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Theses and Dissertations Thesis and Dissertation Collection

1991-12

Revolution and reaction in Europe and their effects

on the international system.

Waldhauser, Michael Gordo

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/27242

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey , California

THESIS

REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN EUROPE AND THEIREFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

by

Michael Gordon Waldhauser

December 1991

Thesis Advisor: Donald Abenheim

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REVOLUTION AND REACTION IN EUROPE AND THEIR EFFECTS ON THE INTERNATIONALSYSTEM

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16 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION m-u _ , •_,,„ ^^^^^r-^^A • „ . v, ^ „ 4. -u ^ „ ,• „ -, v-^. +. v, ~ r~ ~ ~ -r + v, ^The views expressed in this thesis are those of theauthor and do not reflect the official policy or position of theDppart.mpnh nf npfpn^o nr Mip V . S - nnvprnmpnt

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19 ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

This thesis examines two periods of major revolutionary

change in Europe - France in 1789 and Central Europe in 1848 -

to determine what forces emerged from the associated events to

undermine the stability of the existing international system.

Although both revolutionary periods were different, each

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Donald Abenheim

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[19] Continued:

produced the following destabilizing forces: heightened

nationalism; a decline in the internationalist perspective

among the ruling elites; instability among the ruling elites;

conflict in the center of Europe; heightened awareness and

importance of ideological differences; a breakdown in the

cohesiveness of the international system; and finally

diplomacy that was characterized by the pursuit of policies

that had vastly greater ends pursued with greatly expanded

means. Similar forces appear to be emerging in the aftermath

of the upheavals of 1989, and therefore the friction in the

international system will increase similarly to the past. In

effect, the tentative uniformities among destabilizing forces

after 1789 and 1848 will come into operation after 1989.

DD Form 1473. JUN 86 (Reverse) security classification of this page

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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Revolution and Reaction in Europe and Their Effects on the

International System

by

Michael Gordon Kaldhauser

Lieutenant, United' States Navy

B.A., University of Colorado, 1983

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFP MPS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December ]991

;-?''. U\ i _ i '/V

Thomas Bruneau, Chairman, Department of

National Security Affairs

111

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines two periods of major revolutionary

change in Europe - France in 1789 and Central Europe in 1848 -

to determine what forces emerged from the associated events to

undermine the stability of the existing international system.

Although both revolutionary periods were different, each

produced the following destabilizing forces: heightened

nationalism; a decline in the internationalist perspective

among the ruling elites; instability among the ruling elites;

conflict in the center of Europe; heightened awareness and

importance of ideological differences; a breakdown in the

cohesiveness of the international system; and finally

diplomacy that was characterized by the pursuit of policies

that had vastly greater ends pursued with greatly expanded

means. Similar forces appear to be emerging in the aftermath

of the upheavals of 1989, and therefore the friction in the

international system will increase similarly to the past. In

effect, the tentative uniformities among destabilizing forces

after 1789 and 1848 will come into operation after 1989.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I . INTRODUCTION 1

II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY...

4

A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER 5

P. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION 10

C. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION OF 1755 19

D. THE SEVEN YEARS WAR 22

E . SUMMARY 2 5

III. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM.. 36

A. THE INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION .. 36

E. THE UNDERMINING OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY 41

C. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

INTENSIFIES 50

D. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 58

E . SUMMARY 68

IV. EUROFE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS: A RETURN TO STABILITY ... 75

A. THE RESTORATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS. 75

B. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: A RETURN TO STABILITY ... 8

1

C . THE FUNCTIONING CONCERT 84

D. THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE SOLIDARITY IN THE EAST. 89

E. THE NEAR EAST HOLDS THE CONCERT TOGETHER 97

F . REVOLUTION RETURNS IN FRANCE 1 00

G. THE RETURN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION 104

H . SUMMARY 106

V. 1848: THE UNDERMINING OF THE CONCEPT OF EUROPE 113

A . THE BACKGROUND CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTIONS 114

E. THE OUTBREAK AND SPREAD OF REVOLUTION ACROSS

EUROPE 116

C. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY

AFTERMATH 123

D. THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION 125

E. SUMMARY 135

VI. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTFF THE REVOLUTIONS OF

19 89 143

A. FACTORS CREATING INSTABILITY AFTER

REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE 143

B. INSTABILITY IN THE POST 1989 INTERNATIONAL

SYSTEM 149

1. Gauging the Strength of Re-emerging

Nationalism 150

2. Gauging the Strength of Internationalist

Outlook 153

3. The Decline of Ideological Conf rontat ion . . . 1 57

4. Prospects for the Return of Nationalist

Mobilization 159

5. A Return to Continental Conflict 160

6. Instability of the Ruling Elite 167

7. The Breakdown of the International System.. 169

VII . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1 74

BIBLIOGRAPHY 179

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 184

vi

I. INTRODUCTION

To quote Michael Howard, "In 1989, while the nations of

Western Europe celebrated the bicentenary of the French

Revolution, the nations of Eastern Europe reenacted it."

The reference to these two events as analogous are a cause

of great concern, however, as the enthusiasm and joy

experienced by the French in 1789 was shortlived as the wars

that followed devestated the European continent. As

troubling as the outbreak of a series of analogous wars in

Eastern Europe may seem, there are other analogies that are

just as worrisome to both the newly formed democracies of

Eastern Europe and the Western democratic nations.

In 1848 conservative monarchies throughout Europe were

overthrown as revolutionary upheaval in France quickly

spread across Europe to Budapest, Vienna, Berlin, Milan and

Prague. These dynastic collapses created a huge power

vacuum throughout Europe, and left the new inexperienced

liberal leaders with the task of transforming abstract

political ideals into reality. The inability of the new

leaders to accomplish this task resulted in the resurgence

of conservative reactionaries, and led one leading English

historian to note that the revolution "...exhausted itself

without achieving concrete results: it left its imprint only

in the realm of ideas."

Although argument by analogy is dangerous and can often

be misleading, the events of 1789 and 1848 illustrate the

perils that revolutionary change poses to the international

system. The French Revolution destroyed the relative peace

and tranquility of the eighteenth century European order and

plunged the continent into an unprecedented period of

warfare. Similiarly, the revolutions of 1848 undermined the

stability on the European continent established by the

Congress of Vienna and ushered in a new and more dangerous

period as the European states became increasingly

nat ionali st icly oriented. But what factors and forces

emerged from these revolutions that created instability in

the international system? Perhaps more importantly, are

these factors and forces present following the revolutions

of 1989, and what does this indicate about the stability of

the evolving international system?

This thesis has two purposes. First, to determine the

factors and forces that emerged from the post revolutionary

periods of 1789 and 1848 that tended to create instability

in the international system. Second, to determine if these

same factors and forces are present following the

revolutions of 1989, and to assess their likely impact on

the stability of the international system.

"Michael Howard, "The Springtime of Nations," ForeignAffairs , Vol. 69 No. 1 (1990), 17.

Levis Namier, 1P^ P The Revolution of theIntel lectua 1

s

, (London: Oxford University Fress, 1946), 31

II. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The events that took place in Europe during the

eighteenth century have had a lasting impact on the

evolution of the international system. Although at the

beginning of the century the framework of European diplomacy

was well established, by the eve of the French Revolution

this framework had been vastly expanded to the east with the

emergence of the great powers of Prussia and Russia. The

emergence of Prussia and Russia resulted in the

establishment of a true multipolar balance of power system

which covered the entire continent, and because of the

competition between the European powers for colonies

overseas, the system could in a limited sense be described

as global. The emergence of this multipolar balance of

power system substantially diluted the bipolar ideological

struggle that had developed between the French continental

world and the British island world during the seventeenth

century, and resulted in the emergence of a number of

critical factors that helped to promote international

stability in the eighteenth century. The events that led to

the development of this stable system will now be examined

with the ultimate purpose to help understand if the events

of the early 1990s are tending toward stability or

instability in Europe.

A. THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALANCE OF POWER

The Treaties of Utrecht (April 1713), Rastatt (March

1714) and Baden (September 1714) brought an end to the War

of the Spanish Succession that had lasted from 1701 to 1714

and attempted to establish a balance of pover and an

equilibrium of forces in Western Europe. These treaties

ended the fighting and no major war developed until 1740

when conflict erupted over the Austrian succession. This

relatively quiet period was more the result of the events

following the negotiations of the treaties and the general

level of exhaustion experienced by the major powers from the

war, however, than the result of any diplomatic brilliance

in the treaties. Despite this fact, this series of treaties

played an important role in both the conduct of

international relations and in the formation of the

international system during the first half of the eighteenth

century

.

The peace treaties of 1713-14 reestablished the

legitimacy of the independent dynastic state recognized by

the Treaty of Westphalia. The dreams of France's Louis XIV

to be chosen Holy Roman Emperor, unite the Kingdoms of Spain

and France, and establish an era of French preponderance on

the continent had been shattered. The peace treaties

successfully divided the territories of the Spanish

Habsburgs and put an end to any serious effort to unify all

of Europe under a single authority. Thus, despite the fact

that the treaties were largely overcome by events, these

peace treaties played an important role in the development

of the international system because they reinforced both the

legitimacy of the dynastic rulers established by the Treaty

of Westphalia and the legitimacy of the concept of

independent dynastic states. The legitimacy of these

concepts would eventually lead to the development of a

multipolar system in Europe, although in the immediate

aftermath of the var the primary concern was to restrain

future universal pretensions of France.

Following the Treaty of Utrecht it appeared that efforts

to restrain France would result in the European powers

reforming alliances along traditional bipolar lines with

England, Austria and the Dutch opposing France, which was

sometimes supported by Spain and some of the German states.

This tendency was reinforced when soon after the conclusion

of the treaty, Louis XIV seemed determined to evade the

terms which stipulated the demolition of Dunkirk as a naval

base. The fear of renewed French aggression allowed

England, Austria and the Netherlands to set aside

differences that had emerged between them during the war and

unite to restrain France.

To restrict France the allies established a series of

barriers along the frontiers of France by setting up neutral

buffer states in Germany, Italy and the Low Countries. The

Barrier Treaty was concluded in November 1715, and although

these small neutral states vere not strong enough to act

independently, with allied support, particularly from

England, these small states could be used to check any

renewed French aggression. Additionally, England also

envisioned using these states as a counterbalance to any

expansionist desires of the Austrian emperor.

Although it appeared that vith the reformation of

European alliances along traditional lines that stability

would be brought to Europe, even before the completion of

the Barrier Treaty uncertainty began to arise about the

succession of the rulers in England and France. Since

disputes over the legitimacy of any major ruler had proved

to be destabilizing to the European balance of power, the

precarious positions of both the rulers of England and

France would have to be solidified before stability could be

achieved

.

Internal instability was particularly troublesome in

France following the death of Louis XIV in September 1715,

which left Louis XV, a sick and fragile boy of five, the

ascendant to the throne. Had Louis XV died, the only

remaining legitimate male descendents of Louis XIV would

have been the Spanish Bourbons, but they were barred from

othe French throne by the Treaty of Utrecht, which

established the Duke of Orleans as the legal heir to Louis

XV. Since the Duke of Orleans and the Spanish Bourbon King

Philip V were bitter personal enemies, the death of Louis XV

would have most likely resulted in a war over the French

successi on

.

The Du^e of Orleans, who held the title of regent, had

consolidated his position in France, although his strength

was constantly challenged by many factions of the "old

guard" of the French court who favored Philip V and desired

a closer friendship between France and Spain. To counter

the possibility of Spanish support for the old guard

resulting in a war of succession, the regent hoped to entice

another power to give him friendly support. The unlikely

recipient of French diplomatic efforts was England, where

peculiar domestic conditions led France to believe that

?England would be willing to form an alliance.'

In England, King George I, who had previously held the

position of the Elector of Hanover prior to succeeding Queen

Anne on 1 August 1714, faced an internal challenge from the

Jacobite rising of 1715. The rising attempted to restore

the catholic Stuart, James III, to the English throne. The

rising collapsed in early 1716, mainly because James III was

a true catholic and refused to change his religion to claim

the throne. Despite this failure, James III remained a

serious threat to George I, and the possibility remained

that James III might one day change his faith and thereby

increase his prospects for claiming the throne. As a result

of this constant menace, George I was continuously

surrounded by an insecure domestic situation.

Although it is doubtful that George's internal situation

would have resulted in England entering into an alliance

with France, when combined with the events which were taking

place in Northern Europe as the second Northern War raged on

in the fall of 1716, the English became more inclined to

reach an agreement with France. Feter the Great of Russia

had quartered his troops in Mecklenburg and George I

perceived this as a threat to the interests of Hannover.

George I wanted to remove this threat as well as gain

Swedish territory on the southern coast of the Baltic, and

as a result George I was ready to reach an agreement with

France because of France's strong traditional influence in

Sweden. The alliance between England and France was signed

in October of 1716, and was later expanded to include the

Dutch on A January 1717. 6

The Anglo-French alliance proved to be a stabilizing

factor in early eighteenth century Europe. The two powers

were able to bring an end to Spain's expansionist desires in

Italy during the war of 1719, and French diplomacy was

instrumental in ending the Northern War with the Treaty of

Nystadt in September 1721. Although Russia emerged as the

true victor from the Northern War, and Russia's emergence as

a great power is most often attributed to the successes of

Peter the Great, Russia's influence in international affairs

was limited during the next two decades by the series of

short reigns (four successions in sixteen years) of its

rulers. The absence of Russian influence during this period

allowed the Anglo-French alliance to preserve the peace

relatively effectively until the mid 1730s, when a

combination of events significantly altered the continental

situation and resulted in the true emergence of Russia and

Prussia as great powers. The result of these events would

be to establish a true multipolar system which covered the

entire European continent.

B. THE WAR OF THE AUSTRIAN SUCCESSION

Beginning in the early 1730s frictions developed among

the colonial powers of England, Spain and France regarding

trade. These frictions were the result of an inept Spanish

imperial policy which allowed Spanish colonies to trade only

with Spain. Because Spain and France had already

established strong trading ties between them, this policy

greatly benefited France as Spain was often times just an

intermediate stop for French goods on their way to the

colonies. As a result, prior to the outbreak of the war

between England and Spain in October 1739, English trade had

remained almost stationary while French trade rapidly

increased, particularly in the Spanish markets. The large

demand for goods of the Spanish colonies, however, was much

greater than Spain, despite being aided by France, could

supply. These shortages were made up through illicit trade,

particularly with the English who had become more

10

industrialized and vere eager to exploit new markets.

Although the Spanish government vas moderately tolerant of

English illicit trade, the Spanish colonial governors and

merchants became particularly alarmed as their monopoly

trade rights vere circumvented. As a result the Spanish

governors vere able to induce their colonists to fit out

coastguard ships in an attempt to stop the illicit trade.

Although these coastguard ships vere not very effective, in

1737 they successfully seized about a dozen English

v • 8ships

.

The tensions caused by the seizure of the ships in the

West Indies vere intensified by the charges of barbarous

conduct on the part of both the Spanish colonial coastguards

personnel and the English smugglers. The Spanish government

sought to avoid conflict with England, however, and adopted

a conciliatory attitude when England brought its complaints

to the Spanish government over the seizure of its ships.

According to the Spanish government, "...even if some

suspicion of illicit trade remains, the prevention of

illicit trade should never make Spanish officials lose sight

of the need of good harmony vith the other povers of

qEurope .

"

The Spanish attempt to smooth over the situation,

hovever, vas not successful. British public opinion had

become increasingly anti-Spanish, and visions of conquest of

vealthy Spanish colonies resulted in many Englishmen

11

becoming anxious for war with Spain. Disputes over the

boundaries of British Georgia and Spanish Florida only

served to exacerbate the situation. Finally, the weakness

and division within the Eritish cabinet made it almost

impossible for the government to combat popular sentiment,

and as a result Spain and England were at war in October

1739.

The conflict that developed between England and Spain

undermined the Anglo-French alliance that had maintained the

balance in Europe. Although the French had few smugglers

involved in the Kest Indies, over one-half of all the

commodities carried by the Spanish galleons to the Spanish

colonies came from France. France therefore had a powerful

motive to support Spain to ensure the future strength of its

export commodities. In August 1740 France sent two battle

squadrons to the West Indies to support the Spanish.

Before the French could join the war against England,

however, the death of the Emperor Charles VI and the

instabilities that emerged in Austria and Central Europe

forced France to recall its squadrons in order to deal with

these continental complications.

The war that developed over the Austrian succession was

in some ways surprising. Although Sardinia and Spain

desired the opportunity to obtain additional possessions in

northern Italy at Austria's expense, the positions that the

great powers found themselves in had a moderating influence

12

on the continental situation. England and Spain vere at

war, and the French vere on the verge of joining the clash

against England, and therefore none of these parties desired

any continental complications. Although Bavaria refused to

recognize Maria Theresa as the Austrian heir, Bavaria did

not pose a threat due to its general lack of resources.

Finally, Russia was faced with internal difficulties, and

with tensions rising with Sweden, Russia did not overly

concern itself with affairs in Central Europe.

The surprising assault upon Austria came from Prussia.

The young Frederick II clearly realized the geopolitical

importance of the Habsburg province of Silesia for Prussian

power. The annexation of Silesia would not only provide an

immensly wealthy province, but also weaken the Elector of

Saxony by placing Prussian territory between his German

lands and Polish kingdom. Furthermore, Frederick's

masterful assessment of the strategic situation that had

developed in central Europe provided the perfect framework

for Prussia to aggrandize itself at Austria's expense. In

December 1740, Prussia invaded Silesia, starting a conflict

that would soon expand to cover the entire continent.

French policy in the spring of 1741 was the key to

events on the continent. Although Cardinal Fleury desired

to maintain French neutrality in order to be able to

concentrate French efforts on the struggle with England, he

was unable to restrain the nobility that possessed a long

13

ant i -Kabsburg tradition. The traditional ant i -Habsburg

sentiments were intensified in March 1741 when the French

envoy Marshal de Belleises, who was related by marriage to

Charles Albert of Bavaria, traveled to the German states to

obtain support for Charles Albert's candidacy for the vacant

imperial title. Belleisle converted this mission into one

of constructing an ant i-Habsburg coalition in Germany

designed to dismember the Habsburg states, a policy strongly

supported by the French nobility.

French ambitions agains 4- Austria alarmed England's

George II about the safety of his German Electorate of

Hanover. In July George II came to an understanding with

his enemies, and without consulting his ministers in London,

signed an agreement guaranteeing Hanover's neutrality. With

England's neutrality secured, French and Bavarian troops

invaded Bohemia in October. The neutrality of Hanover vas

very unpopular in England, vhich vas seen as allowing

England's traditional enemy France to make another attempt

at continental hegemony. This contributed to the fall of

the ministry of Walpole, and resulted in England's foreign

policy being taken over by Lord Carteret, the new secretary

of the Northern Department

.

Carteret successfully pressured Maria Theresa to sign

the Preliminaries of Breslau in June 1742 to make peace with

Prussia in order to be able to concentrate English and

Austrian efforts against France. This agreement ended the

14

Austro-Frussian var and conceded Silesia to Frederick. In

return for Austria's peace settlement with Prussia, the

English offered Maria Theresa additional subsidies and

troops to counter the French threat. Although Austria

resented English demands regarding the concession of Silesia

to Prussia, it was the events that took place in Italy that

laid the foundations for the diplomatic revolution that

would occur following the end of the war.

The struggle that developed in Italy was largely between

the Austrians and the Spanish. Spain hoped to gain the

Austrian domain of Milanese and Tuscany, however, any

struggle between these two in Italy could be substantially

influenced by Charles Emmanuel, king of Sardinia-Piedmont.

Sardinia, which controlled the Alpine passes, could take

advantage of these mountains to oppose any invasion of

Italy. As a result, both Spain and Austria attempted to

win Charles Emmanuel's support by promising territorial

concessions. Charles Emmanuel realized, however, that

Spanish concessions were contingent upon Spanish success,

while Austria already possessed territories that could be

exchanged for Sardinian support. Maria Theresa realized

this as well, and was therefore only willing to offer

minimal concessions to ensure his support. Maria Theresa's

position was undermined, however, by Carteret, who insisted

that substantial territorial concessions be granted

immediately in exchange for Sardinia's support. Once again

15

Carteret prevailed and coerced Maria Theresa to conclude the

Treaty of Worms on 13 September 1743. The treaty

surrendered a large portion of Lombardy and a section of

Piacenza in exchange for a Sardinian army of 45,000 troops

and vague English promises of territorial compensations once

1 5victory in Italy had been achieved. The concessions

forced upon Austria were deeply resented, and only the

threat to Austrian territory by the French prevented the

Anglo-Austrian coalition from falling apart.

While the Treaty of Worms served to create a rift in the

Anglo-Austrian alliance, it served to unite Austria's

antagonists. The treaty provoked France to secure a Spanish

alliance in October 17^3 with the Treaty of

Fontainbleau , and in March 1744 the French declared war

on England and Hanover, followed in May by a declaration of

war on Austria and the invasion of the Netherlands.

Additionally, because the Treaty of Worms guaranteed the

enforcement of the Pragmatic Sanction but made no mention of

the surrender of Silesia to Prussia, Frederick signed a nev;

treaty with France in June 1744, followed shortly thereafter

i 7by the Prussian invasion of Bohemia.

The offensive against Austria failed however when

cooperation between the French, Spanish and Prussians broke

down over a series of disputes regarding the failure of the

Franco-Spanish naval operations off of Toulon in February

1744. Similarly, the failure of the French army to engage

16

the retreating Austrian army in Alsace during the Austrian

invasion of France in 17^4 was also a source of conflict.

The retreat of the Austrian army intact resulted in

Frederick's army in Eohemia facing the main Austrian army,

which forced Frederick's retreat back to Silesia by the end

of 1744. Austrian attempts to regain Silesia were

defeated by Frederick's masterful military victories at

Hohenf r iedberg and Soor , and the Frussian victory at

Kesseldorf, placing Frederick in control of Saxony.

The combination of Frederick's victory in Saxony,

threats of withdrawal of British subsidies if the war with

Prussia was not concluded, and the rejection of Austrian

peace proposals to France resulted in the Treaty of Dresden

Of)which was signed in December 1745. The Treaty of

Dresden ended the second Austro-Prussian conflict and firmly

established Prussia's control over Silesia Although the

war would continue for another three years with fighting in

Italy and the Netherlands between England, Austria and the

United Provinces against the French and Spanish, the

conflict in Germany was over.

The fighting in Italy dissipated quickly as cooperation

between France and Spain and between Austria and Sardinia

deteriorated. In the Netherlands, French victories at

Lauffeldt and the capture of the fortress Bergen-op-Zoom

raised the chances for French success. However, the

combination of French war weariness and the hiring of

17

Russian troops by Austria, which had nov become possible due

to the settlement of the Swedish-Russian conflict, resulted

in the opening of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle in early

1748.

With the exception of Prussia's annexation of Silesia,

the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle concluded in October 1748

returned Europe to the status quo ante bellum. Any

territorial gains achieved by one of the great powers was

generally offset by reciprocal compensations elsewhere.

Although geographically Europe had only been marginally

altered, the War of the Austrian Succession had a

significant impact on the development of the international

system and the balance of power on the European continent

Russia, which had defeated Sweden, conquered Finland, and

maintained a protectorate over Poland; and Prussia, which

had gained the geographically important and wealthy province

of Silesia, had emerged as true great powers. Austria,

though stung by its lose of Silesia to Prussia was still

perhaps the strongest power in Central Europe. Spain's

strength and prestige continued to decline, and England and

France had "...gained nothing but the experience of each

other's strength and power." The multipolar system

represented by these five powers was thus well balanced as

all the powers possessed relatively equal strength.

Maintaining the balance of this international system

dominated European diplomacy until the end of World War I.

18

C. THE DIPLOMATIC REVOLUTION OF 1755

The antagonisms that developed between the alliances

during the War of the Austrian Succession, coupled with the

emergence of Prussian and Russia as great powers, and the

continued antagonisms that existed between France and

England and between Prussia and Austria resulted in a

multipolar system that was in a state of flux. England

sought to concentrate its efforts against the colonial

challenge of France while remaining detached from

continental entanglements, although the threat to Hanover

from Prussia could not be overlooked. Austria desired to

regain the territory it lost to Prussia, but realized that

English support for Austria's ambitions was negligible.

Prussia was fearful of attack from both Austria and Russia,

and the French difficulties in countering the English naval

threat made Frederick question the likelihood of French

support against attempts to destroy Prussia

.

The increased threat of war that developed between

England and France in late 1754 provided the event that

allowed a re-alignment of traditional European alliances.

England's attempts to secure Austria's support for the

defense of Hanover were not well received. Under the

guidance of Chancellor Kaunitz, Austria stated that it would

only provide protection of Hanover if England agreed to

support an Austro-Russian offensive plan for the destruction

of Prussia. Austria had no intention of subordinating

19

its goal of the destruction of Prussia to England's

continental interests. The lack of Austrian support

resulted in England signing the Convention of St. Petersberg

with Russia in September 1755. In exchange for 500,000

pounds sterling annually, Russia would provide 55,000 troops

quartered in Livonia to secure the safety of Hanover.

Although England's foreign minister Newcastle felt that the

agreement with Pussia would prevent England from becoming

involved in a continental conflict, the Convention of St.

Petersberg upset the traditional continental system and set

off a profound realignment.

Frederick II of Prussia, faced with the possibility of a

concerted onslaught from England, Austria and Pussia, sought

to achieve the insulation of Germany from the growing

Anglo-French conflict. In January 1756 Prussia and England

concluded the Convention of Westminster in which both sides

pledged not to "...attack, or invade, directly or

indirectly, the territories of the other,..." and

additionally, both sides affirmed to "...prevent their

respective allies from undertaking against the said

teritories in any matter whatever."

The Anglo-Prussian alliance produced a severe diplomatic

backlash in both France and Russia. France was outraged

that Frederick had negotiated with his longtime enemy and

did not even bother to consult France beforehand. Russia

felt England had betrayed the Convention of St. Petersberg

20

which was directed against Prussia. The benefactor of this

backlash vas Austria.

On 1 May 1756 France and Austria signed the First Treaty

of Versailles. The treaty bound both parties to provide

24,000 men in the event that either one of the parties

should be attacked. Although the small number of men

and the defensive nature of the treaty make it relatively

insignificant militarily, its most dramatic impact was the

change that it represented in international relations. The

Francc-Austro alliance reversed the historic antagonisms

that had existed between Austria and France a. -" demonstrates

the subordination of ideological and dynastic differences to

the maintenance of the international system and the balance

of power

.

The Franco-Austro alliance, coupled with the

Anglo-Prussian alliance resulted in Russia seeking closer

ties with Austria and France. Russia sought to conclude an

alliance with Austria against Prussia, although it was not

until after the start of the Seven Years War that Russia

acceded to the First Treaty of Versailles at the end of

1756.

Although war between the imperial powers of France and

England began in May 1756, the expansion of the war to the

European continent was the result of the actions of

Frederick II. Frederick, faced with the possibility of

attack from Austria, Russia, Saxony, and France, decided

21

that fighting a preemptive war was Prussia's best chance for

survival. On 29 August 1756 Frederick launched the invasion

of Saxony. Thus, England's diplomatic attempts to pacify

the continent had instead precipitated a diplomatic

revolution which now resulted in the most desperate struggle

on the continent in the eighteenth century.

D. THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

The Seven Years Kar was an epic struggle with wide

fluctuations of fortune. Although Frederick gained an

? 5initial success ever Saxony at Piena on 16 October 1756,

once Austria, Russia and France mobilized opposition,

Prussia's existence was in jeopardy. Frederick suffered

defeats at Kolin by the Austrian army on 18 June 1757, and

only Austria's inability to pursue the routed Prussian army

saved Frederick from complete destruction. The Russians

defeated the Prussian army under Marshal Lehwaldt at

Gross-Jaegersdorf on 30 August 1757, threatening Frederick

with the loss of East Prussia. Additionally, the Swedes,

who had joined the anti-Prussian coalition in March invaded

Pomerania in September. A final devastating blow fell to

Prussia when the Duke of Cumberland and his Hanoverian army

signed the Convention of Kloster-Seven with the French on 8

September as Cumberland's army was trapped in between the

North Sea and the Elbe river.

Faced with the destruction of Prussia, Frederick then

22

engineered two masterful victories that assured the future

existence of Prussia and solidified his reputation as a

military leader of exceptional abilities. At Rossbach in

November, Frederick defeated the Franco-Imperial army

despite being outnumbered by two to one. One month later

Frederick crushed the Austrians in a brilliant triumph at

Leuthen, thereby securing Prussia's hold on Silesia.

Although Frederick had now regained, and indeed

strengthened Prussia's prestige, the losses suffered by the

Prussian army during these campaigns seriously weakened the

long term prospects for Prussia's survival. Fortunately,

the coalition against Frederick suffered a series of

internal crises that dissolved the alliance before Prussia

collapsed

.

In March 1760 France signed the Third Treaty of

Versailles, cutting French subsidies to Austria and reducing

military support to 100,000 troops for use in Germany.

This reduction was most likely the result of the combination

of the low level of compensation offered by the Austrian's

for the French services and the need for France to

concentrate its efforts against England.

More importantly, on 5 January 1762 Elizabeth of Russia

died. Elizabeth had been the driving force in the

anti-Prussian coalition since 1759, and her replacement,

Peter III, who was an ardent admirer of Frederick ordered

an immediate armistice. In May Russia and Prussia signed a

2 3

peace agreement, leaving Austria alone to attempt to defeat

Prussia and recapture Silesia.

The collapse of the anti-Frussian alliance resulted in

successful peace negotiations between Prussia and Austria.

Additionally, the Anglo-French conflict was resolved in a

separate treaty. The dual nature of the peace treaties was

a direct reflection of the dual nature of the war - one

which pitted the imperial power of England against France,

and the other the struggle between Prussia and Austria over

Silesia and the domination over Germany.

The Seven Years Kar ended with few changes to the

territorial division of Europe, although it had important

long term effects on the conduct of the great powers.

Frederick's military capabilities had ensured Prussia's

existence as a great power, but only at a tremendous cost.

Prussia was now completely isolated in Europe - Austria and

Saxony were bitter enemies and the French only slightly less

so. Only an alliance with Russia was possible and this only

extended as far as their mutual interests.

France, despite remaining the strongest power in terms

of population and resources, had suffered a serious blow to

its military reputation. England had secured naval

supremacy over France, and Prussia's military prowess was

now more highly regarded than that of France. Additionally,

France's traditional hostility to Austria would eventually

reemerge as the result of the failure of the Franco-Austro

24

alliance. France's defeat in the Seven Years War also

produced a series of domestic controversies which weakened

the French monarchy, thereby laying the groundwork for the

events that would rock the continent in 1789.

Although England emerged as the potential greatest

victor of the war. English diplomats failed to demand

adequate compensation from the French during the peace

negotiations, and in a large part they " ..undid the

overwhelming victory of Great Eritain by adroitly

alternating resolution with timely concession." The

concessions granted by England ensured that France would

eventually regain its greatness, and then undoubtedly seek

revenge

.

The defeat of France coupled with the traditional

English desire to avoid continental entanglements resulted

in the balance of power shifting to the east, where Prussia,

Russia and Austria dominated the affairs of the continent,

particularly in Poland and Turkey.

E. SUMMARY

After looking at the history of European relations in

the eighteenth century, on the surface it would appear that

a state of international anarchy existed. This perception

is superficial, however, when the diplomatic situation is

looked at from a broader perspective. Although the European

continent was involved in three major wars, with the

25

exception of the Prussian conquest and annexation of

Silesia, the geographic division of Europe on the eve of the

French Revolution was very similar to that established by

the Treaty of Utrecht in April of 1713. Indeed, when

compared with previous epic struggles such as the wars of

religion and the national wars that later developed in the

nineteenth century, eighteenth century European relations

were relatively mild and stable. But what factors

contributed to the stability of the eighteenth century

international system and prevented the numerous conflicts

that developed in Europe from expanding into the large scale

conflicts of annihilation like the wars of the religion or

the clashes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries?

Although there are numerous and complex forces involved,

there appears to be several key factors, either through

their presence or absence, that produced the stability of

the eighteenth century international system. The first

significant factor was the relative stability of the ruling

elites of the European dynastic states. This stability was

the result of the peace treaties of Utrecht, Rastatt and

Baden which re-established the legitimacy of the dynastic

rulers. Despite the fact that disagreements existed over

the rightful descendants to the throne in France, England

and Austria, the fundamental principles underlying the

dynastic order were never seriously challenged. Not only

did this situation allow for a commonality of outlook

26

amongst the ruling elites, it also produced a highly

structured domestic order that helped to prevent videspread

domestic discontent. The combination of a common

fundamental belief in the correctness and legitimacy of the

dynastic principles, and the ordered structure of eighteenth

century society contributed significantly to the stability

of the international system.

The second factor was the absence of nationalism,

particularly as it affected the armed forces and the conduct

of international diplomacy. The lack of nationalism had a

profound influence on the military forces of the period.

The lack of a strong allegiance between subjects and kings

severely restricted the ability of monarchs to raise tax

revenues and personnel to support an army. As a result,

armies tended to be comprised of an officer corps of

nobility, who fought mainly for honor, glory or ambition,

and common soldiers, who fought for a living and could

therefore be considered almost as mercenaries.

Additionally, the lack of strong nationalist feelings

resulted in many armed forces being comprised of foreign

soldiers. The combination of the low quality state recruits

with little nationalist sentiments, and the use of foreign

troops who could never be completely trusted, severely

restricted the mobility of eighteenth century armed forces.

Finally, because these "professional" armies tended to be

expensive to maintain, the European monarchs tended to be

27

conservative in their use and employment, another moderating

5 Rinfluence in eighteenth century relations. The

financial burden that large armies placed on the dynastic

state was reflected in the series of treaties between allies

during the eighteenth century, which often times called for

the granting of subsidies as often as it called for troop

assistance

.

The lack of nationalist sentiment amongst the personnel

of the armed forces also had significant implications for

their employment on the battlefield. As Professor Dorn

notes: "The greater numerical strength of armies, together

with the means of recruiting them, had introduced into the

ranks unreliable elements which could be kept with the

colors only by the most rigorous discipline and supervision.

To have permitted these armies to forage freely over the

countryside would have encouraged wholesale desertion."

As a result, battles tended to be systematic in nature, with

troops arranged in specified formations, and wars being

essentially fought through maneuver and position.

Additionally, since these armies were supplied through state

magazines, even if a battle had been won it was difficult to

pursue an army in retreat for fear of overextending supply

lines and thereby forcing increased desertions.

The absence of nationalism also affected the composition

of the diplomatic services of the period. Although

eighteenth century diplomatic services were not as

28

internationalist as the armies of the period, many countries

used foreign diplomats to fill such posts as resident,

consul or secretary; and even higher positions if no

appropriate native personnel were available. Further

reinforcing the internationalist nature of diplomacy was the

adoption of both the French diplomatic system and the French

language as the standardized means of conducting

international relations. As M. S. Anderson observed:

"Nearly all great treaties of the century after that of

Utrecht were drawn up in French, though in each case with a

saving clause providing that this was not to be taken as a

precedent. Such was its prestige and attractive power that

by the second half of this period it was being used on a

considerable scale in many countries for correspondence

between diplomats and their governments." The

homogeneous nature of the diplomatic services of the

eighteenth century served to moderate conflicts and increase

international stability.

A third factor contributing to international stabilty

was the lack of widely divergent ideological views.

Although it is true that sometimes substantial differences

existed between the political, legal and commercial systems,

as well as between cultural and philosophical traditions

between the great powers, these differences were not so

divergent so as to prevent cooperation when critical issues

were at stake. The rapprochement between England and France

29

following the War of the Spanish Succession and the

diplomatic revolution that preceded the Seven Years War

illustrates the flexibility that existed during this period.

The religious conflicts of the past vere no longer as

important, and Liberalism had yet to make a significant

impact on society.

The lack of ideological division reinforced the

internationalism of the period by contributing to the

feeling that Europe vas forming into a federation.

Additionally, the relative ideological homogeneity of the

period helped to ensure that the European powers did not

intervene in the domestic affcirs of the other powers,

reinforcing the stability of the ruling elites. Although

the great powers often sought territorial conquest and

aggrandizement, this was not perceived to be the extension

of a revolutionary domestic situation, but rather the result

of a common outlook amongst the powers, making warfare "...a

function if not an actual necessity, of the structure of

European society.

"

The absence of modern nationalism and the lack of widely

divergent ideological views contributed to a fourth factor,

which was the general internationalist perspective of the

ruling elites, and to a lesser extent, the peoples of

eighteenth century Europe. The subjects of the ruling

monarchs felt no particular allegiance to their king,

allowing an extensive degree of flexibility amongst the

30

rulers. England accepted the Elector of Hanover as King,

Bourbons sat on the thrones of both France and Spain, and

dukes and grand dukes moved regularly between different

dynastic states. The ability of rulers to move between

states helped to contribute to the internationalist

perspective that pervaded European relations and served to

restrain the antagonisms that developed between states.

Additionally, because the powers did not feel that it

was necessary or proper to intervene in the domestic affairs

of another power, when faced with the threat of one power

attempting to establish continental hegemony, the remaining

powers would resort to a series of alliances to thwart the

aggressor. This outlook, which was commonly shared among

the ruling elites of Europe, helped to ensure the relatively

smooth functioning of the balance of power system without

extensive oversight and maintenance of the system.

A fifth factor that helped limit conflict was the fact

that the European powers were able to expand their empires

through colonization. This served as an important outlet,

particularly for France, England and Spain as these

countries were able to direct their expansionist desires

away from the center of the European continent. Although it

is true that colonial conflicts and cooperation played an

important role in the overall quality of the relationship

between the powers, colonial conflicts did not represent the

threat of engulfing the entire European continent in war.

31

Conflicts that developed in the center of Europe, however,

had a tendency to escalate horizontally very rapidly as the

great powers became concerned over maintaining the balance

of power on the European continent. Although colonial

conflicts certainly added stress to continental problems,

the major conflicts of the eighteenth century began when

conflicts erupted in the center of the continent. Because

the colonial powers were more concerned with expanding their

empires, these countries supported diplomatic initiatives

designed to maintain the balance so as to avoid continental

entanglements, although the inability to restrain Frederick

of Prussia produced a continent consumed by war. Despite

the fact that the War of the Austrian Succession and the

Seven Years War were devastating conflicts for Europe, they

were relatively mild when compared with past and future

conflicts, and a portion of this mild nature can be

attributed to the fact that the European system was

expanding and pushing conflicts away from the center of

Europe

.

Finally, the end product of all these factors resulted

in the pursuit of limited military and diplomatic

initiatives with limited means to accomplish them. The

absence of nationalism and the relative ideological

homogeneity of the period placed constraints on both the

resources available to the dynastic rulers as well as

limiting the rational under which these limited resources

32

could be usee. Additionally, the general internationalist

perspective and stability of the elites resulted in fev of

the rulers seeking to fight preemptive vars to preserve

their rule, with Frederick of Prussia being the notable

exception. Similarly, the desire for colonial expansion

resulted in several of the great powers seeking to preserve

the status quo on the European continent. The combination

of these factors resulted in a system that could be

characterized as one of limited means and limited ends.

The moderate and limited conduct of international

diplomacy in the eighteenth century vas radically altered by

the events in France in 1789. The French Revolution

resulted in the establishment of a French nation-state

rather than the traditional dynastic-state. Additionally,

the political and social reforms introduced in France, and

the response of the remaining powers to those reforms,

produced a fundamentally different ideological perspective

amongst the ruling elites of France. However, to assert

that the cause of international instability following the

French Revolution was the sole responsibility of the forces

of nationalism and ideology is incorrect. To determine what

factors created instability in the international system

following the French Revolution, this period must now be

more closely examined.

33

Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and International System ,

(New York: New York University Press,- 1970), 4.

2 Fenfield Roberts, The Quest for Security 1715-1740 ,

vol. 8 of The Rise of Modern Europe , ed . William L. Lancer(New York: Harper & Erothers Publishers, 1947), 5.

"J. 0. Lmosay, "International Relations," The OldRegime 1713-63 , ed . J. 0. Lindsay, vol. 7 of The NewCambridge Modern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1957), 194.

4 Roberts, The Quest for Security 1715-1740 , 8.

5 .Matthew Smith Anderson, Europe in the EighteenthCentury 1713-1783 , (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston,Inc. , 1961 ) , 177

.

6Lindsay, "International Relations," 194-5.

7 ...Walter L. Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 ,

vol. 9 of The Rise of Modern Europe , ed . William L. Langer(New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1940), 124.

oLindsay, "International Relations," 207.

9 Ibid., 208.

]0 Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 130.

n ibid., 134.

1 Mark A. Thomson, "The War of the AustrianSuccession," The Old Regime 1713-63 , ed . J. 0. Lindsay, vol.7 of The New Cambridge Modern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 418.

Leonard W. Cowie, Documents & Descriptions inEuropean History 1714/1815 , (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1967), 55-6.

Thomson, "The War of the Austrian Succession,"424-5.

15 Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 155.

16 Ibid.

1 Thomson, "The War of the Austrian Succession," 431.

18 Ibid., 432.

34

19Dorn , Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 158

20Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Centurv1713-1783, 207.

21 Ibid., 244.

22-Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 294.

23

1714/1815 , 62.

24

Cowie, Documents & Descriptions in European History815 , 62.

Ibid . , 65

.

2 C>^ Eric Fobson, "The Seven Years War," The Old Regime

171 3-63 , ed . J. 0. Lindsay, vol. 7 of The New CambridgeModern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1957), 469.

Anderson, Europe in the Eighteenth Century1713-1783, 212.

27 Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 37;

2 PR. P. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulov:

From Dynastic to National War," Makers of Modern Strategyfrom Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age , ed . Peter Faret(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), 91-5.

29 Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 82.

30 .Anderson , Europe in the Eighteenth Century1713-1783 , 155.

3 1 Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force andStatecraft Diplomatic Problems of Our Time , (New York:Oxford University Press, 1983), 17.

32 Dorn, Competition for Empire 1740-1763 , 5.

35

III. THE FRENCH REVOLUTION AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The French Revolution had a profound impact on the

international system. The balance of power system that had

evolved during the eighteenth century vas destroyed, and the

moderate internationalist perspective of the ancien regime

vas replaced by an increasingly nationalist outlook.

However, to assert that the emergence of both nationalism

and a French nation that had widely divergent ideological

views from the rest of Europe resulted in the destruction of

the international system is incomplete at best. Although

these factors played an important role, it was only after a

combination of other factors had emerged that these forces

were able to destroy the international system.

A. THE INITIAL REACTIONS TO THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

The early stages of the French Revolution posed little

threat to the international system. The balance of power

system of the eighteenth century continued to function, and

the antagonisms that existed were still the result of deep

seated traditional rivalries and jealousies rather than

ideological frictions. In England political reformers and

those excluded from political life by the Test Act welcomed

the principles of the Revolution, but to most Europeans the

Revolution appeared as an interesting spectacle. Although

36

English public opinion gradually formed into tvo groups,

with both an ant i -revolutionary group and one that supported

it, throughout the period of the monarchical experiment in

France, the government of England led by William Pitt

maintained a strict neutrality.

In Germany the Revolution received sympathetic

curiosity, mainly from journalists and intellectuals. At

Mainz, Gottingen, Brunswick and Hamburg, intellectual

leaders such as Johannes von Muller, Forster , Schlozer,

Stolberg , Kaurillon and Klopstoc 1: supported the Revolution.

Similarly, at Weimar, Herder, vice-president of the

Consistory; Wieland, editor of Merkur ; and Johann Paul

Richter voiced their approval, although Goethe and Schiller

were reluctant but did not declare themselves opposed.

Despite the support for the Revolution demonstrated by

the political reformers in England and various intellectuals

in Germany, on the whole these countries were generally

indifferent to the events in France. The support of the

revolutionary principles in the Eastern European powers of

Prussia, Austria, and European Russia, however, was

considerably less. The Prussian peasant and middle classes

lagged substantially behind their French counterparts in

terms of development, and therefore they were both less

inclined and less capable to fight for equality. Although

the news of the fall of the Bastille was greeted with

rejoicing and met with approval by Archenholz, an editor of

37

Ninerva ; by Nicolai, editor of the Deutsche Bibliotech ; and

•3

Reichardt, director of the Berlin Opera," the minister of

justice Wollner's censorship had little difficulty in

suppressing any pro-French propaganda.

In Austria, the policies of reform that vere implemented

by Maria Theresa following the Seven Years Kar, and

continued by Joseph II during the early portion of his

reign, vere mostly repealed. These policies, which were

designed to promote greater state infrastructure development

in order to support larger and stronger armed forces,

produced a great political awakening among the

non-privileged classes and jeopardized the stability of the

aristocratic class. Joseph IT, and later Leopold II may

have been able to manage the domestic problems created by

this "enlightened despotism", but these problems were

intensified by the failure of Austrian foreign policy.

Joseph's foreign policy was centered around an alliance

with Catherine II of Russia which was concluded in 1781.

Joseph hoped that by detaching Russia from Prussia that he

could obtain greater influence and prestige in Germany.

Similarly, with Austrian support Catherine felt she could

obtain territorial advantages in Turkey, particularly in the

long coveted Crimean peninsula. These ambitions were put

into affect in 1783 when Catherine acquired the Crimea from

Turkey, aided by Austrian diplomatic pressure. However,

when Joseph attempted to obtain Bavaria, Catherine's support

28

for Austrian ambitions vas minimal, and Joseph suffered an

embarassing diplomatic defeat."

Austria's alliance vith Russia vas even more damaging to

Joseph when Catherine manipulated Austria into joining

Russia in declaring var on Turkey in February 1788. The

enormous financial requirements to support the army, coupled

vith the dislocation of trade and an unprecedented rise in

prices, quickly ruined the reforms instituted by Joseph, and

led the Hungarian nobility to revert to open opposition.

This crises vas further complicated by the mobilization of

Prussian, Polish and Saxon troops along the Austrian

frontier. As a result of these foreign policy and domestic

setbacks, Joseph II vas compelled to make far reaching

concessions to the aristocratic classes. The strength of

this developing reactionary movement vhich developed prior

to the French Revolution ensured that the revolutionary

principles vould have little effect in Austria.

Farther east, the combination of distance and poor

communications served to substantially dampen the influence

of the revolution in Russia. Only a handful of Russians,

most notably Novikov, the poet Radischev, and Prince

Gallitzin expressed liberal sympathies, but rather than

forming into revolutionary groups and organizations, they

expected liberal reforms to be instituted by the central

government. Faced vith the more pressing problems of the

var vith Turkey, Catherine and the nobility vere unvilling

39

to implement reforms, and the weakness of the opposition

ensured the continued dominance of the aristocratic class

although some members of the bourgeois were allowed to

discuss commercial and municipal affairs and peasants were

7placed theoretically under the protection of the law.

Thus throughout Europe, the reaction to the French

Revolution was one of indifference. Only Sweden's king

Gustavus III advocated a crusade to restore the French

monarchy, but the influence of Sweden in European affairs

had diminished greatly, and the great powers were unwilling

to pay the expense that would be associated to undertake a

war against France. In fact, to the leaders of the great

powers the French Revolution merely meant that France would

be incapacitated in foreign affairs, and therefore the

remaining powers would be able to benefit further at

France's expense. Already the period of French decline

that began after the Seven Years War had resulted in

Austria, Prussia and Russia gaining territory through the

First Partition of Poland in 1772, and the Russian

annexation of the Crimea in 1783. Since France had long

supported Poland and Turkey, the aggrandizement of Austria,

Prussia and Russia without some form of compensation for

France demonstrated the decline of French influence in

Europe prior to the Revolution, and with further domestic

turmoil it was believed that greater gains could be obtained

at France's expense.

40

B. THE UNDERMINING OF INTERNATIONAL STABILITY

The assumption by the great povers that they would

benefit at France's expense was based on the belief that the

international system would continue to operate in its

traditional eighteenth century manner. However, the

previously mentioned gains made by Prussia, Russia and

Austria without compensation to France already indicated

that the traditional workings of the system were in

jeopardy. The "rules of the game" were altered even more

radically when in early August of 1789 the representative of

the nobles, Viconte de Noailles, voluntarily surrendered all

feudal rights and privileges, resulting in the National

Assembly of France announcing an end to the feudal regime.

This proclamation was followed by the Declaration of the

Rights of Kan on August 27. These two acts had significant

implications for future events, although at the time the

real significance of these events was less clear to those

who observed them.

The weakening of the royal authority in France led to

the flight of sizeable numbers of the French nobility.

These French emigres spread anti-revolutionary propaganda

throughout Europe, but they were particularly influential in

Austria and Prussia for two primary reasons. First, in the

province of Alsace, over which the French Bourbons had

claimed sovereignty, the German princes became alarmed by

France's public disavowal of all feudal rights and

41

obligations, and realized that the revolutionary principles

represented a direct threat to their rule over their

dominions. Austria and Prussia, as the primary competitors

for influence and prestige in Germany -were therefore eager

to defend the feudal rights of the German princes in order

to expand their influence in the German principalities.

The disorders of 1789 also caused a severe economic

crises for the French national treasury. To alleviate the

crises the National Assembly sought to confiscate certain

property. Since the confiscation of private property was

contrary to the principles of the revolution and the rights

of man, an alternative would have to be found. The

alternative was to seize the properties of the church, since

it represented a corporation rather than a private

person. This action was met with great protest by Pope

Pius VI, who could count on support from the Austrian

emperor Leopold.

The ant i -revolutionary support that these two factors

produced was perhaps insufficient to lead Prussia and

Austria to oppose France, but the dramatic and celebrated

flight of Louis XVI in June 1791 forced their hands.

Although many of the reforms enacted by the National

Assembly contributed to the decision of Louis to attempt to

flee Paris, the event that precipitated this action was the

condemnation of the civil constitution and the political and

social reforms of the Revolution by Pope Pius VI in March

and April 1791

.

42

The condemnation by the Fope was the result of a long

struggle over church reform following the Revolution. The

National Assembly's reforms resulted in reducing the

prestige and authority of the bishops by depriving them of

all but their purely spiritual or ecclesiastical functions.

Additionally, the reforms reduced the number of dioceses in

France from 135 to 8?. 12

The reforms endorsed by the National Assembly were not

submitted for approval to the French church, and as a result

the church was presented a virtual ultimatum and left the

bishops with the difficult task of negotiating its

acceptance with the papacy. The National Assembly believed

that the papacy would eventually consent because the

Assembly could threaten to annex the papal enclaves of

Avignon and Venaissin that resided on French territory.

Relations between the papacy and the Assembly were strained

further when on 20 November 1790 the Assembly required the

French clergy to take an oath that required them to uphold

the constitution decreed by the Assembly. Although the

majority of the French bishops refused to take the oath, the

majority of the lower clergy submitted. In support of the

French bishops, Pius condemned the Assembly's act. This

condemnation resulted in numerous retractions by the clergy

who had taken the oath and caused the majority of French

bishops to emigrate. These events persuaded Louis XVI of

the necessity to break with the Revolution and seek safety

l"5

by fleeing Fans.

43

The flight of the King and his family on 20 June 1791

was one of the most important events of the Revolution. The

king's attempted escape was halted at Varennes, and he vas

returned to Paris under heavy guard. The news of the flight

produced a storm of invective protests against the royal

family, and raised fears that an invasion of France was

1 Aimminent

.

The arrest of Louis XVI and the suspension of his powers

resulted in the Austrian Emperor Leopold II, who was the

brother of the French queen, to take an active diplomatic

stance to safeguard the interests of the French monarchy.

On 6 July 1791 Leopold forwarded the Padau Circular to the

empress of Russia and the kings of England, Prussia, Spain,

Naples and Sardinia. The circular urged the need for

concerted action "...to vindicate the liberty and honour of

the most Christian King and his family to limit the

1 cdangerous extremes of the French revolution." Although

initially some hesitation existed in Russia, and England

refused to commit itself, the anti-French coalition gained

strength on 25 July when Prussia and Austria, historical

rivals, concluded a preliminary defensive alliance designed

to produce a European concert for the settlement of French

affairs. 16

It is difficult to assess the effectiveness of these

declarations on the French National Assembly. The Assembly

exercised prudent moderation in not dethroning Louis,

44

however, this moderation can be just as easily be attributed

to the moderates that broke away from the Jacobins and

formed the Feuillant club. However, to Leopold it appeared

that the situation in Faris had been stabilized by his

initiative, and therefore the decision was made to continue

to exert diplomatic pressure on the revolutionaries in

France. On 27 August 1791 Frederich William II of Prussia

and Leopold issued the Declaration of Pillnitz. The

declaration called for the joint effort of all European

sovereigns to help Louis restore a monarchical system in

France. Since England had previously refused to commit

itself to the Fadau Circular, however, it was unlikely that

a joint effort could be agreed upon. Since Austria and

Prussia had no intention of acting without the support of

all the European monarchies, this declaration was

essentially ineffective from the outset.

Despite this ineffectiveness, its effect on the French

revolutionaries was dramatic. The declaration fueled French

fears of counter-revolutionary actions from Austria and

Prussia; and the actions of the French emigres, German

princes and the Pope contributed to this feeling. The fears

of counter-revolution also served to undermine the National

Assembly, for although it had been able to secure the

acceptance of a revised constitution by Louis on 14

September 1791, it was largely perceived as having pandered

to the special interests of the middle class and Feuillants.

45

Additionally, the popular outcry against the monarch as a

result of his flight made the establishment of a

constitutional monarchy unlikely. As a result, the assembly

dissolved itself on 30 September and a new body, the

Legislative Assembly was convened on 1 October.

The Legislative Assembly almost immediately turned its

attention to the threats of counter-revolution. The right

wing parties comprised of the constitutionalists, royalists

and Feuillants lost strength almost daily as the left wing

parties of the Plain, Girondists and the Mountain increased.

This shift, in strength is partially attributed to the

continued flight of the aristocratic class and the revenues

they took with them. The flight of capital from France

resulted in a depreciation of the French assignats, and led

many of the reolut ionar ies to blame the deteriorating

1 7economic conditions on the royalist supporters. This

problem led to the decree of 9 November 1791 that imposed on

all emigres who had joined the armed concentration outside

French frontiers to repatriate themselves by 1 January 1792

or face the penalties of treason and the confiscation of

their property.

Additionally, the Girondists were concerned with the

armed companies of emigres assembled on the territory of the

elector of Treves, and as a result on 29 November the

Assembly requested Louis to summon the elector to dissolve

them. Since the elector was a prince of the Holy Roman

46

Empire, however, he would undoubtedly seek advice and aid

from the Imperial Diet and the emperor. On December \A,

Louis announced that he was sending the summons, and the

minister of war Narbonne followed this with a request to

call up three armies. The mobilization of troops was

supported by both the right and the left in the Assembly.

The royalists viewed any potential conflict as a means to

restore the strength of the monarchy through control of the

army, while the left supported the potential conflict as a

war of defense against the unjust aggressions of the

monarchies of Europe.

When the elector of Treves received the summons, he

turned to the emperor Leopold for help. Though he was not

particularly sympathetic towards the emigres, he informed

the elector that he would provide protection only if the

emigres were dispersed by the end of December. The emigres

were thus disbanded, and the threat of immediate

intervention was removed. However, on the basis of these

new threats Leopold resumed his policy of intimidation,

renewing the threats made at Pillnitz and concluding an

alliance between Austria and Prussia on 7 February 1792.

Despite the death of Leopold on 1 March and the accession of

Francis II, the process of intimidation continued. Faced

with increasing pressures, France seized the initiative and

prepared to march into Belgium in late March, and on 20

April France declared war against the king of Bohemia and

20Hungary

.

41

The War of the First Coalition against France however

did not mark the destruction of the international system

that had developed during the eighteenth century, nor was

the war the total ideological clash that it would later

develop into. In this early stage of the conflict, however,

several key factors were already emerging that would

eventually contribute to the destruction of the classical

balance of power system.

The first factor was the instability of elites that

developed in both the German principalities in Alsace and

within France. The German princes, concerned over the

abolishment of aristocratic privileges within their domains

became exceedingly apprehensive about the solidity of their

rule. This apprehensiveness led to appeals to both the Pope

and the Holy Roman Emperor for protection to stabilize their

positions .

In France, the instability that developed within the

elite ruling classes was particularly dangerous due to the

bipolarization of French society. Supporters of the

monarchy were under constant threat from the liberal

excesses of the revolution, and the flight of many emigres

reinforced this instability as the aristocratic class

rapidly decreased in size. The revolutionaries were also

extremely unstable as the threat of counter-revolution was

well known as both the emigres and the king had engaged in

foreign intrigues to restore the strength of the monarchy.

48

The revolutionaries vere also destabilized by the breakdown

of the French economy following the revolution. Inflation

had already developed by the time of the War of the First

Coalition, and thus the National and later the Legislative

Assembly was faced with both internal and external threats.

The flight of the king to Varennes reinforced the perception

of the external counter-revolutionary threat as the majority

of the French felt that the king was attempting to leave the

country to organize a counter-revolutionary crusade.

Although it is possible that the external threats to the

elites could have been solved diplomatically, this course of

action was highly unlikely because of the effects that a

second factor was having on the international system.

The second factor that emerged was the breakdown in the

cohesiveness of the international system, although it would

not be until later in the conflict that the international

system would be completely destroyed. Still, the Revolution

had a critical impact on the political structures of France,

and the elites who now controlled foreign policy making

decisions viewed interstate relations in a fundamentally

different way from the elites of the ancien regime. This

fundamental difference was perhaps best exemplified by the

National Assembly on 22 May 1790 when it renounced "...in

the name of the French nation all wars of conquest, and

promised never to employ French forces against the liberty

of a people." The differences in outlook of the French

49

and the ancien regime would become exacerbated as the

monarchs of Europe would continue to conduct international

affairs along classic eighteenth century lines. The failure

of the European powers to accommodate revolutionary France

and incorporate France into the existing international

system, as shall be seen later, had an extremely

destabilizing impact on the international system as the

feedback that occurred between the two perspectives led to

the polarization of the international system and eventually

resulted in an ideological war between the antagonists.

Finally, the conflict that erupted in 1792 was in the

center of Europe and the international system. Throughout

the eighteenth century conflicts that developed in the heart

of the European continent tended to escalate horizontally as

the great powers became quickly involved to maintain the

balance of power. Although it is true that colonial

conflicts often reverberated back to Europe and increased

tensions on the continent, the great conflicts of the

eighteenth century were all precipitated by a clash on the

continent

.

C. THE DESTRUCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM INTENSIFIES

Although at the outbreak of the War of the First

Coalition the classical balance of power system was not

destroyed, the previously mentioned factors served to weaken

the system considerably. Although it might have been

50

possible to restore the system through a concerted effort by

the coalition monarchies, the events that took place during

the war would eventually destroy the system.

The survival of revolutionary France during the critical

years 1792 to ] 794 was not the result of French strength but

rather the result of the ineptitude of the coalition formed

against it. The coalition monarchies did not yet realize

the threat that France posed to the international system,

and therefore they continued to conduct themselves along

classic eighteenth century lines. This contributed

significantly to the destruction of the international system

for two primary reasons. First, concerns over territorial

compensations, particularly the partition of Poland,

prevented the coalition from concentrating its efforts to

end the French problems. Second, by continuing to operate

along classical lines, the coalition provided feedback that

further radicalized the French Pevolutionary process as the

"evils" preached by the revolutionaries about the European

monarchical system came to be perceived as true. This

development led to a revolutionizing of the war and

eventually allowed it to take on its ideological form.

The war started with the French intending to overrun the

Austrian Netherlands with 50,000 men in a decisive and rapid

thrust. The Girondist ministry led by Dumouriez believed

that French revolutionary propaganda would result in the

French being received as liberators beyond their borders,

51

and therefore concerns over the readiness of the army was

less important than taking bold action. The French generals

Luckner, Fochambeau, and Lafayette, as veil as the officer

corps, however, were fairly veil trained for var and did not

fully support the adventurous proposals of Dumouriez.

Additionally, the officers distrusted the undisciplined

troops, and the enlisted personnel suspected the officers of

treason as large numbers of officers continued to emigrate.

The lack of confidence and distrust that existed

throughout the French armies had serious repercussions at

the beginning of the conflict. Cn 29 April 1792 the French,

under the command of Dillon and Firon vere ordered into a

retreat upon the first sighting of Austrian troops.

Similarly, Carle and Lafayette vithdrev before even sighting

the enemy. These actions led the enlisted personnel to cry

treason and disband. By June the French offensive had

failed, with the generals blaming the poor discipline and

inadequate training as the reasons, although the generals

had shovn no vill to fight.

Despite the troubles experienced by the French army, the

allies vere unable to take advantage of the situation. Like

the French revolutionaries, the French emigres convinced the

allies that they vould be greeted in France as liberators.

Bolstered by these proclamations, Prussian and Austrian

forces invaded France in the summer of 1792. By September,

the allies had reached Valmy, one hundred miles east of

52

Paris. The invasion of France, coupled with the

deteriorating economic conditions provided fertile grounds

for further revolutionary Girondist propaganda as many

French citizens were convinced that a clandestine committee

was passing millions in gold to Austria, paying emigres,

causing the financial crises by deliberately buying up the

French market, and divulging French military plans to the

23enemy

.

The combination of the poor performance of the French

army and Girondist propaganda served to further polarize

French society. The Girondist ministry issued three

revolutionary decrees in late May and early June to remove

nonjuring priests, disband the King's personal bodyguards,

and raise a new levee of 20,000 men to set up military camps

in Faris to remove the enemies of the republic. Louis XVI

realized that these decrees would make him a captive of the

Girondins, and because Louis felt that the conflict that had

erupted would restore the strength of the monarchy, he

vetoed two of the bills, most importantly the establishment

of the military camps. Roland, head of the interior

ministry, urged the King to accept the decrees to prevent

violent consequences, but Dumouriez, who believed that he

could enhance his personal power and prestige convinced

Louis to dismiss Roland, and elevate himself to war

minister. Dumouriez's appointment was not well received by

the Assembly and within a week Dumouriez was forced to

resign his ministerial post.

53

The fall of the Girondist Ministry and its replacement

by the new Feuillant ministry resulted in the Parisian

sans-culottes of the democratic faubourgs invading the

Tuileries palace on 20 June to force the King to restore the

Girondist ministers. The demonstration failed to intimidate

Louis, and attempts by General Lafayette to disband the

Jacobin and other radical clubs failed as the Assembly

refused to support strong measures to halt further

revolutionary activities.

As the external threat became greater, the actions of

the Girondins and the Assembly resulted in the intervention

of extra-parliamentary forces. The Girondin leaders

"invited" units of the national guards, including the

provisional federes, to attend the Festival of Federation on

14 July. On 5 July the Assembly declared that in the

event of danger to the nation, all able bodied men would be

called to service and arms requisitioned. On 9 July Brissot

accused the king and his ministers of treason, and implied

that the king might be deposed. Faced with this increasing

revolutionary activity, the Feuillant ministry resigned on

10 July, opening up the possibility of a return of the

Girondins. The Girondins, anxious to restore their lost

power made the fateful decision to seek the support of the

King instead of siding with the increasingly revolutionary

populace. As a result, they now became defenders of the

throne. On 11 July the Assembly declared "the Fatherland in

54

danger", further heightening political tensions and tilting

the political balance increasingly to the side of the

revolutionaries

.

The increasing revolutionary situation in Paris, coupled

with the pleas from Marie Antoinette for the issue of an

ultimatum to restrain the fury of the Parisians until troops

arrived resulted in the Brunswick Manifesto of 11 July. The

manifesto required "...the city of Paris and all its

inhabitants, without distinction ... to submit at once and

without delay to the King." Additionally, "If any force or

insult is used against the Palace of the Tuileries, if the

least violence or the least outrage is done Their Majesties

..." the allied powers would "...exact an exemplary and

forever memorable vengeance by delivering the city of Paris

to military execution and total subversion, and the rebels

who are guilty of such outrages to the punishments they will

27have deserved."

The publication of the manifesto in Paris on 1 August

had the opposite affect that its drafters intended. The

federes and the Jacobin club had already listened to

Robespierre's radical program calling for the overthrow of

the monarchy and the displacement of the Legislative

Assembly, and on 3 August forty-seven of the forty-eight

Parisian sections petitioned the Assembly for the deposition

of Louis XVI. The manifesto had thus heightened the fears

of counter-revolution throughout these radical groups, and

55

as a result the Palace of the Tuileries was stormed on 10

August and the King was suspended from his duties.

The delegates from the sections who had met to plan the

insurrection established the revolutionary Commune of Paris.

The Commune imprisoned the King and his family in the

Temple, and then called for a National Convention to be

elected by universal suffrage. The Legislative Assembly

remained in existence until the 20 September although its

strength and influence diminished almost daily.

As domestic conditions deteriorated in France during the

period of the "second revolution", the military threat

increased. On 19 August Prussian armies under Brunswick

crossed the French frontier, and shortly thereafter broke

? Rthrough the fortresses at Longwy and Verdun. Lafayette,

who had tried to turn back his army to rescue the monarchy

fled to Austria on 20 August where he would later be

imprisoned

.

When news of the military misfortunes reached Paris,

what little authority remained collapsed. Rumors began to

circulate that the criminals in the Paris prisons were

covertly aiding the enemy and the emigres. This resulted in

the September Massacres as between 1090 and 1395

criminal and political prisoners were killed between 2 and 7

September, a foretaste of the terror that was yet to come as

the revolutionaries sought to eliminate the threat of

counter-revolution from within.

56

The Prussian advance continued as conditions

deteriorated in France. Brunswick had maneuvered his troops

between the French army commanded by Dumouriez and Paris,

leaving Paris open to invasion. Dumouriez sent for

reinforcements from Kellermann's army, and on the morning of

20 September Brunswick's and Kellermann's troops came into

contact with one another near the hills around the village

of Valmy. Dumouriez' army came up in support, and in the

morning fog a large artillery exchange took place. The

famous battle was really not much of an encounter, and

although it was the largest artillery exchange to date, only

180 Prussian and 300 French soldiers were killed. As

the weather conditions deteriorated with the onset of fall

and winter, and sickness set in amongst the troops, the

cabinets at Vienna and Berlin decided to withdraw their

troops until France was further weakened from internal

conflict. Additionally, both Prussia and Austria were much

more concerned with the events taking place in Poland.

The events in Poland were critical to the survival of

the French Revolution. Russia, which had already gained

from the First Partition of Poland in 1772 had launched

another assault on the truncated Polish state. Austria and

Prussia, as well as England, Sweden and Turkey viewed the

attempted Russian expansion as a threat to the European

system as one of the powers was attempting to expand and

increase its influence. At the time this was considered the

57

greater threat to Europe as Russia was seen as seeking to

alter the balance of power in its favor. Although Prussia

and Austria desired to restore the French monarchy, this

restoration could wait for a more precipitous moment. The

events in Poland prevented the two powers from concentrating

their military efforts against France during the time when

the French army was perhaps its most vulnerable. Although

in hindsight this is now more clearly seen, it illustrates

an important point about how the international system would

become increasingly unstable.

D. THE BREAKDOWN OF THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The international system of the eighteenth century was

slow to react and adapt to a revolutionary actor. The

leaders of the ancien regime continued to operate along

classic balance of power lines and did not perceive the

threat that France posed to the underlying values that the

system was built upon. It was this threat, and not the one

of Russian expansion that threatened to radically alter the

eighteenth century European system.

Intoxicated by the withdrawal of allied forces from

Valmy and the revolutionary advances made in August, on 21

September 1792 the National Convention abolished the

monarchy and established a republic. These events and the

September Massacres resulted in revolutionary France at

least temporarily removing the threat of counterrevolution,

58

and with greater self confidence France began to assert

itself against the monarchies of a hostile Europe. Within

three months French armies occupied Mainz, Speyer and

a i

Brussels, and France annexed Savoy and Nice. 2 The French

occupation of these areas resulted in local patriots

requesting French protection from counter-revolutionary

reprisals. These requests produced the Edict of Fraternity

issued on 19 November 1792 which stated: "The National

Convention declares in the name of the French nation that it

will accord fraternity and assistance to all peoples who

wish to recover their liberty. It charges the executive

power to give the generals the necessary orders for bearing

help to these peoples and defending citizens who are vexed

for the cause of liberty."

Although the French foreign minister Lebrun attempted to

explain that the edict only applied to those countries

engaged in war with France, French sympathizers throughout

Europe hailed the French proclamation as a symbol of French

desires to liberate the remainder of Europe. The

conservative monarchs of Europe interpreted the decree as a

direct challenge to their rule. Thus the conflict that was

initially perceived by France as a defensive effort against

the allies had now turned into an ideological struggle as

the French Revolutionary principles became opposed to those

of the European monarchies. Additionally, despite Lebrun •

s

efforts, the true French intentions were revealed by Brissot

59

on 26 November when he argued that the Republic of France,

engaged in a death struggle vith the "German colossus" could

not be "...at ease until Europe, and all of Europe, is in

flames." Additionally, Brissot demanded the Rhine as a

frontier and proclaimed "...our liberty will never rest

quietly as long as a Bourbon is enthroned. There can be no

peace with a Bourbon; with that understood we must consider

an expedition into Spain."

The ideological nature of the war was further polarized

in December when Dumouriez was unable to obtain local loans

in Belgium to meet his military expenditures. As a result,

on 15 December the Convention declared that war expenditures

incurred during the liberation of subject people abroad

would be defrayed by introducing the French assignats into

liberated areas. The c.ssignats would be secured by the

sequestered property of the clerical and noble estates.

As Lefebrve points out, this "...war for chateaux; peace for

cottages..." decree instituted the "...dictatorship of

revolutionary minorities under the protection of French

bayonets, and undertook to secure the fortunes of other

OCTpeoples without consulting them, at their expense." The

final ideological break between France and the rest of

Europe occurred on 21 January 1793 when Louis XVI was

guillotined

.

The execution of Louis XVI further strained the

relations between many of the neutral monarchs of Europe and

60

the French republic. In England William Pitt had succeeded

in maintaining England's neutrality, although French

revolutionary propaganda continued to irritate England's

ruling elite. A series of royal edicts combined with

government subsidized conservative propaganda, however,

successfully countered this threat. As Dumouriez of France

began to press for military entry into Holland, however,

thereby threatening to take over Europe's largest banking

center as well as an ally of England, foreign relations

between the two countries deteriorated rapidly. The

execution of the king served as a pretext to war. On 24

January the Marquis de Chauvelin was given his passport from

England, a clear signal that England was prepared to break

diplomatic relations with France. Rather than wait for

Chauvelin 's expulsion, the French recalled him the next day.

On 1 February 1793 the National Convention voted for a

declaration of war against England.

The execution of the king also had a dramatic affect on

French foreign relations with Spain and the Holy Roman

Empire. Louis' trial provoked demonstrations in Spain

against France, and it soon became apparent that Madrid's

neutrality depended upon the verdict. After 21 January,

French proposals for neutrality were summarily refused. On

7 March France declared war against Spain. With Spain now

involved in the war, English access to the Mediterranean was

virtually assured, and the increased English naval presence

61

allowed the states of Italy greater freedom of action in

joining the allies.

The ideological character of the war was brought about

by the complex interplay of the revolutionary forces in

France and the reaction of the international system. The

failure of the monarchical experiment was in no way

inevitable at the outset. However, the structure of

government in France was substantially weakened following

the events of 1789, and attempts by the monarchs of Europe

to strengthen the French government through external actions

to support Louis XVI only exacerbated the problem. The

rhetoric of the allies heightened fears of a

counter-revolution, reinforcing the radicalism of the more

revolutionary Jacobin and Mountain parties. Additionally,

during this "age of democratic revolution", ?.t was only

natural that some democratization in foreign policy would

occur, and as these parties grew in strength, French foreign

policy became increasingly susceptible to their influence,

which then triggered even harsher outbursts from the allies

as evidenced by the Padau Circular and the Pillnitz and

Brunswick Declarations. The outbreak of war completed the

radicalization of French society as the weakened political

structures could not cope with the shocks produced by the

military defeats that were suffered in the summer of 1792.

Although ideology had now become an important element in

the international system, the capacity of the balance of

62

power system to contain France had not yet been exceeded.

It was still possible for the allies either to tacitly

accept the revolution by abandoning the provocative rhetoric

against France, thereby increasing French security and

hopefully diminishing the ideological character that the war

had assumed, or to launch a large scale

counter-revolutionary effort to restore the monarchical

system. Instead, the allies fell between two stools and

chose to continue their rhetorical assault while pursuing

the traditional eighteenth century diplomacy that stressed

limited territorial aims achieved with limited means. The

allied policies, when coupled with the instabilities that

existed in France resulted in an unprecedented feeling of

patriotism throughout France. This rising patriotism would

later contribute significantly to the collapse of the

international system as rising nationalism substantially

altered key factors in the balance of power system.

England's entry into the anti-French coalition resulted

in a significant horizontal escalation of the conflict as

the combination of English diplomacy, subsidies, and naval

pressure extended the number of allies. The allied forces

were therefore able to successfully expel the French from

the Rhineland and the Austrian Netherlands. Dumouriez,

whose army was defeated and thereby lost most of the

Netherlands, defected to the Austrians. These events,

coupled with the Royalist support of the peasant revolt over

63

the issue of conscription that occurred in the Vendee in

March increased revolutionary activity in France and forced

the Convention to create institutions to eliminate internal

opposition and strengthen the Republican armies. In April,

the Convention established the Committee of General Security

and the Committee of Public Safety. These two committees/

but mainly the Committee of Public Safety, soon exercised

dictatorial powers through the leadership of Danton and

Robespierre. The arrest of 31 Girondist deputies on 2 June

ensured radical domination of the committees.

The Committee of Public Safety began to establish the

mechanisms that would eventually lead to the Reign of

Terror. However, despite the increasing control over the

internal opposition, France continued to suffer military

setbacks in the summer of 1793. However, just as during the

previous allied assault on France, once again the European

powers continued to operate along classic eighteenth century

lines, and rather than marching on Paris, England broke off

towards Dunkirk and the Austrian's towards Maubeuge as both

countries attempted to obtain territory which could be used

as pawns for the coming peace conference. Similarly,

Prussia and Russia, which had become engaged in another

series of intrigues over the Second Partition of Poland in

January of 1793, were once again more concerned with the

events in Poland and the exclusion of Austria from the

Polish agreement a policy that would create divisions within

the alliance.

64

Although the allies of the First Coalition all had

different war aims, the allies also suffered from an

inability to exploit their resources. The people of France

were much more willing to make sacrifices because they

perceived that the revolutionary regime was responsible for

the liberal freedoms that they had obtained. By contrast,

the allies were much less willing to ask for sacrifices out

of fear that concessions would be demanded in return. The

failure of the allies to decisively defeat France provided

the revolutionary government the time to adopt extreme

measures to combat the external threats to the Republic. On

23 August 1793 French patriotism reached new heights when a

levy was placed in principle on every Frenchman and

Frenchwoman: "Young men will go to the front; married men

will forge arms and transport foodstuffs; women will tear

rags into lint; old men will get themselves carried to

public places, there to stir up the courage of the warriors,

"37hatred of kings and unity in the republic.""

The lack of unity among the allies was exploited by the

French revolutionary generals who assumed the offensive and

cleared France of invaders. It is important to note that

this was accomplished prior to the mobilization of French

society, as the allied defeat was accomplished with only the

levy of 300,000 men that had been requisitioned at the

beginning of the war. This had an important influence on

65

French nationalism as it was transformed from Fisorgimento

nationalism, which is defined as the liberation from

political and social oppression, to integral nationalism,

which espoused slogans about national supremacy and

superiority of the French nation and resulted in French

territorial expansion. The fact that French

mobilization did not become effective until after France had

assumed the offensive was important psychologically for

French citizens. The hardships endured by the French

citizens through the dislocation of large numbers of the

population, coupled with its accompanying affect on societal

production that resulted in the establishment of the maximum

price policy on large numbers of consumer goods, may have

resulted in the collapse of the revolutionary government had

they been in effect during the period of French setbacks in

early 1793. Since these hardships came into effect during a

time when the French had gained the offensive, however, it

decreased the impact of these hardships on French society,

at least psychologically as the French citizens were able to

console themselves with the fact that their sacrifices

resulted in French victories. The French victories thus had

an intoxicating affect on French society as it became

consumed by the exuberance of victory.

The development of nationalism in France was another

important factor in the destruction of the eighteenth

century international system, primarily through its affects

66

on the limited form of warfare of the eighteenth century and

on international diplomacy. The adoption of a policy of

near universal conscription, which could only be tolerated

by a nationalistic society, produced a great increase in the

number of soldiers available to the French generals.

Besides allowing the French generals to fight more

aggressive and costly campaigns and more of them, French

foreign policy now carried more weight. Additionally, by

supplying armies through requisitions from occupied

territories, the French were able to break away from many of

the restraints imposed on armies during the eighteenth

century

.

The rapid expansion of the military manpower base

represented by the growth of nationalism in France produced

a serious imbalance in the international system. Still it

was possible that the international system could have

survived with this imbalance had the French maintained the

international perspective and cosmopolitan outlook of the

ancien regime. However, the combination of nationalism and

ideology dramatically affected the conduct of international

relations. The French ideas of social equality, political

rights and economic liberalism challenged the eighteenth

century aristocratic order and undermined the diplomacy that

was based on conservative social principles. This division

was exacerbated by the infusion of French nationalism as it

now became standard practice to abolish the internal

67

constitution of conquered states and replace it with the new

principles espoused by the revolution.

The defeat of the allies by the French in the War of the

First Coalition marked the end of the eighteenth century

international system. The period of limited ends and

limited means had come to a close as the French Republic/

filled with self confidence and self righteousness, embarked

on a mission to remake the whole of Europe in its image.

Stability would only return to the international system

after French nationalism had been transplanted to the rest

of Europe, establishing a balance of resources available to

both the French and the allies. Additionally, the allies

had to overcome their traditional methods of conducting

diplomacy and war that generally stressed separate aims, and

instead build a mechanism upon which unity of purpose

existed. It was only after these events occurred that peace

and tranquility would return to the European continent.

E. SUMMARY

The breakdown of the international system during the

French Revolution was the result of many factors, however,

it appears that a few key factors contributed significantly

to this breakdown. The first factor was a breakdown in the

stability of the ruling elites in Europe. This began first

in France as the product of the domestic turmoil that

undermined the monarchy, and then expanded to the German

68

principalities with the abolishment by France of feudal

privileges in Alsace. Elite stability was further

undermined by the rhetorical proclamations and declarations

issued by both the revolutionaries and the monarchs of

Europe, as both sides sought to re-establish their own

systems by threatening to destroy the other's. These

actions planted the seeds for the ideological struggle that

would soon develop.

A second factor, and one that encompasses the entire

revolutionary period, is the failure of the

non-revolutionary powers of Europe to adjust to a

revolutionary France as the allies continued to operate

along classic eighteenth century military-diplomatic lines.

Since France had already renounced a great majority of the

principles that comprised the foundation of the

international system through the abolishment of feudal

privileges, the Declaration of the Fights of Man, and the

renunciation of "all wars of conquest", the allied actions

provided feedback to France that served to further

revolutionize French society. The French revolutionaries

were able to point out that the monarchical system was

directly opposed to the liberal reforms of France, adding

credence to the assertions that the dynastic system was

inherently repressive. Had the allies more fully realized

the changes that revolutionary France posed to the

international system, they could have either tacitly

69

accepted the Revolution and attempted to reach an

accommodation with France, something not out of the realm of

the possible in the early stages of the French Revolution,

or they could have better coordinated their efforts to

defeat France. The allied actions during this critical

period illustrates the limits of the preexisting

statesmanship during periods of revolutionary change.

Third, as during previous periods of instability in

Europe, conflict had once again erupted in the center of

Europe. Although this may seem like a trivial point, it is

tremendously important because of the fact that any conflict

on the continent affected the balance amongst the powers and

therefore the threat of horizontal escalation was much

greater. The period of colonization and expansion was

temporarily ended as once again the major powers were

entangled on the continent. The relief valve for the

European powers was now removed, and the continent suffered

terribly for it.

Fourth, the force of ideology became a driving factor in

international relations. The new ideology was important

because it destroyed the commonality of outlook amongst the

ruling elites and hampered their ability to reach agreements

and consensus regarding international relations as both

sides perceived the world in a fundamentally different way.

A fifth factor was the emergence of nationalism. This

factor was important because it allowed France to expand its

70

resources base beyond the point that the international

system could balance. French nationalism produced a

tremendous imbalance in the international system, an

imbalance which had to be corrected before stability could

be restored.

The combination of ideology and nationalism produced a

sixth factor, namely the loss of internationalist

perspective. France was no longer concerned with

maintaining the balance in Europe, but instead sought to

reshape Europe in its own image. The cosmopolitan nature of

eighteenth century Europe had been destroyed and was

replaced by an increasingly nationalist one.

Finally, the period of the French Revolution was

characterized by a diplomacy that consisted of unlimited

ends pursued with enormously expanded means. The

constraints placed on the dynastic rulers by the eighteenth

century international system had been removed through the

development of nationalism and ideology, making the pursuit

of grander goals more achievable, particularly from the

French perspective.

The destruction of the international system and the

violence that coincided with it was the result of the

presence of all these factors. Individual factors, although

capable of producing instability by themselves, could not

have had the dramatic affect on the international system

that the combination noted above created.

71

1 Crane Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , vol.11 of The Rise c Modern Europe , ed . William L. Langer (NewYork: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1934), 72-3.

Georges Lefebvre, The French Revolution from itsOrigins to 1793 , vol. 1, (New York: Columbia UniversityPress, 1962), 183.

3 Ibid.

E. Wangermann, "The Habsburg Possessions andGermany," The American and French Revolutions 1763-90 , ed

.

A. Goodwin, vol. 8 of The New Cambridge Modern History , gened . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1957), 302.

5 Ibid., 294-6.

6 Ibid., 301-2.

7Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 180-1.

8 Ibid., 83.

Q .Geoffrey Bruun , "The Balance of Power During theWars, 1793-1814," War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval1793-1830 , ed . C. W. Crawley, vol. 9 of The New CambridgeModern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1957), 250-5.

Kyung-Won Kim, Revolution and International System ,

(New York: New York University Press, 1970), 23.

!1 Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 47.12. .

A. Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France:October 1789-February 1793," The American and FrenchRevolutions 1763-90 , ed . A. Goodwin, vol. 8 of The NewCambridge Modern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1957), 687-9.

13 Ibid., 689.

Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to1793 , 206.

1 s Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October1789-February 1793," 693.

16 Ibid.

17Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 54.

72

1 o,

°Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October1789-February 1793," 697

19Lefeb1793, 216-8

1 Q .13Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to

20 Ibid., 226.

21 Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 55.

9 9^Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to1793 , 228-9.

Kim, Revolution and International System , 38.

24 Ibid., 40.

Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October1789-February 1793," 703.

9 f)Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to1793 , 234-5.

97 .

R. R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution APolitical History of Europe and America, 1760-1800 , vol . 1

,

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 37.

9 ft Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World , (New York:Collier Books, 1985), 106.

9QLefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to1793 , 243.

30Ropp, War in the Modern World , 107.

Bruun , "The Ealance of Power During the Wars,1793-1814," 254.

32 . ...Leonard W. Cowie, Documents and Descriptions inEuropean History 1714-1815 , (London: Oxford UniversityPress, 1967), 166.

Kim, Revolution and International System , 45.

34Goodwin, "Reform and Revolution in France: October1789-February 1793," 709-10.

Lefebvre, The French Revolution from its Origins to1793 , 277.

36 Ropp, War in the Modern World , 109.

73

37Brinton, A Decade of Revolution 1789-1799 , 128.

Peter Alter, Nationalism , (London: Edward Arnold,1989), 39.

Peter Paret, "Napoleon and the Revolution in War,"Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the NuclearAge, ed . Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press,1986), 125.

74

IV. EUROPE BETWEEN REVOLUTIONS: A RETURN TO STABILITY

Restoring stability and a balance of power in Europe was

one of the primary goals of the leaders and diplomats that

gathered in Vienna periodically from October 1814 thru June

1815. The statesmen of Europe, however, had another and

more important goal, namely moving past a mere ending of

hostilities to devise a system that would prevent future

conflict. This goal was alluded to by Prince Clemens von

Metternich of Austria, one of the leading statesmen and

chief architects of the Congress of Vienna when he stated:

"On this occasion, peace had already been made and the

parties meet as friends who, though differing in their

interests, wish to work together towards the conclusion and

affirmation of the existing treaty."

A. THE RESTORATION OF COOPERATION AMONG THE POWERS

The cooperation that was necessary to form a "Concert of

Europe" began to form in the winter of 1812-1813 following

Napoleon's retreat from Moscow. By this stage of the

Napoleonic Wars the statesmen of Europe had come to realize

that only a unity of effort and war aims would result in the

defeat of a resource and population rich France. Despite

this realization, the continental powers were already

experiencing strains in their relationship as their

75

interests conflicted over the division of the war spoils and

the balance of power. Alexander of Russia sought to

establish a united and autonomous kingdom of Poland out of

the territories formerly partitioned between Russia, Austria

and Prussia. Prussia would be compensated with territory

in Saxony, and Austria would be free to annex territories in

Italy. Alexander's grand design may have been achievable

except for the fact that Alexander had intended to maintain

a protectorate over the Polish state, a situation that was

totally unacceptable to Austria. Although Alexander did not

specifically announce his intentions, Austria was keenly

aware of Russian designs and warned Berlin "If the Polish

question remains unsettled, there is the danger that we may

exchange the yoke of Napoleon for the yoke of Alexander."

To avoid alienating Austria and undermining the formation

of a new coalition against France, Russia and Prussia signed

the Treaty of Kalisch on 20 February 1813, an extremely

vague document that made no mention of territorial divisions

although it served to unify the Russian and Prussian effort

against France.

Although Metternich felt that Napoleon's retreat from

Moscow marked the beginning of the end of French domination

on the continent, Austria remained uncommitted to the

Russian-Prussian alliance. Metternich desired to postpone

Austria's intervention until it would have the most impact,

and therefore obtain the greatest advantages for Austria.

76

Metternich's opportunity arose in the summer of 1813

following the battles at Bautzen and Wurschen where

Napoleon's forces defeated the allied forces and forced

their retreat. Following these victories Napoleon undertook

an action that he later concluded was one of his worst

blunders when he agreed to an armistice at Poischwitz.

Although both sides were exhausted and in need of

reinforcements, Napoleon's enemies were in considerably

worse condition than the French. The armistice allowed

Russia and Prussia to obtain a subsidy treaty with England

at Feichenback on 15 June as well as securing Metternich as

mediator

.

Metternich had long hoped for a general peace that would

establish an equilibrium in Europe, for it was the only way

for Austria to secure its national interests. In the Treaty

of Feichenbach, Austria pledged to join the war against

France if Napoleon refused to accept the following four

conditions by 20 July: the dissolution of the Duchy of

Warsaw; the enlargement of Prussia; the return of Tllyria to

Austria; the restoration of Hamburg and Luebeck as free

cities. Metternich believed that these conditions were

essential to establishing a balance of power on the European

continent, and if Napoleon refused, the incompatability of

French aims with a system of equilibrium would have been

demonstrated. Metternich's desire for a diplomatic

restoration of the balance of power failed when the Congress

77

at Prague collapsed on 11 August 1813 and the next day

Austria declared war on France.

The allied armies, supported by English subsidies,

achieved a decisive victory over Napoleon at the Battle of

Leipzig from 16-19 October 1813. Napoleon's defeat at

Leipzig resulted in a new set of problems for Metternich and

the equilibrium of Europe. Continued defeats suffered by

France would gravely disturb Metternich's grand design for a

balance of pover on the continent and risk the replacing of

French dominance with that of Russia. In an effort to save

Saxony and Poland, Metternich succeeded in securing an

allied peace proposal that would have allowed France to

maintain its natural boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and

the Pyrenees. England did not support the "Frankfurt

proposals," however, and had Napoleon accepted them he may

have been able to dissolve the alliance. Napoleon did not

believe, however, that the allies possessed the resolve

necessary to continue their efforts, and as a result he

postponed making a decision on the proposals.

At the end of 1813, despite the military successes

achieved by the alliance against Napoleon, the cohesiveness

of the alliance was in jeopardy. Metternich desired a

strong France to act as a counter to Russia, and although

England also sought to restore an equilibrium on the

continent, it would not support any French territorial gains

beyond those of "ancient" France nor allow negotiation over

78

maritime rights. Prussia was willing to allow Alexander's

grand design for Poland to occur provided that it was

compensated with Saxony, but Austria was opposed to any

expansion of Russia to the west as well as Prussian

expansion into Germany. To prevent the breakup of the

coalition against France, England's foreign minister Lord

Castlereagh hurried to the continent to consult with the

all ies

.

Castlereagh ' s success in maintaining the alliance was

perhaps more attributable to the events that took place from

January to March 1814 than to his diplomatic talents, but

still his contribution cannot be overlooked. England's

insular position from the continental problems placed it in

the unique position to play the role of a power balancer

among the allies. Additionally, since England's interest in

establishing an equilibrium on the continent paralleled

those of Austria, Metternich could now count on support to

oppose Russian and Prussian designs on Poland and Saxony,

although this required Metternich to support English goals

regarding the areas of Luxemburg, Mainz and the Netherlands.

Although an accommodation with Austria was possible/

achieving an agreement with Alexander of Russia was much

more difficult since Russian designs on Poland, as well as

Alexander's desire to place Bernadotte of Sweden on the

throne of France were contrary to the interests of England.

Fortunately the tide of the war temporarily shifted against

79

the allies when they were forced to divide themselves

because of difficulties with supply and geography. The

division of the allied effort allowed Napoleon to achieve

victories at Champaubert, Montmirail, Chateau-Thierry and

Vauchamps from 10-15 February and at Nangis and Montereau on

17-18 February. These victories worried Alexander enough

that he was now more willing to reach a formal agreement

with the allies to secure Napoleon's defeat.

On 9 March 1814 Castlereagh achieved his goal of a

consolidating alliance when the allies signed the Treaty of

Chaumont whereby each power promised to "...keep 150,000 men

in active service during the present war, and they pledged

themselves not to make peace except with common consent."

This treaty served to hold the alliance together and ensure

the defeat of Napoleon, however, the treaty went farther

than previous diplomatic initiatives by achieving an

agreement between the powers to protect Europe against every

attempt which France might make "...to infringe the order of

things resulting from such pacification..." that might arise

for the next twenty years. Although this treaty ensured

the eventual military defeat of France, it did not address

the general settlement of reconguered territories following

the allied victory. This limitation, however, should not

diminish the significance of the treaty as it laid the

groundwork for the formation of the Concert of Europe.

80

B. THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: A RETURN TO STABILITY

Following the abdication of Napoleon on 1 1 April and the

signing of the First Treaty of Paris on 30 May, the

victorious allies decided to hold a congress at Vienna to

resolve the territorial issues that arose from the newly

liberated areas. The settlement that emerged from the

Congress of Vienna has often been said to have rested on

three principles: compensation for the victors, legitimacy,

and the balance of power. These principles played an

important role in ensuring the peace in Europe, but they

were not the only factors at work.

The triumph of conservatism over revolutionary

liberalism resulted in a return to the commonality of

outlook amongst the ruling elites of Europe. The widely

divergent ideological views that characterized the French

revolutionary period were dramatically reduced.

Additionally, although the leading statesmen of Europe were

still concerned with protecting their countries' interests,

they all realized that their countries could only benefit

through stability in Europe. Even England's Lord

Castlereagh possessed Europeanist views, and although not as

strong as that of Metternich, they were still significantly

different from those of traditional English isolationists.

The commonality of outlook and the internationalist

perspective of the statesmen at the Congress of Vienna was

expressed in the Quadruple Alliance signed on 20 November

1815.

81

The Quadruple Alliance, built upon the principles

established in the Treaty of Chaumont, reflected the

internationalist perspective of Europe's leading statesmen.

Not only did the treaty guard against a resurgent France,

but at the insistence of Lord Castlereagh, the

representatives of the signatory powers of Russia, Prussia,

Austria and England agreed to meet periodically to discuss

common interests and problems. Besides reflecting the

desire of the major powers to cooperate on mutual concerns

and interests, the treaty also showed concern for Europe's

minor states. According to Castlereagh, the treaty was

intended "...not only as a systematic pledge of persevering

concert amongst the leading Powers, but a refuge under which

all the minor States, especially those on the Rhine, may

look forward to find their security upon the return of peace

relieved of the necessity of seeking a compromise with

France . "

'

The Quadruple Alliance modified the traditional balance

of power system that had evolved during the eighteenth

century. The system that had been based on calculations of

material power now also relied upon a new ideological

harmony of self-conscious conservatism to assure the

peace. Liberalism would be opposed before it could lead

to a change in the material position of the European powers.

Although this was originally conceived as a means to oppose

any resurgence of liberalism in France, it was soon expanded

82

to support opposition to liberalism wherever it occurred in

Europe. It is interesting to note that one of the chief

proponents of this conceptualization was Lord Castlereagh

who drafted Article VI of the Treaty which called for the

periodic Congresses "...for the consideration of the

measures which shall be considered the most salutory for the

repose and prosperity of nations .. .and the peace of

QEurope." This type of policy was clearly contradictory

of English traditions and liberalism that generally

prevented interference in the domestic affairs of other

states as well as avoiding continental complications, and

demonstrated the ideological difference that existed between

the English Cabinet and Castlereagh. According to

Kissinger, England only approved the treaty because its

implications were beyond the imagination of the members of

the Cabinet. The differences that existed between

Castlereagh and the English Cabinet would later serve to

weaken the Congress system.

In addition to a return to a relatively heterogeneous

ideology amongst the ruling elites of Europe, the statesmen

at the Congress of Vienna suppressed the emergence of

nationalism in Central Europe. The dream of a united

Germany found no favor among the decision makers at Vienna.

Although the Vienna Congress resulted in the establishment

of 39 independent German states, a considerable

consolidation from the over 300 political units that

83

constituted Germany before the French Revolution, this

increased centralization was the result of the desire to

prevent the small principalities from gravitating into the

French orbit and creating instability in Central Europe.

Similarly, the politically disunited Italian peninsula,

which Metternich alluded to as merely "a geographical

expression", was left divided by the peacemakers. This

arrangement, coupled with the powerful position of Austria

on the peninsula, was deemed necessary to remove the

likelihood of any future attempt by France to interfere on

1 2the peninsula.

The combination of legitimacy, ideological similarity

and suppressed nationalism resulted in a restoration of

elite stability throughout Europe. This stability was

further reinforced by the concepts embedded in the Quadruple

Alliance regarding intervention to halt threats to the peace

- this meant that the princes and rulers of both the great

and lesser powers could once again feel secure from both

domestic and foreign threats. This contributed

significantly to the stability in Europe following the

Napoleonic Wars.

C. THE FUNCTIONING CONCERT

The harmony that existed among the allies following the

Congress of Vienna and the Second Paris Peace Treaty did not

last long in its purest form. At the first post war meeting

84

between the powers, the Congress of Aix-la-Chapel le , which

lasted from September to November 1818, the sovereigns and

ministers met to bring a formal end to the military

occupation of France, settle debts, and re-admit France to

the group of great powers. Despite the fact that the

Congress accomplished much useful work, it also marked the

beginning of a rift between the liberal democratic power of

England and the autocratic power of Russia, while Metternich

of Austria attempted to mediate between the two.

The rift that developed between England and Russia was

mainly the result of the differences that existed in the

structures of society and government of the two powers.

Although in the period immediately following the Napoleonic

Wars, England entered into a period of conservatism as

evidenced by such reactionary measures as the prohibition of

public meetings and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus

following the murder of a gunsmith proprietor in November

1816 at Spa Fields, the fundamental structure of English

institutions were still liberal, and this significantly

limited the range of options available to English statesmen.

Alexander of Russia faced no such constraints from the

autocratic structure of Russian society, and therefore he

was relatively unlimited in his policy options.

Alexander's relative freedom from domestic constraints

in international affairs was demonstrated at the Congress of

Aix-la-Chapelle when he proposed a new Alliance Solidaire

85

that was designed to strengthen the Holy Alliance and would

have guaranteed not only each powers territories and

possessions, but the existing form of government that had

been established. This proposal would have established a

tight organization of Europe and would have permitted a

virtually unlimited right of intervention by the powers in

the internal affairs of others. Alexander's scheme was

dismissed brusquely by Castlereagh, whose policies had

already been attacked in Parliament for their leniency

towards Russia. Additionally, Canning, as well as other

members of the Cabinet, were already raising objections to

England's entanglements in continental affairs.

Castlereagh ' s opposition to Alexander's proposal was

supported by Metternich but for different reasons. Although

Metternich was not opposed in principle to a scheme that

guaranteed the existing order, he had no intention of

allowing Russia a voice in every European concern or of

making Austria's policy dependent on Alexander's consent.

Still, Metternich desired to keep his Russian options open

and ensure England's continued involvement on the continent/

and therefore he persuaded the Tsar that his proposal was

unnecessary because the Holy Alliance ensured that the

various governments of Europe were guided by common

principles. Metternich's logic was successful in inducing

Alexander to withdraw his proposal and to avert a

potentially decisive break in relations between England and

Russia

.

86

The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle , despite its success in

concluding the occupation of France and re-integrating it

back into the European system through the Quintuple Alliance

in ]818, demonstrated the fundamental differences that

existed amongst the allies. England moved back towards a

more traditional isolationist policy and made it clear that

England would only become involved on the continent to

prevent the recurrence of French aggression or in times of

great emergency. The continental powers of Russia and

Austria, however, -were much more concerned with preventing

conflicts from occurring. The Central Powers did not enjoy

the internal and external security that England had obtained

as an island and therefore they favored intervention to

maintain the status quo. It is in some ways a historical

curiosity, although not at all surprising, that the country

that produced the statesman who so stridently advocated the

formation of a Congress system also was the country that in

effect eventually doomed the conference system, a pattern

that would be repeated by the United States after World War

I.

The drift away from continental entanglements by

England, although temporarily causing concern to Metternich,

who had relied on England's support to counter Russia's

increased influence in Eastern Europe/ also served to unite

the Central Powers as Metternich realized that cooperation

with Russia would be necessary in the absence of England.

87

Metternich • s need for a reconciliation with Russia was

further demonstrated when Alexander opposed the Carlsbad

Decree of 1819 that was supported by Austria and Prussia.

The Decree was designed to suppress liberal political

movements that had emerged in the German states, but

Alexander was unwilling to allow Austria to intervene in

Germany in order to prevent increased Austrian influence in

Germany. Additionally, Alexander's brother-in-law was the

King of Wuerttemberg , one of the rulers who had granted a

liberal constitution that the Carlsbad Decree sought to

overturn. In a show of support for his brother-in-law, in

the fall of 1819 Alexander massed troops in Poland as a

threat to Vienna. " Conflict was only avoided by the

astute diplomacy of Castlereagh. Although Castlereagh could

not openly support Austria's and Prussia 'a interference in

the domestic affairs of other states, he did voice his

approval when he stated: "We are always glad to see evil

germs destroyed without the power to give our approval

openly." Castlereagh was able, however, to turn the

necessity of remaining divorced from entanglements on the

continent into a virtue when he was able to persuade

Alexander that the Carlsbad Decree was only a legitimate

effort to insure domestic tranquility, and no intervention

by the other powers was necessary. Castlereagh made it

clear that he expected the Russians to exercise the same

restraint that England had, and thus the limited

88

Anglo-Austro cooperation was able to frustrate Russian

intervention

.

Despite the success that Metternich obtained in

containing Russian expansion into the affairs of Central

Europe, Metternich realized that this was only possible

because Austria was strong enough to reverse the

revolutionary changes taking places in Germany, and England

through inaction was effective in supporting Metternich 's

goals. However, if the conflict had been larger, English

inaction could have resulted in Austria and Russia becoming

involved in conflict over Central Europe. It was this

possibility that made Metternich realize that an eventual

accommodation with Russia was necessary. The social

upheavals that occurred in 1820 and 1821 further

demonstrated Austria's need for cooperation with Russia.

D. THE RISE OF CONSERVATIVE SOLIDARITY IN THE EAST

From 1820 to 1821, four revolutions broke out in Europe

- in Spain (1820), Naples (1820), Fortugal (1820), and

Piedmont (1821). Alexander, who had previously demonstrated

his willingness to accept liberal reforms when they were

introduced as in Germany by the legitimate ruler of the

state, now displayed his unwillingness to allow liberal

reforms to be forced upon a ruler by revolution or the

doctrine of the sovereignty of the people. Metternich, by

contrast, was opposed to liberalism as a matter of principle

regardless of how it became embedded in society.

89

The revolution in Spain began on 1 January when unpaid

troops mutinied at Cadiz, and in March the partisans of the

Constitution of 1812 seized power in Madrid. Alexander

wanted allied intervention to restore order, 10 but

Metternich was concerned over maintaining the balance of

power should Russian troops march across Europe. England

was also concerned with Russian intervention, and as a

result the English Cabinet issued their State Paper of 5 May

1820 which stated that the alliance was "...never intended

as a union for the government of the world or for the

superintendence of the internal affairs of other

States.... No country having a representative system of

Government could act upon [such a general principle ]... .We

shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the

system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act

upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. The

Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its

i qoriginal formation." This paper rejected collective

intervention unless a direct military danger was imminent,

and although this ran contrary to Metternich's general

doctrine, Metternich acguiesced to isolate Russia.

Although Metternich was able to overlook the situation

in Spain, and the combination of Austria and England was

able to diplomatically restrain Alexander, the uprising in

Naples in July 1820 produced a direct challenge to Austrian

control in Italy. Alexander, appalled by the liberal

90

risings called for a formal conference to discuss the

revolutionary problems. This provided a difficult dilemma

for Metternich because he could not idly sit back and watch

conditions deteriorate in Italy as he had in Spain.

Additionally, failure by Austria to act could result in

Russian intervention alone. Finally, England supported

intervention to restore order, but since the uprisings

mainly affected Austria, it only supported intervention by

Austria, both as a means of forestalling Russian advances as

well as a means of saving England from having to reverse the

policy it had announced during the Spanish crises. In an

attempt to reach a compromise agreement, Metternich agreed

to a congress of sovereigns at Troppau, although England

agreed to only send its ambassador at Venice as an observer.

The Congress at Troppau convened on 23 October 1820 and

was essentially a meeting of the three eastern powers of

Austria, Prussia and Russia and marked the beginning of the

cleavage between the conservative powers and England, which

was later jointed by France. Metternich dominated the

conference, but to obtain Alexander's consent to restore

order in Naples, Metternich had to agree that the

intervention would be in the name of the Alliance. This

requirement resulted in the "preliminary protocol" of 19

November which proclaimed: "States which have undergone a

change of government, due to revolution, the results of

which threaten other states, ipso facto cease to be members

91

of the European Alliance, and remain excluded from it until

their situation gives guarantee for legal order and

stability. If, owing to such alterations, immediate danger

threaten other states, the powers bind themselves, by

peaceful means, or if need be by arms, to bring back the

70guilty state into the bosom of the Great Alliance."

After completion of the preliminary protocol, it was agreed

that another congress should be held at Laibach in January.

The Congress at Laibach convened on 12 January 1821 and

resulted in the formal empowerment of Austria to put down

the revolution in Italy. The preliminary protocol reached

between the three conservative powers at Troppau, however,

was opposed by England and France, not because they

supported the revolutionary movements, but because they

opposed the principle that the agreement was based upon.

The English government issued a public protest on 19 January

1821, and stated that His Majesty's Government would

"...never consent to charge itself as a member of the

Alliance with the moral responsibility of administering a

general European policy of this description." By the

time of the protest, however, eighty thousand Austrian

troops had marched into Northern Italy and ninety thousand

Russian troops had crossed over into Europe to back up the

Austrian actions.

Despite the English opposition to the "preliminary

protocol", the English were relieved that only Austria, and

92

not the Russians or French were authorized to act in Italy.

English support for Austria's actions was demonstrated by

Castlereagh when he remarked to Metternich that "...you

would have done better to have acted first and talked

99 ...afterwards." Thus Metternich's skillful diplomacy had

once again been able to prevent Russian expansion into

Europe, and although England had now effectively withdrawn

from the alliance, this was mainly because of procedural

disputes rather than to opposition of the alliance goals.

Although the Congress at Laibach firmly established

Metternich's position as the leading statesmen of Europe,

during the conference an issue arose that would later break

the solidarity of the conservative eastern powers. In March

1821 a Greek uprising in Moldavia occurred against Ottoman

rule. The uprising placed Alexander in a difficult position

because had he supported the Greek revolutionaries, he may

have been able to gain influence in Turkey and secure

Russian access to the Mediterranean, a long cherished goal.

Supporting the Greeks, however, would have meant violating

the principle that Alexander had espoused regarding the

overthrow of legitimate governments by revolutionaries.

Under strong pressure by Metternich, who realized that any

expansion of Russian political influence to the

Mediterranean would jeopardize English maritime interests

and could lead to conflict, Alexander finally denounced the

revolution, and dismissed his Greek foreign minister who had

been supportive of the Greek uprising.

93

By the time the Congress at Laibach ended on 12 May

1821, Metternich had skillfully employed the doctrine of

intervention to ensure the defeat of two revolutionary

movements and further solidified Austria's position in

Italy. Additionally, by using the conservative doctrine to

limit Russian support for the Greeks, Metternich had ensured

that Russian and English interests would not lead to

conflict in the Balkans. Although Metternich had now

achieved his goals in Italy, the revolution in Spain was

still unresolved. Alexander still wanted to intervene, or

as a minimum to authorize the French to intervene to reverse

the revolution. Metternich avoided any committment to

action in Spain in order not to force England into

opposition, although at the final declarations at Laibach

the eastern powers restated their commitment in principle to

the doctrine of Troppau . And, finally, these powers also

agreed to participate in another conference the next year to

discuss progress in Italy and review the situation in Spain

and Fortuga 1

.

The final full gathering of the European concert of

powers occurred at Verona in October 1822. The revolution

in Spain was still a source of concern to Metternich, who

realized that England's support against Russian intervention

would be necessary to thwart Alexander's intentions. The

likelihood of England's support was greatly diminished

however when Castlereagh, who had planned to attend the

94

conference in person, ended his life on 12 August.

Castlereagh was not replaced until five weeks later by

George Canning, and the Duke of Wellington was named to take

Castlereagh ' s position at Verona in the interim. Canning's

appointment had a profound affect on the alliance. Although

he was politically experienced and well informed in foreign

affairs, he did not posses the European outlook of

Castlereagh but instead favored the traditional English

isolationist role. As England's support for involvement on

the continent declined, Metternich was gradually forced to

give in to the demands of Alexander for action in Spain, and

as a result Austria ended up supporting French intervention

2?on the Iberian peninsula. Although England's active

participation in the alliance had already ended, the French

intervention in Spain caused England to openly break with

the alliance. Canning perhaps best summed up the English

attitude toward foreign affairs after the Congress at Verona

when he remarked "For Alliance, read England, and you have

the clue to my policy. Every country for itself and God for

us all." 24

Although England had now essentially returned to its

insular position, English interests on the continent still

required England to periodically assume an active role to

safeguard its interests. The greatest danger to England's

interest would have been the emergence of a Franco-Russo

alliance which would have dominated the continent.

95

Fortunately for England, the necessity of English diplomatic

maneuvering to prevent a Franco-Eusso rapprochement had been

substantially reduced by the congresses of Troppau, Laibach

and Verona which effectively transferred Austria's

dependence from England to Russia. Austria had now assumed

the role of maintaining the balance of power on the

continent. It did so by deterring French attempts at

hegemony with the Austro-Eusso entente and preventing

Eussian expansion through the skillful diplomacy of

Metternich. Despite Austria's mediating role, however,

England still remained engaged on the continent. In April

of 1823, when 100,000 French soldiers crossed the Pyrenees

to suppress the Spanish revolt, Canning intervened

diplomatically to ensure that the French occupation was only

temporary, that the territorial integrity of Portugal would

be respected, and that France would make no attempt to

recover the rebel Spanish colonies. Despite the

relative success of the English diplomatic efforts, the

Spanish crises revealed the weakness of England's insular

position. Without the support of another power England was

virtually powerless to halt the actions of one of the great

powers, and thus Canning realized England would have to

cooperate with the conservative eastern powers where their

interests clashed with those of England rather than oppose

them.

96

E. THE NEAR EAST HOLDS THE CONCERT TOGETHER

England's cooperation with Russia was the result of the

continued chaos in the Balkans between the Greeks and the

Turks. The inability of the Turks to rapidly defeat the

Greek uprising was a source of concern because both England

and Russia were sympathetic to the Greek cause, albeit for

different reasons. The English were sympathetic to the

Greeks, who were assumed to be the heirs of ancient Greek

civilization, and as a result they recognized the insurgent

Greeks as belligerents in 1823, and in 1824 delivered the

first of a series of English loans thereby making themselves

the financiers of the revolution. Russia, by contrast, was

sympathetic toward the Greeks because of common religious

beliefs and the Russian position as protectors of Eastern

Orthodoxy. The common concern by the English and Russians

for the Greeks resulted in a conference of the powers at St.

Petersburg in 1824 to discuss Alexander's plan for creating

three autonomous Greek principalities. The other powers

were opposed to this policy as it was seen as an attempt to

weaken Turkey and strengthen Russian influence by

establishing client states. Metternich was adamantly

opposed to any such plan, even after the Turkish Sultan's

vassal Mehemet Ali, the ruler of Egypt, began to dispatch

forces to Turkey. The failure of another conference at St.

Petersberg in 1825 resulted in Russia cooperating directly

with England.

97

The cooperation that developed between Russia and

England in the Near East resulted in the Anglo-Russian

Protocol of 4 April 1826. The Protocol called for the

Greeks to remain a dependency of the Ottoman Empire and pay

an annual tribute to the Porte, in exchange for which the

Greeks would enjoy complete liberty of conscience, freedom

of commerce and exclusive conduct of their own internal

government. Additionally, Article III left open the

possibility of independent intervention by Russia although

the terms of the arrangements specified in Article I were to

be the basis for any reconciliation of the intervention.

The Anglo-Russian Protocol formed the basis for the

Treaty of London signed on 6 July 1827 by the English,

French and Russian governments. The French had become

involved in the Near East affair mainly because it saw the

possibility of intervention in Greece as a means to

demonstrate their recovery in the Mediterranean as well as

maintaining good relations with Russia in hope of breaking

free of the constraints imposed upon the European powers.

The three powers attempted to force an armistice on the

Ottoman Empire and implement the Anglo-Russian Protocol by

enforcing a blockade of the Morea . However, on October 20,

1827 the allied fleets trapped the Turkish navy at the Bay

of Navarino, and in the confusion fighting erupted and the

Turkish fleet was destroyed. When word of the conflict at

Navarino reached Constantinople, the Turks proclaimed a holy

war against Russia.98

The Russo-Turkish War commenced in April 1828, and

although the strength of the Ottoman Empire had been in

decline, it was not an easy victory for the Russian troops.

By August of 1829, despite stiff resistance, the Russian

armies had marched down the Balkan peninsula and laid seige

to the city of Adrianople. Russian troops were now within

striking distance of Constantinople and thus raised the

possibility that Russia would conquer the city and destroy

the empire. The French viewed the Russian military

victories and possible territorial expansion as an

opportunity to link the war in the Near East with the

rivalries that existed between the powers in Europe. Just

before the signing of the Treaty of Adrianople on 14

September 1829, the French prime minister Polignac proposed

to the Russians a plan for territorial revision that would

have granted Russia extensive territorial gains in Turkey in

exchange for French gains at the expense of the united

Netherlands. Despite Russia's military conquests however,

Nicholas was in no position to support a proposal that would

have destroyed the agreements reached at Vienna.

Additionally, continued Russian presence in the Near East

would have resulted in strong opposition from England and

Austria, and therefore Nicholas did not support the French

proposal

.

Although the French proposal had been rejected by

Russia, the French diplomatic initiatives demonstrated that

99

France was no longer content with the provisions of the

agreements reached at Vienna. The French desire to assume a

greater role in European politics and break free from the

constraints placed on it by the other great powers was

further demonstrated when, on the pretext of suppressing

piracy in the western Mediterranean, the French bombarded

and occupied Algiers. The renewed aggressiveness of

French foreign policy caused alarm. Fears of French

imperialism re-emerged, particularly in England where French

actions were seen as a direct threat to English naval

supremacy. The remaining powers were not overly concerned,

however, because the center of the European continent

remained relatively stable. This condition changed

dramatically however when revolution once again swept

through France in July of 1830.

F. REVOLUTION RETURNS IN FRANCE

The revolution in France resulted in the replacement of

Charles X with the Duke of Orleans, Louis Fhilippe, and once

again raised the possibility of revolution and war in

Europe. The revolution presented another set of challenges

to both England and the eastern autocratic powers. Although

all the powers were concerned with the possibility of

renewed French aggression, Metternich was fearful that any

joint allied intervention would result in Russian armies

marching into Europe. Similarly, Prussia had no desire to

100

see its lands turned into a battlefield, and therefore

Frederick William III was cautious not to advocate an

aggressive response. Finally, England was in the midst of

liberal reform as the Tory government came under

increasing attack as an aristocratic system. When demands

for liberal domestic reforms increased, some of this liberal

sentiment spilled over into foreign policy. As a result

England became relatively more sympathetic to the French

cause, although to state that it fully supported France

would be untrue. Only Nicholas of Russia desired to take

dramatic action, but without the support of the other

powers, he could accomplish little unilaterally. The

combination of these circumstances resulted in Metternich,

in consultation with Nesselrode of Russia, issuing the

"Chiffon of Carlsbad" whereby the two governments agreed not

to intervene in French internal affairs unless France

oninaugurated an active policy abroad.

In an effort to preserve the peace, England recognized

Louis Philippe as the legitimate constitutional ruler of

France and the Austrians and the Prussians quickly followed

suit. The Austrians hoped that by recognizing the new king

that France would recognize Austria's dominant position in

Italy while Prussia hoped to ensure peace on the Rhine.

Nicholas of Russia, however, did not adopt the conciliatory

attitude of the other powers but instead undertook

significant measures against the revolutionary movement.

101

Although these vere largely ineffective without the

cooperation of the other powers, Nicholas' actions

significantly undermined the Franco-Russian relationship

established during the crises in the Near East.

The fall of the Bourbon monarchy in France increased the

pressure for reforms in England with the revolution being

warmly received by the Whigs and radicals. In November

1830, the Tory government was replaced by a Whig government

committed to parliamentary reform. Although England was

still concerned with containing France within its 1815

borders, Metternich and many other European conservatives

viewed the English reforms as an onslaught on the

established order. Liberal politicians were quick to point

out that the great powers were now aligned into two rival

groups: an eastern autocratic alignment and a western

liberal entente.

The formation of two rival groups, although in some ways

correct, was really illusory. England was able to exploit

French fears of isolation and encirclement to render France

subservient to England's interest, while in the east Austria

and Prussia were hostage to their perception of Russian

might. Additionally, since England, Austria and Prussia

were always guarding against possible Russian expansion,

they still shared mutual interests. Finally, England,

Austria, Prussia and Russia still feared French aggression

and therefore shared common interests as well. Thus,

102

although it is true that both England and France felt

compelled to resist absolutism, the commonality of interests

among the victors of Waterloo dominated over any ideological

groupings that they may have been placed into.

Perhaps the most important factor that determined

European relations after 1830 and divided Europe into two

opposing camps was the events in the Near East. In late

1831 Mehemet Ali, the pasha of Egypt/ sought to extend his

control over Palestine/ Syria and Arabia. The Egyptian

forces were opposed by the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud IT,

however, by December of 1832 the Egyptian forces had won a

series of victories and were threatening to overrun Asia

Minor and take Constantinople itself. Austria promoted

collective action by the powers to preserve the integrity of

the Ottoman Empire, but when discussions between Austria and

England bogged down, the Sultan requested aid from Russia.

The Russian intervention in February 1833 saved the Ottoman

Empire, but prior to the Russian withdrawal the tsar

32concluded a treaty at Unkiar Skelessi on 8 July 1833.

The treaty gave Russia expanded influence in the Ottoman

Empire, a serious blow to England's interest.

The Russian diplomatic victory also increased England's

suspicions of Austria's policy as Palmerston believed,

although probably incorrectly, that Metternich was privy to

Russian intentions and had deliberately misled England.

England's suspicion increased however when Nicholas and the

103

Austrian Emperor Francis and Metternich met at

Muenchengraetz and concluded a formal alliance that

recognized the right of any sovereign to summon the aid of

the eastern powers if threatened by revolution.

The solidarity of the eastern powers to put down the

liberal movement all over Europe was a concern to the

liberal English ministry as well as France. To counter the

conservative eastern powers, England, France, Portugal and

Spain established a quadruple alliance in 1834. The

alliance, although formed to safeguard the Portuguese and

Spanish queens from the reactionary pretenders Dom Miguel

and Don Carlos respectively, became an effective

counterbalance to the eastern powers. According to

Palmerston the treaty established "...a quadruple alliance

among the constitutional states of the West, which will

serve as a powerful counterpoise to the Holy Alliance of the

"3*3

East." Although liberals throughout Europe viewed the

treaty as an organization against autocratic power, the

ideological differences that existed were still subordinated

to geographical interests, particularly in the Near East.

G. THE RETURN OF THE EASTERN QUESTION

The conflict of interests that resulted in the Near

Eastern Crises of 1839-41 demonstrated the relative

unimportance of ideological views amongst the powers.

Palmerston believed that Turkey should undergo an extensive

104

program of reform to revitalize and transform it into a

modern state able to look after its own interests and be

released from its dependence on Russia. Additionally,

England was opposed to any Egyptian expansion into Turkey.

Russia, although it shared no desire to strengthen Turkey,

also opposed Egyptian expansion. The desire to halt

Egyptian expansion therefore provided a common interest

between Russia and England in the Near East.

Although England and France shared elements of a common

ideology, French policies in the Near East diverged from

those of England. Throughout the 1830s, following the

French move into Algiers, France had pursued a policy of

expansion in North Africa, and by the late 1830s French

policy in the Mediterranean was decidedly anti-English. The

French believed additionally that a close relationship with

Egypt was an integral part of their Mediterranean policy.

Thus when conflict broke out between Turkey and Egypt in

June 1839, France was supportive of Egypt while Russia and

England supported Turkey.

The Egyptians quickly inflicted heavy losses on the

Turkish forces at Nazib, and when combined with the death of

the Sultan Mahmud II, Turkey was in a state of panic.

Metternich seized the opportunity to regain the diplomatic

initiative, and through discussions with the great power

ambassadors in Vienna, he was able to issue a collective

note on 27 July that informed the sultan that the powers

105

were preparing to intervene. Nicholas had not approved of

the action although he did not reject it because he realized

that any unilateral action by Russia could result in war

with England. Additionally, Anglo-Russo cooperation

presented an opportunity for Russia to separate the

Anglo-French entente, thereby isolating France, the country

that Nicholas considered the breeding ground of revolution

in Europe.

France's support of Egypt, and its desire not to see

Egypt deprived of its gains resulted in the isolation of

France. France's isolation was shortlived, however, as the

French began to threaten war against England and on the

Rhine if the coercion of Egypt continued. Since ustria and

Prussia would bear the brunt of any French aggression,

Metternich used his influence to bring France back into the

concert. Similarly, Louis Philippe also sought to end

France's brief isolation, and as a result, the Thiers

ministry was abandoned and a new ministry was formed. The

change of government in France, combined with the submission

of Mehemet Ali ended the crises, and the agreement concluded

between the five powers in June 1841 regarding the straits

effectively ended France's isolation.

H. SUMMARY

The international system that existed from 1815 to 1848

was a period characterized by general peace and stability

106

throughout Europe. Although the French Revolution and the

resulting Napoleonic Wars had a tremendous influence on the

statesmen of the period, the stability amongst the great

powers of Europe was the result of many of the same factors

that promoted stability in Europe during the eighteenth

century

.

The Congress of Vienna re-established the stability of

the ruling elites of Europe that had been undermined by the

French Revolution. Although the domestic order of Europe

was no longer as highly structured, the fundamental

principles underlying the dynastic order were restored.

Compensating for the decline in the structure of European

society, however, was the general guarantee by the great

powers to protect both one another and the lesser powers

from French expansionist desires. The eastern powers,

additionally, were willing to go beyond merely protecting

one another from French aggression and protect one another

from domestic revolution as well. The combination of these

guarantees produced a period of great elite stability

throughout Europe.

The statesmen at Vienna also made the conscientious

decision to avoid redrawing the map of Europe along

nationalistic lines, thus suppressing any conflicts that may

have developed along these lines, although only temporarily.

Although refusing to accept the new force of nationalism as

a guiding factor in European relations, the great powers,

107

nevertheless, vere able to ensure a high degree of

flexibility in the international system.

A third factor that the period from 1815 to 1848 had in

common with the eighteenth century was the relative

unimportance of ideology and the lack of widely divergent

ideological views amongst the ruling elite. Although

England was substantially more liberal than the remainder of

Europe, and after 1830 there was much talk of an

Anglo-French liberal alignment, the ideological differences

between the powers were never important enough to undermine

the general diplomatic relationships between the powers.

Ideological differences never kept any of the powers from

reaching agreements to preserve the peace or the balance of

power as evidenced by the numerous rapprochements between

the powers throughout this period.

A fourth factor was the return to an internationalist

perspective amongst the ruling elites of Europe. The

leaders of the great powers were now much more concerned

with the maintenance of the balance of power on the

continent, and even though the system of congresses had

broken down by 1822, the statesmen of Europe still exhibited

a high degree of awareness in international affairs.

Fifth, the system created at the Congress of Vienna, and

great power action during this period prevented large scale

conflicts from developing in the center of the European

continent. The European powers not only took quick and

108

decisive action to stop revolutionary movements that may

have threatened the peace on the continent, they were also

careful to prevent large coalition actions from occurring on

the continent. Limitating coalition actions was

tremendously important in ensuring that great power

rivalries would not erupt over conflicts of interests during

joint actions.

The end product of these conditions, finally, was a

return to a system that could once again be characterized as

one of limited means and limited ends. None of the great

powers was willing to embark upon a continental hegemonic

drive for fear of opposition from the other powers, and all

powers were careful to not endanger another's vital

interests through unilateral action.

The moderate and limited nature of international

diplomacy was once again altered, however, by the

revolutions that swept through Europe in 1848. Although the

level of violence would not approach that of the French

Revolutionary period, the revolutions of 1848 significantly

destabilized the international system.

109

Gordon A. Craig and Alexander L. George, Force andStatecraft Diplomatic Problems of Our Time , (New York:Oxford University Press, 1983), 29.

Harold Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna/a study inAllied unity; 1812-1822 , (New York: The Viking Press, 1968),27.

Theodore Ropp, War in the Modern World , (New York:Collier Books, 1985), 137.

Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich,Castlereaqh and the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 , (Boston:Houghton Mifflin Company, 1957), 101-3.

Charles Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston1830-1841 , vol. 1, (London: G. Bell & Sons, Ltd., 1951),277.

6 Ibid.

7Charles Webster, The Congress of Vienna 1814-1815 ,

(New York: Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1963), 51.

Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in WorldPolitics International Systems in Perspective , (Boston:Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 56.

QKissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereaqhand the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 , 186.

]0 Ibid.

Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 , alt. ed . , (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 18.

12 Arthur J. May, The Age of Metternich 1814-1848 , rev.ed., (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1967), 17.

i -a

Frederick B. Artz, Reaction and Revolution1814-1832 , vol. 13 of The Rise of Modern Europe , ed . WilliamL. Langer (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1934),122.

Barbara Jelavich, A Century of Russian ForeignPolicy 1814-1914 , The Lippincott History Series, ed . RobertF. Byrnes, (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1964),46.

•

15 Artz, Reaction and Revolution 1814-1832

,

161.

110

Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereaghand the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 , 222-6.

17. .

Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy1814-1914 , 49.

1 fi .

Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereaqhand the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 , 245.

19 Ibid., 249.

20 C. W. Crawley, "International Relations 1815-1830,"War and Peace in an Age of Upheaval 1793-1830 , ed . C. W.Crawley, vol. 9 of The New Cambridge Modern History , gen ed .

J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957),675.

21 Artz, Reaction and Revolution 1814-1832 , 164-5.

2 9Nicolson, The Congress of Vienna/a study in Alliedunity: 1812-1822 , 268.

23 Crawley, "International Relations 1815-1830," 677.

Kissinger, A World Restored Metternich, Castlereaghand the Problems of Peace 1812-1822 , 314-5.

25 Crawley, "International Relations 1815-1830," 680.

26 F. R. Bridge and Roger Bullen, The Great Powers andthe European States System 1815-1914 , (London: Longman GroupLimited, 1980), 42.

27 Ibid., 45.

2 8Matthew Smith Anderson, The Great Powers and theNear East 1774-1923 , (London: Edward Arnold, 1970), 32.

29Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841 ,

277.

JW Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the EuropeanStates System 1815-1914 , 47.

31Jelavich, A Century of Russian Foreign Policy

1814-1914 , 93.

32 Bridge and Bullen, The Great Powers and the EuropeanStates System 1815-1914, 49.

Ill

-^Gordon Craig, "The System of Alliances and theBalance of Power," The Zenith of European Power 1830-1870ed. J. P. T. Bury, vol. 10 of The New Cambridge ModernHistory , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1957), 251.

34Webster, The Foreign Policy of Palmerston 1830-1841 ,

397.

Craig, "The System of Alliances and the Balance ofPower," 256.

112

V. 1848: THE UNDERMINING OF THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

The liberal, democratic and nationalistic revolutions

that swept across Europe in 1848, although shortlived as

reactionary forces quickly reasserted themselves,

nonetheless had a destabilizing and lasting effect upon the

international system. Both liberal and conservative

ideologies vere undermined by the revolution, leading one

historian to comment that the revolution "...brought about

the end of the world. Being the practical application of an

ideology that sprang from the French Revolution and the

First Empire, it can be said, by its failure, to have

exhausted that ideology. Thus it is an end rather than a

beginning, for subsequent events were the fruit of different

ideas. 1 While it is true that liberal and conservative

ideologies were in some respects discredited, the

revolutions of 1848 had another and more important and

lasting consequence - the triumph of nationalism over

liberalism and its subsequent destructive effects on the

international system as it undermined the principles that

had created stability in Europe during both the eighteenth

century and the period from 1815 to 1848.

113

A. THE BACKGROUND CAUSES OF THE REVOLUTIONS

Although it is not necessary to examine in great detail

the background causes of the revolutions, and the fact that

each revolution had its own unigue causes and vas the

product of each country's unigue historical experience, all

the revolutions were influenced by several general

conditions that existed throughout Europe. The first common

factor was the economic crises that resulted from the poor

cereal harvests in 1BA C> and 1846. The ensuing food shortage

contributed to the substantial rise in food prices

throughout Europe, often times by over 50 percent, with

complex affects on commercial, financial and industrial

activity that was already suffering from a cyclical

downswing. Besides the obvious effect that rising food

prices had on the poor people in both town and country, as

larger portions of income were spent by them on foodstuffs,

expenditures on manufactured goods declined, resulting in

the unemployment of both urban and rural industrial workers.

The pre-industr i a 1 subsistence crises, when combined with

the overproduction and underconsumption crises more typical

of an industrial economy, were particularly difficult for

ruling elites to deal with because Europe was in a

transition from a rural and agricultural society to an urban

and industrial one.

The economic crises created a second common factor,

namely the intensification of social problems that had

1 \A

developed as the result of industrialization and population

growth. The expansion of these two areas, and the

urbanization that accompanied them, resulted in a rise in

social tensions that frequently produced strikes,

demonstrations, increased criminality, and food riots such

as the "potato revolt" in Eerlin in 1847. As a result of

these disturbances, the ruling elites were forced to deal

with the problems of maintaining law and order. In addition

to these pressing social problems, the governing elites were

faced with demands from the rising middle class for

concessions regarding censorship, widening of the electoral

franchise and the establishment of representative

assemblies. The middle class was the decisive group in the

revolutionary process because it possessed the

organizational capacity for mobilization of wider circles of

both the bourgeoisie and the masses and could, therefore,

politicize their discontent.

The economic and social problems produced a third common

factor, namely a political crisis. The aristocratic

ministers of the conservative elites feared that concessions

would only open the flood gates to further demands as

occurred in France during the French Revolution, and,

therefore, the ruling elites sought to preserve the status

quo. This reluctance to respond to pressure for change

resulted in growing political polarization. The economic,

social and political crises represents the background causes

115

to the revolutions of 1848. The effect that the revolutions

of 18^8 had on the international system must now be

examined

.

B. THE OUTBREAK AND SPREAD OF REVOLUTION ACROSS EUROPE

The first outbreak of revolution occurred in January

1848 in Palermo and vas essentially a separatist movement

2against rule from Naples, but its impact on the

international system vas minimal. Of decisive importance

vas the revolution that occurred in Faris in February of

1848. In viev of the previously discussed economic, social

and political crises, opposition leaders to the unpopular

Guizot ministry sought to have him replaced by a cabinet

that vould adopt political and social reforms. The

opposition had planned to hold demonstrations on 22 February

1848 near the Champs d' Elysees, but upon learning that the

government had planned to have police disband the

demonstrators, the leaders decided to cancel the

demonstrations. Radical leaders and hard core activists

Alexandre Ledru-Foll in and the poet Alphonse Louis-Marie de

Lamartine, hovever, decided to continue with the

demonstrations

.

The radical demonstrators and police clashed on the

morning of 22 February, and although fighting developed, it

vas only sporadic and the police were able to control the

situation. On 23 February, hovever, the crovds vere larger

116

and more aggressive, and the police could not adequately

control the demonstrators. This resulted in the National

Guard being ordered into action. Since the National Guard

was comprised of a large number of the disenchanted and

radical workers, however, the Guard was ineffective as it

began to fraternize with the demonstrators. Faced with

rising opposition Louise Philippe dismissed Guizot in the

afternoon. Guizot's dismissal was too little too late, and

on the evening of 22 February angry mobs and elements of the

police force known as the Municipal Guard, clashed on the

Boulevard des Capucines with 40 to 50 people being killed.

Shortly thereafter the French citizens put up more than 1500

barricades on the Paris streets, and by the afternoon of 24

February a panicked Louise Philippe had abdicated and was in

the process of fleeing the country. Despite the turmoil,

Lamartine was able to declare a republic, establish a

provisional government and install himself as foreign

minister .

When news of the events in France reached the capitals

of Europe, fears of French aggression combined with the

widespread social discontent that already existed to produce

a period of tremendous elite insecurity and tension. The

European monarchs responded by preparing for war. In

Germany troops were mobilized. On 4 March 1848, Prussia

ordered its armed forces to the Rhine and placed them on

alert. Holland and Belgium increased their readiness along

117

the French border. On 1 1 March, Tsar Nicholas placed his

armies on a state of alert.

Meanvhile, in Vienna, Metternich embarked on an

aggressive diplomatic campaign to concert vays of preventing

France from once again flooding its neighbors with

revolutionary propaganda. The bourgeoisie in Austria

immediately became convinced that Metternich would launch a

crusade resulting in heavy expenditures and inflation, and

as a result there was a run on the banks in Vienna and other

large cities. This financial panic added to the

instabilities already present within the empire, and allowed

Lajos Kossuth to attack the conservative ministry in a

passionate speech to the Hungarian Diet on ? March in which

he demanded the "...transformation of our present system of

government by committees into a responsible and independent

Hungarian Ministry." Nationalism had now become an issue

in the Habsburg Empire.

Pressure began to mount on France as the diplomacy of

the eastern powers and their military mobilization resulted

in the encirclement of France. In an attempt to prevent

France from being opposed by a hostile Europe, Lamartine

issued his Manifesto to Europe on 4 March 1848 in which he

declared "...the treaties of 1815 have no legal existence in

the eyes of the French republic; nevertheless the

territorial provisions of these treaties are a fact which

the republic admits as a basis and starting point in its

118

relations vith other nations. "y Kith this declaration

Lamartine had attempted to appease both the radical elements

of French society by repudiating the treaties of 1815 yet

acknovledging the existence of the balance of power system

and territorial divisions reached at the Congress of Vienna.

Lamartine's declaration, although regarded by many as a

call to war, did offer some diplomatic encouragement to

England which still supported the policy of non-intervention

in domestic affairs. The English foreign secretary

Palmerston used the declaration to encourage the eastern

powers to give France assurances that "...so long as France

is not aggressive, no aggression will be made upon her."

The powers thus had reacted to France in 1848 the same way

that they had in 1830, and it was hoped that the restrained

nature of their reaction would prevent a further

radicali zation of the revolution, and prevent what

Metternich believed would be another attempt at French

hegemony when he compared the events of 1848 to 1791 and

asked "...can 1793 fail to follow?" 9 The cautious

response by the great powers to the events in France, and

the delicate diplomacy conducted by Lamartine, prevented any

contemplated intervention against France. The rapid success

and relative ease with which the French were able to

overthrow their government, however, helped to encourage

the liberal and nationalistic elements throughout Europe to

act against the already unstable conservative elites.

119

In Vienna a tense meeting of the Lover Austrian Diet

took place on 1? March as a large crovd of disenchanted

workers and radical students assembled to protest the

current conditions. The subsequent events were similar to

those of Paris. Troops vere called in to clear the streets

and restore order, but in the midst of the general malaise

one detachment of troops opened fire and killed four people

and wounded many others. It may have been possible for

the Emperor Ferdinand to restore order had he been decisive

and authorized Prince Alfred Kindischgraetz to intervene

militarily, but instead Ferdinand had a loss of will and

submitted to the demands of the people that called for the

withdrawal of troops, the arming of the students, and the

resignation of Metternich.

The resignation of Metternich had devastating

consequences for the remainder of Central Europe. In Venice

the Austrian General Zichy rapidly capitulated to a group of

insurgent workers and peasants. Zichy, unsure of his

support from both Austria and from his Italian troops,

believed his situation to be untenable. Zichy's surrender

was followed by the establishment of a Venetian republic led

by Daniel Manin on 17 March. Once again the Austrian

Empire was being threatened with dismemberment by a

nationalist revolution.

On 18 March, inspired by the events in Paris and Vienna,

a revolt against Austrian rule occurred in Milan when a

120

crovd of 10,000 petitioned for press freedom, citizens'

militias and the election of a parliament. As in Paris and

Vienna, clashes with troops followed and barricades were

erected. The Austrian commander Radetzky was forced to

retreat after five days of bitter street fighting to a

fortified belt between Lake Como and the Piver Po known as

the Quadrilateral.

The revolutions in Austria, coupled with the Habsburg '

s

difficulties in Italy, also had a significant impact on the

situation in Prussia and the Germanic states. In Berlin a

large crowd gathered at the royal palace to listen to a

royal decree from the king Frederick William TV. Although

the king firmly believed in his divine right to rule, the

decree was moderately liberal in that it promised the

abolition of press censorship, a constitution, convening of

a united diet, and a Prussian leadership committed to work

toward German unity. This last point had important

ramifications for the future of the Vienna settlement.

Prussia's goal of a united Germany represented a desire by

one of the great powers to fundamentally alter the balance

of power in Central Europe, and therefore Prussia's action

represented the beginning of the breakdown of the Vienna

system. Although the breakdown would not be completed for

several years, the action illustrates an important point as

Prussia became more inward looking and less concerned with

maintaining the international system, a pattern that would

121

be repeated by the other powers during the revolutionary

period and its aftermath.

Frederick William's decree may have been able to satisfy

the masses, however, when soldiers were seen massed in the

courtyard of the palace, a panic set in amongst the crowd,

and calls for the removal of the army occurred. Frederick

William, upon hearing the growing disenchantment, ordered

his troops to clear the courtyard. Events similar to those

in Faris and Vienna followed, and within a short time

barricades were being resurrected and street fighting

developed .

-

~

The government could easily have put down the rebellion,

in fact by the evening of 18 March many of the barricades

had been destroyed by cannon fire and many of the insurgents

arrested. In the outlying districts, however, resistance

still flourished. The army recommended that the king

abandon the city for his palace at Potsdam while the army

blockaded and bombarded the city. This proposed action was

too harsh for the monarch who had no desire to see the

Berlin population repressed over what he considered the work

of foreign agitators. On the morning of 19 March, Frederick

William halted military operations and ordered the removal

of troops from the city. For the next several days, a

period known as the "Berlin Days," the king enacted a number

of liberal reforms which seemed to complete the

i 4revolution

.

122

C. SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY AFTERMATH

The events of late February and early March had resulted

in the destruction of the alliance of the conservative

eastern powers as veil as the common internationalist

outlook that had existed between them and helped to maintain

the international system. Although there was brief talk of

a formation of a new liberal alliance, particularly from

1 ^Frussia which sought to liberate Poland, the lack of a

common outlook amongst the liberal powers when coupled with

their inability to overcome the limits of their preexisting

dipolomacy prevented a return to a stable international

system. France, despite being strongly positioned to aid

the revolutions in Northern Italy, continued to avoid an

aggressive foreign policy as fears of hostile encirclement

continued to influence the decisions of Lamartine and

others. England, despite its liberal institutions, pursued

a policy of restraining France due to its past experiences

with French hegemony. Prussia sought not only the

liberation of Poland, but also the unification of Germany

under Prussian leadership. The leaders of the multi-ethnic

Austrian Empire were more concerned with preventing the

breakup of the empire by Hungarian, Italian and Czech

separatists, and therefore their energies were mainly

directed inward. The inability of the ruling elites to

achieve an internationalist outlook as well as break free

from their preexisting diplomatic tendencies resulted in

123

18^8 becoming "a great moment tragically missed" for the

liberals of Europe.

The lack of a common international perspective among the

elites and their inability to overcome the restraints of the

pre-existing diplomacy, particularly on the part of England

and France, hindered a return to stability in Europe. The

instability of the liberal elites following their rapid

accession to pover also produced instabilities in the

international system. The instability of the elites was

largely brought about by the increased political

mobilization and financial disarray from the revolutions,

coupled with the relatively narrow middle class goals of the

revolutions. These factors contributed significantly to the

resurgence of reactionary forces.

In France, the Provisional Government had established

National Workshops to provide relief to the unemployed

masses. Faced vith a growing budget deficit, however, it

was necessary for the government to raise money through tax

revenues in order to pay the workers. The government was

fearful that the imposition of a new tax on the wealthy

bankers, creditors and manufacturers would endanger state

and commercial credit, and jeopardize a return to financial

prosperity that was deemed necessary to cure the social

problems of France. As a result, the government ended

up increasing direct taxation, mainly through a land tax, by

45 percent. This measure alienated the peasant class as the

124

French peasant viewed the Paris proletariat as "...the

spendthrift vho did himself well at his expense." This

sentiment also extended to the middle class and property

owners in France as they increasingly came to view the

unemployed as lazy and worthless.

D. THE CONSERVATIVE REACTION

In view of these conditions it was not surprising that

the elections to the National Assembly held in April 1848

resulted in a decisive victory for the moderate republicans

led by Lamartine who advocated liberal political reforms but

not radical social reforms. The republican victory

increased the tensions in the workshops as the workers

believed that social reforms would not be undertaken. This

in turn raised fears that the workers would unite in a

socialist revolution, and as a result discussions over

dissolution of the workshops dominated the assembly. On 2?

June the conservative catholic Comte de Falloux presented a

decree to dissolve the workshops within three days and send

the workers to either the army or the provinces. Falloux's

plan had already been found out by the workers, and as a

result, as the report was presented in the Assembly, the

workers built barricades throughout the working class

sections of Paris. The streetf ighting that followed during

the "June Days" (23-26 June 1848) resulted in the defeat of

the workers by the government forces led by General Louis

125

Cavaignac after the bloodiest street fighting seen in

Europe. The intense violence made many middle class people

fearful of some of the liberal changes and led to a reaction

against many of the liberal reforms. In the aftermath of

the violence legislation was enacted to suppress radical

clubs and newspapers, and Cavaignac was given dictatorial

povers until a nev constitution and elections could be

held. It was these events that allowed Louis Napoleon

Bonaparte ITT to be elected president on 10 November 1848,

and eventually led to Bonaparte achieving dictatorial powers

through democratic procedures such as the plebiscite.

In Frussia, the National Assembly that had been elected

in May 1848 became involved in extensive debates between the

liberals who desired merely to obtain classic liberal

concessions such as increased political influence based on

manhood suffrage, and the radicals, who advocated stronger

social change. The radicals in the Frussian parliament

frustrated the liberal ministry of Ludolf Camphausen

,

although those who advocated social change never obtained

enough power to legislate changes. The inability of the

radicals to effect change resulted in the formation of

numerous clubs, and as economic conditions deteriorated,

tensions inside Berlin increased. On 14 June 1848, a clash

occurred between the Civic Guard and workers when the

workers seized arms from an armory. Although the violence

that followed does not compare with that of France during

126

the June Days, the majority of the people feared social

upheaval, and thus opposed violence and disorder.

Shortly after the uprising, Camphausen resigned, and

Frederick William began to restore his authority. In

September the troops that the monarch had ordered withdrawn

from Berlin at the start of the revolution returned, and on

5 December 1848, the assembly was dissolved and a

constitution promulgated by royal decree. The constitution

decreed by Frederick William made significant liberal

concessions, and illustrates an important outcome of the

revolutions of 1848. The adoption of liberal principles by

conservative reactionaries, even though only in a limited

manner, served to undermine the legitimacy of conservative

rule throughout Europe and helped to contribute to the

breakdown in cooperation between the conservative powers in

the aftermath of the revolution.

The collapse of the revolution in Prussia had

significant implications for the remainder of Germany,

particularly in Frankfurt where representatives of the

Germanic states were drafting a constitution for a united

German Empire. In January of 1849, the new liberal

constitution for a united Germany had passed its first

reading in the Parliament, and on 28 March the imperial

crown was offered to Frederick William by a vote of 290 to

248. Frederick William refused the crown because

although he possessed nationalist feelings toward German

127

unification, the crown was not given to him by the grace of

God but by the grace of "...master bakers and butchers." 22

His refusal of the crown meant that the initiative for a

new political framework for Germany passed to the individual

states, of which Austria and Prussia were dominant. Since

Prussia had already recovered from the revolution, and its

king had already demonstrated his interest in German

unification under Prussian leadership, Prussia assumed the

lead in moving towards German unification.

Before Prussia could attempt to unite German states,

however, the liberal revolutionaries in Germany who still

supported the Frankfurt constitution had to be defeated.

Frederick promised military support to any German prince who

required assistance. As a result, Prussian troops marched

into the Rhineland city of Elberfeld, the Bavarian

Palatinate, Baden and Dresden and defeated the

7 °revolutionaries. Order had been restored in Germany.

Kith order restored in Germany, Frederick William sought

to achieve German unity through his own designs. Prussia's

German policy was formulated by General Joseph Maria von

Radowitz, who conceptualized a German confederation with the

king of Prussia as its head. The emperor would be assisted

by a college of six princes and a two-chamber parliament,

but the Prussian king would have absolute veto power on all

legislation. This new German Empire would then be joined to

the Habsburg monarchy which would be under Austrian

128

leadership. This larger federation would he governed by a

directory of four, of which two members would be Austrian.

This program was rejected by the Austrian Prince Felix von

Schwarzenberg , however, because a German empire under

Prussian leadership significantly altered the balance of

power in central Europe. Despite these objections, Prussia

implemented portions of its plan on 26 May 1849 when a draft

constitution for the German Confederation was accepted by

Prussia, Hanover and Saxony, as well as twenty-six lesser

German states. Although this was unacceptable to Austria,

the ongoing struggle against revolutionary forces in its own

empire, prevented Austria from opposing Prussia's diplomatic

advances in Germany. Once the revolutions were defeated,

however, Austria assumed a diplomatic offensive in Germany

to thwart Prussian designs.

The triumph of reactionary forces in the Austrian

Empire, although taking longer than the French and Prussian

reactions because of the nationalist revolutionary movements

in Bohemia, Hungary and Italy, was still successful and

followed a similar sequence of events. First, a breakdown

in unity amongst the revolutionaries occurred as large scale

political mobilization resulted in increased demands upon

the government that it was unable to meet. Second, class

conflict emerged between workers, who demanded social

reforms, and the middle class, who sought political reform.

When the working class began to represent a threat to the

129

propertied middle class, the middle class became

increasingly alienated from the revolution. Third, as the

financial crises that helped to precipitate the crises

worsened during the revolution, the revolutionary leaders

realized that the restoration of order vas necessary to

bring about prosperity. The need to restore order resulted

in the revolutionaries relying more and more on the

conservative bureaucracies and armies, thereby allowing

reactionary forces to reassert themselves, often using the

force of nationalism to promote their cause.

In Vienna, the high point of the revolution was marked

by the flight of the Emperor Ferdinand and his family to

Innsbruck on 17 Kay 1848. Ferdinand's flight, however,

produced another heavy run on the banks and created

additional economic chaos in Vienna. What remained of the

government attempted to preserve security and order, but

attempts to dissolve the armed students that formed the

Academic Legion resulted in another spate of barricade

building. The students were joined by the workers, and as a

result the government felt compelled to grant additional

concessions, including the formation of a new Committee of

Security on 25 May. The Committee of Security

essentially controlled Vienna for the next several months.

The Committee of Security attempted to alleviate the

economic and social crises by adopting measures to provide

work or maintenance for the unemployed. As in Paris, this

130

measure resulted in large numbers of unemployed workers

converging on the city from the outlying provinces, and

increased the threat of further social disorder. The middle

class became alarmed at the prospects of social revolution

as they had no desire to see the economic order overthrown,

while the peasants were merely concerned with securing the

9 f\abolishment of their servitude.

Besides the increased divisions among the various

economic classes, divisions also began to develop among the

nationalist groupings in the empire. At the first Fan-Slav

Congress that convened in early June at Prague, the Czech

nationalist Francis Palacky called for the conversion of the

Habsburg empire into "...a federation of nations all

97enjoying equal rights." This led to clashes between

Czechs and Germans, and the heightened nationalist passions

resulted in a series of violent demonstrations as barricades

were erected throughout the city. During a demonstration on

12 June 1848 the wife of Prince Alfred Kindischgraetz , the

commander of the armed forces at Prague, was accidently shot

and killed. The death of his wife, coupled with the

increased chaos in the city, resulted in Windischgraetz

bringing in military reinforcements, and on 17 June

bombarding Prague. Shortly thereafter the revolutionary

movement in Bohemia was crushed, and a military dictatorship

was established.

] 31

The defeat of the revolutionaries at Prague was followed

by similar victories by Austrian forces in Italy.

Fadetzky's forces inflicted a crushing defeat on the

Piedmontese at Custozza from 23-25 July, and on 8 August he

entered Milan in triumph. On 9 August, Charles Albert

signed an armistice in which Piedmont pledged itself to no

longer support Lombardy-Venet i a . The conservative victories

were strongly appreciated by a large number of

Austro-Germans who had "...come to see the point of view

that the Italian insurgents must be crushed not only for the

sake of the Habsburg empire, but for the sake of all Germany

2 P • ...as well." Heightened nationalism was becoming a driving

force in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire.

Ey the summer of 1848, nationalism had become an

important force in determining the outcome of the

revolution. The Czechs, Hungarians, Italians, as well as

the Poles, aspired to destroy the dominant position the

Germans held in the empire while the Croats, Slovenes, Serbs

and Slovaks struggled to break free from the domination of

the Magyars. It was these nationalist divisions that the

conservative forces were able to exploit to their own

advantage to help turn back the revolutions of 1848.

In September of 1848, the Austrian court restored Josef

Jellachich as the governor of Croatia and sanctioned his

invasion of Hungary as a means to help defeat the Hungarian

29separatist movement. The Hungarians were able to drive

Jellachich's forces out of Hungary on 3 October, however,

132

and they then launched a counter-invasion of Austria. On 6

October, a German regiment vas dispatched from Vienna by

German nationalists vithin the government to reinforce

Jellachich. This led many of the radicals to take to the

streets to offer resistance, and angry crowds marched on the

Ministry of War building. One of the radicals then murdered

the war minister Count Theodor von Latour. On October 7 the

"50Austrian court fled to Olmutz, but the violence of

October had turned many of the middle class against the

revolution

.

Kith Vienna in disarray, it may have been possible for

the Hungarian forces to capture the city, however, the

Hungarians were indecisive and failed to take aggressive

action. As a result, Jellachich's forces joined up with the

forces of Kindischgraetz and by 23 October had surrounded

the city. On 31 October Vienna was bombarded into

submission and martial law was imposed.

The defeat of the revolutionaries in Vienna was followed

by the formation of a new government under Prince Felix von

Schwarzenberg who was determined to put an end to the

revolution. Schwarzenberg persuaded the emperor Ferdinand

to abdicate in December 1848 in favor of his nephew, Francis

Joseph. Schwarzenberg, although a firm believer in the

restoration of autocratic rule, established a new cabinet

that included elements of both the upper middle class and

liberals as he realized that some change was necessary to

??prevent further revolution."

133

As the conservative forces reasserted their hold over

most of the Habsburg Empire, the government was now able to

direct its energies to crushing the separatist movement in

Hungary. Although Windischgraetz achieved initial

victories, and occupied Budapest on 3 January 1849, the

Hungarians were able to successfully counterattack and push

the Austrians back to their own borders. The Austrians were

determined to crush the Hungarians, however, and as a result

the Austrians requested aid from Nicholas, the tsar of

Russia in June 1849. Nicholas provided Austria with 140,000

troops, and on August 9 the Hungarian forces were decisively

defeated at the battle of Temesvar. Kossuth realized that

further resistance was useless and fled to Turkey on 12

a -a

August .

"

Kith the defeat of the Hungarians, Austria restored its

internal security and it now turned its attention to halting

the plan of Prussia's Frederick William to unite Germany

under Prussian leadership. By 1850 it became clear that if

Prussia continued with its plan for unification, war would

develop between Austria and Prussia. Under pressure from

both Austria and Russia, Prussia agreed to give up its plan

and signed a convention at Olmuetz in November 1850

reestablishing the old Germanic Confederation. Although

this returned the situation in Germany back to the status

quo, Olmuetz was a diplomatic defeat for Prussia, and is

referred to in Prussian history as the "humiliation of

134

Olmuetz." Thus at the end of 1850, resentments existed

betveen Austria and Prussia over German unification, with

important implications for the future.

E . SUMMARY

The revolutions of 1848 undermined the stability of the

international system not only in the short period of

revolutionary upheaval from 1848 to 1849, but also in the

long run as the revolutions released forces that vould

dominate Europe for a generation. Although the events of

1848 bear little resemblance to the French Revolution, the

forces that they released vere remarkably similar.

Just as during the French Revolutionary period, 1848

produced a period of tremendous elite instability.

Throughout Central Europe conservative and liberal elites

were faced with both internal and in some cases external

threats. Conservatives were unable to deal with the

economic, social and political discontent that precipitated

the revolutions, and therefore it is not at all surprising

that they were swept away by the advocates of liberal and

social reform. The liberals, however, were unable to

effectively handle the political mobilization that resulted

from the revolutions and produced competing demands which

led to divisions within the liberal movement. These

problems were compounded by the liberal failure to achieve

control over the largely conservative armies and with the

135

result that the revolutionaries lay under the constant

threat of counter-revolution.

The conservative reaction that followed the revolutions

did not fully restore elite stability. Although all the

conservative regimes implemented nev means of repression and

the strength of the state increased dramatically,

conservatives nov realized that they could no longer ignore

the liberal demands of the masses unless they vere willing

to tolerate the constant threat of revolution. The

threatened emergence of the politics of mass society placed

the structure of conservative regimes in jeopardy.

According to Richard Rosecrance it was "...this atmosphere

of internal instability and uncertainty which gave rise to

the age of Realpol 1 1 lk ."~ "

1848 also resulted in a resurgence of nationalism

throughout Europe, although nov: it became an instrument of

the conservative reactionaries rather than the liberal

revolutionaries. This reactionary exploitation was possible

mainly because nationalism appealed to elements of all

classes while liberalism was essentially a middle class

it;movement." Thus the conservatives had an effective tool

that could provide broad based support for their cause. The

force of nationalism in conservative hands, just as in the

hands of liberal revolutionaries, proved to be a destructive

force as nationalism eventually destroyed the ability of the

eastern powers to cooperate among themselves. Prussia and

136

Austria would soon find themselves in a struggle over the

control of German}, thereby undermining the once solid

conservative eastern block. The use of nationalism by the

conservatives also undermined the legitimacy of conservative

elites, vhich was based upon dynastic principles, with

important repercussions for both the stability of the

conservative ruling elites and their ability to cooperate

among themselves .

A decline in the international perspective of the ruling

elites also emerged after the revolutions of 1848. The

challenge presented by liberalism and t><e politics of mass

society resulted in the conservative elites focusing on

internal reforms and the strengthening of the machinery of

the state. Conservative regimes were now more concerned

with defending themselves rather than defending conservatism

throughout Europe. Austria, Prussia and Russia (and England

and France as well) no longer worked effectively together to

secure acceptable outcomes as each of the powers sought to

preserve its own institutions even at the expense of its

previous allies."

The year 1848 also marked a return to conflicts at the

center of the European continent, again not only during the

brief period of revolutionary upheaval, but for the long

term as well. Unlike the end of the Napoleonic Era when the

Congress of Vienna resolved the major territorial disputes

and established a balance of power, no such congress

137

occurred after the revolutions of 1848. As a result,

antagonisms remained among the powers over territories in

Germany, Austria and Italy - areas of great sensitivity and

where vital interests were involved. These unresolved

territorial issues, coupled with the inward focus of the

major powers and a resurgence of nationalism resulted in a

situation where the opportunities for frictions were many,

and eventually resulted in a series of continental conflicts

including the Italian war in 18 59, the war between Denmark

and Germany in 1864, the Austro-Frussi an Kar of ] 866 and the

France-Prussian Kar of 1870.

Although it may at first appear that the victory of the

conservative reactionaries after the revolutions of 1848

should have resulted in what Fouthas claimed was "the end of

the world" and that "subsequent events were the fruit of

different ideas", this was not entirely true. Although

after 1848, the ideological struggle between conservatism

and liberalism was not as strongly pursued at the

international level, ideology became a more powerful tool

domestically. Puling elites sought to increase their

legitimacy and ensure political demobilization through the

"...increasing use of formal political ideology whose basic

concepts and slogans were spread to even the remotest

communities by middle class intermediaries." Thus

nations such as France, Prussia and Austria increasingly

used ideology as a means to ensure their survival. In this

138

sense ideology vas very important because when combined with

nationalism the two increased the power of the state

dramat ically

.

The increased power of the state, when combined with the

industrial modernization of the period, allowed states to

obtain increasingly more capable armed forces. The period

of relatively limited ends and means that existed from 1815

to 1848 was rapidly coming to a close, and in its place

would emerge what A. J. F. Taylor called "the struggle for

mastery in Europe" where not only the fate of the great

powers but that of the entire continent was to be decided.

Finally, 1848 marked the breakdown of the international

system. The principles that guided the diplomacy of 1815 to

1848 were no longer able to prevent conflict from emerging.

The relative solidarity of the eastern powers was shattered

by the struggle between Prussia and Austria over German

unity. A system designed to prevent liberalism from

creating revolutionary upheavals was no longer applicable in

dealing with a system where nationalism was now a driving

factor. A new system was necessary, but the statesmen of

the great powers were unable to transcend the limits of the

pre-existing diplomacy. It was not until Bismarck

established a system based on a series of alliances that an

operating international system would be restored. Thus,

while the revolutions of 1848 were brief in nature, they

unleashed forces that created instability in the

international system for a generation.

139

Charles Pouthas, "The Pevolutions of 1848," TheZenith of European Power 1830-70 , ed . J. P. T. Bury, vol. 10of The New Cambridge Modern History , gen ed . J. P. T. Bury(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), 414.

Matthew Smith Anderson, The Ascendency of Europe1815-1914 , (Totowa: Rowman and Li ttlef ield , 1972), 91.

William L. Langer, The Revolutions of 1848 , (NewYork: Harper S, Row Publishers, 1969), 10-14.

Lawrence C. Jennings, France and Europe in 1848 AStudy of French Foreign Affairs in Time of Crises , (London:Oxford University Press, 1973), 2-2.

5 C. A. Macartney, The Habsburq Empire 1790-1918 , (NewYork: The Macmillan Company, 1969), 322.

6 Ibid., 324.

7 A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe1 848-1 918 , Oxford History of Modern Europe, eds. AlanBullock and F. W. D. Deakin, (London: Oxford UniversityPress , 1954) , 5 .

8 Ibid., 6.

Anderson, The Ascendency of Europe 1815-1914 , 97.

10Macartney, The Habsburq Empire 1790-1918 , 328.

Paul Ginsborg, Daniele Manin and the VenetianRevolution of 1848-49 , (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1979), 56.12.Roger Price, The Revolutions of 1848 , Studies inEuropean History, ed . Richard Overy, (London: MacmillanEducation, 1988 ) , 39 .

1 oIJ Peter N. Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide inEurope , (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1974), 146.

14 Ibid., 147-8.

1 c:

Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe1848-1918 , 8.

16 Karl Marx, Class Struggles in France 1848-1850 , (NewYork: International Publishers, 1980), 47-49.

17 Ibid., 49.

140

1 R ...Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe ,

88-9? .

19J. A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped 1848-1878 ,

History of Furope, vol. 4 ed . J. H. Plumb, (Ithaca: CornellUniversity Fress, 1980), 76.

20 Frice, The Revolutions of 1848 , 92.

? 1 .

James Joll, "Prussia and the German Problem,1830-66," The Zenith of European Power 1830-70 , ed . J. P. T.

Bury, vol. 10 of The New Cambridge Modern History , gen ed .

J. P. T. Bury (Cambridge: Cambridge University Fress, 1957),^99.

22 Ibid., 500.

^Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe ,

191-3.

24 Langer, The Revolutions of 1848 , 187-8.

25Macartney, The Habsburg Empire 1790-1918 , 359-60.

Llewellyn Woodward, Prelude to Modern Europe1815-1914 , (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1972), 227.

Gordon A. Craig, Europe Since 1815 , alt. ed . , (NewYork: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), 94.

28R. John Rath, The Viennese Revolution of 1848 ,

(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1957), 256.

29 A. J. P. Taylor, The Habsburg Monarchy 1809-1918 AHistory of the Austrian Empire and Austria-Hungary , (London:Hamish Hamilton, 1948), 74.

30Langer, The Revolutions of 1848 , 156.

31 Ibid., 157-8.

° Stearns, 1848: The Revolutionary Tide in Europe , 195.

33 Rath, The Viennese Revolution of 1848 , 430.

Richard N. Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in WorldPolitics International Systems in Perspective , (Boston:Little, Brown and Company, 1963), 282.

141

Robert C. Einkley, Realism and Nationalism1 852-1 871 , vol. 15 of The Rise of Modern Europe , ed . WilliamL. Langer (Nev. York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1935),69-70.

36 Frice, The Revolutions of 1848, 95

^Rosecrance, Action and Reaction in World PoliticsInternational Systems in Perspective , 247.

38 Frice, The Revolutions of 1848, 97

142

VI. THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM AFTER THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1989

The French Revolution and the revolutions of 1848 both

resulted in the development of several critical factors that

had a destabilizing affect on the international system.

These factors included nationalism, a decline in

internationalist perspective, widely divergent ideological

vievs, policies that had unlimited ends and pursued vith

vastly expanded means, conflicts that erupted in the center

of Europe rather than in peripheral colonial areas,

instability within the ruling elites, and finally a

breakdown in the operation of the international system

brought on by key actors changing the rules of the game.

Although these factors were present during both

revolutionary periods, the differences in the level of

intensity of these factors helps to explain the level of

instability that developed in the international system.

Before assessing the presence of these factors following the

revolutions of 1989, it would be prudent to give a brief

description of each of these variables.

A. FACTORS CREATING INSTABILITY AFTER REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

Although nationalism can be both productive and

counter-productive, during times of revolutionary change it

has tremendous destabilizing potential for the international

143

system. The force of nationalism is particularly

destabilizing vhen it is used as a means of expanding a

nation's resource base and uniting a people to achieve a

goal. This unifying potential was particularly evident

following the French Revolution when a "nation in arms"

almost established hegemony over Europe. Unlike 1789,

nationalism in 1848 created instability through domestic

turmoil, particularly in the multi-ethnic Habsburg empire.

The domestic instability that developed in this central

European empire created a large power vacuum, which would

only eventually be filled by a resurgence of reactionary

forces. Tt is these two possibilities - the one of a state

rapidly mobilizing and expanding its resource base, and the

other of creating domestic turmoil through the dismantling

of an existing state, that makes nationalism a particularly

dangerous force in the emerging international system.

During past revolutionary periods there has similarly

been a marked decline in the internationalist outlook of the

ruling elites. During both the eighteenth century and the

Metternichean period (1815-1848), the monarchs of Europe

strongly believed that it was natural and right that five

great powers should exist on the European continent. This

belief was demonstrated through the concept of the balance

of power, which was designed to prevent one country from

establishing hegemony on the European continent. This

internationalist perspective was destroyed by Napoleon and

144

the French vho were no longer concerned vith maintaining the

existing European order. By contrast, in 1848 and during

the reactionary period that followed, the decline of an

internationalist perspective was the result of domestic

crises and turmoil. Both liberal and conservative ruling

elites became more concerned with strengthening the position

of their own rule, although conservative elites were still

somewhat internationalist-oriented because they realized the

dangers that revolutionary periods posed to stability in

Europe. Still, the political cooperation that existed

between the powers during the Metternichean period was

substantially reduced as domestic turmoil and rising

nationalism produced states that were much more inward

looking. The decline of an internationalist perspective

that developed as the result of the revolutions of 1848 may

repeat itself today as many East European countries and the

Soviet Union face a period of domestic turmoil and

instabi 1 ity

.

The French Revolution also produced an international

system in which widely divergent ideological views developed

between France and the rest of the European powers. The

fundamental rights of man were directly opposed to the

European dynastic order, and produced a European system

similar to the one that existed during the wars of religion.

The existence of widely divergent ideological views

contributed greatly to the resulting violence of the

145

Napoleonic Wars. In 1848, although the potential for the

emergence of widely divergent ideological views to develop

existed, the course of events prevented ideology from

becoming entrenched in the international system. This

smothering of nationalist ideology was the result of the

rapid change from conservative to liberal elites, and the

subsequent reversal. The holding in check of nationalist

ideology helps to explain why the aftermath of the

revolutions of 18^8 was considerably more peaceful than the

aftermath of the French Revolution. After 1848, however,

nationalist ideologies were directed inward as a means of

achieving domes-.ic legitimacy by the ruling elites and as a

result the strength of the state as an institution increased

dramatically. The increased strength of the state helped to

undermine the period of relatively limited diplomatic ends

and means of the Metternichean period.

The forces of nationalism and ideology helped to create a

diplomatic period characterized by policies that had expanded

ends pursued with vastly greater means. During the eighteenth

century, despite the violence of the wars of the Spanish and

Austrian Successions and the Seven Years' War, with the

exception of Prussia's annexation of Silesia, the geographic

composition of the great powers of Europe did not

drastically change, nor did the great powers attempt to

alter political boundaries radically. Although it is true

that there were deep seated hostilities between France and

146

England and France and the Habsburg Empire, none of the

countries possessed the means to destroy another. As the

result of a widely divergent ideology and the appeal of

nationalism during the French Revolutionary period, however,

France ended up pursuing an unlimited policy of liberating

the peoples of Europe from alleged monarchical tyranny.

Unlike 1789, this phenomenon did not emerge in 1848 for two

primary reasons. First, France refused to support the

revolutionary movements throughout Europe for fears of a

return to the Napoleonic Wars. Without the support of

France, liberal elites found it extremely difficult to

triumph, especially in Italy. Second, the conservative

forces had learned well from the French Revolutionary period

and realized the dangers of revolutionary upheaval and the

mobilization of society. This perception of danger, after an

initial loss of confidence by the conservatives, resulted in

a more aggressive response than might otherwise have occurred

The location of conflict during times of revolutionary

change is also a source of instability for the international

system. During both the French and 1848 revolutionary

periods, conflict erupted in the center of both Europe and

the international system. Such conflict was particularly

destabilizing because of the wide range of powers affected

and the complexities entailed. Although colonial disputes

were often dangerous and violent, the risks of horizontal

escalation from instability on the periphery was

147

substantially lower than the risks of horizontal escalation

from instabilities in the center of the European continent

where the great powers had more to lose.

The instability that develops amongst the ruling elites

during times of revolutionary upheaval also tends to

destabilize the international system. Both the French

revolutionaries and the monarchs of Europe soon viewed each

other as mortal enemies that had to be eliminated, and

therefore the likelihood of stability in Europe was greatly

decreased. Similarly, in 1848 both conservatives and

liberals viewed one another as threats to their rule with

resulting foreign intervention in domestic affairs. The

threat of foreign intervention to eliminate real or

perceived threats to the ruling elites placed the

international system in a state of flux and resulted in

significantly reducing the possibility of stability in

Europe. Additionally, the domestic turmoil that preceded

the revolutions and existed during them resulted in the

possibility that ruling elites would be overthrown by angry

mobs, a factor that added to this instability.

Finally, although the end result of all the above

factors, the breakdown of the operation of the international

system prevented the restoration of its stability. France's

hegemonic drive on the European continent, when coupled with

its rapidly expanding resources base, prevented the

eighteenth century balance of power system and associated

148

diplomatic and military maneuvering from checking French

expansion. After 1848/ although the great powers still

attempted to meet periodically to address the problems of

Europe, as a result of the revolutions and a decline in

internationalist perspective, the effective functioning of

the European concert was drastically reduced. It was not

until Bismarck created his series of alliances that a

functioning "international system" would be restored. The

lack of an operational international system has generally

produced an unstable environment even in non-revolutionary

times as evidenced by the instabilities that emerged as the

result of the collapse of the League of Nations during the

interwar period and the ineffectiveness of the United

Nations in the early years following World War Two.

B. INSTABILITY IN THE POST 1989 INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

Numerous scholars suggest today that Europe, and the

world in general, are heading toward peace and stability.

The post 1989 international system, however, is showing signs

of the emergence of the elements of instability that have

characterized previous revolutionary periods. Although the

Hobbesian pessimism of many scholars who predict total chaos

and anarchy may be unfounded, in terms of the variables

previously identified it appears that the opportunities for

frictions to develop in the international system are greater

149

than during the Cold War. This pessimism is at least

partially offset, however, by the possibility that the

strength of the destabilizing variables that have emerged

today are not as strong as those that have emerged from past

revolutionary periods.

1 . Gauging the Strength of Re-eiergina Nationalism

One of the immediate consequences of the revolutions

of 1989 has been the release of long repressed nationalist

passions inside the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe,

particularly in multi-ethnic Yugoslavia in the latter case.

Similarly, the unification of East and West Germany has

raised nev fears of a resurgent Germany using the principles

of the right to self-determination to regain territories

lost at the end of World War Two. Concerns have been

additionally raised that a united Germany will attempt to

establish economic hegemony on the European continent,

establishing a satellite system in Eastern Europe. Although

in the short run, nationalist conflicts are bound to erupt

in Eastern Europe, particularly in the Balkans and the

Soviet Union, the likelihood of nationalism resulting in a

large scale war is less likely today than in 1789, 1914 or

1939.

On the more optimistic side, Stephen Van Evera notes

that two primary developments in postwar Europe have

resulted in a dramatic decline in nationalist propoganda

,

150

particularly in the West. The first has been the decline

of nationalist passions as the result of concerted efforts

by international agencies and educational institutions to

present more balanced historical perspectives. Before World

War Two, nations often depicted their hostile neighbors as

harsh, cruel and backward while portraying its own people as

kind, civilized and progressive. The result of this post

war effort was to create a single, shared version of

European history and reduce the possibility of

hyper-nationalism in the West.

The second optimistic factor contributing to the

weakening of nationalism has been the partial social

leveling of European societies, particularly by the

communists even though they too produced their own elites.

The popular discontent that emerged between the classes in

the European social order has declined dramatically since

World War Two, anr 1 with it the ability of European elites to

appeal to social groupings with nationalistic principles to

bolster their domestic position.

Although there is some truth to Van Evera's

reasoning and his conclusion that hyper-nationalism has been

largely eliminated in the West, the emerging nationalism in

the East may not be so easily overcome. The nationalistic

grievances between the East European peoples are the result

of deep seated historical disputes over national borders few

of which were resolved at Yalta or Potsdam. Additionally,

151

the decline of nationalist passions in the West was

paralleled by the increasing integration among the West

European countries making the re-emergence of nationalistic

passions less likely. In the East, the decline of

nationalist passions was the result of Soviet suppression.

Kith the removal of Soviet dominance, these long repressed

nationalist feelings have already reappeared. As a result,

nationalism in the East will still be a driving force,

particularly in Southeastern Europe. Although optimists

feel that the strength and stability of the Kest will help

to stabilize the East, the likely disintegration of

Yugoslavia and the possible disintegration of the Soviet

Union will serve to inflame nationalist passions, offsetting

the influence of the Kest.

Although the optimistic outlook about the decline of

nationalistic confrontation in Eastern Europe may be

unfounded, the optimistic belief that the unification of

East and Kest Germany will not result in the renewal of

German expansion appears more realistic. Besides the

moderating effect that a more balanced historical

perspective has had on Germany, the legacy of the first half

of the twentieth century has profoundly influenced the

political development of Germany. According to Thomas

Kielinger, the editor of Rheinischer Merkur , "Kith so much

of Germany's national fiber destroyed and morally degraded,

it was difficult to conceive of even a relaxed form of

152

patr iotisrr; , the mildest form of national pride, ever

emerging as a force to be reckoned with. Given to

erudication and cerebral reflexes, Germans had well absorbed

the lesson of their appalling record during this century and

had, as a result, turned to peaceful ways of applying their

talent and irresistible urge to excel."

The German society of today is now firmly entrenched

in the Western liberal democratic tradition, and with the

exception of developing a leadership role in world economic

matters, Germany has consistently maintained a low profile

in world politics. Although there are those who are fearful

of Germany again seizing the initiative, these fears are

based on the experiences of Germany in the first half of

this century when Germany 's historical condition was

remarkably different. The circumstances that contributed to

the two world wars, and Germany's position within those

circumstances, are drastically different today. Thus a

resurgence of German nationalism like that which existed

from 1890 to 1945 is unlikely. As previously noted,

however, the historical circumstances surrounding the

nationalist conflicts in Eastern Europe have not been

altered, merely repressed, and therefore the outlook for

nationalism in Eastern Europe is much more pessimistic.

2. Gauging the Strength of Internationalist Outlook

One of the biggest questions that remains to be

answered following the revolutions of 1989 is whether or not

153

the countries of Eastern Europe, and the world in general,

will develop a more internationalist outlook. In the short

terir, it appears that Eastern Europe will attempt to seek

greater integration with the West, particularly in the

economic sphere. This tendency has produced great optimism

from the proponents of economic liberalism, who believe that

enhanced economic interdependence will produce greater

stability ir: three primary ways.

First, economic liberals believe that states will

become more prosperous and that this prosperity will serve

to bolster peace. Second, economic interdependence will

compel states to cooperate with one another on economic

matters. Third, economic cooperation will lead to political

cooperation and a significant strengthening of the

internationalist perspective. The barriers established by

the Cold War to this liberal economic order have now been

removed, and as a result the liberals believe that a more

internationalist outlook will emerge.'

This optimistic assessment must be tempered,

however, by the past political realities of the Eastern

European situation. With the forced social, cultural and

economic separation from the West by the Soviet Union now

over, the Eastern European countries will seek to reclaim

their individual European identity. Although the transition

to adopting democratic institutions, private property, and a

154

market type economy may be swift, the rise in living

standards to ones comparable to those in the West will not

be achieved in the short term. Although there may be

pockets of rapid economic grovth and prosperity, the

emerging economic relations between East and West may more

closely resemble that of North and South.

The optimism of the liberal economic perspective is

further reduced vhen one considers the role that security

issues have had in suppressing economic disputes between the

Western economic powers during the Cold War. In the past,

significant economic disputes arising between the United

States and its major allies were either repressed or

overcome by the hegemonic powers imposing a solution rather

than solving a problem through mutual agreement. This

situation was possible only because of the overriding

concern for security among the allies. With security

concerns substantially diminished, and the development of

nev systems of equal partners, the resolution of conflicts

that arise over economic policies will become more

difficult, because "...partners can only disagree."

Although interdependence can create mutual

vulnerabilities, these vulnerabilities will vary between

states. The less vulnerable states will have greater

bargaining power over the more dependent states, and may

therefore seek to obtain substantial concessions and

benefits. The disputes that arise from this situation will

155

in all likelihood not be resolved easily. The economic

competition that is likely to replace the security and

military competition of the Cold War also is not likely to

produce states that are deeply concerned with the

international system, but rather with promoting economic

gain for their countries. The economic pie is still

expanding, but there are now more hungry mouths to feed at

the table. And finally, besides the economic problems that

may contribute to a decline in internationalist perspective,

the internal turmoil that has developed within the Soviet

Union and is likely to develop in the Eastern European

states as reforms take place, will redirect a substantial

portion of those states' energies invard.

Although the foregoing paints a dim picture for the

possibility of an internationalist outlook emerging,

pessimism is offset to a degree by the large number of

international organizations (mainly through the United

Nations) that are already established. Unlike the past

revolutionary periods previously discussed, political

leaders will not have to face the problem of establishing

institutions to facilitate international cooperation.

Organizations such as NATO, CSCE, and the EC could also be

altered to accommodate the emerging Eastern European

democracies, although this would require the western leaders

to transcend the previous limits of diplomacy. These

organizations could help contribute to developing an

internationalist outlook amongst the East Europeans.

156

3- The Decline of Ideological Confrontation

Perhaps the single strongest factor that vill

contribute to a more peaceful and stable world is the

decline of ideological confrontation between nations that

existed during the Cold War. In the revolutionary periods

of 1789 and 1848, strong ideological divergence among the

great powers was closely paralleled by high levels of

vi olence

.

Stephen Van Evera argues that the expansion of

liberal democracy to Eastern Europe will promote a peaceful

7 .

world for two reasons. First, the ideologies of

democracies do not incorporate a claim to rule other

democracies, hence they have no ideological motives for

expansion against one another. Second, democratic elites

would have more difficulty legitimizing a war against

another democracy. Although the empirical evidence suggests

that relations among democracies are more peaceful than

relations among non-democratic states, this evidence is

tempered by the fact that the Western democracies have a

shared cultural and historical experience. This commonality

of outlook contributes to peace among these states.

The countries of Eastern Europe, in contrast, had more

culturally and historically diverse backgrounds, prior to

the presently disintegrating period of communist rule. Even

if liberal democratic movements succeed in Eastern Europe,

157

the likelihood that relations between them will be as

peaceful as those of the West is questionable.

Although many of the East European countries are

moving in a democratic direction, making democracy work in

these countries for the first time will be a long and

difficult process. The establishment of political

legitimacy will be closely linked to economic success, and

because the transition to a market economy faces the

challenges of inflation, unemployment, shortages, strikes

and recession, the survival of new democratic institutions

and politicians will constantly be in peril. It is quite

possible that out of the rubble of the Eastern European

states, the political systems that emerge may more closely

resemble Fascist systems rather than liberal democratic

ones. It is not impossible that dictatorships could rise

through popular elections and mandates, similar to the rise

of Louis Napoleon in France following the revolution of

1848.

Despite the fact that the democratic institutions of

Eastern Europe are facing an uphill struggle to achieve

stability and ensure success, there is hope for the future.

Unlike the Cold War, where the West could only exert limited

pressures on the Warsaw Pact countries for political reform,

the fall of communism and the severance of Eastern Europe's

ties with the Soviet Union have placed these countries in a

position where large scale, rapid economic aid is required

158

to rebuild these countries. Even though the West could not

supply all the capital required for recovery, any aid

provided could be linked to the adoption of liberal

democratic and economic reforms. This linkage could be used

to ensure the strengthening of democratic institutions

emerging in Eastern Europe and to help prevent the emergence

of widely divergent ideological views.

4. Prospects for the Return of Nationalist Mobilization

The resurgence of nationalist aspirations in Eastern

Europe has trought with it fears that this force will be

used to mobilize society to redress the long repressed

grievances that have existed between the peoples of Eastern

Europe. This mobilization could result in a situation like

that of the French Revolution, where unlimited ends were

pursued with vastly expanded means. Although this scenario

is unlikely to develop on a continental scale as in 1789,

this possibility should not be overlooked on a regional

basis, especially in the Balkans and in the Soviet Union.

During the Cold War, nationalist mobilization was

largely repressed through alliance structures which promoted

the use of professional armies relying on complex high

technology military equipment and nuclear weapons. With the

dismantling of the Warsaw Pact, the Eastern European

countries may exploit nationalist appeals to mobilize its

citizenry to maintain large standing armies and militias to

159

settle various ethnic conflicts. This process is already

undervay in Yugoslavia as the republics of Serbia and

Croatia have mobilized and made var along nationalist lines.

Although the current situation in Yugoslavia leads

one to be concerned about nationalistic mobilization, this

appears to be a regional phenomenon. The countries of

Foland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have already implemented

steps to decrease the size of their armed forces by 25 to 33

percent. In the Ealkans, hovever , besides Yugoslavia,

the countries of Romania and Bulgaria have maintained their

armed forces at old Karsav Pact levels.

Additionally, although the European states may

propagate nationalism to persuade their citizens to support

expanded defense expenditures, this pattern can be

effectively dampened by the West. The United States can

dampen security motives by maintaining a military presence

in Europe. A concerted effort by the Western European

powers to assist countries that are faced with armed

aggression, thereby rendering any mobilization useless as

well as prohibitively costly for the aggressor, would also

serve to dampen this type of nationalism.

5. A Return to Continental Conflict

Past revolutionary upheavals in Europe have been

particularly destabilizing because they occurred at the

center of the international system. Although it is true

160

that the colonial and imperialist conflicts of the 18th and

19th centuries reverberated back to the European continent

and contributed to increased tensions, the event that alvays

embroiled the continent in war was an inter-European

conflict. The reason for this was mostly the close

proximity of the powers to one another and the fact that

gains made by one power at the expense of another in Europe

were perceived to fundamentally alter the balance of power.

This feeling was particularly strong among the English, who

went through great efforts to secure peace on the continent

in order to more effectively wage wars on the seas and in

distant colonial lands.

During the Cold Kar , both the Western and Eastern

allies sought to prevent conflict from erupting in the

center of Europe, realizing that any confrontation there

would be disastrous. Although vigorous propaganda and

covert operations were mounted to destabilize the opposing

states, there was a tacit understanding regarding the limits

of these efforts. The end of the Cold War and the

withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe, however,

has undermined and enfeebled the international system that

prevented conflicts from erupting in Europe. It is now

likely that Europe may once again become the center of armed

confrontation especially in the Balkans.

Besides the internal ethnic conflicts like those

that have produced the civil war in Yugoslavia and a

161

situation at the time of this vriting where it appears that

only outside intervention will prevent a brutal repression

of the Croation secessionist movement, there are many

external disputes among the states. The conflicts between

nations are particularly dangerous because the majority of

these disputes are territorial disputes arising from ethnic

claims. Although the concept of human rights as it refers

to the problem of national minorities is becoming

increasingly accepted, the right to choose one's cultural

and geographical aree is not, nor will be in the near

future, a universally accepted right. This situation

will lead to increasing tensions between the Eastern

European countries, where a host of conflicts exist,

particularly in the Ealkans.

A dangerous present (1991) threat to stability in

Europe in general, is posed by the continuing disintegration

of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia borders on seven states and is

the heart of the Ealkans. Additionally, because Yugoslavia

is involved in a number of border and ethnic disputes with

its Balkan neighbors, instability in Yugoslavia could easily

spill over into other Balkan states.

The continuing disintegration of Yugoslavia is

likely to increase tensions between Albania and Yugoslavia.

Ethnic Albanians comprise 90 percent of Kosovo, an

autonomous province of Serbia. This large Albanian

population in Yugoslavia was the result of the London

162

Conference of 191? which created the independent state of

Albania, but only included half the Albanian population.

The Serbian attitude is highly antagonistic towards both

the Albanians of Kosovo and the Albanian state, which Serbs

view as conspiring with Kosovo's Albanian majority to absorb

or annex the province. The antagonism developing

between these two countries over Kosovo will most likely

increase under the strong nationalist propaganda being

espoused by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic.

Tensions similarly are increasing between Yugoslavia

and Bulgaria over the Macedonian question. Bulgaria claims

that the Slavic population of Macedonia, Yugoslavia's

southernmost republic, is ethnically and historically

Bulgarian, although Bulgaria denies any territorial

ambitions. This ambiguous stance has raised concerns about

Bulgaria's true intentions. Conversely, Bulgaria has

become concerned about an ethnic Macedonian nationalist

organization known as Tlinden, which has raised fears in

Bulgaria that a resurgent Macedonian nation would claim

parts of Bulgaria. The emergence of Ilinden has resulted in

many Bulgarians believing that the movement is Serbian

sponsored

.

The Macedonian issue is also raising concerns in

Greece, a state which has vigorously denied the existence of

a Macedonian nationality for fear that it may call into

question Greece's northern border. The refusal of Greece to

163

recognize Macedonian nationality led to charges by

Yugoslavia that Greece is not protecting the rights of the

Macedonian minority in Greece. As a result, increased

border crossing disputes arose throughout 1990 as Greece

refused to allow individuals who were identified as

Macedonians on their passports to enter Greece for fear that

they may attempt to ferment anti-Greek sentiment. This

practice led to 50,000 Macedonians blockading several border

crossings between Yugoslavia and Greece in May of 1990.

Besides Yugoslavia, the Ealkan state of Romania is

also embroiled in a series of disputes with neighboring

states. Currently, Romania and Bulgaria are involved in a

series of disputes over the pollution of the Bulgarian town

of Fuse by Romanian industry in Guirgiu, an industrial

center across the Danube. Additionally, there is no

guarantee that the latent territorial dispute over the

Romanian territory of Dobrudja, which contains a large

Bulgarian minority will not re-emerge.

The Romanian-Hungarian dispute over the ethnic

Hungarians in Romanian Transylvania is another source of

conflict. The Treaty of Trianon in 1920 resulted in Hungary

ceding Transylvania to Romania, resulting in approximately 2

million Hungarians living in Romania. Hungary asserts that

these people are denied political and economic rights. This

dispute intensified in March 1990 when attacks upon

Hungarian minorities were provoked by the Romanian

164

ultra-nationalist group Romanian Hearth. This conflict

is likely to deepen as the Hungarian Democratic Forum

continues to make the treatment of the Hungarian minority in

Romanian a major issue.

Romania also is involved in a dispute with the

Soviet Union over Bessarabia, which was incorporated into

the Soviet Moldavian Republic after World Kar Two. Although

it is unlikely that the Iliescu government will promote a

Romanian-Moldavian state, the ethnic clashes that resulted

in the deployment of Interior Ministry (MVD) troops to the

Moldavian Republic in October and November 1990, are likely

1 5to cont inue .

"

The Balkan state of Bulgaria is also involved in a

dispute with Turkey. Currently, approximately 10 percent of

the Eulgarian population is comprised of ethnic Turks,

despite large scale expulsions in 1950-51, 1968 and 1989.

The Turks remaining in Eulgaria have subsequently been

subjected to a national assimilation policy, although the

Bulgarian government asserts that these people were ethnic

Bulgarians who had been compelled to become Turkish during

the Ottoman occupation, and now they are just being

"re-Bulgarianized ." Following the ouster of communist

leader Zhivkov in November 1989, however, the decision was

made to restore the rights and property of Turkish

minorities, leading to the return of ethnic Turks to

Bulgaria to reclaim their past occupations and property.

165

This has led to increased tensions between Bulgarians and

Turks within Bulgaria, and any renewal of violence between

the two groups will heighten tensions between the two

1 7countries .

Although the Balkans are clearly the "powder keg of

Europe", the potential for nationalist territorial disputes

is also present in other areas, particularly between Poland

and its Eastern and Western neighbors. Poland's frontiers

were radically altered at the end of the Second World War

when Poland lost large amounts of territory to the Soviet

Union while being compensated with former German territories

to the West. The 1989 Soviet census results show that over

1 million ethnic Poles are living in portions of

Byelorussia, the Ukraine and Lithuania, and this has fueled

Polish nationalist factions within Poland. Polish claims

have been met by both the Soviet Republic's and Lithuania's

own irredentist claims regarding their ethnic minorities in

Poland .

The number of Germans living in Poland, with

estimates ranging from 50,000 to 1 million, is also a

hot political issue as this number appears to be increasing

as many Poles seek association with Germany for economic

reasons. Although it is extremely unlikely that the

German-Polish border is going to become an issue after the

signing of the German-Polish bilateral treaty in November

1990 recognizing the Oder-Neisse boundary, the eventual

166

growth of German influence in Western Poland can not be

discounted .

Although the possibility of conflict in Eastern

Europe is high, the likelihood of this conflict engulfing

the entire continent is low. The instability of the East is

offset by the unprecedented stability of the West. The

challenge for the West is therefore to promote and expand

this stability to Southeastern Europe. This is currently a

difficult problem since the mechanisms that ensured

stability on this portion of the continent during the Cold

War have been dismantled and no new mechanisms have yet been

put in their place.

6. Instability of the Ruling Elite

The political elites of Eastern Europe are likely to

face many of the same challenges that the liberal elites

faced in Europe following the revolutions of 1848. After

1848, widespread political mobilization created a situation

where diverse groups were able to make demands and seek

recognition of special interests. The developing political

factionalization prevented political cooperation among the

various liberal factions, and prevented a consensus from

being reached regarding solutions to the economic and social

crises that caused the revolution. This resulted in making

the economic and social crises that caused the revolutions

of 1848 substantially worse, and laid the foundation for the

167

eventual conservative reaction as it became generally

accepted that the restoration of social order vas vital for

the restoration of prosperity.

The problem facing the liberal elites of 1989 is

similar to that of 1848. With no experience handling a

mobilized society, and no institutional means intact to

effectively manage competing interests, will the Eastern

European leaders be able to prevent a further decline in

their countries economy and prevent a possible conservative

reaction?

The domestic political problems facing the new

Eastern European leaders is compounded by the problems of

making a market economy function. Despite the difficulties

involved in achieving an effectively functioning democracy,

the transition to a market economy is likely to take much

longer. Although states like Hungary and Czechoslovakia may

have a reasonable chance at success based on their prewar

history, the chances of success for many of the Balkan

nations is substantially less. The probability of failure

of economic reforms in the Balkans is likely to create

further tensions in an area already unstable.

This pessimistic appraisal is offset, at least in

the short term, by the fact that the Eastern European

societies of today are not as sharply divided along class

lines as the societies of 1848, although new class

stratifications are already beginning to develop. The

168

competing interests that emerged in 1848 were the result of

class conflicts as peasants/ workers, the middle class and

the nobility sought to improve their positions. The social

leveling imposed by communist rule, however, significantly

reduced the possibility of this type of conflict from

emerging at the outset of the revolutions of 1989. Social

stratification that is emerging today as a result of the

economic collapse in Eastern Europe which has devastated

many industries, and is a trend that is likely to continue.

Social class frictions may therefore develop as a

significant problem.

Some special interest political mobilization is also

likely to occur. Both the communist party bureaucracies and

the military organizations of Eastern Europe will attempt to

hold on to their own privileges at the expense of democratic

reforms. This is already becoming apparent in Romania,

Bulgaria and within the Serbian republic of Yugoslavia. The

way in which the Eastern European countries deal with the

entrenched bureaucracies will have a significant affect on

the future course of events in Eastern Europe.

7. The Breakdown of the International System

The end of the Cold War has resulted in the

breakdown of the international system. The tacit spheres of

influence and rules of the game have been eliminated, and no

new rules have yet been established. As a result, conflicts

169

and disputes are left unregulated, risking the possibility

of escalation. Currently there are several competing views

regarding the establishment of a new international system,

each with its own merits.

One of the most widely debated proposals is for

European problems to be resolved through the

institutionalization of the Conference on Security and

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). This proposal has the benefit

of the Helsinki process of 1975 being closely linked with

human rights, one of the fundamental sources of instability

in Eastern Europe. The drawback of this plan is that it is

unlikely that any agreement would ever be reached between

many of the Eastern European countries, and therefore it is

more likely to resemble the United Nations General Assembly

where many issues are debated but few of critical importance

are resolved.

Another popular proposal is to incorporate the new

Eastern European democracies into the European Community

(EC). The EC is a strong, well developed European

institution with a good record of integrating less developed

states into the European economic system and promoting

political development. The European states are currently

divided, however, over the admission of the Eastern European

nations into the EC. France favors a policy of

strengthening the institutions of the EC in Western Europe

before allowing the access of Eastern European nations. The

170

French fear that the sudden rush of East European nations

into the EC would undermine recent gains by creating greater

factionalization as more special interests become involved.

The Germans on the other hand favor a more rapid

integration, largely because they stand to benefit the most

as a result of their economic strength. The debate vithin

the European Community over the pace of integration will not

be resolved quickly, and therefore it is unlikely that an

international system can be restored through the EC.

The revamping of NATO into a collective security

organization is another proposal often cited as a means of

restoring stability in Europe. By extending NATO membership

to the East European countries and expanding NATO's security

guarantee to include protection from attack by member

states, NATO could provide a stabilizing influence on the

European continent. The drawback to this proposal is

twofold: first, many European countries (particularly in the

West) are reluctant to enter into this type of agreement

because of fears that they will become embroiled in the

ethnic problems of the East. Second, this type of NATO

expansion would have to include the Soviet Union to prevent

fanning the fires of a conservative reaction. The inclusion

of the Soviet Union, however, would not be warmly received

by the East European nations who have spent the past 45

years attempting to break free of Soviet dominance.

171

Although there are many problems facing the

reconstruction of the international system, these problems

are not nearly as great as those that followed past

revolutionary periods when the entire system had been

destroyed. Currently there are several functioning

institutions (NATO, CSCE, EC) that have the capability to

restore international order in Europe, although they must be

adapted to the changing environment. These changes are

going to be difficult, although not impossible. There is

reason for optimism for the future.

172

^Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace, Europe Afterthe Cold War," International Security , Vol. 15, No. 3

(Winter 1990/91), 23-25.

^Thomas Kielinger, "Waking up in the new Europe - witha headache," International Affairs , Vol. 66, No. 2 (1990),250.

q John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future, Instabilityin Europe After the Cold War," International Security , Vol.15, No. 1 (Summer 1990), 45-46.

Pierre Hassner, "Europe beyond partition and unity:disintegration or reconst itution? ,

" International Affairs ,

Vol. 66, No. 3 (1990), 469-470.

5Robert W. Tucker, "1989 and all that," ForeignAffairs , Vol. 69, No. 4 (Fall 1990), 106.

John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future," 46.

7Stepehn Van Evera, "Primed for Peace," 26-27.

pDaniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," ForeignPolicy , Vol. 82 (Spring 91), 147-148.

Q . ...Marcm Krol , "A Europe of nations or a universalisticEurope?," International Affairs , Vol. 66, No. 2 (1990), 287

F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and Short Fuses,Change and Instability in the Balkans," InternationalSecurity , Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), 72.

17.Dennison Rusmow, "Yugoslavia: Balkan Breakup?,"Foreign Policy , Vol. 83 (Summer 1991), 148-149.

X *F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and ShortFuses," 75.

13 Ibid., 76.

14 Ibid., 83.

15Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," 144.

F. Stephen Larrabee, "Long Memories and ShortFuses," 78.

17Daniel N. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," 145.

18 Ibid., 142.

173

VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The international system following the revolutionary

periods of 1789 and 1848 examined in this thesis were

characterized by instability. Although each revolution

followed a different course of events and was the result of

different conditions, the revolutions did appear to produce

some common factors that created instability in the

international system. Although more historical cases need

to be examined to determine the validity of these factors,

the following tentative uniformities appear to exist among

the revolutions examined.

First, each post-revolutionary environment has resulted

in an increase in nationalist passions. This has had a

destabilizing effect on the international system either

through rapidly expanding the resources available to the

ruling elites or threatening the dismemberment of

multi-ethnic empires and creating a large power vacuum in

the international system.

Second, nations have tended to become more inwardly

focused and have lost their internationalist perspective.

This is normally due to the need to restore domestic

stability, or in some cases, to the misperception that when

a major power is undergoing domestic instability, it drops

out of the international picture and therefore no longer

174

requires the attentions of the remaining powers. The loss

of internationalist perspective creates international

instability, because such a perspective is required to

maintain the system.

A third tentative uniformity is that revolutionary

events produce a heightened awareness of ideology, either

internationally or domestically. This awareness is a common

source of frictions at the international level when the

ideologies of the powers are in opposition. Ideology can

also create instability at the international level through

its domestic application, either by creating internal

instability due to its devisive effects on society, or by

increasing the power of the state as in 1848 and thereby

allowing the state to pursue more aggressive foreign

policies .

Fourth, instability of the ruling elite emerges as the

result of the combination of domestic instability and

external threats during revolutionary situations and it is

difficult to prevent this instability from spilling over

into the international system.

Fifth, major revolutionary periods in Europe have

resulted in conflict erupting in the center of the European

continent. This has had tremendous destabilizing

consequences because of the sensitivities involved as well

as its effects on the balance of power.

A sixth tentative uniformity is a breakdown in the

effective functioning of the international system. This is

175

the result of the combination of the revolutionary actors

fundamentally altering the rules of the game while the

non-revolutionary actors continue to conduct diplomacy along

classis pre-revolutionary lines. Since the old rules no

longer apply, however, conflicts are left unregulated by the

international system.

Seventh, and finally, the combination of these factors

produces a period where the relatively more limited ends and

means of the previous diplomatic period are replaced by a

period of vastly greater ends pursued with vastly expanded

means as nations are willing to sacrifice the maintenance of

the international system for nationalist goals.

If the tentative uniformities that emerged from the past

revolutionary periods are developing today, the world is

becoming more filled with friction than during the Cold War.

Although the strength of these destabilizing forces has in

some cases been reduced, it does appear that all these

forces are present in the post 1989 international system.

First, nationalist passions are emerging in Eastern

Europe and are a grave source of concern. The heightened

nationalism of the Eastern European states is only partially

offset by the enhanced stability of Western Europe, and

therefore it appears that nationalism will again become a

driving force in Europe, particularly in the east.

Second, although the decline of an internationalist

perspective is countered by the unprecedented number of

176

international institutions that facilitate international

cooperation and growing economic interdependence, these will

only be effective if the statesmen of the non-revolutionary

nations are able to break free from the constraints of their

preexisting diplomacy to cooperate with the revolutionary

nations

.

Third, the ideological clash that normally emerges

during revolutionary times is currently non-existent at the

international level, but appears to exist at the domestic

level in the revolutionary nations, adding to the

instability of the ruling elite. The possibility of

reactionary forces or the rise of fascist political systems

in Eastern Europe cannot be ruled out, however, and

therefore it is possible that an ideological clash could

still emerge at the international level.

Fourth, the deteriorating economic conditions of the

Eastern European countries are likely to increase the

instability of the ruling elite. Elite instability will

also be increased by the political mobilization that has

resulted from the liberal and democratic reforms and place

increased demands on political leaders that have litte

experience with democracy.

Fifth, concern exists because of the large number of

territorial and ethnic conflicts that are unresolved on the

European continent. Any unilateral attempts to redress

these grievances will most likely result in conflict because

of the sensitivities involved with territorial adjustments

177

on the European continent. It appears that the return of

continental conflict mat be more likely than in the recent

past

.

Sixth, a new international system to regulate the

conflicts in Eastern Europe has not yet emerged, thus these

countries are left with the legacy of Yalta and Potsdam. In

the absence of a functioning system to regulate and resolve

disputes, the Eastern European states may resort to

unilateral action, with destabilizing consequences.

Seventh, and finally, the possibility of nationalist

mobilization to pursue aggressive military policies can

fortunately be offset by the advanced high technology

weaponry of the United States and Western Europe, however,

this is not likely to be helpful for the Balkans or the

Soviet Union, and therefore the emerging diplomatic period

in Eastern Europe is likely to be characterized by diplomacy

that pursues vastly greater ends with vastly expanded means.

Although much work is required to restore stability to

the international system, the reconstruction of the

international system is perhaps the most important action

which needs to be taken to restore order in Europe. Whether

or not this occurs is dependent on the United States and

Western Europe. Clearly the United States and Western

Europe must assume a leadership role in pursuing a general

post Cold War settlement in Europe. In the past, stability

in the international system has only been restored when a

concerted effort has been undertaken by the world's powers.

178

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ThesisW22025c.l

WaldhauserRevolution and reac-

tion in Europe and their

effects on the interna-

tional system.

ThesisW22025

c.l

WaldhauserRevolution and reac-

tion in Europe and their

effects on the interna-

tional system.

^