House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence

Report on RuSsian

Active Measures

March 22, 2018

!Classified by. 5888841

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,ees

PROPERTY OF Tl IE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNES

Gordon

Grnham

I Hicks I

I . I ... __ -I J~~n,o~

j Kellogg

Kemp

(U) Referenced Persons (cont}

j undsay -

L I Chucl<

! Hope

Keith

1 Brian

Director of Nation.:,! Security of Donald Trump's 2.016 presidentia l campaign _____________ __;_ ____ _ United States Senator from South C~rolina (2003 -present}; former

member of the United States House of Representatives from South

. C~_rolina_(~9~3·2.~0]_ ... - ---------------1 United Stateg Senator from Iowa {:1981-present}; former member of the United States House of Representatives from Iowa (1973-1981)

- - · ·- - -White House Director of Communications (2011-present}; former

White House Director of Strategic Comrnu nicc)tion!I (J;muary 201'· September 2017); National Press Secretarv of th e Presidential Tran-5ltlon Team; Communications Director of Donald Tl'ump's 201G prr:sldcn~i a! cnmpaign; former employee of the Trump Organi1.atlon -- ·-f.ormr.r Sccrntory of Homc1land Scc1J rlty {2013·201,)

E1<eculive S~m:i tary and Chief of Sto H o'i'thoNat1onal .5ecurity CoL1n­cl l (February 2017-pre, e11t); Aeling Ntitional SecuriL-y Advisor (February 2017); foreign policy .1dviso1· of Donald Trump's 201G pres-fdcntial camp air,n 1 Secretary of State of the Stat e of Georgla (2010-pre5P.nt)

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Kushner

Lavrov - · -·

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McCabe

Jared

Sergey ·-...

Loretla -·· - ~-

Emmanuel

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I Senior Advisor to the Preside nt; s.on•in-l~w of the Presfdent (m.:mied . lvanka Trump in 2009); real-estate developer

- - --·~--- - - -----~

I Chuim)Un of~naldTrump's 201G pr~Gldentii ~ilmpolr,n (June • -Augu!:t 2016)

co : led, \;;-ith Senator ·sessions. thef orelgo policy advisory panei .. of. _ _ ___ __

11

_D_o_r_1a_ld_Trump'.s 2016 presidential campaigfl

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· Andrew Former Deputy Director ol the Federal 13ureau of lnvostigatio11 (2016 -2018)

PROPER r Y 01- f HE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTr'\T1VES Iv

(U) Referenced Persons (cont}

r-·- - ---·- - ·- ---,.. .. - - ---· ..--------------~ McConnell Mitch · Senate Majority Leader (2015,present); UnHed Stales Senator from

M cCord

-McGahn

Merlcel --

Mary

! Do~

l Angela ·­---·

l Kentuc:l(y ( 1985-prcsent)

I Former /\cling As~istant At1orney Genr.ra l of the U1)ited.Statcs {2016 1-2017); former Principal Deput'f Assistant Attorney Genr.ra r for r<Ja· lional Security (2014-2016 )

\ ~'hit~ Hou.-;e Counsel (Jan~ary 2017- prnsent); General Counsel of

the Presidenti.ll Transition Team {November 2016-Januarv 2017); Counsel to the Trump campaign during Donald 1rump's 2016 presi­dential C:lmpaign

Chancellor of Germany {2005-present)

[ MuellC!r I Robert Special Counsel for the United States Deportment of Justice (May 2017-present); farmer Dlrnctor oi the Federnl Bureau of lnvestii1a­tion {2001-2013)

! l

Obairm Bilfi"lCk f ormr.r Prcr.ldr.n ~ of thr. Ullitfid St.itc!s {200B·20l 7}

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I I

- -Pupudopoulos 'Gr.-;,-gc- --1To,;;;;:~bo(oitho foroi n pclity;id\lisory ·panc:l to Donald

I Trump' s·201G proslcfontial camp,1ign . .

------ ---- - - - -Pelosi i Nancy Minority Leader of the United Stales House of Representatives

Pence - ·- ·,_.Mike

r I

(201l·presant); former Spe.ikcr of the Unitr.d St<ltes House of Rep­resentatives (2007 °2011); member of the United St ates House of

Roprescnmtives from Cr1lifornia (1987-prescnti

i-.. - -- -~- -~

Vice President of the United St at~ {2017-prc."nnt}; former Governor of tncliana (2013-2017); forrner member of the Un1ted Stc1res House of Representatives from Indiana {2001-2013)

h- --Podast.i

- " Pompeo

-John -- ' Chul~n-;;;--ot Mi'll~ry Clinton;s 2016 prosi<lentinl ciln"lpc.)lgn: formcir

I White Ho1,sa Chief of Staff; former Counselor to the l>resldtmt

~- 111- -- ·- --- ·-

_ ___ ....:._M_l_k __ c _ _ _ S~ct~a-syof Stcite no~lne; (M~rch 2018); oiract;r of the Centra l lr'lt~lllgt:nce Ag1.mcy (Januarv 2017·prC5Cl'lt ); former member of t he

,..__ _____ _____ ___ _,~d SE1.?S Mouse of Representatives from Kan9a, (2011-2017)

PROP~R1Y OF THE U.S. HOUS E OF REPRESENTJ\TlVES V

(U} Referenced Persons (cont}

~P-L1~n - - -·-- - ..,._-~-'i'a-d-rn-,1-r·--·~~----'T"=PresldOfll of the Russian Federollon (7.012,-prr.s(m·t)-- -·· I Harry - · I Forrne/ Mfnofity Leader of the United Srntr..~ Sennto (2015 ·2017); ·- 1.: Reid

I fom1er United Stat.es Senator froo1 N1:vadc1 (1987-2017)

St1~<ln Formef National Security Advisor {20l3-2.0:1.7}; former United · ·\ Statr.s Arnbnss,1dor to the United Nations {2009-2013]

Rice

Romney Mitt Former Rcp-~blican.no'niineefor President {2012); former Governor I of Massachusetts (2.003-2007)

!---------~------+--------- - ---···- - ---Ryan

-I __ Schiller

Schmitz

-Sosslans

Paul

--Spe;iker of the United Scatcis House of Rr.prescnt<Jtive.~ (2015· present}; rnember of the United States. House of Representatives from Wisconsin (19!}9-present)

Former Deputy Assistant to the Pre~ident ,md Director of 011al Office Opercttions (January 20:L7-Septeinber 2017); former Director of Security for the Trump Organization (2004-2017}

1 Former forejgn policy advisor to Donald Trump; fo rmr.r tnspcctor I General of the United Stale~ Departn~ ent of ~-~fe1m_i~902-~ . _

- - --- ·Jr.ff . Attorney General of the United St<ltes {2017-prese i,t); momber of J the 2016 Prnslr.hmtlal 1 r.1nnll1on Tnam ;ind Don-ild Trump's 2016 prosldcntlol campalgr); form<Jt United Stnt~s Senator from Alabama 1rn91.2011}

,___ ______ ... _____ --- · - - ·· ·-··· - - ·- - · \

I~ • 1 StC?elC! Christopher

I ~-Founder of Britfsh research firm Ofbls Rusiness Intelligence; former British intelligence profe~sional

stone-

Sulllvan

-Trump

Tr ... mp, Jr.

· 1 Roger

I Jake

•• Don;ild J.

- - --- ---- - -··-- --- - ·- -Former advisor of Donafd Trump's 2016 presidential camp.1ign

Senior Policy Advisor of Hfllary Clinton's 2016 presidential cam­paign; former National Security Advisor to the Vice President (2013 · 2014)

I President of the United Stclces (2017-present); career real estate developer .ind television hast and producer

- --·- --- ------ -~ D~ 'llo _ _ __ _ _ l ~esident Trtimp' s son; Trump Organization execu\ive

PROPERTY 01= THC: u_s. liOUSE.OF RCPRESE:NT/\TIVES vi

I Y,mulcovlch I Yates - -

(U) Referenced Persons (cont) --Vlktor

l S.il,ly

- - - - - · · . ... .,. .. - --- ·

rormcr President of Ulm1ine (2010-2014)

JI t=ormcr Acting Attorney Gr.ncrill of thr. United States (J~~Oi7};

forn1e, Depllty P,nornr.y Gener.ii of ,hr. United Statc~5 (201S-2017} . - -·----- ·- - ~-- -· -· ---- ·

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEMTJ\TIVES vii

.,.

(U) Preface

(U} In 2015, Russia began engaging in a

covert influence campaign aimed at the U.S.

presidential election. The Russlan govern·

ment, at the direction of President Vladimir

Putin, sought to sow discord in American

society and undermine our faith In the dem­

ocratic process. Now, more than a year

after the election, the American people

rightfully want to know what the Russians

did; how they did it; with whose suppo1t, if

anyone's; and what can be done to counter

any election tampering by foreign adver­

saries in the future.

(U) With this charge1 the House Pem1a­nent Select Committee on Intelligence (the

Committee) initiated an investigation in Jan­

uary 2017 with the mandate to examine (1)

what Russian cyber activity and other active

measures (covert influence activities run by

the Russian lntelltgence services) were di·

rected against the United States and its al­

l lcs; (2) whether the Russian active

measures include links between Russia and

individuals associated with presidentia I

campaigns; {3} what was the U.S. govern ..

ment response to these Russian active

measures and what do we need to do to

protect ourselves and our allies in the fu­

ture; and (4) what posslble leaks of classi­

fied information took place related to the

Intelligence Community's assessment of

these matters. Our goal was to provide, to

the greatest extent practicable, a full ac­

counting of what happened, how it hap­

pened, and recommendations for protecting

our democratic processes and Institutions in

the future.

{U) From the investigation's inception,

we were determined to follow the facts

w herever they might lead within the agreed

-upon scope and refer any criminality (if

found) to the appropriate authorities. Dur­

ing the investigation we identified numer­

ous shortcomings, including counterintelli­

gence concerns, classified leaks, puzz ling

legal processes, and inappropriate or ques­

tionable behavior. All of these are enumer­

ated in this report through findings, recon,­

mendations, and conclusions.

(U) we reviewed every piece of rele­

vant evidence provided to lJS and inter­

viewed ·every witness we assessed wou Id

substantively contribute to the agreed-upon

bipartisan scope of the investigation. We

acknowledge that Investigations by other

committees, the Special Counsel, the media,

or interest groups will continue and may

find facts that were not readily accessible to

the Committee or outside the scope of our

investigalion. We will ensme any new dis­

coveries are considered in the due course of

the Committee's continuing oversight re-·

sponsibillties.

(U) We.would like to recognize the tire­

less work of the Committee's staff, which

rema ined professional and dedica_ted

throughout this inquiry. They deserve our

nation's gratitude. We would also like to

thank the thousands of men and women

who serve in the IC. They will wal<e up to-

PROPE;ffl'Y (W 'l'i'll: U.S. HOUSE 01! ~1:.r>1~1~SUM l'AI tVGB viii

morrow and continue their watch to protect

the American people against further threats

from Russia and other adversaries.

(U) Nevertheless, the Committee re­

mains concerned that Russia will continue

to undermine western democracies by stok­

ing social strife, political unrest, and divi­

sion. As a country, it is time for us to re­

flect, understand what happened, fix the

discovered problems, and unify around the

common purpose of countering any future

influence campaigns by Russia or any other

nation.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES lx

(U) Introduction and Overview

(U) Russia's interference in the 2016

U.S. presidential election was nothing novel

for the Kremlin. The Kremlin aspires to sow

chaos and discord and advance its agenda in

targeted nations, particularly in Europe and

former Soviet republics such as the Baltics

and Ukraine. To do this, Russia effectively

combines decades of experience in propa­

ganda and psychological warfare techniques

with its vast media apparatus, a strata of

well-educated and proficient technicians,

and a robust intelligence and security corps.

(U} In the United States, Russian

cyberattacks related to the 2016 elections

starkly highlighted technical vulnerabilities

in U.S. digital infrastructure and bureau­

cratic shortcomings that were exploited by the Kremlin. Russia's active measures cam­

paign achieved its primary goal of inciting

division and discord among Americans. For

more than a year, U.S. politics have been

consumed by bitter recriminations, charges,

and counter-charges about the attacks. The

reliability of the democratic vote-the bed­

rock of the U.S. republic-was widely and

repeatedly questioned.

(U) At the time of the 2016 U.S. presi­

dential election cycle, the Committee was

already concerned with Russian malfea­

sance and aggression in levels that had not

been seen since the Cold War. In fact, the

IAA for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 included

multiple provisions to improve the United

States' ability to counter Russian aggression.

However, the Kremlin's malicious activities

during the 2016 U.S. presidential election

triggered the Committee to announce a spe­

cific inquiry into Russia's campaign (see Ap­

pendix B). The bipartisan parameters fo­

cused the investigation and this report-this

Committee examined: (1) Russian cyber ac­

tivity and other active measures that were

directed against the United States and its

allies; (2) whether the Russian active

measures include links between Russia and

individuals associated with presidential

campaigns; (3) the U.S. government re­

sponse to these Russian active measures

and what we need to do to protect our­

selves and our allies in the future; and (4)

what possible leaks of classified information

took place related to the Intelligence Com­

munity's assessment of these matters.1 The

Committee interviewed 73 witnesses, con­

ducted 9 hearings and briefings, reviewed

approximately 307,900 documents, and is­

sued 20 subpoenas. This allowed the Com­

mittee to find answers crucial for identifying

and addressing institutional weaknesses to

assist the United States with identifying and

responding to inevitable hostile acts in the

future.

(U) While the 2016 U.S. presidential

election helped focus American attention on

Russian cyber and information operations,

the Russian government has conducted ac­

tive measure campaigns in Europe for years.

Believing it is engaged in an information war

with the West, Russia's influence activities

employ an array of tactics-usually tailored

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 1

to the target country's population and envi­

ronment-in an effort to accomplish t he

Kremlin's goals. These goals generally in­

clude influencing an opponent's leadership

and population, advancing a narrative, or

inducing a behavior change. The factors

that make these campaigns successful also

make them hard to counter. However, gov­

ernments, non-governmental organizations,

and media organizations in Europe have be­

gun taking actions to address and mitigate

the threat that Russian influence campaigns

pose.

{U) The Russian active measures cam­

paign against the United States was multi­

faceted. It leveraged cyberattacks, covert

platforms, social media, third-party interme­

diaries, and state-run media. Hacked mate­

rial was disseminated through this myriad

network of actors with the objective of un­

dermining the effectiveness of the future

administration. This dissemination worked

in conjunction with derisive messages post­

ed on social media to undermine confidence

in the election and sow fear and division in

American society.

(U) The U.S. government's subsequent

response to the Russian active measures

campaign during the 2016 election was slow

evolved, the FBl's notification to victims and

oversight committees was inconsistent in

timeliness and quality, which contributed to

the victims' failure to both recognize the

threat and defend their syst ems. State and

local governments were slow to grasp the

seriousness of the threat and when notified

of breaches continued to resist any action

that implied federal direction or con-

trol. Some states opted not to cooperate

with important defensive measures offered

by the DHS. While no tabulation systems, or

systems that count votes, were impacted,

the overall security posture of the U.S. fed­

eral, state, and local governments was

demonstrated to be inadequate and vulner­

able.

(U} The Committee's investigation also

reviewed the opening, in summer 2016, of a

FBI enterprise counterintelligence investiga­

tion into-Trump campaign associ­

ates:

- Because of "the sensitivity of the

matter," the FBI did not notify congressional

leadership about this investigation during

the FBl's regular counterintelligence

briefings.2

Three of-original sub­

jects of the FBI investigation have been

charged with crimes and the Committee's

review of these cases covers the period pri­

or to the appointment of Special Counsel in

May 2017.

{U) While the Committee found no evi­

dence that the Trump campaign colluded,

coordinated, or conspired with the Russian

government, the investigation did find poor

judgment and ill-considered actions by the

Trump and Clinton campaigns. For exam­

ple, the June 2016 meeting at Trump Tower

between members of the Trump campaign

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 2

and a Russian lawyer who falsely purported

to have damaging information on the Clin­

ton campaign demonstrated poor judge­

ment. The Committee also found the

Trump campaign's periodic praise for and

communications with Wikileaks-a hostile

foreign organization-to be highly objec­

tionable and inconsistent with U.S. national

security interests. The Committee also

found that the Clinton campaign and the

DNC, using a series of cutouts and interme­

diaries to obscure their roles, paid for oppo­

sition research on Trump obtained from

Russian sources, including a litany of claims

by high-ranking current and former Russian

government officials. Some of this opposi­

tion research was used to produce sixteen

memos, which comprise what has become

known as the Steele dossier.

(U) The effectiveness and relatively low

cost of information operations, such as the

dissemination of propaganda, make it an

attractive tool for foreign adversaries. Un­

less the cost-benefit equation of such oper­

ations changes significantly, the Putin re­

gime and other hostile governments will

continue to pursue these attacks against the

United States and its allies. Based on the

investigation, the Committee recommends

several solutions to help safeguard U.S. and

allies' political processes from nefarious ac­

tors, such as the Russians.

1. HPSCI Press Re lease , Intelligence Committee Chairman, Ranking Member Establish Parameters for Russia Investigation, Mar. 1, 2017.

2. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures Investigation Open Hearing," Mar. 20, 2017.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 3

(U} Summary Table of Findings

(U) Finding #1: The Kremlin exploits free or independent media spaces and open democra­cies to conduct active measures in Europe.

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe political parties and non-governmental organizations in Europe to further the Kremlin's agenda while also disparaging or discrediting politicians and groups seen as hostile to Moscow.

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasingly aggressive cyber operations against European governments; a tactic that will continue to present a profound threat.

(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected European populations and exploits social, politi­cal, and racial divisions in an effort to sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite protests.

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business and economic ties in Europe to achieve the Krem­lin's goals, message displeasure, or inflict punishment.

(U) Finding #6: European governments and media outlets are conducting a variety of activi­ties to combat Russian influence campaigns.

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in 2015-2016.

(U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and third-party intermediaries were responsible for the dissemination of documents and communications stolen from U.S. political organizations.

(U) Finding #9: The Russian government used RT to advance its malign influence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presidential election.

(U) Finding #10: Russian intelligence leveraged social media in an attempt to sow social dis­cord and to undermine the·u.s. electoral process.

(U) Finding #11: The Federal Bureau of Investigation' s notification to numerous Russian hacking victims was largely inadequate. ·

(U) Finding #12: Communication between the Department of Homeland Security and state election officials was impeded by state officials' mistrust of federal government overreach coupled with a unprecedented level of Russian cyber intrusions.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 4

(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont)

C~APTER 3: ·AM~Rlt;A REA<;:TS'(CONT)

(U) Finding #13: The joint Office of the Director of National Intelligence and Department of Homeland Security public statement attributing election interference to Russia was ineffec­tive.

(U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's post-election response was insufficient.

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Russia's election activities employed proper analytic tradecraft.

(U) Finding #16: The Intelligence Community Assessment judgments on Putin's strategic intentions did not employ proper analytic tradecraft.

(U) Finding #17: The Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an enterprise counterintelli­gence investigation into the Trump campaign after receiving information related to Trump

(U) Finding #18: As part of the enterprise counterintelligence investigation into the Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of Investigation opened an individual counterintelligence investigation into Carter Page.

(U) Finding #19: The dossier compiled by Christopher Steele formed an essential part of an application to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court to obtain electronic surveillance on Carter Page.

(U) Finding #20: Special Counsel Robert Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several charges, none of which relate to allegations of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.

(U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded guilty to making a false statement to the Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding his December 2016 conversations with Ambassador Kis­lyak, even though the Federal Bureau of Investigation agents did not detect any deception during Flynn's interview.

(U) Finding #23: Executive Branch officials did not notify the Trump campaign that mem­bers of the campaign were assessed to be potential counterintelligence concerns.

(U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indictment of the Internet Research Agency and Rus­

sian nationals exposes Russian actors and their intent to spread distrust towards the candi­dates and the political system in general.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5

TOP SECRET /NOFORN

(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) -

CHAPTER 4: CAMPAIGN LINKS WITH RUSSIA

(U) Finding #25: When asked directly, none of the interviewed witnesses provided evi-dence of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Rus-sian government.

(U) Finding #26: The Committee found no evidence that President Trump's pre-campaign business dealings formed the basis for collusion during the campaign.

(U) Finding #27: The Republican national security establishment's opposition to candidate Trump created opportunities for two less-experienced individuals with pro-Russia views to serve as campaign advisors: George Papadopoulos and Carter Page.

{U) Finding #28: The change in the Republican Party platform regarding Ukraine resulted in a stronger position against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evidence that Paul Manafort was involved.

(U) Finding #29: There is no evidence that Trump associates were involved in the theft or publication of Clinton campaign-related emails, although Trump associates had numerous ill-advised contacts with Wikileaks.

(U) Finding #30: Carter Page did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump campaign, but the Committee is concerned about his seemingly incomplete accounts of his activity in Moscow.

(U) Finding #31: George Papadopoulos' attempts to leverage his Russian contacts to facili-tate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians was unsuccessful.

(U) Finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower where they expected to receive-but did not ultimately ob-tain-derogatory information on candidate Clinton from Russian sources.

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. briefly met with a Russian government official at the 2016 National Rifle Association annual meeting, but the Committee found no evidence that the two discussed the U.S. presidential election.

(U) Finding #34: The Committee found no evidence that meetings between Trump associ-ates-including Jeff Sessions-and official representatives of the Russian government-including Ambassador Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the Russian government.

TOP SECRET /NOFORN 6

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(U) Summary Table of Findings (cont.) .),

. -. cH.~·~~E~.'A:. €AM PAIGNi·tl N 1<s w1t~(RIJss,14 'f~oJ·it}

• (U) Finding .f#35: Possible Russian efforts to set up a 11back channelu with Trump associates after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the commu-nication associated with collusion would have rendered such a "bacl< channel" unneces-sary.

(U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting opposition research targeting candidate Trump's busi-ness dealings, Fusion GPS conducted research benefitting Russian interests.

!U) Finding #37; The law firm Perkins Coie hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton cam-paign and the Democratic National Committee to research candidate Trump's Russia ties.

I U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims to have obtained his dossier information second-and third-hand from purported high-p laced Russian sources, such as government officials w ith links to the Kremlin and intelligence services.

(U} Finding #39; Christopher Steele's information from Russian sources was provided di-rectly to Fusion GPS and Perkins Coie c1nd indirectly to the Clinton campaign.

,•

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(U) Finding #40: Leaks of classified information regarding Russian intentions to sow discord in the U.S. presidential election began prior to the election day-November 8, 2016.

(U) Finding #41; Leaks of classified information alleging Russian intentions to hetp elect candidate Trump increased dramatically after the election day- November 8, 2016.

(U) Finding 1#42: The leaks prior to the classified Intelligence Community Assessment's pub-lication, particularly leal<s occurring after the U.S. presidentia I election, correlate to specific language found in the Intelligence Community Assessment.

(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classified information have damaged national security and potentially endangered lives.

(U} Finding #44: Former Director of National Intelligence James Clapper, now a CNN nation-al security analyst, provided inconsistent testimony to the Committee about his contacts with the media, jncluding CNN.

PRCPERTY or n~G U.S. MO USE OF REPHl;SI-; NT" TIVFS 7

{U) Summary Table of Recommendations ·- . -· It

l~frfhfPliiR,t~ RWSS AN·©AMP.AIGNS1IN EUROP.E . . .... . .. - ~ - - . .

(U). Recommendation #1: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi-nesses, think tanks, and academia should strengthen legal and regulatory environments, promote media pluralism, build professional media associations, and improve the financial sustai11ability of legitimate news outlets.

(U) Recommendation #2: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi-nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement and encourage multi-pronged, coun-try-wide efforts by both public and private entities to combat Russian propaganda, tech-nical, and cyber operations.

(U) Recommendation #3: European governments, non-governmental organizations, busi-nesses, think tanks, and academia should implement more stringent cyber security practic· es, such as multifactor authentication and encryption of sensitive da1a, as well as educating workforces on basic cyber security topics and best practices.

(U) Recommendation 114: European.governments shou ld look to long-term solutions to lessen economic dependence on Russia . . ~ ,..,., ~..,.. ... I,,. . ~ .. . ~ - . -

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{U) Recommendation #5: Congress should identify options available to the private sector and federal government that would address the social media vulnerabilities exploited by the Russian government.

(U) Recommendation #6; Congress should consider updating the Foreign Intelligence Sur-veillance Act to cover malicious international cyber actors.

{U) Recommendation tt7: The Federal Bureau of Investigation should improve cyberattack victim notification.

(U)Hecommendation #8: Threats identified by the Intelligence Community to state and lo-cal elections infr'1structure should be immediately briefed to .ippropriate state and local officials. When threats are Identified, the federal government shou ld conduct an expedit-ed declasslfication review to ensure that the threat information can reach all necessary state and local officials In a tfmely manner.

(U} Recommendation ti9: The Secretary of Homeland Security should provide certain desig-nated state and local election officials ;;ippropri.ate security clearances to enable those offi-cials to respond to election-related threats.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPHESE'NTAilV!:-S 8

(U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.}

_,...,. ,..., .... -.:.;: - .. - " ~ c ~ -Cfiii;\P;f1ER,21& ~: Rt!.1.SSlA'rATr.:'f,«Gl(S THE 1WNJ:f:ED•STAl1ES.~NO•·:ArvIER'JCA 8E~e,::s

{,~~ l}JIT')) : -- - . ~ ,i

-

(U) Recommendation #10: Significant threats to U.S. elections Identified by the Intelligence Community, including cyberatta cl<s directed at politicill organizations, should be immedi-ately reported to the Congressional intelligence committees.

(U ) Recommendation #11: Congress should encourage the adoption of National Institute of Standards and Technology cyber security stendards, such as those adopted by the Elections Assistance Commission, by providing federal resources to state and local governments to facilitate such adoption. Funds should be ti~d to the adoption and certification of elections systems to appropriate standards.

(U} Recommendation #12: Congress should consider additional fu nding for the National Institute of Standards and Technology to enable better outreach to state and local govern-ments.

{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should consider a one-time grant to state and local election agencies to conduct a risk assessment of those agencies' computer systems.

(U)-Recommendation #i4: Congress should consider strengthening the Help Americn Vote Act of 2002. to ensure that both stiltewide voter registration and tabulation systems are better protected from foreign cyber threats.

(U} Recommendation ff 15: The Deportment of Homelilnd Security should provide the own-er or operator of any electronic election infrasttucture affected by any significant foreign cyber intrusion with a briefing and include steps that may be taken to mitigate such intru-sions.

(U) Recommendation #16: State .ind local governments should be encouraged to establish redundancies that are not dependent on current elections infrastructure, such as a mecha-nism that retains individual vote records, ensuring the integrity of the vote In the event of a compromise of voting infrastructure due to a foreign cyberattack. An example of such a redundancy is a contemporaneously created paper record reflecting the voter's selections.

(U} Recommendation #17: While it is important to implement lessons learned from the Ex· ecutive Branch's response, Congress should not hamper the Executive Branch's ability to use discretion in responding to a particular foreign threat.

{U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act.

PROl'l:l~TY OF THE U.S. HQUSt, OF Rl.:Pl'{l':8E:M rATIVl:.S 9

{U) Summary Table of Recommendations (cont.)

.., - -.-Cltl'~ PiflER-:r~.& 3: Rl!JS'Sl'A:A1ifA€l(S'1iHE'llfNITEm1SifAT-ES,AN1!>1~MERlt'!.I,\ RE~€lS

. f~0Nw!) .! ~ - - _, .

~

(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presidential campaigns should receive unclassified coun-terintelfigence briefings at an appropriate time prior to a nomination convention.

(U) Recommendation #20: When consistent with national security, the Intelligence Com-munity should immediately inform U.S. presidential candidates when it discovers a legiti-mate counterintelligence threat to the campaign, and promptly notify Congress.

(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of Congress should consider requiring all staff to receive an annual counterintelligence awareness briefing.

- "'·-··- . I ... , · i GHA.J'iliER-iiUe~ MPAIGN~UNKS if©!RUSSV~ .

- T . .• ~ - - -~- .- -- ~- = h h -(U) Recommendation #22: Political campaigns and law enforcement should ensure that their counte rintelligence defenses a pproprlately account for the role of cut-outs and Inter-medial'ies.

(U) Recommendation #23: Congress should consider amending curre nt ca mpaign finance laws to furthe r increase transparency rega rding services provided by fore ign persons or e ntities.

·-

[ GH~p:;fLE~ S.:i l ~fu~lfULG~Elil GE:(tQr,11'1\itUNl1F'f,'~SS ESS tylE Nl .ti~~r(S - . ~ "'- ·--

(U) Recommendation #24: Each component of t he Intelligence Community should update its guidance regarding media contacts to ensure the guidance applies to every employee, including senior officials.

(U) Recommendation #25: Congress should consider legislation to increase the penalties f~r unauthoriz~d disclosures of classified information.

(U) Recommendation #26: 'rhe Executive Branch should consider instituting mandatory pol-ygra phs for a ll non-confirmed polltlcal appointees that have top secret d earances.

·-- ..... .. ·---·-· --·-~··· ·- -···- -- -··-

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF, REPR.ESENTAllV ES 10

{U) Chapter 1-Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe

Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other a~tive measures were directed

against the United States and its allies?

(U) While Americans became ncutely

aware of Russian cyber and information op­

erations a-fter the 2016 U.S. presidential

election, these activities were not new to

- UNCLASSIFIED

SOVIET PROPAGANDA TARGETING THE WE;ST AFTER WORLD WAR II

Tj~•<}.J('.,... S..1':l\:IHt'(I! /\h(,~ . ...,,,f\f'Q'I• '

!'.u.,1,,.1 Ui'lit,"'-4( f:l;t,ft., ,l.,l,«Ju

UNCLASSfFIED

{U) l~ussla conducts information war­

fare in an effort to manipulate the populace

and leadership of the nations lt targets. To these ends, Russia employs on am:iy of tac­

tics for its influence activities in an effort to

advance the Russian government's inter­

ests. When successful, these aclivities can

influence an opponent's leadership and

population to advance a narrative and in­

duce a b'ehavior change, concurrently serv­

ing multiple Russian objectives.

(U) Russia's goals for: these campaigns

include: to advance the Krernlin's intereslSi

discredit the West ; confuse or distort events

that threaten Russia's image; break Western

political cohesion; and defend Russia's role ·

as a vital global power. More specific and

country-tailored goats also include to: weak·

en, divide, and halt further expansion of

consensus-driven institutions like NATO and

the EU; sow confusion and amplify divisions

among segments of Western populations;

challenge establishment politics; damage

U.S. foreign policy goals; advance Russia's

version of world events; distract from con­

troversial Russian policies and activities; re­

verse perceived anti-Russian policies; im­

prove bilnteral relations; and strengtt1en

economic ties.

PROPERTY OF TH[: U.S . HOUSE or: REPRESENTATIVES 11

(U) Aiding in Ru ssia's influence aclivi­

tives, the modern world's widespread use of

lhe Internet and socia I media for news and

communications has allowed Russia to:

quickly and easily weapon;ze data stolen In

cyber breaches; disseminate propaganda,

misinformation, and disinformation; and

aggravate social, racial, and political divi­

sions.

(U) Finding fll: The Kremlin exploits free or

Independent media spaces ancf open de­

mocracies to conduct active measures in

Europe.

{~) Russia also exploils free media

spaces and open democracies through a

network of Russian state-owned news out·

lets and media pla tfo rms, such as Sputnik and RT, whld1 promote Russia's image

abroad and show foreigners world events

from a Russian perspective (see Appendix

C}.

(U} The Kremlin 's active measures, or

Information warfare, strategy includl':!S sev- ·

eral tactics:

-• (U) After alleged Russian interfer-

ence in the Brexit vote, in October

2013, the U.I<. Electoral Commission

announced a probe into this activity.

According to open source reporting,

Russian-based Twitter accounts post­

ed more than 45,000 messages

about Brexit in 48 hours during the

2016 referendum vote.7

PROPFRTY OF THF U.S HOUSF OF ~1:-PHl~SFMTA11VI::; 12

(U) Plant and propagate false news sto­ries: Russia uses "troW' armies to set up fake

soc ial media accounts and biogs, Including

through an organization l<nown as the Inter­

net Research Agency {IHA}. ti A study by the

European Endowment for Democracy de­

scribed larp,c numbers of paid Russian

"trolls" on socia l media.12

-

(U) Finding #2: Russia supports fringe po­

litical parties and non-governmental organ­

izations in Europe to further the Kremlin's

agenda while also disparaging or discred­

iting politicians and groups seen as hostile

to Moscow.

UNCLASSIFIED

HEADQUARTERS OF RUSSIA'S

:INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY

UNCLASSIFIED

PROPERTY OF 1'HF U S HOUSE OF RF.PRl::Sl:.N fATI\IES 13

(U) In a tactic dating back to the Soviet

era, Moscow also denigrcites and discredits

people and groups seen as hostile to its in-

-· (U) Kremlin-linked journalists and media

outlets also will engage In misinformation:

weaving truth and falsehoods together to

create misleading reports intended to im-

pugn the target's character or reputation .

UNCLASSIFIED AN11-MERKEL PROlESiS FOLLOWING A

RUSSIAN INFLUENCE CAMPAIGN

UNCLASSIFIED

(U} In another example during the re­

cent French Presidential elections, Russian­

controlled media l1igl1Ughted defamatorv

stories ;)bout the private li fe and campaign

funding of the more RwisJa.skepLic cancli­

date Emmanuel Macron. Two days before

the final presidential election, data hacked

from Macron's En Marche party was posted

on a data sha ring website. Cybersecurity

researchers attributed the hack to the same

GRU group that hncked the DNC.u

(U) Finding #3: Russia conducts increasing­

ly aggressive cyber operations against Eu­

ropean governments; a tactic that will con­tinue to present a profound threat.

14

I

I

,•,-. - .. C"\ I ' . ,.''' "•• l.k r:+ 1 f • .. ·, -t. '

•• 0

(U) Finding #4: Russia targets disaffected

European populations and exploits social,

political, and racial divisions in an effort to

sow discord, encourage unrest, and incite

protests.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 15

I

--··- ' I . -- ---~-

I

I

(U) Finding #5: Russia leverages business

and economic ties in Europe to achieve the

Kremlin's goals, mes.:.-age displeasure, or

inflict punishment .

{U} Russia is adept at utif!zing economic

ties to its advantage. Moscow aims to

deepen business ties v:1ith indiv idua Is that

PRO?anY OF THE: U.S. HOUSC Of" REP~ESENTATIVES 16

can be used as agents of influence, and

countries whose dependence on tr~dc with

Ru ssia create vulnerabHltic s to Russian influ­

ence. Economic vulnerability-such as reli­

ance on Russia for trade or energy-can be

leveraged to change behavior, message dis­

pleasure, or Inflict punishment. For exam­

ple, Germanv imports about 40 percent o f

its natural gas from Russia. Because of this,

,11any business leaders are lobbying for the

removal of sanctiqns against Russia_:P

...

.... (U) Finding #6: European governments and

media outlets are conducting a va(lety of

activities to combat Russian influence cam-

palgns.

(U) According to a 2016 study by the

RAND Corporalion, Russia's various tactics

for conducting information operations,

combined with its lack of a consisten t, ideo­

logical goal, make countering these activi­

ties difficult. This study found that the fac­

tors that make Russian disinformalion effec­

tive-the high volume of stories, its rapid,

continuous nature, and lack of consisten­

cy-are the same factors that make it diffi­

cult to counter . .:li.

UNCLASSIFIED

2017 EUROPEAN SEMINAR ON BOLSTERING RESILJENCE TO ACTlVE

MEASURES CAMPAIGNS

t UNCLASSIFIED

{U) Many European governments are

taking proactive steps to counter Russian

propaganda and disinformation efforts.

NATO has prioritized efforts to counter

"hybrid threats" by developing a strategy

that includes strengthened coordination

with the European Union, as well as training

and exercises t hrough its new Intelligence

Division. The Strategic Communications

Center of Excellence in Riga, Latvia and the

Cooperalive Cyber Defense Center of Excel­

lence in Tallinn, Estonia also contribute to

these efforts. In addition, several NATO al-

PROPl,RW () j! Tt-11: U.S. HOUSE OF m: l'RFSr'NTATIVl:::S ]7

lies and European Union members signed a

Memorandum of Understanding to estab­

lish a European Center of Excellence for

Countering Hybrid Threats in April 2017.43

(U) In France, the French newspaper Le

Monde launched a web platform to allow

readers to check the reliability of French

and interr:iational websites with an Internet

browser extension that will alert readers

when they come across false or unverified

stories.46

(U} In 2017, Ukraine banned Russian

social media platforms, as well as RT and

Sputnik-though the latter two c_an still be

accessed online. Additionally, media

platforms such as StopFake are used to

identify false news stories.50

(U} In November 2016, the European

Parliament adopted a resolution to counter­

act-anti-EU propaganda by third parties.5 1

-

.. , ··- · -· PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

18

(U) Russia's active measures campaign

In Europe is nothing new, but the growing

rnittee to Counter' Active Me·asures

by l:he Rllssian Federation to Exert

Covert Influence Over Peo pies and

Governments.

• (U) FY 2017 lAA, Section 502. Travel

of Accredited Diplomatic and Consu­

lar Personnel of the Russian Federa­

tion in the United States.

• (U) FY 2017 fAA, Section 503. Study

and Report on Enhanced lntelfigence

and Information Sharing with Open

Sides Treaty Member States.

I

frequency and intensity of Russian influence I efforts pose an increasingly significant

threat to the United States and its allies.

The Comn,ittee has taken significant

measures to hlchlieht this growing threat to

the American peopll) since at least 201.5.

Specificatiy, the Intelligence Authorizat1on

Act (IAA) for fiscal years 2016 and 2017 in­

cluded multiple provisions to improve the

United States' ability to counter Russian ag-

gression:

• (U) FY 20'16 IAA, Section 502. As­

sessment on funding of political par­

ties and nongovernmental organi2a­

tions by the Russian Federation.

4 (U} FY 2016 IAA, Section 503. As­

sessment on the use of political as­

sassinations as a form of statecraft

by the Russian Federation.

• (U} FY 2017 IAA, Section 501. Com-

(U) Additionally, in 2016 the Committee

held two hearings and seven br!efings for

Committee Members on Russia and related

issues. and the Chairman and Members of

the Committee sent six fC!lters to the Adm in-

istration urging stronger action against Rus­

sia. For example, Committee Members

urged the Obama administration to hold

Russia accountable for multiple violations of

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

Treaty, and expressed concern over likely

Russian attempts to utili2e the Open Skies.

Treaty for intelligence collection purposes.

Additionally, in spring 2016, Chairman

Nunes declared the inability to predict the

plans and intentions of the Putin regime

''the biggest intelligence failure since

PROPC;RTY OF TM! U.S. MOUSC! or, RUPRr.!SEMT1\ TIVC;S 19

9/11."56

1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

::I x.,~ u ... ,.,. ,· .. ..... . "' ... ~ ...

7. Alexi Mostrous, Mark Bridge, Katie Gibbons, "Russia Used Twitter Bots and Trolls "To Disrupt" Brexit Vote," The Times

8. 9. 10.

UK, Nov. 15, 2017.

11. Sonam Sheth, "Our Task Was to Set Americans Against Their Own Government": New Details Emerge About Russia's Trolling Operation, Business Insider, Oct. 17, 2017.

12. European Endowment for Democracy, Bringing Plurality ond Balance to the Russian Language M edia Space, June 25, 2015.

13. 14. HP5CI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017. 15. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017; XE Currency Converter, EUR to USO, ::Jww.xe.coml

curr encyconverter/convert/?Amou,1t- ~.&FrnnrEU R& To=U5D. 16. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017. 17.

18. 19. 20.

21.

22. TrendMicro, "From Espionage to Cyber Propaganda: Pawn Storm's Activities ove r the Past Two Years," Apr. 25, 2017. 23. 24.

25. 26. -27. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Berlin, Germany, Sept. 16, 2017; LexisNexis, Discovery Services Fact Sheet: "How Many

28. 29.

30.

31. 32. 33.

Pages in a Gigabyte?," Dec. 23, 2017.

34. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Chisinau, Moldova, Sept. 19, 2017. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 20

41. 42. -43. NATO, "NATO Welcomes Opening of European Centre for Countering Hybrid Threats," Apr. 11, 2017. 44. 45.

46. 47. 48.

49. HPSCI, HPSCl Staff Delegation to Tallinn, Estonia, Sept. 15, 2017. 50. HPSCI, HPSCI Staff Delegation to Kiev, Ukraine, Sept. 21, 2017.

51. European Parliament, "European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communications to coun­teract propaganda against it by third parties," Nov. 23, 20:1.6.

52. 53.

54. GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Tokes o Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformation Overseas, May 2017. 55.

56. Bridget Johnson, "Chairman: Biggest Post 9/11 Intelligence Failure was Misreading Putin," Pl Media, Apr. 13, 2016; Saa­

gar Enjeti, "US Response to Rusian Spying is 'Biggest Intelligence Failure Since 9/11," Sept. 15, 2016; Susan Jones, "Rep. Devin Nunes: We've Been Warning Administration About Russian Hacking 'And They Did Nothing,"' CNS News, Jan. 9, 2017.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 21

(U) Chapter 2 - Russia Attacks the United States

Key Question #1: What Russian cyber activity and other active measures were directed

against the United States and its allies?

(U) The Russian government's multifac­

eted malign influence campaign was the

subject of extensive public reporting in the

months before the January 5, 2017, publica­

tion of the classified ICA titled Assessing

.Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections. While ma.ny of the facts con­

cerning the attack have been widely dissem­

inated, there are important elements of the

Russian campaign that remain classified.

(U) The purpose of the Committee's re­

view of the Russian information operations

was to establish the facts, as well as the fed­

era I government's understanding of those

facts. This chapter specifically examines (1)

the cyberattacks that targeted U.S. political

organizations (including the method of the

attack and its attribution); (2) the dissemina­

tion of hacked material; and (3) the role of

Russian state media and social media in

Russia's malign influence campaign.

(U) Finding #7: Russia conducted

cyberattacks on U.S. political institutions in

2015-2016.

(U) The Committee agrees with this

statement and finds the ICA assessment of

Russian respons ibility to be based on com­

pelling facts and well-reasoned analysis . .

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 22

•

I

UNCLASSIFIED

SPEAR PHIS HING is a cyber;ittack that uses email

to !ure ,, vjct;in, into opening at..ichn1ents, following

llnks or dlscfostng their credenti.lls. The.se mess;ig.

cs ;ire highly specific ,1nd soo'l1 ,1uthentic to the

recipiont.

CREDENTIAL HARVESTING rs the procc.~, of ldC!llti ·

fying the uscirmimcs, p,1sswords, ;ind hnshes of t;ir·

r::ots which can thon bn usocl to (:ilin un,1 L1thoriz~d

uc:cess to ci user'~ syslti'Tl. I i 1 ·- - -

j

I

i__ _____ _ J

PROPcRW or, TH!! U.S. HO US(: or Rt::PRt::SENTJ\ TIVCS 23

PROPERTY OF nIE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRESE~lTATIVES 24

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSI: OF REPRESENTI\TIVES 25

, ·: ,,,:.

(U) Attribution is a Bear

-I

26 ·-PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PR

OP

l:RTY

or. THE U

.S. M

OU

SE OF REPRt::Sf::N

TAilV

~S

I

-I

I

(U) While the intelligence case for

attribution to Russia is significant, alterna­

tive scenarios have been examined to in~

dude an insider threat or another cyber ac­

tor. No credible evidence was found sup­

porting either alternative, including a review

of information contained in classified intelli­

gence reports.

{U) Finding #8: Russian-state actors and

third-party intermediaries were responsi­ble for the dlssemination·of documents

and communications stolen from U.S. po­litical organizations.

(U} Russlan-stc1te actors and third party

intermediaries were responslble for the se-

lective dissemination of information from

hacked U.S. political systems. This repre­

sents a "significant escalation in directness,

level of activity, and scope of G!ffort" In Rus­

sia's "longstanding desire to undermine the

US-led liberal democratic order." It is there­

fore likely that high-level Russian govern­

ment approval was required in both plan­

ning and execution of the operation. 10

{U} Russian-state Actors

(U} Guccifer 2..0 and DC Leaks

UNCLASSIFIED

GUCCJFER 2.0 TAKES CREDIT FOR

DNC HACK ON WORDPRESS.COM

Sour,~: WouJpress.com (guec1re,2 .wordpresuom)

UN~LASSIFIED

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATWES 28

(U) From their fl,st appearances, both

Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks sought to conceal

the[r identities. During a media interv[ew

on June 21, 2017, Guccifer 2.0 identified

himself as a Romanian "hacker, manager,

philosqpher, women lover," and a "freedom

fighter." He.further explained in broken

English hls desire to follow in Marcel Lazar's

(the original Guccifer) footsteps to "fight for

freedom of minds-and for a world without

illuminati."l9

{U) Meanwhile, DC Leaks identified it­

self as a group of American hacktivists en­

gaged in "a new level project aimed to ana­

lyze and publish a large amount of emails

from top-ranking officials and their lnnu­

ence agents all over th e world ." The self­

described premise of the OC Leaks effort

was that "politicians have forgotten that in a

democracy the people are the highest form

of political authority."~u

li ' '

• (U) Both Guccifer 2.0 and DC Leaks

worked to conceal their true Iden ti ..

ties, physical locations, and motiva­

lions;

•

•

• {U) Guccifer 2,0's first appearance

online and claim of responsibility for

the DNC hack occurred within 24

hours of the public announcement

by- that the DNC had

been hacked by actors affil iated w[th

•

2'l the Russian gov~rnment;

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 29

• (U) Multiple cybersecurlty firms

have evaluated Gucclfer 2.0's activi­

ty and have published evidence that

the online persona used a Russian­

based VPN service to transmit files

and communicate. Additionally,

posted documents were processed

on a computer using Russian lan­

guage settings;2..i

• {U} During interactions with the me­

dia, Gucdfer 2 .0 denied any relation­

ship with the Russian government

and claimed to be Romanian . How­

ever, when pressed to explain how

he hacked into the DNC in his n ative

Romanian language, he failed to

demonstrate fluency. Gucclfer 2.0

terminated the Interview when chal­

lenged on this point;b

•

{U) Wikiteaks

(U) Wikileaks played a key role in Rus­

sia's malign influence campaign and served

as a third party intermediary for Russian in­

t elligence during the period leading up to

the 2016 U.s.· presidential election.

(U) The global r each of Wikileaks and

its established ties to the media makes it an

attractive outlet for the dissemination of

stoten documents intended to undermine

the United States and fts electoral process.

In addition, Wikileaks' historic actions ,

whlch have undermined U.S. interests and been beneficial to Russia, make the organi­

zation an ideal intermediary for Russian in­

telligence.27

UNCLASSIFIED GUCCIFER 2.0 & WIKILEAKS

n ~ ~tl.NbO ;-~ ., - .;.,. · ~ CV ·~ rf$, ~ i;,..<;£: r1>oP<>.-1<.,.1:,,...,,...,,1

THE .;:~~

·p EOOES·T.A ,. . ~ MA~ ;;;\ 9,

"1 .

Sourca: T~!cr

UNCl.ASSIFIEO

(-U-) Wll<ILeaks renes on hackers, leak­ers, and othfa! r criminal ngents to acquire

personal, confidentia l, and classified materi­

al for publication.

As part of that

dissemination, Wikileaks sent 118 tweets

promoting the hacked material. Wikileaks

messaging was then magnified by 426,000

other users' tweet s. According to Twitter,

as much as 25% of these tvveets could have

PROl't:.rtTY Or 'THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE11RESENTA'l'IVES 30

' ""'

been the result of automated activity asso­

ciated with Russia's malign influence cam­paign. 28

UNClASSIFIED

WfKILEAKS DJSSEMtNATES HACK~D MATERIAL

f ~ ,;.- • • ., I .

T"ce Podesta.

~ u;-:e.: \'foo1..eats "1~-L!e

~ 'i·._.

.

.

. (:\ ... ~ = .

~~.._....,.o ,a:..::- ...,~ ~ .... uw~· .... -yeo......-~ ~~M ~ t ""ll.l!O"I .. W ~~~·=~==o~~Nt"ti--:t

UNCLASSIS:IEO

Finding #9: The Russian government used

RT to advance its malign influence cam­

paign during the 2016 U.S. presidential

el@ction.

{U) The Committee finds ample evi­

dence that RT is not only a state-enterprise,

but is subject to the editorial control of the

Russian government. This control allowed

the Kremlin to use RT to advance its malign

influence efforts during the 2016 U.S. presi­

dential election.

(U) RT, formerly Russia Today, became

an international news channel in 2005 .. lt is available in more than 100 countries and

has its largest viewer base in Europe. fU's

stated goal is to "create news with an edge for viewers who want to question more"

and produces content which appeals to ·

skeptics of both the mainstream media and

the e-stablishrnent. 3{)

(U) RT is subject to the control of the

Russian government. The State Department

describes it as a "State-own ed international

satellite news network broadcasting in mul~

tiple languages," which "'spreads Russian.

propaganda tailored to international mar­

kets.'' The IC has identified RT as nthe Krem­

lin1s principal international propaganda out­let.'131

PROPERTY OF TI-!E U.S. HDUSE OF REPRES'cl-H ATIV!::S 31

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential

erections, RT ran stories consistent with its

past editorial bias against the West and sug­

gested that tl1e U.S. electoral proces~ had

been con·upted. RT was critical of presiden­

tial candidates from both major parties but

was consistently cfitical of candidate Cllnton

through the election.

{U) RT's attacks against candidate C1in­

to~ ·were wide-ranging, Including the Insinu­

ation that the Clinton family were crfmlnals.

RT also used advertising to promote materi­

al leaked by Russian intelligence, which tar-­geted candidate Clinton and the Democratic

Party.32 .

(Ul finding #10: Russian intellfgence lever­

aged social media ln an attempt to sow so­

cial discol'd and to undermine the U.S. elec­

toral process.

(U) The Internet Research Agency (IRA),

a Russra-based ''troll farm" with ties to the

Kremlln, was ,·e.sponsible for placing ads and

maintaining both human operated and au-

. to mated social media accounts for the ma­lign influence campa[gn/'11

. (UJ Twitter

UNCLASSIFIED

RT-SPONSORED TWEETS

@ ATO S times whe11 th'? Ciintons escaped foderal charg~

11PoJ~~t<1B: Wikileak~ refc,u1is l.il~t hi>tch of emails from Clinton campaign <.h3lr

~ ! ~l.tc+Mtfo'l.~~,;,/1~~.

~ .o. .. ,~~11 ;U:w,l"'"1-11lll ~-t".2!M"'­h••.W ftt -tvf ti...,.,~~, '--'*""~C. ... r'N'\ ll"Y\ ~ti•

Source: Twitter

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The 2016 Russian Twitter operation

was coordinated with the use of other socia l

m~dia platforms to undermine the U~S. po­

litical process :and divide Americans. Both

presidentia I candidates (@Hilla ryClinton

and @realOonaldTrump) were directly en­

gaged through "retweets" :a nd "likes," as

were various p·olitically active and divisive .

PH0Pf:R1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPREGENTATIVl::'.S 32

factions of American society.

(U) In total, Twitter identified 36,746

automated Russian accounts which were

responsible for producing 1.4 milllon unique

tw~ets. In addition, Twilter identified 2,752

human-operated accounts. Some of these

accounts masqueraded as the news media,

activists, and political organizations. One

Russian accolint, @TEN_GOP, successfully

Impersonated the Tennessee Republican

Party and grew.to have significantly more

followers than the legitimate Twitter ac~

colmt. After tweeting "We Love You, Mr. President" to Donald Trump, @TEN_GOP

received a thank you from the preside'ntial

candidate.35

(U) @TEN GOP and other Russian­

linked accounts incited racial divisions, anti­

Musrim, and anti-immigrant messages.

They also promoted the dissemination of

material stolen from U.S. political organiza­

tions by the GRU. The Russian cyber per­

sonas DC Leaks and Guccifer 2.0 used

Twitter to promote stolen material, as did

UMCLASSIFIED

RUSSIAN TWEETS USING @HlllaryClinton and @realDonaldTrump

32,:?5,, ((1l•))1_- ro1,~ 416.632 Tw<:Oll. /4 f! TwOOIG

~ • A 1' 1,326 480,3-16

l.,i(es l~ea

T~fGC!lng @Hill~l')'Clinton fo llower..

Russl~n T\1Jlt1e,

Acco.unto I TBrgortina@<2alOonnldTrump

fonowen;

Wikileak~.

{U) Facebook

(U) Russian operators also used Face­

book Pages and advertising to advance their

malign Influence campaign. The company's

internal revtew found the creation and ·pro­

motion 9f 120 ~nique Facebook Pages by the IRA. These pages 13enerated approxi­

mately 80,000 posts over the two year peri­

od preceding the election. These posts ap­

peared ln 29 million users' Facebook ''News

Feeds." When Facebook calculated the cu­

mulative lmpact of "Shares" " Likes" and

"Follows,'' the company estimated. that 129

million people may have been served Rus­sia's malign Influence content.JG

{U} According to Facebook, much of the

Russian activity was-designed to promote

divisive soclal and political me~sages across

the ideological spectrum and that advertis­

ing was intended to drive f611owership of

divisive Pages. Four of the top lrnpression­

generating (or number of times an ad was

on screen) advertisernents\1o1ere from ficti­

tious personas claiming to represent organi­

zations lncll1dln3 "B.ick the Badge,"

"Bfacktivist," "Being Patriotic," and "Woke

Blacks.''37

(U) Russian malign influence activities

on Facebook were significant but they were

not well-funded or large-scale operations

relative to the overall scope of election­related .:ictivlty on these platforms:

• Prior to the election, Russian opera­

tors used paid advertising on Face­

book to reach s million Americans

PROPE;Rrf OF '1116 U.S. HOUSE OF REPR"$ENTA'rlVES 33

. M..--.th~

,., • "-""' f l"IJ-.0. ""41 '"'l"'"=

~ u....s -~~-­Mi6,4 "4 fcniJA 1,1, PW

·"f'~~\,C:; -.l~·~r.t V"ffl l<.·~ lffl C1 l•I(~

U NCLASSI Ff ED RUSSIAN ADS ON FACEBOOK

'i...

.......... """"'" ~ . t ei: • • , Ofl.'\li:I .... ' "· • U••"'-

~ r~ fct ail~ r,~,;,i l G8t' ro,rr-~ o,;rir.,, ll"o -

23 .,_.,,..,._ w , 1v C.. !i'~z.

.,. , ._ t] r-.......

,_ . lOU Vflf!dd ~ :-4, N"3,i),,,~ ... t"I.I

~~-........ -W.9'MY.t!_-,_,,_,M_ ~IJQIINl-ot

l'lwlo"-­c-, t ~,~!l.)~At.:!, ~

Source: Facebook

---UNCLASSIFIED

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRl::SENTA1'1VES 34

{based on Impressions). At the same

time, 33 trillion stories were served on Facebook Pages and ust~rs aver­

aeed 220 per day;

• 56% of the 11.4 million impressions

associated with Russian Facebook

advertisfng occurred after the elec­

tion;

• 99% of Russian Facebook ads were

funded with less than $1,000 and

25% were never seen.

{U) Google

{U} Google also was used as a media

platform for Russia's malign influence cam­

paign. The company's investigation re­

vealed that $4,700 was spent promoting 18

channels and 1,100 YoliTUbe videos (43

hours of content).

{U) Google describes this as a limited

investment compared to overall election­

related spending on Google. In total,

0.0002 percent of 2016 U.S. election adver­

tising was found to be associated w ith Rl1S­

sian malign actors. In addition, Google not­

ed that this Russian-funded media had very

low view counts with onty 3% reaching

views of 5,000 or mo~e.

(U) However, it sl)ould be noted that

Google and its services have been and con­

tinue to be used by Russia for the dissemi­

nation of propaganda through RT. This is

partly evidenced by RT's 2.2 million sub­

scribers on You Tube, but also by the fact that RT propaganda is served to Americans

by Google in the same manner as legitimate

news sources.

(U) The Committee's Investigation

found that.Twitter, Facebook, Google, and

other social .media platforms face slgoificant

challenges In tt1eir effort to identify and act

on malign influence campaigns. Some of

those challenges include:

• Sophisticated actors adapt to auto·

mated defenses;

• Social media does not requlre true

name usage;

• Users can easily conceal thef r physi­

cal location wrth virtual pr.ivate net­

work connections;

• Social media seeks authentic ex­

changes and does not want to cen­sor speech; and

• Social media platforms do not have access to intelligence reporting.

PROPERTY 01' 1HP. U.S. HOU9F. OF REPRESENTATIVES 35

}_

4. -5_

5_

7_

8_

9.. 10.

ll.

....... _,_

13. HP.SO, Full Ccmmitte.! Briefing cm Russia Cyber .Al:tivhy (Oosed Session), Sept 6, 201~: HPSO, f ull C=mitto!e Brwmr.gon Russia Cyber Acti\'ity {Close-d Se~n), Jan_ 10, 2016; Hj,.so, fun Commiuee Bri~ng oo Russia CV~r Act1Ylty {Closed Ses-SicnL Dec. S, 2016; -Droft Jnd!Jent i fl'Jestiga:jon Report fer the De,'?UJ0vi::c Nationof Ccmmittee, Aug. 24, Wl6; , Droft tn::Ident lnr.1esO{;(Jt1"on Report f or tile OeJtlocrG!ic Congcesslor.a! C!I«:f!Glgn Committee, 1\ug. 8, 2016.

l<l, I)rajt !.'lcident investig(]rion Repoafcrthe ~100'!1:ic NationoJ Committee, Aug. 24, 2016; Draft fncident lm,e:s:tgation Report jot #r~ D,;mcaaffr:. G;mgres;s.jorr1,I (;Dmpr;ig:: Committee, J..»g. 3, 2016.

15. Draft Jnddent Jqv=ti!!Off,m P.eporr far the Demrr.:rco,;;nationc! Commi!t.:e, A11:s, 24, Wl5; Dr oft faddent lnvesr>9aticm Repor. fer the Demomror; Cangresslcnaf Compqign Camr_rnttee, Au!;. 8, 2016; Lexis Nexis, D1s­cover.f Ser,f.res FJ:le! S.°iie.et: MJ.Jow Mani' P<19es in a G,gal:ryte}" 0..-"<. :W, 2017 _

PROPERTY Of r riE US. !iOUSE;. o,= REPRESENTPiTIVES 36

16. ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections, Jan. 5, 2017; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed), Jan. 10, 2016;

17.

; ODNI, Intelligence Community Assessment: Cyber Threats ta the 2016 US Presi­dential Election (/CA 2016-37HC), Sept. 12, 2016.

18. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activities (Closed), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Rus-sia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; , "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of Events," Politico, Dec. l, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Post, July 11, 2017;

prise in Cyberspace Operations (NICM 2017-06), Jan. 30, 2017. owing Risk of Strategic Sur-

19. , "Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 20. Twitter, @DCLeaks_ 21.

22. "Bears in the Midst: Intrusion into the Democratic National Committee," Crowd Strike Blog, June 15,

, Inside Story: How Russians Hacked the Democrats' Emails, Associated Press, Nov. 4, 2017; "All Signs Point ta Russia Being Behind the DNC Hack," VICE, July 25, 2016;

"Interview with Gucci/er 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 23. -; 24. "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Gucci/er 2.0: All Roads Lead

Back to Russia," July 26, 2016;

25. , "Interview with Guccifer 2.0," VICE, June 21, 2017. 26. ThreatConnect, "Does a BEAR Leak in the Woods? ThreatConnect Identifies DCleaks as Another Russian-Backed Influ­

ence Outlet," Aug. 12, 2016

D. ~ Becker, Steven Erlanger, and Eric Schmitt, "How Russia Often Benefits When Julian Assange Reveals the West's Secrets," The New York Times, Aug. 31, 2016.

28. Wikileaks.org, About Wik/Leaks (www.wlkileaks.org), Dec. 22, 2017; Felke Hacquebord, "Two Years of Pawn Storm," Trend Micro, Apr. 25, 2017; ThreatConnect, "Guccifer 2.0: All Roads Lead Back to Russia," July 26, 2016;

; HPSCJ, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016.

29. HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russian Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Dec. 5, 2016; HPSCI, Full Committee Briefing on Russia Cyber Activity (Closed Session), Jan. 10, 2016; Matthew Nussbaum, "The definitive Trump-Russia Timeline of Events," Politico, Dec. 1, 2017; , "Hacking Democracy: The Post's new findings in Russia's bold campaign to influence the U.S. election," Washington Past, July 11, 2017;

30. RT.com, About, Dec. 23, 2017;

31. U.S. Department of State, Media organizations controlled and funded by the Government of the Russia Federation

32. 33.

(Report 002580), Nov. 7, 2017.

34. Written testimony o Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017; HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017.

35. Written testimony of , Acting General Counsel of Twitter, Inc., Nov. 1, 2017. 36. Written testimony of , General Counsel, Facebook, Nov. 1, 2017. 37. HPSCI, "Russia Investigation Task Force Hearing on Social Media," Nov. l, 2017.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 37

(U) Chapter 3 -America Reacts Key Question 113: What was the U.S. government response to these Russian active measures

and what do we need to do to protect ourselves and our allies in the future?

(U) As disct1ssecl in Chapter 2, the IC

w<Js at the tip of the spear of the U.S. gov­

ernment's response to Russia's nefarious

cyber activities. While the NSA focused on

detection and attribution, the FBI took the

lead on victim notification, and the OHS was

the primary agency responsible for provid­

ing assistance to victims and coordinating

with state and local election officials.

(U} The federal government's ability to

effectively respond to cyber threats de­

pends on the IC's ability to pc;1ss information

efficiently to the FBI at the lowest classifica­

tion level possible. It is also dependent on the sufficiency of the lnteractions between

the federal government and victim, whether

that victim Is a private organizalion such as tlie DNC, or a state or local government en­

tity. Given the response to Russia's malign influence campalgn,-the Committee believes

that FBI and OHS need to Improve the pro­

cesses used to engage with victims and

stakeholders, who independently control

their respective systems.

(U) The Executive Branch's policy re­

sponse to Russia's active measures cam­paign induded extensive deliberation, but

not significant pre-election action. This is

explained by two factors. First, the Execu­

tive Branch was jt1stifiably concerned about

raising an alarm so close to the election.

Second, elections are not run by the federal

government. State and local governments

are under no obllg;ltion to cooperate w ith

federal officials, nor are political or3cm iza­

tions that operate their own networks. In

short, the developing intelligence on Rus­

sian active measures throt1ghout 2.016, the

complexity of the political situation, and the

lack of federal authority to act limited the

options for aggressive pre-election actions.

The Executive Branch t ook some actions, to

include a Joint OHS and ODNI public state­

ment issued on October 7, 2016.

(iJ-, the CIA created a fu­

sion cell on Russian election interference,

which was comprised of analysts from the

CIA, FBI, and NSA. This fusion cell produced

a series of papers for the White House, di­rectors or each of the three agencies, and

the DNI. The cell operated through the

election, standinc down in mid-November.

(U) On December 6, 2016, President

Obama directed CIA Director John Brennan

to conduct a review of all Intelligence re­

lating to Russian involvement in the 2016

elections, and produce a single, comprehen­

sive c;1ssessment. The result, an ICA titled

Assessing Russian Actjvities and Intentions

in Recent US Elections, was drafted by.

and was coordinated with

the NSAand the FBI. While most of the

analysis contained in the ICA held up to

scrutiny, the Committee investigation found

that ICA judgments on Putin's strategic ob-

PHOPEkTY OP THE U.S. HOUS1: OF RePRESENTATIVE3 38

Jectives failed to meet most of the analytic

standards set forth In th<:! primary guiding

document for IC analysis, Intelligence Corn,

munity Directive (ICD) 203, Analytic Stand~

ards.

{U) Another component of the Execu­

tive Branch's response to the Russian gov,

ernment's efforts to interfere in the 2016

presidential campaign was FBl's opening of

a counterintelHgence investigation into "the

nature of any links betw9en individuals as­

sociated with the Trump campaign and the

Russlc:in government and whether there was

any coordination between the campaign

and Russia's efforts." 1

{U) The Committee collected facts relat­

ed to the FB1's investigation through May

2017, until the appointment of Special

Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee

dld not examine events that occurred there­

after in order to avoid interfering with Spe­

cial Counsel Mueller's ongoing investigation.

While this chapter addresses the FBl's inves­

tigation, facts identified by the Committee

relating to Russia contacts with Trump cam­

paign associates, including the individuals

under FBI investigation, are addressed in

Chapter 4.

{U) finding #11: The Federi!I Bureau of In­

vestigation's notification to numerous Rus~ sian hacking victims was largely inade­quate.

...

-· (U) The Commlttee is also concerned

that many, perhaps even a majority, of Rus­

sia's known victims were never contacted

by the r-01. In November 2017, the Associat­

ed Press (AP) reported that it contacted ap­

proximately 80 people out of a 11st of ap­

proximately SOD victims. Only two w ho

were contacted by the AP " learned of the

hacking attempts of their personal Gmall

accounts from the FBl ."8 Although the Com-

PROPcRTt OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA,IVES 39

PR

OP

ER

TY

OF

TH

E U

.S. H

OU

SE

OF

RE

PR

ES

EN

TA

TIVE

S

.... .. LI 0 (. LJ ti C:

mittee cannot verify the accuracy of the

AP's r~porting, Clinion campaign senior pol­

icy advisor Jake Sullivan testified to the

Committee that, consistent with the AP's

analysis, his personal Gmail account" was the

subject of numerous hacking attempts, but

tha t he never received any sort of notifica­tion from FBL~

(U) tnteraction with the DNC illustrated

that even when the FBI expeditiously made

contact with a victim, and conveyed rela­

tive!\, detailed information, the engagement

failed to elicit the desired response­

namely, the DNC's swift and serious atten­

tion. Director Corney testified that, in retro­spect, "[w}e w ould have sent up a much

larger flare. Yeah, we would have just kept

banging and banging on the door, kno1.ving

what I know now. We made extensive

efforts to notify. I might have walked over

there myself, knowing wha~ I know now." 10

Similarly, former DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson

reflected that, ''You know, in retrospect, it

would be easy for me to say that I should

have brought a sleeping bag and camped

out in front of the DNC in lat_e summer, with

the benefit of hindsight."11

(U) Anding #12: Communication between

the Department of Homeland Security and

state election officials was impeded by

state officials' mistrust of federal govern­

ment overreach coupled with an unprece­

dented level of Russian cyber intrusions.

(U} QHS was the first agency to raise

awareness to state election officials and the

general public regarding cybersecurlty con­

cerns with the 2016 election infrastructure.

1n August 2016, Secretarv Johnson hosted a

confere.nce call with the National Associa­

tion of Secretaries of State (NASS} and other

Chief Election Officials. This call was fol­

lowed in September and October 2016 by

four statements encouraging state and local

elections officials to request DHS's cyberse­

curity assistance.12

(U} During the August 2016 phone call,

Secretary Johnson offered assistance to

state officials in managing risks to voting

systems in each state's jurisdiction. He also

encouraged state officials to implement rec­

ommendations from the Department of

Commerce's NIST and the U.S. EAC on se­

curing election infrastructure. At that time,

DHS was "not aware of any specific or credi­

ble cybersecurity t hreats relating to the up­

coming general election systems," and, on

the CQll with state officials, uSecretary John­

son reiterated that OHS, the Election Assis­

tance Commission, NIST, and DOJ are availa­

ble to offer support and assistance in pro­

tecting against cyber attacks."13

(U) On August 18, 2016, the FBI Cyber

Division, in an effort to aid cyber security

professionals and system administ rators to

guard against the persistent malicious ac­

tions of cyber crirpinals, issued an alert to

states entitled, "Targeting Activity Against

State Board of Election Systems.n2'1 The bul­

letin warned that in rate June 2016, an

"unknown actor scanned a state's Board of

Election website for vulnerabilities."15 The

FBI recommended that all states search ac­

tivity logs for any escalation attempts and

suggested three recommendations as pre-

PROPERTY OF 'fliE U.S . HOUSE OF REPR'ESENTATI\/ES 41

cautionary measures.16

UNCLASSIFIED

FBI WARNS STATES OF MALICIOUS CYBER ATTEMPTS

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) In a Septembe, 161 2016 statement,

Secretary Johnson announced "we have

seen cyber intrusions involving political in­

stitutions and personal communications.

We have also seen some efforts at cyber intrusions of voter registrntion data main­

tained in state election systems."" Secre­

tary Johnso,, encouraged election ofiictals

to reach out to OHS and also offered a varie­

ty of cybersecurity services to state and

election officials, Including;

• Scans on internet~facing systems,

including reporting of vulnerabilities and mitigation recommendations;

• Risk and vu lnerabiiity assessments;

• Support from the National Cyberse­

cu1·1ty ,md Comn1lr'nications Integra­

tion Center {NCCIC) to provide on­

site assistance In identifying and re­

mediating a cyber Incident;

• Information sharing of relevant

cyber inciden ts, threats, and vulner­

a bllity rnforrnation;

• Best practices for securing voter reg­

istration databases and addressing

potential threats; and

• Field-based cybersecurity advisors to

assist with planning and incident rw)nagement. 1

~

{U) Also on September 28, 2016, Speak­

er Ryan and Leaders McConnell, Pelosi, and

Reid sent a letter to the National Associa­

tion of State Election Dfrectors, "urg [ing)

states to take full advantage of the robust

public and private seC'tor resou rces available

to them ... " and informing thern that "[iJn addition, the Department of Homeland Se­

curity stands ready to provide cybersecurity assistance to those states that choose to request it." I.!>

(U) On OGtober 1, 2016, Secretary John­

son e:<pressed gratitude for the letter from

congressional leadership, and noted that

there were a few cases in which malicious

actors gained acces~ to state voting-related systems. He also encouraged state and lo­

cal election officials to seek OHS' cybersecu­rity assistance. "So far, 21 states have con­

tacted us about our services. We l1ope to see mor~,'".Johnson said at the time.;,0

(U} DHS and ODNI released a joint pub­

lic statement on October 7, 201~. DHS con­tinued to urge state and local election offi~

ciats to remain vigilant and seek its assis­tance with cybersecurity.n On October 10,

2016, Secretary Johnson provided an up­

date on DHS election cybersecurity s.ef'\lices . .

PROPlliW Of" l HE U.S. HOU$t: OF REPRESt:.NIA llVT:S 42

that "to date, 33 states . , . election agen·

cies have approached the Department of

Homeland Sec1;rlty about our Cybersecurity

services." Johnson stressed that time was

an important factor, with only 29 days until

election; it cou Id take up to two weeks for

OHS to run scans and identify vulnerabili­

ties, and an additional week for elect;ion

officials to mitigate any vulnerabilities. This

was the Secretary's final public attempt to

encourage state and local election officials

to reach out to OHS for assistance.22

Jh l ,h"-"S \'IM ,..

UNCLASSIFIED

6:nnu«r.~ :>I lt111111llrir iMolt11 UJ~ ... nn :nDLl

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thc.113 t\c>()u~n1l'IJ\1th1,,mc~'( ,.-,.,,..,~·:.-,.·frf,'-•,1~ u, 1~ n'l1.thfw o.rta;:.., rtJU1 ,:, u;-c~lkf11\lc<..:1\'n,1.uC\.1 t'i'Vn;t~il:.%t

ltbt,V'•Sil l ,c.:,1 .. \J IT1*'1 1b t\'l 1 V'I h ""~ 1\:1l11-n1ltln-,:-a,nl? f1,• -(E.,.t'( N•i1b'Td:-,1.-Jc .. .h;;, ,._....-w":w:lf .'1;.lic' ,11c.i&'1'w.1,•bi. ,\,.,1 1,,u.,, L-... <_.,1,~ ~111 :,,~AnJf)C(IJ~ ~~r , 1.tlii;T.f:c'lt-.-J t?'"· n\ 1r ... ,,,r: ~.,n..., Jr:.,-r.ilif,; \, 1U'.,;.$,blu • ..J::n: .1 ..&.,..~h; : 11 ~ ) -1.t ,11 1.. c,jiC1,•.,, t1i i,"'' ~ 1...,.,•1ln, u~.ru.lJ : t.r.~,r,l~,i l,~:J.1(<rl""91,, lr1A.ui1lh :,a 1~ ~1luf'(fr',;ur1~Y~l:J°Y"« i\\:at1 1:mt.tlcu.1li .. 'C'J';.J.1:1:.~ i,,J i.f,:t:(11.;nulb. fa.rt& t, lo:i.-a.5,n.: ":.:lflted1\ '"t''"'~ .Nthtali.."\l:"bJAN,.(~I ~:or~ ih p.:!!D t :11"' tr. ir,.u,",.,·~,~1nill l1 twl' },.':,-; •• 1h. '1,y.a, ..,"»'J It 1-=J.J .,.,~,t·U:. T~Swl :r,-U..,i&~ .. 1e>~.1'~1""""""Ni:ya"r"u 1: ... a·,h~,.,. .. l(,1'(1ttl't(;:~~ ~ ,~~ 4tJ,ti.l1Ju~'\l«:1c.t1,-.1u~ i ~,~,.d·~ ,w~-.IJ.:~: ... n:,,:1""'1

7t"4'-~f J:.'"t-! r ... 't, •t ~ fl(IJ~.,halW't:l:~ta:.:r. :,:,U\:!"» .;.,.:<>l.:c::L'lilh3'J· .. ,~ ~ ~ , ... ~ ,t.ao: ... ·.11 Ul,'!...'.1, 11_ 1.l'f UL0

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0

1!":ai:.~'1:l,t ) l.,t•C"ls.l:,')~,N,,{'t.f oll"J..y\,"t l,,it.hJ: lt:::..JfLt {';.,,,"(t:L:A:tcliL:l.6 ,.=~:n..~ U.:,,.1r1.Ca'ufN~ rt.:PtJ:.. u rCt •!'~ rii•+:-Tur+(w~l,!\A, : r : 'Jr i....:\U Cf1"'t "I , cCh1 1~ 11.: fl.l,ntrr~r.-r.(t \ C'U .. ~u, ~1i:'1-r:.te;c..-~l t"11,, lkr.,:,a1 ..tr:ciw, r,d J1.:..1~,,.lr f.~pc-4 n~ •r1l:TL1 :a., ml~ iU\,A'r.,,.a.; •

1-X t '-tf ~o: r~:to: W );1 f11~N,n A.1t1C"'47~l ~ t, ··"""'1 h:, "'I Cfl fn.1"\0rl, ... r.,)'.fN"l\y 1,•, 1"'11~4 )'~·.1.Jln.l( \ \tJA:r,u;«f~,'l'l) ~ l"f ~d4\i!fJ~i.11': J!"~J l') ~C,J~t)N,J ','.if'J,t, •JO,fH r.r:i,J.111){)..-, ..wh

(U) Challenges encountered by OHS in­

cluded the unprecedented slze <:lnd sco pe of

Russian active rneasures, lack of public

attention, and m istrust from state and local

election officials-many of whom lacked

access to classified information. Ultimately,

36 states took advantage of DHS's assis­

tance, but many election officials were re­

sistant to the idea of designating election

infrastructure as c·ritical infrastructure. 23 As

former Secretary Johnson explained to the

Committee, "one thing I discovered in this

conversation, State election officials are

very sensitive about what they perceived to

be Federal intrusion into their process. I

heard that firsthand over and over: This is

our process. It's ou,· sovereign responslbll­

lty. We're not Interested in the Federal

ta keover."24 A clear example of mistrust was

a letter sent from Georgia's Secreta1y of

State Brian Kemp to Secretary Johnson on

December 8, 2016, which accused DHS of

attempting to breach the Georgia Secretary

of Stat e's firewall. "I am writing to ask you

whether OHS was aware of this attempt

and, if so, why DHS was attempting to breach our firewall," Mr. Kemp stated.i.s

Nevertheless, oh January 6, 2017, OHS des­

ignated election infrastructure as a subsec­

tor of the existing Government Facilities

critic~I Infrastructure sector?•

(U) Finding 1113: The Joint Office of the Di·

rector of National 1ntelligence and Depart­

m ent of Homeland Security public state­

ment attributing election Interference to

_ ··-· ) Russia was ineffective.

UNCLASSIFIED (U) No major public actions were taken

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENrATfVES 43

between October 7, 2016 and election day.

It is unclear exactly when policymakers be­

gan focusing on Russian efforts to influence

· the election. As further dlscl1ssed below,

Attorney General Loretta Lynch recalls being

briefed by Fl31 senior leadershi~

that the Counterintelligence Division had essen­

tially uncovered some information or re-

ceived information involving Russian intelli­

gence operatives."27

(U) On May 18, 2016, speaking at the

Bipartisan Policy Center in Washington,

D.C., DNI Clapper stated, "we've [the IC] al­

ready had some indications of that

[attempts of cyberattacks on presidential

campaign websites] and the combination of

DHS and FBI a re doing what they can to ed­

ucate both campaigns against potential

cyber threats."28

(U) By summer 2016, CIA Director Bren•

nan had l:>ecorne aware of information

aboul "specific Russian efforts to Influence

the election," 7~ and the National Security

Council (NSC) Principals Committee began

discussing actions to take In response to

what the Russians had been doing.30 As Di­

rector Brennan continued to brief the Prin·

clpals Committee on Russia, the CIA-:-as

discussed previously in this report- "pulled

together experts rrom the Central Intelli­

gence Agency (CIA}, NSA, and FB­

- to focus on the issue, drawing in mul­

ti pte perspectives and subject matter ex·

perts with broad experti~e to assess Russian

attempts to interfere iri the U.S. Presidential

election."3

While Dl1S was providing assistance to

states to conduct cyber reviews of their

electoral mechanisms, the Prlnclpals Com­

mittee was awaiting "with urgency whatev­

er the lntellrgence Community could pro­

vide" that "would illumrnate !their] under­

standing of {Russian interest in the elec­

tion]."i3

UNC LA.SSIFf ED

lC CONFIDENT OF RUSSIAN PRE­ELECT!ON HACKING

Joint Statement from the Department O( .

Hom£1land Sccuri('! an~ Office! of th~ Dlrector of National lntelllgencc on Election Securlly

.,. __ l)"l..._, tw,..., C..,U,1<1 W.il)

"'-\oj_ ~·C.~t lAO•U-..•,.,h~l(~-..--~.....,_y ~--""""\4·-•- 1-.--....rn.-.,,..,,.\ t ...... ~T'-.-t--a.l t\..,...~ .....,. ._.._ ... .._.,,. CCl-• ... ,.-J..w.-•,,.,'t••~••...,_~,,.,_.._.,.,.­.. .-...~ .._.,,..,._..w"- .. - .a.,o t._.,._,, ... .-._,....,u,.,..... ... ,,. "'~ ... .,..,.....,.~-,·-\)~,-.'--,._.~,_.....,,."-""~~ l>.'"w tAN.V• .. - • •....,__. ~¥_,.._..,..~-.,,,,.t..-'",,,,..__..,'1.,

UNCLASSIFIED

{U) On August 4, 2016, Director Bren­

nan, in a scheduled call with Alexander Bort­

nikov, the head of Russia's Federal Security

Bureau (FSB), became the first U.S. official

to raise the Issue of Moscow's meddling::~4

Brennan told Bortnikov that a campaign

against the United States would certainly

"backfire" and that all Americans "cherished

their ability to elect their own leaders with­

out outside interference or disruption."35

Additionally, former Attorney General

PROPC!RfY OF me U.S. HOUSE OF REPl<E8EN I AT1VES 44

Loretta Lynch testified that the decision was

made to have "the President of the United

States speak directly to President Putin, confront him with knowledge that we were

aware of his efforts on a variety of fronts

and that it was unacceptable, and that that

discussion took place during a pu II-aside ...

at one of the G- either 7 or 20 meetings in

the early fall. 1136 Former National Security

Advisor Susan Rice corroborated in testimo­

ny before the Committee that President

Obama and President Putin discussed Rus­

sian meddling in the 2016 election at the

end of bilateral discussions during the G20

Summit in China in early September 2016.37

(U) The most significant pre·election

public action was the October 7, 2016, joint

OHS and ODNI statement, indicating In part

that the IC "is confident that the Russian

Government directed the recent compro­

mises of e-mails from us persons and insti­

tutions, lncludf ng from the US political or­

ganizations. "38 The IC assessed that the dis­

closures of alleged hacks on websites such

as DCLeaks.com, Wikileaks, and by Guccffer

2.0 were consistent with Russian methods

and motivations. According to Secretary

Johnson, the statement "did not get the

public attention. that it should have, franRly,

because the same day the press was fo­cused on the release of the 'Access Holly­

wood' video. That's what made ou r news

below-the-fold news that day."39 Addition­

ally, the public dissemination of Podesta's

emails commenced on October7.40

(U} In considering a public response,

the Executive Branch was in a unique posi~

tion-lt was dealing with extremely sensi~

live intelligence and had to consider the im­

pacts of jeopardizing sources and methods

when declassifying intelligence.~1 Further ­

more, In the midst of an ongoing campaign,

it had to carefully consider any public state­

ments or actions, as it did not want to be

perceived as taking sides and politicizing the.

election-or, according to former Secretary

Johnson fueling claims that the election was

"rigged ." 4:1

{U) Finding #14: The Executive Branch's

post-election response was insufficient.

(U) In the weeks following candidate

Trump's victory over candidate Clinton.in

the 2016 U.S. presidential election, Execu­

.tive Branch officials began brainstorming

options for punitive actions against Russian

activities. On December 6, 2016, President

Obama ordered D1rector Brennan to con­

duct a review of all Intelligence relating to

Russia and the 2016 elections, i1,ctudfng a

comprehensive assessment that would

eventually be mad~ public.43

(U) On December 29, 2016, among oth­

er measures, President Obama announced

the expulsion of 35 Russian intelligence op­

eratives under diplomatic cover, the closure

of Russian compounds in Maryland and New

York, sanctions against nine entities and in­

dividuals associated with Russian intelli­

gence services, and the Treasury Qepart­

ment's designation of two Russian individu~

als for "using· cyber-enabled means to cause

misappropriation of funds and personal

identifying information."4'1 Also on Decem­

ber 291 the FBI and DHS released a Joint

PROPERTY OF THE u:s. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 45

Analysis Report of declassified technical fn­

form~tion on Hussian cyber activity to help

notwork defenders identify and disrupt Rus­

sian malicious cyber activity.

(U) On January G, 201.7, DHS designated

election infrastructure as a subsector of the

existing government f~cillties critical Infra­

structure sector.11

~ The same day, a declassi­

fied version of the ICA was released to the

public.4 &

(U) Finding #15: The majority of the Intelli­

gence Community Assessment judgments

on Russia's election activities employed

proper analytic trade craft.

(U) The IC produced three versions of

the ICA: (1~ a highly compartrnented docu­

ment, which Included all sources and refer­

ences to the underlying intellrgence, (2) a

Top Secret version that omitted details from

compartmented reports, irnd (3) an unclas­

sffied version . The fu II ICA was briefed to

Pr'csldent Obama on Jam1ary 5, 2017 and

President-elect Trump on fonuary 6, 2017.

The unclasslfied version of the ICA was also

reteased to the public on January 6, 2017.

While the level of detall varies greatly

among the three versions, the fim:il conclu ­

sions and key judgments of each are the

same.

(U) The Committee determined that the

majority of the ICA judgments on Russla's

eleclion activities employed proper analytic

tradecraft. The~e were m~stly well rea­

soned, consistent with observed Russian

actions, properly do~umented, and­

particularly on the cyber intrusion sec-

tions-employed appropriate caveats on

sources and Identified assumptions. Some

of the key ICA judaments that the Com­

mittee found credible because they were

based on proper anarytic tradecra~ are

summarized below:

• (U) Russian efforts to influence the

2016 U.S. presidential election rep­

resent the most recent expression of

Moscow's longstanding desire to un­

dermine the U.S.-led liberal demo­

cratic order.

• (U} Russian intelligenc~ services,

acting on the orders of Russian Presi­

dent Vladimir Putin, launched cyber

and conventional influence opera­

tions-notably by leaking politically

sensitive emalls obtained from com­

puter intrusions-during the 2016

election.

{U) Finding #16: The lntelllgence Communi·

tv Assessment judgments on Putin's strate­

gic intentions did not employ proper ana·

lytic tradecraft.

(U) While the Committee found that

most ICA analysis held-up to scrutiny, the

investigation also identified significant intel­

ligence tradecraft failings that undermine

confidence in the JCA judgments regarding

Russian President Vladimir Putin's strategic

objectives for disrupting the U.S. election.

Those judgments failed to meet longs~and-

PROP~lY OFiHC! U.S. HOUSE OF RCPHl:S!:NTATIVES 46

ing standards set forth in the primary guid­

ing document for IC analysis, ICD 203, Ana­

lytic Standards including:

• {U) ''Properly describe quality and

credibilit:y of underlying sources."

• {U) "Properly express and explain

uncertainties associated with major

analytic judgments."

. (Ut ".Incorporate analysis of altema-tives ·- [particularly] when major

judgments must contend w ith sig-

nificant uncertainties or ... high-

impact results."

• (U} Base confide-nee assessments on

"the quantity and quality of source

material."

• (U) "Be informed by all relevant in-

formation available."

e (U) "Be independent of political

considerations ."41

{U) The Committee emphasizes that the

tradecraft failures identifie<l in this investi­

gation should not be broadly ascribed to

ClA, NSA or FBI analysis, as the shortcom­

ings were confined to select judgments­

specifically, a key assessment on Putin1s

strategic intentions-and not to the entire

ICA product. Moreover, the ICA was

writte~ CIA analysts and their

draft was subjected to an unusual_ly con­

strained review and coordination process,

which devcated from established QA prac­

tice. The Committee is not aware of these

problems being prevalent In o'""Jler CIA, FBI,

or NSA products.

(CfNF) 101 The Committee's find.ings on lCA

tradecraft focused on t he use of sensitive , • intelligence - cited by the 1CA. This presented a significant challenge for

dassifa:ation downgrade. The Committee

worked with inteltigence officers from the

agencies who own the raw reporting cited

in the ICA t o downgrade the classification of

compartmented findings -

-(U} The Committee is planning addition­

al action regarding this information in early

spring 2018.

{U) Finding #17: lhe Federal Bureau of In­

vestigation opened an enterprise counter­

intelligence investigation into the Trump

campaign after receiving information relat­

ed to Trump campaign foreign policy advi­

sor George Papadopoulos.

(U) !n addition to tile other Executive

Branch responses described above, in late

July 2016, the FBI opened an enterprise Cl

investigation into the Trump campalgn fol~

lowing the receipt of derogatory infor­

mation .about f9reign policy advisor George

Papadopoulos. Tne purpose of an enter;

prise Cl investigation is to obtain infor­

mation of intelligence value, umost times ..

. not with any kinci of intent or objective of

reaching a criminal charge."~ FBl's enter­

prise C1 investigation Into the Trump cam­

paign wss ied by a small team a~ FBI head­

quarters.49> The timeline of t his investiga­

tion can be found on the next page.

flRQPS'(TY OF THE U.S. H-OUSE or- ~6PR~6JITATl',f"t::S 47

(U) The derogatory inforn1ation result­

~d from the relationship between Papado-

was

anonymized In Papadopoulos' charging doc-~o ument as "the Professor"}. Based on the

charging documents, the two firsL met in

Italy on or about March 14, 2016, and

"P~padopoulos was interested in -

because . . . fhe] claimed to have substantia l

connections with Russian government offi­

cials, which Papadopoulos thought could

increase his tmportance as a poiicy advisor.

• • " ~1

- was interested in Papadopou­

los because of his r~le in the Trump cam­

paign.52 The first meeting withlailllloc­curred approximately one week pri'or to

candidate Trump publicly naming Papado­

poulos as a forergn policy advlsor.!:,3

(U) In late March, Papadopoulos had a

follow-on meeting with- London,

where-ntroduced Papadopoulos to

a woman who claimed to be a relative of

President Putin "with conn ections to senior

Russian government officials."s,i Papado­

poulo!? informed the campaign about this

meeting, with a campaign supervisor pro­

claiming that Papadopoulos conducted

"great work.1155 Papadopoulos coi:1tinued to

correspond with- who connected

Papadopoulos with an .individual-

1111 claiming to.have connections with the

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.56 Papa­

dopoulos communicated with this Russian

contact throughout the summer of 2016,

attempting to arrange meetings between

the·Russian government and campaign offi ­

clals.57

(U) On April 26, 2016, over brea kfast at

a London hotel, - told Papadopou los

"that he had Just returned from a tr ip to

Moscow where he had met with high-level

Russian government officlals."ss - fur­

ther indicated he had learned that the Rus­

sians had obtained 'dirt' on candidate Clin­

ton. Specrfically that '"the Russians had

emails of Clinton,' 'they have thousands of

emaits.w59 However, the Committee was

unable to discern if the referenced emails

were the missing emails from candidate

Clinton's server while she was Secretary of

State or the emails that were stolen from

the DNC . .

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 48

P~

OP

ER

Tf O

F T

HE

U.S

. !slOU

eE

OF

Rl:.-P

Rt::S

c--:NT

/\TIV

cS

-{U) finding #18: As part of the enterprise

counterintelligence investigation into the

Trump campaign, the Federal Bureau of

Investigation opened an lndlvidu;:il coun­

terintelllgence Investigation Into Ca~er

Page.

(U} By the time Page was announced as

a Trump campaign foreign ·policy advisor on

March 211 2016, he was already a subject of

interest for the FBI. Page previously lived

and worked rn Russra and maintained con­

tact with known Russian intelligence offic­

ers, including -who was

described in a 2015 court filing as an SVR

officer posted to the Russian Mission to the

United Nations. Page previously worked

with the FBI in the prosecution of­

and other Russian intelligence officiais.68 ·

PROPERTY 01' THE U.S. HOUSI:! OF REl-'Rl:~ENf'ATIVES so

(U} finding #19: The dossier compifed by

Christopher Steele formed an essential part

of an application to the Foreign Intelligence

Surveillance Court t6 obtain electronic sur­

veillance on carter Page.

(U) In late October 2016, DOJ sought

from the Foreign Intelligence SurveiUance

Court (FIS(} an order authorizin-

mittee did not find-any evidence of any

cooperation or conspiracy between Page

and Papadopoulos. Additionally, the so­

called "dossier" complied by Christopher

Steele formed a substantial and essential

(For ad­

ditional information about the St eele dossi­

er, see Chapter 4.)

-(U) finding #20: Special Counsel Robert

Mueller indicted Paul Manafort on several

charges, none of which relate to aUega-

tions of collusion, coordination, or conspir­

acy between the Trump campaign and the

_Russian government.

(U) Paul Manafort joined the Trump

campaign on March 29, 2016, and was ete­

vated to _campaign chairman on May 19,

2016. Manafort became campaign manager

after the campaign removed

- on June 20, 2016. The Committee

agreed to avoid, to the greatest e;..1:ent prac­

tical, any potential interference with Special

Counsel Mueller's investigation. Given the

ongoing litigation concerns associated with

Manafort, the Committee.will only discuss

information in this report t hat has been

publicly disseminated by the Special Coun­

sel's office. Although the Committee would

have appreciated the opportunity to inter­

view Manafort regarding his role on the

Trump campaign, the Committee is fimited

in this regard due to Special Counsel

M1:1eller's investigation and indictments.

{U} On October 27, 2017, a gran·d jury

indicted Manafort and his associate, fellow

lobbyist and deputy Trump campaign man­

ager Rick Gates, for various financial crimes,

as well as making false statements.74 All of

the financial crimes took place prior to Man­

afort serving as Trump campaign manager,

and nothing in the indictment relates to any

potential collusion, conspiracy, or conspif"Q­

cy between the Trump campaign and the

Russian government.

{U} On February 22, 2017, a grand jury

issued a superseding indictment for Mana­fort and Rick Gates, which included addi­

tional allegations of financial crimes, indud-

51

ing bank fraud. Sfmilar to the October 27,

2017, indictment, the superseding Indict­

ment does not include any reference to the

Trump campaign, Including no mention of

collusion, coordination, or conspiracy be­tween the Trump campaign and the Russian

government.

(U) While the Committee will not go

Into further detail on the charges against

Manafort due to ongoing litigation con­

cerns, Special Counsel Mueller's indictment

of Manafort illustrates the necessity for U.S.

presidential campaigns to better investigate

individuals who serve in sen for positions

within the campaign. If the accusations against Manafort are true, he should have

never served as a senior official wfth a cam­

paign for the U.S. presidency, much tess

campaign chairman or manager.

(U) G~neral Flynn b~gan advising the

Trump campalgn on or before february

2016 and subsequently became a central

figure on the campaign trail. He was the

former Director of DIA and was one of can­

didate Trump's closest advisors on national

security issues. Following the election, and

during the transition period, he was desig­

nated as the future National Security Advi­

sor to the President. General Flynn served

as President Trump's National Security Advi­

sor for less than a month, resigning on Feb­

ruary 13, 2017. According to FBI Director

Corney, General Flynn's resignation oc­

curred after it came to light that he hacl mis­

led Vice President-Elect Pence about his

contacts with Russian Ambassador Sergey

l<lslyak during t he tronsltion period. 's

{U) Prior to his trip to Moscow, Genera l

Flynn and his son met with Russian Ambas­

sador Kislyak at the ambassador's private

residence in Wa shington, D.C. on December

2, 2015. The r.neeting was later described

by General's Flynn's son In an email to the Russian embassy as "very productive."79

The email indicates that the meeting was

arranged at the request of General Flynn or

his son.80 The Committee was unable to in·

terview General Flynn and his son because

of their written intent to assert t heir Fifth

Amendll)ent r ights against self­

incrimination.

Pnore:RTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRES!:NrnTIVES 52

I {U) Finding #22: General Flynn pleaded

guilty to making a false statement to the

Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding

his December 2016 conversations with Am­

bassador Kislyak, even though the federal

Bureau of Investigation agents dld not de­

tect any deception during Flynn's inter­

view.

(U) According to the charging docu­

ments, on or about December 22, 2016, "a

very senior member of the Presidential

Transition Team" {PTI) directed General

Flynn to contact representatives of foreign e..;

governments. This request concerned a

resolution about Israel[ settlements sub­

mitted by Egypt to the U.N. Security Councii

around December 21, 2016.ss Later, on De­

cember 22, General Flynn contacted Ambas­

sador Kislyak and "requested that Russia

L. l/

vote against or delay the resolution."80 The

next day, Ambassado r Kislyak informed

General Flynn that Russia wou ld not comply

with the request.87

(U) On December 29, 2016, President

Obama "authorized a number of actions'' -

including new sanctions-"in response to

the Russian government's aggressive har­

assment of U.S. officials and cyber opera­

tions aimed at the U.S. election in 2016."85

Following this announcement, the charging

documents state that General Flynn dis- ·

cussed "what, if anything, to communicate

to the Russian Ambassador about the U.S.

sanctions," with a senior PTT official.as

-

PROPER1Y OF TliE: U.S. HOUSE CF REPREScNTA"TIVES 53

{U) Finding #23: Executive Branen officials

did not notify the Trump campaign tha1

members of the campaign were assessed

to be potential counterintelligence con­

cerns.

(U} The Committee found that the

Trump campaign was not notified that

members of the campaign were potential

counterintelligence concerns. This lack of

notification meant that the campaign was

unable to address the problems with each

campaign member and was ignorant about

the potential national security concerns. AG·

Lynell recalled that, during her fi rst meeting

with Director Corney and McCabe about

Page, "one of t he possibllltles the three of

us discussed was wheth~r or not to provide

what is called a defensive briefing to the campaign, wherein there would be o

m eeting wlth a senior person with the

Trump campaign to alert them to the fact

that .. . there may be efforts to compromise

someone with their campaign." 102

(U) Such a defensive briefing would not

have been unusual. According to Lynch, _

"[i]t is not an uncommon thing t o do . . . in

rntelligence matters."103 However, the FBI

did not provide any such warning about

Page, although it was again discussed b.y the

administration's most senior policymakers

after Director Corney briefed t he National

Security Council Principals about the Page

information in "!ate springn 2016.m

PROPERTY t1f THE t).S. HOUSI:: OF REPRESl:.N1'AilVES 54

(U) The Trump campaign did not re­

ceive a general counterintelligence briefing

until August 2016, and even then, it was

never specifically notified about Papado­

poulos, Page, Manafort, or General Flynn's

Russia ties.1o.; Further, the counterintelli­

gence briefing provided to Trump and his

top advisors did not identify any individuals

by name, but rather focused on the general

threat posed by adversaries, including Rus­sia and China.

(U) Finding #24: The February 2018 indict­

ment ·of the Internet Resee1rch Agency and

Russian nationals exposes Russian actors

and their intent to spread distrust towards the candidates and the political system in general.

(U) In mid-February 2018, the Depart­

ment of Justice charged 12 Russians and the

Russia-based Internet Research Agency LLC

with interference operations targeting the

United States political and electoral process· es. The lndictment claims that th~ stated

goal of the Russian actors was to " spread

distrust towards the candidates and the po­l itical system in general" and provides in­

sight into the metl10ds used by the IRA,

such as the use of stolen identities, travel to

the U.S. for the purpose of collecting intelli­

gence, and the procurement of computer

infrastructure to hide t he Russian origin of

activities. ~05 The indictment by Special

Counsel Mueller contains assertions that are · consistent with information examined by

the Committee during its investigation. Spe­

cifically, according to an accompanying DOJ

announcement, "There ls no allegation in

the indictment that any American was a

knowing participant in the alleged unlawful

activity. There is no allegation in the indict­

ment that the charged conduct altered t he

outcome of th~ 2016 election.''107

PROPERTY OF :HE u .s_ HOUSE OF REPRESECl.'TA.Tl\ic S 55

v,

l . Hr SCI, "RuS$la1l /\clive Mca~ure~ lnve5ti;:otion", Mar. 20, 201,, 7.. HPSCf, ''Russla11 Actlvn Moasuw~ lnvc~tlgot1on", M.:ir. 20, 2017, 3. d .

s. G.

7. 8.

9. Hr SCI, Executive Session Interview oUake Sullivan, Dec. 21, 2.017, 10. I-IPSCJ, "Russian Active rvteasurns investigation», Mar. 20, 2017. 11. HPSCI, "RUS5ia Investigative Task Force Heating with former Secretaf'/ of Homeland Setu rity Jeh Johnson," June .21,

2017. 12. HPSCI, "Russia Investigative Task Force HearinB with Former Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh JohnsQn/ June 21,

2017. 13. DHS, Reodovt of Secretary Johnso11's Cali Wit/1 State Election Officials About Cybersecurity, !J!t.eWwww.dhs.eov/

news/2016/08/15/[e<1dout·~ecret<lry-iohnsgns-calr-$\ii\e-elec.lfQD:.officials-£Ybersecu ri 1·,•. Aug.15, 2016. 1c1. F01, FBI Flos/J: Targeting ActMry Against Stat~ Boord of Election Systems, Aue. 18, 2016. l S . Flll, FB/1-"lash: TorgetingAclivity Agajnsc Srate Board of Election Syscems, Aug. lll, 2016. '16. Fil l, FDI F!os/1: Toryetfog Activity Ayoin~t Stote Boarcl of[lection Systems, Avg. 18, 2016.

17. or~s. Stotemenr /Jy Secrera.ry Joh11son Concemlng the Cybersecurliy of rlle Nation's Election Sy:,cems, hltu;LL www .d h ~.ll,o v/11ow1:/7.Q11:./~/ 1 6/.i,t;i tom" n1 ·MtWH~Q!· ttlhnr.on•r.onr..,ml nrt-cy br:(!.<'Cllr I ty-na !inn·~-e:cc1ion · S'll!m, SopL 16, 2016.

18. DHS, Statement [)y Sccrc101y Jat1nson Concr:rn/11y tlt1.• Cyb,ll'.11:cuflly of lhe Na.lion's E(ecttun Sym ims, b.\Sn.:LL v~~,cih<.&2_,•/ nf!.filJ2,016/0'iW,6/;,!1)lCmr. n.1:[,n111.r.:t~11v•)Qhl1HlJ)•Ci)l\r,gmln~,lCmrtl!>Y•llt1tirm';· r:l1!~1tP.t)~ Sopl. 16, 1016.

19. Puul O. Rynn, Nancy 1>01osl, Mitch McConnull, Harry Rold, Li:11,1r to Toud Vulci1t/11a, Sept. 281 2016. 20. DHS, Statement by Sacretory Johnson About EICGtton Systems' C}'IJC!rsccurlty, ~ !!d.lli!Y.l:.~.l?-OJ.6ll..QL!11.L

~li>kpir.nt·secr<~lilrY- 1ohn;o1\.,,~0lrt•sl,1c11oq-&YW\(JI S•c;:r:bN~ Oct. l, 2016. 21. DH~. Joint Stotemunr from the Deportment of liomeland Secut/1)' otld 0,(Jice of tile Director of Noo·onal lntelllat:nce on

Election Security, Z!Jt1l~Jb·1ww,t1hu:cw/"Q~ 01 C,/10/07 llnl Qt;llilteme~ P..a!.!mJl 111-lrotM ln nd•security·il nd-office · dlrector-na1fonaJ, Oct. 7, 2016.

22. DHS, Update Dy Secretcrry Johnson On OHS Election Cybersecurlty Services, btt1?$://wv,w.d l!J!.4.Qy/t1ewsn.01G/lO/lO/ Jtl2f!.itiP,·5PC{P,tary· loh nson,d lls,eJectlon-cybe rs<lcurity-servlce.~. Oct. 10, 2016.

23. HPSCI, "Ru~lll lnYestiR'aiive Task force Hearing with Fomier S(melar,, of Homeland S-ecur\ty Jeh Johnsont June 21, 2017.

24. HPSCI, "Russia Investigative Task Force Hearing with Former Secretary oi Hamel.ind Securit>1 Jeh Johnson.'' Jtme 21, 2017.

25. The Office of Secretary of State of G eorgla, Letter to Secretary Jeh lohnsor\ Dec. 8, 2016. 26. DHS, Statement by ~ecretary Jeh Johnson on the Designation of Election Infrastructure as a Critical Infrastructure Subsec­

Lor, .l:!StmJb:.VV-'W.dhs.gov/ncws/2017l01/0&/~totament-~?.cret:irv•loimson-6oslgnallon-election-lnf;astructure crirtc.al, Jan. 6, 2017. ·

27. HPSCI, Executive Session lntarvlew of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2Q1/. 28. '"The Global DlglLaJ Challenge Initiative - Xey11ote Address,'' .llil)arl:isan Policy Center video, 38:2S, http://br.ove.me/

zff9r41)q, May 18, 2016. 29. HPSCI, E:<ecutiva Ses~lon lnterYit~w of Loretta Lynr.h, Oct. 20, 2017. 30. HPSCI, hecutivc Scs~lon lnterYlew of LOrutta Lynd,, Oct. 20, 2017; llw Prl11r.lpols Committee, convon~d nnd chaired by

tl1c Not1onol S.r.curlly /\dvisor, l~ a Cnl>lne1 level h1teragc11c~· forum for r.o nsldcrln r, pollc11 l$~uos that MftH:t the national u:curlty lntcro~ts of the United Stutes. Regular attendees of tho Prlnd p.ils Commlttc<e Include : the SccretJry of Stntc, the SocroLorv of the Trc~surv. tho SocroLory of l>ofori~f.', tho At\ornuv Goncrol, thu Sor.retary ol l:norgy, tho C:hfaf of Staff to the Pro~ldcnt. tho Director of Notion ul rntclllgtmr.o, the CJiurrmon of the Joint Chlo#$ oi Stnlf, the Director of th~ Centro I lntolll11oncv Ai;oncy. the Nat1onol Soc~ulty Advisor, tho Homeland Security A<Msor, Md tho Ropr<:5r."1miva or tho Un1totl Stot11~ to the Unlted Nol1ons.

31. HPSCI, "Russian AcL~v11 Measuras Dunne the 2016 Election Campalen,N Mo\' 23, 2017. 32. The Gang of 8 is comprised of the Speaker of the House of Represr.otiltlvc-s, the Minority I.ender of the Mouse of Repre­

sentatives, the Chairman and Rankine Member of the Permanont Select Con1mittce on lnt~lliRllnce of t hP. House o r Rep.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT,'!>.TIVt:S 56 .

,esemati~s. the Majcf.ty .,rui Minority lead= of the U..S. Senate, 3J:td the Chai!mrll\ and V:~ Chairman of !:he Sc!Ed Com mitt~ on ln.effigC11ce of tr£ U.S. ~ate.

33. >-IPSO, Ex!:cutive 52S1icn lnteNle:.v of Susan Riro, Sap. 8, 2017. 34. l-ll'SCT, "Russian Aclive Measures Ou ring the 2016 Election Cam~ai!;O. ~ May 23, 2017. 35. HFSO, ·Russi,:m Aai'-'e r·Jl.!asurcs Duri:,g 'the 2016 Election Ca."n~;;ign." May 23, 2017. 36. H?SC!, Ell!!<uti\'-e Session lnter.ri::w of Lorena tynci1, Oct. 20, W17. 37. 1-if'SO, fxe.:um•e Session loter>f,...,., ofS!tSa n Rke,Sep. 8, 2011.

38. Dl"iS,Joinr Statemellt from the OeporrmeflC of Hame/cr.d Secvrizy and Ojficeof the Ui:ecto, of Nutionof lntelfig.:m:e on Eleaion Secority, N ~ps, f / ww,.-.,.dt-s.go·,./ r'l;!w .!}201 G/10/ 07 Ao<nt-s tiltt2.-ner,t-deoa rt-nent-homaland-secu rit'{•a:1d-uifice­din~g:cr-rc1tio ni!I, Oct. 1, 201E.

3!t. HPSCI, "Russia ?1westigai;,;e Task Force Hearing wi,h R;rmerSecreu,ry of Homeland ~curity Jeh lohn5on,0 June 2.l. 20'.i.7. 40. H~I, &.2cuti-1e Session lntel\liew of John !locksra, Jun€! 27, 201'1.

41. Hl>.:-Ct, uRussia Investigative T~5k Force Hearing wflh Fomter Secretary of Hoimiland ~curity leh Johmon,° June 21, 20l7. 42. HPSCI, "'Russia lm.·~tigative Task Force Hearing wi,h Fe<mer Secretary of llcmel.ir,d Security Jah Jofmson, .. June 2i. 2017. -13 .

44.

45.

46. 47.

48. 49. so. 51. 52.

53.

54. 55.

S7. 58. S9. 60.

61.

52..

o3.

in Septenbet 2015-Shari!d similar information in a or.2-on-one meeting with nt G2r.eral COvns~ James Baker. KPSO, Executi-.'e Sessicn cf , Oec. 18, 2017. il.rcund the same time as ms meeting with fBI,- shared tfle information with jcurnatiru, lttclodir. of Slate, who pub-lished an 2rticle at the e.nd of October. r!PSO, E.~ecut:v2 S~ion of Dec. :!13, 2017; "'Wa5

a Trump ~fceCcmmunicating With Russia?," Slate, Oct. 3!, 2016. Candidate Ointon promoted tile: - artidetv lier soti;;! media follCT,.,crs ,f-,e same day it wc1s published. Twitt:er, @Hil~iClintoo. Oct. 31, 2.016, 4:32 PM. White House. Stotemenr by Che PreslrteJlt on A.ccrons in RespMSe to R!!ssi'an Mclidous Cyb.?1 Ac:clllicy am; Harcssmer.t, D~ 29, 201.6. DP.S, Sta~emenc !rt Secretory Jen Johnson on the Des:gnotfoa of Election lnfrost.wcwr:! as a C!ictcol fflfrc;;r:-ucture Subsec­tor, ntt !ls: l l·,•N Lw.dhs. ec,·/ news/2017 iOl/06/5 t-.!remen t-se c:,Hary- jchr .son-d~sie nati!: r,-elccti un--irr<3~t="= re--:rit! ca I, JEill..6,2017.

OONI, Assessing Russian Activ:cies and i'ntenr:ions ln R~enl US cfeettons. Ian. 6, 2017. OONJ, ,'nte/fr9eme Comrn11nity Directive 203: Analytic Stonr!o;d5, Ja". 2, 2015. HP5CI, EXc:cutr,e Se,slon lllteivlew of Mary McCord, No .... 1, 2017. HPSCI, E:r.crotiva So...sslol'l lntuMew of A.nprew McC,1be, Dec. 19, 2017. U.S. v. Ge:irge ?opadciµoulos {3:17-cr-182, District of Columbia). U.S. v . Gecrge ?ap,.d-0~oufos (!:17-cr,182, Distrli:t ofCclumbe}.

U.S. v. GEC'ge Pap ad Dpi;,ulos (l:l 7-cr-UR District of•Col umhe}.

Post Opimons Staff, "A crans.crlpl of Deana!d Trump'!. meeting with The Wilsh,n~o,~ Post e i:frtoriai board/ ;•/mh,r.gtan Fort. Mar.21, 2016. U.S.·;. Ge-:lfge Pa~;iopoutos (1:17~-1S2, District: of Cohani'.!1,iJ.

U.S. v. Geotgc P~dopou:os (l:l?-c.-1&2, District of Cof11ml;;;1); Email from George Fapadop<,ulos to #Re: Me~ti.."lg ·,,•il:r. Russi-am leaderst-,ip- indud'ifll; P(itin," Ma~. 14, 2016. [DJTFP00010i1ll.

U.S.~·- Gecrge ~dcp0".1fo5 (1:.17-cr-182,-District of Columbia}; Email from Georg•:? f'.;ipado;;oulos t!>-­Fwd: (R1mian Outreadl)t May 4, 2016 {OJ1FFO()!}U40S}.

U.S.•:. George Popcdopo,..ifos (l:17-cr-182, Distric:: of Colu~t.iJ). U.S. v. G2org~ !>~padopc•.Jlos (1:11-cr-1S2, Dislrict ofColum~}.

J

PP.O?ERTY OF TIIE U.S. HOU~ OF REPRE:.S~NTATl\fES 57

64. 65.

66. 67.

68. U.S. v. Evgeny Buryakov, a/k/a "Zhenya," ·, and U.S. Southern District of New York, Janu-

69. 70. 71.

72.

73.

ary 23, 2015; "Russian Spies Tried to Recruit Carter Page Before He Advised Trump," The New York Times, Apr. 4, 2017; DOJ, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Application, Oct. 21, 2016, which was made available for review by HPSCI members and staff on.March 17, October 31, November 2, December 14, December 15, and December 18 2017.

74. U.S. v. Paul J. Manafort, Jr. and Richard W. Gates ill (l:17-cr-201, District of Columbia). 75. HPSCI, "FBI Counterintelligence Investigations," Mar. 2, 2017. 76. 77. 78.

79. Michoel G. Flynn, Email messages !o Russian Embassy in United States, Flynt) Intel Group Production, FLYNN_HPSCi_OOOOOSOO, 00007542.

80. Michael G. Flynn, Email message to Russian Embassy in United States, Flynn Intel Group Production, Fl YN N _H PSCl_ 00000.500, 00007542.

81.

82. 83. 84. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 85. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 86. U.S. v . Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 87. U.S. v. Michael T. Flynn (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia).

88. Barack Obama, "FACT SHEET: Actions in Response to Russian Malicious Cyber Activity and Harassment," The White House, Dec. 29, 2016.

89. U.S. v. Michael T. Fiyr,n (l:17-cr-232, District of Columbia). 90. 91.

92. 93. 94. 95.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S.HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 58

96. 97. 98. 99.

100. 101. 102. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct. 20, 2017. 103. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of toretta Lynch, Oct. 20, ·2017. 104. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Loretta Lynch, Oct, 20, 2017.

105. HPSCI, Staff meeting with Bill Pries tap, FBI Assistant Director, Head of the Counterintelligence Division, Oct 31, 2017. 106. U.S. v. Internet Research Agency, et al. (1:18-cr-32, District of Columbia). ·

107. DOJ, "Grand Jury Indicts Thirteen Russian Individuals and Three Russian Companies for Scheme to Interfere in the United States Politi ca I System," Feb. 16, 2018.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 59

(U) Chapter 4 - Campaign Links to Russia Key Question 112: Did the Jlussian active measures ;nclude links between Russia and individ­

uals associated with political campa;gns or any other U.S. persons?

(U) A key focus of the Committee's

investigation was whether Russian active

measures directed at the 2016 U.S. election

(see Chapter 3) ''include[d) links between

Russia and individuals associated with

political campaigns or any other U.S.

persons."1 The first part of this chapter

reflects the Committee's answer to that

question w ith respect to the Trurnp

campaign. The second part of this chapter

addresses the Clinton campaign.

(U} The ''llnl<s" between individuals

associated with u,e campaigns and Russra

have often been publicly described as

inqulril':!s Into whether them was "collu.sion"

between individuals associated with either

ca.ndidate Trump or Clinton and the Russian

government. One challenge with describing

potential "links11 wrth the Russian

government as "collusion 11 is that the term

"collusion" may mean different things to

d ifferent people, as exemplified in witness

testimony before the Committee.

Particularly in light of Special Counsel

Robert Mueller's continuing criminal

investigation-which has a different focus

and the Committee agreed not to impt::!dr.­

it is important to note that the term

"c:oUusion" does not, by itself, describe a

criminal offense. Unlike the closely-ref atcd

concept of "conspiracy," there is no

a pplicable statute that sets out the

elements of " colluslon." "Collusion" is

therefore an ambiguous tenn, not a precise

legal one.

Trump Campaign

(U) The Committee cast a wide net,

generally asking each witnesses whether

they had evidence of any "collusion,"

"coordination," or ''conspiracy" between

Russia and candidate Trump or any of his associates. The Committee also

investigated potential Trump campa;gn links

with Russia, focusing on credible af legations

within the scope of the anreed-upon

parameters. Matters investigated by the

Committee Include allegations pertaining to:

• candidate Trump's business

dealings;

, the campaign's policy positions and

personnel;

• involvement in or knowledge about

the publication of stolen emails; and

• meetings with Russians.

{U) In the course of witness interviews,

reviews of document productions, and

investigative efforts extending well over a

year, the Committee did not find any

evidence of collusion, conspiracy, or

coordination between the Trump campaf3n

and the Russ ians. While the Committee

found that several of the contacts between

Trump assoc;ates and Russians- or their

proxies, including Wiklleaks- .were ill-

PRO!JE:RlY CF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT A TIVF:S 60

advised, the Committee did not determine

that Trump or anyone associated wjth him

assisted Russia's active measures campc,lign.

DIRECT EVIDENCE OF COLLUSION,

CONSPIRACY, OR COORDINATlON

{U} Finding #25: When asked directty, none

of the interviewed witnesses provjded evidence of collusion, coordination, or

conspiracy between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.

{U) The Committee interviewed high­

ranking current and former government

officials, along with numerous Trump

campaign members, Trump administration

officials, and other Trump associates. None

of the witnesses testified they had evidence

of collusion between the campaign and

anyone affiliated with the Russian

government. In most of the Committee's

witness interviews, the w itness was asked

directly for any evidence of "collusion,

coordination or conspiracy" with any

element of the Russian government to

influence the outcome of the 2016 U.S.

presidential election. This question was

asked wfth respect to the w itness' own

actions; the actions of candidate Trump; the

actions of anyone officially affiliated with

t he campaign; or the actions of anyone

unofficially affiliated with the campaign,

defined as including '.'v.rannabes,"2 "hangers­

on,"3 and upeople who represented

themselves as being part of the campaign."4

Each witness was given wide latitude in

answering these questions, but none

produced any evidence. For example,

Trump's son-in-law and senior advisor Jared

Kushner stated categorically that the Trump

campaign "'did not collude, cooperate,

whatever other 'C' words you used, with • ,.,5 anyfore,gn governments.

{U) Several former government officials

testified that, even though there was no

evidence of collusion between Trump

campaign associates and the Russian

government, they were aware of contacts

and interactions of potential concern. For

example, former CIA Director John Brennan

stated in open session, "I encountered and

am aware of information and intelligence

that·reveated contacts and interactions

between Russian officials and U.S. persons

involved in the Trump cam-paign that .I was

conc~rn·ed about because of known Russian

efforts to suborn such individuals, and it

raised questions in my mind .. . whether or

not the Russians were able to gain the

coo~ration of those indi•Jiduals."0

Brennan

continued, however, "'l don't know whether

or not such collusion . .. existed." 7

{U) Similarly, forme r ON! James Clapper

stated that he was aware of the same

information to which Brennan referred,

"that my dashboard warning lights were on

just because of that."5 However,

reaffirming his prior public statements, he

told the Committee that, "I didn't have a~y

evidence-l don't care how you want to

caveat it-of collusion ."9

BUSINESS DEALINGS

{U) Finding #26: The Committee found no

evidence that President Trump's pre-­

campaign business dealings formed the

PROPERTYOF'IBE: U.S. HOUS!::OF RS'RE~NTATI\IES 61

basis for collusion durinB the campaign.

{U) As a politic.ii outsider who had

never ru_n for office, Donafd Trump did not

have a polftical record to analyze, criticize,

or rely upon during the 2016 campaign.

Therefore, his long and varied business

career garnered significant attention from

supporters, opponents, and opposition

researchers alike. Eventually, as described

in the second half of this chapter, candidate

Trui:np's pre-campaign business dealings

with Russians became a subject of

significant opposition research.

(U) As noted above, the Committee's

investigation was focused on the tirne

period of the 2016 election. Trump's pre~ campaign dealings were within scope only

to the extent they formed the basis for or , were otherwise llnked to, Improper conduct

during the elections. As one of the

Committee Members said during an interview, the key question was if any

business "relationships, whether directly or

indirectly or just by some other means, had

the effect that there was a preexisting

relationship with Russia, and that that

preexisting relationship may have in some

way inspired the Trump campa.ign to have a

contact with the Russian Government to

coordinate, collude, or conspire to help

them win the election over HIiiary

Clinton.1110

(U) The Committee focused only on any

potential financial improprieties relating to

the eteclion. In particular, the Committee

examined the Miss Universe pageant in

Moscow in 201.3; the Trump Organization's

unsuccessful efforts to build a Trump Tower

fn Moscow in late 2015 and ear ly 2016; and

other assorted claims of Russian financia l

ties to the Trump family . The Committee

did not uncover any evidence that any of

those matters formed the basis for

collusion, coordination, or conspiracy

between Trump or his associates and the

Russian government during the 2016 U.S.

presidential election.

(U) Miss Universe 2013: Before he was

a political candidate, Trump owned the Miss

Universe Organization. The decision to hold

the 2013 Miss Universe annual pageant in

Moscow was a unanimous one made by representatives of the Trump Organization

and NBC-the event's broadcaster-with

approval of the president of the Miss

Un lverse organization. u Michael Cohen, an

attorney and former Executive Vice

President of the Trump Organlzation, told

the Committee 50 percent of the fees

earned for the pageant went to NBC.12 "[01

f the $12.2 million in foreign income that

lthe Miss· Universe pageant] earned [in

2013), a substantial portion of it was

attributable to the Moscow event."13

(U} The 2013 pageant's hosts were Aras

and Emin Agalarov, father and son of a

wealthy Azerbaijani-Russian family in

Moscow. The Agalarovs' company, Crocus

Group, owned the venue where the pageant

was held.1~ The Agalarovs and Crocus

Group wanted to host the event in Moscow

because tl1ey wanted to have the pageant ln their company's bu ilding, Crocus City Hall,

arid It was a way to promote Emin's music

62

career, who performed atthe pageant.~;

The Agalarovs have connections with senfor

individuals and elements of the Russian

government/6 and Aras received the Order

of Honor from Vladimir Putin.17 The

decision to hold the pageant in Moscow

originated from an "off-the-cuff" discussion

between Emin Agalarov, his manager, and a

representative from the Miss Universe

pageant.18

UNCLASSIFIED

EMIN AOALAROVATTHE 2013 MISS UNlVERSE PAGEANT IN MOSCOW

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) The Agalarovs first met Trump in

person in 2013 in connection with the Miss

USA pageant in l.as Vegas.19 The Agalarovs

and Trump signe-d the contract to hotd the

pageant in Mosc.oi.v during the weekend of

the Miss USA pageant In January 2013.20 At

the conclusion of the 2013 M iss USA

pageant, Trump and the Agalarovs

announced on stage that the Miss Universe

pageant that year \"Jould be held in

Moscow.21 In a June 18, 2013 tweet, Trump

publicly asked, "Do you think Putin will be

going to The Miss Universe Pageant in

November in Moscow-if so, will he

become my new best friend?"v

(U) Leading up to the Miss Universe

page,int, the issue of President Putin

possibly attending came "up a number of

times" among those planning the pageant.23

Emin's manager Robert Goldstone and the

head of the pageant organization had

"casual'' conversations w·ith one another,

but every time Goldstone asked Emin about

it, En1in replied the pageant would have had

to go through "official channels" to make

the request, indicating that the event was

not officially related to the Russian

government. 24 At the time, according to

Goldstone, Emin cast doubt on whether

President Putin would attend, stating "if this

was in America, would Barack Obama

attend? Probably not. It's a beauty

pageant. But there is a chance, maybe, of

some kind of meeting."25 Before the

pageant, however, President Putin's press

secretary called and told Trump and others

that President Putin would not attend the

pageant, and he did not.26

{U} While in Moscow, Trump, along .

with his head of seturity, attended the

pageant and several pageant -related

events.27 for example, Trump attended an

event hosted by the Agalarovs at a well­

known restaurant with local businessmen.28

(U) Although there were allegations in

the Steele dossier that Trump engaged in

illicit activities with prostitutes in the

presidential suite at the Ritz-Carfton hotel,

the .Committee found no evidence to

support these allegations. Trump's former

head of security,-· testified that

PROPERT Y OF THE U -S. H OUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 63

although somebody during a meeting fn

Moscow-did not rrnow who­

''mentioned sendfng women to ITrunw's] room,'- responded "absolute ly not,

we don't do that."29 - told the

Committee he advised Trump of the

comment, and they both laughed about it.

- also festified he walked Trump to his room that nlght, remained for a few

nilnutes, and did not observe anybody enter

the roorn.30

(U) Trump Tower Moscow: While in

Russia for the Miss Universe pageant,

Trump met with the Agalarovs and

discussed a possible joint real estate

development in Moscow.:.u The proposed

project was a Trump Tower in Moscow adjacent to the Agalarov-owned Crocus City

Hall; according to Donald Trump Jr., "it fizz led out" after a few months. 32

(U] Trump Organization lawyer Mlc:hael

Cohen was not Involved In those orlglnal discussions regarding Trump Tower

Mc.)scow. In c1pproximately September

2015, he received a separnte prnpos.i l for

Trump Tower Moscow from a businessman

named->1~ According to Cohen,

the concept of the project was that "[t]he

Trump Organ ization would lend its name

and management skills, but It was not going

to borrow any money and it would not have

any resulting debt for the purchase of the

land and the building of the facility.";~

Cohen worked on this idea wlth 1111111 and

his company, the Bayrock Group, a real

estate consultancy that had previously

worked with the Trump Organization. 111111

has a unique and colorful background, and

described for the Committee his path from

Wall Street banker to white-collar crim inal 35 to governmen~ Informant.

(U) After signing a letter of intent with

a local developer in October 2015,36 Cohen

andlllll exchanged a number of emails

and text messages in late 2015 detailing

their attempts to move the project forward.

For instance, in December 2015,lllllltried to get Cohen and candidate Trump to travel

to Russia to work on the projecLn

(U) Several of-communications

with Cohen lnvolved an attempt to broker a meeting or other ties between candidate

Trump and President Putin, and purported

to convey Russian government interest in

the project.;s Perhaps most notably, ..

told Cohen in a November 3, 2015, emaif,

"[b)uddy our boy can l)ecome President of

the USA and w e can engineer it."39 -

continued that if "Putin g~ts on stage with

Donald for a ribbon cutting for Trump

Moscow, . .. Donald owns the republican

nomination." 10 This asserlion apparently

;;irose from- rather grandiose theory

that cementing a dea l with a hostile U.S.

adversary would Increase candidate

Trump's foreign policy bona fides.41

(U} .. testified that his

communications with Cohen regarding

President Putin were ''mere puffery,"

designed to elicit a response from the

· Trump Organjzation to move the project

along.42 1111 explained that " (u]ntil the

bank wrftes the check, it's all salesmanship

and promotion to try to get many, many,

PROPCJRTY OF ffol l:. U.S. I tOlJSF.: OF REPRl:S!:NTA'TIVES 64

many parties towards the center to try to

get the deal done.,,.:3 Cohen similarly

characterized .. as "a salesman" who

"uses ver1 colorful language."4~

{U) When the project started

proceeding too slov..r[y for the Trump

Organlzation,45 Cohen and .. began to

exchange acrimonious text messages.46 As

part of those text messages- told

Cohen that President Putin's people were

backing the deal, including "this is thru

Putins [sicJ administration, and nothing gets

done there without approval from the top,"

as well as meetings in Russia with

"Ministers" and "Putins (sic] top

administration people.":] 1111111 also

mentioned Dmitry Peskov (President Putin's

spokesman) would "most likely" be

included.48

{U} Cohen thus attempted to reach out

to members of the Russian government in

an attempt to make the project proceed,

but apparently did not have any direct

points of contact. for example, Cohen sent

an email to a general press mailbox at the

Kremlin in an effort to reach Peskov.4n

Cohen's message notes that he has been

working with a local partner to build a

Trump Tower in Moscow and that

communications have stalled with the local

partner.50 The email further seel'-s contact

._ • .,ith Peskov so they may " discuss the

specifics as well as arrang{e] meetings with

the appropriate individuals."!,1 Based on the

documents produced to the Committee, it does not appear Cohen ever received a

response from anyone affiliated with the

Russian government.

{U)- testimony likewise made

clear that neither Presldent Putin nor any

element of the Russian government was

actually directly involved in the project. For

in~ance, in one exchange,~ testified he

was offering the Trump Organization access

to one of-acquaintances. This

acquaintance was an acquaintance of

someone else who is "partners on a real

estate development with a friend of

Putin1s."52 .. testified that he was

unaware of "any direct meetings with any

[Russian) government officials" in

connection with the Trump Tower Moscov.:

project.5> In addition, neither candidate

Trump nor Cohen traveled to Russia in

support of the deal.54

(U) ... was unequivocal in his

testimony that none of the Russians

affiliated with the Trump Tower Moscow.

project had any communications with him

uin which {heJ w{as] asked to do something

on behalf of the Russian government that

[he] knew was on behalf of the Russian

Government1' with respect to the U.S.

election.S!, None of those communications

"were intended for - to take action to

have a ccmmunic:ation w ith or take some

action to influence the 2016 Presidential

election."":.6

The Committee t herefore

assesses tha ... was attempting to

leverage polttical contacts for business

purposes, rather than the othe-r way

around.

{U} It appears the Trump Tower

Mo~cow project failed in January 2016.57

i'.'ROPERTY OF 11-IE U.S. HOUS£ OF REPRESENTATIVES 65

Trump Jr. testified that, as of early June

2016. he beffevecl the Trump Tower

Moscow project was dormant.53 The

project failed because "[t]he due dfligence

did not come through 11 and the Trump

Organization's representative "lost

confidence in the licen.see, and {he]

abandoned the project."59 In fact, the Trump Organization did not have a

confirmed site, so the deal never reached

the point where the company was

dlscussins financing arrangements for the project.uo The Committee determined that

the Trump Tower Moscow proj~ct did not

progress beyond an early developmental

phase, and that this potenli"al licensing dear was not related to the Trump campaign.61

(U) Other Alleged Financial Dealings: In addition to the Miss Unlvl:!l'S<:l and Trump

Tower- Moscow projects, a number of

witnesses were asked about Trump family

financial dealings, sometimes stretching 6~ back decades. For example, Trump Jr. was

asked about Russians: ·buying units in

Trump Tower in 1984 (wh~n he was seven

years old)/3

btJylng properties in soutf,ern

Florida for which the Trump brand was a

!icensor;6'' being involvQd in the Trump

lntern~tional Hotel in Toronto for which the

Trump Organization was the brand and not

the developer;65 and having unspecified

Involvement in a licensing project for the

Trump Ocean Club in Pariama.66 The

Committee does not have any evidence that there is a nexus between these activities

and the 2016 <:.impaign, or information that

contradicts representations made in a

March 8, 2017 letter from Trump's lawyers

regarding his Russia-related fina1)cfal

dealings over the previous ten years.67

POLICY POSITIONS

(U) During the campaign, candidate

Trump and several of his campaign advisors

expressed policy views towards Russia quite

different than those espoused by much of

the Republfcan foreign policy establishment,

including previous Republican nominee Mitt

Romney, wt;io labeled Russia "our number <.me geopolltkal foe" durrng the 2012

election, In factJ a significant nu niber of

Republican foreign policy experts made statements d~irh,g the campaign that they

would not work for the Trump campaign.

As a result, the c;;m1palgn relied on many

lesser-k11own-or in some cases unknown­

advisors on foreign policy issues.

{U) Additionally, a plank of the 2016

Republican pl~tform pertaining to the

Ukraine has been the subject of substantial

controversy. The question for the

Committee was whether candidate Trump's

pollcy positions-and the campaign's

involvement fn the debate over the Ukraine

platform plank-reflected legitimate policy

positions, or somuthing more nefarious.

The Committee found no evidence that the

policy positions of the Trump campaign

were the reslAlt of collusion, coordination, or conspiracy with the Russians. In the

words of Trump campaign

policy offici~I involved in the platform issue, "lt]here was no coordination or tt,ought for

coordination. The idea to have better relations with Russia was a Mr. Trump idea

PROPERTY OFTHe U.S. HOU5EOF REPRESENTATIVES 66

that I thought was reasonable to support 0 63

{U} Finding #27: The Republican national

security e.stablishment's opposition to

candidate Trump created opportunities for

two less-experienced indi\liduals with pro­

Russia views to serve as campaign

advisors: George Papadopoulos and Cart~r

Page.

(U) The Republican foreign policy

establishment was critical of candidate

Trump, w~o had to turn elsewhere for

support. On March 2, 2016, 122 self.

de.'icribed "GOP National Security Leaders"

signed an uopen Letter to Donald Trump"

refusing to support then-candidate Trump.;S'

The next day, Trump announced Senator

Jeff Sessions as chairman of his National

Security Advisory C9mmittee {NSAC}. A few

we_eks later, following continuing media

criticism of his failure to publicly name a

foreign policy team, 10 candidate Trump

named five foreign policy advisors in a

March 21, 2016 meeting with The

Washington Post editoria l board: Wa[Jd

Phares, Carter Page, George Papadopoulos,

.1oe Schmitz, and Keith Kellogg.71

(U) The opposition to Trump's

candidacy by the ,.,ast majority of the

conservative national securitv

establishment paved the way for lesser­

known individuals, such as the then 28-year­

old Papadopoulos, t o join the Trump

campaign. Page was another unknown

. brought into the periphery of the Trump

campaign to fill the vacuum left by more

experienced national ~erurity specialists

who were unwilling to acivise candidate

Trump. There is no evidence that anyone

on the Trump campaign was aware of

Page's past ties to Russian intelligence

services-or Papadopoulos' more r.ecent

contacts with a Russian-connected

professor-when these two individuals

were included among the advlsors that

wt:!re publicly announced on March 21. In

fact, as Kushner candidly put it, "we put

together that list because we vi1ere getting a

Jot of pressure from the rr.edia to put out a

list of foreign policy advisers.'' 12

UNGLASSIFtED

GOP National Security Leaders Open Letter to Donald Trump

5().1To).l~r.r UY f O!tr.l l:R :>tA"flllNAl ill 'l,JRnY i:ffll1ALS

foe o,,jHt"~ 11¥:1t1.:!~1, l:.:,,c :JI ..,m-J "'.«<'I"" ~ -ul ,...,...,11y .i:1~ ·oc f'1ra~ pol).y ~ itic~ lo Atpl)::0.!ltl.'.) ~~irour-~U'\1. (r~ l Rttlwd N<>= to !'lcrrrp: Yi.' llLNt \\~ br" mal ~ ,_,,, r,;:; ,oncl ~ """""'-'','ll!ll!-.,...lt<f"~ P.<'l~clnrLY ir ~ ')(~ t;.;'>~ d= s ...-ar.xn..e l>l\..l <,;:):1 11"",od~ or==, l~.=.:cl> w..•.,..,cs:::,; t'..tillK ... W~b,w 11': ~ ~it.n ~ ;;im ..f-a t21'.':1.'r.len1 o!'(!)( , •n :i: J S1&".o

UNCLASSIFIED

{U) These five advisors were

subsequently incorporated into the NSAC,

which was part of the campaign's O.C.­based policy shop.

7·3 The NSAC was chaired

by Senator Sessions and directed by J.O.

Gordon, a retired Navy officer and former

Department of Oefense spo!<esman. '~ Some

members of the NSAC met with candidate

Trump in Washington, D.C. on March 31,

2016. Page did not attend. Each advisor in

attendance, including Papadopoulos,

briefed the group on a topic of their choice.

Papcidopoulos spoke about Russia.

PROPER1Y Or THE U.S. HOUSE CF= REPRE..."'E.NTATl\>cS

However, in lhe opinion of one advisor,

wafid Ph,ues, the primary purpose of the

meetina was about optics rather than

substance: 11tl1e meeting was about the

picture and to send the rnes/jage that: I ha:ve

f · II t "75 a ore,gn po cy earn.

UNCLASSIFIED NSAC MEETING WITH

CANDIATE TRUMP

~~_.. ........ .,"' .. . ,•a.,:;.,1 -'-'" ....... ..... -... .:,:. ~, ........ "t u..

--•-,;-1.1"'<1•'" • ••-- _:......,._- U/1#- , • • _,, . ..... ~~C.T.

1, \ - .C.."'10':il ·~.)

- "'"''' _...,., ... W\.""''lo'. .. ""'"'"~,.-.,,, ...... , . ~ ...

~e.. .. --··---­-'vJ l,.la-r.. i...-

. ,, .....

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Page was, according to NSAC

director Gordon, "very loosely affiliated

with the campaign and had really no roles

or responsibillties." 76 The Committee

assesses that Page played no major role rn

the campnign, and had no meaningful

access to senior leadership.

{U) Pag·e did not attend the March 31,

2.016, NSAC meeting with then-candidate

Trump, and has never met him.n Although

members of the NSAC occasionally gathered

for meals in the Washington, D.C. area, they

never again met as a group with candidate

Trump.78

Kushner provided a blunt

assessment of the role, qr lack thereof,

played by the individuals on t~e initial Ii.st of

·publicly-announced foreign policy advisors:

"[Tihe amount of Interaction they had with

the actual campaign or in'fluence they had

·on anything that happened in the campaign

I 1179 G d was virtually nonex stent. or on testified to the Committee that he agreed with the ass~rtior, that the NSAC was

minimally Influential In the context of the • /l{l broader campaign.

(U} Finding #28: The change in the Republlca·n Party platform regarding

Ukraine resulted in a stronger position ·

against Russia, not a weaker one, and there is no evid~nce that Paul Manafort was involved.

{':J} It has been widely reported that the

2.016 Republican Party plotform was

weakened with respect to Ukraine, perhaps

as a favor to Russia or some other nefarious

reason. Arter reviewing the Republican

Party platform amendment process,

Interviewing those involved, and revfewing

document productions, the Committee

determined that the original plank was

strengthened, rather than weakened-and

there is no evidence that language advocating for the provisions of "lethal

defensive weapons'' was Improperly

removed.

(U) on July 11, 2016, the Republican National Committee Platform Committee

met to discuss and debate amendments to

the platform. As drafted, the platform

referenced "a resurgent Russia occupying

parts of Ukraine/ but incfudep no langu.age

about support to Kiev.{see inset}. 11111 of Texas, a member of the National

Security/Military Platform Subcommittee,

offered an ~mendment that would "support

Pf~OP!oRTY OF nu: U.S. HOUSG OF REPRESENTATIVES 68

maintaining {and, if warranted, increasing)

sanctions against Russia until Ukraine's

sovereignty and territory integrity are fully

restored."3l ~roposed

amendment further called on the United

States to provide "lethal defensive weapons

to Ukraine's armed forces and greater

coordination wjth NATO [North Atlantic

Treaty Organization] on defense

planning."u

U NCLASSIFll:D

Original RNC !)tank

(U) In the int~mational arena. weakness invites

aggression. The results of the (Obama} Administra­

tion's unilateral approach to disarmament are

already clear: An emboldened China in ti\e South

China Sea, a resurgent Ru:.s!a occupying parts of

Ukraine and tnreatening neighbo:s from the Baltic

to the Caucasus, an aggressive lstamist terrorist networ.~ !n Middle East. All our adversaries heard

th~ message in the {Obama] Arlminlstratio"n's cut­

bac!G: Americil is weak~ arid retreating:

UNCLASSIRED

(U} Much of-amendment was

sdopted, but-following debate among the

delegates-the final version called for the

United States to provide "appropriate

assistance" rather than "lethal defensive

weapons."83 The Committee assesses that

aappropriate assistance" provided flexibility,

and could encompass lethal defensive

weapons as well as humanitarian aid,

medical supplies, and meals-ready-to eat.

In any event, even without the words

"lethal defensive weapons," the final draft

of the platform UV".las tougher against

Russia0 than the orlginal after incorporating

all but three v.iords o­

amendment.s.1

UNCLASSIFIED

Final RNC Plank

(U) Wr:;. support maintaining and, ff warranted,

increasing sanctions, togcthff with our allies,

against RllSSia unless and until Ukraine's sover­ei.gnw and territorial integ_rity are :u'.ly re~t.ored.

We also support provldi:'lg approprla~ assistance.

to the armcci forces of Ukraine and great& coordi­

nation with NATO defense planning.

UNCLASSlF1ED

(U} The Committee also investigated

,...,hat role, if any, Paul Manafort played in the Trump campaign's response to

0€nman's amendment. Manafort, a veteran of numerous Republican

camp.algns,85 had long represented the

government of Ukraine, the pro-Russian

former presid~nt of Ukraine Viktor

Yanukovich, and Yanukovich's Party of

Regions.86 In late March 2016, candidate

Trump hired Manaforno-lead "delegate­

corralling efforts at the Republican National

Convention."s7 Then--campaign manager

testified that, when

Manafort was hired, ~ade no attempt to vet him and was entirely

unaware of Manafort's past work in

Ukra.ine.85 In May 2016, Manafort was

promoted to campaign chaim,an and, after

~as fired the next month,

aevolve[d}" into the role of de facto

campaign manager.69

{U) Manafort left the campaign in

August 2016 following news reports that he

PRO?€Ri'Y OF "THE U.S. 1l0US£ Or REPRESSI.TAnv-eS 69

had rece_ived $12. 7 million In secret

payments for his work on behrilf of

Yanukovlch's Party of Regions; news

reporling also alleged that Manafort and hls

aide Rici< Gates had "dirnctly orchestrated a

covert Washington lobbying operation" on

behalf of the partv-:-while failrng to register 90 C . as foreign agents. ampa1gn press

secretary Hope Hicks recalled that, after

receiving press inquiries about Manafort's

"professional history," a major story broke . 91 on the evening of August 14, 2016.

According to Hicks, "Trump had made a

decision to make a change ln lendership on the campaign outside of Paul's ;ssues that

were being publicly reported," but those

issues "certainly contributed to expedllinn

and Intensifying the way in whfch his roJe

changed, and then ultimately he was fi red

at the end of thnt weck.''92 Trump directed

his son-in-law Jared Kushner to ensure

Manafort departed the campaign on August

19, which he did.'13 As Kushner put it, ''[tf

here was a lot of news that was out there1

and the decision was tflat lt was time for

UNCLASSIFIED

PAUL MANAFORT RESIGNS FROM TRUMP CAMPAIGN

l •rtt ~t0, • .-t :A Tt.,"tftt~~,f'\l~ri.1 ,..-... ~n11.0.. li'• U fV'lrt UU:, Wlt'I tft .. l'\,J IO ''

UNCLASSIFIED

hlrn to resign. ,, !M

(U) Given Mana fort's past work in

Ukraine, If the Ukraine plank change was

made as a favor to the Russian government,

it seems likely that then-campaign chairman

Manafort would have known about it.

However, campaign records produced to

the Commlltee show that Manafort had no

role in, or contemporaneous knowledge of,

the platform change. On July 30, 2016,

Manafort sent an emall, copying Gates, to

Rick Dearborn, then a senior campaign

policy official and Sessions' chief of staff: "I

gather that there was a change In the

platform that ren,oved arming Ukraine. I

don1 t know anythlnc about this change.

I It d ?11 fl!I Who pushed for it and w w was one.

(U} In response, Dearborn generated a

memorandllm, dated August 1, 20:l.6,

outlining a detailed sequence of events th<lt 96 occurred between July 10 and 12, 2016.

As part of that memo, J.D. Gordon created a

tlmeline that noted candidate Trump's

poticy statements-including at a March 31,

2016, national security meeting-served as

the basis for the modification of Den man's

amendrnent.9 ' Gordon's timeline made it

clear that the change was initiated by

c<1mpaign staffers at the ·convention-not

by Manafort or senior o_fficials. Although

Page expressed support after the fact, the

Committee did not find any evidence that

he actively parliclpat:ed in the modificati on

o-f Denr.nan's "red line ~mendment

I I 1198 providing lethal assistance to U m1 ne.

PUBLICATION OF STOLEN EMAILS

70

(U} Finding #29: Thel'e is no evidence that

Trump associates were involved in the

theft or publication of Clfoton campaign­

related emails, although Trump associates

had numerous ill-advised contacts wlth

Wikileaks.

{U} There is no evidence that Trump or

anyone associated with him played a role in

the hacking of emails from the DNC and

Clinton campaign chairman John Podesta,

among other entities and individuals,

detailed in Chapter 2. A5 also discussed in

Chapter 2, the Committee concurs with the

IC's assessment that Wikileaks was one of

the vehicles for the public dissemination of

emails stolen by Russians. As noted in

Chapter 3, on October 7, 2016, the

Department of Homeland Security and

Office of tt,e Director of National

Intelligence releas.ed a public statement

that "[t]he U.S. Intelligence Community is

confident that the Russian Government directed the recent compromises of e-mails

from US persons and institutions, including

US political organizations."1!' The statement

also specifically tfed Wikileaks to the

Russian-directed disclosures.

(U} Trump campaign communications

made ample use of the publicly available

emails, which were reported by virtually aU

major media outlets. Regarding Wikileaks,

Trump Jr. testified that "[aJt the time, I

looked at them as essentially a media

outlet" and an "opportunistic organization"

that would have also put out negative

information on Trump if it had it. 10° For

Senator Sessions, reference to Wikileaks

material in campaign statements was the

product of deliberation: "And so, I

remember making a decision that it [a trove

of hacked emails) was in the public domain,

and it wouJd be silty not to use it . So I used

it, although I could understand somebody

else not wanting to." 101 For campaign press

secretary Hope Hicks, use of emails

published by Wikileaks was uncontroversial

because such information was available in

the public domain.102

U Nct.ASSIF!ED

WIKILEAKS RELEASES CLINTON EMAILS

. _ _._..,,.._ ·~-.. --· 1:· - 0. 11 .-,..,,,

.,.,. ... .,,.I:). ----· ... ~ .. .--,~~~ .. ~ ... -- ·,""'·-Qr·'":.'---..!.•

.., __ ""' '-'•'

-- '-.....:i,..-»,., - " - . - · · r.:11" 11 <: . ... ,. ~--0,--

r_ ._, ..,,I..._ ...._ __ ,_~~ ----·---,--__ .,.,.,~ .... '- _,_ ...... ~ •11-.... ··-, _

,..,,._._, ..... -----:;--:-.';: .... .... -... -· '-- --- ··- -- ·~ - ye., : .. -,o..----··!K.,,.:...- ,- ·

UNCLASS1FIED

(U) Similarly, candidate Trump stated at

a rally on October 10, 2016-three days

after the release of Podesta's emails began

and the IC publicly tied Wikileaks'

dissemination to " Russia's senior-most

officials" -that "I love Wikileaks."10?. Trump

had earli~r encouraged the Russians to "find

~e 30,000 emails that are missing" from

Hillary Clinton's privateserver.10' {These

emaHs. which were the frequent subject of

campaign talking points, should not oe

TOP SECRET/ /NOFOR~ PROPERlY OF THE lJ.S. liOUSE OF R~ESENTA"TlVES

71

conflnted with the DNC emails. The stolen data. Nor did any witness shed llght on

Committee did not receive evidence that the the provenance of the emails, or clarify that

emails from Clinton's private server were Mifsud was reforrlng to emails actually stolen

stolen by the Russians-or anyone elsel05 by the Russians (as opposed to, for example,

(U} Particularly in light of candidate emails missing from Clinton's private server.)

Trump's expressed enthusiasm for Wikileaks, The Committee also found no evidence that

the Committee examined the relationship Papadopoulos told anyone affiliated with the

between his associates and the stolen emails. Trump campaign about M ifsud's claims that

The Committee did not find any evidence that . th_e Russians had "dirt" on candidate Clinton.

Trump associates .were involved in the (U) Michael Flynn: On Jul~ 15, 2016,

publication of emails by Wikileaks and other

outlets-or had access to such emails or other

stolen Information prior to their becoming

publicly available. 106

(U} The Committee did find that multiple

Trump associates went beyond mere praise

and established ·uncs of communication with

W ikileal<s during the campaign. Such contacts

were Imprudent in l ight of Wlkileaks' role In

disseminating stolen emails in line wlth

R1.1ssian interests-and CIA Director Mil<e

Pompeo's post-election characterization of

Wikileaks as a hostile non-state interllgence

service that "overwhelmingly focuses on the

United States, while seeking support from anti

-democratic countries and organizations" such

as the Russian military intell igence service (GRU).l07

(U) George Papadopoulos: Foreign policy

advisor Papadopoulos was told by Russian­

linked academic Joseph Mifsud in April 2016

that the Russ1am; had "dirt'' on Clinton In the

form of "emails of Clinton.''1 ~ However, the

Committee found no cvldenc;e that

Papadopoulos obtained these emails or that

the Trump campaign had a role in facllltating

the Russian government's dissemination of ·

retired Lieutenant General and Trump

national security advisor Michael Flynn

forwarded an email to communications

advisor- in an attempt to connect

.i friend from the military with tl,e campaign's

social media operation. Flynn included the

following edltorlal comment: "There are a

number of things happening (and wlll happen}

this election via cyber operatio11s (by both

hacl<tivists, nation-states and the DNC) ."109

This stateme.nt does not nece.ssarily indicate

non-public knowledge, and could have instead

reflected commentary on .then-current public

events-including the mid-June attribution of

the DNC hack to Russia by the security firm

CrowdStrike, and the subsequent claim of

credi t by the t hen-unkn own persona "Guccifer

2.0." (See Chapter 2.)

(U} Donal~ Trump Jr.: During the course

of-the Committee's interview with Trump Jr. , a

news report from CNN appeared onllne

clalmine he was given a pre-release

notification of a Wlkileal<s release of Podesta

emails.Ho The article appeared clt 1:01 p.m.,

while Trurnp Jr. was still being interviewed by the Committee behind closed doors, which

concluded at 5:51 p.m.111 CNN's Initial report

72

claimed Trump Jr. received an email on

September 4, 2016, alerting him to an

upcoming release of hacked emails.

(U) The email in question was from an

individual named , who

sent a lengthy email to a number of

individuals associated with the Trump

Organization, including Trump Jr., providing

access to hacked DNC emails. 112 The email .

was actually dated September 14, 2016, the

day after Wikileaks published a tranche of

Podesta emails, and thus did not

substantiate allegations of prior knowledge

of the release .113 CNN subsequently issued

a correction, noting the error. 114

(U) When asked about the email by the

Committee, Trump Jr. testified that he did

not have any recollection of the email,

stating that he "get[s] stuff from people that

-you know, people put my email address

online every few months, and I get a bunch

of people that do the same thing and then

they start bombarding you with stuff."rn

Trump Jr. went further to state that while

he may have met a at

some point in time, he was not sure of the

identity of this individual.116

(U) At the outset, Trump Jr. told the

Committee that, although he was not aware

of any coordination "between the Trump

campaign and Wikileaks to disseminate

information acquired from the Podesta

email or the DNC server,"117 he did

exchange Twitter direct messages with

WikileakS' beginning on September 20,

2016, and October 3, 2016.118 Wikileaks

initiated both exchanges. 119 Trump Jr.

testified that he was not aware of the

reasons why Wikileaks decided to reach out

to him directly, but hypothesized that such

direct messaging was likely due to the fact

that he "was retweeting a bunch of their

stuff . . . " and that he has "a relatively

formidable social media platform."120

(U) In the first exchange, on September

20, 2016, Wikileaks sent a direct message

to Trump Jr. to alert him to a "PAC run anti­

Trump site" that was about to launch.

Wikileaks "guessed the password" and sent

it to Trump Jr. and asked for comments .121

Trump Jr. responded the next day, "[o]ff the

record I don't know who that is but I'll ask

around."122 Trump Jr. subsequently logged

into the site using the Wikileaks-supplied

password, which had also been made

publicly available. 123

(U) Following that exchange, Trump Jr.

emailed some Trump campaign officials, to

include Kellyanne Conway, Steve Bannon,

and Jared Kushner to advise them of the

contact and seek their advice.124 In a follow

-up email, Trump Jr. noted the Wikileaks

message intimated "some connection we

[the Trump campaign] should be aware

of."125 The Committee did not receive any

documents or information that reflected a

response to Trump Jr.'s email, although

Hope Hicks recalled that-after being

forwarded the email by Kushner-she

"might have expressed concern to

somebody about putting passwords in

unknown websites, just as a general

practice, not specific to Wikileaks." 126

{U) On October 3, Wikileaks passed

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 73

along a story reporting Clinton's comments

about Julian Assange and noted "{i)t'd be

Breat If you guys could comment on/push

th is story."1J·

7 Trump Jr. responded about

90 minutes later: ''Already did that earlier

today. It's amazing what she can get away

with."1'a Trump Jr. then wrote: " What's

behind this Wednesday leak I keep reading

about?"n 9 Trump Jr. was seeking

Information on what was purported to be,

another future leak of Podesta-related

emails.130 There was no response.

{U} After October 3, 2016, Trump Jr.

received numerous messages from

WiklLeaks that:

• suggest a website llf'.lk to use if the

campaign refers to Wikileaks In a

tweet and suggests having

supporters search through the

leaked Podesta emails, noting

•

•

•

Wikf Leaks " just released" "Part 4" of

those cmails;13l

seek then-candidate Trump's tax

returns <1nd suggests leaking them to

" improve the perception of

[Wlkileaks'] impartiality'';m

suggest challenging the results

should Trump lose the election;m

describe an election-night message

of " (w]ow" and noting Obama

administration witl delete records as 1~d

they leave;-

• suggest the President-elect push

Australia to make Julian Assange

that country's ambassador to the

United States;135

•

•

forward what appears to be a video

with the cap\i on "Fake N~ws";13G and

on the date the news of the June 9,

2016, Trump Tower meeting broke, , •

1 n·, seek copies of Trump Jr. s ema1 s.

W ith respect to the latter, Trump Jr.

published those emails himself on

his Twitter account.

{U) Trump Jr. testified that he did not

reply to any of these messages, nor did he

have any communications with Wikfleaks

before September 20 or aft~r October 3,

2016.138 He testified that the direct

message exchanges discussed above " is a

complete record of any communications

[he] had with Wikileaks." 139

(U) Cambridge Analytica: In add ition to

Trump Jr.'s communlcations w ith Wikileaks,

Cambridge Analytica, a British firm the

Trump campaign used for data analytics,

reached out to Julian Assange in an effort to

confirm whether Wlklleaks possessed the

,;missing" ema!ls deleted from Clinton's

private server.140 That contact occu rred In

approximately June 2016,1~1 between an

employee of Cambridge Analytica and the

speaker's bu reau (a separate thi rd party)

representing Assange.142 Wikileaks replied

through the bureau that " they did not wish

to take a telephone earl or othe rwise ..

[ . A I . ) ,,1 .. :s engage with us Cambridge na ytica .

{U} Trump campaign digital director

- testified that he did not

participate in, nor' was he aware o f,

Cambridge Analytica' s attempted outreach

to Assange.144 The Chief Executive Officer

PROPERTY oi: THE U.S. MOUSE OF' Rl:PRE:G6NTATIV1!S 74

{CEO} of Cambridge Analytica confirmed in

his testimony that he "did not share this

with anyone on the Trump campaign.uHs In

fact, the C:EO testified that the outreach

occurred before the company was even

retained by the Trump campaign.w;

(L!} Roger Stone: Roger Stone has had a

series of business relationships with Donald

Trump dating back to at least 1981, and

served as a paid campargn advisor for

several months in 2015.147 During

testimony to the Committee, Stone

addressed three public statements

suggesting he might have important

information about, and potentially advance

knowle_dge of, disclosures during the 2016

campaign: (1) an August 2016 Twitter

message regarding Clinton campaign

chairman John Podesta, {2} an August 2016

public speech about purported contacts

with Julian Assange, and (3) the March 2017

acknowledgement of pre-election direct

communications with Guccifer 2.0.

{U) Stone denied that he "knew in

advance about and predicted the hackin$

of .. . Podesta's email," notwithstanding his

cryptic statement in an August 21, 2016,

Twitter message-''Trust me, it will soon be

Podesta's time in the barrel"-that

predated by several weeks the initial public

release of Podesta's hacked emails.14s

Stone noted that his Tweet 0 makes no

mention whatsoever of Mr. Podesta's

email. ,,149 Furthermore, it was posted "at a

time that my boyhood friend and colreague,

Paul 1"~'1anafort, had just resigned from tile

Trnmp campaign over allegations rega rding

u .. I

his business activities in Ukraine. I thought

it manifestly unfair that John Podesta not be

held to the same standard" regarding his

alleged business activities. 150 In Octob.er

2017, John Podesta's brother Tony resigned

from the lobbying firm the brothers co­

founded amid revelations about the

Podesta Group's role in pro-Ukraine

lobbying efforts that also involved Manafort

and his associate Rick Gates.:..: ..

(U} Stone also addressed his August

2016 public statement that "l've a'ctually

communicated with Julian Assange. I believe the next tranche of his documents

pertain to the Clinton Foundation, but

there's no telling what the October surprise

may be."m In his testimony to t he

Cornmittee, Stone sought to "darify that by saying the communication I refer to is

through a journalist who I ask {sic) to

confirm what Assange has tweeted, himself,

on July 21st, that he has the Clinton emails

and that he will publish them."153 He

subsequent ly identified the intermediary,

but denied any access to non-public

information. t54 Stone further disputed,

under oath, that he "had advance

knowledge of the source or actual content

of the Wikileaks disdosures." 155

(U)·ln his testimony, Stone described a

series of direct messages exchanged with

Guccifer 2.0 in August and September

2016-which he first publicly disclosed in

March 2017-as " innocuous," and denied

taking action in response to G uccifer 2.0' s

messages.156 He subsequently provided

additional messages with Wikileaks

?ROrcRTY OF T.-fE= U.S. HOUSE: OF REPREScNTA11VES 75

extending from October 2016 to August

2017.157

(U} Despite these multiple contacts, the

Committee did not find any evidence

contradicting Stone's claim that "(a ]ny

information ... disseminated via social

media regarding the timing of the release of

the DNC data or others was from publicly

available sources" and "he In no way

conspired, colluded, or coordinated with

any agent of the Russian state." 152

MEETINGS WITH RUSSIANS

(U) The Committee examined meetings

between Trump campaign associates and

Russians, to include both official and

unof1iclol representatives. The Russlan5

found wllllng interlocutors in foreign policy

advisors llllllland Papadopoulos. These

advisors, however, were peripheral figures,

and neither was in a position to influence

Trump or his campaign. The Russians

engaged Trump associates via official

channe[s and-niore notably-used

apparent cut-outs and intermediaries to make contact with senior officials.

However, questionable contacts like the

Trump Tower meeting resulted in collusion,

conspiracy, or coordination with the Russian

government.

(U} Finding #30:-did not travel to Moscow in July 2016 on behalf of the Trump campaign, but the Committee is

concerned about his seemingly incomplete

accounts of his activity in Moscow.

(U)-traveled to Moscow in early July 2016 to deliver a conimencement

speech at the New Economic Scl1ool-the

first American to do so since then-President

Barack Obama in 2009. At the time, -served as a foreign policy advisor for the Trump campaign. The Trump campaign

made it clear to - that the trip was not on behalf of the Trump campaign,.a point

- acknowledged In his testimony to the Committee.15

"' J.D. Gordon, the NSAC

director, strongly advised against the trip,

calling it "a bad idea." 1€0 However, Trump

campaign manager

authorized lllto make the trip "out side

of [his] role with the DJT {Donald J. Trump I for President campaign.''

16L -

mentioned the upcoming trip to Sessions at

one of the occasional NSAC meals, 161

although Sessions did not recall the

interaction. 11>3

(U) On July 9, 2016, while In Russia,

- sent an "executive summary" of "Feedback From Russia" that stated in part

''Russian Deputy Prime Minister and NES

[New Economic School} Board Member

Arkady Dvorkovich also spoke before the

event. In a private conversation,

Dvorkovich expressed strong support for

Mr. Trump and a desire to work together

toward devising better solutions in response

to the vast range of current international

problems. Based on feedback from a

diverse array of other sources close to the

Hussian Presidential Administmtion, It was

readily apparent that this sentiment is

widely held at c1 ll levels of government." 1(',11

alfldmltted to briefly greeting

Dvorkovlch before or after one of their

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE::3 76

I V ,J

speeches, but minimized the interaction in

testimony before the Committee.165

(U) Ultimately, - failed to clearly

explain whom he meant when he referred

to sources close to Russian government in

his executive summary. He denied having

any private meetings w ith any senior

Russian officials during his July 2016 trip,

and stated that he mostly met w ith

"scholars."1c-E The Steele dossier, a

document compiled by former British

intelligence officer Christopher Steele,

alleges that while in Moscow in July 2016,

Page secretly met with Igor Sechin, CEO of

Russian state oil comp~my Rosneft, and Igor

Diveykin, a senior Russian Intelligence

official. :QJ Further, the Steele dossier claims

that Sechin offered Page a brokerage fee in

connection with the sale of 19 percent of

Rosneft in exchange for the lifting of

sanctions. i6!!

UNCLASSIFIED

CHRISTOPHER STEELEJ THE MAN BEHIND THE TRUMP DOSSIER

UNCLASSIFIED

(U) Since the allegation of meeting with Sechin and Diveykin was first w idely

reported in September 2016, - has

repeatedly and consistently denied meeting

either Sechin or Diveykin, including under

oath in testimony to the Committee. !e9 The

Corn mittee has no information that

confirms the Steele dossier's assertions

rega rding the purported meetings in

Moscow, much less an offer by Sechin to

- for such a role in a potentially lucrative

transaction. After ret urning from Moscov:,

- took a " leave of absence" from the

Trump campaign, and played no role in the

transition or administration.170

(U} Finding #31: George Papadopoulos'

attempts to leverage his Russian contacts

to facilitate meetings between the Trump campaign and Russians ,,yas unsuccessful .

{U} Papadopoulos made minor

contributions to the Trump campaign as a

foreign policy advisor. He briefly served as a

Trump campaign surrogate, a role cut short

in May 2016 when he publicly insulted UK

Prime Minister David C3meron.171

He also­

in an apparent effort to increase his

standing within the Trump campaign- tried

to insert himself into any· number of

international engagements. As described

below, his particular focus was t rying to

broker meetings \fJ ith foreign officials, but

he often acted on his ovm w ithout the

official backing of the Trump campaign.

(U) On March 24, 2016, Papadopoulos

sent an email to several members of the

policy team pitching a " [m]eeting with

Russian leadership-including Putin" -and also volunteered to travel to meet the " next

prime minister of Vietnam,,- alongside

Mifsud (whom he had first met just ten days

PROPi:RTY OF TH£ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATNE5 77

before but nonetheless described as a

"good friend of mine"). i"' Campaign co­

chair and chief polfcy advisor­

responded that "we probably should not go

forward with any meetings with the

Russians until we have had occasion to sit with our NATO allies, especially France,

Germany and Great Britain." 11:, In the same

exchange, Papadopoulos then Immediately

switched gears, indicating that "[i)f we need

any assistance with setting up meetings

here in London or Paris, I have some good

contacts that can open doors immediately

to the leadership."174

(UJ Durh1e the NSAC meeting with

Trump on March 31, 2016-the only time

Papadopoulos is known to have engaged

directly with the candidate- Senator

Sessions told the team that they were not

~uthorized to speak for the campaign .175 In

his words "[t]hls committee was not . . . a

croup of people ~uthorized to speak for

[candidate) Trump, and they absolutely

weren't authorized to go around the world

pretending to represent him."176 That

sentiment was, according to Sessions, ''a

good statement to make quite clear." 177

(U) When Papadopoulos offered that he

could engage, and possibly travel to, Russia

on behalf of the campaign, his suggestion

was swiftly rebuffed by Sessions, who

testified that "I felt like·-and I'm the

chairman of this group-I should not do

anything that indicated to Mr.

Papadopoulos that he was authorized to go

to Russia or anyplace else to represent the

Trump campaign and do some sort of

negotiations. So I pushed back pretty

sharply on that.''178 Sessions' account of his

response has been corroborated by another l/'j-attendee,-. also

attended and similarly recalled that when

Papadopoulos raised the issue of obtaining

contacts with the Russian government on

behalf of the campafgn, Senator Sessions

Interrupted and began "talking about the

Logan Act," which criminalizes unauthorized

negotiations with foreign governments.180

(U) Although the Committee has no

information to indicate that Papadopoulos

was successful in setting up any meetings

b~tween the Tl'urnp campaien and the

Russian government, he worked with

campaign chief executive Steve Bannon to

broker a September 2016 meeting between

candidate Trump and Egyptian president

Abdel Fatah el-Sisi.181 Trump was

apparently pleased with the meeting, which

he described In an Interview as "very

productive," describing el-Sisi as "a fantastic guy."1s2

(U) While on a trip to Athens, Greece in

May 2016, Papadopoulos sent an email to

Manafort stating that he expected to soon

receive "an official invltijtion for Mr. Trump

to visit Greece sometime this summer

should his schedule allow."18~ In the same

email to Manafort, Papadopoulos also

forwarded a meeting Invitation from rvan

Timofeev, Director or Programs for the

Russian International Affairs Council, and

claimed that "Russia has been eager to

meet Mr. Trump for quite sometime and

have been reach ing out to me to discuss.

PROPERTY OF TME U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 78

thought it would be prudent to send to

you."1e4

(U} As of May 2016, Manafort had not

yet been elevated to campaign chairman,

but had a long track record of wor'f( abroad.

Manafort forwarded Papadopoulos' email

to his business and campaign deputy.

- noting that a(wJe need someone to

communicate that D[onald} T(rump] fs not

doing the.se trips." 185 Manafort and­

agreed to assign a response of a "general

letter" to "our correspondence

coordinator.'' the person responsible for

" responding to all mall of non­

importance."1ss

{U) In June 2016, Papadopoulos sought

a paid position and reimbursement for

expenses from -a sessions

aide, who along with , ran

the Trump campaign's D.C. policy shop-for

an upcoming trip "to DC for a high level

meeting (with) the director of the Israel

National Security Counciin and past trips to

" the UK, Israel and Greece over the past

month engaging in some senior level

meetings .. . . 111B

1 -forwarded the

message to Gordon and_

Mashburn then replied as follows: "He cost

us a lot more in having to deal with what he

said about [then-UK prime minister David)

Cameron 2 months ago ... he got no

approval for the travel and did it on his own

in[i]tiative .. .. Let him eat the cost and

maybe he will learn to play nice with the

team, not go off on his m.vn. ·-would never have approved

his going off on world travels at campaign

expense without asking permission first."ts

- replied to- with one word : "agreed.'' l!>~

(U}~espondedto

Papadopoulos that he could take the

me~ting, but he "should do that as a private

citizen.''® Making the point explicit,

- wrote: "You' re not authorized to

meet with him by {sic] the campaign, nor

can you reflect the views of the campaign

on security issues in that meeting." 191

{U} finding #32: Donald Trump Jr., Jared

Kushner, and Paul Manafort attended a

June 9, 2016, meeting at Trump Tower

where they expected to r&-eive-but did

not ultimately obtain-derogatory

information on candidate Clinton from

Russian sources.

(U) tn July 2017, the Committee became

aware of a June 9, 2016, meeting in Trump

Tower, which became a key focus of the

investigation. The Committee's findings

were informed by interviews with six of the

eight participants in the meeting.

{U} Although they did not attend the

meeting, the Agalarovs w ere the driving

force to arrange it. ru previously noted, _the

~aalarovs and Gof~tone had gotten to

know businessman Donald Trump when the

Agalarovs worked with Trump to host the

.Miss Universe pageant at the Agalarovs'

building, the Crocus City HaU, in Moscow in

2013.192 The Agalarovs also had discussions

with Donald Trump in 2013 to facilitate the

possible development of a Trump Tower in

Moscow.m The 2013 M iss Universe

PROPERTY OF THE u_s.. HOUS~ OF REPRESENTA'i'!VcS 79

UNCLASSIFIED

PARTICIPANTS OF THE JUNE 9, 2016 MEETING AT TRUMP TOWER

Oonllct J, YNmp, Jt ,

Longtlm6 l1oputilic a11 on1paig11 ~~r at~ ln:unll'lionol tol>ttrl~.

Son 9< c,nd ldr:\"I Ootlt ld ~,ln-ur,. t~ crondfcllltt> Londo~ prolltlltfr

wl'IO M~~d Ol)p l.tX Eiflin {A,t11,rovj. Lho V.c11 i'roiJdCJnt of !hu Cr0<u~

G1011p.

Trump, TNll'I), Jt: !:etv@od :!.$ 3 0ol'llld_l'n,n,p, i(W,g ~N!d Sllnior Q1.l~rtott111c1mpa,;, a 1u11Mc. DdvlJOno l/lo

M\l'\JIO>"t '41"'1d l'lS llilMtOf

of 1he Tturl'lp c~p;11gn runmng di,y,to-d/ly-OP"'...Uans c~pmr,n

AUAl ll(l l t,Nyar, Wh~

r~i:ra1et1t'1d ~ PrllYCIZ!>n in ~(Ml

leldelwr~ rn~ II\ Hta fl!<f6ral <<Wn: In ~~w

VOii!,

<«>tn Ntw York

Ctt,fotni~uitd man~~, .of \he Ctoc.JJ s Gtoui,.

R/n.u A~m,uhfn

RutJl anj,rr,orican IQ!lbyt!Z.

~ m,a, .imp)l)ya~ .it th<i U.$. Oe!p.art~t iM Srtu, S1ll'!C1rd',0!nO,, ll'iltl~,o for Vo:1;1it\Jt ~~·· rt. VtD

J11n& S\n r110otln11.

UNCLASSIFIED pageant formed the basis of a casual

friendship between the Trumps and the

Agalarovs.1.!H Trump appeared in one of

Ernln Agala rovs's music videos with the

2013 pageant winner,195 and Trump

maintained a frfendly correspondence with Aras 1:i.galarov- includlng during the busy

2016 carnpaign.196

{U) Events. leading to the meeting were

set in motion by a June 3, 2016, email from

Goldstone to Tru·mp Jr,, stating: "Emin just

called and asked me to contact you with

something very interesting. The Crown

prosecutor of RllSSia [possibly referri"g to

Ru ssian Prosecutor General Yuri Chatka)

met with his father Aras this morning and in

their meeting offered to provide the Trump

PROPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 80

campaign with some official documents and

infor.mation that would incriminate Hillary

and her dealings with Russia and would be

very useful to your father. This is obviously

very high level and senslti\le information but

is part of Rus·sia and its government's

support for Mr. Trump - helped along by

Aras and Emin.''197 Trump Jr. replied to

Gold.stone's June 3 request by indicating "if

rt's what you say I love ft especially in the

summer."1~

(U) This exchange indicates that Trump

Jr . was open to discussing derogatory,

information from Russian government

sources that could be useful to candidate

Trump. Goldstone proposed to deliver

information concerning Hillary Clinton via a

Russian government attorney. t~ Trump Jr.

indicated that he had invited Kushner and

Manafort, 2!iO underscoring his belief in the

importance of the information.

- with connections to the

Agalarov family, was one of the individuals

who attended the June 9 meeting at Trump

Tower. The Committee discovered that the

participants.of the June 9 meeting did not

all have the same understanding as to the

re~sons for the meeting, w ith -

testifying that he thought it was odd that al!

three senior Trump campaign officials would

be taking a meeting on the Magnitsky Act, a

U.S. human rights law that imposes certain

sanctions on Russian interests. Accordingly,

- called , a close associate o f Emin .4.galarov based in the

United States, t o inquire about the purpose

s J

of the meeting. -explained that

he believed the scheduled meeting at

Trump Tower was about providing negative

information on candidate Clinton to the • 201 Trump campaign.

(U) Based on Trump Jr.'s testimony and

the documentary evii;lence received by the

Committee, there is no evidence ~o support

that there were any prior communications

between the Trump campaign and the other

attendees: - ; Russian lawyer

Natalia Veselnitskaya; Russian-Amer<can

lobbyist and former Soviet intelligence

officer ; or Russian-

who served

as a Russian interpreter. furthennore, the

Committee found no evidence that Trump

Jr. knew the identities of these individuals before the meeting,202 or that he discussed

rt with candidate Trump beforehand.203

(U) The Committee interviewed all

attendees other than Manafort, due to the

Special Counsel's ongoing investigation, and

Vese!nitskaya, who is a Russian national

located overseas without a valid visa to

enter the United States. Despite the pretext

for the meeting, every person with direct

knowledge of what occurred confirmed that

· there was no m~ntion of derogatory or

incriminating information directly relatir:ig to

Hillan.., Clinton during t he June 9 meeting.

Goldstone testified that he had no ~vidence

that the Russian government supported or

favored Donald Trump, and admitted to

embellishing the contents of the email

solely for the purpose of gaining a response

from Trump Jr., namely by using inaccurate

?HO?ERlY OF T;;E U.S. XOUS:: Of RE.." R!;S£NTA Tl\r=S 81

information.204

{U) Vesclnitskayc1, Samochornov,

Kavcdadze, and Akhmetshin met for lunch

before the Trump Tower rneeting.205 During

lunch, there was a discussion regarding the

Trump Tower meeting. Vesel'nitskaya

shared an approximate ly 10-page document

in Russian to provide the lunch attendees with a synopsis of what would be discussed

at the meeting, a summary that contained

much of the same information as a similar

document reportedly shared with Russian

prosecutor gener~I Yuri Chaika.10b Based on

this discussion, the lunch attendees

believed the Trump Tower meeting was

about tl1e Magnltsl<y Act.201 The lunch

attendees then met Goldstone at Trump

Tower shortly beforf! the meeting.208 They

proceeded to the 25th Floor where they

me1 Trump Jr., and he led the group to a conforence room.200

(U) The June 9 meeting lasted as little . no

as 20 minutes. Kaveladze testified that

he believed Trump Jr. started the meeting

and then turned it over to Veselnitskaya.211

Interviewed meeting attendees agreed that

Veselnitskaya presented information

concerning-the Magnitsky Act and the Ziff

Brothers, including their alleged role in

evading taxes in Hussia and political

contributions to the DNC and/or Clinton

I 2 12 campa gn. Seve,·al attendees also

recalled discussion of Russian adoptions,

which the Russian government suspended

in retaliation for the Magnitsky Act.213

(U) Goldstone further testified that

Kushner, Manafort, and Trun1p Jr. seemed

visibly uninterested In the Ma3nltsky Act

briefing provided by Veselnitskaya.2H

Manafort, according to Goldstone, "never

looked up from his cell phone from the

moment we began the meeting until the

moment we ended."'15 Manafort and

Kushner complained to one another via text message during the meeting that the

meeting was a "waste of time."21G Kushner

asked his assistants to call and give him and

excuse to leave, which one of them did

shortly after the text.m At the end of the

meeting, Goldstone apologized to Trump Jr.

for the "bait-and-switch ta!k abou t

something which we !mew nothfng about,

which was, acain, Russian adoption and the

rvtagnitsky Act." 218

(U) t<aveladze testified thut he received two calls from Aras Agalarov aft er the

meeting. Durir:ig the second call, l<aveladze

explained that the meeting was a "complete

loss of time and about nothing. 1121~ Aras

Agalarov and Kaveladze d id not discuss t he

"dirt" on Hillary Clinton.22° Kaveladze also

sent an email to his daughter after the

meeting indicating that the "meeting was boring. The Russians did not have any bad

info [o]n Hillary"221-a reference back to his

conversation with Beniaminov, which he

had apparently relayed to his daughter. The

Committee received no testimony or

documentary evidence indicating that the

purpose of the meeting was to discuss

Wlkileal<s, J1.1lian Assange, the hackin.e of

DNC servers, and/or the John Podesta

emails. 222

(U) No witness, including the attendees,

82

testified that candidate Trump was aware of

the meeting prior to fts public exposure in

June 2017. Steve Bannon, who had been

previously quoted as saying ''{t]he chances

that Don Jr. did not walk [the meeting

participants] up to his fathers office is

zero," conceded under oath that he had no

evidence to support that ciaim.223 The

Committee also investigated a public

statement made by candidate Trump during

a speech after the final Republican primary

contests on June 7, 2016, the same day as

Trump Jr. exchanged emails with Goldstone

regarding meeting attendees and

logistics.224 According to campaign press

secretary Hope Hicks, Trump's publicly

st(lted intent "to give a major speech .. .

next week . . . discussing all of the things

that h~ve taken place with the Clintpns" did

not reflect knowledge about t he upcoming

meeting; instead, it referred to a planned

speech uthat w.as an outline of the book

Clinton Cash," and was ultimately derivered

approximately two weeks later after being

delayed by a domestic terrorist attack. us

(U) Finding #33: Donald Trump Jr. bri~fly

met with a Russian government official at

the 2016 National Rifle Association annual

meeting, but the Committee found no

evidence that the two discussed the U.S.

presidential election.

{U}Jn the weeks leading up to the

r,.iational Rifle Associa tion's (NRA) 2016

annual meeting, there were a series ~f

emails sent to-a member of the campaign

discussing Russian interest in the campaign

a5 it related to the NRA meeting. Despite

.,

the emails' rhetoric about setting up a "back

channel'' between the United States and

Russian governments, the relevant

testimony obtained in the Committee's

interv[ews showed these email inquiries

resulted in a brief meeting between Trump

Jr. and a Russian government official that

centered on shooting and hunting. It did

not focus on the U.S. presidential election.

(U) from May 19-22, 2016, the NRA held

its annual meeting and exhibits in Lou isville,

Kentucky. 226 In an intervie\'.' w ith t he.

Committee, TrumpJr.'testified he received

an invitation from "[v]arious people at the

NRA" to attend the 2016 meeting.-~v In

addition to Trump Jr.'s invitation, there

were several emails sent to _

seeking to establish a connection at the NRA

meeting between an emissary of the

Russian government and candidate Trump.

(U} In the first email, dated May 16,

2016, a business executive emailed

~ith the po~sibilit':( of candidate

Trump meeting with Alexander Torshin, the

Deputy Governor of the Bank of Russia, the

country's central bank.228 The email

mentions an "overture t o Mr. Trump from

President Putin." ]29 - responds he

will be "[\·1}orking on this first thing in the

am.":!30

(U} - forwarded the email to

Manafort, Gates, and Kushner, noting the

"interesting request." B1 - email

highlighted the entrepreneur's request that

Torshln "meet with a high level official in

our campaign'' during the NRA meeting to

di~cuss "an offer he {Torshin] claims to be

PROPER'N OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REf'RcSENTATIVES 83

carryln{l from President Putin to meet with

DJT." In response to that email, Kushner

wrote: "Pass on this. A lot of people come

claiming to carry messages. Very few we

are able to verify. For now I think we

decline such meetings," as well as "(b]e

careful."23

' - replied to the

executive seeking the meeting: "I've asked

about a mtg but we are not able to

accommodate it at that event in KY."' 33

(U) In addition to the emails d iscussing

a possible meeting with Torshln, on May 10,

201.6, -' who had previously approathecalllllllllll about advising .a.

prospective Trump transition,234 sent

- an e1T1ail about meeting with

Russians at the NRA event.735 The email

discusses- purported "back­

channel to President Putin's Kremlin," that

"Russia is quietly but actively seeking a

dialogue with the U.S. that isn't forthcoming

under the current administration," and.that

"the Kremlin believes that the only

possibility of a true re-set in this

relationship·would be with a new

Republican Whit~ House."7.36

{U) The email goes on to note that

"Presidenf Putin's emissary11 wFII be at the

NRA convention and hopes to make contact

with candidate Trump and present Mrs.

Tm mp with a gift.'~-, The email discussed

Putin's desire to build a relationship with

candidate Trun,p, to Include e)(tending an

invitation to the l<remlin. The email also

asked- to "talk through what has

transpired and Sen. Sessions' advice on how

to proceed.''238

When asked about this

email in his Jntervlew before the

Committee, Attorney General Sessions

testlried he was not c1ware of this email..B9

- testified that he may have met

-once, and did not remember

replying to hrs email.7,1{)

(U) Atthough the campaign declined to

hord a meeting, Trum·p Jr. was introduced to

Torshin, at the request of an acquaintance,

at a restaurant where they were dining

separately .241 Dur ing their brief

introduction, they spoke about "stuff as it

related to shooting and hunting . ..

exchanged casual hellos" but did not

exchange contact information. 2-1z In his

brief exchange with Torshin and a

subsequent exchange wrth Torshln's

assistant, Marla Batina, Trump Jr. testified he·dld not recall any discussion of the

upcoming U.S. presidential e!ection.20 No

other witn~ss provided a contrary

recollection to the Committee.

(U) The Committee reviewed several

emails discussing a meeting with Russians at

the NRA meeting, an attempt to establish a

back channel of communication betw~en

the U.S. and Russian governments, and a

possible meeting between candidate Trunip

and President Putin. However, the

Committee found that all of those email

exchanges resulted in just one, brief

meeting between Mr. Torshin a'nd the

candidate's son that did not include any

discussio1, related to the U.S. election.2~d

(U} Finding #34: The Committee found no

evidence that meetings between Trump

associates-including Jeff Sessions-and

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. !iOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 84

official representatives of the Russian

government-including Ambassador

Kislyak-reflected collusion, coordination,

or conspiracy with the Russian

government.

(U) Meetings between U.S. senators

and foreign government officials are

considered a routine part of the job.

However, there have been multiple media

articles raising concerns about contacts with

former Russian Ambassador to the United

States Sergey l(islyak, particularly those

involving then-Senator Sessions.

(U) Mayflower Hotel Speech: In April

2016, Senator Sessions, an early endorser of

Trump and later a key figure during the

transition, attended a foreign policy speech

by Trump at the Mayflower Hotel in

Washington, D.C.245 l<ushner also attended

and recalled meeting 20 to 25 guests,

including Ambassador Kislyak for the first

time.246

Kushner stated that the

conversation between him and Ambassador

Kislyak mainly consisted of pleasantries, and

concluded with an offer for Kushner to visit

the Russian Embassy for lunch, which

Kushner never attended.247

{U) Attorney General Sessions similarly

described a pre-speech reception of maybe

24 people; immediately following the

speech, he went to a media stakeout to

answer questions about the speech.248

Attorney General Sessions reca lled "no ...

discussions with the [Russian] Ambassador

or any other representative from the

Russian Government or their surrogate" at

the Mayflower.249

(U) Republican National Convention: In

July 2016, then-Senator Sessions attended

the Republican National Convention in

Cleveland, Ohio. Because he used his

campaign funds to pay for his travel and

lodging while in Ohio, his schedu le focused

primarily on his Senate campaign-related

events.25° For the five days that Sessions

was in Cleveland, he attended numerous

Trump campaign-related events.251

(U) Over 50 ambassadors to the United

States also attended a reception associated

with the 2016 Republican Convention.252

Sessions addressed th is group of

ambassadors, as the keynote speaker, at the

Heritage Foundation's Embassy Row

Ambassador's Buffett Lunch. 253 Accord ing

to Sessions, his interaction with

Ambassador Kislyak following that speech

was brief, unexpected, and occurred in the

presence of several other people.254

(U) J. D. Gordon testified about briefly

encountering Kislyak twice at convention

events in Ju ly 2016, including a brief

conversation that occurred during a

networking event that was also attended by

1111.255 ... recalled seeing Gordon and

chatting casually with Kislyak at the same

event.256 The Committee found no evidence

that these brief public interactions related

to the hacking of emails or collusion,

coordination~ or conspiracy between the

Trump campaign and Russia.

(U) Senate Office Meeting: On

September 8, 2016, Senator Sessions met

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 85

Ah1bc1ssc1dor Kislyak In his Senate office:2!)t

As a Senator, such meetings In his Capitol

Hill office are common. Notes of the

meeting taken by Sessions' staff, and

provided to the Committee, verified that the

approximately 30-minute meeting was

official in nature and not related to any role

that Senator Sessions held with the Trump

campaign.258 Sessions testified that the

conversation mainly revolved around

Ukraine, and the two "had a little testy

conversalion" about Ukraine given Sessions'

support for the urm1inian cause.259 The

Committee's investigalion did not uncover

anything improper about Senator Sessions'

meetin~s with the Russian ambassador.

Finding #35: Possible Russian efforts to set

up a "back channel" with Trump associates

after the election suggest the absence of collusion during the campaign, since the

communication associated with collusion would have rendered such a "back

channel" unnecessary.

JU) The Committee investigated

meetings during the post-election transition

period betv-Jeen Trump associates and

Russians-with a focus on individuals who

may have been acting as unofficial

representatives of Moscow. In December

2016, l<ushner met with the head of Russian

bank VEB, Sergei Gorkov, at the urging of

Russian Ambassador Serr,ei Kislyak, with

whom J<ushner and Flynn had met earlier in

the month.260 Kushner took the meeting

partly because he hQd been told Gorkov

could provide "Insight into what Putin's

thoughts were on a potential new

relationship" between Russia and the

United States. 2bl l(ushner testified that the

meeting primarily entailed Gorkov telling

Kushner about VEB, w ith which Kushner was

entirely unfamiliar, and "that was really the

extent of it."16i Gorkov gave Kushner two

gifts, which l<ushner registered with the

transition.263

(U) In January 2017, businessman and

former Navy officer-was

introduced through Emirati associates to

Russian investor Kirill Dmitriev in the

Seychelles.2c4

- had no official or

unofficial role in the transition, btJt had met

twice wlth Bannon at Trump Tower.2G5

- testified that his meeting with

Dmitriev lasted 20-30 minutes and focused

on "trade matters," and "how the United

StatC!s and Russia should be working

together to defeat Islamic terrorism."2~

- stated that he and Dmitriev did not

discuss sanctions, the Russian government' s

"desire to have a relationship with the

Trump admin istration," or "any channel of

communications between the United States

and Russia.''267 -furthE:r stated that he

had had "no communications or dealings

with {Dmitriev] or any of his colleagues

before or after that encounter last

January."26a

(U} The Committee did not find

evidence that Kushner or- did

,mything Inappropriate during or following

their meetings with Gorkov and Dmitriev.

To the extent that one or both meetings

reflected an unsuccessf ul attempt by

intermediaries of the Russian government

PROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 86

to set up a "back channel" to the incoming

Trump administration, that purpose was not

shared with or accepted by Kushner or

--and potentially reflected an

absence of such channels during the

campaign.269

Kushner, who was connected

to Gorkov by Kislyak, asserted that "the fact

that we [we]re going through the normal

channels during the transition hopefully

serves to show that there were no existing

channels through the campaign." Similarly,

- noted his meeting with Dmitriev

"didn't happen until ... more than 2

months after the election. So if there was all

this collusion [before the election], why

would there even need to be any other

followup meetings?"270

Clinton Campaign

(U) Using a series of intermediaries, the

Democratic National Committee (DNC) and

Hillary for America (Clinto·n campaign) paid

a research firm to conduct opposition

research on candidate Trump and his ties

with Russia. As part of this effort, research

from n_umerous purported Russian sources

was obtained and provided to the Clinton

campaign, thereby constituting indirect, but

substantial, links "between Russia and

individuals associated with political

campaigns" relevant to the 2016 U.S.

election.

{U) Fusion GPS (Fusion) is the trade

name of a Washington, D.C.-based

company, Bean LLC, that conducts research

primarily on behalf of corporate clients.271

According to longtime Wall Street Journal

reporter and Fusion co-foundeiallll

- Fusion "specialize[s] in finding

records and reading things and digesting

large volumes of information."272 Fusion's

general practice is to "do engagements on a

30-day basis, and at the end of the 30 days

we write a report about what we found ....

And if you think what we told you was

interesting and you want more, we can sign

up again.''273 Founded and led by former

journalists,274 Fusion maintains relationships

with numerous reporters, and provides

information to ne·ws outlets on behalf of

clients that include law firms, media

organizations, and lobbying

organizations.275

{U) As described below, Fusion was

hired in spring 2016 by

-· who represented the DNC and the Clinton campaign. Fusion was paid to

conduct opposition research on candidate

Trump. Fusion subsequently hired

Christopher Stee le as a sub-contractor to

obtain information from sources purported

to be current and former Russian

government officials. The information

Steele collected was reported back to the

Clinton campaign via Fusion and- 276

{U) Finding #36: Prior to conducting

opposition research targeting candidate

Trump's business dealings, Fusion GPS

conducted research benefitting Russian

interests.

{U) Prior to conducting opposition

research targeting candidate Trump's

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 87

business dealings, Fusion conducted

research benefil1.ing Russian Interests. i n

Specifically, in 2013, Fusion was retained by a law firm to assist w ith representation of a Russian defendant in a civil forfeiture case

arising out of alleged money laundering

activities uncovered by the late Sergei

Magnitsky {whose name was subsequently

given to the U.S. human rights law, the

IV1agnitsky Act). 278 -acknowledged

that the Kremlin's interests in the case were

aligned with his client and against the U.S. government.279

(U) Russian lawyer Natalia

Veselnitskaya hired the law firm for which

Simpson was workfng, and that fjrm

retained the services of Russian-Amerkan

lobbyist Rinat Akhmetshln, both of whom

attended a meeting at Trump Tower on June

9, 2016, described in the first part of this

chapter.280 During the litigation,

Veselnitskaya receive~, via the law firm,

memoranda summarizing­

research:m Certain topics-including the

Ziff Brothers (a venture capital firm

specializing in capital investment)-were

the-subject of both {1) memoranda

Veselnitskaya received from - and

{2} the presentation Veselnitskaya made to

Trump campaign officials.2R2

-

acknowledged being with Veselnitskaya at a

court hearing in New York on the morning

of June 9, 2016, prior to her meeting at

Trump Towef.283 He further recalled having

drinks and dinner with her and others,

including Akhmetshfn, in W(lshlngton, D,C, a

day or two later. m However, he denied

discussing the Trump Tower rTi eeling w ith

her before or after it occurred, and claimed

not to have learned about it until 2017.281·•

(U) Finding #37: The

hired Fusion GPS on behalf of the Clinton

campaign and the Democratic _National

Committee to research candidate Trump's Russia ties.

{U}

., is longtime counsel to the DNC.n °

-.alllatso represented the Clinton

campaign, from which it received $5.6

million in 2015 and 2016.287 Pursuant to

that representation, d~ring the 2016

campaign, "[tJhere was an expectation that

- would hire the consultants,

including rese<Jrch consultants, necessary to

e11able us to provide services to the campaign."288

{U} In approximately March or April

2016,289 Fusion principals- and

- approachecal "and indicated that they might be a good fit for doing work

to support the legal efforts" oial

clients.290 llllllltestffied that Fusion "had

been retained ... by a wealthy Republican ,

.. to do research on t hen candidate Trump .

. . and thought that if I was going to be

looking to hire a consultant to help me

advise the cami>aign on issues relating to

Trump, that they wot1ld be a good fit."m

lllwas looking fo r a consultant to, among other things, sort tf1rouuh the multitude of

public records perta ining to Trump's

business dealings.<92 Although he had not

previously worked with Fusion, he chose to

PROPERTY OF THE: U.S. HOUSE. OF R!:PRESl::NTATiVF.S 88

hire the company based on its familiarity

with Trump's dealings, including "his

business holdings, his financial holdings, and

the kinds of litigation he had been involved

in."293

• · further testified that "[t]hey

were recommended ... [and} thought

highly of in the community."294

(U) The Committee determined the

"wealthy Republican" who funded Fusion's

the Beacon retained Fusion to conduct

opposition research on Trump.295

leadership have publicly stated they "had no

knowledge .of or connection to the Steele

dossier, did not pay for the dossier, and

never had contact with, knowledge of, or

provided payment for any work performed

by Steele."296

- testified that-based on a careful

review of the relevant documents-he had

identified "zero overlap in the work

product" between the dossier and what

Fusion providecl 297

(U) lllllsought and received "budget

approval to be able to spend money in

order for me to retain consultants," from

Clinton campaign manager­

but did not specifically identify Fusion to

- .• 298

Fusion's Simpson was "definitely

aware that-· represented the

DNC and that they were the client in this

matter" based on a general understanding

that-· represents the DNC.299

Fusion's expenses, including the hiring of

Christopher Steele as a sub-contractor,

were passed on to -,300

and

ultimately to the Clinton campaign and

DNC.301 In total, Fusion paid Steele (and

charged-) approximately

$160,000; Steele's efforts were part of a

larger opposition research project for which

- · paid Fusion over $1 million.302

{U)- testified that Fusion began

its opposition research work by "review{ing]

what we had learned over the previous

months," presumably including

"information about candidate Trump's

business ties in Russia," although - had

not been aware of Russia-specific research

at the time he engaged Fusion.303 Fusion

"began to develop more specific lines of

inquiry," and eventually hired Steele, whom

- had known since approximately

2009.304

signed off on the decision to hire Steele as a

sub-contractor in June 2016-around the

same time he learned that Fusion was

beginning to focus its opposition research

on Trump's ties to Russia-but was not

aware of Steele's identity until Ju ly 2016.305

{U) Finding #38: Christopher Steele claims

to have obtained his dossier information

second- and third-hand from purported

high-placed Russian sources, such as

government officials with links to the

Kremlin and intelligence services.

(U) Between June a·nd November 2016,

Steele produced sixteen reports for Fusion,

which comprise what has become known as

the Steele dossier, "concerning Russian

efforts to influence the US Presidential

/ l\l

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 89

election and Hnks betwC?en Russia and

Donald Trump." 30G Steele did not travel to

Russia to con~plle these reports.io, Instead,

Simpson stated that "!Steele] hire(d) people

who can travel and talk to people and find

out what's going on.1130R

(U) Of the separate claims the

Committee identified within the dossier,

almost all are attributable to Russian or

Russia-based sources, such as: a "senior

Russian governn,ent figure," a "senior

Russian leadership figure," an "official close

to [the] Russian Presidential

Administration," a "Kremlin insider," a "former top Russla1"1 officer," a "senior

Russian financial official," a "senior Russian

Foreign Mil\istry figure," a 1'Kremlin official

involved In U.S. relntions," cind a "former

top level Russian Intelligence officer still

active inside the l<remlin."31w

(U) The Committee is concerned with

the degree to which the Kremlin may have

sought to influence information that was

ultimately provided to Steele-through the

.Potential provision of disinformation or

otherwise-consistent with its ongoing

efforts "to undermine public faith in the US

democratic process ... . 11310 In addition, the

vast majority of witnesses the Committee

interviewed, includinEIII, did not know

the Identity of Steele's sources:" 1 Steele

declined to testify before the Committee,

and the two witnesses who cialmed to

know some of Steele's sources-Simpson

and-, a former U.S.

Depvrtment of State offic.lal-decllned to

identify them:m

(U) Finding #39: Christopher Steele's

information from Russian sources was

provided directly to fusion GPS and

- and indirectly to the Clinton

campaign.

(U) Fusion began receiving written

reports from Steele in June 2016. 313 At the

same time, Fusion provided updates­

approximatety weekly and usually orally- to

•3

1A - recalled receiving some of the information later

included ln the dossier '1maybe late June,

early July. " .. 115 - exchanges with Fusion

were not one-way communications: he

specifically recalled directing follow-up

work on lnformalion eathered by Steele.a.1r;

Elias recalkid persont1lly bl:tlng briefed by

Stee le on his findinf.ls d~iring a late September or early October meeting at

office and formed the impression that ''the Fusion

foll<s thou~ht jt was important that Mr.

Steele hear from me directly that I was

aware of his work and was appreciative."3n The Committee requested

records related to this meeting1 but the firm

wc1s not able- to locate any.315

(U). led regular briefings that

contained Steele's Information for senior

Clinton campaign staff, which included

Clinton campaign manag~r-and

campaign chairman John Podesta .319 -

also began '1relaying ... information

received from Fusion GPS to the DNC . ..

around . .. convention time."320

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEN'rAn~s 90

1. HPSCI, · 1nrelligenve Committ$!; Chairman, Ranking Me moor Establish Parameters for Russia lmre:otigot.on,~ httru:/l !J.m:.li'icl:!'lce.hou!e.eov /nev;sicoc..rm•"'ntsinglea:s!li?DOClimen;:1~767, Mar. 1.1, ::>.l)l.7.

2. HP-SCI, Ex2cuti1ie Session lnterif.sw of Jefferson 8. Sessicns, Nov. 30, 2017. 3. HPSCI, executf,,e $eS,s!on lnt~-iew of Don ~rd f n:m p, Jr •• !)~::.. 6, 2017; H PSCI. Executr,re $e$slon fnterviev, cf Jeffe.rson B.

Sessions. Nov. 30, 2017. 4. H!K.,CI, Execufi,,e Ses.sian ln1i:l'~ w oflefferson B. Ses-.slcr.s. Nov. 30, 2017. 5. HPSCI, E>?-cutive: Session !nt.<:Pliew of !ared Kusimer, July 7.5, 201?. 6. HPSCI, ·1wssi.1n Aclfve Measut~ During the 2016 Election Campaign," May 23. 2017. 7. HPSCi, .,,...I\Ussian Active Meawres Ounng the 20!6 Election Campaign;" Mav 2.3, 2017. 8. HPSC!, &.ecutiVe Session fntetvie\'1 afJames Clapp,;r, July 17, 2017. 9. HPSC!, Executive Session rnter\'iew cf James Clapper, Ju~'( 17, 2017. 10. HPSCI, E.-.:ecutive Session Int~ ~ ... of Donald Trump,.:!,., Dec. 6, 2017. 11. HPSCI, o:ecutlve: Session lnteIViE't/ of Michael uihen, Get. 24, 2017. li'~ HPSO, ~cutlve Session !ntenne,., of Michael Cohen, Oc.t.14, 2017. 13. Morgan, lewis & Bockius UP, Letter fro m Sheri A. Dillor. ~mi Williom !'. Nelsof\ to President Don<1ld J. Trump. Mat. 8,

2017. 14. HJ>SO, fxecudlli? Ses1ion lnteNicwof !\•1!chael Cohen, Ocr. 24, 2017. 15. H!7S.CT. Executive Se~sion lnte.-view cf Ike Kaveladze, lfov. 2, 2017. 16. I-IPSO. Execudve Sessron ln!el'VH!w~f lite KaYel;;d:ze, l-lD'1. 2, 2017. !7. HPS.O, Executive Session lnter\'iewof Rob Goldstone Dec- 18, 2017. 18.. HPSO, ExecuUYe Session Lnter>Aew cf Rab Goldstone. Dec. 18, 1017. 1.9. HPSO, Executive Session lnter.iew of Rob Golc!stone, Oec.18, 2017; HPSCI, uecutw.: Session Interview of 1-1:lidiaef c~

hen, Oct. 24, ion. 20. H·Psa, ~utive S:asslon lntennewof Ike Kavcf.idz11, Nov. 2, 2017. 2..!.. HPSO. f:xecutive Session Interview of Rob GoJdsrone, Dec.18, 2.017. 2)_ Twitrer.@re.al DonaJdr,ump, .fune 18, 2013, 8 :17 PM. 2.3. BPSO, W!uttve Session ln,e1viawcf Rob Goldstone,Dec.. 1S, 20!7. 24. HPSO, EY.ecutfveSession lnter.Jiewof Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017. 2.5. HPSO, b.;;cutive Ses~lon lnt~vaf Rob Goldstone, Oec. 18, 2017. 26. HPSCJ, EY.ecutive Session lrm:rJiew of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017. 27. H?sa, E.xecut:•1e Ses~lon lntecrviewof Keith Sdiiller, Nov. 7, 2017; HPSCI, £xe-cunve ~on Inte rview of Roll Go!dstone,

Dec.18, 2017. 2$. 29. 30. 31. ~2. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42..

43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49.

so. 51.

52

H!K...O, Executive Session lnteiview of Rob Goldstone, Dcc. lS. 2017. HPSCJ, &.ecut1•1e Session Interview of Keith Schiller, Nov. 7, 2017. HPSO, becutive Sessicn ln~nf.e...,-af Y.eitk Schiller, Nc-1. 7, 2017. HPSO. Executive 5'>....ssion lnt2n-ie'.v o~ Rob Goldstone, Oec. !8, 2Cl17. HP5Cl, Executive Session ln~e-.v af Oonalc! Trump, 1r., De~ 6, 2017. !IPSO, &.ccucive Session lm:e.-vie-A' of Michaef Cohen, Oc-.. 24, 2017. HP50, o:ecutive Session Inti::\~ "' at Micbae! Cohen. Oct. 24, 2017. Hl'SCl, Execuctve ~e!.sian lnterv'~w of , Oec. 20, 2017. HPSO, E.'<eeutive Session lntenr.ew of Michael Cohi:m, oa. 24, 2017. HPSO. Executive S~~io!i lnteJ¥..ew of felix ~,er, Oec. 20, ::2017.

Text ME:SSaee: Exchange SetWcen Mtch<!el Cohen anci ~ Satar, De-:. 29-31, 2015. [FSHR001!2.-30) .Email ftom f.elix Sater to Midael Colten, "fb1 :Puti11/T rump,~ No,,. 3, 2.01.5. [MOC-H-0©6921 Email from Felix Sater to Mii:hael Coho!!n, "Re:Putin/Trump,• Nov. 3, 2015. [MO.C-H-O!ID592] HPSO, Executr,e Session lnterlievt of Dec. 20,·2.017. HPSO, E.xecutivo!! Session lntavlew of !)ec. 20, 2.017. I-IPSO, Executive Session ln,eiviewof ,Dec. 2.0, 2017. HPSO, &acutive S~sion lntan,iewofMichael Cohen, Cd. 24, 2017. HPSCI, aecume Session lmsvlewof Mlchael Cohen, Oct. 24, l.017 . Text M=age E."<diange Betw;....cn M~el Cohen ,md f~ Sater,~. 3G-31, 2015. [fSHR00112-30] 1-l?SO, ~~u.ti•1e Session !nte!"Vlew of Felix Saer, De-.;. 20, 20!7. Text M=ge from F~lix Sater to Mi;:;hael Cohen, Oec. ~ . 2015. [FSHR00ll4·7.5J Text Messaee from Felix Sate:< wMicllael Cohen, Doc. 30, 20:15. [FSHR00125] €mall fea.m M ichael Cahen to imo@p.;:,res..s.i;ov..n,, QTnm1p TcweHvlos~ow,» Jan.14, 2016. {MC:H:- t-'r-0005!:-J} Email from Michael Cohen to lnfo@prpre.ss.gov.t1.1. "Trump Tcwar-Moscow," Jan. 14, 2016. {MtlC-H-OIX\f.Su] Err.all frcm Mkhae\ Cohen to info@p,press.i::ov.ru, 'Tn...'ITip Taw-er·Mo5cow," .lan.14, 2.016. (MDC·H·000690J HIX.1J. Executive Session I ntcN'.e.'./ of felix Sater, De~ .20, 2017.

PROPERTY Or THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 91

53. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. .

54. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 55. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017.

56. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Felix Sater, Dec. 20, 2017. 57. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 58. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 59. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 60. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 61. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Michael Cohen, Oct. 24, 2017. 62. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 63. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 64. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 65. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 66. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.

67. Morgan, Lewis & Bockius LLP, Letter from Sheri A. Dillon and William F. Nelson to President Donald J. Trump, Mar. 8, 2017.

68. 69.

70.

71.

72. 73.

74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

81.

82.

83. 84. 85. 86.

87.

88. 89.

90.

91.

92. 93. 94. 95.

96.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.

Eliot Cohen, Bryan McGrath, et al., "Open Letter On Donald Trump from GOP National Security Leaders," War an the Racks, Mar. 2, 2016.

Daniel W. Drezner, "Why can't Donald Trump close the deal with any foreign policy advisers?," Washington Post, Mar. 9, 2016.

Missy Ryan and Steven Mufson, "One ofTrump's foreign policy advisers is a 2009 college grad who lists Model UN as a credential," Washington Post, Mar. 22, 2016.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Walid Phares, Dec. 8, 2017. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2, 2017. HPSCI, Testimony of Carter Page, Nov. 2, 2017.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Dec. S, 2017; - RNC National Security/ Military Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated. [DENMAN 000012]

- RNC National Security/MIiitary Platform Sub Committee Proposed Plank on the Ukraine, Undated. 000012]

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jeffrey Gordon, July 26, 2017 . HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018.

U.S. v. Paul J. M anafort, Jr., and Richard W. Gates Ill, "Superseding Indictment" (1:18-cr-83, Eastern District o f Virginia), Feb. 22, 2018.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018; Alexander Burns and Maggie Haberman, "Donald Trump Hires Paul Manafort to Lead Delegate Effort," The New York Times, Mar. 28, 2016. · HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018.

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of , Jan. 17, 2018; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018.

Andrew E. Kramer, Mike McIntire, and Barry Meier; "Secret Ledger in Ukraine Lists Cash for Donald Trump's Cam paign Chief," The New Yark Times, Aug. 14, 2016; Jeff Horowitz and Chad Day, " Trump advisers waged covert influence cam-paign," Associated Press, Aug. 19, 2016. ·

HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jared Kushner, July 25, 2017. Email from Paul Manafort to , "Arming Ukraine," July 30, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-07-30- Arming Ukraine] Email from Memorandum from

to Brian Jack, "Fwd: ukraine," Aug. 1, 2016. [Sessions production: 2016-08--01- Fwd: ukraine] ; , "GOP Platform: National Security, Ukraine Amendment-Sequence of Events,'' Au g.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 92

1, 2016. [Ses:sivns production: 2016-08--01-fw-d: Ukraine-ATIACHMEIIT MEi>.50-Ul:raine Arnendme::tt (l}.pdf] 97. M emo from J.D. Gordon,. ''GOP Pl~tfo,m: National ~rlty, Ur.r<ll ne Ame:~dment-Sc:quimce of Events,"' Aug. 1, 2016.

[DJTF1'00004693] !:ma:i from John Hemen--.·,,ay roJatre\• 0 . Gordon, "Ukrair:,e-~llised F(lfl'l't~t,M Aug_ l, 2016. [DJTFl'OOD04692-93J

98. HPSCI, Testimony of Car.er Page, Nov. 2, 2017.

99. DH.S and OOtJI, Jo;n r Src.tement from the Dep!1!!.-nen, of f/t1me/01i d Sew.'TI'f mid Office of the DI re aor af Notionai lntr:lli­gence on Eleetii:m .Security, t::tto.;;:/ /yjww.drn.. ;zm·fns~·:s i20i~/lQ/Q7 /joint::StiiRrae:rt-4l eo;;rtm-ent-homei::o~~a •rip.,-and-cff:,ce- director-nation::l, Oct. 7, 20.16. ·

100. HPSCl, Executive S=ion Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. lOL H?SCJ, Executive SBsron Interview of Jeffersan !l. S.."'55ion~. Nov. 30, 2017. !.02.. Hf'SCl, Executive Session lntervf= of Hope Hicks, Feb. 27, 2018. 103. Mark Hencn, "'Trnmp; 'llOlle Wifdl.eak;.'" Tr.e Hili, Oct.10, 2016. 1.04. Ashl;iy Parkru- anc Da-.-id E. Sanger, "Dena.Id Trump Calls on Russia to Find ..!illary CEnton'.s Messing E~ils; The 1V2·;>/ York

Time5, July 27, 2016. 105. HPSG, Execut:iye S~:on lnteN~v,' of Matlh£!w F. Tait, 0 Li. 6, 2017.

106. HPSCI, Ei,;ec1:ti" e ScS>ion Interview of Hope Hid:s., f€!:J. 'l7, 2018; HPSCI, Ex=Jti>.,e Session Interview of Dorn,1Jd Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017; H~Cf. Execudve '.!<?S$IC.1 rntel"..ri!lwof letf~rson 8. Session~, Nov. 30, 1017.

107. CIA, "Director Pompeo De!i•,ers Rem~rks c t CSIS,' hrt.::d/www.oa.gnv/~w:;;4lfo;m;;t;onhp;;edies-1esrmonvn 0l , -saceches·te;timonv/c.omoco-<leilvers·r~mzrks-at-csis/htn1I, Apr. 13, 2017.

108. U.S. v. George Papadcpoulos. "Stcternent of ihe Offc...nse" (1:17-cr-182, Oistr:ctof C!!lum!iia), Oct. 5, 20l7. 109. f m.iil from Michael ffyim to - July 15, 2016. (Fl YNN HPSCI 00002980-8:!j. 110. Manu Raju a nd Jerer.r, Herb, ME:mall poln~ 1rump .:ampaign to Wikile.t.l:s dactJ~nts," CNN, Oec. S, 2-017. ill. h.'!:>SCI, Eicec mve Se~o.~ I rview of Donald Tn..'llliJ, Jr., Dec. G, 20i 7.

112. Em aU from ~o Donald J. Trump, e:t2!., ''Trump : AnotllerWll:il..eaks DNC Upload,N Sept.14, 2.016. [TIWMP_ORG

113. Email from o IJooald J. Trump, et al., "Trump: Another \ '!ikileaks DNC Uploa d." Se;,t. 14, 2016. [TRUMP _ORG_l3_0...fit,Q1]

114. O!ive r D~rcy, aCNN corrects story on email w Trumps about W1kilea~.s.N CNN, De<. 8, 2017. 115. HPSCI; Execufa·e Sess!ot1 fn~n1iew of Dona!d T rnrnp, ;,., D~c. 6, 2D17. 116. HFSCI, Executive Ses:slan ln~entiew of Donald Trurni;, ir., Dec. 6, 2017. 117. H?-SC!, E~ecutive Session !nteNiew of Donald Trurnp,ir .• Dec. 6.2017. . ill. Direct Message from l.'Tii.'.ileaks to Donald Trump 1f., Sept. 20, 1016, 11:59 PM; Direct Message from Dcn?ld Trump Jr. to

Wckileaks, Sept. 21, 2016, l l:50 AM; Direct Messar;e from Wikileaks to Do.,a!dTrump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM; Direct Mes.sage from Do9ald Trump Jr. to Wikileaks, Oct. 3, 20l6, 3 :0! PM.; O:rei:tMessagc from Donald Trump Jr. to Wik-· il£aks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. [Dm R01265-65.j

1.19. Ok ed Message from V.'ikil.eaks to Donald Tromp Jr., Sept. 2.0, 2016, 11:59 i'M; Oilcct Me ssage from 'Niki!.cal-s to Ooneltl Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2015, 1:25 PM.

12<}. HFSCI, Executi~·e S~on lnh!r,ie:w of Donald Trump, Jr., Oec. 6, 2017, p. 101. :l2'i. Direct Message from l!J'ib1.eaks to Oonald Trump fr., Sept. 20, 2016, 11:59 PM. [OITJR01265]

122. Direct Message from Dooald Trump Ir. to INikileaks.. 5'.!pt. 21, 2016, 11:50 AM .. [DJTJR0126~j i23_ KPSCJ, Executive Ses,ii!)n lntenliew of Dona!c Trump, Jr., Dec-. 6, 20l'l'. 1£4. Email from Conald Trump Jr. to Keflyanne Conw.1y, ct al., "Wil<i!!!aks," Sept. 21, 2016. [TRUMPORG_11_0000007J 125. Email horn Dona ld Trump Jr. to Ke:llyannc: Conway, et al., ~Wikl!eaks," Sefrt. 21, 20l6, [TRUMPORG_l i_OOC'(JOO?j 126. !-;?SCI, Executive Ss5i:>n tnterliew of Hope Hlcks, ~. 27, 2018. 127. Direct Me!>sage from 't .ftkileak.s to Donald Trump Jr., Oct. 3, 2016, l:25 P~- {OJTJR D1265-66J 128. Direct Mern,ga.frvm C-or.ald Trump Jr. to \Vikit.eaks, Oct. 3, 2016, 3:01 PM. !OJTJR01266] H 9. Dr:ect M~ssage from Donaid -Trump Jr, to \"d'iidlea!::s, Ott. 3, 2016, 3:03 PM. {DJTJR01266] 13u. HPSCI, fxa:lltivc Session lnte.Niew of Donald irump,lt., Dec. 6, 2017. 131. Direct Message from Wi'.~il.eaksto Donald Trump Jr., Oct.12, .20!6, 8:31 Al•t {DJTJRO:i267] 132. Orrecr Message from w r,<lteai<s to Donald Trump J(., Oct. 21, 2Dl6, 9:46-9:5?AM. [OJTJRD1267-69] 133. Direct Message from Wikil.eaks to Don;ild Trurr.p Jrv ,J,'.)v, 8, 2016, 6;35 FM. [D1TJROU6i:'-70] ·

134. Direct Message from Wi"ollleaks to D0n;1ld Trump 1rv Nov. 9, 2016, 12:49-12:51AM. !DJTJR01270] :135. Direct Mess2g12 from >M~ileaks lo Donald Trump k, 02c. 16, 2016, 12:38 i'M. [0JrJR01271]

13ii. Di;-.;ct M~ssage from l;'.Jiklte.:ks to Don;1ld T;ump Jr.,.Apr. 26, 2017, 12:0 l AM. {DJTJR0!272J B7. Direct Message from \,V'oole.1ks to Donald Trump~., .lu:y 11, 2017; 9:2.9 A.I\~. {DJTJR0121S-74j ~ HPSCJ, Exs!cul:i·,•e Sess,on lntet·.<i;;;w of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017.

i39. H!}5(l, Exectrtiye Session lntet'\'iew of Donald Trump, Jr .• Dec. 6, 2017 . 140. n1'5Ct faf!CUtive SeSQo:1 fn terviaw of Ale,ramle~ tux, tl,;c. 14, 20!7.

PROPERTY OF THI:: U.S. HOUSF.. OF RF.PR...CSb""'ITA TIVES 93

I'. - -·-- .,,

?.41. fmail from Alexander NI.~ to F~:er Sciwn!lz.er, et al.. "ne: Rernernh-er m e? I h;1•1e ari idea !:O v/in; t.ug. 26, 2016. f(P.000C.'.l77]

142. HPSCI, Eltec;:uthc.e Session Interview of Alexander Nr,;, !;;c. 14, 20,-7. 143. HPSCl, EltecutiV-2 Se!>sio..-1 lnten:iew oi-Ale>:~nrlet Nil: Ci:c. 14, 2017. 144. HPSCl, f~cuti,,e Sessicn Inte rview of ct. 24, 2017. 1115 . ~.PSCI, E:oc1:cutvc: Session lntervt<:w cf Alex~nder Nb:, O~c. 1-4, 2017. 146. ~iPSCI, E:tecuti~"e Sets1cm Interview cl A'e>!2rn:ler Nix, De.c. 14, 2017. 147 .1-i."SCI, !::xecu~ Sei.s:on lntervi~w of Rci3er Stone, Sept. 26, 2017. 148. HP$CI, l:xer;ut'...-~ Se!.Sicn Interview cf !!oiler ~ one, 5-ept. 26, 2017. 149· . ..tP:SCl, ~cut',>,e Se55lon lnte.Niew o f Reger Stone,~pt. 25, 2.0l7. l~G. HPSO, Executive Session lnte-rview cf Roger Stone, S2pL 26, 2017.

151. Kenn 11th P. Vogel. "'Under Mueller Sc:1 .. -tiny, Cemocrath; O<inot Tony Pc-desta Restf;FIS from Lobb')--:n~ Firm,= Thl! Ue.w York 7imas, Oct. 30, 20l7; HPSCI, E:r..erunVc&:ssions lntet'#ie-,.v i;f :ohn ?Qd.,sta, fone 27, 2D17; U.S. v. Paul.J. Mc1nafor.. Jr., am: liicr.arci W. G3<CS Ill, '"1.1:dJctme:nt" (!:!7-cr-201, District of Columbla), Oct. 30, 2017 (descrihing role of "Ccmparrv A" and &CornpallY il·'}.

152. HPSC!, l:r.:-cut=<,te Session !nte rview !lf Roger Stone, ~pt. 26, 2017. 1.53. H?SC!, E.'<e cu I:!\'{: S~sion lntervi~w of !roger Stone, Sepi. 2 6, 2017. 154. Letter ftam R~rt C. !wschel to The Honor .. ble K. Michael Coo3L'Ja"t/, "'Re; Follqv, Up to Appearanc.e of P.cger Stone on

~p~eml;e-r 26, 2017, and Supp!em~l 10 May 9. 2017 ReQL:e.st to ~oduce {)('Cum:nts"' 04 1.3, Wi7. 155. i-li'SG, Exe-cut'...-<? Se.s.sio.-. Interview of Roger ~ne, 5<?pt. 26, 2017. 1SI>. Andrew Shike. ~~oger Stene, Tr.imp comldant, ackr.owledge:s 'in=ous' Twitter con•,er.;at:ion wi:th DNC hack~,,·

Wo,hirrgmn Tur.es, C\far.10, 2Gl"/; Hl'SO, Eicecutiva S=lon !.,te,v:ew cf R.nger St00<:, Sei:;t. 26, 2017. 157. Letter f:°<? m RO!!~rt C. Busche! to The Ho.,orat-!e K. ri.i"ocnael Coo,avr.,y "Ri!: Fcl!ow Ur, to A;i;,:ear.ir,,;;~ or Rogar Stfrne on

·Sep,em!lE-r 26, 2il17, and Supp!ement to May 9, 2017 ReqUo..st to Pl"oduce Documents~ Oct. J.3, 2017.

158. lette:- frcm Ro!:i-ert C. 6'..:schel to The Honor;;ble K. M"icr-aeJ Coo<1way"lle: rd low Up to ,!ip~atalla! of P..oger Stone on S3pternt.er 26. 2017, and Sup~~ment to May 9, 2017 Reque5c to Prod~ 0...""'Cu=r:o" Oct:. 13, 1vl7.

159. 1-:PSCi, fo;;"tfrneny crf ov. 2, 20li.

iGO . .-!?SCI, Exccuti1.'c Sc~s:Jc11 lnte!'.i ew ot Jl;ifre~ Gordan, Juh• 26, 2017. l6l. E'mail fmin Caner Page to Je!'f~ D. Gordon et 21., ·Re: Commencerrientfuidress, Oass of lOl&, rtew !;CDil()mic School

{NES.}. Ju;y 7, 2016. i:OJlFP000038921 H?SCI, .uecui:Wi: 5es.srcn fr.te:view m' .Jeffrey Gotrlon, July 26, 2017. 162. HPSO, Te~mo., 'f of-Nov. 2,. 1017. 163. i-'.i'Su, &.ecum.'2 Session ir;ten..;ew o; .reffer:son B, SQ>ions, Nr;-v, 30, -!017.

164. E.m;iil fr-0m Caner Pa~e to Jeff:"ev D. Gordon, Ter.:i Dal1I. and Walld Ph;ires, "Feedb-ad< from Rllssi::- Executive Surruna:y,: July 8, 2016. [DflFPOOC'<l4023-24]

165. HPSCI, Testimany of Car.:er Page, Nc'V. 2, 2017; Jos.'I Rogi11, "Trumi::;'s Russia acMs~ speaks out e2lls =~tions 'canmJetc gar~ge.'' ' Wo,h/ng!on Pasr. Sept. 26, 20!6.

166. HPSO, Testima,ly of Car~r Pag~. Nov. 7~ 2017.

167._HPSQ, RU$sla A..rtive Measur~ l.mest!gadon, /.1.ar. 20, 2017; HPSC!, Te.stimo:iy of Camu Page, NC'1. 2, 2017. _168. HPSO, ·Russia P.ctive Me,m.rres lnlle5tigation,M Mar. 20, 20.17.

16~. HPSQ, Testimony O! Car.er Pase, Nov. 2, 2017;Josh Ragin, "frump's Rus.sia acMse.r speaks out, calls a cc~ations 'wmp!et: g~ rh;:ge; 0 Wa..hi1Jgt1:1n Past. Sep. 25, 20:i.6.

!."ID. P.PSCI, Testirr,o:r>' of Caner Page, Nov. 2, 2017. 17'.l. Sha rOll larra nl€.re, Mark Mau£ttf, and Matt Apuz20, gi-low the Rus:sfa lnqu'u-y Beg,m: A Cam!)a ign Aide, Drinks a nd ialk of

Pclltical Olrt,» V.!ashingtr:;n Post, Dec. 30, 2D17; Err.3i! frcm Jah11 tvlashburn to Rick Dearb:::rn and Jeffrey 0 . Gordon, »?.e: Tra'lel re:imburscerllent ~ceived emai1 from Michael G:aSSllcr],"" J1..r:i:e 24, W:iG. [ DJTFPD002i91<lJ

172. E!nail from Gecrge Paµacopaulos ! t ai., ~Re: Meedng vilth Russian le.adershi]:o-induding Putin/' Ma~ !)JTfPOOOlOill-12] .

!"!3. Email frornllllllllllll!lo Geotg~ Paparlnpm.:los ~t a l, "Re: ME-etlng with Russian ieadersl-tij)-lnduding Putin,· Mar. 24, 2016. {DJTFPO,Jill.01B]

1.74. Entail from Ge;:,1ge Pap.:dopo~'.os tc-t al. ~Re: M ~ting with Rcssian Rade~.shi;l-in.duding !'-Jtin,": ~-~ar. 24, 2015. ~D:TfPG-J.OlOlilj

l 75. HPSCJ. Executi.-:! Session Interview of JEffersc-11 5. Session~, Nov. 30, 20l 7. l"IG. HPSO, f;,:ecuti\.'e s~ssjon lntenr~w cf .leJfers1J11 B. Se£Ian>, ~~ov. 2tl, 2017. i77. HPSC, C!:CLJtive S~ssian lntentiew ;:,f Je.-'fers:;;n B. Sessions., Nov. :W,-Z0.17. 17S. }-:il$CI, B,.;wti-.•e Session l ritt"!f'Jt~W oi J«fersot1 B.. Ses$!oni, Nov . .JO. 2017. !79'. i-!PSCJ, Elrecutive Se~iM lnter..<ie•N o , DE-C. 8, 2017. !80. HPSCI, 5.ecutl\<.:! Session lnter.-iew of Jr., D.;c. 12, 2017.

181. Sharon taFraniere, Mar'.: !J,a.rzctti, a nd Man Apuzzo. "1-f.owthe Russia !oqu[T'f .Sega11: A Camp;;ig11 Aide, Drinks an(! Ti!U: of

PROPc:R1"Y OFTHE:: U.S. HO!ISE: OF' P.EFR!:S'"t::NTATIVES 94

Political Dirt," Washington Post, Dec. 30, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session lnter•~iew of -ec. S, 2017, ,:ip. 79-80; E1nall from Goarr,e Popadopoulos 101 l"Tr.:insltton," Nov. ll, 2.016 {"I made the lntroduct1oo between l~r Trump [a)l,d presitlcnt 5!sl bu5ed pr!morlly on the trvvt the ronior, h~i M rHY wo,'$: otc.") [DJTFP0002117Si1]

182. Lou Dobbi, Interview with Oon,Jld Tr11rnp.Fc,x 811s,·11ess, Sept. 22, 2016. 183. Email from Georse PijpijOOJ>OUlos to Paul ManijfOrt, "Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAT-HPSCl-0000025B] 184. Email from George P;ipadopou1osto Paul Mar,afort. "Fwd,'' May. 21, 2016, [GAT-HPSC1·000002S8·SgJ l8S. E:m.:ill from Paul Manaiort t 'Fwd," May. 21, 2016. [GAHiPSC:1·00000:!SB) 186. En,all frt>1'r1 P~ul MoMfort to 'lla:H M.i~·. 21, 2016: (GAT·MPSCl·OC0002SSJ 167. Email from George Papadopou os o re Dtrnrbom, "Trtwel reimbursement {received emiill from Mld,~el Gl3s5ner),"

June 24, 7.016 [OJTf P00022915-16} 1SS. Email fro nd Jeffrey D. ~ordon, "r-WD: Tra'lel reimbursemem (received email from

Michael Glassner)," June 24, 2016. [DJTFP00022915] 189. Emilll from ind Jelfroy D. Gordon, NIie: Tr.wol reimbur~ormint {rc,1,1lvod urnnil fcom

Michat!I C31.is~n,u)," JuM :.!4, 2016. [OJTFP00022~1S] 190. Emallfronj o George Papadopoulos, "Re: Travel reimbursement (received email from Michael Glassner),"

June 24, 2016. [DJTfP0002291BJ 191. Email from~ Georgl! Papa<;lopoufos, "Re: Trave!I reimburS!!lll4'rlt (reci,iv!!d l!ffiail from Micha!!I Glasrnl!r),"

June 24, 20~29181 192. HPSCI, Executive Se~slori Interview of Rob Gold~tone, Dec. 18, 2017; Executive Session lritervlewof Donald Trnmp, Jr.,

Dec. 6, 2017, Email from to Rob Goldstone, "FW-Message-from '26-Cople r·E>:ec,'" Apr. 25, 2016 (p;;s5ing along haodwritten response from candidate Trump to email from Aras Agalarov) [RG000033i

193. HPSCI, Erncutivl! S1,s,sion lnt!!rview of Rob Goldstone, Dec. 18, 2017. 194. HPSCI, E~etutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr., Dec. G, 2017, l9~. rll'SCl, l!J<ocv ti•;<r ~stlon lnt"rvluw of Roll GoldslOnu, Due. 18, 2017. l96.'Emall 1rorralllllllllllao [REDACTED], 11~rom the otriceof DoMldJ. Trump,"' Mn.-, 18, 2016 (passing along hand·

w ritten res~te Trump to typewritten note from Aras Agalarov) (DJTJR00408·09l; Email from Rhona Groff to Rob Goldstone, NFV1,i-Mesx1ge-from '26·Copler·E.:<e1:,"' Apr. 25, 2016 (po.ssing along handwritten re5ponse from p,ntiicfott: Tr\1mt1 to em.iii from AriJ$ Ag~laro11J [RG000033)

197. Email irom Rob Gold~tono to DcrniJld Trurnp Jr.; ~Ro: no : Rus5ia - Clinton - prlv,1tc and crmAdemial," Ju ne 3, 2016. [DJTJR00464} .

l'il8. Email from Donald Trump Jr to Rob Gold~tone, "Re: Russia - Ointon- private and confidential, 0 fone 3, 2016. [DJTJR00464J

199. Em.i ll from _Rob Gold1tone to Oon;Jfd Trunii, Jr., "Re: Russia - Clintorr - privati, and confidenti<JI," June 7, 2016. [OJTJR00467]

200. l:mofl from Donofd Trump Jr to Rob Goldstone!, "Re: Russt.i -Cl Into~ - private and conft<fo11tfo l," June 7, 2016. (DJTJR00469)

201. HPSCI, l::xe!culivE! S-=5s1on lntervil!v,• of Ike l<ave ladze, Nov. 2, 2017. 202. HPSCI, E~ecutive Session Interview of Donald Trump, Jr,, Dei;, 6, 2017. 2.03. HPSCI, Excic1.1tive Se~5lo11 lntcr•,lcw of Dorinld Trnmp, ,Ir,, Ocr,. 6, 2017, 204. HPSCI, ExuculiVI.! SC!~SIOrl lnl1Jr•Jl1Jw l)f Rab Goldslono, O~c. lR, 2017. 20S. HPSCI, E~!!CLHiv~ Si,s.sion lntE!rvlew of Rinat Akhrlll!tshin, Nov. 13, 2017; HPSCI E:tecutive Se:;.slon Int erview of Anatoli

Samochornov. Nov. 28, 2017. ·

206. HPSCI, Executive Session lnter'lie•!v of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; Sharon la r-ranieri! and Andrew E. Kramer, "Talking Po!r,ts Brought to Trurnp Tower M(!1.t11,,g Wt!rn Shacl!d With l<r1irnlir)," Tl) (! Now Yorr. Times, Oct. 27, 2017. 8ns<.id on pub­lie reporting. Vc~lolt~knyn prcvlomty shurcd n version c,f the memo or t alklni,: points with Yuri Chnll<a.

207. HPSCI, h~cutive Stt5sion Interview of Ike Kavel.iclze, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, Executive 5e5sion Interview of Rlnat Akhmet-stJjn, Nov.131 2017; HPSCI, E.xecutlve Ses~lon lntE!l''i'l!!W of Anatoll 5nmoehornov, Nov. 28, 2017. ·

208. HPSCJ, E.xecutive Session lntel'View of lke Kavl!Jadze, Nov. 2, 2017. 209. HPSCI, Executive Ses~ion Jriterview of Oona Id Trump, Jr., Dec. 6, 2017. 210, HPS<:I, l:1«m1t1vo Session lntel'1lcw of Analoli S3moc1X>rnov, Nov. 2~, 2017. 21i. HPSCI, E:tl.!Cutive Session lnlel'1lew of Ike Kijveladze, l~ov. 2, 2017. 212, HPSCf, Executive Se.5sion Jntel'V[e•.v of Ike Kavcladz!?, Nov. 2, 2017; HPSCI, EKE!Cutive S!!!>Sion lnt1<r•Jiew of Donald Trump,

Jr., Dec. 6, 2017; HPSCI, l:xecutive Session Interview of Anatoli Samochorno11, Nov. 2B, 2017; HPSCI, Exe~utive Session lnteiview of Rlnat Akhmetshin, Nov. 13, 2017; HPSCI, Ex!!C1,1!ive S,m ion lnl.l!rvi!!w of Rob Goldstor,11, OE!c.' 18, 2017

213. HPSCI, E>:ccl11ive Sc~~lon Interview of Ike Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017; lir-SCI, Execunvo Sa~lon lntorvl~w oi Oon~ld Tr-urn1l, Jr., Dr,c. 6, 2017; Hl'SCI, Executive 5cS$IOn Interview of Amrtoll S..~rnochornov, Nov. 28, 2017; HPSCI, Execl1tivc Session lnteN lew of J<1red Kushner, July 2S, 2017.

214. HPSCJ, l:x!!cutfve Sesslon lntervl!!w of Rob Goldstor,..,, Dec.18, 2017.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF R EPRESENTATIVES 95

. ..., - ,-,,,

21S. HPSO, e")(ecutive Ses.slo1,.lr.te.n:few of Roh Goldstone, flec.18. 2017.

216. Text r..,1es.sage Exchange Betv.een lar~ Kushne:-,;nd 1'4ul ;".1an.;;.furt, June 9, Wl5. (!'lHPSCTOOD0014Sj i17. 1-iPSO, E,cec utive S-essiol) lntr:tvlew of Jared Kushne.r, July 25, 2017. 218. !IPSO, &.ec1Jtfve S£ss,on ln:enii-ew of Donald Trump,Jr., Oec. G, 2017. :?J .S'. HPSQ, E;icee:.itive Session lnt.etvl'i'!w of r.~e Kavaradze, ND'.'. 2, 2017. 220. HPSCI, &.ecutive ~IM lnt= .. :Niew of L\:e l~vefadz.e, NQv. ?, 2017. 221. Email from Ike Kavelaoze to A. Ka~!adte, llRe: how are yo:i=," June 14, Z016. [K:C-i<AV _00-0201 222. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o{ Ro h Goldstone, Dec. la, 2017. 223. HPSCI, Executive Se:sr~n tn~ew of Stephen &mncm, Ja:t. 26, 2 018.

224. Ryan Teague Beckwith, ~Read Dona ld Trump's Suhdued Victory Speech After \\finning Ne.w J2rsey,r. TIM£, !1;ne S, 2017; CITl3il from Donald Trump l r to R!>l:t.Goklsto1,e, ~"Re: Rll:iSia- 0 1 nton - pr,vate :mtl CCl'\fidential, ~ Ju:ie 7, 2016. [DJTJR0'14S9J.

225. HP.SCI, Executive Session lotcn<iew of Hope ~jicks, f-eb. 27. 2.018~ "full ;:rariscri;n: O=!d Trump NYC.speech on stakes ~f .he election," POUTlCO, June 12. 2018.

225. lJRA, " 2016 NRA Ann\Jo l Meetings &Exhibits Fvll .EventSv..:oule." httos://v,•ww.-uaam.cn/rricdia{l641/dalJ·.r-e,eflt­s,hedule.odf. undated.

227. HPSC:!, Execlltive Se.ssio~onold Trump, Jr., Cec. 6, 20l7. 228. email fm-m o --'Russian b-;;;ckc!oor overture and dinner inwre;" May 16, ].016.(Sessior.s pt"Qduc-

.ion: 2016~ l}~r overture and dinn:r imite (35)] 229. ~al fro~ o ....... "Russlan hackdoorovertureanci dinner rn#te,• Ma)· 16, 2016. !Sessions iuoduc­

.icn: 201~ Ru~!.!an bacl'<door overtura .md dfrut.2r inYlte (:!6)]

23;1: Email fro~~0

Russion b.ad:.door G',-erture and dinn.er irr,m,• May 16, 2016_ [sP..ssi= produc­tion: :m.!.6-05-16--Re ~ r Olferrure and diMQf ln·~ltc (3.6)!

231. i:maif from~ Paul Manafort, e t ~I., Rf'.\lrl; Russian backdror 01.reo~-re an.I di11ner invite/ May 17, 2016. [Se~io.;, production: 2016-uS-l.7--twd Russian b~:doot o\·ertute and dlnr,er invite (28)]

232. Email from Jared Kirshner ~ "Re: Russian b.;;d:door avei:ture ar;d dinner mvi~e, u f\•lay 17, 2016. iRGOQOW:11

233. ·EmaH!ro~ o - Ra: KY R~uecst, ~ M~y 18, 2016. [Scs.slcm ?roducticn: 2015-05:18-~ KY Re­{llleslJ

-n. 17, 2018. "Kr2mtin u;.-mEction;• May 10, 2016. [RD 000.078]

236. Email from '·'Kremfin Ccnnection,~ May 10, 2015. 1RD000078] 237. Email rrom "Krem!in~n..-wction;'' May 10, 2016. [RD000078] 238. ~au fro:n "Kremfin Conneaion," Ma•/ 10, 2015. (RD OW078] 239. HPSQ, c.""<ecutive S<!Ss.fon lntetvi':.•,v o~ Nm·. 30, 2017. 240. HPSCI, £:c~tSve Sassion lntel'.r.e·,v ~ ao. 17, 2018. 241. H?SQ, Exe-cutive Session lnter.icw of Oona Id Trump, Jr., Oec. 61 2017. 242. iiPSCI. &e,1Jti•,e So...,,fon lnte.rview of Donald Trump, Jr., o~ 6, 2017. 243. HPSCI, Exec-.itive Session lnre.-view of Donald Trump, J_r,, Oec. 6, 2017. 244. HPSCI, E.xecutwe S5.>Ssion int:2rvr'2w of Donald Trump, Jr., occi 6, 2017.

24S. HPSCI, a.~utiYe Sessi on lntciview of Jefferson B. SBslOlli. Nov.30.2017. 246. h"P50, executive Sess1on lnt.:n.·i:w of Jared Kllshner, J:ity 25, 2017. 247. HPSCI, EY.ecuHve SP..5$ion Interview of Jarad Kushner, Ju~· 25, 2017. 248. HPSO, i:xe.:utive Session lnte'"'oliew of Jefferson B. Y-"-.$Sicns, Nov. 30, 2.017. 249. HPSCJ, &.erutive Y..5.Sion !nte.-view of Jeffecson B. S2S...eu>rts, Nov. 30 :io11. 250. F~e!1il Election Commission, "HiUart for America Disbursan<!nts t~om 2.0!5-2016, w.,w,.fui'...§0'."; · JBS

Sthedule," July 16, 2016. i201 6-07-!6-Unlitled (15}- ATIACHMEN~ ~nSchedulewith Drop By (Saessior.s Prod uctlon))

251. ·JBSSdledule," Jul,; lti, 2016.. (~ssJons Production: 2016-07-16--Uotitled (15)-ATIACH~~eNT JBS Conventbn Sc.h-edulc "'ith Orop Byi

252. HPSCJ, Executive Session lnte;.,i !:111 of Jeffrey Gorcon, July 26, 2017; Courtney Omi>;.. DU5. Senator 8!)b Cor!:er S;:i-eaks at Global Cleveland's Global Parmers in Oiplomacv Event." Grc,!Jalclevefa r.d.org, Jan. 31, 2017.

253. 0

!6S Schaoule," Juty 16, 2016. [Sessions Production: 20!6-07-16-Untitled ( 15)-ATiACH~..ENT JBS Ccnve-nl!on Sdiedulc ·,•mh Drop B~·}

23ol. HPSCI, Exerutive Sasslon ln!~ -,.-,,;w of Jeffer,;on. l:L Sessions, l'Jov. 30, 2017, p. S6 i~l met '>'ilth him, as i recall. twice. rnere w-i!S an ~cOLJn1er af.er I m;eccie a sp~ech at the Repubt~n Conventfon. .1 didn't-d":d.n't know he W2S golr.g to be ;;1ere. ~kE to .i nulll ber of ;;.mba»a<lors and other peep!~ and was standing in front en the poclum and h~ and l cilatted a :)~ dl-

PR.CFEJHY OF THE U.S. HCl.t"SE OF REPRESEtJTATNcS 96

255. HP50. ExeC\JtiveSes io11 lrr.enri voi Jeffrey Gordon.July :25, 2DJ7 . . 255. H?SO, T2:stimony of Nov. 2, 2017.

257. "JBS Schedule," July 16, 20iQ.. Sessi-ons Produaion: 2•Jla-07-15-Untitled (15)----ATTACHMENT JBS Conyen t;i;m Sdtaiule \\rtth Drop Byl calendar ir"w it~ · Meeting with Russl~n Ambas.sado, Kislyak;" $£pt. s . 2016. [2016-09-0!!-."ieEtlng wlth Russran AmbasEdc,r Kisl-,.ak]

2.58. Senator Sessions' Staff Noto, iID.ssian Ambassador," 5....~. 8, 2016 (Sessiom Suµpleniernal Protfuctiol\]; Caler,dar flwite, «Meethg with Russian Ami:ass.,d.-;il iGsh•ak," Sept, 8, l016. [Ses.sii;;ns prO<;luciion: 201G-09-08- Me.,ting with Rllssicn Ambas.sador Kistvakl,

25S. H?SO, loXecutive Session ln~-viewof J2ffetson B. Se.s.sic-.-.s, Nov. 30, 2017. 260. H?SO, Executive Session rntervie•Nof Jared Kusliner, Ju~ 25, 2017. 26L HPSO, £,cecutive Ses.s ion lnt!!r.iew of Jared Kushni!r, JL:t-; 25, 2017. 262.. HP5Cl. Executive Session lnten'iEv1 of Jared Kushner, ! u.'y ~5, 2017. 263. HPSO, 'Executive Session lr.renliew of Jared Kushner, July 25, 20l 7. 2.64. HPSO, Executi'Je S1a?Sslon lnteNlew of Nov. 30, 2017. 265. HFSO, 81:ecutive Session lr.tcr.iiew of t\10'1. 30, 2017. 265. HP5Q, Executive s~ssfon lnt~rvlew of Nov. 30, 2017. 267. I-IPSO, firecutive Session lnt-cl\.-ie'o of Nov. 30, 2017. 268. HPSCI, E>:.ecuti'le Session lnreNiewof Nov. 30, 2017. 269. HPSO, ExE,cutive Sessiori l~ewof Jared Kushner, July 25, 20!7. 270. HPSO, T~-timony of l:.rik P(inc;'!, N!?~. 30 2017.

271. HPSO, Executive Sesslori ln!c1viewo. 272. 1-lPSCI, Execuw,e Session tm.,vie,•ro, 273. HPSO. Executive Sesslori ln~rvie1u o 274. HPSO. Ex~cuti1Je Session lnta"~ ,

Jo,.,_ 14, 2.017. Jvv.14, W17. 'ov.14, 2017. l.:n. 14, 2017.

275. HPSG, Executive Se.sslon lntel'llie>N o , 1c-\.'. 14, 2.0.17.

2.76. HPSCl, Executive Ses~ion lnterv',ew of .lake Sut!ivan, Dec. 21, 2017~ntral rot1:: In the dossfer was first re-.-ealed in a

pros a rticle. Adam Entous. D.:~lil Barrett, and Rosalind S. Helderm an, NCllnton camp;;ign, DrK paid for re.seorm tf-..;it led to RU£Sia dossier.~ Woshll,gton Po:;;t, Oct. 2.4, 2017. Pn o;-to its pub!i.c.itk;n, £rras elected to reprcsent thre2 witn~es -induc1ne form2r Clil\ton campaign ,chairman 1ohl) Podesta-before, the Committee In CO!ll'H!ction with this im'!!.;tiiration. HPSO, :.,te~t!= Se~lon lrl!e......;ew of John Pooeste, Jur.e 27, 20l7; HPSCf, Exea.,.iv<,S2Ssro11 lnte rvili!w of­Aug. JD, 2017; HPS01 Execi.lti\R ~ sion lnterv~w ofYarlHi Tamene Wolcle-Yohann~. Aug. 30, 2017. Th.a!: decision was q~onable, since Eli,1~ was h.imselfin possession of facts relevant to. the Commitice's inve.tig.ation. HPSCI, ~ecutive Sessl:m Interview of Marc Ellas. Dec.. 13 2017.

277. HPSO, Executr,e Session lnteiview , 278. liPSO, Executive Session Interview or

sJ'jr~ !'.ov. 13; Jcel Schectman and Na 279. HPSO, Executive S~ssio n Interview 280. HPSCI, &:ecutive Session lntcl"\/i~w o

shin, r;cv. 13, 2017. 2.81. H?SO, Executive Sessiol\ lm:l!!Me-.•1 of 282. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of

shin, Nov. 131 2.017; HPSCI, mcutive 2.83. HPSQ, Exect.'tive Ses~ion lnteNiew of 284. HPill, fxecuti11e 5.!ssion lnter ... 1&,,.1 of 285. HPSCl, ~tive Session ,mervrew or 2.86. HPSO, ~ii-cutive Sesslon tnt&"'l.oie•,.,-cl

2fi7. fece-ral Election Commissloa, "'Hillary ·o H!X..CJ, El(ecuti',e Session irrtaview of

288. HPSCI, &.a:cutive Session lm;,rvie-.-1 cf 289. HPSCl, Executive Session ln.t.En.1ew 2SO. HPSO, =x;Cuti'I~ Session lrrterview o: 291. HPSCI, Execvtive Se.ssion trtteNiew of 2S2. HPSO, ExecutiVeSllssiOll l~ nria:wof 293. HPSQ, Executive Session lrlEMewaf 294. HPSO. ~ cutiue S~ssion lcrtentmw ., 295. H?Sa, E.'Cecutive Session lritetvlew

29'5. Miitth-ew Continetti and Midtoel Go! 27,2017.

4ov. 14, 2017. lo-1. 14, 2017: HPSCI, £.xewtive Session Interview crf ffinat Akmet·

" .S. sattles Russian money laundanng case," Reuters, May 13, 2017. tlov. 14, 2017.

Nov. i4, 2017; HPSCI, E.xecuti...-~ Session lntel\llew o; Rit\at AI<met-

lov.14, 2017. ~0'~.14, 2017; HPSCI, Exerotive Session l11terview of Rin.,""t Akhmet­

,, oflke Kaveladze, Nov. 2, 2017.

1/;l'J . 14, 2017.

c Dlshurs-=ments to P.erklns Cole from 2D15 to 2016", •M·.,.-J.!e<.:;:o,·; e-c. 13, 2017. ec. 13, 2017. 11,t:.13, 1017. ec. 13, 2017. ~c..13, 2017. et. E , 2017.

c. !3. 2017. 13 2017.

ec.12, 2017.

l':i and the Washington f ree Beacon.'' Washington Fri!e Beacon, Oct.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATil/"ES 97

297. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of

298. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of 299. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of

300. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov. 14, 2017.

301. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of-ec. 13, 2017.

302. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of . Nov. 14, 2017; Mark Hosenball, "Ex-British spy $168,000 for Trump dossier, U.S. firm discloses," Reuters, Nov.1, 2017.

303. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o-Nov. 14, 2017. 304. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview o . Nov. 14, 2017.

305. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of ec. 13, 2017.

306. Guba rev et al. v. Orbis et al., Defense, (Claim No. HQ17D0413, Queen's Bench Division), Apr. 3, 2017.

307. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov.14, 2017 (stating that, as a known ''former undercover British Intelligence officer who worked In Moscow," Steele would not have been able to travel to Russia safely).

308. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Nov. 14, 2017.

309. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer," Dec. 19, 2017.

310. ODNI, Assessing Russian Activities In Recent U.S. Elections, Jan. 6, 2017. 311. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Dec. 13, 2017.

312. letter from Robert M. Weinberg to K. Michael Conaway and Adam Schiff, Aug. 21, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Inter­view of Glenn Simpson, Nov. 14, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of David J. Kramer, Dec. 19, 2017. The Com­mittee issued a subpoena to Kramer, but Kramer still refused to Identify Steele's sources. HPSCI, Executive Session Inter­view of David J. Kramer, Jan. 10, 2018; letter from Lawrence S. Robbins to Representative Devin Nunes and Representa­tive Adam Schiff, " Re: December 27, 2017, Subpoena Issued to David Kramer," Jan. 10, 2018.

313. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Glenn Simpson," Nov. 14, 2017. 314. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 315. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 316. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017.

317. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017. 318. Email for Katherine Ruemmler to HPSCI Staff, "RE: Production," Jan. 24, 2018. 319. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec. 21, 2017.

320. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Marc Elias, Dec. 13, 2017; HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of Jake Sullivan, Dec.

21, 2017; Jennifer Palmieri, "The Clinton campaign warned you about Russia. But nobody listened to us," Washington Past, Mar. 24, 2017.

I • •....., • ....., • ,,

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 98

(U) Chapter 5 - lnteUigence Communfty Assessment Leaks l(ey Question 114: What possible leaks of cfas!;if/ed ;nformation took place re/c1ted to the In­

telligence Community's assessment of these matters?

(U) Leaks of classified information are

criminal acts, and have the potential to

damage U.S. national security interests, at

horne and abroad.1 Even more concerning

is that the lives of IC employees or assets

may be placed in danger due to unauthor­

ized disclosures of classified information.

Finally, when leaks of classified information

come from congressional sources, such

leaks jeopardize the effective oversight ro le

Congress plays over the IC. Therefore, as

part of the Committee's Investigation, the

Committee reviewed lenl<s related to the

classified ICA on the Russli!n active

measures campaign targeting the 2016 U.S . presidential election, focusing primarily on

leaks that occurred between the IC's estab­

lishment of the CIA Director's. fusion cell I and the publication of the JCA

in January 2017.

{U) On January 6, 2017, the DNI re­

leased the unclassified ICA. The ICA states

that Russia conducted lts active measures

campaign for the dual purposes of (1) sow·

ing discord in and undermining the U.S.

presldential election process, and (2} help­

ing elect Donald J. Trump by denigrating

Secretuy Hillary Clinton. ' Unfortunately,

the publfc release of the unclassified version

of the ICA was not the first time that the

public had seen the IC's various assessments

re lated to the Russian aclive measures cam­

paign. Although outside the scope of this

chapter, leaks related to the Russian active

measures were already happening in 2.015

and 2016. For example, there were press

reports regarding the hack of the DNC, as

well as the potential hacks of pro-Trump

and Republican groups.~ Du ring this time,

the Committee carried out a healthy dia­

logue, whlch included briefings, with the IC

related to these matters as part of its over­

sight responsibilities.~

{U} In addition, this chapter covers

leaks of information about IC assessments

that were likely classified at the time this

Information found its w ay into the press, espedally In light of the fact that the reaks

reportedly came from government sources.

This chapter does not make any determina­

tion as to the accuracy or analytic integrity

of the information leaked to the press and

· subsequently produced in the ICA.

(U} Finding #4-0: Leaks of classified infor­mation regarding Russian intentions to sow

discord in the U.S. presidential election be~

gan prior to the election day-November 8,

2016.

(U} The leaks related to Ru ssian inten­

tions to sow discord in the U.S. presidentia l

election took place prior to the November 8,

2016 election, and notably, after the IC's

establishment of the fusion cell-

PROPERTY OF THE U.S . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 99

Almost a week

later on October 7, 2016, the U.S. govern­

ment formally accused Russia of hacking

politi~I institutions, but did not attribute a

specific hack to the Russians.11

(U) At the time of these lea ks, the infor­

mation contained within them was still clas­

sified. These leaks of classified information

endangered U.S. national security by reveal­

ing key information about U.S. Intelligence

capabilities to its adversaries, including as­

sessmen~s on adversary intentions. The

Committee finds the timing of these leaks

particularly concerning. These leaks hap­

pened during the early stages of the iC' s on­

going assessm~nt of Russian active

measures, thus permitting adversaries to

not only potentially di scover U.S. intelli­

gence capabilities, but also provided adver-

PRO?ER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 100

saries, including the Russians, the oppor­

tunity to thwart or manipulate the IC's on­

going assessment.

(U} Finding #41: Leaks of classified infor­

mation alleging Russian intentions to help

elect candidate Trump increased dramati­

caUy after the election day-November 8 1

2016.

- r -. -, .. __

5, 2016, the administration had not

acknowledged any attempt by Moscow to

influence the election in favor of candidate

Trump.

('I'S/NF) ~ However, four days later on Decem­

ber 9, Adam Entous, Ellen Nakashima, and

Greg MIiier of The Washington Post report­

ed that the CIA concluded a new assess­

ment that Russia intervened in the 2016

U.S. presidential election to help candidate Trump wrn the presidency, rather than for

the sole purpose of undermining confidence

in the U.S. e lectoral system.16

PROPsr.-Y or: THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 101

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET CIA ASSESSMENT SAYS RUSSIA WAS TRYING TO HELP

TRUMP WIN WHITE HOUSE

~ r; ;,. ":J .... :!'lc~""('~~~.,...,~ ~ ~~~ *4,,,;!Jl.a

UNCLASSIFIED

~

(C/NF) (U) ln addition, on December 10, 2016,

fahn Walcott of Reuters reported that a U.S.

official familiar with the !C's findings stated

_that as the 2016 U.S. pres[dential campaign

progressed, Russian government officials

devoted increasing attention to assisting

candidate Trump's efforts to win the eiec-tion.21

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTAilVl:S 102

TOP SECRET/

·­-

TOP SECRET/

NOFORN-

NO~OR~ FRO?ERTY O F TtlE U.S. HOUSE O F REPRESENTATIVES

103

(U) It is irnporta1:it to note that Evan Pe­

rez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bern­

stein of CNN reported on January 12, 2016,

that President-elect Trump was briefed on

classified information indicating that the

Russians have compromising personal or

financial information that the Russians

could use against President-elect Trump.39

The Committee's investigation revealed that

President-elect Trump was indeed briefed

on the contents of the Steele dossier and

when questioned by the Committee, former

Director of National Intelligence James Clap­

per admitted that he confirmed the exFst­

ence of the dossier to the media . .:o

(TS/NF) ·-(1:f; In reviewing the various lea!<s both

before and after November 8, 2016, a trend

becomes e'~ident-prior to the election,

teaks of potentially classified information

focused on Russia's attempts to sow discord

with the U.S. presidential e~ection. -

(U} Finding #42: The leaks prior to the clas­

sified Intelligence Community Assess­

ment's publication, particularly leaks ot­

curring after the U.S. presidential election,

correlate to specific language found in the

Intelligence Community Assessment..

(U} During this review, the Committee

found that leaks of potentially classified in­

formation permeated thro.ughout t he media

both before and after the November 8,

2016, U.S. presidential election. -

PROPERr { OF rnE U.S. HOUSE OF RtP.RESENTATiVES 104

-a ;u 0

~ 0 .,, :i! (ti

f:= ~ ::i: 0

Wi a il

~ i{l en m

~ :::l ~ (J)

I. JP 11,-.~ -· ---:-- ... , . . ' .. . - .. •. - ~ ~!'"-...'\

lro@~tillfl1:mtfutn1Ll©1:fl:&~.wll:r£r.il ~Mt~ .d

Artide I

Quotes in Article that Mirror ICA Final ICA Findings ~----~---···-~ "Secret CrA ;issessmrmt says Russia was trying to : "The CIA has concluded In s secret assessment that

help Trump win White House" i Russia intervened in the 2016 election to help Don-.

Pase 1; "We further asses~ Putin and the Russian Govern­

ment developed a clear preference for Preslclent-Elect

• Date: Doccmbor 9, 20l6

• Outlet: me Washington Post 1 aid ~romp win thl? 11residcncy, rot her th.in Just to Trump."

I undermine confidence in the U.S. electoral system,

l according to officl.lls brkifed on the mmer."

I . -·· - - -- - ---, -------··-----·---

·:·it Is Lhe a5sessmcnt.or the Intelligence community ,· &>age 1: "Nonetheless, Putin publicly lndlct1ted "preference that RllSSla's BO.i i hero was to fnvor one ,::nndldate for Presfdent-cJoct Trump's stated poJJcy to work with Rus-

over the other, to help l'rump get elected,' sald a ' . senior U.S. ofllclal briefed on an intelll{lence presen-

tation m;ide to U.S. senators. 'That's the con~ensus

view.'"

$ia, and pro-r<remlin figures spolcc highly about what they

I. saw as his Russici-frlendly positions on Syria and Ukraine.

Putin publicly concrrssted tfle Presldent-eJect's r,pproac{110

; Russia with Secretory Clinton's 'aggres~lve rhetoric."' l

-- - I . ''Ru~sian Hackers Acted to Aid Trump in 1:lection. , '"We now· have hi~h con Viuence .that they hacked the I P.ige 3: "Russia collected on some Republlcar,-afflllated U .S, S ilYS~ ; D. N .C. and the R.N.C., and conspicuously released no : taq~ets but did not conduct o comparable disclosure cam•

• Date: Dewmber 9, 2016 ' documents' from the Repubf/can organfzation, one I pa/gn." • Outlet: The New York Times senior administrc,tion officiitl said, referring to the

Russi;ins."

;-,r 'A.P.'r. 28,' Is believed to have creat­

ed two outletr. on rhe internet, Guccirer 2.0 orad

DCLcaks. to make Democratic documents public.

Page 2: "We <"lSsess with high confidence thanh DCLuaks.com, and WJIOLl:a

~ I I J P I I t£1 lried lr1 cyber operotf ons public·

! ly and in exclusives to medi,i outlets.

Many of th!:! documents w~re also provlcJud to Wik· 1

lleal~s, which releasecl them over many weeks be·

, fore the Nov. 8 election."

I

.J :t,

~

~ 0 ,, ~ m != fl} ::t

fn lrl 0 11 ;ll

] m (/] m z ~ ·~1 ;;,; rn

•- .f i t .'f.» ....- Pi . 4111!> .:p~! -~ ·v .. ;T;\--vll ~ -- ,,r.:· .. -· - , -- . - ~ ''4-·, ' - , • . J -_ J ' f!.ff:,t,.,...r,,==.,. , . 1 _ . .f L~ .:...':':' ""' .. ·-" •

• .&.J~~:..r.....J.lq, .~., . """ m,c4::_w.,illt~ml1~~~1~1~Mlr~n:~~~ . . · ==-1· ·. -· . . -...:, • ...... ...-...~ '. • •... ~!l(., . . • . . ' . "1 .~-~J~iffl,. - .... ll ,_. ;~_,:, . - ··j{1"; . . .. ~ . :

Article ,n ........ ,,. .. ;,. r.~ ..... 1 .... +-h~t, M:Y~n~ lf"I\ : c· I 1-1\ c· .. • • -I 1-"3 I frl-lrlfflr' ! .. ··- .. - ·- - ____ _. ___________________________ _ "U.S. Officlnls: Putin Personally Involved ir'I U.S. Electior, ''Two seniot officials with direct access to the Page 1: "We assess with high confidence thot Hussian Pl'es­

ldcmt Vladimir P11tin. ordared an lnfluenco campolg111ti

2016 aimed :i t lhe US prc~ldr.nti.'ll clr.ction ... ' '

Hack"

• Datu: Oocernl.>er 15, 2016

• Outlet: NOC News

information say new fntell(gence :shows tl,at

P11tin ,,ersonal/y dlrectad how hflclted moterlt:ll

I from Democrats was leaked and otherwise used.

i The intellige~r,r. came from diplomatic sources

I and spies working for U.S. allies, the officials

i said." 1

fl "Pul1n'~ obj~ellv.es were mul tlfDr.eted, u hleh· r;igc 1: ~Pul1n most like ly wnnted to discredit Socrut.iry

level lntel llsenc0 source told NHC News. What Clinton because he lw.v publ/cly blamed her since 2011 for

I began as a 'vendettc1 1 against H{l/ory Clinton inc1iin(! moss pro,cst~ egalnst hi$ regime ln l,He 2011 and

morphed into an effort to show corrupHon in I early 2012, and because he holds a grudge for comments

j American poHtfcs and to 'split oft ke\' American j' he almost certainly saw as disparaging him." ·

I i!llles by creating the lmi'lge th.:it !other coun,

l tries] couldn't depend on the U.S. to be a credi- i Page 1: "In t ryir'lg to inftuence the US election, we assess

; bl~ globi.ll ltii'lder unymort:,' the offlclill said," : the J<rcmlin soucht to i:!dv.irw: Its longstondlnr, dcslro to

. undermine the US-lerl liberal democratic order, the pro·

motion of which Putin and other senior Ru~sian leaders

view as a threat to Russia and Putin's regime."

1-- - - - ·- --- ·- ------------- ·- - - -11 lnte l 11naly!ll s shows Putin il?proved election hacking"

• Data: December 15, 20l,G • Outlet: CNN

"Repqrt: Putin, Ru~sia Tried to Help Trump By

'Discrediting' Clinton"

• DaLe:J :muory G, 2017 • Out lGt: NfJC News

"'The intelliBCnce community hns a~scsscd that

, In order for this operation to hove been execut·

,.ad, It could not h,Ml L1een done without tM J highest levels of the go11emment, lncl1Jdfn9 the i President himsetf."'

Pa~c 2: "We .issess that lnf:luenw carnpc1lgns m~ approved at the hi!}hest levels of the Russian Gavernme11t­

p(lrtic11l t1l'ly lhoso LhElt would be polil lcoll11 sensitlv~."

- - ___ ,____. --------···-·-····-· ---·--· "The unclassified report doe~ not Identify who

transmitted the information or how. A senior

o1Acl.il with direct knowledge, however, told

NOC News Thl11·sdny that the U.S. has lde11tlftcd

the ftusslcm actors who turned over stolen Dem·

. ocratic rmiterial to Wikll..cal<s." I

; Page 3: "We assess wi th high confidence tha

layed mott?rial it acquired from the DNC ;ind senior Demo­

r.rntlc officlols to Wi!(Jloaks."

(U) Finding #43: Continued leaks of classi­

fied information have damaged national

security and potentially endangered lives.

(U) Finding #44: Former Director of Nation­

al Intelligence James Clapper. now a CNN

national security analyst, provided incon­

sistent testimony to the Committee about

his contacts with the media, including CNN.

(U) When initially asked about leaks

rel~ted to the ICA in July 2017, former ONI

Clapper flatly denied "discuss ling] the dossi­

er [compiled by SteeleJ or any other intelli­

gence related to Russia hacking of the 2016

eledion with joumalists."~5 Clapper subse­

quently acknowledged discussing the

"dossier with CNN journalist Jake Tapper,"

and admitted that he might have spoken

with other journalists about the same top­

ic.45 Clapper's discussion with Tapper took

place in early January 2017, around the time

IC leaders briefed President Obama and

President-elect Trump, on "the Christophe r

Steele information,'' a two-page summary

of which was " enclosed in" the highly­

classified version of the ICA."47

(U) On January 10, 2017, CNN published

an article by Tapper and others, which

. ?RO?ERTY OF 1HE U.S. HOUSE OF RcPRESS·ITATil/ES 107

claimed that "classified documents present­

ed last week to President Obama and Presi­

dent-elect Trump included aHegations . ..

about Mr. Trump'' that were (1} "1?r1:=sented

in a two-page synopsis ... appended to a

report on Russian interference in the 2016

election" and (2} derived from "memos

compiled by a former British intelligence operative.'"8 Those claims were sourced to

"multiple U.S. officials with direct

knowledge of the briefings."49 The next day,

Clapper issued a statement describing a call

with President-elect Trump in which Clapper

"expressed my profound-dismay at the leaks

that have been appearing the in press" and

"emphasized . . . that I do nof believe the

leaks came from w[thin the lC."30

(U) The Committee assesses that leaks

to CNN about the dossier were especially

significant, since CNN's report "that~ two­

page synopsis of the report was given to

President Obama and Trump" w as the prox­

imate cause of BuzzFeed News' decision to

publish the dossier for the first time just a

few hours later.51 Until that point, the dos­

sier had been "circulating among elected

official, intelligence agents, and journalists,"

but remained unpublished.52 As the accom­

panying article explained, " [n]ow BuzzFeed

News rs publishing the full document so that

Americans can make up their own minds

about allegations about the president -elect

that have circulated at the highest levels of

government."5;

{U} In approximately early August 2017,

shortly after his t estimony to the commit­

tee, Clapper joined CNN as a n~tional securi-

-t ty analyst:''

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRF.5!:NTATIVES 108

1. Espionc.ga Act of 1917 {codr.:~ as amended at !8 U.S.C. §§ 793-7gSJ. 2. ODNI, Assessing Russ,·oo Activities mtd lntentior1s i"n Recen t US fledions, Jar\. 6, 2.017. 3. Ellen Nak-oShima, ~Ru:.sian Go~,;,..-nment Hackers Penetrat,;rl DI-IC, Stole Oppo-sition ~arch on Trump," Wa.hittgrot.

Post, June 14, 201.6; Joseph Menn, Mark f losenbal.1, and ;ohtl Walcott, "H ac!(ers Targettd Trump Ca mp,iig11, Re~uh!i::an Party Groups: Sources,'' .'?e!.erers.. Au& 19, 2016.

'1.. HP-~, Staff Briefing on Cyb<?r Targ-en.ng of PolitiuJJ Parties, !une 14, 2016; HP.SO, Swfi' Briefing on Wi}.il;;a k5 ,ma Hadcin; of Camp:2ig11 Systems, Aug. 3, 20!6; 1-!rSCI, Mernb~ Bri1=f.rig on Hussian C•1b;,r AcL,~ti~. Sept. 6, 2016; Gais of S Briefing, "Russian 0 1•ber Acfu:ities,0 Sep;. 8, 2016.

S.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

• • • • 11. DliS and ODNl,.'"Joint Stiltemem from the Department of Homeland Security and Office of the Director of Nanor.ai inte!­

12. 13. 14.

lignncc oo Election Socurlty,"' Oct. 7, 2016.

15. -16. Adam Entous, .Ellen Nakashlma, and Greg Mlller. wSecretOAA5s~ment Says Russia W,as Trting to Help Trump Win

17.

18.

19.

20.

2!. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26.

27.

28.

29.

30.

3L

White House;" Wczshlt1yton Pas!, oer:.. 9, 2016.

-• John \-'Jaloott, "Russia inter,ened to help Trump-win .election: inte!lfgence officials;" R~urers, Dec. 10, 2016.

--

--· PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENT.ATM=S 109

32.

33.

34.

35.

36. 37. 38.

39. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to compromise him," CNN News, Jan. 12, 2016.

40. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. 41. 42.

43.

44.

45. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. 46. HPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Regarding his communication with Tapper about the

dossier, Cla.pper stated: "I don't know exactly the sequence there, but It was pretty close to when we bri~fed it and when It was out all over the place. The media had it by the way. We were kind of behind the power curve, because the media, many media outlets that I understood had that, had the dossier for some time, as did people on the Hill."

47. liPSCI, Executive Session Interview of James Clapper, July 17, 2017. Former CIA Director Brennan testified publicly that the dossier was "not In any way used as a basis for the lntelll(lence Community Assessment." HPSCI, Russian Active Measures During the 2016 Election Campaign, May 23, 2017. However, NSA Director Rogers clarified that, In late Decem­ber 2016, a two-page summary of the Steele dossier was "added" as an "Appendix to the ICA draft," and that his consid­eration of the Appendix was "part of the overall !CA review/approval Process." Letter from Michael S. Rogers to the Hon· orable Devin Nunes, Mar. 5, 2018. See also Evan Perez, "Blden confirms Obama, VP were briefed o_n unsubstantiated claims against Trump," CNN, Jan. 12, 2018.

48. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs p resented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017; Twitter, @cnnbrk, Jan. 10, 2017, 2:13 PM (reflecting the story's initial pub lication time).

49. Evan Perez, Jim Sciutto, Jake Tapper, and Carl Bernstein, "Intel chiefs presented Trump with claims of Russian efforts to compromise him," CNN, Jan. 12, 2017.

50. ODN I, "DNI Clapper Statement on Conversation with President-elect Trump," Jan. 11, 2017. 51. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan.

10,2017. .

52. Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Reports Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017 ("originally posted ... at 6:20 p.m.).

53. Ken Bensinger, Miriam Elder, Mark Schoofs, "These Repo, ts Allege Trump Has Deep Ties To Russia," BuzzFeed News, Jan. 10, 2017.

54. Transcript, "President Trump Takes Working Vacation; Analysts Examine President's Recent Poll Numbers," CNN, Aug. 7, 2017 ("Joining us now to talk more about this is CNN's new national security analyst, James Clapper.").

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 110

-· - - ·--·11

(U} Chapter 6 - Summary of Related Committee Oversight Efforts

(U) During the course of the Com­

mittee's investigation into Russian active

measures targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden­

tial election, the Committee identified sev­

eral issues within its jurisdiction t hat re­

quired additional attention and oversight

outside of the broader investigation.

Sufficiency of "Unmasking'-' Procedures

(U) In March 2017, the Committee be­

came aware of senior Obama Administra­

tion officials' requests for U.S. person identi­

ties related to President-elect Trump's tran­

sition team. These U.S. person identities

were previously redacted in IC reporting.

The Committee initiated its investigation of

the ptoce.ss for requesting identities, collo­

quially referred to as "unmasking," to deter­

mine the sufficiency of existing policies and

procedures related to the release of U.S.

person identities. As a result, the Com­

mittee recognized gaps in the "unmasking"

processes, including the lack of IC-wide

standards related to the justification for re­

questing U.S. person identity information.

Therefore, the Committee's findings related

to these processes necessitated an immedi­

ate change in policy.

(U} The Committee believed that the JC

should use specific procedures related to

the "unmasking" of U.S. person identities in

IC r~porting, including additional review re­

quirements for "unmasking" presidential

transition team officia1s during a presiden­

tial transition.1

The Committee felt that a

change in policy was necessary for the IC to

protect U.S. person privacy 13nd the sanctity

of t he peacefu l transition of presidential ad­

ministrations, all ._ • .,hile resulting in no oper­

ational impact. As part of negotia tions of

the FISA Amendments Act of 2017, DNI

Coats and the White House agreed to devef­

op a new IC-wide policy for handling

"unmasking" requests. Therefore, on Janu­

ary 11, 2018, DNI Coats signed lnte!ligence

Community Policy Guidance 107.1 (see Ap­

pendix 0), which includes requirements for:

• IC element heads or designee approval

for requests for U.S. person identity in­

formation;

• Documentation for names or titles of

individuals who will receive the U.S. per­

son identify information;

. • A fact-based justification for each U.S.

person identity request; and

• IC element General Counser concurrence

for U.S. person identity requests that

relate to Presidential transition team

members prior to those identities being

approved for release. -{U) Using a series of intermediaries, the

DNC and Hillary for America {Clinton cam­

paign} pald a research firm to conduct op­

position research on candidate Trump and

his ties with Russia. Fusion GPS (fusion) is

the trade name of a Washington, D.C.-based

company that conducts research primarily

PROPrniY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESaITA TIVES 111

on behalf of corporate clients.2 Marc Elias,

chair of Perkins Coie's election law practice

w ho represented the DNC and the Clinton

campaign, hired Fusion in spring 2016 and

paid Fusion $1 million to conduct opposition

research on candidate Trump. Fusion sub­

sequently hired former British Secret Intelli­

gence Service officer Christopher Steeie for

$160,000 to obtain information on candi·

date Trump via a Russia-based primary sub­

source and numerous sub-sub-sources net­

work who were purported to be cunent and

former Russian government officials. The

information Steele collected was reported

back through a series of memos to Fusion

and Perkins Coie. Steele produced sixteen

memos, which comprise what has become

known as the Stee.Je dossier.3

(U) By the end of September 2016-in

addition to Fusion and Perkins Coie-Steele

provided the information in the Steele doy

sier to the DOJ, Department of State, nu­

me;ous press outlets, and the FBI. -

1. ~-P- J:::78, § l.07, 115''' Cong.

(U) After uncovering this information, the Committee voted to publicly release two

memos, one written by the Majority on Jan­

uary 18, 2018 (see Appendh( E) and another

written by the Minority on January 29, 2018

(see Appendix f}. In additi'?-n to the.Com­

mittee's oversight of this matter, the Senate

Judidary Committee identified the same

issues in a criminal referral sent by Chair­

man Grassley and Senator Graham to the

DOJ on January 4, 2018, describing Christo­

pher Steele's exploits in detail (see Appen­

dix G}.

(U) Ongoing lines of effort include (1)

continued oversight of DOJ and FBI (see Ap­

pendix H for.relevant correspondence}; (2}

inquiries into the State Department's han­

dling of information from Steele, including

the dossier;4 and (3} post-election anti­

Trump research by Steele and/or Fusion

GPS.-;

2. HPSC1, "~.:utive Session Interview ofG!.:-nn Slrnp.son,n Nov. 14, 2017. . . 3. ,ne dossier; however, has ru:, fixed ccmpasltion. The version pubUshed by BuzzFeed doe; not net:essanly enr.rely corre­

spond with documents provfC:eli to oll'~ pattil!S.

112

4. !=crmer S..a,e Department cff.aal has stated pub!id\• that, over a pen..--o of approximate}; t,•ro years, he

providi:d ever N 100 of Steele's teycrts with the Rus!:ia experts at the State D;;;:iartme..t,' i nc!u ding ;\ssistant &;cretary of

S12t~ V:ctoria Noland. In Se~"":'ll:)er 2016, Winer was personaUv briefed by Staele on the dossi~r, 2nd shared a two-pag;;

summar-., with r-£uland, Y.'ho en..cured th:a t Secret2iy of State John Kerry was m3:le aware of Steele's information. Addi­"3onally.--eceivetl from C!inmn associate nformatioo collecterl l:y an indi\'iciual named­Shearenvhid, "alleged the RU3sians had compromisinRinfurmationon Trump of a sexual and financial nature.· Winer shared , .. ;th r iriform.ition with Steele, wh;;i provided it to t he FBI. , c~..<in Nune:;

is lrr~stic.,ating me. H~re's the truth.," Washington PDSl, Feb. 8, 2018; Susart 6. Gia=, "Victoria Nu land: The Fu!J Tran­

scripr. • POUT/CO, Feb. 5, 20J8; A;:,per.dix G. Tne Committ~ believe, that additional State Deparrment offi~ were

.;1ware of Steele's efforts In 2016..

S. •,ho currentiy leads ~a research and inve-sttgatory ad>1isory" called the ?enn Quarter Group {PQG). ls a

former a:ipJoyee cf The Dasdlle G:-cup, U.S. Senate Select Committee on lntcltigence (SSO). and FBJ; while a~ SSO, he

serv~ ~ the "chief author" of "The Ccrnmitte-e Studi' of the Central lntefligence At;ffiqs Detention and lr,tef"Ogatt,111 P1oyan"_ ~ The Pclln Quarter GrOVJ), aour t.eade~hip, N th~:1 . .:cq,/te,am/leaciershJO; Linlcedln, httns:i/ w\w1.h11<.:din .c.:itr1/in/danie!if~~s. tn late _March 2017, Jones met ,•Jlth FBI reg.anilna PUG, which M descr~ as

~exposil\3. forei8J1 influence in Woti:m elcctions.1111111 mkt, FBI that PQ.G was being funded by 7 to 10 we:il!hy dortors

located prcmarily in New Vork and California, who provided appro:<imately $50 mil~on. - further stated tiet PQG had

s:cured th~ services of Steele, hi!. aucciatf! and Fus.ion Gi'S to roritinue expos ins lwssian interforarice in

,he 201S U.S. !'residential election. -planned to sharalhe lnformalio,, he obtained ,.,.,i~h polieymalters 0:'1 Capitol Hitl

and with the press, and c1lso ofkred .:o provide PQG's e ntfre holdings to the F'31. f!B!. FD-302, Mar. 28, 2017.

PROPERTY Of THE U.S. HOUS;: Of REPR!:SENTATIVES 113

{U} Chapter 7 - Conclusions and Recommendations

Russian Influence Campaigns in Europe

(U) For at least the la.st decade, Russia

has aggressively engaged in an information

war against the West. The Kremlin takes

advantage of the openness, freedom of ex­

pression, and respect for legal norms en­

joyed in Western democracies by con­

ducting targeted, multi-faceted influence

operations against its adversaries. Each in­

fluence c2mpaign is unique to the populace,

media environment, and internal dynamic

of the country being targeted.

{U} The factors that make Russian oper­

ations effective also make them difficult to

counter. Nonetheless, countries through­

out the West are taking a variety of actions

to impede, counter, and where possible,

eliminate Russian influence operations.

(U) The vast majority of Russian tactics

share a common denominator: proliferation

through mass media. Therefore, thls chap­

ter's recommendations primarily focus on

ways to degrade the impact of nefarious

media activities and make them more diffi­

cult to conduct.

{U} Recommendation #1: European govern­

ments, non•governmental organizations,

businesses, think tanks, and academia

should strengthen legal and regulatory en­

vironments, ·promote media pluralism,

build professional media associations, and impn:>ve the financial sustainamlity of le­

gitimate news outlets.

,..._ •JI

(U} Russia exploits free media spaces

and open democracies through a neti.-vork of

Russian state-owned news o.utlets and me­

dia platforms. Those platfon-ns amplify pro­

Russian views in Russian-funded and local

media, provoke doubt and disagreement,

and propagate false news stories. In many

Eastern European and Baltic countries, local,

_independent media outlets often operate

with extremely limited resources, limiting

their ability to acquire and produce high­

quality con.tent. In contrast, the high pro­

duction value of Russia-owned content pre­

sents an attractiw alternative. Russian in­

telligence services or their agents of influ­

ence also purchase, invest in, or partner

with exlsting TV and radio channels, provid­

ing editorialized content for redistribution.

Furthermore, Russian p~opaganda is occa­

sionally re-broadcast by legitimate news

outlets.

(U) Strengthening legal .and regulatory

environments, promoting media pluralism,

building professional media associationsJ

and improving the financia l sustainability of

legitimate news outlets will help to: in­

crease access t-0 legitimate news reporting,

improve production quality and financial

sustainability of-local media, and prnfes-­

sionalize journalists_

(U) Countries that contain sizable ~us­

sian-speaking populations are more vulnera­

bte to the effec-t.S of media-enabled Russian

rnformation operations. As described

~ROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RI:PRE:SENTATI'o'ES 114

above, for many of these populations, Rus­

sian media saturates local markets, provid­

ing few alternatives for news and entertain­

ment and non-Russian editorial viewpoints

{U} For countries with large Russian­

speaking populations, strengthening legiti­

mate Russian-language broadcasters and

independent media outfets that disseminate

fact-based content would provide both bal­

ance to the media space and more viewing

options for r esidents of those countries.

(U} Recommendation #2.: European govern­

ments, non-governmental organizations,

businesses, think tanksr and a.cademia

should implement and encourage multi­

pronged, country-wide efforts by both pub­

lic and private entities to combat Russian

propaganda, technical, and cyber opera­

tions.

(U) Russia utilizes a \l'.'hole-of­

government approach in its information op­

erations, mobilizing a variety of tools to

achieve its goals. From hacking of govern­

ment nen•.:orks, think tanks, and universities

to spreading propaganda via social media,

Russia 's tentacles are many and far reach­

ing.

{U) It is therefore imperative that West­

ern nations implement country-\•Jide efforts

to educate its populations and inoculate

their governments, media outlets, and other

organizations from Russian influence cam~

paigns. To do this, Western nations should

encourage increased partnership between

public and private entities in order to com-

bat Russian information, technica l,. and

cyber operations.

(U} Re<:ommendation #3; European govern­

ments, non-governmental organizations,

businesses, think tanks, and academia

should jmplement more stringent cyber

security practices., such as multifactor au­

thentication and encryption of sensmve

data, as well as educating workforces on

basic cyber s&urity topics and best practic­

es.

(U) In the last decade, Russian cyber

operations have targeted governments, mil­

itaries, industrial control systems, business­

es, think tanks, and universities worldwide.

Whjle Russian intelligence services can em­

ploy extremely sophisticated means for

gaining access to sensitive data, often sim­

ple tacti~s such as spear phisiling can prove

just a$ effective.

(U) Given that cyber operations are rel­

atively low risk/high reward, difficult to

attribute, and even harder to consistently

combat, it is likely that Russia will continue

to utili2e this t actic in its influence C3m­

paigns. Network defenses have to be right

1_00% of the time; a cyber intruder. only has

to be right once. Therefore, it is imperative

that governments, NGOs, businesses, think

tanks, ~nd academia invest more r-e.sources in cyber security-defenses, imp1ement more stringent cyher security practices, and con~

duct regular workforce education and train­

ing on these topjcs.

(U) Recommendation #4: European govern~

PROPERTY OF TliE U.S . HOl>SE OF REPRESEtITATIVES 115

ments should look to long-term solutions

to lessen economic dependence on Russia .

.(U} Russia utilizes economic ties to its

advantage. Economic vulnerability - such as

reliance on Russia for trade or energy- can

be leveraged to change behavi-0r, send a

message of displeasure, or inflict punish­

ment. This is especially true for smaller

countries within Russia's periphery, such as

Moldova, where Russia is among their larg­

est trading partners. Yet even large, eco­

nomically secure countries like Germany

depend on Russia for a large percentage of

its energy needs.

'{U) The United States should look for

opportunities to lessen European countries'

eco·nomic dependen-ce on Russia. Exploring

alternative sources of energy and diversify­

ing trade relationships would diminish one

of Russia's tools for imposing influence on

its neighbors.

Russia Attacks the United States & America

Reacts

(U} The Committee's findings contern­

ing the Russian government's malign lnflu­

ence campaign during the 2016 U.S. presi­

dential election are largely consistent with

the facts outlined in the IC~. The Russian

effort was multifaceted, persistent, and

effecnve in sowing division. The effort in­

cluded cyber operations (hacking}, the use

of social media, the creation of automated

accounts and fake cyber p_ersonas, the use

o f third party intermediaries, and state-run

media.

-(U) Evidence reviewed by the Com­

mittee also shows that the Russcan govern­

ment and its proxies used social media to

advance Russia's malign interests. While

PROPERTY Of THE·u.s. HOUSE OF REPRESE:NTATIVES 116

these efforts were limited - some even

came after Election Day-they were effec­

tive at SO\.'! ing divisions within American so­

ciety and promoting false information.

(U} America's reaction t o the Russian

active measures campaign consisted of a

whole of government response, with vari­

ous activities conducted by the IC, law en­

forcement, and policy makers. Despite ar­

guably the best of intentions in addressing

the Russian cyber menace before and dur­

ing the 2016 election cycle, the Execu_tive

Branch's response fell short of deterring the

Russians from conducting such activity in

the future.

(U) After analyzi.ng the Executive

Branch' s responses to the active measure

campaign, the Committee identified various

gaps in current lai.v and policy that must be

addressed in order to help protect U.S. elec­

tion systems and increase the efficacy of

victim notifications in the future. In addi­

tion, the Executive Branch must diligently

inform U.S. presidentiaf campaigns in the

future of counterintelligence threats, to the

extent consistent w ith national security and

law enforcement equities.

(U) Recommendation #5; Congress should

identify options aiJailable to the private

sector and federal government that would

address the social media vulnerabilities ex.­

plaited by the Russian government.

{U} The exploitation of social media

platforms by the Russian government for

malign purposes demonstrated a significant

vulnerability. The- response of social media

platforms to this threat should be examined

closely and evaluated against ongoing

threats. Furthermore, social media

platforms should consider implementing

m~thods to help counter malign foreign ac­

tivity.

(U} Recommendation #6: Congress should

consider updating the foreign lntetligenc~

Surveillance Act to cover malicious interna­

tional cyber actors.

{U) As part of the Committee's initial

FISA Amendments .C\.ct reauthorization dis­

cussions in 2017,·the Committee sought to

address the changing threat environment as it relates to malicious cyber activitv

threi;iting the U.S. national security. Given

the difficulty in attributing a specific cyber

actor, the lines betv,een independent hack­

er and government cyber operator are often

blurred. U.S. ad,Jersaries are consistently

attempting to obfuscate their i~entity and

location in order to evade detection. Unfor­

tunately, current national security authori­

ties are inadequate to counter the growing

cyber threat.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 117

I O

(U) Unfortunately, the proposed addi­

tion to the FISA "foreign power'' definition

did not make it into the final version of the

FJSA Amendments Act of 2017 given con­

cerns that such a designation would dHute

the ·key distinction between two djfferent

legal purposes: intelligence collection and

law enforcement. This concern, while un­

derstandable! fails to take into account the

changing threat environment, as evidenced

by Russian cyber actors, such as the Internet

Research Agency, that attempted to meddle

in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections.

{U} The-Commfttee renews its call for

Congress to update the definition of

"foreign power" and 11agent of foreign pow­

er' in FISA to account for entities engaged

in international malicious cy'oer activity that

threatens the national defense or security

of the United States. Adding this new entity

to the definition of "foreign power' would

permit the IC to ta met intemational cyber

groups without having to connect that

group to a foreign government or terrorist

organization, so long as the C'{ber entity is

threating US. national security or defense.

Such an addition provides the IC with much

needed flexibility and will help keep the

United States ahead of its adversaries.

(U) Recommendation #7: The Federal Bu­

reau of Investigation shoufd improve

cyberatlack victim notification.

(U) When a state-sponsored cyberattack

is dire.cted against U.S. critical infrastructure

or systems rela ted to _national elections, i~ is

essential for the appropriate federal officials

to work quickly to both understand the na­

ture of the threat and aid the vi~m's de­

fense.

(U) Although the FBI maintained an on­

going dialogue with the DNC related to the

Russian intrusions, the engagement re­

mained at the-working level. These interac­

tions continued for months, despite no signs

of effective mediation to the problem. In

• Director Corney testified that, had he

known at the time the seriousness o f the

- problem, he wouid have "walked over

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RESENTATM::S 118

there" himself.

{U) On the other side of the notification

process, the Committee found that

cyberattack victim organizations did not a!- ·

ways grasp the information conveyed by the

FBr, even when that information was rea­

sonably dear. As a result of both govern­

ment- and private-sector failures, Russian

Intelligence agencies were afforded critical

time on breached systems. During this

time, extensive amounts of data were sto­

len for later use as part of Russia' s malign

influence campaign.

{U) While the DNC failed to handle the

intrusions with the level of seriousness it

deserved-given the severity and national

security implications of the particular intru­

sion sets-the FBI should have engaged

more vigorously at the senior management

level. The FBI cannot, and should not, force

a victim of a malicious cyber event to take

specific remedial measures. However,. the

FBI should update its internal processes to

make it clear that if a victim is neither will­

ing nor able to take remedial measures in

the event of a significant national security

cyber event, FBI leadership should contact

the victim and engage at the leadership lev-

eL

{U) One way to implement these proce­

dures is to p rovide specific guidance to FBI

agents conducting victim notifications as to

the circumstao,es under which the agent

should elevate the situation. Additionally, if

the cyber intrusion is attributed to a foreign

government entity and the victim is a politi­

cal party or campaign, FBI senior manage­

ment should be responstble for victim en­

gagement immediately.

{U) The Committee therefore recom­

mends that notifications associated with

state-sponsored cyherattacks should be

conducted as soon as possible, and at the

highest levels of the victim organization. If

intelligence sources and methods are

threatened by dissemination of information,

the IC should work with the Department ·of

Homeland Security (DHS) to p~ovide specific

recommendations on what actions can be

taken by system owners to defend their net­

works from the state-actor. The DHS and IC

should designate personnel and resources

to carry out this task and should establish a

triage system to prioritize tasking during

periods of high demand.

(U) Recommendation #8: Threats identified

by the Intelligence Community to state and

lo~al elections infrastructure should be im­

mediately briefed to appropriate state and

local officials. When threats are identified,

the federal government ~hould conduct an

expedited decJassification review to ensure

that the threat information can reach all

PnOPERTY OF THE u_s_ HOUSE OF REPRESENTA"O\r"::S 119

necessary state and local officials in a time­

ly manner.

(U} The Committee found insufficient

information sharing between the federal

government and state election officials ln

2016 regarding cybersecurity threats to fed­

eral elections. The Committee has attempt­

ed to address this deficiency in the FY 2018

Intelligence Authorization Act {IAA}.

(U) Section 502 of the House-passed tAA

would require the Director of National Intel­

ligence {DNI}, jn coordination with the Un­

dersecretary of Homeland Security for Intel­

ligence and Analysis and the FBI Director, to

post on the internet an advisory report on

foreign counterintelligence and cybersecuri­

ty threats to election campaigns for federal

offices.

(U) The provision also allows the FBI

and DHS to make available additional infor­

mation to appropr[ate representatives of

any campaign for federal office if those

agencies determine that such campaign is

subject to a heightened foreign counterin­

telligence or cybersecurity threat.

(U) The Committee has seen some re­cent improvement in this area on a general

level. In February 2018, the Office of the

Director of Nati~nal Intelligence, FBI, and

DHS held a classified briefing for election

officials of all 50 states.

(U} Recommendation #9: The Secretary of

Homeland Security should provide certain

designated state and local election officials

appropriate security.clearances to enable

those officials to respond to election­

related threats .. ·

(U) Even if all parti es recognize the in­

terest in sharing information, the classifica­

tion-or even the knowledge of the exist~

ence-of a threat may impair timely sharing

with state and local election officials. Con­

sistent with the need to protect sources and

methods, the Secretary of Homeland Securi­

ty should provide certain state and local

election officials with necessary security

dearances in order to share information.

(U) The Senate Select Committee on

lntelligence~passed FY 2018 IM also

attempted to address this issue. Specifical­

ly, Section 402 of the IAA would require the

DN! to support the Under Secretary of

Homeland Security for intelligence and

Analysis and any other DHS officfal in spon­

soring a security clearance up to the top se­

cret level for each eligible chief election offi­

cial of a state. In addition, the DNI may is­

sue interim clearances to a chief election

official for the purposes of receiving appro­

priate classified information regarding cy­

bersecurity threats to election systems.

(U) Recommendation #10: Significant

threats to U.S. elections identified by the

Intelligence Community, including

cyberattacks directed at political organiza~

tions, should be immediately reported to

the congressional intelligence committees.

(U) The House and Senate Intelligence

Committees should be informed whenever

the IC dete,mines with medium confide,:ice

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSe C!'" REPRES::.NTATIVES 120

- ··- 3

that a significant cyber intrusion or active

measures campaign by foreign actors is in­

tended to influence an upcoming election

for any federal office. Accordingl'I, the

Committee recommends that the FBl Direc:­

tor, the DN!, and the Secretary of Homeland

Security jointly provide a briefing to the

Congressional intelligence committees no

later than 14 days after a determination of a

significant cyber intrusion.

{U) Recommendation #11: Congress should

encourage the adoption of National Insti­

tute of Standards and Technology tyber

security standa~ds, such as those adopted

by the Elections Assistance Commission, by

providing federal resources to state and

local governments to facilitate such adop·

tion. Funds should be tied to the adoption

and certification of elections svstems to

appropriate standards.

(U) Election systems are owned and op­

erated by state and local governments.

Their acquisition and installation is costly

and recapitalization is infrequent.

(U) The federal government largely op­

erates within the limits of establishing vol·

untary standards through NrST, providing

technical assistance and sharing threat in­

formation.

(U) NIST is working with state and local

election officials to develop further en­

hancements to election agencies' system

security.

(U} The adoption of new standards may

involve system replacement, particularly for

- - - - -~

aging systems. To encourage adoption and

in recognition of the federal government's

responsibility to protect the nation against

foreign threats, the Congress .should consid­

er providing significantly more resources to

state and local governments. These invest­

ments could be tied to appropriate en­

hancements in election system security.

(U) Recommendation #12: Congress sho~ld

consider additional funding for the Nation­

al Institute of Standards and Technology to

enable better outreach to state and local

governments.

{U} With additional resources, NIST

could host more frequent engagements

around the United States to promote the

adoption of new standards and to provide

more technical support to state and local

officials. Furthermore, separately identify­

ing the budget for this activity within the

NIST would further convey the importance

of this effort and allow Congre.ss to more

closely track progress.

{U) Recommendation #13: Congress should

consider a one-time grant to state and local

election agencies to conduct a risk assess­

ment of those agencies' computer systems.

{U} Because voting is admrnistered at

the state and local level , even for federal

candidate elections, there is a patchwork of

electronic voting systems: In addition,

those varied systems are not subject to con­

sistent maintenance and replac~ment re­gimes.

(U) Congress should consider allocating

FROPERTY OF THE u.s_ HOIJSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 121

funds to be transferred to state and local

election agencies to conduct a risk assess~

ment of their systems. Doing this would,

the Committee believes, further demon­

strate the need for the implementation of

the NIST cyber security standards for elec­

tion agencies.

(U) Recommendation #14: Congress should

consider strengthening the Help America

Vote Act of 2002 to ensure that both state­

wide voter registration and tabulation sys­

tems are better protected from foreign

cyber threats.

.,

(U) As noted above, OHS Secretary Jeh

Johnson designated U.S. election systems as

critical infrastructure on January 6, 2017,

which was one day after the ref ease of the

classified ICA and the same day as the re­

lease of the uncla~-sified version. By labeling

election systems as critical infrastructure,

DHS can "prioritize cybersecurity assis­

tance11 for those who request it, as well as

provide election systems the same interna­

tional legal protections afforded to other

critical infrastructure. Implementation of

such a designation takes time. As of Sep­

tember 1, 2017, the U.S. Election f!..s.sistanc.e

Commission reported that the election criti­

cal infrastructure subsector plans v,rere pro­

gressing, in hopes of finalization in time for

the 2018 elections. The Committee ap­

plauds this designation because it helps ad­

dress the threats to the nation's voting in­

fra.structure.

(U) However, as articulated in recent

news.reports, even with election systems

designated as critical infrastructure, the DHS

"risk and vulnerabiiity" assessments take

time and resources, and there appears to be

a lengthy wait list. Therefore, in preparing

for the 2018 midterm elections, OHS should

continue to work with the states on priori­

tizing these assessments for election sys­

tems - and other stakeholders must do

more.

{U) Recommendation #15; The Department

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. liOIJSEOF REf'Ri:SENTAnvES 122

of Homeland Security should provide the

owner or operator- of any electronic elec­

tion infrastructure affected by any signifi­

cant foreign cy.ber intrusion with a briefing

and include steps that may~ taken to

mitigate such intrusions.

{U) The Committee found that commer­

cial providers of electronic election infra­

structure were not informed of foreign

cyber intrusions to their systems. While the

IC and federal government may be aware of

malicious cyber activity targeting election

systems, the information is of little value if appropriate threat information cannot be

shared with the owners and operators of

affected systems. Accordingly, the Com­

mittee recommends that OHS provide a

briefing and mitigation steps to the owner

or operator of election infrastructure sys­

tems targeting by a foreign cyber intrusion.

{U) In addition, DHS has offered state

and local governments a network monitor­

ing tool t hat alerts election system opera­

tors about known forejgn threats using in­

formation obtained by the IC. Not all states

have adopted this tool.

(U} Recommendation #16: State and locaf

governments should be encouraged to es­

tablish redundancies that are not depend­

ent on current elections ~nfrastructure,

such as a mechanism that re~ins individu­

al vote records, ensuring the Integrity of

the vote in the event of a compromise of

voting infrastructure due to a foreign

cyberattack. An example of such a redun-

dancy is a contemporaneously created pa­

per record reflecting the voter's selections.

{U} The vulnerabilfty of state and local

erection infrastructure has been well docu­

mented. These systems, which are not fre­

quently updated or replaced, are not devel­

oped to defend against state-sponsored

cyber threats. The fact that voting ma­

chines themselves, as well as tabulation sys­

tems, are not directly connected to the in­

ternet does not offer adequate security.

Rather, it can create a false sense of securi­

ty.

(U) To help p-rntect the integrity of t he

process, state and local election author ities

should consider building in additional re­

dundancies to ensure an audit trail in the

event of a compromise of the electronic

voting systems. An example of this is a con­temporaneously printed record of votes

that is securely stored at the polling place

and transported to the relevant election

office at the end of Election Day. The Com­

mittee is mindful of the reason most juris­

dictions replaced the paper ballot, but

building [n a redundancy using a paper rec­

ord of a vote will help guard ag~inst the po­

tential for manipulation of voting results in

the event of a breach of the electronic

voting machines.

{U} Recommendation #17: While it is im­

portant to implement iessons learned from

the Executive Branch's response$ Congress

should not hampet the Executive Branch's

. ability to use discretion in responding to a

?:'<O?ERTY Of: THE U.S. HOOSE OF RE.PRESENTATM::S 123

particular foreign threat.

{U) The Executive Branch's response to

the 2016 Russian active measures campaign

was neither timely nor effective. As dis­

cussed above, the Execulive Branch did not

publicly attribute Russian attempts to hack

into various political institutions or compro­

mise emails of U.S. people until October 7,

2016-roughly one month before the 2016

U.S. presidential election. The Executive

Branch also waited to issue sanctions

aga(nst Russia, expel Russian diplomats, and

close Russian diplomatic facilities until De­

cember 29, 2016. Further, DHS did not des­

ignate US election systems as critical infra­

structure until January 6, 2017, which was

two months after the 2016 U.S. presidential

election. While the previous administration

made attempts in diplomatic channels to

dissuade Russia from its ongoing activities,

such attempts apparently feil on deaf ears.

(U} However, despite the fact that the

Executive Branch's remedial actions were

arguably too little too late, any efforts by

Congress. to introduce certain legislative

"solutions" are misguided. The President is

the primary recipient of the intelligence

produced by the IC, as well as the individual

constitutionally empowered to command

the armed forces of the United States. As

such, if a foreign government conducts ac­

tive measures targeting U.S. elections in the

future, the Executive Branch should have

the abilrtyto craft a response based on the

interngence known at the time of the inter­

ference and, if necessary, the readiness of

U.S. military forces. These are variables that

the Congress cannot possibly anticipate in

drafting potential legislation. Therefore,

despite potential calls from both Democrats

and RepubHcans to legislate the threshold

necessary to ttigger attribution or reaction

by the President in the wake of foreign hos­

tilities, the Committee urges Congress not

to hamper the Executive Branch's role in

responding to foreign threats.

{U) Recommendation #18: Congress should consider repealing the Logan Act.

(U) Congress passed the Logan Act and

President Adams signed it into law on Janu­

ary 30, 1799. Broadly stated, the Logan Act

prohibits U.S. dtizens to influence any for­

eign government vis-a-vis any disputes that

government may have with the United

States. It provides a punishment of a fine

and three years' imprisonment.

{U} Qver the course of the Act's more­

than-200-year history, there has never been

a conviction for its v iolation, and there have

only been a handful of indictments that nev­

er reached trial.

(U) Oe..,;pite its demonstrated disuse,

the law has gained occasioO?l congressional

interest. In 1978, Senator Ted Kennedy un­

successfully sought to remove the Logan

Act. In 1980, Congressman and former

House Intelligence Committee Chairman,

Anthony Beilenson, introduced legislation to

repeal the Logan Act, stating that the prima­

ry use of the Logan Act was to prpvide for

"periodic calls for prosecution motivated by

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 124

TOP SECRET/

opposition to the cause b2ing expressed in­

stead of actual concern about treason." In

1994, Congress updated-the log,m Act by

changing the $5,000 fine to "shall be fined

under this title."

{U) Due to the lack of prosecutions un­

der t he Logan Act and despite the various

apparent violations since its passage, Con­

gress should evaluate the la1.-v's utility and

consider repealing it.

(U) Recommendation #19: All U.S. presi­

dential campaigns should receive unclassi­

fied counterintelligence briefings at an ap­

propriate time prior to a nomination con·

vention.

(U) During the 2016 U.S. presidential

election campaign, candidate Trump and

candidate Clinton did not receive a classified

intelligence briefing until after their respec­

tive nomination conventions. Since 1952,

the sitting President typically offers the U.S.

presidential candidates classified briefings

as a matter of courtesy, but only after the

nomination conventions. However, the

Committee's investigation found that a

counterintelligence briefing before the

nomination convention, even at the unclas­

sified lev~I. would be a significant benefit to

the candidates and enhance the integr ity of

the campaign.

{U) U.S. presidential campaigns are a

significant target of interest to America's

foreign adversaries. It should be expected

that various foreign intelligence services wil l

conduct offensive operations to penetrate

TOP SECRET/

NOFOR~

such campaigns in the hopes of influencing

U.S. po licy and discourse. Therefore, it is

critical that the IC educate presidential cam­

paigns on counterintelligence issues as an

important protection measure for campaign

operations.

(U) For example, at an appropriate

time, the lC could host unclassified counter­

intelligence tt'cl ining sessions for each cam­

paign. Such training would assist the candi­

dates and campaign leadership in under­

standing the severity of this issue, and

should cover a range of topics, including:

• (U) The intelligence collection pro­

cess;

• (U) Reasons why foreign intelli­

gence services, generally, would

want to penetrate a U.S. presidential

campaign;

• (U} How to better secure campaign

communications and practice good

cyber operational sec~rity; and

• (U) Hypothetical examples of suspi­

cious behavior that may warrant

questioning or t he dismissal of cam­

pafgn staff.

(U) Recommendation #20: When con­

sistent with national security, the Intelli­

gence Community should jmmedlately In­

form U.S. presidential candidates when rt discovers a legitimate counterintelligence

threat to the campaign, and promptly noti­

fy Congress.

{U} The Committee is not aw3re of any

NOFORN .. f:P.O?ERf'I' OF THE U.S. HCUS£ 0 ~ RE.PRE$EtITA"llV£$

125

noti-fication to candidate Trump that the

U.S. government conducted counterintelli­

gence investigations of people associated

directly or indirectfy with the campaign.

While the Committee understands and ap­

preciates the !C's reasons for not disdosing

such information to protect classified

sources and methods, the FBI should have

provided candidate Trump some s-ort of no­

tification, even if it is general and at the un­

classified level, that th ~ IC is concerned that

a potential counterintelligence threat exists

to the campaign.

{U) The DNI should issue an ICD to pro­

vide guidance on how and when the IC

should notify a U.S. presidential campaign

of a legitimate counterintelligence threat.

Similar to victim notifications in the cyber

context, 1ivhen the re has an individual under

an active counterintelligence investigation

and the JC becomes aware of that individu­

af' s affil iation with a U.S. presidential cam­

paign, the IC should have a responsibility t o

notify the candidate, when consistent with

nationa l security. There may be instances

where such notifications are not consistent

with nationai security, such as jf the candi­

date himself or herself is under a counterin­

t elligence investigation.

(U} Further, given the sensitivities asso­

ciat~d with counterintelligence investiga­

tions, if the IC decides that campaign notifi­

cation is required, the IC should promptly

notify Congress of the campaign notifica­tion, induding the classified details under~

pinning the counterintelligence threat. De-

pending on the sensitivity, such notifications

can be made to the leadership of the House

and Senate, as well as the chair and ranking

Members of the House and Senate intelli­

gence committees - known as the Gang of

8.

(U) Recommendation #21: Both houses of

Congress should tons.ider requiring aU staff

to receive an annuat counterintelligence

awareness briefing.

(U) As with.presidential campaigns,

corigressional staff members are targets for

foreign intelligence collection. The IC

should coordinate, and Congress should

consider requiring, an annual counterintelli­

gence briefing for staff.

(U) The briefing should be unclassi fie d,

cover both physical and cyber threat aware­

ness, and should emphasize that all staff are

targets fo r foreign intelligence services. The

Committee's investigation of the 2016 elec­

tion demonstrated that many campaign

staff members were unaware of the-ir status

as a potential target for foreign intelligence

services. Congressional staff may also be

unaware of the counterintelligence risks as­

sociated with their positions. Increasing the

awareness of staff-even in an unclassified

Setting-that they are potential targets

would enable them to take precautionary

measures and be better prepared to coun­

ter the threat.

Campaign links to Russia

(U) Recommendation #22: Political cam­

paigns and law enforcement should ensure

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESS'ITAT!VES 126

that their counterintelligence defenses ap­

propriately account for the role of cut-outs

and intermediaries.

{U} Russian attempts to influen<;e the

American political process, including via in­

termediaries and cut-outs, did not end on

Election Day. The universe o f pre- and post­

election contacts between Russjan interme­

diaries and Trump associates described in·

Chapter 4 sugg·est a sophisticated effort to

target unwitting Americans by leveraging

existing relationships, interests, and oppor­

tunities.3 Therefore, both U.S. government

entities and campaigns in particular must

strengthen their defenses against such sub­

versive tactics, beginning \:nth expanding

counterintelligence education and training.

(U) The IC ~hould work to provide as

much infonnation to campaigns and law

enforcement agencies about foreign intelli~

gence agencies' efforts to target them. _The

Committee is mindful that sensitive coun­

terintelligence issues often involve some of

the most highly classified secrets the U.S.

government has, but the IC should work to

provide some basic training at the unclassi­

fied level about foreign adversaries' use of

intermediaries.

(U} Recommendation #23: Congress

should consider amending current cam­

paign finance laws to further increase·

transparency regarding services pro~ded

by foreign persons or entiti~s.

{U} The Committee is concerned that

current campaign finance reporting Is in-

sufficiently transparent. For example, the

DNC and Hillary for America used Perk.ins

Coie, which they billed as " legal services" or

"legal and compliance consulting," to fi­

nance opposition research by Fusion GPS,

which In turn utilized Christopher Steele, a

foreign person, t o comprle the dossier that

he created for use against candidate

Trump.11

{U) Under current federa l election law,

foreigners are prohibited from making con­tributions or donations in connection with

any campaign in the United States.. 5 Howev­

er, it is not iflegal to contract with a foreign

person or foreign entity for services, includ­

ing conducting opposition research on a U.S.

campaign, so long as the service was pa id

for at the market rate.

(U) ln light of the use of foreign people

and foreign companies for services by the

2016 U.S. presidential election campaigns,

the Committee encourages Congress, in

consultation with the Federal El~ction Com­

mission (FEC), to consider whether Congress

should amend campaign finance laws to re­

quire gr~ater transparency when U.S. cam­

paigns obtain services from foreign persons

or entities. Congress should consider

whether U.S. campaigns that contract with a

foreign person or entity for services should

immediately disclose to the FEC a contract

with a foreign person or fore ign entity, a?

well as a lengthy summary of the types of

services provided by the foreign person or

entity.

PRO?ER'fY OF THE U..S- HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIV"":=S 127

Intelligence Community Assessment Leaks

{U) Based on the extraordinary number

of leaks of classified information over the

pa.st year, it is apparent th~t government

officials are not afraid of the criminal penal­

ties for such unauthorized and illegal con- ·

duct.

(U) This leaves the Committee with an

impression that criminal statutes related t o

leaks of classified informatiqn are not strong

enough to deter potential criminal acts of

leaking classified information.

{U) Recommer:idation #24: ~ach compo­

nent of the Intelligence Community should

update its guidance regarding media con­

tacts to ensure the guidance applies to eve­

ry employee, indudrng senior officiaJs.

{U) The Committee found significant

leaks of classified information around the

time of the ICA. The Committee believes

many of those leaks were likely frol)1 senior

officials w ithin the IC. This recommendation

is similar to a provision of the FY 2013. Intel­

ligence Authorization Act tl_1at expired in

early 2014. That provision required a notifi­

cation to the congressional intelligence

committees in the event of an authorized

disclosure of classified information to the

media or anybody else who had the intent

to make the information public.6 The pur­

pose of the law was to ensure that congres­

sional int elligence committees were in­

formed on a timely oasis when there w as a

disclosure of classified information to the

media, and the stat ute specifically carved

out disclosures made under the Freedom of

Information Act, in litigation or administra­

tive proceedings, under executive orders, or

to any federal employee with an active se­

curity clearance and a need to kno•N.

(U) Recommendation #25: Congress

should-consider legistation to increase the

penalties for unauthorized disclosures of

classified information.

(U) To date, based on pubUcly available

information, there have not been any prose-.

cutions of leaks p~rtaining to. the Russian

active measures campaign. ~s evidenced by

the lack of leak prosecutions, d ifficulties

often arise in finding a culpri t behind leaks

of classified information. However, when

the Executive Branch is successful in identi­

fying an alleged leaker, there should be no

bar to prosecuting that ,ndivid ual. While

prosecutors may utilize multiple ~riminal

statutes to prosecute individuals who leak

or mishandle national defense information,

the construct of the Espionage Act does no t

lend itself in favor of prosecu tion and as a

sufficient deterrent from individuals break­

ing the law for their own political purposes.

Therefo re, Congress shou ld consider legisla­

tion to c learly articulate stronger penalties

for those individuals who make unauthor·

ized disclosures of classified information to

the media.

(U) For example, enactment of Con­

gressman Chris Stewart' s bill - HJL 3448,

the Classified lnform.;tio n Protection Act -

would strengthen the Espionage Act. Unlike

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOL."SE OF REPRESB"1TATIVES 1 ) 8

current unauthorized disclosure statutes

which, by virtue of their complexity, create

difficulties in building cases, H.R. 3448 d ear­ly prohibits any current or former individual

who had lawful access to classified infor­

mation from knowingly providing such infor­

mation to a person who is not authorized to

access the information. If someone is found

guilty under this proposal, the leaker will be

fined, imprisoned for up to three years, or

bod-.. This legislation originally passed both

chambers of Congress in 2000, but Presi­

dent Clinton vetoed-the bill. Given the pro­

liferation of leaks, it is essential for Congress

to examine amending the Esp ionage Act to

strengthen our laws needed to protect das­s[fied information .

(U) Furthermore, given the significant

number of leaks and instances of mishan­

d ling classified information coming from

within the JC in the past several years, Con­

gress should consider ways to strengthen

the protection of dassified information.

·This legislation·could include requirlng the

head or a federal agency to suspend the se­

curity clearance of an individual vJho inten­

tionally or recklessly fai ls to comply with

security procedures for handling classified

information. The legislation could also pro­

vide fur the ability of an agency's Inspector

General to make recommendations to the

President related to potential violations of

seq.Jrity procedures by senior agency offi­

cials. Finally, the legislation should consider

mandating annual training for an individuals

with access to classified information on se-

- ._ I

curity procedures for handling classified in­

formation.

{U} Recommendation #26: The Executive

Branch should consider institu~ng.manda­

tory polygraphs for all non-confirmed po­

litical appointees that have top secret

clearances.

(U) Despite employees in the Executive

Branch having extraordinary access to a sig­

nificant amount of highly classified infor­

mation, there are very few processes in

place to ensure that these individuals han­

dle such information appropriately.

(U) The DNI is responsible for policies

and procedures governing "eligibility for ac­

cess to classified information or eligibility t~

hold a sensitive position made by any agen­

cy_." However, pursuant to ICD 704, the DNI

detegated the authority to grant .access to

an IC element's Sensitive Compartmented

Information (SCI} and other controlled ac­cess program information to the heads of

such element. As it relaies to the admin­

istration of polygraphs during personnel se­

curity vetting, the DNI issued lntel!igenc~

Community Policy Guidance {ICPG) 704.6.

{U} ICPG 704.6 provides basic instruc­

tion as to the types of polygraphs and cir­

cumstances by which polygraphs should be

administered. While IC elements should

have ~iscretion in terms of the timing and

circumstances by which to conduct S!Ps,

every employee not subject to Senate­

confirmation that is granted access to TOP

SECRET classified information should be

PROPERTY OF THE u.s_ HOUSE Of' Rl:PRESl:NTA11\IES 129

--~·- .,

subject to at least a counterintelligence

scope polygraph (CSP). As a result, the DNI

should revise ICD 704 and ICPG 704.6 to

specifically reflect this requirement.

1. so u.s.c. § 1804.

2. so u.s.c. § 1801.

3. HPSCI, "Russian Active Measures During the 2016.Election Campaign," May 23, 2017, pp. 31-32.

4. Campaign Legal Center and Catherine Hinckley Kelley v. Democratic National Committee and HIiiary for America,

"Complaint," Federal Election Commission, www.campaignlegalc1:nter.org/document/fec-complaint-hillary-america-dnc­

failure-disclose. Oct. 25, 2017.

5. 52 U.S.C. § 30121; 11 CFR 110.20.

6. Pub. L No. 112-277, § 504 (2013).

---- ---PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

130

(U} Appendix A - Scope and Methodology

(U} On January 25, 2017, Chairman

Nunes and Ranking Member Schiff released

a joint statement detailing the Committee's

inquiry into the Russian active measures

campaign targeting the 2016 U.S. presiden­

tial election.1

The final parameters of the Russia investigation were ~greed to by

Chairman Nunes and Ranking Member

Schiff on l'v1arch 1, 2017.2 The review's key

questions were: {1) what Russian cyber ac­

tivity cJnd other active measures were di­

rected against the Unite~ States and its al­

lies; (2} did the Russian active measures in­

clude links between Russia and individuals

associated with political campaigns or any

other U.S. persons; (3 } what 1.-vas the U.S.

government response to t hese Russian ac­

tive meas.ures and what do we need to do

to protect ourserves and our allies in the

future; and (4} what possible lea!<s of classi­

fied information took place related to the

Intelligence Community's assessment of

these matters?The Committee remained

focused on investigating the answers to

these four questions and designed the in­

vestigation's methodofogv around them.

(U) Tne Committee interviewed and/or

transcribed testimony from 73 witnesses,

conducted 9 open and closed hearings and

briefings, and issued 20 subpoenas. The

Committee identified witnesses to interview

by reviewing open source material, includ­

ing news reports; official U.S. government

documents, including classified lntellrgence

IC source material; IC agency briefings; and

following up on leads acquired from formal

transcribed interviews with current and for­

mer administration officials, as well as vol­

unteers who offered pertinent testimony or

documents to the Committee. In some in­

stances, prospective witnesses were unre­

sponsive or unwilling to be interviewed.

When appropriate, Congressman K. Michael

Conaway, in consultation with the Ranking

Member, made a recommendation to the

Committee Chairman Devin Nunes in ac­

cordance with Rules of Procedure for the

Permanent Select Committee on intelligence

to issue a subpoena:~ Subpoenas were used

to compel witnesses to appear as well as t o

compel the production of pertinent docu­

ments in compliance with the Committee's

lal<'.rful authority. Six of the witnesses the

Committee requested to inteNie\•.., invoked

their 5th amendment protections from self­

incrimination, which resulted in the Com­

mittee not being able to obtain pertinent

information from those particular individu­

als.

(U) During the interviews, the Com­

mittee Members and staff questioned the

witnesses about activities that generally

took place bet\veen April 2015 and January

2017. lf the Committee discovered anything

that arose before April 2015 or after January

2017, the Committee made a determination

of its relevancy. If it was identified to have

an impact on the campaign or e lection, the

Committee defined it as relevant and includ­

ed it within the scope. However, none of

FRCPffilY OF THE U.S. EOUSE OF REPRE:SE~ITATlVES 131

the witnesses interviewed indicated poten­

tial collusion that would have led the Com­

mittee to adapt a broader scope. The Com­

mittee also collected over 307,900 docu­

ments and 230 hours of witness testimony.

{U} What Russian cyber activity and other

active measures were directed against the

Unim<l States and its allies?

(C//NF) tts, The Committee collected and ana­

lyzed IC products on Russian influence oper­

ations and activities from the period begin­ning with the summer of 2015 and ending in

January 2011:~ The Committee did not ex­

amine the motivation of the Russian actors,

but instead focused on w ilat it found about

the Russian's activities. The Committee also

spent approximately 1,200 hours reviewtng

the classified Intelligence Com_munity As­

sessment on Russian Activities and Inten­

tions in Recent Elections {ICA), -

- In addition, the Committee inter­

viewed the Chief of the CIA Director's fusion

cell, which was an interagency analytic

group run by the CIA that \.~s stood u'9 - to produce products focused on

Russian cf ber and other influence activities

targeting the United States. The Committee

also interviewed the FBl's Section Chief for

the Bureau's Count~rintelHgence Analysis

Section. rn addition, the Committee traveled

to Buigari3, Cypress, Estonia, Germany, f\."IOI·

dova, Ukraine,_andthe Unite~ K1ngdom to

intervie\v these nation's foreign inteliigence

services about the Russ;an active measures

against their governments.

(U} Did the Russian active measures in­

clude links between Russia and individuals

associated with political campaigns or any

other U.S. persons?

{U) The Committee investigated facts

r~!ated to the FBl's investigation through

May 20171 until the appointment of Special

Counsel Robert Mueller. The Committee

avoided examining events thereafter to avoid interfering with the Special Counsel's

investigation. The Committee also exam­

ined allegations of collusion by investigating

the interaction between the political cam­

paigns and Russian agents of influence dur­

ing the 2016 election cycle. The election

cycle was defined as April 12, 2015, when

Hillary Clinton launched her campaign fo_r

President through November 8, 2016, or

election day. To answer this question, the

Committee met \Mith the head of Counter-in­telligence for the DOJ to understand the

context ;;u;d events surrounding the investi­

gation into the Trump campaign. The Com­

mittee afso interviewed several officials

from the FBI and DOJ to collect official testi­

mony about the investigation. In addition,

the. Committee collected and reviewed per­

tinent FBI and DOJ documentsaboutth_e

counterintelligence investigation. The Com­

mittee also coordinated do~ely with the

Office of Special Counsel. For example, the

Committee shared the list of witnesses that

the Committee interviewed and kept the

Special Counsel's omce apprised of any

changes or developments on a monthly ba-

PROPERTYOFTh"F.: IJ.S. HOUSl: OF RE:PRF:Sr:NTATM:S 132

sis.

(U) What was the U.S. government re­

sponse to these Russian active measures

and what do we need to do to protect our­

selves and our allies in the future?

The Committee interviewed current and

former officials at the NSA, FBI, and CIA. The

Committee interviewed these witnesses

about Russia's active measures, the 1mpact

these active measures had on U.S. intelli­

gence relationships and alliances, as well as

the agencies' response to these attacks. In

addition, the Committee t raveled to seven

countries in Europe and met with IC, De­

partment of State, and foreign intelligence

service representatives to obtain other na­

tions' perspectives about the Russian active

measures, the pot@ntial impacts of these

measures, and the U.S. government and its

allies' response.

(U) What possible leaks of classified

information took place related to the Intel-

ligence Community's assessment of these

matters?

{U} The Committee collected, reviewed,

and analyzed open source articles contain­

ing leaks that occurred between the IC's es­

tablishment of the OA Director'.s fusion cell

and the publication of the

classified and declassified version of the ICA

in January 2017. In addi tion, the Committee

collected and analyzed laws and policies

pertaining to the release or publication of

classified information. Finalty, the Com­

mittee also compared the leaks found in the

identified articles to the classified and u n­

classified Intelligence Community Assess­

ment to determine any similarities.

1. HPSQ, NJ;;int Statement on Progress of Bipartisan HPSO lnc;uiry Into Russian Activa M e;isuras," Press Relea!.eS_ intelli· ,!€£lce..h;:;=.eov,J~n- 2 5, 10::.7.

2. HPSO, "l rr.ellieence Commtcee Chairman, R:rnkiog.Member fstabli.;h Parame:ters for Russia ln'Jestigation/ in,elft­l!Ence.i:c.~.!~.gov, MM. l , 101'7.

3. HPSC1, Rl:!e.S of Procedure f or ,lre Pcrmcnent Sc.'eer Commirrec on llllel!lger.ce, United Statas House of Repte_=_ntativ<:S, 1l5:l>Con~....s5.

4. The IC comprtses n dlfforent o:-gani?ot:ons, or IC e lemo,ts, to include the Offu;e of~ Director of Nation.ii !n-re:ligenre,

the Ce.,!ra I Intelligence /\gency, .r.e Federal Bureau of Jn-.odgation, ttie Office of lnteillgence and Count~nte3fge nce at the Department of EMrgy, !he! Office of National Security Intelligence a t the Di!partrnent of Justke's Drug Enforcerr.eot Adm,r-.istration, the Office of !.T.elfjgenc.e and Analysi5 at the Department of Hcmeland Securtw, the Bureau oi lnt!:111· ger.ce ar.rl Research <1t tl\e Oepamnen, of S~ate, the Olr.ce of IJ'lte!Ugenc.e and Analysis a, the Department ofT~ury, Air force fmefligence, Arm\' lntelrigence, Coast Guard lnt<!lligC?Jltc, Defense Intelligence .~gency, r•Aaritle Corps 1n!efiigence, National Goospatial-!ntelligance Jl.gency, N.itional Reconnai:.sance Office, !{ational Sea..crity Agency, and Navy tmelli­gente. For the pu,pose5 of this review, tho Commlttoe re-.rie,...oed lntenigence products fro.n the Central ln~ence Agen­C'i, Federal Bureau of lnYestiifcjtion, and National security ~ncy berousl? ttlllSe aeencieswere the IC pan:neu for com­munity-v.'id~ assess,net\t of It~" a~tiva l\'l~asur~.

FRCPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 133

{U} Appendix B - Russia lnvestig_ation Parameters

--- -. - ----··- · ---... - -- - - ---- ----

TOPIC

· HPSCI TNQl)lRIES At"'l"D INVESTIGATIONS

SCOPE. OF t't'VESTIGATIO~

BI-PARTTSA."l l:"rQtlRYINTO RUSSIAl"' ACTIVE MEASURES

An examination imo Russia., cyber activity 3.1d mher active measures o1rccred· at 1hc 2016 l J .S. election. ·

PL'RPOSE

Whal probl= are you frytr:g if1 s11lo,e? One ofHPSCI's highest priorities is oversighi oftk Intelligence Community"., aclivilic:; to c.ounter Rus:-i<L"l aggn:s:;ion, including th:: cyucr-a1tacks directed 9.gain,--:t the United Seate;: in the last year. As pl!rt ofttiis ovi:r.,ight respv,;~bility, lht.: Comrailtee isnnd~ga bi-parJsan invcstigi:tion imo these activitie~ di reeled at the 20! 6 election and tt,c imdcr!ykg intclligc:1cc used to draftlhefurelligel'..ce Conwuruty 1~eu~ ~aussiru\ Actr~irn:sand lntcnfoms m

. RQCcnl us Ele-.-t:ans." The investigation will ~p lli Octtenmde;staw.Russi..P.n acti,,e mcasun:S agcirn,i the United States and our allies and infonn efforu co prcv~ simlk cpisod~ in lhe future, bolh bcrc arid abroad.

1J'f10 is >-OW' fntende;J ii~rJienur_ . Tnc inteudcd imciCilcc is tlre Members oi BPSC! and- to the extent jl:mJiUt:c by classification and .~ecurily ruks-thc b.rwocr House ofR~tativcs itml th: An:~ pceople. ·

What (JTe tilt! key qu.1?Stio11s y<1ll l·e:ek to answer?_ • \','hat R.;ssfan cyber activity all:d other active measmes ,\'C!"C di,cctcd i,ga)n:it the·tJniled

Slllles mid lts anic:s? • \'lhai: co.m:e..•inrelligc:1ice conee.-ns eXist related to Russia and.the 20l6 U.S. election);.

including any intelligence regarding lin.1<5 ~ctwccn Russia a."'!!! intff\.'itl!!l!l~ a;;sociated v.1th !)Oliticul =npaign3?

• What was tlk USG respot1~e IO !hes;: Rns:;ian active mea;;ur,;s an:d t>,11a! impact, if any, did the Ri.s.,i:m activity have oo intellig=e relationships li!iO u~ditfom,l ul!iances?

• ·V..ilJat po5:>:.b1e ieaks of classified info!m:iti.o.:i took place rc1Rted lo th: lnlcllig~t1ce Community·s z..,~essmCflt of th= maue.s?

WltaJ is your inrerutd olltcome prot!ud(s)? . The Con1mi1tce i:niends to C<\mplelc a FepOrt al the highest c]asi;i lic:ition net.-e.ssat;' to ans~cr the key qu~-tions ~ where possio!e, rcpo.t(s) at !ewer clas.~iicntlon );;Vcls rel~--ai:ile to the House ofRcprescntati,;cs a:id d1e public, as ;apjl!Oy-i-at::.

i

PROPER1Y OF THE U..S_ HO<JS!:: OF REPRE:S~NTA71VES 134

· Wltat i11te11ded impact will tltere be/or budget, legislatio11, or press? The inquiry and report may uncover vulnerabilities within the Intelligence Community and/or USG agencies or institutions. If so, the Committee may identify avenues of improvement that would be reflected in IAA provisions, stand-alone legislation, IC budget adjustments, and/or further areas to focus HP.SCI's oversight efforts.

The Committee also expects that there will be significant interest from the press, given the delicate poli~ical issues surrounding the topic. Staff will remain bi-partisan and focus solely on the facts u.ncovered in our investigation.

What i11te11ded effect do yo11111a11t those products to have? How does that fit i11to the Committee's overl·lgllt p/a11? The objective is lo better understand Russian active mcusures directed at the 2016 U.S. election, and to better position the re and the broader USO to respond to and defend against the threat.

SCOPE

What are the boundaries of your review? Please co11sider time, s11bsta11ce, 11ge11cy, and ra11ge of activities. . ·

Time: The Committee. will focus primarily on Russian active measures deployed during the 2015-2017 timeframe,·but may pursue activities germane to the investigation that took place outside this window. ·

Substance: • What: The Committee will investigate Russian activities airried at USG agencies, political

parties, NGOs, individuals, and private industry, .as appropriate.

The investigation will also assess whether there is any intelligence that identifies insider threat or CI concerns, including whether Russian activity involved any USPs, including those on or associated with campaigns.

o · The investigati<>n will also consider what USG officials believe to be the impact . to U.S. intelljgence of both Russian active measures related to the election·and the

associated recent disclosures. • How: The Committee will investigate the methods by which Russia -targeted the

aforementioned groups. • Why: The investigation will consider Russian leadership plans and intentions, including

whether and in what ways Russia intended to influence U.S. policy or undermine U.S. political systems and democratic institutions.

• USG response: The Committee will examine how the U.S. government responded to Russian active measures.

It will also·include an assessment of the process used to generate the !C's report and any deviations from standard practices in the !C's report.

2

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 135

and an accounting of whether a person or persons in the IC or the.White House leaked information on the report prior to its dissemination to the Gang of Eight, Congress, or the public.

o The report will also assess whether intelligence relating to U.S. persons was collected and disseminated in accordance with applicable laws and policies.

• Recommendations: Several recommendations are likely to come out of this investigation.

Agencies:

• The Committee expects to be in contact with CIA, NSA, DHS, FBI, DTA, and ODN!. However, The Committee will pursue all avenues of inquiry, which may include agencies not listed here,

• The Committee will also engage current and former JC and USG personnel, private industry, and any other parties with knowledge relevant to the investigati9n.

• The Committee will examine the process by which the Intelligence Community Assessment, "Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections." was created and the intelligence underlying tbe assessment to determine whether the JC comported with all relevant Intelligence (:ommunity Directives and security precautions when researching, writing, analyzing, and releasing their product, and whether the assessments meet a reasonable stand~rd of credibility as determined by the investigatory team. The Committee will focus on evaluating the IC's work on the Asse~sment with regard to IC rules and procedun:s, but not create a new or separate assessment of Russian activities.

Given the above, a11d competing priorities, whe11 do you expect to complete the project? The Committee expects the investigation to take several months, at least, and the drafting of a report and any declassification review to ·takc additional time thereafter. Above all, the investigation will prioritize comprehensiveness over completion by a particular date, while still

· seeking to move as quickly as possible to ensure the report is timely and useful.

What if!a11y political or jurisdictio11al issues exist? The inquiry's subject matter carries political sensitivities. ~everthelcss, staff will proceed in a bi­partisan and objective manner, both in conducting the inquiry and in drafting the report.

• The CommitteJ's investigation will not interfere with any ongoing criminal or counterintelligence investigations. Staff wiil, however, seek relevant law enforcement or coun\erintelligence information consistent with the Committee's oversight jurisdiction and investigative responsibilities. The objective of seeking such information will be to assess whether any collusion occurred between Russians and USPs, and the leaks of classified information.

• The investigation could implicate the work of the agencies within the jurisdiction of Homeland Security, Judiciary, Oversight, and Forcigry Affairs Committees. However, because the investigation will focus on an active measures campaign by a foreign adversary, the investigation clearly lies within the jurisdiction ofHPSCI. Additionally, House Rule IO provides that HP SCI shall study the sources and methods of the IC on an "exclusive basis."

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

3

136

Wllat if /a11}' c.ampa.ro11entJJ.tio11 l.'in4:s aist? Staff ::nd l\·1embcrs conductinft the invo.;6.gflliun \viii nee,j access to G:img of Eigln: mat,;rial. This . :iecessi1atei; a sn\llll, nimble group, w,.<l will rc;;quire special nmmgeu::cnts for proper storage of

· compartmented 1nfonnation al TlPSCl: .

;\U~11IODOLOGY Wi/I it b2 bipartisan? Wlw will be involved? This in,-estlgation is bi-JJaIB-'1!1. Gang, of~r access will be: requirci for~ invcstigzrory team.

• Lead· (),fajority)' (Miuo~) • Counsel: 0,..hljority): ~1inority) • and {Majorily} • {Minorilyj

{Bi--p"-l"iisan Fellow) ·

What iliformatiotz do ]'(JU anticipate will be Jt~ary to ac/Ileve J,YJW p;uposd • Access to and cusroriy of all underlying imelligence used to c=e ti1eintclli~-tn1:e

Conununity Assessment, "Russia(! Acti,rues and ln(cntions in~ US Elections.'' This ii.tcludcs P..porting cturently only ss.--ailabtc fo the Gang of Eight and lhcir Staff Directors. .

• Access to im:I cu:stc,dy of o(hcr relevant -~orting on R.ussfon acti~ mi;a5ure:; 25 ii relates co !he timcfiami;o and tupi e:1 described ia th; Scoi:i-e of Investigation, as r_-=ted.

• In.tcrvie"'-;; i.mh. lJSG and non-USG individmls with lmowkdg1: ofRussi!lll active measures. i!icluding those in the fotellig_enee Commwiity, pm ':lll: i.'l!fustry, NGOs, pofi1ical · .:s, and.for niher groups.

• The Committee may aL~ wish to engage cyb:cr cxpc;ns fulm oi.:r NaGorr.11 L.<lbs, both resident at HPSCI and out:ri.dc the comm.itt~c. ·-• Access to d~ and infonnatiotl reg;'.ltdi.ng law enforcement aid <:0U1itcritttelligence investigmons, COOS!S!cnt with the Committee"s ovcrsightj urisdi_cti.<lll and invcst.igat.h': rcsµousibilli:ies, s fwthcr described ~ho .. c. -

Whal roles wl/1 :'l.femf;ers play? At what poir.1$ will they be brought in !o pruviik fec;.aback or guide tire project? Whar Committee evl!l1ts ma)' be necesstuJ•?

• 'fhe investigation is ofhighc$t interest co HPSCT Membi:,-s. The-7 will ne::d to l~ updated on the sla!u:s of ire invc:~tigu1icn at rcguhr mletVals, likely lhrougb bi-partisan investigabl;:y t= m~us :ind 11..fajorily- ~,d :,..1inorily-spt:ciijc coon~els, as necessary_

• Members mar also re inter~Ced in joinhJ.s interviews if lhc:y are of high intere&. • As nccdod, the Comrnitt_cc will hold hcaing:;, both open aoo closed, on clements llfthc

invc:stigafa,n.

PRCPEITTY Of THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 137

i ·

How will yo11 go.tlur infonttatfoo (what types of 4oo.uht!n1 reqll!!sts do you plan. to suim:it; w!,o do yo:u plan to inJ.en.•few; wha2 do J'OU iniimtI IQ tra~{)? ·

• Thi: Comrulttc,;: lms.a!r~d}' r equested froni tlreODNlaci;:ess to and cusrody of all i,:tel [isence reporting included in the i.ntdlig=.--c Comml.Ulity ;1ss.:ssm;:nt, "Rt1~1111

Acti \·ittes and hllentions in Recent US Elcc!i<ms. '' • ·The Co,:rucitc~ vrill submit forthcr rcquc.st5 fo:r documents. am:! for in1cPticws. as the

inquiry proc=k • The Committee wi!l in tee.view CUITCI+t and former USG j)e:-:,0ru,~J, indUS'lsy pi:~mmel,

those wlio work or worked in NGOs n.mlinr pDlitic~I p..-.tie5, wit! milers as the Committee <lo.:ms app_..-opriate. ·

• The Cornmirtec will al...o00 seek ex.i..'<ling lC in.fomJ.atlon on Russian actr,;ity agam..""t U.S. ~llit:s during their clecoons.

llow will yau fde, organiu, mrct retain all of lhe infonI1f11it)11 ~eci.-ed? Hm:e you /(,ctottti in su.fficiurt time for dttl<usfjlt'<ltion rt!,'l'e-,9, if r..itcessa.-yl flow will !flat ocaul

• The CommiltQc: will o~ to 11oo:lllllll0datc document l'C\'i.ew and storage lit HPSC!-. particularly as it relu!.es to (;(Jrn~meriti:d infomiatiori. Tot Commiue:: will also ~ to

fuctor in th:c time it may take ~g,:n~ to rt:spond to d<JCUl'l".cnt access requests, da:lassiflc~ion reviews, au.d/or ma.lcin~ av.tilcl-ile individutls for interY~Ws wiih me investigatory team or l!PSC[ Mei:11),o..rs. .

• The CommiU=e sl.lffha~~ alrt w.ly s,;t-r .. i, <.UgiW fo[decs on the: fiPSC! clo.~ified system . t<> bold all ~evant non-(r.iog ofEight planninsand scoping documcrms, wlth the propt:r p,.."DJl.issious ba:ied on re!pOnsihilitie,; and hfajority!'.Ylinori.Iy st~rus.

Tl:MELINE

Prol•ide specific intended deadlines for e!lt:ft phase of yow revi;w (drita gmlur/11g, amil,sis.. writifzg. Ct1m·di.Jiation/editb1g,publis/Jing.-) Tr.e Committee will pim;\fe ii ~ed. bialdiog-biocks c1:pproncl1 II) the inves!igmion, \.,.hlle prio.itizing compreh1!nsiveness zbove completion by a fixed end <l.:!.te.. The stri.cluring of the im,csngation imo PiY.!..-;es, end the cnnseqw..n!. p;ioritizntion of sp,:qfically identified in~gativc acti viti~ or research, will nor re coc1strued to iimit s1aff s ability <O gather or analyze n:krnmt lnformation.

The Co:runittc:e ::;qr~ ca,;h prn;sc will take weeks t" monlht- 1o complet.c. • Ph.!s,; l 1,111 focus on initial, g1:11crnl knowledge a1:quis:lhm ~boul lhe Russ[a c!Cti\"E

measures ~pai!!;l'I, tlJ.c·u.s. ~e, e-01:ntmntelligeneeconcerns, 2nd tlie othar key ~t!estions id~tified .:.bo\--e.

o Phas; l will im:l~e rcadin,g ur.tl analy7ing intd ligai~ ~~ relevrint to the R.u..~a cyb<::r ~t, inclurJingcll underlying intetligenee usecf:o product th~ Intelligence Communhy Asse;s:inent, ~Russian Activities and ktcntions in Ro:.:ent US Elections:=

o Phase ! also \\ill iuclude meetings with USG a1id h:.-dustry pcr:-oo.ncl g~nerally knowledgeable abm.r.: the lhrcar; m~io.gs 'hitb USG perso,,n~ koowled~~ ~boUl th¢ IC"s.malytic proc,:..<s;,and mcctings with furm~-r USG ~trtS

FROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE.ORES!:l'-JTA n v ES

5

138

1

lrnowlc:dBc;1blc; about tJSG posture against the Rus~in 1.3.IBct, to include countorintclligcnce..

o Ph«~c 1 also will include witness testimony, following investigative leads, and docwnem pro~uction relative co the IC As.~essrnent, counteri1ltelli3ence concerns, the USG responst:, nnd lellk nllr;g.~(ltw;.

o Throughout rh~ l , the Commi ttet will pun;ue tlocumi:nt ACc1uisition and schedule ioterYiews neces..~Qt)' to conduct l'h,ise 2.

,, Phase 2 wjll build on tlie baseline knowledge acquired ill Pha.;e 1 through a focused and spcci.fic'invcstigation. ·

o Phase 2 will include a detailed analysis of the intelligence producti~n process and oonclu~ions in the .Intelligence Community Asscssme..llt, "Russian Acti,,.[ties and Intentions in Recent US ElectioilS" to assess whcilier the IC componcd wifo all re.Jevnnt Intcl!igenc:c Community Dh~ctives and sccur:ity pri:cuutions wh~n ~~rching., w,iting, iurnl:1?:ing, 11ml rclca~i:n~ 1hcir n~~m1.mt.

·o Phase 2 will include inten•icws wi!h ~pecil.ic; USG uml industry personnel knowledgeclile obout rhc specilic !opics discusml in Uie !C's ~port ;mJ tl1e ·process u~d 10 ~rn\pile, ~ view, 110\l 1lissr:minlltc \he IC 's reporl.

o Phnw 2 may inclu1lc dclllilctl inlcr..·icws nm1 unuly~is regarding the Russhm nctivc owm,urc:s cumpaign i the U.S. rcspon.sc; countorintclllicncc con\lcm:;; lhe impuct or H,,~~i ~n acth10 m~,i, urc~ on U.$, ;,Illes; mid whether 1ho IC or the \~~1itc Hou~c lont<ed lnfonnullon oo rhc report prlor 10 i~ 11i~~cmln11tion 10· ll1e Gnng or night, C.:ongrcss, or t11~ public. ·

• Phui;e 3 wlll loco:i oa wr1tinu. ooordlnnt Ing, cdi11n{l, u:onsmltlinfl fol' doclossilication review (if nc~ssary), imd rclonslug tho Commlltr.c's reports ot appropriutc clnSlli!lcaiicm lcvc;!:;.

• TI1ru111>hout nil three phases; the Committee. will engage Members for ru1y fc\'.:db~s:k imd incolJlorn\~ thnt f~back lnlo our proccsii'. ·

Pursuant to Rule 9 of the Com:mittee' s Ruh:s of Pro~un:., I 15th c:ong~s. we hereby jointly agree to the scope of investigation descnoed above.

- t;i?J!6_ <lnm Schiff

Date: Fcbruruy 2?, 2017

6

PROPERTY OF 1HE U.S. HOUSE OF REP RESENTATJV!':S 139

(U) Appendix C- Russia's Media Propaganda Apparatus

{U} Rossiya Segodn ya

{U} Created by Putin in 2013, Rossiya

Segodnya is Russia' s overarching state me­

dia company. Rossiya Sogodnya acts as an

umbrella fur outlets like RT and Sputnik.

· ''Rossiya Segodnya" is translated as "Russia_

Today,~ but it is different from the television

channel with the same name. According to Russian press reporting, in September 2014,

Moscow tripled Rossiya Segodoya's budget

to 6.4S billion rubles and increased RT's

2015 budget by 41 percent to 15.38 billion

rubles, which is equivalent to roughly $600

million.

(U) Russia Today (RT}

{U) This 24-hour worldwide television

(iV) and online network was created in

2005 to promote Russia's image abroad and

to show foreigners world events from a Rus­

sian perspective. Nominally independent

. but Kremlin-controlled and funded, Russia

..... To deemphasize its Russian origin,

Russia Today was rebranded RT in 200S: .

{Uj RT employs 2,000 staff to ~rovide

coverage in Russian, English, Arabic, French,

· German, and Spanish in 100 countries and

on the Internet from its studios in Moscow

and \Vashington DC. Rrs central slogan,

"Question More," is indicative of its over­

arching goal to urge viewers to do·ubt every-

I

thing they see in Western media and from

its leaders.

(U) Sputnik

(U) A l:\ussian state-owned network o f

media platforms producing radio, social me­

dia, and news content, Sputnik was created

[n 2014 to act as Russia's multimedia hub.

Sputnik is based in 28 countries and oper­

ates in 3 3 differen~ languages, broadcasting

pro-Russian messaging and disinformation .

A recent GAO study found that Sputnik·pro­

motes anti-West narr~tives and undermines

(U) Russia Beyond the Headlines

(U} Less ideologically hosti le than RT

and Sputnik, Russia Beyond the Headlines

(RBTH) pays for printed inserts in many

leading European newspapers and targets

Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece,

[taly, Macedonia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain,

and the UK. Comparatively less anti­

American in tone, RBTH provides another

avenue for Russian propaganda to reach

wide audiences in these European coun-

1.

2. GAO, Russia: U.S. Government Takes a Country-Specific Approach to Addressing Disinformati'on Overseas; May 2017. 3. 4.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

(U) Appendix E - HPSCI Majority Memo about FISA Abuses

To:

From:

Subject:

1:XCLASSH11ED

Junuart; rs, io 18

Hl'SCl M.1jority Members

f-'reign m1.dlir;:m .. ~ Survci\lw= Act Abl!!;eS 01 the nej)1Utm=11r &f:Jus1ice and 1he Fcd,ml1 Bur~u oflllwstig:uion

Thil. mi::rrll.)t~t!<:lnm pr0vi~~ ::'i.iember. llil update ao ~ignifi~ fact!'. r.:laring to t~

~mmittee's 1rngoin~ i;wc,"'ti~atiCM1 i11ro rr.e De;,2t1mem .s·.iuruce (OOJ} and F~ral Bu~ of ln•.vslig:u-fon ('iBl) 3!ld thi3ir use oflh,: i:'01ei~ .!ntt'llli~ Sut,·cill~ A~ (.f!SA) durio~th::: "2016 pr~dc:itbl <Jlection cyck Our findings. which ~<l.;t~]cd !,;low, I) rn.is:;c.:,nuems 1;1:1!.h lhc kgitin~scy and leg:ility of ~anru:i OOJ and FBT intcrwio;;s wi!h the for.:isn !ntellig~~ S!!r1eill.mcc c~urt (FffiC), :i:ncl 2) r.:pu:~i!lli 11 ~ling bn:cl.do1,0n one~ p~s est~bii:sll.«I

to prote~'1 Qie Amcn~.!ll p,:,Jple lhnu abuse; tclato:il to cm F!SA pro=.

ln"estlgqtio11 l '~fate

On 0...-i:ob.rr 21, 2016, DO.I=.! l;BI ..ougl-tt ant! received .i r'!SA prol>tb-lc c-au~c ord.:r (!:!fi uud~r Tille VII) oi.."tilori1_iilg : fectrorlic sur\-c:1llnn~ ,'!l ~~ P~g.; fa:,m tb.~ P1SC. t>ag;;, is ~

U.S. citizeil vmo serve..! flS a vo!t~r adv~no th~ Tromp p1esid~ial ~ip:ugn. C.On.-ir.'--ot witll_r.:quircm~c..~ und~FISA, tl1~applic:uio11 l-~~ t., he fi_r,;tcc:tjfi=d oy the Director or Drput1 Di!tctor orth.: FBT. It lh~"'ll !\.'l{uir.;,d ihc appro•~ ol'th:: Attorm:y G::neml, D~p~• Attom:y ~eml (??AG}, 01· the S=nn!s!-ccmfrrmcd -~~t Att~~~ (i~:ieral for the ~a:tioro\ Sec;n:ity Di\'i.sio11.

'!be E'Br rid OOJ o'ht.rirn:d on.c :niti!il FJSA wammt .argeting c.:rt.:r l'as<! imd mree r!S~\ r~wals fam ih<! FISC. As ret{Uired by~Wtu!c(50 li.S.C. §180:i{di{l)), n FISAord;;r on .m -~meric:m citiz.::n must be =~wed :i.y 1he rll>C every 9(1 day;; ,incl ;..-:!!cl) r .:T>Ct\•111 £>aqw.res a 1"~t)'.1I"<1te finding or prubab!..: cause. Th~n-Dir.::.:ior Jamc:s Corney sig..ed tbrc:e FISA app!icatiom u.1 qnestion :.'.!11. b.!lwf oft11'! FBl, and Deputy Dir¢C1or .-\!u:hew Mewl>:: signed Oll<}. Tncn-DAG Silly Y~. th~-Acting DAG !>meBoe:ne, ana DAG Rod Rommcin c~h !-igw.d orw or rr<Q,-:o

FISA npplicdiun~ on ru:lulfofOOJ.

nu~ tot~ sensitive nature of fu:ciei., imcl.Li5cncc n~·. FJSA S?1b1nis.~ions (including .rcnev. :ils) bcfon:: the FiSC arc dassifi-::d. A.-, such, !11:> public•; a.:cnfid~uce in !he wt~ grity ofth~

fiSa\ proc~ <.!~pends on me court's llbtlityto hold the ~ovi:rn.·nan IQ the hlghes!,;,mndl'Jd­p.'.ll!icu[ruiy ~ ii rc)nt::s to "tl:('vciil=.cc of Amcri~.!n ci~ How.: .. -cr. the FI'SC's 1isor hi prot.:~1i:l~ 1he righls of Amcric:cns, wbich i~ remfurc::d b:.g.Q.J::y reG:::WillS of =cillar= ilrd!:n;, is n=sarily d~dent on the sov=t' ~ production to tfle court of al! m:\t,ri.:tl :iad ~-v.:u1l fa •• ~. 11rls shocld inoh1de in.formation potentially fuvornbl~ ,o th,e !Mgd. of the FJSA

t;XCLASfiTFlED

PROPERTY OF THE lJ.S. !-=.OUSE: OF RcFRESEl';fATIVES 142

UNCLASSIFIED

application that is known by the goven.uuent. In the case of Carter Page, the government had at

least four independent opportunities before the FISC to accurately provide an accounting of the relevant facts. However, our findings indicate that, as described below, material and rel evant infonnation was omitted.

1) l11e .. dossier" compiled by Christopher Steele (Steele dossier) on behalf of the

Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Hillary Clinton campaign fom1ed an

essential part of the Carter Page FISA application. Steele was u longtime FBI source wh9

was paid over SI60,000 by the DNC and C linton campaign, via the law finn Perkins Coie and research firm Fusion GPS, to obtain derogatory infonuation on Donald Tnimp's ti es to Russia.

a) Neitl1cr the initial application in October 20 t6, nor any of the renewals, disclose or

reference the role of the DNC, Clinton campaign, or any party/campaign in funding

Steele's effo11S, even though the political origins of the Steele dossier were then · known to senior DOJ and FBI officials.

b) l11e initial FISA application notes Steele was worlcing for a muned U.S. person, but

docs not name Fusion GPS and principal Glenn Simpson, who was paid'by a U.S. law

finn (Perkins Coie) representing the DNC (even though it was known b y DOJ at the

time t hat political actors were involved with the St.::ele dossier). ·me application does

not meution Steo:le was u!timati:ly working on behalf of-and paid by-the DNC mid

Clinton campaign, or that the FBI had separately B\lthorized payment to Steele for the same inJ:onnation.

2) The Carter Page FISA application also cited c>."tensively n September 23, 20 l6, Yahoo News article by Michael Isikofl: which focuses 0 11 Page's July 2016 trip to Moscow.

·111is article docs not corroborate the Steele dossier because it is derived from infonnation

leaked ~v Steele himself to Yahoo News. 111e Page PISA application incorrectly usscsses

that Steele did not directly provide information to Yahoo News. Steele has admitted in

British court filings that he met with Yahoo News- and se\leral other outlets- in

September 2016 at the direction of Fusion GPS. Perkins Coie was aware of Steele's

initial media contacts because they hosted at least one meeting in Washington D.C. in 2016 with Skele and Fusion GPS where this matter was discussed.

a) Steele was suspended and then tem1inated as an FBI source for what the FBI defines

as Ilic most serious of violations-an unauthorized disclosure to the media of his

relationship with the FB[ in an October 30, 2016,Mmher Jones article by David

Corn. Steele should have been terminated for his previous undisclosed contacts with Yahoo and otlJ.eroutlets in September- before !lie Page application was submitted to

UNCLASSIFillD

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 143

UNCLASSIFIED

the FISC in October- but Steele improperly concealed from and lied to the FBI about

those contacts.

b) Steele's numerous encounters with the media violated the cardinal rnle of source handling-maintainingconiidentiality- and demonstrated that Steele had become a

less than reliable source for the FBI.

3) Before and after Steele was terminated as a source, he maintained contact with DOJ via

then-Associate Deputy Attorney General l:lmce Ohr, a senior DOJ ollicial who w~rked

c losely with Deputy Attorneys Gen eral Yates and later Rosenstein. Shortly after the

election, the FBJ began interviewing Ohr, documenting his communications with Steele. For example, in September 2016, Steele admitted to Ohr his feelings against then­

candidate Tntmp when Steele said he "was desperate tlmt Donald Trump not get

elected and was passionate about him not being president." TI1is clear evidence of Steele's bias was recorded by Ohr at the lime and subsequently in official FBI files-but

not reflected in any of the Page FISA applications.

a) During this same time period, Ohr's wife was employed by Fusion GPS to assist in the cultivation of opposition research on Tmmp. Ohr later provided th e FBl with all

of his wifo's opposition reseal'ch, paid for by the DNC and Clinton campaign via

Fusion GPS. The Ohrs' relationship with Steele and Fusion GPS was inexplicably

concealed from the rise.

4) According to the head of the FBl's counterintelligence division, Assistant Director Bill

Priestap, corroboration of the Steele dossier wns in its "infancy" at the time ofthe initial

Page F[SA application. After Steele was tem1inatcd, a source validation roport conducted

by an independent u nit within f:BI assessed Steele's reporting as only minimally

corroborated. Yet, in early January 2017, Director Corney briefod President-elect Trnmp

on a summary of the Steele dossier, even though it was- accordiug to his Ju11e 2017

testimony-"salacious and unv,:ri!ied." While the FISA application relied on St.:ele's

past record of credible reporting on other unrelated matters, it ignored or concealed his

anti-Tmmp fmancin! and ideological motiva\ions.· Furthennore, Deputy Director McCabe testified before the Committee in December 2017 that no surveillance warrnnt

would have been sought from the FISC without the S1c:ele dossier information.

UNCLASSIFIED

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 144

UNCLASSIFIED

5) TI1e Page FISA application also mentions i.nfonnation regarding fellow Tmmp campaign advisor George Papadopoulos, but there is no evidence ol' any cooperation or conspiracy b.itwecn Page and Papadopoulos. ]11e Papadopoulos infom1ation triggcrcd the opening

ofan FBI counterintelligence investigation in late July 2016 by rm agent Pete Strzok. Slrwk was reassigned by tbc Special Counsel's Office to fBI Hurnnn Resources for

improper tell.1 mess.ages with his mistress, FBI Attomey Lisa Page (110 !mown relntion to Carter Page), ,vherc they bolh demonstrated a clear bias against Trump and in favor of

Clinton, whom Strzok had also investigated. TI1c Strzok/Lisa Page texts also reflect

e:1.1e11sive discussions about the investigation, orchestrating leaks to the media, and

include a meeting with Deputy Director McCabe to discuss an "insurance'' policy agaiiist Presidf!nt Trump's election.

UNCLASSII<IED

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 145

{U) Appendix F --HPSCI Minority Memo about FISA Abuses

TO! AH Mcmbc:Ts of\hc Hollo~ qf R~prucntotivcs FROM: HPSCl Mi110rity DATE: J11nuary29.2018 RE: Corcectiiig tuQ RctOTd :-T.hl! [tlisji:t Jn,'c-stigation"

Tile HPSCI Majori(y's m:>ve to rclc= tot~ House cf Rcp~..itivcs its llllcs:3tioo.:s agair.st lhc Federal Burent1 ofinv1mis;itio~ (Fnl) end the Di:~rmmt of Ju.siicc (DOJ) is a rrans~cnt effort to und.?rmin~ those agcncks, the Special Cou,1!CI, a.'lrl. Congress' in\-cstig.itions. II 11lso risk! publ:c C.'<pOSUTC of scnsiti\·c sou= am:'I methods (OT no tcgitim!!c p1U'\JO&

FBI and DOJ officials did w "nbuse" 1h:: Forcign ln1cllf~c:t1er.: Sun•ci llancc Ac1 {FISA) ~ess. omit moterlnl infoIJTl.'ltion. or sub\lcrt this vital tool to spy on the Trump camp;i;ign.

ln foct, DOJ and the FBI would hawi teen nmiss in thecr ciucy to p:ote-.."'1 the C'O'JnUy !rad mC}' not soug,u ct FISA wzrrnnt and ~cd n:n.cmi!>. to wr.du.ct lcmporccy sur,..cilhl=: of uutcr ~ .. ~c. someone tlte f.BI asse.'i$1:d to be an 11gcru oflhc RUSS'".an go\'rmumnL DOJ met the .!imrs lransi,arenc.:, ~ud C\i£i.!J~i bmis ·11~ to nteet FlSA ;s prooob!e i:.iuse rTaquiremen(. by

dem:::.i.slntt!ng: o contampor:uteolli evirlenc~ of ~!.Si.o's ek-..tion interf=~; o concerning Ru~an link:, nnd o~ac-h Ir> Trwnp co.m~in c>niciJi.ls; o Paie's history wilhRussian int.cllf-sencc; nnrl o P.age's su::plcious nctMtlcs io 2016, including in Mi&Ow.

·rt:i.e Committee's Minority 1!53 thcrefore Jm!parcd !his memorandum to corrc:1 the record:

• Cb'r.tslophcr Steele•, raw iotclligm~ rcpo rli.Dg did not lnforn1 the rn.rs decision ,a initle1c !a counf~rinlcUigcnce im·estig•tion in lste July 1016. In fuct. ~ rBl'si:loscly­!leld inV1:S1ipth~ team only received Steele' s ·rqioning in mid-Scp1tml;,,;r- more lnmt S-e\'tn weeks le1er. TI:e FBI - 8ml, subscqmntly, the SpccfaJ Coun~I 's - i nvesti~tion in!o links between I.he R~inn GOVC!iJ,"r11:nl ll.n.d Trump cMOp..1ign '1Ssoi:btcs bas be.en based l>ll

troublins law enfortr:mrnt and intcllig_cm:c inform:?tlon t1nn:1'ltcd lo the ... dossier."'

• DOJ's Octo~rll, 2016 FISA 01>plii:.,Hloa..11.11d tflr~c suln-cqu_ent renm-nls cru-~fully outlinetl f()r the Cnurt ~ multi-pronged mtlonnlc !o:- sitl"\·eilling Page, who, at me tirne of d~c fir.it npplicatiot1, v.ns oo longer ~ith the Trump CArn))llig~ DOI detrukd Pege's past rebt!onslilps \\ith Russi!ln S!Res nnd imcrnctfo:, with Russinn officie.ls during the 2016 campaign • DOJ cited multiple soonxs to support lhc; c~c for s!!::vcil!ing Pnge-buI ~de only narrow ll!lo ofinfonnatlon fr~m Srccle's source:;i !!bout Psge's specific acfo'i1il:s in 20 l 6, chiefly his s~<red July 2.016 meeti.r..gs in M~oow \\i th R~iu., officiirls. la f&el. tbc FBl i.nlen•kwcd P(l:ge io Murch 2016 nbout hi; conta.:r.,ith Russian iatclligeocc. lh-: \'cry m;:>nlh ~ndidale Don'1d Trump n~ bim a fordgn policy &.,·iso,.

As OOJ informed tlic Com in suhseqneru rene,~-a!s, Ste.cl~·., reporting 11b~I11 Page's MC5cow nte~tia~ • DQj's

appliea1ions did not o!h=n..ce rely on Steele's rcpotlin2. incl"Jding any "si!oi:iou:s" nlle~:itio11!; l

' 1/ P"OP::RlY OF THE U.S . HOUSE OF RFPRESENiATll/ES

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1

redactions taken

146

nbout Trump, 11mJ 1h1: F8l n1:var pttld Stcuh: fo1this reporting. Whllc: t;(pln[ninB why Iha FBI vlcwed $tC(tk's roporting ond ~ources ~ relir1hh: ant\ m·dibh:, DOJ ruso dl~loscd:

o St~le'$ J1rior rclntionsltip with lhci Fl31: o tho foot of ond rcfuion for his termlnotlon ns n :s.ou~; nnd o 1h1a1 uss~sstd polilh:al motiva\ion of thos~ who hln:tl him,

• TIJ.t Co111mlll1:c MnjoriJy'~ xur:.111onind1.11111 which druw, .,c1~1lvrtr on highly llrn~ltlw ('l11JsffietJ 1nrorm11tJon, tr1clude~ orhcr Lllslorrlons on<l mlsrcprc.scbllltlons lho111re contradicted by. lfle underlyins ~!a:ssi!ied clouumenlS, which the vast rruijority ofM~mbers of the Commltte~ and the House hnvc not h1l.~ the; oppol1uni1.:, to l""vicW-· and whi;h Choirmun Nunes chose not lo read hini;c:Jf, 1

Background

Ou Jwumrr J 8, 20\8, the Committee Mojority, during nn unrelated busincs~ meeting, forced c. surpriat: vote 10 ~h:111111 to the (ull Hause lil profpundl)" mis!C11ding,memonmdum alleging s~rious ob1iscs by lhe FBI and DOJ. Mnjority slafl'drulkd !ho docwtli:nl iri secrcl rm bdialforCh.iirmM Devin NUC\es (w,d rcpo11tdl)> v.ilh gu!tfon~e und inpul from R~p. Trey Oowdy), 11od lheo ru.:slw.J 1111any-ti.ru: volo \~hhout pripr noti~c.

Thi.s was by dc-!ign, The oYcrwhelntlng nmJorI1y or Commillco Mornbtrs oovcr rccckro DOJ nuU1orlin1lon 10 ncc~ss the: uoderlyhli ~liu,lfied lnform111\01'1, Md th~~rorc could 110-t judgo lh~ vomc'tty of Chrurm1m Nuoc~' clni~. Due to son~Wve souroC:1 nod 111ctbod.~, DOJ providt;d m:cess only 10 Ul1l Commilll!ll1$ Chnir nod Ttmud11s Mcmb\lr (orrespeciive d~~is.um}1 l:\nd limitcc! :;to.ff, to fllcllltntc thu Com111lh~':1 itwc~li!!otion Into Rus,ln's coven cumpnisn lo lnnucnce the '201 G U.S. cleciions? M DOJ ILi!, cauf1m1~ publicly, it did nol t1ulhorize tho bron~~r relt.Uc ofrh).$ informuUon within Congress or to lhtl' public, nnd ChlllJJDll[I Nwic., r~u.s«i to nUow OOJ mid lhc FBI lo review his tlocumen1 lllllil lie p<:rmiw:d lhe F61 Director 10 sec it for \he first time lo HJlSCl's secure spnccs late on S11ndny, Janu11ry 28 - 10 dayi; nncr diS(:losurc 10 \he J:lou~.'

ln its Oclober 20 J 6 FISA opplicBHon aod sub~µenl ri!IlewaT!!, DOJ ll(curntely fnfo.nncd the Court t)lat 1h.e FB[ initiated its collntcrin1elligc_n~c investiga1ion on Juiy 31, ~0·10, nfl~r r~~ving information---.. OcoJllc P1ipadopolllos re~ealetl __ _ -thpl~ll. who,t~oklntcrest ioP11pad~ulo~mp =Jia.ign foreign- polic 1uMser, infilJ"lll~ him in lute April 20l61.ha1 Russitt

. Papadopoulos's disclosure, mo:n:over, ~cllm:d 11s11irin Jhc: b11~kdrop o( ijiw;iit's os.grei:th·C) c:9vcrt 1:1nnpalgn fo I nffucn tt• our c:Jc:dions, which th~ FDJ WM 11tre11dy monitoring.. \Vo W(l\l]d J:11cr lcwa in Pnpadop,.11ilos'1, pliai th~tlh~l t~I) infonnat!ort th-c Rtt<tSlnos co!,1111 n~ist b)'llflC1J1yntously relea.~ing were 1hou.!m11ds 9fHlllory Clint<m1

~ cmo.ils.3

DOJ 1otd the Court the lruth.11.s rC'J>resm1aH011 WtJS consisleol wilh the fBl's undcrl,Ying , inve.stlgutivc rccor~, wlJich curm1111ml fonncr:rcnior officiuls I Mei· corruoonw~i.J In extensive

2

I' PROPERTY OF THE U.S. 1-JOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

147

Committee testimony. Christopher S!eete's Rp,;rting, wlrlgi he beg;m to sh~ ,\ilh ru:i Alf Ggtnt

thro!J&b the end of October 1016, planed no rnlc in launching tho FBl's c:ounterint.elligence investigation into RtiSSian in!erferencc ~rid lin;:s to thr! Trump campaign. ln f5ct, Steele's rcponing did no1 rcru:h the counieri~tellig~nc:c; tcam_invc:stiS'ling R=ia_ at FBi headqu:mers until mid-Septcmbcr2016, more tbll!l seven Weeks: nfter the fBI Q?ened its um:sti'gatfaa, ~!lu~ 1.he prore's existence ,,m; so cl0£e!y held wilhin \he FBf.6 By tr~n. the FBl had ~dy opened rub-inquiries into U)divldll,11$ linked to th, TrumP can;pnign

As Committee tcslimo:iy bea.ra <>ill, tM FBI WQuld h.wc conlinucd iu investignticn, incluiµng ::gain intlividu:ils, c:i;e..,. ifit h;ui :,e\-er received in(ormation from Stcefa, ncve: :ipplied for a FISA warmn[ lJe!!ll!! Pu..~. or if the FISC hnd rej:ctcd tho a~l~tion.'

DOJ's FJSA Aru,ILC!ltion !lnd.R£newal5

The initial w-arrnnl ~pplica1ion :md sul>seq11cnt rC'llCWills ctt<:lved indcpemle.n1 sautiny m:d llJ)prova! by fullt' different federal judges, three of whom were appoin_1cd by l?=it!enl G~rp:; W. 8~h ilnd oi::e liy Pr~i<l1:nl Roiald Rengsi. DOJ ftrst ~plied to the FISC on October 21, 2016 for a warnmt to pcnrrit ibe FBI to inittale clmn:mic su.rvcillancc imd physkel ~arch of Page for 90 dayS: con..~s1ent with RSA reqcit~ena The Couit 31>-p..-o,id tr.tee renewids- in cariy January 2017, early April 2017. a.-id Jot~ Juae 2!H7 -'-'ill'cl1 authcnizi:d the FBI to mafoiain ~ ,\'eiUane¢ on Page until !Ille: Scptem~r101?. Seni<1rD0J m,d FBl offid.als spp<1int~ by lte Obama end Tr.llTI p A~nisunlions, including accing Atton-.~y Gero...rol Dan.. B-0ente and Deputy Attorney General Rod Rd5enstcin, certified th:: applic:ntions with the Court,

FlSA wns not used le spy on Trump or ho carn1111ign. Af the Trump c.-.mpai~ and Pa~ ®''C 1aclmowtcdg.cd, Pn£e: :ndcd his £omni 11ffilk!ti~:; wilb lh:=paign months~ OOJ spplied for a \v:rmint. DOJ, moreo\-cr, ,;ubmitted the initial applica~o l~than lh.ree .... ui:s be(ore !bi:

. clcctlon. e,·crr ilioug!t the FBJ's im·estlg.ntioo had bcc:n ongoing sin:a lbc c:nd of July 2016.

DOJ's v~t requ::s1 wos based on cornpellin5 e\idcm:eand prob.:bl<: caus~ to bcUc\·c Page was knowingly i=isting ciandcstinc Russi/In i.nlcUiicr.cc o~livitles in l.l:e U.S.;

• Page's Connections ro Russi::in Go\·~rnm~nt 11.ml tnlcllig.cncc Officla~ TI,e FBI h:!d on indep;.'lrlent basis for investieotjng Pose's mo1ivnfio11s and actions durin2 the cnmpajm lrnnsition. and followinl! the irul'Jgµration. As DOJ d=ribcd in detail to r!::c Court, ~l!l? had nn c.xtl!DSi\·e recmd es -

•>i prior te> jornin~ th~ Tnunp crunpsis,,. He ~d~ in Mcw...ow from '2004-2007 and pursued husin.:5.'i dcaJs with Ruma's sUtC-il\"llcd tnel'g.y comp.my O~.oro-

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Page rcmsiotd on (h~ rndllr oJ Ruisi11n in lelligen~c nnd the F8l. ln 20)3, prosecutor.. indicted thr~ omu 1qissian spies, two of whom 1;lfgetetl llESg-e for re....uitmenL The FBI also intc.viewcd Pagi:; mcl.tiple times ai>D11t hi! Rw.siun. intelllgr:ncc con~. ir.tluding in Marth 2016.u The FBI's can~ about and kno\dedgi;:- of Pag,e's cc:1iYi1~ tlrerc:forc long predate the FBI's 1ccei5=t ofS!~tl:'s 1nrorm!l.llon.

• Page's StJSpiciom Ac.ri-Yity Do.ring the 2016 C:impnign: The FJSA .app!;c;,lions also detail Pl!gc·s 5USpic:om nctivity nl'\l?r joining the Trump ccmpaign io March 2016. I

Pose oaw:Ied ra Y...o:scow u; July 20!6; during wliich he gev~ e uniYCJStt"J comm~e<meal e:!;;h,:ss -an honor 1.L9'eJJy RServeiJ for ·wcll­kno..n luminaries.

o 3t 4 ln [b~ $'.ll~ifi~ ,ult-s~lillll C)f 1be application$ rh11 I OOJ 1'1!fe~ to ~tceJc's nporting on P.1:,:; 4nd hb alk,g~d coonlin11tilln wltl1 'Runirul aI&fab. Ste~Je's infonnetionnlxnn Page \YnS consisteru. ,.;lb~ fB1's ~ent ofRussl!ln intelligem:: effora to ffl:ruit him nnd 1'.i.s-connections to Russmn _r.r-...0113 oflntere~.

o ln p:uticuia;, Stec!e·s soum3 rqioited UIB\ Page met s~aratcly wt:Ue ia Russia wilh Igor. ~run, a clDseess1fola1C t'lfVlsaimir Put.in end ei<ecuti'!c c~i:ma:n of Rosneft, RlWicl.'s .51:l1c;-omrcd oil comp;mj•, mid igor Di\'}"<;kJn, .a s.eitlor Kmnlin official. Scdun al legC'dly disi:us5ed die prospect of futu.-e U.S.-Russfo. i:OCfEY ~-peraticm and "an ossocinted mm-e tD l.ifl Uknii:at·rclat~d v.es.tem ~ctions ascinst Rus!i.l." Divyckln al legcdly <fuclo.."61 ro Pa.gc llml ihe Kremlin J_)l)S?..ssed comproIPJ~mg info~iion o:i Clintan ("kamproma1") 8Ild not~d ><the possibilily of its bdng rcle=i;i to Candidate # \ '$ campaign."12 [No1e ! "Cnndkla.<e #l" rerers to candid:1.tc Trump.] This c!O:Scl v

1rack3 what o!hs RnssillJl conhlci, ~-e infomiin& anotb~ To.mp !~tgo policy advisor, Geer};:. ~daponlo;;,

• Tn subsequenl FJSA renewals, DOJ JH"Ovld.cd llddilion;d inform"lion obtiunrd thro!lgb multiple: ~udcpcndcnt sourc~ lhnt c11rrabor:1r~d Stc~Jt', rrpor tlng..

0

This information ccntrod.~ :Pa_ge's No\·mb:r 2, 2017 tcsJimonyto the Conirnittee, ln which he i.niliu.lly cic:nfod.any ~ incetings~d tb:;i \~ forced to ·Ddmi1 spea'<fag w~lh

4

IU ~I:. 149

DvorF.ovich !lilt! fl'll!'<:tln& wilh Rosncfi's S~hln..-ttcd im-cslor rcl;.tfu.'JS'. cchi;f, Andrey Bmanov. ·

• Th~ Court-:ippro-.,ed sun·cillancc: orl':.J!e illlowed Fm: to rollc-ct \'lllm1b!c in li:lligcn~ The F1SA 1\."'tlewals cfcrr..onstrorc WI lhD f'BJ .:olk><:lcd hnpcu1o.nf iri~·~igat:\>t= in{armotfon and !tads by cc·nducring Court-nppro\'ed sun-ei!lancc. FOf insta.ricc.

Pllge's c.ffoits to sworn testimony to our Comn,jtl.ec.

DO.l't Tr.a.nspnr~ncY about Chri.~1onhC!r Stvtlli!

FAr (rom .. omitti.Dg" m~tc~nl fucu nhcut St~Ye. ,u thi:: Majority da.lm,,~ DO.I rcptatcdly lnformccl the Court 11boutSt~c?c'll bnt1,gro1md, ~rcdlbllity, 11nd porenti:il bills. DOJ explained in dellli._l Stecl~s p,-for ri;lntionsl1ip ~ithu.1d compcllSlltion from lru: FEH; hrs credibility, reporting hi:slory, illld source m:lwnrk; tl'l!! fact of and n:-~ fil'r his h:rminlllcon as fl

sourc¢ in late October20I6; ruid the likely pmi~ motivn1ion."I of lt.ose who i>Jred Slee le.

• DOJ w~t tmrupnrcnrwlth Coutt2hootSt~lc's.$0Urdng: Tl'le Committe~Mnjori:y, which hcd ea.ii.ie-r att1.tScd ObllJlU\ A<imia.istmion officials of improp:r '"unmasldng. •r f!tults DOJ for not r.ev~ling the ru\l'lt~ of specific U.S. ~r.;ons ~ ·entiti~ in the FISA npplkation ond subsequec1 renewa~- ln. re.ct, OOJ .lpJ!!'OJlrilllely upheld its i9ngsraudiog. prnctic.e of protc,:ting U.S. ~tizcn infomiation Ir; p~fully r.cl "unnui.,king'' U.S. pc-rson and entlty names, unless they we~ thcm:;eh-es lM subjc::t of I\ cowiten'ntcllig~tie in.-.·es1ign1ion. ·nru 1nstead uscl g:nerlc identifiers t1m! pro'i'ided lh.e Court with mere than sufficient info,-mitti<: n to undl:TSt!lnd I~~ politic:al conle:ct ofStttk's ~seatch. In an ~leJ\Sl~-c cxplanution·to ~ Court, DOJ dlsdoS::?5 that Steel~

"i,tLS" flpprcached by (;11 fdan1{/ied U;S.. P~~n/1 wlro fr.diCll/M (0 S:J=~ :J l{S!eeleJ11 t1Mt a U.S.-based f= jlritr'1 r.ad hlwi lr<E irkn.tifi~d U.S, Pl!r.ton ((1 r!or.thta re~!J!'Ch regarding Candidate ;;1 •~'I 1it.s to R1wfa. {Ir.;: JdrrJiffecl U.S. fer.fjm and &iI1r&t !1i have o !1mg• stcmdlJtg b!lli<;-s:! r~fotlo,uhtp.) T~ i:.lmcijt1J U.S, per um hf~d ~ J.S J Jo ~onduct fh~ res~nrr:h. 71>-: /dcnl{jled U.S. Pt:rwn n!!,'eJ' IUNf.red St,111'~ JI.I as !o tl!i! l!:J)! im/!an bchir,,J lite re.march m:c Candldaro -fl] '.r ties 10 Jlus:r:D... 11r,1. FBf s~CJrm/es ll-,a; ,Fr,, filirr;1i((ed U.S. Pcr,roq w<1s li~/y lookfrr~ {or fnformt1tion ,r.m °rou!,J be user! lo ,(isr::rr;dil Cgr.:Nefarc Ii I 's f(lf12J?(~n. ""

Co!ltr.>..ry tc> th.: Majority's osscrtiort tltill DOI falls to mentlo:-i ~ Steele' s r~c-h {\'2.$

commissi'1ned by "P:Olit:cCal w::tors" ,o "obmrn derogatory informa.ioo on Donald Tn.1mp's lies to Rusn11,~ DOJ t, fnct lnfomird Ott Court e~urnhily th::it S!ccle WA! blrctl by

PIWPERiY OF THE; U.S. liOUSE OF R£::PRESENTA llVE.S 150

polilic:tlly-moth--:itcd U.S. per.sons .11.nd c,nl!tks nod th:it bi! r~~rth np~nrtd"inrN1tkd for use "lo disercdil" Tnimp1s ,:ump11lgn.

• DOJ CXJ)llliocd lhc flll ', rca~onnbk bllsb for findin Stcdi: credible: The npplicalions correctly dcscn~-"d Stecle os

. The 2ppltc11ions also ~ S'jen~d Stcclc:'11 rim Ill-yea; hi.story of cro:iible .eponins on RU$sia and oll:tr msttcrs, includins..info.rra:itioli OQJ us~ in criminal pro~c:-cdings. 27 Senior FBI and DOJ ollicirilis lia~·c r.:~rolly affirmed tot~ Committee the reliab:@y and credibility ofSt~le·s ~porting, nn ~;ii\ also rdle1;,cd in !lie FOl' s ur.der}y;ng sawce documcnlS.21 The FB! Jms uml~na1:cn li rigomos proc~ 10 vet allesolions fro:n Steele's reporting, includir.g wilh regard to Pcge.'1

• The FDI propErly uodficif thi f'ISC i:ifttr II rennf11.2..ltd Sttck .U"ll s~lln:t for n1aklog un{lothol"l:ted disdosu«:S to tlii mtdill.. 1hc MajoriLy dt~s no ~ ·ider.~ fr..il \he FBI, prior 10 filing in; initial 0~ 21, 2016 oppli~i~n, ~loolly knew or should bave kriovm of nny nUesedly iru1pp~oprie1c mediCL contacts l>y St.e:I~. Nor do they ei~ niden::e tlult S1cele disclosed 19 Yill-.DD! d~111Us iru:luded 511 lhe FlS!, wm'ront, since the.British Couit filings to wbich they refer rlo ilDl edtlrcss. wont Steele may have said to Yahoo!.

DOJ informed the Coun in iis rencwD}s lhat the FBI ~I~ promptly to t~innlc Steele afu:r l"1tning f(om hlm {afle; DOJ fili:d tht· first ~t application) tr.at he mrl discus..~ his work with a media outkl in [ate lxtom. Tu Januuy 2018 r~wt1\ f11rt.~r e~plaincd to 1he Coun that Slccle I.Old 1.he FBI lhVJ he made his unauthorized mC'd.io disclosure betouse of his fMlralion 111 D~ Camey's public rmacunccment ,hwtly before the e!c~tion lira! the ffil rcopc~ its investigation in((} cnttdidate Clin:on'.s email use •.

• OOJ·n~nr p,-.hJ S~e !or the "dossier": The Majority assms that 1l1s FBl had "separately outho~ pn>menr !a-St~ele fer his n:~rclt on 'Tnnnp but ne_gl«tS to ffi!mtion Ui:it payment wns ~~~l!ed ond never Uittde. As the FBl's records m-:1 Commiltee tcsti,mllll)I confum.s, althoogh the fBI inilialfy considered c:omp:nsntlon

St~clo ullho~lcly ncv~r rccclvctl p:iymcnt from the FBI tor nny "dosilcr"-rcbkd iDfonnntlo11 • .ll DOJ acaimtely infon:ocd the Coi:rt th111 Steele hntl been o.n FBI. c~ human source ~irice •• for which he •,\';li ... cmnpensatcd

by I.he FB1" - payms for pre\;ow;!y,th:u-cd information of \·sl u.e Wlt'l!lated tQ 1be FBI'~ R:nssui invc-stigotion.:;,

,-\dd itional Omission!.. Error.11 11nd Dislortions in the l',1Ajoritv•5 Memorandum ~ - - . - .. .

• DOJ :lppropriaid)" provided lfo: Court wilh .Q cor:nprcb~11slv~ CXJllll:Il:lllon of Russi.n's election interfcrcn~. rocludi.llg c~·itlcnce th:11 R11UI11 courr.-d :in.o!bcrTrump c:nmpoign ~tlt·uor, Pap~ct\l!X'"ulOJ, .\IHI nrnt Ruuilln ~sen~ prcYiC\Ytil tbtir hnck rui(I

d~semfo11tion ohtokn cmPib, In cfaimiog 1J-~ there is "no cvi~ t}f any coop~ro1ion or conspiracy bct\\,:en Fagc aml PapadopoulllS,.-.).1 lhe ~iajori1y milii.ates t1E ffl!Son wiiy DOJ spmfa:ally expl~td Russia's ~ounfag of Papadopoulos. Popadopoufo.s's imerattion _\.,ith ~!l!.11 agents, COllpkd ·with real-time cvidzn;,; ofRltSSian d~i~n inte.fere!JCC, provided th1: Ccurt withe bro* ~1."Xt in whicll 1t> 1:l~luatc RI.ISSia's c!antfeitir.-e octMlies PDd P:lge's- hi~ory and alleged con~ct ,,ith RUS$t.""lll offic:iols. Mori:o'rtt, ~ only i'iigc-

6

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESeITATIVES 151

I no cvldtnec ofll..so~tc co~piracy lieiwc:cn him and _ Pepadopou'los was required. DO.f ,'l"(Ju!tl hnv1: bun utgligi:nt in omillcng ~-lh•l in{'ormalion :1bouC Pupmlopoufos nnd Ruulo'5 conc.erutl efforts.

• In it, Court filingi, DOJ made prop~ use of n~,·s con rage. The l!.tijcrity fals:ly claims rhet thi:. f"ISA materials '"'relied hea\'jly" on B Scp!cm_licr23. 2016 Yahoo( News .micle by Mkh:ic:l Tsikoff :uid th.at thi~ artick ''docs not conoboratc lho Stcctc Dossi~ becQusc·ii is derived from infonn~tioo leaked by S(Cck: hlllL"Clf." lS In fuc!, DOI fl:fcreo~cd 1sikofi's 4'.lticle, nlongside onothc:r article th¢ Majoril)' fruts lo menlion. not to provide sc~te co:-roboration for Steel:'s repqning. but instenct 10 inform the Court of Page's public da.1it1l ofhi3 ~uspected meetings in MoS(:()w, which Ps" 11lso ecr.o...e.,1 i1111 Septeml:>ct 25, 2016 letter to FBI Direc.torConiey. I

-"'

• Tbc Majority' 5 n~rcncc'to Bruce Ohr ii mislell<ling. The Majority mischnmclcl'lZ\?S !}ru-cc Ohr's role, ove~ lbe ~ignific;mce ofh.i3 tnren:icticms with Stcclc, lil!d misl~::s ab-Jut the timefrome ofOh:'s con.,mUJlkntion .,.,,th the FBI. In fol~ Novm1bcr 2016, Ohr info:-mel the FOi of his p.•-ior pn:>iemoaa.I rdotionship with Srecle and information tillt S~ele sl1ared \\ith him (i!'tiuding S-teele.'s ccncezc: a~t J ruinp bci11g ~mpromisrd by Russia), He nlso described hill wife's con!rac~ wt1rk with Fusio~ GPS, th: Hnn th~t him! St~?e separate!)'. This oCCWl'ed ween after U1e ele..-tion mid more than a month~ tho Cau."1 ;ipprovcd ~ initin\ F!SA DP?1i~ion. The M11jo:ity des~n"bes Bruce Ohr as a g n.for DOI officfot wl:-0 "\\~rl:cd cfoscfy ,,.;th lhc: Dcpul;- AUom~i' Otncrel~ Y Gtts 11nd lnter Rosenstein," io order to imJ)!y tht11 Ohr \\,1lS somehow involved in.1he Ff SA process, b!!l there is no indication this is the e2..ce.

Bru~e Ohr is o well-respected career professional whose ponful io rs drugs and orgmized ~rimi:, not counterln1ellig~u. There i! rro ~\'idence t.1i!lt he woa[d ba\·ct!cnown o.bou! tfa::. Pag~ F(SA niiplicntions and their c:onter.ts. The Y..sjo:ity'iii;ssmicms, mo~ver, Qr1!

izTo..kv:mt in detcrm1:iing lb: '\'l:rw:iiy ofSlee[e's reporting, By 1he: time O_hr.debri.efs \'rich the FBl, i1 had nll'¢ilci)' termic~ Steele as a sow-c:e Q.r\d ,vns iridependcntl;• corroborating Steele's ~n.ini about P.ng~·~ oc1hities..13ruc1l Ohr rook the initiative!o inform tra: FBI of whs.t he krew~ mid the Majo:ity do:::s hi1112. gr.n,~ diss:e..-i.1re by suggcslin! he is part of som~ malign ccnspir2C.y.

• Finalty,1'eterS.tn.okan~ Lba Pc.gels h:~t messages arc im:levant'to ~e FISA . upplkation. The f\.fajority gratJJitD'.J.S!y includ1$ rc~nce to Strzok 1µ1d P.ige ot the end of theh· memoran-dum, in mi effort 10 imply that pclitie,.l ~ias infec:ed the f81'5 lii=tig_ation orA DOJ's FISA applications. J11 ract, neither Strz.ok nor P0&e se:-\'fd as cllil).lits en lh-:­opp!ic::ations, wnkh \\'ere the prodl.lCl of e.xtensh·c! and senior DOJ and FBI m•il:'lv.37 !n dcmonizir:g both cam:i ptefc:ssionllls. th.: Majority ac~ thtm o·r~otclf:=5trnlin:g tc-aks to the media." -:nscriou:; charge, omits ir.convcniect !ei,:im,:5.~~. in which they critiqtr!:d ;i wide :range of other o fficicls a11d candidates from bolh parties; docs nql disclo.sc !hat FBI Deput}' Din:c:or McCibe te!\if!cd to the Committee toot ~ had n-0 idea wlut P:i.ga ml:1 Stnok were referring to in their l'insurencc policy .. tcxtsr1 emi ignores Strzok's 11r:tnowl~dged ro!e in prep:.1rins Cl public.declnrallon, b)' 1hen Director Corney, about former So=wy Clinton's ·•e.~: careJeSSlle3S'' in h-:.'ld!1og clasiitied inform.alien-which greatly ~a.'1la~ed Clmion' s·puolic ~11\ti~n in lhednysjust prior to the presider;lbl el~1ioo.

1

?ROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 152

1 ~tr 111 HPSC I Ch1dmllln Dcvln N11n~. Awlrwll Auomcy Gcm~I Su:pl1en 80yd, ~pnrunc1u of Juui,t,

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8

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s HPSCI ?,bjori:y Mcm~"mUI>. Fcirdg:J l,,i~lligt.~ Sl;m:i!{c1Ji.-.; ,!~ Abusc.t o. 1J:,: ~y,;1c:w11 of ~=::e c-..1. I~ Ftdmu lhre,."110/lrtr~lfa:, .. J:i.n=)' 18, 20J9 .. ~.2.

;; P:pllrll'llt1ll of!'..1Mlcc. Fo:-:{an l~emse= ~-eilb-~ Cc= Ap;ir.:!uon, O.:-..:-oa2l, 20i6, p. IS. r~e s. Rci*-lted tD ~ent r~al applicm-...m.

-:1 fr:lo-vicw ot.~.s,fn:w M!Oik (Fl3l ~ ly Pirffi1r}. Ho~~ St:leciClmltlillee~.!l Lit?l!ia;<~ Oc«mbct 19, 2011, p. 46. 100; L'"ll(rvl:£< o(Sillt Yatc, {fo:m{r D~.;[)· Alto~--y G<nr:ral). He,~ P~=nt Sd~1 C!!mmittceon J~Jlie,cn~ Nov:rnbtr ;, 1017, ·p. 16; J~cwr..h Jnlto Cerli.i {f~= A~t!!ll Alll)me}' G~~~I ~ Ncll¢n::} ScC1/rl[)I)., Ho~ P6maacot Sck,t CQrnmi:Jrt on !R:cllig?t:~. l ufy, Wl7, p. 35. <1 tn!miewof A:.dtcw Y~c {fBf Depucy !)~=:}, Hen= P~t Select Committee= lntcl!i~ D=mbcr 19, 2617, p. lOC'-101,: 15.

n lntcl:'(jc"'·c!fal Ag~n:. ~(C ~=1 Seleet ,Cei;:;,,,iri~ c:, ln~IHs~c:e. Oe--...ell'.~r .20, '.Ull 7, p. 112..

n ~~=:ru c! fostice. Fo..igo lnlelf~~ SuNci~t: C-oort Ai:,iikcifon. O:ro~r 21: 2016. pp. Is. !-6.. n. S. Repeated hi ~enc :e-~,.,,I aP£1l1c::ii~.s.

;c t!PSCI .Mi:y.my Men~uro, Fore!'gr. lnt<lf~ cr.w S;,,wili= Act .ibiues u1. 1Jre lkpt:.roT.FJ ef Ji:rJ~ t!F..d ,b frd~rci &r~,m o/hr-re J.iJ;r:tfa,,, Jon~')' 18, ::!018, p. 4 f'™ 1'3z~ FISA ap;,licati<,n a.~ir.t11,lo~ iuforo!:Slfo:i re;i~l~s (elk= l'rurnp ='i"lfp, n,i.-i~r GcQ('!<: P~p<)11los, l,,..:t t.'tm is r.o :ville= or w./ coo~~ or ro.-upirncy W."= P;,gc .;r..i P.19,>:l.opm.,.'cs.. ")

;s !lPSCT M1jnru'1 Mtmo:"'.J:nUlll. F«~ f11u!fi~~ S:,n.-eil~~ .id A~1t1~ c: JJ,z Dq>;1r:3.lm c>f Jasria <1)'.!l ;;;~ Fed~r:;.f S.~ -:,u of f,ry~li"{', 1=11 Is., :!.O 1g, i'-.2. Ne,ithcr b ilcrl iT lfflf Y.=.'::;o(>I ~"C specir=lly t&!iliflro in !b.: FIS/I. M:itcricl~. in ke"ep~ "lil.'l 1he fBJ's g~mif i;octicc of .:M 1~:isit)'bl U.S. pc=

J.c ixp:lrtment of J i.st1ts Ftnigr. lnic!tig,.*!1~ Su.,·ci!t:ctt C-0un AppC-c:uciC111, Ccober 21, iGI 6,_ p. 2~; ~ = mt ci lt:11!ce, F~ lnl~lliru=..S,.;;v~flm.~ Col..'i /\pp!'?:aion.1"1=r"f Ii. 201;, p. JI~ C~TJ;;r ?a~ Lsu (l) FBl 0:=1cr J"-!Tlt1Corn~j,. Sc~ crr.tu2.S, :l:OH!. 9

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. 1-'.0USE Cr REPRES8'ITATIVES 154

1a lr.tcrvic,irof Ao~ MeCa!:c(F81 Oq>u!}' l)lr,,cwJt f.= f'tm:::a1m11Se~ ~~ on ["telliie1:~ Oe.-emlxr 19, 2017, f , JS7.

10

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSc: OF REPRtSENTATIVSS 155

{U) Appendix G-Senate Judiciary Memo about Steele Referral

TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN (UNCIASSIFraDwhcn ~rated from atmchmen1}

YlA ELECTRONIC TRA."iSMISSIQN

Th? HOOCl'nlble Rod J. Rosmrui.n. Deputy Attorney C-=al U.S. Otpc:<.mart of I~cc 950 ~mmylvm!aA~ NW Washington, DC 2053-0

J=:sry 4. 2C l8

Toe Hoconblc Chm~ A. Wray Dirtd.ct Fcdml!B~ofm~ 9'35 Pecnsyh-anm A~ NW W~on, DC20S35

DCl!t 0epazy Atnr!M)' G=al Roscnstcin ilad ~ Wra'j:

AtlXbcd p~ fil)d I i:u.t:11.ficd mcm~ releicd. to email!. comcurua:tiom ~tween Chrimpbcr Stccle aod multipk U.S. ncwsOIIL.lct! reprding the ~led "'Trump~~ ~ Mr. S~le tOnlptled Oil behili offmfon OPS {qr Ebe Clinron Ca,np.-dga Md the Dem~ NNtioiw Com.m.itte: amt iblo prmi<b! ~ the FRI

8-=:d on !he mt'Dffll3lkln cwu:aino:I. thcmB. Wll an: r:1pectlully ref:mng Mr. ·st«le ll) )'IN fir. investig,ttfon of po!a!tW viol.$tkins of t8 U.S.C. § 100!, fur mtmii:nb ti» Cammittee has re-om to bdlm Mr, S>.ecle-~ n:ga.diog l.u:i ~!:xmon cf i.nfonnatlon t£1rusir'.!d l!\ l~ ~~.

11:itnk. yoa fw ;-our prompt are:mion In 1h:h nflPQrtl!!nt matter. If }"OU. h.we =.ny qµatl om. pl=~ Patridt Dam c:rr DcLis3. L:.J ofChlinnan Ormley·• rtalT il{l02) 224-S225.

S:ikomminec an Cril=~T~ Comm.!~ on die Judiciuy

TOP SECRET/ /NOFORN {UN'Cl..~PIED ~separated fn:im at~tJ

PROPERTY Ot= THE'c ll.S. tiO-USE OF REPRESENT:'>Ti\lF.S 156

cc: The HonQroblc Di~oc f'cinltcln Hllnkina Member Committee on the JudkllU)I

The Ho.'lOTa.bhi Rlchatd Burr Chaimwi Senate Se!«! Committ(I; oil In1clligcne<:

The ll~Mf*blc Mmk W~r VioeCho.irrruw S=te Scl«t Cooimi~ Oil l!Uelli~

1be Honomblc Devi.SJ Nunai Chainnan

~ All~ Oolltrll R.on m11in M:I Olrc<;ot Wr&y hnuuy o!, 'lOUI

~2af2

House Pcrmnruml Scled Conunitt.ce on ~Ulgt'.nu

The Honornblc Acwn Schiff R1mking Mcmbct Jlouse Pcrinlllle'.III Selca Commin« on IMcllig~

f I

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 157

l I

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(tf) FROM: Cb!!rks 2. Gr-J.!.Slcy, Chainr.n, U.S. S«:nr.te Commiu~ 011 the J::diciuy Li~y 0. Gnilurn, Chaimwi. Su~mmitl~ un Crim:: and Tcirerism, U.S. Semie CoUUil!u« on Irie JuiditilU')'

TO: Th.e Honorable Rod J . R~nstein, Ixputy Attorney <ii."'!l.erol. U.S. ~tofJUSiicc

RE:

~ HoJl!)mb[c Christopher A. Wray, Diro:1or. federal Bureau of fa\ 'rS!i g"..!iO n

Rem-nu o.f ~pbcr S~!e ((){' Po1colisl Violation of J & U.S.C. § l 00 l

(U} As you know. iortna Orhh.'l Intclli~~ Officx:r Chruto~-r Skclc was hircl by(~ privste furn Fmion -OPS in JU!".e 2016 10 ~r infurm:nion obo-,n "links be.n"ffl! R~llaod fthi:o-pri:£i<icmial caooidBle] Donald Trump. .. 1 Pltr.ruanl to that l-mir= arrangcmcnl., ~.r. Sr~le prepared e series of docum,?Dts. s.-J!ed iii itltelligenre repom. some of which i,wre kn~ cmiplled into a "'tlos5i.er·• !!nd p11bliwd by Bi=F~tdill Jan~·y 20l 7.2 On tM foce orthe ~er, it a:ppe:?6 th.at Mr. S~e gru.heccl much of his informwou from Riwien go\'e.rnn-.enr !¢1.ll'ttS

inside Russia.1 A!wrding to lhc 111w furn Pclil'I!! Coic. Mr. Sleck'sdossfcr-n:latro efforts wc:rc runded tfo,:iugh Fmion GPS by Ula! li!,w fum on ~ 1:clf oflfo: Ixma.;rauc: N.tL'OIW.I Committee: and the Clinton C~!!ll-~

(1.J} ln rcspo~ to rq,orting by the WC?1hi11i1cm f>osJ obotn Mr. Steele·~ relotkmship v..ith the FBI rcluling 10 uri, p:inis..m douitt 9t0ject. lhe JU(i~ilU)' Coi'?'IMictee began taf.s.ing :i seri.?s of questioll!l to the FBI and thl!' Jn.ruce ~l abcut ~ mane.IS ns part o!the Committee'9 c:onstitutioncl. o,-enisht respcJJSibiliCies.s

(U} The .FBI has~ providd th: C«nmillr:1: Jiec~ ~ c:~jlic;d documents re!e<rant lo the FBr, relationship v.ilh Mr. Steele :md -.hctl,cr &.c ffiI relied on hi, dossier wori:.. As apJain::d in grcmi:r dcmrl below, wt.en W'onnalion in l1u:lse classilicd docWit::flts is ev.1h.,J?.ted m light ofsvmm stlW'n.ents by Mr: S1~le ~ Brit~h liligation, it~ tha ei!1ler Mr. Steele lied to tm FBI or lhe· Brlti5h tt>Wl. or 1hot w.: cl.a.s$ilicd d..~umcn,5 m ·icw«J by ~ Commiuee coninin mnteru!ly false statements.

I (U) ~. Vzlxva Cl. ,IJ ,-, Orru B~ la!l~UJcitr..,J cUd O..mffJb;,hu Stttlz.. Crum )la.

11Q1mooo3.Qll(e:a·, &nsb(Apr. 4. 2(111}, p:= 9{Hcn:i:o~·~-,:1c S!Jl:m.ccn n 1~ ,.i '(ll) tit ;,: pan.. 10: Kffl B~. ~rlam Eti."f, l!lxi M11..1. ~ ~~ .'~~s ,r[{c,g,, r .... .-p /i4$ o.....,., nu ta lil<Ui:T- Bl•zzFE:m{h::i. 10. ?017). 't'U) 1.! • {U) Adz.'!! Enl :!D, Dc.lm &m5t i1:d it.<MJ!D,:I~ !Id,~~~. Glri.,:;,, C~..,,, DNC f>atf /11" R=-k tbat L4:J u, Jam..'o lJn:.Iitf', T:r.; WA.'<1~ rt'IST(O:t. 2..t,1i:l17).. '\ U) Y-cm Hamb~ cd Rol.ll1r~ S. lkldtm=. FBI Orrct i'!~ ,a P.zy Ft!ff/Jf!'I BrJrW. ~· >tlto A ~l:.£tttl ('<lJUraWTrla! 1'nmlp 0<=1#, Th"E W~GTOSl'c:sT {f'cb. 2t . l0!7).

., PROP!aRTY OF T1-IE U.S. HOUSE OF RtPRES~TA TIVES

158

(U) ln mpom'C co lhr: CommilC«'s inqu.lrics, lh,: Chainnnn nnu Rwlkinu Member reecived o tnknnu on Mitrctl 15, 2017. from lhl."n-Dln:ctc,r Jrunr:3 B. Corney. Jr.

-nllll briefing 1uldre.S$ed the Ru:.~lo in\'~\ifllllion, the rDI ':i n:latioruhlp will1 Mr. Steele, nnd thi: FBl's reliance on M.r. Steele', d@iCf in two opp)i~tioll.! it filed for survcitlwicc under lhc Foreign Jntcllig~cc: Surveillance Act (FlSA}. Then, on MNch \ 7, 2017. the Chuinnan an<l Run}dng Member were pro\lided copie$ ofth~ cwo relevnut flSA applicntions, Y.bi~h requostcd aulhorit)• IO coodntl sqrveil~ ofCar1cr F2g~. Doth relied heavily on Mr. S1oelc':1 dotsie.r cle.imi, Md bo!h ll?Plienlif)ns Wt1" glUillcd by the Fcmigo lw:lligcncc Surveillance Court (FJSC). In Dcccmbcr of2(JJ7, lhc Chairmnu, Rankin; Membe1, nnd S1Jbcommittee Chnirman Grabs.DI were clJowed to review a totol offo1U' f'ISA applicatioons relying oo 1he dossier to seek :;W\•elllance of Mr. Caner P11gc, f\S well cs mimcro\1$ otn:r FBI doetunc:nts rcla1fos 10 Mr. Srecle.

(U) SimUurly. in Jw,e 2017, fomt« FBl OlrcctO!' C01My testified publioly before the Sc-111,.10 Select Commlttcc on 1t11elllgcn~c 1]1Al lie hod bticrcJ PN:dilcnt•Elc:-ct Trump on 1hc tlw.,si~r ollcgations In JanlW)' 2011, whith Mr. Comcy described us ·'sQlnclous·· o.nd MunvClifi:<l. o,G

•)lheo ~ lll lhr: M111ch 2017 briefing why Hl<l FBI n:llad on lhc d003ict in the

FISA 4119 1c.>ns 11bs.m1 mcanlui;rul c11nohor11Llon-Md in lliil1l oftl~ h!ghly politicnl ,.nod~ rurrour.dint! iU cn.-.illoll-\l1en-Dirci:ior Cnmcy s1111~ tl\ll \ho FBI inclu~ llJc dossia l\lleJ?Blions about Cl'.ll1t:t ~ lo lhc F1SA upplic.\tfon~ ~use: Mr. St1:elc hims<:lf was (Oll!icltffl.l reliable du.c to hu pns1 worl; wilh 1he Uurc4111.

-[ndocd, th!: doc=lll.! we hiwe revie)\~ sbow lhn1 the FBI ~ool< impQtt:ml

iJm:st.ignth-e steps wgely oos«t on M.r. Steele's. infonr.o.tlon-onr.l ~lyiTJll h:JWily Qn his credlbillly. Spei:iJkally, on Cktobt, l J. 20l6, Ille FBI filod iu first ·~1 applic:uion untie• flS/\ for Cener .Pnge. This iniLi&l appliCLJtion relks in Pift on cllc:gc:d past ~ am.~mpt:!i lo recroit ~e )'ellJ'S aso. That portion is lc.5:i llwl five JP..J;C$. llie bulk of Im: L1PW01.1ion con~ of !)llcgruions o.g4m51 Pngc lllll-t l.\~re di~lD~cJ !o the FBI by Mt. Sx~!e 11nd aro 111~ outline<! in the- S1ecleoo53ic:r. ~ application appears IO cont111n l30 :u.kl.ilional information tO~bQsaflns

\ho: dossier allcg11tions ~ainst Mr. Page. although it does cite-10 a news B11!1:hnbn1 appear~ 10 be solUWd to Mr, S(cdc's dos.,itt 11., w~l1.

G (U) SllllCmetil o! J~ta1 U. Conicy, Jr .• Hcurills or lhc l.J .S. Sm. Sclric:t C'cr.:rJo. on lnteUlgrnN (l une 11, 2017).

TOP SECRET NOFORNIII PROPERTY OF THF. U.S. HOUSE OF RF.PRF.SENTAilVES

159

TOP SECRET /NOFOR'9111a

-11'.e fBl di~u.ssed lhc ttlitlbilir: of tlti!I um·CTi[i~ iubmuliim pn:widd hy Mr. St~lc in fooUlO(c:s 8 aruf 18 ofll:li; flSA wam::nt !!pplianioa Fim. lhc FB! noted to a vaguely limi!rd extent the politioil ori~ns of th~domer. fu f~e 8 lile FBI ~iai rf:11.t 1he dos..ier lnformetlon wnsc:o;npiledpllJSlJllnt lo thedi=<i.onQf a Taw ffiro wht!~ tr.m:g .i.n 'id;entilied U.S. pa-son"--nowt.nowa as Glc:nn S"nnpsoa ofFusi<tn GPS-"ia to.5ia:t =,i,"Ch.rcgiurling [Tnunp' sl tii:s .o Russie. .. The FBI funhcr-spccui311:[drtha1 Mr. Sir.ipson °'Q1!.5 likely Jooking ror information lh&t cou1d ~ used to diseredil lTl:UmP'S} campaigp." The SWlioli<m. railed Co <fuel~ ~l !he fdc:ntitks or Mr. Simp.wn' s ultimalc: c£ienls 1n-en= th;; Clintm:J campnign XU'ld Im DNC.

~ fBt ~ w lh; r1SC th:il. "'wscd on [Steele's) ~'ious rc~ing hislo;y with l~~y [St«k} provided n:liw'.<:: i:tformnJicn to \he FB-L tr.a FOi belifl",I~ [Steclc:'s} rtporti.ngto be cmfiblc." Ir, :sher., itappc:mi me FGI relied c;nadmin-'"<lly LmWrrobotn1ed infom1.a.uoo1 funded by md ~cd fbr S«:rctaiy Cllirlfil\'s p=idc11~al ~fflj>W$0, in orde; to G<lOOUel 5-urvtillo.ntt of Qt :lSSOCinte of the opposing jires?denlinl candidate. It did so~ on Mr. Stei:lc".s pcm>nnl cre.ficility mw:I presumably haling fl!ith in ~ls ~ of obl.un.ing the mfcrmlilim.

(U) But ti,ae is YJbsun1ial ~i:kooe suggc:ning lhst Mr. Stedc mntc.ricl[y misled~ FBJ !lbolll a~ t of hi$ dossic:r effons.. one which b:llr.l on hiHrc:<lib,1ily. -In lhc ()cfgb.;r 2016 FISA ~i-;Qtion,aod in ca,-cn cft.'>e three l'C.1141wals, ai\er relaying S\i:c:Jc·s dorner o.llcgsrions agaimt C!neT Page, lhe Fl:31 suircs: '"!Stttlfi told the FBJ tb1t he/she on.Iv prgyidNI this iftlorntttioo ta the bu~ln~ MJ2t\S'1 Jfu.sf913 GPSI !]Id Uic fil!!."7 (c:mplwis added>. tndm thi: fJS/\ iw.ewa! appfie:tlion fa lanu:.r, 2017 fl()lf:S 1hZ1t

Steele had received· a ---ct the PISA 4t>plialio.ru not-e the- aistence of 4 ne,,s .:rticle d:!!cd Septeltbcr 23, 20 t 6, whM1 in pmicu!az containod some of lhc .wne d~iei: infonn:l!iDn eboul Mr. ~ oompikd by Mr. S1e11le and on which li:e FBI re.lied in iu 4pplica1ioo.. Whllc rc0t c.wlicitfy slated. !his is ~3bcy lht! micle by Miclt;;d f.s:ikoff of Yah~ N~.e.:., fiU:d .. U.S. In•cl Offic h1ls .[>ro~ Tics &IWrtll Tl'Ualµ A.cvisc:r ~ KmnliD, M /\flc:T mning thzu }.'tr, S~lc hsJ cll!.imed to the F.B.l he lu!d. only provide<.f lhls informatlon ICI lhe FBI and M.. Simpson. ~ applicatian .at~ to explain uway It~ ir.c{lnsis.mcy betw~"n Mr. Sttel.e'i ~ion lo the FBI and lh~ c:~ce cftr.c mi.cl~ DpPl)rcr.ily to shidd Mr. S:..eclc'l i;red.ibJ1ity o.nv.i1kh it roU . relied for !he im='Sl mt!le$1. The applic:atian to the l:1SC .!:.lid: "~ that t~ infoml!tion conlainod in th: Sq,!rmber 23rd n.}\l,'S a-tlefe ~ml!y ~tehe, lhe infurmatiuu about '11~ !hat {Steele J discovert"d coing histher re~h.,

)

f'ROf'E:RTY OF TiiE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 160

17re FBI dJHS no/ trli= that f Steelc} dmctly provided this inform111ion to lhc yICSS" {miphnsi, tl<lckd).

1111111» f«M()tc 9 ofiisJ:wllW)' 2017 eppliC4Woo 10 n:new ,re%: f!S.I\ wlmUll! for Mr. &,gi:., the FBI~ add..11:SS:d Mr. Stm.e's CRdibility. AI that Ii.me, the Fm t:0ltd that it had ~dc:,1 iu ~letiomhlp with Mr. S1eel: in Ocwbe" 2016 ~use of~·~ ·'unmnhori'Zi\d rlis1:losnre of informllilim co 11-.e presiJ.,. The FBI relayed d)ar. Sceele hM be1:r? bc,!lien>d oy the FRJ 's notifies!] cm to C('l'".gre!S in October 2016 ebo\21 tlM: rcoJ=m& of~ Ciinl~ invcstigm.ion, i.nd as aresull "{Sk:eicJ ind:pmdrnUy end~ the prior admonishment from ilie rBl lO

~ only wilh th.i: F.!ll on thiJ ll14tlef, ~lwi:d tiN rcpcnu,g dlSCU$SCO hmm {do$.'lier cllegarloos £1.sninst ~ ) Ill s:n ilknlified oor.-s ~-mi1.alioa." HOWt:\'CS', \he FBI coatinutd 10

cite to Mr. Sit.tie'!!.~ wrk l!5 i:vi~c.c ofhi3 rclinbility, e:rid st111etl t.~t "l;hc iilcidenl thzt led to the FDJ ~ing iU in:ti.omhip .,.,;lh [Mr. ~e.elcJ uccum:d after [Mr. Sttclcl pro\i<li;d" ti¥.: fel mlh the~ infonnation dt3ml>«I in the i5JlPlicalion. The FBI furthc-a;scrtal in fuotoote 19 t1mt it d_,;d rot bclh:\"t: tha1 Steele dm!c1ly ga'Je informE!lion lo Yaht>o Ntw~ thst "p-.ibli~~ du; Scpc.cmbcr 23 Ne\'15 Article."

lallllo.. !!.$ documc:nt.¢d in the Fl SA R:DC\va.!:;, th 1: Fm &rjll ~ to bc:I i c\~ Mr. Stee'Je~ tba1 be had only provided~~ ioform.Eilion to the FBI and Fuson­,;m nol to \be ~07 lD bis ~ med:11 C'01UBc.t !hid resulted in me FBI suspemii123 the mlitiOllS'jp. Accordingly, cl,;: FBI still d«mi.>d die information he p.>nvided prior to th¢ October dlS':lQ!JU!C LO bo ~li.Bhk. Aim all. the FB1 all\'Zdy believed Mr. Steclt Wi!S mirdlle, he had previo~y ioJd the fBl he ~ not shattd the mfonnatlon v.i 1h the press - rad l)ina to the Fm is , crime. 1n dd1?odio& Mr. Slce[e's credihility lOlhe F'lSC. l1P! FBI h:srl po-~ an ii,n~us cxplaoafum for 1he Sept2mber 23 emcle, based on the nsromptlon Jr.Ol Mc. St.oelc hfl.d tt,Jd lhc FBI the trUfh abou1 hB}'.tt:SS con\ru:l.&. The FBI 1heiJ .. ~ ior him twia: mo~. U$Ulg lbo ~c rationnte, in s11bscq=t l'eDe'.\'3.1 npplieatiom fil.~ \.\-il.b. llx P-0mgn Jn~m,~ Sur.·dltmcc Coll:11. in Aprll llJ)(} l= 2011.

(U) How~'l!f. ?"J.bii; rcpor1s, COlct ~ l!l1d infonnlll:ion obiainai O}' the Commitlee duriDg wunc:ss iDkr.:ic:ns in the coune ofi~ ongo1:tS io-.~i;rst~n i.ndi~ thtl Mr. Strcle oo1

cnly pro11ideddo.s:sier infomration 10 lhe F.BI. bUI also to n.u:m~rOU3 media orgimiz.etioD.3 prior to U-.f end of his relation.ship with the Fm in Oclobcr 2016.s

(t,') Jn Steele's m-om cou.-t filingsm lilip.tion in.London, bt"lldmi!ierl!hat be ugaveoff lhc ~ord briefings 10.t 9.Ill'lll number of journalists itbout tbr.! prc-ct,eclion 0H:moram.L1 [i.e .• !be ei'.IS5kr] in lat,; ~v·au~ 2016.'~ 1n Zlliltht:r sworn filing in nw case. ~tr. Sl~le further

: (l.l} Sn Su:el~ SW=c."'J:l J; O.:r~· lte$pom,: 5o ~I~' 11.:q.x:,I Cw fur .. '!tf ~f~, Pun~ so CPR P2n. t &, Gdxzr.?v ft, Al 'I'. o.-b-~ l!~1 l111dhg-..., 1.!!,;:Ud arxl Ckilrt;pf,rr SUrk. 0.l:i:l Na. HQ 17WD413. ~D'$ 8ei:Y.h {M~y la.;.'017), ~ "Slcdl? ~.atlml.2'11~~ 131'; Ttllll fu:&..~v imd·Roulilld .S. Hcldennan. FBJ Or,= Pll'Jf!l,.-zl to Pt1J1 ForYt>r. Braim Sn ,rle:; . .fwhr,ml C~ Tr2!f1.Dw.rf u , "OE W ASJIINOTO.~ l'OST (f!b-2!, l011); ~ T~ eJ filo .,.itf. Sc,i. C'M!l!l.. a; ur.> k<:Jcmy. ~ {U) Steele St..mmtnt I ?! µa J2.

FRCPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRESENTATIVES 161

staled th.sl jourMfu.13 from "'1.,ic N!:W Y Olk Timo, lhe \Vashlrie,ton ~. Y:aboo New11, the New Yorker, and CNN-were -brl~feQ 1c tbecll.11 or SeptcDlb~r- 2016 by {Strot!} and r1.1&ion nt Fuslon' s instruttic~ "10 The filing futlrer Slates that Mt, St:eefe "subs!<i_uer.tly p:i.rtifi?,lltcd in funlier ~n~ m Fusion's wt=1t<>n ~ith F<Gion mid lhe Nr;w Yort; T'tTID:S. the Wa..<t.ingtcn Po.st, Md Y11.bro N;ws. wh.i~ took ~cmid-Ott-0ber 2016.->.11 AcrotifJtlS to these cowt filings, ~itlhc briefing$ in;-uh-ed the disclosure of limi!ed inti:l!i~e rl.!1:Jlt'ding, imfia,.tions of Russinft interf~ in tht: US dc,;fion process md tht; p:;,s;sil>k co-otdirumon of mcmb:rs orTni.mp's

• campaign teM\Md Rlmim .govemm~toffidals.~r. rn his intcnitw ·.iri.th tlu: Comminee, Glenn Simpson of Fmion GPS confinnNi this lh.'l:Ount by Mr. S!eele and l"d! c:.otnpM}' as filed in the Brifuh COOl't. 11

-

~ fir!% of tl>.ts~ tilings WilS pooiidy reported in the U.S_ m~ia in April of 2017, re did 110( subsequcn1ly di~lo~ t<i Lh~ rlSC lhb evldenre SUJ:&C!llf1S 1ha1 Mr. Steele 111:d lied to !:be FBI. inste.ad !he appik.llio!I still tefied prnmrily en his c:redibHh}' prior to !he October mroia inci~at.

fl::U n:ccis::d simi12r infom,:ition from a lmili:! .D:pamneaJ offici • ruce • '-''at! maintuinol ~PU!cl:5 v.ith Mr. Si1I1JOOD l!IDd Y.r- Sl:clc a.bout •~r dcsi.i1:r wi;m. .er.d whose wife 11150 1vork.¢d for F\lsion GPS on the Russi! projcc,. ln ill1 interview with the: FBI ·oa Na\.'cmbc:r 2Z1 20l 6, Mr. Ohr~ tlul Mr. Simpson gave the

same intetvic:w Iha! Mr. :Steele v.-as "rkspcr~tc" 10 see th.ct }r'flo, Trump v.-ns not cl!!c1ed

presidrn1.1' None oflh~ infonnmion prcvJd«t by Mr. Ohr !n bis ititem&S wifu the fB[ wns

indudcd in the FISA renc:wal l!pplicaI!o:u, dt:!pi~ rts relcvmc.e ro \\ie1het ML Steele hm! lied to lhe fBl sbout his c:onta~U wi:th the ~M well as its bro~c:r ~lc-..uitc to hll ro:dibollity and his stated poUtl~ mati\'1:.

.. I ..

0n tue tritb lbc Sea C-=!l:.. r.i ~ Jlidii:~ 11120s...o; . • 3"~ {NC>Y: l:l, ~Cll 5) •

F0-.302 {u«.. 12,. 20 ( 6; FD-l-07{Ncw_ 22, 201si

5

"'ROPERTY OF Tl-iE U.S. HOUSE Of REPRE:SENTATl'JES 162

-h~·thet Mr. Sleek lied to 1bc FBI ubout hi$ rnedii1 eon\.lri:l) i~ o:lcvunl ror 111

Jca,i \v.t> rct\!Ul'"· f'irsl, hi~ rc:lc:\'Ulll lo hiJs crc<liblllly IL" 11 souroe, putlcula.rly W"cn 1hc hick of corrobom1iu11 for his clnlm,, u1 lc.ut :11 \hQ limo lhcy were iru:Juded ia the FlSA. applicdotlOf\ll. Scoond. it is ~l~VMI to the 1cli1)1lillly of hi, infonnation-glll.htrlng tffor1.1.

(U) Mr. S1cclc condum:d his wort for Fu,ion OPS compiling lhc "Jlrt. .. olection lllL'CllOrnilda~ ' '(b]t't\\WII Jwie Md enrly Novcmbi!r io 16.~n lo the Brilish litigmlan. Mr. S1celu ncktlowJ~dgcd brieftngjoumnli~ ntx>u1 thct do9sie: /Tlffl1Cln:lndll "io lnh! summer/muumn 20l6. "18 Uusw-ptisingly, durills Im: summa- of2016, n:port.'I of 111 lemt some oflhc: ~c:r allegations bcf:l!UI cimilllling amQll3 rcponcrs and people invclved io Ru.s.siim i~cs. 19 Mr. Steele oJsn admi11cd in the llri1i!ih li1igruion ro t,riefing joumnlisis.from 1hc WaJJt/11gran Pc.v, Y'1MO New~. tlie New iar*-u, IS1\d CNN m Scpttmbcr of Wl6.:w Simply put. tlte mo~ p:opl~ who contcmpOranco!J!ly .k.miiv tluit Mr. Steele: W8.'l. ~mpilins his do:isia, the more 1ikdy it \\Ill:\

vul11erable 10 ro.nnipQlo1ion. 1n· fact, in I.be British litigaiioo, whicb ID\'O.h"t'.S s J'IO!l<kc:ticm do.55ia mmiorandllID. Mr. S!celc: oomitted lhnl he received lllld. indudcd in it unsoficlt ::f--ilnrl unvcrified-nllcgatiom. lJ That fitiog ~plies lhat hs! siotilarly :recd1,Gd UilSOlidted ir.tcl.ligence on these moners prior to the election a, Y.--eil. Slitting that Mr. Steele. Mcorrtfnutd 10 ,~ull'e UMOl/dJed }IJ/tlllgtnu on the ms~ covered by d1e pre-elci!lioo mcm.Pram.b rillc!r ~ tJS Prcsiden'!iCl.l cl~tion."12 ·

. (U) Olk! memomndum b Mr. St~lt lli:u WM not ublishL-d by Bu=(cl!d is dnl.ed October 19 2016. Thuttponnllegc.5tl Cl.'lweil~

Mt. Stet lo' s memonu wn ~llltcs I us complln}' "ru«ivcd lhls JeJJ()lt f'r<>m Jon S SUlli! Dc:p.1rtmcn1," Jluu the repott won the StCQntl In u $t'Ji,c ti I n

t c ,e from o forcl2l) sub,,s(lUY(:e who ·~.~ in 101.1 frl~ ot' th~ Clioiom, who ~13od h 11 11 i~ troubling cnoull,h

thul c Ch111011 Com1):)18Jl ful'\dcil Mr. Stet:le'~ work. btlt 1hu1 thQ~ Cliruon A:Uo~ln.tc! were c:-0ntcmpo™1towly feeding M,. Stttle alltSolions roi~ oddilioMl concmu nbout hi5 credibility.

11 (U) SUolt Suuomcnt I Cl p:,t'I, ii. i. (lJ) St~k s~1cmm1 r at JlC1L. )l tt (U) hhknlP~hiri Tl'IIO~ On fi~ whb 11'.: Sat. Cc,otru. Cfl 1hr 1\ldlcW')' (Mt. ~ bfn IJ\r~rn,cd 1hr, Comrnliltt fh~I flt!~ hwt~ l\'oin J!Nmdilu IIOOll1 thl: \10$.Jlll' bet~ It 'II'~ p,_blbhod, DiKI 1/ioos&,'IJ h Y'11S lll~ ·5\IJlllllCf af:?ll 16). "'{IJ)Stcck swemem 2 a1 ~ 111 tcurpba.lu lldd1:d). 1, {IJ) ~l, S1t1mocn1 I 111 ~ I~ Md 20C. . u (U} Id; -s~1c S~til!lttll 2 ~t 4 rStM:b lne~IH"1)C.C .-M>I e,.;ti\Tly iOUgb\. i\ \l"t.! rncnly ~ !"o:d.")

6

PROP!:RTY Of iHE: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRl:SENTA11VES 163

~-Steele Ihm apparently p=ec.i lhls repo:t to the FBi.

-.S:mply put, Mr. Steele to.Id the fBI he ood oo1 roi..~ ~ Cmn- PAgl? doss-ier info~d his clit:m imd the Fl3l Th: Dfpamnra repc:!led Iha! dnim to u~ FISC. Yet Mr. St~Je ad.:nowla:lgai in =m fili~ thaJ he-did bnt?f Yahoo Nn,,~ and other.media Ol't]animtions nbom die d<mier-around. the timi! of the [1Ublicar.ion of the r ahoo Ne1r$ rutiele llat seems to be~ en the ~r.

(U) On Sej>tetnber 23, 2016, >".koo Nfm pubtls.hal Hs ortlek entiikd "'tl.S. in tel Official$ Frobe "Tie$ &tween Tromp AdYise:r and Kii:mlia.»ll That Ql'ti~e ~Dt'rl cl!lllI15 about meetings bc-t\,ttn C.mer J>uge md Russians, includ.ing rgor ~n. Mc. Si:cnin is described in tlR: article a5 <>a longtime Putin aS!OCfate nnd form~ Russian d~..1ty pri.mc rrunJncr­undl:1' ~rui by~ Treasury Departm..."llt in respon:si:. ID Rusm's e,ai_cuis in lhc Ukrainc.2 i ~ article ouribittc:i (he lniormaticn lo ''ll \\"elt-ttlaad WC$C~l intelligence sour.;e," who repotto.ily said tool "'[~rt their =Ileged ~tins, Seehin r:w=i lhe issi:re of!he lining of ~ tiol'ls wilh Page:.z, Ta:is infurm-ation also appears in or~ltip!c "'m<!mornrtds'" [}";it ~ up the dossir:r. ~

(l;1 in $UlD. erouoo lire 5llmC lim c r af.;c,o-Neir.s publisfu:'d its sru..-u: co nlafoing doss.icr infonnnt:ion l0JUl est~ Page., Mr. Siu!~ ll!fd F-,l!.ioo GPS had brle~ Yal!oo i\~;1' 111:1d O'(het oi:w.. outlets them infrunlMion conl.ained in the dassler.

~ fai::ts app,ear to direc!iy ccntradkl the fBl · .s ass..-rticns ill iis inili.sl sppli~~-~e PISA w11rr11m.as "7i'::llas subsequent renev.al 1.pplic:aiom. Toe FBI repear~dly ~cd to lhe court thlll Mr. Sttcli:: !Did Iha FBI he dkl ,rot m.'t'l! ur.mi\horizcl contacts wilh !ht: p r,:s:, ~boui the dos.1itt prior ~o Ocl.1'.ll:wWl6. Tbe FISA !!.pplic.il1ions mllke !.htse cl.e.itm spec:ifitl!lly in ~ context of .the 5.e?1ember Ult ti l~ l..'&-setide. Bw Mr. Stt:dc ha, ~-publicly before a cou:t of ra-truu he till hA\-e ~ CQl:W:~ with·il'.e pr=~ this time, i>!'.<I his lb.-mer busl~S$ ~ Mr. Simpson ~ COllfrrmed it to toe Committee. TI.ro5. ~ RSAcppllca1kmsar¢ci1Mrnwaially fslse in daimingths\ Mr. Steele said he did not pl'(ni de doss!~ iD.form~ to~ p=s prior lo~ .WI 6, OJ Mr. S~h; made materially i~ S1a1emcal9 to lbe FBl ,vhm he claim~ h<: only ~idcd the do$$i.er inft1rmation to hiJ bu!i=u prutna- !Uld lhe F9f.

1111111n this ~c. Mr. Sta:!e•s <1pp.trsn deception !!Cem.5 io ~-ve ~ significanL.. m.st~riat ~u~tts on the F Bt' s in\~th-c decisions wxl reprcscntlllions lO 1hc ~Wt. Mr. Steele's !!lfoJT!lDtion.fqrmei;l s $igJJifi~.t portion arl.hll fl31'll w~t ::ippli~Ii~a. and lb:: FIS.A .:ipplicotioa rt:li<.-d rogre fu:a.~'i.ly on Stecte•s cn:dihUiiy tl'!lln on any wdtpcndc:n vcrific;.wion or oormboranon £'or his dsims.. ThllS lile ~ fo;-~ we.mu1l l'Wthori_zmg wr.-cilhmce 011 a U.S. citi7.tn rtsts l.argcly oo Mr. Steele's crc-dibiliiy. Tho O.:~t or l~~ I= a l'C$pomi.hility to

:u (U) fl.I ~l lsillC.{[ U.S. fmd Of!l<"1/s f?o.."'« Tic e~ Tra:tl\p Mrti'lf' or.d K!'ecfl::i. Y Ml'"...O N1:.11;s ~cpt. i..;, Z0\6). "(U} Id. ., (Up.:/.

?> (U) &o.,m&tt ~- :::i, lit.:Tfte:o.

7

PROPERlY OF THI::: U.S. HOUSE OF RE:PRCoSr:;NTATIVES 164

1kto?rmins? wh!!thcr 1'.lr. Steele proviucd falsi: informu1iu11 lu tl:t: FBI u11u \ ' hcthcr !he F Bi's rcprcsematkms 10 ll1e eourt \\<!re in c.m,r.

(U) Accordingly. we are ,cfor rins Christopher S1edc to the lkp:irtmcn1 of Justice for invo:s1igotion ofpot,mlial ..-iolaiion(s) of 18 ll.S.C. ~ J(){)J.

8

I PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

165

UNCLASSIFtEO ATTACHMENT A

--~™

166 FROPERiY OF THE U.S.. fiOUSE OF REPRESENrATl'v'£S

IN THE HIGH COURT Of JUSTICE i. CW~Q170Q0413

QUEE:.N'S SEHCH DJVISION ) - ~ APR 2BV ·

0ETWfEN:• {1) Al.EKSEJ GUBAR.!f1< - ~.::,0 Q.l....;

(2) WEBZIUA B.V. '<,,- >,·-N n<cY m w~~tJ,.A l-JMm:o ~:..-~1:...~ .P· {4) xaT HOLDINGS 5.A.

-and•

{1} ORB1S BUS1NE5S INTELLIGENCE l lMITI:D {2) CHRlSTOPHER STEELE

DEFENCE

Cl11lma.nj~

Defafldonts

~ ., t!i~ veffin~ ....-e !o pw.,gr-~ in lhs P~ al Oain wte.1e olhetY;ll!O

Gtmd

1. Sa\se 1h51 R Is admltted lhal lr.!t Sece9d a.id Thlro O;ilm3re. 1;1ra tM;.11liog lnlm:!!rucM'e =npanle: t;es.ed in e-~ NeQ)ertands and ~rm !8!.pe~. no !l<!rnlsl~ ~ tr.ede 0$ lo persorsphs 1 f!od 2.

~- Th9 Se:oM Oe!enaanl es'.d CM:;!opoor B;.urC'\'4 ""9l'O ~ Ae~ end eipe~ Cii;znn .satWl'ltl: In !h~ ~~n ltnd ~mmo~'?h ~

5. ~ .Atdtr1N Wood G"CMG ~ ina 8'1tkn .Am~r lo M~..al'tl ~ 1995 a!JJ 2000. He ta an ~ le i=e!bw C>f k'li& Ru!J!a mil Eurasia Programme at the RQYal 11'1:!llillJI& !or lnlemafiCl1lll Aftainl el Chca'il'.sm Ho~ He ~ oho on A;sociale ol Oro!~

1

I/

PROPERTY OF r...;E U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 167

6. FUJi:)(; GPS {'FU3/,cn'}l$ a alffli.1£sl1C'j l::i85ad In Wastihglcn DC pro'~ fll$(M!TCl1.

11fro:eitc in\~ arxt tlL11;1 ::!~'tee SCfV!ce~ ro cllM\l$.

7. Pnc:v to 1,)6 O't'OO~ In 1$Sw In~=~ Ifie Oefendanls ,'la'tl <iewloped 8 l'iOJ1LTJlg roiator:st.fp ~th Rlslon OV!!t a n.srnhEr of}'88ft;.

8. Al cB .T~lWl! U.'11M F\1~1-0l'I w.3~ ~~ to a11 ObligaUon rtil t~ ~ -!O th.."11 pertle.s confide~ lnte~ mo!~m!! p.rovldcd ~ ii by ~.!I nerend2nts tn tlii,

CCtl1SQ of tl'la! ~~no rolal~ ~'W..i! a,s ssraemern or iff.l DE!Sld.imi.

e. Bo~= J1.'nll am eiar1y Nov-emt« 1016 Obis Wi'J';!, (Jnnai;-eo ~ F~ to prepara :i

&()(Jes°' ~~v:1531 1'11~-.da ~ I);') 11\~I~ a.ir~ Rici:sien effocta to Inf!~ ::ha US Froo/dr.nlial ~cGci.'I ~ .!l'ld llMll bal',Y2!l:'l ~ ~~ 0Q(\31d tn.im,>.

10. The De~s.;dsn1~ produced ~ lhJctl marnorar.da. ThwJ '1£J be re'..elTBd to for i;oo\~Jer<C8 as '"Iha pra.e~n ~·. l'l.a\,rag b$81\ prop.a;.!d ~oro C'>O 2018 us Prc~a1 erect!a.'l. TI"dS iatt ooc ~ ~ in aie tauar p,srt or Cc»~ rote. Nc:1D won, p;od~ h Ne\~ 2018. Noc» a1 tl'le p<lHlleruoo memM:rida. C011ts!r4d 8ttf ~ }o_ or ln~lll;«ic::& about. L"ie ~

11. A!i .en Asscciato er ~ ~ MCrrM.Wood wu tvrure or in'3 s~ oereridar:t's ln!e2lga.~ gsthef.r;g f« tl)ci ~*"-n memooandq.

12. ~!Cl J-,iu, McCflin I! jhe Chmr ci !.fl8 us Sllnia'.O Armed S!~~s ~ltt(IO Md :s me.m::.er of~ US $aroiile ~ on Hemo!anc! ~ Vl<I G<Mltnn1an~l Alfulra..

1 :t 03-41 Kramer )a a !ocmer us ~-e ~(!fll cl','!I sa1w:rt ano ~ ·us AiSi1.tani. s~ of S"1la ~ Desrn:icn,q, Hun-an Right!!, and ub.:ic fro:'r. ~ to 2000.. H5 ls ~ Senb" Dir"-~cr tcf Hum.so RJs1t15 SJ'ld Human fnasr:loa;q si Sat'abr LtcCatn's lr.sli!W!tcr !fitem~tonol Lez~Jp.

1od... Meir ~J) O:loclfon of Oot'ulld Trul'l'lp 8 ! t!Je 45" Pc.isidonl d 6"' Un:"lcd S1altm Oil a No...::r..tm Zil1 e. Sir M!Jrtn/ WOC4 r.:et l.!t" Krnnrs1 e.no ~~-A> it R.&\iit of the:r (f~fOris S1r Arl:!.rew anM.,g,!!d for the Sacood ~ &ri meet Mr Knsmer, as Iha ~resootatlw of ~« McO.ln, In ~ to 6hc:?H him the p~ ill9clioo msmcranda on a conf.<ler.tia! ~

PROPER1Y OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REF'RESENTATl\iQ 168

1. l

1

15. The rn&.:±)g t:..a:Jl9e!I tM Seco.nd Os&ndMI end Mt 1(.'E;Tl'B( t::.x p\OC8 Oil 2B N!M!rnber 2P18 !."I &"ffey. Mt l<ror~ ~the S=ul Oefondo.ll! lha1 :he ln~~e oo had gaihelrl r,ijS6(j ~ of ¢.es?s l na~I ~ ~ -

,6. An arrangancnl w::s IOOsT m200 upc:1 Mr Kramslis teUJm ~ Wash;.T,.tlOn lo, Fu...<>lon to ,:wt.!l_s Sm. Mt"Caln ~:I\ tl'W ~ of the P'JHll~ r:;-emnranda QO ~

00/l~ ~ V:>3 +k Ktmnsr.

17. On b1!11',a.'f of Son !l~n, Mr l<rermr requo:iled lO bo pro,."l~ ...-:th oriy hL"ther lnfEIUl!Js.-r;e ga~ by It\!! Def~ ~u:11llegod ~n ~ e.S11cs In Iha US Prll'!lde.'"l!i~ e-ac:Uon.

18. Toe Defer~ c:i.'ltlnued to~ ~.ell&.1 lMeUlci&nca or, h tr.aEar.i CO'rara<S

by th& pre~ memonmd11 ~ 8'~ US Presdenllal ~, l!1l:i the condl.!S.00 cl Ula assigrtme:11 f0t Fuakln..

19. Aller r=.'Y.ng ~me wtll Weill~ the Second Defc,x!;m\ J:tepen!d !he COrlfiOGn~ t:loeomw ~ refe~ 10 et ~ph a,. c:n h~ own !nllla1hiie en 111" el"Q'.io;i 13 Dewmbet 20ta.

20. The De!~ anu collSldored, ~,. lhi?lt Cho iaw lni.Glfqence in tl'"' Decernbor mem~

lL w:ea of c:.nsid~ lmPol'lllnoe in relf.\lio1l LO all!Jge.-J ~ rruerrorer,ce m tro US P<oskJi;q-itlal a.lac6oo;

i,. ~ ir,;,;,ica!.kull; ror· 1.lJ!l naSOnai sec:.,.'k,. of !ho US a~ fh:, UK; .,111';1

c. rir.«!c<i IO be anaiylsed anti~ ITTV!;3.ti;zaledlvanfi~.

21. Acz:ordinQ~1 lh8~ OclendDl\t .r,.-ot~ & ro-r,y d the~ ~orarullrn to:

a. A !~r UK ~ er.t nafon?J 10:::u't.'Y offlcl&J a~ in tis ~cial ~fy. o., o ~n!.c!antiDl rir..is 1n ti&rn w:;,-; rem,: a.rad

b. FUliO:t, ~ ettQPhattd emu!! ~ ~11 IO!lruefion to Fusion !O pmwle a ~ ~ ll) ~- McCthl '<UI ~ ~:st.

Uabrnty for the publication comp!!llned ct

22. Snw 1.'13! !t is edmlt1ed Ula! ~ ffilfC~ com~ of Md ~l!l oo.rt !llOmf1 1,1,<:?HI

con\2illed in ~ eonfldanfral Dac8mber memara~. ptHagmph 61! ~-

PROFE.C!TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE CF P.E?RESENTATIVES 169

23. 11 Is denied ihf,i In ~r n&t!.r.l! e.od ~ roea.rimg, i:': lherr ~er tantiro. ~ wt,rtls wmpilltnoo of bore oc Wl!fo i;spaNei of beef.;-ig ttie .meenng pk!aasd s1 pcragrn~ 7.

24. Rea.I in conraxs !he nawrnl Ml! ocrl!ruuy mminirlQ ot Iha YKl(CS ~oo o( -

~t m9m 'ffl!rn ~n:,ur.:l:a !o lm.1'S'.l;rB1e ~ the O~lltll ~ bG6cl coe,n::ect hy R.uwa ln!O tis~ .be cc:nputu'!: ~ tly 1.11!3 US ~traSc ~ ~~­IJansnittlng ¥fro-.;. P8~ b<~-;g. s1es11og da-ta entl i:ca-~ llltal:"ITTl OpEScl~

25. S9YS iJ: ... <s0lar as a Is aclmltl~ etove paregl'!-PII S.1 19 t*l'~.

2$. Tl',s, flm sentor~ QI ·parag-:oj:h 8.2 13 notDt3. Thh Is uooo.-sraod3blo. lM 00tl1Cl)3j Of ths O!;-QJm~r mo..w.orancrwn 'W'ln? h'igr.!y sen~itr.ia aoo ~.a Ce'fe~ rr:i.'y

alssem!.iatod ~P~ ce u In st:ia eonn~co Be alO!IKak:I.

26. Sub~raptis 8..2. , . 8.Z.2 ~ 6.2.4 im, cdmltte<I.

29. A$ to sub-~ a.2.3:

L The Int gel'l{mc:o is «,o w;ue for Iha OefeMarts to plesd to rn £nY tn!ar/..~l way.

t Thll &"Et ~llntenr;a ~ again IQO ~ fa; :J)Q Ocl'~:a ID plcx! IO t.'\ any mea~ way. The~ mr;mo,~ndum ~ pto~ed (:) (t",e rec_~ I~ ebcr.-e SC Uu!t !hal lho !mon;-.atoo Ill ll was known to (ha Uniliid Slat~ 6r,d Uniled ~ go<;'QITlffliv.is el a higll l!n~ by~ wltfl ~tiiltY fo; iwU!x'ral s~

30. To.:t Rrs1 sc;nts=ci $l!>~h 8.2.S!s noted.~ Defendants did no\. ltG'_,.'!f, prov!t1a .n)' ot l~ p.-la~ r.'.8~ b:) !Ueda Olg"'...Jl~~ or p.ime.li5ls. far orl lhby ilUtho,.rt?o an,'Me to oo ao. ~ did l?i§y prowlo u-11i l;Otl!ide.?°..:al Dece.-n'ixif mF-roorenc!tim fl) medb o~ns or Jo~. Nor di! !hey auihorizll am.,-one to do 60.

4

?ROPEP.lY OF THE u .S. HOUSE OFREPRES::NTATIVES 170

32. Sl!Vtl lhltt it b 41<1mitt«l U'lcrt Iha SQQan(I Ool00!1Dnt (Jt1vo off IIIQ r~etm.l IA!lingi; to ll ll!niili · m11111>0t of Joumnl~ riboul !hi, pr0-0IC1Clion mnmornndo r, llltl'!I :iurnmor/® h.rnn 201e, AUl).~rogn.ipll o.2e 13 <knlod.

35. Parngrnph B..5 i9 O!!:ll!Gd. The Del~ \s ara oot·Tiebta for ptt~liOrl by 8~.

Quatlfktd prlvUeg-~

:ie. Further o, in Ula nltsmeGv", the <XK1/idonUel 090Bmbor men:.0111ndum Yfil!i ptmfi~hltu by Wi Dofond3nts. as !HB!lrmd 111 pa.mo raph 21 above, In good tallh, QO un QC:CllSlol1 of qulllllied pi1.,,.3eoe.

37. In the cltf.lJrnetanCl(Jll or,t cul cbDll'ft Iha OD!l)O(l.,11111 woro t.JWr,r p l,l\rty lo puCI.$ tho fniormollori fn U1u 0 11com"81 m~ni le ~ nor,trJ1 VK QO','(lrnmont nllUonnl i.,cullty officio! 11.nd &n. Jkenln co th.11 It ~1 koown to the Llnl~d KJngekJm M d Ul\llod Stotoa govomrnonlt Ill i:t hloh klvul by PoriOII& wi.h rMfl(lni,Jblllly IOI nnUoMI· t.OCUIII)', ~ mcl;,l«lnl!I had O C:Of,OJ jmlllllnlJ duty (Jf ll'llc!,ost Ill t1)01'llvo It Ill !Mir

c.ipoc,l11>u WI Ur«>t ~ nllllMl:.ot lh«lo uovommonta ~ •vcll rnnpoooiblrillu.!l.

SO. The fncldc,nt.et f)vbllcolloNI v.i F~ ulld Mt Kmmor WCl«l rcosol\(1blo Oft a moann of bnnl)kl{) U1hs uDMUVft d()aumon1 , '10\mll)' to lho •Uon.Uon o( S&n. MoCul11.

39. Tho Dofernhmll) old ·"ot publr.h tho DtlCC1mb01 momo~ to any of !ho wxl rociplenlo wRh mo lnt"1l)on II ~k1 bo ropubil~hod lo tho world at 1D:rzy, not" r:Sld tt,(ry n!Jc llMY ol them to ropub~!!h lhfl Ou<>ernb?:r 1nemorv11dum to o\l'IOJ'S. It any or loo rociplonla dill '° with lhlJ roa\JI lhAt It ~ s pubfi~l1od ~ tho world al laly11 Iha Oofondonw, In tho clrwtn~ llCell.. rl!mln I.lie pro'..!)Ct!cn of qi.ziuC'lll:d pi'filege.

40. L, J1;1lation to parzigrapn 9, It ~ @t!mltti;d ihet publ[callon Qf .l>i& '>\'Oros comp'~ oo of by 8uzzfood ("' EJJY 51.Jbs&qu~I ft>ltm'lill repubflcalion ~ tl'IOOO IIIO«hl by U,..ird parties) WBS likely !ti ca"<lSll S!!rlrus ha(m to Iha rer,umtion ol lho Flrol Claim:anL Save as nfomsoid, po1tlg(Clph 9 hs no; !ldmlllod. In parlli::ul.11, II ~ riot adrnifsd that the publication or 1m words ~!HI o/ by BuzzFeed (or an~ 11uch S~LICnt ropublloo\ion) h~ o.mm1d 8000llS fiflllndal lollll w any of Ito CtalrnaA\3 °' the< it b tik91y to do r.o In future. The Cm mmls il!t(I roqvll9CI Ill prow ttl9 nXl1lUtnoo and ~tent of or,y ~i r!OM()IOI IO?is ci.ndlor eny ·1111.ry rwo 'flnunckit toe,.,. llllO!led hy th6 pvbllc.it/,Qn of tiw. W()rdn r.o/llp!tllood 1;1f,

5

PROPERTY OF THF. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 171

-41. Pa~ra;h 10 is rot:c. It~ r.ocr.dlrottod~i lh1:> ~wor sadtQf too ~ .sd"~ic(o.s it! ~> Eur~'\ Uni= in Y.°h!i;l'l lhe ;wrtis c.om~ ol wen, rx,ibll&hed ~ iir.d IS, ~ fe: as m1t:9dal, \hs S£1lle as Ole ia.,, r:J England ard W.ile5.

42. /n7tlilal!On to~ f1:

t>. Sub-porag;e;>'I n2 l3 ednulled bul it is ~1'ia:I l!tru ~ Qe(e~·.a ~ llshll:l or CG~od ft;:i '11)b!icnfo:a of Iha wo,'d:; OOi!lp.:.linod ofeoan:mefyw;dely.

44. !fl re>.all:>n 1!l tllO secoo1 Snnlllfl::& of ~ t; 12. II is ~>ad !Bll lt\15 C!L,."Tialn

are ~ ~Jeo to ~ ®meg~. w~r aggr.r.~led or Q~. agatzw. !!l8 Oa~6f'ldalts ll~ o~ lo Bu27.Fe8d.

45. In~ to~~ 1i,1 ana 12.2. u"' adrntUl!lG !!lat !he D~ dld not contac! the Ctai;411l"i$ p.rklr ?D 11",e l)l.lbbl!® of Ire 'fflmls ~ined of by Bu::zFaed. In f:::Jltl of :he mal!el'S p!aa.delS aboYa ih8 0~111 h:::d n) ~ to con~ lt\11 Oei:m~ I'll rclaS~, ta Iha p1.-b..";callon oflho Deoomber tr..:~trm I:?/ Bum~.

'6. Pa~ 1'2.3 la~-The Fil!t. Sl?C.)l1d ar.d Thkd C',a:msr,'!s mr.ta IQUer blita IH:!JDI\ lo !M 0e1~rlda,:r,.~ Oi1 ;l3 J!JU..l!t'/ .2017. fhe i)efeodanls A<:k/JaMedgad ~I of '111 !«tor bofn u~ lhrouQbl! letiet fran !hair fomietllofTci'.Qte. ~a. en :m JMua.rJ 2017. Tho Oo!enda....,.3 !tEn J)tQ'Vlded a d~ response 10 the let\er beflx8 aeljon fO'Jt day& ~ on 3 F~ 20T7. Jha Defendani$ t,Oln~ o:Jt tl'ISl t?lD Ctalmsr.ts' 1au,1 b!l!orl, action ifxl not me..: the mqlin!manls ca:itei.-:ed rn the ~ A.cl.lo!\ Prot~ toe Ol:!£amt1tlon. tn ~ailar rJte liUe.r M!att ;ietion;

a. stst&d tl'lal t~(JOO;l Y/Q) 3, en«Y ~l'& ~..ictcd tr'/ •e_ffilfire~ ot ~ ~lld and Thirtl Ov~ts.. bU1 ca not pro'lidA! Iha ~ or Mr/ d019!'~ t;f :i'loi!:o 'ell:~ . Nor (ijcf ft 5La1$ ~ r M~!l1\0tt Wil & Ems,y ~ r.struct9d by ea Fau.~ Cta~nl;

b. @ not !~n(f'/ Liie ~r ~i.on{e) lt!Sl ~ I.ho ~J~ o£ lllB ~pe~ om, c;:oo!la:ry to p:irag;-aph 3.2 of illo l':,t-Acc&:t» Prot~ool fo.-0:sfamBl<::n:

c. c.id net ~ffy L'18 ~ t.10l Iha F'iB! !o Thi:d Cfa~b !db'tlul&d ta ~ 'l!ffllS co.'T!p!2i;:-ad of, cx:otmry IO ~ra;,.'l 3.3 eJ lhG ~,oaoo ~ ti:"

C>Efama~

The Defenc'an.!q lhe!oCoro n:q~ l!l6 ~nrs to proi.ic5e Ula ri~

:otomiatGn In c:der IO ieuab:e tll<;J Defffldar!l5 to prov.oo. a rl.lll ~ io ir~

6

I••

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RES=NTA 1WES 172

IU 11111

proposed cln•m Notwithstond,ng thP- l:1cl thi\l the Oefondants provldad a tJolcl1lcd

response lo ll'ie C!alm11nls' lelter belo10 action wllhm 11 clay:i of ti1nt teller being ser.l ,

end nolwil.'lstancllng the r,umorous dr.llclenc1cs 1n tno lotte:r oefore aaion, on J Febni.iry 2017 lh9 Claimants Issued nnd served proccedi1Y;JS on tho Defendants. In

the circurnstanccs. tho Oaim.inls' decision to ,ssue procoedings less than rNo wooks anor the !cUer before oclion was 11recipitous, i ncompa:ib)e .,..,,ti the ove,,1e11r.g ol>jcct1vc In lho Civ,I Proccduro Rul!ls, ond b,e.,chod tllo roqu1rllrncn;!; of tho Pm, ac!ion Pro:urol /or Dc:lwnullon.

4 '( 11,s <1F.riP.<I thill the ClalmR'llS R•e t:nlllled lo ;in 1n;unc1ron againsl ltl!l Oe(el"\1.11:I~ ::is pl~~dCXJ ·n parngropll 13 ol tr,e Particulars (t/ Clo:m or m <111.

GAVIN MILLAR q.c.

EDWARD CRAVEN

STATEMENT OF TRUTH

I ho Dotondonts t:ollavo tnat lhe facts set out ,n these Port>culors of Claim ore hue.

Sign9d:

Po~1tion:

Dille:

t~tv~--Chrtstopt,er Steele

Director, Orbls Business lntcllig1Jn::o L1r1

03 Apill 2017

7

PROPERTY OF THE U .S . HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 173

UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT B

174 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE llUl:EN'S B!!NCH DIVISION

Cl:ilm no. HQ17000413

BETWEEN 11) Ai.EKSEJ GtJBAAEV

(2) WEB21L.1.A B.V. (3) WEBZJLL.11.1.IMITED (4) X8T HOLDING 8.A

{1) ORB15 BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE l.lMIT!:O (::Z) CMRISTOPH!!R S"tEEll:

OEffHDANT5' ReSPONSE TO CLAWANTS' REQUEST fOR FIJRTIU!R INFORMAllON PURSUA~T TO CPR J>AAT 18

--------------- ·--- --------(Jndo, p.11rngr•ph, ? ond ll

Of: 'Al IJII mmonnt tlmoc F111'JM ~ :wl>}tlcr 10 ar, oOJ/gation ntX 10 ~Q(JO 10 //lY'tJ (/0/lilN• r:or1/if.fq,,,//(II lntonlgcmo ,rwsorr.,1 prol'idacl 10 tt by /ht, O(r{DJldar:ni ltl tho 0011{111> ol /fhtl WOffllnr, l~~p \VIIIIOI.~ tllo oOMCllllM/ o//JIO Dllfflfldi1J1/~ •

~

I. Wtinlhetr Iha o,ooed <Si>\)' of CClt1Jldontio11ty is smd 10 flt!~ by eon1roe1 or in eqully.

2. !I by coolmcl. sum, \lthelhot too duly llf0$0 under (P) n gooorru coocroct ol rotuln171; o< (b) '$pCCir11. coolnlQa relt,llno lo Ute ~oflc wot~

3. In eIDler e,'!N'll ~la\D lllhe\her ony C1)1l!r~~) ie!oo on were wr11~ Ot ~ II Of'lll, sb1firl$ ~ $nil betv..e<in v.tiam IN)y W@ffi made.

RESPQl:,ISE

The duty 11= both by i;onlract end ln ~. A l'lrllliln non--Olsclcxwle agm9ment was eonciuded between 1he F'!ta1 Oefe!idan\ and e rep~lr"9 of Fusion In JeJ'lUltY 2010 In ra!lll\on to ld(lJ'1( condudim 11y Ftl~ for \hQ ~t Oafendsnt. S:!ath!Rmon1, Fus!O., wM !r'lliere of \ha eo111ldenllalily oS lnl.e~ t'Df)Olit, throuQ.h tllCI course of t>ulllll= \llitn Uis DefElll(Janl& and, ln miatlon to ~ di,clo.sure cf !ho memo..inda le ftlt t<ra:ru?t, 1h11 ~ Oe/erdellt ani:s Fl.1£loo hM oac, s~ ~OG Jn "rrtch ll'ltl con11conlilt~ty or the memornncla had boon ernptau;IS&d ll ncl Fur.'On v,as ln:iU-.. <CJed IO lntonn Mr· l<IBmer al their conTIOeollB!l',y.

REQUEST

. , .

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOVSE OF REPRESE~ITATNES 175

4. S!!l!e 'ttflelhe< 11\e a.."eged d,cy ~ w dl&dQ:.e s~ 1n1e,.,genca ID l~ ~­Vli(ho::t tho pi'.!lf a;J"CKm9nl er fl'I.; Def~ 'II lhe coull!D ~ U-,9 w~ reJatk),-.ship e.$!1Cfci:! ~ <II~~ 'by FWCII to :Mir o.irn i;;fl(JrJs (ic Ola clkl<,~ v.i\o hacl com..'?lisslooed u» in~cllC8 m11lcrieJ: s!IS pa~J]h 5 of !he Del~).

IriSPQNSf

1n sastion to tl\8 ;iro-e!ection m.werooort thr: dtty f"IOl b d':~l.w.i !r.!e;.i~ tc thifcS patties "':thwl ll\il prior agreenlEUll. -Of Ina Def~ did not extllOO to dl~~ by ~ Co II); t!;en:{lt), olthough l!le 01:r~.ots ~lend ~111 ~s ct !he rr:e.."Tln."'3.IGa ·:.-e:."B tt.it m~ bY F\@Cn to ::s cfierll{s}.

(n.ra.'n)ion !() the Oecen'lo!lllr rr.ert<ll'B!ldurn, ttrls was r.OI ~cl p.;,~lll,;t'll to ar,y CC!ll!llCI DI W!!l.d Ill ii3rag.-.iph 1a cC !!\a Oe{sn;a Tl'.e 0\/?Y ~ '.a ~lc-S9 ~ ~'lC8 rip!l't to thi:d ~ ;,,ilhout lh9 ';)dot ~:"il of lhs Cefemia:ita 1.1-.e.1'&'= dlli er.sod !o ef.~ b:, Fu,lcn to it.. c!;ef$).

REQ JA::."1:

5. Slalt> ~tullh<l, OIC Oafclld:m:s GQed any rocip'ocai duly cl ~ Ill f'usioo an~ FU:;.io(l's t:;e."'l.~ in ro~i::,c\ ~ !l'>ll lr,!cffigorGQ lh8y pro•,fdoo.

S:'.nt:e i4 vra.G not p~a ~tto Iha enguQerrrent wi!h FuS>Qn ~'b~ l!-l ~ph SI c4 tho Oorenco. Ibo '0$fcll<!al"..la did not o:-,oo ony c~!lllon o/ ~nllden:o lo FUilen ondl'or F~'11 d!i!,t\1(111 .1:1 r~llon to lr4 ::uJrtgenoe eonl:a.ln$d kl ~ Oe(:e-:nb,,r rr~n<lum.

6. Slal9 ¥r!Y.lther Fu*JI·.$ ~11e'1:i. it'COfat 8$ tfscrosure to lt~m \'fa$~~~ {~it Ri)ql1¢Sl 4). were ~erciry (Mylo lr1'1 O~ffld•,inb 11n:S:oc Fue.'Qn r.at to (a) ~i?

nndlor {l>} d~ Ifie ln\'Olligana; • .m;j, ii ..o, eiva lilm ~n as b h£Nf ll'lal <My ~ aleQ8d to~-

"Th& ra;pon~ to qoos.lkfl 4 ®~ ~ repeated. The De!~e;;nts u-nde.~d ll',at !lie arrangement ~$1 ~ ~ ~ di:W(t.) wu 1tra1 lntc!5geme would ool be a~ed. As eipt~ ~ IJle December m~ \llt!IS ooi ~ooed ~~ to ll'le c.'l",,a~elll re~ to at paregtaprt 9 of Ul9 Otll'e~ and C'knl~ore Ill..~ of lt.e oecen:oor memot2M!!r1 to u-.w clia!'l'!{S}Vfflll Mt ~1ted.

Undor p.anrgr•¢18 9 and to O! ·s~ ~'l.llfJ eno iH!-'fy Ncwr.:~ 2G16 01i!5 wzs eng.ll~ 1:/i' Fw..e, io ~ e o ~.'os ol coo5dcnt1ai memanmrfs ba~ or, ~nro C1:JtlCem&lfi Rus:ief; effc;rt: to frJNience the US PresiiG.~I ~ trCXlO!;!J ll!'/d llnlrs bo~"l?M RussJa ;;.-i<:t ~'d Tromp".

. ,_

I

PROPERiY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 175

7. f>l.oii,oo 1dal\01y (r.oe pornornpn 6 ot tl'lrJ Dn/ol'\CI)) Fu~l\'o Glioro{n) ,n rt11t11ion to thlt pa11i<:tl!ll1 {l~on'(lnl.

RESPONSE

111.6 roquosi IS /leithor rGOsooab!y net1>1>SB,y nor 1>1opo,lion~1e lQ enab!;e \ho Cffl~iwn1~ to propore 1h0lr own.c.uo nos 10 iR'Hlmlana tho case \llo)' l'IBW 10 moot

OI ·11re Otlfend.inls fTO(SuCf!d sixleiin ~di memoroflda. Thew ~ bf> lllfem:d IO fa: come~ es ~ha~ memr:rrutdt1~ l)BVinp been prepe,-ed bolot6 Ille 2016 US Pr.zsfdonllal e#eclfon. T1't9 ~sf l)f)O 'or.ls prodllCe{J in lrie 1$(18( ~ o/ Oclobar 201ti NDna = producoo .it) NfJVM?l),:.< WtCl. /'l<Jt10 al lh8 j:,r~lon memomMa COl!ItJ.'11~ any ro~ to, or k1toNgcn,» ~ . tho ClolmlJllts·.

8EO!JEST

8. In \'lew qf lho =«tlon 1,.>uu no rnEJT!Omnda -e pl'Ddul;oo 10 Novembat 2010, p:el'it:a 111111t1 !rt& nature CJf 111e ol"l!lll9omOl'll rn oart,. UO'tl9'1\txlr 2018 on 1"8/erred lei In j}Mlgraph 9, ontt wt)Gthflr t.llls ongngement Wl!.!I porfoJmcd end what intollkJcmcc ll roolod lo.

uese0Ns1; nm nllluro o! tno Dolondnnt&' OJ1g11gernont by Fu.skin dl<l not GtulnlJ<I dunr4 too polled txJIWoon lhu pro1Wrnl\oo of kltt1 lonl pco--01<i1(l lliJn mr,mornndum ori 20 OC\Dbttr 2016 MO ttia <Into ol UV., OS Pt1111dantllll i:,6eellon liOWl'tl/1lt r~noo th& OolondllnlJ> dld nol rlM'lClivo eny r~l&Vllnl lrttollgoooo c<111~mlng flu,ah111 otlOftll ID lnlNllJICO tht US PruklMlint olt.llllloo pt(.)C4>M 11nd llnka btllwvnn Rui1la ond Donnld Trump tl~ng lhlo pe(.rxl, oo mt11no1111lda we,o p,oduCQd p111t1J~I to tho Ofl!)l)(JOl'llOOI rinC)( 20 OClobor 21) 1 O.

Un~r l)l)1111Jfl'.1Ph, 12 ond 13

OI ·s~nr1Ior John Ml:Caln Js I/to Cl'laJt Qf thlr us SOrniU, Nfnr,q Serviwo Ccmmiltoe Q/ld a mombor ol //IQ Us Sonll.la Commiltoo on HomoJIJnd 5ocl.uftr ar,d Gl)Yt!(1Ut'l(N'Js1 A(fahv anti '~vi,J ~ k, O fomvl,r US Sffllr;r Psps,frrlDl'I( r::MI tllmrMl tlncl WM US A!d:sltdll $(1(:ttilety 6( Stitto !tr ~. Huil>M RJQhw. arid Lr.W from iooo lo ~009. Ho f!J tho Serr:« ~ fCI ffuman Rights and HU71JfN1 Ftwr!Qw.l 1;11 ~enalt:Y McC£Jfn·s fnst/Ulra fer tnJemollonaJ t.DfJtkJrohJp".

REQUEST 9. Pfeesa confl,m (as l)!IJ'9Qroph 29b{ij of \Jla O.ifoocs ~IS) ~t S:JNlor

McCain and ti< Kremor a~ il\leg(ld (a) lo hsva bo.M e.cons In ~11 offic;L,I capaclUe~; a.,o (b) Mly In · relation to ~ C8')0d~ In tn,: ccurse or the mntlorn ploo<IOO ln paragraphs 14 lo 17 end 21b; .ood, i! not, Lcfenllly anyo\h~r cap~clly In vm!ch tmy wero 8Ciliig ord whorl and forwh."lt pc,1poe.<l{a).

-~·

PROPEHTY OF lHE U.S. HOUSI:. OF REPRES1cNTA71Vl:aS 177

The Oefendar:15 b<'..iifM!d Iha[ S!maror M::Qlui am! Mr KR.mer ""-sri: ~":9 «:fy il'l their cffic;;!i ca.Decitie!. sna ~ ,.i« nt:xmei:l of ~ other Cl!?!clly er ~upose L"I ;,,tJ.::h ~ were &;511!;1. There weto no gro\.roo$ that led !Tie Dofoooorns to~ lhnf ~<o, ~k;Caln and Mr Kramer ;a."6re not a:t'!.9 lri ll'lofr otrJCW ca~ at eriy ,l!ma ~;> ~ i:md S'ldudklg llle !1'Jll!icaoon af lhe Ol?cernt,,,;; m=o-nmsndwl IQ Mr l<ra!M!.

Undar paragraph 1•

or •.4s a =l d 0-=:1: a:'¢"~ssfotls s~ .Ar!rit.:-N ~ for the Se,:;a,d D:e~.tf.6nf to niaot J.Jr K'mtroe!, ~ !~ ro,nt:1/'llallv~ CJ{ S9rH!Dr McCain. j1) Otdsr lo :;t;:;-1( r.im /hD ~ion m<Jm:r.m<I;; oo a ~loon!i&J be.sis'.

REOt.l§§I

10. S!Slo whot .a mearJ by 'on a ccnrld~bssii;', ~g preasat;-..t-.al 11Sa or usaa ~or Mte.oo wB.Ylllen; penn;tled 10 m~lla of 1:1\8 pre-e!6t1lor; mamOfatld~ and Ylttether ~ ~~, e.pedn.d \0 ~lw McQirl and Mr l<r&JneJ.

ffi;§f'.QNSf

The Oe~o!a ~<006 lhst th& ~811~ of l,t,o memo.-and3 v ..ul;f be trenllld i.'l ll".a ~!l$1 ttinllde,r.co ttlld ~ onl~ be used Ir! Sa,.,,.1~ Mc:CmrT In hl<i offlc!at ~ (Qt the $0<& puJ3X?$8 c! ~ng. {I\~~ ,anr;i ~!'IQ

their ~ lo ensble 51Jch t.~lon te be takll!t 3$ n11~,. for &.e ~ of proted:r~ us natSoool ~rfty. The Secood Oe!el"ldant ~ lnCcrmoa Mr Km= ti:81 ~ ?l'e,-e!edlon ~n!la were only ~ be tJ5ed far !ht& axclLIS"t'9 ~e boforo he shM,&(5 t.!r Ktamer any cf CM m1;~. M, Krsrner was ~ $l t11le llm11 praMad v&h a,pr~ of ~ ~ tmn h$d been i:ir~ n~ ti.n data, b~ wa,~~-

Uncle-r p_aragtaph 1!!

OI "Th& Del!:nda!".ls cor.(!.."tlJtd to ~Ive llf"~Q"tc,J itlio,'figence M lfu l;ll!Uar~ ccvr:rt1d by the ~ momorailda at:er me US PresidCMfie! oiocBc,, 0/ttJ /tie ,;or,c;J-.1~ ol !f>e as...•<nenl kJr FIJ.$kxl•.

11. Pte.a&& st1:ate v.ft5lne( SlJCtl nle:9'9er.ca "'/&$ a~ =.-ghl tiy !ha- ~d acroOG?ru or rr.e."ely ttteeNe<i (ss pre!,!.,U-/ pleruie-.!J.

R%}PONSE

Sucf) I~~ wu rlOI acL'vely s:o~t;:; Ji w:lS manslv re~w.

Un!fM paragraph 'i9

. j.

PROPERTY Of THE LLS. HOUs;: OF REPRESENTATIVES 178

01 'Altur rnco,•,ing OOffl<I r.uch lnfo/llgu11eo 11w, Sor,orrcJ DotcntJonl PfOIWfC<I (fl{) ~ nlidomlnl Oocomboi mom<l('1f>cfwn, t(l{t/ft()(l lo hi PMJWtl/.)11 8.1. OIi hi8 own Inll/11Uvo °" or (l!Olllltl 13 Doco~, :io1a·.

12. Plllntilt c.1,110 whlltoor tho ~ 'on hl:i = lnlllallvu' moan tnat tho [)(Jcember memororuhsm ""1fl not (fl) C!&Hltw; or (t>) pro,.ided lo Fuoion r,umun11t lo eny r..:,ntmcl. II 001, plimae vpoe1fy \ho CQnlrool in que:iUon.

~~PONSE

Tho Dllcember memorandum wa~ not created 01 ~1/Jdoo to Fus.on p,x&uanl In any cootta ct

uni:ier pnrooreph 20

Of "The Del'ornto..ts considered, COITTlGl,ly. 1/'ull tho rlJVI inloll/g!Jnc& in !ho Dilccmbpr m.imortmd~m: e. was of crmsi,;!erab!e im~onct)· ln m/Mlon to ~ Ru:;st;Jn mltll181'0t1Cf> In Illa US f>ros/dsn~·lil ~; b. (1£Jd ~km~ [Qr nw nE16onat sec,.sify a! lJw US 8ltd thtt UK; Md o. r,seded IQ l,e or.~/ysw end Tc.trl:tr&r inv&sti:}s!edlv~rifleo'.

13. Ptoo&ll 6\ale wt-.e!Nlr 1M Sbooro De(oodant only r!!rl'lehod thla eonciuSliOn on bohell or n-.a Flfs\ Dafc,ndB.il <II' '*'1cther Chri&topht'lr Burrow& Mi11o1 Sat Ar.dtew were parly to his aliSassrnenl

Ss5Pl'.?N~E

Tho Ocfood1Lnlo' 11~110:wnonl that t/10 pttM>lodl.On momoomdo ontJ ;ny . r.ubr,oq110l'II rolcuwt tnlOU!oor,eo wtrlch lho~ ~C>d MOIJl.'J bo ~ lo the lndMdu11I) ntlom,d lo a l pffllOmph 21 of !hi> .Oofa~ wno roochod lolJc\Mp ooi,~rcito l!bcu,ulo~ botwoon lho Sowfl"d OOfoO<Jnn\ unO. ll) Cl11l~Nflho: Oun=• of 1h11 Firul ooronoont; (f1} !llr h-tdJtM Wood ~ h04 ~\\011 wltl'l ~11n.110( ~); (QI 011v'd Knimcr (,tho WO\\ ocllno on t>Qlu.\W of S0l)Clto1 Mr.Com) oncJ (IV) Ulo lJI< n&tbnal 11acun1y ost~illl ,ctfuntld to ul poruvruph i llbl ot tho C)orcncu. Mr Burrow, e.htlro~ tno Suceo<r ()U(oll(l,:11'11'0 u~soum11nt 1:11 tho l'lllavoo1 Omo. 11'<1 Oofor.ot1n1, oonokJ016d thllt lho ,~1111:i v.1110 oo:t,-0Y1"onuy n:,JO"'t)l"I! ~ lhO oolioll(II r.oc:urlly ot \lln US, UK Md 1~ 11 o\Sea 11.!1d !mil nul>Do:iuonc 11\lbllil)onco rallbng to thOMi mauttG oul))n 10 be dlsdo(md lo lho lndlvk11.lllb rolonoo 10 01 p011>i]rnph 21 of 1ho Doloncu. Eoch OI Iha tndMdlJlll& \IIIU1 miom \fin 80<:0lld OctondMI ol&CIJWJd Ulo lllOve Nll"llod &ill vlS¥J 11t rho IIMo and, 10 lhcl Soc:oocl Deiond!Ull'a lulov/edtra Md ool'81. contiouo to ilo!d lh:81 "4cw.

·~·

PROPERTY OF TME U.S. HOUSE OF Rl:PRESENTATIVl::S 179

B.EOUEST

14. ~se elote ~!~ !he O..accrr.t>er memoran~um ,~ ~llY~ kl (sl 1Jl8 UK ~!loriru 5et.~ clfrot?t and,!c,r to) F!ISlon: aM/C!l' (tj Mt Kra.,na( ili'ld Sonil!o" ~in wiih the 30'.Hl:.e or ;,,a e~ ew;imt Ire r.&u1man1s racacroo C< ~l

,r.torma!ion ~!Ilg b tho 2bl11JS ol Lit!! ~ce{s} n! !he ~t~~,ce to:nl:<liOOd '4'!iron tne O~bef mamOfli!Xfum WI:~ no! r~ted whon ~ wa, prov~ :o e:1her !.">a UK ~1)31 ~ cit~ ,mdlnr F~ aridl01 M( Kra-t:lor ~ 59nator ~- Tos 1nl~n contained wntun ctl!l 1n.~1co mix,ru i,;ertalC!~ le tl'le stl!tus of U,e soun:e{sl v,zs coll$Wlt ~ith lhe Oe{u,65,.1!5' COT\G~ eff~ !O ~c:! tha rcerilly d O!B~s}. .

1 ~ P.aaso sl.a!a whslhel l!,s !Afl...ru;;!'.M to rutaon co!ltclned any e~s:s: l'Sf«~ to eodld8!'.lialily {cootr.tst para,grapn 21.> ~ a~ ri!fcrs to 'c,11 11 cor,~~·}.

RES?ONSg

!n Ole Seo:,od Dere.-.dan\'5 ::cmmu~ wrtli F~ ,;tino<,mn9 U'!9. pro>tl6ion of tne ~ tiy ~nerea en-~ f( ~~a~~ 1110.t !.'1~ 4lemoranda ~-e oo.'y ID be r,,~:,oad 10 Mr -K~ fa:- 100 ~ ¢ pa~'-lg L1'.im oo !o s~~ f~. ~~ ~ -werssi~ ~ lll9 ~ Oefenaant arr:s Fusitn na:,J;a~ Eo lti5 ma\.~ wera !:alduded us!r.,g .!:l!al.'B

teleptic;:ie c:cmar..r-l0"j;n$. ~ o-~ =re- com:nunt~ ~ Sna:-n:I Oefrm!1ant ~,.l'GSSly e.r~~c.a ~l fOO Da-~"er IJ=ll'.012ldi.1m ~s stil;f~ \0 Uie ~a ~ tew1ctlon:s. on~ to iliird ~ a& -..aro eoo.!all>.e!'S In IJ")e wri2n 8g=na~ de$cr.~ ~ ltut l'IMl)O("Ga ~ /~~ 1 !O l abO\le.

U.nd-ttr p::in11mph 21a Md b

Of 'J.!;l;q1Jinfly the S=;n.rt Def~/Tlhr,t PTJomed 8C®'r <;;( ll1e Do~~ 10: a ;1 sen/cY we ~rn rt.J l/ar/21 ~t oJf/Ciei acfintJ f.'l hl:s (J.~ ~. ca 3 CQt1r'l!kul1;.'I/ ~~ ,n lwo .;;cyy fwn: eJlrJ b. F=m, by sn-::lpllemd cma!/ ~th l1'!l

1:J~h'JC!iat to ~ n ;<:> rr.wftfr, 11 h;r.J copy r.o SM. ~ \/kl 1...'r Kra:rot ".

16.. R eag~ state ~.her !nt&~ pn:::':id8d t,y l!',ii Olt~i1at1~ to ~ n W'3S

g3,~r~::, pro-.i~ in ~ere!~

-e -

FROPERTY Of TtlE U.S. llOUSE. OF REPR~ NTATIVES 180

.......

Ri:SPQNS;

lotllllll)onoo pro·,lela.d by 100 OotQr.<11Jot8 to Fv,lon w11ri provl<k!d socv,oly.iM \1-hwo J>ro«od oloct101'1alll'/ ii w11~ p,0\-ttled li'I on<:lpllllrod (crm.

Unaar pMonmptu 23 nttd 24

Of '1l IS donilld tllor In lhDfr f)(l(l,lf'O/ Md QlrPrrtJfy mr:ottlfll'/, In tholt f)IOpor 0011/eJd. Uio words complo!nod of lxYD at !I/Em (;{1l,l/tlJh1 d ooarmg the meanmg pie.oded at pera!J(t}Ph 7" and ·Re.act In GOMm tho rA<1tuts/ er.cf crdinwy me&J!ng of th<t war1S comf))DJt>IJa of was lnl!l l!We weu, grO\Jflda lo trwo:ffgat& whether too Clsim8llf3 fi-0!1 mn ~ by RU3Sia info lulclri/'lf/ tho compulo,.s USBd by Jh(> us DortlWll/&: PaJty lon(J~fp, lrtlm.millirrrJ wu~on, {X(IIllft~ bull$, s!oallf'l/1 ""'" ooo ~clln1111111Nin9 o:>C,TUtlons~

17, Please kfBnlify the context Ol!iO!l on and Iha 1'1l8118,<1.1) !O ~ n wa:a o!leli,led!;• knooNn.

Tile reaclers ~:.cm.I ID sre lhe roadors of ti'ID O~bet rt'l8mornndU1'r1 Yltio acx:eue<i and r""8d the v.c~ complalne6 of via ~ Bfllt!o Iha! waa ptiblistxla on !ho auuFOOd ~toon ,o Jlffiuury 2017.

Tho Docombor memOl!.)1)(fvn, WM o. ,ow l/lto~nw ~r\ ""111d'I oontalfl«l inJom1ot!on gnlh1Jrcc from a c:onfldor1tto.1 GQurc:e(.IJ) l!ll)Ov\ ~r'.au, notkll,01 Mlellrily '3.:sue$ lh11~~ rurth!JI' invm;ligntlon.

Fur1l'n!lr, 1h11 wtw'Cls ~ -or were pub!ishC!d by BtJru:sed as p;irt at an Ml® ~"I ~os~ad 8VJI lhb OMlbll!o of tho dl1Mit>· ('nfl-lcil lnflludod !he Oar.oml>8r mornorori<lum) W'lll'O "JJt'l'larillod., ·unco()f1rm11d' and OO!'ll1llnod '11t1W1tf(i~, o.ncJ fX)lo.ntl{J{ty ,mverlfloblr, DIIOO(ll/oo.~·. Tho .euttclo nc;tc!G<J I.hot 'Buwoad Nmva ropatl~ Kl tlra. VS and C:wvpr, huvo l:it>On /nvostJaorlrrg IM Rliogcd 18cl~ In {he rkwi9r but hmlll "°' vri1«J OF,~ lhDlfl.' Tho w1!du rtlportad thal lhei Pr~1-c1ec1'11 01tome1. P.!lctiee! Cohs.'l, hll11 !!(lid ~at oHegattom In th~ ll~ler ·~~false·.

111 lhOAO cifcumulll11~0. fll.i'-dO[l) of thu word3 complDlnod of 1w10 lhorororn 1nvim.1 OIOJ (I) U>c! i::onkinto d ll'lo Ovetlmbe< momomOdum dll1 nol roprn&<mt loml cJld not pwpo1t lo raproMlfll} lj(lriliod fact£. bul YMro raw illto,.'!Jgooco .which had Jdenutied a nltlDB cf alk!gation:i thaJ \,;,airanw.d lnve:.tigaljon .11l~n lt.eir Pote111illl natlomll aeevfily i11~1lons; Oi} pem>/lS men!!onoe(l in Iha o«itlmb<::t rl\tmlOl'Mdum WGl'O ~:y to hOIIO been 11ppmachod IOI CtJnliTlOO!,. rutd ttmmfom mony or ttio.~o PQr&Qns \11$~ lilloly lo dony 1tio·t1U<tgotlon, oonlziinccf tn \I~ rnw lntoJHl)onco: and (81) whll6 lho 004ombtlr rnomomn<lum w111 pni;innid In goOd lolth, I~ oontont ~, bo .criliclllly lliowoo In Uuht of tho ptll'ptll:o fot n.nd cltcumelnn<:~ In wh~ ll'oe inlomiotlon wa:s c;.o!laclsd

., .

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 181

Under pu.igroph · 'li

or ·s.iwi !hBf ll 1:s l!dmJi1Cd cr.ar .ne> &cJoo ()..lf'!md2r,r fl3'.f9 o.7 rt.e recad or~, la s !Jrn-~ nu.r,-.w /JI jc,.Jmafisls a.."v.;,.Jt Uia p!l>-;te:tlon rr.oot,;r~ !it1 la!~ svmmf;:f&:ttmtn 20t~. S®-pstllgr;;p/1. IJ.2.6ilrcferwd".

~

tB. P1~ l!!enliJy !he Jc...~(,&t& t;ri$!8'1 by !Ile~ Deter.6ant and ata:a wr-l a,,d her"' t!1:e ~!"!!lg ~ don,e in eaai CMa 111-..d m glsl 'Jf wtml ~ co;;yeyed.

R!;§PQ7§!;

ni... lol,l!llll~~ illi!laffy l:.ooroo at l:"ll et1t1 cl Se\:lrembJ>..r 2018 b1 t.')e se.tona Dnl'e{!di.:i: er.o Fu~lcm l!l F®,:-,cr's i.-.21T1Jciioo W'l!!'O Crtirn 11'.G, ~ Y«,; Tlmos, l2'l'l W~!on Post. YaJ\oo News. t!'..o ~ YGl"1.er tir~ CNN. To; Sacctid D.?:!onder,t so~u~1 p:µtcpaled in ru~r n-.e(;1.~9s el F\J~'s tr..\'-'Uctt.lr> ~ FIJS!en l>.~ !he New YO!'!( Tim!!!. 1/\e W~w\Oll Pou BOO Yoh::ic ~'6, whlch fe>:l( ~ ln rrJ~-Ocl®'lr 2016. In ~h Q( 0'.0$6 C2i6:i ltia or'~ ~ Yl'i!S =idueied \erc:a,ty !fl !)Ot"'..on. rr; ~. a:tt:I SIJa)'i al Fusion'~ w!r..don. in iel!e ~ r 10 f6 the Second Da!®danl br'oe!od a jootnalist Crom MoU. ~looOeS l:J,J ~ . 1..o ~ ol the p:s~~loll memor.1r.da ~re e\'el' s;.)'ll'J1 or p.'Olllded !o any joumef:Jb tiv. o, ~ \t'>8 ll~\lon oJ, !rl(I Do~~ n, n b<ie!ino~ ~.cl'lla!I tho ~=ra oi t,(tljbJd: lr.!el%er.cG ~ins !n~ cl RuslYlltl l:1~ert'.:won~!!l me tJS ~ ~ soo tM poa!ibl&co,c,-cI,~n al mi:tmbe13 of Ttump'I campal2fl IDa'll ond R\d&~~ gowm.'T>0Rl eHlc:R..~

REQUEST

1S. P'~a e!st!! l'lt'.et '5 rn=I ~ 'off In~ reot!,"ti' !Ult!, ln psrtlcu\Sr ~ i! maa~:

(a) Tho i~ Coo ptt:,i.~ was rot to be pu~ {butm~I be vae:l~

te) Tho 1rJ~ ~J 011 QIJbf:s.'Je~ tM ~~ i;m-d:JutS<J ,o the e>&r~"dY!ta tr, arwway:

{~> AFi (bl, tJ;i;t Liu! Daa:mnts tt:hM t~ ~flGl'1>:3Jly ~ctUYA, tll.rl tio1 IJ'i nam&.

RESPONSE

~ S.."="rd D!lftt!IWlt uno~ ltat lb1I imoona-.i(m pro\1/(fed ffiiihl re used for lhe pUfPDSC cf f\Jcther rel!e!!mh, b<Ji woolj not t;e pubf.sheo or &llrib~: T~ DErfflc!a.l1ts ta~al Illat no c!f the n!O;>l'tl brt&f,-,g ~ (OOK pi.."1:$ COOOiMin,g IM Oecsrnbo: tneff'.orandum, llnti M ~ cf any oi ti» )!t~or, mgrnotaDM er-Oi8 C«el'!l!!et me~dum wero e-.~ pn:;\'ded le l~~ b),. t'if v.Wt U'l9 euthcr'cu&.a cl, !h.o 081~.:fimh;.

REOUEST

20. ~ SGt& ...mstr.8t ll".ese le.tm:i ~ agru,d IO~ mo ~i:d.~t:l~-

-S-

PROPERTY OF THE LJ.S. tlOUSE Or- REPRl=.SENTATIVES 182

Tho Stlcond l)cll)rufonl W1l4 totd by fu5'oll llloll U10 lt1rm11 htld boon uxpl/J1noc.l l0 tho tOloVMI }oumu~I& In OOvt}t\C() by ~l)Jl'I llnd UIO Socond Dofcndonl rf>JoforCG<I !ho bi»itl on wnlc:h ho wan opoaJdng lo .a~h o# Ole joLIITlllll.11tc ho mm In potaan. Nono or tho Jou1Mll~8 mlsl!(J any ob)odioii.

Under pnrogr.ap~ 36 lQ 39

2, . Prasso slate whllth_er tho 00191\CD or quarirti.x, prlvi~o 13 rillied oo by tt,fj DeCO(lcl&11ts If tticy um held lo be liable to, pub!icaUon ta lh9 wolld el Iorgo oe "dlslnct from tt,e admitl.'Jd pot,acallon lo lh& 1/\divld~s ldMtif"ied by IJle Dafemlants In Ula DefBf1cs.

Yea.

STAlEl1ENT OFTRUTli

The Defendonlo beli8'\/8 that lhe fatts !!tllod In lhlt Ro~Pon10 111m truo.

Si{J;wid;

D.llo:

Nic:.cla Cnln

L~ot J}lroctor. RPC; 00Pond11nb' klgol 101)1'1).cunwtivc

18 fAay2017

PROPERlY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RePRESEN l'ATIVE'S 183'

- ,.

Trtt'fi.\Tnl'n- •• 1

Cl:1lm No. HQ17000413

IN THI: HIGH COURT OF JUSTICI: QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

BETWEEN

(1) ALEKSEJ GUBAREV

(2) WEBZlLLA B.V.

(3) WEBZILLA LIMrreD

(4) XBT HOLDINGS.A.

Claimrinta

ilnd

(1) ORBIS BUSINESS INTELLIGENCE LIMITED

(2) CHRISTOPHER STEELE

Dafendenu

DEFENDANTS' RESPONSE ro PART 18 REQUEST

RPC Tav.,er 8ridoo HaJS<J Sr l(a\Mrir,c', W"Y Lon~oo E1W IAA T: 020 3000 C-00-J

Re!ere-:1oe. ORSA.!

Solicitors for thu 0ter~11:Janls

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 184

(U) Appendix H - Committee Corres(?ondence about FISA Abuses

Appendix H Table of Contents

{U) letter to Acting Deputy Attorney General Dana Boente (March 8, 2017) 187

(U) letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer {March 17, 2017} 188

(U) letter to FBI Director James Corney et al. {March 15, 2017) 189

(U) Letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower {Aprll 4, 2017) 191

(U) letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions {May 9, 2017) 192

(U) letter to Acting Attorney General Marv McCord (May 9, 2017) 194

(U) letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 7, 2017) 196

(U) Letter .to FBI Acting Director Andrew McCabe (May 161 2.017) 197

(U) Letter from Acting Assistant Attorney General Samuel R. Ramer (July 27, 2017) 199

(U) Lette.r to Special Counsel Mueller and FBI Acting Director McCabe (May 17, 2017) 200

{U) Letter from FBI Acting Director Gregory A. Brower (July 26, 2017) 202

{U) Letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. 1, 2017) 204

(U) letter to FBI Director Christopher Wray {Sept. 1, 2017) 206

(U) letter to Attorney General Jeff Sessions (Sept. s, 2017) 208

(U) Letter to FBI .Director Christopher Wray (Sept. 5, 2017) 209

(U} letter to Attorney _General Sessions and FBI Director Wray (Sept. 15., 2017} 210

(U) Letter from Deputy Attorney Genera1 Rod J. Rosenstein (Sept. 22, 2017) 212

(U} Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein {Sept. 26, 2017) 213

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein {Nov. 2, 2017) 215

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 28, 2017) 216

(U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Jan. 4, 2018} 218

(U) Letter to Former FBI Director James Corney (Nov. 8, 2.017) 220

(U) Letter from former FBI Director James Comev {Feb. 1, 201~) 222

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 6, 2017) 223

185 PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

. (U) Appendix H (Cont.}

{U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (March 14, 2018) 225

(U) Letter to Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein (Dec. 12, 2017) 227

(U} letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Dec. 12, 2017} 228

(U) Letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Jan. 19, 2018) 230

{U) letter to Deputy Attorney General Rosenstein and FBI Director Wray (Jan. 25, 2018} 233

{U) letter from FBI Assistant Director Gregory A. Brower (Feb. 2, 2018) 235

(U) Letter to Assista1Jt Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd (Feb.16, 2018} . 236

{U) letter from Assistant Attorney General Stephen E. Boyd {March 7, 2018) 237

(U) letter to Former t:Bl Director James Corney {Feb. 20, 2018) 238

(U} Letter to FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe (Feb. 20, 2018) 240

{U} letter to Attorney General Jeff sessions {March 1, 2018} 242

186 rROPcR1Y OF. t HE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA11VES

... , .,, ........... . . .. , .... ; . . -:. . -, .

. .... ~ .. ' I · - & , • . ..... ,, .. :., ... ,. ' '"'· ... UNCLiiSSIFJF.D ~- .. =. ::.:. : ~: .. ·.7. (.~ . ., . ,,. .. ·· .. :, ...... -.,, _, __ ..! • • ,. : , .. ; . .,.

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ,t,..· , ....... .. ;., -...... . , :. ,_ , t. • ,• •

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. " , .

F't;tr."·~~r,fN I" e:F.J~Ci"' Cc,r.c~ :'"'TEE ~1 J:-:n:u .1~;ENC1c

M=h 8, 2017

The Honor:ibJe Dana &ente Actir.g Depur;r A:tomey General United S:a..es Depamnem of J1Jsticc 9SO Pmnsyh"$Ilia Ave, NW WashiOJIOD, D.C. 2{)530

D~ Acting Deputy ;\nomcy Gcnaal Boentc,

... ... ·c: ~ i'-lt,(..:.-.;. ;. ""1.,.l,! M "'C:: k)'\t et: ;f,f',J ::'

-:>aJ": n~ . .a< 1

... ··.·· " ::.

·~·

The Ho~ Pcmianrnt Se!~ Committee on Inte1liil!nfe (the C=ittee) is av.we o( T"..tP...nt media reports iodie:lting ih.c possi'blc wsteri:¢e of Foreign rnteili~ Sun-eifla::u:e A~ . (F!SA) appli;a.uons subm:ued '] the 0.:pPrtltLO~ of Justice {DoJ) in 2016, and'm- r<lrelgn ln1¢11igcnoc SUN:etllencc Court F1SCJ orders o-r criminal warrants ~t to T'uk m of 11te Omoi"bus Crim! Cont.o! 2::!d Sa e Slrccts Act of 196B !hill msy h1W¢ iwthori~ ~ .:atleciicn ;;ii' communkatlons and/or infonnarlon ~~ins Presidei1tii;t tandid8.lf: D=1d J. T=iy OT hl5 ;w..Q~i:;ites in 2016. ~

Porth: pwposes oithis lellf:t', -associ~Ies' includes =IJY Trump cam])8tgn SUITOSJ!!C!>, er.)v.isors, or e:mP.loy::es; U."f TTWnp Org_4nization si.-m,gn1es. sdvfaor5, or employees; a.>til fe.rnily. friends, 1111d business ~ates ot Mr.Trump.

Acoo::dingly, (bi: Committee m:.=ts ~ fo!lo,\fog ln~orm::ti<m. i fil exis:is:

1. Any· 11.nd 11n r;apies of er.y FrS,upPfie.ni ons subwiC'.ed to tt.e FISC by ~ DoJ in 20r 6 regilltfiog then Presidential arndidate Don-el.d J, Trump or bis as:-.cci:I:~ .

2. A,,y lUld cl1 ca~<if any orders issued b1 lb.e FISC in 20l!> regarding then Pr--..sid~lial c:indidnle Dmla!d J. Trump or his s=fates.

3. kl.y and .;11 coplesof ~ we:mnt is!l.1Cd by a Fdcni.l Judge or MllgiS!l""...!e ~.muan1 to Tit!~ UI of the Omn.ibt.ls ~rime- Ceontrol a..-,d Safe Street:. Act of 1968 in :W f6 ~ding then Prcs.idai:i:11 e£ndtd:itx: Donald J. Trump or his a,.socfarcs.

We seek coi:,:~ of the for~ins do=umenis, iith,:y c:ds1, r.o la!¢r than Merch 13, 20 i7.

P:vlnNtz= Chai!'Tlll!Il

Copy to: Tne Ho:iorcl)lc 1AmfS Co~. Ditedca-, Fcd.:~l l3= of lrwi:s.tig:ition

UNCLASSIFIBD

[__ - ----- ------ ------ ------ _ ___________ _ j

,,,...., PROPE.~TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REFRESENTATM:eS 187

. I

------- - ---

(I ' .

OffiL-e of the Assis•.11nt Attorney Gcncntl

The Honorable ~vi:i Nunes Chairma.., P1:r.mmcnt Scle(:t Committc: on lnt,:IIig~ U.S. House ofRepreSi!ll[:i.rive:s Washing~n, OC 20515

Tii~ Hom)mhlc Adam B. Schiff Ronking Mcmb.:r Pcimam:m Scle.-::t Committee: on lntcllig= U.S. Bouse of R.ep.resenlfili ves Washington. DC 20.515

Dear Chatrm2n Nwles and Congresmian Schiff.

U.S. D~:irtmt<trt<lf Justice

omce oftegi5lll!ive ./IJfairs

Washington. D_C 20530

March 1 i, 20i7

Endo.Scd p!eas.e find ctessifiro documenls re!ponsi\'e to your ~ which w:: a.re providing for te\iew only by each of )~u an1 fur ri:turn 10 us !CX!ny. q1 !!i.!dilion, pun.mm! to 01-'T asreernen1, one s~mcmb::r for e.ndi of yo.u, who lru the rcguisi~_~ra:ru:cs, also ~ ny review lhe matc:rials. ln the cvcr.t that either cfyau is not available today ro mi.aw these mareriols, you may designare one staff mcm~rwim the rcqmsitc clearan~s to review ~min you. sc~d- A;-i attomey from :his office will r<:m11in with lhe: docu.rt1cn1s at ol! times and R:tt.'nl with lhcm to tile D1.:parun¢t1I today.

We hope chat Chis intbnnruio.n :s ~"lfut P!~e do not ::esit;Ue to ~niact tnis oflic~ if we mny pn11:idc additioaal ;;,ssjst~iK-.: regimling this or any other rm.tn::r.

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FROPERiY OF"iHE U.S. tIDUSEOF REPRESENTATf\JES 188

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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PERMANENT SELECT COMMITIEE ON INTELLIGENCE

March 15,2017

The Honorable Admiral Michael Rogers Director, National Security Agency Fort Meade, MD 20755

The 1 Ionorablc James Corney Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Washington, D.C. 20535

The Honorable Mike Pompeo Director, Central Intelligence Agency Washington, D.C. 20SOS

Dear Directors Rogers, Corney, and Pompeo:

HVC- 304, THE C:l\l'IIOl WASHINGTON, DC 20515

(202) 22~121 D• U"i,, N,1'51UJ

!i•~r0Hl"t~

As you know, the Committee bas been very concerned regarding the purported unauthorized disclosures of classified information, po.rticularly when they pertain to intelligence collection on, or related to, U.S. persons (USP). To take a prominent example, a January 12, 2017 article in a mojor newspaper was the first to claim that "Retired Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, [then President-Elect] Trump's choice for national security adviser ... . phoned Russian Ambassador Sergcy Kislyak several times on Dec. 29."

Such stories would appear to contain the unauthorized disclosure of USP identities. This potential misuse is a key reason why the Intelligence Corrununity (IC) has developed robust ''minimization procedures" for the protection of USP information, including requiring the "masking" of USP identities in most circumstances.

However, as recent news stories seem 10 illustrate, individuals talking 10 the media would appear to have wantonly disregarded these procedures. The Commillec is concerned that USP identifiable information may have been mishandled in violation of approved minimization and dissemination procedures pursuant to statulc and/or Executive Order 12333, as amended. Therefore. no later than Friday, March 17, 2017, each of your agencies should provide the Committee with the following:

UNCLASSIFIED

.,.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 189

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UNCLASSIFIED

I. All spt<i(ic l)()ticlcs Md/or proi.:cdures c11ch ag;mcy employs to make II dc1~rmin111ion It> un~kand disseminate 1hc i1kmi1y ofa USI'; ~ifically, the Commluee rtqueru the :ipprovnl process requirt'd co autll-Orizc such a di.s£eminalion within a11d outside the: llflcn,;y, mchidi11g lhc nU111bt.-r ofimlh•idWt(g who cen uw,ove an unmu:t!<ing in ci:ch

, 1111,cncy:

2. The.toral number of d~in.itions of ruiy unmu~ked USP id<:nlitics between June 2016 and January 2017, it'lheJ' e.xist;

3. lfthi::y e.xist, the names of any unrnas.lu;:d USPs. whose identitf.es were dlsscmi~<:d in TCSJl<lllSe to requests from IC agencies, ww cnfurcemcnl, or senior Executive Branch officlals betv.>een June 2016 and Janiwy 2017, and thet n.:lntc to Prc:si\31:ntinl candidntcs Donald J. '!'.!'ump w.rl HillBJ}' Rodho.m Clinton a11d their C$0cillles in 2016; 1

4. lflh~y oxist, tl1c rumics ofiiny lC ngcnciC81 law er:uorccmcm agencies, nnd/or senior Executive Brunch ofl1ciD.ls 1lwt r1:qucstcd nnd/or nu1hori1.ed the w,rm1sllins nnd dl&.'!t'lttinutlon of USP infomintion n:la1ins to too specific [ndlviduals and entities 11pcctfkd in request t,J abov~. AS well II$ the 11~,:~ ofull ~pcclftc retlpient.s oflhat 11nmiukcl LISP informnllon; m\<l

5. 1 fit exists, th~ s1mcd reason, pursu.im \O the ri:lcvant m1t,lml.1.n1lon pruc~dur;;u, for unm'a.,il<ing crn:h USP idcmJty rclntinc 10 request IIJ ~bovc.

We Opprt¢io1c your prom pr mtcntJon 10 tl1is request .• If you han: any questions rcg:irdln& the forcaolr,S, please COTIIOCI 11~ Commill~o ~\ (21>2) ?.2S•412 I,

Cupy to:

Devin Nunes Chainnnn

Sin~~n:ly,

Ad4m F3. Schiff Rooking J't,kmber

~ Honorable Michael Dcm!l!lcy, Aeling Director of-:-Jatiunal lmclligeIB:r:

' For 1bc 11~1j)0.1Q or this )011~,, ··iu,orlJ>1•'1• lndu<k o..,ry c.111n;111f!!)l ~w1ogo1C$, advhON., er cmplo)'ilc:31 M)' iNmp ~&11!rA!l~1n cir Clinlll~ Poµn<C..ll1.1:i wrroi:,>IG~. 11dvi~. «· cn,pto~~"ct; "2id fo111llr, frl~As. lllld bu~lru.'11~ 11.!MlClacc, of Mr. Tnimp lllld Mn, CUncorL

lJNCLASSIFLHO

----,

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 190

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H="l!.hlc: Adam B. Sc..l1iff l{Jm);ing Member r~ Stlecc Comrni!lfc en !:nti:mb=c: U.S. llouse:ofR.~tati-,.-cs W:ciiing1t1n. DC 10S13

April 4. 20! 7

Thls re.spor.ds toy= le~d~tcd March iS, 2017 to Admiral Rog-ers, National S=ily A~~J; Director ?o~pco, Ccntra.l lntcllig~me Agency. :..'ld Di,relor Come:y, Fcc!en:l Bure~ of Jn\·~~tio;i {FBI), ,:=qt.:cstlns. ir.:orm:.1ion con~"11ing ~ci> ~ncy's po!iciese.rid pra.."'\'.ldUr=! cdz.1.ms lo the di~=unawm of U.S. :;;,erson infor.nsticn.

J\s 'l\'l: ha\-e dlscu~ with your s1s.ffa on :s¢,'eraJ oc:::asioos, vn: .ve?co= :au oppoctllliliy to hr.ff lb~ Commi1rec <:0.nceming !he F'Bl's poric:icsMJ! procc-!ur,;s motd~r t.J identify inf=.ni<>n h~lc.l by me- FBI th..·u is of in~;:;;t co the Committee.

'},le 2;)i)rccutc )'OU::-.:orttinued supp,on for the FBl aiKI ill llliS£Dn. P~ <:anact this oiikc is we c:2.0 be of f urtha nssis'.a!ire.

Siaooely,

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Gregory A. Bro= A~t i)i~ctor Off.ce of v.ing.r=ro,1:al .A..mir.s

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PROPERTY OF lHE U.S.. HOUSE OF REPRESEN:ATWES

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UNCLASSU:CED//COMMITIEE SE.NSll'lVB

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

P"Jl,081N1.Sfu.c.1ct f•IHor'.I H'1"1:'fhQl.~1c:1.tA~

Pl!AMANEN'I' St!UlCT COMMrrTGG ON INTI!LLIG!l'NCE

May9.20l7

VIA CElQlFJBD u.s.~ND ELECTRONIC MAIL

The Honorable Jeff Sessions U.S. Artorocy Gcoeral · U.S, Department of JUSlice 950 Pennsylvania Avenu,: N.W. Washingwn, D.C. 20530

Denr General Sessions:

HVC•'.)04, Tu" CA1'1ToL YIAmt:N0.101'1, 0C 20$i0

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Ju part ofits bipartisan investigation into R\1$UU1 nclh·e m~surcs directed at the 2016 U.S, election, the House Permanent SeleQt Commit!~ on lntelligence requests that you prodUGC certain documents nnd 01her matcrla.ls 10 the Commlttet: nnd nmmgc for your partictpation in o voluntnry, transcribed Interview at cho Committee's ofrtces.

First we respectfully ask that you produce lo the Committee, 1,y L10 later tha.11 the olo~c of business on M!ill, the following;:

Any documents, rccor&, elce(ronlcally stored inform.1tlon 111cludiog <:•mo.ii, communic111iou. rccordingo, dotn nnd tnnglblo Lhlngs (tncluding, b'Jt OQt limlt\XI to, grnf)hs, clu:u1:J, photogruph.s, images and other documents) rlll£tlrdlc:is of form, other thnn tho:.e widely ovnilnblc (e.g., nowspnpcr nrtlcles) that reasonably could lund to U1e discovery ofuny fucts within lh.c iovesUgntion's publlcly..unr1oun~d pnrnmct~.

In complying with this rcqu.cst, we nsk th:.t }'OU furnish to the Committee, in Ulll'1!dacted form, :my OJ\d o.11 resix>nsive materi11l in youacrual or constntctive possei.sion, custody, or control or otherwise available to you. including rcsJ>Onslve material possessed by any ~ party to be transferred to your possession and shaced whh the CQmmin~. This ~uesl ;s also made on an ongoing b-.!sis: If after making an initial production to the: Committee you find addltional responsive material. you should produce that material to the Committee.

To the extent not encompassed by the above requesi. this leuer also ri::quests ~ervatio.n of all docuine.nts, rcccmis, electronically stored infonnation, recc.rdings, data and 1angible things (including, but not limited to, graphs, cfwts, photographs, images .and other documents) regan:lless offonn, other than those widely availaole: (e.g .• n~wspapcr llI1icle3), ralateQ to the Cornmittee"s investigation, your interview, and any anclllmy mauers.

PROPERTY OF rne U.S. HOUSE or, Rf.iPRGSE NTATIVES

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UNCLI\SS!l-1ED/JCOMMITTEE SENSITrVE

Shoufo ft hcromc nec:tssery t~ do m, ti:~ <:9mmi1~ m::n, suppl£mcnt the rlo"im~nt reot1est ronl:iincd in tyis lcttcc::it :mv tim£:

Cornmilli:>.: staff will work wiih you 10 m:\uge }'O\lf illt.:'.rview, at a t irnem111 <fu,e S!lbsettU>.:m to · )'0\1.f prcduc:Lion of do-..-;::n~n\s tO tll~ Commi:!.i!~. The m£i: .. 1::w m11y co~·cr miy hlpic within the Ett.blic:ly•:wiou."'JCC'd paramc:<crs oftht: Comcni1~c·i; im.estigziion, iccluding Rl.!ssiw cy~r ::etM,ies diCl!C~ ~1 lh~ 2')16 U.S. ek~tion, po11:n1izil li.n:."<s betW<cn Rt!S'Siu ~~ indiv;d113Js assi:>: i.l~ ·wilh p,ol!ti~ I cam~sns. lh~ U.S. g.ovemmcnt•s ~n.se 10 these Ru.ssfan ict!\•c m~o..u=, aod relared leclcs of classified it1fi:rn.,a1ion.

Shollld }'GLL !1:..-,'<! any q=Liot1:s at l!ny tii"D<?, p~se contru:t C-Qn-,mitt~ sufT a.t (202) 225-4 i 21. Jr :,-ou = r,:pn:~tcd by !!n attorney, pl=r forward thl.., lc.ncrto your anomcy. tmd i!.a\·e h.iiu or !-.tt con=t the Committee o::i your bdclf.

Sincerel;: :.o-· -:- · ­- • f· · .

~~;2~7-~ !':,fembeJ- of Congn:.ss Tt:.n!dr.g Mcmb;r

.iUradunrot: l'or2roeters for Rl!Ssia !n\'estigorion

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PRC~ERTY OF THE U.S. 1-iOUSE OF Rc?RESEJ\<f A 'flVES

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193

u,..tnH-.,, 0,1~.ata_ CH.•J •"IAN

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ON lNTf!UJGElNCE

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VIA CERTIFIED U.S. AND ELECTRONIC l\fAJL

Ms. Macy McCord Actillg Assismnt Auomey Genera! U.S. Departmmi of Justice National Security Division 950 Pcmmylvania Avenue N.W. Washington, D.C. 20530

Dear Ms. McCord:

As part or its bipllctisan invcslig:itlon lnto Russilm nctlvc imnsurcs directed et the 2016 U.S. election, 1ho House Pmtnnncnt Se.lcct CQmmittco on Intelligence requests thAl you produce ccrt!lln dOC\.lnlcnlS nnd 0U1er m11tc.rials to the Conunittcc and pnrtlclpotc in a voluntnry, 1ronscribcd il){crvicw nt the Committee's offi~s.

First we r~ccUi.dly nsk ltwt you produce to the Commi«ec, by no Inter 1hru1 lhc close of businosson~. the following:

Any documcnlll, records, olectronJ~lly scored itifonnntlon including o•mllil, communlcutior1, 1ecordinge, data ru1d tansiblo lhing.s (hwludlng, but not limited n:i, nroph:,, chnru, photographs, imas~ and ·other documrnts)' regnrdless of fom11 other 1han those widely o.vn.Unble (c.g., lle\V5papcr LUticloo) tbatzeasonably oould lead to the discovery of uny facts within the invcstisntfon's publicly-announced p[IJ'8fflclers.

hi complying v.ith this request, we ask lb.at you fumi~h to the Committee, In an.redacted form, any and all rcspon.5ive material in your actual or c·onstmctlve possession, custody, or control or oUierwise available to you, including responsive mnteri1d possessed by any third party co be tnulSfurTed to your possession· and shat~d with the Committee. Th[s r~est is also made on an ongoing basis! ifiuler making an lnilia! production to the Committee you find additional responsive material, you should produce ttiat material to the Commltt~

To the extent not encompassed by the above request, this letter also requests preservation of all documents, records. eteetronically stored informalian, recordings, d!rta and tangible things (ineludlng, but oot limited to, graphs, char!s, photographs, imnges and other documents)

PROPERTY or- THI: U.S. HOUSG oi:- REPf<ESeNTATIVES 194

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UNCL.-\SSlf,'fF.i}{iCOMM!TIEE 8I!NSIT!VE

regardless of fonn, cli;er th.ar; rhllSe widcly lf'tailable {e.g., n::-,v:;p:3per n,1icks). related 10th.: Commi~'s im'l-srigation, your ittll!!",i ew, :ind any 2r.!:.l1!ary martct'!I.

Sboutll it hccom.e n~e.rv to do so, the Committc~ m!lv .su~plem~nt tbe document n:~rui:-.st co11taint!I In chis letter at am,- time,

Ccmminee suff 11;ill work wi1 h yon h) nrra.~ y.:iur interview, at :i time ::md d~e subsequent to y:,;,ur r,mrlw:rion of rl..~wn:nls to !he 0.:imntitt~- Tl?t! imer.-icw may ccve. any topic ·\,ithln tlie pub! i c;ly-mwcunced ~m meters of lh¢ C-On::mit1« 's inv,;stigaiion, i.~cl uding l{ussian cyb;:r ac:livili~ directed against the 2016 U.S. elceti-Or., potaitinl links between Russia and indi\'idml3 assocfarc,d v.;111 politiea.1 ~mpaig.'lS, lhe U$. go,•emment's respcmse to thi:sc Russian a.-ti,-e measures. end refaterl leaks of cl,'>S3ified cnfumi2.tion.

Shoufd you have ar,yquestions m any lime, pk::ii~ i;on~-ct Commiuee staff at {202) 2254121- ff you ~ ~resented by an attorney, ph:asc for\,.'an.l lhis le.·t:!T 10 yo,,.ir uttomey, and tia-.•e bic:. or her contact tfo:- Commi!itt on your l:cl,alf.

2

?RO~!:RTY Of TI-IE U_S.. HOUSE a.= REPRES::NTA71\'ES 195

• Tho Hon.orablc K. Mlcliacl Conaway

· Pcrrr.llncnt Select Committee o:i lnt.:lllgencc U.S. Efo= ofll~entntiv~ w~~bi.ogton, DC 20515

11ic Honor&1le Ad~m Sc.hiff Ra..~J.:w.g Member P=~~t Select COJllll\illee 011 lntclligcnt.o CJ.S. House ofRcp1-u.."C®tives WllShington, DC 2Q5l5

U.S. l>cpnnooont of Juslicd

Office ofLcf,i:1l~tivc Affuir.i

Wa$hin.r:ton. D.C. ,10S50

JUL O· 7 2017

near Congressman Coruiway and CongmmI'.an Schiff:

Thi, rc::pouds l.o youz lcttlll's to the Attowoy Gooorol and to 1hllll•Actin,e Assfot:1111 Ar.lnniey Cicnmil l'>'llll'Y McCord ofthe N111ionnl Sc;,cmity Division, both dated f\{Jly 9, 2017, will.oh. requested do~umeots in oonuecUon with \fa~ C:ommiUc:e'N 1m·1:Nlig11\ion int.o Rll!lslmt acrivc moos rues directed 111 tho 20 16 U.$. eleotlrm.

A:i ) 'OU )mow, on Moy 17, 2017, 'Ille Dcpartmoot of Juutico (O.iplll'tmcnl) announced the ni1pol11.trr11:nt of Robert S. Mudlcr m to sc:we 11~ S11cclol COWLSel to ovorsc;Q too ;rrovh)tL'!ly- . oon11nnod FBI invosllgat!on of R~i~n !)O\'t:mmcnl offor(IJ to infl~1011ca the 20 L6 prc.?idcntio t election nnd rolntml numerJ. We o.ro odvlSlld I hat tho 8pcci:tl Cow1sol ho, ~sun to lnke r.tep~ tn l\1JJill U1cse rospcmm'bilitics. Under these c!rcwnstanoc~ ruid co1wistcnt with the IJ<:plll'll.Ue.ul's hmg-~t~ndiog polity rcgnrdlng thu '°nfitlcntiwily uncl scn1iliYity oflnforrnntion rc:ioting to J)Olldh1g n1.1ltCTS, the Depnrunen( is not p~t W rc:&ponJ furthor to yo11r rcquosts ut Uus time.

We nppreci.nte the Commiltee's luterests in Ulis ut.11tcr ond hope that tb4; infonnetion !R helpful. Plc&e do not hesitnto to oontn.ct this office Jf we may provide a:fditioual :is~ist:Ulce 11bout nny otbc-r m.1tter.

&sm~.~

uel R. Rnmer g Ass.stant Attorney (!Cll~al

L_ PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RC:PRESEN l'A'l'IVl:S

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VIA CERTIJ.'IED U.S. AND ELECTRONIC MAlL

Aaing Di.rwor Andrew McCal:e FBI Hf:a.dqU211.erS 9<..S Pe11.1lsylv~ AVet°t'.!C, NW W3Shingtoa. D.C. 20535-000t

t.~ Act.ioi Di~r Mcl:abc:

. As part oi'its bipmis~n investigation ic..10 Rus:san ~Clive me~s ci~cted at the 2.\1]6 U.S. ekction, tr.e HCU3e Petmf!lCll.t Si:ltx.t Commine= on. ~er.ce req~ ~ you prod= ce:tlBin doclJIJ'lea?s .!lld ot!::er meieri.als to I.he Comminee !l.!ld 2rnmge fo:- YQ1.1r pe:rticip:.Ui® in a •,olwlwy. trans::n.1>od inll:n'icw at~ Ccmmittce's (If.ice:;,

Fi~ we respectfully cl that you prorlu.-:e to tf'l..e Committee, by no tarer i.,an \.he; close of Ir~ on Jl.!av 23. the following:

Any d0¢s.!l:.!Ct1lS, :i:cotds, elcdr~i:.nlly st¢rcd infcrmE!icm including e-mail. ccn:muni~oo. t1:corclir,gs.. dau. and t.ogiblc lrungi {incl~ but Mt lil:ruted to, ~ . clw1s, pruitograpru, umacs and ocl1er documr:n.~) ~~ of form. oth<:r lhwt those widely a-.'.llW>le (e.g., De'>\'S;>al)U .!..4:ic!es) that i:ea.ou~bly eould !e9d to the di;oovery of any ucts witliin the bvestigatio:J's publicli'· llnC~ Faram.e:cnt.

fn complj'ing with lhi:1 ~ul;St. we Ask tct yo;i furaisb to the Committee, in ~edat'.ed fOffll,. =y arui an ~'l~"e nweri4l in your ect\l8I ar~ons(nlCti \"<: possession, cc.s:tody, or control i)r olh:::wisc ~"~ to )'Ou, inclumoi rcsptmsi;·c ma!:ml possi:ssod by .any u:ircl paey to be ~ca to y<Wr pcs:::es,ion end shsred with the Comznircee. nus requ~t is alS<> ma& ca im

orsoing leis: if ~tter mtki og a.'I illitial i:;roduc:tion ~o Ille Committee rou finrl additi=al re;sponsive roaterial, you ~ u!d _produc:: tha.t m~~tW to the Commi~

To the no:cnt not encompasso:! by tlte shove request. thjs ltUJ:r also TI:1,.u:sts ~ent:tion cf al [ d1:a1rncotS. r~ords, c!cc:tr.lni<:al:y stored information, n:cordmgs, da~ and l:l.ngible c..'lings (mcludinE, but Mt lil-...ited to, ~s. charts. photographs, im1:ges ar.i.ct.'ler6'.lcume.ltS} regardless of fuim, O<he! thllll tfa:ise widely available {e.g .. ne.WSP'!P!l' anides}, rel21:d to ~ Ccmmilte:'s i.'!,:CS!igatlon, yoU? in!et\'iew, !lllli ~y znciJ:!wy :n.attei:s.

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PROPERTY o; m E U.S. HOUSE OF RE?ReSEITTATM:5 197

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SJtuLLld ii l)CC,ODll) IIC~.'lslln' to d() ~n, thc Con\ntltMS! nil)]' sunnlollut~Ul t{le ~ocum~nl regugt sonlllipcd In lill11 ldtcr 1't 11ny func,

C<1mmittoc ~taff will work with you to ammgc yo\tr intcrvfow, at a. time and date: ~ubseqlJ<:[ll 16 yout production of documco\S to tho Comauttee, T11e lntcn-iew 10.~ <:over o.ny topic within the publicly•an:nounccd pua:ne:er.; oftl1e Cammitt~'s investiga.lion, including Rl.l.~an cybor wivltle:.c; dicected age.inst the 2011? U.S. eh,ction, J>Olcntial links b~eeo Russia nnd lndivldunls llll!ociated with politlcal ~J.'Vgns, 11\e U.S. go\'trna1cnt's rcsponoo to th~ Russian active me11surcs, and reh1tcd leaks of classified infomu1tlon.

ShO\l.lcl. you irnvc 11n:r q~~ns ~t .any time, ple8Se contact Committee stoff at (202) 225-4)21. If you~ represented by an anomey, please fol'WlUd this lette? to your attorney, and lun•e him or her i:.on~t the Committee on your bob!!lf.

Sincerc:ly,

K:7.':!7 Member ofCMgtc:!i'S

AWichmcnt: Parameters ror Russl11 lnvcstisation

2

Mam Schiff Ronkins Membct

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF nEPR~SENTA'rlVES 198

• The Hm:orab'.~ l<. ~l Cmlll.way !'~ s~J:e,::t Col:Il71itt~ on Int=lligca.o:. U.S. H'omie ofR.er,!r&l:ffitiv~ Washiog(oo. DC 20515

The &itoral>!: .tui= Schiff R:.r~lci~ M,:;;rnbc:-Peml2!!-' .... at Se~"f Committee ;:in brelligoooo V-S. H= of~,.,:s \V;;shin_giO!!., DC 20515

U.S. DepQrtm:nt of J.ustlce

Ofiloe of Legis!ative A.ffiim

Washlr.grc,n, D_C. 20530

JUL 2 7 2017

~ Congrcssirum COil3W'f:Y arid Congr~ Sclilii:

Thli responds lo your .cttcr to Fcd..-zal Burcm of fu.~ {FBI} Ac~g Oiteen kl:lr~'t McCuic, dJ;red Mr.y I~ 2017. ,-.-hit::l ceqvtiled doe:uIUenIS i.n ~on ..ith tk Qir.lnlith=c:'s imi=stigatfon into Rus..qan activ:ro~-urcs diroe:l.o:,l iuihe 2016 U.S. cie¢il>n.

As )'Oil ~w. 11:0.:Moy 17, 2Dl7 !lle Di:panment of JllS1lce tD:pattm!!Ilt) :m;)Qtlet~ tile ,'JfJ>Oizmm:nt cfRJ)b=t S. Mveller JlI to &.."IW ~ Sp--~ Cmmscl.to O\iasee oc prcvi=ly­co~ FBI i.o.,~.,aiion of~gm'<::C!lmelll elmru to .influ.~~ tbc 2016 F=1l~ electicc mid rilit.ed ~.~- We en::i::hrii;cil thut t::.e Sp,;:;;.id Co~fh~-: bcgoa b tak.c ;teps to fu?fiU fu.;sc ~onsibilities. Unrler mes~ cir~~ eoo C-Ollsimo.t with l!?e ~!:llt's long-~flg po1ic-t ~Ilg 1!1e ~fidcn!Wity ~ .scnsithity oiinfo:rmoc,n rclatittg 10

pcndin&matte=s, the Depa.rttniem is not prepared to r,espond funh.t:r ,o Yt>UI t1:qu~~t ct this om e.

We tipprec;iate the Ccr.I,miue's illt.ere."!9 io ibis mQtlft aud irope ~ this inf=zfum is n~pful. Please <!o no,i:e.iliae to colllact thl.s-0ffioe-if we !Itl.Y pro\.'id~ ::dditfon.al esst!f'<:11.CC ebou, ecy ott matter_

Sir.-ccral}-,

t(l/~j!.. ~~/ S!twiel R- Rttm!:r Acru:i.g Assiscan. Auomey ~

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PROPER TY OF THE U.S. HOUSE 0~ REPRESS-lTA'JWES 199

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Mr. Robcrt.M\t.eller Special Cou.osel U.S. ~aitmcnt of JUSl!te Washington, D.C. 20530

Mr. Andrew McCebe Acting Director Federal Bureau ofTm-cstigt:!i~ WasbingtOll, D.C. 20S3S

·PE~MliENT Sft.S::TCoMMnTEE ON l~Ell.lt?!:NCC::

Mayl7,2ul7

0--...ar ~- Muellr;;r and AC!ing !)irel:(or McCabe:

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Mr •. M.uelJ~·s sppo{C!meI!l a.i S!)':l:litd OJun~e:1 fa e.1'lCOc5S81Y an!! Jioslt.'Y.: de\'~en.t in the Depe.-tmcm of Justkc·s ia~1egttding Russi!I. As~ qf.'.hrs O'Ml. ~ inquiry into Russian utive ~ io ir.crudt cowteiil'!teIH~ i:anccms, theCamtnittecl'>iU be =dutting rigorousO\'~&htto ensUR: !i.Mlfle De~of Juslice's1.Vorl; ~mcludeili.: ongoing COl!Iltmatellig=e im-eEtlgat!O!I rcg&nling Rwsiaby the f~1 Bur-"..au of Invc:stig!itior,. is not ~d cc interfen:d w.th in eny way.

A.c:cotclitl&l:r the~ teqne~ts tha!:til~ ~-rmer.t of Justice, including the.Fodetal Borom ofin'l2St.igatio;,. pre=ve&ld produce !Xl th: Cammin:ee:

(I) cc,~ of all docu==.nt$, reeo.."lis, elec-.m::~cally ~QTCd in.!i)~cm i::clwiing e-rr&lil, ecmmumicmca, ~rdlati, dat11 end ~le thingS. ~cdl~s of f<r.m. ~ than ~widely ~le (e.g., ~y.:r ~!es) that tcferenco Mr. Oamoy's dfamissal es FBI ~~. 3itd-tbilt m: po~ttlC\'lUlt tti the B=u's ~tdligence i~on.

(Z.) cll dO(!U!D.enlS =orializing con~ between t~ P~ end Mi. C1;Uncy re~ bis tctivrties M Direclor. n:, inciuck all :r.~rn~ no?es, er ~lher documems ~~ canv~, Ihm ar.e ~lly rclcv2:nr ro the Buc-eau's coU!lterin!cllig¢~ iavestigafon.

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f>ROFERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE c;= REPRESENTATr,'Es 200

We would appreciate your written reply, and the fulfillment of this request, by no later than the close of business on May 23.

Should you have any questions at any time, please contact Committee staff at (202) 225-4121.

+:.Kj~C;, Member of Con:~! !

Sincerely,

2

Adam Schiff Ranking Member

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 201

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Jio.noroblc K. Michaol Con:iwny ML'll'loor of Congmfl!l Perrnancnt Select Commit.rec on lntellf£ence U.S. House of~nw.tiw,,:, Washingtoa, DC 205l5

Ifonnrnb[c AdlUll Sohlff Rol)Jdng Member Pen:,anent Select Committee on Imolligencc. U.S. House ofRq,~ntath·es W:isbington. DC 20515

U.S. DopartnM,nt or Justice

Fc<loro.1 Duroau of h1vc$tlgnllon

July 26, 2017

Denr Concrc,sm~n Com\\Vl'IY 1md Rimkfog Member Schiff:

This is in rospo:iro to your letter to Acting Director McCabe and Special Cowisel Robe.i:t Mueller dated May 17, 2017, seeking all dOCU,"D.cnts, .recorrls, and data l,iat reference "'Mr. CtJmt=y's dismiss.it as FBI Directnt" dun are ''potentially relev(lJ)t to the FBJ's countcriniolllgen~ invostig:i.tion" ofR\lllsinn intcrfci'Onco in the 2016"Pr~oo:nilll clootfon.

As you know, Acting A:Wmey Gcner'J.l Roocmtcin wmoum:cd the appoinblent of a Special COUllsel "to conduct the investigation confinncd by thcn--FBI Oto;r.tor J= B. Comcy in tcs.timony before the House Permanent Sel~t C-Ommittte on Int.el~c on MtlfCh :w, 2017, including: (i) any links ;ind/or coordination be.tween Ina Russnn covcrnment nnd J.i,dividuaJs oGsor.intcd with tho campaign of PrO,,",idrmt [)(lnald Trump; and (li) rmy mortcn fu.lt :i~oso or may arise dirci:lly from 1ho l.nv~gntion; lllld (Iii) eny olbor matter.; within the 5COpe of28 C.F.R. § 600.4(a)." A'S a xcsult, }'Q\:..t' r~ue~ ~~ch lovM.tig11tive mlttcrfals re.laced to rui ongoing investigation, arxl, consistent witb l<ml?,'lhmcf.ng Department of Justice policy, .~'C would decline to produ;e tho~ mattrlklS ot this lime.

ln -addition, yoQ r~'.IC,tcd nil d~cumen11: memorl~lizinB communicntion~ bctwcr>n lM Pre$idcnl rn>d then P.Bl Director Com<.'Y, We 11te advl~cd that -:be Spociat Counsel'~ Office :md the Department of Justice have provi<lcd tbe Committee with at'ltlSS to lhe mcmo[I\Jl.(]zi Md . documents of foanor FBI Director Comq. fo light l)f tha!. ~.mmodatiori, we believe lbis requc~t h!IS bc:cn :i-dw=.c!.

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 202

Pk3.5c: ~ntici tn:s offi.~ ifw.: cw oe of as.istu~e ~~g ,){he~ mattetS. We ~illt~ )~Ill' cm:.l.itnu,;l sippart for the FBf w ifs mh.:ion.

Sie::e:tely,

~ As3istanr. D:rec~r Offic-e ofCongre::sional A!fhli:s

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203 PROPERlY OF TriE U.S. iiQµSE OF REPRl':'.S91TATIVES

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES l'H!W,,1,NEt rr Saeo,· OoM!JJlTE.e

OM INTf::U.lliiENCE

SepteO'b<:r l, 20 l 1

'f11c: Honc,r.1b)e JoJT Sc~iQ111 A~yGcncl'll1 Unitea S111tcs Dc:pactm.cnt of Justice 950 P~IUl3yl\~niu Ave:, N .W. Washingt<Jn, D.C. 20530

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On August 24, 2017. lho Ho\We .Permanent &tt:l:1 Committee oo.1Dt2lli[lencc ("Committee") li>Crved su~nas on tbe Atton1ey Qenml, In bis ~p~cicy ~ h~ of the Ixpartm1m1 of J~J.i;e ("DOJ"), and tho Diroctar of the P~deral Bureau of !nvesdgation ("F.Br') fM J)t"O(f11t-tlon of de>cumeuts retcvtwt lo the Conuuittl.le'11 ongoiug luve.-run:itilm ofR\10ail'ln ln1cif1:renco i.a t.hQ 201G U.S. presldcnlfal Qloction, fnc:ludlng ullegations of coUus(on between tbe Trump cr.tnpal.gu 3nd me~

The:: :;iibp<.1~:i.s di~ccfOOJ and FB1 to produce any o:m.l !LU doc.ur.umts re Wing IQ the: ilgcncie:1' 1-elnllo11.111iip with funner Brltbh ~n:t lntcllitt:n~ Scnicc offica Chrilltoµbor St<10Jo c.mdlor the so-calkd '"l"tump Duu~icr." inolut.ling thMC meml)tlollilng Fi3l' !l tClt\tlon!lblp w.ilh Mt. Steel•>, any p.iymtnts OlOdo to Mr. Slilele, and effort':! to oorroborare lnfotmation pJ'Ovided by Mr. Ste,e.le l!nd hi.~ ~ub-SOlll'l:(&-whcilicr directly onia l-\1.Sion GPS. The subpoelll.lS also directed "DOJ and FB1 to prnvide c~pie.s of any Foreign Imclligi:nr,e SUNelll~ Acr (FISA) &pplications subm:lted to the Fnreign Tntemgenoe Survcilloo~ C~ (FJSC)-wheUler or l);O( opproYW by tbo FlSO-incorporatiag informntlnn f,t'lwidoo 1:>y Mr, ~tcclc, tila S\lb-:;QurccG, a.octlor f'uslon GPS.

"Re90rt to compuloorypro~ was ~563'}. bCQIU~ ofDOl's ~d FBr$ in:.ull'i.eient TCll\1¢ns1venc:ss to llie Committee's !;\umaou, Russia-1nveAisatlou tclllted reque$1.! ove.r the patt sovoml m®ths. On .ruultiplo ~iQns, throurJ1 wri11.cn ?'1;QUC513 11nd dlr<:cl c:og11E!1:1TI¢11l11 the Cort'lmitt40 ha: soueh1 but fui.lod to r«iclv~ ~po!l!Jvo tcl&tun<my or documen<s fi'o111 DOJ ~d FBI. For exnmplc, to do.te 1h1: Coinn1it1ee has not received n me:'lningl:\ll .rt3Pome to il9 "Moy 9, 2017, request to AttOffley Genera.l Sessions. Addltionu.Dy, oo May 16, 2017. the Coiuntiue,; tt-lll a lel:t..er a~ then-Acting Dh:cctor Andrew Me.Ce.be tn piini:lipl\!¢ it,-! ~9luntnzy interview, and p,-od11c;,: rele,-mit i:!ocnm~Cs. The Coinmlnee niceived no rq,ly until Miif27-mcm:: thnn 1wo iuontl1:, lutc:r-when DOJ d«Hned the inwrvlew .request 1m:I. indir:11ttd lhnt "ll\Q D~Jt(T\(!111 !.s not Jl("CJ>trred to It"toponcl furth~ to yourrcquc,i t1l thia tfmo."

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA"lWES 204

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Prcvi=ly. on March 8, th; Com.mi~ sought fu>m DOI ·certnh documents, incrudin;g rcle-1ao.t FISA applicatio:tS e.idflSC or&:rs, and Oil Mucb.17 "~ allotted t~,_, billets to Ie'.tie\11 respinsi.c do~ on a read"'1!.<kanm basis.. The Commim:c ,,-as not povitlc..1 a CO?}' of these c.foc=e::-.ts, mul the Committee'5 reqt.-est to review them again was iiecied.

the sub--~ iss1r>...i on Aagu:sl JA ~uiJ~ production JIO !stcr than l2:00pm cm~ 1, 2017. Neithet DOJ nur FBI provid~ any~ by thedeMline. Onrl:e ~nn of August 31. lessthrui 24 hears bcfo~ lhe d~ dw:, the Co.-nmittc::. {t:eei~dz.'l initial ~ns:: fCO!Il the UOJ Office ci ugislmve Affaiis 1:eq~a. bcb.tlf of oolh DOI an.i FB[-1ui::ii.t:cy;:at time tr> ~ply w.hh-tite ~~- ·

The Commiue.: requires timely ~C)ll <1fth.e :iubpo-ecaed ~"-Ul:C>:r.!$ in Qrdc:c to ~"'UCC irs o·~bt ttspaMifr.!itfcs <1n bcllalf c! 1:.-ie A~ J)Qblic :zid ni[ly w,cl:us.u: the s.ctioll3 of both DOJ an<i me FBI. Th.ere is no !cgi&.JJ!e besis fur DOl,s· fuilute co w~ullr t:!i~ aic Com:nin~ wuil lhe eve of the de,.cilinc: or oc2Jn prodtu:tion as a show of good E:ilih.

Moreaver, mere is n.o legµimak basis fur DOJ'sreqi=t !ora&h1uinal time to comply. b-eCl:l:ISc DOJ a:.d tbo FBI im: well ewm of the identity ar~ ~ed dccum:ms. Indeed, as a.ow;:! abovi:. c.tlrastS<lm.eofthem havt alreidy been~ed n.c.d made temporarily availchle for the Commi~s rcvh~"·, l!Jld. ~ n:mafum~T(:~\li:~t;.ci \!OQ.lmc:nts an: n:~ id.entiftable.

NoMitllstrrodlngU-,e.se ~ms, uieComminee h«eby gnats m~liottal !..birt=i (13) da:.,-s for full oompttance and production. ,o ooc.ur-nD Jaror llllin 9:00 am. an September 14, 2017, at · ilie ~ Sji¢Cifed in ~ Gligin.:l suhpoc.~t. 11iis revised dcadlin: will a.Qt be extsw!ed

In thf a!tem.ati,i:, if Ell tes;-ons.i\·e ci=in1~ a:o oo.. prcdu.~ed by the revise.I d~lnc, !hi: Attvmey 0:entl'at r..d the Dueck){ ofth.: FBI slull .eppes hef1,11; the Committee st 9:00 ~ on Sc¢:mbi:r I~ 2017, i11 Room HVC·210 afthc U.S. Capilo! dur.lllg .s:i open ~g, w cxplam unds oamDOJ';i et.dFBrs umvi~ er i:12hilli"Jto =ply m full witl: the ru~ iuucd on August 24.

?lease be £.dviscd tha1, in~ 0\-ml that DOJ or FBI mis to.provid: th:; doo=Ct'.!s ia filU Ci

1estimony. d¢.scn1icd !ll!O\'C, !he CDm:nitt~ e:x~ly reserves llS rlf,lu to prceeed with~ end :ill liVl!i!cl!k lei!,!!. options-includbg reporting !O the full Ho~: ofR::pce~ves a n:solut:on to bold the Attomey G~I e.1ld Di=tor oftiw FBl in c~pt of Con~. p=,t tn 2. u.s.c. §§ ll12, l94.

Sincerely,

l)~M./17~ Devin Nu;;~ . Cl:tl'irm::in

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PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. HOt;SE OF R&-"REfil:N'fAT!VES 205

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Ser,<ember l, 2()17

Tht: Horn.'fflblt, Chri,;tophcr W.my Dtn,ccor Federal Bureau of Illve-..t.igalion 935 PcnnsylvaruaAve, N.W. Wosbin~on, D.C. 205::30

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On August 24, 20 l 7, the Ho~ PcllllinCnt Se[ecl C-QmmiUc:c {ln, J,,!,clligeim ("Commi!tce") served ruhpoenas on the Atto.mey Oe:l\e,a!~ in hls ~!y llS head of die D¢ps.rtm~t of J1tstice ("DOJ"), a11d the Director of the Federal Bureau of Inv~ga.tion ("JiB1'1 forproQuction of documenti1 relevant ro the Commitloo'~ 01:going ir1v~~g~1l11n ofRu~sh111 in.terlcrcnce in the '7.0lo U.S. pre.~ideutlnl t:.lci:lion, including tllcg&lions of collusion ~vci:n th~ Tnnnp campalen and tb~Rw:sians. ·

The subMtnas direetcd DOJ and FBI 10 produce My and 3.11 doeumente. relating to lhc agencies' n:J11tio1:1sbip with fonnc.-r 13.rituh Secl'ct lnt.elligence Servlu offfoer Chri!llophct Stei,le At1dlot the ~-o-c:.uUr:d "'J'rum.p Dossier." l.ncrutlin,g those mcmorfoll:t.lJ13 fBl's rollltlonsbip with Mr. Steele. Ol'lY pnyrucnts ma.do 10 Mr. Stcctc-, and effoits to corroborat.e information provi.dcd b)• Mr. Sto:1c t111d his sub-sourtcs-whcUt~dlrectl.y or\'ia.Fullion GPS. The $Ubp~nas also din:cted DOJ ~:I rnr ~ pt\Wide copies of ant Fotcign Intellist®e SUn'eiUaiic~ Act (Fl$A) upp[icauons 51.lbmitted to ilio Foreign Intr.lligcnce Su.rvellliill.C-0 court (FISC)-whether or nol llpJ)roved by 1hr. Fl.SC-lnr.0111()rttting iothnmilion prct'ided. l>y M~. St«le. hi~ Mlb-SO'.lt«S, o.m!/or Pu.~lon GPS.

!w;ott to compulsory prllc.¢$$ W!IS ne~ry l;,ec:a~e ofOOJ'.s and 1'81's iusufficlcJ:u: respo.c.siv.nie~~ to the Comniuee's numerous Ru:isia-inVtStigati011 relati:d 1c:qutsts over1h¢ put revi:m.l mcmt11s. O.ri muldple ocmv1/on.'i1 throu)lh writtell l"e1jUests and dlte,.'t etlg:ig~ments. lhc Commitc~ ha, ::our.I.It but ~ilc<I to lllQlivc rcSp1)mlvo le:J!hnony 0r <lMlunen<s ftom DO.t ru;d FB1. For CXlllllplc, to date the Commltt~ hs not r,1,10Civcd a ,nc:mingful respDDSa 10 ell! M11y 9, 2017. request to Atl{]r11c:y Oen~ Sesitiln!;. /\dditionally. 011 May l6, 2Dl7, llie Commil\1;1; ~I a. letter 81!king tben,Actin~ Director An<lrew McCabe t~ J~ttfolpate ~~!untaey interview, and pmdu~ r-E:lc;·.ll~i QQCIUIJ.•;:n!S., Tht: Comrolttl.."v twc:ivcd no Nply nntil "rfiJ! '27-:ncrc th:m two rno:iUas lntr.1'-Whtn DOT declined the interview 1\lqi1em. .md lnd!ca1ed tht\.t "'the Depnrtra1:nt i$ not propntcd to ie~pond further to yo11r m-t'llesl Qt th[~ tl!lle .. "

PROPERn' OF THE U.S. 1-iOUSF, OF Ri:PR.F.SF.NTATM:S 206

Pr..·•vfou.~ly, on ~fare!-! 8. the; C.ommitte= $Ought from. DOI Cfflain 00(.'btnent:., including rele=t FlSA ep-plicatians and flSC orom-, !ii!d en Much I 'i w=s allotted 0,,.-0 biJ!c;ts to r~i cw respon:s:v~ <!o=na O:J !l read-and-rerurn bw. Y~ Com::ilicl:e ..........,,..:; r.ct pro,~oed a OO?Y of theAe dccumcnrs, un!ftl\; Corc-.anitt-ae 's reqUeSt to review theta agitin was den..~ d.

T11e suhpoenns iss(2j llll. Au gt.st 24 required p,.--odt.>ct:on no lem tru'::!:112: OOpm 011 S:pten:ilitr l, 2017. N.."I'Jm OOJ nor fBT ptQvided imy ~ots by !he df:adlir.-::.. On the aftcmf:Jon of Aognst31, less ihan 24 lx>urs ~fore ~~d>Jc ~. J}x'. Co1m11itt~ i=ivcd an ini"tial ~= from the DOJ Office of Lcgislauve Affilits reque!l.!ing-<in bdl~lf of botb DOI a:td FBI­~ i(iOJW time to comply \\'ith die scl,;l~

The Cammi~ requirs timely production oft.he s,hpoeosed do<:uments i.o order 10 t,xeC!.l?e i.!.s ov=i&}it ?Csponsx"billiics oo bciielf of :he Ameri= pci)Uc ~ ful lycwluntc the s.dions of :Qth DOJ ~d the FE£. T.oe:::e is no Jesitimate basi3 fur FBrs failure to o>..Mingfully engage :he Com.'Tlitrc: until ti:o e-.•c oflhc.ie:icllinc or begin p~l.ion a3 a sh~ of goc.d faith.

Moro/Jvtr, thm i3 no l~ilime~ basis for FBrs mt~ fi>:r additiot\3l 1:im~ to comply, f=rse DO.I ~ the FBI ve well aware of the k!l:Dtity of the requem-:i dOCillD.CtllS.. fudced, 4S noted cl!~ u !east WRi: of.r,an have alccady bi:en compiled ml m.adet=pc:-.rmi!.>• n•..-iub.blc for the C:lmmia.='s ~iew, 212d the remaining 1¢:!U!:Skd ch::t.'Ill~ts me n:edily idectifisbic.

Notwithstanding~ com:i:rns, the Committee lu:«b}- g:rao~ an eddlciona\ Ulirtecc (t..,") days fur full ccmplience all'! production, to oceur no li:!er (Olm ~:00 e..m. cm Se?lt:mh~ 14, Wl 7. i.. !1,e lo-ccl ~cifi~d in the orisi~ su~ Thl3 rc-.-is~ deadline will not be exr.eod::,d.

!n che 1:l.t=l!live, if rut teSpOClSii,e dCQ!!:re8U ..re not prod~cd by th:: rcvi~ deiutlini::., the /-~y Gt:llero! .and !he Direct« of dte FBl sl:!tt.l. ~ ~ii>.re th: Commilrec at 9:00 am~ Sep-~ 14, 2017, in Room HVC-210 of the U.S. Cspilt>l durinB sn open lteering. to t:Xplcin w;dei- oll!h DO.ts ll.tl:d FB£'s unuillingncss or in:ibllity to oo:nply in full 'l'.'itb tilC subpoena,; issued on Augt!St 24.

P!ettSe be adv.Iseli th4?, in 1he evmt th3l OOJ or FBI fulls to provide~ docuuimts i.: full or ~csrimoir/ described abo\-e, the Cuill!IliUce c:i..~ly ide!'VeS i~ ri.._w to prccecd with. any ei:d i;ll avai!?.cle Cegal options-including reporting to the fu!l.Housi: of Re~= a a"e$01ulicn ta ho:!d ~ Attomcy Gcm:ral m:d D[~. oftl:t f-BI hl co"templ of Con~, purro:nt ro 2 u.s.c. §§ l.~ 194.

-------~

PROP~1Y O~ "In!: 1J.S. HOU$EOF RO!RESEITTA71VES 207

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Th:! Ho!lOmble Jeff'Sc~ons Attomey GeaetXll _ Uni~ States Dqxinment of Justi~ 950 P~>•lvnnu:. Ave:, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20SJO

De& Attorney General SC11sioas:

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A$ explained in nw lett~ of [September t, 2017], if lhe Otpartment of J1mioe uils to comply in full \\1th w ~-:ubpoc1111 for produc\ign cu docurncn(s is~ by 1hu Ho\1Si: Pmn~ent Scl~t Committee on Tntolligence (Committee) on August 24, 2017, the Committee rcqu[rns thlrt Atto:ncy Ocnorol Jeff Session.~ appcnt before Ille Comminee on September 14, 2017 to cxpl.llin tlllll failure, The nccon,~nylug ~ubpoen.a, !s&iietl todlly, 18 ialt2uJt:d lrJ L'fl)= cu,;nplioocc: wilb lhO: l'C<lttircrnuut, Shoul,J lhe 0~1tmen1 of Ju.'itiiXl comply in full Md In o limcly monMr with tho Commiu~'ll subp.:,cun of AugQ~t 24, 2017, lh~n lhe A!ttlmcy Cler:eml'o O])Jlcn~ ...,ill n.ot b~-c«C11SnfY, 1md U1a llf'PC'MUICC subp<Jeno dilled Scpttmb« S, 2017, will bi, wilhdnwm.

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Pl"<C)PE;RTY OF TliE U.S. HOUSF. OF REPRESEtffATIVES 208

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES P~MENT SE.I..ECT CcMr.1.'11'EE

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Deer DL"eCtot Wray;

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AsGXJ)iaiQQd ii.my lett:f of[~ l,2011], cth.: F~l D=u l)fl.:ive:stigatianfai.!s to comply m full with ~ subpocm for (?IOduo.tion of ili!--..unu:ms i:Ji.u:d by !be !I= P=nt Selei..i Ccmmitt= oo IiuUigeice (Can-.mitte?j oo Ang'.!St 2-f.i 2017, the Committee requl~ (i,,.at Dlreclor Chdstaphe.r Wnry app:ar before the Olm.mittec on Sc;,tember l 4, 2017 to e.'<t)l,ain that fai111re. Thi: ac.:ompaeying su!lpo~ issued today, is intc!ld~ to ensw,: comp~e with fr JU rcquin:~L Should ~ F~ B!!l'e.ail ofln"lestig?iion comply (n full ar..i in 3 t:inety :a:zo.:?er with 1e.i: Com:mttee' s ~..bpo~.:if ~ 24, 2017, L};eD the DiR>..-:or's 811?-=<=<: will O;Y. be ttoocssarf, and lb, aJ)]St!:lNll~~ ~td S~r 5. :2017, will be willidrewn.

ffiOPl:R'TY a:= THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPR'ESENTATIVES 209

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·nw Honorehle Chri&Cl.)pb.ec Wmy Dic0010r Fcdtrel Bnr~ ofJ'1Vi:.,ti~tlon 93S P<;nnsyl\'ania Ave, 'N.W. Washln)l.con. D,C. 20530

ON lt.n'EUIGENOE

~ptcmba 15, 2017

Dear Anomey Ul!n(l.Ul.1 Sessions nnd Olrecmr Wray:

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On_September 14, 2017, tepresentllli\~ frorn the Dopot(lnez.t o! JI.IS~ ("OOf') ~ F~= Blrte1\l oftnvesdgotion. ("FBP') informed Ille ~unittee that they vreroitot prcpmtccl tti }X(ldure a11y dCJcumc:cl!i rt:(;JNJ11:1ivo lo tho ~ubpoi:nll3 i,:n1Q() on AuEU31 .24---<kspltc 11 13·doy c.xlcrurlon <ii tho originn.l Scptclllh<:r l dcadlinu that 'l\'(l!; gp.ntcd ot DOJ13 n:qucr.t. [ \Vil$ p:3l'tic:ulr.rly «m~d.t.Q !cam that, in tho past~ v,-uk.,, efforill to assemble SUl}b documc.nb l1ad no!

· advanced beyond~ p~lim~· 54~.

A$ noted In~· letter of Scptcmb~ 1~ the C<>mmit(ce conli111:es lo ::eok an)' (l~ IQ)"ICIJ~ ,i;gwlins lhQ ox tent or your 11u.cncii.w.;' rolnllonshtp with forom Bnttsb &x:ri:t llltelligcocc S01, 1l<ir. officer Chrl~upJLet St~lo 11ml/o.. lhc so-cwkcl. "Tc:I.UtlP Do~io.r'' tclevAnt to th¢ Conunince'll oogo~ imeatigation orRussiM in~rferanct in the 2016 U.S. presidential clctt.ion-ioc:h1ding e.llegatforu; of coJlwsioii b~cn the Tro.mip tAnl~ and !he ~iftIU. The C::ommittee has c:lso 00!.lght any Foreign Int~U.{gence Coltrt SwveiUanro Act (PISA) apPliations submitted lo tho foroign Intell!gei1o0i: Survcill,111ce CQllrt (FJSC)-who1het or not ilpprove<I by the RBC - thlit muy htJ.vc i11C1:1rpc,t1.1tctl .ioy inform11tlon pru~ by Mi•. 81e¢lu llD()/or fu81110 0 118. To dfitc, 110 document., M\'c beeu provided.

L'nfottlmllt.ely, DOJ's ond FBI'~ li.st-Mtt1u.ts cng~nant with th.e Cornroiuc~ t"egnrdinJ; subpoc:ne. COJTIJ)li~ ff!'ld f$il~ to prodiJcc a,zy do,:.ulll.enb-includlc& !hose pmvh>usl.y mode aVllUllbler-fiu into u oontinllm8 puttcru ofiosufficico1 t.;Sp<>N5lvena111 ta wrilfcn Comm!~ J"OI\IICSC, daili1g bock over S mootho, lnalwllne ll>i· documco~ md t~U1v.ony 6'om A1101uoy

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSc OF l=lC:PRESENTA.TIVES 210

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(k;o.e:a! S~[ons, FBI Di:pu;y Dircetor A'!Uire;v Mc0:t1le, end funner Acting Ass:..<1ll..a"!t Arrorrey ~ ~JBI)' lV..cC-0.rd.

The Commitr.ee ~ aommitttrl to exezclsi!lg its ~on.al ov~tre~Msibi[itles, a!ld wiU c:onnr.uc seckhl,gyour co,;ip=.tio.n \'ti.th there df~:tts.. :oOJ !nd FBI a.e theref~ ~t¢i eu c:x-.raordinaty e.\.emion r}j en add.'tiora.l se,..-en (7} days :or prod.uctkin tJmt .smsfies d:e Aug;..ist 24 ~s,, t.o oocm no 1filf:r than 9:C-0 a.m. on St:ptembf:r 22, 20 l 7. ID mea.!tenl3live. !!D;I.

~t to dtetmimonrel s~iss>;:s;d on Sep~ S, th.c At.tome,,/ ~era!~~ DircctoT <lf the FBI sha.11 ~ fur mi op,:n heufug attJ:9{l em on S!ptembe.r 2.8, 2017, ill Room HVC.210 of tlie U.S. Cepitol, to temfy UI!dtx oath.

Jn .he e\o"Cllt of c.~d &ar'..ccropli~t. tr& Commi.~rcs:= i~ rigbtto pmc.:ed witheny arui £.!t s:;ailabfe Iege! opti~r.clmfing reporticg ro th:: full .Hou:s-e of Repre:.~(iv::s <1

rescforioi:I tc b.Qtd !he.A.tti~Ir .. cy Go:iacl and Direi.:w: (If fui;: FBI iu Ct!nlcmpt of Congress, !JIIl'.SllIDt to:2 U.S.C. §§ L92. l94.

st.,,._ore!y,

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?RCPERTY DF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REP'RESENTATIVcS

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Scptcm't,:r 2J , 20 J 7

Pemuinent Select Cnmmiltee on Int<:lligi:nco U.S. HouS<J ofR~rescni,.1h•i:-s Woshir.~1011, DC 205!5

Dear Cht1i.rm(in N11~;

Our Legis!ati~c .Affairs Offic.! h!!S been cun5\llling with ,!'(l\lr ~iaff In~, clfit.>rC co nrr:mic for me to tncct \\ilh yo\1 tn di~cl.l~$ 1111: Commitll:~'11 inqu,h'ie:1. T undtrntond thn1 ynu h:ivc been ot1 foreign tJ·,net tbl3 \.\-eek l ,~1ll llc on for,:ign lrt\vcl for the 111:.-:c nv1: d11y3. I 1htreforc rcque~t lh~t you c'1ltc11d lhe deodllne 4te1ed In your Scpt~ub~r l 5 letter 10 the ,\\lorro:y Gc11e1'8l .111d the fBl Dircctur, s1.1 tlmt we can ~rmng11 tu ~uclfC!!~ ynur requc=1~; withoan nndul~ damasi11!) notioMI sec uiity mtd dil!(up(ing .'.l.11)' ongoing criminal i11vesli;i,i1ion.

I 11pr,,recitl1~ our btid' 1clcphonc: \'.01WCt5alic111 la:i1 w~ok. l 1'now lhM y-,u unJcisrsnd th~1 tht' exWJth,e br.mch's ~,blii;ntlon tl> ~tegu3rcJ ih(e!Hgenee wurces and m1;tbods :IDd protei..1 ~~ integrity of invc.stigatious sometimes wnm1111s =ommode.tion.

Tnii; is not a no,-el issue, nnd II is ncil a p~«isim ir.sue. Law enfon;emcnt ruid nurion:11 securil)' mo.11cr; 11rt: kt..-pl ll0110<len1lal for .gouil r~;isons.

Wi5e lcgiNlative ru,d e:tcculh~ br.inch of{lcb1I~ haw wotked iogell1er for 11111,t)· de.cad~•o dct~11d uur nation'$ ton~ •term inter~ts by protc..:tiog the confidenliality or lJcpnti,nent 11f Ju~icc invt:~liglllions ilfld pteS~·ing the Dcpartmcm·s indcpc:ndcncc trom 1hc pollrical ,vcnn.

I h(1.J1c: thm loni~rundinu m1dition will cont[nuc 011 our watch.

Thank you for youc contlOUlni OOllrtesies.

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESEN1ATlVES 212

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'fb.! H!inorable Rod RilSe!!Stein D~puty A1teraey &!ueml

f>'EAt.V,«c,'>IT 5al:CT Col.\Mi'i,cE ON lr,n.n.-LIGENC!:

Umte'l Surt~ De:,mrneot of Ju..<tire 950 Pcmisylv.mie-Av~ NW Wahingto::;. D.C. 20530-0001

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1l=1c you fur yol!!: letter ofS~bct 22, 20!i. As yw 1Ue wcll avrm; the lfcu..ac Pemwient s~lect Comm!~onhlrelligem:e (the C~) is miiq,~yequ:ppcd u, $efegi=d in~lig,= WU?c.!$and mc:!ho&. Othe:r~;·e b..-=cl? ~cic:, ~ prtradcd tl:e Camm.Ill= wllh the e<;x::mr>=•s =nsy to cor~uct its ongoiug lav~oa into~ 2016 p.."csirlemfa! electi.m, in.crc.:dif'.gllighly-classtfied info!1m'.tion ofo:ttannilnlnJ' saisl-ti.ify. ~ Com."'Iliru:c has ~ to greaI Jeng,i~ tQ avu:d irJi:r£l:~ Wlih Uk'j «igoi~ a=im~ brancll inv~~. oo.i we~ r:tSrly to won. with :i,-~u ill this reg::ID!. r l!lso takcthl5 o~-tlty to ~ooro that ow: requests for i:nfurniatfan are lil«ily to be fu-.lJCI' itt 1l!lillber and smsli~ in .scc,pe th!tJ,. l!I(:: l;pic:tl qusons Judges and attnm..ys 'Pi'Qll).i 3* i;,1 crunmal pr,,bi:s..

Furihfnncre.,jillt fS the ~ of JDstiee (00.J)-ruid Fe~ Buretiu of !nv~tii:;.Licn (FBI) b3.\•e eonsf.i.tltionlll o~tiom, so too rloes Congre~, whlch is respons:i~!e Co. ov=e.zg beth DOJ =! FBL \Vb11e tb:: Cc=!!mittce h:.~ been vt:ry pe&n! Ov'Ct ~ hrstsiX. llJ;:llll]-,.s, !kt patience is cot wil:hottt limiL Todi!C', r=ittgful c:o~ce wrt.~ mi: Commfucti's == re,;~ts has been ~ and th: Coll!mitte: has not =ivro my docu.mc:n!s pu.=t to ~~a month i:tgo fer which the-deadltne h?$ k= twice e.'.!endfd. The fs:ci. U'.!d ~ mf.xrmatfmt may h~ ~i.ng u1 c:i.stDOJ er FBI en-. ligm )'<l'J pi'Clcr to a.--oid is not suffi~--nt grounds ro deny me Contlnittce ~ to m~.ds relev~ t~ its O•~Sht ~biliti~ Nc.r'a:re there an"f lawfuljurufi~ons.forsuch ad~ co Co~ Thrs ~ i>f raspott.S!veness from the w-0rld's p=i.i~ law e.:i:on::crnmt agency is una-r-ccptmle.

For cxlm'.lpl~ <rn Much.} 7, tiiQ Cammi~ W'S.$ !J!O!tcd tWO, biHr;ts to re\lU::W dQci.=tl;s r~ivo to areip.JJ::tt fur Foreign Jntel~cc Sµo<~ Act (PISA) applicztlon:s~ Foc:igo In~g= Snr.rcillaru:e Coon (F1SC) <mkrs. r n.e ~ill 7,'Crv provid~ ()D a rc:arl­l!llG-i"ctum bss~md th.c C=m!tt~'s .cequaat CD rcvl=, th.c.."ll again v.--as dcoii:d. [ .om paI"tlCU!.arly frust!:a!ed by DOJ's ~ of coop~o,n in prov{~ documents t(! whidi the

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PROPERTY OF iHE U.S. HOUSE C~ REPRESENTATIVES 213

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Commi(<cc hri.s al.Icudy ~ sivcn nccc:.10, and addilion11tly h!W(l renson to believe tha1 rcspon:;lve docwnenl.s were improperly withheld from the Maren 17 pro<l11ctiou.

WiJh ?CSJ>Clct to the pending subpo~ tbe l'Cf,e.:itcd latt·D1illute re:!pQJl&es by DOJ and FBI to gcnerou:i <leradlincs have b~n wholly i~cqu:itc. Given tJte Congrcss':s obll8{ltiotu co the Amcrica.n J)(;IOple. Conwi:ss needs answers. TherofCY.ll, l look fomzml to d.istussing these matters in p~1:ion witb you oo Thu11d.ay.

-,A/~ ......... _ Copies to: Th~ Honotnble Jeff Session.., Attorney General

The: Honorable Chrisropher V/-,ay, Oi:icdor, Fedetal Bureau oflnves~tion

214

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'DcirutY Dictttor Rod Ros:t'.s.o:?in U.S. [xpartment of J~1itt <>SO Pel'ltUYlv-cnia Av~c, NW Waswnglor., DC 20530-00m

Dtptit)' Dir.:ctar RtNl Rosca.'-t_.:in,

NG'1e~2, 2017

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I herelrJ Jcsig.we Cooircssr-.An Trey C"!O,.tly as my proxy fot un in ewicra. WJic.w of dc=erus ~ :i.vlrila:ile per tllc subpocias is~ to A<tom,;-; Gt!ll:ml ~;ens ani FBI Direcr.oc Wray d&tec ,\u.glEI. 24, 20!7. This d.csignatioa. ls ,~;t1,ou1 p.cjudia: to, ar.di shaJ· uo\ limit or v.'<rl~ ~ aulrn.lrity oi ill M:mb:~ of tl:e Hoi:se P~rrr,31:cnt S,elt:e, Comminee oa Tn1eiligence from rcvie\\rjng the docwn<nlS ~ta l::.t~ d:;te upon requesL

JL i~ lli/ requestthe.t this ~\·fowo=r by cwse of busitl':SS on Nc>\'~ober 2. 2011.

Best Rcguds.

b,AI[/~ Th:11in r.'u:i~ ,..

Chaim=

PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 215

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Pl!FIMMJEliT SE:I.EtlT Co!AIAmE.E

on INTEL1.1GEN¢E

Deoembct· 28, 2011

The HQllorab!eRod Ro~tein Oojltlty l\ttomey Geuernl U .s. Deptutment of Ju3ticc l 20l POlllJay!vMin Ave, NW Wamlnnton, D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. Rosc:m.toin:

liVC~d, THI ~-1QI WA!l""-'a!DN, DC ~S15

12(J~j:12S,-.4121

The Hoip;e Perm.Anent Select Committee on lnlellis~ {the Commiltee) writeJ 111 rc:i,pollD\l to th-.: Depwtrocnt of Ju.1rloe's (DO)) ;md the Federal Bur"o.uof lnvestigutlo11's(Fal) foiluro ti> fully pro du~ responslvc doCUJllcnl.$ o.nd prov Ide. lho requested wltnOS1Jos lo CQ:7lJ)llnnco with tho subpoenas issued over four nron!h.t ago, 011 Au11,ust 24, 20] 7.

Several v;,,clcs l!l!C>, DOJ informed the Commlttce that the ba~c investigatory ~ocurmmt:1 de.mimded 't;y dt.e .subpoen.o.s. F}}J Fom:1 F0-302. interview ~cs. did not wst. Howevtf, shortly before my mooting with }'Ou in early Dcccmbo::r, DOJ sub..sc:quently local~ flJld produced nwnei:oua f'D..J02s pact.a.in mg to the Steclc doom, lMreby rendering the initial respan~ disingenuous sr bc:st, As it cums out. aot O:lly di;t dc)cum,:nts e:,:igt tha.t wett. directly r~13onsive to the: QiaJ1:nitn:e's subpoenM, bi.1 lhey Lll',olved =ior DOJ and FBI o~cials who w-c.e swiflly ressGigor:d whm th.air rofas in mnttera under 1he Commi«e~'s lnvesligaticn. w.tre bs:ousht to !igbl. Olven th~ conlent and 1.mp:a<:l of these suppoi:erll.y newly-di!covered FD-302s, the . CoJtunil.te\: is no longer ru:re to accept yoor pmporled basis. for DO J's blfillket retir.sal to pim1de .responsive FBI FO!Tll FD-l023s-<iocumenting m~ bc\wi:cn FBI officials and fB! confidential hl.llUllll sources.---or 1111ythlng less !h.en furl aJtd eortlJJlete eamplianoe with iis ~ubpoen;i.s.

Al.i1 :i.=ult1Jf1.lle nwncrou.& d~lnys Md W!!CreJ)RnCie:i tha! hiwe h1UJJpc:ted !he pfOOC.SII of sub~'\ compllanet:, the Comml\lec no l~r a-edits the rop~tAfions madD by DOJ *3:tcl(or the FBI l'C68.fdins theflel matters. Aooortiing)y, DOJ arid the FB r ure in~tructed to promptly protlucu ta tho Commitcec.-no tnter th.on JMunry 3, 2018-ALL outs!aJlding teem'do £dentlficd es cer;pon~ivc m tl1c Augw.t 24 robpQc1111S, inoludit1g but not U1V1[tl:<? 10:

PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSI: OF REPRESENTATIVES 216

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•vr

• All responsj,{e FD-l 023s, i.i.clooing 1l! reports th3! summarize nm:tings betw«n FBl conn~~, humm !l:>urees aid.FBI o1l1cim ~to~ ~le cl«s:icr,

• All responsi1,~ FP-3023-not pn.'Vivu.sl.y provided to theComrnitree; 81'.d • In adcfition 10 the R>.302s e,,d FD·l023s. cemm ~cf,rc: er.alyt!~ end

reference dacumenls ll:e.t w~rc ~ly identii-'ied end rur.icsted by Irie Cammittt.c,andt.~Y subjea to ~mt~on. es of Da=b:r IS.

Sb®ld DOJ decid:: lll withhold my mpanm"C ~ ot po.lions thereof, from the Cc:nmittee, it must, co~ with .be n:bj)ocne irmuctions, provide c wrluca respaiu.e. un~ yuur si~ dewfuJ.s tile Jegalju.,~(>11 re. Lriling to comply wilh ~ ~o~~ su'\)poi:ns~

AdditL":laily, by Il2 =e ~ ~p:ovtdo-,-.;.D wtitiri~l.ehla~ in J~J ~ 18 fad~;:ws with the. following offi::ws.

• Filttner DOJ .~soci~ D~,cy ~y 0~ Bm~Ohr. • A3l S-0.peNOO?Y Sp::ci?.1 ~ P:ti::r (SSA) S02Xlk; • fB( AUcmey James Bah:r. • F.Bl Atmmey UsaP~ • FBI AJumJ..sy Sally Mc.yet; and • FBI Assisti:nt Direcw. fot ConS[CSS:oll31 Affairs G!eg 8ro'9r=t.

11'.e ~e f.ath.er ronim3s you (}f ti= othu outstanding reqi:essfur ~on:

• Details mnrernin.& en~ April 2.irl 7 meeting with the media iJn,o}.ing 001/FBl ~nnel, ii:rclu.iing DOI Anorr,ey Al:ldrewWc:is=E:n (d~ Occe:.nber 13) ecd

• Toe ~g~l mi:osages be~ SSAS~ and M~ ~-c {doc D=mbet 15).

Unforomately, DOYFBl's ~pee with respc,:t lO 1he Auguc.;t 24 ~ow;s is pert oiabroader~ af~wr that ~1U)lot1!!(T:>e tolerated. As I said mapublic~mt S";"~-;:.al we(:}cs sgo, when the reasDn fu1 SSA Strzd:'s n:moval from L~ Sp?cisl Collll~ irr.'CStigntian Wl.3 leeked to lfui JYashtngtvt-t J'()Sl be!bte .hat reason was provided tn this Co;:J:nittee, at1ni! paint itseem11ihe00111mJ FBI~ to hr: invcrlipti!!.g themstlY~

I look forward tD }"OU?. timely wrr.t= response.

L ____ _

PRO~cRlY OF THc U.S. HOUSc OF REPRES!:r,JTAYIV~ 217

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ?ERM.ANENT SEl.2Cr COW,fiTTE~

0Fi lN'l'RU.ICENC~

H'JC•304, THe C!J'l"j'lll. w~~o~0a,. OC~15

~02) :2:l5-4 t:?.!

The Honorable Rod R~em Deputy Anorni:y G=al U.S. Dep;uunent of~ 120! Pennsylvania A·~-e. NW W2.Shinstor., D.C. 20004

Dear Mr. RoS!:llS!ein:

Js.nll8.tjl 4, 2i.ll 8

Pwsuan1 to our phal?- call ;-esterdey evsning. .i writ:? to memorial~ th= a~ wt! teacbccl rcgerdi.ng compli11llec wi!.b the subPo=na:s i~ by the Ko= Permso::ill Select Comrnitttt: an futelligcnce (the Co=ittee) on Augu.st 24. 2.017, to 1hc Department of l ustke(DOJ} and Federal. Bu..-eau of In¥estign!ior. (FBl}, as well ~$1:Vt:tal other o~nding tc:qta::S'.s by L'1e Committ~ fur infummfion and in[crvi~ws. JI fa my hope tr.al thls ~en, w,Jl provide the C.Omnuttce wirlt tall o,.J1mnding docum.cius and"'~ n~=ll?Y to .xirnpl.ete itli invi:stig:mons lo.to =n= ~alving DOJ ll!ld FBI.

Al agreoo. d-:slgns.ted Co=ninee i.cl""es-Jgators w-m:ffwill be p~videil ~ to all ~~g inv~siir;ati vc d~\l!Ilen!S, in unredncted form, furtt'l'i,ew at DOI on Fn&y. ]~f S, 2018. The documo:ors to be wli~~ Y>ill include all FBI Fo.m FD-J 0"'"3s ll.Jld all remainh::g FBl rorm FD-31)')...s responsl~ to.~ Co=ittee'~ Au~ 24, 20!7 subpo;:.1as. The o.tly ~n e:cecption pcnains to a singi~ FD-302, which. dui. ;o ruaiomd security~ ~ill be ~o,m ~aratcly by D~r Wca.1 IX) myself 2nd lllY s,ex;for inv~tiga{QIS during the: w~ c,f JIIJtl1AtY'&, 2018.

Yo\lfurt.1:er eonfam~ ~ tbtrc mt: ~Qthere:<tmti11~~ive doc:i.'t)lelll3 iliE!~11.re to!he Committee's inv23"'Jgarl= in.o (a) Russfa., im·c!."1:ull:llt in~ 2016 ~d::ri21 :[ectloo or (b) DOJ/FBl'& related s.ctloos dunQg this time perloo. Tt.is im:ludes FD-302s, ~Hl23s, and £ny t:..r.i;:r in,~tigatory d~ genmuto to the Cc:l]:lllitt~'s invesliSlltio.,s, ~$ of fom'I aad/or title. lf. someh.ow, '"n..-vr or"oth.a" rcspoMJy; dot~cs 8K ~ E!3 di$'CU$.~

yoc. will nutify me i:r.medi2l.e.!y utd aUow my =-:.OrinVl:stlg~tor&.to ~w the.::i shortly t~Ci.

1.Jrllh cespeet to the '\\oitnBs ~s 1equ~ by the Co:um~ ;,;,ii have ~ct! cha1 all :1ucll •.:titil.t:I~ - i=r.cly, ~ OOJ Assaciile Dt!pllt)· Attorney Genr;,,'al Sni-ce Ohr. FB1 Supervfaort Spet:ial Age::tPetet Stnolc; fo=r FBI Genmil Cou~l i~ ~ FBl ~ Lisa f88e; FB1 Attnrr .. e"/ Sally Moyei,; PBI A.5sist:nt Dltcctar C-reg Brvvtcr; FBI ASS!s!attc Dircctor Bill Pricstsp; and FB[ .Speci!! ..\gent Jmnc. Rybicki -wi11 be"rruide avoUahlc fur in~cvi~ to bei:onaucte:i m JlillUafy.

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOLISE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Lw.ly, as to the~ioings.pproxim~dy 9,SOOt::xl ~~~ w..t.,,,·= FBI~ Special Agent Pl:ler Stnak-L'ld his mi~ fBl Ai..-omey u~ Pego, i t is my-t:nd:rst=ling b~ 0-ll

your rep~catiom tmt l!ltother search is being ccndm:u:d 11r.d all reii:V""...at ~ will be p,.-ovidcc!, A~Cl4i!l.&IY, ~ Coimaitti:c fdltl~ p;onuctiro. -Of ;i;CS~ r.ll!SSt\~ by no &l.tt:rtrtl!J'I cl= of busm~. Th~y. Jim=y 11 , 2018. Shoil~y. I ~8l>d !t'i::n yo~ offi;c is (e$S.--clwig reco~ds re!aled ~ the d£tail, of Bil A.prll '2017 m~g b~--=en 001 Atto.,iey Arakcw Weis:mia,; (now &be seniar m11;)mey for S~~ Counsel Rob--~ M.uet!er) and the ~~a. wti:b will also b: pro•lid::d to this Committee by close of busi!::ss on 111\m;day, Jamiuy ! ~ ,· 2018.

rt wa."t furtba ~¢,d ll-.1.1 d! <!OC~t$ i:ode ai.uilable to the C<mJmin::e will elso be ;,;v.illal:fa 10:-review by th~ minority Ra a king: M~r a.-d dcsign.r.«i stdf.

Tne Jlulll:!W9 we are rcqi."'Cltiog ;.re ·,itd to the Commntec's :nve.."'tig~on oi po~al abure.s into iraems~~ and taw eaforcx:ir..mt ~cncics' h~cilmg oi the Chris::.opber Steele d.assier, The Cm.lrr.ittee is f:X",.,cme(y ron.cemeil b)• inctcatioGS that top U.S. Gavm.illlCQt ofl~I.$ who -..i=

i~311. ptes!dffllW camp3ignr~on ~verified L.fommioa di;;t was funded by the ~ng pc!itfcl csmpcign and 'A'3S ~ on Rnssian ~= Goi11& fonvm-d, it'i; cmcial ch1t we =r.nrleli~ C1llf COl1\'~miriollS on chis is~. Bnd thllt v.~·re as tF~t !IS])O.UiI:,h: ,filth the Ameri=i people, who oo:.sm~ 1!1),SWiZ to du: questions ~ C:i=itt~ is :nw.stiplin3.

Co¢e3 to: The Hontr."..h!e Jef!°Sc:$!k-m, A~):' Gen.e':21 ~Hon~le Chrutop~ Wray, D1re<:ter, Fwera. Bureau ofl::,;estig.ation

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PROPERTY OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF RC-PREScNT?.11VES 219

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\-lA U.S. MAlL

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PERMAN.Em" SELcCT COllt.l.'JTTE.E

ON INTEU.!SEIIICE

Novtmbct &, 2017

The HolUltahl.e Jam.~ 13. ~~y

Dear Mr, Cotney;

H','C-~.1)i~ C...,C-"'"1. WAS><JI"""", 0C %:515

1:,,127.s-,!, :a

Thank you fur yourte:stimoay before the House Jl~cn: Selt:-et CQrr,mttti:e va fnWligroo; on Marc:li 20, 2017 and h~ 4. 2017 in. the C.OlJIIIlittl:c's bipar.isan itl~ in!O Rlls!aan active measures directc:i st the Wi6 U.S. cltctlon. In light of add:ttiQ!W facts~ during tho investigation,~ Commi11ee ~ ue.sts tr.at you pc.rti.clpa.te ina voluntary, transaibe::I iQlelView at cbe Cor:nrnicree' s offi~

Commim:e stllffvdll ;,,'Orl: ~-ith you to t'!fflltige )'C!!l" in~• f<>r either~ week of~ocmbo: 4 or December 11. ~ iim:mew may c;ov;;r s:ny topi~ within the pi.1blic}y-llJ100'..inc:cd paraIDa<:I:i cftbe ComJnj&c's nr,~oo (see~), im:ludingRllssian cyWac:rl.iti?S directed a~t the 2016 U.S.. ~an. pm~tfol :illlcs 1:~ Russia Md i11dh.:i.duaa asoociatcid \l,ilh p,,!itical csmpaigns. the U.S. gpverruuent's mspo,.:ise to these-Russian s:tive m=es, and rel~tod

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I~ of c!:;tjffad i:nfurmation.

We n:specliully ask~ yo.: pmdw:,c to th~ Com~ by m> Istcr lhn th<:: ¢klse ofbus'.r1;,ss on. Nonmbu· 24, ~ availabilit'Y for lhe i.mi;rn~.v ~ring the time: idc.mificd ah:>-.:c..

This lett.,;_, also ~ quc::;.s prcsq,,ation aixl producruri of ell dix:un1ems, records, cl~onically st=d information, re::o."'limgs, data ;ind tangibletaiugs. (mcluding. bu1 not limib:d to, gt!!plu, c:iart.,;, pr.nrogx-.q>bs, im5ses ~ 0~ dc-cwnetlts} !'egnrdle~ orfomt, otbatha!I tho so wid~ly available (e.g., nev.sp,..peratleles), related to the C<>mmiru:e's inves!i&=,tio», yow interview, Jllld ~Y anctll:ny matt=.

Should you have any~ at any !h:u:, plei= contact Committee S'.zff itt ('202:) 225-4121. If you are ~e:;1:nted by en lll!Omil)', p!csse fotwud this 1~ co ~·oiir ~-O<llCY, .:c<i tm,~ him or hcrconl.l!Ct 11\e {'A)mll"Jnee on :,our bchili'.

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K SiIJCl:rely, ·~~-t-;i .. . . . . . , . . . .... . .

K.lvilclie~lC~"'~Y Mcmb::r of Congrc...<:S

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Adam Stbiff lo.ol<llli; Mcrnb-::r

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Uuited States House ofRepri?Scntativcs Pennari.mt Select Committeo on [ntelligl!llce ATTN: Nick Ciadimtc HVC-304, U.S. Capitol Washing.on. D.C. 20515

Dea- Mr. Ciarlante:

February 1. 2018

I r~oeived your JanuBJ')' 24, 2018 lcltcr, forwnrding a November 8, 20\ 7 l~cr that

\Vllll sen~ to nn old mailing address of mine..

1 respectfully decline the i!).vilation ton voluntary interV{cw. I nm confident you cnn ob1ain the best information from cumnt .r'FH cn1pl0}1ees. Please give my b~l lo Messrs. Conaway nnd Schiff. 1 hn.ve1 lhnd recollections of our pnst int ... -ractioo~.

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATiVES PE:RJ.'A.'IEl>tT $Eu;CT CO.\~.;:

01'-1 [Ni"El.UCJSitcE

The HOllOl'ahle Rod ~n Deputy Att=,ey 0~ Uni~ S~ ~ent of Justlre 1201 Pen::JS)'lVll:!l:a Ai,,e, NW W~oo, D.C. 2n004

Deee:mbe?<i, 20l 7

i!'Jc-JC-1, Tfl.C.U..Ta::t:. WA!.W~OC2C6t5

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i am vmtins y{)I,\ as e follo-.v-op too~ rec~ converelii!!\ about the ~stl:ll.i prcll!tin QI uns.n.lhmmd w..ks ofinfmmal:io!i. r.o the .tnf:~ ~m ~ti~ bra:clt Z.,"'lmeies.

In F~ 20 li, Imoto a fci.!.i!r to tf->..n-Fec!t'nl Bur(all ofl"l~g.atlcn (FBI) Direcw. J,~ Comeyex~my eoni:em cegaromg~ "epi~~of ~discio~to th: press:", i:.:::;1uy ofwh~ pwpar.cd to cootcin ;Iass:ifiEd infom£ti0ll, partirule.rly thea!!c~ lcelc: <Jf Lt. G<>..n. Mi~ FJ..vnn's namer~ e oonve!:S!Iionmat ~ repaztl'Aly bad ":\1th fomicr RUl!S2n Amb~r Setf,ci Kislyek. In ~ 2017, r .,,-rote mother I~ to the mwtigmce Co=uciiy lnspectcr Ge=al mid y~ ex.P=5U"..g 11 gi:ave CWCEm a.bOct a i=di:l& .a,ticl¢ biased en a., mir,ropcr lellk. Unful1llrul"..e[)', itis .stilit10tclee:z~ tbeHOt!Se PermMC;:t Se!~ Com:ni:r...ce on h.-iclli~c.i (HPSCI) "lmell:~Jie Dcp;!:$:r..eitl of !1L."il.c.e{DOJ) fa investig;:dng ll:i~~

fn the pas.s:evual momlts, nmnemusznciti~I leaks, soma oomp.isicg p!.!tpcrtclly ::las:sffici! it.fo:cnai!on, h.rt\-<: ~ in tt-a press in «~-.ion to the ~ ins inv$lgarlon cf Russian ir.t~'"l:io;:i with the Tnnap cempeign.

! am p~ly coneemcd :iliout th~~ rote of DO] ~$on:iel in ~'"lillrllling sucli lm(~. HPSCl ras !~ th?.t Oll « ah cot A+n1 H, Wl 7, !It me bechest: m 11. ~~ ~am:ey assigned t!> S,i=ial CmmscJ. R.obe.t Ml.16..llet III, !,ndrew W~ 1hc:n bud of1)().)'ll Crimin&l DMSt<lll's Ftaud Scctron, m::t, t.!ong "vith FBI~ with agrol.ip of~~ £tom a =jcr ~~ o~atfoo to discuss tile 0Qg!ins-R=l:8in'IS~ In light cf this in~o.1, l roque:-t thu >'-cu provide HPSCI vii th ~ to the fulrowillg qusions:

• Did lfur. ~.ccrun,g bcti\.'(';Cfl DOJ r,v.,/c. FB! officials N.d ~t=oel!;lll'? • Iftms·~o::==d:

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- \Vb.y \vt\S it Wll b1fofod to l[l'SCI oroth11.r relevant ov1::1'5ight committees? - Who from tho oor nnd/or 1:-"Hl approved ~ meCiing? - Which tepc;>rl!s:s and n:prcserusuves ftom DOI and/or FBl attended. the: 01eetlng? • Did the ammgll)i and CQndactoftbe meeting follow all R:le·r.urt DOJ and/or r-m

~roiocola? - At lhc mcetili.g, dld nuy OOJ and/or FB) ottio!a!s provide nny inforrnntfoll to du:

rcpo1·ter:1 ubou1 tho FBI lnve:J\lgation or confirm MY infom1ution provided by ll'e rep~

~ Dl.d anyone from OOJ ond/or-FBI file a cornplni11t about thls meeting? - :Did any DOJ and/or FBI rc~tivce tA.\e nows during the meeting? - lo ill.is mc.eti.11~ the ~1~ 01' a. lG mvc-~ti{:llti~?

Cop~ to: The Honorable Mk:hw::l ~. rJotOWil"Z., !n&p1.-etor Gee.era.I, U.S. ·oepmtmcnt of Ju.,lice

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IP.a • The l:1.-cnCl.,abic !>min Nm1es Chmm2:o ?~..anent Sel«t C=tnl~ on lnt=lli.geoce U.S. Ho:= of Rcprcsentati.vcs Washlag,-..un~ DC 20St5

U.S. D~_partm.eat of Ju.'ltl~

Office <ifLegisJ:itivc Affai!s

Thls r~Dds to Yi!W: lener-to the D-'vpmy A:mroey Geoet':!! d!lted Deeer.i~ 6, 20!7. Yen: 1~ e.'(presses concern abau.;: anaumorizcl dlsclOS'Um! of classi.fi.e<l infomiation. ro the !!leili:a from eucutii.•e brancb age.ncies, and notes yocr panreul.ar ronrem cilout t!te )JIF'teotiei rule oflJap:mment cf lustice (Dc:pa."trnc.nt) pmsollllcl in fa.cilitaimg such discl=e;:. Dqo..rliI'.enl polrcy- does not ~ collillm2.ti.on of the existence of migomg invesugatlons, fuciu<ilng mveslig.;;l:liIDS' of~orizcd msc!ruures of coosificd infumlatfon. HoWe""{et'., the- llipattm.en;:

~eS ;,our con..-.;ms about u~ disclosi;rra m clES<,,--i/ied in:fuanatlon, UMJS!ig3res such disclnsun:s, and ~-i.rtes offenda.is 'l'ffi.ell 8PJifO-pP..:dc.. It cert.m'Jy would bEl tclpfu! ro any i.nvestigatiim thE the Oepmme:.rt :rm.y be oondu.:tlng for y,ou m share any iciomiation your.av<:: ll!:lolii the it:-emity of any !ll!'.ilvicmals :n. any hirtncls.. of gevemment wbo have disclosed cl!tsslfied infol!Wltfon to 1m: m:dia m to a:nyo~ witcout a =.d to knotV t:ie i11fu:rom,13i, The DepDJ'tOlen, wil.1 wo:rk ll'iitll you to recei¥e :;ny sucll. infu.:mai!Jn -oonfi:deruially at ye,11r con\.'2:!li~

You h.a\.e aJs.i aske-1 wheme:- a meeting occurred 8n101ig ~ent pez-.:x:iull::l and reporters or. April 11, 2017 to "discs= the ongobg Rns.<ifr. fu.vestig~" TI-,e Dep;,...Jt::!'!clli is ;;.waze of no sucli r.r.e:a!ing n whi<lh.1hls w--..s the topic af d~cussion. On. tha ~ -~ t

oiTicla!s did m~=t w'itl1 ,¢.POrtacs from lhe Associated~ {AP) 11t ~ tqxmer5' rcqn,:st. Th.e Depa::rtment <lfficials in'Cluit:d .<\nd.ew W~i.n1~ Chief ofthe Fraiu! Semjon of 1he CriminD.! Dlvition; tll:ree AJI ?go:::nts; a Dep.arnn~m rci~ ~ ; rui.d.mi A.lists~ U.S. Atti111l.ey from. t.'ic E~ DiSttiCT of.Vi.-gina r.our AP reporters~ A.ti AP tepor~ eontaared Yi.. W~ to waa&l! the rneetfoB., ooo.Mr. Wci5'S=n did so .

.DuriUg fii<? ~ting, th<: AP ~;1c;s pro.·iili:11 i.,fomu1ri.m. to rili:: DepartmCilt th.at jiey lud. kamed as a 1esult of tlleir mves5gtcioo of Paul Mannfurt. Thc.y des~ 2-."'U\•i:ties umclat~ to any role Mr. I,E...enafurt !!!:ll.Y mM: bi.d ~ifu:thc campaign of Preside.,t Donald J. Trnmy and focused pmnarilyaa.his busini::ss p.--::-cL~ fuia:;iclal ad'rities, aa.dielatio$hlps with :mrcign ir.divicmals or entities. The AP ttparters askm questi= of 1-~ Depa..~ offit:ial~ who declinal w OJI!lmCilt 011 the-q,.i¢:;tfons. Th"Dcpu;r.m~ undm~ frm:notcs were t!!kc:n C!iling them~ Ba~ cm-~ Dcpmmc::rit's ,:1i:=nt 1.>nde:rsrending. it~ Eot

sppe.s-1r.-.a1 De~ ofikiels ll'llpi-operly d[sclcsed aiy .:vnfiderrtild fofumiati.{11).

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PRO?ERTY OF THE U.S. liOUSE Or REPRE3ENTATIVES 225

The Honomblc Devin Nunes 'PnBc Two

rnc: Oepu:me1\t ba:11efcrred 10 thd lnspcctor Gcnernl youc o,.uc~Uom, os tn whether an}'Ona :6b:d n oompl.nlnt about the mcotlnS ond wll\!th81' [he mcctin(I; fa Ule .robj~ict of Lin Inspector Genera] inves1ig.11ioo.

J>l~ do nnt hcsitme to contact tbi~ offi0t:: ifwc may pwvic!e additiolJ!ll as~istan~ r1,:9;111iiing this or any nther .. matter. ·

~= The IJonor..ible Adam B. Schlff Ri!L'<lllg Mt!Pl her

Sincciily,

Stcpb<'.n E. Hoyo Assistant Attorney General

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PROPERTY OF rHe U.$ MOUSE: OF ft!:PR!2Sl:.NTA1WES

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!i~~~~ U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ..,.1,.1t.~•ea-. ~i~~ PEnl-~J,6"¥J" SB£C'r Go,..eL•tTTEE ~11~~~~~ 0V Jf'fJEll.1:3~E" '\\M11.l:-t.,f';1JI

Tnelfo::.,ol'!.i:!li!: ~ ~ ~ Aitorney G' .... --eru U.S. D~:rtt of.hmic~ l20l frnlisy!varus.Ave. NW W:.shfagton, D.C. 20004

Dee Mc. R=stes:o:

KYC-:;.t. Tlii: C:...1\TCl V/"51'.=i!lN, OC2Co1S

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This lcttrs ~It s.er.sc :;s the CO?m!1l!e!:'s mis! ~ to tl-x: ~--mnent cf Jusfu.e {001) ~ 1M ~l 3tzre,.a.offo·.~tion (FBI) for,=opi~cf 11!1 ~ii:aio11= (li> m-:,lm:-e~ rn~ ea:em, ano~ otl>et-ca.p.urc,:l =.."It~)~ FBI~ Pctu-SD:mkami PSI At!i;-m;y ~ P~ SSA S-trznk s;.:dMa. ~ bl!-.-e hr:,::;;m!::11:ified in mtdfa.reponilig astwo=ilar--lc\'cl !'a[ cmp~'ets'Yit..o botll ~ ia ~ FBl'sez:11.m~rcllis= i~ o:,n~i.irtg3l0 Hillmy Cli:J!!m e--mEib i!!Dd lite 2016 prtsl~lal ele.:tlll11.

SSA S1120.hras inc Deputy !l~=cfifter.Bl'a ~igcnceDivis~ v.i,~. o~ ~Cr:!! rl\V"'~ Ms. P~ ls a FBI ~ cf~[ C..,~ J Bl:iJcney, wflalil lhctim,;.. ..-~~~ to i>.i:ur.,· l):i:a'.:1t'Ji' n11drew M~'s om:c end pnmd--d 1C£!d sup;;,an: » ~ io~~1J'-o,,..s. &tll SSA S'.r~ ~lld !,,!s. l'ag,1.1sL<o ~ fOTSpcda:! ~] Robii:,t J\-faB]JE? =li~6i3 y= tiara bal.s qu.~ydismiised u:p.:n me diffil~l:l)'~Ulm-~tal srru.~c!me~of == pc-!iml1y c~ ~~ d:imigtlie a:11rSc of booi ln\'¢3tlgMOll$ Lh.!..t "'= ail'c~edl-.1~Tru:np u:I ~ C!mI.la.

Th:,~ktl!e ~r:.os.Jy~~e.~~~1 ro:- !n-~CD ~be:'2, 2017, n.-ai ~ ott ~ ~. 2.0!7. I :a~ made~ reg= fur t'le commmicatfoll5 dmiag my !l1~ai:Jg wirl:r.Jill1 M ~~. 2!ll7. TI'~ Ca~ c:,;:p:rr.u to i=:ivc =--~ rop~t>f !Ill ~uest:d ctr:mD1mic,,ticll5, ~ wiJJ ~ t to ~mpnl=y proeos if ell .si:cli filX:im!Ul~ m:e m;t del fverc::! b th!, Cacmi~kforo9:00 AM, ~~e:- 15, 2,017_

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PROPERTY OF THE U..S. J;OUSE OF RE'f>REt:ENTATIVES 227

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• Office of the Ati~IIDlt At1nmey Oe:iorol

Tut: Honocl>le lxvin Nunes Cl!.ajnnan Pemmnent ~1C"..t C11mmittte on lm.cllisencc U.S. Hou5e of~~vcs W;:.shingtoo, OC 2{1515

D:nr Cruu.nrum NUDo",

U.S. Ocpartwcnt or JusllNJ

Ofike orL~&lslath·o Aflblrs

JF"ashfngton. .b.C. 20S30

DEC I 2 2811

Thi5 r~onds to the Couu.11.iltoo's rcqucst that1he DeprutJ.nent of Iwaice (Dcparuncnt) pr<Jvltle llte1 Commi~ with copicJ of text mcs11.1go communio:itloDs botwe.:11 F11dcit,l l1'U'CIII). or lnvosiJsntlon {PB!} omployec.1i'Pet1:r St17Jlk imct LJS11 I>11g1>. Wu o~u s;nxllng icltc4;11 nnd Identical analosum, to b n~ml,er or Coogrc8nioool Cornmitttiou Ulut t..nvo mfldc bimll:1r ,re.quests.

M, )'OU mny kllQW, on.Jru,uuty 12, 2016, UmDcpmmcntof.T~CA:'t,, Oilko oflcupwtnr OcTJer:it (OIG) pub11uty =~1U1rod lhnt the 010 would cevicw ''uUup;1\lc:m.~ thin:D1ipt1rtmcntc,r POI [1-0llclcs or pin«d~, 'M 1101 follow¢\! ~l 001\llOQt/cm with, or 1n actil"n~ Jcntlln,i up co or :relntcd co, tbe Fnl Dircctnt'!t publlo onnounoc.mcnt on July$, 201611 :uid thll lllructor's fonom to Crmgn:~1 on Octoher28 ru.ul.Novcrober 6, 20l6, 11.tld Umt ccitn:in. untl.llrl)IUIS iovc:UliBJLtlve deut~ion.o v.i:rc b;iscd 011 ~pct con$l~ro.tlooJ1?" ,\$ fll1t oftli.'\t ~vfow, the QIO o'bw.incd, lllllC1J1g oth rr tb.ing:1, taxt mcw1gl:.'I t:<mvoou Mr. SllZOk and Ms. Poge.

Tile D~p:uuncot cxpcctcd thedoatll7\Cnts pwvldcd·h:rc~ to beprovlded ai. r,act or.a cnmpktcd OIG reporL How~ver. public tq'lmJ.ns about the exis\ellce of the !ext IJU:S..~

prompted Coogres...-lonnl Cc,TDI11i!tcc n:~3ts for th~ cext ~ - Pl=e.fm.d cnclrn;ed. = initiol dJsclarurn nf spproxmuiw]y 37S text mc~5ngo <:ol!llllunic.rtiOOJJ, 4lue4Allgusl 16, ~OJS tQ

~b~ I, 2016, th.tt I.a,-.: been ic!cntiticd as JJcr'\incnt to~ OJG tcVicw l'Cfi:It-"I'lecd :i.tiove. '!'he ~ do~UIDC!lt!! contain mfairnnl. n:dacllooo that1)nltccl the ]l!ivac;.y C~!s of third partic~ and sensitive law enfor=nmt lllfa.rmation, nrnl.rcmgve ~cvlU'it inf¢tmation. Tbe Dq,llrtment co11.tin'l]e;!l to review dc<=ier.ts mu.I will pm,<i&: ~riincm. ~e!lrs·os 11\ey ~ nvel!ablc. ·

' On 1hnc di!,:. thcn-Ffl! Dirow 1~ I!. Qimoy IC!DOuucad thJJt t~ l'll(was 1-c.:on~ to 1hc Ocpanm-:nl of hull~ chit w cll!rgeg ~Gold bi! flied mlldng to~· 8cv1~tocy or Sb.to flil!ar,· ~:i'a ~ 1>f u _priVllc emc'1 -· .

'UO/ OIO A=ooic~ 1uitlarloo orRcvio)f. Jarnmy 12, 2017, n"-'11.ti~ a~ htlps:f/ciiju)..;o,,,i:o,·/tnu.VWli/201 '1• Ql-11,J!dl

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PROPERTY OF THE U . .S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 228

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;\?; he.,; b'ero pct-~:ly t;:pQ:tz:c, Mr. s~ previously 9t:i"'cl Q1l tl-.;: ur,esti~iv::: ttai-u !.o:i by Spec>.=! C~.:mel Romt M~TI~-~ Om mfon .. cd th,; Spe61 ~clef the ~s== Qf lh:atd=:.i l::o;t~On;>:' aoottJuJy27, 2017. ?,:fr. ·!.{ucl]::rirr.m«liat,:.ly«m.cl~ ~ ).fr. Sttriik oo;.ld 11!1 IOD£Cf pi:rticip= m ~ ~\Cesli¢ol!, .r.d !:.e = rc:r.ovcd f.-=r ilic ~

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.. PRO?ERTY _(.'F THE U.S. HOUSE=: OF ~EPiU~SE.'ITAliVES 229

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• Office of I.he Assista.n.t .... ~ vene~l

The Honorable De"i"It.l Nm:es CIJ:linnrm P~"1l Sr;Jc,ctiQlJ Cc=itt:e (,Ill In!i!!Hgerice U.S. House of~.;.:s Ws..<htog(ou, DC 20515

U.S. De:parlment of ,l~

WashingtoJ~ D.C. 2053!)

JA:N 1 9 20ffl

Iilis respon:!s to yom :-equi:st w tile D~t of Jnstlc-1} (Dcp:mm=nt) ;o provide the Committee 'With ccpies <lf te:n meSsage Cf.llllmll!l!~011S bm\=. Fedes:21 Bm= of lnvcstig-.,.uoo (FBI) .:m~"S Peter SII:z.Ok =I Llst. I'n.ge.

As you lllZIY know, m Jamii~y 12, 2016, !be Dcpartm=Dl'~ O.flfoe Gf !Dspccto: Ot::ni::ral {OlG} publioly c,nnounc;d thin the OrG would r:-,-5::w '\Jlegations !hai ~ er FBl polici~ or prooed= w= t:!!< followed in conn~n \\ilh. or in ~ar,s l~g llJ> to or 7elatei to, 1ho FBI Uircctw's pablic arm=i::emem on July 5,2016, 1 and~ !F_<e::!or's lettcr3 ti:> Coi:si=, on Octo~ 28 w Novembi::r 6, 2016, md lWlt ~ein undctl)'ing Un5t:g;itive decisioos 'M:n: 00$:d n::I llEpOf.CI c0n.,;ide1llt!DnS.. ~ As pan o.f fhe.t Te'\.i-:,.,.•, Ule 0[G ob(afoed, among c,(hez thin_s:s, t::!ttm~~ 1:etw= Mr. Snzok :ind :Ms. Page.

I:c. Deccmbct1017, = provxlcd you ,<ritt. s iuitil\l production of ~~ly 375 t~1 =segecommuni~ons,&-iro August 16, 2015,o December!, 2016. in:respall.."'e m the rcq=tS for the tcl\'!S ~ . !he !JeI)2!1lrulnl collt:ctt:J Hi leJ(t messages ~ !-.1r. S!!.zok md Ms. Page avcil~l" !roal.the FBI for~ pc:rioo. July,!,2015 to Juty2S, 2017,l which w~ !he salilfil r,ciod re~ by the: rna. The Dep-J?!lllart beg;in reviewing tll6e do=ts in an effctt to pro>'ide yc,.1 thoac n-=sagr.s thai were cilher-work-n:Jntod or 1h21 p;ovi&d llIJY insi&hf llllO Im: politi(::11 Vtc>\S of tile plltl:CiPQDl5.

1 on tlla~ ~~. lb-:a·FBl DiJ= I=s 3, Ccmq anoc-mc:,d tl!st di<> FBI wa~ reco~to t!tt Dq,artm;::n of .'imi,o 1im no ~h.n~s ~,d ~ fil:d reol~lir.~coio.-merS~ ilfS::U: Hil~· Cllr.:ro's = :;f~ PITT;ir¢ ~ro:Jl = · 1 DOJ O!G Anooul!.C:S lufmlio:: <lfRcvltw, bt=l)' 12. 2017, a.,,~la'l,.l~;tt }l~-".)1.,)';t~.~Q!V~2:: fil:!1Jldf

'A!l~OtJ&!llMTIX1=i:.~=titr0ugb Ju!y.lS, 20]7.,ii= -..-er:aoitxt lll~~~~Mr. Str7.<>k 11:.-><1 Ms. l'".r.i_;~w Jul)' I, 201?, mlfth: m:!stgcs ef.o- J~25, '.20!7• 'oJCrep:m>n.!I in a=

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PROPERTY o:= THE U.S. HOUSE Or REPRESE:NTA TIVES 230

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Tre Dep,irtnient ti not pa>\'u:lillg ~ ~"'(S .nat ·=c pu:-dy pew.mal in cmure. Far.Ji.e=-<iro, ~ Depenn:.c.o.tll3s ~<1 from ;om? v.-ork-rehlocl .:xt me-;s:.ges ponions tli:!i were pu:ely p~~!l.al. 1M Dcpmmcnt's aim ia witt.!m1'1lns ;::urcl)· pmon~ t:xt ~~~~ =:J ~atting ~ ponicos of .. .:irlc·rdzt~ ~ m~cs 1\\-a:i prinll!,Jy to fe::i\itsk. 1be Commm~·s 6,C;:e:;$ 10 pct~ntitlly rcl~t text mo.ss:iges wilooat lm,ingto cull dtro~h ~ qU3?lti1.ies of m!:!d'ial U!\relaled to ei'O:er t!.-c i.~igwion. of fumier ~retmy of Sta.a Rilfart Gin.tttn's use of a perso!ol e!lliU1 se1vtr Qt' llic :r.vestigl!tion iclO Russ:i:aa e.ffir!".s to in.~ with !he 20 !6 :Presid::miru cl:don. A I~ th~ wilhholding of p::r:sir,a! infomiztioii in sc,m: i.osi.u,;:es . m:olds ~ =!mra=cntor~ to fuird p!l11!1:' ~ could l':;S\l)l f= pul:fu.: :clf:aSeoi':sucli inforam:!ioa. Ile= ~Ln:ductal lh:Dim:.o:s of emplo)·ees who are r.o: SES· le,;~ c:mo1loyec>., .m!I. in 5<lT!lC ins~ r.:dtct:.1 SES cmplo:i=s' =cs to e:.-oid unw.immll:d ~liDn:.;, lh.tls-; ~i;rn'id:rals when colJl!"l1t;D\s wc:t"e ~us l!Drl md not pteT-de re!C'll.a.nl i:t1mna1bn W 1%igQmg Congtc,,--s:ioi:il U!J!l:lirics.

in a m~ mstaoocs, ihc ~ Jw ffi!ecl;d portions of Wt!dc-,-,,~,!(f telttS !ha! con<:cm «i?ff i.avesdgtllious. fir.ally, ths Dcpetment c-0llSult.,d with the Special Co:=el's Offi-;:,e (SCO) m1 ~ some redactio:?S related ro uiemucture, op;.~~ Sll~e cf~ SCO im-cstigation because it is o~i.og.

'fo ll'i'Oid any cot-cem cil:lt the D.:parlmeot h~ \ruhll.e!d rel~,mt info=atia.; :f e Ccmmi~ ha. .. sp«ffie qucstior.s :tbom: why a panic,w u:>.'l was per.wly r~ctoo o, abo:n the cmun: of r.cr5omJ text mess:ige v.ithheld, tllC Ikpartm~ will worl:: with t:ba.t COlllt:litt.ee to ~UJP.J' furlhcr de=:ire cz disclose ud21:1:trl infommtio:a in !1 closed ~ . Afllu)ugh the onp l ;p!~cetconll1iilcd ocly w1w. the D~e::t believed to be ~'Qri::-o:Jak.d tc~t ~. ~ teviews identified Si:Jme l:IC!dillonlll p,::r9~ t«:rtn::=ll£l'S within !ht ~,-:in.

Ta.erefore, lhe doc.umcnl produt.6i today c:cmt.s:Jl.9 a ~ lll.lllL~i-of fully r~ed W-!'l~'\'S 61tt were cleteonined to be y.:i:s<irral Jl"~gel f:llhs,;q_u~-nt ~ tocir initial intlUSlon in the :P{C",ioll3ly providt;,:! ~ '?b: c:r,c!~ ~mcnt :.!so e,;~1-:~s cotwnm ofinfonnatio:l that COl!I2inoi 011.ly ce<:hr.iul fomrmatifto such 11, phone numbas er email &1drcs..scs in :m effort <o pre-.ide a mo~ n: .. dily 1,:vicwsi!fc sd of d~~umi:nt.:i. In the at~:hed. lt.c ..,~oo:t;' d&;umeDt3 ere

I frcOl ML S:o.ox to Ms. P;tgc:. 2I1d the "()...nbox" d~im:ii:r.ts arc from !.is. Psgc co M.r. Strrok.

. The Dejmtmt:nl =~ to bring xi yo:.ir ntkat!on thet the FBPs ~kal s;'Sl::m for i:etilini.o~ ~xt =~cs ~t ruidr~cci\.,:d on F.Bl Ill.Omle rievice.9 fa.Hed to presen,e ~rr-=ges

I · for Mr. &i=k21dM9. P:lgefro:nD=be:r !4, 2016to~~tol\!ay 17, 2017. The

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, .fBI fo1s infom~ m this many i'BI-pw-;i.J~d S3msun:g 5 mobile d~ies did fiOl ca~ 01 stOJ'<°l 01

text mc:ssae~s d-.ia tt; mi.=nligura1i09 iss:uos rel .. ~c! to r<l'llo1<i3: pro\-L.ioning. aad sof:ra"l!re I L~ ili..t i;;o.tflictcd v.ilh 1hr:;.FBl'5 ccU~tic;:, ~c:s. 1'11.e =It was thaldsa tll.2f

I ~oou."d lll.'\'e ~=o~lycoll~~..d.re:Snedfar !ong-tenn 5loClgc and tetri:v-.tl wzs ru>t ~ll=ed. Tni:s probkm wuld line btoen ~ with t!'.i: .rolliro1 cflhe Snn:..cung 7JJ m ;

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PrtOPERTY OF THE U.S.. HOUSE: Of REPR=SENTATIVES

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·n1c Honorable De.,.in Nunes Plle11 TIU'«

Mr. Smznk's San~ung S phouc Inst coo.nt,(;ted to the stonii;e sy:.1c:nl oo June 18, 2016. He recch·~d his new SatnSWtg 7 phoi:u! on or about July 5, 1017. Ms. :Page·~ Samsun~ .S pbone last conn,?Ctt'd to tho stOJ11ge aystem on December 13, 2016. She tee&i,-i::.d her n~w S:J.1T1Sung, phono on or abouc M:ty 22, 2017.'

Tut! O.ffic:e of r.o,~or Gc111ll'!l! pit:e,;d together I~ te.\'l mc:mi.gcs l)C(wocn M1·. Stt1.ok and Ms. Pase fromJwie 18, 2016. 10 necembel 13, 2016, ll.illlgtbe data from t.u. P11gc' , p.hcne notll the connt"Ction to lhesto~ sysn:mstowctl ot1 Dcccm\x-.r 13, 2016. Ou May 17, 2017, Mil, P11sc's dnm cDll.:ctinn n:-iiutiotcd v.hcn she roccivcd her new pho11e.

Plc11SC !cl !his office know If you b:wt: ony qu~llons TCgnrtllug tl1J:; prod1101ion,

ce: The Honomblo Adam Sob.16" R.nnki.u& Mcmbt.'1'

• Altl\oup,h FBI ldcniHlcd M•)' l.2, 2011 nHhc u;illt() dncg tor M~. Pt,~·, rho,ic, uoll<Xticn r~tmcdan Moy 1a, 2017. ·11io FBI Im not yet be\':'I able to ni,0111\tfOf lhl1tlbetcJ:Qn<Y.

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PROl~!=RTY Of THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 232

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

~:stcntt. c.t.nrr-. Fl~,IJ.....:::;.

~ttr-,1.w~,:;:i:.,...-: 1=-.:A.~t...a .. ~ NQ;I~~. ,_,.,,. a'r"ll;t!~""'·Qf1.,,•lll t.:l.a:0:lfk\, h'»I i:u~-l~l"l"'4 ~t::MK : _.. ~) .... 'MD,,.,.";~?..• rJDI

f'.UC !Nn..~'!L.u,4<'f._:,:=;:r ~.~~tt..~rc~

flt:rn.tMlENT a:,LECIT Qo:W,IITT£l! 0~ lNTE.t.l.lGBICE

YJ,,I\. F.LE:CT.RONIC Mt!:Cb

Ute Hoooral:le Ri1d I. RMenstcm Do/'-ty ~rney ~end lf.S. ~1niea.tof.Juuice 9~ Pert.'IS'.fl\.-:m.i:i.Avenne, "NW Wa.<hi.'lgtan, D.C. 20~3Q

The Honnmble Chmtop!ifr Wray Di:cctor Fedcre.l Bareau af Investigation 935 Pmnsyi""1llli3 Avc:w:e, NW WashhistmJ, D.C. 2053S

t-,\'C~, T1,:c.r= w~~"· oc.~15

r,..."?}~~121 OQ,cwCf•=.:: '!~PU,..~

• __ ... .,, !tar.:ID.~ M~:i.:111 ~11

For cnonrls, tho HtJusc. Pcm.anmr Sol~ Commm.io OJ"J InteUi.,=cc bas boc:n cone=~ aooor ~~·s and~ ~eral Bure;m of lnVesligati.r,n's actk,as inanumbe..of ~. ~ v.=kcod':. ~·cl~ that the Dcpsrtmc:ot end !he FBI fa.!Jc:4 to p~~-e -and tooey's media rcponing ~ the ~'s ~rGC!l~ has fare::u:iC2lly re.co.et"~ -~p.?Qidma.tely f.-ve monlhs of text m=&e OKCimngcs b..."'1:W1:lell S~w Ag.::nt Peter Slr.zok a."l!i FBI sttomey Lisa Pa_~ h..~ only ~e(i lb:>ie C(!!ll".CDlS.

To eC1:,"1ll'e ti!l!1 my Committi:.: ic.quiry is as thorollB,h a:l!i cc..-.ipk:tc llS r,os.<u"hle. v..12 ~~ req~ (hat the Dcpar°c.lllecl and t1:ie FE[ ensme doctll7?.Gts llDd m:fommioo. ~ to the following L~ a-e pn:ser-red fur porentr.21 prnch.l,:tfon to !ha Cc,mmittee:

• Arzy ccmmllllicauons devioes lssllec110 A&<Slt &17.0k and :M·s. F.:g::!;

• A."ly eii'o.rts to r1:ttic-..c infon:muion frQm Agci:it Sr:zd:'i and :Ms. Page's £.O,cmn:i<mt· iss~ devices.;

• .t..rry d..ta on the SMISllllg 5 p.'wn~ iss!l'M to AE.~ Strzok....nri! on er about July .S, 2017;

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?~OFeRT'( OF THE U:S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 233

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• Any infum.ation ooot.'t 1he alleged "misconii~on i=s retiued w rollo ... "ts, 1=visio::ililg. md sofiware tlpgxa<!fs that ccnfficted witl:i. the FB!'s ~ion ~litie.3" tru.t caused ''=y FBi-provlded Samruog·s-l'tlObile<leYices" J10! Io "'ca:pttiR OT store to?lG: mes~*'; :::ld'

• Any in,·cstiga!ion by'fue DcP3]'1mcnL or the FBI inio che ci~u1r4,11m= related to the il:ilure to p;csen>c the ~t mes~

Thf) Dejl3J"u-m:ill And FBl !.lwuld in!crpret '']ll\!Senratfo::1ft in !ht: b~ possibie i::o.annc:.,

includrag e:i...'>nri.ag the discoll!imi!tfon of imy z:uto-®!z-..e or~rmDar fimctions tt>.n era,e n;;m;rlals ilftcr a cer.ain pet.i-Od of time. Tcis ~'alion requ~ = Bll ~ts, reroros, e!e()1ronic..fly stored mfal'<O,\Uon, n:coroill8J', d!!u1, M4 w,gible ~ [:."'!cluciin3, bm not lim.lt~ lo, sraPm. cimts, pl-,<1tograpbs. imaga; :md ~ rloci.1!lltnts), ~gt..-dless. of form and Jllc.dil!:C of !forage, .frmn Janua..'3' l, 2016-~ ·

1hc ~e also :i:eq=ts th:u you:

l . Elc=is~ rc:~able cffo.tS t0 identify a:ld notl fy fonner ~ployee." mid .::onttv.c.:v:rs, ~11booirtract01s and conscltmts "'~ r:i-.JlY ha\l.c ~ to such el~ recards thla! the-.t are to-·ix:, prc=ed;

2, E..".w~i:.¢ ~bl: c[QJl$ I.Q ida.tify. rc:caver, a.id ~;c: ,my cl~c1~ whl.c:h h.a~oe b= Jdt:ted er r.:wked. fuy cieletfon 1ml are still tee011crable; :?:!id

3. lfit is ibe romme practioei ofa.'IY ageru:j· cmpleyec or ronmaru- to destroy O!"otb~"e

-alee such elearonie reetmlq, eitb:r hall such~ or llm.lge for the~ of comp!ece an:i a~ duyli~s o~ ~of~ records. scilabl.e for pn:,dui;tion, if ~~-

We wculd a~e yunr coofuming tha all ~1<:Vam documerus and inriJ.r:matio:i aro being _p~-e.d rui later tha:i lhe close of business oa J:uwarv 29. :?OJ 8.

~; Mich.act Horowitz, Jnsp~r G¢netal, l i.S, Dc:param:nl of J~ce

• ~ :to:.. S<9-ie;l E. i3o)'O, ,"\ssj!;t:;nl Alt)· Oa:i. o,...,., DF l.e~n ~ RJ!EI. ~;,, l'iuncs. Ch!!lmum,. U.S. Hco~Pcran:=S•li:ct~at>1'1:<!lliS-Cr.a;h l9,:201S.

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l be HcnOJBOle Devin Nunes C."'3irm:ln Pcrm~tU S::kd Commiuee on fote!ligc:r..ct U.S. House ofRtp.rCSel!toth~ Wasbin',!l(ln, DC 20$15

Dear Mr. Chairman:

U.S. Depucro.,bt ofJias~ce

federal Burc::.tu 1~f In,esli gation

i fxl:/,/r~~.P.':. MSf _wi0/11

M1ruary 2, 20 I~

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I v."Tite ir. r1:sponse to :?~)ut lc,ti:t dal.~d Ji.,nuary 25, 2018, rc64roicg FBI reter.tilm .:nd prcsetvation ob6gations. Your :t:qr..~ il:15 bi:er: forwimied l!> ~e P1 l's Ofllce of\he o--~eral ~;!D!>'CI fOl" ~opria:c: nctlcn. Plt:3-.~ n~le, llov.-c\ld", that p=t'o'ai1~ rcquc:st.:; nolai~~ the FBi-isi.1.ll?d mobile dcvkt:s 1:SSiSncd to Ms. Page e:1d Ms. Strzok dunng th,; rcl.:\•Mt ~riods shollla be di~t.."1 10 the OOJ Olficc oft/!~ !nsp~or <'.reocral, as th11

se de,,icc11 arc not in 1he

physical C\!SiOify of ttr- FBl.

ThB1lk ~o\.l foryourccntioual suppDttof~ PB!. ,.

l • The I lonanblc ,\dam Sdli l'f Rankins Mtt11bcr Pcrrn:mcnl Select Cornmith!e on i.,uclligc11c­U.S. HOU$:! or Rcp.~tatives \V11shinstcn. DC 20515

Sincerely,

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f'RCPERTY OF THE U.S. HOOS:: OF REPRESENTA1iVE.S 235

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Srepbt:!! E. Boyd As.sistn.'lt Ano~ G~cral U.S. Oc:partmcnt cf .1mtkc 9SO Penmylvs.-ua A,-e, NW Wa8h~an, D.C. 20530

Dw :Mr. Boyd:

PE~'tEMT S::!...:C! Co~ITTES CN lf-rtaU13ENCE

F~16,2018

Oa P~iy 7, 2018, I wm:e ia1be Honorsb!c R=uy M..Cc!Jye,-, ~!U(f~ of1!tc U.Dlied SI.ms foreign ~cc SuM:illlllla: Conrt {FtSC_), :n:quc:stir.g tha1 tfie Q;;,.u:r. ;:i:ro:fuce lnmaipr.s of eny ci:h:vant FlSC h=ingse=iaried v.i!.'i~ inil:hl FISA awlica1ioii ar :.~t r=:.-ewals ~ to lho elWJ,onl~~r.-clrlM.coof~ ~-

rn lier~ ta :he CmmnineellWgl: C~~ ..... ynu. i:r.ay note tl.a tl-.:: ~1:11.t of J~ pcm-dus {O!"=i c:;sily olltl!io)thc ~e~~ imbnnstianthe<;o:uti:cig:;l p=s, imd ... is b:ttu pr,sttiC'l'.ai ?h~ ~ Coart t:m:spood qicia.ly."

Theltfu,-:; in mi ~.en LG mf,;mn the: Cc=nlttce's cmgoiag i11~ao, the~ s<:ebs 1hc tnlnscn]ils af my n:!CY!!llt FlSC he.Itri~ =.soi::h:cd with tfl1:. initkl fl.SA ~~ c, spt,.x:qieem renewals~ to eh:ctrcmic ~ QfCtit,:.-~ The Comcitu:e ~.:fl.Illy n,qu.c:m ~ no Inter th!n Februzy26, 20 Ir. DOJ infuml toa Com:r.iiu= whi:thu ~ucb tm!!=:lpt$ ci.:, smt, if' ~ pl:ate prcvcdc them.

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PRO?!:RTYOF THE U..S. HOUSE OF RE:PRESENTATIVE:S 236

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~rma., P=t Select Co1Ullll:trae on !c.tclli~ U.S. House ofR~ti\'eS We.,hmg'..c,:i, DC 20515

Office of!.cgisJ:&•ivo Affulra

MAR O 7 2018

This responds to yum I~ dated Fclmmy 16, 2018, ti:que~ting trr.ustripls of any rele.--znth::ari.ngs of~.Fa:cign Ia:td.l.igen,.-c Slln'Cill~ Court{FIBC) associ*d '-'i'rtlI the fu!li.al FlSA. ~li~cm. or sub~i:nt ~e'l\"'.lll ~Iar~ tti 1ht: c!ectro;iic so.n:ei..llanct: 01' r..e.w Pa~ As is typical in the coJ'lSitktatron ot wal?'"..nt applli:aiicns 6anera.'!y, mchidi!Js ~pli~~ t\) the Pf&~ th~ fjSC cons:dt:re.1 the .ewlk:a1k= ba=l up011 ~ , 'll'it;en s1llllllissicn, aoo.he!d r.o hea.,jnss. AcC(lrdmgly. no mpop,,ive ~p-.s cxisL For your reff:reooc. '9.~ hare ~1»i a letter detcd July 29, 201'.3 frcm. F1SC Pzes!din.g Judge R1,.ggii;, B. \II alron to the Sena ~ cm O;: Jl!diciai:y lh;;n~ P:atrickJ. ~ t.hatmrtlr.u:11 file FlSC prac!i~ when con...<i&ricg FJSA appli~. 'lmich. it:clndei. cotl3i~n o:' clrci;m_<t;mces in whwh s.h"..aring =.a.y be rcquh-ed.

We h~ this infb:imalkm is helpful. Pl~c do~ )Jesit.,re to cm-i!act this office ifw~ TIJ.P.Y provide a.dcfuiomil a.5Si....o:tanci: rcgi?tding this c,r any other matter.

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PR0PER1Y OF i HE U.S. HOUSE OF RE?RESENTA Tl\/ES 237

M111e.~.~ lt~.)WJJIJ

J,'MI06.MJN111.f.S11HHJ,d. ,.,,; ~ t tut1 ~ li\lMll1\,i ,,.,1,cu,, -. 1,-, ..... ,U;1J1i)1'A',(M'f .. ;,.

th"'~''>·"""' t4 1~ ..... ,.r .. 11~,L1 :,.a,,:t)n Cllln.. 1.:µt

UTIW\ tQc-1. ,'fuH I'll,.,

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES P1:F1MANSN1' se.eC"T COt--41,\ln'l'.iG

01'1 lrffEl..UGe!NCe

rebru51')" 20, 20 lS

Deur DinN«n CO!noy;

HVC-,0~, ft1e =~• W~SH!llnTO'I, DC2C~15

11~) rJ&-<111.1 Cl,1.1,,lhlMfl""' ~ J.l" Dw;atlt

,._.,,."'~~t"' •~,,.,,...,,. 9 .. ,.:-w

Enolo~ please fmd Heri~ af questions ~~ing1h.c infoimariDn conrairu:d in ll\e Sle\lle dor.sicr, wt,i.cl\ was fundro by the Democnuic Nntiolllll Comm1n~ (PKC) and Hillsry fer America (Clinton c&n1p11lgn) and n~ed in II Foreign Intelligence Surveilhmcc Act(FlSA) e.wllce.don targeting C~er

l"u~

Please provide ¢0tt1plc1e written respo~es llS soon es possll,la, and no l~tcr lll,on !:Ii~, Martll 2. 1013. tG 1he stnmthm of the Committee's chief cler~ Ni-.1:. Ci~tUU1tc. Jf you do not pcovide timely IIJ:IS\t/eta on a volUPtllrY ba~,. 1M Cornmittte wm initiate compulsol)' ~i:.s.

Thnnk. you for ~our prompt nl!cntlon 1h16 m11t~r. lfyo11 h:we c,ny questioru, pf~i\ con!AC't

Con1mh~~fht202-22S-412,.

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PROPERTY Of" THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESE~IT ATIVES 238

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1. Wtt:ti and bow aid yo~ fira1 b;;ome a!A.~ Qf !:Dy of th.: mfunnation contained in 11:: S!c:ele dil5:stet? .

2. In ,,,hat furm(s) wis 1h~ inibnnAtion in Ute Stec.\! dom::r pr~tea lC yoi// By whom? (Please ~rfbe ~h i.nsmnce)

3. 'M:r.o did )"01.1 sm:e this iafom:ation mfrt7 Wh;n? Tn ;1:h:at fb::m? (Pki;.se ~be ~;h [l!Sa.-11!.e) -

4. What official acticms did you ttke .as a result of ro:eMng the infu.m.E!ion confainci in tho ~le i:lcwkr-?

S. Ord you eanvane any =eti.ugs wit.11 the Intdlige!!ce ~mmt.:city :md/c.r lr.tW .:nfo=em o:>mmn:riliies as a re3Ult of the lnfu=.tfon co,-...tainod in the Sti:ele dossier?

6. ~n did }'mt fut I~« o.Jtne to bclie-.'e l:hat the St~le dm.:ri~ 'rffiS. fmid;:d by a Di:mot:rat-alignM entity'?

1, \lf1ten did you fut Jeam or ccme t<> believe !fu4 me S=Je dossier was fimckd by~ DfmOC!?lie N111iml.Bl Cammi~~ (ONC) IU\dfar .Hill~ry for Ametica {Clinton~~)?

S. Wh~ diet you first ~me-~~ tild $C1:::ck ~sicr we, tJS«l :p obtain .aPISA ord:::r L'{l {'.at1i;c Pllge?

9. Wl:.3 President Cham~ 1::riafw Oll any iniocmaliml ami:aincd m the das3.ier prior to ]ElllUIJY 5, 20J7?

10. Did youdiscus3 me i.nt'cmna!i<:m contair.ed in the Stee.~dossier with any repo~ er other ~vi:i of the media? If iso_ who md when?

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u. ERTY OF THE U.S. _Hou_~ O.F REPREScNl'AllVES

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~~::~~,~~,~~Wirn U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PE.AMANEITT $ELE:CT COMMlTTEI: """tt.\1'11J,..c\ rt1b

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J.~L:!NY.~Mtil• , l\.tlil.Uf\t M w,n

Mt, Andrew McCnbo l!«Jera{ )3urcau oflnvcstigation 935 Pe.11nsylvani11Av1:, NW Wasl1lngton, D.C. 2053S

Dt:ir Mr. McC.'l!x:

ON INTCLUGENCE

February 20, 201&

H\1Co30l, 7l•e CArr:oL \Vl-911.~TD rl, DC ,r/.515

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Etieloscd please find n. series of q_~lou5 regardin!! tile information con1ained m the Stec.to d~cr. wllich Wl.\5 ft;ndcd by the Oemocro.tlc N atiorul Commiueo (DNC) and } tillacy for America (Clinwn cnrup~igr,) on<l 1mcd In II foreign ln\lllfjl!i::nce SurvoJllonco Ad (FISA) nppli1;0.tfo11 tnrsetlng caner Pngo.

Plcllsc provide complete wrl~n respo~e3 215 soon os po~ibl~ and tHI ~<!!.' than f)ridoY, ~h 2, ~ to the anMtion of~ Committee's chief c!erl(, Nick Cis.i:lan~. rfyou do not provide timely 1mswor~ on a v-ohmu1ry"bo..sis, the CoJnJ11ittce will. inltintc «impulsory process.

Tim1k you for you.r prompt nt1MtlnL1 this maner. If you hn,·e nny que.ot\lons. plensc oontnct C<immitlee sUiff at 2()2.2~ 412 l .

PROPERTY OFil-11: U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 240

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l. 'wuen and how did ;'QU first he-c<mi.e aw-~ of e;ey of !he iiifmui:atior. containtd in ~ Steele do:;si~

2. £n what f0m1(s) was the iafunnat.ion iu Ebe Steele ciostier prese:.'lted to yau? Br whelm? (Plc:asc describe eaeh in~)

.3. Wno &d you shMe this- inf~ with? Wh£:.J? Ill wf•M fom1? (Plea;e dcsw:e caciJ instance)

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4. 'What official acru= did y\lu ta.11-c ~ s rr;awt of~vfag: the ir!furms:icn coutained iD the St~i=lc d.:!Mi::r?

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5. Did yoo convene my !lleetings. 'wim the i:n!e.llig~ oommunity arui/llr l.e:w ~ t ccmm1lllilies as n Te;ult of~ fofomtJJtiOJl cox:t~ ir:i. the Steele <lossier?

6. When did you. first !t:Slil or ~me to b~!ievc thfil the Stecle dostler was funded by a Democ.""dt-cligned emity?

7. Wbro. did you first !cam or ~ to lx:l~ thst Ch¢ Ster;lc dossier ~ func:cl by the Daruicr.atfo Na~ Cormnit£={DNC} en4/~ Hillary fuT Amm¢ll (C!iaton ca.~)?

S. ~ did you first becoi:ne awa .. re that the St.ecle do...<:1:iec "i\'BS UScd tp o~ a fIS:\ mtler -vn~~Page?

9. Was Presi~ Oooma briefed on my :infooua.tfon coo~d in the d~er p.riCf to J.a:.nuery s, 2017?

!O. Did you disoiss the i!lfu~on oamawi:u in~ Steele oosaii:u-with any reporters or ~!he.n:preseZl!ativ¢$ oi'tlte mcata? ff $0, who e:nd when? ·

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The ![Qn.o.tebJc J ;il" Sc=ic,n:s .Atrom:y Omeral u .s. Depsrtrnea1 of 1!:Sttee ~O i'c:i::insyh,ani1t.Av=2~ NW W~!m,p;tcm,DC 20530-0001

PeR.!.w/5:IIIT Se..ECT Q:il.O.ld1"'J"E"e ON !tiTI::lLlc3cJ(CE

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Thef~ Sim:a-u oflnvestigatiou (FBI) i~clmged mm pnm:cting tile Am:ricanpeo)l!e·and i:n.tbmo.g our !~:: in accordance with the U.S. Coostm.1imi. To carry om:tbis ~d mi1::tlon,. the FBI ~ a slriet 9et oriffil!ro8l rules imd p~ cm.bodied in the Domsi~Inv~cms SJsl Op:ratic:ns Guide (DIOO). The DIDO v.'8S crelll.~ by cha Bureau~ and~ by tb.e Ocpemiem of Jmt.ice (DOJ).

Toe~ tmredected ~ of the Dl-OG available 10 ~ Committee (d;aed ~ber 15. 201 l) dci~ ~ th-: "FBI rr.ust.ful!ow wf:en subtnilling-q,pli~mm to the Fo."eign !!uelligence Surveillance Court (rISC) for o.-ders to ~SJrlleilimce thrm:gQ £!-.e Fo.-eii!ll blt~~ee:Sun:eill~ Act. (F~A). ~gtQ lheDO!G:

• FJSA sl.lfVeill~ is a v,:ry irr'..w.siveme:lll!S of ~rinB il'~:.on .htt m;m hai!mce thi; r.ccil-11> ob1ain ~live~ ~urity~ori ~eMI iib~i:::..

• W.hec striking 1hls b!ihnce, s "\>-enn~n ~ mu!-t be con~ fur alt FISA applications.

o Undar tht sub$ection ''P1SA V~rifi.catimi of A=iracy ~dµres," the FBI jl::stjf

acl<no>'iiedges tbi5 mi~ "Th;: rusen.-ac:y cfm.f"onnm()a co:rtakied wimin Frs.A eppllcatlom is of~ imp-.:.i~..... O.nl1 doct=!'.ed and verified

_ i:n~n .r-.ey be w:trl to sc:pp,.1rtFBI cpplicetfol!S lFISAJ to fue~ourt lFISq.n • Tne DIOG pro\-ides d*-i!cd lnstnt~ for &FBI to followw = th3tinfu:maµon

epp..._.-uig in a FISA applics:ti<lll tbrti~ ~t~ 10 tbi;,FlSC bs reen maroughly vencd and co:nfinned.

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In light of what ~ '!Q b¢ a cltsc vioWio:J of fBl pro~ls:, t.'r! Committee dra:cis tlid 0 0.J ~ I, '"2 l?W than March 8. 201S, provide answe.s m the fo1ICT,\--u;~ questions:

•· Were these ~..s ~ed ~ r t1te 2.().11 veis:oo :o all<lw for the use of wiv~ w:omiatfon to suppon Fai FJSA. appfu:ations t-> ~ FISC?

• If 11{1!., wlurt st::ps ha the !)OJ Ellldfar the }:Bl~ to hold i!lX:Qtmtaf)li: tho_se officla:ls who viollltc:d lb= proio.cols? ·

I will~ you tha1-esidc from uic violation of these protocol.!, the preser.tilWlll of fe!se and/or unverified i:J::lformuion m the FL..~ in tC!nn:aion with the Car.er Psgr: ~ nt ~ ceto:ozs cm.id dail viob:tiolJ.$ of!he following~ ~es;

• 18USC242 • souse tro9 ·~ • O"t'5tIU.Clion~f jmxice • Co!:i!etnpt of Court

Toe FBI DIOG provi~--s mtemal o,,-ersight md corttrols cm: a11thomi:d FBI eci.itios so tl:e Amerirao. p;lhlic cm be 8SSU?ed .he Bweau is QODduc:mig ilS vital mission in w.ord.en:e mlh law a.nii ~_blishe,d pddelinas. Heiweve:, in thl3 illsw=; it's Cllenfutbasie ~ ~ wss viol.2.ed..

CoD~ ov=ight is dc$iiC,.-d to bold~~ ~cnttible. I -i:ust 1m! y.ou lhm:e ~ view, ~ will .mitt me Committee's !nvcstigc:lon l.no ,iclatluns o! 0100 _prc~es related to thG us: ofth: S~el.: dos:rlcr in BSA ~~?:S.

cc: Mlcbe:l Horowitt, lilSJ>llCIC? C~l2ll -Of ili= Dcp:.:m=t of J~ Th2 Himorahle Cl:cistopber \\'ray, Diicctoz. Federal &!eau ofim'atigalion

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