Scoping Study - Centre for Affordable Housing Finance Africa

Scopingstudy:GovernanceofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe

Contents

ScopingStudyGovernanceofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe

PreparedforUrbanLandMarkbyNelsonMarongwe,ShameMukotoandKudzaiChatiza

August2011


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Contents

Tables ..............................................................................................................................4Boxes ...............................................................................................................................5Maps................................................................................................................................5Images .............................................................................................................................5Abbreviationsandacronyms ............................................................................................61. BackgroundandcontextforunderstandingurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe ........71.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 71.2. Rationaleandobjectives.............................................................................................. 71.3 UrbanlandmarketsintheZimbabweancontext .......................................................... 81.4 HistoricalcontextofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe................................................. 91.5 UrbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe:overviewofissues ................................................ 11

1.5.1 Thelegalframeworkforurbanlandmarkets ................................................... 141.5.2 Thehousingsectorandurbanlandmarkets .................................................... 151.5.3 Nationalpoliticsandurbanlandmarkets......................................................... 17

1.6 Researchmethods ....................................................................................................... 181.6.1 Methodologyworkshop.................................................................................... 181.6.2 Primarydatacollection..................................................................................... 191.6.3 Secondarymethodsofdatacollection ............................................................. 201.6.4 Analysisbyexperts ........................................................................................... 20

1.7 Studyarea.................................................................................................................... 201.8 Studylimitations .......................................................................................................... 201.9 Chapteroutline............................................................................................................ 212. Zimbabwe’seconomicperformanceanditseffectonurbanlandandhousingmarkets..........................................................................................................................232.1 Realsectorperformance ............................................................................................. 232.2 Monetarysectorperformance .................................................................................... 242.3 Incomelevels,nationalsavingsandinvestments........................................................ 252.4 Availabilityoffinanceforlandacquisition,landdevelopment,housingdevelopmentandpurchasingofhouses ..................................................................................................... 27

2.4.1 Liquidityandfundingcrisis ............................................................................... 272.4.2 Recentsignsofrecoveryinresidentialpropertysales .....................................28

2.5 AsynopsisoffinancingopportunitiesinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets ............... 282.5.1 Centralgovernmentfunding.............................................................................282.5.2 Localauthorityinitiatives.................................................................................. 292.5.3 Self‐financingoflandpurchasesandpropertydevelopment........................... 292.5.4. Availabilityofmortgageloanstoindividuals .................................................... 302.5.5 Employer‐assistedhousing ..............................................................................302.5.6 InfrastructureDevelopmentBank ....................................................................312.5.7 Theplaceofbuildingsocieties..........................................................................31

2.6 Concludingremarks ..................................................................................................... 323. Institutionalactors,mandatesandoperationalchallenges ......................................333.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 333.2 Stateactorsintheurbanlandmarket ......................................................................... 33

3.2.1 Localgovernmentactors .................................................................................. 353.2.2 DeedsRegistryOffices ...................................................................................... 35


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3.3 Privatesectoractors .................................................................................................... 363.3.1 Institutionalinvestorsanddevelopers ............................................................. 363.3.2 Financialinstitutions......................................................................................... 37

3.4 Propertyprofessionals................................................................................................. 373.5 Civilsocietyorganisations............................................................................................ 38

3.5.1 DialogueonShelter .......................................................................................... 393.5.3 HousingPeopleofZimbabwe ...........................................................................393.5.4 Otherhousingcooperatives .............................................................................393.5.5 CivicForumonHousing .................................................................................... 39

3.6 Analysisofinstitutionalgaps ....................................................................................... 403.6.1 Unavailabilityofpublicinformationonlandtransactions................................ 403.6.2 Collationoflanddeliveryinformationandmanagementofinformation ........403.6.3 CentralisationoflandadministrationinHarareandBulawayo........................ 403.6.4 Lossofinstitutionalmemory ............................................................................413.6.5 Researchanddocumentationonurbanlandmarkets .....................................41

3.6 Concludingremarks ..................................................................................................... 414. InterrogatingthePlanningFrameworkanditsimpactonurbanlandmarkets........424.1 PreparationandimplementationofMasterPlans ...................................................... 424.2 Townplanningschemes .............................................................................................. 434.3 Developmentcontrolandplanningstandards ............................................................ 444.4 Subdivisionandconsolidationofland ......................................................................... 474.5 Importanceofreviewingplanninglegislation ............................................................. 484.6 Concludingremarks ..................................................................................................... 505. Performance,challengesandshortcomingsofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe ...515.1 LandandhousingdeliveryinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets................................... 515.2 Housingdeliveryapproaches....................................................................................... 60

5.2.1 Publicsectorhousingconstructionandlanddelivery ......................................615.2.2 National Housing Delivery Programme (Garikai /Hlalani Kuhle) .................... 625.2.3 The Homelink Housing Development initiative ............................................... 625.2.3 Civilsocietyinterventions................................................................................. 63

5.3 Realestate,valuationandpropertysalesinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets ......... 675.3.1 Sourcesoffinance............................................................................................. 695.3.2 Operationalchallengesfacedbythesalesandrealestatesector.................... 71

5.4 Disputesintheurbanlandmarketsector ................................................................... 735.4.1 Tenantandrental‐relateddisputes ..................................................................745.4.2 Fraudulentpropertytransactions.....................................................................765.4.3 Failedrepaymentofmortgageloans................................................................ 775.4.4 Inefficiencyinlandadministrationsystems...................................................... 77

5.5 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 786. InformallandmarketsinEpworthandHopleysettlementsinHarare.....................796.1 LandaccessmethodsinInformallandmarkets........................................................... 806.2 Landandpropertyrightsininformalsettlements....................................................... 816.3TheintersectionofinformalandformalactivitiesinEpworth ....................................... 836.4 Informalsettlements:aplaceforthepoor?................................................................ 866.5Discussion ....................................................................................................................... 886.6Conclusion ...................................................................................................................... 88


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7. LandandpropertyrightsregistrationinZimbabwe’surbanareas……………………….907.1 Introduction................................................................................................................. 907.2 ThehistoryoflandregistrationinZimbabwe.............................................................. 907.3 Typesofownershipofurbanland ............................................................................... 917.4 Theprocessofregisteringaproperty.......................................................................... 957.5 ThecentralroleoftheDeedsRegistryOfficeintheregistrationofpropertyrights .. 997.5 TheDeedsRegistryofficeanditsoperationalchallenges ......................................... 1007.6 Summaryofmajorchallengesfacedintheregistrationofproperty......................... 101

7.6.1 Recommendationsforimprovinglandregistrationsystems.......................... 1027.7 Concludingremarks ................................................................................................... 1038. ProposedprogrammeonurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe...................................1048.1 Synopsisofchallenges ............................................................................................... 1048.2 Programmecomponents ........................................................................................... 105

8.2.1 Planningpolicyandlegislativereviewprogramme ........................................1058.2.2 Tenureupgradingprogramme........................................................................1078.2.3 Localauthoritiesandlocalactorsprogramme ...............................................1098.2.4 Publicinformationanddialogueprogramme.................................................1108.2.5Researchprogrammeonurbanlandmarkets ................................................... 1118.3 Riskstoprogrammeimplementation ................................................................ 113

8.4 Concludingremarks ................................................................................................... 115References ...................................................................................................................116Annexure1:ListofparticipantsforthemethodologyworkshopongovernanceofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe19November2010,CASSTrustBoardroom,Harare ...........118

FiguresFigure1.1:Simplifiedconceptualframeworkforurbanpopulationandlandsupply

dynamics .............................................................................................................10Figure2.1:Realeconomicperformance(%changeyear‐on‐year).......................................24Figure2.2:Inflationtrend.....................................................................................................25Figure2.3:Sustaineddeclineinmortgagelending............................................................... 27Figure3.1:Actorsinasimplifiedlanddevelopmentprocess ............................................... 34Figure5.1:Standproductionbysectorandyear..................................................................52Figure5.2:Standdeliverybydifferentincomegroups......................................................... 55Figure5.4:ZimbabweHomelessPeople’sFederation......................................................... 66Figure5.5:Propertytransactionsforaparticularestateagentin2010bysettlementtype70Figure5.6:Sourcesoffinancingforhousepurchasesinhigh‐densityareas ........................ 71Figure6.1:Acontinuumoflandrightsinurbanareas ......................................................... 86Figure7.1Keystepsinthelandregistrationprocess ........................................................... 97

Tables

Table2.1:Percapitaincome,savingsandinvestments ....................................................... 26Table5.1:Standproductionbysectorbyyear .....................................................................52Table5.2:Publicsectorhousingproduction,1982‐2000 ..................................................... 61Table5.3:AidedSelf‐helpunderGarikai/HlalaniKuhle........................................................ 62


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Table6.1:IntersectionofinformalandformallandmarketsinEpworth ............................ 85Table7.1:Typesofsharesinablocksharesystem .............................................................. 92Table8.1:Summaryoftheplanningpoliciesandlegislativereviewprogramme ..............107Table8.2:Tenureupgradingprogrammeandservicingofinformalsettlements ..............108Table8.3:Governanceprogramme:strengtheningCouncils,localactorsandproperty

professionals......................................................................................................110Table8.4:Publicinformationanddialogueprogramme .................................................... 111Table8.5:Summaryoftheresearchprogrammeonurbanlandmarkets.......................... 113

Boxes

Box1.1–DirecthousingprovisionbytheStateinthe1980s:thecaseofZviZvobgo..........13Box1.2–UnprocedurallandallocationsinHarare:extractsfromtheSpecialInvestigations

CommitteeoftheCityofHarare ...........................................................................18Box3.1–FunctionsanddutiesoftheDeedsRegistryOffice ............................................... 35Box4.1–Newnationalhousingstandardsforurbanareas ................................................. 46Box6.1–LandaccessmethodsinEpworth..........................................................................81Box6.2–AtypicalinformalsettlementinHopley ............................................................... 83Box6.3–Landaccessandpropertyrightsissuesinthepost‐2000informalsettlementsin

Epworth ................................................................................................................. 83Box7.1–Documentsrequiredtoregisterproperty............................................................. 98Box7.2–Costsandpaymentsinpropertyregistration........................................................ 99

Maps

MAP1A–Settlementsbyland‐usetypeinGreaterHarare ................................................. 22

Images

Image5.1–MainwayMeadowsmedium‐densityhousingdevelopmentinWaterfalls,Harare ............................................................................................................... 54

Image5.2–KuwadzanaPhase3low‐income/highdensityhousingdevelopmentproject 56Image5.3–ProjectinDzivaresekwaundertheParallelDevelopmentPolicy...................... 58Image5.4–High‐densityhousingdevelopmentbyaCooperativeinDzivaresekwa

ExtensionHararethatbenefitedfromtheParallelDevelopmentPolicy ..........59 Acknowledgements: Cover photos by Sokwanele – Zimbabwe, from www.flickr.com/photos/sokwanele/3606485561/sizes/o/in/photostream and www.flickr.com/photos/sokwanele/3661779781/sizes/l/in/photostream, used here under a creative commons attributionnoncommercialsharealike licence


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Abbreviationsandacronyms

CSO CivilSocietyOrganisation

CASSTrust CentreforAppliedSocialSciencesTrust

CBZ CommercialBankofZimbabwe

GDP GrossDomesticProduct

ELB EpworthLocalBoard

GOZ GovernmentofZimbabwe

HPZ HousingPeopleofZimbabwe

IDBZ InfrastructureDevelopmentBankofZimbabwe

IMF InternationalMonetaryFund

MDC MovementforDemocraticChange

NHDP NationalHousingDeliveryProgramme

NHF NationalHousingFund

NHGF NationalHousingGuaranteeFund

NHLF NationalHousingLoanFund

NGO Non‐GovernmentalOrganisation

NSSA NationalSocialSecurityAuthority

RBZ ReserveBankofZimbabwe

RTCPAct Regional,TownandCountryPlanningAct

SAFLII SouthernAfricanLegalInformationInstitute

UN UnitedNations

ZANUP.F. ZimbabweAfricanNationalUnionPatrioticFront

ZHPF ZimbabweHomelessPeople’sFederation

ZLR ZimbabweLawReport

ZIMRA ZimbabweRevenueAuthority

ZINAHCO ZimbabweNationalAssociationofHousingCooperatives


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1. Backgroundandcontextforunderstandingurbanlandmarketsin Zimbabwe

1.1. Introduction

Thisreportfollowsascopingstudyonurban landmarkets inZimbabwe.WithafocusonHarare,thestudy interrogatesthegovernanceofurban landmarkets inthecountry.Keyquestions for the study included investigating the actors in Zimbabwe’s urban landmarkets,thetypesofurbanlandmarketsthatexistandhowthepoorparticipateinthem,andhow thegovernanceofurban landmarketshas changed in relation to the changingeconomic, social and political situation in the country. In responding to these keyquestions, the study interrogated the framework governing planning and landadministrationZimbabwe.

Inrelationtoplanning,thestudy investigatedthe impactsof landdeliveryprocessesanddevelopment control on the operation of urban land markets. The investigation of thecountry’s land administration system informed the studyon the registrationof propertyrightsandthechallengesthispresentstotheoperationofurbanlandmarkets.Examiningthe extent towhich urban landmarketswereworking for the poorwas an overarchingfocusofthestudy.

Targetingbothformalandinformalurbanlandmarkets,thescopingstudyfocusedontheperiod after independence. Without losing sight of the country’s colonial past and theexperienceofthe1980s,thestudyfocusesonthelast20years.Overall,theanalysisshedslight on institutional challenges that constrain the smooth functioning of urban landmarkets.Thestudyhighlightschallengesandopportunitiesasabasis forpossibleactionsneededtostrengthentheperformanceandgeneralresponsivenessofurbanlandmarkets,particularlytotheneedsoftheurbanpoor.Thestudyacknowledgesthemultiplepressuresthatinfluencethefunctioningofurbanlandmarkets,includingincreasinglevelsofpoverty,particularly over the last decade,which have exertedpressure on the systems inheritedfrompre‐independenceandprogressivelyadaptedsincethen.

1.2. Rationale and objectives

InDecember2010,UrbanLandMarkcommissionedresearchersattheCentreforAppliedSocialSciences(CASS)TrusttoundertakeascopingstudyonthegovernanceofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe,usingHarareasacasestudy.Thestudy’sspecificobjectiveswereto:

ProvideabackgroundreportonurbanlandmarketgovernanceinZimbabwethatcouldcontributetotheregion’sbodyofknowledgeonurbanlandmarkets.

Identify opportunities for work to make urban markets work better for the poor inZimbabwe.

Investigateandidentifyopportunitiesforpracticalpartnershiporotherengagementbyorganisations working in this field with Zimbabwean partners or internationalorganisationsbasedinZimbabwe.

Identifyriskstobetakenintoaccountwhenundertakingworkinthisarea.


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Identify synergies, potential alignment and opportunities for co‐funding with otherprocesses.

Proposeapotential five‐yearprogrammeofworkwhichcouldcontributetothemoreeffective functioning of Zimbabwe’s urban land markets, with a broad costing ofimplementationandforeachcomponentoftheprogramme.

ThefirstthreeobjectivesofthestudyareaddressedinChapters1to7ofthisreportwhilethelastthreeobjectivesareaddressedinChapter8.

1.3 Urban land markets in the Zimbabwean context

Theinteractionofbuyersandsellersoflandandpropertyandtheaccompanyingprocessesofregisteringpropertyiswhatthisstudydefinesasalandmarket,withrentalmarketsanintegral sub‐sector of such land markets. Urban land markets encompass an array offunctions,fromlandalienationtoregulation,enjoymentandtransferoftherightstosuchlandandcompleteddevelopments.

Accesstoanduseofurbanlandisregulatedbydefinedrulesandismediatedbymultipleorganisations.Where such interaction iswith formal state andduly registerednon‐stateprivateorcivilsocietyorganisations,themarketcanbedefinedasaformalone.However,interactionalsooccursthroughindividualisedorcommunity‐basedsystemswithoutformalaccordance of ownership rights to land accessed in this manner. Such interaction isregarded as occurring in informal landmarkets, andhappensmainly in settlements thatare established without direct or full involvement of formal state and non‐stateorganisations,or in settlementsyet tobe fully regularised. In thecontextofZimbabwe’surban areas, formal landmarkets accord legally binding and enforceable property rightsmainly through central and local government administrative structures. Informal landmarkets accord land rights ofwhich the enforcement or validation is basedon social orcommunitysystemsofkinshipandotherformsoflocalknowledge.

In making the distinction between formal and informal land markets, UN‐HABITATobserved: “Generally,urbandevelopment that comeswithin thepurviewofa state landadministrationsystemandcomplieswithits legalandregulatoryrequirementsis labelledformal and all development that does not comply with one or another requirement isconsidered informal” (UN‐HABITAT, 2009:47). The best‐known informal settlement inZimbabweisEpworth.Asfarbackasthe1980s,thestatehasmadesignificantattemptstoformalisethesettlementthroughanupgradingprogrammewhereplanningandnon‐titlesurveyswereinitiated.Subsequently,theEpworthLocalBoard(ELB)wascreatedtotackleland administration.Whilst the Board has spearheaded the re‐planning process and thedevelopmentofaregisterfortheresidents,suchformalisation isonlypartiallycomplete,withmanyothertransactionsbeingdoneinformally.Moreover,somesectionsofEpworthqualifytobeclassifiedasformal,whileothersremaininformal.

Anothernewdevelopmentthatsurfacedinthepost‐2000periodisthatthestate,largelymotivatedbypoliticalconsiderationsbutpartiallytoaddresslandsupplybottlenecks,hascreatedsettlementsofmarginalformality.Inthisregard,thepresenceofthestate(i.e.itsformal institutions) becomes an inadequate indication that a particular settlement isformal,asnotallstatelandadministrationsystemsarebeingadheredto.Forthepurposesof this study, settlements thatdonot comply fullywith the requirementsof formal land


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markets are categorised as informal settlements and thus transactions in thosesettlementsdepictinformalurbanlandmarkets.

1.4 Historical context of urban land markets in Zimbabwe

Starting from the colonial period and continuing into the post‐independence period,transactions in land and other forms of property in Zimbabwe’s urban areas were, ingeneral, undertaken through formal land markets. A common feature of the country’smainurbanareasisthattheywereestablishedduringthecolonialperiod.Byandlargeandforracialreasons,thecitiesandtownswerelocatedinthemidstofprivatelyowned,large‐scale commercial farmland. Regulated by the powerful Regional Town and CountryPlanning (RTCP) Act and theUrban Councils Act, the development of Zimbabwe’s urbanareaswasguidedbyformaltownplanning,surveyingandlandregistrationprocesses.

Guided by the same town planning and development standards, the post‐independencegovernmentdidnotpermit thedevelopmentofslumsor informalsettlements invariousparts of towns and cities (Zinyama, 1995). Essentially, the new government stronglyopposed the development of unauthorised/informal settlements within urban areas.Consequently, squatter settlements were generally destroyed wherever they appeared(Zinyama,1995).

The system for establishing and governing Zimbabwe’s urban areas has generally beenfraught with bottlenecks, as it was originally initiated to meet the needs of a smallpopulation (see Figure 1.1, Era 1).With independence and the growing permanency ofurban settlement amongst indigenous Zimbabweans, more demand than it could copewithwasplacedontherestrictivesystem.Theadherencetohighplanningstandardsandformalitycreatedlandsupplybottlenecksandcameatacost,asbothgovernmentandtheprivatesectorfailedtomeet,inparticular,thehousingneedsandspacerequirementsforundertakingeconomicactivitiesinarapidlyexpandingpopulationandinformalsector(seeFigure1.1,Eras2and3).

Evidence of such failurewas seen in a growing informal sector and the development ofillegalextensions in thecountry’s low‐incomeresidentialareas (commonlyreferredtoashigh‐densityareas), a condition that thecentral governmentcondoneduntil 2005when,overnight, government launched the Cleanup Campaign (or Operation Murambatsvina)(UN‐HABITAT, 2005). The costs of land acquisition were prohibitive and ultimatelypresentedthegreatestconstrainttolandsupply.


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Figure1.1:Simplifiedconceptualframeworkforurbanpopulationandlandsupplydynamics

UrbandevelopmentinZimbabwethroughthepre‐1980periodexhibitedafalseefficiencyin terms of land delivery, since demandby black Zimbabweanswas suppressed throughlegal instruments (e.g. the Pass Laws) and in termsof the developmentmodel thatwasapplied.However,theremovalofsuchrestrictionstoblacklandownershipandpermanenturbanresidencyafter independencesawasurge indemandthatoutstripped landsupplybytheearly1990s(Era3).Landsupplyresponsesremainedguidedbypre‐independencegrowthprojectionsanchoredinsimilarlypre‐independencelegislationandpractice.Thus,the inherited frameworkgoverned landacquisition forurbandevelopment,planninganddevelopment control until the radical land reforms of the post‐2000 period, commonlyknownas Fast Track land reform1. Although land supplyhas improved,demand remainshigher, creating a significant supply gap. This simplified representation of the dynamicinteraction between urban population growth and urban land supply informs thediscussioninthisreport,particularlyasthishasshapedthestructureandperformanceoftheurbanlandmarketinHarareandelsewhere.

Inresponsetothechangingpoliticalclimateandthenewdevelopmentdictateswhichsawthe emergence of a strong opposition political party, the post‐2000 period sawgovernment promoting the development of informal settlements. With the centre ofpower still located in the liberationwar‐basedZANUP.F. andallied structures, even thenewlycreatedGovernmentofNationalUnityhasincreasinglymovedtoformaliseactivitiesinsuch informalsettlements.Whilstsuchanapproachcanbeviewedasprogressiveandwithin the realms of creating inclusive cities (see UN‐HABITAT, 2009), the thinking andpoliticalimperativesmotivatingsuchactionwerebeyondthescopeofthisstudy.However,what is evident is that the ingredients of informality have increasingly penetrated theoperationof formal urban landmarkets.Notably, andunlike theexperienceof East andWest Africa, the State and its regulatory framework have remained both present andvisibleinZimbabwe’sinformalsettlements.

1FastTracklandreformwaslaunchedbytheGovernmentofZimbabweintheyear2000.Initially,thelandoccupations‐drivenprocess targeted the acquisitionof large‐scale commercial farms for settlement for agricultural purposes.Overtime, thescopeof theprogrammewasbroadenedto includetheacquisitionof land inurbanandperi‐urbanareas forurbandevelopmentpurposes.

Era 1 (Pre 1980) Era 3

(1990-2000) Era 4 (Post 2000)

Land supply Pop growth (demand)

Time

Era 2 (1980s)


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Notwithstanding the above, the state and form of urban land markets are largelydeterminedbytheoperationofformalsystems.Thusmostoftheparametersthatgovernthe operation of urban landmarkets are prescribed in policy and legislation. Shaped byhistory,thetypeofactorsinvolvedandthetypeoflandandpropertyrightsapplicableinurbanlandareclearlydefined.

Ashasbeenthecasewithallothersectorsoftheeconomy,thefunctioningofurbanlandmarketshasbeenaffectedbytheeconomicdeclinethatstartedfromthe late1990sandintensified in thepost‐2000period (seethediscussion inChapter2).Theeconomiccrisiswascharacterisedbysteeplevelsofinflationwhichpeakedat11.2‐millionpercentin2008(UNDP, 2008). A sharp depreciation of the Zimbabwe dollar against major tradingcurrencies forced repeated redenomination cycles to lop off ‘accumulating zeros.’FollowingtheadoptionoftheFastTracklandreform,questionswereraisedinZimbabweandabroadoverthecountry’scommitmenttothe‘ruleoflaw’.Compoundedbyeconomicdecline,arrearswithinternationalfinancialinstitutionsandoftenviolentlandreforms,theloss of rule of law led to Zimbabwe’s regional and international isolation. Consequently,the country became isolated from mainly the western countries and their alliedinstitutions, especially theWorld Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF). Thiscreated funding bottlenecks, which in turn affected the performance of urban landmarkets.Astheeconomicmeltdowncontinued,themultiplepressuresassociatedwiththisultimately affected the functioning of urban land markets. With the weakening ofinstitutions(UNDP,2008),lessemphasiswasplacedonadherencetopolicyandlegislativeprescriptions.Inresponsetotheworld‐recordhyper‐inflationlevels,newformsofbusinesstransactionshaveemerged,aswellasnew formsof interactionbetween formaland infIassumewewouldnotbepostingtheormallandmarketsinurbanareas.

1.5 Urban land markets in Zimbabwe: overview of issues

ThelegacyofcoloniallegislationandurbandevelopmentpolicyshapedthecharacterandformofZimbabwe’scitiesandtownsinthepost‐independenceperiod.Thustheinheritedurban structure and the functioning of urban development and urban managementsystemsoriginatedfromraciallybased,urbansettlementpolicies.Thepracticethenwastocreate separate residential areas for the black majority, with African townships beingcreated far away from the city centre and the European areas (Chikowore, 1993).Restrictive labour lawsmeant that thenativepopulation couldnotmove freely into theurban areas, curtailing their participation in urban land markets (Zinyama andWhitlow1986, Patel, 1988). Planning standardswere high in the European areas,with plot sizespegged at not less than one acre in residential areas where sewerage disposal was byseptic tank (ibid).Mostof theoperational townplanning tools,especially legislationandzoninginstrumentsliketownplanningschemesinZimbabwe’smajorcitiesandtownswereestablished during the colonial period. The inherited town planning framework andassociated planning standards have created numerous bottlenecks associated with thelanddeliveryprocesstodate.

WiththeformerEuropeanareasandAfricantownshipsevolvingintolow‐densityandhigh‐densityresidentialareas,respectively,thecontrastingspacedemandsforthetwotypesofsettlementscontinuedintopost‐independenceZimbabwe.Thesegmentednatureofurbanland markets is an important determinant of land prices, with income levels being thedeciding factor onwho participates (as buyers) in urban landmarkets in the respective


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localities. Planning and land delivery for residential areas has continued to follow thepatternofseparateareasforhigh‐density(low‐income),medium‐density(middle‐income)and low‐density (high‐income) residential areas. In this regard, the place of the poor inZimbabwe’s urban landmarkets – in terms of land availability for residential and small‐scaleeconomicactivities–isunderstoodtobelocatedinthehigh‐densityareas.

Followingtheattainmentofpoliticalindependencein1980,thedemandforhousingunits,particularly for the low‐income groups, mounted. For a long time, planning anddevelopmentstandardsremainedpitchedatalevelthatwasbeyondthereachofthepoor.Allthesame,asignificantproportionoftheemergingnationwaslessenthusiastictowardsloweringplanningandhousingstandards,preferringtoabidebythesamelivingstandardsintroducedby thecolonial government (seeBox1.1).With limited fundingavailable, thegovernment increasingly provided for fewer housing units for the poor. Zinyama (1995)reportsthatlow‐incomegroupsrespondedtotheshortageofhousingandtheirinabilitytoconstruct informal housing in twomajorways. First, they took advantage of the 1980s’homeownershipschemestoextendtheir ‘new’properties toaccommodatemorepeopleas rent‐paying lodgers. This however, required planning permission from the localauthority.Secondly,andrelatedtotheabovedifficultiesassociatedwithgettingplanningpermission homeowners started to build illegal structures thatwere then rented out tolodgers.Thisbecamethemaincauseofsevereovercrowding inthehigh‐densityareas,asituationthatgaverisetotheconditions that theCleanupCampaignsoughttoeliminate(UN‐HABITAT,2005).

In addition to the escalating demand for residential properties in the post‐1980 period,therewas a shortage of office accommodation as a result of the increased demand forspacebydiplomats,otherinternationalagenciesandprivatecompanies.Theconstructionindustry expanded as new properties were constructed for commercial, industrial andresidentialusepurposes.Forthehousingsector,blocksofflats,townhousesforrentalandstand‐alone houses on a rent‐to‐buy basis were constructed by institutional investors,government and aid agencies, especially USAID (Kuipa, 2006). In essence, the country’surbanlandmarketsweresettoexpandandbecomemoreactive.Animportantfeatureoftheearly1980swasthecriticalshortageofresidentialaccommodation,asituationwhichwas then abused by landlordswho charged exorbitant rents and evicted tenants atwill(Kuipa, 2006). In essence, this formed the basis for the enactment of the Rent ControlRegulations of 1982, an instrument that would in the end drive investors away frominvestinginthehousingsector(ibid).


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Box1.1–DirecthousingprovisionbytheStateinthe1980s:thecaseofZviZvobgo

Atindependencein1980,urbanareasinZimbabwe,particularlyHarare,wereconfrontedwithpopulationinfluxintotheirperi‐urbanareas.Theinfluxhadbegunattheheightoftheliberationstruggleasruralareasbecameincreasinglyunsafe.Twomajorsettlements,EpworthandChirambahuyo(StMary’sareainChitungwiza)thathadsprungupinthe1960s,illustratethistrendquitevividly.WhileforEpworthin‐situupgradingwasthemajorstateresponsetotheovercrowdedandhaphazardsettlement,inthecaseofChirambahuyothestaterazedthesettlementandrelocateditsresidentstopartsofChitungwiza.

Aninsignificantproportionoftheoriginalsettlersbenefitedfromin‐situupgrading.ThoserelocatedtoChitungwizawereallocatedstate‐providedultra‐low‐costhousingunitsinUnitsN,OandP,intheSekesectionoftheChitungwizaMunicipalarea.Chirambahuyowasbulldozedin1981andthefirstareawhereultra‐low‐costunitswereestablishedwasUnitN,where1661unitswerebuilt.Theunitsweretwo‐roomedhouseson200m2standswithatoiletandakitchensinkin‐betweentherooms(Schlyter,2003).Thehouseswereallocatedtopeopleonarent‐to‐buybasis,managedbytheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandHousing.

Becauseofthesmallsizeoftheunits,thematerialsusedtoconstructthestructures2andthestandsonwhichtheywerebuilt,thehouseswerederidedas‘match‐boxes’.Theyinformallybecameknownas‘zviZvobgo’afterZimbabwe’sfirstLocalGovernmentandHousingMinister.Suchunfavourableevaluationbybeneficiariesandotherstakeholderswaslargelyareflectionofhighpost‐independenceexpectationswhereZimbabweanswerelookingforwardto‘suburbia.’Thecriticismsofthe‘zviZvobgo’forcedapolicyrethinkintermsofminimumstandsizes(reviewedto300m2)andgaveimpetustosite‐and‐servicesschemessothatindividualhouseholdswouldbuildhomesoftheirchoice.Assuch,thissawapartialabandonmentoflarge‐scaledirectstateprovisionofhousinguntiltheadventofGarikai/HlalaniKuhleafter2005.Becausemostbeneficiariesofthe‘zviZvobgo’wereformersquatterswithlittleincome,paymentswereslowanderratic.Thisresultedinanincreasing‘crowdingout’ofthepoorastheunitswerebeingsold.

Source: Summarised from various documents; authors

Ingeneral,Zimbabwehaswell‐developedurban landmarkets,withtransactionscoveringallformsofproperty,especiallyresidential,industrialandcommercialproperty.Giventhedominanceof formal landmarkets, thekeyactors involved includeplanning institutions,land and property registration institutions, property professionals (conveyancers andestate agents), financial institutions and the general public (as buyers and lessees ofproperty)(seethemoredetaileddiscussionofactorsinurbanlandmarketsinZimbabweinChapter3ofthisreport).

Generally,acommonfeatureofthepropertymarketistheextenttowhichgovernmentsinterfere with “market mechanisms and the allocation of property interests betweendifferentusers”(BalchinandKiere,1977:76).InZimbabwe,thehousingsectorasaformofinvestment isprone togovernmentcontroland the trend is for institutional investors toprefer less involvement inthatsector (Kuipa,2006).ThroughRentRegulationsandotherformsof governmentdirectives, interventionby theZimbabweangovernmenthashadamore intense effect on the supply of rented accommodation than any other type ofproperty(Kuipa,2006).Asdiscussedinothersectionsofthisreport,therehasbeenasteepdecline in institutional investment in the sector as a result of such government control(ibid).

2Prefabricatedmaterials(cementreinforcedbywiremesh)


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1.5.1 The legal framework for urban land markets

The legal framework governing the operation of urban land markets includes Acts ofParliament, statutory instruments, government policy documents and Ministerialdirectives. The principal legislation relevant to the operation of urban land marketsincludes theRegionalTownandCountryPlanningAct (RTCPAct)andtheUrbanCouncilsAct (for landdelivery), theLandSurveyAct (for title survey),and theDeedsRegistryActandtheDerelictLandsAct(fortheregistrationofpropertyrights).Intermsofgovernmentpolicies and directives, the land policy, the national housing policy, the policy onincrementalandparalleldevelopmentandotherMinisterialdirectivesaffectingaccesstoland by different actors are key instruments that govern urban land markets. ThesignificanceoftheRegionalTownandCountryPlanningActisdiscussedinChapter4ofthisreport.TheDeedsRegistryActisdiscussedinChapter7,whichdealswiththeregistrationofpropertyrightsinZimbabwe’surbanareas.

Land Survey Act

TheLandSurveyActprovideslegislationrelatingtothesurveyoflandinZimbabwe.Itisanimportant piece of legislation because it applies to any survey used for the purpose ofeffectingtheregistrationofanylandintheDeedsRegistryanditisbindingontheStateinrespect of unalienated State land. Chapter 7 gives an elaborate discussion of the landSurveyAct and theprocesses involved in thepreparationofdiagramsandgeneralplansthatarecriticaldocumentsinthelandregistrationprocess.

Derelict Lands Act

This piece of legislation provides for instances where the former owner of immovablepropertycannotbefoundtosignthepowerofattorneydespiteadiligentsearch.Heorshemayhavemigratedorleftthejurisdictionaftercompletionofthesalebutbeforetransferwaseffectedandregistered.TheremedyintermsoftheDerelictLandsActistomakeanapplication showing that the applicant complied with all his obligations in terms of theagreement of sale and requesting the court to order registration of transfer to theapplicant. The application is made on the basis that the applicant cannot obtainregistration in his/her name because of the death,mental incapacity, insolvency and/oralternatively absence in the jurisdiction of Zimbabwe of the person inwhose name theproperty is registered. Apart from attaching affidavit(s), the agreement of sale and anyotherdocumentaryevidencemaybeattached.Ifthecourtissatisfied,theapplicationmaybe granted. The order granted should then be lodgedwith the Deeds Registry togetherwithproofofpaymentofalltaxesandduties.InthistransferthereisnoappearerandtheRegistrar’sofficepreparesthedocuments.

Consumers Contract Act

InZimbabwe,intermsofSection1oftheConsumerContractsAct,allsaleoflandmustbeinwritingintheformofamemorandumofagreementofsale.Furtherdiscussiononhowthis legal provision affects property sales and the registration of property rights ispresentedinChapter7.

Urban Councils Act

The Urban Councils Act is relevant in the operation of urban land markets throughprovisionsrelatingtoplanning,registrationofpropertyrights,thesaleofpublic landand


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the change of land‐use reservation. Further, it is necessary to lodge a rates clearancecertificatewhentransferring immovablepropertyonwhichratesare levied(alsorefertothediscussioninChapter7).Section152oftheUrbanCouncilsActisparticularlyimportantwhen selling public land and changing the land‐use reservation of planned land. In thepost‐2000periodwithitsslackeningofprofessionalstandards3,unproceduralmeanshavebeen used to dispose of public land (see the discussion in the latter sections of thischapter).Thus,non‐observanceoftheprovisionsofSection152isonetest‐caseofhowthegovernanceofurbanlandmarketshasbeeninterferedwith.

Capital Gains Tax Act

WitheffectfromAugust1981, intermsoftheCapitalGainsTaxAct,taxischargeableonthe capital gain made on the disposal of immovable property. Capital gains tax is apercentageof the residual value aftermakingdeductions from the gross selling priceofcertainallowancesandinflationaryadjustments.Itisnecessarytounderstandtheroll‐overprovisions of the Capital Gains Tax Act (also refer to the discussion in Chapter 7). Forinstance,whenan individual sellswhat isdescribedas thePrincipalPrivateResidence inordertobuyanother,taxisdeferred–thereisnocapitalgain.Deceasedestatetransfersdonotattractcapitalgainstax.Wherethepropertyisbeingtransferredbetweenspouses,taxcanbedeferred.However,donationsattractcapitalgains tax. It is important tonotethat salesbya landdeveloperattract income tax,not capital gains tax. Inall suspensivesalesorsaleofproperty in instalments,thecapitalgainstax iscalculatedandpayablebymonthly instalments. There are other instances where property is transferred but notpursuant to a sale. Such transactions are referred to as deemed sales, for example,donations,expropriations,salesinexecutionofacourtorder,etc.CapitalGainsTaxisstillpayableonthesetransactions.

1.5.2 The housing sector and urban land markets

Ingeneral,thehousingsectordominatesthevolumeoftransactionsinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets.TheplaceofthepoorinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarketsisoftendiscussedinrelationtothehousingneedsofthisvulnerablesectionofthepopulation.Inaddition,thepoorneed landand shelter for supporting theireconomicalactivities. Zimbabwe’surbanpopulation is estimatedat 4.456millionpeople (MinistryofNationalHousing and SocialAmenities,2010),growingatarateof5%to7%perannum.Thishasplacedtremendouspressureonthehousingsector,whichhasbeenunder‐performingforalongperiod.Thus,by 2003, there had been a decline in housing provision in urban areas, from an annualaverageofbetween15000and20000unitsduringtheperiod1985to1995toameagre5000unitsin2000(MinistryofLocalGovernment,PublicWorksandUrbanDevelopment,2006:2). Against an urban housing backlog of over one million stands, the householdoccupancy rate forhigh‐ tomedium‐density residentialareas increased to12peopleper200m2stand,upfromastandardofsixpeople(ibid).

Themajordebateonfactorsinfluencinghousingdeliveryiscentredontheroleofthestateandthetypeofmodelsusedtodeliverhousing.Inthecolonialperiod,Zimbabweanurban

3 The slackeningof professional standardsoccurs in different forms. For instance, theweakened state institutions areunderstaffed and under‐resourced, eroding the capacity of such actors to enforce standards as dictated by law andpolicy. In other instances, ‘the new culture’ of the post‐2000 period has seen property professionals flout standingproceduresthatregulatetheoperationofurbanlandmarkets.


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areasprovidedhousingtoemployedpeoplemainlyinsinglesquarters(Auret,1995).Basedon a blue‐print approach, the state (central and local) directly constructed andadministeredhousing.Beneficiariespaidmonthly rentalsanddidnotownthepropertiestheyresided in. InHarare,oldsectionsof low‐income(high‐density)neighbourhoods likeMbare, Mabvuku, Tafara, Dzivarasekwa and Mufakose were established based on thisapproach.

With global trends increasingly recognising housing as a key social and economic right,housing delivery approaches based on state‐supported self‐help programmes with fullownershiponcompletionofasuperstructurebecameprominent.Thestateprovidedlandand housing subsidies (as opposed to direct housing construction and allocation tocitizens), upgraded slums or squatter settlements and generally recognised the informalsector.Beneficiariescouldnotonlyexpect tobeallocatedacompletedhousebutalsoasemi‐developedplotonwhichtheywouldputuptheirownsuperstructureusingtheirownor borrowed resources. Examples of the application of this delivery model in Harareinclude Kuwadzana, Warren Park, Budiriro, Glen Norah and Glen View (beforeindependence)andGlenNorahC(post‐independence).

Underthesite‐and‐serviceprogrammes, internationaldevelopmentorganisationsliketheWorld Bank and USAID participated in leveraging trunk infrastructure development andmortgage financing. At the same time, community and work‐place cooperatives startedparticipating in housing delivery, a typical example being the cooperatives supported byHousing People of Zimbabwe that started in 1992. The post‐independence period alsowitnessedgovernment’sadoptionof thehomeownershippolicywheremostof thepre‐independence rental housing stock was sold to sitting tenants. The policy gave a newimpetustohomeowning,whichbefore independencewas limitedtoa fewZimbabweansandwastiedtomunicipalgovernance,asthosewithouturbanpropertycouldnotvote.

AnothermajorhousingdeliverymodelcurrentlybeinginstitutionalisedinZimbabweistheenabling approach, which gained prominence globally in the late 1980s. The approachemphasises private sector participation in housing development without necessarilyexcluding public sector provisions and assisted self‐help. The approach seeks to steermulti‐actor approaches guided by sound urban management where the state reducesparticipation in direct provision to avoid market distortion, and offers a suitableinstitutional macro‐economic framework within which other actors seek and pursuestrategicopportunities.

Thedominanttoolusedintheallocationofhousingandstandsbycentralgovernmentandlocalauthorities is thewaiting list.Thewaiting list isa recordofhomeseekersregisteredwiththeappropriateauthority.An important requirement foronetobeadmittedtothewaitinglistisproofofemploymentorincome.So,effectively,theverypoordonotqualifytobeonthewaitinglistbasedonthiscriterion.Applicantsonthewaitinglistareprioritisedbasedontheirdateofemploymentanddateofapplication.Animportantpolicyprovisionis that (inHarare, for instance) 1%of residential stands available shouldbe allocated topeoplewithdisabilitiesortheirparents.

In general, the usefulness of thewaiting list as a resource allocation tool is increasinglybeing questioned (Chatiza and Mlalazi, 2009). For instance, the lists are dependent onvoluntaryentries,withauthoritiesrarely(ifatall)involvedinthemobilisationofpeopletoregister.Thewaitinglistdoesnotreflectthedemandforhousing,makingitlessusefulasa


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planningtool.Further,themerefactthatonemustbeemployedorshowproofofincomeinordertoberegisteredonthewaitinglistisenoughreasontoarguethatthetoolisnotpro‐poor. In the absence of independent evaluations, it is not possible to confirm thatallocationsbycentralandlocalgovernmentauthoritiesweredrawnfromthewaitinglist.Indeed,mechanismsforensuringtransparency intheallocationofsuchcritical resourcesaremissinginZimbabwe’spolicyimplementationstrategies.

1.5.3 National politics and urban land markets

ZimbabweiscurrentlygovernedthroughaGlobalPoliticalAgreement(GPA)putinplacein2009.Underthisarrangement,thethreepoliticalpartiesinthecountry–ZANUP.F.,MDC‐T andMDC‐M share power, withministerial positions allocated based on some ‘agreedformula.’ There are three main ministries involved in the functioning of urban landmarkets.TheMinistryofJusticeandParliamentaryAffairs,controlledbyZANUP.F.,iskeytothefunctioningofthecourts,theDeedsRegistryOfficeandtheDeputySheriff’soffice.The Ministry of Local Government and Urban Development, headed by a ZANU P.F.minister,controlslocalauthoritiesandtheDepartmentofPhysicalPlanning.Ontheotherhand,MDC‐TcontrolstheMinistryofNationalHousingandSocialAmenities.Thispoliticalsetupisacriticaldeterminantofhowcertaincomponentsoftheurbanlandmarketwork,anddonotwork.

Urban local authorities in Zimbabwe are governed through elected councillors, mostlybelonging toMDC‐T.However, thesearepresidedoverbyaZANUP.F.minister.Tensionbetweenthetwoactorshasoftendestabilisedthefullandcompetentfunctioningofurbanlocal authorities. In a very significant way, the tension has affected the functioning ofurbanlandmarkets.Forinstance,theSpecialInvestigationsCommittee’sreportoftheCityofHarareLandSales,LeasesandExchangeshasexposedallegationsrelatingtothegrossmanipulationoftheoperationofurbanlandmarkets.ThereportmakesreferencetocasesrelatingtolandswapsbetweentheCityofHarareandsomepoliticalelites,unproceduralsale of public land which violated section 152 of the Urban Councils Act, unproceduralchange of reservation of land, unprocedural disposal of council houses and the non‐adherencetocouncilpolicyontheallocationofstands.

Section152(2)prescribesthat“Beforeselling,exchanging,leasing,donatingorotherwisedisposingoforpermitting theuseofany landownedbycouncil; council shall,bynoticepublishedintwoissuesofanewspaperandpostedattheofficeofcouncil,givenotice:a)of its intentiontodoso,describingthelandconcernedandstatingtheobject,termsandconditions of the proposed sale, exchange, lease, donation, disposition or grant ofpermission;andb)thatacopyoftheproposalisopenforinspection…attheofficeofthecouncil…andc)thatanypersonwhoobjectstotheproposalmaylodgethisobjectionwiththetownclerk...”(GovernmentofZimbabwe,1996:558).

It is this particular legal provision that seems tohavebeenbreached.Up to the timeofwritingthisreport,thereisnopublicinformationonthestatusofthereportandthelikelycourseofactiontobetakenbytherelevantauthoritiesontheallegationsrevealedinthereport.Indeed,theMinisterofLocalGovernmentandDevelopmentisatthecentreoftheallegations(seeBox1.2).


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Box1.2–UnprocedurallandallocationsinHarare:extractsfromtheSpecialInvestigationsCommitteeoftheCityofHarare

ContrarytoCouncilPolicythatanindividualmustnotgetmorethanoneresidentialpropertyfromtheCouncil,theMinisteracquiredvasttractsoflandwithinGreaterHarareandregisteredthemincompaniesassociatedwithhim.ItremainsdisturbingtonotethattheMinisterwouldidentifypiecesoflandinthecity,influenceCouncilofficialstoapplytohimforchangeoflanduse,andthen,sitoverthesameapplicationsandapprovethechanges.HewouldthenwritetoCouncilofficialsaskingtobuythesamestandsandobviouslygetsthem.Landreservedforrecreationalactivitieswouldenduphavingtitledeedsinhiscompany’sname.AcaseinpointisStand61Hellensvale,Harare,measuringalmost20hectares.Accordingtotheadviceofpayment,theMinisterpaidUS$2300forthisstand…

TheCommitteediscoveredwithconcernthat‘Mr.Other’(apoliticalelite)wasgivenpreferenceaheadofseveralapplicationsreceivedearlier.TheCommitteealsonotedthatthelandwasexchangedforsalariesandvehicles(twoLandRovers).TheCommitteealsonotedwithconcernthatthepriceofUS$5persquaremeterchargedto‘Mr.Other’waswellbelowthemarketsellingpriceoflandinsimilarzoneswhichweresellingatbetweenUS$10andUS$15persquaremetre…TheDirectorofUrbanPlanningServiceslettheCouncildownbyprocessingtransfersbeforefullcompliancewithsection152oftheUrbanCouncilsAct.

Source: Extracted from the City of Harare 2010: Special Investigations Committee Report on City of Harare’s Land Sales, Leases and Exchanges from the period October 2004 to December 2009, pp. 8, 14

Thepreceding sections have provided an overviewof issues affecting the functioning ofurban landmarkets. It has been argued that, by and large, the legal and policy contextgoverning the functions of urban landmarkets originated from the colonial period andcontinuedintopost‐independenceZimbabwe.Aswillbearguedindetail in latersectionsof this report, the town planning bottlenecks that negatively affect land delivery are aresult of limited progress by the post‐independence government to adjust legislation tosuit the new socio‐economic order of the post‐independence period. That the DeedsRegistry office, the key institution involved in property registration remains highlycentralised in Harare and Bulawayo as a result of colonial‐based legislation, is clearevidenceoflimitedcreativityonthepartofthestate.Thesectionhasalsodelvedintothenational political issues that have affected the governance of urban land markets inZimbabwe.Thenextsectionpresentstheresearchmethodsthatwereusedinundertakingthisscopingstudy.

1.6 Research methods

A combination of primary and secondary methods of data collection was used inundertaking the study. A methodology workshop was held prior to the data collectionprocess. Primary datawas collected usingmainly key informant interviewswith officialsworkingintheurbanlandmarketssectorandresidentsofinformalsettlements.Secondarydatawascollectedfromkeystakeholdersworkingintheurbanlandmarketsenvironment.ThestudywasundertakenduringtheperiodDecember2010toFebruary2011.

1.6.1 Methodology workshop

Amethodologyworkshop for the studywas held on 19 January 2011 in the CASS TrustBoardroom.Thehalf‐daymeetingwasattendedby15participants(seeAnnex1.1forthelist of participants) drawn from selected actors in the urban land market sector.RepresentedattheworkshopwerethetheUniversityofZimbabwe’sDepartmentofRural


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andUrbanPlanning,theCityofHarare,civilsocietyorganisationsworking inthehousingsector, conveyancing practitioners, estate agencies, independent economists, researchassistants involved in data collection and all threemembers of the research team. Themain focus of themethodology workshopwas to present the research proposal to keystakeholders and obtain feedback on the character of the research and appropriatemethodsofcollectingdata.Thespecificobjectivesoftheworkshopincluded:

Soliciting the views and comments of participants on the clarity and perceivedusefulnessoftheresearch.

Identifying the broad issues affecting the governance of urban land markets in thecountry.

Identifying existing literature on urban landmarkets and how the study could accesssuchinformation.

Sourcing suggestions onwhat data needed to be collected and possiblemethods forcollectingit.

Obtaining insights on existing and potential partnerships in the urban land marketsector.

The methodology workshop was a success. There was a rich discussion on all issuesoutlined in the workshop objectives. Useful contacts were established at this stage,facilitatingthecollectionofinformationwhenthedatacollectionprocesscommenced.

1.6.2 Primary data collection

Primary data collection targeted officials working in the urban landmarkets sector andresidentsofinformalsettlements.Interviewchecklistsweredevelopedandusedtogatherdata from the identified officials. The key institutions targeted by the key informantinterviews were local authorities, property professionals, international developmentpartners and civil society organisations. Local authorities were the key source ofinformation on land delivery, the impact of planning frameworks on land delivery andinformation on howplanning standards have responded to the need tomaking housingaffordabletothepoor.Key informant interviewswithofficials fromEpworthLocalBoardprovideddataontheinterfacebetweenformalandinformallandmarkets.Inthisregard,issues covered related to the history of informal settlements, re‐planning of informalsettlements,landtransactionsininformalsettlementsandpropertyrightsinsuchtypesofsettlements. Property professionals were useful in gathering information on types andcausesofpropertydisputes,andspecific issues relating to thegovernanceofurban landmarkets. Development partners and civil society organisations provided data onpartnerships in the urban land markets sector. Further, civil society organisations alsoprovided information on their role in improving access to housing by the poor. Keyinformant interviews and focus groupdiscussionswith residents of informal settlementswere centred on land access methods, property rights issues and land transactions ininformalsettlements.Specificcasestudiesweredevelopedontheexperiencesofinformalresidents.


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1.6.3 Secondary methods of data collection

The methodology workshop was useful in identifying existing literature on urban landmarkets. Secondarydatawascollected fromkey stakeholders in theurban landmarketssector.Giventhatliteratureonspecificurbanlandmarketsthemesisscarce,mostoftheliteraturecollectedwasintheformofunpublishedpaperspresentedinthepastonsomeof the key themes on urban landmarkets. The Zimbabwean courts, especially the HighCourtofZimbabwe,providedthebulkofthe informationonpropertydisputesthathavebeen handled by the courts. In addition,many of the legal cases decided by the courtsweredownloadedfromtheSouthernAfricanLegal Information Institute(SAFLII)website.ThedataonlegalcasesinformedthestudyonthetypeandcausesofpropertydisputesinZimbabwe’surban landmarkets.Specificexampleswerealsodevelopedon thedifferenttypesofdisputes.

1.6.4 Analysis by experts

Inlightofthefactthatdataonpropertytransactionsarelargelyinthehandsoftheprivatesectorandhencenotreadilyavailabletothepublic,thestudyidentifiedthreeexpertstoprovide an analysis of the urban land markets sector from their respective areas ofexpertise.Thiswasextremelyusefulinaccessingsomeoftheinformationonprivatesectortransactions in the land markets. The three experts selected were an economist, aconveyancer, and an estate agent and property valuer. Sections of this report that dealwiththeeconomyanditsimpactsonurbanlandmarkets,propertyrightsregistrationandtheestateagents’sectorperformanceweredevelopedlargelythroughmaterialscollectedfromtheinputsofsuchexperts.

1.7 Study area

Primary data were collected from Epworth and Hopley settlements. Epworth emergedlargely as an informal settlement. Located 15 km to the east of Harare, Epworth wasselectedbecauseitrepresentsthebestexampleoftheintersectionofformalandinformallandmarkets.PrimarydatacollectionwasalsodoneintheHopleysettlement,apost‐2000scheme initiatedby theMunicipalityofHarare.Hopleyalsohaselementsofboth formaland informal land markets. Whereas the collection of secondary data was national incharacter,forpracticalreasonsmostdataaccessedwerecollectedfrominstitutionsbasedinHarare. Ingeneral,mostofthedataonlanddeliverywerebasedontheexperienceofHarare(seeMap1.1).

1.8 Study limitations

In general, the study can be seen as a case study of Harare, the capital city. Itwas notpossible to get deeper insights into the operation of urban landmarkets based on theexperiences of other key urban areas like Bulawayo,Mutare,Masvingo andGweru. Theexperiences of residents of informal settlements in other cities could not be captured.Further,acomparativeanalysisof landdeliveryacrossZimbabwe’smaincitiesandtownswas not possible. Given the limited time frame for the study, it was not possible tonegotiate thedirectparticipationof state institutions in the study itself. Toalleviate theburden created by some of these constraints, the study made an attempt to collectsecondarydatathatcapturedtheexperiencesofurbanlandmarketsinothercities.Inthis


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regard, the data on property disputes captured incidences occurring outside of Harare.Further,datafromtheMunicipalityofMutare’sMasterPlanstrengthenedthesectiononplanning frameworks.Anextensionof theproject, through funding fromUN‐HABITAT, isbeingnegotiated.Ifsuccessful,thestudywillbeexpandedtobecomeanationalstudyinallrespects.

1.9 Chapter outline

Theprecedingchapterhasprovidedthebackgroundandcontextof thestudy.Chapter2presents a discussion on how the state of the national economy has affected thefunctioningofurbanlandmarkets.Chapter3presentsfindingsonthemainactorsinvolvedin the governance of urban land markets. Chapter 4 interrogates the role of planningframeworksand their impacton landdelivery.Chapter5presentsdataon landdelivery,theperformanceoftherealestatesectorandpropertydisputes.Chapter6elaboratesonthe activities of formal and informalmarkets, while Chapter 7 discusses property rightsregistration in Zimbabwe’s urban areas. Chapter 8 presents a proposed five‐yearprogrammeofworkemanatingfromthisscopingstudy.


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MAP1A–Settlementsbyland‐usetypeinGreaterHarare


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2. Zimbabwe’seconomicperformanceanditseffectonurbanland andhousingmarkets

ThestateoftheZimbabweaneconomyisamajordeterminantoftheperformanceofurban land markets. Thus, the performance of the construction and real estatesectors, both of which are integral components of urban land markets, is largelydetermined by the performance of the national economy. The rate of nationalemployment,incomelevelsofpeopleandtheirsavingsallplayanimportantroleasa source of finance by individuals to do business in urban landmarkets. Financialinstitutions,especiallycommercialbanksandbuildingsocieties,aretraditionallythecritical sourceof revenue for financing property transactions in Zimbabwe’s urbanland markets. Given this background, it is important for this study to present ananalysisoftheperformanceoftheZimbabweaneconomyanditsimplicationsforthealleviationofpovertyandtheeffectivefunctioningofurbanlandmarkets.

2.1 Real sector performance

The period 2000 to 2008 saw government policy shifting back and forth betweenattempts to implement economic reforms and the imposition of overarchingeconomiccontrols.EconomicblueprintssuchastheMillenniumEconomicRecoveryProgramme (MERP) during 2000‐2002 and the National Economic RevivalProgramme(NERP)of2003‐2004allcontainedsomehybridapplicationofeconomicliberalisation. During the period 2000‐2008, Zimbabwe experienced a sustainedcontractionofitseconomy.Itisestimatedthattheeconomyshrunkbyacumulative51%duringtheperiodunderreview.Theunderperformanceoftheeconomyledtoincreased loss of employment, the informalisation of the economy and increasedpovertylevels.By2007,itwasestimatedthatover75%ofZimbabweanswerelivinginextremepoverty,onlessthatUS$1perday.

Theperformanceoftheconstructionsector,whichiscriticaltourbanlandmarkets,also plummeted due to the high cost of building materials and the rising cost ofconstruction. Notwithstanding the limited availability of statistics, the buildingmaterialspriceindexshowsthatthecostofbuildingmaterialsincreasedby305.3%for the period December 2002 to December 2003. This trend worsened ashyperinflationgotoutofcontrol.


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Figure2.1:Realeconomicperformance(%changeyear‐on‐year)

Source: Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe data, 2010

Theconstructionandrealestatesectorsrecoveredmomentarilyandexhibitedhugegrowth during 2005, owing to the improved foreign currency situation in thecountry, as well as the effect of concessional financing facilities provided by theReserveBank.Thisrecoveryandthesuccessoftheforeignexchangeauctionsystemwereshort‐livedduetothecontinueddepressionofthemainproductivesectorsofagriculture,manufacturing andmining. Thedecline in constructionactivitydirectlyaffected thesupplyofhousing in thecountryand thismanifested in the increasedurbanhousingbacklog,estimatedat1055000by2005,with83%ofthisbackloginHarare.

2.2 Monetary sector performance

One of the main features of the economic instability of the past decade washyperinflation,whichseverelyerodedincomesandnationalsavings.Annualinflationreached231000000%byJune2008.Thissituationerodedthepurchasingpowerofdisposable incomes,which inevitably rendered the prospects of accessing housinguntenable.Thelow‐incomesocietywasthehardesthit inthiscrisisasit lackedthemeans to cushion itself from the scourge of inflation. Yet this same populationsegment does not have adequate shelter and is currently living in overcrowdedconditionsinhigh‐densitysuburbs.

During the period 2000‐2008, the government policy framework, among otherstrategies,wasencouragingself‐financingofhousingprojectsatthehouseholdlevelbyprovidingsubsidisedservicedlandwithbasicamenitiessuchaswaterandsewerreticulation. The household would then be expected to self‐finance the actualconstructionofthedwellingatitsowndeterminedpace.Inflationwreckedhavoconthisschemethroughthefollowing:

Local authorities’ budgets shrunk rapidly during the hyperinflationary period,renderingtheseinstitutionsincapableofdeliveringservicedlandtopeopleonthehousingwaitinglist.

Dwindling fiscal grants to local authorities, which became inadequate tosafeguardthepolicydirectiondesiredbygovernment.


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Thehyper‐inflationcausednewwaysofdoingbusinesstoemerge.Asisreportedinother sections, property transactionswere then done inmultiple forms, includingpayment inkind,especially through land;conductingpayments in foreigncurrency(which was illegal at that point in time), negotiation of rentals on the date ofpayment,etc.Someofthesecharacteristicshavecontinuedintothenewera,whichis characterisedby theuseofmultiple currencies. Inparticular,payment inkind isdominating business for some of the property transactions, including thoseundertaken by the state. Indeed, press reports (for example,Herald, 22 February2011) have quoted a senior government official calling for supplementing civilservantssalarieswithstands.

Figure2.2:Inflationtrend

Inflation

Year YoY(%)

2000 55.2

2001 112.1

2002 198.9

2003 598.0

2004 132.7

2005 585.8

2006 1281.5

2007 66212.3

2008 231000000

2009 ‐7.7

2010 4.5

Source: Zim Stats 2010

2.3 Income levels, national savings and investments

Onamacroeconomicscale,hyperinflationdecimatedper capitaincomes,destroyedthe savings culture and severely stalled capital accumulation, which is vital forfinancing land development and construction activities. During the period 2000‐2008,percapita incomesdeclinedby59%,fromUS$658toUS$268.Hyperinflationalso discouraged financial institutions from giving loans to customers for propertyinvestmentsbecause thepurchasingpowerof repaymentswasbeingwipedout intheprocessand theirbalance sheetswere shrinking.Thiswasapparentgiven thatmortgage rates for housing development and purchases were regulated at levelswellbelowinflationthroughouttheperiodunderreview.Mortgagerateschargeableonresidentialpropertyloanswereregulatedbygovernment,intheformofperiodicminimumandmaximumcapsimposedbytheMinistryofFinance.Theinterestratecapsonbuildingsocietiesloansanddepositsontheonehand,andthemuchhigherinterestrates inthemoneymarketthroughouttheyearontheother,posedmajormismatchproblemsforthem.


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The fixing ofmortgage rates occurredwhenmoneymarket rateswere allowed tomovein linewith inflation. Investorsrespondedtoprevailinghigh interestratesbyswitching their savings into money market instruments, a development that leftbuildingsocietieswithacutefundingproblems.Secondly,duetothelower interestrates that could be charged on mortgage loans, mortgage lending yieldedsignificantly lower returns, compared to the money market. Building societiesresponded by shifting from their core business of providing low‐cost mortgagelendingtoconcentratingoninvestmentsinthemoneymarket.Nationalsavingsfellfrom10%in2000to‐5%by2007.Investmentlevelsremainedabovethesavingsratebecauseof the increased foreigndirect investment (FDI) inflowsmainly associatedwithplatinumdevelopmentprojects.Thisnotwithstanding,thelevelofsavingsandinvestment has been far below the 30% of gross domestic product (GDP) markrecommendedforensuringsustainabledevelopmentindevelopingcountries.

Thefundingofbuildingsocieties ismainlycomposedofsavingsandfixeddeposits.As inflationdecimatedsavingsandfixeddeposits,theveryfoundationofmortgagefinancing was severely weakened. In addition to the effect of the regulatoryrestriction on interest rates, mortgage lending was also acutely affected by thedeclineintermdeposits.

Table2.1:Percapitaincome,savingsandinvestments

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Percapitaincome(US$)

658 736 579 431 390 381 368 302 268 291 336

Savings(as%ofGDP)

10 8 5 3 3 2 0 ‐5 ‐5 2 2

Investment(%ofGDP)

13 10 8 8 10 10 5 5 0 4 4

Mortgagerates(%):residential 14‐35 14‐37.5 16.5‐37.5 30‐55 30‐85 35‐85 35‐85 35‐85 ‐ 14‐25 14‐25commercial 30‐45 32.7‐49.5 32.7‐49.5 40‐60 40‐130 110‐135 110‐135 110‐135 ‐ 20‐30 20‐30industrial 30‐45 32.7‐49.5 32.7‐49.5 40‐60 40‐130 110‐135 110‐135 110‐135 ‐ 20‐30 20‐30

Source: RBZ, Ministry of Finance, Investment saving due to FDI in platinum projects

Total assets for building societies during the period 2000‐2008 became skewedtowardsinvestmentsinthemoneymarket,CPIIndexedbondsandfixedassets(seealso thediscussion inChapter5).Theproportionofmortgage loans to totalassetsdeclined from40% in 1999 to 4.33%byDecember 2006, reflecting amarked shiftfromthecorebusinessofmortgagelendingtosecuritiesandinvestments.

By the end of 2006, fixed assets accounted for 59% of total assets. This trend isconfirmed by examining the income statements of the building societies over thesame period. More than 95% of the income of building societies at this point isderivedfrominterestincome.Duringtheperiod2000to2006,thepercentageshareof interest incomefromborrowers(mortgagelending)declinedfromabout26%toless than 8%. On the other hand, the share of income from investments andsecuritiesincreasedsignificantly,from74%tomorethan92%.


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As the economic meltdown progressed during the period 2000‐2008, the incomeflowsfrompropertieswere inadequateanddidnotprovideafairreturn(all thingsbeing equal) to justify property as an investment. This development also stalledcapitalexpenditure in thepropertiesmarket.Thestateofbuildingsalso started todeteriorate,withverylimitedcapacitytofinancerepairandmaintenance.

Figure2.3:Sustaineddeclineinmortgagelending

Source: RBZ Supervision reports (various)

2.4 Availability of finance for land acquisition, land development, housing development and purchasing of houses

2.4.1 Liquidity and funding crisis

The introduction of multiple currencies for trade and the suspension of the localcurrency for tradevirtuallyplacedall economicagents in thecountry ina start‐upmode.Thismeantthatatinception,bankingsectordepositsweretoolowtosupportmeaningfuleconomicactivity, letalonecapitaldevelopmentprojectsincludinglandacquisitionanddevelopment,andhousingdevelopmentandpurchasing.Thescarcityofcapitalresultedinveryhighinterestratesforshort‐termfacilities.

Anotherchallengewasthatbankingsectordepositswereindemandbecauseofthelimited capacity of the economy tomobilise long‐termdeposits and fixed savings,which are the driver of mortgage financing. However, banking sector loans andadvances have an average tenure of 6‐12months, whereas development projectshave funding requirements of a medium‐ to long‐term nature. This structuralmismatch between the tenor of available deposits and that of real estatedevelopmenthas limitedprogress in this sector.During2009 therewere very fewbuyersonthemarket,mainlyduetotheliquiditycrisis.Withtheeconomyrunningon a cash basis, building societies, like other financial institutions, were failing tofinancethepurchaseofproperties.


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2.4.2 Recent signs of recovery in residential property sales

Themonetary transition to theUSdollar in2009wasabig shift for thepeopleofZimbabwe. Residential and business property sales increased by 30% and 25%respectively in 2009 and were estimated to rise by 20% in 2010 (also see thediscussion in Chapter 5). While Zimbabwe’s property market has begun toexperienceincreasedactivityintermsoftrading,affordabilityisstillabigchallengeduetolowdisposableincomes.Theissueoflimitedaffordabilityisalsoattributedtothehighcostofmortgagefinancing.Buildingsocietieshaveresumedofferinglimitedfundingthroughtwo‐yearmortgagesatinterestratesofupto22%perannum.

The residential property market has been active, especially in areas belowUS$50000.Mosthousesinthisbracketaresaidtobe‘belowstandardandunworthyoftheaskingprice’but,accordingtorealestateagents,buyersarepreparedtomakerenovations at their own pace when they buy. Rental yields have also recoveredsincetheinceptionofmultiplecurrenciesin2009.Rentalyields,whichwerearound0.5% in 2007‐2008 improved to between 6% and 7% by 2010. Investors whopurchaserealestateorlandforconstructionofrentedpropertiesconsiderthistobeanimportantvariable.

2.5 A synopsis of financing opportunities in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets

2.5.1 Central government funding

The Zimbabwean governmenthas traditionally provided resources to support landandhousingdevelopmentsinceindependencethroughbudgetaryallocations.Duetobudget limitations,allocationsbygovernment towardshousingprojectshavebeenrangingbetween2%and5%oftotalbudgetsince2000.Themaininstrumentshavebeen theNational Housing Fund (NHF) and theNational Housing Guarantee Fund(NHGF). In the last decade, allocations and therefore the functionality of theseinstrumentshavedeclinedinlinewiththeeconomicchallengesinthecountry.The2010and2011budgets,however,haveseeninjectionoffundsthroughthreemaininstruments of the NHF (US$2.3‐million allocated in 2011), the National HousingLoan Facility (NHLF) (US$25‐million in 2010) and the Civil Service Housing LoanFacility (US$5‐million in 2010 and US$10‐million in 2011). The NHLF is beingmanaged through the Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe (IDBZ) andmakesuseoffundingavailableundertheIMF‐providedSpecialDrawingRights(SDR)to leverage partnerships between central government on one hand and localauthoritiesandprivatelanddevelopersontheother.Todate,11projectshavebeeninitiated nationally4 with three of these in Harare (Willowvale Flats, DzivarasekwaExtensionoff‐siteinfrastructureandSunwayCity).Atthetimeofthestudy,thehostMinistry (NationalHousingandSocialAmenities) indicatedthatthiswas leveraginglandsupplyinHarareandothercities.

4Kwekwe(Mbizo22),Marondera(ParadisePark),Bulawayo(ParklandsandEmganwini),Masvingo(RunyararoWest),Chipinge(Checheche),Chiredzi(Tsovani),Mutare(Chikanga)andGwandahousingprojects,someofwhichhavealreadybeencompleted.


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TheCivilServiceHousingLoanFacilityismeanttoassistpublicservantstobuyland,purchaseandrenovateexistinghousing.Thishas injectedliquidity intothemarket,which is furthercomplementedbytheNHF,whichmainlysupportsadditiontothepublic sector housing stock (houses used by public servants). Both facilities coverrural and urban housing, but due to the sheer size, Harare exerts much of thedemandonthesefacilities.

In 2009 and 2010, the government also disbursed over US$30‐million (sourcedmainlyfromUNICEFandtheSouthAfricangovernment)tolocalauthoritiesforwaterandsanitationrehabilitationandexpansionworks.TheZimbabweangovernment isplanning to complete housing projects under the Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle schemeamounting toUS$70‐millionby2015.A totalnumberof160projects,with30%oftheseata60%completionlevel,areearmarked.

2.5.2 Local authority initiatives

Local authority budgets have remained underfunded since the inception of amultiplecurrencyregime.Thesebudgetsareunabletoaddressthelandandhousingdelivery shortfalls. For example, in June 2010, the City of Harare’s HousingDepartmentindicatedthatithadahousingbacklogof500000residentsbutdidnothave an adequate budget for servicing land, particularly provision of off‐siteinfrastructure. Although the government had deregulated tariffs charged by localauthorities, the actual collections were still very low due to a high default ratebecauseofdepresseddisposableincomes.Duringthe14monthstoMarch2010,theCityofHararewasreportedlyowedacumulativeUS$60‐millionbyratepayers.Underthepresentcircumstancesandtheconstraintsbedevillingthelocalauthorities,thereisscopefor increasedprivatesectorparticipation intheprovisionofserviced land.This calls for an appropriate policy framework to support private sector landdevelopment.

2.5.3 Selffinancing of land purchases and property development

Developedanddevelopingcountriesalikeareusingself‐financingschemesforurbanlandandhousingmarkets.Thefollowingoptionscouldbepursued:

Renttoown scheme

In view of the stabilisedmacroeconomic environment, the rent‐to‐own scheme iscapable of providing a tenant with a rental lease with an option to purchase theproperty at a fixed price at a specified point of time in the future. The option topurchasethepropertyusuallystatesthepriceatwhichthepropertyistobeboughtandthetimeperiodduringwhichthetenantisabletoexercisetheoption.Thesellermayattractthetenantbyhavingaspecifiedportionoftherentappliedasacredittowardadownpaymentonthehouse,ormayreceiveabulksumofmoneyfortheoptionofgivingthetenanttimetorebuildtheircreditifnecessary.Thisoptioncouldinvolve financial institutions supporting private investors who meet the requiredcollateral and loan disbursement criteria. The private investors would invest inpropertyonsubsidisedlandallocatedbylocalauthorities.


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Use of individuals’ own savings for property development

Inthisscheme,urbandwellersdesiringtoacquirelandforpurposesofconstructingtheirhomeswouldregisterwiththeirrespectivelocalauthoritiesforlandallocationpurposesandbeplacedon thehousingwaiting list. Theadvantageof this schemewas that beneficiaries obtained serviced and subsidised land for developmentthroughthelocalauthority.However,thesituationhassincechanged.Forinstance,theCityofHarareisnolongerthemainactorintheservicingofland,whilecitieslikeMutareandBulawayoarestillcontinuingwiththepractice.

2.5.4. Availability of mortgage loans to individuals

Financial institutions involved in housing finance include building societies, theInfrastructure Bank of Zimbabwe and pension funds, e.g. Old Mutual and theNational Social Security Authority (NSSA). During the period 2000 to 2010, theZimbabwe economy had very few strong institutions to support robust andsustainablehousingfinance,efficientlanddeliveryandbuildingmaterialsproduction(UN‐HABITAT 2009). Notable was the acute shortage of mortgage finance, ashyperinflation dislocated building societies from their core business of providinghousingfinance,asdetailedearlierinthisreport.

Low‐incomegroupswerehardesthitbythisstateofaffairs,astheycouldnotaccessthe little financingthatwasavailableduetohigh interestcostsandthe inabilitytomeettherequirementsofcollateralthatcamewiththeloans.Governmentfundingtowards housing development also suffered from the effect of inflation erosion.AlthoughtheNationalHousingFundprovidedfacilitiesatinterestratesof15%,thescopeofcoveragewasseverely limitedbyreducedfiscalspace.Whenthenationalfiscuswasconstrained,areasthatsufferedincludedcapitalexpenditureprojects,asresourceutilisationbecameskewedtowardsrecurrentexpenditure.

The Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe has not been able to make asignificant contribution tohousingdevelopmentdue to severeundercapitalisation.However,pensionfundssuchasOldMutualandtheNSSAhavecapacitytoprovidesignificant assistance to low‐cost housing initiatives due to their sheer size. Thisoptioncanbepursuedtoensuregreatercoverageofhousingloanfinanceschemes.

2.5.5 Employerassisted housing

InZimbabwe,institutionsthathaveplayedasignificantroleinprovidinghousingfortheir employees include state‐owned public enterprises and private corporationssuchasmininghouses(e.g.ZIMPLATS)andbanks.Thehousinginitiativeshavebeeninthefollowingforms:

1. Employerhousingwhichiseither‐rentfreeorsubsidised.

2. Company loans, either to buy a house or to finance a down payment or adeposit. Banks played a significant role in providing housing loans toemployees during the hyperinflationary era as a strategy of retaining keytalent.

3. Companyguaranteestoassistanemployeetoobtainabuildingsocietyloan.


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4. Monthly housing allowances in the form of company housing to enableemployeestobuyorrentahouse.

While government can encourage increased participation of employers in thesehousing development initiatives, this strategy bears greater fruit in a highlyformalisedeconomy.

2.5.6 Infrastructure Development Bank

The Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe was launched by theZimbabweangovernmentin2005asavehicleforthemobilisationof infrastructuredevelopment in Zimbabwe, with finance from both domestic and internationalsources. The Bank’s mandate is to mobilise financial and technical resources ofappropriate duration and cost for public and private institutions involved ininfrastructuredevelopment,includingthefacilitationofinvestmentinaffordableanddecenthousing.

However,sinceitsinceptionin2005,theBankhasbeenfacedbyfundingconstraints,hence it was not in a position to undertake any significant infrastructuraldevelopmentprojects.Withtheadventofthemultiplecurrencysystemin2009,theBank has managed to construct an estimated 4 000 new housing units at aboutUS$1‐million across the country’s urban areas, using seed funds fromgovernmentand a development partner in China. Its major target clientele are the low‐ tomedium‐incomeearners.Plansforthenearfuturearetobuildcapacitytoprovideatleast2500newhousesperyear.TheInfrastructureDevelopmentBankofZimbabweis capable toundertake this as it hashadvast tractsof landallocated to it by thegovernmentandhasmanagedtomobiliseexternalfundingfromexternalpartnersinChina.ThehousingunitsbeingdevelopedbytheBankcostbetweenUS$15000andUS$20000.

2.5.7 The place of building societies

The pre‐requisite for any investment in housing is the accumulation of sufficientsavings for purchasing land and developing the infrastructure and thesuperstructure,andgrantingmortgageloansforconstructionorpurchasingexistingproperties for new home seekers. Government initiatives to encourage buildingsocieties tomobilise financing for loans tohousing includethemeasurewherethesocieties are allowed to issue ‘Class C’ tax‐free, paid‐up permanent shares.Government would then require that about 25% of the issued shares be used tofinance low‐income housing. Traditionally, building societies have provided up to65%ofhousingfinance.Buildingsocietiesalsoprovidecapacityforonwardlendingofhousinggrantsreceivedbygovernmentfromdonororganisations.

The Building Societies Act (1996) specifically requires that candidates for loansshouldhaveanadequateincomeandcollateral.Unfortunately,theserequirementsaredifficulttoprove,letalonemeet,inthelow‐incomesegmentofthepopulation.GiventhelevelofinformalsectoractivityinZimbabwe,theseconditionsmeanthatasignificantportionofthelow‐incomepopulationisleftout.


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2.6 Concluding remarks

The low market activity in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets is a reflection of thecountry’s economic performance currently (also see Chapter 5 for furtherdiscussion).Infact,landmarketactivityisaproxyindicatorofeconomichealth,andit is thereforenotsurprisingthattherangeofactivitysustainedbytheeconomyislowatpresent.Abroad rangeofmeasuresareunderway to revive theeconomy.The inclusive government has prioritised this since its formation. Governmentwillcontinue to play a significant role in providing policy direction and an appropriateenvironmentforinvestmenttostimulateurbanlandmarkets.However,thefundingroleofgovernmentisnotanticipatedtoremainsignificantasausteritymeasuresareinstituted to ensuremacroeconomic stability. Employer‐assisted housing initiativesareseenashavinglimitedimpactduetothecurrenthighlevelofinformalisationofthe economy and thus the low level of formal employment. The role of privatefinancial institutions, private investors and initiatives for self‐help or financingprovidegreaterscopefordevelopmentofhousinginfrastructureinZimbabwegoingforward. Fundingwill continue tobea critical componentof the landandhousingdevelopmentmarkets,hencetheneedforinitiativestopromotesavingsatalllevels.Partnership with international development institutions is another avenue foraugmentinglocalfinancingmechanisms.


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3. Institutionalactors,mandatesandoperationalchallenges

3.1 Introduction

Zimbabwehas a set of institutions that operate in theurban landmarkets sector.Theseincludestateinstitutions(centralandlocalgovernment),privatesectoractorsandcivilsocietyorganisations(CSOs).ManyoftheCSOsworkdirectlywiththeurbanpoor.Forstateactors,relevantfoundinglegislationdefinesboththeirspecificrolesand operational structures. The operations of non‐state actors are guided bylegislation under which they are licensed or registered. Beyond such foundinglegislationorregistrationframeworks,itisimportanttoacknowledgethattheurbanlandmarketitselfisgovernedbygeneralrulestowhichthedifferentactorshavetoadhere.

State institutions include Ministries and government departments, the Courts ofLaw,localauthoritiesliketheCityofHarareandpublicenterprises.ThemainpublicagenciesinvolvedinurbanlandmarketsincludetheNationalRailwaysofZimbabwe,the Urban Development Corporation, the Infrastructure Development Bank ofZimbabwe and the National Social Security Authority.Ministries and Departmentsare primarily responsible for regulating physical planning, surveying and theregistrationofpropertyrights.Thecourtsplayanimportantfunctioninthesettlingofdisputesthatoccurintheurbanlandmarketsector.

Private sectoractorsoccur in a varietyof forms, and their functions inurban landmarkets include financing, developing land, conveyancing, property valuation andpropertymanagement.AsnotedbyUN‐HABITATandUrbanLandMark(2010),suchprivate sector actors include developers, investors, landlords, formal and micro‐financiers,propertyprofessionals,privateindividualsandtenants.

Fortheirpart,civilsocietyorganisationsrangefromcommunity‐basedorganisationstonational non‐governmental organisations that principallyworkwith thepoor toaccess landanddevelop residentialandother spaces.This chapterdiscusses thesedifferentorganisations’rolesandrelationships,andpresentsthekindofinstitutionaloverlaps,gapsandopportunities.Thethrustofthisscopingstudywastointerrogatehow the actors in the urban land market are operating, focusing on their roles,capacitiesandconstraints/opportunities.Further,theanalysisexaminedinstitutionalgaps thatexist in theurban landmarketwhilealso identifyingsectorpartnerships,bothexistingandpotential.

3.2 State actors in the urban land market

The key governmentdepartments in theurban land sector are theDepartmentofPhysicalPlanning(MinistryofLocalGovernment,RuralandUrbanDevelopment),theSurveyor General’s Department (Ministry of Lands) and the Deeds Registry Office(Ministry of Justice). Each of these institutions is responsible for implementingspecificpiecesof legislationasdiscussedelsewhere in this report.Worthnoting isthatthesekeydepartmentsare located inthreedifferentministries,which in itselfcreatesbureaucraticchallengesinlandadministration.


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Inaddition, thereare localauthoritieswhosefunctionsareregulatedbytheUrbanCouncilsAct.Furthertotheregulatoryfunctionsofthestate,otherfunctionsincludeplanning,surveyingandpegging,propertydevelopmentandpropertyregistration.Inessence,actorsinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarketcanbeunderstoodintermsoftheroles of different institutions in the land development process. Such actorsparticipateinthelanddevelopmentprocessasdevelopersandinvestors,financiers(thebankingsector),propertyprofessionalsandprivateindividuals(aslandlordsandtenants).Thestatecompletesthecircuitwithrolesspreadacrossthekeyfunctionsofdeveloperandregulator.Figure3.1summariestheframeworkforunderstandingactors in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets and the main functions they perform.Regulatory functions are principally state functions but there are private and civilsociety actors that perform regulatory functions, for instance to ensure that theirmembersadheretobasicethics.ThisisthecasewiththeEstateAgentsCouncil,theValuers’ Council and the Lawyers’ Association of Zimbabwe for Estate Agents,ValuersandLawyers.

Figure3.1:Actorsinasimplifiedlanddevelopmentprocess

FUNCTIONS

ACTORS La

nd

iden

tificationan

dacqu

isition

Land

‐useplann

ing

andde

marcatio

n

Land

surveyan

dpe

gging

Land

servicing

Land

tran

saction

facilitation

Land

rights

registratio

n

Supe

rstructure

designs,app

roval

andconstructio

n

Centralandlocalgovernment Privatelandsurveyors Privatelanddevelopers Financiers/Investors Propertyprofessionals Civilsocietyorganisations Privateindividuals

Source: Summarised from various documents

Not all actors perform thewhole array of functions. The participation of actors indifferent stages of the land access and development cycle is a function of thenationaldevelopmentframework,economicfactorsandspecificsectorapproaches.For instance, constrained financial sector performance due to economic declineresulted in financial institutionsnotbeing active in the landmarkets for sustainedperiods in the last decade. The functions that individual actors perform result inspecificoutputs.Intermsoflandmarketperformance,thecriticaloutputsare:

• Landforurbandevelopment

• Masterandlocalplans

• Layoutdesigns

• Surveyedstandsandplots(non‐titlesurveys)

• Servicedstands/plots

• Buildingplans


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• Actualbuildings/superstructures

• Propertyregistrationdocuments(agreementsofsale,leaseagreements,etc).

3.2.1 Local government actors

Urban councils are key institutionswith important functions in Zimbabwe’s urbanland markets. The core functions of local authorities include land acquisition,planning, land development and actual construction. Urban councils are planningauthoritiesintermsoftheRegionalTownandCountryPlanningAct.Theirplanningfunctions are centred on the preparation ofmaster and local plans, developmentcontrolandthesubdivisionandconsolidationofland.PartIVoftheRegionalTownandCountryPlanningActdefinesthepowersoflocalauthoritiestopreparemasterand local plans. The Department of Physical Planning and Urban Councils haveregulatory functions. This is particularly evident when executing developmentcontrol functions and the subdivision and consolidation of land. Amore elaboratediscussionofthesefunctionsisprovidedinChapter4ofthisreport.Urbancouncilsarealsoresponsibleforissuingratesclearancecertificates,akeydocumentrequiredin the registration of property rights (see Chapter 7). The operational challengesfacedbyurbancouncilsandthe implicationsthereoffortheperformanceofurbanlandmarketsarepresentedelsewhereinthisreport.

3.2.2 Deeds Registry Offices

Located in the Ministry of Justice, the Deeds Registry office has the exclusiveauthoritytoregisterrightsinland.TheDeedsRegistriesActandtheDeedsRegistriesRegulations(RhodesiaGovernmentNoticeNo.249of1977)regulatetheregistrationofrightsinlandthroughasystemthatrequirestheservicesofaRegistraraswellasaConveyancerinprofessionalpractice.

Box3.1–FunctionsanddutiesoftheDeedsRegistryOffice

Broadly,thefunctionsoftheDeedsRegistryOfficeinvolveregistrationoftitleinland,registrationofmortgageandnotarialbondsaswellasrelevantconsents,waiversofpreferencesandanyotherdocumentspertainingtosuchbonds,cancellationsofmortgagebondsandtransferoftitle,rightsandinterestinland.

Specifically,dutiesoftheRegistrarareoutlinedinSection5oftheDeedsRegistriesAct.TheRegistrarofDeedsismandatedto,interalia,

‐TakechargeofallrecordsintheDeedsRegistry.

‐Examinedeedsanddocumentssubmittedforexecutionorregistration.

‐Rejectdocumentswhichdonotcomplywiththelaw.

‐Registernotarialdocumentssuchasleases,trusts,notarialbonds,etc.

‐Registermortgagebonds,cessionsofmortgagebonds,waiversofpreference,cancellationsofmortgagebondsandallconsentsrelatingtomortgagebonds.

‐Registertitlesdeedstoland,aswellasallgrantsorleasesoflandissuedbytheState,andregisteramendments,renewalsandcancellationsofsuchleasesandreleasesofpartofthelandleased.

Source: Government of Zimbabwe, Deeds Registry Act, 1996


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Section 3(1) of the Deeds Registry Act establishes Deeds Registries in two of thecountry’sbiggestcities,HarareandBulawayo,eachtoserve its respectiveareasasoutlinedintheSchedule.IntermsoftheSchedule,anyfilingorregistrationofdeedsordocuments relating toaparticularproperty is effected in theDeedsRegistryofthe particular area inwhich the property is situated. In essence, there is a highlycentralised system of registering rights in land in Zimbabwe compared to thesystemsexistinginneighbouringcountieslikeSouthAfrica,NamibiaandBotswana.

3.3 Private sector actors

The private sector is active in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets as investors anddevelopers of property, financiers of property development and propertyprofessionals. There are multiple legislative and policy frameworks that regulatethesesub‐sectors.

3.3.1 Institutional investors and developers

Zimbabwe’s property investment sector is dominated by the activities of pensionfunds, life assurance companies and unit trusts. It is estimated that this group ofinstitutional investors controls in excess of 85%of all property investments in thecountry(Kuipa,2006).Amongotherformsofinvestment,thePensionFundindustryisexpectedto invest inpropertymarkets.TheNationalSocialSecurityAuthority,astatebody,isthebiggestofallpensionfunds.

Institutional investors and land developers are generally expected to leverage off‐site infrastructuredevelopment toensure thatmore landbecomesdevelopable.AkeyconstrainttotheavailabilityofdevelopablelandinZimbabwetodayisashortageof bulk infrastructure (sewer and water) and trunk services like roads. A secondfunctiontheyareexpectedtoplayistoleverageresourceavailability,particularlyforbuildingsocieties,throughparticipationinthesecondarymortgagemarket.

However, economic and regulatory bottlenecks have seen institutional investorsparticipating in stages of land development other than leveraging large‐scaleinfrastructuredevelopment,notparticipatinginthesecondarymortgagemarketandbasicallynotleveraginglandavailability.Insomecases,biginstitutionalinvestorsliketheNSSAhavebeendirectlyinvolvedinhousingconstruction.Insurancecompaniesand pensions funds handle large sums of money on behalf of policy holders.Unfortunately their participation in housing has been limited. A few of these, inparticular OldMutual, have handled housing schemes such asWestgate (Bluffhill)and Prospect Park in Harare. However, such schemes arose principally to supportshoppingcentredevelopmentsthatwereinitiatedbythecompany.

InZimbabwe,therolesofdevelopersandinvestorsareblurred.Forinstance,majorpropertydeveloperssuchasOldMutualandtheMining IndustryPensionFundarealso investors or owners of properties. This increases the risk of investing in thepropertymarket.ElsewhereinSouthernAfrica(e.g.SouthAfrica),developerslargelyfunction as profit‐takers who are in business of building and then selling almostimmediatelytoinvestors,thusspreadingtherisk.


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3.3.2 Financial institutions

Financial institutions includebanksandbuilding societieswhichplayamoredirectand significant role in urban land markets. There are four building societies inZimbabwe,andtheir functions includeofferingmortgage loans forthepurchaseofall typesofproperties.Otherbankingservicesoffered (thoughofa limitednature)includesavings,andfixedandsharedeposits.Further,buildingsocietiesparticipatedirectly in the servicing of land and construction of propertieswhich they hold astheirowninvestments.Theactivitiesofthesekey investors inthepropertymarkethavealsosufferedinthepastdecade.Forinstance,Kuipa(2006)hasnotedasharpdecline in investments inmortgage loans by building societies, compared to theirnon‐corebusinessactivities.Thus,thebanksandtheBankSurvey2005Supplement(asquotedinKuipa,2006:5)reportedthat “…conditions[prevailing]atyearendin2004, where Building Societies’ industry had only 19% of their asset base inmortgage,withtheremaining81%innon‐corebusiness,[are]unacceptable.”

The broad range of private sector financial institutions involved in urban landmarkets include building societies, the Infrastructure Development Bank ofZimbabwe and some commercial banks. The IDBZ was created by government tofinancehousingandinfrastructuredevelopment.Inadditiontodirectparticipationinthedevelopmentofhousingschemes,the IDBZalso lends fundstodevelopersandlocal authorities. Theparticipation of financial institutions in thehousing sector inparticularhasbeenlimitedduetoperceivedlowreturns.

3.4 Property professionals

Property professionals, especially those involved in conveyancing, real estate andvaluationareanintegralcomponentofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe.Simplyput,anurban landmarket isa forumwherebuyersand sellersof realestate ‘meet’ totransact. Themeeting point of these partiesmay not be a physical place (like forinstance, theZimbabweStockExchange),butcanbeusedtodescribethebusinesstransactionswhereverandinwhateverformitmaytakeplace.Estateandvaluationagentsarecentralinbringingtogetherthedifferentparties.Therolesofestateandvaluationagenciesincludefindingbuyersandsellersforproperties,representingtheinterests of either or both parties, determining the value of properties for rental,sale or other purpose, managing properties on behalf of clients, negotiatingtransactionsonbehalfofclients(buyersorsellers), identifyingpropertyinvestmentopportunities for clients (e.g. investment in existing or new properties) andorganising land resources for property development projects. The role of estateagenciesisthereforetobringpartiestogetherinthedisposalofrealestateandforvaluationagenciestodetermineworththroughthevaluationofrealestateinterests.

TheoperationsofestateagenciesfallundertheEstateAgentsCouncil,whilethoseof valuation agencies fall under the Valuers Council. Both bodies are statutoryorganisationscreatedbyActsofParliament–theEstateAgentsActandtheValuersAct,respectively.ThepreambletotheEstateAgentsActsummarisestheintentionsofthelegislationas,“ToprovideforthefunctionsandpowersoftheEstateAgentsCouncil;toprovidefortheregistrationofestateagentsinZimbabwe;toprovidefortheoperationof theEstateAgentsCompensationFund; toregulatethekeepingof


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moneyheldbyestateagentsonbehalfofotherpersons;andtoprovideformattersconnectedwithorincidentaltotheforegoing”.TheEstateAgentsCouncilisthebodythatregulatestheactivitiesoftheestateagents.Itenforcestherulesofconductforthe profession and ensures that estate agents have the necessary documentationthatenables themtopractice.Todoso,estateagentsneedaCompensationFundCertificate and a Certificate of Registration. At the time of undertaking the study,there were some 260 individuals and 130 companies registered as estateagents/agencies (from an interview conducted with the Estate Agents Council,February2011).ProfessionalsobtainaCertificateofRegistrationwhentheyareableto meet two main conditions. The first is that they should write and pass theexaminations set by the institution in one sitting. The second is that professionalsshould have a minimum of 3 years’ work experience. All companies operating asestateagentsarerequiredtoopenatrustaccount.AuditedaccountsformthebasisfortherenewaloftheCompensationFundCertificate.Ingeneral,theEstateAgentsCouncilworksthroughitsSecretariat,supportedbydifferentcommitteesthatcoverareassuchasfinance,disciplinaryissues,examinationsandaccountsreview.

The Valuers Council, operating under the Ministry of Public Construction, wasestablishedin1996butonlybecameoperationalin2010.

In general, professionals in the estate and valuation sector admit that there aregovernance‐related problems emanating from the misconduct of someprofessionals. Bogus estate agents continue to be a major cause of fraudulentproperty transactions. Such bogus organisations are inmost cases not registered,and are known to charge lower property prices in order to lure clients (from aninterviewconductedwiththeEstateAgentsCouncil,February2011).Withtheofficesof the Estate Agents Council located only in Harare, the organisation encouragesmembersofthetransactingpublictocheckontheauthenticityofparticularestateagentsbyeithercontactingthemtelephonicallyorvisitingtheiroffices.Inaneffortto eliminate bogus estate agents, the Estate Agents Council on an annual basispartners with the police to inspect estate agents throughout the country. Somepoliceofficersaretrainedonwhattolookforwhencheckingtheauthenticityofsuchpracticing estate agents. Disciplinary measures taken against offenders includeclosure of companies operating illegally and banning guilty professionals frompracticing. In 2009, four companies were closed for operating without beingregistered,whileninewereclosed in2010for thesamereason(froman interviewconductedwiththeEstateAgentsCouncil,February2011).Theownerofoneestateagencywasderegisteredin2010forfakingtitledeedstoaproperty(ibid).

3.5 Civil society organisations

Whereascentraland localgovernment institutionshaveworkedto improveaccessto land by the urban poor, limited success has been achieved because of highplanningandbuildingstandards,whichhavetheeffectofpushingthepriceof landbeyondthereachoftheintendedbeneficiaries.Ontheirown,somesectionsofthepoorhaveorganised intocooperativestofacilitateaccessto land.Thepastdecadehas witnessed the formation of civil society organisations with the thrust ofpromotingaccesstolandandotherhousingdevelopmentresourcesbythepoor.TheprincipalinitiativesidentifiedinthecontextofthisstudyincludeDialogueonShelter


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for the Homeless People in Zimbabwe Trust, the Zimbabwe Homeless People’sFederation,HousingPeopleofZimbabwe(HPZ),theZimbabweNationalAssociationofHousingCooperativesandtheCivicForumonHousing.

3.5.1 Dialogue on Shelter

Dialogue on Shelter is a registered Trustwhichwas establishedover 10 years agoand works in alliance with the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation. It offerstechnical assistance to the Federation (which has at least 40 000 membersnationwide) on matters of savings mobilisation, land negotiation processes withcentral and local government authorities, managing land development processes,thedesignandconstructionofhouses,aswellassupportingbroadermanagementofsettlements and the social movement. Within and outside of Harare, theorganisationhasfacilitatedaccesstotractsof landandhassupportedconstructionprocesses, with a number of Federation members having graduated to becomehomeowners.Initially,DialogueonShelterwasallocatedlandbytheCityofHarareinCrowboroughandbycentralgovernmentinDzivarasekwa.Atthetimeofconcludingthis study, Dialogue and the Zimbabwe Homeless People’s Federation, working inpartnership with the City of Harare, were steering a city‐wide slum upgradingprogrammefundedbytheBillandMelindaGatesFoundation.

3.5.3 Housing People of Zimbabwe

Theorganisationwasestablishedintheearly1990stoprovidetechnicalsupporttohousing cooperatives. Its principal partner/client is the 100‐member ZimbabweNationalAssociationofHousingCooperatives (ZINAHCO). LikeDialogueonShelter,Housing People of Zimbabwe has transformed how both central and localgovernment perceives housing cooperatives. In the process, members of theCooperativehaveaccessedlandanddevelopedhousingestatesinHarareandotherlocalauthorityareas inZimbabwe.Theformation,registrationandmanagementofcooperatives is regulated under a Cooperative Societies Act. However, somecooperativeshavebeenformedinrecentyearsthatdonotcomplywiththerigorouspre‐registration processes but still participate in the urban land market andundertake activities that influence both policy and practice in Harare and otherurbanareas.

3.5.4 Other housing cooperatives

In addition to cooperatives that are affiliated to ZINAHCO andworkwith HousingPeople of Zimbabwe, there is a host of other housing cooperatives, formal andinformal, in Zimbabwe that have successfully accessed urban land and developedhousing.Mostarecommunity‐basedwhilesomearework‐place‐based.

3.5.5 Civic Forum on Housing

The Civic Forum on Housing is a coalition of local and international developmentorganisationsactiveinthehousingsector.TheForumhasaSecretariatandconvenesmeetingstodeliberateonissuesinhousing.


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3.6 Analysis of institutional gaps

The above section has shown that actors in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets arelargely formal. Based on the overall assessment, there are limitations to theoperationofthesectorasawhole.First,thestudyrevealsthatthereisnopubliclyavailableinformationonpropertytransactions.Secondly,andrelatedtotheabove,thereisnoreadilyavailableinformationonlanddeliverythatcanbeobtained.Thislimitstheunderstandingoflandsupplyfunctionsofurbanlandmarkets.Thirdly,thecentralisation of property registration information is not only an inconvenience tothe transacting public, but amajor cause of fraudulent property transactions. Thefourthlimitationisthatresearchonlandmarketsisalmostnon‐existent,limitingthelevelofunderstandingofproblemsandconceptualisationofsolutions.

3.6.1 Unavailability of public information on land transactions

Amajor limitationofestateandvaluationagencies is thattheyareprivateentitieswhoseoperationsfalloutsideofthedomainofpubliccompanieswhicharerequiredtopublishperformance results. Thus the real estate sector is characterisedby theunavailabilityofinformationthatshouldbepublicallyavailable.It isnotpossibletoobtain information such as volumes of trade, value of transactions, trends inproperty transactions,etc. fromthese firmsAlthoughsomeof the informationcanbe sourced from the Deeds Registries office, it is very difficult collating suchinformation.Aprivate firmwhich in thepast compiledmonthly informationonallproperties transferredby theRegistrarofDeeds, coveringdetails suchaspropertydescription, landsizeandsellingprices,doesnotdosoanymore.Such informationwas of immense value to property industry practitioners, as it enabled them tocompare selling prices. Further, the comparison method of valuation which iscommonlyusedreliesheavilyonhavingaccesstoinformationonsimilarpropertiesthatwouldhavebeensoldonthemarket.Theabsenceofsuchcritical informationactsasanobstructiontothesmoothfunctioningofurbanlandmarkets.

3.6.2 Collation of land delivery information and management of information

Based on challenges faced by the authors of this study, in particular around thecontent of Chapter 5, it is evident that information on land delivery remainsscatteredandlargelyunusableforpolicyformulationandacademicdiscussion.Thisparticularstudyexperiencedgreatdifficultyaroundsourcingsuch information,andhadtoobtainindividuallayoutplansfromtheappropriatelocalauthoritiesinordertocollectinformationonlanddelivery.Thus,landsupplycanonlybeestimatedfrominformationcollectedona layout‐by‐layoutbasis,methodswhicharebydefinitionless accurate and labour intensive. Such information is also crude in form anddifficult to analyse. In this regard, there is a gap in termsof how local authoritiesoperate. Thus, the compilation and collation of land delivery information fromapprovedlayoutsisamissingcomponentinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets.

3.6.3 Centralisation of land administration in Harare and Bulawayo

Asdiscussedelsewhereinthisreport,theDeedsRegistryhasofficesonlyinHarareand Bulawayo. This makes land registry information generally inaccessible to allusers outside of the biggest cities in the country. The cost of doing business also


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increases for those living outside of these two cities as a result of the costsassociatedwithhavingtotraveltoeitherofthetworegistryofficestocheckonkeydocumentation before transacting. Some experts believe that failure of theDeedsRegistry office to decentralise is aiding the escalation of fraudulent propertytransactions,astransactingprofessionalsmaychoosenottotraveltoeitherHarareorBulawayotocheckontheauthenticityofpropertydocumentsbeforetransacting.

3.6.4 Loss of institutional memory

A common feature of state institutions in Zimbabwe is that they have beenfunctioningat sub‐optimal levels fora long time. Inaddition to losingexperiencedpersonnel, many such institutions no longermaintain efficient systems of record‐keeping,leadingtoalossofinstitutionalmemoryonalargescale.Duringthecourseof this study, it became evident that some key policy information was no longeravailableattheofficesofsuchinstitutions.Atypicalexampleisthepolicyonparalleldevelopment,where the policy instrument had to be retrieved from the home ofoneoftheofficersworkingfortheCityofHarareastherewasnocopyavailableatthe office. Property professionals interviewed during the course of this study alsomadereferencetothemisfilingofrecordsattheDeedsRegistryoffice.

3.6.5 Research and documentation on urban land markets

As indicatedearlier, this studyhasestablished that the topicofZimbabwe’surbanlandmarketsisgreatlyunder‐researched.Literatureonurbanlandmarketsisscarceandnopublicationsonsuchissuescouldbeidentified.Giventhedeclineofservicedeliveryinstateinstitutions,noannualreportsfromgovernmentdepartmentscouldbe found. As such, there is a severe lack of information on key aspects of theperformanceofurbanlandmarkets.


ThischapterhasshownthatawiderangeofinstitutionalactorsexistsinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets. Ingeneral,eachgroupof institutionalactorsoperatesunderaspecificlegalframework.Thereisnoactiveforumthatbringsthesegroupsofactorstogethertodiscusscommonissuesthataffectthefunctioningofurbanlandmarkets.As already discussed, institutional gaps exist as well, with nobody bearingresponsibilityforsomeimportantfunctions.


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4. InterrogatingthePlanningFrameworkanditsimpactonurban landmarkets

Cities in thedevelopingworld are facedbypressures linked to rapiddemographicchanges,rapidurbanisationandincreasinginformality,climatechange,thefailureofmarket‐basedapproaches tovariousaspectsofurbandevelopmentandchallengesrelated to governance at the local level (UN‐HABITAT, 2010). At the same time,planning and development standards operational inmost of the developingworldare based on the experience of developed countries, and hence are generally notaffordable to themajorityof residents (ibid). Zimbabweancitiesand townsarenoexception. In addition, most of the country’s urban areas face acute problems ofageing infrastructure. Planning interventions are best placed to assist cities andtowns respond to suchpressures inamanner that is sensitive to theneedsof thepoor.

Within the context of urban development and city management practices inZimbabwe, the planning framework determines the performance of urban landmarkets. Inparticular, landdelivery is largelyanoutcomeof theplanningprocess.Thekeyactorsintheplanningprocessareurbancouncils(localauthorities)andtheDepartmentofPhysicalPlanning(centralgovernment),whichfallundertheMinistryof Local Government. The ability of these key institutions to make sound plansimpactsonlandprovisionandhenceaffectsurbanlandmarkets.Themajorplanningfunctions include the preparation of Master and Local Plans as defined in theRegional Town and Country Planning Act, undertaking development controlfunctions asprescribedbyPartVof theAct and the regulationof subdivision andconsolidationofland.Theimpactofthisplanningframeworkonurbanlandmarketsisexpressedthroughland‐useplanning/zoningandtheimplementationofplanningstandards.

4.1 Preparation and implementation of Master Plans

In terms of Part IV of the RTCP Act, urban local authorities have the power toprepareMasterandLocalPlans.Ifforsomereason(e.g.lackofcapacity)theyfailtodischargethisfunction,theMinisterofLocalGovernment,throughtheDepartmentof Physical Planning, is empowered to prepare such plans on their behalf. This isprovidedforundertheDefaultPowersoftheMinisterasstipulatedinsection70(1),Part XI of the RTCP Act. Zimbabwean urban areas with Master Plans includeBulawayo, Harare, Gweru,Mutare, Kwekwe, Chegutu, Redcliff, Kadoma,MasvingoandMarondera. In essence,Master and Local Plansmap the general direction ofdevelopment through land‐use zoning. In addition, such plans identify the criticalinfrastructure required to support development and possible sources of funding.LocalPlansaremoredetailedinnature,providingspecificdevelopmentparameterslikestandcoverage,buildingheights,floorareafactors,buildinglinesandtherangeof standsizes.Whenproperlyarticulated,proposals inMasterandLocalPlanscanfacilitate innovative solutions to, for instance,affordablehousingbacklogs throughthe demarcation of smaller stand sizes and the development of cluster houses.Intensificationanddensificationofsettlementsareotheravenuesthatcanbeused


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asasolutiontoaffordablehousingproblems.AcaseinpointisHarare’sWaterfalls‐Hatfield Local Development Plan,which promotes such initiatives, and the HarareCombination Master Plan policy on housing and land delivery, which emphasisesintensification/densificationandtheuseofseptictanksandsoak‐aways.

However,therearechallengestothe implementationofMasterandLocalPlans.Amajor drawback is that there are always delays in their preparation and finalapproval, which slow down the release of land onto the market. For example,Harare’sSouthern IncorporatedAreasLocalPlan tookmanyyears tobeapproved,compromising its potential to release housing stands at scale. More importantly,onceinplace,MasterPlanstakelongtobereviewed,asituationthatoftenresultsinsuchplansbeingoutdatedandproposalsbeingovertakenbyevents. Forexample,theMutareMasterPlantookmorethanfiveyearstoprepare,andwasmeanttobeoperational for up to 10 years,with its critical assumptions andmajor projectionsbased on the premise that they would be in force up to the year 2000. Yet theMutareMasterPlanremainsoperationalmorethan10yearslater,andtheprocesstowards reviewing it has only just started.Meanwhile, some of theMaster Plan’sprovisions have been overtaken by other events and processes, and in particularpolicychangesbybothcentralgovernmentandtheMunicipalityofMutare. In thisregard,policychangesinhousingandplanningstandardsanddevelopmentfinancingarenolongerinsyncwithsomeoftheMasterPlan’sprovisions.SuchchallengesarecommoninallcitieswithMasterPlans.

The successful implementation of Master and Local Plans is premised on certainassumptions. If suchkey conditions areabsent, the significanceofMasterPlans ininfluencing land delivery processes is diminished. The Harare CombinationMasterPlan is a case in point. The plan identified land for development throughdensification and southward expansion towards Chitungwiza. It also identifiedcritical infrastructure needed to support such development. In particular theupgrading of Furle and Crowborough (Sewerage) Treatment Works and SelbyTreatmentWorkswere a critical requirement that would enablemore land to beserviced and delivered onto the market. However, the lack of a coordinatedframeworkbetweenplanningand implementation createdbottlenecks forhousinglandprovision.Ultimately,Councilandcentralgovernmentdidnothavethefundstoupgrade treatment facilities or construct new treatment infrastructure. Thus landidentifiedfornewdevelopment(e.g.intheSouthernAreasLocalDevelopmentPlanand parts of the Waterfalls‐Hatfield Local Plan) remained undeveloped for sometimeduetolackofinfrastructure.

4.2 Town planning schemes

Criticism has also been levelled against operative Town Planning Schemes, withmany housing/property developers and practitioners stating that their rigidity is ahindrancetothequickreleaseoflandontothemarket.Ingeneral,suchcriticismhasmerit,especiallyinrelationtothreemainaspects–landtemporarilyrestrictedfromdevelopment, generous stand size provisions and the lack of provision for thedevelopment of cluster houses. Even though the existing Town Planning Schemescontrol development only in certain parts of the City of Harare, especially theaffluentnorthernsuburbsandsomeoftheeasternandwesternsectionsofthecity;


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where the town planning schemes do operate, there is restricted supply of land,pricesarehighandthepoorareexcluded.

During the 1950s when most Town Planning Schemes in Harare were prepared,primelandfordevelopmentwasinabundanceandalotoflandthatnowisviewedasdevelopablewasclassifiedas‘LandTemporarilyRestrictedagainstDevelopment’.The critical assumptionwas that such landwouldbedeveloped in the futurewiththeappropriatetechnologyandundertherightcircumstances.Theschemesdonotclearlyprovidetheconditionsandproceduresforreleasingsuchlandandinpracticethis might entail preparation of Local Development Plans or lodging a SpecialConsent application, processes which are lengthy and often lead to delays inreleasinglandontothemarket.

In general,mostTownPlanningSchemesaregenerous in the stand sizesprovidedfor, with some land now within the City boundary still being zoned as ‘RuralAgriculture’ (forexample, some landnorthofVainonaandBorrowdale is currentlyzoned‘RuralAgriculture’,withstandsizesrangingfrom1acreto1.6hectares).Thiscontradicts the Densification Policy advocated in the Harare Combination MasterPlan which was approved in 1994. Further, international debates are promotingurban planning approaches that produce compact cities (UN‐HABITAT, 2010). Forsuchlandtobereleasedontothemarket,LocalPlanshavetobeprepared(asisthecase at the moment for the Avondale, Marlborough, Mount Pleasant, Greendale,BorrowdaleandVainonaareas).Onaverage,suchplanstakefiveyearstoprepare,causingcostlydelaysinpropertydevelopment.ItisclearfromtheaboveobservationthatTownPlanningSchemesarenotresponsiveenoughtodevelopmentimperativesontheground.

In Harare, cluster housing development has been undertaken in recent yearstargeting the middle class in areas like Greendale, Hatfield, Mount Pleasant andBorrowdale.ExistingTownPlanningSchemesdonotprovideforclusterhousingasause; however, Special Consent procedures are often applied when processingapplications for cluster housingdevelopments.As already argued, theprocess is alengthy and costly exercise, and it also limits the number of units that can beconstructedandreleasedintothelandandhousingmarket.

4.3 Development control and planning standards

Development control and the enforcement of planning standards determine,amongst other things, the use of land and the cost of developing the land. In theend,thepriceoflandandanyimprovementsonitreflectsthecostassociatedwithcompliance with development conditions and the enforcement of planningstandards. Part V of the Regional Town and Country PlanningAct empowers localauthorities to monitor and control development in their areas of jurisdiction.Developmentcontrolisbasedonthevariousstatutoryplans(e.g.MasterandLocalPlans,andTownPlanningSchemes)controllingdevelopmentinanarea.Asindicatedabove,MasterandLocalPlansdefineplanningpoliciesandproposals inrelationtozoning, development density and use mix (from ‘freely permitted’ through thosepermittedby‘specialconsent’tothosethatare‘prohibited)’.Further,suchpolicies


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and proposals relate to bulk infrastructure provision (water, sewer and roads),financingmechanisms,andphasingandimplementationofthevariousproposals.

Based on appropriate land use zoning, some development is freely permitted,requiring only development permits to be issued before development takes place(i.e. after approval of building plans). However, there are also provisions forundertaking development that is not ordinarily permitted in a zone, subject tocertainconditionsbeingmet.Inthiscontext,section26(3)oftheRegionalTownandCountry Planning Act provides for special consent procedures, whereby suchdevelopmentproposals are lodgedwith theauthoritiesand thenadvertised in thepress,withadjacentpropertyownersbeingdirectlynotified.Whentheconsultationsareconducted,afinaldecisionismadebycouncilforeitherapprovalorrefusal.

There is an increase in caseswheredevelopment takes place in Zimbabwe’s citieswithout the necessary planning approvals being obtained. Indeed, the conditionsthattheCleanupCampaignof2005soughttoeliminatewascharacterisedbyillegalsettlementsandstructures.Indealingwithsuchillegaldevelopments,therearetwooptionsprovidedbytheRegionalTownandCountryPlanningAct.Thefirstrelatestoregularisation of illegal developments as provided for under section 27,while thesecondoptionistoimplementsections33‐35oftheActthatsanctionstheissuingofenforcementandprohibitionorders,anduptodemolition ofproperty,aswasthecaseundertheCleanupCampaign.

Planning standards, either as stated in Master and Local Plans or in Policyinstructions,areanintegralpartofdevelopmentcontrol.Planningstandardscoverawide range of issues, with the key areas being building heights, stand coverage,buildinglines,areafactors,standsizesandminimumsubdivisionspermittedineachzone.Insomecasesspecificbuildingmaterialsmustbeused,whilethetypeofroadfinishescanalsobedefined.Asageneralrule,highplanningstandardsincreasethecostofservicingandbuildingof infrastructure.Thusfor instance,therequirementsthateveryroadshouldbesurfaced,everystandaccessedfromanaccessroadandconnected to a water supply, and that either a septic tank or connection to areticulatedsewersystemmustbeavailableinevitablypushupthecostofdevelopingtheland.Effectively,thisreducestheparticipationofthepoorinurbanlandmarkets.

Ingeneral, therehasbeenwidespreadcriticismofZimbabwe’splanningstandards.TheRegional TownandCountryPlanningAct and theHousing StandardsActhavebeen criticised for setting unrealistically high standards of servicing andinfrastructure development (UN, 2005). “The norms and standards contained intheseActs,whichwereappliedbythecolonialregimeas instrumentsofapartheid,include individual connection towater supply andwater‐borne sewerage for high‐density, low‐income neighbourhoods. Water‐borne sewer systems, which areparticularly costly tobuild andmaintain, are... unrealistic in thepresent economiccircumstances …similarly, the prevailing building codes and standards are alsounrealisticandexceedstandardscurrentlyusedinseveraldevelopedcountries”(UN,2005:25).

In the light of such criticism, government took measures to lower some of thestandardsovertime.CircularNo70of2004fromtheMinistryofLocalGovernment,Public Works and National Housing provided a new set of planning, housing and


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infrastructure servicing standards. The overall thrust was to reduce the cost ofbuildingandtherebyimprovingonaffordability.It isinthiscontextthatstandsizesfor low‐cost/high‐densityhousingwerereducedfrombetween150m2and300m2to between 70 m2 and 200 m2. The new stand sizes for middle‐income/medium‐density housing now range between 300 m2 and 500 m2. For high‐income/low‐density housing, stand sizes now range between 800 m2 and 2 000 m2, with thelarger of these stands being reserved for areas with on‐site sewage disposal. Thethrust with the reduced stand sizes was to promote densification, an importantpolicyprovisionintheoperativeMasterandLocalPlans.AsummaryofthenewsetofstandardsisoutlinedinBox4.1

Box4.1–Newnationalhousingstandardsforurbanareas

PARAMETER PERMITTEDSTANDARDS

70m2‐200m2forhigh‐densityhousing

300m2–500m2formedium‐densityhousing

Standsizes

800m2–2000m2forlow‐densityhousing

Buildinglines Forhigh‐densityhousing,onemetrefromthesideboundary,3metresfromthefrontboundaryand2metresfromthenearboundary.

Formedium‐densityhousing,5metresfromthefrontboundary,2metresfromthesideboundaryand3metresfromthenearboundary.Forlow‐densityhousing,5metresfromthefrontboundaryand3metresfromallotherboundaries.

Roadwidth Districtdistributors(maininternaltrafficroutes)tobe20‐25meters.Primarydistributors(majorregionalthroughroads)tobe25‐30meters

Allstandsshallhavedirectaccess.Accessroadstobe8metersinhigh‐densityareas,10metersinmedium‐densityareasand12metersinlow‐densityareas.

Infrastructure,roadsandstormwaterdrainage

Infrastructure,watersupply

Accessroadsinhigh‐densityareasmustbeappropriatelygravelled,allroadsshallbesurfacedinmedium‐andhigh‐densityareas.Inhigh‐densityareas,allstandsshallbeconnectedtoareticulatedwatersupplynetwork,withcommunalstandpipesallowedastemporarymeasures.

Infrastructure,sewerage Inhigh‐andmedium‐densityareas,allstandstobeconnectedtoreticulatedsewer.Inlow‐densityareas,subjecttosoilsuitability,standsizesabove1200m2shallhaveon‐sitesewagetreatment,whilestandsonactivesoilsandthosebelow1200m2shallbeonreticulationsewer.

Housingconstructioninhigh‐densityareas

Theminimumroomsizeis6m2,downfrom7m2.Wallsshallbeconstructedofburntclaybricks/blocks,cementbricksandstabilisedsoilbricks.Burntfrombricksorotherapprovedmaterialcanbeusedforbuildingsinglestoreybuildings.

Floorsshallhaveagranofinish.

Roofsshallbemadeofasbestossheets,claytiles,zinc.

Thethicknessofexternalwallsistobeaminimumof115metres.

Source: Summarised from Circular No. 70 of 2004, Ministry of Local Government, Public Works and National Housing


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In addition to the above‐mentioned guidelines, theMinistry of LocalGovernment,Rural and Urban Development in 2006 recommended that local authorities adoptthepolicyof”ParallelDevelopment”,whichallowshousingconstructiontoproceedsimultaneously with the servicing of stands. It is against this background that theEnvironmental Management Committee of the City of Harare, then led by theunelected Harare Commission, allowed parallel development for major estatedevelopmentbycooperatives.Itwasnotpossible,withinthecontextofthisstudy,toestablish the extent to which other local authorities have reacted to therecommendations.

The review of planning standards is generally perceived as a positive step bygovernment. However, fears in some circles remain that some of the describedactionsweremotivatedmorebypolitical than technical imperatives. For instance,someofthebeneficiariesofthepost‐2000periodwereallocatedlarge‐sizedstandsof 2 000 m2 which are expected to be serviced by septic tanks and soak‐aways,effectivelyfloutingthenew,revisedstandards.Moreover,mostofthebeneficiariesarepoor residentswhocannot finance theservicingof suchstands. InHarare, thespecific housing schemes affected are Stoneridge, Eyecourt and large parts of thesouthernincorporatedareas.Thelong‐termstatusofsuchschemesremainsunclear.Theuncertaintyisfurtherfuelledbyawidespreadperceptionthatbeneficiarieswereencouraged not to erect permanent structures (from key informant interviewsconductedwithbeneficiaries,January2011).

In general, the adjustments to planning standards are still considered inadequate.Eventhestate‐organisedSecondNationalHousingConventionof2009criticisedtheplanningframeworkasnotbeingresponsivetothecurrenthousingrequirementsinthecountry.TheprocessofpreparingMaster,Localandlayoutplansisseenasbeingcumbersome and time‐consuming (GOZ, 2009), while Development Controlprocessesaredescribedasveryrigid,withtheapprovalofbuildingplanstakingtoolong. In addition, infrastructure standards that dictate that residential areasmusthaveroads,sewers,reticulatedwaterandstormwaterdrainagebeforeconstructionareconsideredinappropriateinthecurrentsituationandstallingthedeliveryoflandforlow‐costandlow‐incomehousing.

4.4 Subdivision and consolidation of land

New land becomes available on landmarkets as stands or plots for developmentfollowingthesubdivisionoforiginalparcelsofland.PartVIoftheRegionalTownandCountryPlanningActprovidesforthesubdivisionandconsolidationofbothprivateand public sector land. The subdivision of such land is through the preparation oflayout plans by either by the Department of Physical Planning, urban localauthorities or private town planning professionals. The subdivision of privatelyowned land is governedby section40of theRegional TownandCountryPlanningAct for either development that is freely permitted or that which is permittedthroughspecialconsent(Section40(3)).Animportantprovisioninthesubdivisionofprivate land is the setting aside of land for public use and the payment ofendowment fees to therelevant localauthority.Section43of theActprovides forthe subdivision of state land, a process that is done by the Director of PhysicalPlanning.


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In terms of the Regional Town and Country Planning Act, for one to lodge anapplication for a subdivision, one has to either be the owner of the property, anagent of the owner or have the owner’s consent in writing. Once the relevantsubdivisionformshavebeencompletedandtheapplicationfeespaid,theprocessesof consultations (with Council departments and other statutory bodies like ZESA,PTC, etc.) begins. If it is a subdivision that requires Special Consent, then thenecessaryadvertisementsarelodgedandnotificationsofadjacentpropertyownersdone.Normallyasubdivisionapplicationshouldbedeterminedwithinfourmonthsunless an extension of time has been sought and granted by the Local PlanningAuthority.Inpractice,thisisseldomthecase.

Auniquechallengewasfacedwiththeplanningoflandthatwasacquiredforurbandevelopment in thepost‐2000period.This landwasonceprivatelyownedbuthasbeenacquiredbythestatethroughtheFastTrackLandReformProgramme,astheprivateownerswereunabletosubmittherequiredtitledeedsofthepropertiestheyhad acquired. In the initial phases, Local Planning Authorities were hesitant toapprovelayoutspreparedbythenewbeneficiariesintermsofSection40andsuchlayoutshadtobereferredtotheDepartmentofPhysicalPlanningfordeterminationintermsofSection43oftheAct.Thisputthedepartmentunderimmensepressure,both intermsof lackofcapacitytoapprovesuchplansaswellas lackofclarityonhowtodealwithsuchlayoutsinthefirstphasesofthelandacquisition.Forexample,layouts that were approved in terms of Section 40 (Council) for the EyercourtHousing Developmentwere later sent for approval in terms of Section 43 (to theDepartment of Physical Planning). This created delays in land delivery as well asadditionalcostsinengagingconsultantstopreparesuchplans.

In general, thewhole process of layout approval is cumbersome and bureaucratic(thereisno‘one‐stop‐shop’facilityfor layoutdetermination).For instance,asinglelayouthastobecommenteduponbynolessthaneightdepartmentsintheCityofHarare.Ifthelayoutisbiggerthan250stands,theDepartmentofPhysicalPlanninghastobeconsulted.Thisaddstofurtherdelaysinapproval.Thisisevenworsewhenthe application involves Special Consent processes where some land owners canobjectandstalltheprocess.

The process of layout preparation and approval assumes that the planningauthorities have the necessary capacity to assess and approve such plans. In thecurrentcircumstancesthisisnotthecase,astheCouncilsorDepartmentofPhysicalPlanninghave lostexperiencedpersonnel.This leadstodelays in theprocessingoftheapplications.Forinstance,anapplicationinChitungwizawithmorethan15000standswas lodgedwith theDepartmentof Physical Planning in 2009. It is nearingapproval now in 2011. This puts pressure on the local authoritywhich has a longhousingwaiting list.However,given the large‐sizednatureof thisparticular layoutplan,itcanbearguedthatthetimetakenwas,infact,relativelyshort.

4.5 Importance of reviewing planning legislation

As discussed in preceding sections, the planning framework has incrementallyresponded to some of the challenges faced by Zimbabwe’s cities and towns.However,itseemsasifmorestillneedstobedonetomakeplanningmoreeffective


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in addressing the challenges associated with rapid urbanisation, climate change‐related challenges, informality of settlements, urban poverty and improving thegovernanceofcities.

Inmanyrespects,theplanningframeworkhasremainedstatic.Acaseinpointistherequirement for public participation in connectionwith the preparation ofMasterandLocalPlans.Sections15and18oftheRegionalTownandCountryPlanningActrequirethatMasterandLocalPlansbeputonapublicexhibitionforaperiodoftwomonths at designatedplaces.During theexhibitionperiod,membersof thepublicare expected tomakephysical visits toplaceswhere theplans areondisplay andmake their representations, if any. In general, this method of promoting publicparticipationisnotconvenienttothepublic,asonehastomakeaphysicalvisitandrepresentationsaftera‘short’browsingofthedocument.

Thepoorersectionsofsocietybarelygettheopportunitytomakerepresentations.In the new world order where technological advancements have improved thepublic’s access to information, it remains long‐overdue to review the planninglegislation to allowpublic participation throughmultiple fora that include internetandemail.UN‐HABITAT(2010)madeastrongcaseforimprovedparticipationintheplanningprocess.Itadvocates“puttinginalegalbasisforlocalpoliticsandplanningthat specifies how the outcomes of participatory processes will influence planpreparation anddecisionmaking, ensuring that local governmentshave significantresponsibilities, resources and autonomy to support participatory processes,ensuringcommitmentofgovernmentandfundingagentstoresourcedistributioninorder to support implementation of decisions arising from participatory planningprocesses,makingsurethatparticipationhasconcreteoutcomesandenhancingthecapacity of professionals in terms of their commitment and skills to facilitateparticipation, provide necessary technical advice and incorporate the outcomes ofparticipatingintoplanninganddecisionmaking”(UN‐HABITAT,2010:ix).

In addition, other sections of the Act such as Section 1 that deals with regionalplanninghaveremaineddormantforseveraldecades.Inthisregard,areviewoftheplanninglegislationwithaviewtoimproving,interalia,efficiencyinimplementationandthesignificanceofpublicparticipationintheplanningprocessisnowrequired.More importantly, space needs to be created to enable the participation of theurbanpoorinplanningprocesses.TheseissuesarealsoaddressedinChapter8thatproposesafive‐yearprogrammeonurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe.

Climatechange‐relatedchallengesarepracticalproblemsfacedbycitiesandtownsworld‐wide.Planningprovidessomeof thegreatestopportunities formakingcitiesand towns adapt to climate change through the establishment of greeninfrastructure, expanding on small‐scale energy and water systems and thepromotion of local economic development (ibid). It is important for Zimbabwe’splanningtools,especiallyplanninglegislationandtools likeMasterandLocalPlans,toincorporateappropriatemeasurestomitigateclimatechange‐relatedimpacts.Asdiscussed elsewhere in this report, informal settlements in Zimbabwe are atdifferent stages of re‐planning and thus it is the opportune time to incorporatemeasuresthatmitigateclimatechange‐relatedchallenges.Throughthe loweringofplanning standards and permitting the construction of gravel roads, the state hasmovedintherightdirectioninreducingthecarbonfootprintassociatedwithtarring


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ofroads.Whatremainsmissingistheadoptionofdevelopmentmethodologiesthatbenefitthepoor.Atypicalexampleistheadoptionoflabour‐intensivemethodsforconstructing gravel roads to allow local economic development that benefits thepoorininformalandupcomingplannedsettlements.


This chapter has argued that Zimbabwe’s planning framework plays an importantfunction in delivery of urban land for development. Through planning for high‐density areas, the planning framework makes an attempt to plan for the poor.Significantstepshavebeenmadetoreduceplanningstandardstoallowthepoortheopportunity todevelopaffordablehousing.However, there is stillaneed formoreproactiveinitiativesthatbenefitthepoor.Thecurrentend‐resultisthattheplanningframework inhibitsaccessto landbythepoorbecauseofhighstandards,delays inapprovalsandimplementation,andoutdatedplanningtheories.Morepositivepolicyinterventions are still required. Further, there is a need formore creativewaysofmakinglandmarketsworkbetterforthepoor.Forinstance,theuseoflanddonatedthrough endowment can be reserved for the ultimate benefit of the poor. Thedevelopmentaccountsoperatedbythelocalauthoritiescanalsotargetthepoorforinfrastructuredevelopment.Amajorweaknessisthattheplanningframeworkdoesnot exclusively define who the poor are, and neither are there any elaborateproceduresthatguidetheselectionofthepoor.


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5. Performance,challengesandshortcomingsofurbanland marketsinZimbabwe

This chapter presents findings on the performance of Zimbabwe’s urban landmarkets.Itpresentsdata,albeitsometimeslimited,onlandandhousingdeliveryinHarare.Asindicatedearlier,itwasnotpossible,withinthecontextofthisstudy,toprovideanationalpictureonthestatusoflandandhousingdeliveryinZimbabwe’surbancentres.Thechaptershowsthatwithinarestrictiveplanningframeworkandadepressed economy, land and housing delivery have continued to under‐perform,missing policy targets and failing to meet demand. On the surface, the situationseemstohaveimproved,however,withlandacquisitionundertheFastTrackLandReformProgramme.Thestateisemergingasthedominantplayerinthedeliveryofland. Admittedly, the data presented on land delivery are biased towards thehousing sector; however, this should not be a cause of concern, since the sectorconstitutes the dominant land‐use in Zimbabwe’s urban centres. The chapteraddressesissuesrelatingtoformallandmarkets.Adiscussionontheperformanceoftherealestatesectorisincluded,focusingonbothlandandpropertysalesandtherentalmarket. Further, thischapterpresents findingsonthenatureandcausesofdisputesinZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets.

5.1 Land and housing delivery in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets

Dataonlanddeliveryarebasedoninformationcollectedonthemajorlayoutplansimplemented in the City of Harare for the period 1994 to 2011, and directobservations on the ground. Small layout plans, especially infill developments andSpecial Consent Permits (for cluster housing and other smaller subdivisions) byindividuals are not represented in the figures discussed in this section. Table 5.1showsthetrends intheproductionofresidentialstands intheCityofHarare,withthegraphictrendspresentedinFigure5.1.Thestudydiscussestheperformanceoflanddelivery inHarareaccording todefinedperiodsandattempts togivepossibleexplanationsforthepatternsshowninFigure5.1.


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Table5.1:Standproductionbysectorbyyear

Year Council Stateland Private Overall

1999 0 0 3500 3500

2000 0 0 6250 6250

2001 0 1200 3400 4600

2002 0 1200 0 1200

2003 0 1000 550 1550

2004 172 0 1200 1372

2005 3963 0 0 3963

2006 639 2600 0 3239

2007 2731 0 3200 5931

2008 1238 8000 0 9238

2009 197 1000 800 1997

2010 0 3300 4100 7400

2011 0 18500 0 18500

Total 8940 36800 23000 68740

Source: Compiled from City of Harare Layout Plans

Figure5.1:Standproductionbysectorandyear

Source: Compiled from City of Harare Layout Plans

Residential stand production experienced four peak periods, namely around 2000,around 2005, around 2008 and in 2011. The peak periods were dominated bydifferent actors, with the private sector being more active around 2000, Councilbeingmoreactivearound2005andthestatebeingthedominantactorafter2005.Performancewas lowest in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2009.Whilst there are no clearexplanationsforsuchtrends,thefollowingreasonscouldpossiblyexplaintheabovephenomena.Duringthe1990sandaround2000,Councilandthestatedidnotownmuch land in theCity, sincemostof the landearmarked forurbanexpansionwasprivately owned and indications are that therewere protracted negotiations withlandownersoversellingprices (CityofHarare,2002).Added to this, therewasnomoneyforservicingwhatCouncilandstatelandwasavailable,andthusitcouldnotbe sold for development. Given this background, the private sector was the


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dominantplayerinthesupplyofland.Thelandavailableduringthistimewasmeantlargelyforthehigh‐andmiddle‐incomegroupswhohadthemeanstoparticipateinland transactions, thereby elbowing out the low‐income group (see image 5.1 fortypicalprojects financedby theprivatesector targeting themiddle‐incomegroup).Standproductionwaslowduringtheperiod2001to2004,whichwasthetimewhenthe land occupations of the post‐2000 period were at their peak. This possiblyaffected landdelivery,askeyactorswerestilladjusting to the realitiesof theneweconomiccircumstances.

Reacting to thedemandby low‐income groups, Council embarkedon several infillhousing projects, mostly in high‐density areas like Kuwadzana and Mufakose,Warren Park and Budiriro suburbs from 2004 to 2006, which were especiallyearmarked for low‐income housing cooperatives (see image 5.2 for a typical low‐incomeCouncilhousingcooperativeinKuwadzanaPhase3).Still,thesupplyoflandwas low, and given the economic hardships in the periods around 2006 to 2008,private sector participation in stand production declined significantly. From 2006onwards, the state became the dominant actor in the supply of land. Two factorscontributed to this – the ‘conclusion’ of the land acquisition process and therelaxationofthestringentplanningandbuildingstandardsasevidencedbythe2004reformofplanningstandardsandthe2006ParallelDevelopmentPolicy(seealsothediscussioninChapter4,section4.3).However,itisnotcleariflandallocationbythestatetargetedthepoor.Figure5.2summarisestheperformanceofstanddeliverybyincomegroupduringthestudyperiod.


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Image5.1:MainwayMeadowsmedium‐densityhousingdevelopmentinWaterfalls,Harare

Source: Google Images


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Figure5.2:Standdeliverybydifferentincomegroups

Source: Compiled from different layouts (Harare City Council)

In summary, the key actors involved in land delivery during the period discussedwerecentralgovernment,theHarareCityCouncilandprivatedevelopers.Table5.1shows that a total of 68 740 residential stands were released onto the market.Centralgovernmentreleased36800standsontothemarket,whichconstituted53%ofthetotal landdelivered,whiletheHarareCityCouncilcontributedonly13%andtheprivatesectorproduced33%.

From the available statistics, it seems as if the state is increasingly becoming themajor source of land supply to Zimbabwe’s land markets, while the role of theHarare City Council has diminished in importance. By and large, the situation isexplained by central government’s acquisition of peri‐urban farms under the FastTrackLandrReformProgramme,manyofwhichwerelocatedintheurbanandperi‐urban areas. These farms were planned, demarcated and allocated by the state,hencethesignificantroleofcentralgovernmentinlanddelivery.

Dominance by private sector, targeting high and middle income groups

Dominance of Council, targeting low income groups and Council Cooperatives

Dominance by the state, targeting low income groups and Cooperatives


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Image5.2:KuwadzanaPhase3low‐income/high‐densityhousingdevelopmentproject


The discussion on land delivery (the supply side) and its impact on land marketsneeds tobeplaced in thecontextofdemand for land. Ingeneral, thedemand forlandandhousingispoorlyconceptualisedinpolicydebates.Elsewhereinthisreport,thesignificanceofthehousingwaitinglistsandtheirlimitationshasbeenalludedto.In the absence of accurate data, quantifying the demand for land and housing inZimbabwe’s urban land markets remains merely speculative. As such, therelationship between demand and supply of urban land is better understood bycomparing land delivery statistics and set policy targets. Thus, Auret (1995) notedthatannual supply in the1990swas less than10%of targets,at12000 to14000units per year, against a target of 162 500 units. A USAID report on housing inZimbabwenoted that the country needed to build at least 84 000 units a year tomeetthehousingdemand(USAID,1996). InChapteroneofthisreport ithasbeennotedthatby2003,housingprovisioninurbanareashaddecreasedfromanannualaverageofbetween15000and20000unitsinthe1985to1995eratoonly5000


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unitsin2000(MinistryofLocalGovernment,PublicWorksandUrbanDevelopment,2006).Basedonthis, it isevidentthat thesupplysideof landdelivery is farbelowthedemandside.Effectively,thishastheimpactofpushingupthepriceforlandandhousing on the market and excluding the poor in participating in formal sectorhousingdevelopment.

Inaddition,thestatisticson landdeliverymustbeunderstoodintermsofwhetherthe stands have been serviced or not. For instance, the policy on paralleldevelopment was put in place as a response to a lack of funds to finance theservicingofstandsbeforetheywereallocated.GovernmentrecordsshowthatunderOperationGarikai/theHlalaniKuhleHousingProgramme,un‐servicedstandswereallocated to housing cooperatives, developers and employers to facilitate thebuildingofhouses(seeimages5.4and5.5forsomeprojectsthatbenefitedfromtheParallelDevelopmentPolicy).Assuch,landdeliverybycentralgovernmentmustbeviewed as a package that is not complete compared to the policy and legalrequirementsontheservicingof land.However, it isgenerallyagreedthatthis isamorerealisticapproachtolandaccessbytheurbanpoorwhowilldevelopstructuresat their own pace. In any case, other actors like the private sector and localauthoritiesarestillrequiredtoservicestandsbeforereleasingthemonthemarket.Whilstthepolicyonparalleldevelopmentcouldbeseenaspro‐poorandleadingtothe immediate release of land, it has the potential to distort land prices. Moreimportantly,theeffectofsuchapolicyonthequalityofsettlementsandtheextenttowhichthemodelisassistingthepoorareyettobeevaluated.


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Image5.3:ProjectinDzivaresekwaundertheParallelDevelopmentPolicy


Image 5.3 illustrates the basic tenets of the Parallel Development Policy(development with relaxed planning standards to enable the poor to haveaccommodation).PartA(bottomleft)showssomehousesatfoundationlevel,whilstpartBshowsstructuresabovegroundlevelandpartCshowscompletedstructures.Note that such development has been carried out with minimum infrastructureinstallation(withnodirectstandaccesstoroadsasrequiredbytheHararebylaws).Theroadsprovidedaregraveldistributorroadsonly.Theassumptionisthatsomeoftheinfrastructurewillbeprovidedprogressivelyoncethebasicshelterrequirementshavebeenprovided.Image5.4showsthesamedevelopmentinalargercontextwithbuilding sites at different stages of construction, as well as different levels ofinfrastructureprovision. It is clear that priority is beingplacedon theprovisionofaccommodation,withonlythebasicinfrastructurebeingprovided.

A

B

C


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Image5.4:High‐densityhousingdevelopmentbyaCooperativeinDzivaresekwaExtensionHararethatbenefitedfromtheParallelDevelopmentPolicy


Chapter one dwelt at length on the politics affecting the governance of key stateinstitutions.Acommonfeatureofnationalpoliticsisthepolarisationofthecountrybased on affiliation to the main political parties – ZANU P.F. and the two MDCparties. It is commonknowledge that the landoccupations legitimisedby the FastTrack Land Reform Programme were driven by ZANU P.F. party structures(Marongwe 2003, 2009). Accordingly, the question of who benefited from landallocation, even in the towns and cities, cannot be unrelated to one’s politicalaffiliationtoZANUP.F.

Elsewhere in this report it is mentioned that residents of informal settlements inEpworth confirmed that the tenure security to their allocated residential standsderivesfromZANUP.F.,thepoliticalpartythatgavethemthelandinthefirstplace.Withcentralgovernmentemergingas themajorsourceof supplyof land tourbanmarkets inHarare, it is inevitable that the land allocation process in certain casesmighthavebeenpoliticallydriven.WiththeCityofHararerelegatedasasourceofland supply, it is not clearwhether thewaiting list hasbeenadhered to as a landallocationtool.Thustheplaceofcentralgovernmentasthemainactor involved in

See Image 4 for more details on this new development site

A completed section under the parallel development program. Note the completed roads and compare this with the new site shown below

Another new site being developed under the parallel development policy

Another new site being developed under the parallel development policy


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landdeliveryraisesquestionsoffairness,transparencyandgoodgovernancearoundthelandallocationprocessinurbanareas.

Asalreadyargued, thestateownssignificant tractsof land incitiessuchasHararefollowingtheacquisitionoflandforurbandevelopmentthroughtheFastTrackLandReformProgramme.Suchlandwasallocatedthrougharrangementsthatwerenevermadepublic. Ingeneral, thestatedoesnothavethefinancetodevelopsuch land,andhencehasgoneintopartnershipwithcompaniesandindividualstodeveloptheland. In return for investment on the land through servicing of infrastructure,investors are paid in kind, that is, through land. For instance, in the HatcliffeExtensionarea,adeveloperwasgiven20haundersuchatypeofpartnership(frominterviewsconductedwith townplanningexperts,February2011).Otherexamplesof privatedeveloperswhichentered intodifferent kindsof partnerships areAlphaDevelopers and Divine Homes (from interviews conducted with town planningexperts, February 2011). It seems as if such state‐private sector partnerships areinformedbyongoingdebatesontheindigenisationoftheeconomy5.

Inmanycases,theallocationofstatelandanditsdevelopmentthroughtheabove‐mentionedpartnershipshaveraisedconcernswiththepublic.Variouspressreportshavemadereferencetoallegationsofshadylanddeals. Inonesuchcase,theAnti‐CorruptionCommissionofZimbabwehasreportedlystartedinvestigationsintohowaprivatecompanywasgivenstatelandtodevelophousingstandsintheBorrowdaleresidential area of Harare. Press reports claimed that the Minister of LocalGovernmentandUrbanDevelopmentfacilitatedthetransactionandauthorisedtheprivatedevelopertodevelopresidentialstandsin August2009,andyetthenoticetochangetheuseofthelandwasonly institutedayear later(The Standard,20‐26February2011).Inarelatedcase,thesameMinisterwasalsoallocatedprimelandintheCityofHarare.“Documentsinourpossessionshowthatduring63daysthatthecaretaker council was in office,… [the Minister) acquired stands numbers 61Helensvaleand293AvondaleinHarare.Thematterwasreportedtothepoliceandthe Anti‐Corruption Commission last year but no action has been taken as yet. Inlight of the police’s inaction, councillors have argued that PrimeMinisterMorganTsvangirai should petition President Robert Mugabe and Deputy Prime MinisterAurthur Mutambara to seek an explanation from Police Commissioner GeneralAugustineChihuri”(ibid).Such incidenceshaveonlyservedtofuelspeculationthatgovernanceofkeynationalinstitutionsappearstohavebeencompromised.

5.2 Housing delivery approaches

Whilst the above discussion provided the general trends of land delivery, specificvehicleshavebeenputinplacetofacilitatethedeliveryoflandandhousingtourbanland markets. Such delivery vehicles include Garikai/Hlalani Kuhle HousingCooperativesandtheHomelinkHousingDevelopmentInitiative.

5TheRegulationsonEconomicEmpowermentandIndigenisationstatethatprivatecompaniesworthoverUS$1‐millionshouldhaveaminimumof51%ownershipbythelocals.


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5.2.1 Public sector housing construction and land delivery

From independence through to 1985, government complemented thehomeownership scheme throughdirect provision.However, from1986 through to2000, the emphasis was on making land (stands) available through a site‐and‐services scheme. Table 5.2 shows the visible shift from construction of completeunits to delivery of land. This shift was in keeping with global trends in terms ofhousingapproaches.

Table5.2:Publicsectorhousingproduction,1982‐2000

By end of Year Completed houses Stands delivered 1983 12 089 14 000 1984 9 385 15 000 1985 5 031 6 000 1986 6 124 14 845 1987 5 230 11 223 1988 4 862 16 500 1989 1 000 4 292 1990 600 6 951 1991 - - 1992 - - 1993 1 200 26 667 1994 950 27 000 1995 3 000 53 333 1996 1 600 7 400 1997 2 500 2 000 1998 3 000 6 200 1999 3 500 44 848 2000 2000 54 020

Source: Government of Zimbabwe, 2005:11

Direct provision was revisited following the 2005 Cleanup Campaign, through theGarikai/Hlalani Kuhle6 Project,with government targeting the production of 7 478unitsinitsfirstphasein2005(GovernmentofZimbabwe,2005).Ofthetotalplannedunits,2950or39.4%wereearmarkedforHarareMetropolitanProvince.PhasetwoofGarikai/HlalaniKuhlesawareturntolanddeliveryofmostlyunservicedland,withgovernment emphasising that it would “continue to acquire peri‐urban land toaugmentitslandbanktomeetfutureurbanexpansion”(GovernmentofZimbabwe,2005:26).

6ShonaandNdebelefor‘decentaccommodation’


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Table5.3:Aidedself‐helpunderGarikai/HlalaniKuhle

Province PlannedunitsbyDecember2005

Allocationsasof31October2006

Harare 6000 35637Bulawayo 3000 15500Mash.Central 600 896Mash.East 800 2014Mash.West 700 13624Mat.North 700 1095Mat.South 800 ‐Midlands 900 15599Manicaland 900 5801Masvingo 600 3240Total 15000 93405

5.2.2 National Housing Delivery Programme (Garikai /Hlalani Kuhle)

In November 2003, government adopted a five‐year National Housing DeliveryProgramme(NHDP)for2004to2008.Thisprogrammefocusedondeliveringhousingin a framework that responded to the Habitat Agenda, particularly investmentpromotion to boost annual production,which had dropped to 5 000 units from arangeof15000to20000.TheNHDPwasbasedonaninclusiveapproach,areviewof policies and standards, the introduction of alternative building technology andinformalsectorparticipation inhousing. Implementationoftheprogrammestartedslowly because of resource and other structural constraints. The NHDP gainedmomentumafterthe2005CleanupCampaign,asgovernmentsoughttorespondtolocal and international criticism by expediting direct delivery of housing throughGarikai/Hlalani Kuhle. Garikai thus became the flagship of theNHDP and had twomajorphases.Thefirstinvolveddirectconstructionofhousesbygovernmentwhilethe second was about land delivery. Table 5.3 shows the programme’sachievements.

5.2.3 The Homelink Housing Development initiative

TheHomelinkHousingDevelopmentInitiativeisaproductdevelopedfromtheneedtotapintotheforeigncurrencyholdingsofZimbabweanslivingandworkingabroad.Throughthisinitiative,Zimbabweanslivingabroadcanobtaincheapmortgageloanstopurchaseorbuildhousesbackhome.TheinitialobjectiveoftheHomelinkPrivateLimited company was to mobilise inflows of foreign currency from suchZimbabweansbyprovidingproductsthatwouldmeettheneedsofZimbabweansintheDiasporaandatthesametimeensureasteadyflowofforeigncurrencyfromtheDiasporatoZimbabwetohelpmeetthecountry’simportrequirements.Itsmandatewasthenbroadenedtocover the facilitationof theseZimbabweans’ investment indomestic real estate, driven by the premise that in the course of facilitatinginvestment intodomestic realestate,andmoneyandcapitalmarkets, theReserveBank of Zimbabwe would be able to improve inflows of foreign currency intoZimbabwe. The challenge is however, that the product can only benefitZimbabweanslivingandworkingabroad,andmostprobablyonlythetopincometierofsociety.Dataonprogressmadetodatebytheinitiativearenotreadilyavailable.


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5.2.3 Civil society interventions

As discussed in Chapter 1 and further elaborated in other sections of this report,urbanlandmarketsinZimbabwehavetraditionallybeenaformalmarket.Formalityhas manifested in many ways, particularly through use of written law, and stateadministrationofprocessesoflandaccess,planninganddevelopmentcontrol.Ithasalsomeantsecuringfinancefrombankstoacquirelandandtodevelopit.Formalityhas also meant queuing or getting wait‐listed by central and local authorities toaccesslandandhousing.Thealternativetowaitinglistshasbeenaccessinglandandhousingfromtheprivatesector(openmarket).

Behindthisfacadeofformalurbanisationwerecasesofsquattingandovercrowding.EvidenceofburgeoninginformalsettlementsbeforeindependenceincludesEpworthand Chirambahuyo in the Harare region (see also Box 1.1 in Chapter 1). Afterindependence,theCleanupCampaignof2005wasapeakinaseriesofstrugglesbythe state to constrain ‘illegal’ responses to homelessness. There had been somelocalised‘clean‐up’campaignsandrelocations,forinstance,in1991inreadinessforhostingtheCommonwealthHeadsofGovernmentsMeeting (CHOGM)and in1993(Churu Farm outside of Harare). These evictions resulted in the creation of PortaFarmholdingcampandinformalsettlement,whichwaslaterdestroyedwithsomeoftheresidentsbeingmovedtoDzivarasekwa(south‐westofthecity),Hatcliffeholdingcamp (north of the city) and Hopley (south of the city). The growth in informalsettlementsreflected, inpart,aformalurban landmarketunabletoaccommodatethe needs of the urban poor. As such, it can be argued that the formal system,dominated by the public and private sectors, was failing to deliver adequate,appropriately locatedandaffordableurban landtothepoor. Inviewoftheviciousresponses to ‘illegality and informality’, homeless people increasingly began toorganisethemselves,startingintheearly1990s.

Poorpeople’sorganisation focusedon lobbying forspace inarelatively ‘unfriendlymarketplace’.Byextension, thiswasaboutadvocacy fora setof rules thatwouldaccommodate their interests and capabilities regarding land access anddevelopment. For some of the homeless, organising was about averting furtherfrustrations from multiple evictions and the attendant livelihood disruptions. Thepoor’sorganisationtooktwomainstreams.Theearliestwasthehousingcooperativemovement, followed by the Mfelandaonye7/Federation. This has created aframeworkforcivil societyparticipation inurban landmarkets.Thesetwotypesofsocial movements do not necessarily represent all urban poor residents inZimbabwe.Theyhave,however, securedrecognition, theyparticipate inkeypolicyprocesses,haveaccessedconsiderableland,haveimplementedanumberofhousingprogrammesandcontinue tomobilise thepoor.Theirparticipationhasbroadenedoropenedupchannelsforaccessingland.

Government recognises the work of civil society and includes their performancetargets in its reporting cycles. Civil society organisations have also done somecapacity‐buildinginthepublicsectorthroughexposingcivilservantstointernationalbest practices. For instance, Dialogue on Shelter and the Zimbabwe Homeless

7Ndebelefor‘dyinginoneplace’(together).


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People’sFederationhave takenhousingsectorpublicofficialsat localandnationalleveltocountries likeKenya,SouthAfrica,NamibiaandIndia,withsuchtripsbeingseenashavinginfluencedlandallocationsanddevelopmentmodelsbeingtestedinsome local authorities at present. The City of Harare has eased conditions underwhich poor federators and co‐operators can enter the housing waiting list, forexamplethroughusingsavingsbooklets,whichhaveallowedmoreentrantsontothelist.

The Housing Cooperatives Model

TheNGO,HousingPeopleofZimbabwe(HPZ),wasestablished in1992topromotethe cooperative housing approach by providing technical support to registeredhousing cooperatives. Over the years, HPZ structured the housing cooperativemovement intodistrictunions, leading to the formationof theZimbabweNationalAssociation of Housing Cooperatives (ZINAHCO) in 1999 as an umbrella body forhousing cooperatives with a mandate to advocate, build the capacity of districtunionsandcooperatives,aswellassupportingthemobilisationofhousinggroupstoformhousingcooperatives.ThoughZINAHCOwasonly formally registered in2001,and it is one of three apex (cooperative) bodies, the others being for fishingcooperatives and for agricultural cooperatives. Zimbabwe has more than 3 000housingcooperatives,althoughnotallofthemareaffiliatedtoZINAHCO8.Therearetwo types of housing cooperatives; the first is workplace‐based and the secondcommunity‐based.Giventhesocio‐economicbackgrounddiscussedinchapter2,itisnotsurprisingthattherearemorecommunity‐basedthanworkplace‐basedhousingcooperatives.Masuko (2008)makes reference to a third category ofwar veteran‐basedcooperativesthatsurfacedinthepost‐2000period.

Cooperatives are generally self‐mobilising entities where individuals with similarconcerns and those attracted by benefits (actual and perceived) realised by oldercooperators form or join cooperatives. Access to land for these cooperatives isthrough (central or local) State land allocations and purchasing land from privateland owners. ZINAHCO cooperatives have, since inception, received state land inMutare(1144residentialstands)andanother1500standsonmunicipal land(CityofMutare)aspartofaconsortiumofcivil societyorganisations.Cooperatorshavealso been allocated state and local authority land in other local authorities. Inaddition, Kumboedza Housing Cooperative9 bought enough land for 68 stands inRuwa,whilePepukaiHousingCooperativeinMasvingo10hasincrementallyacquiredlandthroughtheopenmarket.

Usingthesetwoprincipalmethods,thehousingcooperativemovementhasaccessed6 078 residential stands (excluding non‐ZINAHCO cooperatives) and built 2 045housesinthelast10to15years.However,accessinglandhasnotbeeneasy,asnotalllandandplanningauthoritieshavebeensupportiveofthecooperativeapproach.Localauthorityresponsestocooperatives’needshavebeennegativeinsomecases,whileinotherstheyhavebeenverysupportive.Forinstance,thelandallocationsin

8ZINAHCOcurrentlyhas104members.9KumboedzaHousingCooperativehas100members.

1018ofthePepukaiHousingCooperative’smembersnowhavehouses.


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Mutarereflectthisopennesstothemodel,whileHarareandotherlocalauthoritieshavedirectlynurtured somehousing cooperatives.Another key challenge that thecooperative movement has faced is the flurry of bogus and badly governedcooperativeswheresomemembersofthepublichavelosttheirlifesavings.

Activities of Dialogue on Shelter and the Federation

Asdescribedinchapter3,DialogueonShelterfortheHomelessPeopleinZimbabweTrustwasestablished in1998toboostcitizens’housing initiativesaswellaspublicsector‐civil society partnerships. The organisation works in alliance with theZimbabweHomelessPeople’sFederation,a45000‐stronghouseholdmovement inalllocalauthoritiesinZimbabwe.

Dialogue offers technical support in housing processes (from land acquisition toconstructionandbeyond)andtriestodealwiththenegativeexperiencestheurbanpoorhavehadatthehandsofgovernment(centralandlocal)arundthedemolitionoftheirhousing.

AlthoughDialogueandtheFederationaretwodistinctorganisations, theydohaveinterpenetrating structures focusing on relevant housing processes. Like therelationship between HPZ and ZINAHCO, Federation members are not Dialogue’s‘beneficiaries’butrather itspartners. Inthiswaytherelationshipbetweenthetwoorganisationsisbasedonempoweringprinciples.Figure5.4showsthisrelationship.

The Federation is a community‐based organisationwith a nationalmembership inseven regions and at least 200 savings groups. Thismakes the ZHPF a network ofpoor people’s housing savings schemes coming together to address social andeconomicproblems.

Dialogue and the Federationwork together on six key components – savings and mobilisation; land, loans or the Gungano Urban Poor Fund, enumeration, health, exchanges and networking11, and technical and training. Each savings scheme hasrepresentatives for each component. The same structure is replicated at all levels,andeverycomponentcompilesrelevantinformationattheirlevel.Componentsaretheprincipalway inwhich theFederation’swork isorganised. The rangeof activecomponentsincreasesorshrinksdependingontheneedsinacommunity.

Atthetimeofconcludingthisstudy,Dialoguehadacquired5000residentialstandsand built 2 000 houses. The other 3 000 stands had been serviced and awaiteddevelopment. The alliance is in 54 local authority areas and is currently runningabout30schemes.

11 These are local, regional and international, i.e. group to group within a region, the country or outsideZimbabweforlearningandteachingpurposes.


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Figure5.4:ZimbabweHomelessPeople’sFederation

Property rights for social movements

Boththefederatorsandco‐operatorsusesavingsmobilisationwithinaframeworkofmutualself‐help.Assuch,thekindofrightsaccordedtoindividualswithrespecttoland is subordinate to group rights. Cooperative and Federationmembers do notreceive individual title until a scheme is fully developed and individual membersmeettheirobligations.Allallocatedlandisvestedintherelevantcooperativeor intheZimbabweHomelessPeople’sFederation,as relevant. Land isallocated to civilsocietygroupsonthebasisofofferlettersandmemorandaofunderstanding.

Household 1. Federation targets women

(first), spouse and children. Household 23-45

000th.

Housing Saving Scheme 1. 50 to 300 members. Housing Saving

Scheme 193rd+.

A Scheme has at least 7 Components (see note 1) headed by volunteers in a Committee governing the group. The Savings Component has admin volunteers (collectors, treasurers and bookkeepers). Every scheme has a constitution. Schemes network by area, theme/component etc within their area, region and outside.

Area 1 e.g. Hatcliffe with 11 Schemes.

NB: Components replicated at this level.

Area 26th.

Region 1 e.g. Harare. Region 7.

1. Each Region has a Coordinator (from Federation) and Facilitators who manage decentralised budgets and support activities. 2. A Regional Committee made up of Area Leadership oversees activities in a Region. 3. The Committee largely replicates component-based leadership from lower levels.

National Committee. 10 National Coordinators + Dialogue Program Staff as Trustees of the Federation.

ZIMBABWE HOMELESS PEOPLE’S FEDERATION [ZHPF] AN

AFFILIATE OF SDI.

DIALOGUE SECRETARIAT.

DIALOGUE BOARD.


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Land servicing

Land allocated to civil society organisations is often in areas unserviced by trunkservices.Thisispartlybecauseofproblemswithlandavailabilityinareaswheresuchservicesareavailable.Theotherreasonisbecausethepoortendtobesqueezedoutofprime landby ‘market forces’, particularlyprice. Socialmovementsusea groupapproach to servicing land. Due to the lack of adequate off‐site infrastructure,servicingextendsoverlongperiodsastrunkservicesareexpensivetoinstall.Atthesametime,evenon‐site infrastructureisveryexpensive.Recenthistoryshowsthatthepoorarebearing thecostsof services that themiddle‐andhigh‐incomeurbanresidentsdidnothavetomeetdirectly.

Theforegoinghasdemonstratedthesignificantroleofcivilsocietyorganisations inhousingandlanddelivery.Worthnotingisthatcivilsocietyinterventionsrepresentsome of the clearest examples of initiatives that target the poor. Driven bypartnerships between cooperatives and civil society organisations, the emergingmodel is making an impact on housing and land delivery. Group‐based propertyrightsarethemainformofpropertyrights insuch instances,and itseemsthishasbeenworkingwellforthecivilsocietyinterventions.Giventhiscontext,itisdesirablethatthenotionofgrouprightsbepilotedasamodelthatsuitstherequirementsofthepoor(alsoseethediscussioninchapter8).

5.3 Real estate, valuation and property sales in Zimbabwe’s urban land markets

Thepreceding sectionhas elaboratedon land andhousingdelivery in Zimbabwe’surban landmarkets.This section is intended to inform the studyonhow landandhousingdeliveredonthemarketistransacted.Inaway,partofthesectionisbasedon a case study of only one estate agency. The section does not claim that datapresented represent the national picture on property transactions. It is onlyintendedtoprovideinsightsonsomecriticalcomponentsofurbanlandmarkets,inparticularsourcesoffinanceandthepricerangeofproperties.

Zimbabwe’s property sector can be split into the three broad categories ofcommercial, industrial and residential properties. Each of the sectors has its ownsub‐sectors,withcommercialdividedintoofficeandretail.Residentialpropertiesarecomposedof garden flats, townhousesand stand‐alonehouses inhigh‐,medium‐and low‐density areas. This differentiation affects transactions in both rental andproperty sales. Although there are no documented rules and regulations for landtransactions, the Estate Agents Council has from time to time communicated toestateagentsguidelinestobefollowedwhentransactinginlandandwithmembersof the public. These include securingwrittenmandates for sale from land ownersandauthenticatingownershipthereof;authenticatingownershipwiththeRegistrarofDeeds’Office;andwherelandisstilltoreceivetitletoonlybeinvolvedinsellingwhen the developer has fully complied with the subdivision permit conditions inrespectofrequirementssuchasroads,waterandsewerreticulations,andregulatingfeeschargeableforpropertytransactions.

InZimbabwe’surban landmarkets, landattractsdifferentpricesdependingon theusetypeandlocation.Locationcanbelookedatintwoways–betweentownsand


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within towns. Land‐uses which attract the highest values within a locality arecommercial land‐uses,with residential and industrial having almost similar values.Withineachuse type thereare sub‐sector variations. Thus,within the commercialuse type, thereare retail andoffices,with the former tending tocommandhigherrates per squaremetre. Landdesignated forwarehouseusewould also commandhigherratesundertheindustrialusetypecomparedtogeneralindustrialuse.Therearealsodifferentratesbetweentownsforthesameusetype,dependingonthesizeof the town and the demand and supply fundamentals for that particular town.Hararehas thehighest landvaluespersquaremetre foralluse types, followedbyBulawayo.Theproperty industrygenerallyvalues land insmallertownsbasedonapercentageofHarare’svalues–mostlyquotedas60%–but thishasnotyetbeenscientificallyproven.However,thisgeneralapproachtendstoloserelevanceinsometownswhichmayhaveexcessivedemandrelativetosupply.TownssuchasChinhoyiand Kariba are believed to have high demand compared to supply due to theirlocations.

Where the residential market is concerned, high‐density properties are oftenfinancedbydiasporafundsandemployer‐assistedschemessuchasCBZ,NSSA,CAIPFand CABS. The leading building societies have in recent months resumed issuinglimited mortgage bonds, a move which is expected to improve activity on themarket.Servicedlandthatisreadytobebuiltonremainsinshortsupply,withmostdevelopers alsso having limited capacity to handle large tracts of land. As alreadymentioned,Hararepropertypricesprovidetheguideonpricingtrends.TherangeofpricesforpropertiesinHarareisasfollows:highdensity‐$20,000to$35,000;one‐bedroomflats ‐$25,000to$35,000;mediumdensity ‐$35,000to$80,000;gardenflats‐morethan$60,000andlowdensity‐fromhigherthan$80,000andupwards(thisdatahavebeensourcedfromtherecordsofoneselectedestateagency,2011).

Forcommercialproperties,exceptforafewgoodbuildingssuchasBardHouseandLivingstoneHousewhichhavecomeontothemarketforsale,mostotherbuildingsonthemarketarethosewhichhavereachedtheendoftheirusefuleconomiclivesand can only be brought back to life throughmajor refurbishment.Most of thesebuildings are over‐priced and stay on the market for a long time. The nature ofpropertyownership inZimbabwe–where thedevelopersarealso theowners– issuchthatveryfewpropertiestradeonthemarketasthedevelopers/ownersinvestforlong‐termcommitmentsandnotforsellingpropertystock.

Key steps in making a land sale

Itisimportanttohaveadiscussiononthekeystepsinmakingalandsale.Itmustbenotedthatmostofthestepsareaboutthetransferofpropertyrights(seechapter7).Theprocessis‘duplicated’heretodemonstratetheroleofestateagents–whohappentobethedominantsourceofpropertytransactionsinformallandmarkets.Thestepscoveredinthisreportfocusonlandwhichistitledandwhichisbeingsoldasitis.Itisalsoassumedthatallpaperworkisstartingfromtheestateagent’sofficeat the point where both parties have signed a sale agreement. The steps wouldinvolvethefollowing:


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- Selling agent sends instruction to conveyancer of seller’s choice to requestconveyancer to attend to transfer of the property, enclosing copy of saleagreement.

- Conveyancer prepares declaration and power‐of‐attorney documents forsigningbybothparties.

- Paymentmade, with transfer fees being for the account of the purchaser.Theestateagentcanretainallsaleproceedsintrustaccountorforwardsuchproceedstotheconveyancertobeheldintrustpendingtransfer.

- Conveyancercarriesoutdeedssearchtoverifythatthepropertyisfreefromencumbrances such as mortgage bonds. Conveyancer liaises with bondholder to request release of original title deeds of the property; normallyconditionalonthebondholderbeingguaranteedpaymentofamountsowedtoit.

- Conveyancerseeksratesclearancecertificatefromthemunicipalityshowingthatallratesarepaidupandcoveredforthenextthreemonths.Apropertycannotbetransferredwithoutaratesclearancecertificate.

- Conveyancer arranges both parties to attend interviews at the ZimbabweRevenue Authority (ZIMRA), leading to the granting of a Capital Gains TaxCertificate, without which a property cannot be transferred at the DeedsOffice.CapitalGainsTaxisnormallyexemptonprincipalprivateresidencestopersonsabovetheageof55years.

- Oncealldocumentation is inplace,conveyancer lodges transferdocumentswiththeDeedsOfficeforchangeofownershipfromsellertobuyer.

Theprice fetchedwhen selling a pieceof land is also determinedby thepropertyrightsstatusoftheland.Landwithtitleisreadytobesoldandtransferred.Thusthecostsforvirginorrawlandthatstillhastobesubdividedandservicedaredifferentfromthosefortitled land.Assumingasellerengagesanestateagenttodisposeofhis land, the attendant costs are: estate agent’s fees at 7.5% of the selling price;rates clearances (depending on the amount owing) and capital gains tax of 5% to20%. (Capital gains tax is levied at 5% of the selling price for those propertiespurchasedbefore1February2009andat20%of thenetgainon thosepropertiespurchased after 1 February 2009.) The total costs to the seller which can bedeductedfromthesellingpriceistherefore12.5%ifoneassumesa5%capitalgainstaxliability.

Thediscussionaboveshowsthattheinvolvementofestateagentsinpropertysalespushes the price up by 7.5%,making such properties less affordable to the poor.Giventhedominanceofestateagentsinpropertytransactions,suchacostislargelyunavoidable. The option of by‐passing estate agents and purchasing directly frompropertyownersisriskyandexposesbuyerstofraudulentpropertytransactions.

5.3.1 Sources of finance

Land purchases in Zimbabwe are being financed through several sources – loans,mortgages, cashsavings (locals)and funds fromZimbabweans in theDiaspora.Forloans, these are mainly employer‐assisted financing schemes. Employers require


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landwith titledeedsas theyhave toprotect their interestsover the loan grantedandsuchprotectioncanonlybeeffectedondocumentsthatarecentrallyregisteredand available to the public. There has been an improvement in the availability ofmortgagefinance.Areasonablenumberoftransactionsarebeingfinancedthroughthis route.Buildingsocietiesalso insiston titled land.Other transactionsarebeingfinancedoutofowncashresourcesbythepurchasers.Zimbabweans livingoutsidethecountryalsoactivelyparticipate in landpurchasetransactionsoutoftheirownresources or throughmortgage/loan finance sourced externally. Given that estateagencies are private organisations, data on volumes of transactions, sources offinance, etc. arenoteasily available.However, information froma case studyof aparticularestateagent canbeused todemonstrate the significanceof thevarioussourcesoffinanceinaparticularyear.

Thisparticularestateagencycarriedout55transactionsin2010.Ofthese,21wereforpropertiesinhigh‐densityareas,20forpropertiesinlow‐densityareasand14forpropertiesinmedium‐densityareas(SeeFigure5.5).

Figure5.5:Propertytransactionsforaparticularestateagentin2010bysettlementtype

Thesourcesoffinanceforthetransactionswerecash(57%),bonds(27%),employer‐assisted schemes (5%) and deeds of sale (11%). It is important to note thatZimbabweansintheDiasporaconstitutedasignificant15%ofthetransactions.Thestatisticsshowthatcash‐basedtransactionsdominateothersourcesoffinance.WithpropertiesranginginpricebetweenU$9000andU$150000,itisevidentlynotthepoorwhoareinvolvedinthesetransactions.Forthisparticularcasestudy,onlytwofinancial institutions had financed property transactions, one contributing 5% andthe other 18% of the transactions. The general picture of cash‐based transactionsdominating property transactions is a reflection of the liquidity crisis faced atnationallevel.

Figure 5.6 shows how transactions for properties in high‐density areas werefinanced.Bondsandcash‐basedsourcescontributed50%eachtothetotalvolumeoftransactions, thus the employer‐assisted scheme did not finance transactions in


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high‐density areas. Properties sold in the high‐density areaswere also all houses,withnotransactionscarriedoutforstands.Sincepracticallythepoorcannotaffordto purchase a finished house, this date underscore the view that not even thetransactionscarriedoutinhigh‐densityareasweredonebythepoor.

Figure5.6:Sourcesoffinancingforhousepurchasesinhigh‐densityareas

Source: Original data from a selected estate agency

5.3.2 Operational challenges faced by the sales and real estate sector

Asdiscussedelsewhereinthisreport,thereisnopublicinformationonthedetailsofurban land market transactions. The information available from the Registrar ofDeedsisnotonlyhardtofind,butalsohaslimitations.Forinstance,informationonproperty transactions is only available for properties with title deeds, as thosewithout are not registered at the Deeds Office. Yet there are many transactionstaking place for properties without title deeds. Also, in many instances pricesindicatedontitledeedsasthesellingpricesareknowntobeunderstatedaspartiesseektominimisetheirexposureonliabilitiessuchastransferfeesandcapitalgainstax.However,thebenefit inunderstatingthesevaluesismarginal;capitalgainstaxwhensellingthesamepropertyinfuturewillbecalculatedbasedontheunderstatedvalue.

Urban land markets face several operational challenges, a significant number ofwhicharetraceabletotheeconomicenvironmentandgovernmentpolicies.


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Challenges in the rental market

• Rentalpaymentchallenges:therecontinuestobeanincreaseinthenumberofdefaultersonbothrentalsandoperatingcosts.

• Leasingactivity is down in all real estate sectors,withmanybusinesseshavedown‐sized their space requirements.Conservativeestimatesput the levelofvoidsat20%,whichisdoublethetrendoverpreviousyears.

• Zimbabweanrentallevelsinallsectorscontinuetolagbehindthosewithintheregionandarereportedlythelowest.Existinglevelsmakeitdifficulttoembarkonnewconstructionprojectsasentryyieldscanbeaslowas2%.

• The pool of quality tenants continues to shrink as regulators close downtechnically unsound businesses. The Insurance and Pensions Commission hastodate closeddown74 insurance firmscoveringbrokers, life companiesandreinsurers. These companies have in response to the liquidity crisis failed toraise the statutory capital of $300 000 for short‐term insurers, $400 000 forreinsurers and $500 000 for life assurers. The Estate Agents Council ofZimbabwe has also this year closed down firms failing to meet registrationrequirements.

• It is taking very long to conclude rental negotiations, with some tenantstending toavoid thenegotiations altogether. Protractednegotiations arenotnecessarilyduetoperceivedhighrentalsbeingsoughtbutuncertaintyonthepartofthebusinessesrenting.

• The frequencyof rental reviewshas by and large remained annual, althoughsome owners have been able to implement bi‐annual reviews. Leases withescalationsarevirtuallynon‐existent.

• Achievable rentals for all property sectors are still at low levels, making itdifficult for investors to consider putting up new projects. Tenants are,however, still struggling to pay those low rentals and arrears are atastronomically high levels in some portfolios. This is further compounded bynon‐viable tariff structures for utilities such as power andwater.One of thelistedproperty companies (Pearl) reported its level of arrears at 25.3%at 30June2010 compared to 21.9% for theentire yearof 2009.Anotherpropertycounter(ZPI)collectedonly68%ofrentalsduein2009.

• There is a deliberate strategy by someproperty owners to keep some spacevacant–eitherbecause it isexpensive to retain ‘bad’ rent‐payersor toplacethemselves in a position to accommodate ‘the’ good tenants expected tostreamintothecountryoncetheeconomypicksup.

Challenges in the sales market

• There is reportedly a decrease in interest in Zimbabwean properties fromexternal investors following the announcement of ‘indigenous’ and‘empowerment’regulations.Therearealsoincreasingmovestobarforeignersfrom purchasing existing properties. These moves, if implemented togetherwiththeindigenisationlegislation,willhaveanadverseimpactonthevalueof


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existing properties as local players have low appetite for properties due tolimitedfinancialcapacity.

• Zimbabweanpropertiesarecurrentlyunder‐valued,sothereisarealprospectforvalueupliftmentwhenthedepressedeconomyandhighcountryriskprofileareaddressed.Thatpropertiesareunder‐valuedexplainswhyforeignershavealways had an appetite for existing stock as a way of positioning for futureupliftmentinvalue.

• There isadecline insalesactivityacrossallsectorsoftherealestatemarket.Thereareseveralreasonsforthis,themostnotablebeingliquidityconstraintsand fewer buyers. Multi‐currency trading has removed all speculativeopportunities,intheprocessliquidatingthebuyingcapacityofmostplayers.

• Thelackofliquiditybecauseoftheabsenceoflong‐termmortgagefinanceandthe effects of the global recession has severely limited the number ofcompleted transactions. Very few commercial and industrial properties arebeingtraded,makingitdifficultknowingwherepricesandcapratesshouldbe.

• Inspiteofinflationhavingstabilisedsince2009duetomulti‐currencytrading,replacementcostsforpropertiesstillremainhigherthanmarketvalues(threetimesormoreinsomeinstances,atleastforHararecommercialproperties).

• Likemostothermarkets,thepropertymarketisstillsufferingfromtheeffectsofthe‘braindrain’,withskillsshortagesremainingworrisome,forexampleinareassuchastheservicingoflifts.

5.4 Disputes in the urban land market sector

Thissectionpresentsananalysisof thetypesofdisputesthatoccur inZimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets.Thesectionwasdevelopedfromdatacollectedfromareviewofcourt records, especially those from the High Court and Supreme Court ofZimbabwe.Itinformsthestudyonthetypesoflandandpropertydisputes,andthecausesofsuchdisputes.

Themaintypesofurbanlanddisputespresentedinthisreportcovercasesrelatingto rental disputes and evictions of tenants, fraudulent land and propertytransactions,disputesaround the repaymentofmortgagebondsandauctioningofproperty, and disputes associated with weakening land administration. Whereassuchdisputeshavealwayshappenedinthepast,certaintypesofdisputesescalatedin the post‐2000 period. It is in this context that, for instance, rental disputesescalated at the height of inflation. As economic hardships increased andinstitutionaldecaytookitstoll,fraudulentlandtransactionsalsobecameprevalent.This discussion on land and property disputes also presents details on thenature/characterofactorsinvolved.

Conflicting parties involve all segments of society in the public andprivate sector.The disputing parties include individual buyers of property, financial institutions,local authorities, estate agents, conveyancing lawyers, landlords and tenants, andpublicinstitutions.Inessence,thesectionisthereforeareflectionofthechallengesassociatedwithlanddeliveryandlandadministration,andtheproblemsfacedwhen


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transacting in property rights. This section also demonstrates the significant roleplayedbythecourtsinsettlingdisputesintheurbanlandmarketssector.

5.4.1 Tenant and rentalrelated disputes

Zimbabwe’s rentalmarket is regulatedby twopiecesof legislation thatgoverntheoperation of commercial premises and residential properties respectively: theCommercialPremises(Rent)Regulationsof1983andtheRentRegulationsof2007.Thissectionaddressestheformalrentalmarket.Importantaspectsaddressedbytheregulationsrelatetothenegotiationof fair rent, theterminationof leasesandtheeviction of tenants, and payments and refund of rental deposits. Further, theregulationsalso introduce theconceptofa statutory tenant (that is,a tenantwhocontinues to occupy leased premises upon the expiry of the lease agreement,continuestopayrentwithinsevendaysoftheduedateandcontinuestoobserveallother conditionsof theexpired leaseagreement). This situationoftenariseswhenincreases in rentals have not been concluded by the expiry date of the lease.Anotherissuehereisthatrentregulationsexplicitlystatethatrentalsmustbepaidin the local currency. At the height of inflation and before dollarisation of theeconomy,rentaldisputesescalatedasmost landlordsresortedtochargerentals inforeigncurrency,atransactionthatwasillegalatthattime.12

Thelawstipulatesthatatenantoccupyingaresidentialpropertyordinarilyrequiresno less than 3 months notice to vacate the dwelling. More importantly, the lawpermitsevictionforasetofprescribedreasons.Inaddition,thelandlordisrequiredto obtain clearance from the Rent Board that confirms that the reasons for theevictionarefairandreasonable.Therentregulationshavethereforebeencriticisedas over‐protecting the tenant to the detriment of investors. Crafted soon afterindependence in 1982 to curb arbitrary increases in rent for residentialaccommodation following the relaxation of colonial controls which had caused asteep rise in demand for residential accommodation, the rent control regulationshave,overtime,discouragedinvestorsfrominvestinginresidentialaccommodation.Whereascriticsargueagainstanyroleforgovernmentinregulatingtheoperationoftherentalmarket,proponentsofthepolicyjustifyitonthebasisthatitispro‐poor.Giventheimportanceofhousingfornationaldevelopment,suchproponentsarguethatwhen left unregulated, the pricing of housingwould become unaffordable tomostcitizens.

Thedilemmathenisbalancingtheneedsofthepoorandtheinvestmentinterestsofthose investing in the housing market. The available evidence shows that such abalancehasnotbeenstruckinZimbabwe’shousingsector.Forexample,astudybyKuipa (2006) noted that the critical shortage of all types of housing (flats, clusterhomesandhigh‐andlow‐densityhouses)wasattributedtothelackofappropriateincentivesforinvestmentintohousingbythemajorpropertyinvestmentinstitutionthat include pension funds, life assurance companies, building societies and unittrusts.Thestudyrevealedthatthefivemajorinvestorshadbetween1995and2005disinvested from the housing sector, especially blocks of flats (Kuipa, 2006). Thereasonsforthedisinvestmentwerecentredonpoorandnegativereturnsasaresult

12SeeforinstancethecaseofVillaRealFlatsPrivateLimitedvs.Undengeandothers(HH86‐2005).


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of rent control and escalating maintenance costs (ibid). Rent control and thesubsequentdisputesthataroseinrelationtomanagingrentalinvestmentportfolioslargelyexplainedthedeclineininstitutionalinvestmentinthehousingmarket(ibid).Inpracticalterms,thepro‐poorregulationshaveresultedinareductioninthesupplyofrentalaccommodationthatitwas,infact,meanttoboost.Itisthereforepertinentthat government has to work out the right balance in regulating the provision ofrentalaccommodationbytheprivatesectortoavoidperverseoutcomesthatcouldunderminetheoriginalpurposeoftheregulation.

In the main, rental‐related disputes are characterised by disagreements over thesettingofa‘fairrent;’evictionoftenantsandchallengesovertheadministrationofleasingcontracts.Ingeneral,disputesbetweenlandlordsandtenantsarearbitratedby theRentBoard. Thediscontentedparty canappeal theBoard’s decision to theAdministrationCourtofZimbabwewhosedecision isdeemedtobefinal.However,amongst other operational challenges, the Rent Board’s arbitration process ischaracterisedbydelays.

Multiple reasons can cause the eviction of a tenant. This discussion is importantbecauseithighlightsthepracticalissuesthatinvestorsanddevelopersmustconsiderbeforemakingdecisionsontheevictionoftenants.Suchadiscussionalsobringstotheforetheconcernsthatbothdevelopers/investorsandtenantshavetoconsiderinmanagingtheirrelationships.Alookatsomeofthelandmarkjudgmentswillassistindemonstratingsomeofthemaincausesofrentaldisputeswhichoftenresultintheevictionofthetenants.In1991theSupremeCourtofZimbabwemadearulingthatthedecisionbyapropertyownertousethepremisesforitsauthorisedpurposewasalegitimateandcommercialdecision,andthusconstitutedgoodandsufficientcauseto allow for the eviction of the tenant13. Violation of the conditions of the leaseagreement has also been a cause of rental‐related disputes, possibly leading toeviction. InthecaseofLocalAuthoritiesPensionFundversusDuxochromeServices(Pvt)Ltd,heardin2008,thelatterwasrentingpremiseswhichweretobeusedasaphoneshop.Thetenantchangedtheusetoavegetableshop,promptingtheshopownertoseekhiseviction.Thecourtgrantedtheeviction.Itisacommonfeatureofleaseagreements that the tenant is forbidden fromundertakinganyalterationsoradditionstothepremiseswithoutthewrittenconsentofthelandlord.InthecaseofAerialHeights (Pvt) LtdversusCraftTrading (Pvt), the tenant fittedburglarbars tothedisplaywindowsoftheshopwithoutthelandlord’spermission.TheMagistrate’sCourt allowed the termination of the lease agreement and ordered the tenant tovacatethepremises,amovethatwasconfirmedbytheHighCourtonappeal.

The above discussion shows that disputes in the urban land markets sector arepartiallycausedbytheignoranceoftherightsandobligationsofonegroupofactors,inthiscasetenants.Theinformationcampaignthatisproposedlaterinthisreportisparticularlyusefulinsolvingsuchissues.

Itiscommonpracticeintherentalmarketthattenantshavetopaysomethingcalleda ‘goodtenancydeposit’asasuretyagainstdamagetoproperty.Suchadeposit isrefundable when the tenant vacates the premises without counter‐claims on

13SeethecaseofMobilOilZimbabwe(Pvt)LtdvsChisipiteServiceStation(Pvt)Ltd,1991(2)ZLR82(SC).


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damages to the property by the landlord. This has the tendency of increasing thecostsofrentalaccommodationforthepoor.Inaddition,depositspaidhavebeenacause of conflict between landlords and tenants. In some situations, tenants haveagitated suing for interest accrued for theperiod their fundsweredepositedwiththelandlord.Ingeneral,theZimbabweancourtshavenotgrantedsuchrequests.14

5.4.2 Fraudulent property transactions

The post‐2000 period has witnessed a surge in fraudulent land and propertytransactions.Themostcommonpracticehasbeenthatoftheownersimultaneouslyselling theproperty tomore thanonebuyer. Inother situations,non‐ownershaveforgedpropertydocumentstoselllandthateitherdoesnotexistorthattheydonotown.With theweakening of all state institutions, both state and non‐state actorshave in some cases facilitated fraudulent land and property transactions. Therelaxingofprofessionalethicshasseenofficialsinvolvedinthelandmarketssector,including conveyencing lawyers, estate agents and state officials, facilitatingfraudulentlandtransactions.

Inmany instances, property professionals have colluded in undertaking fraudulentpropertytransactions.Inonesuchcasebroughtbeforethecourts,theemployeesofregisteredrealestateagencyFingoldRealEstatemastermindedthefraudulentsaleof a stand.15 In a related case a conveyancing lawyer disregarded standingproceduresbyreleasingmoneypaidtothesellerbeforethetransferofthepropertyhad taken place. In making a ruling, the judge noted that “for a conveyancer toreleaseadeposittoasellerpaidbyabuyerbeforetransferiseffectedinfavourofabuyer is an act attendedwith theutmosthazard”.16 Inother situations, legitimatepropertyownersdrivenpurelybygreedsoldproperty,especiallyresidentialstands,tomorethanoneperson.InthecaseofFiscGuideInvestmentversusTazaruraandothers,thejudgeobservedthatitgoeswithoutsayingthatthisisacaseofadoublesale of property, involving two innocent purchasers where no transfer has beenpassedtoeitherparty.Intheabsenceofspecialcircumstancesaffectingtheequities,the rights of the prior purchaser take precedence over those of subsequentpurchasers”.As discussed earlier, the actions of someproperty professionals havebeen characterised by increasingly less adherence to policies and procedures,creatingchallengesinthefunctionalityofurbanlandmarkets.

The analysis of legal cases on fraudulent property transactions also shows thatunscrupulous sellershavestarted toexploit the fact thatproperty transfers takealongtimetogothrough,leadingtodoublesales.Thusitseemsasiftheweaknessof 14InthecaseofLensAgencies(Pvt)LtdvKnightFrankandRutleyandAnov,atenantwhohadleasedpremisesfromalandlordhadbeenobligedtoagoodtenancydepositwiththelandlord’sestateagent.Thetenantclaimedthat itwasentitled to intereston theamount lodgedasadepositwhendismissing theapplication, the Judgenotedthat‘thereisnothinginsection50oftheEstateAgentAct(Chapter27:05)thatobligesanestateagenttopayinterestonmoneyheldasdepositequally,thereisnothinginthatsectionthattheestateagentisentitledtokeep interest earned on thismoney. However, no authoritywas placed before the court to show that undercommonlawinterestisinvariablypayablebyanyoneholdingmoneyofanother:Thedepositpaidwasinrealityamutuum or loan for consumption, and interest is only payable under amutuum if the contract expressly orimpliedlyprovidesforit[2LR1997(2),167]

15SeeDrawingServices(Pvt)LtdvKanyuchi(HC3016/08)

16SimbarasheManhandoversusStanleyMtetwaofZiweniandcompany;HH‐25‐2003:pg3)


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landadministrationsystemsisaidingfraudulentpropertytransactions.Furthermore,thelackofpublicinformationonpropertytransactionsalsoaidsfraudulentpropertytransactions,sincethere isnoplacewhereapotentialbuyercangoandcheckthedetailsofapropertytransaction(includingpropertydescriptionsandprices) takingplaceinanarea.

5.4.3 Failed repayment of mortgage loans

Inthepast,mortgageloanswerethepredominantsourceoffinanceforpurchasesofland and other immovable property in the urban land market sector. It is alsocommon knowledge that when purchasers fail to repay their mortgage loans,financial institutions seek recourse from the courts to recover their investments,togetherwithinterest.Thecalculationofinterest(onborrowedmoney)hascausedconsiderable debate in the urban landmarkets sector. In 1996, the High Court ofZimbabwe formalised the application of the in ‘duplum rule’ where the interestclaimable ina summonsshouldnotexceed thecapital sumdue.Thus foralldebtswhere the capital sum is repaid with interest, interest stops running at the pointwhereitequalstheunpaidcapital17.Attheheightofinflation,thisjudgementhadacatastrophic effect on existing mortgage loans, as financial institutions failed torecouptheirinvestments.

5.4.4 Inefficiency in land administration systems

Disputeshavealsoarisenasaresultofinefficiencyinthelandadministrationsystem.Inoneexemplarycasebroughtbeforethecourt,thetitledeedsoftwoneighbouringpropertiesshowedtheboundarybetweenthemasastraight line.However,awallonthegroundsofoneofthepropertiesencroachedontotheneighbour’sproperty.When a new owner bought the property, he claimed ownership of the illegalextension based on the law of prescription. The argument was that the wall hadbeen erected more than 30 years before the said purchase – although the newowner had not owned the land for 30 years. Whilst the judge did not grant therequest of acquisition through prescription, it is evident that the problem hadpersisted for such a long period because of weak development controls by theresponsiblelocalauthority18.

Whilst the dispute resolution mechanism remains firmly in place through thecountry’s courts and theDeputy Sheriff’s office, there are challenges to executingjudgements.For instance,theslowrecoveryoftheeconomyhasmeantgoodssoldat auction as part of executing judgments go for lower than expected prices. –because of less expendable income being available in the economy. In somesituations there is also resistance to the Deputy Sheriff seeking to execute courtjudgements, with cases recorded where one of the parties had sought to stopexecution through engaging friends or colleagues with influence. This clearlyindicates theneedtostrengthenthe institutions involved in thedisputeresolutionprocess.

17ZLR1996(2)420,p421

18JudgementNo.HH‐102‐05


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Thelackofunderstandingofthelanddevelopmentprocessisalsofuellingdisputesinurbanlandmarkets.Somepractitioners,becausetheylackexpertknowledgeandexperience,or evenbecauseof someulteriormotive,wrongly advise their clients,leading to litigation. Of course, these situations could also arise because of thelowerstandardsnowregulatingtheoperationsofprofessionalsworkingintheurbanlandmarkets sector. For instance, there are caseswhere estate agents sell standsbefore a title survey has been completed. And sometimes town planners’ layoutplans even containmore stands than can actually be accommodated on the land,withtheresultantproblemsofencroachmentofpropertyboundaries.

Anothermajorweaknessinthedisputeresolutionprocessisthetimetakentosettledisputes in court. An analysis of court judgments confirms that most propertydisputestakeseveralyearstofinalise.Ofcourse,thecostsassociatedwithgoingtocourt(includinghiringalawyertorepresentone’scase)areprohibitive.Thuswhilstthe courts remain open and accessible, the poor can rarely afford the costs ofengaginglawyers.

The nature and type of property disputes are also shaped by the state of theeconomy. Interviews with the Deputy Sheriff’s office confirmed that double saleswereontheriseduringthehyper‐inflationperiodfrom2008.Theyalsorevealedthatsince the dollarisation of the economy, there seemingly has been an increase intenantevictionsbecauseoftheirfailuretopayrent.TheDeputySheriff’sofficealsonotedthatatthetimeofwritingof thisreport,anaverageofthreeevictions fromcommercial premises and about five from residential premiseswere conducted inHararedaily.

5.5 Conclusion

Thischapterhasprovidedinsightsintotheperformanceofdifferentcomponentsofformalurbanlandmarkets inZimbabwe.UsingHarareasacasestudy,thechapterpresentedtrendsinhousingandlanddelivery.Atthetimethestudywascarriedout,governmentwasthemainsourceof landforurbandevelopment.Thechapteralsonotedtheincreasinglysignificantroleofcivilsocietyorganisationsinprovidinglandand housing for the poor. Although partnerships existwhich facilitate civil societyinterventions, there is room for further partnerships. The chapter also provided asnapshot survey of property transactions – which are predominantly financed bycash resources, a situation that does not favour the poor. The chapter concludedwith an analysis of the type and causes of disputes that characterise Zimbabwe’surbanlandmarkets.


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6. InformallandmarketsinEpworthandHopleysettlementsin Harare

Thischapterpresentsfindingsonthestatusof informal landmarketsinZimbabwe,presenting a somewhat different scenario from land transactions in the formalsector.ItisbasedondatacollectedfromEpworthandHopleysettlementsinHarare.Epworth, a settlement originating in the pre‐independence period, is a typicalinformalsettlementwhichisstillintheprocessofevolvingintoaformalsettlement.The data presented in this chapter show how central and local government havemoved to formalise some sections of the settlements through planning, servicedeliveryandsomenotionofpropertyrightsregistration.Ontheotherhand,Hopleyfarmislargelyapost‐2000settlement,withsomesectionsplannedwhileothersarenot.

Thedatapresentedinthischapterrelatetomethodsofaccessingland,theplanningstatusofsettlements,thetypeofpropertyrightsapplicableintheareaandissuesoftransferability, the statusof housing and the servicingof stands (water and sewerreticulation). The chapterwas developed largely through key informant interviewswith residents in Epworth and Hopley, interviews with the Epworth Local Board(ELB)officialsandareviewofsecondarydata.

Toensurea soundunderstandingof Zimbabwe’s informal landmarkets,wegiveabriefhistoricalaccountofEpworth.Locatedsome25kmoutsideofHarare,Epworthwas established in the 1890s by theMethodist Churchon three farms – Epworth,Glenwood andAdelaide. It initially consisted of twomain villages called Chiremba(Muguta and Makomo) and Chizungu (Chinamano and Zinyengerere). As theliberation war intensified in the 1970s,more peoplemigrated to the cities whichwereconsideredsafer.Theinformalset‐upofEpworthmadethesettlementaneasydestination for new arrivals, resulting in unprecedented growth,which forced theChurchtodonatepartofitslandtogovernmenttoallowtheestablishmentofalocalgovernmentarea.ThisledtothecreationoftheEpworthLocalBoardin1986,withthemandateofadministeringandregulatinggrowthofthesettlement(ChatizaandMlalazi, 2009). At that stage, efforts were started to regularise and formalise thesettlement.

An important term in the discussion of informal land markets in Epworth is theconceptof ‘originalresidents.’Originalresidentsarethesettlerswhostayed inthefourvillagesofMakomo,Zinyengerere,MugutaandChinamano.(Eachofthesewasofcourseextendedastheoriginalsettlersexpandedinnumbers.)AtthecreationoftheEpworthLocalBoard,originalresidentsoccupiedmorelandintheareaastheymovedtodefytheauthorityofthenewlycreatedbody.Theoriginalresidentswererecorded in a register and were allocated ELB cards. The register has since beencomputerisedtofacilitatepaymentofrates.Asisdiscussedlaterinthissection,thisprovidessomesecurityoftenurefortheoriginalresidents.

Informalsettlementsstartedtobeestablishedagaininthepost‐2000periodattheinstigationofZANUP.F.‐ledlandoccupations.(Someoftheschemesstartedearlierduringthe1998/1999landoccupations.)Anestimated13147standswereallocated


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by ZANU P.F. structures but these remain unplanned, although the Epworth LocalBoardisintheprocessofregularisingthem19.

6.1 Land access methods in Informal land markets

Therearemultiplemethodsof accessing land in Epworth andHopley settlements.These include purchases fromoriginal settlers, free allocation from theMethodistChurch (for originals), allocation by the authorities (Epworth Local Board and thestate) and settlement through the post‐2000 land occupations. In Epworth, socialnetworksplayedacriticalroleininformingwould‐beresidentsontheavailabilityofland for sale. Many of the original residents, who had been allocated land thatmeasuredacoupleofacres,subsequentlysubdividedandsoldnewplots.Thenewresidents came both from within and outside of Epworth. In most of the cases,transactionswerewitnessedbyrelativesandfriends.TheEpworthLocalBoardnowplays an important role in sanctioning land transactions. Box 6.1 provides furtherdetailsonlandaccessmethodsbysomeoftheresidentsinthestudyarea.ForsomesectionsofEpworthandHopley, residentsoccupied the landduring thepost‐2000landoccupations.Thisparticularmodeoflandacquisitionprovidedthebasisforthefusionofinformallandmarketswithformallandmarkets.Usinglandoccupationstoaccess urban land does not conformwith the key legislation traditionally used toacquire such land. Following the use of informal methods of land access andallocation,governmentmovedtoformalisethesettlements,though landallocationwasinstitutedviapoliticallyandsociallydrivenprocesses(Marongwe,2009).

19InterviewandEpworthLocalBoardrecords,2011


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Box6.1:LandaccessmethodsinEpworth

HouseholdAwasallocateda4900m2standbytheMethodistChurchin1979.Asanemployeeofthechurchandachurch‐goingmember,thestandwasallocatedforfree.RecordsattheMethodistChurchandELBpapersdocumentownership.Thefamilyconstructedfourcottages,threethree‐roomedandonetwo‐roomed.Thekeysourceoflivelihoodforthefamilyarepensions,remittancesandurbanagriculture.

HouseholdBwasallocateda4900m2standbytheMethodistChurchin1977.Atthattime,standswerebeingsoldtooldresidentsofEpworthonly.Thehouseholdhead(thehusband)thenworkedfortheCityofHarare.Aroundthetimeanew‘village,’Domboramwariwasbeingsetup.ThosewillingtojointhesettlementwererequiredtojointheMethodistChurchandcompleteformswithamarriagecertificateattached.Noinitialpurchasepricewaspaidthoughbeneficiariespaidforthelandinannualinstalments.ELBcardsissuedyearslaterandratesreceiptsarethesourceoftenuresecurity.ThehouseholdunderstandsthatitcansellthepropertyfreelyalthoughconsentfromtheELBisrequired.Thefamilyconstructedasix‐roomedmainhousein1981andthepropertyisservedbyadeepwellandpitlatrine.

HouseholdCwasallocateda4900m2in1977.AtthattimethehouseholdwasbasedinMufakose,ahigh‐densityresidentialneighbourhoodinHarare.AcloserelationoftheirswhoworkedasateacheratalocalschoolinEpworthhadinformedthemoflandsalesintheareabytheMethodistChurch.Thehouseholdpaidnoinitialdeposit,althoughthehusbandwasasanemployeeofO.K.Zimbabwe.Theheadofthehousehold(thehusband)paidyearlyinstalmentstotheMethodistChurch.Thefamilyinvestedinaseven‐roomedhouse,atoiletandawell.ELBcardsandratesreceiptsarethedocumentsthatprovepropertyownership.

Source: Field survey 2011

Land access methods in Epworth defy the traditional conception of informalitywherelandisforfree.Agoodnumberof‘originals’,particularlythosenotaffiliatedwithorworkingfortheMethodistChurchactuallypurchasedland.Eventhosethatgot land for free are justified in claiming it as theirs as allocations by affiliationsuggest formality. As such, there is a marked difference from the post‐2000 landoccupations‐basedmechanismsforaccessing land.What isclearthough isthattheEpworthlandmarketisgovernedbyfactorsdifferentfromotherurbansettlementsin Zimbabwe. The Epworth Local Board’s regulatory authority is only slowly beingestablished (Chatiza and Mlalazi, 2009) and the land values as well as landtransactionsrespondtodifferentparameters(Chatiza,2010).

6.2 Land and property rights in informal settlements

Epworth andHopley settlements have elements of both formal and informal landmarkets.Forthetwosettlements,the land involved isessentiallystate land. InthecaseofEpworth,areascategorisedasformalhaveapprovedlayoutsandthestandsare numbered. Hopley has a combination of areas that were properly plannedbeforeoccupationandasectionwherepeoplehavehaphazardlysettledaspartofpost‐2000 land occupations. In the properly planned areas, residents have leasesadministered by theMinistry of Local Government andUrbanDevelopmentwhilethose inunplannedsectionshaveno formally recognisable landrights.Hopleyalsohostsresidentsaffectedbythe2005OperationMurambatsvinaevictionselsewhereandassuchhasbecomerelativelyovercrowded.


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AsisshowninTable6.1,sectionsofEpworthhavegonethroughuniqueprocessesofchangeandgrowth.Someofthesectionswerereplanned,aprocessthatmarkedthebeginningofformalisationofthesettlement,whileothershavecontinuedtosproutwithout any formal planning. In terms of land rights, Epworth residents proveownership byway of signed leases, receipts for rates payment and lodgers’ cardsissued by the local authority. All Epworth residents have been registered by theEpworth Local Board. As such, the Council‐based register, signed leases and ratesreceiptsconstituteproofofownershipandthusactasavalidationoftenuresecurityfor residents. Issuanceof leasesonlyapplies inareaswherenon‐title surveyshavebeendone.Theleaseis,however,issueduponrequestbyastandowner.Whensucha request ismade the stand is valuedand fullownershipwillbegrantedonce theagreedvalueofthelandhasbeenpaidup.

Discussionswith Epworth Local Boardofficials revealed that residents only ask forleaseswithoptionstopurchasewhenseekingfinancefromfinancial institutions. Ingeneral, itwas revealed that residentswere lessenthusiasticaboutpaying the fullvalueofthe landtoallowfullownership.Thus,residentsseemedcontentwiththeregisterandtheratesreceiptsastheirformoftenuresecurity. Indeed,theoriginalsettlersarguethatthelandhasalwaysbeentheirsandthattheEpworthLocalBoardas a recent creation has nomandate to “sell land to them” (Chatiza andMlalazi,2009).AsnotedbyChatiza (2010), thishas createda situationwhere someof theland in Epworth is locked in a development system of low value and haphazardutilisation.

TheofficialpositionthatalllandundertheambitoftheEpworthLocalBoardisstatelandmeansthatresidentsarelegallynotsupposedtosellortransactinsuchland.Inpractice,residentsdoconductlandsales,butmostlyassubdivisionsoftheiroriginalstands.ThosewishingtosubdividetheirstandsarerequiredtoapproachtheBoardfirsttocheckwhetherthereisroomforasubdivisiontobeeffected.TheBoardalsousesthatopportunitytocheckifthepersonintendingtosubdivideistheownerofthelandasrecordedintheregisterandonratesreceipts.

Although the Epworth Local Board pretends not to be aware of themotivation ofsubdivision,mostresidentsdo it tosell the land.For theEpworthLocalBoard, thecreation of a new subdivisionmeans an additional source of revenue through thepaymentof rates.Thus,whilsteffortsarebeingmadeto formalise thesettlement,many of the transactions taking place are being done through informal channels.Eventhetypeofpropertyrightsissued(theregisterandratesreceipts)isablendofformalandinformallandmarketactivities.Thetransitionfrominformaltoformalisa process that takes time to complete. What is important is to recognise that aprocessthatcoversalargeproportionofEpworthhasbeeninitiated.Yetdespitetheexistenceofnon‐titlesurveys,insomesectionsitwillstilltakealongtimeforafullyoperationalformallandmarkettodevelopinEpworth.Thisisbecausetherearestillsomeareaswhichareclearlycategorisedasinformalsettlements.Thepoliticsofthepost‐2000periodgaverisetomanysuchtypesofsettlements(seethediscussioninChapter1).

In Epworth these informal settlements have no approved layout plans and noplanned roads. Interviews with Epworth Local Board officials revealed that in apoliticallydrivenprocess, residents inward7 (wherethe informalsettlementsare)


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demonstrated to Council, demanding recognition as ‘official’ residents.Consequently, a register was developed, temporary household cards issued andresidents started paying rates. Discussion with residents in the post‐2000settlementsconfirmedthattenuresecurityforinformalresidentswasguaranteedbytheir political affiliation to ZANU P.F. Examples from both Epworth and Hopleyprovidecredencetothis(seeBox6.3).

Box6.2:AtypicalinformalsettlementinHopley

ThesectionknownasMbareinHopleyemergedin2005followingtheCleanupCampaign.Theresidentsstayedinthe‘real’MbarepriortotheCampaign.WhentheywereevictedfollowingthedestructionoftheirillegalstructurestheyrelocatedtoHopley.TheHopleysectionwheretheyresideispurelyinformal.Thereisno‐onewithauthorityoverthesettlersonmattersoflandaccess.Thestandshavenotbeenproperlydemarcated,theyhavenostandnumbersandthestandsizesareunknown.Thesectionishaphazard,overcrowdedandhaspoorsanitationfacilities.

Source: Field data, February 2011

Box6.3:Landaccessandpropertyrightsissuesinthepost‐2000informalsettlementsinEpworth

HouseholdDwasallocateda3000m2standinward7followingtheyear2000landoccupations.Previously,thehouseholdstayedinrentedaccommodationinEpworth.ThehouseholdconfirmedthattheywereallocatedlandbyZANUP.F.partystructures.ThepossessionofaZANUP.F.partycardwasseenasprovidingthemwithsecurityandtenure.Thefamilyhassinceinvestedinthedevelopmentofatwo‐roomedcottageandatoilet.ThepoliticaltensionbetweenMDCandZANUP.F.wasseenascomplicatingthecommunicationbetweenresidentsandtheMDC‐controlledCouncilofEpworthLocalBoard.

HouseholdEwasallocateda1600m2standfollowingtheZANUP.F.‐ledlandoccupations.TheheadofhouseholdEhadbeenretrenchedfromworkatthetimethelandallocationsstarted.Hisparents,whoresidedinEpworth,invitedhimtocomeandparticipateinthelandoccupations.ThefactthatEpworthhasalonghistoryofunplannedsettlementsgivespeopleconfidencethatthesettlementispermanent.Further,beingZANUP.F.partycard‐holdingmembersisseenasprovidingsufficienttenuresecurity.

HouseholdFwasallocateda1600m2standunderthesameprogrammeasHouseholdsDandE.Priortothelandoccupations,thehouseholdstayedinEpworthastenants.Havingstayedonthestandsince2000isseenasprovidingsecurityoftenure.Thefamilyhasinvestedinafive‐roomedcottage,adeepwellandapitlatrine.

ThecommonviewamonghouseholdsD,EandFwasthatlandwasgiventothemforfreebecausetheywerethechildrenoforiginalinhabitantsofEpworth.Itwasalsoanagreedpositionthattheirpoliticalparty,ZANU‐P.F.,didnotpermitthesellingofthestandsallocatedtothem.

Source: Field data, February 2011

6.3 The intersection of informal and formal activities in Epworth

AnimportantargumentpresentedinthischapteristhatlandmarketsinplaceslikeEpworthandHopleyareahybridof informaland formal landmarket transactions.Over time, the state (central and local) has moved towards formalising suchsettlements through settler registration, planning andnon‐title survey, as is underway in Epworth. In the post‐2000 period, politics played a critical role in theemergence of new informal settlements. Even some schemes of the post‐2000periodhavesincebeenplannedandformallyallocated.ThisisthecasewithHopley


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scheme,partofwhichfallsundertheGarikai/HlalaniKuhlehousingprogramme(seethediscussioninChapter5).

Table 6.1 gives a general description of the different sections of Epworth. By andlarge, most of the settlements started with residents accessing pieces of landthroughtheirownmethods(informallandaccess).Thehistoryofindividualsectionsof the settlement shows that they started very informally, with no stateinvolvement.Mostofthesettlementshavesincebeenplanned,withtheexceptionof one area known as Zinyengere Extension orMagada. Thus one important steptowardsformalisationisalmostcomplete.Insomeofthesections,waterandsewerinfrastructurehasbeenput inplace,although thesystemremainsnon‐operationalformaintenancereasons.Thiscanbeseenasthesecondsteptowardsformalisation.With the exception of Overspill, most of the sections do not have houses withapproved plans. The standard, type and quality of housing present clear evidencethatthesebuildingswereerectedwithouttechnicalsupportfromCouncil.Thussuchbuildingsreproduceatypicalcharacterisationofinformalsettlements.

The status of property rights registration in Epworth has elements of bothinformality and formality. For the planned settlements, provisions for obtainingleases with an option to purchase exist. As already discussed, interviews withEpworth Local Board officials revealed that there has been a slow take‐up of theoption.DiscussionswithresidentsrevealedthatEpworthLocalBoardcardsandratereceipts were seen as the key forms of tenure security. This can be seen as aprogressiontowardsformalpropertyrightssincereceiptsandregistersdonotfullyrepresent formal property rights (they do not, for instance, provide for thedescription of the pieces of land which they represent). In the post‐2000settlements,affiliationtoZANUP.F.asapoliticalparty isseenasa formof tenuresecurity. This can be viewed as a very informal arrangement although it can beargued that the recognition by a political party is a step towards formalisation. InEpworth,ZANUP.F.affiliationwaseffectivelyused toagitate for formalisationandthe first elected Council (MDC‐T) resolved to accommodate the formalisationprocess.Overall,thetrendsinEpworthconfirmtheexistenceofacontinuumoflandrightsinurbanareasaspresentedbyUN‐Habitat(2010)(seeFigure6.1).Thus,itcanbe argued that informal tenure has evolved into intermediate forms of formaltenure, with some already transforming into registered leaseholds. Indeed, thearrangementssuitthesituationofpoorerpeoplewhocannotmeettherequirementsforformalregistrationofpropertyrights(seeChapter7).Theset‐upofZimbabwe’surban areas is such that customary tenure does not exist in those areas, even ininformalsettlementslikeEpworth.


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Table6.1:IntersectionofinformalandformallandmarketsinEpworth

Area Year HistoryofsettlementLegalandplanningstatus

Statusofpropertyrights

Statusofhousing

Service

MakomoCirca1908

MethodistChurchmemberswereallocatedlandwhichformedthecoreofthesettlementgrowth.

Legalandformallyplanned

Leaseagreementsoptionsexist,ELBcards&ratesreceiptsprovidetenuresecurity

Oldhouseshavenoapprovedplans,newhouseshave.

Waterandsewerinfrastructureexistsbutnotworkingforlackofpumpingcapacityandwaterrespectively.

Chizunguinthe1940's

Originalsettlerssomeofwhomsoldpartoftheirland.

Re‐plannedinthe1980s,partialinstallationofinfrastructure.

Leaseagreementsoptionsexist.Ratesreceiptsareaformofsecurity.

Somehouseshaveapprovedplansothersdonothave.

Useofnaturalspringsanduseofpitlatrines

JachaCirca1978

Areausedtobegardensoforiginalsettlers,descendentsofwhomdemarcatedandsoldstands.

SettlementisunplannedbutrecognisedbyELB.ELBprovidedstandnumbers.

ELBcardsandratesreceiptsprovidesecurityfortenure.

Houseshavenoapprovedplans.

Waterinfrastructurewithnorunningwaterforlackofpumpingcapacity.Sewerinfrastructurenotworkingforlackofwater.

ChirembaPre‐1980

Settlersconsiderthemselves'originals'whosettledinEpworthfirst.

Legalandofficiallyrecognised.

Leaseagreementsoptionsexist,cardsandratesreceiptsprovidetenuresecurity

HouseswerebuiltbeforeestablishmentofELB.Houseshavenoapprovedplans.

Waterandsewerinfrastructureinplacebutnotworking.Useofdeepwellsandpitlatrines

ChinamanoExtension

Justbefore1980

Originalresidentssoldlandintheirfieldsandgrazingareas.

Settlementre‐plannedandupgradedinearly1980'sbycentralgovernment.

Leaseagreementsoptionexists,ELB,cardsandratesreceiptsprovidetenuresecurity.

Old&dilapidatedhouses,mostlywithnoapprovedplans.

Nowaterandsewerinfrastructure.Useofpitlatrinesanddeepwells

Overspillinthe1980's

Settlementplannedfromthebeginning

Formalandplannedsettlement

Leaseagreementsoptionsexist.ELBcardsandratesreceiptsprovidetenuresecurity

Houseshaveapprovedplansthoughothersdonothave.

Waterinfrastructurewithnorunningwaterforlackofpumpingcapacity.Sewerinfrastructurenotworkingforlackofwater.

Magada/Overspill

Early1980's

Originalssoldlandthatwaspartoftheirfields.

Formalandplanned

ELBcardsandratesreceipts.Settlersconsideredillegal.

Houseshavenoapprovedplans.

Waterandsewerinfrastructureexistsbutnotworkingforlackofpumpingcapacityandwaterrespectively.

Zinyengereextension/Magada

Circa1997

Originalresidentssoldlandintheirfieldsandgrazingareas.

settlementnotplanned

LandownedbyELB,residentsnotclearonthisstatus.Securityisintheformofratesreceipts.

Houseshavenobuildingplans,structuresrangefromshackstohouses.

IndividualconnectionstopipedwaterfinancedbyPlanInternational.Nosewer,useofpitlatrines

Domboramwari

Originalssoldlandintheirfieldsandgrazingareas.

LegallyrecognisedbyELB.

ELBcardsandratesreceiptsprovidetenuresecurity

Noapprovedbuildingplan.

Waterinfrastructureexistsbutnorunningwater.Nosewer;useofpitlatrines.

Source: Summarised from Epworth Local Board (2009)


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Figure6.1:Acontinuumoflandrightsinurbanareas

Source: UNHabitat 2010:7

Property transactions taking place in Epworth combine informal and formalmethods.Whilstthelandinvolvedisstatelandandisnotsupposedtobesold,eventhe ELB admitted that residents continued to engage in the buying and selling ofsuchland.TheELBhascreatedspaceforitselfasa‘witness’tothetransactions.Thesame situation is replicated through the subdivision of stands. With no formalprocedures followed to subdivide stands, residents, with the blessing of EpworhtLocal Board, are involved in the subdivision of land. It is in this context that thediscussionontheintersectionofinformalandformallandmarketsiscouched.

6.4 Informal settlements: a place for the poor?

Chapter5hasarguedthatpricesforhousesandstandsinthehigh‐densityareasarewellbeyondwhatthepoorcanafford.Forinstance,thechaptershowedthatpricesfor houses and stands in high‐density residential areas range from US$2 000 toUS$10000.InZimbabwe’sdepressedeconomywhereincomelevelsarelowandcivilservants – the largest section of those employed – earn only around US$200 permonth,thisrepresentsaseriousconstraint.InEpworth,standsintheplannedareaisbeing sold for US$650.00 for a 150 m2 stand (interviews with Board officials,February2011).ItisevidentthattheverypoorcanonlyaffordstandsinplaceslikeEpworth.The followingdiscussionpresentsprofilesof randomly selected residentsfromHopleytobetterunderstandthepovertystatusofresidents.

Household J at Hopley settlement

Household J originally came from Porta farm. The household was evicted by thepolice and the army during the Cleanup Campaign of 2005. Originally fromMozambique, the family was allocated a 150 m2 stand under the Garikai/HlalaniKuhle scheme. As per requirement, the household paid US$50 deposit uponallocationandpaysUS$50yearlyasleasefeestotheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandUrbanDevelopment. Thefamily’smajorincomesourceisthesaleofflowerstomournersatGranvilleCemetery.Whenthefamilyarrivedin2005,itstayedinplasticshacks provided by AN NGO, Christian Care, until the City of Harare pegged andallocatedstands.Thegovernment,throughtheCityofHarare,thenstartedbuildingtwo bed‐roomed houses for those that had been allocated stands. Some houseswerecompletedwhileotherswereleftatfoundationlevel.Otherswereneverbuilt.Those whose houses were completed weremade to pay US$15 permonth while

Informallandrights

Formallandrights

Informaltenure

FreeholdGrouptenureCustomarytenure

Registeredleasehold

Intermediatetenure ttetenure


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those whose houses were left at slab level pay only US$50 per year forimprovements made. Household J’s house was left at slab level but it has sincecompletedthetwo‐roomedhouse.

Household K at Hopley settlement

HouseholdKisfemale‐headedandwasalsoevictedfromPortafarmin2005bytheCleanupCampaign.Thehouseholdhead isoriginally fromMozambiquebutcannotremembertheactualdateshearrivedinZimbabwe.Therearesevenchildreninthehousehold,allborninZimbabwe.WhenshearrivedatHopley,shestayedinaplasticshackprovidedbyChristianCare,togetherwithfourothersiblingsforclosetotwoyears, during which time the stands were being developed. She has a stand thatmeasures150m2.Thestandswereonlyallocatedtothosewhohadbeenaffectedbythe Cleanup Campaign. In an interview, the head of household K noted that “...atfirst we never paid anything for these stands until 2009 when we started payingmonthlyrentalsof$15”.Shehasa leaseagreementsignedwiththeMinistryofLocalGovernmentandUrbanDevelopment. Shenoted that themainproblem theareafacesisacriticalshortageofwaterandalackofproperinfrastructuresuchasroadsandelectricity.Shefurthernotedthat“...wedonothaveaccesstofirewood.Whenwe go to nearby plots to fetch firewood, we are chased away by war veterans.Anotherbigchallengethatwefacehereisthatoflackofwatersuitablefordomesticuse. Two boreholes that were sunk broke down a year ago and we are fetchingwaterfromunprotectedwellstherebyriskingcontractingcholera.” Shesurvivesonsellingapopular‘illicitbrew’(chikokiyana).Shearguedthatpoliticiansfromdifferentpolitical partieswere hampering development in the area by canvassing for votesandfurtherallegedthatpoliticalpartiesoftenlied.

Household L at Hopley settlement

Household L came fromMalawi in 1963 and worked at InyatiMine in Headlands(ManicalandProvince)beforethemineclosedinthe1980s.Aftertheclosureofthemineandfromthesavingsgivenasaretrenchmentpackage,thefamilyofsixmovedtoMbareinsearchofemployment.UponarrivalinHarare,thehusbandworkedfortwocompaniesbeforebeingretrenchedagain.ThehighrentandsubsequentlossofemploymentforcedthemoutofMbaretoPortaFarmin1999.Thehouseholdthenaccessedapieceof landtobuildatwo‐roomed‘makeshift’houseatPortafarm.In2005, the family, alongside others, were bundled into police vehicles during thenight anddumpedatHopley Farm. Thehouseholddidnotpayanymoney for theland during the first four years of their stay at Hopley farm where they wereallocateda150m2stand.Thehouseholdheadnowworksasasecurityguardwhilethewifeandchildrenare involved infishvending,whichtheygetfromPortaFarmwhere the family members have remained members of fishing camps. Thehouseholdalsohas aleaseagreementsignedwiththeMinistryofLocalGovernmentandUrbanDevelopment. Inaddition to the tworoomsbuiltunderGarikai/HlalaniKuhle,thehouseholdhassincemanagedtobuildtwootherbedroomsatthestand(notroofedatthetimeofthestudy).

Household M at Hopley settlement

HouseholdMisfemale‐headedwithfourchildren.Theheadhasneverbeenmarried.ShecamefromMbarein2005whereshewasrentingaone‐roomedbackyardshack


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in theMatapi area. Shewas forcibly removedand the shackdestroyedduring theCleanupCampaign.Duringthemayhem,shemanagedtopulloutherwardrobe,bedandsomesmallkitchenutensilsandsoughtaccommodationata localchurchuntiltheyweredrivenoutofthechurchduringthenightandtakentoHopleyfarm.Shestayedinashackuntilshewasallocateda150m2stand.Likeotherresidents,sheisalsopayingmonthly rentalsof$15 to the responsibleministry.Sinceacquiring thepropertyshehasmanagedtoextendthetworoomstothreeandhasplanstofinishthehouseintwoyears’time.Sheearnsalivingthroughsellingeggsandsadza20totobaccofarmersatBokaAuctionFloorslocatedsome300mfromherhouse.

6.5 Discussion

AllfourhouseholdsdescribedabovewerevictimsoftheCleanupCampaignof2005.They used to stay in informal housing either in Mbare or at Porta Farm. Thehouseholds also depended on precarious livelihoods as vendors and lowly paidformalsectoremployees.ThelivingconditionsthatprevailinHopleyarepoor.Withstand sizes averaging 150m2 rentals at $15 and households relying on communaltoiletsandwatersupply,itisclearthatresidentsofHopleyarepoor.Inotherhigh‐densityareas,rentalsarearound$50perroom,afigurethatthepoorcannotafford.Whilst settlements like Epworth and Hopley are partially formal, it can be arguedthatinformalitycoexistswithformality.ArelatedpointtomakeisthatGovernmentandtheCityofHararearevisibleactorsintermsoftheHopleylandmarket,butonlyin the formally planned section of the settlement. Tenure is secure, withbeneficiariesholdingvalid leasesandwithfees(annual)andrentals (monthly)paidtotheMinistryofLocalGovernmentandUrbanDevelopmentsincethesettlementisonstateland.Publicsectorparticipationhashadabearingontherentallevelsandleasefees.However,thereareotherhouseholdsintheunplannedsectionsofHopleywherelandownership,tenuresecurityandserviceprovisionaremorecomplexbutgenerallyinadequateandinsecure.

6.6 Conclusion

The coexistence of formality and informality in Epworth and Hopley presents aworkingarrangementthatsuitsthesituationofthepoor.Bothgovernmentandcivilsociety organisations have made efforts to help the poor in these informalsettlements. It is fair tosuggest thatboth (stateandnon‐state)organisationshavefacilitated landmarket participation by the poor inways that require upscaling tocover other poor people that remain unserved. There is more potential forpartnershipsbetweenresidentsofsuchsettlementsandvariousstateandnon‐stateactors.Itseemsasifgovernment,whereitsawfit,showedtraitsofflexibilitywhendealingwithinformalsettlements.Suchflexibilityis,however,notdivorcedfromthehiddenagendaof seeking state control of the residents. The caseof Epworth alsodemonstrates that the Council is following up on residents who occupied land,formallyregisteringthemasawayofensuringtheircompliancewithamoreformaland urban governance regime moving forward. In both Hopley and Epworth,obtaining land rights include informal tenure, intermediate tenure and registered 20ThisisthestaplefoodinZimbabwe,madeofmealie‐meal.


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leaseholds. Gravitation towards formal land rights is evident in Epworth. Bothsettlements present some options for integrating the poor in formal urban landmarkets–moreso inHopley,sincemostofthebeneficiariestherewerevictimsofthe2005CleanupCampaign.


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7. LandandpropertyrightsregistrationinZimbabwe’surbanareas

7.1 Introduction

ThischapterpresentsananalysisoftheregistrationofpropertyrightsinZimbabwe’surban areas. The discussion is entirely informed by the formal processes ofregistering property rights. The chapter starts with a historical account of howpropertyrightsregistrationevolvedinthecountry,startingfromthecolonialperiod.Thechapterdiscussesthetypesofpropertyrightsapplicableintheurbanareas,andthe implications of such forms of rights to the needs of the poor. The chapterinterrogates the key steps followed when registering property rights and thedocumentation required in such a process. The key argument pursued is that theformal property rights as they currently exist cannot be afforded by the poor.Informed by the discussion in the preceding chapter, the chapter argues that ahybrid of informal and formal property rights could be the solution to the poor’spropertyneeds.

7.2 The history of land registration in Zimbabwe

Pre‐colonial Zimbabwe did not have an organised, systematic system of landregistration.Thesystemoflandregistrationoperationalinthecountryisavestigeofcolonialism.ThelandregistrationsysteminZimbabweiscloselymodeledonthatinSouth Africa. The RhodesianDeeds Registries Act is a replica of the South AfricanDeedsRegistriesActof1937.TheprimarystatuteonlandregistrationwastheLandSurveyRegulationsof1895publishedintheSurveyRegulations(GovernmentNotice,SurveyDepartmentNumber1of1894).However,theDeedsRegistriesActpassedin1959remains,withafewamendments,theapplicablestatuteinZimbabwe.

Originally all land in the country belonged to the State. In colonial times it wasknownascrown land,now it isgenerally termedStateLand.Therewasno titleorprivateownershipofsuchland.Ifthestategrantedonetitletosuchlandhe/shewasgiven a Deed of Grant. This was the first title to land and evidence of privateownership. In the absence of any such arrangement the state landwas known asunalienatedStatelandasdefinedintermsofSection2oftheDeedsRegistriesAct.Unalienatedstatelandisdefinedasstatelandinrespectofwhichnotitledeedotherthan a Certificate of State Title exists. Each piece of land registered as a separateentity must be surveyed and reflected on a separate diagram approved by aSurveyorGeneral.Thedebate in theformal landmarkets ishingedonthethinkingthatanefficientsystemoflandregistrationisimpossibleunlesseachregisteredunitoflandissurveyedandrepresentedonadiagramorgeneralplan.

The very act of registration originates in the survey of the unit of land to beregistered. It is thedeciding factor fordetermining theboundariesofanyunit, forthe Deed itself can only repeat the description as it is on the diagram. ThepreparationofdiagramsandplansisgovernedbytheLandSurveyAct.IntermsofthisActadiagramcanonlyberecognisedifithasbeensignedbyonerecognisedinlaw as a land surveyor and thereafter be approved or certified by the SurveyorGeneral. A general plan on the other hand represents the relevant positions anddimensions of two or more land pieces of land and has been signed by one


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recognised in law as a land surveyor and thereafter be approved or certified as ageneralplanbytheSurveyorGeneral.The importanceofadiagram lies in the factthatthediagramisthedecidingfactorfordeterminingtheboundariesofanyunit.IfthereareanyvariancesbetweenDeedanddiagram,thedescriptioninthediagrammust prevail. Section 40 of the Land Survey Act prohibits the registration of landwithoutanapproveddiagramorageneralplan.

Thelandregistrationsystemisoperationalisedbyaregisteredconveyancerwhoisinprivateprofessionalpractice.TheconveyancerisempoweredtoactintheplaceandsteadofonecalledtheAppearer.Betweenthemisthefiduciaryrelationshipofagentandprincipal. Theenablingdocument is the special PowerofAttorney.Without ittheconveyancerhasnocapacitytoactonbehalfofanindividual.Thenextrunginthe ladder is the Surveyor General and the Registrar of Deeds. These are bothindispensible components of the system. They are essential to the process ofregistration and without them there can be no registration of title in immovableproperty in Zimbabwe. The end‐product of the land registration system is theregisteredtitlewhichisevidencedbyaTitleDeed.

7.3 Types of ownership of urban land

Ownershipof land in theurbanarea isevidencedbyaTitleDeed.This is thedeedwhereby title to land is held. It is a generic term for Deed of Transfer, Deed ofPartition Transfer, Deed of Grant, Certificate of Registered Title, Certificate ofConsolidated Title etc. The Deed of Grant is the original title to landwherein theStatehasgrantedtitletoanindividual.ItissucceededbyDeedsofTransfer,DeedofPartitionTransfer,CertificateofRegisteredTitleetc.Thediagramdeed is thedeedunder which property is or was held to which an approved survey diagram isattached.Theholdingdeedisthedeedunderwhichtheregisteredholdercurrentlyholdstitle.Whenanewdeedisregistered,thepreviousdeed,notbeingadiagramdeed,becomesadeaddeed.Substitutedtitledeedsaredocumentsthatareissuedinsteadoftitledeedsbuthavethesamevalueandweightcarriedbytitledeeds.

Undivided shares in land

Whenapieceoflandisownedbyoristransferredtotwoormorepersonsitissaidtobeheldbythosetwoormorepersonsinundividedshares.Thesesharescouldbeequalornot.InZimbabwe,therearemanypropertiesregisteredjointlyinthenameofahusband‐wifecouple‘inequalundividedone‐halfshares’.Anundividedshareinlanddoesnotsignifyandmaynotbeheldtorepresentdefinedordistinctportionsofthe land even if the joint owners have agreed to each occupy defined or distinctportionsoftheland.Ifoneoftheownersbuildsastructureorenhancesthepropertyin any way, such structures and enhancements will be jointly owned by all theownersintheirrespectiveshares.Actualownershipofadefinedordistinctportionof the land can only be achieved by the owners agreeing to partition the landaccordingtotheirrespectivesharesintheland.Suchpartitioningoflandconstitutesa subdivision and is subject to the provisions of the Regional, Town and CountryPlanningActandtheLandSurveyAct.


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Block share system

Thiswasasystemofownershipofasingleunitinabuildingorblockofflatsbeforeenactmentofsection27oftheDeedsRegistriesAct.Althoughthesystemisstill inexistence in some urban areas it is no longer popular. It is rarely used nowwithpreference being given to undivided shares coupled with exclusive right ofownership.Intermsoftheblocksharesystemanownerofapieceoflandwhichistobe developed into a block of flats or where there is a block of flats for multipletransferwouldregistertheflatsinthenameofacompany.ThepropertywouldthenbetransferredtothecompanyandshareswouldbecreatedthatcorrespondtotheflatsasillustratedinTable7.1.

Table7.1:Typesofsharesinablocksharesystem

ClassAShares Flatnumber1ClassBShares Flatnumber2ClassCShares Flatnumber3ClassDShares Flatnumber4ClassEShares Flatnumber5

Source: summarised from appropriate legal documents

The purchaser who intended to buy flat number 3, for instance, would purchaseclassCsharesinthecompany.Consequently,therewouldbeatransferofsharestothepurchaserandissuanceofasharecertificate.Thecertificatewasproofoftitleinthesamewaythatatitledeedisused.Themainadvantagesofthissystemisthatitissimpletoputinplace,itislessexpensivethanthenormalsystemandthatitwouldbesuitedtolow‐incomeusers.However,therearedisadvantagesaswell.Titledeedsand selected substituted title deeds are the exclusive evidence of ownership ofimmovable property not a mere share certificate which is proof of ownership ofsharesinapropertyholdingcompany.Also,aholderofasharecertificateisnotableto mortgage their property in the same way that mortgages are registered overimmovable property. Loan financewould have to be secured over thewhole titledeedwhichisinthenameofacompany.Itisinconceivablethatalltheownersoftheshares in the propertywould agree to one person burdening the property to thedetriment of all. A holder of share certificates would face grave challenges whentrying to sell the property as he/she could only sell shares rather than land, asevidencedby the titledeeds.Likewise the insolvencyof thecompanywouldaffectinnocentholdersoftheblocksofshares.

Undivided shares couples with exclusive right of ownership

It was because of the inadequacies of the block share system that the system ofundividedsharescoupledwithexclusiverightofownershipwasintroduced.Thisisinterms of section 27 of the Deeds Registry Act. It is popularly known as SectionalTitle.ItissimilarinmodeltothesystemsinSouthAfricaandBotswana.Itappliestourbanlandonly.TheprocedureisfortheownerofapieceofpropertytoregisteraNotarialDeedagainsttheTitleDeedtothelandwherehewishestotransfertooneor more persons an undivided share in land coupled with an exclusive right ofoccupation.TheNotarialDeed:


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1. Specifiesthenumberofshareswhicharecoupledwithanexclusiverightofoccupation

2. Indicates clearly the buildings or portions of the building which are to besubjecttotherightofoccupation

3. Defines the reciprocal rights and obligations of the owners of undividedshares

4. Providefortheadministrationandmaintenanceofthebuildingandthelandconcerned

5. ProvidesforthemannerinwhichtheNotarialDeedmaybeamended.

Theexclusiverightofownershipisarealrightandisinseparablefromtheundividedshare. Undivided shares coupled with exclusive right of ownership shall not beregardedassubdivisionsofthelandconcernedintermsoftheRegional,TownandCountry Planning Act. Exclusive right of occupation is defined as the right of theownerofanundividedshareinapieceoflandinanurbanareatotheexclusionofevery other owner of an undivided share in the land concerned either with orwithoutanyareaofground.

Partition transfer

Partitioningoflandisdefinedaswhenthejointownersofapieceofland,orpiecesof land (provided each partitioner holds a share in each of the pieces) agree toredistribute such landby subdividing it in suchaway thateach receivesadefinedpieceofland.Inordertoeffectthis,theremustbeasubdivisionpermit.Ownershipis,thereafter,heldunderaDeedofPartitionTransfer.

Cessionary rights

Themostcommoncircumstancesinwhichrights,titleandinterestinpropertymaybecededfromonepersontoanotheriswheretheholderofunregisteredtitle,rightsand interest in a property cedes to another. Due to the absence of proper TitleDeeds, the normal process of transfermay not be used hence the onlymeans oftransferringrights, interestandtitle in immovableproperty isthroughcession.ThedocumentthatenablesthisistheDeedofCessionwhichthenbecomestheevidenceof title, rightsand interest.Thetransfer isachievedbyacessionto thethirdpartywho thenacquires title, rightsand interest in the sameway that theoriginal rightholderdid.Transferofrightsbywayofcessionalsohappenswheretitleisstillheldby the local authorityormunicipality andhasnot yetbeen transferred to the lastpurchaser.Every localmunicipalityhas itsownguidelinesorregulationsrelatingtothe cession of land. The purchaser has a right, with the consent of the localauthority,tocedethepropertytoanother.Usuallybeforeapropertycanbecededfromonepersontoanother,thewrittenconsentofthelocalauthorityisrequired.

Asageneralrule,thelocalauthoritymaydirectthatlandbecededtoathirdpartywheretheholderofrightsinlandhasfailedtofulfilcertainobligationsorconditionsrelatingtotheproperty.Forexample,theCityCouncilofHararecededrightswhereowners of various properties in Harare’s high‐density suburbs had not developedtheir properties over protracted periods of time as per agreement.Municipalitiesand local authorities derive their power and capacity to cede properties to third


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parties in the event of default from the agreement of sale. A clause is usuallycontained intheagreementsignedbetweenthe localauthorityandthepurchaser.The local authority thereby retains a right to cede the property to another in theeventofthepurchaser’sfailuretosatisfythetermsandconditionsofthepurchaseand/ortransfer.Inthecaseoflease‐to‐buyagreements,thelocalauthorityalsohastherighttoterminateanagreementandcedetheirrightsinthelandtoanother.Anexampleofthisiswhereapersonfailstomeettheirobligationsorfaltersinpaymentofcertain rentals.The localauthority thencancels theagreementandproceeds tocedethesamepropertytoanother.Insummation,thecessionaryrightsinpropertyownedbyCityCouncilcomeinthreeforms.

The first is through a normal lease; where the tenant is given a certificate ofoccupation.Thetenantcannotselltheproperty.Forexample,ifhe/shepassesaway,theCityCouncilhastherighttogivesuchcertificatetoanotherneworindependenttenant. The second is through a cession. In such case, the City of Harare as theregisteredownerofacertainproperty;cedestherightsofthatpropertytoanotherparty.Thenewownercansubsequentlycedethoserightstoathirdpartyprovidedthat the City Council; as the owner; consents to the cession; through anendorsementonthecessionform.Thethirdisthroughactualownershipwheresaythe City of Harare gives a party the right to ownership and the same cansubsequentlyapplyforatitledeedinhis/herfavour.

Discussion

ThetypesofpropertyownershipapplicableinZimbabwe’surbanareashavelargelynotbeenplacedinthecontextofaffordabilitybythedifferentsegmentsofsociety.Inparticular,therelevanceofeachofthementionedtypeofownershipisnotlinkedtowhatformofpropertyrightsareapplicabletothepoor.Theanalysisofthecostimplicationsofeachformofownershipanditsimpactonaffordablepropertyrightsregimesthatsuitsthepoorwasbeyondthescopeofthisstudy.Titlesurveysbasedonblocksurveyswouldbesubsequentlycheaperandmoreaffordable to thepoorthanthetitlesurveyearmarkedforindividualfreeholdtitle.Also,itisworthnotingthatthetypeofownershipoflandandotherpropertyaffectsbusinesstransactionsthatinvolvesuchproperties,especiallythemakingofasaleofthesaidlandandordeveloping such land. For example, thenewurban centrehierarchyestablished inthepost‐independenceperiodsawtheestablishmentofgrowth‐pointsnation‐wide.Ingeneral,landinsuchcentreshasnotitleandthisaffectslandsalesandtheuseofsuchpropertyassecurityagainstloansobtainedfromthebanks.

CessionaryrightsareacommonlyusedpropertyrightsregimeinZimbabwe’surbanareas.InHarare,therearestillexistingpropertiesinthehighdensityareaswherenotitlesurveyhasbeendone.ThisincludespropertiesinMbare,Mabvuku/Tafara,GlenNorahandMufakose.Insuchsituations,cessionaryrightsaretheprevailingpropertyrightsregime.However,inBulawayo,theCityCouncilpre‐financedthecostsofblocksurveys and subsequently charged beneficiaries. This strategy can be seen as onesuchoptionofprovidingsecurepropertyrightsforthepoor.

Evidencegatheredfromcourtrecordsrevealsthattheadministrationofcessionaryrights is problematic to local authorities. Inmany situations, owners of cessionaryrights attempt to sell their rights in suchpropertieswithout the knowledgeof the


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localauthority.Ultimately, somemembersof theunsuspectingpublichave lostonpaymentsmadewhenintheendlocalauthoritiesrefusetotransfertitle.Innullifyingoneparticular transaction thathadbeendonewithout theknowledgeof the localauthority,theJudgequotedtheverbatimoftheCouncilAgreement,“thepurchasershallnotpartwiththepossessionofthepropertyoranypartthereofnorcedenorassign nor hypothecate this Agreement or any rights hereunder to any personwithoutthepreviousconsentinwritingoftheCouncil.”21Inothercases,fraudulenttransactions involving cessionary rights have taken place.22 There are also strongelementsofinformalitywhenbeneficiariestradeincessionaryrightsbutdeliberatelychoosenotseekauthorisationinordertoavoidtheofficialviolationofcouncilpolicythat an individual can only benefit once from the allocation of council land orhouses.23 However, informal arrangements often backfire when people used asfrontstofacilitate‘illegal’transactionsrefusetocedetherightswhenrequiredtodosoasperthe‘informalagreement’betweenthepartiesconcerned.

7.4 The process of registering a property

The process of registering property requires the services of a conveyancer.Conveyancing costs are normally passed on to the purchaser and this in itself isexpensive to the poor. The conveyancer needs to be given the power of attorneybeforethestartoftheregistrationprocess.Thepaperworkstartswiththedraftingof an agreement of sale followed by the preparation of the Deed of Transfer.Supporting documentation required before the lodging of documents include theratesclearancecertificateandthecapitalgainscertificate.Thesestepsincreasesthecostsoftransferringpropertyandthetimeinvolved.Theneteffectofthisisthatitworksagainstthepoor.

Role of a conveyancer

A conveyancer is a lawyer in private, professional practice who has undergonespecialisedtraininginthetechnicalandspecialiseddisciplineofConveyancingandisregisteredassuchbytheHighCourtofZimbabweintermsoftheLegalPractitionersAct. In Zimbabwe, a conveyancer is crucial and necessary to the process of landregistration.Therearedocumentswhich,intermsofthelaw,maynotbeacceptedforregistrationifnotdrawn‐upbyaconveyancer.Thesearecertificateoftitle,deedoftransfer,mortgagebond,cessionofmortgagebond,consenttosubstitutionandagreements to variation of terms of a mortgage bond. Moreover, it is theconveyancerwhoperformsallthepreliminarytaskssuchassearchingfortheoriginaldeedinthedeedsofficetoensureitsexistence.

Securing the powers of attorney

Thepowerofattorneysimplymeansthepowertoactonbehalfofsomeone.Itcaneither be a special power of attorney or a general power of attorney. A special

21 See the case of Pambana Kudakwashe v Muzira and others, HH 52-2006; HC 996/200022 See the case of Cyril Chikadaya vs Zakeyo Chikadaya and City Council of Harare, HH 1-2002; HC 11678/98. 23 See also the case of Mushure Jangara v B Chinembiri, B Nyakutumba and B Guveya and City of Harare.


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powerofattorneyisexecutedwhereapersonwhowishestotransferpropertygivesaconveyancerthepowertopassownership. Intransferswhereaspecialpowerofattorneyisused, itmustbefiledwiththeDeedsRegistry. Ifactingunderageneralpowerofattorney,theoriginalislodgedtogetherwithacertifiedcopy.TheRegistrarwillreturnthecertifiedcopytotheconveyancer.Theexistenceoftheoriginalpowerofattorneyisevidencethatithasnotbeenrevoked.Whenaminorchildisreceivingadonationofland,thepowerofattorneymustbeexecutedbytheminor’sguardian.Theprocessofsecuringthepowerofattorneyisparticularlysignificantasitensuresthat it is theownerorhis/her representative thathasauthorised the saleand thesubsequenttransfer.Whendoneproperly(especiallyafteraDeedssearchtoproveownership),fraudulenttransactionsbecomelessprobable.

Drafting an agreement of sale

In Zimbabwe, all sale of land must be reduced to writing in the form of amemorandumofagreementofsale.Thisisparticularlyimportantinminimisingrisksassociated with giving verbal instructions. The agreement of sale is prepared interms of Section 1 of the Consumer Contracts Act. In terms of the ContractualPenaltiesActanagreementforthesaleofimmovablepropertymustalsobereducedtowritingotherwisetheonusofproofisshiftedtothepersonallegingitsexistence.Before drafting an agreement of sale one should checkwith theDeedsOffice thecorrect names of the parties, the endorsements, servitudes, restrictions, caveats,mortgagesandsoon.

Thenormalagreementofsalewherethefullpurchasepricehasalreadybeenpaidposenoproblemsandareusuallyregisteredwithnoqueriesatall.Problemsusuallyariseinasaleoflandbyinstalments,aprocesscommonlyreferredtoastheDeedofSale. The seller may become insolvent or as has become increasingly commonamonglowincomegroups;thesellersellstomorethanonepurchaser.Inallthesecasesthepurchaserisnotasecuredcreditorandonlyhaspersonalrightsagainsttheseller.Totryanddealwiththis,section64oftheDeedsRegistriesActwasenacted.It provides for, among other things, the new requirements for a valid sale ofimmovableproperty.Theseincludethattheagreementmustbereducedtowritingtoberegistrable.

Secondly, the consent of the registered owner and the purchaser are required.RegistrationoftheDeedofSalehastheeffectofendorsingonthetitledeedsoftheland concerned that such land is subject to the contract. Theseendorsements canonly be cancelled with the written consent of the registered holder and thepurchaser

Deed of transfer

Section13oftheDeedsRegistriesActdealswiththepreparationofDeeds.Bylaw,adeedoftransfermayonlybepreparedbyadulyregisteredconveyancerpractisinganywhere inZimbabwe.Zimbabwean lawgenerally recognisesprofessional liabilityfornegligenceinimproperlydrawndocuments.TheprocessingofaDeedsTransferbecomes a possibility upon meeting fundamental requirements relating toavailabilityofaratesclearancecertificate;paymentofthecapitalgainstax,paymentof conveyancing fees andwhere appropriate, payment of the estate agency fees.


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Effectively, these key conditions have the effect of pushing up the prices ofproperties,makingthemlessaffordabletothepoor.

Payments of rates, taxes, levies and duties

It is necessary to lodge a rates clearance certificatewhen transferring immovablepropertyonwhichratesarelevied.Thesearepaidatthelocalmunicipalityorcouncilinwhichthepropertyislocated.Section282oftheUrbanCouncilActprohibitstheregistrationoftransferbeforearatesorchargesclearancecertificateis issued.Thepractice varies from local authority to local authority. Generally the conveyancerwhohasbeeninstructedtoattendtoatransferwritestotherelevantlocalauthorityrequestingtheratesclearancecertificate.Thelocalauthoritywillcalculateallratesin arrears and add this to the rates to be paid some time in future.Most districtcouncils in Harare ask for payment of rates three months in advance. Theconveyancer will forward the payment of the required rates before the localauthorityissuestheratesclearancecertificate.TheRegistrarofDeedswillrejectanypaperslodgedwithouttheratesclearancecertificate.Further,theRegistrarofDeedscan only register a transfer of immovable property on production to him/her of aCapitalGainsTaxClearanceCertificate.

Lodging of documents

When all paper work is complete, the documentation is lodged at the DeedsRegistries Office. Figure 7.1 summarises the key steps in the land registrationprocess.

Figure7.1Keystepsinthelandregistrationprocess


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ThecomplexityoftheformalregistrationprocessisevidentfromBox7.1.Atleast12typesofdocumentsarerequiredbeforethelodgingofthedocumentation.Toarriveat thisstage,othercritical steps thatwouldhavebeenpassedthrough includethelayoutplanningapprovalprocess, thetitlesurveyprocessandtheservicingof landthatwouldendwiththeissuingofthecompliancecertificatethatmakesitpossiblefor property transfer processes to start. From Table 7.2, the costs of propertytransfersincludethecapitalgainstaxcalculatedat4%ofthevalueoftheproperty;stampdutycalculatedat4%ofthevalueofthepropertyandtheconveyancer’sfeescalculatedat3%ofthevalueoftheproperty.Cumulatively,propertytransfercostsincrease by a minimum of 11%, and where applicable, 7.5% fees for the estateagencyareadded.

Basedon statisticspresented inChapter5,pricesofproperties in thehigh‐densityarea ranged from US$9 000 to US$31 000 (for houses), compared to US$900 toUS$6 300 and US$21 000 to US$150 000 for medium‐ and low‐density areas,respectively. Thus, a property costing US$10 000 in a high‐density area willapproximatelyattractanadditionalUS$1100 forcapitalgains tax,stampdutyandconveyancingfees.Consideringthatincomesofemployeesremainlow(seealsothediscussioninchapter2)withcivilservantsearningaroundUS$200amonth,thecostofpurchasingapropertyanditsregistrationarenotaffordabletothepoor.

Box7.1:Documentsrequiredtoregisterproperty

TheDeedofTransferislodgedwiththefollowingdocumentswhichareknownassupportingdocuments.

• 1.Powerofattorneytopasstransfer

• 2.Titledeed(whichistheHoldingDeed)

• 3.Diagram(iftheholdingdeedisnotadeedofgrant)

• 4.Proofofappointment

‐Lettersofadministrationofthedeceased’sestateissuedbytheMasteroftheHighCourt

‐ResolutionoftheBoardofDirectorsofacompany

‐Certifiedcopyofawill

‐Generalpowerofattorney‐Constitution

• 5.Mortgagebondtogetherwithcancellationofmortgagebond

• 6.Ratesclearancecertificate

• 7.Declarationsbypurchaserandseller

• 8.Capitalgainstaxclearancecertificate

• 9.Variousconsentsinrelationtoconditionsoftitle

• 10.Courtorder

• 11.Certificateofdesignation

• 12.Chequeforstampduty

Source: Summarised from appropriate legal documents


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Box7.2:Costsandpaymentsinpropertyregistration

Action Cost Paymentmadeto

Approximatecostforastandardhigh‐densitycorehousecostingUS$10000

Ratesclearancecertificate

Allratesinarrearsandsomeinadvance

LocalMunicipality

Capitalgainstaxclearance

4%ofthevalueoftheproperty

ZIMRA US$400

Lodgingofdocuments4%ofthevalueofthepropertyforstampduty

DeedsRegistryOffice

US$400

Conveyancer’sfees3%ofthevalueoftheproperty

Lawfirm US$300

Source: Summarised from appropriate legal documents

7.5 The central role of the Deeds Registry Office in the registration of property rights

Ingeneral,theDeedsRegistryOfficeisthehubofformal landmarkettransactions.All transactions involving landare, invariably,directed to theRegistrarofDeedsatone point or another. It is not possible to sell, cede, donate or transfer land inZimbabwewithoutgoingthroughtheDeedsRegistry.Moreover,theDeedsregistrykeepsrecordofallmortgagebondsburdeninganypieceof landwithinZimbabwe,together with any subsequent consents, waivers, cessions, cancellations andamendments.

AnimportantpointtonoteisthattheRegistrarofDeedsisinchargeofallDeedsandDocumentsintheDeedsRegistryandnopersoncanlawfullyacquirecopiesofthosedeedsanddocumentswithouttheauthorisationoftheRegistrar.TheRegistrar’ssealandsignatureareindicativeoftheauthenticityofanysuchdeedordocuments.TheRegistrarhasthepower,capacityandmandatetorejectanydeedordocumentthatdoes not conform with the requirements set out in the Deeds Registries Act. Inpractice, the examiners at the Deeds Registries Act examine all deeds anddocuments,andrecordanyqueriesorerrorsontheExaminingSheet.Thereafter,iftheyaresatisfiedthatthedeedsanddocumentsarecorrect,theysealthedocumentandsendittotheregistrarforhis/hersignature.Thissystemofregisteringrightsinlandisbasedonlongstandingjuristicpracticesandproceduresthathavewithstoodthe test of time, the effect ofwhich is a system that guarantees title uponwhichfinancial institutions and investors can rely. The systems and processes ofexamination and registration, its control and monitoring, public registers andinformation systems as well as methods of preservation cumulatively contributetowardsproviding securityof title in theeyesof the law, financial institutionsandthepublic.

Thesystemofregisteringpropertyrightsisbasedonthefundamentalandjustifiableprinciplethatnopersonmaybedeprivedofpropertyexceptintermsofthelawandno such law may permit arbitrary deprivation of property. This is entrenched inSection 16 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe. Several arguments have been put


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forward to justify the continued existence of a centralised system of registeringrightsinland.Theseincludethefollowing:

Conveyancingisahighlytechnicalandspecialiseddisciplinethathasbeen,formanyyears, the exclusive preserve of the Registrar of Deeds, conveyancers and a fewother relevant officials involved in the process. Over a decade ago, the LawDevelopment Commission argued that creating more offices would result indecliningstandardsbecauseofashortageofresources.

The cost of creating new sub‐offices in other cities and towns is often considered‘too’highforcentralgovernmentgiventhatthetwoDeedsRegistries inZimbabwearenotcommercialised(i.e. feeschargedaresubsidised)andwouldnotbeabletofinancesuchaprojectontheirown.AdditionalDeedsRegistriesofficesarethereforenotseenasapriorityforZimbabweinthelightofthisargument.

AnotherargumentusedtostalldecentralisationisthattherehasbeennorecordofthetwoRegistriesfailingtocopewiththeloadofwork.Thisisdespitethefactthatthe system is no longer effectual nor efficacious. This, however, serves as anindicatortocentralgovernmentthatadditionalofficesarenotnecessary.

Amajor critiqueof theexisting system is that itwasestablished in colonial times.Giventhevolumeoftransactionsthatprevailedinrelationtonow,itwasrealistictohave twoadministrativeoffices togovern theprocessofacquisitionofproprietaryrights. Surprisingly, the system has remained inviolate in post‐independentZimbabweandyetitcannotbeseenascopingwithdemandsoflandadministrationofpresentdayZimbabwe.Moreimportantly,thepresentsystemofregisteringrightsin landisnotpro‐poor. Intheprevailingeconomichardships, it is inconvenient,forinstance, for aperson inVictoria Falls to travel all theway toBulawayo tohandlesuchmattersonly.Ingeneral,thesystemisindireneedofacompleteoverhaulifitistoremaincredible,accessibleandtransparent.

7.5 The Deeds Registry office and its operational challenges

TheimportanceoftheDeedsRegistryofficecannotbeoverstated.Thecentralityofitspositionarises from the fact that therehas tobeaplacewhere thepublic canaccess information regarding the property rights of any property owner. This isimportant for protecting the public from any fraudulent activities within theirpropertiesorpropertieswhereintheyhaveinterests.FortheDeedsRegistryofficetoexecute its mandate it must be equipped with the requisite human and otherresources. Itmust be able to operate at full capacity.Moreover, all staffmust beadequatelyremuneratedtopre‐emptanywhomaybetemptedtoactfraudulentlyor in a corrupt manner. Yet, at the present moment the Deeds Registry office isfunctioningwithaskeletalstaffthatisstrugglingtocopewiththeloadofwork.Thebrain‐drain that affected the nation in the last few years did not spare theDeedsRegistryoffice.Therehasbeena large scaleexodusof skilled staff fromtheofficeleavinganofficewithfewstaffmembersmostofwhomare ill‐equippedtohandlemattersathand.Whileitisnotnecessaryforthestaffmemberstohaveanadvancedqualification in the law, it is regrettable that most staff members have negligibleunderstandingoftheconceptsunderpinningthedisciplineofConveyancing.


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In 1999, theMinistryof Justice, Legal andParliamentaryAffairs, as it thenwas, inconjunction with the Ministry of Finance commissioned and institutionalised asteering committee for the computerisation and commercialisation of the deedsregistries office. The idea was to transform the Deeds Registry Office into afunctional and efficient public office. The effect of computerisation would besimplifying the process of land registration as well as securing all deeds anddocumentsinawaythatthemanualsystemcannot.Muchhasbeendoneinamovetoattain thisgoalbut the targethasnotbeensurpassed.At thepresentmoment,the Harare Deeds Registry Office survives on both a computerised and manualrecord keeping system. Themanual system involves thehard copies of deeds andother registration documents that are filed by the filing clerks and kept in thebasement in huge folders. Regrettably, this antiquated system is failing. Mostrecords kept in hard copy are succumbing to the elements and are no longerdurable.Itisthereforenosurprisethatmostdeedsthatareolderthan25yearsareunusable,iftheyareavailableatall.Tocomplementthissystem,isacomputerisedrecord keeping system; which stores information relating to the deeds registeredwithintheoffice.Itisimportanttonotethatthissystemdoesnotstoresoft‐scannedcopiesoftheDeedswhichwouldhavebeentheidealbutisonlymeantforrecordinginformationrelatingtoproperties.

Land Registers are physical registers that record all land in Zimbabwe that is heldunder specific title. Thesemust beelectronic if they are going tobeeffective andmeaningfultothegeneralpublic.Thepresentsystemofcardindexingwherebycardsthat bear an index number are used to search for deeds that are filed in derelictfoldersisobsoleteandantiquatedinthisageofcomputers.Moreover,manualdeedssearchesareno longercompatiblewith thisgenerationof information technology.Thefilingsystemwherebyageingfoldersandfilesareusedisunreasonablegiventheimportanceoftheinformationheldinthedeedsoffice.Thereisnosecondaryback‐up.Therefore,itisclearthatthemanualsysteminuseisadisasterinwaiting.

Inessence,thestateoftheDeedsOfficeispoor.Deedsanddocumentsarekeptinlargefolders inalphabeticalorder.Mostofthedeedsabovetheageoftwentyfiveyearsareinastateofphysicaldeteriorationandderelictionhavingbeendestroyedbywhiteantsandotherphysicalelements.TheseDeedscanhardlybeusedand ifthisisnotchangedtheywillbeutterlybeyonduseand,therefore,lostinafewyears.This has caused serious problems especially when searching for old deeds anddocuments. The reason for this dereliction is neglect. The Deeds Office is not acommercialoffice.Allmoniesthatarereceiptedatthedeedsofficesaregovernmentlevieswhichareabsorbedintocentralgovernmentcoffers.

7.6 Summary of major challenges faced in the registration of property

1. Thedraftingandlodgingofdocumentscanonlybedonebyalegalpractitionerwhomustberegisteredasaconveyancer.Thismeansthatitisthesolepreserveofconveyancerswhoarefewandchargeexorbitantfeesfortheirservicesandthishasadeterrenteffectonwouldbepropertyowners,especiallythepoor.

2. Theprocessislongandtediousgiventhatthepartiestotheagreementofsaleneed to acquire a capital gains certificate and rates clearance certificate. This


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means that certain offices have to approve certain formalities before thedocumentscanbelodgedwiththeRegistrarofDeeds.ItmighttaketwoorthreemonthsbeforethepropertyisfinallyregisteredwiththeDeedsoffice.

3. ThelackofcomputerisationattheDeedsofficesmeansthattheprocessisdonemanually.Whilstitisnotpossibletoestimatethevolumeoftransactionsontheformallandmarkets,itisevidentthatastheeconomycontinuestorecovertheformal landmarketwill continue to get busier. Consequently, the backlog onproperty rights isexpected togrowaswell. It is likely that theDeedsRegistrywillfailtocopewiththehighvolumesofdocumentslodgedbytheoffice.

4. There has been an increase in people being issuedwith fake title deeds as aresultofcorruptpracticesattheofficewherecertainofficershaveissuedfakedocumentsinreturnformoney.

5. Therehasbeenlackofefficiencyattheofficesasaresultofunderstaffing.Thishas led to un‐ or under‐qualified personnel being employed, further affectingtheregistrationofpropertyrecords.

7.6.1 Recommendations for improving land registration systems

Theproblemsbeingfacedintheregistrationofpropertyrecordscanbesolvedifthefollowingsuggestionsareimplemented:

Thefirststepistoreformandchangethelawinordertofacilitatedecentralisationand commercialisation of the office. If the law governing the deeds office is notreformedthenitishardlypossibletointroducetheproposedchangesastheywouldbeultra virestheenablingact.

The offices need to be decentralised to other parts of the country making themaccessibletoeveryone.Thiscanbedonethroughtheestablishmentofindependentoffices at theMagistrates courtdottedaround the country. Thismeans that thereshould be a deeds office at town, city or district level depending on the availablefundingscheme.

Upon decentralisation, the deeds officemust be given ameasure of autonomy inrelationtorevenuecollectionand itsuse. Ifgiventhepermissiontocommercialiseits operations and be allowed to operate autonomously, the deeds registry officemaybeable to garner resources for the smooth functioningof theoffice. Lessonsmaybedrawnfromthefunctioningofthedeedsofficesinothercountries.Completedecentralisationwillallowall leviesand impostschargedby thedeedsoffice togotowardsrefurbishmentoftheoffice,computerisation,increaseofstaffinglevelsetc.

Asdiscussedabovetheprocess isasolepreserveof legalpractitionerswhochargehighfeesfortheirservices.Howeverinordertoguardagainstthismonopolytherecouldbeintroducedlegalaidclinicstohelpthosethancannotaffordthehighfeesorallowingjudicialofficerssuchasmagistratestodraftthedocumentsandallowthemtochargeasmall feewhich is remittedtothestate.Otherthanthis,conveyancingmattersmayalsobehandledonapro deo andpro amicobasisinthesamewaythatpaupersareassistedbythestateininstitutingordefendingothercivilandcriminalmatters. This will be particularly useful in assisting low‐income groups, most of


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whom neither understand the law nor have the resources to engage a legalpractitioner.

Introducinge‐conveyancinglikeinothercountriesasthishelpsexpeditetheprocessas the documents are lodged online and then the records can be accessed easilyanywhereintheworldviatheinternet.Theintroductionofe‐conveyancingcanonlybe complimented by the computerisation of the Deeds Offices given that mostinformationisnowrecordedonacomputermakingiteasilyaccessible.

The recent move of stationing police officers to combat corruption and fraud isworthyof praise.However,much still needs tobedone if this step is going tobeeffective. These policemen must be equipped with the requisite resources andcapacitytoensureefficiencyandtheyshouldberemuneratedwelltobemotivatedtocontinuethiswork.


This chapter has demonstrated the complexity of the formal property registrationsystem.It isademandingprocessthatthepoorcanrarelyafford.Thediscussioninchapter 6 has shown the continuum of property rights that exist in informalsettlements.ThekeypointraisedinChapter6istheimportanceofapropertyrightsregistrationsystemthatisaffordabletothepoor.Basedonthediscussionpresentedin this chapter, debate is also required on how the existing property rights in theformal sector canbemade towork for thepoor.Thenotionofgroup rightsbeingtriedintheregistrationofpropertyrightsneedtofitintotheframeworkofpropertyrights in the formal sector. It has also been argued that theDeeds Registry officeneedsextensivesupportinordertoimproveontheefficiencyoflandregistration.


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8. ProposedprogrammeonurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe

The problems and challenges identified by this scoping study are deep andsystematic. There is no single programme that can address all of the identifiedchallenges. The programme activities proposed here are a realistic attempt toaddress someof the fundamental issues in away thatwill assist in ‘makingurbanlandmarketsworkbetterforpoorpeple’.Theproposalsoutlinedinthisprogrammecover two broad areas. The first is direct support to projects and activities thatsupport the poor (e.g. servicing of informal settlements, accessible and securetenurerightsforthepoor,etc).Thesecondisputtinginplaceapolicyandlegislativeenvironmentthatmakeslandmarketsworkbetterforpoorpeople..

8.1 Synopsis of challenges

The study has shown that the governance of urban land markets is faced withmultiple operational challenges. Seven key issues are discussed in this section. Indiscussingthesesevenchallenges,somejustificationforactionispresentedaswellasinitiativesorpartnershipsthatexist.

The findings of Chapter 3 have shown that government’s performance in landadministration is constrainedbya lackofadequatehuman, technical and financialresources.Thus,keygovernmentdepartmentsliketheDeedsRegistryofficeremaincentralised and underfunded. State actors are also suffering from the loss ofinstitutional memory emanating from, inter alia, collapsing records anddocumentation infrastructure. Previous attempts at computerising the DeedsRegistryOfficewerenotimplementedtocompletion.

Chapter5hasarguedandprovidedevidenceofthefactthatpartnershipsbetweenlocal actors like cooperatives, actors in the private sector and mainstream civilsocietyorganisations faceoperational challenges.Apart from resource constraints,the partnerships have been stressed by loss of trust and the politicisation of landissues in the country. However, there are some critical institutional spaceswheredebate to enhance policy consistency and institutional coordination has occurredwith a focus on housing delivery. Some local or community‐based actors, inparticularcooperativeswhich inessencerepresentthepoor,sufferfromabroadergovernancecrisischaracterisedbyweakinstitutionalmechanismsthatareincapableofpromotingtransparencyandaccountability.

Despitetheadjustmentsmadetotheplanningframeworkovertime,suchchangesremain insufficient and more still needs to be done to facilitate the release ofaffordable land for housing and economic development (please refer to the keyfindingsofChapter4).Policydirectiveshavenotbeensupportedbyanappropriatereviewof legislation, leaving application to individual local authority discretion. Atthesametime,interpretationofrelevantpolicyguidelineshasbeenpositiveinsomelocalauthoritieswhilerigidinothers,resultinginpolicyinconsistenciesthatneedtobeaddressed.

Whilstgovernmenthasmadesignificantattemptstoupgradeinformalsettlements,as demonstrated in Chapter 6, urgent work is still required in the upgrading of


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tenurerightsandtheservicingofsettlements.Thepracticalmanagementofinformalandquasi‐formalsettlementslikeEpworth,HopleyandHatcliffepresentschallengesas far as service provision, tenure security and access to land are concerned. Thissituation isalsofound inotherpost‐2000peri‐urbanareasand inovercrowdedoldneighbourhoods in the City of Harare and elsewhere. Tenure insecurity in theseareas affects residential, commercial and service‐industrial land. These complexinsecuritiesaffectlivelihoods,furthercomplicatingsocio‐economicdevelopmentandby extension limiting prospects for improving urban land market functionality.Addressing the complex tenure insecurity situationswill leverage livelihoods, spururbanmarketfunctionalityandguaranteehumansecurityanddevelopment.

Chapter5hasdemonstratedthattheperformanceofurbanlandmarketsishinderedbytheabsenceofpublicinformationonpropertytransactions.Informationonlanddelivery remains scattered and the picture on land supply is not that clear. Acombinationofhumanandtechnicalcapacitylimitationsandthetendencytomovetowardsinformality,particularlyinthepost‐2000period,haveerodedthecapacitiesofstateandnon‐stateactorstocontinuallyupdatetheinformationrequiredforthesmoothfunctioningofurbanlandmarkets.

A key finding of this scoping study is that research and other academic work onurban land markets are lacking. This limits the level of understanding of theperformance of urban land markets. As such, there is a dearth of policy‐relevantevidencetoguideimprovementstourbanlandmarketfunctionality.

The programmeofwork proposed in this chapter addresses some of these issuesanew whilst also complementing existing processes. The components of theproposed programme cover the broad themes of policy and legislative review,tenure upgrading and servicing of informal settlements, strengthening of localauthoritiesandlocalactorsinurbanlandmarkets(inrelationtohousingapproachesfor the poor), public information and dialogue on the functioning of urban landmarkets,andaresearchprogrammeonurbanlandmarkets.

8.2 Programme components

8.2.1 Planning policy and legislative review programme

The study has shown that the country’s legislative and planning processes stillpresentbottleneckstolanddeliveryintheurbanareas.ManyoftheprovisionsintheRTCPActareoutdated.Forinstance,themethodsforpromotingpublicparticipationareno longeradequate. It is imperative fornew formsofpublicparticipation thatbenefit from the rapid improvement in technology to be enshrined in policy andlegislation.Theuseoftheinternet,email,cell‐phones,workshopsandvariousothermeansofcommunicationneedtobeincorporatedasnewtoolsforpromotingpublicparticipation.Inparticular,speciallegalprovisionsthatprovidefortheparticipationofthepoorneedtobemade.Therearealsonoclearindicatorsthatcanbeusedtoassesstheperformanceofthecountry’splanningandlegislativeprocesses.ManyoftheoperationalMasterandLocalPlansandTownPlanningSchemeshaveremainedrigid.Thus,forinstance,theprovisionsthatsupportclusterhousingdevelopment(amodelthatsuitstheneedsofthepoor)aremissing,whilerestrictionson landthathasbeendesignatedas‘temporarilyrestricted’againstdevelopmentforthepast30


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years remain in place, limiting access to land by the poor. Given this context, areviewoftheplanningandlegislativeframeworkinZimbabwewouldbeappropriatewithinapotentialfutureprogrammeofactivities.ThiswouldincludeareviewoftheRTCPAct,theUrbanCouncilsActandtheexistingMasterandLocalPlans.Thepolicyreview process will focus on developing appropriate tools that can facilitate therelease of land to the urban poor. For instance, land ceded to councils asendowment can be used for benefitting the poor. In addition, there is a need forclear policy ondefining/identifying and supporting theurbanpoor. Townplanningofficialsalsoneedaproperunderstandingandinterpretationoftheexistingplanninglegislationandhowtheycanmakeuseofittoovercomesomeofthechallengestheyface in the governance of urban landmarkets. A renewal of the internal planningprocesses and procedures that affect land delivery should also form part of thisscopeofwork.

Zimbabwe’s urban areas do not have strategies of adapting to andmitigating theimpacts of climate change. The planning framework presents one of the bestopportunitiesofmanaging such impacts,aswellas increasing the resilienceof theurbanpopulation to such climate variability. In particular, theplanning frameworkneedstoguideorenablethecreationofgreeninfrastructureandtheadjustmentofplanning standards to mitigate the impacts of climate change. In this regard, thereviewof legislative frameworks forurbanplanningandgovernanceshouldenableinterventionsonclimatechangemitigationandadaptation.Ongoingre‐planningofinformal settlements also needs to factor in relevant approaches. An appropriatetownplanningandclimatechangehandbooktoassistplanningofficials inplanningclimate‐resilient cities needs to be developed. Table 8.1 summarises the keycomponentsofapotentialPlanningPolicyandLegislativeReviewProgramme.


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Table8.1:Summaryoftheplanningpoliciesandlegislativereviewprogramme

Descriptionofproblem Listofactivities Actors Expectedoutputs

1.Framework/policiesandprocessesill‐adaptedtorapidurbanisationandclimatechange

2.OldandrigidTownPlanningSchemes,MasterandLocalPlans

3.Inflexibleinterpretationofplanninglaw

4.Slowdeliveryoflandandrestrictiveinternalprocesses

5.Unreliabletoolsforhousingdemandestimationandtargetingofthepoorinhousingallocation

6.Inflexibleplanning,infrastructureandhousingstandards

1.Support24reviewoftheRTCPandUrbanCouncilsActs

2.SupportreviewofMasterandLocalPlans

3.Supportrelevantspecialiststudies25toguidereviewofMasterandLocalPlans

4.Supportreviewofinternalprocessesandsystemsfor,amongothers,planapproval,subdivisionsandconsolidationsandspecialconsent

5.Buildprofessionalcapacityinapplication/interpretationofthelaw,resolvingdisputes,etc.

6.Internationalexposureofelectedandappointedofficials

7.Developnewtoolsforestimatinghousingdemandandtargetingofthepoor

8.Undertakereviewofplanning,infrastructureandhousingstandards

9.Holdingseminarsandworkshopstodisseminateresults,engagepolicy‐makersandpractitionersandstimulaterelevantdebate

1.DepartmentofPhysicalPlanning

2.AssociationofLocalAuthorities

3.Plannersinprivatepractice

4.Nationalconsultantsandacademics

5.Internationalexperts

1.Revisedlegislation

2.RevisedMasterandLocalPlans

3.Updatedinternalprocessesandsystems

4.Reportsofspecialiststudies

5.Updatedplanning,infrastructureandhousingstandardssensitivetothepoor’sneeds

8.2.2 Tenure upgrading programme

The study has shown that the formal property rights registration system, whiledesirable, is largely inaccessible to the poor. The process is both complicated andexpensive,makingitinappropriateforthepoorinageneralsense.Atthesametime,the experience in Epworth and Hopley settlements in Harare has shown creativemethods of bringing a reasonable formof tenure security to residents in informalsettlements.Theuseofacouncil registerandtheuseof rates receiptsareservingthe purpose of securing property rights without serious shortcomings beingobserved. Further, cooperatives have piloted the notion of group rights. In thisregard,apotentialprogrammeofworkgoingforwardshouldlooktosupportingthefurtherrefinementofanappropriatecontinuumofpropertyrightsaffordabletothepoor, and to supporting the institutionalisation of such a property rights regime

24Supportwillincludedirectfundingandprovisionofinternationaltechnicalexpertise.25Toincludeinfrastructure,population,housing,employment,povertytrends,climatechangeadaptation,governance,etc.


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through capacity‐building of relevant actors. Such property rights also need to beprovidedforinpolicyandlegislation.Ithasbeennotedthateveninthere‐plannedinformalsettlements, informalitycontinuestotakeplacethroughtransactionssuchassubdivisionofland.Afutureprogrammeofactivitiescanincludesupportfortheupdating of such subdivisions. This is particularly important to minimise disputesaboutpropertyboundariesinfuture.LocalauthoritiesliketheEpworthLocalBoardneedsupportinrecordingsuchimportantlandadministrationinformationthatsuitstherequirementsofthepoor.

Informalsettlementsarefacedwithchallengesrelatingtotheservicingofstandsandthe quality of housing developed. The study made reference to differentpartnerships that have assisted in providing sewer and water infrastructure ininformal settlements like Epworth. In Hopley, some civil society organisationsassistedinprovidingshelter.Thereisanopportunityforaprogrammetocoordinatesuchpartnershipsandmakeacontributionintheservicingofsuchstands.Whereassewerandwaterinfrastructurehasbeenputinplaceinsomeofthesettlements,thesystem remains largely non‐operational because of design and infrastructure orequipment failings. The programme could support the piloting of appropriatepartnerships (state‐community, state‐privatesector, state‐civil society,etc.) for thedevelopment and maintenance of infrastructure and the delivery of services ininformal settlements, while in the process contributing to appropriatemodels forcity‐wide upgrading initiatives. Table 8.2 summarises the major components of apotentialTenureUpgradingandServicingofInformalSettlementsProgramme.

Table8.2:Tenureupgradingprogrammeandservicingofinformalsettlements

Descriptionofproblem Listofactivities Actors Expectedoutputs

1.Limitedmodelsonappropriatetenurerightsforthepoor

2.Lackofmonitoringofinformaltransactionsininformallandmarkets

3.Inadequatepartnershipsinservicingofinformalsettlements

4.Lackofappropriatelandservicingmodelsthatbenefitthepoorandpromotelocaleconomicdevelopment

1.Undertakebaselinestudies26ininformalsettlements

2.Developandpilotincrementaltenureupgradingsystem

3.Developalandinformationsystem27forinformalsettlements

4.Internationalexposureandlocalappraisalstodevelopandpilotpartnershipsforservicinginformalsettlements

5.Holdingseminarsandworkshopstodisseminateresults,engagepolicy‐makersandpractitionersandstimulaterelevantdebate

1.Localauthorities

2.Residentsofinformalsettlements

3.Nationalconsultantsandacademics

4.Relevantstatedepartments

5.Internationalexperts

1.Updatedbasemapsandlayoutsforinformalsettlements

2.Reportsofbaselinestudies

3.Landinformationsysteminplace

4.Modelpartnershipsforlandservicingandsettlementupgrading

26Thestudieswillestablishsocio‐economicdata,landusepatterns,transportation,landmarketstructuresandperformance,landdisputesandresolutionmechanisms.

27RangingfromsimplelandregisterstoGIS‐basedsystems.


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8.2.3 Local authorities and local actors programme

Governance systems in local authorities in Zimbabwe’s urban areas are notfunctioningwellforanumberofreasons.First,thestateofnationalpoliticspresentsgovernance‐relatedchallengesasdiscussedinChapter1.Secondly,decision‐makingwithin local authorities is throughelected councillors,manyofwhomdonothaveadequateknowledgeandskillsaroundtownplanningandlandadministrationissues.Forexample, theirknowledgeof theRTCPActandthe importantprovisionsof theUrbanCouncilsActislargelyperipheral.Withnoclearunderstandingofcriticallegalprovisions that dealwith, for instance, the sale of public land, use of endowmentland, use of the development account, change of land‐use reservation and theimportance of public participation, councillors cannotmakemeaningful input intomonitoringtheimplementationofsuchprovisions.

Thirdly,thereisaworryinglyweakcultureoftransparencyandaccountabilityinthegovernance of local authorities. Regardless of political affiliation, it seems as ifcouncillors aremotivated to take public office as ameans of facilitating access tostate resources, especially stands. In the absence of any formal induction ofcouncillors on good local governance and a participatory performancemonitoringsystem, it is likely that local authorities will continue to be misgoverned ascouncillors are driven by self‐enrichment motives. For these reasons, localauthorities,especiallycouncillorsandtopmanagementofficialsneedtobeexposedtomethodsofpromotinggoodurbanlandmarketsgovernance.Acarefullydesignedtrainingprogrammeandexposuretorelevantbestpracticesonlocalgovernancearerequired.Further,itmightbeusefultohaveminimumqualificationsandexperienceforone tobeeligible forelectionasacouncillor. Suchan interventionwill requirebackingthroughreviewofrelevantprovisionsoftheUrbanCouncilsAct.Also,suchissues require extensive debate and research before incorporation into policy andlegislation.

This study has argued that local actors, especially cooperatives, are facinggovernance challenges. In some cases, the leadership of cooperatives has beeninvolved in the embezzlement of funds. In other cases, partnerships between theprivatesectorandcooperativeshavenotworkedsmoothly.Thisispartlyattributedto that cooperatives are not properly equipped with the know‐how on how tomanage partnerships and contractual arrangements with the private sector.Accordingly,it isappropriateforULMPtosupporttheactivitiesoflocalactorssuchas cooperatives in order to improve on their governance and delivery capacity. Asummary of the key components of a potential Local Authorities and Local ActorsProgrammeispresentedinTable8.3.


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Table8.3:Governanceprogramme:strengtheningCouncils,localactorsandpropertyprofessionals

Descriptionofproblem Activities Actors Outputs

1.Weakadministrationoflandandrealestatestocksbypublicinstitutions(e.g.weakenforcementofplanningrules,un‐proceduralsaleorchangeofreservationsofpublicland,contestablelandgrants,etc.)

2.Inadequateoperationalknowledgeofrelevantplanningandlandadministrationinstruments

3.Lackofstatutoryaccountsrelevanttoproperfunctioningoflandmarkets(developmentandestateaccountsareempty)

4.LackofproperenforcementofgoodgovernanceinCouncilsandembezzlementoffunds

5.Lackofintegrity28inthefunctioningoflandmarkets

1.TrainingofCouncillorsonrelevantsectionsoftheRTCPandUrbanCouncilsActs

2.Trainingofpropertyprofessionalsonlandadministrationandthemaintenanceof(professional)standards/ethics

3.Promotepublicdialoguesbetweenresidentsandelectedofficials(MPsandCouncillors)onrelevantlandadministrationandplanningissues

4.Exchangevisits

1.CouncillorsandParliamentarians

2.Propertyprofessionals

3.KeyCouncilofficials

4.Consultants

5.Centralgovernment

1.Trainingmanuals

2.Improvedskillsandknowledge

8.2.4 Public information and dialogue programme

The study revealed that there is no public information on specific issues that arecentraltothegovernanceofurbanlandmarkets.Forinstance,itnotedthatdataonland delivery is not collated consistently, leaving it scattered in individual layoutplans. There isno clearpictureof landdeliveryat thenational level. The collationand compilation of land delivery information is really nobody’s domain. Thecontributiontolanddeliverybythestate,individualsandtheprivatesectorcannotbe easily segregated. The same challenges apply to information on propertytransactions.Asalreadyargued,thisaffects thefunctioningofurban landmarkets,especially the pricing of properties, which works best where information oncomparativeprices is readilyavailable.Apotentialprogrammeofwork in thisareacould support the compilation of key information on the operation of urban landmarkets to make it available to all the actors. Appropriate electronic and/orphysicallyaccessibleplatformscanbeusedtodisplaysuchdata.SuchfacilitiesneedtobedevelopedinZimbabweinpartnershipwithlocalorganisations(stateornon‐state).

The keys actors who are expected to participate in the development of publicinformation on urban land markets are state, civil society and private sectorinstitutions. State actors at the core of this activity are the Deeds Registry (forinformation on property transfers), theDepartment of Physical Planning and localauthorities (for information on land supply and land delivery) and the DeputySheriff’soffice(forinformationonpropertyauctions).Privatesectoractorscentraltothe activity are financial institutions (for information on financing property

28Thismanifeststhroughbogusestateagents,slackprofessionalstandards,fraudulenttransactions,etc.


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transactions) and estate agencies (for information on property transactions,includingpricingdataandvolumesoftransactions).Civilsociety institutionswillbeparticularlyuseful inprovidinginformationonlanddeliverytothepoorandtenurerightsapplicabletosettlementsthathousethepoor.Informationgeneratedwillbein various forms, including a newsletter, a website and annual reports. Whereappropriate,policybriefswillbedeveloped.

The process will need to be steered by a selected organisation from either civilsocietyoracademicinstitutions.Suchanorganisationwillhavethekeyresponsibilityof accessing information fromdifferent actors and processing such information tomeet the requirements of particular dissemination channels. A public informationdissemination strategy will be developed, targeting key decision‐makers likeparliamentarians and councillors. The information generated will also feed intopolicy and advocacy processes. The major components of a potential PublicInformationandDialogueProgrammeareshowninTable8.4.

Table8.4:Publicinformationanddialogueprogramme


1.Absenceofpublicinformationonpropertytransactionsinurbanareas

2.Lackofinformationonlanddeliveryforuseinplanningandlandsupplyprojections

3.Undevelopedforumwherepublicinformationonlandmarketscanbedisplayedforthebetterfunctioningofurbanlandmarkets

1.Facilitateagreementonaframework29forcollatingandfacilitatingaccesstoinformationonlandmarkets

2.Establishafocalpointforcollatingthepublicinformationonlandmarkets

3.EstablishanurbanlandmarketsStakeholderForum

4.Establishmentofcontactpointsinkeyinstitutionsworkingintheurbanlandmarketssector

5.Developmentofappropriatemethodsfordisseminatinginformation(newsletter,website)

6.Holdseminarsandworkshopstosteerrelevantdebate

1.EstateAgencyCouncil

2.StateDepartmentsinvolvedinlandadministration(e.g.Deeds,DPP,andSurveyorGeneraletc.)

3.NGOs

4.Academics

5.Privatesector(e.g.EstateAgents)

6.ICTserviceproviders

1.Frameworkforpublicinformationsystemonlandmarkets

2.Informationdisseminationplatforms

8.2.5 Research programme on urban land markets

This scoping studywas limited in terms of issues/themes covered and the spatialcoverageofstudysites.Thelocalcontextsfacedbythepoorwillalwaysvarybasedonparametersrelatedto,amongstotherthings,the locationoftowns,thetypeofsettlementsandthesizeofurbansettlement.Thustherearereadilyidentifiedgapswhere more research is required to improve on policy‐making processes. Forinstance,townsestablishedbasedonminingactivitiespresentspecificchallengestothepoor.Whenminingoperationscease,thepoorinsuchsettlementsareleftwith 29Thiscanincludethedevelopmentofcoordinationandcollaborationmechanisms(e.g.signingofMOUs,regularmeetingsofcontactpoints,etc.)


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limited livelihood options. Mining towns are also established without strictadherence to town planning principles and the type of urban land markets thatevolveinsuchsettlementsarenotwellunderstood.

In addition, a large proportion of the urban population, mostly composed of thepoor,relyonrentedaccommodation.Thisstudyhasnotbeenabletocaptureissuesrelatingtochallengesfacedbythepoorwhorelyonrentedaccommodation.Issuesrelating to affordability of rentals and evictions of tenants are particularly critical.Therearemanyotherissuesthatrequiremoreresearchwork.

A potential new programme of work could make a significant impact bycommissioning academic studies on the functioning of urban land markets inZimbabwe.Thisparticularreportperhapsrepresentstheonlymajorworkonurbanlandmarketsinmorethanadecade.Therearemanyissueswherefurtherresearchon the functioning of urban land markets is needed. Also, research activities willsupportthefunctioningofotherprogrammecomponentsonpublicinformationanddialogue and debate on urban land markets. There is need for a more rigorousanalysis of key issues relating to land and property disputes in urban areas, landtransactions in informal settlements,housingdeliveryapproachesandaffordabilityby the poor, land administration challenges, property professionals and thegovernanceofurban landmarkets,access to land foreconomicactivities,planningand its place in managing climate change impacts, etc. In addition, appropriateuniversitydepartmentscanbeinvolvedtopromoteresearchwork,evenbystudentsthroughtheirMasters’dissertations.Thisapproachwouldrequirethepreparationofan appropriate research proposal on urban land markets, with clearly articulatedresearch methodologies. A consultative approach is required in developing andshapingtheresearchprogramme.


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Table8.5:Summaryoftheresearchprogrammeonurbanlandmarkets


1.Weakenedlandadministrationsystem

2.Slowdevelopmentofnewhousingandinfrastructure(designanddelivery)models

3.Lackofinnovationinlandacquisitionanduseoflandtoleverageresources

4.Inadequateunderstandingofpropertydisputes

5.Inadequateappraisalofexistingpartnerships(somemodelsworkononeprojectandnotonothers)

6.Limitedunderstandingoftheperformanceoffinancialmarkets(smallandlarge‐scale,formalandinformal).

7.Limitedunderstandingofplanningstandardsandtheirimplicationsforlandmarketeffectiveness

1.Develop30amulti‐disciplinaryresearchprogrammeonurbanlandmarkets

2.Settingupofmulti‐disciplinaryresearchteamsinclusiveofpropertyprofessionals,sociologists,urbangeographersetc.

3.SettingupastudentresearchprogrammeatBachelors’,Masters’andDoctoratelevels,anchoredintheDepartmentofRuralandUrbanPlanning

4.Undertakingfield‐basedresearchonurbanlandmarkets31

5.Supportapublicationsstream(monographs,books,journalarticlesandpolicybriefs)basedonfieldresearch

6.Supportfeedbackprocessestorefineprogrammeandotherrelevantnationalprocesses

7.Seminarsandworkshopstodisseminateresults,engagepolicy‐makersandpractitioners,andstimulaterelevantdebate

1.CASSTrustandDepartmentofRuralandUrbanPlanning

2.OtherrelevantUniversityDepartments

3.Councillors&Parliamentarians

4.Privatepractitioners

5.NGOs/civilsocietyorganisations

6.Relevantstateandlocalgovernmentunits

Internationalexperts

1.Researchreportsandstudentdissertations

2.Policybriefsandpolicyrecommendations

3.Publications

8.3 Risks to programme implementation

Theunstablepoliticalandeconomicsituationperhapspresentsthemostseriousrisktoprogramme implementation (to theextent thaturban landmarket functionalitydepends on economic stability and performance). Political stability also allows forpolicy consistency and predictable policy reforms that make for the effectiveinsertion of new ideas and appropriate capacity‐building. In such an environment,capacities become easier to retain. As such, in the absence of these two criticaldimensionsofstability(economicandpolitical),theproposedprogrammemayfacechallenges.Thepoliticsof thecountry, thoughgenerallypeaceful fordevelopmentworkpurposes, canpotentially be a risk if politicallymotivated violence escalates.Thepotentialforviolencetoescalatewillheightenshouldthecountrydecidetogofornationalelections.However,sucheventswillalwaysneedtobewatchedcloselytoallowappropriatedecisionstobemadeonprogrammeimplementation.

30Toincludeconsultationswithstakeholderstoensureownershipofanationalresearchagenda.

31Suchstudieswillbenationalincharacterintermsofspatialcoverageandthecompositionofresearchissues.


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Land policy and administration have been heavily politicised in Zimbabwe since2000.Anumberofinformalorganisationsandwaysofadministeringland(yettobecodified) have arisen over the years that have acted to reduce predictability andmarketfunctionality.Programmeinterventionsonlandmattersareoftenconsideredas sensitive. There is therefore a risk that programmepartners, particularly in thepublic sector, may be hesitant, while non‐state actors may lack both clout andadequateinformation.However,thestudywasactivelysupportedbytheMinistryofNational Housing and Social Amenities since it allows operationalisation of keyNationalHousingConventionresolutionsaswellascommitments inrelationtothe2010BamakoDeclaration.

Related to the above is that there is a shortage of land experts and propertyprofessionals instate institutionswiththeconfidencetohandleurban landmarketperformanceissues.Anyprogrammeinitiativesrequirearobustshort‐,medium‐andlong‐termcapacitybuildin‐component forkey institutions.For instance, thereviewof planning law will require close collaboration with the Department of PhysicalPlanning. With limited experienced staff it may become important to supportsecondment of experienced experts for intermittent periods to work out of theDepartment to entrench ownership of such a review process while also buildinginternalcapacity.Thesamemaybetrueofotherstateinstitutionsthatwillbecriticalfortheothersuggestedcomponents.Itisthereforecriticalforpotentialpartnerstoanewprogrammeofworknot to take toomanycapacities forgrantedas there isa‘missingmiddle tierofpublic sectorprofessionals’withahostof greengraduates.For example, UN‐HABITAT has had to complement state resources in setting upZIMHABITAT as a way of ensuring that appropriate capacity is attracted into thesystem.

Related to the risk of assuming too much capacity is the question of under‐estimatingtheamountofdata‘reconstitution/recovery’thatisneededinsomekeyinstitutions. With the considerably sustained stress on land informationmanagementsystems,inpartduetoupdatingbacklogsbutalsoduetoadelugeofinformality, especially in peri‐urban areas, amedium‐ to long‐term focus becomescritical.Thereisariskofassumingaquickconsultancy‐typeintervention,whichmaynot yield sustainable results. It will be important for partners to a potential newprogrammeofactivities topromotea sustainedpresenceandabroadpartnershipapproach.

The other risk relates to entrenched interests in an elitist system of planning andadministering land. Somekey informantsmaybe stuck in ‘thewayweused todothings’.Intheprocessthismaydelayifnotcompletelyobstructanytransformation.Forexample,therehasbeendebateaimedatestablishinga‘one‐stop’planapprovalframework where critical actors sit as a ‘Board’ to consider planning submissionscomplementedbyuseofthe‘deemedapproval’principleaspartofexpeditingplanapprovals.Theargumentsforsuchaproposalarefoundedoninvestmentfacilitationthrough cutting red‐tape and generally not punishing the developer (i.e. reversingthe ‘deemed refusal’ principle in the RTCP Act). There has been professionalresistance from some senior planners to the ‘deemed approval’ principle, whichbordersondoing things the ‘usualway.’Similardebatesexist in termsofadapting


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land survey technology, data sharing regarding land transactions and propertyregistrationoptions.


ThepoliticalandeconomicsituationinZimbabweisyettonormalise.Itisexpectedthatmanyoftheproposedinterventionswillhavetobenegotiatedwiththerelevantauthorities.Theprogrammehasbeendesignedinsuchawaythatthefirstyearsofprogramme implementation will focus mainly on research and public informationissues. This will enable the programme to be developed on the basis of betterknowledge.Thiswill runparallel tosometechnicalassistancetokey institutionstobring international good practice and perspective into the process of change. Thelatter yearsofprogramme implementationwill focuson targeted interventionsontenureupgradingandpilotingofideasemergingfromtheresearch,aswellassomeregulatory/policy impact work to model some of the possible implications(especiallyforthepoor)ofeffectedpolicyorlegalinterventionsaffectingurbanlandmarkets.


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Annexure1:ListofparticipantsforthemethodologyworkshopongovernanceofurbanlandmarketsinZimbabwe19November2010,CASSTrustBoardroom,Harare

Nameofparticipant Institution Cellno Emailaddress

DrNelsonMarongwe CASSTrust 0772347715 [email protected]

DrKudzaiChatiza CASSTrust 0772908160 [email protected]

DrVupenyuDzingirai CASSTrust 0772312752 [email protected]

WonderJekemu SIDA 0772278801 [email protected]

PeterMutavati UN‐HABITAT 0772227464 [email protected]

BethChitekwe‐Biti DialogueonShelter [email protected]

AKasiyamhuru CityofHarare 0712623460 [email protected]

JChaeruka UZ‐RUP 0772980021 [email protected]

MargaretMadanhi Legalconsultant 0772572155 Magi‐[email protected]

RChizema Economist 0772261572

JosephChaumba CASSTrust 0773813475 [email protected]

TrymoreMuderere UniversityofZimbabwe 0775031477

NTKuipa SouthBayProperties 0772303265

ShameMukoto ARUP 0774329719

Scoping Study - Centre for Affordable Housing Finance Africa

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