1

Śākya mchog-ldan on gotra in Yogācāra and Madhyamaka

Peter Gilks I-Shou University

Presented at the XVIIth Congress of the International Association of Buddhist Studies

August 2014, Vienna

Introduction

This paper is being presented as part of a panel on the topic of Reformulations of Yogācāra in

Tibet. Particularly, it relates to Tibetan commentary on Abhisamayālaṃkāra (AA) I:39, in

which it is taught that the foundation (pratiṣṭhā) for religious practice is the dharmadhātu and

that since the dharmadhātu is undifferentiated (asaṃbhedā), there are ultimately no distinct

gotras corresponding to the three vehicles. This teaching is usually interpreted as a

Mādhyamaka justification for one final vehicle, as opposed to the three-vehicle theory,

attributed to Cittamātra/Vijñaptimātratā, and which is closely related to the doctrine of three

gotras found in sutras such as Saṃdhinirmocana and Laṅkāvatāra and śāstras such as

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. However, there are some Tibetan writers outside the influential

Gelug tradition who see the equation of gotra with dharmadhātu as an essentially Yogācāra

doctrine. This alternative viewpoint implies that Yogācāra and Cittamātra are not, as is

commonly held to be the case, the same thing and brings to the fore the question of whether

Yogācāra is better understood as a tradition that transcends traditional doxographic categories.

Through an analysis of Śākya-mchog-ldan’s explanation of AA I:39, which includes a

differentiation of two other terms that are also often held to be synonymous, namely gotra

and buddha-essense (or tathāgatagarbha), I aim to highlight some of the ways in which his

‘reformulation’ of Yogācāra implies a reformulation of certain Cittamātra doctrines. Finally, I

conclude the paper with a brief discussion on the extent to which doxographical discourse

both restricts and allows for the formulation of an individual point of view.

The idea that Cittamātra and Yogācāra are not the same thing, although not new, is contrary

to the standard Gelugpa postion, which has been very influential in modern Buddhalogical

research. Against this trend, but in accordance with the thinking of the Kagyu masters Mi-

bskod-rdo-rje and dPa'-bo-gtsug-lag-phreng-ba, Karl Brunnhölzl has distinguished three

streams of Yogācāra. He identifies the first of these streams as the system of Maitreya,

Asaṅga, and Vasubandhu, also known as ‘the lineage of vast activity’ or simply ‘Yogācāra’.

This system, he argues, is not Cittamātra, and its final intention is not different from

Madhyamaka.1 Another alternative position is that of the Sakya teacher, Śākya-mchog-ldan,

who classifies the two Yogācāra sub-schools, Satyākāravāda and Alīkākāravāda as belonging

to Cittamātra and Madhyamaka respectively.2 Like the Kagyu view outlined by Brunnhölzl,

Śākya-mchog-ldan’s position is based on a fundamental distinction between two different

approaches to the ultimate—the contemplative system (sgom lugs) of Maitreya etc., which is

employed to describe its essential feature positively, and the analytical system (mtshan nyid

1 Karl Brunnhölzl, The Center of the Sunlit Sky (Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2004).

2 Yaroslav Komarovski, Visions of Unity (Albany NY: State University of New York Press, 2011).

2

kyi lugs) of the Niḥsvabhāvavāda tradition stemming from Nāgārjuna, which points to

ultimate reality as a non-affirming space-like negation.3 Śākya-mchog-ldan sees these two

approaches as complementary, unlike the distinction which is often made between Cittamātra

and Madhyamaka in which they are identified as antagonistic ‘schools’—a distinction that is

grounded more in pedagogy than in historical reality.

One of the first points of difference between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka that a student

encounters in the Tibetan monastic curriculum is when he or she studies topic of gotra (Tib.

rigs) in chapter one of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (AA), the fundamental text for the study of

Prajñāpāramitā, which is not, as the name suggests, so much about the perfection of wisdom,

as much as it is about constructing a worldview that takes the bodhisattva path as its center

and within which all religious practice makes sense.4 The topic is dealt with in a textbook on

the AA’s difficult points (dka’ ba’i gnad), called Lung-chos rgya-mtso’i snying-po5 by the

Sakya master, Śākya-mchog-ldan , and which is studied in the Pullahari Monastery in Nepal,

an institution founded by 'Jam-mgon-kong-sprul Blo-gros-chos-kyi-sengge, a Kagyu master

in the ecumenical (ris med) tradition. The work was composed in 1480, during the period

when Śākya-mchog-ldan’s unique views on Yogācāra were still evolving, 6

i.e., before their

crystallisation in works such as bDud-rtsi’i char-’bebs, (1489) and Yid-bzhin lhun-po(1501) 7

,

wherein he expresses the view that the Yogācāra tradition of Maitreya/Asaṅga is properly

considered as Madhyamaka, not Cittamātra. Śākya-mchog-ldan’s treatment of gotra in this

work has been translated and included as an appendix to this paper.

Śākya-mchog-ldan’s evolving position on a closely related topic, that of the buddha-essence

(tathāgatagarbha), has been analysed in two excellent articles Yaroslav Komarovksi,8 and

this paper is intended to serve as an extension of that work. However, it differs from

Komarovski’s analysis insofar as it focuses on gotra. The difference is significant since,

unlike other writers who are often clubbed together in the gzhan-stong camp, Śākya-mchog-

ldan does not see gotra is seen as synonymous with buddha-essence,9 nor does he see it as a

reason that establishes the concomitance of the buddha-essence in all beings.10

Śākya-mchog-ldan’s presentation of the gotra in Lung-chos rgya-mtso’i snying-po is also of

interest because its description of the differences between the Cittamātra and Madhyamaka

assertions regarding gotra also tells us how Śākya-mchog-ldan understood the tenets of

3 ———, "Shakya Chokden's Interpretation of the Ratnagotravibhāgha: "Contemplative" of "Dialectical"?,"

Journal of Indian Philosophy 38(2010). 4 See Georges Dreyfus, "Tibetan Scholastic Education and the Role of Soteriology," Journal of the International

Association of Buddhist Studies 20, no. 1 (1997). 5 Śākya Mchog-ldan, Mgnon Par Rtogs Pa'i Rgyan 'Grel Ba Dang Bcas Pa'i Dka' Ba'i Gnad Rnam Par Bshad

Pa Spyi'i Don Nyer Mkho Bsdus Pa Lung Chos Rgya Mtsho Snying Po (Kathmandu: Rigpe Dorje, 2008). 6 Komarovski, Visions of Unity.

7 Dbu ma’i byung tshul rnam par bshad pa’I gtam yid bzhin lhun po, translated in Yaroslav Komarovski, Three

Texts on Madhyamaka by Shakya Chokden (Dharamsala: Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, 2000), 1-36. 8 (1) ———, "Reburying the Treasure—Maintaining the Continuity: Two Texts by Śākya Mchog Ldan on the

Buddha Essence," Journal of Indian Philosophy 34(2006). (2) Komarovski, "Shakya Chokden's Interpretation of

the Rgv." 9 See S. K. Hookham, The Buddha Within (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), 105.

10 See Uttaratantra I.28

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Cittamātra during this evolving period. Of particular interest is Śākya-mchog-ldan’s view that

the equation of dharmadhātu with gotra is a tenet common to both systems, a position which

raises questions of how Cittamātra can accept three final vehicles. Also of interest is his

attribution to Yogācāra of the view that practitioners in all three vehicles take the emptiness

of apprehender and apprehended as a focal object of mediation. Since this is considered the

definition of the emptiness of phenomena in the Yogācāra, Śākya-mchog-ldan must address

the question of whether śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realise the identitylessness of

phenomena in Yogācāra. Both of these points will be discussed in this paper.

1 The Abhisamayālaṃkāra

By way of providing a context for the discussion that follows, I begin with a brief discussion

of the doctrinal standpoint of the AA as a whole, as it is understood in the Indo-Tibetan

exegetical tradition. It should be noted at the outset that Western scholars who have analysed

the correspondence between the AA’s paradigmatic interpretive structure and the

Prajñāpāramitā (PP) sutras have found it to be quite artificial,11

and the occurrence in AA

I:39 of the argument that there is just one gotra is a case in point. Gotra is rarely mentioned

in the PP sutras, and when it does occur, it does so right at the end, where, in direct contrast

with the AA’s doctrine of a single gotra, three distinct gotras are taught.12

If the standard Tibetan approach to understanding the PP corpus has been coloured by its

reliance on the lens of the AA, it is also true that attempts to classify the AA within the well-

known four-‘school’ doxographical framework mean that it too has not always been

understood on its own terms. Although Indian Buddhists commented on the AA from a

variety of standpoints,13

in Tibet it is the commentaries of Haribhadra and Āryavimuktisena,

who are often grouped together as representatives of a single tradition, that have been most

influential. Since they are both classified Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas, it is often

thought that the AA is a work of Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school. This has been

asserted by a number of prominent Western scholars, 14

yet unfortunately they do not cite any

Tibetan sources, and I haven’t been able to find any that explicitly state this.

11

“It is an indisputable fact that the original authors of the Prajñāpāramitā, when they composed it, gradually

over a number of generations, never had such a scheme in mind.” Edward Conze, "Marginal Notes to the

Abhisamayālaṃkāra " Sino-Indian Studies 5(1957): 22. “The commentaries often provide reasons for the order

of the chapters in the AA and certain of its topics, but these reasons seem somewhat arbitrary, obviously

attempting to forge a coherent overall structure where it is hard to find one.” Karl Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond: The Ornament of Clear Realization, and Its Commentaries in the Tibetan Kagyu Tradition, 2 vols., vol. 1

(Ithaca, NY: Snow Lion, 2010), 701. 12

See Edward Conze, The Large Sutra on Perfect Wisdom (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), 652.

While it is possible, if not likely, that the chapter in which three distinct lineages are taught was added after the

composition of the AA, it nevertheless stands as an example of directly contrasting standpoints that the

commentarial tradition has had to come to terms with. 13

E.g., the commentaries by Ratnākaraśānti – Śuddhamatī (To. 3801) and Sārottamā (To. 3803); and Bṛhaṭṭīka

(Tib. Yum gsum gnod 'joms), by Daṃṣṭrasena (To. 3808) 14

Ruegg mentions “the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, a work which has been classified as belonging to the Yogācāra-

Svatantrika-Madhyamaka…” David Seyfort Ruegg, Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan

Madhyamaka Philosophy: Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought (Vol. 1) (Vienna: Arbeitskreis

für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien, Universität Wien., 2000), 18. Hopkins says, “Vimuktisena's view is

clearly that of a Yogachara-Svatantrika-Madhyamika, and Maitreya's Ornament for Clear Realization

4

On the contrary, in rGyan gyi mthar thugs pa’i lta ’grel by Khedrub’s disciple, Chos-dbang

Grags-pa’i-dpal it says that Tsong-kha-pa, rGyal-tshab and mKhas-grub are unanimous in

saying that the ultimate view of the AA is Prāsaṅgika.15

He states that were its ultimate view

that of Svātantrika-Madhyamaka, it would imply that the ultimate view expressed in the

Prajñāpāramitā sutras themselves was also Svātantrika-Madhyamaka. Even it is accepted that

Haribhadra does faithfully interpret the AA, it is not necessarily agreed that he can be

narrowly classified as belonging to a sub-school of a sub-school of Madhyamaka. Certainly,

no such detailed subdivisions existed at the time of his writing.

Although the AA is one of five famous works attributed to a single author, some Tibetans take

the view that the five works of Maitreya represent a range of different doctrinal positions.16

Others see all the five works of Maitreya as united in their viewpoint, which is variously

claimed as Great Madhyamaka,17

Alīlākāravāda,18

or Yogācāra-(Madhyamaka).19

Of course,

such unification is doubtlessly driven by a belief that these works were composed by a single

author, but it should be noted that the attribution of all these five works to Maitreya appears

to be relatively late.20

While the idea that the AA should be considered in toto to be a Yogācāra work may require a

flexible and expanded view of Yogācāra, there are a number of Western scholars who at least

recognise the clear influence of Yogācāra on the work. Conze, for example, observed that

“the standpoint of the work is not that of the Yogācārins proper, but of those who stood

halfway between Yogācārins and Mādhyamikas.”21

He also noted that the work contains

several verses that are very similar to ones found in works normally associated with the

(Abhisamayalamkara), which was brought to this world by Asanga on his return from the Joyous Pure Land,

manifests the same view.” Jeffrey Hopkins, Meditation on Emptiness (Boston: Wisdom Publications, 1983),

362-63. Brunnhölzl also says that many Gelugpa commentaries make this claim, while at the same time noting

that most earlier Tibetan and Indian commentators did not express such a view. Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond I, 81. 15

Chos-dbang-grags-pa'i-dpal, "She Rab Kyi Pha Rol Tu Phyin Pa'i Man Ngag Gi Bstan Bcos Mngon Par Rtogs

Pa'i Rgyan Gyi Mthar Thug Pa'i Lta Ba Thal 'Gyur Du 'Grel Tshul Gnad Don Gsal Zla," in Stong Thun Skal

Bzang Mig 'Byed (Mundgod: Gaden Jangtse Libary, 2006), 623-24. For mKhas-grub’s assertion that the ultimate

view of the AA is a Prāsaṅgika, see José Ignacio Cabezón, A Dose of Emptiness (Albany NY: State University

of New York, 1992), 224. 16

It is often held that in the Gelugpa tradition, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, Madhyāntavibhāga, and

Dharmadharmatāvibhāga represent the doctrines of the Cittamātra, the Abhisamayālaṃkāra represents those of

the Yogācāra-Svātantrika-Madhyamaka school, and the Ratnagotravibhāga is said to represent the point of view

of the Prāsaṅgika-Madhyamaka school. 17

This view is attributed to Dolopa by Taranatha in Jeffrey Hopkins, The Essence of Other-Empiteness by

Tāranātha (Ithaca & Boulder: Snow Lion, 2007), 121. 18

This view is attributed to Śākya Mchog-ldan. See Komarovski, "Shakya Chokden's Interpretation of the Rgv." 19

This is the view of the Eighth Karmapa, Mi-bskyod rDo-rje. It should be noted, however, that he believes Yogācāra is not a doxographical category comparable with Madhyamaka or Cittamātra. See Brunnhölzl, The

Center of the Sunlit Sky, 501. 20

Maitreya is not mentioned as the AA's author by the earliest Indian commentators. The MVB predates Asanga

(source?). Paul Griffith writes that the attribution of Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara to Maitreya is also quite late and

probably unknown during the time of its circulation in India. Paul J. Griffiths, "Painting Space with Colors:

Tathāgatagarbha in the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkara Corpus Iv.22-37," in Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of

Minoru Kiyota, ed. Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan (Reno: Buddhist Books International, 1990), 43. For a

more detailed discussion, see Karl Brunnhölzl, Luminous Heart (Ithaca NY: Snow Lion, 2009), 79-84. 21

Edward Conze, "Maitreya's Abhisamayālaṅkāra," East and West 5(1954): 194.

5

Yogācāra school22

and that the doctrine three kāyas—svabhāvikakāya, sambhogakāya, and

nirmāṇakāy— is a Yogācāra doctrine, unknown in the Prajñāpāramitā sutras. Similarly Karl

Brunnhölzl has also identified a number of terms and doctrines typically associated with

Yogācāra in the AA and concludes that its “strong Yogācāra underpinning makes sense”23

since it is about bringing an experiential understanding to the sutras.

I would go further and suggest that reason why the work contains many Yogācāra influences

is due to the existence of those influences in the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā-Prajñāpāramitā, the

version of the PP sutra with which it is most closely associated. These include not only the

existence of the word yogācāra (not found in the earlier version, but also traces of the

pañcamārga system and of course, the Questions of Maitreya chapter, which, although an

apparently later interpolation, teaches the classic Yogācāra doctrine of three svabhāvas in a

manner reminiscent of that found in the Saṃdhinirmocana sutra.24

2 Śākya-mchog-ldan on how gotra is viewed in Cittamātra and Madhyamaka

Turning now to Śākya-mchog-ldan’s explanation of gotra in Lung-chos rgya-mtso’i snying-

po, there are three parts: (1) a general explanation of the different types of gotra (2)

identifying the tathāgatagarbha (3) a detailed explanation of how the dharmadhatu functions

as the support for the accomplishments of practitioners in the three vehicles. In the first part

Śākya-mchog-ldan’ presents his general explanation of the gotra and its divisions as

something with which he claims Cittamātra and Madhyamaka are broadly in agreement (phel

cher mthun pa). It should be noted that although he does not explicitly identify Cittamātra

with Satyākāravāda, while considering Alīkākāravāda a division of Madhyamaka, but would

appear to be the case. The main points of similarity are as follows:

2.1 Similarities

The natural (rang bzhin du gnas pa’i) gotra is the ālaya wisdom (kun gzhi ye shes).25

Three gotra-bearers are posited by way of the three divisions of the developmental

gotra.

The dharmadhātu that is nurtured (gsos btab pa) by various conditions is just the

buddha-gotra. The conditions which nurture are the gotras of the three vehicles.

22

AA I:18-20 is very similar to Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra IV:15-20 while AA VII:8 is almost identical with

Mahāyānasamgraha X:13. See Ibid. 23

Brunnhölzl, Gone Beyond I. 24

In addition, it is noteworthy that Gareth Sparam has described the Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā as “a Yogācāra

version of the Prajñāpāramitā sūtra.” Gareth Sparham, Ocean of Eloquence (Albany: State University of New

York Press, 1993), 16. 25

The division of the ālaya into consciousness and wisdom is based on Asaṅga’s distinction between ālaya into

consciousness and supramundane mind. Brunnhölzl, Luminous Heart, 864, n.1250. The use of the term ālaya-

wisdom is an innovation of Dolpopa's.

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The natural gotra is the suchness (chos nyid) of the stained mind which is suitable to

become a svābhāvikakāya if those stains are purified.

The nature of the dharmadhātu of the stained mind is asserted to be the luminous and

knowing pole of stained mental experience (dri ma dang bcas pa'i sems myong ba

gsal rig gi cha). This, he says, accords with the general system of all the Maitreya

scriptures and their explanations by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

The natural gotra is pervaded by suchness (chos nyid) and uncompoundedness (’dus

ma byas).

He says the teaching that both the natural gotra and the svābhāvikakāya are non-

affirming negatives does not appear in the scriptures of Maitreya.

2.2 Differences

Regarding the differences between Cittamātra and Madhyamaka, Śākya-mchog-ldan then

writes:

Although they are similar in teaching that the nature (ngo bo) of the natural gotra is

the dharmadhātu, [within] the two Madhaymaka systems there is a division regarding

whether or not the nature of the dharmadhātu is the pole of experience that is

luminous and aware.

Śākya-mchog-ldan is saying here that the Cittamātra position with regard to what the

dharmadhātu is only shared by one of the two Madhyamaka systems, and that the point of

agreement with one of those systems is that the dharmadhātu is the pole of experience

(myong ba) that is luminous and aware. Since this positive description of the dharmadhātu, in

which is not seen as the mere actuality of phenomena but what realises this actuality accords

with that found in Madhyāntavibhāga, we can see that at this stage in the development of his

thinking Śākya-mchog-ldan appears to divide Madhyamaka not according to the

Prānsaṅgika/Svātantrika distinction, but along the lines that he later articulates in Yid-bzhin

lhun-po, namely the tradition of pioneered by Nāgārjuna and that pioneered by Asaṅga.

However, to claim that Cittamātra asserts that all beings naturally possess the buddha-gotra

in the form of the dharmadhātu appears to go against several conventions. Although Śākya-

mchog-ldan includes the uncompoundedness of natural gotra among the points with which

both systems broadly agree, as the contemporary ris med teacher, Ngag-dbang kun-dga’

dbang-phyug, points out:

7

in Cittamātra the natural gotra is compounded and therefore not necessarily the

dharmadhātu. In contrast, in Madhyamaka dharmadhātu, gotra, and cause of the

buddhadharmas are equivalents.26

The other problem with saying that Cittamātra equates the dharmadhātu with the gotra is

explaining how that in that system three ultimate vehicles can still be asserted. Śākya-mchog-

ldan’s teacher, Rong-ston, expresses the Cittamātra position as follows:

since all Vijñaptivādins assert three yānas ultimately, according to them, it is not

suitable for the buddha gotra to pervade all sentient beings”27

.

Similarly, Ngag-dbang kun-dga’ dbang-phyug also writes:

those who assert that there are ultimately three yānas hold that the gotra is not

necessarily the Buddha gotra. This is taught to be an essential point of their

philosophical system28

So how does Śākya-mchog-ldan account for the fact that Cittamātra accepts on the one hand

that that the buddha-gotra is the dharmadhātu yet on the other hand assert that there are three

ultimate vehicles? At first glance his explanation seems contradictory. On the one hand he

seems to say that, unlike Madhyamaka, in Cittamātra beings (i.e., arhats) somehow manage to

extinguish their natural gotra. He says:

Although [Cittamātra and Madhyamaka] are similar in their assertions regarding the

Buddha essence at the time of no remainder, there are differences regarding whether

or not they assert the natural gotra [exists at that time].29

It seems to me that Śākya-mchog-ldan claims that, although Cittamātra and Madhyamaka

both assert the natural gotra to be the dharmadhātu, their different definitions of what the

dharmadhātu is (e.g., conditioned vs. unconditioned, cause of all phenomena vs. sphere of all

phenomena) entails different positions on whether the natural gotra is extinguished in arhats

at the time of no remainder. In Cittamātra the arhat has truly transcended existence and there

is nothing that can be nurtured by conditions to become the svābhāvikakāya.

On the other hand, elsewhere when presenting the Cittamātra response to the consequence

that there would only be one ultimate vehicle in that system if it is accepted that dharmadhātu

is that natural gotra, he writes:

26

———, Gone Beyond I, 478. 27

Translated in Ibid., 458. 28

Ibid., 477. 29

lhag med gyi tshe sangs rgyas kyi snying po 'dod par 'dra yang/ rang bzhin du gnas pa'i rigs yod par 'dod mi

'dod kyi khyad par dang/

8

Although the natural gotra is not broken, since it is possible that the conditions that

nurture it may not be complete, it is possible that some beings do not attain

buddhahood.30

Although it is not possible to fully understand his thinking on this topic based on this text

alone, it does appear again that the differences can be accounted for by recognising that

Cittamātra and Madhyamaka conceive of the dharmadhātu differently, and that in Śākya-

mchog-ldan’s interpretation of Cittamātra, although the continuum of the natural gotra, it

ceases to be the buddha-gotra for the arhat at the time of no remainder since there is no

possibility that it can function as the foundation for the practices of a bodhisattva.

3 Buddha-essence

Śākya-mchog-ldan’s definition of the buddha-essence in this text is essentially the same as

that in found in the Essence of the Ocean of Scriptural Doctrines.31

Here, he expresses it as

follows:

[The essence] is the suchness of the inseparability from the qualities of a Buddha such

as the [ten] powers etc. It is not differentiated here by way of genuine and imputed

[essence]. [However,] if it is so divided, there is the fully qualified (mtshan nyid pa)

[essence] which is the reality purified of adventitious stains and the imputed (btags pa

ba) [essence] which is the naturally pure reality.

The first is [of two types]: the perfected [purified reality] of a Buddha, and the partial

one—the reality purified of adventitious [stains] (glo bur rnam dag gi chos nyid) on

the ten [bodhisattva] grounds. It does not exist in ārya śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas.

The main point to recognise is that, unlike the Buddha-gotra, it is not something that is

possessed by all beings. Śākya-mchog-ldan explains how those sutras that teach the buddha-

essence is possessed by all beings are not to be understood literally, but such arguments are

outside the scope of this article.

4 How gotra is the foundation of the three vehicles.

Next, Śākya-mchog-ldan addresses the question of how the dharmadhātu functions as a

support for the three vehicles. It will be recalled that Śākya-mchog-ldan defines the

dharmadhātu not as a space-like non-affirming negative, but the pole (cha) of the mind that is

luminous and aware. When bodhisattvas take this as their focal object (dmigs pa) of

meditation, they realise its emptiness of apprehended and apprehender. The question then

arises: if this emptiness is the nature of the dharmadhātu of the stained mind and it is the

30

rang bzhin du gnas pa’i rigs ma chad kyang de gsos ’debs byed kyi rkyen ma tshang srid pa’i phyir na ’tshang

mi rgya ba’i sems can srid cing/ 31

lung chos rgya mtsho’i snying po, Tr. in Komarovski, "Reburying the Treasure—Maintaining the Continuity:

Two Texts by Śākya Mchog Ldan on the Buddha Essence."

9

meditative support for practitioners of the three vehicles, wouldn’t śrāvakas,

pratyekabuddhas and bodhisattvas all realise the same emptiness, namely the identitylessness

of phenomena?32

Śākya-mchog-ldan explicitly asserts this to be the system of the Yogācāras and that he

maintains that there is no fault that śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas realise the identitylessness.

He writes:

Although it is accepted that all three vehicles take as their focal object the

dharmadhātu of their own mental continuum, there is no fault [that śrāvakas

eliminate realise the identitylessness of phenomena or eliminate obscurations to

omniscience]. The pole of luminosity and awareness which is empty of apprehender

and apprehended is called the dharmadhātu (gzung ’dzin gnyis kyis stong pa’i gsal rig

gi cha la chos kyi dbyings zhes bya) Furthermore, there is a classification into two: the

emptiness of apprehender and apprehended that is made with respect to persons and

the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended which is made with respect to

phenomena. Also, there is a distinction between the emptiness of the duality of

apprehender and apprehended which is made in dependence on external objects and

which is made in dependence on inner consciousness. Having thus made a threefold

division, the three gotra bearers take these respectively as their object and cultivate a

path cognising identitylessness in accordance with respective focal object

arises. …the teaching that the identitylessness of persons is the dharmadhātu is a tenet

of Yogācāras.33

Śākya-mchog-ldan here says that the realisation of the identitylessness of persons is made by

taking the pole of luminosity and awareness which is empty of apprehender and apprehended

as the focal object by all persons of all three vehicles is a tenet of Yogācāras. The expression

rnal ’byor dpyod pa ba dag suggests he is talking about both satyākāravāda and

alikākāravāda, yet the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended which is made in

dependence on internal objects would appear to the realisation of the pratyekabuddha in

alikākāravāda only. That is, within the dharmadhātu which comprises all that exists, the

śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha take the person as a focal object. Win this, although the śrāvaka

cognises the lack of a substantial difference between of apprehender and apprehended, he/she

still sees the mind’s projections of external phenomena as real

32

This point and Śākya-mchog-ldan’s response (though he is not identified by name) is also raised by other

Tibetan scholars. Mi-bskod-rdo-rje writes: Some Tibetans present the nature of the dharmadhātu as conscious

that is lucid and aware. They explain the assertion that, by focussing on nothing but this, it functions as the

support for the various types of realisation of the three yānas as being the system of the Yogācāras. They say, “If

the dharmadhātu is realised, this is not necessarily the realisation of phenomenal identitylessnes,” and “When the result of the any of the yānas come forth in dependence on the dharmadhātu, it is not certain that the

dharmadhātu must be realised [for this to happen]”. There are indeed [such statements], but [for now] I leave

them as bases to be examined. 33

Des na gang zag gi bdag med kyang chos dbyings su ’chad pa ni/ rnal ’byor dpyod pa ba dag gi grub pa’i

mtha’ yin la/

10

It is not necessary to accept that if the dharmadhātu is cognised the identitylessness of

phenomena is also cognised. Even if it were necessary, since the dharmadhātu is only

taken as a focal object, there is no entailment that it [the identitylessness of

phenomena] is realised.

There are no differences between wisdoms of the three vehicles, which having taken

the dharmadhātu as their focal object, are born as the nature of the dharmadhātu

wisdom. However, there is no fault of the unwanted consequence that all three realise

the identitylessness of phenomena because the meaning of realisation of the

identitylessness of phenomena it is posited as a realisation of the pervaded

dharmadhātu while the two vehicles only take a tiny part of the dharmadhātu as their

focal objects, the realisation is only of that much.

To restate the two main points I have highlighted from Śākya-mchog-ldan’s explanation of

gotra and put them in theoretical perspective: (1) Śākya-mchog-ldan is in agreement with the

AA exegetical tradition when he says that it teaches that the natural gotra is the dharmadhātu.

However, he disagrees with most other commentators when he says that this is a view taken

by both Cittamātra and Madhyamaka. In order to explain how Cittamātrins can accept this

view as well as the doctrine of three final vehicles, he says that they do not accept that the

natural gotra exists for an arhat at the time of no remainder. However, this would appear to

require a different interpretations of what the dharmadhātu is. (2) The second point is that

Śākya-mchog-ldan holds that in Yogācāra the aspect of mind that is luminous and aware is

identified as the dharmadhātu and this is taken as the focal object by practitioners of all three

vehicles, though this does not necessarily entail them all cognising the identitylessness of

phenomena.

5 Yogacara as a doxographical category?

It is worth asking the question what exactly Śākya-mchog-ldan trying to explain here. I

believe that he was trying to explain not just how Madhyamaka and Cittamatra are closer

than we might suspect, but that the practices of the three vehicles are also very similar. Given

that his claim that the identification of the naturally gotra with the dharmadhātu is an

essentially Yogācāra doctrine (rather than a Madhyamaka doctrine) may be seen as original,

it is worth revaluating some of the criticism that has been levelled at the Tibetan doxography

genre.

It has been said that works of this genre flatten out the distinctions between authors,34

and

that the ‘four schools’, have little in common with historical reality and may lead to a

distorted understanding of texts and authors. While it is true that historians agree that there

were many more than two Hīnayāna schools, and even if these many schools were to be

grouped, it makes more sense to group them, as most scholars who have studied them do, into

34

Matthew. Kapstein, The Tibetan Assimilation of Buddhism : Conversion, Contestation, and Memory (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2000).

11

Sthaviravāda and Mahāsāṃghika, despite the lack of a distinct institutional basis, John Dunne

is surely right when he says that through “their intertextuality, the continuity of their ideas,

their, appeal to the same authorities, and so on” identifiable schools, such as Madhyamaka do

exist.35

However, the deeper problem, I feel, is that Buddhist traditions end up being differentiated

predominantly on philosophical terms, or even more narrowly, in only ontological terms. José

Cabazón has shown how in the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, systems of tenets canonize

philosophy by functioning a filters through which all doctrines must pass if they are to be

accepted as Buddhist.36

Against this however, it is important to remember that Buddhism is

not purely a system of doctrines; and for those such as Śākya-mchog-ldan, who may see a

fundamental doctrinal difference between the analytical and contemplative traditions in, it is

also possible to not only recognise them both as Madhyamaka, but show that the differences

between Madhyamaka and Cittamātra are not that great.

In conclusion, I would like to explain Śākya-mchog-ldan’s approach in terms of a distinction

between the genre of doxography and doxographical discourse. The former are works

specifically dedicated to detailing the doctrinal differences between the Four Systems. The

latter is the simply a framework of reference, a set of rules, existing in the background in

Tibetan commentarial works, which allow for the creation of order out of disorder, albeit not

reflective of historical reality. The two are related, as Hopkins explains when he writes that

in Tibet, students are taught this fourfold classification first, without mention of the

diversity of opinion that it conceals. Then, over decades of study, students gradually

recognize the structure of such presentations of schools of thought as a technique for

gaining access to a vast store of opinion, as a way to focus on topics crucial to authors

within Indian Buddhism. The task of then distinguishing between what is clearly said

in the Indian texts and what is interpretation and interpolation over centuries of

commentary becomes a fascinating enterprise for the more hardy among Tibetan

scholars. The devotion to debate as the primary mode of education provides an ever-

present avenue for students to challenge home-grown interpretations, and affords a

richness of critical commentary within the tradition that a short presentation of tenets

does not convey.37

Śākya-mchog-ldan’s evolving position is an example of this process. By making use a

doxographical worldview he is able to harmonise apparently conflicting systems and arrive at

a personal philosophical position not exactly found in any Tibetan text, yet appears to be

consistent with the basic impulse of Yogācāra, namely a tradition that was not limited to the

35

John Dunne, "Buddhism, Schools Of: Mahayana Philosophical Schools of Buddhism," in Encyclopedia of

Religion, ed. Lindsay Jones (Detroit: Macmillan Reference, 2005). 36

José Ignacio Cabezón, "The Canonization of Philosophy and the Rhetoric of Siddhānta in Tibetan Buddhism,"

in Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota, ed. Paul J. Griffiths and John P. Keenan (Reno, NV:

Buddhist Books International, 1990). 37

Jeffrey Hopkins, "The Tibetan Genre of Doxography: Structuring a Worldview," in Tibetan Literature:

Studies in Genre, ed. Jose Ignacio Cabezon and Roger R. Jackson (Ithaca: Snow Lion, 1996), 176.

12

theoretical discussions, but a practical teaching aimed at recognising how a basically pure,

luminous mind was tainted with adventitious stains It also accords with the experience of a

Gelugpa geshe who once told me that he had learned about 25% of what he knew from texts

and about 25% through oral instructions from his teachers. The remaining 50% of his

knowledge was arrived at through debate and the reflection prompted by those debates.

13

Appendix: Shakya Chogden on Support of the Practice (sgrub pa'i rten)

General explanation of the divisions of gotra itself

Generally speaking, the word 'gotra' has the meaning of cause. Furthermore, between the

cause of saṃsāra and [that of] nirvāṇa, here, the general term is particularly applied with

respect to the latter. Both causes are similar in that they exist within (steng du) the ālaya as

seeds. [Regarding the ālaya consciousness, in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha] Asaṅga cites [this

verse] from the [Abhidharma]sūtra:

The sphere (dhātu) without beginning is the basis (gnas) of all dharmas;

It being so, it has every destiny as well as the attainment of nirvāṇa.

There are also two [types of] seeds—contaminated and uncontaminated.

The first is the actual ālayavijñāna. As a conceptual isolate, it is also said to be the its [i.e.,

the ālaya's] seed factor (sa bon gyi cha). These seeds are newly deposited; they are not

naturally acquired (chos nyid kyis thob pa).

As for the second [the uncontaminated seed], it is called ālaya wisdom. In the tantric vehicle,

it is labelled 'the natural gotra', 'the tathāgatagarbha', 'the vajra of the mind', 'the original

Buddha', etc. This [uncontaminated] seed is not newly planted because it is acquired by

nature. [In the Sūtrayāna] it has several synonyms: it is called the uncontaminated seed, the

special feature of the six internal sense-spheres and imprints for listening because

[respectively] it is suitable to become supramundane wisdom, because it is the basis of the

specialness of the six internal sense-spheres, and because it is nurtured due to hearing the

speech of the Buddha.38

In the commentary on the Uttaratantra root text, "the

uncontaminated sphere and its consciousness" are also mentioned [as synonyms].39

Some latter-day Tibetans say that, with respect to the natural gotra, there are the three [types],

such as the śrāvaka natural gotra etc. This is mistaken because it is pervaded by the buddha

gotra.

In that case, how, are the three gotra bearers classified? It is taught that when the three

different conditions that cause awakening nurture the single Buddha gotra [in three ways],

there are three gotra bearers. As it says [in the Abhisamayālaṃkāra]

By way of the instances of the phenomena based on it

Its divisions are expressed. [AA I: 38cd]

38

The text reverses the order of the last two reason. But since it seems they should be understood as applying

respectively to the three synonyms, I have changed the order in the translation. 39

I can't find this in the ACIP version.

14

The meaning [of these lines] in brief is that three gotra-bearers are posited by way of the

[three] divisions of the developmental gotra.

In that case, if one [mistakenly] thinks that the three gotra-bearers become definite in the

Mahayana gotra due to being definite bearers of the buddha gotra, there is no such fault. The

positing of definite and indefinite gotra is not done from the point of view of the natural

gotra; it is done [from the point of view of] whether the developmental gotra does or does

not nurture. There are three agents of nurturing by way of the divisions of the mind

generations of the three vehicles. The dharmadhātu that is nurtured by those [three] is just the

buddha gotra, and that which nurtures is the gotra of the three vehicles. The three [types of]

person who abide in those [three vehicles] are termed the [three] gotra-bearers.

Thus, there are two gotras—the natural gotra and the developmental gotra.

As for their distinctive features: the first is naturally acquired while the latter is a condition

that causes nurturing of that [natural gotra]. By these differences they are divided.

The definition of the first [i.e., the natural gotra] is: the reality (chos nyid) of the

contaminated mind which is suitable to become a svābhāvikakāya if those stains are purified.

The definition of the second is: it is a condition causes that nurturing of the natural gotra

which is suitable to become the body that effects the welfare of others if the stains are

purified.

It cannot be posited as the developmental gotra merely on the basis of being newly arisen

because it does not pervade the virtues which are merely conducive to the merit [for attaining

rebirth in higher realms] (bsod nams cha mthun tsam).

With respect to the distinctive features of the two gotras, some other Tibetans teach that they

are divided on the basis of whether the uncontaminated seeds in the ālaya nurture or do not

nurture. This is mistaken because, as it says in the Sūtrālamkāra

Natural, developed, support, supported, existent, and nonexistent; (III:4)

Both are explained as support and supported, virtuous qualities and possessor of virtuous

qualities and there is no explanation of the other when one is nurtured by conditions alone.

Given this, at that time, what can be made as the nature of the dharmadhātu of the

contaminated mind? The experience of the contaminated mind is asserted to be the clear and

knowing aspect because such is taught in the general system of all the Maitreya scriptures.

Asaṅga and his brother have also explained it in that way. Master Zangpo also accepts this

point. Also, it is said in the Sūtrālamkāra [XIII:19]

15

it is decreed that there is no other mind apart from the mind of reality which is naturally

luminous.40

With regard to the mind, there is a twofold division into reality and subject; the first is taught

to be aspect of experience that is clear and knowing.

In the Uttaratantra: [104]

The uncontaminated knowledge which is in all beings is like the honey [and the

Defilements are like bees]

Through the assertions of this master [Asaṅga?] recognition of suchness and emptiness is

taught extremely clearly. Others, with regard to the natural gotra, teach that perceiving

subject and reality is a division into compounded phenomena and uncompounded phenomena.

The first is the factor of experience that is clear and knowing, and the second, emptiness, is

the non-affirming negation factor. This is [a case of] not knowing because the natural gotra is

pervaded by reality (chos nyid) and uncompoundedness. And because the natural gotra and

the svābhāvikakāya both being taught as non-affirming negatives factor does not appear in

the scriptures of Maitreya.

The both of them having just been explained, if one asks from which point of view is it,

Madhyamaka or Cittamātra? Here, there are two sections: with regard to this point, the

teaching that Madhyamaka and Cittamātra are mostly in agreement and a short explanation of

their distinctive disagreements.

Broad agreement

The positions of Madhyamaka and Cittamātra with regard to the just-explained two types of

gotra and identification thereof are similar because the Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra and the

Uttaratantra and Dharmadhātustava and explanation in Bodhisattvabhūmi and the

explanation in Abhidharmasamuccaya and [Ratnākara]śānti's Śuddhimatī all are in

agreement.

If it is objected that, since the Cittamātrins' position that the nature of the natural gotra is the

dharmadhātu is like that, there would follow unwanted consequences of not accepting beings

who are bearers of gotra and there would be one ultimate vehicle.

There are two answers: turning the argument back on the objector and the grounded

[response].

40

mataṁ ca cittaṁ prakṛtiprabhāsvaraṁ sadā tadāgantukadoṣadūṣitaṁ| na dharmatācittamṛte 'nyacetasaḥ

prabhāsvaratvaṁ prakṛtau vidhīyate||19||

16

First, since Cittamātrins accept that all sentient being possess the buddha-essence, the

unwanted consequence [that there would only be one ultimate vehicle] applies to you too.

They assert like that because the sutra that teaches all sentient beings possess the Buddha

essence is accepted literally by the Cittamātrins, according to the glorious Chandra. In the

Sūtrālamkāra [IX:37] too, it says, "All beings have its essence."

Second, although the natural gotra is not broken it is possible that the conditions that nurture

it may not be complete, it is possible that some beings do not attain buddhahood, and

although being a possessor of the Buddha-essence, since there is the possibility of the

absence of causes for taking rebirth in samsara, there are three ultimate vehicles. Thus is

asserted by Cittamātrins.

Short explanation of their distinguishing differences.

Although they are similar in teaching that naturally abiding gotra is the dharmadhātu, [within]

the two Madhaymaka systems there is a division regarding whether or not the nature of the

dharmadhātu is the pole of experience that is luminous and aware. And although they are

similar in not asserting that there are beings who are cut off from the Buddha-essence and the

natural gotra, they are different in asserting and not asserting that there are beings who never

reach nirvāṇa. And although they are similar in their assertions regarding the Buddha essence

at the time of no remainder, they different in asserting and not asserting the natural gotra

exists [at that time]. And although they are similar [in asserting] there are no delusions then,

they are a little different in their assertions regarding the presence and absence of causes for

taking rebirth. Based on these differences the two are differentiated. In [Kamalaśīla's]

Madhyamakāloka it is said that, since the gotra which is a natural purity exists, [to say] some

people never become completely purified is unsuitable. There, the opponent is a Cittamātrin.

Identifying the tathāgatagarbha

Identification of the essence

[The essence] is the suchness of the inseparability from the qualities of a Buddha such as the

[ten] powers etc. Since it is not differentiated here by way of actual and imputed [essence], if

it is so divided, there is the fully qualified [essence] which is the reality purified of

adventitious [stains] and the imputed [essence] which is the naturally pure reality.

The first is [of two types]: the perfected [purified reality] of a Buddha, and the partial one—

the reality purified of adventitious [stains] on the ten [bodhisattva] grounds. It does not exist

in ārya śrāvakas or pratyekabuddhas because they don't have the dharmakāya or [attainment

of] nirvāṇa. They are unlike ārya bodhisattvas because the existence from the first bhūmi of

the dharmakāya that is purified of adventitious stains is taught in the Sūtrālamkāra, the

Uttaratantra commentary and Dharmadhātustava and because in [Candrakīrti’s] commentary

on Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti it is said that nirvāṇa is manifested from the first bhūmi.

17

Qualm: It is said [in the Uttaratantra?] that except for buddhahood there is no nirvāṇa. By

this example, isn't it also taught that there is no dharmakāya of tathāgata etc. on the path of

training either? [Answer]: The intention behind that teachings is that there [i.e., on the

training paths] one is inseparable from all the positive qualities of a Buddha. As it is said [in a

verse cited in the Uttaratantra commentary]

The characteristics of liberation are having countless aspects, inconceivable and

stainless and being inseparable from its qualities. Such liberation as this is the

tathagāta.41

The intention behind the teaching that [this inseparability] exists on the ten bhūmis is that it is

a inseparability only some of Buddha's qualities. As it is said in the Sūtrālamkāra [XI: 75]

[The bodhisattvas' investigations are proclaimed to (take place at the levels of) being]

unincorporated, incorporated, [lightly incorporated, and fully incorporated (in the truth

body)]

The ārya śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas are not the same because they do not have the

practice of cultivating (sbyong byed) the dharmakāya from dharma sphere of their own

continuums . [This is] because they delight in a mistaken dharmakāya. For example, as long

as one cognises the equivalence of saṃsara and nirvāṇa, and the elaborations of the existence

and non-existence of self are not pacified, the dharmadhātu of one's continuum is permanent

and unsuitable to be the self. If it is unsuitable, there is no way to posit the [tathāgata]

essence. Similarly, it is not at all the meaning of "the dharmadhātu of ordinary beings' minds

is inseparable from the qualities of a Buddha" because supramundane wisdom does not exist

in those beings.

The intention behind saying that the essence pervades all beings

The thought behind the literal meaning of [saying that] the essence pervades all

beings

In the sutras it is said that all beings possess the Buddha-essence. As for the literal meaning of this statement, it is that all beings have the essence of each buddha [?]

Facilitating knowledge of the non-literal meaning

Actual

First, the basis of [the Buddha's] thought: the thusness of the impure is intended. When dividing by way of conceptual isolates, there are three: the aspect which is suitable to be free of impurity, the naturally pure aspect, and the aspect that is suitable to engage the

potentialities of love and wisdom etc. These three are labelled as "dharmakāya eminations", "undifferentiated thusness" and "Buddha gotra".

41

For Sanskrit, see ratnagotra_tetral.pdf at http://www.fodian.net/world/

18

The purpose: for the sake of abandoning the five faults. The damage to the explicit [rendering]: All sentient beings are not bearers of the Buddha essence because their dharmadhātu is not inseparable from any of the qualities of the

dharmakāya such as the [the] powers etc. Alternatively, the subject [of the syllogism] is the four persons without the eye to [?] see the essence.

Establishing through scripture

The Uttaratantra śāstra explains the meaning of what is said in the sutras [i.e., the essence pervades all beings] is non-literal. There, the three, basis of the thought etc. [i.e., the necessity

and the damage to the explicit teaching] are clearly taught. How? (1) The basis of the thought is, in brief, the three purposes (don).

42 When they are further

divided, just the nine points illustrated by the nine examples [of the budda-essence in ordinary beings] is the basis if the thought. Then in the context of (dbang du byas nas)

explaining the intention of the teaching that all beings possess the essence, it [the śāstra] says:

Because the perfect buddha's kāya is emanating, Because reality is undifferentiated, And because they possess the gotra,

Beings always have the buddha nature. [I:28] The subject [of the syllogism] is all corporal beings. The existence of a reason for the statement that [all beings] possess the buddha-essence is what is established. "Because the kāya is emanating" etc. literally is the reason. Though that is the meaning to be understood,

[the śāstra] teaches that through the reason being suitable to arise in one's continuum [one

knows that] one is a possessor of the essence. Otherwise, if one asserts that one is literally the possessor of the essence, it does not go beyond being a contradictory, or indefinite or unestablished reason. Because if 'essence' is taught as an actual Buddha, 'because the gotra exists' is a contradictory [reason].

43

[If it is taught] as the suchness (chos nyid) of a buddha, the division of dharmakāya into three and the division of gotra into five would not be essences. Thus, [the reason] would be either contradictory or indefinite.

And it would be an indefinite reason if for the sake of making known the suchness of buddhahood, when setting [as a reason] the undifferentiated suchness, the unestablished would be [used] to establish [the reason]. Thus it would become an unestablished reason. (2) Also, as for explaining the necessity of teaching that it is as if all beings are not bearers of the Buddha essence, it says [in the Uttaratantra]

[He had taught in various places that every knowable thing is ever void,] like a cloud, a dream or an illusion. [Then why did the Buddha declare the essence of Buddhahood to be there in every sentient being?]

42

The goals of the three vehicles (?). 43

Because becoming a buddha means one no longer possesses the buddha-gotra.

19

The meaning is, having taught in the second turning that all phenomena are self-empty, in the final turning a Buddha essence that is not empty of its own nature pervades all beings is taught. Why?

As for the teaching that the intention of the second turning is other emptiness, it is said [in Uttaratantra]

It has been said [in the Scriptures] All kinds of phenomena, made by causes and conditions And known in the forms of Defilement, Action and Result,

Are, like clouds, etc., deprived of reality. || 158 || As for the the teaching of the necessity of the ten powers etc. are not empty of thoroughly establish phenomena, and the essence which is empty of adventitious imaginary stains pervades sentient beings, [the Uttaratantra says]

There are 5 defects [caused by the previous teaching]: The depressed mind, contempt

against those who are inferior, Clinging to things unreal, speaking ill of Truth, And besides, affection for one's self. [The teaching about Essence of the Buddha] has been taught In order that those who are possessed of these defects Might get rid of their defects. || 157 || Uttaratantra I:157 "The existence [of the element] is taught to relinquish these five faults: discouragement, disparagement of inferior beings, holding on to the inauthentic,

denigration of the authentic truth, and considering ourselves to be superior. (3) Third, explaining the damage to the explicit [teaching]: It is taught [in verses 84 to 93] from

For that reason, [the buddha-essence] is the dharmakāya, the Tathāgata…

up to

Therefore, [they are] similar to [the light, the rays] and the orb of the sun. This meaning is also taught in a sutra:

With regard to considerations about whether the explanation of the Element of beings and the dharmakāya etc. should be taken literally or not, since the ten powers are inseparable from the qualities [of a Buddha], they are not other than a fully enlightened Buddha.

Detailed explanation of the support

The meaning of being the foundation of the three vehicles

The teaching about the gotra from the point of view of logical reasons

Regarding what is taught by

20

Just as [we perceive the stages of realization] of the śrāvaka vehicle [and so forth, we similarly impute conventional names to the lineages in presenting the dharmadhātu as

the nature of a cause because it acts to realize the Āryan dharmas.] 44

The meaning is, although the dharma sphere (dharmadhātu) of the mind of those of the śrāvaka vehicle is, in general, the buddha gotra, there is a reason for temporarily designating it with the term, śrāvaka gotra. It is because it is said to be the cause for producing all the

qualities of a śrāvaka. Although it is accepted that all three vehicles take as their focal object the dharmadhātu of

their own mental continuum, there is no fault [that śrāvakas eliminate realise the selflessness

of phenomena or eliminate obscurations to omniscience]. The pole of luminosity and

awareness which is empty of apprehender and apprehended is called the dharmadhātu

(gzung ’dzin gnyis kyis stong pa’i gsal rig gi cha la chos kyi dbyings zhes bya). Furthermore,

there is a classification into two: the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended that is made

with respect to persons and the emptiness of apprehender and apprehended which is made

with respect to phenomena. Also, there is a distinction between the emptiness of the duality

of apprehender and apprehended which is made in dependence on external objects and which

is made in dependence on inner consciousness. Having thus made a threefold division, the

three gotra bearers take these respectively as their object and cultivate a path cognising

selflessness in accordance with respective focal object arises.

.

As it says in the Madhyāntavibhāga [I:15]

Because they are the cause for the arya's qualities, they are synonyms.45

And as it says in the Abhidharmasamuccaya,

Why is it called the sphere of reality? Because it is the cause of all the qualities (chos) of the śrāvakas, pratyekabuddhas and buddhas.

46

Thus, the teaching that even the identitylessness of persons is the dharmadhātu is a tenet of Yogācāras. The master Zangpo too has clearly asserted this very point. It is not necessary to accept that if the dharmadhātu is cognised the identitylessness of phenomena is also cognised. Even if it were necessary, since the sphere of reality is only taken as a focal object, there is no entailment that it [the identitylessness of phenomena] is realised.

44

'grel pa don gsal : ji ltar nyan thos kyi theg pa la sogs pa rtogs pa'i rim gyis dmigs pa de bzhin du/ 'phags pa'i

chos rtogs par bya ba'i phyir/ chos kyi dbyings rgyu'i ngo bor rnam par 'jog pa'i sgo nas rigs nyid du tha snyad

'dogs so/ / 45

"How should one understand the meaning of these synonyms? Because emptiness is not something else, it is

suchness and is, therefore, always present. Because it is unmistaken, it is perfectly genuine. It is, therefore, not

a basis for error. Because it is their cessation, it is the absence of marks and is free of them all. Because it is the

sphere that the noble ones engage through wakefulness, it is the ultimate, the object of sacred wakefulness.

And, because it is the cause of noble qualities, it is the basic field of phenomena. In other words, observing

emptiness is the source of all noble qualities. Respectively, these are the meanings of the synonyms." 46

Abhidharmasamuccaya §10B(2) AS_ETEXT_V1_ALL.PDF

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The way the divisions are tenable by way of examples

[AA I:38 states]: By virtue of the divisions of phenomena founded on it, [its divisions are expressed.]

This means that although the dharma sphere of the mind in all three vehicles are similar in being the buddha gotra, there is a reason for positing three temporary (gnas skabs) gotra bearers. It is because the names of the supported developmental gotra having been used to label the foundational natural gotra, there is a threefold classification of gotras and gotra

bearers. For example, although three containers are alike [in terms of being] honey containers, they are classified as three [kinds] by way of [their different] contained contents.

The meaning of being the foundation of the thirteen practices

How are there thirteen divisions when the dharmadhātu is taught as the foundation of practice? [Answer]: [It is] by way of the division of supported phenomena. In what manner are they supported [by the dharmadhātu ]?

Practice in this case is mainly posited in terms of (kyi cha nas ‘jog) the wisdom that realises the identitylessness of phenomena. Also, it is taught that those who cognise [identitylessness] make the dharmadhātu of their own [continuum] their object of mode of apprehension

because when [a person] meditates [on that object] those practices arise as the nature of the wisdom of the dharmadhātu. As for [this teaching] it is said:

[it] is the basis of dharmas that has been taught accordingly etc.47

There is an alternative way of explaining that teaching. Since all objects of knowledge exist

[song ba] with respect to knowers that depend on the dharmadhātu, there is an extremely great pervasion.

48

In short, the basis of the qualities to be accomplished, [their] foundation and [their] cause are synonymous. In addition, the practices that cognise the dharmadhātu are thirteen [in number].

The nature of the wisdom of the dharmadhātu is posited as production, just as the six levels of dhyana are posited as the mental support on the uncontaminated path. The wisdoms of the three vehicles too, having taken the dharma sphere as their focal object, there are no differences with respect to wisdom of the dharma sphere which is produced as its

nature. However, there is no fault of the unwanted consequence that all three realise the identitylessness of phenomena because what is meant by the realisation of the identitylessness of phenomena is posited as a realisation of the all-embracing dharmadhātu (khyab pa’i chos dbyings) while the two vehicles only take a tiny part of (nyi tshe ba’i) the dharmadhātu as their focal objects, the realisation is only of that much.

When the wisdoms of the three vehicles are born as the nature of the dharmadhātu, are they asserted to be the dharmadhātu? No, because while they are not separate substantially, by

47

ji skad bshad pa'i chos kyi gzhir gyur pa [source?] 48

Another way of saying the dharmadhātu pervades all objects of knowledge by way of being the support for

knowers of objects. [?]

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way of being conceptual isolates, it is necessary to separate foundation/supported and object/object possessor etc., as, for example, [the case of] svābhāvikakāya and dharmakāya.

[Concluding verse]

The classification of the gotras of the individual gotra-bearers and The tathāgatagarbha is just as [I have explained]; The nature of the natural gotra too Is unfolded in this way by the developmental gotra.

23

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