Security and the commercialisation of ‘fan fests’

I N T E R N AT I O N A L C E N T R E F O R S P O R T S E C U R I T Y

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Vol 1 | No 4

Stadium technology– from access-control innovations to futuristic viewing experiences

Securing sport


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Editor Chris AaronConsulting editor Simon MichellAssistant editor, safety Marion Flaig ICSS editorial director Dr Shaun P McCarthy ICSS Director Research & Development Editor-in-chief Barry DaviesManaging editor Jane DouglasAssistant editor Emily Eastman

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3ICSS Journal – Vol 1 | No 4

Dear Reader,

In my experience, most people have an overwhelmingly positive perception of sport, in its broadest sense. From playing football in the park, to winning a gymnastics gold medal, the skill, effort, discipline and determination involved are seen as good values; and the athletes that dedicate their lives

to achieving their best are rightly viewed as role models in society, setting examples for others, particularly younger people, to follow.

Yet in the United Kingdom, 31 per cent of boys and 29 per cent of girls are now considered by the country’s health service to be obese. The London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, specifically aimed to increase sporting participation among the British population, yet, during 2012-13, participation rates actually dropped. Sport is commonly held to embody values of fair play and honest competition, but new reports of doping and match-fixing seem to surface every week.

Most worryingly, while it is vitally important to encourage children’s involvement in sport, the Coalition for Safeguarding Children in Sport, along with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), reports that 75 per cent of children participating in sport have experienced emotional harm, while three per cent have been abused sexually.

What should we do when faced by these troubling contradictions? At the ICSS, we believe that we have to keep shining a light on the darker side of sport, revealing more about what is happening, even if some of it is unpalatable. The recent conference on Child Protection in Sport that we organised with others in Geneva is a case in point. Nobody likes the idea that sport and major sporting events could actually bring harm to young people, but if research suggests this, we must investigate and suggest measures to stop it. Likewise, though less urgently, if the 2012 Olympics has not increased the take-up of sport in its host country, we should try to find out why, and try to build improvements into the next Olympics.

On 5 December, the ICSS participated with UNESCO Member States and other key stakeholders, such as the IOC and Nike, in a sports advocacy initiative under MINEPS V. The meeting addressed the challenges associated with encouraging public investment in sport and physical activity and socio-economic benefits. The ICSS looks forward to being an active participant in such efforts, and to playing an active role in developing key principles and performance indicators for encouraging increased physical activity among Member States.

Exposing the problem side of sports is not always easy, as several journalists have discovered when covering cycling in recent years. At times, it can also seem to make a situation worse, at least in the short term. As more attention is paid to a problem, more is revealed; this is good in itself, but can lead to overreaction and a loss of confidence in the overwhelmingly positive benefits of sport.

The ICSS will keep the light, and the pressure, on – whether in the fields of match-fixing, doping, corruption or human rights in sport – as it is our belief that, together, we can build laws and policies that will improve the game for everyone.

Yours sincerely,Mohammed Hanzab

Mohammed Hanzab

President, ICSS

Contents


ContentsVol 1 | No 4December 2013

News and comment8 A review of events and developments

Lookingatsportsintegrityandchildren'srights,theatmosphereamongfansinfootballstadia,anewWADAcodeandtheeconomicimpactoftheAmerica'sCup

12 The evolution of sport and stadia in a hyper-interactive world Technologicaladvancesarehavingasignificantimpactonsecurityand

crowdsurveillance.DrShaunMcCarthyrevealshownewtechnologiesmaychangethedesignoffuturestadia,alongwithpeople'sviewinghabits

Technology18 If the face fits: business and safety

benefits of stadia access-control systemsTraceyCaldwellstudiesthelatestaccess-controlsystemsforsportsstadiaandfindsthat,whiletheyarebeneficial,implementationisnotalwayseasy

24 A typology of cyber threatsChrisAaronconsiderswhowouldwanttocarryoutcyberattacksagainstmajorsportingeventsandthepotentialimpactofsuchaction

Bongarts/Getty Images

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Tribute

ICSS Journal – Vol 1 | No 4

In 1995, victorious South Africa captain Francois Pienaar received the Rugby World Cup from Nelson Mandela, who wore the Springboks’ jersey in support of the national team, formerly a symbol of white rule

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The world lost a true leader with the death of Nelson Mandela in December. Mandela had this to say about sport and how it plays a unique role in peace and reconciliation: “Sport has the power to unite people in a way that little else can. It can create hope where once

there was only despair. It breaks down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of discrimination. Sport speaks to people in a language they can understand.”

Not only has one nation, South Africa, lost an inspirational leader, but so has the world. Nelson Mandela showed us how to use sport to promote peace, forge reconciliation, and to enable a nation to put aside its differences and to focus on excelling on the playing field. Sports men and women around the world owe it to Nelson Mandela to continue to pay tribute to his example, his courage, his passion for brinkmanship and his enthusiasm for sport.

Mr Mandela, the world of sport salutes you, Hamba Kahle!

A tribute to Nelson Mandela

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Security and safety28 Spanish football clubs aim for ultra security

Javier Santos Núñez looks at the evolution of security operations within Spanish football and how clubs are getting tough with ultra groups

34 Threats, designs and predicting the future In the conclusion of his two-part article, Roger Cumming considers the

challenges that are faced during the construction and operation of a venue

42 Sochi: potential threats and security preparationsNathan Barrick reviews security preparations for the Winter Olympics, along with the possible threats and impact of any disruption to the Games

50 Pitching in: fans struggle for control of public spaceJames Dorsey examines ultras' involvement in recent protests in Egypt and Turkey, and militant fans' attempts to distinguish their different identities

58 Security and the commercialisation of ‘fan fests’Simone Eisenhauer takes an overview of the FIFA Fan Fest in Cape Town and examines the security and rights-protection arrangements that surrounded it

66 The role of fan projects in avoiding conflict at football matchesRichard Giulianotti and Peter Millward examine alternative strategies to combating violence at sporting events and the attempts to get fans on side

Integrity72 Commercial implications of corruption in sport

Samantha Gorse finds that, while corruption in the sporting sector is highly criticised, not enough thought is given to its impact on stakeholders

78 How major sporting events can mitigate risks of child exploitationProfessor Celia Brackenridge and Dr Daniel Rhind look at child exploitation and abuse associated with major sporting events and call for action to be taken

84 Monitoring betting at Olympic events: lessons from London 2012Kevin Carpenter examines a UK Gambling Commission report that provides a thorough and frank insight into the Joint Assessment Unit's operations

90 Looking for betting fraudDavid McCarthy reports on how sports-betting monitoring systems have developed rapidly over the past 10 years and reviews their progress

94 Match-fixing cases underline need for new lawsChris Aaron examines cases of match-fixing across Europe, how players and officials are lured into corruption and what is being done to prevent it

Legacy98 Tackling the dangers of inactivity through sport

Iain Lindsay runs through the wide-ranging physical and financial costs of a lack of exercise, and assesses the effectiveness of policies and initiatives designed to address the problems

Last word102 The future of sport

Governing bodies wait with bated breath to see how the forthcoming major sporting events in Sochi and Brazil will be received, writes Simon Chadwick

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ICSSSport

IntegrityModel

PROTECT

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ICSS Sport Integrity ModelAdvancing the integrity of sport to safeguard the future


ICSS

www.theicss.orgFor further information about our Sport Integrity Services, contact us at [email protected]

• Harmonised government legislation and sport statutes

• Integrated police and sport investigations

• Independent and integrity-driven referees

• Protect sport’s image as a model for the best in human behaviour

• Harmonised disciplinary and integrity systems across all sports

• Internationally standardised consequence delivery to corrupted persons in sport

• International database of persons complicit in sport corruption

• Promote for a single agency monitoring international gambling to detect betting fraud for all sports

• Sport specialists monitoring play to identity suspicious matches

• A procedure to advise and guiding sport bodies on global corruption threat

• In-play corruption-prevention procedures for urgent match-corruption alerts

• Preventative investigation resources for sport bodies

• An independent global intelligence collection and sharing body for sport bodies and police

• The support of government regulators and the betting industry to provide investigative indicators and administrative evidence

• Strong statutes operating in all sport bodies

• Transparent integrity and due-diligence for all sport bodies

• Independent anonymous reporting mechanisms

• Global integrity information sharing across sports

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News digest News digest


Sport integrity issues, specifically match-fixing and children’s rights, were discussed at a conference in Geneva on 6 November.

The meeting, organised by the Italian and Qatari Permanent Missions to the United Nations Office at Geneva, along with the ICSS and Lega Pro, aimed to evaluate the nature of criminal acts and abuse occurring within a sporting setting, and their threat to the potential of sport to promote positive benefits.

The positive values of sport are built upon foundations of integrity, equality and ethical competition. However, these foundations are at risk of being eroded by the increasing prevalence and significance of instances of abuse and criminality.

The conference noted that these twin threats to sport’s integrity are genuine, substantial and global, and that multi-agency collaboration is required to challenge them effectively.

A key theme was the need for the international community to pay greater attention to child protection issues within sport. This was underlined by the presentation of the summary of a 2010 UNICEF report that noted the global significant violence and sexual exploitation of children within the sport domain.

Panel members observed that while some countries may have robust protection policies, many others can be found to be severely lacking. It was stressed that even within developed nations, child protection remains a fundamental concern. This was highlighted by the Coalition for Safeguarding Children in Sport which, in conjunction with the International Olympic Committee, presented research indicating that in the UK, 75 per cent of children participating in sport had experienced emotional harm and three per cent had been harmed sexually.

UNICEF described its work in the development of universal child protection standards by outlining its ongoing international safeguarding project. This project has designed and implemented a set of globally applicable child protection standards that are currently being piloted by about 50 organisations around the world, and independently evaluated by child protection experts at Brunel University in the UK. Preliminary results from this study are expected to be available in 2014/15.

It was remarked that increased international efforts to tackle crime and child abuse will inevitably result in an increase in reported cases; as detection, reporting and prevention

strategies become more effective and widespread, the figures will actually start to look worse. Therefore, it was considered that any collective effort towards prevention should embrace detection and should operate without castigation or blame so as to promote unity between a diversity of sectors that currently work in vastly different ways.

Several other key themes emerged from the panel presentations:

■ The ultimate responsibility for crime lies with the state, governments and law enforcement authorities. However, sport authorities do have a key role to play in detection, sanctioning and prevention.

■ The protection of sport’s integrity is a collective responsibility.

■ There is a fundamental need for collaboration and dialogue in order to ensure maximisation of effectiveness and minimisation of wasted effort and resources.

Participants supported a proposal by HE Sheikh Saoud Bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani to designate an International Sport Integrity Day to build upon the work of the IOC by providing a sustainable forum for collaboration between sport, key stakeholders and government.

There was also backing for the ICSS Save the Dream project that promotes ethical standards for individual and social development through sport. In Geneva, Save the Dream was represented by former Olympian Penny Heyns, who spoke about her role as an ambassador for the project and the opportunity it provides to unite young people with ethically sound role models. It was agreed that the twin initiatives of International Sport Integrity Day and Save the Dream would help to solidify the foundations of ethical sport and raise awareness for sporting integrity and human rights.

Sport integrity: a right for youth

The international community has been advised to pay greater attention to child protection in sport

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The atmosphere among supporters at English Premier League football matches was criticised by a number of club managers, among them Chelsea’s José Mourinho and Arsenal’s Arsène Wenger, in the latter months of 2013.

In an Observer article on 16 November, Owen Gibson noted that muted or apathetic supporters, and a lack of stadium ‘atmosphere’ could eventually effect the “overseas television revenue that contributed to a £5.5 billion windfall for clubs for the three seasons starting with 2012-13. One of the key factors that helps make the Premier League the most saleable commodity in world football is its noise, pageantry and atmosphere”.

Gibson quoted the Premier League Chief Executive, Richard

A new anti-doping rulebook was ratified at the World Conference on Doping in Sport in Johannesburg, South Africa, on 12-15 November 2013, increasing the ban for first-time doping offences from two to four years.

The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code, drafted by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in consultation with sports federations, anti-doping experts and governments, also introduced measures to encourage athletes to blow the whistle on doping activities in their sports, enabled greater leniency in cases of inadvertent doping, and granted increased powers to sanction coaches or other support staff found to be abetting doping.

“The new measures are an excellent step forward and the IOC welcomes any improvement in the fight against doping,” said the IOC’s newly appointed president, Thomas Bach. “It is a much-improved code, but it alone is not enough.” Bach also urged more research and technological developments.

Scudamore, saying fans were an integral part of the ‘show’ being sold around the world: “Unless the show is a good show, with the best talent and played in decent stadia with full crowds, then it isn’t a show you can sell.”

The causes of the change in atmosphere is a matter of debate: some blame it on all-seater stadiums; others point to the ‘gentrification’ of supporters and more families attending games; some suggest that this gentrification has gone hand-in-hand with increased ticket prices, resulting in the financial exclusion of younger fans.

“We’ll never go back to where we were in the 70s and 80s. You could pay on the gate, it was much cheaper and you could congregate together,” Tim Rolls, Chair of the

Sir Craig Reedie, who was elected to the presidency of WADA during the conference, said he hoped “that the higher sanctions become a much more regular fact of life”.

The outgoing president, John Fahey, commenting on the incentives to share information on doping with sport authorities, said that “if you can bring about a greater good with the cooperation you give, then there ought to be some encouragement for you”.

A further move, reflected in various changes to the rulebook, was to put greater emphasis on investigations into doping and not to rely solely on analytical testing of samples.

In a sense, this would bring anti-doping and anti-match-fixing strategies somewhat closer together; certainly there is a growing consensus for international harmonisation of legislation, oversight, information exchange, and investigation in both problem areas. “Investigations, in particular, are seen as essential if we are to

Fan apathy is criticised by football managers

New WADA code signals a time for change

Chelsea Supporters Trust told Gibson. “Also, there are more tourists, it’s an experience and they’re there to capture it on their iPad rather than interact … There’s a definitely now a big element of ‘here we are, now entertain us’ with many fans.”

The debate surrounding the atmosphere in stadia has renewed calls for a return to some standing areas, as well as initiatives to increase supporter interaction within stadia. Some of these come from fans themselves, while others are being pushed by the clubs. Whatever their origin, telecommunications and social media are playing a significant part in the initiatives: the question for clubs is whether such media are going to get the crowds singing or just watching their smartphones.

do what we must do as effectively as we can,” said Fahey during the WADA conference.

At a subsequent conference between the main sports governing bodies hosted by FIFA at the end of November, Dr Mario Zorzoli, chief medical officer of the Union Cycliste Internationale, said: “We have to find new ways of testing athletes, but also have to strike a better balance between the cost and the effectiveness of the fight against doping. The exchange of ideas with authorities such as police and customs must continue to be promoted.”

FIFA’s chief medical officer, Professor Jiri Dvorak, said at the Anti-Doping in Sports Consensus Meeting: “Approximately $300-400 million [is] invested in the fight against doping in sport every year ... We’re therefore discussing potential cost-effective and deterrent strategies. The time may be right for the development of a customised system which takes account of the risk assessment in each different type of sport and also has to be cost efficient.”

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UNESCO and the ICSS have agreed on a strategic partnership to work together on building the international capacity to combat match-fixing and corruption within sport. The agreement was concluded in Paris on 10 December.

Alexander Schischlik, team leader of UNESCO’s Anti-Doping and Sport Programme, said: “Individual nations can’t prevent international threats to sport integrity, but collectively they can. With its international expertise, the ICSS is a strategic partner for UNESCO in the area of manipulation of sport competitions. Together we can enhance our scientific, multi-stakeholder approach to this problem.”

Match-fixing is a complex, transnational crime and efforts to minimise its impact require a concerted approach to international capacity building, including the dissemination of methodologies for sport integrity standards and good practice; mechanisms that are designed to enhance cooperation and information sharing; and educational programmes, executive training, as well as public awareness raising.

ICSS President, Mohammed Hanzab said: “The UNESCO-ICSS

UNESCO and ICSS join forces on integrity project

America’s Cup falls short on economic impact

partnership will enable us to drive forward the sport integrity agenda. Through UNESCO’s intergovernmental mandate and influence, the ICSS’s commitment to the eradication of corruption in sport now takes a significant step forward.”

In line with the aims of UNESCO’s MINEPS V Declaration of Berlin on Preserving the Integrity of Sport, the collaboration will seek to mobilise government support for agreed principles on sport integrity, building on the current work developed by the ICSS and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Representatives from the ICSS, Sorbonne and the Council of Europe also took part in a Sport Integrity Forum at the European Parliament in Brussels on 5 December.

The forum, which was opened by Androulla Vassiliou, European Commission Commissioner for Education, Culture, Multilingualism, Sport, Media and Youth, explored the threat of match-fixing and its economic and social consequences for European countries.

The event highlighted a number of initiatives that could be introduced to safeguard the integrity of sport, alongside the introduction of

the Council of Europe convention on match-fixing, which, for the first time, will provide legally binding standards for governments across Europe and potentially beyond.

The forum also stressed the importance of European Union initiatives, such as Erasmus + and the European Sport Day as vehicles to promote ethical values in sport to young people. It discussed a number of programmes at international level, such as Save the Dream – a joint initiative of the ICSS and the Qatar Olympic Committee, as well as projects that will be introduced at a national level in order to promote and protect sport integrity values among young people.

Santiago Fisas Ayxela, a member of the European Parliament, said: “I decided to host this event given the current focus on the human rights dimension of violations to the integrity of sport. We need to work on a comprehensive approach, including the development of international legal standards, information exchange mechanisms and, perhaps most importantly, educational programmes to protect belief in sport’s core values, and the dreams of children for fair sport.”

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agesIn 2010, the Bay Area Council

Economic Institute (BACEI) and Beacon Economics published a report estimating the economic impacts of holding the 34th America’s Cup in San Francisco Bay.

The report noted that there were various uncertainties surrounding any such event, but by comparison with previous cups in Aukland, New Zealand, and Valencia, Spain, it estimated that hosting the 34th America’s Cup in San Francisco would result in a total economic impact of $1,372,414,635.1

The report breaks this down by type of contributor: the event owners’ expenditures, that of syndicates, local visitors, non-local visitors, media, infrastructure spending and so on. Syndicates, the teams that race their yachts, were predicted to produce a total economic impact “on [sic] the order of $368 million, resulting in the creation of 2,287 jobs”.

The report also considered the effect on local government funds, setting out its estimates and including several caveats, and concluding that the city’s General Fund stands to benefit by more than $13 million.

The report’s summary noted that “a great deal of uncertainty exists surrounding the format of an America’s Cup on the Bay. It is possible that the extent of racing will be less than that assumed here. This will naturally reduce the economic impact. However, the bulk of the benefits come from the activities of the Cup management and syndicates. Most of these expenditures will occur regardless of the duration or format of the event.”

In December 2013, BACEI released draft figures of the actual economic impact of the event. These were reported by Associated Press (AP)2 as being about $364 million in increased economic activity, rising to $550 million if the construction of a new cruise ship terminal is factored in. Calculating the difference between increased local government expenditures and increased local

tax revenues associated with the event, the San Francisco Chronicle estimated that the races cost city taxpayers more than $5 million.

The biggest single reason for the difference between the 2010 estimates and the draft figures was that only four syndicates eventually decided to take part in the 2013 races, instead of the 15 that the report had assumed in its estimates. Apart from the direct reduction in spending by syndicates, this clearly had a knock-on effect on other types of contribution, including non-local tourism.

It shouldn’t be forgotten that the 34th Amercia’s Cup was a fantastic event, positively portrayed in the global media, and bringing reputational benefits for San Francisco as well as the $364 million in new economic activity.

However, the consequences of a projected positive impact on local

government funds turning negative shouldn’t be ignored either. AP began its report with: “The America’s Cup sailing races this year generated far less economic activity in the San Francisco Bay Area than projected, and have cost taxpayers more than $5 million”.

Could such negative press have been avoided? As cities increasingly look to benefit from major sporting events, such as the America’s Cup, local authorities need to look closely at the downside risks of events as well as the real social and economic upsides. Taking a ‘negative’ view of prospects is not always a popular position, but ‘red teaming’ proposals should be built into decision processes so that downsides can be mitigated.

Many citizens enjoy the atmosphere that major sporting events bring to a city, but all citizens tend to complain if their taxes rise.

References1. www.bayareaeconomy.org/media/files/

pdf/San_Francisco_America_Cup_

Economic_Impact_Report.pdf

2. www.abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/

americas-cup-economic-impact-

projections-21164297

The America’s Cup winners, Oracle, cross the finish line in San Francisco in September 2013

Mapping

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The evolution of sport and stadia in a hyper-interactive worldShaun McCarthy reviews the impact of technological advances on security and crowd surveillance, and explores how future technologies may change sports fans’ viewing habits and the design of stadia

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A number of new technologies are being developed for sport-stadium applications,

including unmanned aerial vehicles, which could be used for surveillance if

regulatory hurdles are overcome

For the consumer rather than the participant, sport is essentially an unscripted form of entertainment for enthusiastic supporters (fans), who either travel to a venue where their

favourite teams are competing, or who gather round their television sets to watch a fixture in the comfort of their own home, or maybe at their local bar.

When fans flock to stadia to watch the game and support their teams, crowd size and exuberance are the key ingredients that create the special atmosphere and spirit. This also creates the need for stadia operators to ensure that the events are held in hospitable and friendly environments while simultaneously making sure that all are safe and secure.

The popularity of a sport, a team and a fixture generally dictates the number of supporters, and numbers have been the central factor driving larger stadia and more accompanying facilities; to cater for the needs of the public. These needs include parking,

refreshments, VIP areas and even internet access in order to enable stadia operators and support personnel to communicate and reach fans.

Investors in stadia expect to reap positive returns on their investment and sports clubs derive revenue from ticket sales, media and sponsorships and commercial activities ranging from merchandising to players’ fees for premium player transfers. Sport is one of the few economic activities consistently growing in revenue generation year on year.

Modularised stadiaWith increasing concerns associated with public expenditure on stadia construction, we are starting to see the introduction of modularised sports stadia. Such stadia allow capacity size to be decreased following mega sporting events, cutting major event venues down to manageable sizes that can be more effectively utilised after these large-crowd events.

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The redundant modules can then be made available to cities or countries that need help to host events or develop stadia. This concept has yet to become widely adopted, but it is a step in the right direction.

In the past five to seven years, we have seen the introduction of a range of technology-driven safety and security measures designed to help secure sporting events. In order to be relevant and effective, security technology needs to be rooted in the application of scientific knowledge but practically applicable in order to secure and protect people, assets and information during sporting events, while also ensuring the integrity and value of sport. The key characteristics that define security technology are:

■ risk and impact based (relevant to some perceived or real threat);

■ flexible – as unobtrusive as possible but able to increase with rapid speed and, therefore, scalable;

■ proven, based on tried-and-tested technology; and ■ affordable, with the ability to integrate and function

seamlessly with other technology and systems.

Embedding all of this technology is not always possible at the outset, when a facility is designed. The technology often becomes obsolete or redundant with the introduction of more integrated or systemic solutions. Although, where possible, the security and safety by design principle should be adhered to, and continual technological innovation and development will require upgrades and retro-fit as some of these new progressive technologies are introduced.

Underpinning the technology, however, are a set of standards and best practices that include: venue security and safety by design; facility hardening and vehicle-borne explosive device mitigation systems; crime prevention through environmental design; and, of late, as the realisation regarding the growing problem of sedentary lifestyles grows, the inclusion and the encouragement of physical activity by design.

Strong security technologiesThe most prevalent security technologies used in securing stadia can be categorised as access-control and technical security systems.

Access-control systems typically have comprised barriers such as doors, locks, booms, turnstiles and fences. However, as Tracey Caldwell points out in this edition (see page 18), UEFA 2013/14 key venue requirements for Champions League matches specify that “modern electronic access controls and mechanical counting systems must be installed, delivering real-time analysis of data on crowd flows and spectator attendance”.

Technical security systems consist of access-control systems, intruder detection, surveillance and people and goods screening systems, including chemical biological radiation and nuclear detection.

These demands are stimulating research and design into a range of security solutions, giving birth to emerging technology outcomes, such as:

Millimetre-wave technology: take, for example, the emergence of mass non-intrusive ‘stand-off’ screening. This technology will facilitate the screening of larger clusters or groups of people, improving on the current system whereby fans are screened one by one. Although still under development, we believe negotiations are under way to introduce this during the 2014 Brazil World Cup.

Facial recognition: closed-circuit television systems with powerful digital enhancement and facial recognition capabilities have significantly augmented the security services’ abilities to control access to events and to identify known dangerous and/or disruptive individuals and deny them entry to an event.

Mobile-telephone technology and smartphone biometrics: government-mandated security measures that monitor mobile phone and internet transmissions are also being enhanced and deployed. For example, in Russia the mobile operator Rostelecom is installing ‘deep packet

inspection’ (DPI) systems on all of its mobile networks, technology that allows the FSB to monitor and filter all traffic.1 Another development is the use of biometric data available on smartphones, which can be cross-referenced with the data uploaded at the time of ticket purchase (GPS and so on) and with the physical person present, essentially eliminating ticket fraud, expediting the ticket checking process and assisting with personal identification.

Smartphone access control: technology is already available to enable fans to use the smart card or even the mobile phone-based ticket that they used to access the stadium for cashless payments. Stadia owners are able to confer different access rights through software, so one smart card, for example, can control access for staff, visitors and supporters to different parts of the stadium and also enable a secure PC log on for staff. In time, the combination of mobile phone and radio-frequency identification (RFID) technology could be used to guide fans to their pre-purchased seats, and shortly prior to kick-off, stadia operators could assess the number of unused premium seats, offering fans, by way of text messages or online (mobile) marketing, the opportunity to upgrade

their seats at a discount. These prolific technological enhancements will undoubtedly attract customers and make their experiences more convenient, safe and secure. Cooperative fans could also be enlisted to assist in the securing of an event by enabling them to text reports of incidents anonymously to a central command system for venue operations centre (VOC) consideration, thereby enhancing the real-time event management system.

Real-time sport-event incident-management systems: these integrate an entire range of information sources in real time to provide the VOC with a overview of every facet of operations during the event. This includes safety, security, utilities, environmental and related personnel availability and whereabouts (location) status. VOC commanders would know the precise location of the overhead drones, for example, and could redirect them to trouble spots in the stadia or the surrounding approach or egress routes from the stadia.

Technology will facilitate the screening of larger clusters or groups of people

Video surveillance technology on display at a trade show. Facial recognition software such as this enables security personnel to identify individuals known to be disruptive

Millimetre-wave technology, which is currently used in airport scanners such as the one shown here, is being developed to screen large groups of people

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Comment Comment


During the 2014 Brazil World Cup and at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, we can expect to see the use of blimps and drones equipped with powerful thermal-vision cameras as well as digital feature-recognition technology. As the cover of this journal illustrates, drone and enhanced surveillance technology could help stadia operators detect a potential troublemaker located deep within the spectator base of an opponent team and assist marshals to respond with pin-point accuracy and extract the transgressor.

Potential profitGiven this surge in technological advances, investors can be forgiven for being excited about the potential to generate healthy returns from their investments in stadia and their associated assets. However, the advent of technology could, in time, prove to be a double-edged sword for those investing in bricks and mortar stadia. The incessant march of technology is poised to change behaviours, perhaps not immediately or overnight, but certainly with some significant impact in the next decade.

Let us consider the following, quite probable, advances: ■ increasing computing power that enables

improved virtual reality capabilities; ■ development of a techno-expectant generation; ■ 3D and holographic imaging technology with larger

and significant bandwidth speed services; and

■ significant increases in online gambling.

In addition to enabling a more effective and unobtrusive approach to securing sporting events, technological advances could also alter the way in which spectators start to view sport. Over time these new ways of viewing sport could also have a profound impact on the design and economics of sports clubs and stadia.

What would happen if the above ‘advances in technology’ combine to expedite the ability of broadcasting firms to project holographic images of a major sporting event held in São Paulo on to a football pitch in Tokyo? Indeed, Japan has raised expectations in this respect by claiming that it was ready to do this if it had been awarded the 2022 World Cup.

Japan demonstrated holographic display technology during the 2009 National Association of Broadcasters show. However, Professor Seth Riskin, Manager of the Emerging Technologies and Holography/Spatial Imaging Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Museum, believes Japan’s proposal would be unworkable due to the imbalance across the world in bandwidth availability and transmission speeds.

Professor Riskin points out that today, Japan has three times the internet speed available in the United States. Only time will tell, but if there is one lesson we have learnt from our most recent history, it is that progress on the technology front consistently surprises us.

Let us examine another scenario – what could happen when the next generations of sports fans are able to not

only create their own avatar players and virtual football teams, but also to set up and run their own virtual leagues and facilitate online betting, all from the comfort of their college dormitory or home? Would the development of holographic and virtual reality capabilities result in a greater usage of stadia? For stadia operators this could introduce increased usage of an expensive physical asset, as fans could view a match in their home-stadia, even though the sporting event was being played on the opposite side of the globe. Or, alternatively, will virtual reality and computing power and increasing bandwidth capabilities lead to a marked decline in fans who physically attend sports events in stadia?

The first possibility could result in a situation whereby existing stadia would be granted extended use as live matches are beamed on to football fields in multiple stadia simultaneously. However, the alternative scenario could result in diminished demand for large, physical stadia and infrastructure. Would the losers in this scenario be those investors who expect to derive a positive return for their investments into large stadia as opposed to the winners who have invested in what we call ‘studio stadia’ – media broadcast facilities that are only just large enough to house a football field, but with state-of-the-art television and broadcasting

equipment so that matches can be televised without the need to host a large crowd of spectators?

Of course, traditional fans would probably be horrified at the thought of this second scenario, and quick to point out that what makes a sporting event so special is the distinct atmosphere that can only be generated by an exuberant fan base. Traditional supporters would also no doubt point out that the technology that is being discussed above has a long way to go before it will become ubiquitous and free of glitches. That may well be true, however, if we consider how short a time it took for society to ditch public phone booths in favour of mobile phones, and letter writing in favour of email, then the above scenarios are not that implausible or far out in time. We cannot foresee the breakthroughs across a wide range of interconnectivity and related technologies that could give rise to the next major social and economic disruptions.

Dr Shaun McCarthy is the Director of Research and Development at the ICSS

References1 Borogan, I., Soldatov, A. and Walker, S. As Sochi Olympic venues

are built, so are Kremlin’s surveillance networks, The Guardian,

6 October 2013

Real-time analytics of water consumption, waste- water and refuse generation and ecological footprint data could be made available. In her article, Caldwell emphasises the utility of such a system when combined with spectator or customer relationship management systems to arrive at a better understanding of spectator patterns, movements and behaviour in the stadia and facilities prior to and during an event so that operators can improve the customer experience.

Robots: in order to augment static sensors, mobile robots could be deployed to detect explosive materials. The potential replacement of bomb dogs by robotic canines, however, would have to balance greater robotic accuracy versus cost-effectiveness.

Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones: these will be used with increasing frequency, should the necessary regulations and air traffic control issues be resolved.

In the previous edition of ICSS Journal, Dr Ann Rogers noted the current limitations created by flight-path restrictions, as well as those that exist primarily due to public safety. Nevertheless, these unmanned craft can be fitted with increasingly sophisticated surveillance cameras, high-resolution streaming video, explosive-detection devices and chemical-detection sensors. Furthermore, prices are dropping, making UAVs more affordable. However, more work would need to be done to reassure spectators that these craft are reliable and safe. In 2013, a drone suddenly lost its link with the controller and plunged into the crowd at the Great Bull Run event in Virginia, US, injuring one spectator.

Notwithstanding one or two mishaps, this versatile technology should not deter security personnel from deploying drones during major sports events once the regulatory environment catches up with the technology.

To augment static sensors, mobile robots could be deployed to detect explosives

It is likely that, in time, technological advances in areas such as virtual reality and holograms will alter the way in which spectators view sport

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18

Technology Technology


Access-control systems are key to ensuring that tens of thousands of people can enter sports stadia safely and securely within minutes. These are core systems for stadia,

with massive built-in resilience and redundancy. However, many stadia are now looking beyond the basic access issues and are putting access-control technology to work to improve the fan experience.

Champions League-level stadia in the UK have to comply with UEFA 2013/14 key venue requirements, specifying that “modern electronic access controls and mechanical counting systems must be installed, delivering real-time analysis of data on crowd flows and spectator attendance”. Many stadia, of all sizes, are also considering how best to use that data more widely in order to market and cross-sell to attendees.

The technology is already available to enable fans to use the smartcard or even mobile phone-based ticket that they used to access the stadium for cashless payments as well. Stadia owners are able to confer different access rights through software so that one smartcard, for example, can control access for staff, visitors and supporters to different parts of the stadium, and also enable secure PC log on for staff.

If the access-control system is linked to the customer relationship management system, then the stadium can promote in-stadium special offers

If the face fits: business and safety benefits of stadia access-control systems

Tracey Caldwell examines the technological advances in access-control systems for sports stadia, highlighting the benefits they can bring to the business as well as security, but noting the challenges that exist for implementation

to fans and market to fans who have not been attending recently. For example, fans may be given access to executive areas of the stadium if they have upgraded.

Technology is evolvingThe primary function of access-control systems is to enable secure and safe access to people who have a right to enter an area because they have paid for a ticket or pass, or are staff or legitimate visitors. Technology is evolving and access-control systems are becoming more intelligent. Traditionally, they have been linked to alarms that trigger on forced entry, or if a guard patrol does not present their card credentials at the right location. Increasingly, the systems are linked to CCTV in order to track persons of interest as they enter and leave zones of the stadia. This is perhaps becoming more pressing in view of the ongoing threat of terrorism.

The UK’s National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) recommends that stadia have measures in place to limit individuals’ access to parts of the stadium and incorporate appropriate access-control measures. NaCTSO recommends keeping “access points to a minimum and make sure the boundary between public and private areas of your building is secure and clearly signed. Invest in good quality access controls such as magnetic swipe identification cards or proximity card systems”.

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Access control applies to vehicles as well as people, and larger, more high-profile stadia in particular are taking steps to use access-control systems to protect against hostile vehicle-borne attack. Chris Rowlands, Managing Director of APT Security Systems, observes that the “threat of terrorism remains serious throughout the world, and hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) is just one method of managing such risk”.

APT Skidata, which supplies car access-control equipment, has worked with Manchester United FC since 2006. The club’s home ground, Old Trafford, has a seated capacity of more than 75,000. In 2011, having had an APT turnstile access-control system in operation for five years, Manchester United commissioned APT Skidata to provide access-control software for 7,000 match day car park spaces. The people and car access-control system was integrated, with match-day tickets and season cards controlling entry to various car parks.

The original installation for stadium access now has 140 access points controlled by readers. Subsequently, two more car parks were fitted with the same readers that were linked to Skidata car park barriers. Both the car parks and the stadium access controls can be accessed using the same data carrier – ticket or season card. Often, the car parks are used for VIP or corporate hospitality guests, and previously this involved preprinted car hangers and other material, which was expensive and operationally difficult for the club to manage.

As we head towards 2014, APT Skidata considers integration with customer relationship management (CRM) systems to be the most pressing issue affecting stadia owners, along with achieving cost savings from tickets sent to smartphones or ‘print@home tickets’. The company is focusing on the use of access-control technology to capture fans’ data when they enter stadia for the purpose of activating CRM promotional activity, such as upselling merchandise or food and beverages, and links to loyalty programmes through the recorded fan attendance data.

Insight into customer ticket usageTicketmaster is also seeing strong interest from stadia management in leveraging customer data from access-control systems. Mark Yovich, president of Ticketmaster International, tells the ICSS that: “Attendance data and

arrival trends are invaluable for stadia managers. Understanding arrival patterns helps with staff planning as well as creation of incentive programmes to entice customers to arrive at more desirable times to avoid bottlenecks leading up to event time.” Yovich adds: “The insight into

customer ticket usage is invaluable for real-time marketing and loyalty. Particularly in sports where it is unusual for season ticket holders to use their tickets for every single game in the season, loyalty schemes can tie attendance to rewarding people for ticket usage.

“Perhaps even more valuable is the knowledge of your fan base that is not in attendance; marketing opportunities exist for these customers to offer auxiliary services, such as ticket transfer or resale, to increase the opportunity for those tickets to get to fans who will attend the games.”

Ticketmaster provides access control for more than 1,500 venues globally, inclusive of stadia, arenas, theatres and clubs such as White Hart Lane, where Tottenham Hotspur is based, and Scottish rugby stadium Murrayfield. Yovich believes that the primary challenge around access control is cost, but in terms of it being balanced against the opportunities: “Installing and maintaining networking infrastructure and access-control hardware carries a capital cost, which can seem prohibitive. Older stadia in particular require the back-fitting of modern network technology to buildings that were not designed with electronic access control in mind.

“As stadia managers aim to offer a superb in-venue experience for fans, access-control technologies become vital to that desired experience, while providing insight into customer behaviour for continuous improvements. Finding a balance between the capital investment in the required hardware and the potential return in customer spend and propensity to visit the venue again, can be difficult,” Yovich adds.

There is huge opportunity in this space for access-control systems, which will increase personalised experiences, according to Yovich, who says Ticketmaster is focused on “understanding the increasing trends in terms of mobile usage in Europe – opportunities to have tickets rendered for mobile phones and associated systems, like Apple’s Passbook, are areas we are investing in”.

Aston Villa FC’s Villa Park stadium in Birmingham and its Bodymoor Heath Training Ground in Warwickshire have been experimenting with staff access-control options. The number of staff and visitors on a non-match day is typically around 1,000; on a day with a big game this can swell to more than 5,000 people at the training site.

The club has a long-standing relationship with TDSi, which has supplied access-control technology for about 100 access points. “Using TDSi’s access-control products and software has given us a highly flexible approach to our access control; we can easily add additional access control on a selected door and integrate it into the rest of the network,” says Josh Tooth, maintenance manager.

The human factor in system selectionHowever, providing staff with an acceptable access-control system has not been easy, mainly due to human rather than technological factors: “At the training facility they don’t like carrying the cards. We have tried cards, we have tried fobs, and RFID [radio frequency identification] wristbands, but they leave them behind or forget them, so we tried biometrics,” says Tooth.

Tooth planned to roll out TDSi’s facial recognition reader as a next-generation access-control system, but has hit difficulties: “We have tried fingerprint and facial biometrics. They work perfectly in our test room, but when we put them in the field they are not quick enough.

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Attendance data and arrival trends are invaluable for stadia managers

APT Skidata access-control gates. Feeding data captured from such technology into CRM systems can facilitate upselling activities

Manchester City FC is a trailblazer for the potential of access-control technology, with a smartcard-based

system that can admit up to 1,200 people each minute

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People are just too impatient and you have got to stand in the right position for the system to let you through”.

Tooth adds: “The club is trying to put the onus on staff that they have to swipe the card in the morning. If they don’t swipe in they don’t get paid, so that is the incentive to bring the card.” He acknowledges that this approach could also work in mandating that staff use biometric access: “We have a cleaning company that uses a fingerprint reader for the cleaners. If they don’t sign in they are not getting paid and that works for them.”

Tooth has seen the possibilities opened up by the latest access-control technology in other stadia: “Man City’s new complex is very impressive – their door access CCTV can physically track people around the stadium.”

“We are not that confident yet to integrate our CCTV with our door access control. TDSi do CCTV and the software would incorporate the CCTV, but [we] are still running on old digital video recorders – all the feeds go to digital video recorders. We have branched out into IP cameras, but they are just far too expensive. We have 95 normal cameras and eight IP cameras.”

Manchester City FC is something of a trailblazer for the potential of access-control technology. Its stadium was built for the 2002 Commonwealth Games. In 2003, the stadium was converted into a football stadium to replace Maine Road stadium and has a smartcard-based access- control system that can admit up to 1,200 people a minute.

As far back as 2008, Manchester City piloted issuing season-ticket holders with a reloadable, contactless MasterCard, both to gain access to the stadium on match days and to buy items inside and outside the ground. It has also achieved new revenue streams, from ticket upgrades, for example, using data from its access-control systems.

In contrast to the new-build Manchester City stadium, the 42,785-seater Villa Park stadium has been the club’s home since 1897, and since then has seen numerous expansions and changes. Tooth observes: “The trouble is, at Aston Villa, it is four independent buildings and to rip it out and put new systems in would be a major cost for the club.”

Biometric identification systemsBiometric access control for stadia has seen some success at the construction stage. Before the London 2012 Olympic Games started, UK officials were reported to be travelling the world to take fingerprints and face scans of Olympic athletes and their coaches, according to UK newspaper The Independent, but biometric identification seems to have been confined to construction staff in the London Olympics, despite hand readers being used as long ago as 1996 to protect parts of the Olympic Village during the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta, United States.

Biometric hand and iris scanners were used during the construction of the Olympic stadium, with most of the systems installed by UK companies Human Recognition Systems (HRS) and Reliance High-Tech. HRS is now back on site for the transformation stage

of the Olympic Stadium into a football stadium for West Ham. Simon Meyer, HRS operations director, tells ICSS: “We will likely be there until they finish the stadium in 2015. At the moment, we are working with BAM Nuttall and Careys, both of whom are involved in the next phase of the park transformation, providing the secure access to various parts of the park. As the perimeter moves, how we use our system changes.”

Each individual worker uses biometrics to enter the site and they have to go through an enrolment and induction process. As part of that, their construction accreditation is checked. In this way, the access-control system checks not only that the person is who they say

they are, but also that they have the training they need to be on that part of the site. “Biometrics provides that surety of identity, which a card-based system just can’t do. It adds an extra layer to have a card and biometric solution. You have to have a card to access the site then

use the biometric in tandem, so it made it that much more secure as people weren’t able to pass cards between workers,” says Meyer.

Facial-recognition technologyBiometric technology is improving in leaps and bounds. Globally, law enforcement authorities, perhaps more so than stadia management, have been interested in facial recognition from CCTV, but the challenge was always the quality of the CCTV technology. Now that the quality of the cameras is significantly improved, the ability to start integrating facial recognition has improved significantly.

In the US, the Department of Homeland Security is reported to have used CCTV footage captured at a hockey match at the 6,000 seat Toyota Center in Kennewick, Washington in September 2013 to test a new facial recognition system.

In Argentina, the Argentine Football Association (AFA) has introduced a biometric system, in place of paper tickets, to address hooliganism. The scheme, which reportedly cost the AFA €47 million ($64 million), will use biometric scanners as well as electronic cards containing the supporter’s name, address, photo and fingerprints.

Stadium owners considering leveraging data from access-control systems to market to attendees will

have to keep in mind the legal ramifications from both the physical means of access control they choose to the data they store. In the UK, the Disability Discrimination Act 1995, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human Rights Act 1998 all apply.

Catering for an ageing populationPhil Downs MBE, Disability Liaison Officer at the Manchester United Disabled Supporters’ Association, points out that responding to the needs of disabled and elderly attendees is essential if stadia are to cater effectively for an increasingly ageing population: “As the population gets older, it becomes part of the business case and could be the solution to retaining a lot of the season-ticket holders for as long as possible,” Downs says.

“If the journey through the stadium for people with mobility or disability problems can be made smoother, just as easy as it is for anybody else, the match day experience will probably stay quite positive for them.”

For example, ensuring that people with mobility issues have unimpeded access to lifts is critical: “These aspects are crucial in terms of persuading people not to ditch their season ticket,” he says.

Downs believes technologies such as biometrics or RFID cards could go some way to addressing the access-control issues faced by people with disabilities: “Ultimately, it is going to be easier for somebody with some sort of mobility deficit which means it might be hard for them to get a card out of the wallet or pocket.”

Downs cautions against over-reliance on smartphone technologies to enable access or book access facilities: “We would like to see these companies evaluate the best way of making those kinds of things accessible to disabled people, bearing in mind that some of them have physical disabilities that mean they can’t use a touchscreen device.

“Are they going to work on the assumption that speech technology is going to become so advanced that it is not going to make any mistakes? I don’t think we are anywhere near that yet,” he adds.

Clubs that fail to address these issues could find that a rival stadium that makes access easier will attract more people in the long term. “They will lose fans to somewhere else or they will take their kids somewhere else; it is all about retention, as well as bringing in new people,” says Downs.

The NaCTSO’s Good Practice Checklist – Access Control and Visitors points out that entry and exit procedures should allow all legitimate users to pass without undue effort and delay. Crucially, it also points out that safety is more important than security when it comes to access control. If safety can be assured, with security coming a close second, access-control systems’ integration with systems focused on customer experience and upselling can enable stadia to retain valued customers and mine rich new revenue streams.

Tracey Caldwell is a business technology journalist who writes regularly on information communications technology security, mobile and networking advances

Biometrics provides that surety of identity, which a card-based system just can’t do

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Meeting the needs of disabled and elderly attendees is essential if stadium staff are

to cater effectively for all of their customers

Technology


Technology


Cybersecurity is an increasingly important issue for all organisations, including those that plan and operate major sporting events. The technical and organisational aspects of

cybersecurity have been and will be examined in other issues of the ICSS Journal, but it is equally important to understand the types of group that might attempt to mount a cyber assault on a sporting event.

State threatState-sponsored cyberattacks on major international sporting events are highly unlikely due to the global negative response that the perpetrator could expect, and the significant lack of any positive advantage to be gained. Even if a state could disguise its responsibility for an attack, it is difficult to see what it would gain from disrupting a sporting event. While the United Kingdom, United States, China, Russia and Israel could probably deploy the most advanced cyberattacks, they have little or no motivation to do so in the domain of sporting events.

There are some fears, however, that cyber expertise developed by state bodies could proliferate and be taken up by non-state actors. This has been a concern with the research into the Stuxnet worm, and may also apply to specialist programming skills leaking from the state to non-state sector. In both cases, however, such specialist abilities would more likely be deployed against higher-value targets than a sporting event.

Terrorist groupsA terrorist attack on a major sporting event is obviously one of the highest security concerns, but cyberattacks are an unlikely vector for a terrorist group, intent as they are on achieving political ends through violent action. While a cyberattack might be able to disrupt power supplies or lighting and heating systems, and this would be a major incident for emergency services, it would not achieve the aim of high-impact violence that terrorist groups pursue. That said, cyberattacks might be used by a sophisticated group to disrupt the response to a physical attack, or to

A typology of cyber threatsChris Aaron examines the different types of group that might be motivated to conduct cyberattacks against a major sporting event, and considers the potential impact of each kind of attack

grant them access to sensitive information or areas. This might aid them in achieving their prime mission of physical destruction. Reports of the attack on the Taj Mahal Palace Hotel in Bombay, India, indicate the use of modern technology to coordinate terrorist operations; this is only likely to become more sophisticated with time.

A terrorist group is probably the most likely type of attacker to seek sensitive floor and design plans and access-control information by means of a cyberattack.

Criminal gangsWhile there is evidence of increasing cyberattacks related to sporting events, these tend to be directed at fans and visitors more than the facility, organisation or event itself. Criminal groups are seeking low-risk/high-reward attack vectors and targets, and these are more likely to be found through phishing attacks on individuals, as outlined below.

It is possible that criminal groups might seek to steal personal data (for example, credit card details) or designs for use in counterfeiting, but these are well-known threats to all ticketing organisations.

Similarly, a criminal group might seek to disrupt a sporting event in order to manipulate its outcome for the purpose of betting fraud. If this were possible through some form of cyberattack (for example, by turning off the lights or activating stadium alarms), the only questions would be how much the attack would cost to implement and whether the reward would be worthwhile. The threat is well understood and the technical challenges are high, so while this would be a high-impact attack, it remains quite unlikely. That said, the cyber theft of power-line plans, lighting systems or staff rotas might aid a sophisticated group in planning a physical disruption of an event.

Protest groupsIncreasingly, major sporting events are being used as a platform for political protest of various kinds, and a cyber intrusion would be an effective attack vector for various groups. If the biggest sporting events, such as the FIFA World Cup and the Olympic Games come to be seen as Es

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over-commercialised, they also risk being targeted for embarrassment by certain groups. The likelihood of a protest group being able to take control of a large in-stadium display or broadcasting channel is vanishingly small. However, sporting organisations’ websites would be easier to hack in order to leave messages; something that would be widely reported.

Access to floor plans, security system designs, access controls and staff rotas would also be valuable to a protest group wanting to mount a phsical demonstration. The Greenpeace demonstration against Gazprom at Schalke 04 football club, for example, required some layout and access information.

While protest groups are not likely to have a destructive impact on a sporting event, they are likely to be active in attempting to subvert event-related communications to their own ends, and this may have harmful organisational and economic impacts.

Thrill-seekersA 2011 symposium, Keeping the Nation’s Industrial Base Safe From Cyber Threats1, held at the Carnegie Institution for Science, includes thrill-seekers among potential threat sources in the cyber domain. This identifies an individual

or networked group that attempts to infiltrate a computer system purely for the challenge of breaking through the security. Such attackers are unlikely to seek a destructive impact, but they may have disruptive effects on systems as they try to penetrate defences without a specific purpose.

The symposium report also drew attention to threats from ‘insiders’, who could belong to any of the groups delineated above, but have privileged access to systems. The report identified three types of insider:

■ the classic insider who has already been tasked to do damage and seeks a position with a specific organisation to carry out that task;

■ the disgruntled insider who joins an organisation with the best intentions but later becomes dissatisfied. That dissatisfaction causes them to decide to do damage after they are in place; and

■ the careless insider, who is probably well-meaning but can create dangerous vulnerabilities. This is the individual who inadvertently introduces malware by carelessly connecting personal storage devices or accessing untrusted sites and files, who simply leaves a system on when going to lunch, or who writes down a password and leaves it in the top desk drawer.

In the domain of major sporting events, the classic insider described above is the greatest threat. As staff are recruited to operate systems for the relatively short period of a major sporting event, there is always a risk that someone seeks a post for a nefarious purpose. This is one of the reasons why security needs to be considered holistically, and cybersecurity should not be separated from the normal, physical security milieu. The importance of design plans and their security is also something to be considered in the whole, and not just as a physical or data security issue.

Targeting fansAs noted above, much sport-related cyber criminality targets fans rather than venues, infrastructure or event data. Internet security company Trend Micro has published a review of different techniques that it has seen where sport has been used as ‘bait’ with which to scam fans.2 These techniques include phishing scams, spammed email, website exploits and blackhat search engine optimisation attacks.

Phishing: according to Trend Micro, a scam claiming tickets had been ordered from the online marketplace StubHub for the 2011 Manny Pacquiao v Juan Manuel Márquez boxing match was used to lure boxing fans. Users who mistakenly clicked on the link were taken

to a phishing site that gathered information entered by the users. In 2008, the company discovered a similar scam website supposedly selling tickets to the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The site invited users to create an account, enter personal information and buy tickets to specific events. That particular phishing scheme garnered an undisclosed number of victims, and the Los Angeles Times reported that the victims lost a significant amount of money. Trend Micro’s discovery led to the website being shut down.

Scams and spam: in May 2010, Trend Micro identified several spammed messages that used the 2010 FIFA World Cup as bait. In both cases, the users were purportedly winners of a lottery and were asked to send money to a contact before they could claim the supposed lottery prize. This is typical of 419 type scams.

The company also saw several scams using the London 2012 Olympics and the Beijing 2008 Olympics logos or banners asking users to reply to the message with their personal information in order to claim a prize. Users who fall for this type of trap may end up as money mules for cybercriminals. According to Trend Micro, “such scams usually start via a spammed email message, with the

sports event as the subject. The messages are a variation of the recipient being declared as a winner of a prize in a lottery drawn by the committee of the particular sports event in the subject. The message is purportedly signed by a committee member. Some of these messages even have PDF attachments to explain the event and the mechanics. All of these scams end in asking for personal information.”

Website exploits: Trend Micro has also observed cybercriminals using fake websites in order to serve malware to New York Jets fans, Super Bowl fans and Arsenal fans. These compromises have led to the download of malware to the computers of users who accessed the compromised websites.

In addition to the website compromises, some of these reported cases used exploits in MS Windows components. In Trend Micro’s investigation of the New York Jets and Super Bowl fans sites compromises, several Windows exploits were used in order to download malware on the vulnerable systems.

Blackhat SEO attack: Trend Micro also spotted attacks that were related to the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver. In that case, cybercriminals poisoned search results to host two different malware: a backdoor and a FakeAV variant. “Search results that lead to the download of BKDR_INJECT.ANI were fronted by a bogus download of Windows Media Player update. Other poisoned search

results that led to the download of a FakeAV component leads to the installation of the rogue antivirus known as Security Antivirus,” the company claims.

Internet security company McAfee also observed scams relating to ticket sales, events and sporting-themed lotteries at the London 2012 Olympics, and commented on the security of

mobile devices in sports venues. “There are some very simple steps that everyone can

take to protect themselves and their devices from cyber-sporting scams,” says Raj Samani, Chief Technical Officer, EMEA at McAfee. “Firstly, think twice before jumping on a public Wi-Fi connection – they’re hotbeds for data theft and scamming. Secondly, turn off file-sharing when you are on the move to prevent hackers from stealing sensitive data from your mobile device. Thirdly, turn off geo-tagging on your mobile device before posting photos on sites like Facebook so your location information won’t fall into the wrong hands. Finally, if it looks too good to be true, it normally is. Be wary of phony websites, emails, texts and pop-ads offering deals on tickets to sporting events.”

Chris Aaron is the editor of the ICSS Journal and former editor of Jane’s Intelligence Review

References1 Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five:

Keeping the Nation’s Industrial Base Safe From Cyber

Threats, CACI International, September 2011

2 Lagrimas, D.K. bit.ly/SportsBait

Much sport-related cyber criminality targets fans rather than venues, infrastructure or event data

Cybercrime surrounding sporting events tends to be targeted at fans. Security company McAfee observed ticket-sale scams during the London 2012 Olympics

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Security and safety Security and safety


Spain, which perhaps has the strongest football league in the world, and where football is treated almost as a religion in many cities, is a good example of the long-term effort to

improve safety and security at football matches. How approaches to policing, crowd management and fan relations have evolved in Spain is also informative.

The Spanish National Professional Football League (LFP) includes two of the most powerful and famous teams in the world – Real Madrid and Barcelona – as well as a second-line group of clubs of huge local importance and tradition, including Atlético Madrid, Valencia CF, Sevilla FC and Athletic Bilbao. These teams attract thousands of fans with fierce rivalries. Eight teams in La Liga had average attendance figures of more than 30,000 in 2013, with Barcelona and Real Madrid averaging gates of 78,296 and 73,878 respectively. For comparison, France had only four

Spanish football clubs aim for ultra securityJavier Santos Núñez reports on how security operations within Spanish stadia have developed over recent years, and examines how Spanish clubs are starting to crack down on ultra groups

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Real Madrid supporters throw barriers at riot police outside the Santiago Bernabéu stadium ahead of a match in 2002. Since then, Spanish clubs have taken a harder line with radical fans

clubs with average attendance over 30,000 in 2013; Italy had seven, but the biggest club only managed a 47,250 average; England had 11 and Germany had 12 clubs with gates averaging more than 30,000.

The rapid growth and modernisation of football in Spain over the past 20 years has forced the LFP to improve safety and security measures and controls at all Spanish stadia, effectively upgrading the entire security environment within clubs.

Take a seatIn the early 1990s, most Spanish stadiums had fences around the pitch, but these have disappeared as more modern and effective technical measures, such as surveillance cameras, checkpoints on access to the stadium and sophisticated emergency control systems have been installed. La Liga clubs now have all-seater stadia, and in recent years, more than €200 million

30



The power of the ultras group has accordingly become strong. In 2013, just hours before his presentation to the public, the club Celta de Vigo informed the former player Salva Ballesta that he would not be able to take up the post of assistant coach at the club. Protests against Ballesta’s appointment had been made on social media networks by the team’s ultras, who were against the new coach’s political ideology, although the club president, Carlos Mouriño, denied that this was the reason behind its decision.

Something has changed in the past decade in the consciousness of the clubs. In 2003, the president of FC Barcelona, Joan Laporta, banned the far-right Boixos Nois fans from Camp Nou. He refused to let them use facilities in the stadium, isolated their stands with security glass, and finally got them out of the stadium. Laporta’s stand came at a cost, with personal threats and even an attempted assault. But his decision was applauded by all sectors of Spanish football, and such measures have been encouraged by new laws that have been introduced by UEFA and FIFA that force clubs to remove privileges from ultras, preventing their use of the facilities within grounds.

The relative strengths of management and ultras were tested during a similar situation at Sevilla FC in 2012/13. The then club president, José María del Nido, tired of fines and the club’s bad image resulting from the ultras’ behaviour, decided to take extreme measures to control access to the Sánchez Pizjuán stadium and prohibit entry to fans with a history of infringements.

For most of the season, the most radical fans went ‘on strike’ and refused to enter the stadium. After several meetings between club officials and representatives of the ultras, the radical fans promised to control their most unruly members, at least inside the stadium. As a result, control measures were relaxed somewhat.

As the ICSS Journal went to press, it was reported that Real Madrid also wants to reduce the privileges of its ultras, widely regarded as the most unruly in Spain, from the Santiago Bernabéu stadium.

Something has changed in the past decade in the consciousness of the clubs

30,000+ The attendance of eight teams in La Liga

78,296 Barcelona

73,878 Real Madrid

Spain Across Europe

47,250 Inter Milan, Italy

80,508 Borussia Dortmund, Germany

45,429 Paris Saint-Germain, France

75,164 Manchester United, England

Average Spanish football match attendance compared with rest of Europe, 2013

($275 million) has been invested by clubs and the LFP in modernising security systems. The LFP imposes minimum safety and security requirements without which clubs are not admitted to the competition. All clubs are also required to invest 33 per cent of revenue from match betting (la quiniela) on improving security.

The LFP, National Sports Council (Consejo Superior de Deportes) and police regulate and oversee clubs’ emergency and evacuation plans. Each club has a security coordinator to liaise with police and there is close contact between the two, especially in the days before matches that are perceived to be high-risk.

Spain has extensive experience of high-risk matches that involve large contingents of away fans: Real Madrid v Barcelona, Sevilla v Real Betis and Atlético Madrid v Real Madrid are all good examples, as well as the final of the Copa del Rey.

In the early 2000s, there were several violent incidents at such matches that pushed clubs to further enhance their security systems. Today, it would be difficult to repeat the massed throwing of dangerous objects that occurred in the Barcelona v Real Madrid 2000 game, or to witness the kind of events that happened during a Sevilla v Real Betis game in 2002, when a security guard was assaulted and a fan tried to punch the Real Betis

goalkeeper in the middle of the match, or indeed the kind of brawl that occurred between Real Zaragoza players and several fans on the pitch of Villarreal’s El Madrigal stadium, also in 2002.

The results of improvements to safety and security are obvious: violence inside stadiums in Spain has virtually disappeared, reduced to some sporadic cases of individual violence, such as a lone fan throwing an object from the stands. Even these types of incident have declined significantly due to video surveillance systems and coordination between the police and private security companies. The LFP punishes clubs for the misbehaviour of their fans; forcing them by way of severe penalties to intensify their security measures, and control and keep track of their most problematic fans.

Interacting with ultras One factor that has changed dramatically in recent years is the relationship between club management and ultras – the most dedicated, and sometimes violent, fans.

In Spain, close relationships have traditionally existed between club presidents and their more radical followers. This still exists in large part, and it is considered commonplace for presidents to gift free entrance and the use of facilities to ultras in exchange for their support.

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Although the risk of violent incidents inside stadiums has fallen close to zero, the risk of violence remains outside the stadium. According to a study conducted in 2012 by security solutions company ADT, entitled Citizen Security, 70 per cent of Spanish fans feel unsafe when going to a football game and consider the level of security to be too low. Most fans believe that going to a football match is much more dangerous than going to any other type of public event. Respondents were concerned not only by the threat of physical violence, but also by the level of verbal abuse, which they considered equally important.

Putting a stop to violenceSome security experts and members of the Spanish police have said that security operations would be much easier if stadiums were located on the outskirts of cities, and police insist that clubs should do more to improve security around the stadium as well as inside. Legally, however, responsibility for suppressing violence outside the stadium falls to the law and to the police. Spanish laws are now tougher than ever in this regard, and the Spanish police have gained a reputation for tough, efficient policing and expertise in monitoring the activities of ultras.

Whatever the legal delineations, collaboration and coordination between clubs and the police is the key to developing and improving the security environment further. The importance of such cooperation, and the value

of professional security management, was demonstrated in 2004 when a bomb threat was made during a Real Madrid v Real Sociedad match. In eight minutes, 80,000 people were evacuated from the Santiago Bernabéu stadium.

“The security team treats all matches at Real Madrid as high-risk events,” Julio Cendal, Real Madrid’s former security manager, explained in an interview in Seguritecnia magazine. “For special matches we have even used bomb-sniffing dogs. For such matches we have about 1,000 people in our department, counting volunteers, private security guards and club staff.”

José Castro, the newly appointed president of Sevilla, who has overseen security at the club for the past 10 years, said: “Foreseeable risks are managed and controlled. It is the unpredictable event that is most concerning; a lack of relevant information [about a threat]. Communication between clubs and other public and private organisations is important.”

How Spanish security measures upSo, how does security in La Liga compare with other countries? “Security in Spain is at the same level as any European country we visited with Real Madrid,” Cendal told Seguritecnia. Castro shared that view: “I do not have a complete overview at the European level, but I have good information about countries like England, Italy and Germany, and I am sure that we are at that level.”

Communication between clubs and federations is increasingly common and has helped to improve security when two teams from different countries meet. Relevant legislation is also gradually becoming harmonised across Europe. The UK government introduced the Football (Disorder) Act 2000 after a series of violent clashes involving England fans occurred at the UEFA Euro 2000 tournament. Under this law, the police had the right, for the first time, to prohibit the presence at some games of fans suspected of engaging in violent actions, even if they had no previous record of offending.

One of the major changes in the Spanish situation has been a recent amendment to the Sports Act (Ley del Deporte), broadening the scope for action on prevention and increasing the punishment for violent actions.

Holland and England have in recent years become a benchmark for security operations around stadia. The Dutch model is strict: all fans who want to attend a match must have a club card for identification, and without one

they will not get in. The system also requires fans with a serious record of violence to remain at the local police station before, during and after games – a measure that can also be invoked in other countries, including Spain. Dutch and English clubs have also increased their private security staff, meaning that fewer police are needed inside the stadium.

A method for studyThe Spanish system is not as strict as its counterpart in Holland, but access control is comprehensive and can be ramped up when needed. “The Spanish state created specific legislation relating to sporting events in the early 1990s, thereby providing the legal tools to achieve a very high level of security. Development and improvement has been constant since then. Continuous contact and working relationships with professionals from other clubs, contact with European competitions, and meetings bringing together counterparts from different countries, point us in the right direction,” says Castro.

Improvements to Spanish stadium security operations in recent years have placed it in the top rank of European countries from a security perspective, to the extent that the LFP now promotes its methods for study by other countries. A particular improvement has been the creation in each club of a working group dedicated to security, and led by a coordinator who is in constant contact with government agencies and the police.

The process of security improvement has also taught personnel how to adapt stadia to modern needs and technological advances. Nearly 2,000 surveillance cameras are installed in La Liga stadia. Research into fresh means of meeting new and existing challenges is constantly under way.

Within stadiums in Spain, the security environment is now very good. Outside the stadium, the biggest concern is with violent individuals who have not, or cannot, enter the stadium, many of whom are from groups with extreme political ideologies and have only a secondary interest in football. For example, the new leader of Real Madrid’s Ultras Sur has acknowledged being a fan of Atlético Madrid, Real’s eternal rival; something inconceivable from a football fan’s point of view.

The future challenge for the football sector in Spain will be to maintain a high level of training and specialisation for security personnel. Football, as a mass spectator event, has particular characteristics, requiring specially trained staff and managers, both at

football clubs and in the police. While the majority of fans are genuine team supporters who only want to enjoy a great match, football in Spain remains a locus for some small, violent groups who see it as an opportunity to use violence that is not tolerated in other areas of life.

Javier Santos Núñez is a freelance sports journalist based in Sevilla, Spain

Within stadiums in Spain, the security environment is now very good

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Riot police stand guard during clashes with Atlético Madrid supporters in 2013 after their club won the Copa del Rey

final against Real Madrid. In Spain, the biggest threat now comes from violent individuals denied entry to stadiums

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Threats, designs and predicting the future Part two: building on the strategy

In the second of his two-part article on designing and building safe and secure sporting infrastructures, Roger Cumming considers how to anticipate the challenges that will be faced during the construction and operation of a venue

Part one of this article, published in ICSS Journal Vol 1 No 3, proposed four strategic guidelines that should influence the design, build and operation of a sporting venue:

■■ consider■the■security■aspects■at■the■beginning■of■the■design■process,■not■as■something■to■■be■added■at■the■end;

■■ place■these■security■considerations■in■■a■wider■context,■for■example■as■part■of■a■■national■government’s■overarching■security■strategy■or■policy;■

■■ take■an■impact-driven■approach■to■the■■design,■for■example■focus■on■the■impact■■of■a■hostile■event,■such■as■a■terrorist■attack■taking■place,■not■its■likelihood;■

■■ consider■security■from■a■holistic■perspective.■■All■security■is■a■combination■of■people,■procedures■and■technology,■but■a■holistic■approach■goes■further,■balancing■the■physical■and■cyber■considerations■and■developing■a■positive■culture■among■the■staff■so■that■their■everyday■actions■contribute■effortlessly■to■a■safe,■secure■and■enjoyable■celebration■of■sport.

In■part■one,■early■engagement■between■the■security■professionals,■designers■and■architects■was■stressed■

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Perimeter security measures at London’s Olympic Stadium. Continuous engagement between security

professionals, designers and architects can save money and ensure that security enhances an event

as■being■essential.■This■can■save■money■in■the■long■term■and■produce■a■design■that■enhances■the■spectator■experience■by■inducing■a■greater■feeling■of■safety■and■security■for■both■them■and■the■competitors.■

Part■two■of■this■article■considers■the■importance■of■continuing■this■process■of■engagement■throughout■the■construction■phase■as■the■real■venues■start■to■emerge■and■the■number■of■people■involved■in■the■project■increases.■This■throws■up■a■different■set■of■challenges,■but■most■–■if■not■all■–■of■the■same■guiding■principles■apply,■combined■with■the■need■for■good■communication■between■those■with■the■original■vision■and■those■responsible■for■making■it■happen.■

Getting the security requirement rightArchitects■and■designers■of■sporting■infrastructure■should■seek■to■build■security■features■into■the■very■fabric■of■the■structures■themselves.■The■best■security■is■usually■the■most■discreet,■but■there■will■also■be■occasions■when■more■overt■measures■will■provide■a■deterrent■to■those■with■malicious■intent,■as■well■as■reassurance■and■comfort■to■competitors■and■spectators.■Further,■there■will■also■be■times■when■security■features■separate■from■a■main■building■will■be■necessary.■The■most■obvious■example■of■this■is■a■perimeter■fence.■

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All■stadium■systems■should■be■designed■and■installed■in■a■way■that■maximises■through-life■flexibility■to■support■both■changing■operational■needs■and■emerging■technology.■To■achieve■this,■it■is■important■that■all■relevant■stakeholders■agree■on■a■structured■mechanism■to■capture■requirements■for■the■functioning■of■system■components.

The■temptation■at■this■stage■is■to■think■in■terms■of■solutions■rather■than■requirements,■but■this■is■a■false■economy.■Take■the■simple■example■of■a■perimeter■fence.■The■designer■may■ask■for■a■fence■of■a■certain■height;■but■on■what■is■that■decision■based?■Is■it■just■because■a■similar■stadium■had■a■fence■of■a■certain■height■surrounding■it,■■or■was■that■fence■the■most■prominent■in■a■catalogue?■■It■is■important■that■rigour■is■applied■to■the■specification■■of■security■components■based■on■what■they■are■seeking■■to■achieve■in■the■environment■in■which■they■will■operate.■■

The■generally■agreed■best■approach■to■this■issue■is■through■the■drafting■of■an■Operational■Requirement■(OR)■for■a■security■component.■This■is■a■statement■of■need■based■upon■a■thorough■and■systematic■assessment■of■■the■problem■to■be■solved■and■the■hoped■for■solutions.■■A■structured■process■for■the■development■and■agreement■of■ORs■has■been■successfully■used■to■deliver■the■security■systems■for■numerous■parts■of■the■UK’s■infrastructures■and■many■permanent■and■temporary■sporting■venues.■

Among■the■questions■to■be■answered■during■the■preparation■of■an■OR■are:■what■is■the■output■desired■of■■the■system/component?■For■example,■in■general■terms■■‘a■fence’■is■a■solution■rather■than■a■requirement.■Is■the■objective■to■demarcate■a■particular■area■from■another;■■to■give■one■area■more■protection■than■another;■or■■to■channel■people■in■a■certain■direction?■All■of■these■aims■could■be■solved■in■a■number■of■differing■ways.■It■is■also■worth■remembering■that■it■is■a■mistaken■belief■that■fences■will■keep■people■out■of■a■certain■area.■While■this■is■true■for■most■law-abiding■people,■the■same■does■not■apply■for■those■determined■to■enter■a■restricted■area.■In■this■case,■the■fence■will■only■delay■their■entry■(as■it■is■climbed,■burrowed■under■or■cut■through),■although■sensors■will■be■able■to■detect■this■activity■and■alarms■will■be■raised.■If■the■fence■was■required■for■surveillance,■was■this■for■constant■coverage■of■a■particular■area,■or■only■at■certain■times?■

The■next■question■is:■what■are■the■options■by■which■the■output■could■be■achieved?■For■example,■fences■come■in■all■shapes■and■sizes.■Some■are■hard■to■climb;■others■difficult■to■cut.■Sensors■to■detect■this■activity■can■be■discreet■(sounding■silent■alarms)■or■noisy■(triggering■klaxons■and■spotlights).■Also,■surveillance,■can■be■achieved■through■the■deployment■of■people,■technology■■or■a■mixture■of■the■two.

Another■key■consideration■is■the■environmental■and■technical■requirements■for■system■components.■Harsh■environmental■conditions■will■affect■the■materials■that■a■security■component■is■made■from,■especially■if■it■is■part■of■a■permanent■structure.■CCTV■cameras■are■particularly■

sensitive■to■the■weather■–■those■designed■to■function■well■in■wet■or■damp■conditions■may■not■perform■so■well■in■■hot■and■sandy■conditions,■and■the■reverse■is■also■true.

The■residual■risks■and■weaknesses■in■the■proposed■solutions■should■then■be■considered.■A■fence■might■have■sensors■to■detect■when■someone■has■cut■it■or■is■scaling■it,■but■what■happens■then?■How■are■resources■mobilised■to■respond■to■the■intrusion■and■how■quickly■will■they■arrive?■In■the■case■of■surveillance,■the■effectiveness■of■this■could■be■reduced■during■heavy■rain,■fog,■snow■and■sand■storms.

The■next■question■is:■what■are■the■interdependencies■between■various■system■elements?■This■is■a■simple■question,■but■the■answers■might■be■complex■and■take■a■long■time■to■work■out.■This■article■is■not■long■enough■to■tackle■this■in■anything■other■than■superficial■detail,■but■as■an■example,■the■level■of■security■a■fence■provides■needs■to■be■matched■to■the■response■time■of■the■manned■guarding.■The■shorter■the■delay■the■fence■can■provide,■the■faster■the■manned■guarding■needs■to■respond.■This■may■require■more■guards■at■shorter■distances■from■the■perimeter.■

It■is■important■that■rigour■is■applied■to■the■specification■of■ORs■and■the■focus■is■not■allowed■to■■drift■back■to■thinking■in■terms■of■solutions.■It■is■unlikely■that■the■fundamental■requirement■for■a■security■feature■will■change■much■(if■at■all)■over■the■lifetime■of■the■infrastructure,■whereas■the■technologies■that■might■be■employed■to■achieve■a■particular■outcome■could■change■considerably.■It■is■important■that■the■replacement■technologies■do■not■weaken■the■overall■security■stance■■

or■remove■features■that■were■present■in■the■original■■build.■The■best■way■to■achieve■this■is■by■focusing■on■■the■requirement■rather■than■the■solution.

Designing for the future Once■the■ORs■and■interdependencies■of■security-system■components■are■understood■and■agreed,■the■system■can■be■designed■and■installed.■However,■remembering■that■any■form■of■permanent■sporting■infrastructure■will■last■a■considerable■number■of■years,■it■is■necessary■to■adopt■■a■strategy■that■seeks■to■maximise■the■capabilities■of■new■technologies■as■they■emerge■and■minimise■the■disruption■and■change■required■to■embrace■them.■Such■a■strategy■is■likely■to■include■the■following■principles:■

■■ Modularity■–■systems■will■be■specified■and■delivered■in■a■way■that■makes■it■easy■to■upgrade■one■element■without■changing■numerous■other■components.■

■■ Internet■Protocol■(IP)■based■–■the■historical■separation■between■the■physical■and■logical■worlds■is■no■longer■applicable■as■so■many■of■■the■physical■entities■in■a■stadium■(including■■

entry■gates,■CCTV■monitors,■public■address■system■and■display■screens)■will■all■be■controlled■across■communications■networks■based■on■IP.■Modern■stadia■can■all■be■flood-wired■with■IP■networks■to■achieve■this.■Such■networks■will■be■flexible■and■able■to■adapt■to■changing■requirements■of■the■terminating■equipment.■However,■care■needs■to■be■applied■in■the■way■in■which■such■networks■are■configured■and■protected■to■prevent■them■becoming■a■weakness■that■can■be■exploited■via■cyberattack,■rather■than■a■strength■that■delivers■flexibility■and■adaptability.■■

■■ Based■on■open■protocols■–■wherever■possible,■system■components■will■be■specified■to■use■open,■rather■than■manufacturer-proprietary,■protocols■for■interfaces■and■data■transfer.■This■will■be■particularly■important■for■the■control■of■numerous■physical■entities,■as■discussed■above.■It■is■inevitable■that■the■degree■to■which■a■cyber■environment■is■used■to■control■physical■entities■will■only■increase■over■time.■Similarly,■the■number■of■manufacturers■offering■products■in■this■area■will■also■increase.

■■ Flexible■at■the■security-management■system■level■–■this■is■the■point■at■which■the■inputs■from■the■various■systems■are■combined■and■then■presented■to■the■system■operators.■

Ongoing■operator■training■is■an■important■element■of■the■process■that■is■often■forgotten■or■minimised■after■system■commissioning■has■been■completed.■Ongoing■refresher■training■programmes■need■to■be■planned■and■executed■in■order■to■ensure■that■operators■remain■conversant■with■the■latest■aspects■of■the■system.■These■programmes■will■also■be■the■best■route■through■which■■to■introduce■new■capabilities.

Designers■of■security■systems■need■to■devote■time■■to■keeping■themselves■up■to■date■with■developments■in■■the■technology■market■through■a■mixture■of:

■■ attendance■at■trade■shows,■exhibitions■■and■conferences;

■■ ongoing■dialogue■with■suppliers■and■manufacturers■in■order■to■understand■new■■uses,■improvements■to■existing■as■well■as■■new■products,■and■capabilities■that■are■■in■development.

All systems should support changing operational needs■and emerging technology

Fisht Olympic stadium under construction for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics. When selecting security solutions, such as perimeter fencing, it is

important to consider the desired operational outcome, and how that connects with wider security arrangements, for example the availability of guards

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■■ Regular■engagement■with■relevant■government■or■national■bodies■responsible■for■research■and■applied■science■and■technology■–■each■national■government■will■have■slightly■different■structures■and■processes■to■cover■this.■In■the■United■Kingdom,■the■Home■Office’s■Centre■for■Applied■Science■and■Technology■is■responsible■for■testing■and■assessing■security■equipment.■The■Centre■for■the■Protection■of■National■Infrastructure■(CPNI),■part■of■MI5,■provides■advice■to■the■companies■that■run■the■UK’s■infrastructure■on■how■to■protect■themselves■from■national■security■threats.

This■engagement■will■allow■the■designers■of■sports■infrastructure■to■understand■the■strengths■and■weaknesses■of■products■as■assessed■by■independent■experts,■as■well■as■aiding■the■implementation■of■current■best■practice.■This■will■enable■a■judgement■to■be■made■as■to■whether■an■emerging■capability■offers■a■significant■improvement■(both■technically■and■financially)■over■those■currently■proposed.■This■kind■of■activity■could■be■swept■up■in■the■design-integration■meetings■that■often■take■place■in■major■projects■when■each■engineering■discipline■determines■how■it■is■affected■by■security■requirements■and■vice■versa.

A structured approachIt■is■during■the■design■and■construction■phases■that■the■layers■of■security■for■venues■will■be■specified■and■installed.■Once■this■phase■starts■and■the■number■of■people■involved■in■the■project■begins■to■rise■significantly,■it■is■important■that■a■structured■approach■to■the■handling■of■information■

is■introduced.■The■importance■of■this■was■highlighted■in■part■one■of■this■article.■Information■in■many■forms■will■be■vital■to■the■successful■design,■construction■and■operation■of■all■major■sporting■venues■for■the■many■years■of■their■legacy■use.■The■protection■of■information■will■normally■be■achieved■by■the■definition■and■implementation■of■an■Information■Security■Policy■(ISP)■that■needs■to■be■written■in■collaboration■with■all■relevant■stakeholders.■This■should■be■designed■to■ensure■that■sufficient■information■relating■to■security■systems■is■incorporated■into■master■designs,■but■that■sensitive■information■(for■example,■camera■fields■of■view)■is■only■released■on■a■need-to-know■basis.

To■facilitate■this■process,■a■single■authority■should■be■established■with■the■responsibility■for■writing■the■ISP■and■also■deciding■the■relative■sensitivity■of■information■to■be■disseminated.■This■authority■should■specify■how■sensitive■information■will■be■marked,■stored,■transmitted■and■handled■by■users.■Different■countries■will■have■their■own■established■processes■for■this,■such■as■some■form■of■national■protective■marking■scheme■for■sensitive■documents■(for■example,■restricted■or■confidential).■

The■ISP■needs■to■cover■appropriate■elements■of■the■supply■chain.■The■challenge■here■is■to■ensure■that■information■is■appropriately■cascaded■down■the■chain■to■facilitate■the■purchase■of■the■right■goods■and■services,■but■without■exposing■the■overall■security■posture■of■the■venue.■This■will■be■particularly■tricky■when■dealing■with■overseas■suppliers■or■organisations■with■an■unknown■or■weak■cyber-security■posture.■This■is■a■new■area■that■may■require■the■venue■designers■and■builders■to■seek■specialist■advice■■to■ensure■that■they■can■balance■the■advantage■of■going■to■

the■market■for■goods■and■services■against■the■exposure■of■potentially■sensitive■information■through■the■same■route.

It■is■important■that■the■ISP■covers■the■protection■of■the■numerous■industrial-control■systems■that■are■necessary■for■the■operation■of■physical■systems■at■the■venues,■or■that■a■separate■policy■is■written■to■address■these■risks.■A■modern■venue■will■have■innumerable■systems■–■including■those■for■crowd■access,■lighting,■air-conditioning,■display■screens■and■many■aspects■of■security■(command■and■control■rooms,■CCTV■networks)■–■which■will■be■controlled■via■data■networks■and■electronic■infrastructures.■Complete■or■partial■loss■of■control■of■any■of■these■systems■would■result■in■serious■consequences■■for■the■safe■and■secure■operation■of■the■venue.■

The■challenges■of■securing■these■systems■from■cyberthreats■are■brought■into■sharp■focus■when■considering■the■projected■life■of■the■control■units■that■■turn■cyber■commands■into■real■action■on■the■ground.■■On■average,■an■item■of■corporate■IT■equipment■(such■as■a■desk■computer)■will■have■a■refresh■or■replacement■rate■of■about■four■to■five■years.■A■typical■industrial■control■

unit■may■have■a■refresh■rate■of■20■to■25■years.■The■cost■of■replacing■the■remote■control■units■and■the■disruption■to■essential■services■while■this■happens■are■among■the■reasons■for■this■sharp■difference■in■refresh■rates.■Over■that■period■of■time,■it■is■impossible■to■predict■what■cyberthreats■may■emerge.■This■is■why■it■is■important■to■adopt■an■impact-driven■approach■to■security■as■described■in■part■one.■Focusing■on■a■threat■that■cannot■be■judged■so■far■in■advance■may■ultimately■lead■to■an■inaccurate■assessment■of■the■risks,■resulting■in■either■inadequate■■or■over-specified■security■features.■

It■is■certain■that■those■who■wish■to■compromise■information■assets■belonging■to■a■sporting■venue■will■be■imaginative■in■their■approach.■In■response,■it■is■necessary■to■understand■the■threat■to■assets■and■build■solid■defences■against■incidents■that■could■ultimately■impact■the■security■of■venues■and/or■supporting■infrastructures.■In■particular,■the■ISP■needs■to■have■a■flexible■response■that■adapts■to■changing■technologies■and■attack■methodologies.■The■pace■of■change■in■information■systems■is■such■that■it■will■be■necessary■to■keep■the■designs■flexible■and■able■to■integrate■appropriate■new■technologies■as■they■emerge.■But■new■threats■also■emerge■at■a■significant■rate.■The■ISP■should■ensure■that■venue■owners■can■be■confident■they■are■able■to■manage■their■risks■effectively■throughout■the■lifetime■of■the■venues.■This■reinforces■the■need■to■adopt■an■impact-focused,■risk-based■approach■that■will■build■the■appropriate■information■security■controls■(for■cyber■and■other■mediums)■into■the■fabric■of■the■venue.■This■will■ensure■that■it■is■capable■of■deterring,■detecting■and■

defending■against■the■inevitable■attempts■to■compromise■its■operations.■It■is■impossible■to■prevent■all■compromises■from■internal■and■external■threats,■but■an■effective■ISP■will:■support■a■security■architecture■necessary■to■create■a■resilient■operation;■respond■to■incidents■effectively;■learn■from■security■breaches;■and,■most■importantly,■manage■risk■within■proportionate■tolerance■levels.■

Information security standardsThere■are■numerous■internationally■recognised■information■security■standards■and■frameworks■that■could■be■adopted.■These■include■the■standards■set■by■the■Geneva-based■International■Organization■for■Standardization■–■ISO■27001■and■ISO■27002■–■and■the■800■series■from■the■United■States’■National■Institute■of■Standards■and■Technology■(NIST),■in■particular■NIST■800-53■and■800-82■for■industrial■control■systems.■There■may■also■be■applicable■standards■from■the■US-based■International■Society■of■Automation■(ISA)■and■others,■such■as■ISA■62443,■which■covers■the■protection■of■plant■networks.■Most■national■governments■also■provide■protective■security■advice■through■specialist■organisations.

The■engagement■of■security■specialists■as■part■of■the■multi-disciplinary■design■team■will■ensure■that■all■the■physical■infrastructures■are■inherently■secure■and■resilient,■and■make■it■relatively■easy■to■search■for■suspect■devices■prior■to■the■public■being■admitted.■

Once■construction■of■the■infrastructure■is■under■way,■it■is■important■that■there■is■a■controlled■process■to■review■proposed■design■changes■from■a■security■perspective.■This■process■needs■to■encompass■both■substantive■changes■to■the■building’s■construction■(for■example,■the■redesign■of■a■layout),■and■changes■to■elements■such■as■the■cladding■to■be■applied■to■a■wall.■Such■cladding■could■easily■be■seen■as■‘cosmetic’,■but■might■have■been■selected■for■the■way■it■resists■explosive■blast.■However,■this■is■unlikely■to■be■known■to■the■supply■chain,■who■might■propose■a■similar-looking■material■that■is■less■resistant■to■blast.■

During■the■construction■phase■it■is■important■that:■the■site■is■physically■segregated■from■the■wider■world;■the■workforce■has■been■vetted■prior■to■being■allowed■on■site;■goods■and■materials■are■screened■prior■to■site■admission;■and■frequent■verification■visits■are■undertaken.■There■are■a■number■of■models■that■could■be■adopted■to■achieve■this,■one■of■which■is■described■below.

An■appropriate■perimeter■barrier,■with■supporting■technology,■will■be■specified■to■separate■the■construction■site■from■the■surrounding■areas.■A■typical■set-up■for■a■major■sporting■venue■or■site■would■consist■of■a■perimeter■fence,■supported■by■CCTV,■lighting,■perimeter■intrusion■and■an■operational■guard■force■around■the■whole■of■the■construction■site.■Individual■areas■within■that,■for■example■the■main■stadium,■would■have■their■own■construction■■site■boundaries.■A■central■construction■command-and-control■location■should■be■specified■to■be■responsible■■for■monitoring■installed■systems■(for■example,■CCTV■■and■intrusion■detection)■and■managing■the■guard■force.■

It is important to review proposed design changes from a security perspective

Security office operations at the Millennium Stadium, Wales, during the 2012 Olympic Games. Surveillance can be achieved with a mixture of people and technology – assessing the options is key to a successful security outcome

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If■deemed■necessary■by■a■threat■assessment,■measures■to■guard■against■vehicle■attack■will■be■installed■to■protect■the■construction■site.■However,■such■measures■need■to■be■considered■carefully■to■ensure■that■the■barriers■are■suitable■for■that■environment■and■their■installation■will■■not■impede■the■required■flow■of■construction■vehicles.■

Deliveries■of■construction■plant■and■materials■should■be■controlled■through■the■use■of■a■delivery■management■system■to■record■details■of■loads,■delivery■vehicles■and■their■drivers.■To■minimise■risk■to■the■construction■site,■■one■or■more■off-site■centres■should■be■used■to■process■and■check■vehicles,■drivers■and■their■loads■before■they■■are■sealed■for■final■delivery■to■the■site.

Checks■on■vehicles■should■then■be■undertaken■at■the■boundary■to■the■construction■site.■For■vehicles■entering■the■site,■the■checks■should■confirm■that■the■vehicle■and■occupant■details■are■as■expected■and■that■the■load■has■■not■been■tampered■with■since■the■off-site■checks.■For■vehicles■leaving■the■site,■the■checks■should■confirm■■that■no■unauthorised■goods■are■being■removed.

Throughout■construction,■verification■and■assurance■visits■should■be■undertaken■to■confirm■that■potential■issues■are■identified■early■and■addressed■quickly.■This■■will■include■a■process■for■certifying■that■voids■are■in■■fact■empty■before■they■are■sealed.

It■should■now■be■obvious■that■the■number■of■people■working■on■the■project,■either■in■offices■or■on■site,■has■risen■dramatically■from■the■levels■involved■at■the■pure■design■stage.■This■means■more■people■have■access■to■information■(some■of■which■may■be■sensitive)■and■more■people■have■access■to■sites■and■systems■that■may■be■vulnerable■to■malicious■activity.■It■is■therefore■necessary■to■consider■carefully■the■personnel■aspects■of■the■overarching■security■strategy.■This■is■very■often■overlooked,■with■attention■being■focused■on■the■physical■and■cyber■elements,■while■the■people■who■operate■both■are■forgotten.■It■is■wrong■at■this■stage■to■suggest■that■all■staff■need■to■go■through■comprehensive■vetting■in■order■to■establish■their■good■faith■and■levels■of■integrity.■That■is■unnecessary■and■too■time-consuming■and■expensive.■However,■care■should■be■devoted■to■ensuring■that,■as■a■very■minimum,■the■true■identities■of■all■staff■and■contractors■are■fully■established,■and■that■they■all■have■the■appropriate■right■to■work■from■the■host■country.■Some■staff■and■contractors■will■require■extra■clearance■if■they■are■to■have■access■to■more■sensitive■data.■

This■is■an■area■where■the■importance■of■taking■a■holistic■approach■and■not■operating■in■silos■cannot■be■overstated.■The■venue’s■security■professionals■should■take■an■active■interest■in■this■area■and■not■simply■leave■the■matter■to■the■human■resources■or■personnel■department.■High-quality■leadership■from■the■organisation’s■top■management■layers■will■be■necessary■in■order■to■articulate■a■vision■of■how■the■everyday■actions■of■all■staff■involved■

in■infrastructure■and■delivery■contribute■to■the■overall■security■of■the■event.■If■the■leaders■are■clear■about■the■type■of■event■they■want■to■achieve,■then■it■is■much■easier■for■the■staff■to■understand■what■they■need■to■do.■So■often,■weak■or■absent■leadership■will■be■filled■by■staff■doing■what■they■feel■is■right.■Quite■often,■they■will■get■the■tone■wrong■and■this■could■adversely■impact■the■overall■security■stance,■or■inhibit■the■spectator■experience.

Let the games beginSecurity■does■not■end■when■the■building■phase■is■over.■Towards■the■end■of■this,■and■prior■to■the■venues■being■used,■there■needs■to■be■a■final■process■of■assurance■to■test■whether■the■various■security■infrastructures■and■systems■are■fit■for■purpose.■This■is■when■their■operation■is■tested■against■the■original■OR.■The■quality■of■finish■should■also■be■examined.■If■the■processes■described■here■were■followed,■there■should■be■minimal■need■for■remedial■action■or■reconstruction,■but■this■is■not■always■the■case.■

If■security■has■been■integrated■into■the■very■fabric■■of■the■building■then■it■will■also■support■the■handling■of■incidents■or■emergencies.■An■integrated■design■will■enable■the■event■organisers,■police,■emergency■services■and■others■to■respond■to■security■incidents,■disruptions■and■threats.■The■way■that■security■is■designed■into■the■structure■should■aid■this■and■produce■an■integrated■response■to■a■wide■range■of■circumstances,■for■example,■

through■the■careful■location■and■functioning■of■control■rooms.■This■is■the■point■at■which■people,■processes■and■technology■should■all■come■together■in■perfect■harmony.

Very■often,■security■is■considered■as■an■afterthought■–■something■

to■be■applied■once■the■design■is■complete.■Not■only■can■this■be■expensive,■but■frequently■it■will■fail■produce■the■desired■levels■of■protection.■By■considering■security■aspects■at■the■beginning■of■the■design■process,■taking■a■holistic■approach,■thinking■in■terms■of■impact■and■involving■relevant■experts■throughout■both■the■design■■and■building■phases,■it■is■possible■to■take■discreet■yet■effective■security■measures■at■reasonable■cost.■This■can■deliver■high■levels■of■assurance■to■event■organisers,■and■others,■that■the■competitors,■spectators■and■the■venue■itself■will■be■protected■against■malicious■activity.■

Adopting■the■approach■outlined■in■this■article■takes■dynamic■leadership■from■general■management,■supported■by■appropriate■security■professionals.■By■working■together■from■the■very■beginning■of■a■project,■they■can■ensure■that■security■enhances■a■sporting■event,■rather■than■being■seen■as■a■tax■upon■it.■

Roger Cumming is the Technical Director of security at Atkins – a design, engineering and project management consultancy involved in the design of the infrastructure for the London 2012 Olympic Park and temporary venues

Very often, security is an afterthought – applied once

the design is complete

Renovation work taking place on Maracanã Stadium for the 2014 Brazil World Cup. It is important, for security reasons, to separate construction sites from the wider world, vet the workforce and screen materials

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Sochi: potential threats and security preparationsNathan Barrick reviews security preparations for Sochi, assessing the threats and potential impact of any disruption to the 2014 Winter Olympics

On 7 January 2014, full-scale security measures will come into force in preparation for the XXII Winter Olympic Games, which will be hosted by the Russian Federation

between 7 and 23 February. Most indicators suggest the Sochi Games will be conducted successfully and free from major security incidents. If this is the case, it will be in large measure due to the significant security precautions that Russia, along with its Olympic Organising Committee and its international partners and supporters have taken in order to ensure that the Winter Olympics is not disrupted.

The importance of a visibly safe and friendly event is twofold: in addition to bolstering Russia’s prestige, it will reassure sport governing bodies and politicians that future major sporting events (MSEs) can be held in areas with some level of instability and risk.

Potential security concernsInternational criticism of the Sochi Winter Olympics has not been particularly vocal since the city was selected in 2007 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Criticism that has arisen has focused primarily on alleged corruption in Russian government, corporate and legal structures, and more recently on security concerns.

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Going for gold: security preparations have been meticulously planned for the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, which will take place from 7-23 February

In June 2013, Russian officials announced a planned increase in the security regime around Sochi. According to an official order dated 28 March 2013, 95 sites were to have increased security measures in place by 1 June 2013, and an additional 523 sites’ security status was to be verified or secured no later than 1 September 2013. The order also indicated a significant increase in security protocols, including a no-fly zone enforced by Pantsir-S air defence missile systems, from the 7 January 2014 to the end of March for the Paralympic Games.

Part of the security problem will include individual, non-violent criminal behaviour, such as pickpockets and con artists seeking to steal from visitors for immediate cash benefits. Additionally, as with local protests in Brazil during the Confederations Cup in 2013, security issues may arise from local residents and migrant workers expressing dissatisfaction about negative impacts from construction and security practices during the preparations for the Sochi Games.

The security problem expands to the possibility of protests regarding a number of controversial issues highlighted over the past few years: claims of a Circassian genocide dating from the mid-19th century, environmental damage and Russia’s recent anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) legislation. While

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any such demonstrations are likely to be non-violent protests intended to embarrass the Russian government, the possibility of violence due to crowd reactions or heavy-handed police dispersal tactics cannot be discounted.

Additional security concerns were highlighted by the August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing. A gradual normalisation in the tense relationship between Russia and Georgia since 2008 can be attributed to both countries’ anticipation of the Games and the possible economic and prestige benefits. While the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing does not appear to have affected Russia’s pre-existing planning efforts, the Boston Marathon bombers’ linkages to the North Caucasus highlighted the regional threat to the Sochi Winter Olympic Games, and certainly energised the attentions of both the international community and Russia’s security officials.

In July 2013, Doku Umarov, the leader of the ‘Caucasus Emirate’ terrorist band, threatened to renew terrorist attacks in Russia after a brief suspension of operations, reinforcing security concerns over the Sochi Olympics. Umarov supposedly granted his ‘moratorium’ to allow Russian political opposition to protest Vladimir Putin’s election to a third term as president in relative safety. Refocused global attention on the Chechen problem in Russia after the Boston Marathon bombing, combined with notable failures by the Russian political opposition to mount effective actions against Putin and the approaching Winter Games in Sochi, gave Umarov the opportunity to

■■ Terrorist■acts■■High-profile attacks, suicide bombers, car or truck bombs, improvised explosive devices, hostage taking, targeting infrastructure or VIPs

■ Regional terrorism (most likely)• Caucasus Emirate (Doku Umarov); and• other jihadist groups (several smaller regional

groups exist, often unknown until claiming responsibility, and frequently claim affiliation to Caucasus Emirate after the fact).

■ International terrorism (less likely)• Al-Qaeda; and• Al-Nusra Front (Syria) or Syrian

Islamist opposition sympathisers.

■■ Protest■activity■with■higher■possibility■of■violence■Grenades or small explosives, assassinations, vandalism, suicides, sewing mouths shut, same symbolic gestures as in peaceful demonstrations, but perhaps more bloody or gory.

■ Circassian genocide (more likely) Dozens of Circassian groups in Russia and globally demand recognition for alleged genocide; 150th anniversary of Circassian collapse at Krasnaya Polyana; unfair representation of

Potential security concerns for Sochi 2014

■ Abkhazia (less likely) Dissatisfaction with Russian promises; not allowed to participate in Winter Olympics as a national team.

■ Corruption (less likely) Many Russians and international groups concerned about corrupt practices in Russian government, corporate, and legal structures. Many believe Russian elites garnered too much profit from the historic expenditures on Sochi 2014 (more than $50 billion).

■■ Criminal■activity ■ Narcotics trafficking. ■ Petty crime (pickpockets and con-artists).

■■ Possible■catalysts■ ■ Warm weather highlighting challenges

of hosting the Games in Sochi. ■ Power outages indicating lack

of infrastructure preparation. ■ Traffic jams (vehicular, pedestrian)

and transportation hub delays. ■ Earthquakes (faulty construction) or

storms resulting in possible flooding.

nationality at Olympics events; prior protests at Istanbul Marathon on 17 November and in New York City on 21 November; 14 March is National Language Day for Circassians; many Circassians relocated from Syria to areas near Sochi.

■ Migrant workers (less likely) Tens of thousands employed as labour for Sochi 2014 construction; inadequate housing; attempted relocation of tens of thousands prior to Olympic Games; desperate situations; demanding wages; claim to be victims of discrimination and repression; large numbers of Central Asians, who have also experienced violence from Russian ultra-nationalists.

■■ Peaceful■demonstrations■ Posters and placards, social media cartoons, viral videos, graffiti, flags, T-shirts, disrespect for national anthems, symbolic gestures.

■ LGBT activists (almost certainly) International furor by pro-LGBT rights groups and individuals against Russia’s anti-LGBT propaganda legislation; many activists calling for protests both against the Russian government and IOC; expect rainbow symbology among athletes and visitors.

■ Sochi residents (more likely) Multiple drivers for protest; many lost housing and claim they were not compensated fairly or timely; power outages; rising prices; improper rubbish disposal; damage to water lines and sewer systems due to construction; concern about future energy exploration efforts in the Black Sea.

■ Environmentalists (more likely) Claim repressive tactics by government when activists attempted to draw attention to ecological damage related to Sochi construction; concern about future energy exploration efforts in the sea.

■ Reporters without borders (more likely) Seek to draw international attention to the plight of reporters and reprisals against journalists in Russia, especially covering the North Caucasus violence.

■ Animal rights (less likely) International concern about methodologies used on stray animals in Kazan Universiade and in preparing for Sochi 2014 Olympics.

■ Olympic boxing (less likely) Popular sport in Russia and former Soviet republics and many are upset at the IOC’s decision to remove boxing from the Olympics.

re-declare war on Putin’s Russia. The fact that the Russian government continued to prosecute anti-terror campaigns across the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan, probably contributed to Umarov’s ‘change of heart’.

Security services and expert observers don’t doubt the capabilities or willingness of Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate to conduct horrific attacks. In October 2013, a female suicide bomber blew up a bus in Volgograd, Russia. A couple weeks later, Russian security forces killed the woman’s husband, who was believed to be a bomb-maker in an anti-terrorist operation. While Umarov did not initially claim responsibility for the attack, the methodology matches attacks on Moscow’s subway in 2010 and Moscow’s Domodedovo airport in January 2011.

According to Robert Pape, Director of the University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism, which recently completed an 18-month study of terrorist incidents, the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus is now more willing to attack civilian targets. Pape assessed that Russia’s counter-terror operations have driven the Caucasus Emirate to consider more desperate measures.

Security preparations for Sochi 2014Complete details of Russia’s security preparations for Sochi 2014 have been kept guarded, but public statements have offered insights that the security measures will rely on multiple layers of security, overt and discreet security presences, venue access controls and sophisticated technological tools. Russia will utilise most of the same

techniques that have ensured security at similar MSEs and has publicly acknowledged its willingness to accept security-related assistance from the United Kingdom, United States and Georgia. What distinguishes Sochi 2014 from previous events is the existence of a threat in geographic proximity and with dedicated intent to cause the host government pain as well as embarrassment.

In July 2013, Russia’s Interior Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev vowed to set up a multi-tiered security system in Sochi in compliance with IOC requirements. The multi-tiered approach envisages:

■ National-level ministerial support in Sochi, the North Caucasus, and key transportation nodes throughout the country.

■ Augmentation of regional and municipal government agencies with necessary personnel and equipment to address increased security responsibilities.

■ The planning and coordination for venue- specific and important site security roles.

This multi-tiered approach is mirrored in geographic layers to provide perimeter security by the relevant agencies, with further layers surrounding transportation hubs and key Olympiad locations. For example, Russian authorities are designating a vast mountain area above

Sochi as a ‘restricted zone’ and attempting to control border access with neighboring Abkhazia. Checkpoints have been established in key transportation nodes outside Sochi and at random and strategic locations along roads and rail routes into the area. In preparation for Sochi 2014, Russia has equipped its security forces with the latest

technology, including remote-control drones, thermal imaging, ultrasound scanners, infrared sensors, specially trained dogs and improved border control procedures. The Russian government also purchased snowmobiles and sleds to provide special operations and border-guard forces with improved mobility.

Russian security services will be monitoring all local communications. The regional telecommunications network has been upgraded with technologies that allow encrypted communications for command and control. In June 2013, Rostelecom, Russia’s national telecommunications operator, launched a 4G LTE network around Sochi, pledging the fastest Wi-Fi networks in Olympic history. The Federal Security Service (FSB) will probably use ‘deep-packet inspection’ systems to allow

Port facilities will have improved security, including the use of drones

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Timeline of terrorist events relevant to Sochi 2014 security

20062005 2007

2014199519961997

2008

2009

2010

2000

1999

19

98

2001

(This is not exhaustive list, and does not include terrorist acts in Dagestan and Chechnya, or attacks that caused fewer than 10 casualties)

14-19 June 1995: The Budyonnovsk hospital hostage crisis took place when a group of up to 200 Chechen

separatists under Shamil Basayev took hundreds hostage in Budyonnovsk. At least 140 people were killed and more than 400 wounded. The incident

caused a political crisis for the Russian government.

15 April 2013: Boston Marathon bombing kills three

and injures hundreds of others.

June 2013: Doku Umarov re-declares war on Russia, claiming the Sochi Games

games are “satanic dancing” on the graves of Muslims and urges

all jihadists to use maximum effort to attack the Games.

21 October 2013: A female suicide bomber, the wife of an Islamist militant, carries out a suicide bombing on a bus in

Volgograd and kills at least six.

6 November 2008: Vladikavkaz, North Ossetia – a suicide bomber in a taxi exploded in the marketplace,

killing 12 people.

February 2012: Doku Umarov proclaims a moratorium on terrorist attacks against Russians to allow political opposition to

protest against the government in “safety”.

May 2012: Russian authorities discover 10 weapons caches in Abkhazia. Terrorists possibly pre-positioned the weapons and

planned to stage an attack during the Sochi Olympics. The caches reportedly included three portable air defense missile systems, two anti-tank missile systems, a mortar with

36 shells, 29 grenade launchers with hundreds of grenades, 12 improvised explosive devices,

15 kilograms of TNT, 15 anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, a sniper rifle, automatic weapons and ammunition and topographic

maps of the area.

24 January 2011 A suicide bomber killed

37 at Domodedovo airport in an attack conducted by the Nogai Steppe Battalion

subordinate to Doku Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate.

29 March 2010 Two female suicide

bombers, wife/widow of terrorist

leaders, blew up in two Moscow metro

stations killing 40 and wounding more than 100. Doku Umarov

claimed responsibility.

17 August 2009: A suicide car bomber attacked police HQ in Nazran, Ingushetia. At least

25 people were killed.

27 November 2009: A bomb on the Nevsky Express train between

Moscow and Saint Petersburg exploded, killing 27 and injuring 95, with one

wounded by a secondary explosion caused by a remote

detonation the next day.

23-26 October 2002The Nord-Ost siege took place when a group of 40 terrorists, including suicide

bombers, attempted to take several hundred hostages in a theater. More

than 130 hostages were killed, and all 40 terrorists, when security forces used a

strong dose of knockout gas in the assault.

2013

2002

20

11

2004

2012

2003

1-3 September 2004 Beslan school hostage crisis in North Ossetia where

rebels demanding Chechen independence took more than 1,100 children and teachers hostage. They killed 334 hostages, including 186 children.

24 August 2004Two passenger planes were blown up by

Chechen suicide bombers after taking off from Domodedovo airport, killing 89 people.

6 February 2004 A suicide bomber blew himself up on a metro

train in Moscow, killing 41 people.

5 December 2003 A suicide bomber struck

on a commuter train in Stavropol Krai, killing

46 people and leaving many injured

1 August 2003 A suicide bomber

driving a truck filled with explosives blows

up a military hospital at Mozdok in North Ossetia.

Fifty people are killed.

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them to monitor and filter all internet usage. SORM, Russia’s technical system for intercepting communications and internet traffic, will likely be significantly updated and secretly employed around Sochi. The most recent SORM upgrade is believed to be capable of collecting information from all forms of communication and providing long-term storage, including actual recordings and geographic details. Russia’s security services are also expected to employ electronic ‘jammers’ for radio-controlled bombs.

Stepping up preparationsPort facilities will have improved security, including the use of drones and SONAR to monitor restricted offshore areas. Additional inspection vessels with modern technologies and multi-purpose fire-rescue boats are supplementing the coastal security effort.

Russia has participated in several large-scale anti-terrorist and national security exercises over the past three years, for example ‘DonBass-Antiterror-2011’ and ‘Don-Antiterror-2012,’ integrating Sochi Olympic Games-related security objectives into the training. According to Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (previously the long-time head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations), military exercises in 2013 tested the combat readiness of more than 160,000 troops and numerous weapons platforms and military equipment.

While not directed exclusively for securing Sochi, Russia’s training and leadership focus in all security services has yielded dividends for providing security during the Olympics. For example, in July 2013, two mountain brigades of the 49th Army in the Southern Military District conducted training directly related

to performing security tasks for Sochi. Also in July, the Ministry of Emergency Situations conducted a surprise readiness check for disaster relief in the Southern Federal District.

Disrupted terrorist plotEarlier, in May 2012, Russian authorities claimed to have disrupted a plot targeting the Olympics when they uncovered 10 weapons caches in Abkhazia, including anti-aircraft missiles capable of taking down low-flying planes. The FSB believed terrorists had pre-positioned the weapons in a plan to move them to Sochi to stage an attack during the Olympic Games (see box story, page 32).

From 7 January 2014, a month before the Winter Olympic Games, until 21 March 2014, one week after the completion of the Paralympic Games, access for people and vehicles to Sochi will be restricted. Everyone will be required to wear badges and carry appropriate documentation for inspection. Demonstrations and rallies will be permitted in designated protest zones and only authorised meetings will be permitted. Vehicles will require special registration and only approved vehicles will be allowed near venue locations. Spectators using vehicles will have to park in designated, distant areas and use public transportation to travel within the Olympic areas. Armed guards are likely to be located at hotels and checkpoints at major intersections. Plain-clothed policemen will continue to patrol the city. Uniformed patrols will be accompanied by professional translators to assist in handling incidents and contacts with foreign visitors. These measures are the culmination of extensive preparation over the past several months.

The sale of weapons, ammunition, explosives and selected industrial materials and poisonous substances have been restricted. In the immediate areas of Olympic venues, security forces have conducted house-to-house searches and attempted to gradually lock down the area by registering residents, merchants and workers and removing migrant labourers who do not have official documentation. Police have increased security awareness through a heightened presence and security training exercises. The exercises have included improving populace awareness and willingness to report suspicious behavior.

At the student games, Universiade in Kazan in July 2013, the Ministry of the Interior concentrated 24,000 Interior Ministry troops and police. At Sochi, these forces are expected to reach up to 50,000. According to the head of the Southern Regional Centre, Igor Oder, the Ministry of Emergency Situations will provide an additional 1,000 personnel with modern equipment to the security effort.

The large number of security personnel reflects the objective to provide security, but also impacts another stated objective – to limit the obvious presence of security personnel and avoid a ‘fortress-like’ aura that could diminish the visitor experience of the Games. The size of force involved is testimony to the scale of the geographic effort and to the establishment of layered security around the Olympic sites, at venues, hotels, and other high-traffic or high-importance sites. The personnel will be augmented by thousands of surveillance cameras and drone use. Contrary to some media reports about drone use at Sochi being an Olympic Games first, drones were used in London 2012 and to enhance border security at the Vancouver Winter Olympics in 2010.

Transportation hubsAnother challenge for the large number of security personnel is the effort to prevent security procedures at transportation hubs from disrupting the flow of visitors. Traffic flow will have to account for more than 2,000 trucks a day delivering food supplies. Siemens electric Desiro trains will operate at five-minute intervals, transporting up to 12,000 passengers an hour. Sochi International Airport has purchased additional buses as well as mobile stairways to handle 4,000 passengers an hour. The Adler railway station has added more than 50 additional exit screening systems to allow rapid passenger travel. Railway stations at other parts of the route to Sochi and Adler have also been upgraded with improved security procedures. In addition to the transportation hubs, numerous metal detectors have been installed at entrances to Olympic venues, requiring further manpower in order to ensure smooth visitor access to venues.

If rational calculus governs the Caucasus Emirate’s attack planning, it would probably decide not to attack the Sochi Winter Olympic Games itself, but instead conduct

attacks elsewhere in Russia. Any attack on the Winter Olympics would harm international citizens and Russia’s prestige, but the consequences would be worse for the Caucasus Emirate by raising international sympathy for Russia and its problem with Islamic violent extremism. At present, many international observers criticise Russia for its handling of North Caucasus issues and have been less than sympathetic to Russia’s claims. A major terrorist event carried out at Sochi would arguably shift international sympathy towards Russia.

However, a terrorist attack elsewhere in Russia during the Sochi Olympics is a possibility, and this is something that the Russian security services are undoubtedly working to prevent.

Likely legacies of Sochi 2014Major international sporting events organisers are clearly trying to select host countries that expand the global character and quality of these events, but obviously with important attention towards that country’s economic ability to host the event. Security is an important aspect in that decision, but not usually the deciding factor.

A terrorist attack at Sochi would elevate security further as a consideration for subsequent MSEs. For example, security would rapidly become a significant problem for the 2018 FIFA World Cup, currently scheduled for Russia. The 2014 Brazil World Cup, the Rio 2016 Olympics and Tokyo 2020 Olympics, do not have similar terrorist threats at this time, but security costs would inevitably rise in the wake of any attack on an MSE.

A further impact of any attack in Sochi would be felt in Kazakhstan, which hopes to host a Winter Olympics in 2022. This would be the first time that a predominantly Muslim country had hosted any Olympic Games. Although Kazakhstan has the economic and sports infrastructure ability to host the Olympic Games, the spectre of a growing security problem with violent extremists in western Kazakhstan (bordering the North Caucasus) might be considered a negative factor. The security issues associated with the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics will be closely scrutinised by the IOC and Kazakhstan’s security professionals, not just because of the common threats to Sochi 2014 and potentially Almaty 2022, but because of the similarity in security approaches by the host countries and their cooperation in security matters.

It is worth noting that the IOC selection of candidate cities for the 2022 Games will not occur until July 2014, several months after the Sochi Games, so once again there is much riding on Sochi’s security success.

Nathan Barrick is an experienced international security cooperation consultant with an expertise in Eurasian and Middle Eastern security issues

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Security staff working on the site of the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics. Access to Sochi will be restricted from a month prior to the Games until 21 March

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In February 2012, the deaths of more than 70 fans of Cairo-based club Al Ahly SC hardened public attitudes towards the military and security forces, and accelerated the Egyptian military’s desire to

turn power over to an elected government.Eighteen months later, protests involving Muslim

Brothers, non-Brothers and militant, street battle-hardened football fans decried the military ouster of elected president Mohammed Morsi and the subsequent brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. The ingrained resistance to military rule and arbitrary security forces among many soccer fans and youth groups has been reinforced by what many Egyptians perceive to be a restoration of repressive features from the Mubarak era.

The stance of football fans in Egypt, one of the country’s largest civic groups, is based on more than their normal anti-military attitudes, and reflects

Pitching in: fans struggle for control of public spaceJames Dorsey tracks the involvement of ‘ultras’ in popular protests in Egypt and Turkey as militant fans seek to distinguish their ‘political’ and ‘football’ identities against a backdrop of social unrestM

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Supporters of Al Ahly SC demand the release of members of its ultras group. Banners held by demonstrators reflect the death

toll of riots that followed a football match in Port Said in 2012. The incident hardened fans’ attitudes towards security forces

widespread qualms about the military’s disruption of the democratic process (despite Morsi becoming unpopular after only a year in office). Their influence is also evident in various forms of pro-Morsi protest, including jumping up and down while chanting, a typical way for militant soccer fans, or ultras, to support their club, and the waving of flags with a skull and crossbones emblem.

Their stance takes on significance as Egyptian fans, like their counterparts in Turkey, struggle to maintain their power and identity in the face of government suppression; a struggle that, in Egypt, is taking place in the shadow of the military’s campaign to repress the Brotherhood.

The polarisation of opinion in Egypt, as well as the crisis in Egyptian football that was accelerated by the 74 Port Said deaths, has not left militant soccer fans untouched. While the ultras as organisations have

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refrained from joining the fray, many of their members and leaders have taken part in pro- or anti-Morsi demonstrations, reflecting the gamut of political views that exists across their ranks.

Many Ultras White Knights (UWK), the fan group of Cairo club Zamalek SC, joined the pro-Morsi protests. Their arch rivals, Ultras Ahlawy, the fan group of Al Ahly SC, issued its first anti-Brotherhood statement soon after Morsi was ousted. The statement ended the group’s silence with regard to the government while Morsi was in office. By refraining from attacking the government, Ahlawy had hoped that harsh verdicts would be served in the trial of those who were responsible for the deaths in Port Said. The group got only partial satisfaction. While 21 supporters of Port Said’s Al Masry SC club were sentenced to death, seven of the nine security officials involved were acquitted.

“The ultras have become fascists. Like Egypt, they have collapsed. They have no values and no real beliefs,” said a former ultras leader who left his group in disgust at the political turn it had taken.

In a perverse way, the difficulty of Egyptian as well as Turkish ultras in defining themselves is not dissimilar from that of the Brotherhood. Neither can decide what it really is. The Brotherhood has yet to make up its mind whether it is a social or a political movement. That decision may become easier if it survives the crackdown and emerges strong enough to negotiate terms of a political solution to Egypt’s crisis, a prospect that appears increasingly unlikely.

The Egyptian and Turkish ultras refuse to acknowledge that they are as much about politics as they are about football. Their battle in Egypt for freedom in the stadiums and their prominent role in the toppling of Mubarak, the opposition to the military rulers that succeeded him and the Morsi government, made them political by definition. Yet, those who populated their rank and file were united in their support for their club and their deep-seated animosity towards the security forces, but in little else.

The ultras’ fate could change if Egypt continues down the road on which it has embarked – towards a police state. Repression with little more than a democratic facade could turn stadiums into political battlefields against military control (whether overt or behind the scenes), brutal and unaccountable security forces, and autocratic government masked by hollowed-out democratic institutions.

“I’m afraid of the return of the military state. That is not what I fought for in the stadiums and on Tahrir Square. I’m also afraid of the Brotherhood. It’s a choice between two evils. If you ask me now, I’d opt for the military, but that could well change once this is all over,” the former ultra said.

Several months after Morsi’s downfall, the UWK made a statement emphasising that they were not a political organisation, irrespective of the political leanings of their members. This echoed statements made during anti-Mubarak demonstrations in 2011, when the UWK, alongside Ultras Ahlawy, stressed its non-political nature,

but said its members were welcome to participate in the anti-Mubarak protests. UWK said it represented “the entire Egyptian people, with some members who are supportive of the revolution and others who are against it. The membership of many of our members in the

Islamist current does not trouble us …. We are not an organisation with a specific ideology.”

UWK leaders said privately that they had issued the statement to counter efforts to undermine their credibility by identifying them as a group that supported Morsi and the Brotherhood. Their statement came amid

a campaign in pro-military and pro-government media asserting that the ultras, who pride themselves on their financial independence, were financially beholden to political interests. The UWK, like other Egyptian ultras, as well as their counterparts in other parts of the world, position themselves as non-political, despite their anti-authoritarian bent and hostility to law enforcement, in a bid to reduce their vulnerability.

Ultras chanting for freedomThe UWK insists that its focus is support for its club. Their militant club support nevertheless led to years of confrontation with security forces in the stadia during the Mubarak era, in what amounted to a battle for control of the pitch in a country that sought to control all pubic space. The UWK and other ultra groups constituted the only group that challenged the government’s right to control public spaces. They did so in the belief that as the only true supporters of the club they were the real owners of the stadia. “We were confronted by repressive regimes

just because we dreamt about living,” UWK said. It said its “battle for survival … [was] our motivation for chanting for freedom.” The group charged that the military and the government were cloaking themselves in the mantle of the 2011 revolution to justify another round of repression.

“Nothing has changed, we’re still the terrorists we were before the revolution ... we are still demanding what is right and fighting for it, laying down our own lives to fight some ignorant people, for whom suppression is a way of life and whose imagination is sick. Amr Hussein, we restore your rights or die like you,” the group said, in a reference to the post-Morsi regime’s attempt to criminalise them. “It doesn’t matter how hard they hit us. We have been steeled in resisting repression and abuse. We have demonstrated our resolve,” a UWK member said.

His words echoed sentiments from across the Mediterranean, in Turkey. Like its Egyptian counterparts, Turkey’s foremost group of ultras, Çarşi, which supports Beşiktaş JK, has a massive following across the country.

The Ultras White Knights position themselves as non-political

Egyptian protestors run away from a burning bus during violent clashes between supporters of then-President Morsi and opposition demonstrators. The country’s ultras tried to remain non-affiliated as groups, but individual members took sides

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It traces its roots to the far-left and positions itself as anarchist. Yet, despite having wholeheartedly embraced massive protests against Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in June in Istanbul’s Taksim Square, Çarşi and other groups of ultras stress the apolitical nature of their organisations; particularly in response to the charging of 20 members of the Beşiktaş support group with belonging to an illegal organisation.

Tough security measuresNevertheless, neither the government nor the ultras are under any illusion that this will end the confrontation. The Erdoğan government has adopted measures that could have been taken from the playbook of Egyptian military chief, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. They include replacing

private security forces in stadiums and on university campuses with police forces; banning the chanting of political slogans during soccer matches; obliging clubs to get spectators to sign a pledge to abide by the ban before attending a game; and cancelling scholarships for students who participate in anti-government protests.

To drive home the message that protest equals terrorism, a video issued by Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism Office and the police warns that protests are the first step towards terrorism. The 55-second video featuring a young woman demonstrator turned suicide bomber cautioned the public that “our youth, who are the guarantors of our future, can start with small demonstrations of resistance that appear to be innocent, and after a short period of time, can engage without a blink in actions that may take

the lives of dozens of innocent people.” Throughout the video, the words ‘before it is too late’ are displayed.

Critics charge that Erdoğan is employing the same carrot-and-stick tactic he used to tame the media. The impact of Erdoğan’s effort to restrict media independence and limit critical reporting was evident in June 2012, when television stations broadcast soap operas and penguins instead of pictures of mass anti-government protests on Istanbul’s iconic Taksim Square as football fans joined the demonstration. The fans may, however, be tougher to crack than the media. They have already defied the ban on the chanting of political slogans, rejected attempts that have been made by clubs to force them to sign pledges to abide by the ban, and ridiculed the government’s campaign to equate protest with terrorism.

Fans reminded the government that the battle was not over and may have just begun when they chanted “Everywhere Is Taksim Square! Everywhere Is Resistance!” and demanded the prime minister’s resignation during a recent match. It’s a slogan the Brotherhood adopted in practice with its launching of regular smaller scale protests across Cairo and the rest of Egypt rather than massive demonstrations that risked a renewed bloodbath.

Mounting tensions in Egypt“People should not ruin their lives, should not have criminal records,” Turkish sports minister Suat Kilic warned in an ironic twist, given that Turkey with its history of military coups and the Erdoğan government’s crackdown on the media has scores of intellectuals and

Fans of Turkish club Beşiktaş JK clash with riot police after a Super League match. The ultra group associated with the

club, Çarşi, positions itself as an anarchist organisation

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journalists with police records. Among those is Erdoğan himself, who spent four months in prison in the 1990s for reciting a controversial poem. In Egypt, the mounting tension, deepening polarisation and political activism of fans has not only expanded into universities, but also beyond supporters to include athletes who effectively sided with their supporters. Prominent Al Ahly striker Ahmed Abdel-Zaher was banned from representing Egypt by the Egyptian Football Association (EFA) and put up for sale in November, despite having another four years on his contract, for showing the four-finger sign of the opposition after scoring a goal in a match against South Africa’s Orlando Pirates that helped earn the club its eighth African club championship title. This followed a statement by Egyptian sports minister, Taher Abouzeid saying that he expected the EFA to “suspend and fine Abdel-Zaher”.

The sign, known as Rabaa (fourth) in Arabic, symbolises Rabaa al Adawiya Square in Cairo, where opponents of the military camped out for weeks in summer 2013 in protest against the ousting of Morsi. Hundreds of people were killed in mid-August when security forces evicted the protesters from the square as part of a brutal crackdown on the Brotherhood.

Abdel-Zaher was the second athlete in as many weeks to be penalised for showing the anti-military four-finger sign. Kung Fu fighter Mohamed Youssef was suspended in October for a year for showing the sign after he won a gold medal in the Sports Accord Combat Games competition in St Petersburg.

Egypt’s autocratic rulers, as well as their associates in sports and club management, traditionally penalise players when they express anti-government sentiments publicly, but never when they express pro-government opinions. Players in Mubarak’s time largely endorsed the president because he showered them with gifts when they were victorious. It was Mubarak’s way of associating himself with Egypt’s most popular form of popular culture in the hope that some of the game’s glory would counter his increasingly tarnished image.

In the latest manifestation of the region’s nexus of sports and politics, Egypt’s military had hoped that the country’s national team would counteract polarisation and weakening popular support by making it to the World Cup finals in 2014. The team needed a victory over Ghana in November to ensure qualification. Those hopes were dashed when they lost 6-1 at the away leg in Accra.

Al Ahly’s success in becoming African champion offered the military and the government little solace. The decisive match against South Africa’s Orlando Pirates was

mired in contentious politics, with clashes between fans and security forces even before Abdel-Zaher made his statement. The clashes put an end to conciliatory efforts by the government designed to co-opt the fans.

Flashpoints for confrontationDays before the match, security personnel allegedly shot a member of the UWK, who died of his injuries, when the group tried to storm the club’s headquarters demanding the resignation of its president. In a bid to pre-empt further confrontation, the government conceded that fans would be allowed to attend the Al Ahly match against the Pirates, the first time Egyptian fans had been allowed into the stadium since the Port Said massacre. It also released 25 Al Ahly fans who had been arrested a month earlier when they attempted to storm an arrival terminal at Cairo International Airport. In defiance, fans commemorated the Port Said dead in chants during the match and put up posters in remembrance of the incident. The stadium, secured by some 4,000 police officers with armoured vehicles, was lit up with bright red flares and fireworks set off by fans, as security forces threw tear gas.

Flashpoints for confrontation between fans and security forces continue to multiply. Unrest in Port Said looms on the horizon as a court prepares to retry 11 militant supporters of the city’s Al Masry SC, who had been sentenced to jail terms ranging from 15 years to life for their role in the February 2012 incident. Last year’s sentencing to death of 21 of their colleagues by a court in Cairo sparked an uprising

in Port Said and other Suez Canal-based cities. If the sentences against the 11 are upheld, renewed protests are likely. By the same token, a reversal will probably spark protests in Cairo by Al Ahly supporters.

A new protest law adopted in late November has mobilised youth groups, soccer fans and students who see it as a return of the police state they had sought to destroy with the overthrow of Mubarak. The law gives security forces rather than the judiciary the right to cancel or postpone a planned protest or change its location. It obliges organisers to provide authorities with details of the planned protest in advance, including the identity of the organisers and their demands. It further bans protests within a 100 m radius of government buildings.

As more protests have been sparked in universities, fuelled by the sentencing of 21 girls to prison sentences of up to 11 years for holding an anti-government rally, and with football fans joining youth groups in demonstrations in major cities, the April 6 youth movement warned: “Time will not go back to the era of rulers issuing laws to silence their opponents.”

James M Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, co-director of the University of Würzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture, and the author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog

A new protest law adopted in late November has mobilised youth groups, soccer fans and students

Al Ahly striker Ahmed Abdel-Zaher celebrates scoring a goal against the Orlando Pirates with the four-fingered Rabaa sign. Showing the pro-opposition sign resulted in his suspension

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Security and safety


Security and safety


Security and the commercialisation of ‘fan fests’ Simone Eisenhauer examines security and rights-protection arrangements for the FIFA Fan Fest in Cape Town during the 2010 FIFA World Cup

During the South Africa 2010 World Cup, official FIFA ‘fan fests’ were staged in seven international cities – Berlin, Mexico City, Paris, Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Sydney – extending

the concept of the remote public viewing area (RPVA) beyond the territory of the event itself.

Despite this extension overseas, attendance at all fan fests during the 2010 World Cup reached only five million, which is small compared with the 18 million fans who attended the 12 fan fest locations in Germany during the 2006 World Cup. While this seems surprising, attendance may have suffered from cold weather in South Africa during the southern hemisphere’s winter, as well as the games being broadcast on national television. Germany 2006 may also have been an exceptional event, as it enjoyed perfect weather, a successful performance by the German team, an affluent catchment population, and easy access to the RPVAs.

Despite relatively low attendance figures, event organisers in South Africa have stated that RPVAs were one of the big success stories of the 2010 World Cup. President Zuma told the South African parliament in August 2010: “our fan parks were so huge that they resembled mini-stadiums, which had not happened in other host countries”. FIFA President, Sepp Blatter, stated: “The public viewing events became a symbol of the power and charisma of football, the pictures of the millions of fans from all over the world celebrating at public places across the entire country was the image that went around the globe.”

Cape Town’s fan fest In South Africa in 2010, there was one official ‘FIFA Fan Fest’ (FFF) in each host city, apart from Johannesburg, which organised two sites. According to Namibia Sport, the best attended FFFs were the three, mostly sunny,

Football fans gather in Long Street’s Fan Walk during the South Africa 2010 FIFA World Cup. Designated Fan Walks enabled visitors to approach stadia on foot from the Central Business District

coastal sites of Durban, Cape Town and Nelson Mandela Bay/Port Elizabeth, which saw 741,533, 557,483 and 276,742 visitors respectively over 25 operational days. Fan numbers were measured and calculated based on helicopters taking video-footage.

Ensuring access for foreign visitorsFrom the outset, the City of Cape Town (CoCT) World Cup business plan stated that its RPVA was intended to ensure that non-ticket holding international visitors had access to the World Cup.

Chris Haber, Director of Media and Marketing for World Sport, and a member of the consortium that ran the Cape Town RPVA, predicted before the event that the Cape Town FIFA Fan Fest would be the ‘iconic Fan Fest’ of the entire 2010 World Cup, situated as it was on the

Grand Parade, with the historic images of City Hall and Table Mountain in its picture-perfect backdrop.

The main aim of the FFF was to provide a safe and secure viewing area for international visitors, and organisers stated that the target audiences for the FFF were soccer fans, families, supporter clubs, local foreign communities, company staff members, and corporate VIPs. However, FIFA’s media FAQ guide also stated: “We believe that all South Africans of all backgrounds will be caught up in the event and attend the FIFA Fan Fest in large numbers, similarly, they provide a safe, recognised and exciting environment for visitors who have limited comparable alternatives ... We therefore believe that the FIFA Fan Fests will be a cultural melting pot.”

The main aim of the FFF was to provide a secure area for international visitors

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In practice, the FFF in Cape Town was dominated by middle-class patrons, most of whom were locals. In a case study on the female experience at RPVAs by Bob and Swart (2010), it was found that the majority of FFF attendees were host city locals (close to 80 per cent). This was confirmed to the author by a FFF event organiser, who reported that not many international fans attended the FFF on the Grand Parade in Cape Town “except when the Netherlands played and the Dutch fans were present. We had many people from suburbs and townships”.

At a post-event conference organised by the Institute for Security Studies, Dr Jonny Steinberg from Cape Town University observed that, in Cape Town, “the middle class had, through the World Cup, rediscovered their city bowl”. He noted that, “most of the time ... middle-class South Africans move from bubbles of guarded security to other bubbles of security. What the World Cup did was bring people to spaces where people would usually feel unsafe.

That was created by the event. This was easy to police because it required focusing on specific places.”

The author’s personal observation at the FFF in Cape Town confirms Steinberg’s claims. Not only was the FFF visibly policed, but there was little evidence of working-class citizens or noticeably poor patrons. Compared with the municipal RPVAs on the fringes of the city, the FFF featured Cape Town’s (mainly white) middle-class and some foreign football supporters. Thus, the FFF embraced the tenets of inclusiveness in its urban design, but there was minimal uptake by Cape Town’s less affluent citizens.

Design features The Cape Town FFF was situated on the Grand Parade in front of the City Hall and the Castle, close to the main railway station with a view of Table Mountain. The Grand Parade is the city’s oldest public space and one of its best-known heritage sites – the late Nelson Mandela

made his famous first public address there following his release from prison in February 1990. The fenced FFF was surrounded by these historic sites, while an enormous 74 square-meter screen provided a football-specific viewing space. These structural elements also veiled views of the uglier parts of the neighbourhood and any third-party advertisements surrounding the event precinct. Moreover, the Grand Parade was refurbished by the CoCT at a cost of some R22 million. The entire area was resurfaced with paving stones that matched the colour of City Hall, while a double row of trees (stone pines) was planted around the perimeter, with lighting masts installed.

The FFF was themed with the FIFA brand and sponsors’ commercial messages. The logos of FIFA’s corporate partners adorned the advertising boards surrounding the FFF, which consisted of two main areas: a reserved area and a general area. The reserved

area was exclusively for sponsor advertising and sales of FIFA merchandise, including the Official World Cup shop. It was the prime area around, in front, and behind any giant screen and the main stage of the FFF, in particular the main screen, and within line of sight of the screens and stages, as determined by FIFA. The general area was defined as the remaining area of the FFF. In this space, it was possible for other CoCT entities (third- party exhibitors) to establish a modest on-site presence, so long as their products and services did not compromise those of FIFA sponsors. Cape Town also had the opportunity to develop additional on-site branding (for example promoting tourism), under FIFA’s supervision.

The FFF could safely host up to 25,000 people. The goal was to enhance fans’ experience through the delivery of entertainment, food, beverages, and merchandise in a controlled and secure environment. This was pursued by offering a range of hybrid consumption activities: watching

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Crowds gathered at the FIFA Fan Fest in Cape Town. Private security firms checked bags at the entrances for prohibited items, which included beverage containers that were not products of FIFA or the event’s sponsors

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the FFF had to be ‘sufficiently far from the Match Venue’. This was in order to ensure that the spectators going to the match venue and those heading to the fan park did not merge, thus minimising traffic congestion on match days.

FIFA also prepared a document entitled General Public Viewing Guidelines, which were underscored by FIFA’s RPP. Special advertising guidelines also applied to a 100 m radius around the FFF. A linkage between FFF security and commercialisation was apparent in the Prohibited and Restricted lists, which were issued in the official 2010 FIFA World Cup South Africa Fan Guide. Weapons were listed in the same category as food and drink. Not only was

there a zero-tolerance approach to any non-sponsoring brands, but also to people who carried the brands. Private security checked bags for the following items that were not allowed to be taken into any of the fan venues: aerosol cans, bottles, cans, cups, vacuum flasks, or any beverage containers other than official FIFA containers or sponsors’ products, glass, weapons, flagpoles, banner poles, laser

pointing devices, pyrotechnics, sticks, poles, or umbrellas longer than 40 cm, food and beverages. Despite private security exercising this task, the police were the primary ‘enforcement’ agent, with authority to charge people for breaches of the various criminal laws and by-laws and instigate proceedings for ambush marketing violations.

Liquor licensing and control There was some controversy surrounding the policy governing liquor sales at RPVAs, with event organisers and executive officers expressing divergent views. Before the tournament, the Operational Commander for the

Safety and Security Directorate of the Local Organising Committee, Rhode, said that “as it stands, people in fan parks will not be able to drink because of legislation governing public drinking”.

In the end, liquor consumption was permitted within temporarily

privatised, demarcated event spaces only, such as RPVAs, but not in other non-fenced public spaces.

South African Brewery (SAB), a sponsor of the national football team, Bafana Bafana, was given a contract to serve beer at official fan parks after the FIFA sponsor, Budweiser declined to exercise its right because it wanted to concentrate on its presence inside

Some definitions of FIFA spaces

FIFA Fan Fest (FFF): the primary official public viewing area (PVAs) for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. ‘Public viewing’ simply means the television broadcasting of sporting events in public places. Fan Walk: since ticket holders were not allowed to drive to the stadium on match days, fans were meant to reach the stadium using either the shuttle service from the main transport hub in Hertzog Boulevard, outside the Civic Centre, or by foot from the Central Business District (CBD), via the Fan Walk. Municipal PVAs: four municipal public viewing areas were set up on the outskirts of Cape Town to alleviate some of the transport and visitor impact concerns within the Cape Town’s CBD by reducing the need to travel to the City in order to experience the atmosphere. Commercial Restricted Zones (CRZs): these are areas subject to a variety of special regulation and policing methods, as competition is restricted to those businesses legally authorised to sell and advertise. Thus, their purposes were to:

i regulate advertising; ii regulate special events and the management

of neatness of public open spaces; iii adopt appropriate traffic management

procedures; and iv regulate street trading.

live match broadcasts, laser light displays, an interactive activity zone, popular local bands, entertainers and DJs, food and refreshment stalls, art and crafts, and branded merchandise at the official FIFA Fan Store.

Reports in the Cape Town business news before the tournament claimed that the FFF would provide an opportunity for small businesses and for promoting local artisans. Shameel Ho-Kim, the local city coordinator of the FFF, stated that it ‘would definitely have a Cape Town flavour’ (Barnes, 2009). Despite FIFA’s Rights Protection Programme (RPP), Cape Town was able to include areas within these spaces for vendors offering traditional African handicrafts, food and beverages, and local (non-competitive) companies were able to promote themselves within the FFF. However, in practice, only a handful of traders and artists were observed.

Different levels of hospitalityWithin the FFF fenced-off zone, other sections were demarcated as being ‘special’, such as dedicated areas for meet and greet, drop off and pick up, private and group hospitality, a catering service and a beer area. Further, the FFF organisers planned to provide different levels of hospitality, such as ‘private’ (exclusive pre-event cocktail reception), ‘tribune club’ (reserved match viewing seat and food/drink voucher on the FFF main area covered grandstand), ‘super fan club’ (reserved match viewing seat on a big screen and food and drink voucher in the

City Concert Hall) and ‘castle’ (private lounges and function facilities with private parking). In practice, few businesses signed up for this opportunity. According to the Operations Director of the event company contracted to organise the FFF, “We tried to target businesses to whom cooperative functions at the stadium were too expensive. Hence, we wanted to offer them something. However, it wasn’t demanded much.”

Security strategy and policies The following key stakeholders were responsible for safety and security in and around the FFF during the event:

■ CP Event Security: a private security company that was contracted to supply a total of 210 security officers experienced in special events. Their roles included helping with access control and searches, exits, and patrolling the FFF.

■ World Sport: a Cape Town-based event organiser, which managed the logistics, including security around the FFF.

■ South African Police Service (SAPS): responsible for minimising crime and gang activity and enforcing visible policing in and around the event area (FIFA 2010 Grand Parade Fan Park Emergency and Contingency Plan, 2010). SAPS officers were trained to identify perceived attempts at ambush marketing alongside other crowd control measures.

■ CoCT Traffic Services: responsible for controlling traffic flow in and around the FFF space and manning road closures for the duration of the Grand Parade Fan Park.

■ Metropolitan Police Service: responsible for police vehicles and mounted police to assist with traffic services and to help with ‘ordinary’ law enforcement in the area. They were empowered to enforce the RPP, including provisions relating to the 2010 event-driven by-law.

■ The FFF Contingency Plan, which required Central City Improvement District-supplied officers in Cape Town’s Central Business District to assist whenever they were needed.

■ CoCT Disaster Management unit: this group deployed its officers and volunteers to give support to the medical team and communications, monitored crowd behaviour, and assisted with evacuation procedures.

■ Other private security companies: • Bolt Security, which carried out most

of the entry searches; • DC Security, which involved one man

observing the entry and searches (from the inside); and

• Usana Security, which consisted of three men near the exit between the toilets.

An event manual compiled and distributed by the

Parliamentary Monitoring Group outlined how to run a FFF. For simple crowd management, the location of

The location of the FFF had to be ‘sufficiently far from the Match Venue’

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Police officers were present at 2010 World Cup fans fests to deal with breaches of criminal law. They were also empowered to enforce FIFA’s Rights Protection Programme

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stadia. However, FIFA’s exclusive contract with Budweiser meant that SAB could not overtly brand the beer it served in FIFA’s space. Accordingly, SAB provided the beverage, but it gave it unbranded to customers.

The Public Viewing Areas Liquor Control Policy was drafted by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), setting the framework in which the trading of liquor was controlled during the event. This policy was greeted by a public outcry, especially from the hospitality industry. They were critical of a requirement for existing liquor licence holders to obtain a costly special licence during the event; the draft policy’s wording required venues hosting ‘any public viewing event’ where matches are broadcast ‘to the general public or otherwise’ to obtain a special licence. This caused widespread confusion, and fear of prosecution for infringements may have reduced the number of pubs and schools and other non-commercial public viewing areas from really getting involved. Zodwa Ntuli, the Deputy Director-General of the Consumer and Corporate Regulation Division at the DTI, said that the policy was not intended to stifle business, but was intended to maintain security, and control the trading of liquor during the World Cup. The DTI then explained that this policy would only require a special licence in respect of commercial public viewing events, for example those that charged an admission fee or similar surcharge. At the FFFs, the municipalities and host cities were told to apply FIFA’s endorsed liquor policy as well as a fee for the special liquor licence and a levy of two per cent of turnover.

In the end, though, bars and restaurants did not need to obtain a special licence, and the policy did not become part of the Host City agreement. In other words, no liquor-control policy was implemented in Cape Town, and no RPVA organiser, including the FFF, Fan Walk and municipal RPVAs, had to pay any percentage of alcohol sales to FIFA. Nevertheless, the sale and consumption of liquor at RPVAs, as well as the opening and closing of the liquor premises, were monitored by security forces and a zero-tolerance policy for intoxicated spectators was applied.

Security operations FFFs were planned to have the same level of security as the World Cup stadia. To enter the Cape Town FFF, visitors needed to pass through security check points positioned in Darling Street and at the corner of Buitenkant and Longmarket streets. The chairperson of the Planning Committee stated that at the security check points, standardised access control was administered, which included checking bags for items that were included on the Prohibited and Restricted items lists.

At the FFF in Cape Town, where entrance was limited to 25,000 fans, Bob and Swart (2010) observed spectator frustration outside the perimeter when the FFF was closed due to this limited capacity. However, the Operations Director of the event company contracted to organise the FFF stated: “Every time we were full to capacity, we communicated on radio to trains and buses that people should look for alternatives to watch the games

at, for example, municipal RPVAs. These structures were used on a daily basis and it was very successful.”

Children under the age of 14 had to be accompanied by an adult, and during the event social workers assisted with issuing children with a plastic/temporary tag in the FFF and municipal RPVAs for ‘easy identification purposes’ and to ‘safeguard children’ (Department of Social Development). Altogether, 6,249 children were tagged in RPVAs in the Western Cape Province. During the event in Cape Town, 21 children were deemed to be neglected – street children, 13; begging, two; neglected children, two; abused children, two; assaulted children, one; substance abuse, one. Tagging children under the age of 14 will remain a legacy project at all major events in Cape Town, according to the city’s Department of Social Development.

Defining objectionable languageWithin FIFA event spaces, there was enforcement of the requirement that: ‘no person shall use abusive or otherwise objectionable language or behave in an abusive, objectionable or disorderly manner’ (2010 CoCT By-law, 2009, p 20-21). According to one observer, (Bond 2010), a Durban police superintendent responded to the question: ‘What if I say ‘Viva Argentina!’ in the fan park?’ ‘No

problem’, the police officer answered. Bond then asked: ‘What if I say ‘Phansi FIFA phansi! [Down with FIFA!]?’ ‘Then you’re wrong. You can’t say Phansi FIFA phansi’, the SAPS officer replied. Without wanting to exaggerate the point, such reports do suggest the power of FIFA’s brand protection strategy, even over police in a commercial space. The fact that people were unable to openly criticise FIFA indicates how far organisers and police were prepared to accommodate the sensitivities of the event owners.

While in Cape Town, the author observed that the FFFs and municipal RPVAs were intensively policed, with large numbers of officers visibly on duty. However, according to one of the FFF organisers, the officers did not have a great deal of crime to deal with: “The only challenge I think we really had was people illegally handing out flyers or other marketing material”. Other reports by the Cape Town Partnership noted: “A handful of lost children (all reunited with their families); a few minor injuries when people tripped and fell, and one pedestrian knocked over by a scooter driver after jaywalking when she should not have”.

Indeed, despite the large crowds, there were only a small number of incidents reported in Cape Town’s Central Business District and surrounding areas. According to the Department of Health, a total of 779 patients were treated at the FFF, of whom 40 had to be transferred to hospital. According to Ralph Straus, Head of FIFA Business Development and New Media, no serious incidents of

violence had previously been reported in any of the FFFs worldwide. During the World Cup, in the 1.5 km radius around the FFFs, 1,712 incidents were reported to the police. Inside the various FFFs, 76 incidents were reported to police, representing 0.005 per cent of those in attendance.

However, this level of crime, reported in the official statistics, was contested in the media and on internet sites. As one blogger wrote in response to a community newspaper article in the TygerBurger: “I find your statistic very interesting, stating that there has been no violence whatsoever in fan parks in South Africa. I work as a doctor in an emergency unit in Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa and have worked on many nights during matches. I have treated one man who was stabbed in the heart during one of the Bafana Bafana matches and many others who attended fan parks during that time. Possibly your reporting only covered fan parks in heavily touristy areas, as I assure you that the reality in the majority of South Africa has been far from violence-free during this period. I would be very interested to find out where you acquired your statistics from.” It is therefore very difficult to ascertain the extent of injuries and incidents in the various RPVAs from this combination of

official and unofficial information. The government‘s policies,

decisions, and actions associated with staging of the 2010 FIFA World Cup reflected new and exemplary commercialisation in concert with intensified levels of policing and securitisation. The measures taken

to combat ambush marketing were of particular note. FIFA’s requirements for the host city drove decisions about public and private spaces that redefined public policies and rules. The lessons that could be learnt from the policing during the World Cup primarily lay in the organisational strategy that involved integrating national security and law enforcement issues, as well as specific safety arrangements based on FIFA safety instructions (Pruis, 2011). Future studies might investigate whether the lessons learnt and the recommendations made about security legacies are effectively captured and form part of a knowledge-transfer process to other event organisers.

Dr Simone Eisenhauer is a researcher specialising in sporting event commercialisation and security issues

References 1 Bob, U. and Swart, K. The 2010 FIFA World Cup and women’s

experiences in fan parks, Routledge and UNISA Press, 2010,

volume 24, no 85, pp85-96

2 Barnes, C. Fan parks get local flavour for 2010, The Cape Argus,

Cape Town, 28 September 2009, p4

3 Bond, P. FIFA forbids free speech at World Cup Fan Fest,

Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2010

4 Pruis, A. Policing the FIFA World Cup: What lessons can be

learned for policing in the future?, in Policing in South Africa: 2010

and beyond, Dissel A. and Newham G. (eds), ISS, 2011, pp13-16

FFFs were planned to have the same level of security as the World Cup stadia

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Children under the age of 14 had to be accompanied by an adult in 2010 World Cup fan fests, and social workers were on hand to identify neglected children

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Hansa Rostock fans cheer amid smoke from fireworks during a match against FC Carl Zeiss Jena. Fan-

project workers can help to diffuse tension and broker agreements between spectators and the authorities, for

example to limit the use of pyrotechnics at games

Faced by perceived issues of aggression, violence, discrimination and extremism among supporters at football matches, the most common response from state and football authorities is a repressive,

‘law and order’ approach, such as the use of riot police and extensive surveillance to control spectators.

However, several European nations have tried to adopt alternative strategies, centred on a preventative approach, involving dialogue and education that offer better prospects for long-term security and safety in and around stadiums.

To help develop such strategies, the European Commission funded a recently completed project that sought to promote education and dialogue among supporters in order to reduce the risk of negative behaviour at football matches. The project – entitled ‘Pro Supporters: Prevention Through Empowerment’ – was led by the Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and Cooperation (VIDC)/FairPlay, with participants coming from two national football associations (the Republic

The role of fan projects in avoiding conflict at football matchesRichard Giulianotti and Peter Millward discuss the findings of European research into football-related violence prevention – in particular, the part played by fan projects in mediating between supporters and security staff

of Ireland and Northern Ireland), Football Supporters Europe (FSE), FIFPro – the professional footballers’ union, the authors of this article and representatives of Fan Projects and movements from Austria, Czech Republic, Germany and Poland.

The end-of-project symposium in May 2013 was attended by these groups, as well as officials from UEFA and the Austrian Ministry of Sports. The project saw the production of the FSE’s Handbook on Supporters Charters in Europe1 and VIDC/FairPlay’s Handbook: Socio-preventive Fan Work in Europe.2

The authors’ involvement centred on the role played by ‘fan projects’ in engaging with young supporter groups. Fan projects operate at a city level and work with the ‘fan scenes’ at individual football clubs. Fan projects emerged first at SV Werder Bremen football club in 1981, and since then have grown to become particularly prominent in Germany, where there are now 51 fan scenes receiving this professional support.

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Fan projects are little known in many countries, so it is worth detailing their histories, broad aims and backgrounds. It is important to state that fan project workers are not Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs) – since the 2012/13 season, it has become mandatory for professional European football clubs to employ an SLO (under Article 35 of the UEFA Club Licensing and Financial Fair Play Regulations). The two roles may be complementary, in practice sometimes being occupied by the same person, and they share a goal of promoting better communications between the fans and other stakeholders, but fan project work is not enshrined within UEFA legislation.

Fan projects come in different shapes and sizes. Crucially, some of the largest and most established projects, such as those in Bremen, have long-term

funding, enabling them to support two or three professional social workers, some administrative support and offices. Others are largely based around a single social worker, with fewer separate facilities and support structures.

Substituting riot police for social workersFan-project workers are professionals trained in social work, youth work and community education. In establishing football as a legitimate site for social work intervention, fan projects substitute the riot police officer and the magistrate for the social worker and the educator. Fan projects are most active within the social spaces and scenes of young supporters, particularly in stadiums and en route to away football matches.

Fan-project workers engage fully with local fan cultures, helping to organise events and campaigns,

assisting in creative activities, and facilitating links with other fan groups at national and international levels. Thus, fan-project workers look to dissuade young fans from drifting into violent confrontations with rival supporters; educate supporters on issues of racism, sexism, and homophobia; and help ensure that any ambiguous or problematic interaction with police does not deteriorate into disorder and police intervention. One long-term aim, as a fan worker explained to us, is to ensure that young fans are able to have fun without being criminalised, so that, when they are older, a criminal record does not restrict the activities open to them.

One key element of the fan-project worker’s role relates to communication and mediation – in passing on information and acting as a go-between – with the aim of ensuring that a potentially tense or problematic situation

does not get out of hand. For example, if a dangerous rumour circulates among fans, or if a fan is arrested by police, then the fan-project worker should be in a position to obtain reliable and authorised information, and pass that on in order to calm the situation. Hence, fan-project workers need to have good links with a wide variety of key people, including police spotters, police officers, stadium security personnel, club officials, SLOs and fan-project workers from other clubs.

One of the earliest successes in terms of mediation occurred in 1982, after a young Werder Bremen fan was killed during an attack by SV Hamburg supporters – the first such fan death in Germany. The Bremen Fan Project helped to organise a meeting between rival supporters, which in turn served to reduce tensions and the possibilities of further violence over the longer term.

Our research saw us engage with six fan projects, spread across four different countries. These projects were associated with: WKS Slask Wroclaw (Poland), FC Slovan Liberec (Czech Republic), SV Austria Salzburg (Austria), FC Wacker Innsbruck (Austria), Werder Bremen (Germany) and FC Carl Zeiss Jena (Germany). The selection of fan projects ranged from those that were long-standing (Werder Bremen and Carl Zeiss Jena), to those that were new and emerging (Slovan Liberec) and even those where no fan projects currently exist but their development is being explored by some supporters (Austria Salzburg). The selected fan projects showed substantial diversity with regard to their positions in their respective football leagues: Werder Bremen, Slask Wroclaw, Wacker Innsbruck and Slovan Liberec are in their top national divisions, while Carl Zeiss Jena and Austria Salzburg compete in the regional divisions.

Practical examples of fan projectsFan projects may be a strong advocate for the protection of the fan scenes at different clubs. For example, in the early 1990s, the Werder Bremen Fan Project was at the forefront of opposition to plans by the German football association to remove standing areas or terraces inside stadiums. The fan project was instrumental in developing a successful campaign that sought to retain standing areas in order to safeguard the strong fan culture and atmosphere in the stadium. That now appears far-sighted, as the large terraces, boisterous atmosphere, low admission prices and huge attendances in many Germany stadiums are envied by clubs and supporters in other nations.

Our fan project visits showed us numerous elements of good practice. However, not all fan projects operated in the same way, with differing strengths of relationships with local security authorities (including both police and private security firms) and supporter groups. Fan-project delegates generally thought that the stronger the relationships were between supporters and security agencies, the more effective their role could become. A challenge that was immediately presented was that of developing the most effective communication channels.

Across the project, we gathered large volumes of data, which demonstrated how fan-project work might

Werder Bremen fans unfurl a banner before a Bundesliga match against Hamburg. In 1981, the club became the first to have a fan project

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perform an effective role in dissuading fans from violent and intolerant actions. For instance, at a league match we observed at Carl Zeiss Jena, a well-established member of the active supporter group had passed away earlier that month at a young age. Many of his friends who had moved away from the German city returned to mark his passing at the match. The Carl Zeiss Jena supporters negotiated with the security officials through the fan-project workers that they would set off only one pyrotechnic at the start of the match, in his honour. They stated that if this were tolerated, no ‘disorder’ would break out. The request was agreed and a potentially emotional match passed with very little supporter violence. Later, in engagements with supporters, we were told that they believed that the fan-project worker had acted on their behalf, as a representative to the police. However, the fan-project worker said that he had reduced violence because he had also represented the security staff/police to the supporters. The maintenance of trust in both relationships is evidently crucial to the success of the fan-project worker.

Furthermore, we observed Wacker Innsbruck’s home-match draw against SK Rapid Vienna. At the final whistle, some Wacker Innsbruck supporters ran on to the pitch. The strong relationship that existed between the local fan-project worker and the head of the private security firm meant that a response was brokered that saw pitch-invading fans peacefully ushered back into the terraces and stands rather than being forced to do so using more punitive sanctions. No violence broke out as a result of the invasion and the supporters left the pitch after no more than a couple of minutes.

The potential of fan projectsThese actions are then compared with a situation where no fan project currently exists, at Austria Salzburg. This club is fan-owned and emerged from the buyout and renaming of the original Austria Salzburg club in 2006 (bought by the Red Bull drink manufacturers and renamed Red Bull Salzburg). We observed Austria Salzburg’s visit to its former stadium – the Red Bull Arena – to see the team play FC Liefering, which is financially supported by Red Bull, in a match that played an important role in deciding which of the two teams won the Austrian Regionalliga West title. FC Liefering won the match – and the title.

At the end of the match, the Austria Salzburg chant leader collapsed. The Salzburger Nachrichten reported that: “After the end of the game, there was a dramatic incident. The ‘whip’ [chant leader] of Austrianer [Austria Salzburg] suffered a seizure and collapsed. He was taken

in a critical condition to the regional hospital, where he received intensive care treatment. Criticism emerged that his recovery was not helped by the security, who appear not to have helped with extricating the fan. [Translated]”3

Preventing communication problemsThe incident, as observed by one of the authors, raised some important points. The chant leader was in the fenced area of the terraces when he suffered his seizure. Once he collapsed, many supporters loudly banged on the cages to gain the attention of the private security firms. Those working for the private security firms misunderstood the panic of these supporters as a sign of aggression and refused to open the security gate in order to allow the injured supporter to gain rapid medical attention. This negative response intensified the sense of panic among many supporters, which turned into collective anger that a member of their fan group was not being tended to. In turn, this prompted an increasingly hostile approach from the security staff, and so the issues related to supporter

violence deepened. In this case, if a fan-project worker had been employed, the worker could have called the head of the private security firm at the very start of the incident, and treatment could have been provided more rapidly.

We would argue that a critical value in any sphere of social work relates to the independence of the

social worker. From these incidents – and our wider research on the project – we drew upon this idea to suggest that it is important for fan-project workers to highlight their independence and to build the long-term trust of young fan groups. To demonstrate independence, in some contexts, where possible, it may be better if the fan project is at least primarily funded by local or national government rather than solely by the football club.

Overall, we found that there is no ‘one size fits all’ model for fan-project work; instead, the work is adapted to the context and to the methods favoured by the fan workers. For example, some fan workers emphasise the importance of observing and respecting particular rules of conduct; hence, these workers do not engage with fans that are actively involved in violence. Other fan workers indicate that they have links with such fans, in part to facilitate opportunities for mediation and education over the short and long term.

The point here is that there is no ‘right or wrong’ method for how fan-project workers should engage with such fans; instead, it is more beneficial for these workers to share their experiences and to learn from each other in order to understand what may be more or less appropriate or successful in different circumstances.

In the light of the findings of our investigation, we would highlight five main ‘next steps’ that might be taken to assist the work of fan projects. First, the exchange of knowledge and expertise across fan projects should be fully pursued. Over the past three decades, a rich pool

of knowledge and expertise has been built up at many fan projects. While there are coordinating organisations that facilitate this knowledge exchange – for example Koordinationsstelle Fanprojekte (KOS) in Frankfurt – there is a need for such dialogue to occur more systematically, particularly at an international level.

Second, the range of stakeholders within these initiatives should be extended further. Much of the work conducted thus far has centred on the ‘fan scenes’, particularly involving ‘ultras’ (groups of fans renowned for their fervent support); future activities might engage more fully with a much wider cross section of supporters. Additionally, on the security side, more engagement with police officials and private security staff might also make fan projects more inclusive, while also having an impact on the methods and strategies of these stakeholders.

Third, new means of communication and dialogue should be explored. The messages and campaigns involving fan projects have tended to employ relatively familiar formats and techniques of communication, such as action days, educational events, posters and displays by various stakeholders. New means of communication might help to ensure that these activities and messages do not lose their impact by becoming overly ritualised. Social media is highly prominent within the fan scenes in particular, hence more might be done to explore how this form of communication may be used more effectively to cultivate positive behaviours.

Fourth, the scope for dialogue should be explored when the established cultural practices of the fans come

into conflict with recent security impositions. Inevitably, tense relations with police or security officials will arise when relatively popular and established aspects of fan culture are subject to restrictions. One example is the use of flares and fireworks inside stadiums. It may be fruitful to explore how forms of dialogue involving fan-project workers, police and security personnel might help to resolve these potentially difficult situations.

Fifth, the fan-project model should undergo wider diffusion at an international level. Thus far, fan projects have been limited in their spread through European football. We have found much to recommend in this model, and would therefore suggest that resources are found in order to facilitate the strengthening and spread of fan projects to different European countries.

Richard Giulianotti is Professor of Sociology at Loughborough University and Professor II at Telemark University College, Norway; Peter Millward is Senior Lecturer in Sociology at Liverpool John Moores University

References1 www.fsf.org.uk – for the full report, see bit.ly/1hmRBRz, and for

FSE Coordinator Daniela Wurbs’ discussion, see ICSS Journal,

volume 1, no 3, 2013

2 www.fairplay.or.at – for the full report, see bit.ly/1ikU1By

3 Öhlinger, G, 1 May 2013, accessed 29 November 2013,

www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/salzburg/sport/fussball/

sv-austria-salzburg/sn/artikel/fc-liefering-besiegt-austria-

salzburg-10-57192/

If a fan is arrested, the fan-project worker should be in a position to obtain reliable and authorised information

Five steps to assist the work of fan projects

ExchanGE KnowlEdGE Increase dialogue and the exchange

of expertise between fan projects

ExTEnd RanGE oF STaKEholdERS Engage with a wider cross section of supporters and build up links with police and security staff

TRy nEw MEanS oF coMMunicaTion Utilise social media to publicise messages and campaigns rather than relying on action days and educational events

ExPloRE ScoPE FoR dialoGuE bETwEEn FanS and PolicE When fans’ cultural practices come into conflict with security considerations, dialogue between fan-project workers and security staff can resolve tension

iMPlEMEnT ThE Fan-PRojEcT ModEl on an inTERnaTional ScalE While fan projects have a big profile in some central European countries, resources need to be found to facilitate the spread of this model across the continent and internationally

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Integrity Integrity


Current discussions on doping and match-fixing in sport tend to focus on the mechanics of corruption, the severity of sanctions that should be applied, and the means

of preventing and monitoring such activity. While corruption is widely condemned as being highly damaging to sport, little attention has been paid to assessing the real impact of corruption on stakeholders in the sports sector – including club owners, sponsors, governing bodies and, indeed, the fans.

Sport has a long history of corruption. Back in 388BC, Eupolos of Thessalia achieved notoriety when he won a gold medal in a fighting tournament at the Olympic Games by bribing three of his opponents, including the reigning Olympic champion Phormion of Halikarnassos1. More recent names, once synonymous with sporting excellence and achievement – including Marion Jones, Juventus Football Club, Hansie Cronje and Lance Armstrong – have been tarnished by corruption. Each reached the pinnacle of their respective sports, only to fall from grace for using performance

Commercial implications of corruption in sportSamantha Gorse reviews the impact that corruption cases can have on various stakeholders in the sport sector, noting a greater activism on the part of some sponsors to bring cheating in sport to an end

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Match-fixing and doping scandals can have numerous adverse commercial effects, including harming sales of

team-branded merchandise such as replica shirts

enhancing drugs (PEDs), fixing matches or selling information to gamblers and fixers.

In 1919, the result of Major League Baseball’s World Series was fixed by gamblers who paid players of the Chicago White Sox – who became known as the Chicago Black Sox as a result of the scandal – to lose the series. Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson all but destroyed his career in 1988, failing a drugs test after breaking the world record in the 100 metres final at the Olympic Games in Seoul, South Korea. Of the eight finalists in this blue-riband race – which became known as the ‘dirtiest race in history’ – six sprinters faced accusations during and after their careers of using PEDs, failed drugs tests or were banned from the sport for supplying illegal substances to other athletes.

In recent years, ‘Crashgate’ in Formula One, ‘Bloodgate’ in rugby, and the spot-fixing scandal involving three members of the Pakistan cricket team, not to mention the match-fixing allegations surfacing almost continuously in football, have kept the issue of corruption firmly in the media spotlight.

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Integrity Integrity


There has been a vastly increased level of investment in sports teams and events by sponsors, media and consumers over the past 20 years. Global sports-market revenues are estimated to hit $145.3 billion by 2015, with sponsorship worth $45.3 billion, accounting for 28.8 per cent of the total sports market2. Television and media exposure, attendance at live games and the sale of branded merchandise across international markets has ensured that sports, teams and, perhaps most extensively, players have global appeal and an ever-growing consumer base. Sports properties have become big business.

In turn, sport offers businesses and other organisations a platform on which to enhance their corporate image and reputation, build brand equity, develop relationships with key stakeholders and enjoy the benefits of positive image spillover through sponsorship agreements, both parties in such agreements seeking to benefit by capitalising on the values of competition, performance and fair play associated with sport itself.

For fans, Whannel (1992) suggests that “sport offers a utopia, a world where everything is simple, dramatic and exciting, and euphoria is always a possibility… Sport entertains, but can also frustrate, annoy and depress. But it is this very uncertainty that gives its unpredictable joys their characteristic intensity”3. This uncertainty in sport relies upon the principle of opponents playing to the best of their natural ability in order to win a sporting contest.

Cheating to win, by using PEDs, or cheating to lose, in the case of match-fixing and tanking (or point-shaving – cheating to win or lose by a particular margin) undermines this principle, removing an event from the world of sport and condemning it to a world of fakery and fabrication.

Impact on sponsors“Cyclist Lance Armstrong’s doping scandal is causing sponsors to question their future in a sport that allows them to reach mass audiences at a moderate price, but risks tainting their brand.’’ 4

The reputation of professional cycling, and the credibility of the sport’s top race, the Tour de France, has been brought into question repeatedly by scandals involving the use of PEDs. As a result, sponsors have been forced to re-evaluate their involvement, recognising that “in cycling, doping allegations can instantly tarnish a sponsor’s reputation”5. Since 2006, sponsors including Deutsche Telekom, Audi, Adidas, Nissan, Enovos, Liberty Seguros, Phonak and, most recently, Rabobank have pulled out of the sport, many citing the continuing threat of doping scandals as the main reason for their withdrawal.

Sponsors of other sports have also been forced to re-evaluate their investment as a result of corruption. Dutch financial services provider ING immediately terminated its association with the Renault team due to the ‘Crashgate’ scandal that occurred at Formula One’s 2008 Singapore

Grand Prix, as did fellow major team sponsor Mutua Madrilena, suggesting that the scandal, while not only compromising the integrity of the sport and the safety of spectators, marshals and drivers, “could affect the image, reputation and good name of the team’s sponsors”6. The Pakistan team equipment supplier, BoomBoom, severed ties with brand ambassador Mohammed Amir as his involvement in the cricket spot-fixing scandal in England in 2010 became clear, stating that they couldn’t allow their brand to be “associated with any whiff of corruption or suspicion of foul play”7.

In the aftermath of the US Anti-Doping Agency investigation into cycling that revealed the “most sophisticated, professionalised and successful doping programme that sport has ever seen” within the US Postal Service Pro Cycling team and, in particular, by team leader Lance Armstrong, it was anticipated that more sponsors would terminate their association with the sport. This has not been entirely the case, however, and a more complex reaction has ensued.

The Tour de France is one of sport’s biggest global events, with some stages of the race attracting crowds of up to one million people and extensive global media coverage. For sponsors, such exposure is obviously a powerful attraction that must be weighed against the risk of a negative impact on their ‘image’ by association with

doping. In fact, the risks of being associated with cycling have put sponsors in a more powerful bargaining position than they would find in other sports. For example, prior to his company’s withdrawal from cycling in 2006, Phonak (now Sonova Holding AG) co-founder and then-chairman, Andy Rihs, stated “he was glad that doping was an issue in cycling, because it scares off big corporations from

Prominent sponsor ING terminated its association with the Renault Formula One team after driver Nelson Piquet Jr was ordered to crash deliberately to affect the outcome of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix

The risks of being associated with cycling have put sponsors in a more

powerful bargaining position

Disgraced former Olympic champion Marion Jones became one of the most high-profile examples of cheating in sport following her imprisonment after lying to a US grand jury about her use of steroids

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becoming sponsors, allowing smaller companies like his to afford to be involved”8. Other sponsors, such as BSkyB, have taken a firm stance against doping in cycling, adopting a zero-tolerance policy towards the use of PEDs9; this has allowed these organisations to benefit from the exposure gained by being involved in the sport, while also promoting their brands as ‘honest’ and ‘open’. US technology firm Belkin announced its intention to replace Rabobank as the title sponsor of a team just before the 2013 Tour de France, and airline Emirates decided to extend its association with FIFA after feeling satisfied that the football governing body’s officials were actively addressing issues of corruption within the sport.

There are also examples, though limited, of sponsors seizing the opportunity to enhance their reputations, or at the very least protect their interests, by leading the charge to change governance structures in sporting organisations hit by scandals. Sportswear manufacturer Skins established the pressure group ‘Change Cycling Now’ in an attempt to force change in the governance of the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), which ultimately proved successful at the recent presidential elections.

Skins chairman Jaimie Fuller launched a new Skins-sponsored anti-doping publicity campaign, called Pure Sport, in September 2013. At the I Play Fair sports-law conference in Cape Town in November, Fuller set out

the argument for greater corporate social responsibility in the sport-sponsorship sector: “I believe sponsors can no longer pay for the exposure a sponsorship package will give them and then calmly sit back and simply wait for the association to benefit their business. Sport these days is such a complex, multi-billion-dollar business that anyone who touches it is inextricably linked by a chain of responsibility. Sure, as sponsors we want a ‘bang for our buck’, but there’s no point in operating commercially if you’re not prepared to stand up for every athlete and sports fan who wants to watch or take part in a fair contest. As I see it, what is the point of Skins selling products to enhance performance and recovery to people who compete at any level, if they believe the top-level sport we’re supporting is rotten to the core? It’s guilt by association and it makes no sense at all.” 10

Governing bodiesGoverning bodies develop close relationships with other stakeholder groups in sport, in particular fans and sponsors, as well as governments and law-enforcement organisations. The role of the governing body in managing the impact of corruption in sport, to protect their own interests as well as those of other stakeholders, and the manner and speed in which it is dealt with, is crucially important for the commercial impact of corruption. Sport is littered with

References1 Maennig, W (2005), Corruption in International Sports and Sport

Management: Forms, Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures,

European Sport Management Quarterly, 5(2): 187-225

2 PwC (2011), Changing the Game: Outlook for the global sports

market to 2015, http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/hospitality-

leisure/pdf/changing-the-game-outlook-for-the-global-sports-

market-to-2015.pdf

3 Mason, DS (1999), What is the sports product and who buys it?

The marketing of professional sports leagues, European Journal of

Marketing, 33(3/4): 402-418

4 Weir, K (2012), Cycling sponsors face doping dilemma

after Armstrong scandal, Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/

article/2012/10/20/uk-cycling-armstrong-sponsorship-

idUKBRE89J0AD20121020

5 Casert, R (2007) Doping scandals leave sponsors wary, USA

Today, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/

2007-12-15-1427767261_x.htm

6 Reuters (2009), Spanish insurer cancels Renault sponsorship,

http://ca.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idCATRE58N47R20090924

7 Telegraph Australia (2010), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.

au/sport/cricket/boomboom-youre-sacked-as-pakistan-

sponsor-dumps-mohammad-amir-over-betting-scam/story-

e6frey50-1225913105790

8 Day, J (2006), Sports sponsors and doping scandals,

The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/media/

organgrinder/2006/jul/31/sportssponsorsanddopingsca

9 Slater, M (2012), Team Sky strive for cycling’s moral high ground,

BBC Sport, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/cycling/20147726

10 Hindustan Times (2013), http://www.hindustantimes.com/

Specials/Cricket/T20/Chunk-HT-UI-T20-SpotFixing/Cricket-

fans-feel-cheated-after-spot-fixing-scandal-survey-finds/SP-

Article10-1063066.aspx

11 http://watercooler.skins.net/2013/11/18/our-continuing-fight-

for-sports-values/

cases in which governing bodies have been slow to get to grips with transgressive behaviour, particularly in the use of PEDs. Any perception of an inability to effectively deal with corruption in sport presents a real challenge for governing bodies in their pursuit of sponsorship revenue.

Sports fans’ reactionPerhaps the most significant commercial implication for both sponsors and governing bodies is the reaction of fans to corruption scandals. If a significant number of fans, television viewers and purchasers of sports-related products react to a case of match-fixing or the use of PEDs within a sport by withdrawing their support and turning their backs on sporting competition, governing bodies will not have an audience for their sport and sponsors will lose their target market.

The cost of attending a Premier League football match in England or an NBA basketball game in some cities in the US can be in excess of $250 for two people, aside from any additional spending on gambling or merchandise. If even the smallest part of the match has been manipulated in any way, consumers are spending this money under false pretences. The question then becomes how long will it take for corruption scandals to make fans withdraw their support.

There is currently little quantative research into the impact of match-fixing or doping scandals on the attendance at and viewing of sports events, or on commercial viability. The chaos in Chinese football in the period 1995-2005 is often cited as an example of how match-fixing can drive fans away, but, in contrast, a series of match-fixing scandals in Italy seems to have had little effect on spectator numbers.

Former Major League Baseball player Jose Canseco (left) and ex-sprinter Ben Johnson (centre), both of whom used performance-enhancing drugs, join entrepreneur and anti-doping campaigner Jaimie Fuller at a round-table discussion

A survey of 500 Indian cricket fans earlier this year reported that “82 per cent of cricket fans feel cheated for having watched the domestic T20 league as a result of the spot-fixing controversy”11. Two-thirds of respondents said their confidence in cricket itself had been eroded, but only 37 per cent said they wanted the T20 tournament scrapped entirely. Interestingly, the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) garnered the most concerted criticism, with 87 per cent of those surveyed expressing feelings that it was “not doing enough to curb malpractices in cricket”.

Given the cases of corruption in sport and the increasing media interest in the issue, it is vital that all key stakeholders – including sponsors, fans and governing

bodies – are aware of the potential impact on the image and reputation of their brands. What is very clear is that corruption in sport has broad implications for even unsuspecting stakeholders in the sport industry, such as grassroots sport and youth participation, with a subsequent impact

on the very foundations of sport itself. The implications for stakeholders should be examined more closely as the debate about corruption in sport continues. As is apparent from the example of Skins, these stakeholders have a significant part to play in addressing the threats that are posed by such behaviour.

Samantha Gorse is a researcher at the Centre for the International Business of Sport (CIBS) at Coventry University in the UK. Her research is focused primarily on corruption in sport – the implications of such activity for all stakeholders in the sport industry, the education of these stakeholders and the management of corruption in sport across the world

Sport is littered with cases in which governing bodies have been slow to get to grips with

transgressive behaviour

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How major sporting events can mitigate risks of child exploitationProfessor Celia Brackenridge and Dr Daniel Rhind assess the risks of child exploitation and abuse associated with major sporting events, and suggest measures that can be adopted by event planners to protect children from harm

The relatively new field of security studies in sport has examined many dimensions of major events, from technology to on-field violence, but has not focused closely on the abuse of children.

In the first issue of this journal, ICSS Research and Development Director, Shaun McCarthy, presented a list of ‘unacceptable political behaviours’ that might prompt debate about protective actions in sport.1 The authors of this article believe that harm to children associated with major sporting events (MSEs) should be added to that list because the plight of such children is a political blind spot in current policy and practice. Drawing on a recent report for the Oak Foundation, Child Exploitation and the FIFA World Cup, this paper takes a critical view of the evidence about risks to children associated with MSEs and presents a case for collaborative action on harm prevention by international sport organisations.2

Sport and risks to children Despite recent efforts to blend sport and human rights, children’s rights and activism work in sport has historically been marginalised. Perceived wisdom defines sport as a site of fun, security, pleasure and safety – a view reflected in the pervasive images of joy presented by the media during the Olympic and Paralympic Games at London 2012. The many benefits of sport for child development – related to learning, healthy lifelong physical activity, civic pride and multicultural sensitisation – are also well documented. But the positive ‘social legacy’ of sport events frequently masks issues such as gender-based violence, cheating and corruption and, indeed, child exploitation.

There is an overriding need for action by those responsible for commissioning and staging MSEs, such as

FIFA, the IOC, governments and civil society, to anticipate, prepare for and adopt risk-mitigation strategies and interventions in relation to children. Leadership from these culturally powerful bodies could prove decisive in shifting hearts, minds and actions toward improved safety for children associated with MSEs. Thus far, however, and despite long-standing international agreements on children’s rights, such as the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, child protective action has not been a criterion of either bidding or social legacy planning for most MSEs, rendering children invisible.

A shift towards protecting children’s rights at MSEs would be timely, as it would complement ongoing work being carried out by UNICEF, the IOC and other agencies working in development and humanitarian environments, to make sport safer for children3,4. However, the focus of this article is on risks to children outside of, but

associated with, MSEs (see Figure 1). Risks emerge at all levels of life – individual, family, community and society (see Figure 2). These risks result from a combination of social, economic, cultural, environmental and structural factors that can disempower children and weaken their protective environment.

Many assertions can be found in literature about the sources of risk for child exploitation associated with MSEs. In relation to the FIFA World Cup, for example, some interviewees in the aforementioned report talked about the ‘obvious’ risks of high numbers of people

Children’s rights and activism work in sport has historically been marginalised

A child at work on a construction project in front of a stadium in India. Child labour may be the main reason for human trafficking to sporting events

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Figure 2: Framework for analysing risks to children associated with MSEs

gathering in one place, opportunities for criminal activity, violence and abuse through street round-ups, deceit by pimps and agencies to drive women and children into the paid sex workforce, trafficking for child labour, the dangerous influences of paedophiles and increased alcohol and drug consumption associated with the ‘soccer mood’. Yet, while these concerns sound alarming, they often rest on weak evidence, propaganda from those with vested interests and pre-existing social problems in the vicinity of MSEs; causal associations with sport events have rarely been demonstrated.

The very nature of child exploitation, however, does not lend itself to conventional hypothesis testing, and the illicit, sensitive, personal and hidden qualities of exploitation problems render them difficult to reach by researchers.

Despite this, it is clear that some child exploitation does occur at MSEs. Four main categories of risk and harm emerged in our research, often with functional overlaps: child labour, displacement of children from forced evictions for infrastructure projects and street clearance, child sexual exploitation (CSE), and human trafficking affecting children.2

Child labour – this is the longest-standing form of child exploitation associated with MSEs and may be the main cause of human trafficking to these events. It includes involvement of children in the manufacturing of sporting goods, the construction of stadia and forced begging or street selling. In some localities, however, child labour is regarded as ‘normal’, posing a challenge to those pressing for an end to the practice.

Displacement – of street children and poor communities as part of event ‘clean up’ for infrastructure development has been a regular concern of child welfare advocates and researchers at past MSEs. The literature surrounding this is vague with regard to when displacement becomes forced eviction, and even more so regarding when this constitutes child exploitation. Child exploitation resulting from forced eviction mainly affects children whose families are already marginalised and vulnerable. Displacement increases poverty, divides families and heavily impacts on children, who sometimes witness their parents being beaten and their houses torn down.

Child sexual exploitation (CSE) – hard evidence of CSE occurring before and during MSEs is scarce. The examples we uncovered indicated a risk of CSE, rather than actual incidence, or their explicit connection to the event was difficult to verify. Assumed links between measured rises in prostitution among underage girls and MSEs, for example, cannot easily be tested. Extended school holidays during MSEs leave children unsupervised and vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation, as do bans on street traders and hawkers, since the resultant economic strain on families can lead to domestic violence and increased risks of CSE for economic purposes. In short, child sexual exploitation linked to MSEs appears to be hidden behind other social problems, such as diverted services, family stress, poverty and domestic violence.

Human trafficking for sexual exploitation affecting children – very few of the studies we examined focused only on sexual exploitation of children at or around

Figure 1: Children at risk in relation to MSEs

Children at risk

Child athletes

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Cultural

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table 1: Factors inhibiting good child-protection work at MSEs

AttituDinAL ■ Ignorance and a lack of

awareness and understanding ■ Fear ■ Secrecy ■ Denial ■ The taboo of sexual violence

PRoCEDuRAL ■ Failure to report abuses ■ The difficulty of going from policy to practice ■ Lack of a learning legacy shared

between MSEs ■ Lack of involvement of children or

participatory approaches ■ Lack of verifiable data ■ Absence of policies and procedures ■ Lack of risk assessments ■ Lack of mandatory child protection

within MSE host-bid criteria ■ Absence of continuous improvement

models of quality ■ Lack of long-term planning

oRgAniSAtionAL ■ Lack of leadership, especially by senior managers ■ Political and legislative inertia ■ Obsession with money ■ Pressure on time, energy and resources

(‘no capacity for international lobbying or collection of evidence’)

■ Vested interests ■ Jurisdiction (‘silo’ mentality, ‘not our problem’,

‘head in the sand’ approach) ■ The sheer scale and complexity of some

of the organisations involved ■ Difficulty in tailoring responses appropriately

to different types and sizes of organisation ■ Insufficient data to persuade the private sector

to adopt the issue in their corporate social responsibility and sustainability work

■ Lack of transparency/democracy in governance ■ Getting sponsors to pay attention to the issue ■ Concerns about reputational risks of associating

with the issue ■ Resource allocation skewed to elite

sport performance ■ Partnership with inappropriate sponsors –

for example, alcohol companies

MSEs, but significant attention has been paid to the alleged connection of MSEs with street grooming, human trafficking and prostitution more generally, with resultant impacts on children. Researchers seem to agree that while the ‘rationale for fear is logical’, there is little systematic research that yields supporting evidence for the impact of MSEs on sex work. It is difficult to judge whether this evidence gap is a reflection of the success of mitigation strategies, of the non-existence of the problem, or of the weakness of monitoring and evaluating designs. The absence of baseline data about CSE also means it is not possible to know whether prostitution figures during MSEs are an increase on the norm.

Overall, we conclude that human trafficking for sexual exploitation associated with MSEs appears to be adult-focused, responsive to advocacy interventions and difficult to measure. Where it does occur, it is probable that such trafficking masks harms to children.

Protective interventionsResponses designed to minimise the impact of risks for children associated with MSEs are wide-ranging, but dedicated child-focused responses are scarce. Very few programmatic or advocacy interventions are age-specific, and most of them address general rather than particular risks. Also, human trafficking appears to overshadow

all other risks in relation to the attention, resources and priority afforded to it by programmers, irrespective of the relative significance of this risk for children. There is very little material on programmes and advocacy related to child labour, CSE and displacement, masking the fact that children all too often become victims when the adults who are close to them are exploited. However, the corollary of this situation is that protective interventions that are targeted at adults can also have important prevention benefits for children.

A range of factors appear to inhibit good child-protection work for MSEs (see Table 1), all of which indicate that researchers and interventionists are working on what one interviewee described as ‘soft ground’. Multi-agency protective work includes law enforcement interventions (such as special visa regulations and fast-track courts) and child-protection strategies (such as safe houses, holiday clubs, facilities for street children, mobile telephone apps and HIV/AIDS awareness programmes).

The literature is clearly dominated by the issue of human trafficking, yet this masks the exploitation of

children that lies beneath the exploitation of adults. While the risks of child exploitation per se certainly increased during some of these events, the examples that we found highlighted the universal rarity of reliable empirical data concerning child exploitation surrounding MSEs. Robust research designs, focused specifically on children, are essential in order to verify these assertions.

Responding to risksNeither absence of data nor moral panics are excuses for inaction. Risks to children are clearly evident in the wider context of MSEs, so there is a need to mitigate them, to prevent them and to respond to harm. Good protective interventions need not wait for research to catch up, but the long-term prospects for funding and political support for such work will depend on demonstrating that such interventions are effective. In Table 2, we propose a set of actions for event planners and advocates that will help them to prepare risk-mitigation work at future MSEs.

Events such as the FIFA World Cup may not be a direct cause of child exploitation, but they do present a significant opportunity for MSE organisations to act as a catalyst for the adoption of policies and practices by host countries that will enhance child protection. Strategies to protect children should not just be a temporary priority attached to a single MSE, but part of a sustainable long-term plan, as has already occurred with environmental standards. The social-impact assessments that are already embedded in the criteria for many MSEs should prioritise the voices, needs and rights of children.

The boundaries of moral and social liability are contentious, especially where international sport organisations such as FIFA or the IOC are perceived to have unlimited funds and are therefore expected to invest in resolving every conceivable social ill. Local host agencies within host countries and cities must decide exactly how to prepare in ways best suited to

their own conditions and state of readiness. For some, cultural, historical, financial and legal limitations mean that the delivery of risk mitigation is likely to be less than ideal. However, there seems no reason why – at least beginning at the level of vision and strategy – governments, non-governmental organisations, human rights groups and civil society in general should not accept their social and moral responsibilities that align with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Professor Celia Brackenridge is a Professorial Research Fellow and Dr Daniel Rhind is a Lecturer in Youth Sport, at the Brunel Centre for Sport, Health and Wellbeing at Brunel University London

Acknowledgements: the authors would like to acknowledge the

co-researchers who worked on the project reported in this article –

Sarah Palmer-Felgate, Laura Hills, Tess Kay, Anne Tiivas, Lucy Faulkner

and Iain Lindsay – as well as the Oak Foundation for funding the work

References1 McCarthy, S. Can sport and politics be separated? in ICSS

Journal, Newsdesk Media, London, 2013, volume 1, no 1, p13

2 Brackenridge, C H., Palmer-Felgate, S., Rhind, D., Hills, L., Kay, T.,

Tiivas, A., Faulkner, L., and Lindsay, I. Child Exploitation and the

FIFA World Cup, Brunel University London, Uxbridge, 2013

www.sportanddev.org/en/toolkit/latest_publications/?6320/Child-

Exploitation-and-the-FIFA-World-Cup

3 Brackenridge, C H., Fasting, K., Kirby, S., and Leahy, T. Protecting

Children from Violence in Sport: A Review with a Focus on

Industrialized Countries, UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, Florence,

2010, www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/violence_in_sport.pdf

4 Brackenridge, C H., Kay, T., and Rhind, D. (eds) Sport,

Children’s Rights and Violence Prevention: A Sourcebook on

Global Issues and Local Programmes, Brunel University Press,

London, 2008 and 2012, www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_

file/0009/259344/UNICEF-book-whole-text-6-12-12.pdf

table 2: Main messages for MSE planners and advocates of child protection

■ Establish a coalition of all relevant partners as early as possible and develop a coherent strategy that allocates clear responsibilities and avoids disrupting the everyday work of local NGOs

■ Secure a ‘memorandum of cooperation’, or similar, among all coalition partners to place the interests of children above those of the partner agencies

■ Ensure that the exploitation of children is also made visible in all interventions ■ Make sure that, from the very beginning, all interventions have robust monitoring and evaluation plans built in ■ Ensure that monitoring and evaluation plans adopt multi-method designs that provide both quantitative (statistical)

and qualitative (experiential) evidence ■ Do not assume that no data means no problem ■ Broaden the gaze of policymakers, programmers and advocates to include potential child exploitation

associated with other MSE-related issues, for example displacement and construction labour ■ Hold MSE hosts accountable to their social development legacy claims through longitudinal

monitoring and evaluation ■ Adopt child-exploitation criteria and child-protection assessments as a requirement of bidding for all MSEs ■ Ensure that children are clearly targeted in any risk-mitigation activity ■ Involve and listen to children from a range of demographic backgrounds in the design and delivery

of all child-protective interventions

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Match-fixing and sports betting received the full attention of the Olympic movement for the first time at the London 2012 Games, when Jacques Rogge, then the president of

the International Olympic Committee (IOC), inserted a sports-betting monitoring and cooperation clause into the Host City Contract in order to combat the threat of match-fixing. Rogge’s successor, the newly elected Thomas Bach, has reinforced the commitment to tackling match-fixing, stating when he took office that this was one of his principal areas of concern. These words were backed with action during the most recent Olympic Movement Coordination Meeting, held at the beginning of November in Lausanne – more of which later.

Being the first Olympic Games to include such a clause, there was some uncertainty as to how the operation would run during London 2012. The IOC decided to establish a Joint Assessment Unit (JAU) to deal with the threat. An evaluation of the JAU and lessons for Rio 2016, called Working together to protect the Integrity of Sport: the Role of the Joint Assessment Unit at the London 2012 Olympic Games, was published by the Gambling Commission (GC), the gambling regulator in the United Kingdom, in March 2013. For a quasi-governmental body such as the GC, this report provides an unusually thorough and frank insight into the JAU’s operations.

Mandate and designThe focus of the JAU was to ensure that the UK was prepared to receive and quickly assess information relating to possible corruptible betting activity and assist the primary decision-makers and stakeholders

Monitoring betting at Olympic events: lessons from London 2012Kevin Carpenter examines the UK Gambling Commission’s report on the role of the Joint Assessment Unit in monitoring sport betting and identifying possible manipulation during the London 2012 Olympics

in determining an appropriate response. In essence, it was a mechanism for the collection, collation and assessment of information. Key stakeholders involved in the JAU were:

■ London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games;

■ International Olympic Committee; ■ Gambling Commission and their

Sports Betting Intelligence Unit; ■ UK police; ■ Non-Olympic sports bodies; ■ Sports governing bodies and

international federations; ■ Betting operators and associations; ■ International Sports Monitoring

(a betting monitoring service); ■ Interpol; and ■ Media.

Prior to the Games, the JAU knew the challenge would be twofold: to protect stakeholder interests and to put theory into practice.

Early stakeholder engagement to gain agreement as to high-level operating principles was vital. The delivery model conceived during the feasibility process included procedures designed to assess the JAU thoroughly through scenario-based testing sessions prior to the 2012 Olympic Games. This raised key questions of capabilities and competencies, both for the JAU and its stakeholders, highlighting the importance of the depth of understanding of all organisations involved. This meant that there were

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no surprises during the operational phase of the JAU. Although the preparation and feasibility process for the JAU began 18 months prior to the beginning of the 2012 Games, the JAU was actually operational from the day after the opening of the athletes’ village until the day of the closing ceremony – 29 days in total.

The Joint Assessment Unit in actionDuring that period there were 16 reports/actions logged with the JAU. One related to the farcical scenes that accompanied the final round of group matches in the

women’s doubles badminton tournament, gaining infamy in the sporting world. Four pairs, from China, Indonesia and two from South Korea, who had all already qualified for the knockout stages, played each other, and all were accused of deliberately trying to lose to ensure a favourable draw in the next round. The governing body of the sport, the Badminton World Federation, acted promptly, disqualifying all eight players from the tournament the very next day. This scandal led to a

change in the format of the badminton tournament for future Olympics, so that there will no longer be ‘dead-rubber’ matches, which are often the subject of match-fixing, as has been seen in Italian football for example.

Interestingly, the majority of the reports/actions that were logged came from monitoring of the media. The fact that the JAU acted as a ‘coordination hub’ meant that stakeholders were notified of issues within a very short period of time after they had been identified. All of those incidents were logged by the JAU, leaving a robust audit trail. This was despite the fact that none of the incidents

logged were ultimately found to have been linked to any form of unlawful manipulation. In the badminton scandal, given the part of the world where the players came from (South Korea, China and Indonesia), with the Far East being known both for match-fixing activity and illegal gambling syndicates, there were some suspicions voiced as to whether

there was a betting corruption element in addition to the sporting motivations to fix the matches. Both the IOC and the GC confirmed to the author at a conference in London in October 2012 that, although it had been investigated, there was no evidence found of the misdemeanors being related in any way to suspicious betting or manipulation.

Based on the data that the JAU was able to capture, the amount staked by customers or matched on betting exchanges on Olympic sports during the 2012 Games was

at least £350 million ($545 million). This was 10 times higher than the level seen for the Beijing Olympics in 2008. All of those figures may seem high in isolation, but the report was at pains to stress that in comparison to the normal levels of betting on major sporting events, they were actually quite low. For example, the men’s Olympic tennis final between Roger Federer and Andy Murray, attracted only 20 per cent of the bets wagered on the Wimbledon final between the two earlier in 2012. However, it should be borne in mind that the report is not clear on how much of the estimated market the JAU knew about, and one suspects that there was a large amount of betting, particularly in the Asian markets, not captured by the International Sports Monitoring service used by the IOC.

Media managementAs mentioned, the majority of the actions logged by the JAU came from monitoring the media. This was because journalists often identified cases that were unusual, or unsporting practices that had allegedly occurred across

all the different disciplines during the Games. One such example was controversial decisions that were made by the judges in the boxing competition. In the report, the GC says that the interactions between the JAU, the IOC Ethics Commission secretary and the press were a key factor in effectively determining the lines of enquiry, and a means by which these could be disseminated clearly to other relevant parties as quickly as possible.

Furthermore, the report notes that monitoring the media offered crucial reassurances that corrupt betting integrity was not the driver behind one suspicious incident. This inclusion and encouragement of good and close relations with the media is something the author has advocated previously, and the media should not be seen as acting contrary to the interest of sport – it is (in the main) interested in maintaining sport’s integrity and can use methods and resources not available to sports governing bodies and federations.

The Learning Points section of the GC report is undoubtedly the most important, and it lists 12 separate

Journalists often identified cases that were unusual, or unsporting practices that had allegedly occurred at the Games

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The majortiy of the actions logged by the Joint Assessment Unit at London 2012 arose from

monitoring worldwide media coverage of events

One of the 16 suspicious incidents logged at the 2012 Olympics was the case of eight women’s doubles badminton players – including the Indonesian and South Korean pairs shown here – who were accused of trying to lose matches in order to secure more favourable draws

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issues. In general, the view was that the JAU model was a success and could be deployed and enhanced to provide similar, or even more effective support, at future Games and other major sporting events. Some of the Learning Points deserve further discussion.

Learning Point Eight addresses the need to embrace legitimate/licensed betting operators. It is in legitimate operators’ interests to maintain the integrity of sport because legitimate gamblers will not bet on events that they believe are already predetermined. This point highlights again the importance of good relationships by ensuring that operators are listened to actively and are reassured that their contribution and efforts are valued and appreciated. Importantly, this applies not only to the gambling regulator in the country that is hosting the Games, but also to as many of the betting operators themselves, and/or the gambling associations, in as many jurisdictions as possible.

Learning Point 10 talks about the detailed profiling that took place of each Olympic sport by the JAU to find out their respective inherent risks and vulnerabilities with the aim of ensuring that the resources of the JAU were used as effectively and efficiently as possible. Monitoring was therefore prioritised for those sports that were more at risk of corruption and integrity

problems. This was assessed by examining previous weak or compromised governance in the sport, or previous doping or match-fixing issues.

Significant lessonsIn the author’s opinion, Learning Points Four and 10 are the most significant, as they highlight a major problem in the fight against the ills of match-fixing. The report says it would be prudent to ensure that law enforcement investigators have an understanding of the type of criminal threats posed by and associated with match-fixing. This is certainly true from the author’s own experience, and not only is the criminal threat – be it fraud, money laundering, violence or human trafficking – underplayed and misunderstood by both the police and the sports governing bodies, but there is also an inherent lack of understanding about how sports betting markets work. Unfortunately, these twin misunderstandings result in a lack of convictions, or even interest, from law enforcement agencies in particular. In my opinion, this is because match-fixing is often viewed as an ‘unglamorous crime’.

Linked closely to this, even if there is an impetus to actually investigate and to try and obtain evidence, there are currently significant hurdles in converting

intelligence into suitable evidence. This is why a number of investigations taken over by the police then collapse and are passed back to the sport, sometimes years after the allegations were made, by which time the reputation and faith in the sport has been irreparably harmed. However, an encouraging case has emerged recently from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The case has shown that to overcome these evidential difficulties, the CAS is willing to accept betting monitoring patterns and expert evidence thereon as sufficient grounds for a life ban from a sport for match-fixing, as well as the use of anonymous witness evidence (CAS/2009/A/1920 FK Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA).

Future GamesShortly before the release of the report in March 2013, the IOC passed stringent rules on betting for the Sochi Winter Olympic Games in 2014 (Sochi Rules). Replicating the JAU model in Russia is not mentioned; rather, there has been the use of a cross-stakeholder working group.

The Sochi Rules themselves are very comprehensive and seem to strike a good balance between detail and flexibility. The Sochi Rules cover the principal offences of: betting, manipulation of results in the context of betting (for example match-fixing), corrupt conduct in

the context of betting and the use of inside information.

The Sochi Rules also then go on to cover other offences that often arise in the criminal law: attempts [to manipulate], knowingly assisting or otherwise being complicit in acts or omissions, a failure to disclose, and a failure to cooperate with

an investigation. Parties can abide by the disclosure rule through the anonymous email address or telephone hotline that are detailed in the Rules. Indeed, these lines of communication were set up by the IOC for this purpose.

However, it has been shown time and again that those people within the sport/competition covered by the regulations often do not use integrity-reporting mechanisms set up by the sport/competition itself due to a lack of trust in the governance of that sport/competition. It would be better for integrity-reporting mechanisms to be operated by a truly independent service, which also aids the paramount guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality for those brave enough to get in contact.

In October 2013, the local organising committee for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro signed an agreement with INTERPOL for on-site support from one of its Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs). As part of this agreement, INTERPOL will also provide training and investigative support in relation to illegal betting and match-fixing activities.

Back in March 2011, under the auspices of the IOC, the Founding Working Group on the Fight Against Irregular and Illegal Betting in Sport was established. This was designed to assist the IOC in its collaborations with public

authorities. The working group had its fourth meeting in May 2013, with a number of recommendations being set out formally under the three separate themes of:

1. Education and Information;2. Monitoring, Intelligence and Analysis; and3. Legislation and Regulations.

One of the key recommendations that the members of the IOC, and the relevant national bodies, are being asked to support is the draft Convention of the Council of Europe Against the Manipulation of Sports Competitions. This is an ambitious project, and although the author applauds their efforts in principle, one questions how many countries outside of the Council of Europe member states, particularly high-risk jurisdictions for sports betting integrity, will sign up to this in the medium to long term.

The working group is correct in saying that the protection of integrity in sport cannot be waged by the federations and governing bodies alone, particularly where evidence of a criminal nature is required. However, given the apparent reluctance and/or inability of law enforcement agencies to deal with this transnational, global issue, there needs to be more consideration given to the need for concurrent sporting investigations and criminal proceedings to take place so as to fully

protect the perception, image and integrity of sport. Encouragingly, during the 82nd Interpol General Assembly in Colombia in October 2013, the delegates endorsed a resolution for a memorandum of understanding with the IOC that would provide a formal structure for enhanced cooperation between the two organisations, particularly in relation to promoting integrity in sport.

In the author’s view, the key broker and leader in the global fight against match manipulation through corrupt sports betting practices can, and should, be the IOC, as it is the only body with the necessary political, social and sporting influence and strength to bring all the key stakeholders together under a common umbrella, using the experience gained with the JAU during London 2012 to provide a coherent, powerful and above all, effective strategy for Sochi 2014 and beyond.

This is an updated version of an article first published by the author on LawInSport.com

Kevin Carpenter is a sports lawyer at international law firm Hill Dickinson LLP, specialising in regulation, governance and integrity matters. He can be contacted by email at [email protected] or via Twitter @KevSportsLaw

The criminal threat – be it fraud, money laundering, violence or human trafficking– is underplayed and misunderstood

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Crowds in Brazil celebrate winning the bid to host the 2016 Summer Olympics. In 2013, the local organising

committee signed an agreement with INTERPOL for assistance in combating illegal betting and match-fixing

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Looking for betting fraudDavid McCarthy examines the emergence of betting-monitoring organisations, both within sports bodies and private entities, and reviews their progress

“The regulator must play a central role in fraud detection, taken in this context as the detection of ‘irregular bets’. To do this, the regulator must be cognisant

of developments in the market, the bets placed and the concentration of bets in relation to competitions. In the light of the very substantial growth in live betting, this overview must be facilitated in real time. The detection of irregularities will then enable warning levels to be set, and the necessary measures to be taken in the event of fraud. The regulator must serve as an interface and centralisation point for data on fraud, to which end the existing monitoring systems of some betting operators may be used.” So read the 2012 Sports betting and corruption: How to preserve the integrity of sport study by the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques.

Sports betting monitoring systems have developed rapidly over the past 10 years for two reasons. Firstly, as a means to detect suspicious betting patterns that may indicate match-fixing behaviour and fraudulent betting activities. Secondly, as a means to improve efficiencies for betting operators. These two existential motivations explain why a range of betting monitoring organisations exist. Some of them have originated from sports bodies, such as FIFA, seeking to crack down on match-fixing, while others have developed out of the gaming industry, from their own internal business monitoring functions to shared monitoring functions. Some betting monitoring organisations are still tied to their founding bodies, while others, such as Sportradar, are independent operations.

Monitoring systems typically observe the odds before a match, how they change during the game, the number of bets placed on a sporting event or aspects of the game, or substantial bets placed in unusual circumstances. These systems also watch client activity and the opening of new accounts: spikes in new accounts can indicate attempts to place fraudulent bets on rigged matches. The IRIS report identified three types of betting monitoring organisation:

■ Those created by each operator to develop and protect their own business;

■ Those shared between operators as a common warning system and for improved risk assessment; and

■ Those created by sports organisations for the targeted surveillance systems of their own competitions.

Monitoring systems often observe the opening of new accounts, which, if occurring in large numbers, can indicate attempts to place fraudulent bets

Two further monitoring systems could be added: private monitoring organisations, such as Sportradar, and monitoring units set up within regulatory organisations, such as the UK’s Gambling Commission.

Sport-based monitorsFIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are probably the two most powerful single entities in sport, and both have developed betting monitoring organisations, although it was FIFA that led the way.

FIFA’s Early Warning System (EWS) is designed to safeguard the integrity of the organisation’s tournaments against the potential threats of sports betting. The system functions through a combination of monitoring and the analysis of betting patterns.

In the run up to the 2006 World Cup in Germany, FIFA established a prototype early warning system. The system was piloted to monitor, analyse and report on betting patterns during the competition as part of an overall strategy to combat the negative influences of sports betting, which had been a particular concern in Germany after the match-fixing cases in the Bundesliga in 2005. The pilot was a success and FIFA decided to formalise the unit, establishing the EWS GmbH as a separate and independent entity in Zurich in 2007. Since it was established, the company has expanded its role with FIFA and has branched out to monitor betting for other sports associations.

EWS has developed a three-pronged approach, which includes monitoring and analysis, education, and prevention operations. The company’s front line monitoring and analysis operation collates and analyses detailed information on betting activity and trends. This operation breaks down into three functions.

Firstly, data provided by betting companies: EWS has contractual arrangements in place with betting companies to share data on betting patterns. The platform is secure and companies that participate are protected against reputational risk – otherwise, if news became public that their systems had been targeted by fraudsters, it might be damaging for those companies.

Secondly, data analysis: EWS has developed a system to analyse betting patterns and identify those that are suspicious. This system focuses on the range of betting offers and odds. It is also designed to capture information on surges of money being placed on sporting events.

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Thirdly, market intelligence: EWS has developed a wide range of contacts that provide information and intelligence on sporting events, new trends within the betting marketplace and persons of interest within both sport and betting.

The education operation of EWS provides training seminars and information to stakeholders, such as players, officials and sporting organisations, on the threats that they may face and some of the approaches they may receive, as well as information on how to report such instances. As noted in the round-up of recent match-fixing cases in this issue of ICSS Journal (see Aaron, page 86), such support for players and officials is essential in preventing vulnerable individuals from being drawn into fraudulent activities.

As part of its prevention operation, EWS has developed links with various bodies, including INTERPOL. Under a contractual agreement signed in 2011, EWS assists in the formation of e-learning modules on integrity and anti-corruption for stakeholders. Provided by INTERPOL, these modules educate stakeholders on the nature and consequences of corruption.

Since its establishment in 2007, EWS has refined and expanded its monitoring of the sports betting market. It has also extended its assistance to other sporting codes and leagues. For example, EWS was commissioned by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to monitor the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The company also provides consultation and support services to national football federations, as well as other sporting bodies, and is represented on FIFA’s internal Betting Integrity Investigation Task Force.

The IOC set up its own company, International Sports Monitoring (ISM) GmbH, based in Meilen, Switzerland, to monitor irregular betting patterns in 2009. The experience of the EWS monitoring the Beijing Games in 2008, despite the fact that no irregular betting patterns were detected, encouraged the IOC to create the ISM to help monitor qualifying competitions for Olympic events, as well as the main Games themselves. The ISM’s approach is similar to the EWS and other betting monitors, although it naturally has to monitor developments across a big range of sports.

Information-sharing systemsFollowing the London 2012 Olympics, the IOC’s Founding Working Group (FWG) on the fight against irregular and illegal betting finalised a set of recommendations to strengthen education, monitoring, exchange of information and intelligence, and legislation relating to match-fixing.

In May 2013, the FWG called for the creation of a permanent monitoring system based on the operation at the London 2012 Olympic Games. In London, the IOC and the UK Gambling Commission’s Sports Betting Intelligence Unit created a Joint Assessment Unit to monitor betting (see Carpenter, page 76). The new system could be used by international federations during major competitions to share information regarding suspicious betting activity. The FWG also called on national sports betting regulatory authorities to strengthen ties between themselves and with sports organisations and betting operators.

“Irregular and illegal betting attacks the very foundations of sport, and our efforts to combat the threat require the commitment of a number of important partners, specifically governments ... The setting up

of a common sports monitoring system still needs to be discussed by the Olympic Movement, but the work undertaken by the Founding Working Group is paving the way forward and we have made significant progress since our first meeting in 2011,” noted the former IOC President Jacques Rogge.

The FWG urged governments and sports organisations to adopt rules that are designed to combat irregular and illegal betting at all levels. Countries that had not yet done so were encouraged pass legislation modelled on the convention against the manipulation of sports competitions, which is currently being drafted by the Council of Europe. Specifically, the FWG:

■ urged states to create national platforms for the development, understanding and exchange of irregular betting-related information among national law enforcement agencies, betting regulators and operators, sports organisations and other national bodies;

■ recommended the creation of national betting authorities in states that do not yet have them;

■ encouraged crossborder cooperation between national betting authorities;

■ proposed a permanent betting monitoring system based on that used at London 2012;

■ pushed for an improved mechanism for the confidential reporting of match-fixing suspicions by athletes, officials and others; and

■ suggested the creation of a global forum on match-fixing and fraudulent betting in order to maintain a high level of awareness of the issues.

In November 2013, the IOC announced in a statement that it would “set up a special unit to coordinate efforts [on match-fixing and illegal betting]... This unit will work on risk prevention and the dissemination of information and will support the harmonisation of rules of the Olympic and sports movements. These rules will be based on examples from some of the international federations already working on this issue, such as FIFA, which has already applied severe sanctions.”

Since 2004, private, independent sport data provider, Sportradar, has been supplying organisations such as UEFA, the Confederation of North, Central American and Caribbean Association Football, the French Tennis Federation and German Handball League with betting monitoring services through its Fraud Detection System (FDS). In November 2013, Sportradar signed agreements with several other sports bodies, such as the Asian Football Confederation, and the English Rugby Football Union.

According to the company, the FDS uses betting information provided by over 350 betting organisations and gambling institutions on a 24/7 basis, and collates other market information and data that can be relevant to match-fixing. The Alerting System monitors the movement of odds on a pre-match and real-time basis, and can

track betting movements based on pre-set criteria. A deviation in expected odds can indicate that something suspicious has occurred. Such events are reported to the relevant association for investigation. The Fraud Scoring Database monitors high-risk individuals who may have some involvement in match-fixing, keeping track of the countries, leagues and clubs in which they operate. Their movements and signings are tracked so that new countries or associations can informed of their potential activities.

The Sportradar analysts working on the FDS have geographic and industry specialisms (for example betting exchange or state lottery experience) to cover the range of betting activity and patterns that may be suspicious. They also maintain extensive contacts with researchers and stakeholders who can provide them with local information on sports integrity. Furthermore, the team has developed relationships on an organisational level with sporting associations and law-enforcement agencies, both in

providing information to investigators and in learning more about the matrix of match-fixing and betting fraud.

An eye on the futureAll of the organisations discussed above have been created in the past decade, and their development has gone hand in hand with advances in information technology that have revolutionised the betting world, but have also led to a rise in betting fraud and match-fixing. The power of modern computing and communications means that data on irregular betting patterns can be shared, stored and analysed in near real-time, providing both betting operators and sports bodies with alerts to illicit activity. This data can also be compared with account profile information to track criminals and bring prosecutions. There remain, however, significant barriers to information exchange and the use of data in international investigations, and these need to be resolved at a governmental level.

It is likely that the betting monitoring sector will continue to evolve with sports organisations, betting operators and some independents such as Sportradar running monitoring operations. Recent statements by the IOC suggest that it will develop a significant operation to cover a range of sports and manage information exchange between stakeholders internationally, as well as in various sectors (such as police, national betting authorities, sports federations and betting operators). Given that the IOC and FIFA are seeking very similar solutions, it will be interesting to see how they work together.

David McCarthy is a freelance researcher focusing on sport integrity issues related to betting and match-fixing

Spikes in new accounts can indicate attempts to place fraudulent bets

FIFA President Sepp Blatter answers questions at a congress held by the Early Warning System company in April. EWS helps to protect FIFA’s tournaments from the potential threats of sports betting W

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Estonian authorities arrested 11 men in early December on suspicion of match-fixing. Eight were professional footballers from the Estonian clubs JK Narva Trans and JK Tallinna

Kalev, and had previously been suspended by their clubs on suspicion of match manipulation. The men are alleged to have fixed 17 matches in total during the 2011-12 season, including 13 Estonian league and cup matches, one Lithuanian league match and three Europa League games.

In the same week, charges were brought by UK police against several people on suspicion of involvement in betting fraud. At the time of going to press, four men had been charged: Singapore national Chann Sankaran, 33, and Krishna Sanjey Ganeshan, 43, who has dual UK and Singapore nationality, along with Michael Boateng and Hakeem Adelakun, both 22 and former Whitehawk FC players, were charged with conspiring together and with others “to defraud bookmakers by influencing the course of football matches and placing bets thereon”, according to the National Crime Agency in the UK.

Match-fixing cases underline need for new lawsChris Aaron reviews recent cases of match-fixing and the measures that may be introduced to help combat increasing corruption

The Daily Telegraph newspaper, which uncovered the fixing, reported claims that a lower-league match in England could be ‘fixed’ for £50,000. Betting monitors believe that millions of pounds have been wagered on non-league ties recently, out of all proportion to the normal level of interest in such matches.

Meanwhile, investigators in Austria say that 20 players have been questioned about allegations of fixing in at least 17 league matches since 2004, nine of them in the Austrian first division. Investigators say the players were questioned based on a list of footballers’ names obtained from two Albanians, who had previously been arrested for allegedly coordinating match-fixing. Some of the games are linked to Dominique Taboga, who was arrested in November for alleged attempts to manipulate games after he claimed former international Sanel Kuljic had talked him into match-fixing to settle a personal debt.

So what do these latest cases tell us about trends in match-fixing? Although the cases are all based around European football, we need to be careful about cause and effect. Football is obviously a target, as about

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70 per cent of betting is on football matches, and it is betting fraud that drives most manipulation. But more cases are turning up in Europe because authorities and governing bodies have upped their game; not to mention The Daily Telegraph, whose sting operation was apparently behind the latest UK arrests.

As fixing in European football becomes more difficult, the activity will displace to other regions and codes. In fact, this is already happening. In January 2013 FIFA’s head of security, Ralf Mutschke, estimated that “there are about 50 different national leagues outside Europe which are targeted by organised crime on the betting market”.

Suspicions of match-fixing have even surfaced around StarCraft video-game competitions, which are extremely popular in South Korea. So the nature of match-fixing should not be judged only by the tip of the European iceberg.

Lower-league vulnerability In the wake of the UK arrests, there was much talk about the vulnerability of lower leagues, where players are not so well paid and may therefore be more open to bribery.

Former Premier League chief executive Rick Parry said lower-level games were “relatively below the radar” and that it would be harder to fix a televised game, though no one should be complacent as match-fixing allegations “can very rapidly lead to a major loss of confidence”. While it makes sense that criminals trying to manipulate the results of games would seek lower-risk, less-expensive targets, it is worth remembering Calciopoli in Italy, where first division matches were manipulated, and the fixing in Germany in 2005 that affected second- and third-tier divisions. In these cases, referees were involved in organising the manipulation rather than players.

Match-fixing is generally a conspiratorial crime, and result manipulation for the purposes of betting fraud is a conspiracy every time. In each of the cases above, there is a connection between those trying to commit betting

fraud and someone who can manipulate the result of a game. Further linkages can spread on either side of this chain. On the betting fraud side, many chains now appear to stretch back to Asian organised crime, but this may change in future. On the fixing side, the chain can spread among teammates or through business colleagues.

In most cases, the central connection is based on greed (essentially bribery), however, there are other forms of influence and even intimidation that can help to forge the bond between fraudster and fixer. The nature of these connections needs more study in order to understand how criminals can lure players and officials. But all sports codes and leagues should also emphasise the importance of sharing suspicious approaches and reporting suspicious

activity. Such issues need to be handled carefully and there should be recommendations for best practice. Without them, individuals can be left feeling vulnerable to subversion or turn a blind eye.

Mutschke noted in early 2013 that an informant had told him: “Organised crime is moving out of the drug trade and getting involved in match-fixing because of low risk and high profit”. Similar patterns have been seen in the rise of human trafficking, another crime considered to be ‘low risk/high reward’. Betting fraud and fixing is even less of a risk for criminals as there is no product to transport, sell, have confiscated or be used in evidence. Activities can be shifted rapidly geographically and between the betting companies that are targeted for fraud; that flexibility is only limited by the time required to establish the relationships necessary to fix results and bets.

Given that this is essentially an ‘information crime’, the pathways to detection and prosecution also rely on information being available to authorities. In November 2013, Chris Eaton, Director of Sport Integrity at the ICSS, said in a BBC interview that there should be “a self-regulatory, cooperative approach from the totality of the sports betting industry, at a global level”. He went on to say that this should be underpinned by a data clearing house for the exchange of information between sports, betting and policing organisations, and might be based on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) model.

Changing legislationSports betting generates revenues of about €750 billion ($1 trillion) annually, Torbjorn Froysnes of the Council of Europe told politicians in Brussels in December 2013. Illegal betting is estimated to represent about a third of that. Froysnes told EU politicians that the Council of Europe agreement to help combat match-fixing should be ready for signing by September 2014, but that “in order to make the involvement of law enforcement agencies

possible, the criminalisation of some actions connected with match-fixing offences is essential”. This would mean changes to legislation and improved oversight arrangements in some EU member states.

According to Federbet, a Brussels-based body funded by the gambling

industry, more than 50 matches around the world were definitely fixed in the period August to November 2013, while another 150 games were ‘suspect’. Problems were particularly noticeable in Malta and Cyprus, Federbet told Brussels lawmakers, where “the great majority of matches are distorted by irregularities”. Lithuania and Latvia were also badly affected, and there had also been cases in Bulgaria, Sweden and Spain, according to Federbet. The organisation also cited cases in China, Indonesia and Georgia, and said the problem was not limited to football, but had also been observed in tennis, basketball and women’s volleyball.

Chris Aaron is the editor of the ICSS Journal

More cases are turning up because authorities have upped their game

Although football has seen the highest-profile cases of alleged match-fixing, other sports – including tennis, basketball and volleyball – have not been immune from suspicion

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Tackling the dangers of inactivity through sport Iain Lindsay notes the threat to public health from low levels of physical exercise in many populations around the world, and questions the efficacy of existing policy and initiatives, particularly those built around major sporting events

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Physical inactivity has been labelled the 21st century’s biggest threat to public health.1 While this assertion may seem to clash with images on television of mass participation in

marathons and an ample media diet of sporting events, the statistics paint the true picture.

According to the World Health Organization (WHO), in 2008, around one-third of the global adult population was insufficiently physically active, with 3.2 million deaths being directly attributable to inactivity. A highly visible consequence of this inactivity, combined with changes in diet, is the global obesity pandemic. International obesity levels have increased exponentially in recent decades, and are now responsible for up to 30 per cent of global deaths.2

The costs of obesity are enormous and growing: obese patients’ medical costs are, on average, 30 per cent higher than those of people with a normal weight. UK government figures reveal that, in England, treatment of health problems related to being overweight and obese cost around £5 billion ($4.2 billion) annually.3 The latest data available indicates that between 1993 and 2011, England has seen a marked increase in the proportion of adults that are obese: from 13 per cent (male) and 16 per cent (female) in 1993 to 24 per cent (male) and 26 per cent (female) in 2011, with childhood obesity levels even higher (31 per cent of boys and 29 per cent of girls)4.

Obesity has been likened to a “runaway train with no brakes”,5 with the underlying causes being decreasing levels of physical activity and the over-consumption of food.6 In 2013, the American Medical Association officially classified obesity as a disease – ensuring that increased focus will be placed upon both prevention and treatment. However, unlike other major causes of preventable death, such as HIV/AIDS or smoking, there are not currently any robust examples of populations within which this epidemic has been reversed through public health measures.

It must be acknowledged that obesity is by no means the only negative outcome of physical inactivity. Regardless of weight or body composition, physical inactivity has significant detrimental effects on lifespan,

disability, quality of life and work productivity, which combine to ensure the classification of physical inactivity as the fourth leading risk factor in global mortality today, according to the WHO. These outcome factors place significant burdens upon a country’s economy, as well as their population’s health, healthcare systems and national productivity. This reality must be considered when determining the most effective and cost-effective strategies to improve any nation’s economic and physical health.

Sporting mega events and public exerciseHosting sporting mega events is commonly considered an effective way of increasing physical activity through event-generated opportunities and increased motivation as well as inspiration. However, there is little evidence to support the belief that this has any sustainable impact on physical activity. This is due to the fact that elite sports legacies are by no means comparable to community activity and health legacies. This has been demonstrated in legacy evaluations of some recent Olympic Games – events that it was argued would be a means of increasing physical activity and health, for example:

■ Sydney 2000 – these Games had little impact upon physical activity participation among either Australian adults or Sydney residents;7

■ Athens 2004 – there is no evidence to support claims of increased levels of sport participation or activity in the long term; and8

■ Beijing 2008 – there is no clarity about whether the purported legacy benefits attributed to the hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games were academically or methodologically robust or generally applicable to other countries

Additionally, in 2013, an overview of systematic reviews that considered the best data currently available concluded that hosting an Olympic or Paralympic Games does not lead to tangible increases in physical activity or sports participation.9 Despite the lack of evidence, London 2012 was the first Olympic Games to explicitly combine

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Olympic hosting with specific physical activity targets. Organisers aimed to get two million more people active by 2012. These targets were officially dropped by the new British Coalition Government shortly after coming to power in 2010. Moreover, in December 2011, some seven months before the start of London 2012 Sport England released official figures that demonstrated only ‘111,000 more people ... [had participated] in sport since 2007’, just 11 per cent of the target they had been pursuing for the previous four years.

The most comprehensive indicator of sport participation currently available within the UK is the

annual national survey conducted by Sport England. The most recent results demonstrate that between April 2012 and April 2013, despite a surge immediately before the 2012 Games, there was an overall decrease in UK sports participation. These findings, along with all the other evidence cited above, indicate that strategies that depend upon Olympic events (and other major sporting events) to boost physical activity through increased sport participation are ineffective in the long term. The question therefore becomes how can sport in general, and major sporting events in particular, be used more effectively to increase participation rates?

In 2011, prior to the London Olympic Games, the UK Department of Health presented national recommendations relating to the volume, duration, frequency and type of physical activity required for general health benefits in a report entitled Start Active, Stay Active. This was aimed at the National Health Service, local authorities and other organisations that design services to promote physical activity. These were the first UK-wide published guidelines, intended to promote cohesion in advice within the country.

The report stated that everybody should aim to be active on a daily basis. For adults, 150 minutes per week is recommended, in bouts of at least 10 minutes, placing

emphasis upon overall amount as opposed to type, intensity or frequency of activity. Interestingly, it also recommended that children over the age of five engage in at least 60 minutes of moderate to vigorous physical activity on a daily basis. How can sport contribute to such targets?

The UK Department of Health states that increasing physical activity levels will directly contribute to the prevention and management of a number of diseases and provide significant physical and mental health benefits. Despite this increased focus, physical activity levels in the UK now fall well below expected targets. In England, only 40 per cent of males and 28 per cent of females met or exceeded these recommended levels of activity in 2011, and these figures decline with age.

Global capacity building is needed to formulate effective, local measures that governments and society at all levels can implement rapidly and at a low cost. The

failure of existing measures to reverse the trend of non-engagement suggests that a different approach is required; an approach that sets out to understand and address the reasons for physical inactivity. To these ends, there are currently a variety of local-level research programmes and global movements actively engaged in the development of new strategies that may demonstrate progressive thought.

One example of a local/national initiative is that currently being conducted by Brunel University in conjunction with Sport England. The Health and Sport Engagement (HASE) project aims to make a tangible contribution to national policy that will reduce the number of inactive people within the UK. It aims to accomplish this through a diverse range of innovative sport for health

projects that provide local opportunities for sustainable physical activity. The approach is based on the premise that innovative community sport projects can directly and sustainably contribute to physical activity engagement and beneficial health outcomes over the long-term. This capacity building method is based on the removal of barriers to participation, the introduction of educational programmes and the guided implementation of ‘sport for health’ initiatives in order to facilitate physical activity.10

Progress on an international levelOn an international level, some progress is being made by organisations such as GAPA – the advocacy council of the International Society of Physical Activity and Health (ISPAH). GAPA is arguing for the inclusion of a global target on physical activity in the WHO Global Strategy on Diet, Physical Activity and Health. It is thought that the inclusion of specific global targets will help facilitate large-scale national strategies to increase physical activity. The monitoring and surveillance of global targets, if adequately measured, would enable lessons to be learnt and policy to rapidly become more robust and efficient.

The problem remains that despite the large body of evidence proving the health benefits of physical activity, advice to improve health through physical activity is a relatively recent phenomenon, and its impact is negligible. It appears to be the norm that, despite the proliferation of communication attesting to the benefits of exercise and the consistent reminders of the costs of inactivity, the advice is ignored.

It is an extremely complex task to reduce inactivity levels when people are knowledgeable but remain unwilling to change their behaviours. Therefore, success in this field will require well-formed, but responsive, strategies that can overcome a variety of barriers to physical activity that exist within diverse local contexts around the world.

Dr Iain Lindsay works for the ICSS and Brunel University. His principal research focus is sport for socio-economic development, physical activity and mega-event analysis

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Minimal Hopes of Control, in The Journal of the Royal Society for

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3 www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-obesity-and-

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Many Accelerators, not Enough Brakes, in British Medical Journal,

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6 Wald, N. and Willett, W. Reversing the Obesity Epidemic, Lancet,

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7 Bauman, A., Ford, I. and Armstrong, T. Trends in Population

Levels of Reported Physical Activity in Australia, 1997, 1999 and

2000, Australian Sports Commision, Canberra, 2001

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Increase in Grassroots Sport Participation? in Savery J. and

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Illinois, 2011

9 Mahtani, K.R., Proteroe, J., Slight, S.P., Demarzo, M.M.P.,

Blakeman, T., Barton, C.A., Brijnath, B. and Roberts, N. Can the

London 2012 Olympics ‘inspire a generation’ to do more physical

or sporting activities? An Overview of Systematic Reviews, in

British Medical Journal, 2013, volume 3, no 1

10 Mansfield, L., Kay, T. and Anokye, N. The Health and Sport

Engagement (HASE) Project, proposal submitted for the Sport

England/National Lottery Get Healthy Get into Sport Awards, 2013

The American Medical Association has officially classified obesity as a disease

Guidelines from the UK’s Department of Health recommend that children do at least an hour’s moderate exercise a day

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In Brazil's case, the costs of hosting the 2014 FIFA World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro have exacerbated civil unrest. This reached boiling point during the summer of 2013, when

hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated during the FIFA Confederations Cup. While initial protests were sparked by a bus fare price increase, other issues soon emerged: the Brazilian government's apparent granting of tax breaks to FIFA; exclusion zones and special privileges being extended to commercial partners; concerns about cost over-runs on stadium construction projects; lack of investment in other public infrastructure; and general cynicism about corruption.

Similarly, Russia faces the challenge of hosting two of the world’s biggest sporting events in the next few years. While a Brazil-style street protest is unlikely, these events are already exposing Russia to wider public scrutiny. Though not directly connected to the staging of the 2014 Winter Olympics, some groups, organisations and countries have nevertheless called for teams to boycott the Games in response to Russia’s homosexuality laws. At the same time, Human Rights Watch has drawn attention to the treatment of construction workers and immigrants in Sochi, the host city of the Winter Olympics. Other civil liberties groups have highlighted the controls over communication that the Russian government is imposing; even social media channels are likely to be policed.

Russia has also become the target of Greenpeace activists in sport, with a recent UEFA Champions League match between FC Schalke 04 and FC Basel being stopped when protesters unfurled a banner protesting against Russian state oil corporation, Gazprom, and abseiled from the stadium roof down to the pitch. Schalke’s shirts are sponsored by Gazprom, which is also an official partner of the UEFA Champions League. The game was therefore used by the protesters to make a high-profile statement. Following another recent incident involving Greenpeace protesters and a Gazprom gas rig in the Arctic, several of the pressure group’s members were detained and charged.

All such protests and incidents increase the risks and uncertainties involved in the organisation and sponsorship of sporting events, but it is not only politics that is raising the stakes; criminality is also on the rise.

Match-fixing and sport-fixing scandals pose a threat to the general integrity of sport and specifically to sport’s

economic integrity and financial sustainability. There have been several notable incidents, of which Stephen Lee’s 12-year ban from snooker for match-fixing stands out. The stakes are not only rising for the fixers though, the pressure is increasingly on sport itself.

In October 2013, Puma ended its partnership with the South African Football Association (SAFA), following compelling allegations that SAFA had fixed games in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup, staged in South Africa itself. Despite the fact that Puma had been supplying equipment to SAFA for six years and is strategically committed to football in Africa, the company terminated the contract with immediate effect.

Such action is part of a growing trend, with ING, Nike, adidas and T-Mobile all withdrawing from or suspending deals with sports where there has been evidence of match-fixing or doping. While regulation and intervention can be one way of addressing matters of sporting corruption, market-led responses are becoming more prominent.

Governing sportSeveral governing bodies continue to grapple with issues pertaining to internal corruption and governance standards. The Union Cyclisme Internationale (UCI) in particular has had a difficult year. After the Lance Armstrong doping debacle, professional cycling’s reputation and its appeal as a commercial property suffered further following an incredibly fractious presidential election contest between incumbent Pat McQuaid and rival Brian Cookson. In the end, Cookson emerged as victor to become new president of the UCI. Stories have since emerged that within hours of his victory, Cookson ordered that UCI headquarters be sealed and the corporate investigation firm Kroll Associates be called in. It would now appear that a ‘root and branch’ internal investigation of cycling is taking place.

This is an interesting development: firstly for the way in which it could impact on cycling and its commercial contracts, and secondly for the engagement of Kroll. Rather than an incremental approach to changes in governance practice and procedures, Cookson seems to have taken a revolutionary and hard-line approach. Teams, sponsors and other sports governing bodies will be paying close attention to how that strategy plays out in the forthcoming months.

The future of sportOver the next six months, sport governing bodies will be watching anxiously to see how the Sochi Winter Olympics and the FIFA World Cup Brazil are received by sponsors and governments. Both events will test resilience, says Simon Chadwick


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