adminis-tration are much more familiar with thestrategies of the Cold War and eager toemploy them rather than innovate. Beingmindful of the reactions to September11th within international system, discussedearlier, it would be premature to announcedemise of unipolarity, although the high-lighted aspects of the post-September 11thdevelopments should lead the analyst tobe more flexible and open-minded in fu-ture categorisations. Enthusiastic use oftechniques and rhetoric, intrinsic to thebipolar structure of the international sys-tem by the Bush administration, can be-come a self-fulfilling prophecy in the end.

II.2 The maturing hegemon andinternational relations

In the international relations, one candiscover a mix of change and continuity

of the pre-September 11th patterns ofinteraction. The most significant changeperhaps should be associated with the waythat the hegemonic power (the USA) hasbeen acting since the terrorist attacks.Having been averse to the role of a globalpoliceman and hesitant to commit itselfwholeheartedly to building security andprosperity wherever such a need arises forthe last decade, the United States seems tostart interpreting its position in the worldpolitics more robustly, appreciating thatthe selective engagement, let alone self-iso-lation, cannot prevent hostile acts andchallenges. As the U.S. secretary of defenceDonald H. Rumsfeld wrote: �Forget about�exit strategies�; we�re looking at a sus-tained engagement that carries no dead-lines.�14 It is more likely now that the U.S.engagement will be far deeper and widerthan previously, even in the places wherethe U.S. interests seem to be largely ab-sent. The conflict between India and Pa-kistan over Kashmir, the Muslim insur-gency in the Philippines, failure of statesin places such as the Democratic Repub-lic of Congo or Somalia, the Palestinian

intifada and many other developments andevents, are set to receive or are alreadyreceiving a far bigger U.S. attention, thanprior to September 11th. Essentially, theUnited States is undergoing transforma-tion from being a reluctant into being amature hegemon, ready to throw its powerand resources into the troublesome spotswhere opportunities for the U.S. oppo-nents to undermine the U.S. interests canpresent themselves. The declared readinessto stay in Afghanistan and assist its newlyformed government as long as it takes tobuild a viable state can serve as a precur-sor of the revised U.S. approach to itsinternational responsibilities.15 The will-ingness to sustain the global engagement,though, can still wither away as a sense ofcrisis and pressure for action subside.Some analysts have expressed their doubtsover whether such a transformation willbe sustained. As Professor Niall Fergusonof Oxford University puts it: �The U.S.has the resources: but does it have theguts to act as a global hegemon and makethe world a more stable place?�16 Mean-while, the expected reversal from unilat-

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eral to multilateral methods of formulat-ing and implementing the U.S. policies17 ,which implies more consensus buildingand appreciation of the interests of theother states, has failed to materialise. Abroad anti-terrorist coalition which theUSA sought to assemble before taking anymilitary action, represents the pursuit ofa theoretical imperative of isolating theenemy diplomatically and strategically,rather than introducing multilateralmodes of policymaking and implementa-tion. To be accurate, multilateral elementshave indeed emerged in the U.S. policy.Reinvigorated interest in the opportuni-ties offered by the United Nations, largelyabsent until recently, can be presented asan example.18 Concern over not alienat-ing valuable allies in the war against ter-rorism is also playing its part. But theoverall trend of the United States beingready to consult but seeking to avoid anyconstraints that the multilateral actionusually entails, especially in the militaryrealm, continues unabated just as priorto September 11th. Furthermore, thepolicies of eluding or even undermining

some multilateral binding arms controlagreements, seen as an undesirable con-straint to the U.S. freedom of manoeuvreand set on track during 2001 or even ear-lier, remain firmly in place. The UnitedStates further refuses to ratify the Com-prehensive Test-Ban Treaty and has ruinedany chances of making the Biological andToxin Weapons Convention more cred-ible through strengthening its verificationregime,19 despite the risk of upsetting itsallies and creating the atmosphere of dou-ble standards so readily endorsed by thefoes. The same holds true for the U.S.determination to dispense of the 1972Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, viewedby the former adversaries and current al-lies alike as a cornerstone of the strategicstability, in order to open gates for thedeployment of the NMD system. Presi-dent Bush has already announced that theU.S. withdrawal from the treaty is immi-nent. Thus the USA did not grow anymore sensible to the concerns of the in-ternational community after September11th. Instead, it is exploiting the momentto make the cause for a new strategic

framework stronger and more acceptable.Relations with Russia perhaps best exem-plify the continuity of the same patternof interaction as prior to September 11th.

The U.S. relations with Russia have beendeveloping as an uneasy mixture of co-operation and disagreement for the lastdecade. A number of issues such as NATOenlargement and the Alliance�s �out-of-area�operations as in the Balkans, the NMDsystem and the fate of the ABM Treaty,non-proliferation, Russia�s two wars inChechnya and its meddling in the so-called�Near Abroad� have been poisoning thenew agenda of bilateral relations almostall the time. With President Bush takingoffice, it was widely expected that the U.S.policy towards Russia would be far moreassertive and less conciliatory, than un-der his predecessor. As Russia�s PresidentVladimir Putin was also seen as a personpreferring a tough stand in foreign policyto regain Russia�s lost status in interna-tional affairs, it was tempting to concludethat the two states would slide back intopermanent confrontation, although lessdangerous than during the Cold War, but

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nevertheless potentially bruising and dam-aging enough to prompt concerns. Post-September 11th developments seemed torender those concerns irrelevant. Bothstates have found a common uniting is-sue since terrorist threat has been longregarded by Russia to be the most dan-gerous to its national security. Given thatshared threat perception is always a start-ing point for building an alliance, Rus-sia�s determination to join the anti-ter-rorist effort can be interpreted as draw-ing it closer to the West. Some Russianofficials went so far as to ponder onceagain the possibility of Russia accedingto NATO and to tone down objectionsto the accession of the Baltic States intothe Alliance.20 NATO also moved to re-shape and upgrade its relations with Rus-sia and make them to better reflect thepost-September 11th realities.21 Moreimportantly, Russia has become an indis-pensable ally of the United States duringcampaign in Afghanistan, sharing intelli-gence and expertise on the region andlifting objections to the U.S. military pres-ence in Central Asia, perceived as Russia�s

�backyard� in terms of influence and stra-tegic interests. Washington, in turn, wasquick to suspend criticism of Russia�smilitary campaign in Chechnya, acknowl-edging that at least some part of Russia�sargument for military action was valid andlegitimate.22 This was followed by theannouncement of bilateral cuts in nucleararsenals during the summit in Texas inNovember, applauded as heralding a newera in the strategic relations of the formerCold War adversaries and laying groundfor a new strategic framework, while ad-dressing Russia�s anxieties over the U.S.intentions to abolish the ABM Treaty.23

Although not abandoning their opposi-tion to the NMD, Russia�s officials soundmore realistic and more assured on thisissue than previously.24

Positive as they are, these developments,however, are neither entirely new norrooted solely in the events of September11th. The dawn of a new era in strategicrelations between Russia and the UnitedStates was declared during the June sum-mit between Bush and Putin last year inLjubliana, Slovenia. On the same occasion,

both sides pledged to work on puttingsubstance into the envisioned frameworkof their strategic relations.25 In a similarvein, Putin has been softening Russia�svehement opposition to further NATOenlargement quite for a while, replacingthreats of an adequate response with ar-guments questioning the rationale of theenlargement.26 Russia even failed to comeup with a usual counter-statement afterPresident Bush had outlined his visionof Europe �free and united� endorsingNATO enlargement project in Warsaw,Poland, last year.27 Not to mention thatRussia has been already talking of notexcluding the possibility of joining theAlliance some time in future, althoughtailoring this idea to a set of conditionsdeemed unacceptable by the West. Rus-sia�s drift towards the West, therefore,could be noticeable already before theSeptember 11th attacks. A more co-opera-tive agenda has been unfolding withoutthe effects of the terrorist attacks. Theobservers and policy analysts, taking noteof the pragmatic nature of Putin�s poli-cies, seemed to have somewhat underesti-

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mated his pro-Western credentials. Mean-while, after September 11th Putin is tak-ing stock of the pro-American sentimentin the Russian society and seeks overcom-ing the hardliner conservative elementsin Russia�s establishment by redefiningRussia�s interests in order to strike a chordwith the West.28 The USA has also uti-lised the moment to give a fresh momen-tum to the dynamics set into motionduring 2001. Both sides have reachedunderstanding of where the commonalityof their interests lies, which was blurredby mutual disagreements and suspicionsbefore the terrorist attacks. September11th has only accentuated the ongoingchange in the bilateral relations and helpedto remove the obstacles to the process ofrapprochement on both sides. Assessmentby the U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powellthat September 11th �did not start some-thing, it accelerated�29 is very much validin the post-September 11th U.S.-Russianrelations and perhaps is applicable in theinternational relations in general. The waythat September 11th events are influenc-ing the post-Cold War patterns of inter-

national conflict is somewhat more com-plex, but nevertheless does not redefineits lines as dramatically as it may have beenexpected. The next part of the article willdwell upon the September 11th impacton major cleavages in the internationalsystem, described previously.

Change and continuity ininternational conflict

On September 11th, three lines of in-ternational conflict out of four seem tohave blended together into one shockingblow to the USA, the state residing at thevery core of the international system andemerging as a nod where those lines ofconflict intersect. Firstly, the global ter-rorist network al Qaeda spreading wellover 60 states and born out of the patho-logical hatred to the United States as apower allegedly seeking to destroy Islamas the cultural and religious phenomenaand to subjugate the Muslims exemplifiesvery well the by-product of globalisationprocess and accompanying frictions.Osama bin Laden personifies those un-

able to accept the post-modern way of lifeand social values, brought about byglobalisation, and reacting with anger anddestruction to being pushed into obscu-rity and irrelevance in the contemporaryworld.30 In a way, anti-globalisation pro-testers causing havoc in the streets dur-ing the WTO or G8 summits and al Qaedaterrorists represent the two sides of thesame coin in terms of the origins of theirdiscontent. Also, just as the protesters onthe streets, while skilfully capitalising onfree communications, movement of fi-nances and new technologies which aresustaining globalisation, the terrorists at-tacked the state embodying globalisationitself, and accomplished this by selectingthe targets symbolising financial and com-mercial as well as military might of theU.S. dominated and led world. Further-more, they managed to strike a chord withanxieties and sensitivities of the societiesin the Muslim world, unveiling the ten-sions created in those societies by mod-ernisation and exposure to the effects ofglobalisation.31 Without going into de-tail and leaving the roots of terrorism for

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other inquiries to explore, it is enoughto record that the social and ideologicalcleavage in the international system,brought into being by globalisation, isstrongly present behind the September11th attacks. Secondly, the �rogue states�versus the United States line also manifestsitself here, as the former are long suspectedby the latter of sponsoring and support-ing international terrorism. The presenceof this conflict behind the terrorist at-tacks is obvious despite the fact that someof the �rogue states� were quick to issuecondemnations of the atrocities. At thevery early stage of war on terrorism, theU.S. administration made it clear that thisconnection would be central to the U.S.anti-terrorist strategy. During his addressto Congress, President Bush stated that�any nation that continues to harbor orsupport terrorism will be regarded by theUnited States as a hostile regime.� Argu-ments within the U.S. administration overwhether Iraq, one of the most prominentpariah states, should be the next targetafter Afghanistan in the anti-terrorist cam-paign, have further reinforced perception

that the terrorist attacks are closely associ-ated with existence of the �rogue states�.32

The failed states also inevitably come intoplay in the analysis, as Afghanistan con-stituted the ground for recruiting andtraining terrorists and the physical baseof the al Qaeda leadership. Mostly ne-glected since the failure to restore thegoverning structures and order in Soma-lia, they turned out to be the safe havenfor the training and operational activi-ties of the terrorist network. Afghanistanhas immediately become a target of theU.S. war on terrorism, and Somalia as wellas another state balancing on the edge offailure, Yemen, have been named to belikely to draw the anti-terrorist action ofthe USA.33 A sober realisation by the USAthat the existence of failed or weak statesis not favourable to the U.S. interests sim-ply because it can further stimulate theterrorist threat and, therefore, cannot beignored, will be shaping the Americanstrategy for the foreseeable future. Thusthree lines of international conflict, rec-ognisable well before September 11th andhaving led to the terrorist attacks, are

likely to remain in place. The only cleav-age that has been obscured by September11th is the one between the democraciesand undemocratic regimes for variousreasons not qualifying for the status of�rogue�. Pakistan and the states of CentralAsia serve as the best examples of howundemocratic regimes have ceased to bethe trigger for conflict and turned intopartners of co-operation. Pakistan, widelyregarded as gradually slipping into becom-ing a �rogue state� or even a failed state,or both, under the rule of General PervezMusharraf, is now one of the most valu-able U.S. allies.34 The United States seemsto be ready to tolerate undemocratic re-gimes as long as they remain loyal to theUSA in its war on terrorism and untilthese regimes retain a degree of controlover their territories and populationsnecessary to prevent the rise of extrem-ism and development of the new terror-ist �pockets�. Meanwhile, the authoritar-ian rulers can enjoy the legitimacy of theirrepressive policies, mocked as �fightingterrorism� long before September 11th,obtained as a result of the changed U.S.

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attitude.35 It remains to be seen whetherturning blind eye on the undemocraticpractices in the other states for the sakeof strategic co-operation will be a short-term U.S. strategy or a long-term trend asthe calls to prepare for a long haul maysuggest. The note of caution is that suchan approach during the Cold War pro-duced all sorts of troubles for thepolicymakers in the post-Cold War era,including anti-Western sentiment in manysocieties.

One of the biggest fears of the inter-national community, though, was that theU.S. response to the terrorist acts wouldindeed validate the Huntingtonian modelof international conflict by turning thewhole struggle into a clash of civilisations,between the U.S.-led Western world andthe Islamic world. At the outset of a bomb-ing campaign in Afghanistan, the argu-ments that the United States was punish-ing the whole Muslim society for theatrocities perpetrated by a group of crimi-nals and that it would antagonise the wholeMuslim world were at the core of criti-cism of the U.S. strategy.36 Signs of out-

rage, spreading through the Muslim soci-eties, over the bombing and the civiliancasualties were apparent as the demonstra-tions in Pakistan or lack of endorsementby the Gulf states coming under the pres-sure of their societies not to support thecampaign demonstrated.37 An unfortunateparallel between the crusades and the cur-rent war on terrorism, evoked by Bush,was not helpful at all in presenting thecampaign as an effort directed against the�rogue� elements and not as manifestationof the long-harboured Western hostilityto the Muslims.38 Talk of the West, andthe United States in particular, exploit-ing the opportunity provided by Septem-ber 11th to unleash its power against theMuslim states and societies has becomecommon among the Muslims.39 Giventhat any war tends to harden the attitudesand push them to the extremes, the ter-rorist attacks may well induce prolifera-tion and consolidation of anti-Muslimand anti-Western sentiments in Westernand Muslim societies respectively, thuspitting them against each other and bring-ing about something resembling the clash

of civilisations. However, this remains avery remote possibility, since the USA andits allies have made every effort to isolateand discourage any domestic anti-Muslimhysteria as well as to win the hearts of theMuslims by disassociating Osama bin Lad-en�s cause from their grievances. As a re-sult of a relatively measured and self-re-strained U.S. response and a carefullymastered public relations campaign toconvince the Muslim societies of the ab-sence of any broader anti-Muslim moti-vation behind this response, the views thatthis is a war between Western and Islamiccivilisations are confined to the marginsof those societies.40 Commitment to stayin Afghanistan and help to re-build thecountry destroyed by the decades of civilwar served very well to strengthen themessage of assurance. Nonetheless, Septem-ber 11th underlines the fact that percep-tions can be pushed by terrible events atsuch directions as to turn the theories,currently lacking credibility, into a domi-nant explanation of why the conflict istaking place. The terrorist attacks and thefollowing Osama bin Laden�s propaganda

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to unite the Muslims behind his religiouscause to destroy America and other �infi-dels� may have rendered Huntington morerelevance it has had before in the eyes ofmany, even though the terrorist attackscan be better explained in other termsthan the clash of civilisations. It takes andwill continue requiring a sustained andcarefully crafted policy and action to steerboth sides away from the overwhelmingperceptions of confrontation betweenWestern and Islamic civilisations in ac-cordance with Huntington. Huntingtonwas not entirely right prior to Septem-ber 11th, remains such afterwards, but hestill can become right as the war on ter-rorism continues.

III. Conclusions

Provoked by numerous accounts thatthe terrorist attacks against the UnitedStates on September 11th have dramati-cally changed the world, this article ex-plored a moderate avenue of interpret-ing the importance of these events to theworld affairs. Taking three interrelated

dimensions � international system, inter-national relations and international con-flict � as the analytical framework, it en-deavoured to place September 11th intogeneral post-Cold war setting whichemerged during the preceding decade.Preoccupied with the question whetherSeptember 11th should be conceptualisedas a trigger of change or a symptom ofwhat has been evolving already for sometime, the analysis leads to accepting thelatter way of interpretation. Certainly, thisdoes not imply that nothing has changedat all. Our perceptions and understand-ing of the terrorist threat, of destructive-ness it can bring and of the means whichterrorists can use to exploit ourvulnerabilities have acquired completelynew dimensions and, more importantly,are now rooted in a terrible experiencerather than theoretical models and hypo-thetical contingencies. But the world poli-tics, with some minor adjustments andsome new probabilities, remains a con-tinuation of the pattern set prior to theattacks. The unipolar international systemis not showing any signs of collapsing,

even though the strategies and character-istics of the bipolar world have appeared,causing to ponder the theoretical possi-bility of neo-bipolarity and the need torevise the notion of the system�s pole. Theworld-wide rallying behind the UnitedStates underscores the extent to which theUSA has positioned itself as the centralpower in the international system, ensur-ing its functioning, stability and security.The USA remains a hegemon in the inter-national relations dictating the rules ofthe game as well as the nature of responsesto the challenges from within the system.Its influence, interests and policies con-tinue formulating imperatives for theother actors. Only this time, reluctanceto exercise the hegemonic influence isgiving way to a wider and deeper globalengagement to prevent further challengeslike the one on September 11th, bring-ing closer the USA to the role of a �globalpoliceman� it sought to avoid but hascome to realise it has no choice but toassume. The hopes of multilateralists havebeen dashed, however, and the expectedshift towards multilateral decision-making

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in international relations has failed to takeplace as the USA remains unwilling toaccept any external constraints althoughdisplays more readiness to consult, beforemaking the decision. Finally, most of thestrands of international conflict remainin place after September 11th. Pressureupon the �rogue states� will persist andwill even intensify. Interventions in thefailed states will be as instrumental in en-suring security of the international sys-tem as ever before. And globalisation willcontinue generating social and economictensions with implications to internationalrelations. Only those who believe thatfurther expansion of democratic valuesand practices can guarantee peace and sta-bility will be temporarily upset as theUnited States needs allies in its war onterrorism, whether they are democraticor not. And the Huntingtonian clash ofcivilisations, which was not driving in-ternational conflict before September11th, is not becoming a reality, althoughits coming into being is another prob-ability exposed by the terrorist attacks.September 11th events are symptomatic

of the trends and developments preced-ing them. They accentuate the character-istics of the post-Cold War setting andhave also accelerated some processes, suchas rapprochement between Russia and theUSA, by making their rationale moreobvious. September 11th atrocities, thus,is not a new departure point from whichwe could start counting the days of a post-post-Cold War era. Certainly, the continu-ing war on terrorism may make differ-ence, but it is rather a war which will con-solidate the current world order insteadof installing a new one. Most probablyPresident George W. Bush will not enterhistory along with Woodrow Wilson,Franklin D. Roosevelt or even GeorgeBush Sr. as an architect of a new worldorder, despite his merits for fighting ter-rorism.

1 See Moisi, Dominique, �Welcome to the New,New World Order�, Financial Times, September13th, 2001.

2 See Tickner, J. Ann (1995), �Re-visioning Secu-rity�, in Ken Booth & Steve Smith (eds.), Interna-tional Relations Theory Today, Cambridge: Pol-ity Press, pp. 183, 184.

3 See Slim, Hugo (1995), Military Humanitari-anism and the New Peacekeeping: an Agenda forPeace? at www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a015.htm(accessed on May 17th, 2000).

4 Van Ham, Peter (2001), �Security and Culture,or, Why NATO Won�t Last�, Security Dialogue,vol. 32, no.4, p. 398.

5 Huntingont, Samuel P. (1993), �The Clash ofCivilizations?�, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993.

6 Ibid.7 Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the

American People, September 20th, 2001, atwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on December 14th, 2001.

8

9 See �Defining the Challenge: Who Asked MrBush to �Save Civilisation?�, The Guardian, Oc-tober 24th, 2001.

10 See Hoagland, Jim, �America Can�t Wage theAnti-Terror War Alone�, The International Her-ald Tribune, January 14th, 2002.

11 See Grant, Tracy, �Bush Braces Country forWar�, Washington Post, September 15th, 2001.

12 Address to a Joint Session of Congress andthe American People, September 20th, 2001, atwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920-8.html, accessed on December 14th, 2001.

13 Dao, James & Schmitt, �U.S. Hawk Hints IraqWon�t Be Next Target�, The International HeraldTribune, January 9th, 2002.

14 Rumsfeld, Donald H., �A New Kind of War�,The New York Times, September 27th, 2001.

15 See The White House Report The Global Waron Terrorism: The First 100 Days, at http://

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www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/12/100dayreport.html, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

16 See the contribution by Prof Niall Fergusonto the joint Guardian-RUSI conference on NewPolicies for the New World, published in TheGuardian, October 31st, 2001.

17 See Naim, Moises, �Even A Hegemon NeedsFriends and Allies�, Financial Times, September14th, 2001.

18 See Remarks by the President to United Na-tions General Assembly, November 10th, 2001, athttp://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011110-3.html, accessed on January 15th,2002.

19 See �Bush�s Hang-ups�, The Economist, De-cember 15th-21st, 2001.

20 See �Why Not Accept Russia Into NATO?Interview with Sergei V. Stepashin�, Business WeekOnline, September 21st, 2001, on Johnson�s Rus-sia List (JRL), Issue 5454, at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5454-7.cfm, accessed on January15th, 2002.

21 See Finn, Peter & Baker, Peter, �NATO andRussia Reinventing Relationship�, WashingtonPost, November 15th, 2001.

22 See Politkovskaya, Ana, �Remember Chechnya�,Washington Post, November 14th, 2001.

23 See Sanger, David E., �Bush and Putin Agreeto Reduce Stockpile of Nuclear Warheads�, TheNew York Times, November 14th, 2001.

24 See Wines, Michael, �Facing Pact�s End, PutinDecides to Grimace and Bear It�, The New YorkTimes, December 14th, 2001.

25 See Charlton, Angela, �Bush, Putin Face Dip-lomatic Hurdles�, Associated Press report onJohnson�s Russia List (JRL), Issue 5037, June 18th,2001, at http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/5307.html, accessed on July 10th, 2001.

26 See �Putin Softens Tone on Baltic Quest ForNATO�, Jamestown Foundation Monitor, Sep-tember 6th, 2001 on CDI Russia Weekly at http://www.cdi.org/russia/170.html, accessed on Sep-tember 9th, 2001.

27 See Remarks by the President in Address toFaculty and Students of Warsaw University, War-saw, Poland, June 15th, 2001, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/06/20010615-1.html, accessed on January 15th, 2002.

28 See McFaul, Michael, �Putin�s Risky TurnWestwards�, The Christian Science Monitor, No-vember 9th, 2001.

29 See �U.S. and Russia to Complete Talks onArms Control Pact�, The New York Times, De-cember 11th, 2001.

30 See Neier, Aryeh, �Warring Against Moder-nity�, Washington Post, October 9th, 2001.

31 See Friedman, Thomas L., �One War, TwoFronts�, The New York Times, November 2nd, 2001.

32 See Woollacott, Martin, �Saddam Will be theNext US Target, One Way or Another�, The Guard-ian, November 16th, 2001.

33 See Ottaway, David B. & Ricks, Thomas E.,�Somalia Draws Anti-Terrorist Focus�, Washing-ton Post, November 4th, 2001.

34 See Keller, Bill, �The World According to ColinPowell�, New York Magazine, November 26th, 2001.

35 See �The New New World Order?�, The Econo-mist, October 5th-12 th, 2001.

36 See Ruthven, Malise, �This Man May BecomeOur Nemesis�, The Guardian, October 10th, 2001.

37 Hirst, David, �The West Ignores Arab Resent-ment at Its Peril�, The Guardian, October 9th, 2001.

38 See Ford, Peter, �Europe Cringes at Bush �Cru-sade� Against Terrorists�, The Christian ScienceMonitor, September 19th, 2001.

39 Freedland, Jonathan, �The War Bin LadenHas Already Won�, The Guardian, October 10th,2001.

40 See Fidler, Stephen, �Washington Wages aWar of Diplomacy�, Financial Times, November8th, 2001.

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ussia�s state and identity crisis thatcommenced with the end of the cold

war has inevitably touched the militaryof the state.

Military reform has been discussed overthe last decade in Russia, with decidedlymixed results. In practice, reform has pri-marily meant further cuts in the size ofthe armed forces (from 5,1 million to 1,2million) with some moderate organiza-tional changes. Reform under PavelGrachev (defence minister in 1992-1996)basically amounted to a gradual hollow-ing out of the military structure inher-ited from the Soviet Union. The army

Russia�s Military Reform:Political Trajectories

By Assoc. Prof., dr. Raimundas Lopata and Assoc. Prof., dr. Ceslovas Laurinavicius*

was cut but not reformed. IgorRodionov�s tenure (defence minister in1996-1997) was marked mainly by his in-creasingly strident complaints of the mea-gre finances available to the army and ad-vocated preparations for a theatre-wideconventional war with NATO. The mostsignificant steps toward not just a smallerbut also restructured military have takenplace under Igor Sergeyev (defence min-ister in 1997-2001). Further cuts were en-acted in a more logical fashion - assem-bling of a small number of �permanentreadiness� divisions has been started, itwas tried to integrate all components of

* Associate Professor, dr. Raimundas Lopata is the Director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius,Lithuania. Associate Professor, dr. ¹eslovas Laurinavi²ius is also with the Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius,Lithuania.

strategic deterrence under one commandand to reduce the number of militarydistricts1 .

However, several factors played a ma-jor role in the trajectory of the militarydevelopment: the Kosovo crisis, the sec-ond Chechnya War and the �Kursk� sub-marine catastrophe.

Russia, as response to the NATO op-eration in Kosovo, laid a new emphasison a nuclear deterrence, which shouldcompensate for the weakness of the con-ventional forces. At the meeting of Rus-sia�s Security Council on the 29th of April1999 there were prepared three secret de-

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crees. One of them allegedly prescribedthe development of new tactical weapons.Neither the content of those decrees northeir implementation has becomeknown2 . Nevertheless, the military ma-noeuvres in Kaliningrad that imitated thescenarios of �de-escalation� mission spokefor themselves (Russia�s military doctrinesigned in April 2000 confirmed this)3 .

In 1999 the reactivated use of thearmed forces in Chechnya determinedpreconditions for the authoritarianism ofPutin and for the emergence of a hyper-trophied status of the military. In everypublic speech in early 2000, Acting Presi-dent Vladimir Putin reiterated the keymessage: �The Army has regained trust initself and society believes in and trusts itsArmy�4 . At this juncture the situationcould end up with the formation of themilitary authoritarianism.

However, in 2000 the Kursk submarinecatastrophe brought the public attentionto the disastrous deterioration of themilitary. Without any doubts the accidenthad a huge impact on Putin�s authorityas well as on a presumable model of the

military authoritarianism. The urgentneed to restructure and reorganise thewhole military system was confirmed dur-ing the series of the meetings of the Secu-rity Council during autumn 20005 .Thereby Putin faced the dilemma: Howto reform (modernise) the military bykeeping up political leverage that assistedin the forming the authority of Putin?Therefore Kremlin�s trajectory with regardto the military reform reflects certain con-tradiction. The military issue implicatestwo scopes reflecting the above-mentionedambivalence.

Reshuffle of the top of the militaryand security establishment

At the end of March 2001, in appoint-ing a retired KGB Lieutenant GeneralSergey Ivanov to head the Defence Min-istry and making a senior woman officialLyubov Kudelina from the Finance Min-istry one of his deputies, Putin claimedto have begun de-militarising Russia andjustified his decision by saying that asSecurity Council Secretary, it was Ivanov

who oversaw the inter-ministerial work-ing group that drew up a military reformprogram. Now he will have to implementthis programme6 . The fact that Putin hasappointed a close ally to the Defence Min-ister�s job suggests he really does considermilitary reform a top priority and re-signed the principal that the military re-form was given to the military �to preoc-cupy themselves with�.

The new Deputy Defence Minister re-sponsible for the financial and economicissues is a well-known specialist LyubovKudelina, who will also head the DefenceMinistry�s Chief Military Budget and Fi-nances Department. When one considersthat the defence budget represents one-fifth of the total state budget, the impor-tance of this job is obvious. Over the pastdecade the structure has been much criti-cized for its poor performance and twoof Kudelina�s predecessors have been dis-missed. There seems to be a new aware-ness that the department needs qualifiedcivilian specialists. The Defence Ministry�sFinancial Inspectorate and Labour Depart-ment, where new directors are to be ap-

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pointed, will be subordinate to Kudelina7 .The dismissals followed given appoint-

ments. A top Russian Defence Ministryofficial known for hawkish statementstoward the West Colonel General LeonidIvashov, the Head of the Department forInternational Military Co-operation, is tolose his job. Ivashov has become knownfor strong statements against NATO�s east-ward expansion, blaming it for being a�criminal organization� and for the USplans to deploy a missile defence system.Presumably the situation can be inter-preted as Russia�s interest in military co-operation not only on bilateral but as wellon international-institutional basis. By theway, Mikhail Dmitriev, the person fromPutin�s entourage, former professionalintelligence agent, and incumbent DeputyDefence Minister was appointed to headthe Military Technological Co-operationCommittee of the Defence Ministry. Theoutspoken, hawkish General ValeryManilov was ousted as the First DeputyChief of Russia�s General Staff8 .

Nevertheless, is it realistic to expect se-rious reforms from the obedient

�aparatchik� and implementer of Putin?9

It could be expected that the appointmentof Ivanov, the person closely related toPutin, will put an end to the conflict be-tween former Defence Minister Sergeyevand the Chief of the General Staff AnatolyKvashnin over differing approaches to thearmy reforms. However, it is hardly cred-ible that this factor points to the reform-ist potential of Ivanov. It is more likelythat Putin has started a disassembling ofthe military establishment (mostly basedon the Soviet clan-corporate principal) re-placing it by the bureaucracy structuresconsolidating a so-called vertical line ofpower. A statement of Ivanov made dur-ing his visit in Minsk, Belarus, in April2001 confirms the version: �Today, thediscussions are over. The armed-forces re-form plans have been approved by thePresident, and it is time to implementthe approved decisions�10 .

In reality, however, the appointmentof one or even several civilians to the topdefence posts could end up doing moreto discredit the idea of de-militarisationrather than furthering its cause. To say

nothing of the state of the civil society inRussia, it is worth noticing that Kremlindoes not feel any need to inform the pub-lic on what is going on in the military.In the meantime, changes in the person-nel at the top of Defence Ministry followthe old tradition � Kremlin changes po-tentially disloyal persons.

Except the interest to consolidate thepower of Putin, these appointments,maybe, do not change anything. The De-fence Ministry is still a military rather thana political institution. Russia does not yethave the hundreds of civilian officials withsolid military knowledge it will need. Nordoes it have top generals open mindedenough to take orders from a Ministerclose to the President, let alone from not-so-high-ranking civilian officials. Real de-militarisation of the political institutionswould have to start by removing the mili-tary status from the dozens of ministriesand government agencies run on militarylines. Instead, it looks as though the mili-tary contingents in these governmentbodies will in some way or another bemade subordinate to the Defence Minis-

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try. This could lead to the emergence of amilitarised behemoth, encompassing overtwo million people, even with the plannedmilitary cutbacks. The problem is thatKremlin does not seem to understand thatde-militarisation of the military relatedministries is an important element in es-tablishing civilian control. And this is notthe only step - it is equally important toencourage greater openness and transpar-ency. But as Security Council Secretary,Ivanov preferred to keep all plans as se-cret as possible - the military-reform plansare still secret to this day. And as forKudelina, when she was in charge of themilitary budget at the Finance Ministry,she insisted on maximum secrecy11 .

Cutbacks in numbers in theArmed Forces

Ivanov particularly emphasises thatcutbacks are to take place in the numberof servicemen. Over the coming threeyears, the armed forces are to be cut by365.000 servicemen (respectively theGround Forces by 180.000, The Navy �

50.000, the Air Forces � 40.000; in total90.000 during 2001) and 130.000 so calledcivilian specialists. Given that the state can-not even properly feed and arm all itssoldiers12 , this looks like a perfectly ra-tional decision.

The biggest cuts can be expected in Si-beria, the Far East and in the KaliningradOblast. Cuts will also affect Russian troopsin Trans-Dnestr and in the South Cauca-sus13 . Though some army corps will bedisbanded it is emphasized that cutbackswould not involve units on permanentcombat readiness and the number of sol-diers in some of them (the South-Westernand Central-Asian Strategic Zones) will evenbe increased14 . While having reservationssome analysts envisage certain changes inthe priorities of Russia�s security policy(Islamic extremism as the main threat)15 .

The significance of the cutbacks underway requires new approaches in the armedforces. The battle over Russia�s defencebudget for 2002 shows that the DefenceMinistry is prepared to bring militarywages in line with those of public serv-ants and in parallel to abolish the ben-

efits for the military. This could be inter-preted as a tendency of shifting to a pro-fessional army16 . Ivanov does not masksuch intention. Asked when Russia wouldmove from conscription to a professionalarmy, Ivanov said at the moment it was�impossible to say�, because it dependedon the economic situation. The DefenceMinister pointed out that the changeovercannot occur overnight, and that in theUS - for example - it took 10 years17 .

On the other hand, it should be men-tioned that the decrease of the armedforces that started during the period ofGorbachev was fitful partly because of thefinancial deficit. Let us not forget thatthis is the third major cutback since So-viet times. The armed forces have shrunk,but this has not led to any proportionalincrease in effectiveness. The resourcessaved were allocated to maintaining thestructure, but not to reorganising it. Mili-tary authorities are following a simplelogic in their planned cutbacks - if theycan spend more money on each soldier,servicemen will serve better and have moreresources. The catch is that this logic does

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not work. The problem is that the reformprogram�s authors have not veered an iotafrom the principles on which the SovietArmy ran18 .

The reality of the matter is that com-pulsory military service in Russia is notcompulsory for everyone. According toGeneral Vyacheslav Putilin, Head of theGeneral Staff�s Chief Recruitment Depart-ment, 88% of young men who are calledup get their service deferred. It is no se-cret that many educational establishmentsexist for the sole purpose of granting thesedeferrals. Putin also finds himself forcedto admit that the best of those able tomilitary service are dodging it. More thanhalf of the draftees have never studied orhad a job. It�s pure fantasy to imaginethat these young men will become thesoldiers of the 21st century. But despiteall this, the �office� generals are doing allthey can to prevent the changeover to aprofessional army. The state�s military andpolitical leadership still does not see theneed for a corps of professional Non-Commissioned Officers. One official ar-gument the Russia�s top generals give is

that a professional army would mean dras-tically increasing the defence budget19 .

So long as the conscript system remainsin place, there will not be any real qualityimprovement among soldiers. Meanwhilethe traditionalism of Russian office gen-erals, the concepts of mutually assured de-struction and �all-azimuth defence�, �ide-ology of total siege� still substantiallypoint to the existence of the conscriptsystem20 . Eventually the references thatestablishment of professional army re-quires a long time confirm the resistanceagainst the plans of the establishment ofprofessional army.

The correlation between the cutbacksand the officers� corps should be takeninto consideration as well. Effective re-form means that there will be winners andlosers within the military. The point isthat the Russian officers corps is not im-mune to what is going on within the stateas a whole. In Russia, with its bureaucraticand organizational politics, the majorityof officers who have remained in themilitary through the 10 years period ofinstitutional decline believe, that they have

no employment alternatives21 . Essentially,what this all boils down to is that cut-backs in the armed forces will not resultin any serious change.

Changes in the command systemof the armed forces

The contretemps regarding the struc-ture of the armed forces were personifiedfor a long time, when the former Minis-ter of Defence Sergeyev and the Chief ofthe General Staff Kvashnin came outopenly as antagonists. The discussion onwhat armament should prevail demon-strated serious organisational tensionsbetween two institutions as well as the racefor influence. In the framework of thediscussion, the earlier created RussianForces of the Strategic Purpose (RVNS)as a separate branch of the Army, has un-doubtedly been expected to carry andenhance the weight of Sergeyev. However,Kvashnin managed to take over the ini-tiative by both appealing to the war inChechnya and calling to prioritise con-ventional armament.

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A substantial moment was November2000 when Kvashnin proposed strict di-vision of functions between the DefenceMinistry and the General Staff22 . Underthis plan, the Defence Ministry would takeon political and administrative functions,while the General Staff would be respon-sible for the operational command of thetroops. The concrete project was supposedto be presented to Putin in January 2000.However, the project has still not beenworked out23 .

Such a situation speaks of portentoustension between the Kremlin and theGeneral Staff. The next link down in thecommand chain is the Military Districts,which have both administrative and op-erational functions. Kvashnin�s propos-als would simply fragment command ofthe military. If they were implemented,Putin, as Commander-in-Chief of theArmed Forces, would lose his direct linkwith the troops. At the same time theGeneral Staff - the agency responsible forplanning military operations for every oc-casion - would get the chance to meddledirectly in political life. Currently, as an

expression of the tension, Chief Com-mand of the Ground Forces, whose Com-mander (Colonel General NikolaiKormilcev) is designated to be a DeputyDefence Minister, has been revived. Hewill take the supervision of military de-tachments and will be responsible for themilitary training of all armed forces. Inparallel it is tried to overcome the frag-mentation of the military establishment.The military reform is treated as a struc-tural issue and is to be conducted in asso-ciation with the reforms proceeding inother �power institutions�, including theMinistry of Interior, headed by BorisGryzlov who is closely related to Putin24 .

However, the status quo is that theChief of the General Staff Kvashnin ex-tends his influence with the help of po-litical capital made in Chechnya. So thetalks about the possibility that Kvashnincan be removed are doubtful25 .

It means that while Sergeyev will be aloser in the bureaucratic infighting, it willnot be clear whether the General Staff willemerge as a winner. Nevertheless, the mostimportant is that two tendencies develop -

whether the �office generals� representinghierarchy of the army will take over theinfluence or whether the power of the armyhierarchy will be broken trough introduc-tion of civil institute in the military sphere?In other words, we observe a silent discus-sion on the form of potential authoritari-anism in Russia: Military authoritarianismor modernised authoritarianism based onan extensive social-political basis.

Priorities for armament

It was decided that the Russian ArmedForces would be given a structure basedon three main branches (the GroundForces, the Navy and the Air Force)26 .This could be interpreted as the returnto the priority equalising conventionaland nuclear armament. It is planned thatthe Strategic Missile Forces will form abranch of their own (till 2002) that willexclude the Space Forces, which will bemade into a separate wing. Such thoughtsboth presume that nuclear armament is aprerequisite to retaining the superpowerimage and can be one of the answers for

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the US missile defence plans. However, inone of his first interviews as a DefenceMinister, Ivanov said that the decision tomake the Space Forces a separate wing isnot a response to the US plans to deploya National Missile Defence. Ivanov spokeperfectly seriously about how the SpaceForces could back armed-forces subdivi-sions on a tactical level27 .

But even in this framework it is verywell known that the Russian Space Forceshave half the satellites of the US SpaceCommand, which really does provide tac-tical support for the army troops. Fur-thermore, 70% of the Russian satelliteshave already expended their service life28 .It is not at all certain that they can fulfiltheir original tasks - strategic intelligence,early warning of missile attacks and com-munication.

Finally in May the fire at the Russiansatellite control centre showed how far theplans to create an independent space forceare from reality. It took almost a day toput out the fire at this strategic militarysite, suppressing the fact that Russia doesnot have the specialized fire fighting equip-

ment needed to fight this kind of fire29 .All this leads to the conclusion that mak-ing sure the early warning system func-tions reliably at all times, is not a majorRussian defence priority. Moscow doesnot seriously believe for a second that theUSA could launch a sudden nuclear at-tack.

Generally, according to the last reportsRussia�s strategic nuclear arsenal is agingand shrinking and strategic delivery ve-hicles have limited operational lives30 .Russia�s heavy missiles will be withdrawnfrom service in 2008 and they have longsince passed their guaranteed service life(SS-19s (Stileto) would rapidly reach theend of their operational live after 2007,the SS-24 (Scalpel) will be phased out by2007 regardless of the Strategic Arms Re-duction Treaty II (START II), few if anySS-18s (Satan) and SS-25s (Sickle) wouldremain by the end of 2010, the numberof operational Sea Launched Ballistic Mis-siles (SLBMs) may drop precipitously overthe next decade as Russian Ballistic-Mis-sile Submarines, Nuclear-fueled, (SSBNs)reached the end of their service lives31 ).

With or without treaties, Moscow will beforced to dramatically reduce its nucleararsenal over the coming years.

It is unlikely that Russia will be able tobuild new missiles of this class. Duringthe Soviet time, these missiles were builtin Ukraine. For understandable reasons,Moscow is hardly likely to risk develop-ing its missile-building potential on aforeign state�s territory. This leaves themost modern of the Russian missiles, theIntercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)SS-28 (Topol-M). These missiles are de-signed to carry three warheads. It had beenhoped at one point that Moscow wouldbe able to produce 30 new SS-28s eachyear, but the reality is no more than 10 ayear; and last year, only four new missileswere produced32 .

Having the capabilities of Russia�s stra-tegic nuclear arsenal in mind it is possi-ble that Moscow is following a more ra-tional logic. An indication of this is arecent statement by Sergeyev, who saidthat what matters today, is not so muchthe number of warheads or the discus-sion how to balance a strong nuclear ca-

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pability with a robust conventional forcestructure, but the military command sys-tem33 . The analysis above demonstratesthat Sergeyev can appeal to the main is-sue - forthcoming political system in Rus-sia. The same could be said about the in-fluence of economy on the military do-main.

Economy and the military reform

Russians openly declare that the paceand success of military reform in Russiaand its security policy will depend on theeconomic situation. Even without discuss-ing the Strategy of Russia�s Developmenttill 2010, by German Gref and plannedannual growth of economy by 5 � 5,5%,the decision on Russia�s long-term defencestrategy is still an open question.

First of all, it relates with a possiblecorrelation between Putin�s course to-wards more functional, market-orientedeconomy and Russia�s huge andunreformed defence-industrial complex,which employs two million people34 . Atthe beginning of April Deputy Prime

Minister Ilya Klebanov, who oversees themilitary-industrial complex, said that thereform programme of the sector wouldbe presented before May. The programmehas not been approved yet. It is knownthat the draft programme supposes creat-ing 30 � 40 vertically organized holdings,consisting of the most effective defence en-terprises, for the different arms produc-tions sectors. All companies in the hold-ing would have to hand over controllingstakes to the state. The programme�s au-thors say this would allow the state to con-centrate its limited resources on the mostimportant military programmes. It wouldalso free the military-industrial complexfrom needless competition35 .

The paradox is that these plans are notnew at all. The first plan to create hold-ings along arms-sector lines appeared adecade ago. Then, as now, the main ideawas not so much to rationalize produc-tion, as to maintain cosy jobs for mili-tary-industrial complex bureaucrats. Thissame aim lurks in the current programme.Russia has only a handful of effective de-fence enterprises, and they are effective

only because they export arms to China,India and �rogue states�.

On the other hand the decision onRussia�s long-term defence strategy relateswith the real funds for the military re-form, as well as with the situation in thedefence budget. Over the past eight years,the armed forces have made only one-offarms purchases. Arms procurement ac-counts for 6% of total defence expendi-ture as opposed to a minimum of 20% inNATO member-states. The greater shareof Russia�s defence budget, according toIvanov - 70% goes to wages, food, uni-forms and so on as opposed to 25 � 27%of the defence budget in NATO states.Modern military technology accounts for15 � 20% of Russia�s arsenals, while thefigure for NATO is 60 � 70%. Since thecollapse of the Soviet Union, the armedforces have not purchased a single newmilitary transport plane. Most money themilitary receives goes to maintaining andmodifying old arms and technology36 .

In financing terms, the defence budgetexpenditure for 2001 has risen more than150% compared with the previous year

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(from 140 billion roubles to around 230billion roubles, and it is planned to in-crease defence spending to 262 billion rou-bles for 200237 ). But this is a low figure.Former Defence Minister Sergeyev said,that given the financial limitations forbuying new arms and technology, moneywould be spent primarily on extending theservice life of existing technology38 .

Nevertheless, there are vital claims tosustain nuclear parity with the USA inRussia. Considered projects of the answersregarding, the US plans for the missiledefence confirm such intention. One ofsuch projects supposes four scenarios. So-called minimal deterrent scenarios envis-age 1.500 Strategic Nuclear Warheads(SNW), i.e. 17 billion roubles per year or8% of the defence budget. The second sce-nario - �to keep the USA in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty� - foresees 2.500SNW, i.e. 20 billion roubles or 10% of thedefence budget. For the implementationof the third scenario � �to hold back theU.S.A. from the arms race�- Russia wouldneed up to 3.500 SNW, i.e. 40 billion rou-bles or 17% of the defence budget and fi-

nally, the fourth scenario � �deterrent fromconventional, wide-raging attack� suggests6.000 SNW, i.e. 50 billion rouble or 25%of the defence budget39 .

Having in mind the still lasting inert-ness of the military-industrial complex,such considerations demonstrate the ten-dency to maintain Russia as a militarisedauthoritarian state. However, the state-ments that Russia is able to implementthe scenarios by �tightening its belt� arequestionable. Verification of the economicvalidity of the described scenarios is com-plicated particularly as there is no trans-parency in Russia�s defence budget. Forexample, who could describe the state ofRussia�s conventional armament in the caseof the fourth scenarios, without sayingnothing about the living conditions ofRussia�s citizens or the perspectives of thecivil society?

Meanwhile, according to AlexeiArbatov and Aleksandr Golts, Moscowshould give preference to the model thatprojects to reduce the SNW to 1.500, todecrease the military personnel to 0,8million and to change the ratio between

maintenance and investment portions ofdefence budget to 50 � 50% in the longrun40 . In that case it should be said thatthe Russian leadership has come to theconclusion that nuclear deterrent does notautomatically mean having a nuclear par-ity with the USA. Nevertheless this modelwill allow modernising of conventionalforce structure able to operate not onlyat the frontiers of the former Soviet Un-ion, but eventually realising the claims ofa great power (e.g. qualified for militaryactions in the Balkans).

All the discussions demonstrate thatthe crucial factor in defining Russia�s longterm strategy is not the number of SNWand the quantity of conventional forces,but the principle response to the ques-tion, what will be the evolution of Rus-sia�s political system and how Russia seesits position in the international system?

Undoubtedly, The Second ChechnyaWar plays a major role in the future ofRussia�s political system. As for the warin Chechnya, its continuation enablesPutin to keep public opinion in mobili-zation mode and to accuse the opposi-

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tion of any sins he pleases, from insuffi-cient patriotism to treason. For the sec-ond time, Russia is burying its potentialfor economic development in Chechnya.There is now little room for manoeuvrein the economy - the positive effect ofdevaluation has worn off, world oil pricesare falling, the debt crisis continues andthe temptation to soften the blows byprinting money as elections roll around,will only worsen the financial situation41 .

Putin is not going to be drawn intoanother Afghanistan, nor is he going towithdraw from Chechnya. It should notbe forgotten that Putin�s appealing forassurance of national security in internalpolitics means, that he behaves as writtenin the textbooks of realism � he empha-sised that the main political function ofnational security is the validation and le-gitimating of the use of force and weak-ening of internal opponents. Suchthoughts re-emphasise the inertness of thedirection towards the military authori-tarianism.

Regardless of the fact that the war inChechnya revealed the limitations of Rus-

sia�s existing military capabilities, it an-nually costs of about 25% of the defencebudget and Russia�s losses rise to 2.500with 8.000 wounded in action42 theKremlin is not going to fall back. Takinginto account the support of Russia�s pub-lic opinion for the military campaign, itis hard so far to forecast eventualities,which can be seen in connection with thecurrent information on the new politicalinitiatives, helping to solve the problemand able to symbolize the shift from thecourse towards the military authoritari-anism.

Conclusions

It is always hard to forecast Russia andparticularly in the meantime, when Rus-sia propagates the idea of specific devel-opment and stands for the idea of a multi-polar global order. In addition, the in-fluence of multiple specific economic,social and cultural factors is unpredict-able for the still on going post-commu-nist transformation in this part of theworld. That is why the answers to all ques-

tions related to Russian security, its di-rection and perspectives of its militarycomponents, could hardly be given withmuch certainty.

Nevertheless, all analysed aspects ofRussia�s military reform confirm the di-lemma: Will Russia choose the way ofthe modern, though authoritarian, statewith a wide-range social-political base,modernised (civilian control, profession-alism, modern armament) as well as car-rying the functions of minimal deter-rent army; or will Russia take the direc-tion towards the military authoritarian-ism, i.e. will it still desperately lay claimsto the status of superpower, will it allowthe military-industrial complex to mani-fest by inertia and to dominate the So-viet-type office generals standing for theideas of the Soviet-type conscription?Fundamentally it means a conditionaldecline of the living conditions in Rus-sia and stagnation in the developmentof civil society.

The context analysed reveals the neces-sity of Western political and diplomaticpressure on Russia�s military sector. At

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the same time it is essential to promotethe segments of market economy and civilsociety, to encourage the Kremlin to findthe political solution in the SecondChechnya War, to evolve from the modelof Soviet (Prussian) military sector. Vari-ous military servicemen training and re-training programmes, opening of theworld armament market for the reformedRussian military-industrial complexwould be helpful.

1 Baev P., �Putin�s military reform. Two Trajec-tories for the First Presidency� � The NorwegianAtlantic Committee, Security Policy Library, 2001,No. 6, p. 4 � 6, �Prospects for Military Reform inRussia� in http://www.ceip.org/files/events/asp?pr=2

2 Sokut S., �Russia�s Priority State Interests� inNezavysimoe Voennoje Obozrenie, 17 - 13 May1999, No. 17.

3 Sokov N., �The �Tactical Weapons Scare� of2001�, CNS Reports in http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/raports

4 Shukshin A., �Russia�s Putin Praises Army,Promotes Generals� in Reuters, 21 February 2000,Johnson�s Russia List, No. 4125.

5 Trenin D., �Russia�s Military in Crisis� inhttp://www.carnegie.ru

6 Smith A., �Russian Chronology. January �March 2001�, CSRS, London, 2001, p. 51.

7 Mukhin V., �Reshuffle Brings Putin People tothe Top�, The Russia Journal, http://www.russia-journal.com/index.cgi, May 4, 2001.

8 �Radical Military Reform Finally Takes off inPost-Soviet Russia�, April 6, 2001 in http://www.wps.ru/chitalka/military/en/; �Russia�sIvashov Expected to Lose His Job�, AssociatedPress, 3 July 2001.

9 Bennett G. Ivanov, The New Russian DefenceMinister, CSRS Occasional Brief, London, 2001,No. 81, p. 3 � 5.

10 Mukhin V, Op. Cit.11 Antonenko O., �Putin�s �New� National Secu-

rity Team�, IISS Reports, March 29, 2001. Golts A.,�Civilian Goes to Top, but Same Old Approach� inThe Russia Journal, http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi, March 30, 2001.

From the perspective of �secrecy-openness� aninterview with Kudelina is eloquent: �LyubovKudelina: vopros ob otmene lgot voenosluzhaschim nestojit�, April 2, 2001 in http://www.strana.ru/

12 For instance, daily bread allowance is 750gram per head. In reality 150 - 200 gram. Formore details, see Bogachov D. Osobenosti polevojkuchni in Argumenty i Fakty, July 2001, No. 27, p.6; Sivkova V. Kto kormit armiju? in Argumenty iFakty, July 2001, No. 27, p. 6.

13 Golts A., �The Russian Military�s Exercises inFutility� in The Russia Journal, http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi, February 24,2001.

14 �Sergej Ivanov: Plody Voennoj Reformy Pojavitsianie Ranshe 2004 g� in Izvestia, June 25, 2001.

15 Golts A., �Signals of Reform, but under SovietPrinciples� in The Russia Journal, http://www.russiajournal.com/index.cgi, May 4, 2001.Orlov A., Vladimir Putin Odobril Plany Voenychin http://www.strana.ru/

16 Golts A., �Battle begins Over Russia�s DefenseBudget Cash� in The Russia Journal, July 7, 2001.

17 �Sergej Ivanov: Plody Voenoj Reformy�� ; GoltsA., �Battle Begins Over Russia�s Budget Cash�;Mukhin V., �Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the Top�.

18 Golts A., �Signals of Reforms, but under SovietPrinciples�.

19 Golts A., �Why the Generals don�s want a Profes-sional Army� in The Russia Journal, April 24, 2001.V Blizhaischije 5 let v Rosiji ne budet ProfesionalnojArmiji in http://www.strana.ru, June 5, 2001.

20 Egorov I., Genshatb: Rosija ne Gotova kProfesionalnoj Armiji in http://www.strana.ru, No-vember 11, 2000.

21 Zisk K., �Putin and the Russian Military�, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/; Wallander C. A.,�Conference Report. December 2000�, http://www.fas.harvard.edu/ponars/; �Soldiers WorryAbout Road to Civilian Life� in The Russia Jour-nal, May 15, 2001.

22 Smith M. A., �A Russian Chronology. October-December 2000�, London, 2000, p. 58.

23 Golts, �Signals of Reform, but under Soviet Princi-ples; Minoborony i Genshtab Chiotko RazgranichatFunkciji�, http://www.strana.ru, March 29, 2001.Orlov A, Kadrovyje perestanovki v Minoborony budutpoetapnymi, http://www.strana.ru, April 26, 2001.

24 Arzumanova M. Silovyje, Organy Nuzhno

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Reformirovat v Komplekse, in http://www.strana.ru,April 2, 2001; Baev P, Op. Cit, p. 9.

25 Korotchenko I., Generalnyj Shtab Zhdut Peremenyin Nezavosymoje Voennoje Obozrenije, June 15,2001.

26 Orlov A., Op. Cit.27 Mukhin V., �Reshuffle Brings Putin People to the

Top�.28 Golts A., �Signals of Reform, but under Soviet

Principles�.29 Golts A., �Russia�s Superpower Illusions go up in

Smoke� in The Russia Journal, http://russiajournal.com/index.cgi, May 18, 2001.

30 �Status Report: Nuclear Weapons, Fissile Materialand Export Controls in the Former Soviet Union�, CNSPrint Publication, 2001, http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/print/nsr2.htm

31 Ibidem, p. 14 � 17, 19.32 Golts A., �Kremlin Moves to Rekindle Cold War

Missile Plan� in The Russia Journal, June 28, 2001.33 Op. Cit.34 �Prospects for Military Reform in Russia� in http:/

/www.ceip.org/files/events/trenin.asp35 Golts A., �Greedy Bureaucrats Hinder Defense Re-

form� in The Russia Journal, April 4, 2001.36 The details were presented by Yuri Baluyevski,

Head of the General Staff�s Chief OperationsDepartment in Mukhin V., �Reshuffle Brings PutinPeople to the Top�.

37 Golts A., �Battle Begins over Russia�s BudgetCash�.

38 Mukhin V., �Reshuffle Brings Putin People to theTop�.

39 Solovjov V., Rosija Drognula Pered AmerikanskojNPRO in Nezavisimoje Voenoje Obozrenije, June22, 2001.

40 Arbatov A., �The Transformation of RussianMilitary Doctrine: Lessons Learned from Kosovo andChechnya�, The Marshall Centre Papers, 2000, No.2, p. 15 � 26; Golts A., �Kremlin Moves to RekindleCold War Missile Plan�.

41 Stephen Ch., �Changes in Power Structure� inThe Scotsman, May 10, 2001.

42 Trenin D., �Russia�s Military in Crisis� in http://www.carnegie.ru

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n literature, the Baltic States are usu-ally called �small� although their total

area is not that unimportant at all. It isroughly as large as two thirds of North-ern Germany or the UK, it comprisesabout half of Japan or California and itis about one and a half times larger thanthe area of the BeNeLux states (Belgium,the Netherlands and Luxembourg). Re-garding transport and commerce, theBaltic States are perfectly situated betweenEastern and Western Europe. They areagriculturally self-sufficient. Shale in Es-tonia and waterpower in Lithuania andespecially Latvia create optimal conditionsfor power generation and the industrialdevelopment of these states. After WorldWar II, oil fields even were found in

The Military situationin the Baltic States11111

By Mr. Edgars Andersons

Lithuania and Latvia. The forests in theBaltic States, especially in Latvia, can beregarded as one of their great natural riches.Moreover, the Baltic States are not as poorin mineral resources as commonly assumed.An important factor in the Baltic Stateswas the development of industry based onlocal materials, but that later turned into aspecialization in electrical engineering, pre-cision instruments, chemistry and similarbranches. This industry, especially in Latvia,could more easily compete with the greatpowers on the world market. The long coastof the Baltic Sea with its great ports, espe-cially Riga, Ventspils (Windau), Liepâja(Liebau), Tallinn (Reval) and Klaipeda(Memel), is of considerable economicimportance for the Baltic States. Although

the Baltic Sea gives access to the AtlanticOcean, one should pay attention to thefact that it belongs to the so-called bor-der seas, which creates certain militarydifficulties. The Baltic States are also anatural focal point for international traf-fic routes in the air, on railroads androads. The land�s surface is mostly verysuitable for the building of transportinfrastrucure.2

However, the military situation of theBaltic States must be regarded as highlydangerous. They are in the northern sec-tion of a long and narrow line of smallerstates that are an obstacle for access fromRussian territory to the Atlantic Ocean,the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.One should always be aware of the fact

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that the Russian empire, known today asthe Union of Soviet Socialist Republics(USSR), makes up one sixth of the earth�stotal surface area. The situation of theBaltic States was aggravated by the factthat access to the Baltic Sea was easiest pre-cisely in their territory. This fact poses aserious threat to the independence of theBaltic peoples as long as the Russian em-pire exists and the non-Russian peoples thatare under Russian influence (about one halfof the general population) do not gain sov-ereignty. To the rear of the Baltic people �in the West � is the open sea. TheScandinavian peoples on the other side,remembering their sad experiences in thepast, have always tried to stay away fromthe problems of the European continentand especially of the Baltics and to remainin relative isolation on the ScandinavianPeninsula. However, the Baltic and Finno-Ugrian people have been able to stay onthe coasts of the Baltic Sea for more than4.000 years although they have lost wideareas in Northern and Central Russia.3

The German Empire bordered the Bal-tic States in the Southwest. Just like in

the Middle Ages, it has been a serious threatto the independence of the Baltic Statesin modern times. But centuries-old expe-rience has taught the Germans that theBaltic �horn� � situated far in the North-east and under German rule � has alwaysbeen extremely difficult to defend and,thus, constantly endangered in militaryterms.4 Therefore, the opinion has devel-oped that support for the bastion of theindependent Baltic States and an encour-agement of the right of self-determinationof the Baltic people against the presump-tions and the pressure of the non-Balticpeople (especially those of the Russians),would be the best solution for the Ger-man interests.5 Unfortunately, this under-standing came to late.

An extremely unfavourable factor isthe small Baltic population. Only six mil-lion people live in the area, among theman unusually high number of descendantsof late immigrants such as Russians, Poles,Germans, Jews, White Russians, Swedishand others. Estonia and Lithuania (exceptfor the areas of Petseri, Vilnius, andKlaipeda) were nationally quite uniform,

whereas Latvia�s situation in this respectwas threatened. In recent years, as muchas 25% of Latvia�s population has beennon-Latvian.6

Another negative factor was the centu-ries-old alienation between the Baltic peo-ple and lack of a sense of community.Even while the Baltic States were independ-ent, little was done to remedy this situa-tion. Only when the threatening cloudsof World War II started gathering did,the Baltic peoples realize that they shareda common destiny. But then it was toolate to combine their powers on a largescale.7

In international literature one can findthe view that the independence of theBaltic States was just a short incident inworld history and that the Baltic peopledid not play a part in political, economicand military terms in the past. This opin-ion is completely wrong. In the course ofhistory, the fact went unnoticed that theBaltic and Finno-Ugrian people have beenable to stay in their present areas of settle-ment for 4,000 to 5,000 years, that about2,000 B.C. the Baltic peoples inhabited

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an area that extended from the Urals tothe Oder and from Estonia to CentralPoland and that from the birth of Christup to the sixth century the Baltic tribes,had reached a cultural peak that was quiteremarkable compared to their neigh-bours.8 For several centuries, the Latvianand Estonian tribes not only resisted thesimultaneous pressure of the Scandinavianand Slavic tribes, but also started coun-terattacks into the areas of the Swedes,Danes and Slavs.9 The Baltic peoplesshowed unusual persistence and braveryand were militarily successful against en-emies that often were technically betterequipped during the crusades. The Esto-nians� fight for freedom against theSwedes, Danes and Germans lasted from1191 to 122710 and the resistance of Latviaagainst the combined German powerslasted considerably longer � from 1186 to1290. The Order of the Brothers of theSword was destroyed and the LivonianOrder was severely beaten.11

The Lithuanians not only managed tohold their ground against intruders, butalso enlarged the area under their con-

trol several times until it stretched fromthe Baltic Sea to the Black Sea, becom-ing the largest state in medieval Europe.12

The combined powers of the Poles andthe Lithuanians stopped the advance ofthe Tartars and the Mongols towards Eu-rope, saved several Russian areas fromthe Mongolian yoke, slowed down theGermans� drive towards the East by beat-ing the German Order in 1410, and ab-sorbed the Ottomans� advance towardsthe Holy Roman Empire.13 Unfortu-nately, the Lithuanians lost their politi-cal and even cultural independence to aconsiderable extent during the unionwith Poland, although kings from theLithuanian Jagellons-Dynasty governedboth states for several centuries.14 ThePoles on their part made a historic mis-take when they tried to subjugate notonly the people of the states they hadconquered � White Russians, Ukrainiansand Latvians � but also the Lithuanians,who were their allies and much larger innumber. The Poles were not interestedin a confederation in which these peo-ples would have had equal rights.15 This

mistake cost the Poles, as well as the un-fortunate peoples who were linked tothem, dearly.

Although the German conquerorssaved the Latvians and Estonians frombecoming assimilated by the masses of theSlavs, connected them with Western cul-ture and did not try to Germanise them,they committed a crucial mistake in ex-ploiting these peoples in the interest ofGerman squires and merchants ever moremercilessly. A deep rift opened up betweenthe German immigrants and the nativepeoples, a rift that weakened the bastionof Livonia and was hard to overcome.Although Latvian and Estonian unitsfought bravely under their own com-manders, together with German troops ofthe Livonian League against the Russianintruders in several battles, the LivonianLeague fell apart. The conflict between theleading groups was to blame for this. Inthe following centuries the leading Ger-man social classes mainly tried to defendtheir own interests and privileges and failedto unite the native peoples against the su-premacy of foreign states.16

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Although the local landowners sub-jected the majority of Latvians, Estoni-ans, and Lithuanians to serfdom, thesepeoples did not lose their national andmilitary spirit even under the most se-vere conditions. The great Estonian re-volt of 1343 against Danish and Germansupremacy, which liberated the whole ofNorthern Estonia for a short period,proved this.17 In 1372, the Lithuaniansconquered the Kremlin in Moscow.18

During the Livonian War Latvian andEstonian peasant armies operated.19 Unitsof Latvian soldiers were among the troopsof Sweden and the Dukedom of Courland.Latvian soldiers fought not only in theirnative country, but also in Poland, Aus-tria, and the Netherlands and some sol-diers and seamen even showed up in thecolonies of the Dukedom of Courland,in Africa and America.20 In 1560, the Es-tonians even liberated a part of theircountry again for a short period oftime.21 During the Great Nordic War,twelve Latvian infantry battalions and ar-tillery units fought on the Swedish side.22

When Latvia and Estonia fell under Rus-

sian control, soldiers of these peoples werein Russia�s army and fleet, where they heldpositions at the end of the 19th and thebeginning of the 20th century.23 DuringNapoleon�s invasion and during theCrimean War, there were purely Latviannavy and army units in the fight againstthe invaders.24 When the Lithuanians cameunder Russian control, the opposite hap-pened. Lithuanian units volunteered forthe fight against the Russians in 1812.25

In the part of Lithuania that had fallen toPrussia, the Prussian army had two Lithua-nian cavalry regiments for many years.26

The times of the Russian administra-tion were nevertheless the hardest trial forthe Baltic peoples. Several revolts, under-taken by Estonians, Latvians and Lithua-nians against the local authorities of theRussian, German-Baltic and Polish land-owners and against the Russian adminis-tration, clearly show this. These uprisingsreached their peak in the great Polish-Lithuanian revolutions of 1830-1831 and1863-186527 , the Estonian Mahtras Warof 185828 , and the bloody revolution ofall three Baltic people, but especially of

the Latvians and Estonians, in 1905, whenthese countries were more or less undercontrol by their own people.29 Lithua-nian and, in smaller numbers, also Latvianemigrants also took part in the AmericanCivil War. The first victim of this warwas the Latvian Martiò¿ Buciò¿.30 Dur-ing the Spanish-American War, Lithuanianemigrants even sent their own militaryunits.31 All the above shows that the pe-riod of oppression that lasted for centu-ries could not suppress the national con-sciousness and the instinct for truth, jus-tice and solidarity among the Baltic peo-ple. Latvians and Estonians not only hadtraining opportunities in the Russianarmy and fleet, but were also able to gainexperience in the highest commandingpositions. The Catholic Lithuanians werenot accepted as officers into the Russianarmed forces.32 Instead the political lead-ers of Lithuania had � due to the longperiod of proud independence � the clear-est and the farthest-reaching political goal:the restoration of Lithuania�s independ-ence. The part of the Lithuanian popula-tion that was under Russian control was

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more strongly oppressed economically andculturally than the other Baltic people.Although the political goals of the Latviansand Estonians were not as far-reaching asthose of the Lithuanians, these peopleswere able to create a solid economic andcultural foundation for greater self-deter-mination and, eventually, for independ-ence. 33

The lessons of World War I andthe fight for freedom

Since 1795, all the Baltic states, withthe exception of a small area in Prussiainhabited by Lithuanians, were under Rus-sian rule. Except for the short period ofNapoleon�s invasion, the Baltic peoplesdid not have the slightest hope of gettingrid of the Russian control. A pact withGermany would only have meant strength-ening of the local German oligarchy. Be-cause of the Polish weakness and lack ofunderstanding, the Lithuanians bitterlyregretted their co-operation with themduring the revolutions of 1830 and 1863.The Russian Revolution of 1905 gave rise

to greater hopes among the Baltic peo-ple; the majority of the local leaders, how-ever, even then only hoped for an au-tonomy of their peoples Only unusuallybig international changes could help theBaltic peoples to gain the longed-for in-dependence. Extremely favourable condi-tions were created by World War I, theBolshevik Revolution in Russia, the col-lapse of the German Empire, the right ofself-determination of the people pro-claimed by the Entente and the wide-spread economic and political prepared-ness of the Baltic peoples for an independ-ent life.

The Baltic region � just like in earliergreat wars � became a battleground rightat the beginning of World War I, a factthat did harm especially to Lithuania andLatvia. The native soldiers that were mo-bilized in the Baltic area had to withstandfirst the advance of the German army, butlater also had to undertake the first inva-sion into East Prussia. Tens of thousandsof Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian sol-diers were put into Russian units, wherethey fought bravely under the command

of incompetent and corrupt Russian gen-erals. Right from the beginning of thewar, the soldiers showed excellent brav-ery, steadfastness, and contempt for death.Observers of the Battle of Augustova com-pared the 20 Russian Corps, which wasalmost completely comprised of the Bal-tic soldiers, to Napoleon�s guards. The suc-cess of the Baltic soldiers was described asthe Russians� success by the press. Roughly20.000 Latvians, as many Lithuanians, andmany Estonians fell in the name of Rus-sia�s glory, their people not gaining anyadvantages by that.34 In the big rearguardactions, however, two Latvian garrison-battalions were able to draw attention; 70%of the men were wiped out.35

Latvian politicians achieved the crea-tion of national Latvian light-infantryunits. From 1 August 1915 and onwards,they consisted of some battalions, later ofeight combat regiments and one reserveregiment that were combined in two bri-gades, for a short period in one divi-sion.36 These units, commanded by theirown officers, broke through the Germanfront lines several times by using new tac-

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tics and rescued Russian units out of hope-less situations. Due to their bravery andsuccesses they were so different from Rus-sian units, that they drew the attentionnot only of Western military observers,but also of the international press.37 Un-fortunately, these excellent Latvian unitswere thirsty for glory and wanted to getattention and thus let themselves get ma-noeuvred into hopeless situations, pay-ing a high toll of lives during the offen-sive of July 1916 and the heroic offensivesof Christmas 1916 and New Year 1917.They all led to negative reactions amongthe soldiers. The complete national-Latvianunits consisted of approximately 45,000men. About 10,000 Latvian soldiers foundtheir death in these units, e.g. during thedefence of Riga in September 1917.38 Alltogether about 35,000 Latvian soldiers fellin Latvian and Russian units during WordWar I.39 The Latvian soldiers found a wayof drawing the attention of the Russiansand their allies to their victims, but theLatvian people did not gain any advan-tages from these victims of World War I.Only after the Revolution of 1917 did

two Latvian regions � Vidzeme andKurzeme � get autonomy; Latgale did notreceive it, and the whole area of Latviawas not united into one national terri-tory. After all, the Russian governmenthad to take into account the morale amongthe Latvian units.40

The Estonian political leaders were longin doubt whether it was worthwhile hav-ing the Russian government draw up Es-tonian national units. They were afraidthat all Estonian units might be annihi-lated in one single battle, whereas with adistribution of the soldiers along thewhole, long Russian front, there was hopethat the basis of the Estonian peoplewould survive.41 Yet in the end, the opin-ion prevailed that national units wouldbe necessary for the achievements of theirpolitical goals. On 21 April, the first Es-tonian infantry regiment was formed.42

Due to the weakness and the retreat ofneighbouring Russian units, this regi-ment suffered a great deal when defend-ing its positions, just as the Latvian regi-ments did.43 Only as late as 19 December,did the Estonians get permission to es-

tablish an Estonian division, somethingthey had really done already. In contrastto the Latvian brigades, who were pureinfantry units, the Estonian division wasallowed to raise an artillery brigade, a cav-alry regiment and a technical unit.44

Maybe because the units were formed solate, the commanders of the Estonian di-vision (in contrast to the Latvian com-manders) managed to avoid militarily andpolitically unnecessary bloodshed and toprevent a distribution of the Estonianunits across Russia after the breakdownof the front. Some Latvian units brokeup; others were transferred to Russia,where, after the Bolshevik Revolution,they were forced to fight as a special divi-sion for the Bolsheviks, while their homewas being occupied by German troops.45

Later, an Estonian soviet-division wasformed in Russia.46

As the representatives of the Lithua-nian people abroad had demanded fullindependence right at the beginning ofthe war, the commanders of the Russianarmed forces tried to prevent the forma-tion of national Lithuanian units. The

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first four Lithuanian battalions and twosquadrons were created as late as Augustand September 1917.47 Many Latvian andEstonian officers were in the Russianarmy, even in the highest ranks, but therewere only few Lithuanian officers. Towardsthe end of the war, Lithuanians weretrained as officers in spite of their reli-gious belief. Now there were some Lithua-nian officers among the lower ranks, butthere were virtually none in the higherranks. Those soldiers who remained onthe Bolshevik side after the revolution dis-persed for the most part.48

In February and March 1918, units ofthe Estonian division � in co-operationwith the Germans � helped liberate thelater proclaimed Estonian Republic, but inMarch the German military administra-tion disarmed the Estonian units; onlybadly armed militias remaining.49

The Lithuanians did not do any bet-ter. In January 1918, a Lithuanian battal-ion deserted to the Germans in the Rovnoarea in the Ukraine. Until August, theGermans used this battalion for garrisonduties, but then sent it to Lithuania, where

it was immediately disbanded.50 The Ger-man authorities did not approve of theformation of Lithuanian self-protectionunits. As the Latvians were considered tobe the most radical, all men fit for servicethat had been in the Russian army werebrought into prison camps.51

The Latvian light-infantry units thatwere distributed across all of Russia wereof greatest importance on the front inthe Russian Civil War. To a certain de-gree, this was also true of the EstonianSoviet-units. These units showed extraor-dinary bravery, discipline, and sense ofresponsibility in the fulfilment of mili-tary tasks under the command of theirown officers. They also differed very muchfrom the revolutionary Russian units, that� for the most part � were very undisci-plined. 52 Some Latvian and Estonianofficers who were cast away in Russia werealso appointed to highest position in thearmed forces of Soviet Russia. They com-manded brigades, divisions, armies andeven army groups and fronts.53 TheLatvian Colonel Joachims Vacietis waseven in command of the whole armed

forces during critical times.54 Latvian unitsheld the front and won the battles ofKasan�j, Orla, Perekop and others, thatdecided the outcome of the Civil War.55

Military observers of the Entente and Ger-many acknowledged the importance of theLatvian units and tried to win them over.All of them, however, made a crucial mis-take because they regarded the Latvians asmercenaries that would fight in the nameof anything for money, but they did notpromise independence and social justice.56

Two Latvian regiments and a Lithuanianbattalion nonetheless fought for the alliesin the Far East, where they sustained heavylosses, while the Estonian legion played arole in Northern Russia.

When the German Empire collapsed,the national governments of Estonia,Latvia and Lithuania had the chance tostart their work. Although Soviet Russiahad given up the Baltics in the Treatiesof Berlin and Brest-Litovsk, its govern-ment nonetheless tried to re-conquer themafter Germany�s breakdown.

World War I was over. The right ofself-determination for the people had been

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declared, and the League of Nations hadbeen founded. But several small states,among them the Baltic States, still had tofight hard to protect their independence.The Baltic States were dragged into theconflict between the communist and anti-communist powers, into the imperialis-tic contest of several states and into theattempts by the communist and anti-com-munist Russian governments to get theBaltic States under their control again.57

The proclamation of independence bythe Baltic States was not sufficient. TheBaltic States had to use their own armedforces in order to defend their nationalinterests. The leaders of the Baltic Stateshad to recognize that the Western powersignored the right of self-determinationthat they themselves had declared58 andthat they only took advantage of the Bal-tic States in their own national interestand in order to get support for the anti-communist forces in Russia. Moreover,these leaders did not get any promise of afuture independence for the Baltic peo-ple.59 The democratic government of Ger-many, which approved of Baltic independ-

ence in principle, was too weak to influ-ence the huge administrational and mili-tary machinery, which for the most partwas led or influenced by people who werein favour of imperialism. Some of theGerman revolutionary forces on their partsympathized with or were against any con-tinuation of the war against Soviet Rus-sia in the interest of the Entente. The lat-ter did not promise any support for Ger-many�s victims nor consider any compen-sation in the peace treaty.60 The eigth andtenth German armies were supposed todefend the Baltic region until the BalticStates were able to defend themselves. Butwar-weary and influenced by Bolshevikpropaganda, they retreated to the Germanborders and dispersed.61 The voluntaryunits that took their place came underthe influence of politically short-sightedand reactionary people. After some suc-cessful battles against the Bolshevik forcesthat threatened not only the Baltic Statesbut also Germany, these people manoeu-vred the voluntary units into the fightagainst the anti-communist forces in theBaltic States. The best example was the

Battle of Cesis (Wenden) in June 1919against the Estonian and Latvian troops.The German armies could have gained thestatus of liberators of the Baltic States, ashad happened in Finland. But instead theyearned the eternal hatred and suspicion ofEstonia and Latvia. If the Battle of Cesishad ended with victory for the Germantroops, this would have been reason enoughfor an occupation of Germany by the ar-mies of the Entente. We have to empha-size that the attack on the Estonian andLatvian troops was made although the Ger-man command had given contrary orders.A disadvantageous outcome of the Battleat Cesis would have exposed the BalticStates to a complete pincer movement bythe Bolsheviks. But the national forces won,and the German reputation was severelydamaged.62

All of the above shows that the BalticStates could not rely on any declarations.They really needed their own armed forces.Similarly, strong co-operation was essen-tial.

When World War I was coming to anend, only Estonia was practically able to

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form a small army in a short period oftime. The largest part of the forces, in-cluding the commanding ranks, had sur-vived, but they were lacking arms andmoney. German help was very reluctantand small. Support by the British fleetand the Finns was most important, butnevertheless the Estonians had to relymainly on their own abilities, their re-sourcefulness and their toughness.63

The majority of the Latvian soldierswere in Russia or in German Prisoner ofWar camps. The Latvian troops that werein Russia were used by the Russian Sovietgovernment to oppose in the name of aSoviet Latvia the Latvian national gov-ernment. At that time, the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of SovietRussia was the Latvian Colonel JoachimsVacietis, who was a Latvian patriot, butstill was loyal to Russia�s Soviet govern-ment, hoping to find support for Latvia�sindependence there.64 At first, there wereno soldiers, no weapons, and no moneyin Latvia. There was a very radical atmos-phere among the population, who hadsuffered tremendously during the war.

This situation was aggravated by the nega-tive attitude of the leaders of the Germancivilian government and of the majorityof the military commanders towardsLatvian independence and the creation ofthe national Latvian forces. These peoplewere still influenced by imperialistic andcolonialistic ideas.65

In Lithuania, the military units were bet-ter preserved, but they did not have anyqualified officers, weapons, or money. AsLithuania was right on the Russian-Germanborder and as Germany as well as Lithuaniawas in conflict with Poland, the Germangovernment agreed upon partial support forthe state of Lithuania. This support droppedwhen Lithuania made official claims for theKlaipeda (Memel) region.66

All the Baltic States were economicallyextremely weakened. Furthermore, Latviaand, to a large extent, Lithuania were verymuch destroyed. Financial and economicsupport by the Western powers was verysmall and came under very unfavourableconditions. Weapons and other materialdelivered was mostly worn out and dam-aged.67

The Baltic States, that were virtuallyforeign to one another, started some kindof diplomatic co-operation, especiallyLatvia, Estonia and Finland, whereasLithuania was only partially involved. Butthe newly formed military forces oper-ated independently from one another.68

Yet, some remarkable examples of co-operation should be mentioned as theyalways ended with important military orpolitical victories that gave the states in-volved the same advantages and sense ofsecurity. The co-operation between theEstonian and the Latvian Northern Armyin the battles at Cesis and Jugla (Jegel) inJune and July 1919 should be especiallymentioned, although the neutrality of theLatvian Southern Group, which was un-der German control, was a negative fac-tor.69 The Estonian army also covered andprotected a part of the Latvian border inthe East until December 1919. In the sum-mer of 1919, it actively took part in thefights against the Bolshevik forces that werethreatening Latvia.70 The Lithuanian armyon its part held its ground against theBermondt Army without any Estonian or

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Latvian support for a long time and fi-nally defeated it. This was in the interestof all the Baltic States.71 Unfortunately,one has to point out the belated co-op-eration between the Latvian and Lithua-nian armies in November 1919 in thisconnection. The Lithuanians are not re-ally to blame for their late involvementbecause they had to fear possible aggres-sion by the Polish troops.72 Despite thefact that Poland did not recognize an in-dependent Lithuania, but was aiming at aPolish-Lithuanian Union, Poland prom-ised not to take advantage of Lithuania�ssituation during the threat by Bermondt.Its army even protected the Eastern bor-der of Lithuania, while the largest part ofLithuania�s troops was involved in fightswith Bermondt.73 Co-operation betweenthe Latvian and Polish armies during theoffensive in January 1920 against the So-viet forces was very successful. We have tostress that Poland was the only big statethat did not demand any payment for itshelp.74

To be historically true, we must alsoemphasize that Germany, whose voluntary

units liberated Western Latvia, helpedwith the formation of new Latvian troopsfrom January until May 191975 and sup-ported the Lithuanian army just as long,did not receive any compensation.76

The considerable help to Estonia bythe Royal Navy from December 1918 un-til January 1920 has to be mentioned aswell as the support by British and Frenchnaval units during the fights of theLatvian army against the Bermondt Armyin October and November 1919. The pres-ence of the British fleet itself was somekind of guarantee and moral support forthe independence fighters in the BalticStates.77

The Russian Soviet government, who -at the beginning of the invasion � hadtolerated the formation of military forcesby the Soviet governments in Latvia,Lithuania, and Estonia for political rea-sons, later tolerated their disintegrationbecause of new political considerationsand made peace with the national gov-ernments of the Baltic States. The real rea-son for this disintegration of the Baltic

Soviet troops was the violent and shortsighted politics of the Soviet governmentand the aversion of the troops themselvesto fighting against national forces. Mostof the Baltic soldiers mobilized by theSoviets found ways of going over to thenational forces in order to continue theirfight together with them.78

Viewed in its entirety, another nega-tive factor was the insignificant mutualdemands by the Baltic States to correctthe borderlines that were a disadvantageto the common military and politicaloutline.79 However, the Baltic States wereable to solve their problems rather early,in 1920 and 1921.

During the wars of liberation of theBaltic States, only two attempts weremade to consolidate the action of thearmed forces. The British General Frank.G. March initiated the first one on 26August 1919. The anti-Bolshevik troopsof General Yudenich, Estonian andLatvian troops, the anti-Bolshevik Rus-sian-German troops of Bermondt as wellas the Polish and the Lithuanian armies

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were supposed to start a common offen-sive against the Bolshevik troops.80 Thesecond attempt, initiated by the BritishGeneral Arthur J. Turner, was made on6 January 1920 and was supposed to cre-ate a military alliance among the BalticStates. Representatives of the Estonian,Latvian, and Lithuanian armies agreedin Valga/Valka (Walk) upon regular meet-ings and the standardization of war ma-terial, but a political agreement or a de-fensive alliance did not follow this meet-ing. The political leaders of the BalticStates missed a unique chance to gaingreater security and international pres-tige for their states.81

After initial misjudgement of what washappening and apathy in the history ofthe wars of liberation, one could witnessa spontaneous growth and more strengthamong the national forces. A clear exam-ple is the formation of a national armyin Latvia.82 Estonia showed the greateststability. Latvia showed the same level ofstability after it had overcome difficul-ties that originated from external andinternal negative forces. There was less sta-

bility in Lithuania. The interference inpolitics by the army often created dan-gerous situations that could have endedwith a catastrophe.83 Latvia and partlyEstonia, too, were negatively influencedby the service of some of their troops inthe Latvian and Estonian Soviet divi-sions. However, these divisions, whichfought at the heart of the Red Army andwon crucial victories over anti-Soviet Rus-sian forces that were averse to independ-ence of the Baltic States, indirectly helpedto secure the independence of the BalticStates.84 Yet, one has to keep in mindthat the Baltic States had to fear an at-tack by Soviet Russia through the pe-riod of their independence. The Sovietgovernment was only waiting for theright moment to consolidate its powerin the Baltic States. Such favourable con-ditions developed in 1939/1940 and thenagain in 1944/1945.

Though poorly armed and their ac-tions often impeded by foreign politi-cians, the armies of all three Baltic Stateswere enormously successful on the bat-tlefield.

At the end of the war, the Estoniannational army consisted of 74,500 menand had 39 artillery batteries, 10 armouredtrains, 8 armoured cars, 28 aircraft and10 warships. During the war of libera-tion, the Estonian army lost 3,588 soldiers(2,236 of them fell at the front) and had13,775 injured.85 The Latvian army had �at the end of the war � 76,394 men, 91pieces of artillery, 707 light and heavymachineguns, 5 armoured trains, 8 ar-moured cars, 5 tanks and 19 aircraft. Itlost 3,046 men and had 4,085 injured.86

At the time, the Lithuanian army had60,000 men in four divisions and 3 cav-alry regiments, 48 pieces of artillery, 450heavy machineguns, 4 armoured cars, 1armoured train, and 18 aircraft. Duringthe war, Lithuania lost 614 men and an-other 822 died of their injuries. Therewere 1,175 injured and 154 invalids. 87 InWorld War I, the Latvians had lost about35,000 men, the Lithuanians approxi-mately 15,000. The exact number for Es-tonia is not known. During the Russiancivil war, the Latvians lost at least 20,000men. The Estonian casualties were high

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in number, as well. Lithuanians also foughtin the British and American units thatfought for the Entente in Siberia.

This overview shows the military spiritand the absent fear of death among theBaltic peoples. It also shows that, becauseof the unfavourable geographic situationand the historical conditions, the Balticslost a great part of their �national strength�in the battle for the interests of foreignpowers, without gaining a real advantagefor their own states. Considering theoverall political and military situationas well as the conditions that were unfa-vourable for the independence of theBaltic States, one has to say that the Bal-tic politicians and their military leaderswere very successful and showed extraor-dinary competence in securing the inde-pendence of the Baltic States. Their co-operation could have been more exten-sive, but we have to admit that the Bal-tic States were not really able to help oneanother as they all had to suffer fromthe collapse of the economy that theWorld War I and the exploitation by theoccupying powers had brought about.

The Situation of the Baltic Statesafter the War of Liberation

In the first decade of independence,the leaders of the Baltic States were some-what optimistic about their military situ-ation. They had full confidence in theLeague of Nations and believed that thepeople of the world seriously wanted peaceafter the extraordinarily destructive andbloody World War I. They were fully con-fident also not only about the treatiesmade, but also about the self-interest ofthe great powers, which would not allowone state or a bloc of states to gain con-trol over the Baltic States.88

The leaders of the Baltic States did eve-rything imaginable to foster peace, over-all co-operation and disarmament. Theynot only signed, but also ratified all in-ternational treaties that had these goals.89

It was not the fault of the Baltic States,but because of the egoistic interests ofthe great powers that all these treaties re-mained no more than paper and were notbrought fully to life.

In their resistance to the Soviet Unionand, later, to Nazi Germany, the BalticStates defended the goals of the League ofNations and remained members up to thelast day of their independence.90

The political leaders of the Baltic Statestried to forget that they had not beenaccepted into the League of Nations in1920 only because the other states fearedthat due to their prominent geographi-cal situation, they might have to helpdefend the independence of these states.91

In 1921, at last, the majority of the mem-bers of the League of Nations had thecourage to accept the Baltic States intotheir number.92 The lack of a commonspirit and courage was typical of the ac-tions of the League of Nations during itsentire existence. It was paralyzed by theexaggerated egoism of its member statesand by the lack of intention to seriouslyco-operate and support peace. The mem-bers soon realized that they had to relyon their own moral, economic and mili-tary power. Thus, the smaller states alwaysemphasized their complete neutrality incases of conflicts.

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Hopes that the League of Nationswould guarantee the Baltic States� inde-pendence grew weaker. Yet, the leaders ofthese states believed the victorious pow-ers of World War I would be able to main-tain their leadership position for a longtime and that it was in their interest tosupport the independence of the BalticStates, directly or indirectly.93

But the Baltic States were mistaken inthis respect, as well. They viewed with con-cern the disagreement between the UK,France, the USA, Japan and Italy as well astheir economic and even military compe-tition and their lack of co-operation. How-ever, the two biggest potential threats toBaltic independence, Germany and theSoviet Union, were weak due to war andrevolution, a fact that somewhat lessenedthese worries. Until 1933, the Baltic Stateseven saw a democratic Germany as a guar-antor of independence.94

The gigantic neighbour in the East, theSoviet Union, caused the greatest concern.Although the Baltic States did everythingto give the Soviet Union convenient ac-cess to their ports in order to build eco-

nomic ties with them, it was clear that theloss of the Baltic coast was very painful,not only because of political prestige, butalso for practical reasons. The Gulf of Fin-land, which also meant the Russian partof the Baltic Sea, was covered with ice forsix to seven months of the year. Duringthese months, the navy as well as the mer-chant fleet of Russia were captives of theice and they could not be stationed inthe ports of the Baltic States. It was veryinconvenient for a great power to be de-pendent upon the small Baltic States forthe transport of goods, especially as it reallyhad to fear that these states might soonbe under the influence of hostile greatpowers or power blocs.95

Another concern was the aim of worldrevolution declared by the Soviet Union.A seventh of the Latvian population as wellas a large number of Estonians and Lithua-nians had remained in the Soviet Union.Among these Balts, the flames of hateagainst the democratic governments of theBaltic States were fanned and the Commu-nist Information Bureau (KOMINFORM)supported by the Soviet Union as well as

Baltic organizations in Russia repeatedlypromised the re-introduction of the so-viet system in the Baltic States by revolu-tionary means. 96

Spies, saboteurs and political agitatorswere continuously pouring across theborders of the Soviet Union into theBaltic States. This could not lead to goodrelationships between the Baltic States andthe Soviet Union, although the latter hadbeen the first one to recognize the inde-pendence of the Baltic States and hadwaived all claims to their territory.97

The Baltic States� fear of the SovietUnion was later somewhat calmed by thefact that the most extreme groups wereremoved and those in power wanted toavoid wars as long as the social system wasnot consolidated and the armed forceswere not ready for an offensive.98

The growing military power of NaziGermany was a real concern as well as itsaggressive ideology and its open effortsto expand which were also aimed at theBaltic States and Eastern Europe in gen-eral. From 1933 and onwards, militaryplanners in the Baltic States had to reckon

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with an invasion from the West as well asfrom the East.

At least there was some hope that theneighbouring quarrelling powers wouldnot allow each other to take up positionin the Baltic region, but would rather keepit as a kind of a buffer zone between eachother, at least as long as they did not in-tend any open conflict.99

The self-destructive policy of the West-ern powers and the real, ideological, de-mographical, and military weakness ofPoland, the �fifth European great power�,created real concern among the leaders ofthe Baltic States during the last years be-fore World War II. In Latvia and Estonia,they did not fear any military conflictbetween Lithuania and Poland because ofthe Vilnius area conflict. Still, the latterwas a senseless hindrance to political andmilitary co-operation between all the smallstates situated between Germany and theSoviet Union and to a concept of somekind of defence system in an obviouslyhopeless situation.100

During the first post-war years, Latviaand Estonia regarded the UK as its strong-

est ally, whereas Lithuania saw the samein Germany and Poland in France. To-wards the end of World War I, the Brit-ish were without doubt interested to sup-port the efforts undertaken by the BalticStates to reach independence in order toweaken their enemy, Germany. Moreover,they wanted to create possibly long-last-ing chaos for their potential competitorRussia, no matter whether it was Bolshe-vik or anti-Bolshevik.101 Later, the UKsupported the Baltic States only to pre-vent the Soviet Union from invadingEurope through their territory and inorder to tie them to itself economically.

From the point of view of the UK,the Baltic States were too far away, geo-politically too endangered and economi-cally too unimportant. British militarybases in the Baltic region would have beenin constant danger. They would have beenright on the border zone of Russia andGermany, far away from the British Isles,and their access would have been verycomplicated because of the �closed� char-acter of the Baltic Sea. The missing agree-ment between the Baltic States also pre-

vented the possibility of far-reaching co-operation.102

Representatives of the UK admonishedthe Baltic as well as the Scandinavian Statesrepeatedly during the first post-war yearsto build closer political and military con-nections, but all in vain. It did not onlyseem to be unwise, but also dangerous tomake treaties of military support withseveral small states that did not get alongwith one another.103 The British did notwant to get involved in the meaninglessquarrels among the Baltic States, but theyused them, especially Estonia, as a basefor spying against the Soviet Union.104

After the emergence of the Third Reichof the Nazis, the British were aiming at aconfrontation between the latter and theSoviet Union, hoping both totalitarianpowers would destroy each other with-out the UK getting involved.105 When itbecame fully clear that German policy wasmore dangerous for the Western powersthan the Soviet Union, the UK reluctantlyapproached the Soviet Union shortly be-fore the war to induce Germany to cometo an agreement with the Western pow-

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ers. In this connection, the idea of a guar-antee for the Baltic States was initiated bythe Soviet Union. This suggestion wasdangerous for the Baltic States due to sev-eral suspicious conditions. The UK andFrance were in reality unable to give ef-fective guarantees to the Baltic States asGermany lay between them.106

The interest of France in the BalticStates was different from that of the UK.Both powers were political and economiccompetitors. As long as Germany did notgo directly against the UK economically,the latter was interested in a relativelystrong Germany as a useful business part-ner. However, it was France�s interest tokeep the weakened Germany down as longas possible and to build up a group ofnew allies under the leadership of an en-larged and strengthened Poland east ofGermany replacing Russia, which hadbeen lost as an ally. Moreover, France triedto get back the enormous amounts ofmoney invested in Russia by putting pres-sure on the state.107 Should it have beenpossible to come to a direct agreementwith Germany or the Soviet Union,

France was prepared to leave Poland andthe other East European states to theirfate.108

Nevertheless, there was some exchangeof information between the general staffsof France and the Baltic States. SeveralLatvian officers were trained at Frenchmilitary academies, and most of the Latvianwar ships were built in France.109 But thatwas all.

In the first post-war years, Latvia andEstonia refused to enter a military alli-ance with Poland as long as the latter didnot settle the conflict with Lithuania in away that satisfied both states. Because ofthat, Latvia and Estonia were not evenindirectly integrated into the French sys-tem of military alliances.110

Latvia and Estonia did not directly co-operate with Germany militarily, but Ger-man military literature and German mili-tary know-how were used to a large extent.

Lithuania had close connections withGermany for some time concerning mili-tary supply and the qualification of high-ranking officers.111 For a long time, Ger-many and the Soviet Union played Lithua-

nia off politically against Poland. AlthoughLithuania felt safe from further aggressionby Poland because of its co-operation withthem, Germany and the Soviet Union didnot help Lithuania re-gain the Vilnius re-gion nor did they plan to protect Lithua-nia from potential further aggression byPoland. Germany�s only intention in caseof a Polish attack was to take back theKlaipeda (Memel) region that it had lostto Lithuania in the Treaty of Versailles.112

The aggressiveness of Nazi Germany inthe question of re-gaining the Klaipeda(Memel) region put an end to the closemilitary co-operation between Germanyand Lithuania.113 With the Soviet Union,Lithuania did not maintain any militaryco-operation at all. It only bought a lim-ited number of expensive field guns.114

As the Western powers were not interestedin an obligation to defend the East Euro-pean states and the League of Nations wasnot a safeguard for safety and peace, theonly option was a regional military bloc.There were two realistic possibilities: aneutral Nordic bloc of the Scandinavianand Baltic States, or a defensive alliance of

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all states from the Arctic Ocean to the BlackSea that had a common border with theSoviet Union.115

To the Baltic States, a Scandinavian-Baltic bloc seemed to be the best solu-tion. This bloc would have been situatedwholly ti the north of the Central Euro-pean area of conflict between Germanyand the Soviet Union, and the problemsconcerning territory between Poland andRumania on the one hand and the SovietUnion on the other would not have af-fected it directly either. But the politi-cians of the Scandinavian states were ofthe opinion that the Soviet Union wouldsoon try to take up its position on theBaltic coast again and thus absolutely re-fused to enter into any kind of connec-tions with the Baltic States. TheScandinavian states felt quite safe in theirisolation as a peninsula and in their long-lasting tradition of neutrality.116 There-fore, Finland and the Baltic States hadonly one option, to come to an agree-ment among each other and to find abetter solution. Until 1922, the orienta-tion towards the Baltic States was predomi-

nant in Finland; then its orientationshifted towards Scandinavia. Finland�spoliticians regarded the Baltic States asmore endangered than their own state.Finland is so far up north that it cannothave the linking function that is so charac-teristic of the Baltic States. Historically andpolitically, Russia had already previouslyconsidered Finland to be an autonomousentity. Moreover, it would not see the cru-cial necessity of having bases in Finland ifit could have them in the Baltics. In caseof a war, the Gulf of Finland, which sepa-rates these states from Finland, would havemade an alliance with the Baltic States dif-ficult. The united navies of Finland andthe Baltic States were also too weak to keepthe strong Soviet navy in the Eastern partof the Gulf. But especially, the Finns feareda co-operation with Poland, which theyregarded as a danger to their security. Thatis why Finland wanted to get as close aspossible to the neutral Scandinavian blocand refused to co-operate militarily withthe Baltic States.117 The only element ofco-operation was that Finnish military ob-servers took part in general staff meetings

of the Baltic States and Poland in the 1920sand the beginning 1930s. The most seniorofficers of Finland, Estonia and Latvia vis-ited each other several times and observedmilitary manoeuvres. In individual cases,Estonia and Latvia took advantage of therecently created Finnish armamentsindustry.118 Except for Lithuania, the Bal-tic States did not make use of the highlydeveloped Swedish armaments industry.Economic considerations were the reason.Sweden did not need the products of theBaltics; thus, the expensive weapons andammunition would have had to be paidwith cash, which the Baltic States couldnot afford because of their financial diffi-culties. The British as well as the Frenchdemanded that the Baltic States should buyweapons and ammunition primarily fromtheir states if they wanted to sell their goodsin the UK and France. However, it wasmainly used and very old weapons thatwere sold to the Baltic States. In case of awar, there would have been no hope ofsecuring a continuous supply with spareparts and ammunition from these coun-tries. The traffic with Sweden was muchless disturbed and safer.119

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For military protection, the BalticStates either had to join together or theyhad to seek co-operation with the strong-est neighbour of the Soviet Union: Po-land, and its ally, Romania. Such co-opera-tion would automatically have dragged theBaltic States into the Polish border dis-putes with Germany and the Soviet Un-ion, and further into the conflicts in theBalkans and the border disputes of Roma-nia and the Soviet Union. Seen from theoutside, Poland was a big and powerfulstate, but in reality, it was unstable andweak. A large part of the Polish territorywas not ethnically Polish, especially alongthe border with the Soviet Union. Onlytwo thirds of Poland�s population werePolish, the rest was composed of Ukrain-ians, WhiteRussians, Germans, Lithuaniansand Jews. Only five percent of Poland�sborder was common with friendly Roma-nia. With the latter, Poland did not main-tain close relations although a military con-vention had been concluded. Everywhereelse Poland bordered hostile states: Ger-many, the Soviet Union, and Lithuania,with all of which it had border disputes.

The border with neutral Latvia was only106 km long. The latter had been Poland�sally during the wars of liberation. But Po-land�s action against Lithuania, whose his-torical capital and wide border areas it hadoccupied in 1920, as well as the threat posedto Lithuanian independence in general andterritorial claims also against Latvia forcedit to avoid closer relations with this state.120

Theoretically, Lithuania and Poland wereeven at war, and in 1926 Lithuania was theonly one of the Western neighbours ofRussia to conclude a non-aggression treatywith the USSR.121 Poland protected Lithua-nia against a possible attack by the Sovietswith its territory which stretched north-wards to the east of Lithuania. But themilitary leaders of the Baltic States did nothave a high opinion of the big Polish armybecause of its old-fashioned organization.From a strictly practical point of view,Estonia would have been willing to ap-proach Poland, but Latvia as Lithuania�sneighbour refused to do so. Because ofLatvia�s opposition, the project of a mili-tary alliance between Estonia, Latvia andPoland failed.122

There were only two alternatives left: amilitary union of Estonia, Latvia andLithuania; and the union Estonia-Latvia.For many years, Lithuania demanded thata military union of the Baltic States bearmed mainly against Poland. But Latviaand Estonia rejected this demand. Polandmight have been the only source of fairlyreliable support against an attack by Ger-many or the Soviet Union. Until 1933,Lithuania was also little interested in acloser union of the Baltic States as it re-garded Germany and the Soviet Union asnatural allies against Poland, whichLithuania considered to be its main en-emy.123

A military union of Estonia and Latviawas the only option left. So it was; butthis union was not a very important fact,as we will see later.124 In the long line ofneighbours of the USSR, each state con-sidered itself to be less endangered thanthe others for some reasons. For each stateits own, often egoistic, interests were moreimportant than the common ones. Thefeeling of a common destiny and a com-mon region was still poorly developed.

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Latvia�s Military Situation

After the overview of the unfriendlygeneral situation, we have to take a closerlook at the military conditions in each ofthe Baltic States. Latvia (65,791.4 km2) wasthe largest of the Baltic States and was situ-ated in the middle of this group of states.With regard to population (1939:2,001,900), it was in second place. Thecommon border (1939) with friendly Es-tonia was 374.6 km long (19.94%), the onewith the hostile Soviet Union 351,3 km(18.66%). The common border with Po-land was 105,9 km long (5.64%), and theone with friendly Lithuania 570.4 km(30.3%). The coast was 479 km long(25.46%), one fourth of the overalllength.125 No natural obstacles, disregard-ing small rivers, lakes, marshland, and smallwoodlands, protected this state boundary.In case of an invasion by the Soviets, thedefence was planned to really start in themiddle of the state, along the line Pededze,Lake Lubans and Aiviekste (Ewst), an areawith broad marshlands and large wooded

areas and further along the Daugava(Düna), which would also have been animportant natural hindrance in case of aGerman invasion.126

Concerning food and clothing, Latviawas self-sufficient. But it was completelydependent on foreign states for fuel andheating, disregarding the large supply ofwood and the power generation startedin the last years of Latvia�s independence.Latvia�s industry was the most developedof all the Baltic States. The metallurgicalindustry, the car-parts industry, precisionengineering, the manufacture of appli-ances and instruments (e.g. the world�ssmallest camera �Minox�), aircraft and shipconstruction in Riga and Liepaja and thearsenal in Riga have to be mentioned. Thelatter built guns and machine guns as wellas infantry- and artillery-ammunition.Latvia also produced mines and anti-sub-marine weapons.127

75% of Latvia�s population wereLatvians, the rest was made up of severalnationalities who were represented onlyin small percentages (1938): 10.6% Rus-sians, 4.8% Jews, 3.2% Germans, 2.5%

Polish, 1.4% White Russians, furtherLithuanians, Estonians and others. Theminorities had complete cultural au-tonomy and in the Latvian army theirsense of Latvian citizenship was strength-ened.128 The Latvian army was comprisedof 2,200 officers and 23,000 sergeants andother ranks in 1938. The annual draft wasabout 13,500 men, but it decreased dur-ing the last years of independence. Thepolice had only about 3,100 men, theborder guard had about 100 officers and1,100 men. The Voluntary Home Guardreached 35,000 men. According toAmerican information, the trained re-serves were about 170,000 men, whereasthe untrained reserves were 20,000. Intheory, Latvia could deploy an army of200,000 men, but in reality only 130,000to 180,000 could be armed. In times ofpeace, 10 out of 1,000 inhabitants ofLatvia were members of the armed forces,the ratio for the Home Guard was 28out of 1,000 citizens. These figureschanged from year to year, of course.Latvia was divided into 15 defence re-gions. During the last years of independ-

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ence, the troops were supposed to be mo-bilised within three days (i.e. 72 hours).

In times of peace, the armed forces hadfour infantry divisions, with a total of 12infantry regiments and one cavalry regi-ment. Each infantry division had one fieldartillery regiment. The First, Second andThird Infantry Regiments and the KurzemeArtillery Regiment belonged to the FirstDivision, whose headquarters was in Liepaja(Liebau). The Second Division consistedof the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth InfantryRegiments as well as the Vidzeme ArtilleryRegiment. This division�s headquarters wasin Riga. The Third Division consisted ofthe Seventh, Eight and Ninth Infantry Regi-ments and the Zemgale Artillery Regiment.The Fourth Division had the Tenth, Elev-enth and Twelfth Infantry Regiments theCavalry Regiment and the Latgal ArtilleryRegiment. Its headquarters was inDaugavpils (Dünaburg). The TechnicalDivision consisted of the Engineer Regi-ment, the Tank Regiment (later the motor-ized brigade), the Air Force Regiment, theIntelligence Unit, the Armoured TrainRegiment and the Coastal Artillery Regi-

ment. The four field artillery regimentsmentioned above, the heavy artillery regi-ment, the anti-aircraft regiment, the spe-cial artillery section, the tank regiment andthe coastal artillery regiment were underthe control of the Chief of Staff of theArtillery concerning training, weaponsand organisation. The Staff Battalion,which corresponded to an elite guard unitin other armies, was independent. All na-val forces were united in a squadron un-der the command of the Commander-in-Chief of the Fleet.

In times of peace, an infantry regimenthad two battalions � 50 officers, 700 ser-geants and men, the reinforced regimentshad three battalions � 80 officers, 1,220sergeants and other ranks. In case of a war,each regiment would have been enlargedup to three battalions. The weapons con-sisted of English Ross-Enfield M-14 rifles,Lewis-light-machine-guns and Vickers-Bertier heavy machineguns, all with cali-bre 7.7 mm. The production of lightmachineguns of the type �Bren� had beenstarted in the state. They were more use-ful in combat. During the last years, the

regiments also received 47 mm Böhler anti-tank guns and 7 cm Skoda infantry guns.Further, they were equipped with 81 mmStoks mortars. Each regiment had recon-naissance companies; some also had bicy-cle and ski companies. The cavalry regi-ment had five squadrons and one heavymachinegun squadron, the remountsquadron, two bicycles squadrons and onebattery, all together 1,200 horses and 1,200men, four cannons, English Lee-Enfield7.7 carbines, Madsen light machinegunsand Vickers heavy machineguns. At an ex-perimental stage, there were also bicyclebattalions and motorcycle companies thatwere planned to join the army.

Each artillery regiment had two unitswith two gun batteries and one howitzerbattery; thus the whole regiment had sixbatteries with 24 guns and six howitzers.All regiments had English 18 Pounder(8.38 cm) guns and 4.5" (11.43 cm) howit-zers. English 13 Pounder (7.62 cm) andRussian 75 mm (M-02) guns were in re-serves. For war times, three units (36 guns)and one to two anti-aircraft batteries (fourto eight guns), which was 40 to 44 guns

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altogether, was intended for each fieldartillery regiment.

The heavy artillery regiment consistedof three units, including the anti-aircraftbatteries that were organized into an in-dependent anti-aircraft battalion. In theheavy artillery regiment, there were atleast 30 heavy guns or howitzers of dif-ferent type and production country. Ex-cept for some German howitzers, all thesewere out-of-date. Out of the four trainsof the Armoured Train Regiment, threewere in Daugavpils (Dünaburg) and onein Riga. With regards to material, sixarmoured trains and 6" Canet ship gunswere intended for two batteries of rail-way artillery.

The overall firepower comprised: six10.5 cm, one 152 mm (6"), 10 77 mm,three 12 pounder howitzers and five 6"Canet Guns, two 38 mm anti-aircraft gunsand 36 heavy machineguns. In times ofpeace, the regiment had 40 officers and245 sergeants and other ranks.

In the sea coastal fortress Daugavgriva(Dünamünde), the Coastal Artillery Regi-ment had five batteries (20 guns), one

search light battery and one auxiliary ship.As weapons, they had Russian 3", 6"Vickers and 6" Canet Guns and one anti-aircraft battery. In times of peace, the regi-ment had 500 men. Mobile railroad coastalbatteries were in preparation. The anti-aircraft regiment had 15 batteries � Rus-sian 3" (76-mm) and 40 mm Bofors anti-aircraft guns. It had about 1,000 men. Anti-aircraft batteries were also formed for alldivisions, except the Third.

The Autotank-Regiment had six ar-moured cars, two heavy, one medium andsix light tanks as well as 18 tankettes (asmall tracked reconnaissance vehicle). Al-together six armoured cars and 27 tanks.Moreover, it had 40 trucks and 15 mo-torcycles. For times of war, each divisionwas supposed to have three tankettes (21altogether). In 1938, the regiment was re-structured into a motorized brigade withfive battalions in three motorized groups.Furthermore, motorized anti-tank unitswere planned.

The engineer regiment consisted of twobattalions and 500 men, including thebridge and the pontoon company. The

intelligence battalion had four companies.The air force regiment had three units,

100 to 150 aircraft in three fighter squad-rons in Riga, one reconnaissance squad-ron in Gulbene, one long distance recon-naissance squadron in Krustpils and onenaval aviation wing in Liepaja.

The Latvian navy had one minelayergunboat, two minesweeper-minelayerboats, two submarines, one auxiliary sub-marine and some motorboats. A mine-layer (3,000 tons), four submarines andtwelve hydroplanes were planned. Therewas also a coastal observation service.

The border guard brigade had fivebattalions and one fast patrol boat. Theself-defence organisation was divided into19 Home Guard regiments and consistedof cavalry and motorcycle-units with atankette, one railroad Home Guard regi-ment, one aircraft Home Guard regimentas well as several Home Guard Battalions.It also included 12,000 women. The AirHome Guard had 24 aircraft. In contrastto the other Baltic States, the HomeGuard organization in Latvia was not sub-ordinate to the Ministry of War, but to

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the Ministry of Social Affairs. Neverthe-less, 150 active officers and 100 sergeantsprovided military training in the organi-zation.129

Of all the Baltic States, Latvia had thebest traffic network. In 1940, there were1.880 km of highways, 9.621 km of first-class roads, 7.625 cars, 4.321 motorcycles,3,466 km of railway tracks, 294 locomo-tives, 11 motor wagons and 6.684 wagons.Further, there were three large seaports andseveral small ones. In 1940, the Latvianmerchant fleet had 89 steamers, seven mo-tor ships and seven sailing ships, altogether103 ships with 120.676 register tons. Thecivilian aviation system had a large numberof training and sport planes as well as twomiddle-sized passenger aircraft.130

In times of war, Latvia planned to op-erate with 130.000 men in seven divisions,two regiments of special cavalry squadronwith a strength of two regiments, threemotorized brigades, three to four bicyclebattalions, three to four special artilleryunits, and one fleet. A Supply Divisonand garrison unit would be kept in re-serve.

Should the Soviet Union attack thecovering force would consist of one bat-talion and one company of the SeventhRegiment in Vilaka and Liepna, one bat-talion and two companies of the NinthRegiment in Ludza, Zilupe and Karsava,one battalion and one company of theTenth Regiment in Daugavpils, later inKârsava and Dagda. Together with threeto four battalions of the border guardand a mounted battery these forces wouldhave had to defend a front line of 200 to260 km from the Estonian border toPiedruja and Semgallen respectively. Thus,real defence was not planned for the firstdays, just a delaying action.

The Fourth and Third Division withthe First Cavalry Regiments, but withoutthe Eight and Twelfth Infantry Regimentwere supposed to cover the mobilizationof the forces and the occupation of thedefence line Malupe � Pededze � Litene �Lubana � Varaklani � Livani � Daugavpilsand to withdraw to the line Pededze �Lake Lubana � Krustpils. They were sup-posed to accomplish that by following theEstonian troops with their left wing and

� in their centre - by using the naturaldefence line in the marshland around theLake Lubans and the widespread forestsin the north. Should the Fourth Divi-sion still be able to move east if necessary,the command of the Third Division couldeasily lose connection to the Seventh andEight Regiments that were further north.To subordinate these regiments to theThird Division after the arrival of the Firstand Second Division at the front wouldhave been very problematic. A retreat ofthe Fourth Division along the left bankof the Daugava into the area of the Aiviekstewould have been very difficult, too. TheSecond Division was supposed to deployeast of Rezekne. The fourth mobilizationplan had three prepared alternatives: A, D,and K. Alternative A intended a deploy-ment of armed forces for a defence againstan attack by the Soviet Union, whereas op-tion D planned the same if Germany at-tacked. Alternative K consisted of simulta-neous defence against the Soviet Union andGermany.

Option A had been worked out in alldetails; option D had been prepared rela-

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tively thoroughly. Option K was onlyoutlined in rudiments as a co-operationbetween Nazi Germany and the SovietUnion appeared to be hardly imaginable.

According to option A, the mainforces should be deployed on the lineSkrudaliena-Lielborna-Izvalta-Andrupene-Kaunata-Stocerova-Berzgale-Nautreni-(Rogovka)-Tilza-marshes north of Tilza-Kuprova-Liepna-Pededze River, withother troops covering them. After thisdeployment, the following was planned:either a defence on this line, an offensivein order to re-gain the third of Latgalelost during the mobilization or a retreatto the line of the Lake Lubana in orderto prepare the decisive defence battle. TheFirst Division Group (three divisions)would have operated on the right andthe Second Division Group (two divi-sions) on the left. The border betweenthese two division groups would havebeen the northern bank of the LakeLubans-Karsava. The Supreme Com-mander would have had two divisions inthe areas of Madona, Barkava, Lubana andCesvaine at his disposal. Each division

would have received one unit of heavyartillery and a certain number of recon-naissance flight hours. Positions were sup-posed to be occupied by the fifth day ofmobilization, which seems to have beentoo optimistic.

Option D comprised the defenceagainst Germany. The main idea was todeploy the armies some kilometres northof the southern state border as protec-tion by the Lithuanian army was ex-pected. Engineer plans did exist, but onlyfor limited works. The forces were sup-posed to operate in two division groups,whereas the cover units should remain atthe eastern border.

Option K existed only in outlines. Threedivisions were supposed to operate towardsthe south, four towards the east.

After the ceding of bases to the So-viet Union in 1939, a fifth mobilizationand defence plan was worked out, butnow a defence of the state was almostimpossible. According to options A andD of plan four, a further defence of theDaugava line was provided for. In caseof an attack by the Soviet Union, a fur-

ther retreat to Lithuania and a follow-ing internment in Germany wasplanned.131 Neither Latvia nor the otherBaltic States believed that each or all to-gether would have to fight without anysupport by one or the other great power.Treaties or even plans, however, for sucha co-operation did not exist, not even withneighbouring Poland. Military observersof the great powers classified the Latvianarmed forces to be behind the Finnishand Estonian forces regarding the degreeof readiness. Soldiers and regular officerswere considered to be good to very good.Their endurance and courage werepraised, but cruelty that had been sup-posedly noticed was criticized. The assess-ment of higher officers was altogether bad,with some remarkable exceptions. Reasonswere old age, insufficient training, lack-ing initiative and bureaucratic mentality.Regarding supply and weapons, Latvia�sarmy was considered to be better thanEstonia�s, but worse than Lithuania�s. Inthe opinion of the US observers, the di-visions that would have had to be estab-lished after the beginning of the war could

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have moved to the front as late as 30 to60 days after the proclamation of the mo-bilization. Active divisions could havereached the front within 24 hours. Themorale and composure of the Latvianarmy were rated high. Thus, success wasexpected not only in defensive, but alsoin offensive battles.132

The Military Situation in Estonia

Regarding the area (47,549 km2) andpopulation (1939: 1,133,917), Estonia wasthe smallest Baltic state, but its borderswere the longest. The common border withfriendly Latvia was 374.5 km (9.4%) long,the one with the hostile USSR 258 km(6.3%), of which 145 km went across the84 km long and 31 km broad Lake Peipsi,a further two km across the endangeredMehikoorma Strait and across the LakePskov, which was a little more narrowthan the Lake Peipsi. The coastal bordercomprised 1,159 km as the crow flies. Be-cause of the many bays and 818 islands,the coastal border was some 3,449 kmlong (84.3%).133

The section between the Gulf of Fin-land and Lake Peipsi was relatively easy toprotect, the Narva River being a naturalobstacle. The area north as well as southof the river is marshy and wooded. Onlya seven to eight km broad gap along theWest-East railroad and the highway waseasily accessible for a potential enemy. Thechain of lakes made up by the Lake Peipsiand the Lake Pskov was a great advantage.Regarding defence, the area south of theLake Pskov was less favourable, but nothopeless. The area is sandy and withoutany transport routes. In the middle sec-tion, there was a deep valley in a north-south direction that could be used fordefence. The marshy and wooded area ofthe Lida and Vruda Rivers extendedwidely. Should these positions be lost, theEstonian army could retreat to the linePjusa-Pskov-Pankjavitsa-Laura-Liepna, the9 km wide middle section between Pskovand Pankjavista being the most endan-gered. Furthermore, the Estonians couldretreat to the line Lake Võrtsjärv-EmajõgiRiver-Lake Peipsi. A defence of the longcoastal border was virtually impossible.

The navy and the coastal batteries alonecould defend Tallinn, which was also pro-tected by several islands. With the help ofthe Finnish fleet, Estonia could close offthe Gulf of Finland between Tallinn andPorkkala with a mine field.134

Concerning food and clothing, Esto-nia was self-sufficient. Yet, the situationconcerning food was not as good as inLithuania or Latvia. Shale (about 5,500,000tons [sic]), out of which petrol and ma-chine oil were produced and which wasalso used as fuel, was an important natu-ral resource.

Regarding the ethnic composition ofthe population, Estonia was the mosthomogeneous. 88.2% of the populationwere Estonians, 8.2% Russians, 1.5% Ger-mans, 0.7% Swedish, and 0.5% Latvians.135

Usually 0.98% to 1.2% of the populationwere in the armed forces. The number ofthose drafted was 12,000 men, but it de-creased in the last years. In earlier years,the armed forces consisted of 14,000 to17,000 men, but in 1938 there were only11,358 men (1,358 officers). The policehad 1,200 men, the border guard 1,200

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men, and the Home Guard units 60,000men. According to the Intelligence Serv-ice of the USA, the total number of peo-ple organized, including police, borderguard and Home Guard unit was 51,000men, including reserves 121,000 men andincluding untrained reserves 161,000 men(14.2% of the population). The whole statehad three defence districts (correspond-ing to the number of divisions in timesof peace) and eight defence counties (cor-responding to the number of brigades intimes of war).

In times of peace, the Estonian armyhad three infantry divisions. The staff ofthe First Division was in Rakvere andcomprised the defence counties Narva andVõru-Järva. The First Infantry Regiment,the Fourth and Fifth Infantry Battalion,the First and Second Artillery Group andtwo trains of the Armoured Train Regi-ment in Tapa belonged to this division.The staff of the Second Division was lo-cated in Tartu (Dorpat). The defence coun-ties of Tartu, Petseri-Võru and Valga wereunder its command. The Seventh Infan-try Regiment, the Second, Third and

Eighth Infantry Battalion, the PartisanBattalion Kuperjanov, the Cavalry Regi-ment, the Third and Fourth ArtilleryGroup and two tank platoons belongedto this division. The staff of the ThirdDivision was in Tallinn. The defence coun-ties Harju, Pärnu-Viljandi and Lääne-Saarebelonged to it. The Sixth, Ninth, andTenth Infantry Battalion and the PartisanBattalions Kaleva, Scouts and Sakala, theFifth Artillery Group, the Tank Regiment,the Engineer and Intelligence as well asthe Guard Battalion were in this division.At the beginning of 1940, the FourthDivision in Viljandi and Pärnu was cre-ated.

The First and Seventh Infantry Regi-ments were active units. Each regimenthad 2.000 men. The recruits were trainedin independent battalions that were sup-posed to be transformed into regimentsin case of war. Half of the staff and lineofficers of these regiments were regularofficers. In case of war, there would havebeen 14 infantry regiments, each one hav-ing 3.331 men (107 officers). In each di-vision, two brigades with two infantry

regiments each were planned. The normalpersonnel strength of a division in peace-time was 100 officers, 400 sergeants, and2,500 men. In peacetime, the regimentshad two battalions each; in wartime itwould have been three. The weapons ofthe infantry were obsolete: Russian 7.62-mm-rifles from 1891, Madsen lightmachinegun, calibre 7,69 mm and Rus-sian Maxim heavy machinegun, calibre7.62 mm, from 1905 and 1910. There werealso English 7.7-mm Lewis lightmachineguns in reserve. The arsenal of theWar Department started to standardize thecalibre to 7.69 mm. Towards the end ofindependence, it was planned to equip theinfantry with infantry guns and anti-tankweapons. Experiments with heavy mor-tars, calibre 81 mm, with anti-tank riflesfrom Solothurn, with anti-tank cannonsfrom Bofors, calibre 37 mm, and withheavy anti-tank guns from Rheinmetallwere undertaken. In Võru and Narva, therewas already anti-tank batteries.

The First Cavalry Regiment was inTartu. It had three sabre, one machinegun,and one skiing and bicycle squadron, one

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combat vehicle company (six tanks andsix tankettes) as well as a technical unit.The weapons were: English Ross-Enfield-Mid. 14 rifles, calibre 7.7 mm, six heavymachine guns, 16 light machineguns andthe weapons of the armoured vehicles. Incase of war, the regiment would have hadto operate together with Latvian units inthe area of Laura between Boberikova andVöborka. As a quick retreat was plannedfor the Latvian army at the beginning ofthe war, the Estonian cavalry might havebeen able to form a link between theLatvian and the Estonian armies. The FirstCavalry Regiment was also the basis forthe Second Cavarly Regiment, whichwould have been raised in Tartu at thebeginning of a war.

In the Estonian army, there were fiveartillery units. The first and the thirdgroup were active units. According to theLeague of Nations and to informationfrom the German Intelligence Service, Es-tonia had more than 70 field guns and 60heavy guns besides anti-aircraft guns andinfantry guns in 1938. The artillery wasdivided into 11 field, six heavy and 17

coastal defence batteries. The division-ar-tillery was organized in artillery groups.The First Division had the first artillery-group (four batteries) in Olgino and thesecond group in Rakvere � heavy artilleryand material for another four batteries.The third artillery-group (with four ac-tive batteries in Pskov) and the fourthgroup belonged to the Second Division� two batteries in Tartu and one in Võru.The fifth artillery-group of the Third Di-vision, with material for four new batter-ies, was under the command of the FourthDivision that was to be created. In its place,a new, sixth group was created in Tallinn(Reval). This group was supposed to havetowing vehicles, which did not arrive bythe beginning of the war. Thus, old Rus-sian guns had to be used.

Each battery had four guns or howit-zers and 90 men (four officers) with 60horses in peacetime. Most guns were out-dated, Russian 76 mm guns from 1902,English 84 mm and French 76 mm can-nons, English light howitzers, calibre 114mm, Russian heavy 102 mm cannons fromSchneider (1910), English 102 mm, Ger-

man 150 mm and Russian 152 mm howit-zers (the latter from Schneider, 1909).Horses were used to tow all guns. Towingvehicles were still in an experimental stage.

According to Estonian information,the coastal artillery had 10 batteries: one30.48 cm (12") battery in Äigna, 20.32 cm(8") batteries in Suuropi and Viimsi, two152.4 mm batteries in Äigna, two inNaissaare, one in Suuropi and two 13 cmbatteries in Viimsi. The anti-aircraft artil-lery had three batteries with twelve guns,one searchlight and one chemical defencecompany.

In the last years, the tank regiment hadthree tank and armoured car companies,one transport company, one training com-pany, and two batteries. One unit hadfour old heavy English tanks Mark V,twelve old light Renault-17 tanks, six mod-ern Polish TK 3 tankettes, 12 self-madeCrossley-Austin armoured cars. In reserve,there were several heavy armoured vehi-cles of the type Garford. The regimenthad about 400 men. In 1924, Estonia stillhad two armoured trains regiments, lateronly one with 350 men. The regiment had

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one heavy broad-gauge armoured railway-train with one 152 mm, two 119 mm, two105 mm cannons and four heavy-machineguns, two light broad gauge and one nar-row-gauge armoured train, each with two76 mm guns, eight heavy machinegunsand six light machineguns.

The air force consisted of three airdivisions, in Rakvere, Tartu, and Tallinn,as well as of the naval aviation division inTallinn with auxiliary units. Each divi-sion had two reconnaissance squadron andone fighter squadron with nine aircrafteach, the naval aviation division had onereconnaissance squadron (six aircraft) andone fighter squadron (four aircraft). Al-together, there were 54 reconnaissance and27 fighter aircraft as well as 10 naval air-craft, a total of 91, but 125 when count-ing the training aircraft. In 1937, therewere 540 men in the air force.

The engineer regiment had three engi-neer battalions, each having one gas-war-fare, railroad, search light, transport, work,training, and reconnaissance company. Thereconnaissance battalion had three recon-naissance and one other company.

The base for the Estonian navy wasTallinn. The fleet comprised the Sea andthe Peipsi Divisions, the coastal artilleryand the garrison administration, altogether2.100 men (of whom 900 were in the coastalartillery). Initially, the fleet had two largedestroyers, one torpedo boat, six gunboats(two on the Lake Peipsi), two minelayers,two mine boats, two patrol boats (one onthe Lake Peipsi), four icebreakers, threevessels of the hydrographical service, fivetenders and one tug. The largest part ofthese ships was old and worn-out. The main-tenance of this fleet demanded tremendousresources.

In 1933, the Estonian government soldthe two large destroyers and agreed upona programme for the development of anew fleet. Two submarines, eight patrolboats, twelve torpedo boats and ten fastpatrol boats were planned. As funds werescarce, the programme was cut down totwo U-minelayers, four motortorpedo-boats, and twelve aircraft. During the lastyears of Estonia�s independence, the navyhad two submarines, four motortorpedo-boats, four gunboats (two on the Lake

Peipsi), two patrol boats (one on the LakePeipsi), one customs cutter, five icebreak-ers, four hydrographical ships, five ten-ders and one tug. Altogether the tonnagewas 5.200 tons, not including the icebreak-ers and those ships that belonged to thesea route Civilian Maritime Administra-tion.136 The Estonian merchant fleet had304 ships (143 steamboats, 60 motor shipsand motor sailing ships as well as 101 sail-ing ships) with 214.000 register tons.137

In Tallinn, there was a large arsenal withdepartments for machineguns, artillery,optics, foundry, smithy, handguns, elec-tronics, carpentry, leather goods, andmuch more. Ammunition for rifles andartillery was produced there, shells andarmy rifles as well as light and heavy ma-chine-guns were produced for the HomeGuard units.138

The number of cars in 1940 was 3,618;there were 2,476 trucks, 285 busses and1,401 motorcycles. Estonia had 195 steamand 22 electric and motor locomotives,529 passenger and 5,633 goods wagons,three radio stations, six commercialairplanes, eleven ports and twelve airports.

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The total length of the railway system was1,702 km.The total length of first orderhighways was 2,531 km and second-orderhighways 8,168 km.139

In case of a war, 100,000 men in eightbrigades and in the navy were supposedto be mobilized. The amount of uniformsand equipment was sufficient, but theweapons were generally bad and outdated.The Estonians relied on the competenceof their intelligence, who would have dis-covered any movement of Soviet troopstowards Estonia early. They also believedin the ability of their defence county of-ficials to mobilize the soldiers within oneto 24 hours.

The First Infantry Regiment and theFirst Artillery Group were in Narva,Narva-Jõesuu, Kuurtna and Vasknarva, twoarmoured trains were in Tapa, and oneair force squadron was in Rakvere. Theseforces had to reinforce the border guardunits, to occupy the line of defence alongthe Narva River, to close off the rivercrossings at Narva-Jõesuu, Krivasoo andVasknarva, and to observe the enemy�smovement in the Gulf of Finland and up

to the line Mustvee-Oudova, where thearea of responsibility of the Second Di-vision began. 50 steel-concrete bunkerswere erected at the threatened sector be-tween Riigi and Kulgu. The staff of thearmy had calculated that the Soviets wereable to move three to four divisions tothe Narva front within seven days. Theactive units of the Estonians were able totake their positions on the first day andto counter the attack by the enemy forthe next three days. Although the Sovietair force might be able to attack maintargets, they would not be able to con-fuse the decentralized Estonian system ofmobilization. The regiments would havegathered by train, by car, and throughnight marches. They could have beenmobilized within three days, and withinthe next two days they would already havebeen at the assembly points. On the fifthday, the First, Fourth and Fifth InfantryRegiments, the First and the Second Ar-tillery Group would have reach the front,the Tenth Infantry Regiment would be inRakvere, the Reserves-Regiment in Tallinn,and the Scouts-Regiment in the area of

Haapsalu. However, the US observers as-sumed that the Estonian army would notbe completely ready for war in less thanseven to 10 days after the beginning ofthe war.

The Seventh Regiment, the Third Ar-tillery Group, the First Cavalry Regiment,one anti-tank company, one armoured carand tank company, one armoured trainand the Second Air Division were plannedto be at the front of Petseri. These forceswould have had to defend the line LakePskov-Irbosk Valley-Velje Lake, then forfive days the line Piussa-Petseri-Pankjavitsa-Laura, then Piussa-Lepssaare-Vastsellina-Misso. They also would have had to watchthe movements by the enemy on theLatvian territory. In the south, there wereno fortifications. Instead, artillery andfield fortifications would have had to dothe job. The enemy was expected to needfive to seven days to move three to fourdivisions and tank and artillery units fromPskov to Ostrov. In order to absorb theoffensive, the Estonians would have hadthe Kaleva and the Põlva-Sakala Regimentat their disposal on the sixth day, the Sec-

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ond Kuperjanov Regiment from Pskovto Misso, the Seventh, Eighth and ThirdInfantry Regiment, the First Cavalry Regi-ment, the Fifth, Fourth and Third Artil-lery Group, the Sixth Infantry Regimentclose to Ape, and the Ninth Infantry Regi-ment in the area of Pärnu-Mõisaküla. Thiswould be all of Estonia�s forces.

As the Soviet Union had only very weakforces on the Lake Peipsi (some landingcrafts), the two gunboats of the Estoniansand three more sent by the base in Tartucould have defended the shore line rea-sonably well for two to three days, espe-cially the dangerous strait of Mehikoorma,where the Lake Peipsi and the Lake Pskovmeet each other. Local self-protection unitswould have supported the war ships.

In the Baltic Sea, the Estonian navycould not compete with that of the So-viet Union. Nevertheless, it was widelyknown that the Soviet Navy Commandwas afraid of the strait between Aegnaand Porkkala. Soviet submarines couldpass this strait in order to sink Estoniansupply vessels, and ships could launchlanding crafts. To prevent any provoca-

tion of the Russian fleet, the Estonianfleet could only start laying mines afterthe start of hostilities. The submarineminelayer would protect the area aroundthe island of Suursaar and Tütarsaar andthe minelayers on the line Äigna-Porkkala. With support by the Finns,another mine field in the area of Suur-saar, Tütarsaar and Lavansaar could havebeen laid out, while submarines and alarge Finnish armoured vessel (with 8"guns) would have offered protection dur-ing the operation.

At worst, the Estonians would try toretreat to their capital and to fight a finalbattle of despair, or to flee to their is-lands. According to calculations of Ameri-can observers, the ammunition could lastfor about two weeks of fighting. But sup-posedly the army could only defend Es-tonia one or two weeks if no other statesthan Latvia supported them.

In case of an attack from the SovietUnion, Estonia intended to co-operate withLatvia, something it did not want to doin case of a German attack. Estonians con-sidered a German attack on Lithuania to

be possible; they also thought that Latviamight be endangered. But even shortlybefore the World War II, they were con-vinced that for the next ten years Ger-many was not interested in an occupa-tion of the Estonian islands as a base fortheir actions against the Soviet Union.140

Estonia�s military planners saw danger onlyin an attack by the Soviets. Estonia regardedits other neighbours and Poland as its natu-ral allies and hoped for a German inter-vention, but it did not expect any helpfrom Western European powers. The Esto-nians were worried because the Finnsavoided any relationship with the BalticStates to protect their Eastern borders andsought protection in the Scandinavianbloc. The Scandinavian States publicly pro-claimed that they did not wish to get intoany kind of relations with the highly en-dangered Baltic States. Moreover, the Es-tonians were worried about the unsteadyforeign policy of Latvia. Estonia�s militaryplanners doubted whether Latvia reallyintended to resist any ultimatum or anopen invasion. Estonians were especiallyworried by missing fortifications on

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Latvia�s eastern border and by the Latvians�plan to retreat to the line Pededze-LakeLubans, which opened the whole south-ern front of Estonia and virtually destroyedits defence system. There were also prob-lems with direct co-operation under com-mon command. Until the abrupt changein the Latvian military command in 1940,Estonia�s military command did not relyupon Latvia�s preparedness and ability tocommand the armed forces under mod-ern combat conditions. The Estonians be-lieved that in case of co-operation, theLatvian Supreme Command would tryto use the Estonian army not to defend itsown country, but Latvia.141

Western observers all agreed that theEstonian army was the best one of allBaltic States although it was most poorlyarmed and had the shortest training forsoldiers. The Estonian officers were be-lieved to be highly qualified, the Esto-nian soldiers were said to be tenacious,brave, intelligent and patriotic. In co-operation with the armed forces of thegreat powers, the Estonian army was re-garded to be a potential force not only

for defensive, but also for offensive ac-tions.142

The Military Situationin Lithuania

With a population of 2,575,300,Lithuania was the largest Baltic state. Itsarea (55,670 km2) was the second largest.The length of the border was 1,367 km.Lithuania did not have a common bor-der with the Soviet Union, but 525 km(37.7%) bordered hostile Poland, 272 km(20.5%) the dangerous German Reich, andonly 570.4 km (41.8%) bordered friendlyLatvia. The border regions were in themain completely open, except for a smallsection from Zarasai to Giedraiciai in thenortheast, where a group of lakes was situ-ated, and another section in the South-west, where the Nemunas River formedthe natural border to Germany. In thecoastal area, the Lithuanian part of theKurzeme Spit was separated from the restof Lithuania by the German part and theKurzeme Lagoon. Furthermore, Lithua-nia had only limited sovereignty in the

Klaipeda (Memel) region (2,848 km2). Ger-many did everything possible to keep theidea of separatism alive in this region.Because of the lost, nationally mixedVilnius region (3,244 m2), Lithuania wastechnically at war with her second largestneighbour, Poland.143

Concerning food supply, Lithuania wasnot only self-sufficient but even exportedfood. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia,however, its industry was not very devel-oped.

The population was more uniform thanin Latvia. 80.6% were Lithuanian, 7.15%Jewish, 4.1% German, 3.04% Polish, 2.3%Russian, 0.7% Latvian, 0.2% White Russian,etc. 80% of the population were Catholic,in contrast to Lithuania�s northern neigh-bours, who were mainly Lutheran.144

In 1939, the army of Lithuania con-sisted of 24,000 men (1,100 officers, 500war administrators, 1,400 sergeants). Onaverage, 1.25% of the population were inthe armed forces; 13,000 to 17,000 menwere drafted each year. The police had4,000 men, the border guard 3,500 men,and in the Home Guard units there were

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55.000 men. In theory, Lithuania couldhave mobilized up to 250,000 men. Outof technical and financial considerations,only 120,000 to 135,000 men were sup-posed to be mobilized.

The Lithuanian army consisted of threeinfantry divisions; a fourth division wasbeing formed. The First, Third andFourth Infantry Regiment as well as theFirst and Second Artillery Regiment be-longed to the First Division in Panevezys.In the Second Division, whose headquar-ters were in Kaunas, were the Second,Fifth and Ninth Infantry Regiment andthe Third Artillery Regiment. The Sixth,Seventh and Eighth Infantry Regimentand the Fourth Artillery Regiment werein the Third Division, whose headquar-ters were in Siauliai. Towards the end ofindependence, only one artillery unit hadbeen formed in the Fourth Division,which was being established in Kedainiai.

Most of the infantry weapons wereobsolete, but modernization did takeplace. The army had 7.9 mm Mauser-Mod.24 rifles, Praga light machineguns andMaxim M. 08 heavy machineguns. There

were experiments with Stokes-Brandttrench mortars, infantry guns and anti-tank guns. One infantry regiment had2,279 men.

The cavalry brigade with headquartersin Kaunas had three regiments: The Hus-sar Regiment in Kaunas, the Ulan Regi-ment in Alytus, later in Taurage, and theDragoon Regiment in Taurage, later inVilnius. There was also a unit of mountedartillery, three bicycle companies and onearmoured car company. Each cavalry regi-ment had about 1,000 men.

The field artillery had about 120 gunsin 10 units. These guns were mostly out-dated: French 75 mm Schneider M. 97 andRussian Putilov M. 02 75 mm cannons. Theheavy artillery had 48 pieces in six units.The weapons were 155 mm and 105 mmhowitzers made in Germany. In reserve,there were also English 127 mm and FrenchSchneider guns, calibre 155 mm. The anti-aircraft unit had 150 modern Swiss Oerlikon20 mm and 12 old English 75 mm cannonsfrom Vickers, modern sound detectors andsearchlights. During the last years of inde-pendence, there was no fortress artillery and

no armoured trains anymore, as they wereconsidered to be impractical.

In Kaunas there was a tank battalionwith twelve light French Renault M 26/27 tanks and 51 Swedish tankettes madeby Skoda as well as one armoured car com-pany with twelve armoured vehicles madeby Renault and Landskrona.

Each of the three divisions had oneengineer battalion. A reconnaissance bat-talion was also planned for each division,but up to the end of the independencethere were only two such battalions.

The Lithuanian army had the strong-est air force of all the Baltic States. Someof the reconnaissance, training and fighteraircraft (of the type �Anbo�) were pro-duced in Lithuania. The air force had eightair stations and four landing strips at itsdisposal. It was divided into reconnaissance(three squadrons), fighter (four squadrons),bomber (one squadron) and traininggroups (two squadrons) and had schools,workshops and supply units. Some of theaircraft were out-dated, but in their placemodern machines were arriving. In 1937,795 men served in the air force. In 1939

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the air force had 110 air craft, 80 in theunits and 30 in reserve.

The fleet had only one patrol vessel withmine laying capability and six armouredcustoms boat. Six submarines, several fastpatrol boats, minelayers and coastal bat-teries were planned. But the loss ofKlaipeda destroyed these plans for arma-ment.

The weapon factory Radviliskis hadproduced rifle, machinegun and artilleryammunition since 1938. It also repairedrifles and completed orders of the airforce.

In contrast to Latvia, the Home Guardorganization in Estonia and Lithuania wassubordinate to the War Ministry. Lithua-nia�s Home Guard unit was divided into12 infantry regiments and one dragoonregiment. There were also engineer, recon-naissance, air and Naval Home GuardUnits that were partly motorized. Plansthat included the training of Home Guardmembers for partisan war were not real-ized.145

Concerning traffic routes and meansof transportation, Lithuania was the weak-

est of the Baltic States. In 1939, Lithuaniahad only 1,526 km of railroad and 1,481km of solid roads. It had 205 locomo-tives, 313 passenger and 4,351 goods wag-ons, 1,765 cars, 298 trucks, 298 buses and619 special cars. The merchant fleet con-sisted of only 11 ships with 10,299 regis-ter tons. Moreover, Lithuania had onlytwo ports, i.e. in Klaipeda (Memel) andSventoji. In the whole state, there wereonly two radio stations, in the last yearjust one.146

In contrast to Latvia and Estonia,Lithuania really had only one friendlyneighbour: Latvia. It had to reckon witha direct attack by Germany or Poland andwith an indirect attack by the Soviet Un-ion through Latvia or Poland. In case ofa war, Lithuania could only operate withfive infantry divisions and two cavalrybrigades. Active units were the First Regi-ment in Ukmerge, the Seventh in Taurageand Zemaiciu Naumiestis and the Ninthin Marijampole and Vilkaviskis. Theirstock was enlarged and they were rein-forced by artillery. Until 1939, the SixthRegiment in Klaipeda and Plunge was also

an active unit; then it was transferred toTelsiai.

Until 1935, the mobilization plans con-sisted of mobilizing the units within oneweek after the beginning of the war (12days according to the US information).Stasys Rastikis achieved a decentralizationof the mobilization and thus shortenedthe time span to 24-72 hours. Weaponsand clothing were divided among the mo-bilization points. A quick modernizationof the equipment now also took place.

Although Lithuania sought to reclaimthe Vilnius region from Poland, its plansfor war against Poland were of completelydefensive nature. Just as defensive werethe plans for a resistance to potential at-tacks by Germany or the Soviet Union.The Lithuanian army hoped for a sup-port by Latvia in these two cases or evenfor an active involvement of the Westernpowers. The defence plans against Polandand Germany had priority, those againstthe Soviet Union were of second impor-tance. The Lithuanian Army Commandhoped to be able to fight for two weekswithout foreign support.

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In case of an invasion by Polish orSoviet troops, a retreat to the line Kaunas-Nevezis was planned, later to the DubysaRiver. With its high banks, this river wasalmost the only natural obstacle in theinner part of the country. A defence linewith bunkers also existed there. In case ofa German attack, a retreat to the Dubysawas planned, as well. The retreat to theDubysa after an attack from the Eastwould have meant the giving up of thelargest part of the state and a simultane-ous opening of the southeast front ofLatvia. In case of a Polish or Russian at-tack, a retreat towards Germany after theloss of the Dubysa-line was intended.During a German attack, the Lithuanianswanted to retreat into the Latvian terri-tory after the loss of the Dubysa-line.

During the last two years of their in-dependence, Lithuanians started the en-largement of the peace time strength ofthe armed forces. The Third Infantry Regi-ment was intended to be the basis for afourth division in the region Kedainiai-Raseiniai-Seredzius. When the Vilnius re-gion was regained in 1939, the Lithua-

nian army command transferred the FirstInfantry Regiment and the Third Dra-goon Regiment to that place.147

Western observers did not judge theLithuanian army in friendly terms. Theyregretted the unusual influence of politicsand chauvinism in the Lithuanian officercorps. According to their judgement, manyhigh-ranking officers of Lithuania werepolitical creatures who were incompetentto fulfil their tasks and were not interestedin their completion. Positive changes inthe command of the Lithuanian army couldonly be noticed in the very last years ofindependence. In contrast to the other ar-mies of the Baltic States, the Lithuaniansoldiers� quality was judged to be only sat-isfactory, the main reasons being the lowgeneral education and insufficient train-ing. Nevertheless, the soldiers were regardedto be tenacious, physically strong, modestand especially suitable for the partisan war.Although everyone acknowledged that theequipment of the Lithuanian army wasmore modern than that of the other BalticStates, they still assumed that this armycould not be used in offensive actions.

However, there was no doubt that it wassuitable for a defensive war. The opinionthat the Lithuanians would be more fitfor a partisan war than the other Balticpeoples is interesting. Observers viewed theextraordinarily frequent change of the WarMinister, the Supreme Commanders andthe Chiefs of Staff as well as the intriguesin the army undertaken by various politi-cal groups negatively. All of this not onlyinfluenced the officers� morale, but alsothe morale among the soldiers in an unfa-vourable way.148

As a gap in the defence system alongthe border with the Soviet Union haddeveloped due to the politically independ-ent line of Lithuania, it can be assumedthat western military observers regardedthis aspect as highly important. Nobody,however, blamed Poland.

The Military Co-operation of theBaltic States

Latvia and Estonia were the only statesin Northeast Europe that had concludeda military alliance. This alliance was based

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on traditions from the war of liberation.The basis of this alliance was the treaty of7 July 1921, which was extended in thetreaties of 1 November 1923, and 17 Feb-ruary 1934. The alliance was of a defen-sive character. The Estonian-Latvian de-fence treaty of 1934 gave similarly inter-ested states the opportunity to join.149

On 12 September 1934, all three BalticStates � Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania �came together in the Baltic Entente, butthe treaty only consisted of a general co-operation among the states and regularconferences of the Foreign Ministers, butnot of military co-operation.150 Estoniaand Latvia categorically refused to con-clude a military treaty with Lithuaniabefore the latter had solved its conflictswith Poland and Germany. However amilitary treaty was not concluded whenLithuania was forced in March of 1938to re-establish diplomatic relations withPoland and when it lost the Klaipeda(Memel) region to Germany in March of1939.

Despite the existing military treaty,military co-operation between Estonia and

Latvia was really very meagre. There was �to a small extent � an exchange of officersto learn about the military training ofthe other state, to establish connections,and to learn the language of the neigh-bour. In 1930 and especially in 1931, large,common army and navy manoeuvres ofboth states took place, but were not re-peated in the following years. In individualcases, the three Baltic States exchangedweapons or sold them to one another. Toa small extent, the arsenals of all three statesalso co-operated.

During the whole period of their in-dependence, the Baltic States were not ableto agree upon common defence plans incase of a threat. The self-interests of eachstate seemed to be more important thanthe common interests. Each Baltic statehoped - for little convincing reasons - thatit would be able to prevent the loss of itsindependence, even if one or both of theothers had already lost it. Western observ-ers pointed out the extraordinary fear thatshowed in all foreign policy actions ofthe Baltic States. Each Baltic state had thestrong wish to avoid any provocation of

the Soviet Union. A military union ofthe Baltic States was considered to bepossible reason for an attack by the So-viet Union. Yet, there are indications thatat the time of the creation of the BalticEntente in 1934, it was in the interest ofthe Soviet Union to have a Baltic militarybloc between itself and emerging NaziGermany. This view changed later, of course.From 1933 on, the Baltic States also avoidedprovoking Nazi Germany, which did notwant to see a Baltic military bloc come intoexistence. The German diplomatic repre-sentatives repeatedly pointed out the hos-tile relationship with Lithuania because ofthe Klaipeda (Memel) region to Latvia andEstonia, and tried to use the disagreementbetween Latvia and Estonia by showingitself as the understanding and benevolentgreat power to the latter. Poland too re-peatedly pointed out to Latvia and Esto-nia that it did not want any military agree-ment of the Baltic States with Lithuania.Therefore, all three Baltic States tried toremain absolutely neutral and even weak-ened their conditions to the League ofNations (refusal of the obligations of the

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members of the League of Nations men-tioned in Article 16).

A Baltic bloc could have mobilized anarmy of 550,000 men, which would havebeen a notable force even on an interna-tional scale. One has to remember thatneither the Soviet Union nor Germanyor Poland, because of the constant threatto their borders, would have been able toturn their entire forces or a substantialpart of them against the Baltic States un-der any conditions. The Vilnius and theKlaipeda (Memel) problems were trickyand dangerous, but a military union ofthe Baltic States could have been formedbecause of the international situation with-out being influenced by threats of cer-tain states, threats that were not seriousanyway. Among the international commu-nity, self-confidence, unity, and power israted higher than the splitting up offorces and the idea of neutrality. Westernobservers have made many ironic remarksabout the extreme individualism of theBaltic politicians, about the exaggeratedemphasis on solely nationalist interests,and about the inability to co-operate in

the common interest and for the protec-tion of security. The great powers tookcare not to reach any military agreementswith the individualistic, small Baltic States,which were not connected to one another.

Of course, the question arises howmuch the Baltic States could have co-op-erated militarily and what they could havedone to foster such a co-operation evenbefore a treaty had been concluded. Theanswer is: A lot!

It is a sad fact that the Baltic States �during the whole period of their inde-pendence � felt very foreign to one an-other and that they really did not knoweach other. It often happened that theEstonians, Latvians and Lithuanianstreated each other not only with benevo-lent humour, but even with sarcasm. Un-fortunately, the latter happened a lot onan international level, during talks betweenrepresentatives of these peoples and thoseof the great powers. Measures that sup-ported mutual learning of history, cul-ture, and economy of the neighboursstarted late and remained small. There wasalmost no understanding of the common

fate and the common goal, and very littlewas done to foster mutual respect andfriendship as well as the development of aco-operation. Such efforts came too late,were too small and too �official� to reachlarger parts of the population. Much morecould have been done!

Each Baltic state had a different nationallanguage. There was no common linguafranca. Older generations were partly ableto communicate in Russian, to a small ex-tent also in German, but in Lithuania inPolish. It would have been perfect if thecitizens of the Baltic States would haveunderstood the language of the other twostates, but this was virtually impossible.Because of the geographic situation, it wasimportant for the population of the Bal-tic States to learn international languages,making it even more difficult to learn thelanguages of the neighbouring states inaddition. Sure, there were people that spokethese languages, but they were only a few.After the war, the Baltic States stressed theirindependence from Russia and Germanyand their attachment to Western Europe.Thus, Russian or German were rejected as

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the first foreign language. However, theycould not decide which of the western lan-guages, English or French, should be cho-sen as the first foreign language. So, Eng-lish and French were taught at the sametime, German being the second foreignlanguage. School graduates, however, hadonly acquired a basic knowledge of theselanguages and did not normally use themin everyday life. The majority of the high-ranking officers could also communicatein Russian, but the younger ones hardlyunderstood the language. On the otherhand, the majority of the older officers �with few exceptions � spoke neither Eng-lish nor French, and a large part did notspeak German, either. An agreement on acommon foreign language that could havebeen used for mutual communication inthe Baltic States would have been highlynecessary. Scandinavians understand with-out difficulty all their languages; never-theless they can all also communicate inEnglish and mostly in German.

During the whole period of independ-ence, the Baltic States did not develop aneconomic union. The small states even com-

peted with each other economically andwere unfit for broader economic co-op-eration. Estonian shale could have partlysolved the fuel problem, but the quarry-ing started too late and was too little. Re-garding fuel, the Baltic States were depend-ent upon Poland and even more so uponthe western powers, which on their partwere far away from sources of raw mate-rial. Latvian water power also remainedunused for common economic measures.

Without any effort, a standardizationof the organization of the armed forcescould have been implemented, as well as aunifying of ranks, badges, etc., but noth-ing happened.

Each of the Baltic States spent aboutone fifth of its budget on weapons andthe daily needs of the armed forces. Theseamounts were tiny compared to the pur-pose aimed at, but they were tremendousfor the small states that had suffered a lotand had to do it without any internationalhelp, especially when compared to the largerand luckier countries. Thus, the resourceshad to be used wisely. The supply of thearmed forces with uniforms, towing ma-

chines and food posed no problems. Butweapons were a very great problem. Theyhad been acquired during the struggle forliberation in insufficient amounts. Theyconsisted of different systems, were for themost part out-dated, and partly even de-fective and without spare parts.

The weaponry had to be standardizedand modernized. If the three states hadacted together, it would have been easier,more convenient, and also cheaper. Be-cause of political and economic combi-nations, the governments of the BalticStates and their troops did not co-oper-ate, though. The weapons of the armedforces of the Baltic States were, thus, var-ied and made up of very different sys-tems, which also limited the possibilitiesof a co-operation extremely. Not even anagreement on the standardization of am-munition was reached. The Estonians usedRussian ammunition; the Lithuaniansused German, and the Latvians Englishammunition. In case of a war, ammuni-tion supply would have been very limitedand in Estonia�s and Latvia�s case even im-possible. If the three states had been able

148

to agree on common ammunition for lightweapons, they would have become inde-pendent from foreign states at least in thisrespect and would have saved a lot ofmoney by producing the material neededin their own state. In addition, they couldhave helped each other out. Finland pro-duced light artillery and mortars herself.The Baltic States, with nearly double thepopulation, could have accomplished thateven more easily. During all years of itsindependence, Lithuania built fairly goodtraining and fighting aircraft. Latvia didso as well during the last years of inde-pendence. But the Baltic States did not co-operate in this respect either, but wastedresources in mutual competition.

The supply of heavy weapons had tobe concentrated on states that were acces-sible most conveniently in terms of traf-fic and from which spare parts could alsobe received in wartime. Sweden wouldhave been the best choice. Due to eco-nomic considerations, the Baltic Statesordered nearly no weapons in Sweden.The latter had few economic relations tothe Baltic States, whose products it did

not need. Moreover, Sweden demandedpayment in cash. The UK and France, onthe other hand, threatened not to takeproducts from the Baltic States if weap-ons were not bought from them. Usually,the Baltic States received only out-datedweapons for a price that was at least twiceas high as for the English and Frenchforces. Lithuania also bought a few weap-ons from the Soviet Union, but their gunswere also out-dated and very expensive.The Baltic States also feared to have rela-tions to a state whose political leaders sup-ported elements that were aiming at theireventual incorporation into the SovietUnion. The weapons became more andmore complicated and more and moreexpensive, making a close co-operationbetween the Baltic States essential. In 1939,a modern English destroyer already costa fortieth of the whole Latvian defencebudget. Today twice the annual budgetof 1939 would be needed to buy one sin-gle supersonic aircraft, to say nothing ofmissiles.

The question of a supreme commandin wartime was also important. It seems as

if the Baltic States hoped to co-operatewith some great powers, which would havetaken over command then, of course. Therewere no treaties between the Baltic Statesand the western powers nor any plans forpotential co-operation in wartime. Therewere arrangements between Latvia and Es-tonia for a potential common supremecommand in wartime. But questions ofprestige and about military qualificationas well as political considerations andmemories from the war of liberation werebrought up. Estonia regarded its supremecommand as more competent, which west-ern military observers confirmed in theirevaluations. The Latvian forces, on theother hand, would have been nearly twiceas strong. The Estonians had a low opin-ion of the long-time Latvian War Minis-ter, who had not supported them in theBattle of Cesis (Wenden) and in times ofpeace had not cared about the completionof his military knowledge, but - accordingto several observers � wanted to becomesupreme commander. The Estonians alsoremembered how they were forced duringthe war of liberation to hold a consider-

149

able part of the Latvian front althoughtheir forces were urgently needed some-where else. The fact that the Latvians werein an extraordinarily unpleasant situationhad been forgotten. The Latvians on theirpart had the suspicion that the Estoniansupreme commander would try to use theLatvian forces mainly for the defence ofEstonia, whereas the Estonians thought theLatvian supreme commander would use theEstonian forces mainly for the defence ofLatvia. The defence plans of both states werediametrically opposite. Nevertheless, theplans provided for co-operation betweenthe Latvian Eighth Daugavpils Infantry withits Fourth Battalion and the Estonian FirstCavalry Regiment at the beginning of awar.

Shortly before World War II, theLithuanians did not raise any objectionsthat a Latvian general would commandthe combined forces of the Baltic States,but the Latvian government did not wantto be politically connected with Lithua-nia. Thus, the question of a common su-preme command remained unsolved.Western observers pointed out that the

supreme command only started to put re-ally highly qualified and gifted officersinto leading positions during the last yearbefore the catastrophe. They would havebeen able to command troops undermodern combat conditions. Names shallnot be mentioned in this article.

The Baltic States shared a common fate.A militarily advantageous situation wouldhave come up for them in connectionwith a democratic and liberal Russia be-hind them, as many Western observerspointed out. But such a situation did notexist. If the Soviet Union threatened Eu-rope, only a common resistance of allEuropean states would evoke hopes fordeliverance. In the opinion of Russian andWestern observers, the individual BalticStates were militarily without value, butjoined together they would have been asignificant enemy. Much could have beendone to consolidate this defence powerover 20 years, but almost nothing hap-pened. External factors are partly respon-sible for this, but to a large extent theleaders of the Baltic States have to takeresponsibility, too. The Baltic States were

not the only ones, the �regional guilty�.The Scandinavian States as well as the statesin the Balkans had to learn the hard wayduring World War II. At any rate, thearmies of the Baltic States had a great moralimportance for the strengthening of na-tional self-confidence of the Baltic peopleand could have posed a considerable threatto a potential attacker.

1 Offprint from Acta Baltica 1969, INSTITUTUMBALTICUM.

2 For a general overview, the following sourcescan be referred to: Royal Institute of InternationalAffairs (London), The Baltic States (London: Ox-ford University Press, 1938); Louis Tissot, La Baltique(Paris: Payot, 1940); Max Friederichsen, DieZentraleuropäischen Randstaaten mit besondererBerücksichtigung des Baltischen Dreibund-ProblemsLettland, Estland und Litauen (Rifa: Selbstverlag, 1921).

3 United States of America National Archives,Record Group 165 � Military Intelligence Divi-sion (Hence: USA, N.A., R.G. 165) � General Analy-sis.

4 Already during World War I did Theobaldvon Berthmann-Hollweg, Chancellor of the Ger-man Reich, comment on General Ludendorff�sproject of the annexation of the Baltic territory,pointing out the difficulties such an incorpora-tion would implicate.

5 Such views were already met with response inGerman Reichstag-discussions from 1916-1918. See

150

ed. Andersons, Latvijas vçsture 1914-1920, Stock-holm: DAUGAVA, 1967), pp. 165-166, 216, 272-273, 286-287.

6 Royal Institute, pp. 30-38.7 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Entente

� The Initial Phase�, Pro Baltica, Mélanges dédiés àKaarel R. Pusta (Stockholm: Publication du Comitédes amis de K. R. Pusta, 1965), pp. 41-42, 50. Hence:Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente � The InitialPhase.

8 Marija Gimbutas, The Balts (New York:Frederick A. Präger, 1963), pp. 21-29, 43-172.

9 Ibid., pp. 153-158; Alfred Bilmanis, A History ofLatvia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press,1951), pp. 33, 35; Ewald Uustalu, The History ofEstonian People (London: Boreas Publishing Co.,1952), pp. 31-32.

10 Uustalu, pp. 32-48.11 A. Bîlmanis, pp. 53-83.12 Constantine R. Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian

Nation (New York: Lithuanian Cultural Institute,Historical Research Section, 1948), pp. 45-145.

13 Ibid., pp. 146-160.14 Ibid., pp. 161-163, 229-250.15 Ibid., pp. 265-352.16 Edgar Dunsdorfs, Arnolds Spekke, Latvijas

Vçsture 1500-1600 [Latvia�s History 1500-1600], Stock-holm: Daugava, 1964, pp. 67-73, 172-184.

17 Uustalu, pp. 54-56.18 C. R. Jurgela, p. 100.19 Dunsdorfs, Spekke, 1500-1600, pp. 41-42, 67-

73, 127-141, 172-184, 678-680.20 Edgar Anderson, The Couronians and the West

Indies, Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Uni-

versity of Chicago, August 1956, pp. 59, 110, 146,229, 309, 311.

21 Dunsdorfs, 1500-1600, pp. 127, 129.22 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Latvijas vôsture 1600-1710

(Stockholm: Daugava, 1962), pp. 50, 100-102, 159-165.

23 Edgars Dunsdorfs, Mûþîgais latvieðu ka?avîrs[Eternal Latvian Soldier] (Melbourne, Australia:Generâïa Kârïa Goppera fond, 1967), pp. 189-192;Edgars Andersons, Latvieðu cîòas vçstures notikumos[The Latvians� Fights in the course of history], inLAIKS, XIX, No. 26 (1959), April 1, 1967.

24 Edgars Andersons, �Krimas kaº� Latvijâ�[Crimean War in Latvia], in Ceïa Zîmes, No. 9,March 1952, pp. 367-372; No. 10, July 1952, pp.450-455.

25 Jurgela, pp. 385, 394.26 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December

20, 1963.27 Jurgela, pp. 408-416, 427-456.28 Uustalu, pp. 109-110.29 Bruno Kalnins, De Baltiska staternas frihetskamp

[The Fight for Freedom of the Baltic States], Stock-holm: Tidens Förlag, 1950, pp. 33-42.

30 Dr. Constantine R. Jurgela, personal inter-view on November 21, 1968.

31 Dr. Albert N. Tarulis, letter from December20, 1963.

32 Ibid.33 Ibid.34 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 34-38; Pulkv.

[Col.] Dr. Gustavs Grînsbergs, letter from Janu-ary 22, 1962; Colonel Elmar Lipping, letter fromApril 17, 1963; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, interview on

November 16, 1968.35 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 47-49.36 Ibid., pp. 78-85, 92-93.37 Ibid., pp. 90-92, 96-97.38 Ibid., pp. 97-104, 107-109, 113-133, 218-225.39 Ibid., p. 225.40 Ibid., 186-189.41 Eesti vabadussõda 1918-1920 [Estonia�s Fight

for Freedom 1918-1920], Tallinn: VabadussõjaAjaloo komitee, 1937-1939; I, pp. 53, 63-70, 525-526; E. Andersons, 1914-1920, p.207.

42 Ibid.43 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 70-71, 93-95; Kindral

[General] Johan Unt, Tallinn: Kaitsevägede Staabi,VI, Osakonna kirjastus, 1931, pp. 28-29, 31.

44 Eesti, Haridusministeerium [Estonia, Depart-ment of Education], Eesti Maa, Rahvas ja Kultuur[Estonia, People and Culture], Tartu, 1926, pp. 17-19, 34-37, 62, 268.

45 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 225-226, 276-277, 301.

46 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 123-124; JohannesTipner, Punaarmee Eesti vaeosade võitlustest 1917-1920[The Fights of the Estonian Units in the Red Army],Tallinn: Eesti riiklik kirjastus, 1957, pp. 20-22.

47 Kari Archyvas, I, pp. 73-79, 84, 100-101, 234,268, IV, 182-190.

48 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209.49 Eesti vabadussõda, I, pp. 84-86; Unt, p. 34.50 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, p. 209.51 Ibid., pp. 226-226.52 Ibid., pp. 257-260, 301-309.53 Ibid., pp. 310, 592.54 Ibid., p. 307.

151

55 Ibid., pp. 586-591.56 Ibid., pp. 328-330; Winfried Baumgarten,

Deutsche Ostpolitik 1918, München: Oldenbourg,1966, pp. 240-241.

57 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 624-626.58 Edgars Andersons, �British Policy Toward

the Baltic States�, Journal of Central European Af-fairs, Vol. XIX, No. 3, October 1959, pp. 276-283,285-286.

59 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 475-494, 499-500.

60 Ibid., pp. 343-346.61 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 277-278.62 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 394-398, 406-

414, 427-441, 456-471.63 Ibid., pp. 415-417; Edgars Andersons, �An

Undeclared Naval War�, Journal of Central Euro-pean Affairs, Vol. XXII, No. 1, April 1962, pp. 41-50.

64 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 367-376.65 Ibid., pp. 352-363.66 Pirmasis nepriklausomos Lietuvos deðimtmetis 1918-

1928 , Kaunas: Iðleido Vyriausias LietvuosNepriklausomybés 10 metu saukakatuvémskomitetas, 1930 [The First Ten Years of Lithuania1918-1928, Kaunas: Highest Committee for thePreparation of the Tenth Anniversary of Lithua-nia�s Independence, 1930], pp. 64-65; Karo ArchyvasI [War Archives], pp. 140, 161-; Friedrich Janz, DieEntstehung des Memelgebietes [The Origin of theMemel-Region], Berlin-Lichterfelde: Edwin Runge,1928, pp. 59-60.

67 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 490-492.68 Edgars Anderson, Toward the Baltic Entente �

The Initial Phase, p. 44.69 Ibid., pp. 43-44.70 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 553, 556, 568.71 Ibid., pp. 506-536.72 Ibid., pp. 536-537.73 J. Þukauskas, Jonas Steponavièius, Lietuvos

kariuomené, Kaunas: Iðleido Sajunga ginkluotomskraðto pajegoms remti [Lithuania�s Army, editedby the Association for the Support of the ArmedForces of the Country], 1938, p. 8; KonstantinasÞukas, Þvilgsnis i praeiti [Look into the Past], Chi-cago: Terra, 1959, p. 394.

74 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 568-575.75 Ibid., pp. 367-375, 378-383, 394-398, 406-414,

434-441.76 Forschunganstalt für Kriegs- und

Heeresgeschichte, Darstellungen aus denNachkriegskämpfen deutscher Truppen und Freikorps[Research Institute for War and Military History,Descriptions of the Post-War Fights of GermanTroops and Volunteer Corps], Berlin: E.S. Mittleru. Sohn, 1936-1939, I, p. 128; II, p. 58; III, pp. 159,161-162, 167-168, 203, 206-208.

77 Edgars Andersons, An Undeclared Naval War,pp. 43-78.

78 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 404-406, 445,552.

79 Edgars Andersons, Toward the Baltic Entente �The Initial Phase, pp. 50-51.

80 Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-1939,First Series, 1919-1929. ed. Ernest Llewellyn Wood-ward, Rohan Butler, J. P. T. Bury (London: H. M.Stationery Office, 1947-1961), III, pp. 54, 69, 72-73,81-82, 86-87, 93, 225. 81 Les Problémes de la Baltique

(Paris: Centre Européen de la Dotation Carnegie,Division des relations internationales et del�éducation, Bulletin, No. 8/9, Publications de laConciliation internationale, 1934), pp. 731-732;Frank Percy Crozier, Impressions and Recollections(London: T. W. Laurie, 1930), pp. 245-246.

82 Edgars Andersons, 1914-1920, pp. 566-567, 584,615.

83 Ibid., p. 600.84 Ibid., pp. 586-592.85 Ibid., pp. 566-567.86 Ibid., p. 584.87 Ibid., p. 615.88 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. P 00/115; Germany,

Foreign Office, Microcopy T-120, R. 1466, D596533; 3. 2783, E 378494-95; Latvju Enciklopçdîja,Stockholm: Trîs Zvaigznes, 1950-51, I, pp. 108-109, 528-529.

89 USA, N.A., R.G. 59, 860. I.00/71; 860. M.00/56;Fçlikss Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ [The Change ofTimes], Stockholm: Memento, II, pp. 256-260, 349-374.

90 Bîlmanis, pp. 386-387.91 League of Nations, The Records of the First As-

sembly, 1920, Plenary Session, 27th Meeting, Annex6, pp. 634-636; John Spencer Bassett, The League ofNations. A Chapter in World Politics, London:Longman, Green & Co., 1928, pp. 101-102.

92 British Documents, First Series, XI, pp. 714-715,732-737; League of Nations, Records of the SecondAssembly, Plenary Sessions, 16th Plenary Meeting,pp. 318-319, Annex A, 334; Cielçns, Laikmeti maiòâ[The Change of Times], II, pp. 181-191.

93 Former long-term Secretary of the War Minis-

152

try of Latvia, Pulkv. [Col.] Pçteris Kaòeps, letterfrom March 24, 1962.

94 Edvards Virza, ed. Z. A. Meirovics, Riga: Z. A.Meirovica piemiòas fonda izdevums, 1935, pp.85-86, 90-91; Vilhelms Munters, �Meirovicaârpolitikas orientâcija [Orientation of Meirovics�Foreign Policy], in Sçjejs, Vol. I, No. 3 (1937), pp.235-236; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 1466,D 595311-12.

95 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24,1962.

96 Latvijas PSR Zinâtòu Akademija, Vçstures unmateriâlâs kultûras institûts, Latvijas PSR Vçsture,III [Scientific Acadamey of the Latvian SSR, Insti-tute of History and Material Culture, History ofthe Latvian SSR, Vol. III], ed. K. Strazdiòð, Riga,1959, pp. 338, 356-361, 370-372; Jürgen von Hehn,Die Entstehung der Staaten Lettland und Estland, derBolschewismus und die Großmächte [The Origin ofthe States of Estonia and Latvia, Bolshevism andGreat Powers], ed. Horst Jablonovski, WernerPhilipp, Vol. IV (Osteuropa-Institut an der FreienUniversität Berlin, Historische Veröffentlichungen,1956, pp. 127-128, 163.

97 Latvijas PSR Vçsture, III, pp. 232-239, 244-245,247, 249, 156-258, 274; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. pp/18, 21; 860. P. pp. B/8, 14, 32, 860. I. 00/92; 860. N.00/62; 860. P. 00/50; 860. I. 00/31, 33, 45, 60; 860.N. 00/55; 860. N. 00/B./3; Germany, Foreign Of-fice, T-120, R. 2778, E. 374516.

98 Pulkv. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 24,1962.

99 Ibid.100 Ibid.

101 Edgars Andersons, British Policy, pp. 276-289.102 Edward W. Polson Newman, Britain and the

Baltic, London: Methuen & Co., 1930, pp. 224-226; John Duncan Gregory, On the Edge of Diplo-macy (Rambles and Reflections 1902-1928), London:Hutchinson & Co., 1929, pp. 87-88.

103 United States of America, Department of State,Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the UnitedStates, Russia, 1918, Washington, D.C.: Govern-ment Printing Office, 1931-32, II, pp. 839-841, 849.

104 Interview with the leader of the former intel-ligence service of the Eastern part of Poland, JerþyNiezbrzycka (pseudonym: Richard Wraga) onJuly 11, 1964.

105 Ibid.106 Jânis Ritenis, �Great Britain and the Baltic

States During the Anglo-French and Soviet Talksof 1939�, Unpublished Master�s Thesis, Depart-ment of Politics, University of Adelaide, Febru-ary 1966.

107 Cap. Jerþy Niezbrzycka, interview on July 11,1964.

108 Ibid.109 Col. Edvins Mednis, letter from March 11,

1964; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2781, E.377014-16; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomatija [Secret Di-plomacy], pp. 81-84, 90-91, 96-98, 215-216; USA,Nat. Arch., R. G. 165.

110 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Un-ion, 1920-1927�, Lituanus, Vol. XII, No. 2 (1966),pp. 37-38, 44-45, 48.

111 Col. Edvîns Mednis, letter from March 11,1964.

112 Edgars Andersons, �Toward the Baltic Un-

ion, 1927-1934�, Lituanus, Vol. VIII, No. 1 (1967),pp. 6-8; USA, Nat. Arch., 860. P. 00/105; Germany,Foreign Office, T-120, R. 2311, E 154-226; R. 2777,E 374025-26; R. 2779, E 374974-76.

113 Capt. Jerzy Niebrzycki, interview on July 11,1964.

114 USA, Nat. Arch., RG, 165, DD 21/8, fromSeptember 20, 1935.

115 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

116 Ibid.117 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 37, 49-50;

Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14, 1962.118 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/60, 61; 760. I. 6111/

119, 120, 121; Germany, Foreign Office, T-120, R.1466, D 596349, 51-52, 62, 68-71; R. 3605, E 685736; Latvijas Saeima, VIII Session, 10th meeting,kol. 354-355; Sîpols, Slepenâ diplomâtija, pp. 132,133, 139, 217, 220.

119 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

120 Ibid.121 USA, Nat. Arch., 860. I. 00/141; 860. P. 00/102;

Leonas Sabaliûnas, �The Politics of the Lithua-nian-Soviet Non-Aggression Treaty of 1926�,Lituanus, Vol. VII, No. 4, p. 101.

122 Col. Pçteris Kaòeps, letter from March 14,1962.

123 Edgars Andersons, 1927-1934, pp. 17-19, 22-28.124 Edgars Andersons, 1920-1927, pp. 356-357,

42-44.125 Latvia Country and People, ed. Jânis Rutkis (Stock-

holm:: Latvian National Foundation, 1967), p. 154.

153

126 Lt. Col. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April27, 1967.

127 Ibid.128 Latvia Country and People, pp. 302-303.129 USA, Nat. Arch., Rg 165, 10641-355/5, 2621-

74/1, 2587/52-6, 2621-53/7, 2667-D-59; Col.-Lieut.Kârlis Augstkalns, letter from April 27, 1967, May5, 1967; League of Nations, Armaments Year-Book1938 (Geneva: Series of League of Nations Publi-cations, IX, Disarmament, C. 206, M. 112, 1938,IX), pp. 566-567; Kurt Passow Taschenbuch des Heers,Ausgabe 1939 [Pocketbook of the Army, 1939 edi-tion] (Munich, 1939), p. 229; Latvija i ejo armija(Moscow, 1938), pp. 60-61, 80-81; Col. PçterisKaòeps, letter from January 23, 1963; Col.-Lieut.Jânis Druvaskalns, letter from March 19, 1963;Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Plûmanis, MS. 1962 (Mobilisa-tion); Col.-Lieut. Jûlijs Íikulis, letter from January13, 1964, February 17 and March 2, 1964; Gen.Voldemârs Skaistlauks, letter from March 21, 1962;Gen. Eduards Kalniò, letter from August 20, 1962;Col.-Lieut. V. Ginters, letter from March 7, 1963;Col.-Lieut. K. Zîverts, letter from February, 1963;Capt. Adolfs Blâíis, letter from August 26 andOctober 19, 1963; Capt. Kârlis T. Dakteris, letterfrom April 29, 1967; Gen. Jânis Lavenieks, letterfrom July 12, 1962; Col.-Lieut. Pçteris Dzçrve, let-ter from December 10, 1962, and February 4, 1963;Capt. Antons Buls, letter from October 15, 1962,and August 4, 1967; Capt. Teodors Dreimanis,letter from January 24, 1962, and March 2, 1967;Col.-Lieut. Vilis Hâzners, January 31, 1967 (con-nection); Col.-Lieut. Jânis Rucels, August 3 and16, 1962, March 18, 1967; Eng. Kârlis Irbîtis, April

19, 1967; Capt. Edgars Mittenbergs, February 19and August 26, 1962, March 18, 1967; Capt. RobertsRiks, December 16, 1960; Capt. Kârlis Ercums,November 2, 1968; Capt. Arvîds Strazdiò, No-vember, 1962.

130 Rutkis, pp. 237, 451-457; Latvijas TirdzniecîbasFlote [Latvia�s Merchant Fleet], 1934, 1940; FormerMinister Dr. Alfreds Valdmanis, letter from Feb-ruary 15 and March 10, 1963; Air Pictorial, 1957,pp. 254-257; H. Volck, �The Irbîtis Line�; Eng. K.Irbîtis, letter from April 19 and 28, 1967.

131 Col.-Lieut. Kârlis Augstkalns, letter fromAugust 8, 1962, April 27 and May 2, 1967; USA,Nat. Arch., RG 165, 1064-355/5; Germany, ForeignOffice, T-454, R. 92, 53 (Gen. Oskars Dankers).

132 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-41/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67/2; 10641-355/5.

133 Villibald Raud, Estonia, New York: The Nor-dic Press, 1953, p. 33.

134 Maj. Kohn Madise, letter from April 4, 1966;USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, S. 2503-118.

135 Raud, p. 34.136 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; Capt. Elmar

Lipping, correspondence from 1966; USA, Nat.Arch., RG 165, 2780-1; 2775-3/9; 2780-1, 2, 3, 5/1;2881-DD-2. 7/1; 2584-44/7, 9, 10; 2737-18/1.

137 Raud, pp. 73-76.138 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, Estonia - passim.139 Raud, p. 76.140 Maj. John Madise, April 4, 1966; USA, Nat.

Arch., RG 165, November 20, 1937.141 Germany, Foreign Office, MC T-120, R. 1807,

411573-75; Gen. Rudolfs Bangerskis, Mana mûþaatmiòas [Memories of My Life], Copenhagen:

Imanta, 1959, II, pp. 91-92.142 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6.143 Anicetas Simutis, The Economic Reconstruction

of Lithuania After 1918, New York: Columbia Uni-versity Press, 1942, pp. 15-16.

144 Ibid., pp. 12-14.145 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-55/1; 2587-53/

6, 7, 11; 2724-DD-21/9; 10641-342/3; Gen StasysRastikis, letter from April 12, 1959, and January 4,1963; interview on June 12, 1959; Gen. MikasReklaitis, letter from February 3 and 14, 1964;Col.-Lieut. Kazys Alik�auskas, �Lietuvoskariuomene� (ms., 1958)

146 Royal Institute, pp. 191-194.147 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2587-52/7; 10641-

342/3; Gen. Stasys Rastikis, letter from April 12,1959, and January 4, 1963; interview on June 12,1959.

148 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2621-74/1; 2587-52/6; 2584-67; 10641-342/2.

149 Ibid., 2584-67/2; Sîpols, Dzimtenes nodevîba(Betrayal of the Fatherland), pp. 140-141.

150 USA, Nat. Arch., RG 165, 2584-67/1, 2731-10/1; RG 84, 760. M. 605/48 Bangerskis, II, p. 93.