Recent Key Developments in Russian Human-Rights Law

Potenal of Civil Society Actorsrsquo Engagement in Different Aspects of EU-Russia Relaons1

Asociace pro podporu demokracie a lidskyacutech praacutev Associaon for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights

JEFF LOVITT Preface 1

ELENA BELOKUROVA The Role of NGOs in Cross-Border Cooperation between the European Union and Russia 2

NIKOLA KARASOVAacute Recent Key Developments in Russian Human-Rights Law 6

PIOTR KAŹMIERKIEWICZ Barriers to and opportunities for cooperation between think tanks in the EU and Russia 10

VAacuteCLAV LIacuteDL Russia and the EU Perspectives on a Counter-Terrorism Strategy 14

ANDREI RYABOV Russia and the European Union in the Post-Soviet Space From Rivalry to Cooperation 18

Table of Contents

POTENTIAL OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORSrsquo ENGAGEMENT IN DIFFERENT ASPECTS OF EU-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Preface ldquoShapingrdquo minds to rebuild trust

Civil society actors in Russia are now confronted with mulple chal-lenges to free associaon and effecve implementaon of their respec-ve missions and goals From proscripon of foreign funding to curbs on public gatherings these circumstances are compounded by an-western propaganda broadcast through government-controlled mass media

Experts on EU-Russia relaons were brought together in Prague on 27 May 2014 to examine ways forward for EU-Russia co-operaon at a debate organised by DEMAS ndash Associaon for Democracy and Human Rights which contributed to the formulaon of the following studies examining the scope for co-operaon between civil society in Russia and the EU

The geo-polical context is sketched by Andrey Ryabov Aer Russiarsquos annexaon of Crimea he argues it is important to idenfy ldquocorridors of opportunityrdquo for construcve relaons The confrontaon that fol-lowed from Russiarsquos policy of ldquorigid pressure on Ukrainerdquo he writes ldquostrengthened pessimisc assessments of prospects of EU-Russia rela-ons that were widespread in internaonal polical circles and expert communiesrdquo

The noon that the struggle for influence is carried out on the princi-ple of a zero-sum game needs to be overcome he argues and a win-win outcome could be generated from the ambiguity that even an EU-fo-cused Ukraine will remain closely connected with Russia economically He idenfies connued potenal in economic co-operaon and joint efforts on the common challenge of Islam

Vaacuteclav Liacutedl also sees the challenge of Islam as an area for joint ac-on He examines EU and Russian perspecves on a counter-terrorism strategy an area where Russia is in fact more vulnerable than the EU Here he argues NGO co-operaon ldquocould build trust between the EU and Russiardquo on human rights

Nikola Karasovaacute explores the human rights record of Vladimir Punrsquos Russia highlighng laws on ldquocriminalisaon of blasphemyrdquo and on ldquoprotecon of Russian historyrdquo among the most recent legislave steps aimed at the restricon of freedom of expression

At the same me she argues that the tradionally weak role of civil society means that ldquothe potenal significance of the Russian non-profit sector in publicising human-rights concerns and demanding jusce for those affected is immenserdquo

Elena Belokurova also addresses the change in climate since the return of Pun as Russian President stressing that the introducon of the ldquoforeign agentrdquo rule was already having an impact before the Russia-Ukraine crisis ldquoThe Russian offices of some foreign foundaons and NGOs were closed or scaled back their acviesrdquo An area of com-mon ground however is cross-border co-operaon on social protecon issues - which she writes is regarded as problem-solving rather than foreign interference and is supported by Russia and the EU alike It will be important she argues that the Ukraine-Russia crisis does not jeop-ardise cross-border co-operaon

Piotr Kaźmierkiewicz concurs with Ryabov that the economic sphere provides scope for co-operaon between think-tanks in Russia and the EU While such co-operaon could be a ldquowin-winrdquo axis he says it is necessary to recognise that Russian think-tanks will face increasing difficules in arculang a posion on foreign policy different from that promoted by the government and mainstream media Common ground on which to discuss regionally relevant issues will be lost he writes

ldquoReading the mindrdquo of Russian policy-makers argues Kaźmierkiewicz ldquois becoming a top priority in a new phase of relaons characterised by lower trust and fewer direct contactsrdquo Thus he writes opportunies to exchange views at conferences seminars and through study visits ldquocould help build trust establish a shared vision of strategic problems and eventually lead to joint iniavesrdquo

The compeon to ldquoshaperdquo minds is part of the problem and the soluon With the propaganda onslaught from Russian television the challenge to offer a plurality of perspecves has become more acute It will take me to move from the zero-sum game to the shaping of com-mon objecves by the EU and Russia but joint iniaves at the civil soci-ety level can contribute to laying the ground for the gradual emergence of a win-win situaon

J L

PASOS ndash Policy Associaon for an Open Society


The Role of NGOs in Cross-Border Cooperation between the European Union and Russia

ELENA BELOKUROVA

Centre for German and European Studies St Petersburg State Unviersity

This paper presents some reflecons on the role played by non-gov-ernmental non-profit organizaons (NGOs) in relaons between the European Union and Russia with special emphasis on cross-border cooperaon In comparison to the other more policized lsquohighrsquo policy areas the cross-border cooperaon shows an example of the lsquolowrsquo policy with more pragmac approach on the local level Usually such policy fields are developing differently and more successfully than polical ones

These mechanisms of cooperaon as well as the role of NGOs were elaborated during the 1990s and 2000s and the first part of the paper will analyze these processes before in the second part evaluang the current and potenal role of NGOs As a result some conclusions about the main factors influencing the NGOs role in the cross-border cooperaon are made as well as the recommendaons for its strengthening are given

The 1990s Building Mechanisms of EU-Russia Relations Cross-Border Cooperation and the Role of NGOs

The EU and the newly constuted Russian Federaon established rela-ons at the beginning of the 1990s a special me both for Russia and the EU Russia had declared and implemented a radical policy shi to-ward democracy and the market economy Aer the Maastricht Treaty the EU has got opportunies to be involved into the external relaons as the EU These circumstances influenced every aspect of coopera-on including the role played by NGOs

In legal terms the first step in the establishing of formal coopera-on between the EU and Russia was the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperaon Agreement (PCA) which was signed in 1994 came into force in 1997 and was planned for ten years but prolonged in 2007 unl a new agreement is negoated and signed The PCA defined the basic fields and instuons of EU-Russia cooperaon and reflected both the situaon of the transional economy and polical system in Russia and efforts to harmonize Russian legislaon with the EU acquis communautaire1

During this period the EU acvely supported the Russian transi-on with financial and technical assistance chiefly through the TACIS program (Technical Assistance for Newly Independent States) thus giving a boost to cross-border cooperaon and the acvies of NGOs TACIS was established in 1990 and started its acvies in 1991 Russia has been the biggest beneficiary of support to the countries in the post-Soviet region receiving about half of all funding Between 1991

and the end of the program in 2006 Russia received 27 billion euros in TACIS funding for 1500 projects in 58 regions2 The program sup-ported projects for the development of human resources instuonal reforms and infrastructure restructuring and privazing industry and agriculture and combang so security problems In the case of Rus-sia the EU technical assistance was not made condional on legislave approximaon to the EU acquis communautaire as in the other CEE countries preparing for EU membership but rather on cooperaon on increasing stability and security on their common borders To that end TACIS placed significant emphasis on cross-border cooperaon in its programs for border regions of the EU and northwestern regions of Russia In the NGO sphere the 1990s were also characterized by very acve establishment and development of independent organizaons which started to emerge from the polical protest movements in the late 1980s built around ecological social ethnic cultural and human rights issues3 Some of these NGOs have become highly profession-alized and now occupy leading posions in their fields of acvity4 Another impetus for NGO development grew out of the urgent need for self-help in the difficult mes of the economic and social crisis of the 1990s

Because of the crical economic situaon Western foundaons especially from the United States and the EU became a very impor-tant and oen the only source of funding and training for newly estab-lished NGOs Branch offices of American and European foundaons were established in Russia and these provided not only funding but also training capacity-building and networking opportunies

The approach of the US foundaons differed slightly from the emphasis of EU programs US organizaons were more acve in sup-porng NGOs while the EU concentrated more on the strengthening of state instuons and social partnership Partly this was because American funders drew on the American model of a more acve NGO sector primarily funded by private sources while the EU and EU mem-ber states brought their experiences of a tradionally stronger state to bear on the idea of more effecvely influencing Russian policies through state instuons Even when working with NGOs the Eu-ropean foundaons and partners promoted cooperaon with state instuons

The difference between the US and EU strategies could be also seen in the regions where they were acve US organizaons chiefly operated in more ldquofamiliarrdquo areas with relavely high levels of de-mocrazaon such as Novgorod Nizhny Novgorod and Ekaterinburg oblasts5 while EU-funded programs were mostly implemented in re-gions bordering the EU ndash for instance the Russian Republic of Karelia bordering Finland which benefited from very high levels of financial and expert support ndash as well as some regions with a high level of ur-banizaon and social capital6 Russian NGOs were part of this process

2 Data of the Delegaon of the European Commission to Russia see hpwwwdelruseceuropaeuenp_259htm 3 Zdravomyslova E Sociologija obwestvennyh dvizhenij ndash stanovlenie novogo issledovatelrsquoskogo napravlenija [Sociology of Social Movements ndash Establishing a New Direcon] in V Jadov (ed) Sotsiologija v Rossii Moscow IS RAN 1998 pp 545ndash568 4 Beljaeva N Grazhdanskie assoziazii i gosudarstvo [Civil Associaons and the State] in Soziologicheskie issledovanija 1995 11 pp 109ndash117 Sungurov А (ed) Grzhdanskoe obshestvo ndash v poiskakh puty [Civil Society ndash In Search of Its Way] St Petersburg Norma 1997 5 McMann K Internaonal Influences on Russian Regional Democrazaon in Tabata S and Iwashita A (eds) Slavic Eurasiarsquos Integraon into the World Economy and Community Hokkaido Slavic Research Center Slavic Eurasian Studies 2004 2 pp 413ndash4346 Lankina T Explaining European Union Aid to Russia Post-Soviet Affairs 2005 21(4) pp 310ndash329

1 Bordachev T Romanova T Russiarsquos Choice Should Provide for Liberty of Acon in Russia in Global Affairs 16 May 2003 hpengglobalaffairsrunumbers3470html


because they were seen by both the EU and Russia as agents of de-mocrazaon Thus including civil society organizaons in EU-Russia cooperaon naturally grew from the common goals of Russiarsquos desired transion to democracy and the market economy its ldquoEuropean choicerdquo7 NGOs were considered as a significant part of EU-Russia cooperaon at this me especially in the border regions where NGOs became important also at the level of regional and local polics due to the EU support8 Another contribung factor was the Russian federal governmentrsquos lack of any real policy toward the NGOs Civil society thus developed in different ways in the Russian regions NGOs were more acve in the northwestern border areas

Although the TACIS programs were cricized for their insufficient effecveness and the excessive say-so of EU experts over the needs of specific recipients9 cross-border cooperaon was at this period generally successful and important and NGOs in the fields of the im-plemented projects played an important role

The Turn of the 2000s New Models for Cross-Border Cooperation and NGOs

EU-Russia relaons including the elements of cross-border coopera-on and the role of NGOs took a new turn in the 2000s aer the new president Vladimir Pun instuted both a new foreign policy and a new policy on civil society

Under Punrsquos foreign policy Russia in the 2000s turned from its rapprochement with the EU toward its own ldquonaonal interestsrdquo The results first appeared in the separate EU and Russian strategies toward each other in 1999 and 2000 respecvely where the strategic inter-ests were formulated very differently While the EU defined stability democracy rule of law the social market economy in Russia and se-curity in Europe as strategic goals the Russian strategy was ldquoprimarily aimed at ensuring naonal interests and enhancing the role and image of Russia in Europe and in the worldrdquo10 The Russian concept aimed to restore Russia among the most important global powers Here Russia openly expressed its readiness to accept European technical assistance for the sake of its naonal interests seen as different from European interests and values

At the same me European policians began to seriously cricize Russia for its rejecon of the path of democrazaon This in turn fed Russiarsquos increasingly skepcal posion on the EU As result the two sides agreed on a new ldquostrategic partnershiprdquo model envisag-ing a more equal partnership and more pragmac problem-solving11

focused on four ldquocommon spacesrdquo (1) economic es (2) a common space of freedom internal security and jusce (3) external security and (4) a common space of research and educaon including cultural aspects12

Another factor for the building of this new model was the expected EU eastern enlargement in May 2004 which heightened the need to address problems of so security on the EUrsquos external borders such as ecological and nuclear threats and promong the rule of law and a favorable social environment To do so the EU proposed a new instrument the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) for all its new neighbors The Russian government however refused to take part empowered by economic growth and the redirecon of its foreign policy to prove itself as a rapidly emerging global power Russia did not want to be just a ldquojunior partnerrdquo of the EU like the other ENP coun-tries Moscow refused to work on a common acon plan insisng on EU-Russian cooperaon outside the ENP Finally Russia was excluded from the ENP but at the same me it maintained its availability for EU funding delivered through the European Neighborhood and Partner-ship Instrument (ENPI) which included a noon of ldquopartnershiprdquo es-pecially for Russia Technical assistance under TACIS thus gave way in 2007 to ENPI and EU financial support decreased significantly These new cooperaon programs emphasized civil society local iniaves and cultural cooperaon (Instuon Building Partnership Programs) and NGOs dealing with human rights and social support (European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights and some other pro-grams) The EU directed its financial resources toward an equal part-nership and on cooperaon with co-funding from the Russian side ENPI became especially important in Russia as a vehicle to support cross-border cooperaon funded both by ENPI and Russia Financ-ing and decision-making including choice of projects and priories shied to the level of EU-Russia cross-border regions The five regional programs set up under the new framework in 2005 established their own joint decision-making instuons which were acve chiefly in the 2007ndash2013 budget period13

Apart from ENPI in 1997 the EU adopted another program to strengthen cross-border cooperaon with Russia including at the non-governmental level the Northern Dimension iniave This set a more consequenal EU strategy towards the European North with a special role for Russia14 The Northern Dimension mul-level approach fore-saw from the beginning the involvement of different actors that were already acve in this field the EU internaonal regional organizaons such as the Council of the Balc Sea States the Barents Euro-Arcc Council and the Arcc Council internaonal agencies such as the In-ternaonal Energy Agency and non-state actors including local and re-gional organizaons (for example the Balc Sea cies union) and busi-ness and civil society groups Important projects were implemented

7 Arbatova N Natsionalnye interesy i vneshnaja polika Rossii evropejskoe napravlenie (1991ndash1999) [Naonal Interests and External Polics of Russia Euro-pean Course (1991ndash1999)] М IMEMO RAN 20058 Yargomskaya N Belokurova Е Nozhenko М Torkhov D Pochemu NKO i vlas nuzhny drug drugu Modeli vzaimodeistvija v regionakh Svero-Zapada [Why NGOs and Regional Authories Need Each Other Relaonship Modes in the regions of the Russian Northwest] in Gorny М (ed) Publichnaja polika voprosy mjagkoi bezopasnos v Baliskom regione St Petersburg Norma 2004 pp 52ndash147 9 Mikhaleva G The European Union and Russian Transformaon in Hayoz N Jes-ien L van Meurs W (eds) Enlarged EU ndash Enlarged Neighbourhood Perspecves of the European Neighbourhood Policy Bern Peter Lang 2005 pp 107ndash12610 Morozov V (ed) Rossija i Evropejskij Soyuz v bolshoj Evrope novye vozmozh-nos i starye barjery [Russia and the European Union in Greater Europe New Possibilies and Old Froners] St Petersburg Izdatelstvo SPbGU 200311 Fedorov Y Nygren B (eds) Russia and Europe Punrsquos Foreign Policy Stockholm Swedish Naonal Defence College 2000 Klitsunova E EU-Russian Relaons the Russian Perspecve in Johnson D and Robinson P (eds) Perspecves on EU-Rus-sia Relaons London and New York Routledge 2005 pp 35ndash54 Medvedev S

Russiarsquos Futures Implicaons for the EU the North and the Balc Region HelsinkiBerlin Ulkopoliinen instuuInstut fuer Europaeische Polik 2000 Kassian-ova A Russia Sll Open to the West Evoluon of the State Identy in the Foreign Policy and Security Discourse Europe-Asia Studies September 2001 Sergounin A Russian Post-Communist Foreign Policy Thinking at the Cross-Roads Changing Paradigms Journal of Internaonal Relaons and Development 3 200012 Road Maps of Four EU-Russia Common Spaces hpwwwdelruseceuropaeuenimagespText_pict494road20mapspdf 13 Yarovoy G Belokurova E Evropeiskiy Sojuz dlja regionov chto mozhno i nuzhno znat rossijskiv regionam o ES [The European Union for Regions What the Russian Regions Can and Should Know about the EU] St Petersburg Norma 201214 Haukkala H Polozhitelnye aspekty realisatsii Obshei strategii po Rossii [Posive Aspects of Implementaon of the Common Strategy on Russia] in Moshes A (ed) Rossija i Evropejskij Soyuz Pereosmyslivaja strategiju otnoshenij [Russia and the European Union Rethinking the Strategy of Relaons] Moscow Moskovskij Tsentr Karnegi 2003 pp 35ndash77


primarily in the field of social protecon By the same logic NGOs involved into the cross-border cooperaon and working on the local level for the social problem-solving are not seen as a threat or lsquofor-eign agentsrsquo Thus divisive polics of the federal government was less relevant in affecng civil society cooperaon with partners from EU member states on the local level This could be clearly seen in the case of the Republic of Karelia where special mechanisms were established to help NGOs facing difficules created by the federal legislaon As result applicaon of federal legislaon in that region was more re-laxed than in other Russian regions This can be partly explained by the posive experience of NGO involvement in managing pressing social problems and cross-border cooperaon which is very important for the region which has led regional and local governments to keep sup-porng NGOs in spite of their foreign (eg EU) funding

Aer the Ukrainian crisis and Russian problems in the foreign policy in 2014 the Russian government started also to speak about the at-tracon of Russian NGOs to parcipate also in the implementaon of the Russian foreign policy For the cross-border cooperaon this situaon means that if agreed by the EU and Russia there will be no problems from the Russian side for the NGOs to be involved

At the same me the deep crisis in the EU-Russia relaons during the Ukrainian crisis led to the situaon when cooperaon partners became more suspicious to each other Another negave influence on the cross-border cooperaon can be in freezing of the EU-Russian negoaons But these consequences are not known for the moment of wring this paper

So although NGOs funded by foreign foundaons and programs in general lost much of their welcome in Russia in the 2000s in the area of cross-border cooperaon they sll are considered as something posive and worthy of connued support

Factors Influencing the Role of NGOs in EU-Russia Cross-Border Cooperation

Several important factors emerge from the historical and instuonal overview presented above which influence the role of civil society in EU-Russia relaons in general and in its cross-border cooperaon component in parcular

bull The history of EU-Russia relaons and the context of their devel-opment in different stages led to NGOsrsquo dependence on funding mechanisms from the EU or from EU-Russia cooperaon pro-grams

bull European funders gave less direct support to Russian NGOs in the 1990s than American foundaons reflecng the differences between the European model of the state-NGO relaonship and the American model of civil society One consequence was that EU programs mainly supported NGO cooperaon with state instu-ons and cooperaon between NGOs in Russia and the EU coun-tries

bull The interests of the EU and Russia in cooperaon with NGOs were and are different While the EU is interested in including NGOs both in cooperave projects with Russia (for more democrac dialogue) and cross-border cooperaon (for more effecveness) Russia shows lile interest in cooperaon with the EU in general but supports the involvement of NGOs in cross-border coopera-on Hence in this field governmental and non-governmental instuons and actors are acve at both regional and local levels

in the fields of environmental protecon nuclear and energy security development of human and academic resources quality of health and life No new financial instruments were created instead exisng EU and internaonal financial instruments were coordinated In 2006 the iniave was reorganized as the Northern Dimension policy (ND) with the parcipaon of the EU Russia Norway and Iceland as a regional dimension of four common spaces Four ldquopartnershipsrdquo were set up in the fields of the environment public health and social well-being transport and logiscs and culture Each partnership coordinates the acvies of various actors including NGOs and financial instuons in the corresponding fields Consultave bodies such as the Northern Di-mension Business Council and the Northern Dimension Instute bring together business and academic partners from the EU and Russia All these acvies gave rise to a mulfaceted and intricate instuonal structure15

While the EU connued to be interested in the involvement of NGOs in EU-Russia cooperaon especially in its cross-border dimen-sion Russian policies on NGOs became less favorable especially aer 200416 This was among other reasons a reacon against the Orange Revoluon in Ukraine aer which NGOs primarily funded by Western foundaons and cricizing naonal policies were demonized as po-tenal organizers of so-called ldquocolor revoluonsrdquo against the naonal interests of Russia17 As result in 2006 new legislaon was adopted which strengthened state control over NGOs especially for those hav-ing foreign funding18 This policy was especially restricve and strong in 2006ndash2007 before the parliamentary and presidenal elecons Aer a break during Dmitry Medvedevrsquos presidency (2008ndash2012) dur-ing Punrsquos third term since 2012 this restricve policy towards crical NGOs and those funded by Western and internaonal funders was fur-ther ghtened by adopon of the new legislaon on ldquoforeign agentsrdquo

As a result the Russian government no longer looked so favorably on the inclusion of NGOs in bilateral cooperaon with the EU This change of policy on NGOs also negavely influenced Russiarsquos relaons with the EU in general and with some EU member countries The Rus-sian offices of some foreign foundaons and NGOs were closed or scaled back their acvies The Russian government did not support the iniave of EU and Russian NGOs to establish the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum19 It is always very crical towards consultaons of the EU and Russian human rights NGOs before the EU-Russian Human Rights Dialogue In this sense Russian NGOs became more closed to the EU then to the Russian side and the Russian officials logically do not like this situaon

At the same me in the 2000s the Russian president began fi-nancially and organizaonally to support many Russian NGOs acve

15 More informaon about the Northern Dimension hpwwwnortherndimensioninfo16 More about this change of discourse and policies towards NGOs at Belokurova E Civil Society Discourses in Russia The Influence of the European Union and the Role of EU-Russia Cooperaon in Journal of European Integraon vol 32 issue 5 2010 pp 457ndash47417 Pun V Fragmenty iz Poslanija VV Puna Federalrsquonomu Sobraniju Rossijskoj Federacii 26 maja 2004 goda [Excerpts from Presidenal Address to the Federal Assembly 26 May 2004] in Abakumov S (ed) Grazhdanskoe obshchestvo i vlastrsquo provniki ili partnery [Civil Society and Government Adversaries or Partners] Moscow Galeria 2005 18 Human Rights Watch Choking on Bureaucracy State Curbs on Independent Civil Society Acvism Report February 19 2008 hpwwwhrworgenreports20080219choking-bureaucracy Human Rights Watch An Uncivil Approach to Civil Society Connuing State Curbs on Independent NGOs and Acvists in Russia Report June 17 2009 hpwwwhrworgenreports20090616uncivil-approach-civil-society19 Official web page hpeu-russia-csforg


Also during the period when the policy towards the NGOs became more restricted in the cross-border cooperaon became involved mainly those NGOs which were supported by the regional or local authories

bull Russian parcipaon in other European regional internaonal organizaons such as the Nordic Council of Ministers the Council of the Balc Sea States the Arcc Council and the Barents Euro-Arcc Council also strengthens the role of Russian and European NGOs in EU-Russia cross-border cooperaon They themselves and under the coordinaon of the Northern Dimension Policy support cooperaon of corresponding NGOs in the EU and Russian border regions

bull In comparison to the EU-Russian conflicts on the lsquohighrsquo polical level in 2012ndash2014 the cross-border cooperaon as a field of lsquolowrsquo policy is less in danger Although the crisis of 2014 which led to the freezing of the EU-Russia negoaons and strong ideologi-cal disagreements of people on the both sides of the border and also inside of the countries can finally influence even this lsquolowrsquo policy cooperaon level Moreover these problems became even more important in the situaon when the negoaons on the European Neighborhood Instrument programs for 2014ndash2020 budgetary period should take Thus in Spring 2014 the cross-bor-der flaws between the EU and Russia decreased significantly At the same me it is now too early to judge about the long-term character and consequences of the current crisis

Recommendations for More Productive NGO Involvement in EU-Russia Cross-Border Cooperation

bull Although NGOs are already very well included in cross-border cooperaon measures can be taken to make their role more useful

bull The prevailing role of the EU in the iniang the programs of cross-border cooperaon both in the 1990s and 2000s led to the asymmetry which is kept in spite of different aempts to build more equal partnership20 Therefore more measures should be undertaken especially from the Russian side in order to prepare Russian partners beer for the cross-border cooperaon and involve them more acvely into the process of iniaon develop-ment and management of the cross-border projects Moreover much more freedom should be given to these potenal local partners because the strong control from the federal and regional authories hinders their iniaves and use of opportunies

bull For the future ENI programs to tackle the serious problem of insufficient resources of NGOs to invest into cooperave projects as co-funding the threshold for co-funding should be reduced (at least to 10 ) In addion to larger projects it is also important to promote smaller scale projects that are easier for NGOs to imple-ment Special training in project management for NGOs and cut-ng red tape can also help NGOs to be involved more

bull For the future ENI programs for the next funding period of 2014ndash2020 the priority of the people-to-people cooperaon is reduced which is the most important priority for NGOs There-fore it would be necessary to bring it back and maybe even in-crease its costs At least these aspects should be foreseen in some other priories Maybe it would make sense to strengthen the partnership principle into the cross-border cooperaon in order to oblige the cooperaon partners to consult and cooperate with the local NGOs

bull For the Northern Dimension to address the problem of NGOs having insufficient resources for sustainable partnerships and co-operave projects it is necessary to include corresponding NGOs network support into the funconal tasks of the ND partnerships and to create some special mechanisms promong NGOs support by the internaonal financial instuons cooperang within the ND partnerships

bull For the Northern Dimension since NGOs are not well represented in strategic decision-making for the ND iniave it might make sense to set up a forum where NGOs can exchange ideas in hopes of influencing the ND agenda Cooperaon between NGOs and the ND Business Council and ND Instute should also be increased

bull For the ENI and Northern Dimension lack sufficient influence on decision-making Therefore special consultave procedures should be set up in order to give NGOs a voice in seng priories designing strategies to tackle problems in their field of experse and selecon of specific projects (where no conflict of interests exists) Ensure parcipaon of NGO representaves in the manag-ing authories consultave instuons and selecon commiees

bull For ENI and Northern Dimension instead of emphasizing civil so-ciety building and polical issues put the stress on resolving social problems with the parcipaon of NGOs which in turn can also contribute to strengthening of Russian civil society

bull EU-Russia Civil Society Forum cross-border cooperaon is not very visible here It is therefore important to pay more aenon to these issues within the Forum

In general it is extremely important to include more and more ac-ve NGOs in EU-Russia relaons in all areas and parcularly in cross-border cooperaon because their acvity is less prone to polical influence instead they concentrate on the everyday life of people on both sides of the borders This is all the more significant in periods of serious polical conflicts such as the current disputes between the EU and Russia over the Ukrainian crisis at a me when the policians clash and lead informaonal wars it is important that the cizens do not lose their es and good relaonships in hopes that closer es will be restored when the crises end

20 I am thankful to Eleonora Burtseva my MA student who has shown it very good in her MA Thesis on the topic of the cross-border cooperaon wrien within the MA Programme lsquoStudies in European Socieesrsquo at the Faculty of Sociology St Petersburg State University in 2014


NIKOLA KARASOVAacute

Association for International Affairs

Introduction

Following the 2011 parliamentary elecons in Russia and the sub-sequent protest movement that emerged in reacon some posive progress was made by President Dmitry Medvedev in the field of hu-man rights and polical freedoms This process was soon interrupted by the succession of Vladimir Pun to the presidency in May 2012 and his ldquounprecedented crackdown against civic acvismrdquo1 The exchange of polical offices of Vladimir Pun and Dmitry Medvedev and the return of the former to the most powerful post in the country caused outrage among that part of the society which supports the govern-mental opposion polical liberalizaon and democrazaon

Since that me the legislaon of the Russian Federaon concern-ing fundamental human rights and freedoms has undergone major changes This paper summarizes the main points of development in this area and analyzes the content and the praccal impact of certain legislave amendments which have been introduced recently Sec-ondly it examines the reacon of the internaonal community as well as those most affected by the new legislaon that is the Russian non-profit sector What are the implicaons of the new legislaon for the polical dialogue between Russia and the EU What is the role of NGOs in this polical dialogue

The ldquoForeign Agentsrdquo Act and the Dima Yakovlev Law

In 2012 a new law was adopted with the aim of reducing foreign poli-cal and financial influence on the acvies of the non-profit sector in Russia and therefore to weaken its posion and in a way legally to in-midate its acvists Russian federal law No 121-FZ was adopted by the Parliament of the Russian Federaon and signed by President Vladimir Pun on 20 July 2012 Widely known as the ldquoforeign agents actrdquo this legislaon has seriously affected the freedom of acvity of many non-profit organizaons in the country2 The amendments of July 2012 require from those non-profit organizaons engaging in polical acv-ity and receiving funding from abroad to register as ldquoforeign agentsrdquo This label itself has a negave connotaon as for most Russians it has a meaning of ldquoa spy acng in Russia in the interests of other countriesrdquo3

According to the law the ldquoforeign agentrdquo label applies to ldquoevery Russian non-profit organizaon which receives finance or property from foreign states their organs internaonal and foreign organiza-ons foreign cizens stateless persons or persons authorized by them [hellip] and which takes part in polical acvies carried out in the territory of the Russian Federaon including for the benefit of foreign sourcesrdquo4 Thus the state has the right to determine whether an or-ganizaon is engaged in polical acvity regardless of its actual aims5 In this way ldquopolical acvityrdquo can be understood very broadly ranging from making a direct influence on the decision-making of public au-thories to funding of an organizaon carrying out polical acons6 An excepon is made for certain enes including recognized reli-gious groups state companies and business groups as well as those operang in the field of science culture educaon health and social support etc7

The ldquoforeign agentsrdquo are required to register with the Ministry of Jusce of the Russian Federaon and submit financial reports and documents describing the character of the organizaonrsquos acvies and the composion of its leadership Among other dues a ldquoforeign agentrdquo is obliged to ask the authories for permission before starng any polical acvies and to mark all its materials distributed in the media as products of a ldquoforeign agentrdquo8 If an organizaon labeled as a ldquoforeign agentrdquo refuses to register it can face financial penales suspension of its acvies or imprisonment of its leadership9

Aer the ldquoforeign agents actrdquo came into effect in autumn 2012 hundreds of non-profit organizaons in the Russian Federaon started facing legal discriminaon by the authories Since March 2013 mas-sive inspecons have been conducted mostly by prosecutors or spe-cialists from the Ministry of Internal Affairs the Ministry of Jusce the Ministry of Emergencies the Federal Security Service (FSB) and other instuons10 Many inspecons were carried out without the inspec-tors providing any documents to jusfy them or were conducted in a very violent way as for example in the case of the All-Russia Public Movement in June 201311 Subsequently the Ministry of Jusce filed administrave acons or lawsuits against several non-profit organiza-ons but prosecutors lost most of them12 On the other hand for example the acvies of the Associaon of Non-Profit Organizaons for the Protecon of the Rights of Voters (GOLOS) a leading expert group monitoring elecons in Russia were suspended by the court13

It seems that the act endangered mainly the well-known non-profit

1 ldquoWorld Report 2013 Events of 2012rdquo Human Rights Watch 2013 hpswwwhrworgsitesdefaultfileswr2013_webpdf (accessed 2322014) 4602 ldquoOn Amendments to Legislave Acts of the Russian Federaon regarding the Regulaon of the Acvies of Non-profit organizaons Performing the Funcons of a Foreign Agentrdquo [O vnesenii izmeneniy v otdelʹnye zakonodatelrsquonye akty Rossi-yskoy Federatsii v chas regulirovaniya deyatelrsquonos nekommercheskikh organiza-ciy vypolnyayushikh funkcii inostrannogo agenta] Federal Law of the Russian Fed-eraon No 121-FZ State Duma Official Website hpntcdumagovruduma_naasozdasozd_textphpnm=121-D4C7ampdt=2012 (accessed 1822014)3 Internaonal Legal Developments Year in Review 2012 hpwwwamericanbarorgcontentdamabapublicaonsinternaonal_lawyerl_47_1introauthcheckdampdf (accessed 1922014) 666

4 Federal Law of the Russian Federaon No 121-FZ5 Ibid6 ldquoRussiarsquos NGO Lawsrdquo Freedom House hpwwwfreedomhouseorgreportcontending-puns-russiafactsheet (accessed 1822014)7 Ibid8 Federal Law of the Russian Federaon No 121-FZ9 Ibid10 ldquoSerious concerns about massive inspecons of non-profit organizaons currently conducted in Russiardquo Statement by the Steering Commitee of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum 21 March 2013 hpeu-russia-csforgfileadminStatements21032013_EU-Russia_CSF_SC_Statement_On_the_NGO_inspec-ons_engpdf (accessed 1822014)11 ldquoOn deterioraon of the legimate work of human rights groups in Russiardquo Statement by the Steering Commitee of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum 09 July 2013 hpeu-russia-csforgfileadminStatementsEU-Russia_CSF_-_SC_state-ment_For_Human_Rights_09072013pdf (accessed 1922014)12 ldquoRussia rsquoForeign Agentsrsquo Law Hits Hundreds of NGOsrdquo Human Rights Watch 5 March 2014 hpwwwhrworgnews20131120russia-foreign-agents-law-hits-hundreds-ngos-updated-november-20-2013 (accessed 932014)13 ldquoROO lsquoGolosrsquo priznana lsquoagentomrsquo i oshtrafovana na 300 tysyach rubleyrdquo Agent-stvo socialʹnoy informacii 5 June 2013 hpwwwasiorgrunewsroo-golos-priznana-agentom-i-oshtrafovana-na-300-ty-syach-rublej (accessed 1922014)

Recent Key Developments in Russian Human-Rights Law


organizaons those engaged in elecon monitoring operang in the Caucasus or environmentalists who are oen in conflict with the in-terests of Russian business14

In the period following the adopon of the act other laws concern-ing the acvies of Russian non-governmental organizaons were passed In December 2012 the Dima Yakovlev Law in fact a response to the previously approved US Magnitsky Act not only banned adopons of Russian children by US cizens but also targeted all USndashfinanced non-governmental organizaons and Russian-American cizens working in the non-profit sector15 The law imposes a ban on polically oriented organizaons that receive funding from the USA and prohibits Russian-American cizens from leading or belonging to a foreign non-governmental organizaon that engages in polical acvity16

LGBT Rights in Todayrsquos Russia

In modern Russian history the stance of the society toward sexual minories has always been problemac With the excepon of the years 1917 to 1933 homosexuality between men was considered a criminal offense unl its decriminalizaon in 199317 Nevertheless the approach of the Russian majority to homosexuality has remained negave and certain homophobic groups even use brutal violence to inmidate acvists and members of sexual minories18 Several homo-phobic murders have been reported as was the well-known Volgograd case of Vladislav Tornovsky in May 201319

The rejecng stance of society is seen in discussions about the rights of sexual minories for instance the debate on the freedom to donate blood and other issues20 With respect to current legislaon the situaon of the LGBT community in the Russian Federaon has worsened since the adopon of a law prohibing ldquothe promoon of non-tradional sexual relaons among minorsrdquo which was signed by Vladimir Pun in June 201321 The so-called propaganda of unconven-onal sexual relaons is defined by the law as ldquospreading informaon aimed at formaon of non-tradional sexual orientaon of minors aracveness of non-tradional sexual relaons distorted ideas of social equality of tradional and non-tradional sexual relaons

or imposing informaon about non-tradional sexual relaonships which raise interest in such a relaonshiprdquo22

Where such acons cannot be assessed as a criminal offense the law imposes fines on individuals officials and juridical persons of Rus-sian or foreign origin While the financial penalty for individuals ranges from 4000 to 5000 rubles and for officials from 40000 to 50000 ru-bles a juridical person can face up to a million rubles or its acvies can be suspended for a period up to 90 days23 An even heavier fine can be imposed if the acons were carried out through the media Foreigners are treated differently by the law apart from paying a fine they can also face expulsion from the country or imprisonment for 15 days24

Although the new legislaon imposes relavely harsh penales recent public polls suggest that a large part of the Russian popula-on supports it According to a 2013 survey by the Levada Center only 21 percent of Russians believe that homosexuality is a sexual orientaon people are born with while 45 percent think that it is a result of ldquobeing subjected to perversion or loose personal moralsrdquo and 20 percent understand it as a combinaon of both factors25 The same poll showed that more than half of Russians believe that homo-sexuality should be either punished by law (13 percent) or medically treated (38 percent) Another 2013 survey by Pew Research suggests that 74 percent of Russians are persuaded that the homosexuality shouldnrsquot be accepted by society with only 16 percent of respond-ents saying the opposite26 Not surprisingly the law was supported by 76 percent of Russians at the me of its adopon27

It is necessary to stress that this law doesnrsquot mean a new criminali-zaon of homosexuality Its supporters defend it as an effort to protect the tradional form of family and social values and emphasize that it cannot be misused in any way to limit the rights of sexual minories28

Unfortunately the pracce seems to be quite different The problem of the law lies in unclear definions which is typical for legislaon concerning human-rights issues in Russia The original proposal con-tained the term ldquohomosexualityrdquo instead of ldquonon-tradional sexual relaonsrdquo The laer term was informally defined by the lawmakers as ldquorelaons that cannot lead to the producon of an offspringrdquo29 Secondly the explanaon of what the ldquopromoonrdquo or ldquopropagandardquo of these relaonships means is more than vague The absence of pre-cise definions in the law was heavily cricized by the head of Russiarsquos Human Rights Council Mikhail Fedotov According to him it created a dangerous precedent by ldquotreang people differently based on their personal characteriscs not any criminal behaviorrdquo30

14 Nikola Karasova ldquoEU-Russia CSF Russian members as ldquoForeign Agentsrdquo under Act No 121-FZ (No 102766-6)rdquo DEMAS hpwwwdemascznovinky6937-nov-policy-paper (accessed 1922014) 615 ldquoRussiarsquos NGO Lawsrdquo16 ldquoOn Sancons for Individuals Violang Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Cizens of the Russian Federaonrdquo [O merakh vozdeystviya na lits prichastnykh k narusheniyam osnovopolagayushikh prav i svobod cheloveka prav i svobod grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii] Federal Law of the Russian Federa-on No 272-FZ State Duma Official Website hpntcdumagovruduma_naasozdasozd_textphpnm=272-D4C7ampdt=2012 (accessed 1922014)17 ldquoGay rights in Russia Facts and Mythsrdquo RT 2 August 2013 hprtcomnewsrussia-gay-law-myths-951 (accessed 2322014)18 ldquoRussian an-gay gang violence seen for the first me on camerardquo 1 February 2014 The Guardian hpwwwtheguardiancomworld2014feb01russia-an-gay-gang-violence-homophobic-olympics (accessed 2322014)19 ldquoPoliciya Volgograda oglasila podrobnos togo kak pytali i ubivali 23-letnego geyardquo LGBT-Grani 13 May 2013 hplgbt-granilivejournalcom1822637html (accessed 2522014)20 ldquoV gosdumu vnesen zakonoproyekt o zaprete donorstva krovi dlya gomoseksu-alistovrdquo Kommersantru 26 August 2013 hpkommersantrudoc2263909 (accessed 2322014)21 ldquoGosduma prinyala zakon o netradicionnykh otnosheniyakhrdquo BBC Russkaya sluzhba 11 June 2013 hpwwwbbccoukrussianrussia201306130611_duma_gay_propagandashtmlprint=1 (accessed 2322014)

22 ldquoOn Amendments to the Arcle 5 of the Federal Law ʻOn the protecon of children from informaon harmful to their health and developmentʼ and certain legal acts of the Russian Federaon for the purpose of childrenrsquos protecon from informaon promong denial of tradional family valuesrdquo [O vnesenii izmeneniy v statrsquoyu 5 Federalrsquonogo zakona O zashite detey ot informatsii prichinyayushey vred ich zdorovrsquoyu i razviyu i otdelrsquonye zakonodatelrsquonye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v celyach zashity detey ot informacii propagandiruyushey otritsanie tradicion-nykh semeynykh tsennostey] Federal Law of the Russian Federaon No 135-F3 State Duma Official Website hpntcdumagovruduma_naasozdasozd_textphpnm=135-D4C7ampdt=2013 (accessed 2322014)23 Ibid24 ldquoGosduma prinyala zakon o lsquonetradicionnykh otnosheniyakhrsquordquo25 ldquoGay rights in Russia Facts and Mythsrdquo26 ldquoThe Global Divide on Homosexualityrdquo Pew Research 4 June 2013 hpwwwpewglobalorg20130604the-global-divide-on-homosexuality (accessed 2322014)27 ldquoGay rights in Russia Facts and Mythsrdquo28 ldquoGosduma prinyala zakon o lsquonetradicionnykh otnosheniyakhrsquordquo29 ldquoGay rights in Russia Facts and Mythsrdquo30 Ibid


Freedom of Assembly

An obvious connecon can be seen between the mass protests in the months following the 2011 parliamentary elecons and the amend-ments to the law securing freedom of assembly in Russia which was quickly pushed through by the Russian Parliament in June 2012 Seri-ous clashes between protesters and police forces also accompanied Vladimir Punrsquos inauguraon on 7 May 2012 and the new legislaon was enacted only shortly before the next planned an-Pun demon-straons in Moscow31

The new Federal Law of the Russian Federaon No 65-FZ sets in-creased rates of fines for parcipaon in illegal demonstraons and for violaon of rules on holding public events including the rules on holding rallies consuming alcohol and narcocs in public places or blocking roads32 The original dra of the law which was proposed by depues from the ruling United Russia suggested an increase from the current maximum financial penalty for individuals from 5000 ru-bles to 1000000 rubles33 This move was strongly cricized by the polical opposion as well as for example by Dmitry Medvedev and was subsequently reduced to the amount of 300000 rubles34 While the maximum fine for officials is 600000 rubles the financial penales for the organizers of rallies or protests that fail to comply with current federal regulaons rose from 50000 rubles to 15 million rubles35

From those who are unable to pay the fines the law requires compulsory community service36 The law also prohibits those ldquowho have been convicted of a breach of public peace and security or have been subject to administrave penales for rally violaons twice or more mes within a yearrdquo to organize any demonstraons or public events37 Although the law contains certain guarantees regarding the police protecon of rallies from provocateurs etc it relavely limits freedom of assembly in the country and reduces the opportunies for cizens to express their demands publicly

Further Challenges to Freedom of Expression

Laws on ldquocriminalizaon of blasphemyrdquo and on ldquoprotecon of Rus-sian historyrdquo belong to the most recent legislave steps aimed at the restricon of freedom of expression in Russia In late June 2013 President Pun signed a new law criminalizing insults of religious feelings which allows imposing fines of up to half a million rubles or imprisonment for up to three years ldquofor people convicted of intenon-ally offending religious sensibilies at places of worshiprdquo or one year

in case of offenses commied elsewhere38 In addion the obstruc-on of acvies of religious organizaons became a criminal offense punishable by one year in prison and a prohibion on holding official posts for a period of two years ldquoPremeditated and public desecraon of religious objects or booksrdquo is also subject to a fine39

The law was originally advanced in September 2012 as a reacon to the well-known case of the Pussy Riot members who were arrested aer their performance of ldquoan an-Pun punk prayerrdquo in Moscowrsquos main cathedral and later sentenced to two years in prison for ldquohoo-liganism movated by religious hatred and enmityrdquo40 The trial and their convicon was accompanied by a wide discussion which found Russian society divided The opponents of the law rejected it as a lim-itaon of freedom of expression and called for a secular state while its supporters strongly backed by a considerable number of Russian policians and the Russian Orthodox Church demanded strict punish-ment for insulng other peoplersquos beliefs41 The queson of growing clericalizaon in the Russian Federaon is not a new topic Public at-tenon was drawn to it already in 2007 when the so-called Academi-ciansrsquo leer pointed to the growing power of the Orthodox Church in Russian polics and society42 Recently a deputy of United Russia Aleksandr Sidyakin has called for even harsher legislaon speaking explicitly about criminalizaon of blasphemy43

In February 2014 United Russia deputy and chairman of the com-miee for internaonal affairs in the State Duma Aleksey Pushkov proposed a new law on the protecon of Russian history44 He believes that both in Russia and abroad there are people who want to distort the interpretaon of certain important events in the countryrsquos history Among other things he was reacng to the debate in the Latvian Par-liament on introducing criminal responsibility for jusficaon of Soviet and Nazi occupaon of the country during World War II According to him the Nazis were menoned in the dra only as a pretext and the bill is aimed exclusively against Russia and its interests45

The State Duma has made several aempts to criminalize cricism of the acons of the an-Hitler coalion46 In 2013 President Pun set in moon a new unified method of teaching history in public schools It met with criques by many educaon experts social sciensts and historians for being jingoisc and for laying the foundaons of a new state propaganda machine47

31 ldquoRussian Parliament Approves Massive Increase in Protest Finesrdquo RIA Nov-os 5 June 2012 hpenriarurussia20120605173855383html (accessed 2522014)32 ldquoPun signs law ghtening punishment for rally violaonsrdquo ITAR-TASS 8 June 2012 hpenitar-tasscomarchive676946 (accessed 2522014) ldquoOn Amend-ments to the Code of Administrave Offenses of the Russian Federaon and the Federal Law ʻOn meengs rallies demonstraons marches and pickengʼrdquo [O vnesenii izmeniy v Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob administravnykh pravona-rusheniyakh i Federalrsquonyi zakon ldquoO cobraniyakh mingakh demonstratsiyakh shestviyakh i pikerovaniyakhrdquo] Federal Law of the Russian Federaon No 65-FZ Rossijskaya Gazeta 9 June 2012 hpwwwrgru20120609mingi-dokhtml (accessed 2522014)33 ldquoRussian Parliament Approves Massive Increase in Protest Finesrdquo34 Ibid35 Federal Law of the Russian Federaon No 65-FZ36 ldquoRussian Parliament Approves Massive Increase in Protest Finesrdquo37 ldquoPun signs law ghtening punishment for rally violaonsrdquo

38 ldquoPun signs lsquogay propagandarsquo ban and law criminalizing insult of religious feel-ingsrdquo RT 30 June 2013 hprtcompolicspun-law-gay-religious-457 (ac-cessed 2622014)39 ldquoDuma approves criminalizaon of insulng religious feelingsrdquo RT 11 June 2013 hprtcompolicsresponsibility-insulng-feelings-believers-526 (accessed 2622014)40 ldquoPun signs lsquogay propagandarsquo ban and law criminalizing insult of religious feelingsrdquo41 ldquoDuma approves criminalizaon of insulng religious feelingsrdquo42 ldquoOtkrytoye pisrsquomo desya akademikov RAN prezidentu Rossiyskoy Federatsii V V Punurdquo 23 July 2007 hpruwikisourceorgwikiОткрытое_письмо_десяти_академиков_РАН_президенту_Российской_Федерации_В_В_Путину (accessed 26 2 2014)43 ldquoNakazaniye za bogokhulrsquostvo ndash segodnya i zavtrardquo Radio Svoboda 28 Febru-ary 2014 hpwwwsvobodaorgcontentarcle24692050html (accessed 2622014)44 ldquoV Gosdume predlozhili zakonodatelrsquostvo zashitrsquo rossiyskuyu istoriyurdquo Lentaru 12 February 2014 hplentarunews20140212pushkov (accessed 2622014)45 Ibid46 Ibid47 ldquoUSA Today Zashishaya istoriyu Rossiya dvizhetsya k neo-totalitarizmurdquo RT 18 February 2014 hprussianrtcominotv2014-02-18USA-Today-Zashhishhaya-istoriyu-Rossiya (accessed 2622014)


The Impact of Human-Rights Questions on EU-Russia Political Dialogue and the Non-Profit Sector

The queson of the impact of human rights on the polical dialogue between the EU and Russia is a relavely tough problem to solve It is difficult to assess to what extent this agenda itself shapes policy dis-cussions or the rhetoric of each side As well the role of non-govern-mental organizaons in influencing the form content aims and results of the EU-Russia polical dialogue remains unclear However consid-ering the tradionally weak role of civil society in Russia the potenal significance of the Russian non-profit sector in publicizing human-rights concerns and demanding jusce for those affected is immense

Represenves of the EU and its instuons oen come under pressure when faced with the issue of human rights in Russia since they have to find a balance between what can be called European democrac values and the necessity to preserve good polical and economic relaons with Russia a country which sll belongs among the world superpowers Although the reacons of EU officials to viola-ons of human rights in Russia tend to be cricized as being too weak to be able to change anything they sll have a great importance Lately it has been mainly (but not only) the case of several Pussy Riot members and their inprisonment that caused outrage among the EU representaves Subsequent polical pressure certainly helped secure their release as part of the amnesty signed by Vladimir Pun in De-cember 201348 In late February 2014 EU High Representave Cath-erine Ashton made a statement on the sentencing of demonstrators involved in 2012 protests on Moscowrsquos the Bolotnaya Square events poinng out certain judicial errors and new limitaons regarding freedom of expression and assembly49 Although the High Representa-ve ended her statement with a mere hope that ldquothe sentences will be reconsidered in the appeal processrdquo and with a call on Russia ldquoto uphold its internaonal human rights commitmentsrdquo Russian officials certainly wonrsquot be completely deaf to it50 Russia is striving for presge and a beer internaonal image as projects like the planned Eurasian Union show

The Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics one such iniave aimed among other things at showing the world that Russia has developed into a modern state In an interview for the Voice of Russia Vladimir Pun stated ldquoI would like the parcipants guests journalists [hellip] to see a new Russia see its personality and its possibilies take a fresh and unbiased look at the country And I am sure that this will happen it has to bring about good and posive results and it will help Russia to establish relaons with its partners around the worldrdquo51 In reality the image of the Olympics was to a considerable extent spoiled by im-mense corrupon by abuse of local residents and migrant workers and by threats against acvists ndash all these accompanied the organizaon of

the games52 The fear of possible terrorist aacks reminded the world of Russiarsquos problemac approach to problem-solving in the Caucasus53

Under these circumstances several polical leaders decided to boy-co the tradional opening ceremony of the Olympics among them US President Barack Obama German President Joachim Gauck German Chancellor Angela Merkel Lithuanian President Dalia Grybauskaitė Brish Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Franccedilois Hollande54 Following the dramac polical development in Ukraine American and Brish officials decided to skip the following Sochi Paralympics too as part of the first sancons imposed on Russia55

In the months preceding the start of the Olympics outraged rep-resentaves of many European states and other countries around the world began a campaign of cricism mainly aimed at the law prohibit-ing the promoon of non-tradional sexual relaonships which many called a violaon of fundamental human rights56 The Internaonal Olympic Commiee even asked for and later received assurances from high Russian officials that the legislaon would not affect those aending or taking part in the gamesrdquo57 Members of Pussy Riot case had run-ins during the Olympics too58 The queson remains whether the internaonal pressure on Russia over human-rights issues will per-suade the country to change its stances or will force it in this respect to an even more isolated posion

The Russian non-profit sector has reacted in different ways to the human-rights legislaon enacted recently under Vladimir Pun Clearly individual non-governmental organizaons donrsquot behave in a unified way Further each of the laws actually aims at different kinds of NGOs and their scope and effects differ Unl now the much discussed ldquoforeign agents actrdquo has led to suspension of acvies of only two NGOs the voterslsquo rights group GOLOS and a member of the GOLOS network the Regional Public Associaon in Defense of Demo-crac Rights and Freedoms59 GOLOS originally based in Moscow has appealed the ruling and decided to move its acvies to Lithuania60

More than twenty NGOs have faced legal acon at different lev-els with different results Among them we can find organizaons with diverse interests for example the Perm Regional Human Rights Center the An-Discriminaon Center ldquoMemorialrdquo in St Petersburg the Center for Social Policy and Gender Studies in Saratov Coming Out in St Petersburg Women of Don in Novocherkassk and even environ-mentalists such as Baikal Environmental Wave in Irkutsk61 From these the Center for Civic Analysis and Independent Research (GRANI) from Perm can be menoned as one successfully defended itself in court62

48 ldquoPussy Riot band members released from jail call amnesty lsquoPR stuntrsquordquo RT 23 December 2014 hprtcomnewspussy-riot-alekhina-relased-655 (accessed 932014)49 ldquoStatement by the Spokesperson of EU High Representave Catherine Ashton on the sentencing of demonstrators involved in the Bolotnaya Square eventsrdquo EU External Acon Brussels 24 February 2014 hpeeaseuropaeustatementsdocs2014140224_01_enpdf (accessed 932014)50 Ibid51 ldquoI want Sochi games to show the world a new Russia ndash Punrdquo Voice of Russia 19 January 2014 hpvoiceofrussiacom2014_01_19photo-Interview-of-Vladimir-Pun-President-of-the-Russian-Federaon-to-Channel-One-Rossiya-1-ABC-News-BBC-CCTV-television-channels-and-Around-the-Rings-agency-6631slide-1 (ac-cessed 2722014)

52 ldquoRussiarsquos Olympian Abusesrdquo Human Rights Watch hpwwwhrworgrussias-olympian-abuses (accessed 2722014)53 ldquoSochi UK officials warn terror aacks lsquovery likelyrsquo BBC 27 January 2014 hpwwwbbccomnewsuk-25907140 (accessed 2722014)54 ldquoWinter Olympics Barack Obama many world leaders will not aendrdquo Daily News 7 February 2014 hpwwwnydailynewscomsportsolympicsbondy-miss-ing-leaders-games-behin-olympic-games-arcle-11605471 (accessed 932014)55 ldquoUS To Boyco Sochi Paralympics In Protest Over Ukraine Incursionrdquo Time 3 March 2014 hpmecom11527u-s-to-boyco-sochi-paralympics-in-protest-over-ukraine-incursion (accessed 932014)56 ldquoGay rights in Russia Facts and Mythsrdquo57 Ibid58 ldquoPussy Riotrsquos tour of Sochi arrests protests ndash and whipping by Cossacksrdquo The Guardian 20 February 2014 hpwwwtheguardiancommusic2014feb20pussy-riot-tour-of-sochi-protest-winter-olympics (accessed 2722014)59 ldquoRussia lsquoForeign Agentsrsquo Law Hits Hundreds of NGOsrdquo60 ldquoGolos leader leaves Russia aer suspension of operaonsrdquo RFERL 5 Septem-ber 2013 hpwwwrferlorgcontentrussia-golos-shibanova-leaving-russia25096401html (accessed 932014)61 ldquoRussia lsquoForeign Agentsrsquo Law Hits Hundreds of NGOsrdquo62 Ibid


The tough measures of the new human rights legislaon have in general worsened working condions for non-governmental organi-zaons in Russia Cooperaon with their European counterparts or parcipaon in networks similar to the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum could help Russian NGOs intensify their protests and cricism On its website the Forum calls aenon to the deterioraon of human rights in Russia denounces the persecuon of certain Russian NGOrsquos and demands the release of their imprisoned acvists63 The statements of the Forumrsquos Steering Commiee and its conferences can be seen as the results of debate among many actors and should serve as a plaorm for further discussion

Recommendations

bull The most serious problem of Russian federal legislaon concern-ing human rights is probably its reliance on broad and unclear definions and vague explanaons of what kind of acvies can be assessed as a criminal offense In consequence the new laws are opet to misuse

bull Most of the legislaon was designed to legally inmidate the ac-vies of NGOs Thus NGOs need to learn how to comply with the laws and to avoid possible defeats in court ndash in short to learn how to survive in the worsened condions

bull All the legislaon menoned in this analysis was meant to weaken the credibility of non-governmental organizaons their acvists members of sexual minories or simply supporters of the polical opposion The legislaon treats them as those who break the law and work against the interests of Russia or as opponents of the countryrsquos tradional values Secondly the new legislaon aempts to deprive unwanted NGOs of foreign funding to render them un-able to finance their projects

bull Large parts of Russian society support or at least donrsquot oppose the controversial legislaon adopted in recent years Non-govern-mental organizaons should devise a new communicaon strategy to present their acvies and explain their posions to Russian cizens In cooperaon with internaonal and foreign-based NGOs (for example through networks like the EU-Russia CSF) they could launch new educaonal projects in Russia concerning the issues of human and civic rights and freedoms or simply presenng prac-cal results of the work of Russian NGOs

bull Foreign non-governmental organizaons should always be pre-pared to express solidarity with their Russian colleagues The only way to persuade policians to talk about human rights with Russian officials is to hold discussions and informaon campaigns targeted at persuading the European authories to take heed of the situaon of the Russian non-profit sector and to assist Russian NGOs legally financially or with other available tools

bull The issue of human rights is an important element of the EU-Rus-sia polical dialogue although the results of raising such quesons in polical debates are not easily measurable Sll it is necessary to insist that these debates carry on and to seek a mutually ac-ceptable balance between what can be called European demo-crac values and the need to preserve polical and economic relaons with Russia

PIOTR KAŹMIERKIEVICZ

Institute of Public Affairs

Opportunities for Russian think tanksrsquo engagement

In theory domesc think tanks could fulfill a number of tasks vital to the democrac transion of Russia and to the countryrsquos opening to the West Firstly especially in the economic sphere they could help improve public policies through reference to best internaonal prac-ces and an exchange of expert ideas Secondly seng the agenda for discussion and serving as neutral plaorms for social and poli-cal debates they might bring together advocates of widely disparate views drawn from government administraon academia civil society and the media Finally in the internaonal sphere Russian think tanks could be indispensable ldquointermediariesrdquo providing evidence-based insight into Russian foreign policy and changes in the naonrsquos public opinion

For the European policy community prospects for partnership with Russian think tanks looked parcularly appealing at the turn of the century The EUrsquos eastward enlargement brought the Unionrsquos froner closer to Russia and soon aerward the Union launched the Eastern Partnership program open to all the countries lying between Russia and the EU The two partners grew closer not only geographically but also appeared to be more and more interdependent through in-creasing economic es as well as rising contacts between people As Russia is the Unionrsquos third biggest trading partner dominant energy provider and the country of origin of 40 of all short-term Schengen visa holders ensuring its stability and facilitang systemic reforms was recognized as an EU policy priority In fact unl early 2014 the level of cooperaon across a number of policy areas seemed to be rising in a sasfactory manner as noted in the most recent progress report for the bilateral Partnership for Modernizaon iniave presented at the EU-Russia summit on 28 January 20141

Several areas of bilateral dialogue provided opportunies for engaging independent think tanks from both sides Reflecng the primary role of economic cooperaon a broad range of technical is-sues on removing barriers to trade and investment has been at the center of aenon including approximaon of technical standards in commerce and industry exchange of pracces in fiscal and monetary policy cooperaon in customs and facilitaon of cross-border move-ment of goods Resolving these technical issues has been of interest to both pares as it could lead to mutually beneficial expansion of the volume of trade and investment This could explain the relave openness of the Russian authories to the involvement of independ-ent policy analysts in the technical aspects of the trade regime and modernizaon of the Russian economy This atude is in line with

Barriers to and opportunities for cooperation between think tanks in the EU and Russia

1 Progress Report approved by the coordinators of the EU-Russia Partnership for Modernizaon for informaon to the EU-Russia Summit on 28 January 2014 available at hpeeaseuropaeurussiadocseu_russia_progress_report_2014_enpdf

63 ldquoStatements by the Steering Commiee EU-Russia Civil Society Forum hpeu-russia-csforghomepublichnye-zajavlenijakoordinacionnyi-sovethtmlL=1cHash3Db32179fc0ad0773ee42265d7774acf6f (accessed 932014)


the approach taken by the authories of some Eastern Partnership governments such as Azerbaijan which is selecvely open to think tank experse Dialogue with think tanks is largely limited to the area of macroeconomic policy where globally-renowned independent or-ganizaons such as the Center for Economic and Social Development and the Economic Research Center are recognized as sources of inde-pendent stascs and forecasts2

Comparing think tank strategies in Russia and the Eastern Partnership visa issues

Another ldquowin-winrdquo issue where the involvement of think tanks both from the EU and Russia has been welcomed by all pares including the Russian government is the dialogue on facilitaon of the visa regime Inclusion of civil society actors in the debate is appreciated by both sides in the negoaons the EU is interested in civil societyrsquos monitor-ing of progress of necessary reforms and pressure toward maintaining momentum of the process while the Russian government may in turn find backing from civil society representaves for holding the EU ac-countable for assessing the actual progress that has been made and delivering on the promise of gradual easing of visa requirements At the same me unlike with technical aspects of economic cooperaon progress toward visa-free travel is of direct and tangible interest to Russian cizens This fact was recognized in the mission statement of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum adopted in 2011 which considered easing the travel regime central to ldquopeople-to-people cooperaonrdquo which in turn ldquohas a key role (hellip) in the overcoming of dividing lines across Europerdquo The link was reaffirmed in the foreword to the Forumrsquos monitoring report on the issue released in September 2013 which stated that unless ldquobarriers hampering cooperaon and human con-neconsrdquo such as visas for short-term travel are eliminated ldquoreaching the Forumrsquos goals of building a common European connent based on common values is not possiblerdquo3

The extent to which independent policy analysts could actually make a difference in the visa facilitaon process is debatable however Certainly when compared with other issue areas this queson gener-ates significantly higher acvity by think tanks both within the Civil Society Forum and more broadly Apart from issuing public statements in 2011 and 2012 the Forum produced two policy papers targeng parcipants of EU-Russia summits In 2013 the Forum entered a new stage of policy dialogue with the EU and Russian authories by seng up an expert group on visa issues The group comprising academics and independent analysts from Russia Belgium Germany and Poland produced a study outlining the current legal framework for the visa re-gime as well as implementaon issues and providing a comprehensive picture of praccal problems faced by visa applicants The monitoring report provided further evidence for the recommendaons issued by the Forumrsquos steering commiee earlier in 20134

This iniave deserves credit for cing evidence in support of policy recommendaons reliance on best pracces from abroad and delivery of the message to the CSF summits These have all been major signs of progress in the inclusion of independent analysts in policy advice Nevertheless when this process is contrasted with the achievements of think tanks in the Eastern Partnership countries its limitaons become evident Unlike in Russia where think tanks grouped in the Civil Society Forum delegated the task of analysis to academic experts their counterparts managed to establish them-selves directly as monitors of their governmentsrsquo compliance with EU technical requirements in the area of visa facilitaon and liber-alizaon Think tanks in Eastern Partnership countries were able to perform such a role by achieving synergies among various iniaves with overlapping membership First a visa facilitaon subgroup was created as part of Working Group 1 (ldquoDemocracy human rights good governance and stabilityrdquo) of the Eastern Partnership Civil Soci-ety Forum Its mission was defined in operaonal terms with a clear view to exerng pressure on the key instuonal stakeholders the European Commission EU member states and Eastern Partnership governments5

Another difference in the advocacy strategy applied by Russian and Eastern Partnership think tanks is the laerrsquos coalion-building capacity Several members of the visa facilitaon group reached out to think tanks and advocacy groups in the EU to form the Coalion for the European Connent Undivided by Visa Barriers (Visa-Free Europe Coalion) The decision to invite partners from outside the Eastern Partnership region was grounded in the words of the coalionrsquos mission statement by a belief that this form of cooperaon would demonstrate ldquowide internaonal support for visa-free movement for Eastern neighborsrdquo6 Importantly apart from 18 organizaons from the Eastern Partnership region the membership includes 29 ins-tuons from the EU as well as two from Russia This demonstrates the appeal of a common cause to civil sociees in various regions of Europe

The coalion is also characterized by openness toward different types of organizaons bringing diverse assets such as ability to carry out ldquoresearch projects advocacy and monitoring acviesrdquo Among the various iniaves (statements campaigns events) a unique moni-toring tool stands out the Eastern Partnership Visa Liberalizaon In-dex which enables all stakeholders to compare the progress of all the Partnership countries on the technical criteria of the process Unlike the one-me report of the Expert Group in Russia the index is com-piled supervised and updated by a permanent group of think tank experts in the Eastern Partnership countries using both desk research and consultaons with officials of their governments7

2 hpwwwcesdaz hpwwwercaz 3 Y Dzhibladze ldquoForeword Why progress in the visa dialogue maers for civil soci-etyrdquo in EU-Russia Visa Facilitaon and Liberalizaon State of Play and Prospects for the Future EU-Russia Civil Society Forum September 2013 available at hpeu-russia csforgfileadminPolicy_PapersOthersVisa_Report_engpdf 4 Steering Commiee of EU-Russia Civil Society Forum ldquoRecommendaons on the process of facilitaon and liberalisaon of the visa regime between the European Union and the Russian Federaonrdquo April 2013 available at hpwwweu-russia-csforgfileadminPolicy_PapersOthersCSF_Visa_policy_brief_April2013_eng_01pdf

5 The subgrouprsquos main goals are ldquochallenge the unwillingness of some govern-ments of the EU Member States and the European Commission to share informa-on related to quesons of potenal visa liberalisaon for EaP countries monitor the process of negoaons and implementaon of introduced or prospecve visa facilitaonliberalisaon (VFVL) dialogues and agreements track the applicaon of funding earmarked for VFVL projects and other similar acviesrdquo See the website of the Visa-Free Europe Coalion for further informaon hpvisa-free-europeeuabout-uscsf-visa-subgroup 6 hpvisa-free-europeeuabout-usmission 7 Informaon on the index is available at hpmonitoringvisa-free-europeeu


Barriers to Russian think tanksrsquo influence

The success of the Visa-Free Europe Coalion placing Eastern Part-nership think tanks in the center of an ongoing process of monitoring the naonal governmentsrsquo compliance with their own commitments is not likely to be replicated in Russia The effecveness of Russian think tanks in promoon of good governance standards and assess-ing the performance of the Russian government has been severely hampered by a combinaon of two factors low transparency of pub-lic administraon and business acvity combined with resistance to reform and the increasingly hosle environment in which independ-ent policy instutes operate The first tendency can be seen in the limited impact of the work of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum in areas such as an-corrupon public oversight of government deci-sions and reform of the bureaucrac apparatus The second trend can be illustrated by reference to several government iniaves that seri-ously limit the opportunies for Russian think tanksrsquo cooperaon with foreign partners

It is noteworthy that almost all the think tanks working within the framework of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum chose to join the ldquoDemocrac Structures and Processesrdquo working group The grouprsquos areas of interest include government accountability to the public civilian control over the police and security forces and an-corrupon strategies8 Unlike the queson of visas all these issues are highly sen-sive for the government and NGOs are likely to take an adversarial posion vis-agrave-vis the authories The original strategy of the Working Group adopted in 2011 envisioned inter alia surveying the exisng regulaons and programs in the EU and Russia with a view to suggest-ing appropriate legislave changes and developing joint projects with the EU9 The first recommendaons report however shied the em-phasis from a transfer of rules and procedures to note a deeper prob-lem insufficient access to informaon on government decisions for civil society organizaons whose representaves ldquomeet systemac ungrounded restricons to official informaon of social significancerdquo10 Its recommendaons were largely reiterated a year later in a report to the 2012 summit in St Petersburg which could indicate that lile progress was achieved in the meanme11 Both documents concluded that mere pressure from civil society on authories to provide access to relevant informaon and by extension to the decision-making process is ldquosurely insufficientrdquo Instead they recognized that officials crucially need ldquolong polical willrdquo in order to realize the value of trans-parency and accountability of the state to effecve governance

However the progress of dialogue with the authories on govern-ance reform has been impeded by the weak posion of think tanks in Russia which only deteriorated as a result of unfavorable changes in legislaon in recent years Assessing the posion of Russian think tanks in 2004 Jessica Tuchman Mathews of Carnegie noted ldquoa number

of constraints [that] connue to hinder the development of the policy research sectorrdquo First the level of financing (whether from the state or business) was insufficient and when available it oen was condi-onal on delivering results in line with polical or business interests Second low presge of research and ldquostrained relaonship with academiardquo reduced the flow of fresh talent to think tanks Finally and most ominously Tuchman Mathews noted that ldquothe present govern-ment invites very lile outside consultaon and interacon on policy maersrdquo leaving very few channels of actual communicaon between experts and policy-makers12

It would appear that one area in which the Russian government would be open to independent advice would be management of the naonal economy This should be parcularly so in light of the fact that some of the most presgious think tanks in Russia are economic instutes The 1990s and early 2000s indeed demonstrated some no-table examples of independent analysts having an impact on Russiarsquos economic policy-making from the reform program of Yegor Gaidarrsquos cabinet to the economic agenda of Minister German Gref in Vladimir Punrsquos first cabinet in 2000 A number of influenal think tanks were established in the early 2000s when in the renowned economist An-ders Aslundrsquos evaluaon

Moscow probably had the best economic think tanks in the world outside the US They were freer livelier and more significant than the predominantly state-controlled or underfinanced private think tanks in Europe13

Aslund argues that the decline of Russian economic think tanks was a result of deliberate state policy consistently pursued by the authori-es since 2003 He lists four key elements of this policy which were introduced gradually The first two were carried out in 2003ndash2005 cut-ng off first financing by big business and then orders for policy analysis from the government They were the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovsky the head of the Open Russia Foundaon which had become a model for other business tycoons financing economic research and then the loss of demand for independent advice associated with the termina-on of reforms in the wake of a rise in oil and gas prices These fun-damental negave changes in the working environment of economic think tanks were followed by two legal measures that constuted direct threats to the survival of the civil society sector as a whole The law on nongovernmental organizaons of January 2006 increased the bureaucrac burden making non-state actors vulnerable to tax audits while the 2012 law on ldquoforeign agentsrdquo praccally forced many think tanks to disconnue receiving funding from abroad for fear of losing domesc public financing14 Apart from liming the funding base for independent organizaons the new laws contributed to the exisng negave image of foreign-funded organizaons as representaves of external interests As Civil Society Forum members Fraser Cameron and Orysia Lutsevych noted in their policy brief ldquomany Russians agree that Russian human rights groups should not receive funding from abroad and believe that by receiving Western funding such groups try to influence Russiarsquos internal policyrdquo15

8 hpvisa-free-europeeu 9 hpeu-russia csforgfileadminPolicy_PapersPolicy_Paper_PragueWG_Democrac_Structures_and_Processes_Report_Prague_engpdf 10 Working Group Democrac Structures and Processes ldquoProposals on Increas-ing Transparency and Accountability in Acvies of Government Bodies of Local Self-Governmentrdquo Policy Paper EU-Russia Civil Society Forum Warsaw 2 Decem-ber 2011 available at hpeu-russia-csforgfileadminPolicy_PapersPolicy_Papers_WarsawPPWG4_transparency_engpdf 11 Working Group Democrac Structures and Processes ldquoProposals on Increasing the Transparency and Accountability of Naonal Governmental Authories and Lo-cal Self-Governmentsrdquo Policy Paper EU-Russia Civil Society Forum St Petersburg 10 October 2012 available at hpeu-russia-csforgfileadminPolicy_PapersPolicy_Paper_StpPolicy_Paper-WG4-Transparency_engpdf

12 Jessica Tuchman Mathews ldquoRussian Think Tanksrdquo available at hpcarnegieendowmentorg20040216russian-think-tanksmux 13 Anders Aslund ldquoRise and Fall of Russiarsquos Economic Think Tanksrdquo Moscow Times 19 December 2012 available at hpwwwthemoscowmescomopinionarclerise-and-fall-of-russias-economic-think-tanks473265html 14 Aslund op cit15 Fraser Cameron and Orysia Lutsevych ldquoRussian Civil Society Under Threat ndash How to Respondrdquo EU-Russia Civil Society Forum Policy Brief 4 June 2013 available at hpeu-russia-csforgfileadminPolicy_PapersOthersPolicy_brief_Four_final4613pdf


The state policy has forced many analysts out of independent think tanks back into academia and it is not surprising that much analy-cal work is carried out in liberal educaonal instuons However as the next secon will show the growing polarizaon of discourse in relaons between the EU (and the West in general ) and Rus-sia puts limits on freedom of expression even in those enclaves of free thought

Prospects for the future

The growing ri between the EU and Russia in the wake of the Crime-an crisis is likely to widen the gap between think tanks from the two sides This will be seen both with regard to foreign-policy think tanks whether Western- or Kremlin-oriented and to research instuons working on domesc issues of government transparency polical and human rights With the onset of a ldquosecond Cold Warrdquo (the term used by Dmitri Trenin of Carnegie Moscow) we may expect a polarizaon of posions with further consolidaon of the naonal consensus on Russiarsquos relaons with the West among the majority of domesc ana-lysts generally supporve of the Kremlin line On the other hand the combinaon of rising cricism of Russian acons by European govern-ments and civil society actors (including donors and think tanks) and a rise in an-Western senment in the Russian public may further limit the appeal of the pro-European think tanks in Russia

Two examples can be given for the foreign policy field At the second European conference of think tanks that was organized by the Penn Program in March 2014 a heated debate between representaves of Russian and Ukrainian think tanks took place While a Ukrainian par-cipant argued the ldquonecessity of demilitarizaon and a legal soluon regarding Crimeardquo indicang ldquothat Russia had undermined Ukrainian sovereigntyrdquo his Russian counterparts disagreed suggesng that the conflict was part of a broader confrontaon with the European Union They repeated the arguments made earlier by analysts supporve of the Pun line of policy that the conflict had originated already in the 1990s when the West adopted a policy of containment out of ldquoobses-sive fear of the creaon of a new Russian empirerdquo16

Another instance of the increasing difficules in transcending the re-emerging East-West divide was the decision taken by the MGIMO state-funded instute on 24 March 2014 to fire the renowned histo-rian Andrey Zubov The reason for Zubovrsquos terminaon was his arcle in which he compared the annexaon of Crimea into the Russian Federaon to Austriarsquos takeover by Nazi Germany In a statement on the subject the MGIMO administraon considered Zubovrsquos posion expressed in interviews and arcles ldquoas going against Russiarsquos line on the internaonal scene subjecng state acons to ill-considered and irresponsible crique and damaging the educaonal processrdquo17 The fact that a top Russian university-affiliated think tank (ranked 4th in Europe and 10th globally according to McGannrsquos ranking)18 would

take administrave measures to eliminate dissent in its ranks is a potent warning not only to its own staff but also to other analysts at Russian state-funded think tanks not to adopt an independent posion

In turn independent instuons already under pressure to re-duce their funding from the EU are concerned that their precarious posion may be further jeopardized if the conflict between the West and Russia escalates Representaves of two Russian think tanks that are generally considered pro-Western (the Carnegie Moscow center and the Levada Center) expressed anxiety as to whether they would be allowed to connue their acvies involving foreign partners19 In the short term in their view the condions of cooperaon will largely depend on the course of policy adopted by the Russian au-thories and as a consequence on the EUrsquos and its membersrsquo decision to scale down joint iniaves with Russian partners They were also rather pessimisc about the role that Russian think tanks could play as ldquointermediariesrdquo between public opinion in the EU and Russia nong the barrier of the rise of an-Western and xenophobic dis-course in Russian society as it rallies behind Punrsquos asserve foreign policy

Conclusions

The current developments present a number of challenges to coop-eraon with Russian think tanks

bull The immediate vicm of the conflict with Ukraine will be collaboraon between think tanks in Russia and in the neighboring European countries whether in the Eastern Partnership region or members of the EU As Russian think tanks are facing increasing difficules in arculang a posion on foreign policy different from that promoted by the government and mainstream media their counterparts in neighboring countries are losing com-mon ground on which to discuss regionally-relevant issues Their funcon as an ldquoalternave voicerdquo countering radical rhetoric is parcularly essenal to resoluon of the conflict that may spill over from state-to-state relaons to the level of communicaon between sociees However for this to happen the EU would have to come up with a financing scheme for projects involving Russian and Eastern Partnership civil society actors which so far has been lacking20 Possible areas for cooperaon with partners from Eastern Partnership countries could include cross-border cooperaon reducing barriers to mobility and post-conflict resoluon

bull In the short to medium term it is unrealisc to expect that Rus-sian think tanks will take the iniave in either communicang values of an open society democrac standards and human rights to the domesc public or seeking to impart European standards to Russian public administraon especially in the sensive areas of internal security diplomacy and the polical system These crucial tasks advocated in part by the members of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum will need to be carried out by internaonal foundaons branches of internaonal nongovernmental organiza-ons (in parcular watchdog bodies) and the EU itself Transfer of European experience will be sll possible but in a limited number

19 Interviews with Gudkov and Lippmann Moscow 20 March 201420 Interview with Stefanie Schiffer Kiev 25 March 2014

16 ldquoPenn Think Tank program organizes European think tank conferencerdquo Daily Pennsylvanian 20 March 2014 available at hpwwwthedpcomarcle201403european-summit-addresses-ukrainian-crisis 17 ldquoRosja Profesor Zubow usunięty z MGIMO za krytykę polityki Pu-nardquo Gazeta Wyborcza 24 March 2014 available at hpwyborczapl19144615678831Rosja__Profesor_Zubow_usuniety_z_MGIMO_za_krytykehtml 18 Tabke 38 ldquoBest University Affiliated Think Tanksrdquo in J McGann 2023 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report Think Tanks and Civil Sociees Program Uni-versity of Pensylvania Philadelphia 22 January 2014 p 90 available at hpgotothinktankcomdev1wp-contentuploads201401GoToReport2013pdf


VAacuteCLAV LIacuteDL


Introduction

A serious alienaon between the European Union and Russia has emerged in the last few months This is especially seen in the diver-gent opinions of both pares regarding the post‒Arab Spring develop-ments in the Middle East and also over the escalaon of the Ukrain-ian crisis which heralds the inevitable clash between European and Eurasian ideological concepts of integraon and values As Grigory Yavlinsky points out in his recent arcle for the Russian daily Vedo-mos there is no room for choice between European and Eurasian models of development1 The Eurasian model was already exhausted during the Communist period and simply does not represent a viable opon any more Russia has one real choice Europeanizaon Ukraine is already moving in this direcon and even though Russiarsquos elites are endeavouring to impede this process they will have to follow sooner or later2

This paper recommends the deepening of mutual cooperaon in the struggle against internaonal terrorism as a way to bring Russia closer to the EU and to reset relaons aer the Crimean crisis Terror-ism represents a serious threat to the core values that are common to both the EU and Russia Moreover because this field of cooperaon is strongly depolicized it could easily build a firm basis for deeper cooperaon in other areas Above all the menace of terrorism is far more dangerous to Moscow and thus the cooperaon with the EU is in its best interest From the EUrsquos perspecve although it has advanced a policy of creang a stable and secure neighbourhood it must first understand that not every security threat can be solved in the frame-work of the NATO alliance Secondly it has to understand that any reset of relaons with Russia has to start with the security quesons which are of paramount importance for Moscow It will be possible to open debate on other aspects of joint cooperaon only when Moscow feels secure Unfortunately the topic of human and civil rights may have to be taken up toward the end of these discussions The most im-portant duty for the rulers of Russia in the past several centuries was to safeguard their country and those old habits die hard

This short study will focus first on the hotbeds of potenal terrorist threats for Russia in the North Caucasus Afghanistan Syria and Iraq because the deteriorang security situaon on the margins of the post-Soviet area could represent a major incenve for Russiarsquos coop-eraon with the EU Next possible scenarios of cooperaon will be elaborated Finally key recommendaons will be given

1 Grigory Yavlinsky ldquoRossija sozdaet vokrug sebja pojas nestabilnosrdquo Vedomos February 27 2014 2 Ibid

Russia and the EU Perspectives on a Counter-Terrorism Strategy

of fields (such as technical environmental or economic standards) or where the foreign partner takes the lead (organizing study visits or supplying its own expert personnel)21 This would serve to limit the visibility of a Russian entyrsquos involvement and consequently reduce the negave backlash from the authories

bull Paradoxically in the new stage of EU-Russia relaons while the role of think tanks as intermediaries in a dialogue between socie-es will diminish temporarily it is likely to increase in the capacity of analysts of government policy ldquoReading the mindrdquo of Russian policy-makers is becoming a top priority in a new phase of rela-ons characterized by lower trust and fewer direct contacts Thus European think tanks are likely to seek opportunies to exchange views with their Russian counterparts at conferences expert semi-nars and through study visits Such events could help build trust establish a shared vision of strategic problems and eventually lead to joint iniaves

21 Interview with Jeff Lovi Prague 22 March 2014


Deteriorating security situation in Russia

According to the US Department of State at least 182 terrorist at-tacks occurred in Russia during 2012 In the course of these aacks 659 people were killed and 490 injured3 Almost half of the aacks targeted law enforcement security services and emergency respond-ers The majority of aacks in 2012 took place in the North Caucasus such as the bomb aacks near a police staon in Makhachkala in May Several aacks were carried out outside this region for instance the bombings in Tatarstan in July The rise of radical Islam amongst Rus-siarsquos 94 million Muslims threatens the foundaons of the Russian Fed-eraon4 Moreover radical Islamist or terrorist organizaons such as the Caucasus Emirate are expanding their influence and membership Several cases of ethnic Russian suicide bombers have recently been recorded It is esmated that there are already more than 7000 eth-nic Russian Muslims in the Russian Federaon Furthermore there is a much higher percentage of terrorists in this group than for instance amongst Russiarsquos Tatars For example the aack on Volgogradrsquos trol-leybus in the end of 2013 was likely carried out by a man of ethnic Russian origin It is obvious that ethnic Russians have easier access to sensive areas and facilies and thus could be more dangerous5

In comparison 219 terrorist aacks were carried out in the EU in 2012 according to Europol However only 17 people died as a result The most prominent aacks were connected with religious extrem-ism such as the religiously inspired solo terrorist who shot and killed seven people in France6 The number of terrorist aacks in the EU rose in 2012 by almost a third over the previous year owing chiefly to the fact that the conflicts in Mali and Syria provided potenal breeding grounds for militants7 Nevertheless it is clear that terrorism in the EU does not represent a threat of the same magnitude as in Russia Not-withstanding both the European Commission and Europol consider the struggle with terrorism as one of their most important tasks

Sooner or later Russia will become unable to manage the radical Islamist threat on its own and it should thus consider deepening its counter-terrorism cooperaon with the EU and other partners such as the Shanghai Cooperaon Organizaon (SCO) countries The Rus-sian government established the Naonal An-Terrorist Coordinang Centre in 2006 as the principal government coordinaon body for response to terrorist threats The government also plans to improve the socio-economic situaon in the North Caucasus by providing $81 billion to the region by 2025 It is esmated that approximately 90 percent of this financial help will be sourced from Russian private companies8 However this might sll not be enough

Cooperaon with the EU should not take place only on the inter-governmental level On the contrary it should be accompanied by the work of NGOs likely under the aegis of the EU-Russia Civil Society Fo-rum The NGOs could contribute to building trust between the EU and Russia and focus on the agenda of human rights that would be ill-fated if voiced too quickly on the intergovernmental level Starng with the

outbreak of the Second Chechen War in 1999 Russia has pushed in-ternaonal NGOs and other organizaons out of the North Caucasus claiming that they were undermining Russiarsquos territorial integrity and aiding insurgents This step had however an opposite effect as a rise in insurgency followed9 Hence the full return of some Western NGOs such as Amnesty Internaonal or Human Rights Watch to the region and closer cooperaon with the EU might parally remedy the dete-riorang security situaon

The Caucasus Emirate

The terrorist aacks in Volgograd carried out on the eve of New Yearrsquos celebraons in 2013 revealed the weaknesses and unpreparedness of Russiarsquos intelligence and security services Russiarsquos capability to suc-cessfully fight the terrorist threat is in queson These aacks were likely organized by people connected with the Caucasus Emirate (CE) This radical Islamist organizaon aims at the creaon of an independ-ent Islamic state under the rule of sharia law in the North Caucasus The CE was proclaimed in October 2007 as a successor to the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria10 Both Russia and the US consider the CE to be a terrorist organizaon In July 2011 the UN Security Council added the CE to the list of enes associated with Al-Qaeda The CE is held responsible for a number of terrorist aacks including the Moscow metro bombings in March 2010 the bomb aack at Moscowrsquos Domod-edovo Airport in January 2011 and the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 The territory claimed by this self-proclaimed virtual state enty encompasses the enre North Caucasus namely Chechnya In-gushea North Ossea Adygea Krasnodar Krai Kabardino-Balkaria Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai The organizaon structure is divided into several vilayats each consisng of mulple fronts or sectors Finally each sector comprises several jammats or units Emir Doku Umarov the leader of the Caucasus Emirate is also considered to be the founder of this jihadist organizaon11 There is no compa-rable organizaon in the EU regarding the extent of its aims military potenal or ideological vindicaon Nonetheless a similar group could be established on the territory of the EU and thus providing assistance to Russia could bring the EU invaluable experience

Doku Umarov changed the strategy of the CE aer the wave of an-regime protests in Russia in 2011 He declared a moratorium on aacks on Russiarsquos cies and ldquociviliansrdquo However this moratorium was cancelled prior to the Sochi Winter Olympic Games On 2 July 2013 Umarov called on members of the CE and radical Islamists in Bashkor-tostan and Tatarstan to stop the Sochi Games from taking place12 The CE has allegedly also changed its operaonal strategy in the past five years It began to use suicide bombers and became much more de-centralised13 At the end of 2013 Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov posted on his Instagram profile that Doku Umarov had been killed14 His supposed death however seems to have had lile influence on

3 ldquoCountry reports on terrorism 2012 ndash US Department of Staterdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpwwwstategovjctrlscrt2012 4 Ibid 5 Emil Souleimanov ldquoVolgograd bombings demonstrate the inability of Russiarsquos security servicesrdquo CACI Analyst January 8 2014 6 ldquoRise in terrorist aacks in Europe in 2012 ndash Europolrdquo last modified February 28 20147 ldquoTerror aacks in Europe rise by a quarter as EU cizens fight in Syria ndash Europolrdquo last modified February 28 2014 8 ldquoState programme North Caucasus Federal District Development to 2025rdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpgovernmentruendocs7303

9 Valery Dzutsev ldquoRussia unlikely to change policies in North Caucasus aer Boston bombingrdquo CACI Analyst May 15 201310 Gordon M Hahn ldquoGeng the Caucasus Emirate Rightrdquo (Washington Center for Strategic and Internaonal Studies 2011)11 Ibid12 Emil Souleimanov ldquoVolgograd bombings demonstrate the inability of Russiarsquos security servicesrdquo13 ldquoEthnic Russians recruits to insurgency pose new threat before Olympicsrdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpinreuterscomarcle20140101russia-blast-caucasus-idINDEEA0004X20140101 14 ldquoThe nine lives of lsquoRussiarsquos Bin Ladenrsquordquo last modified February 28 2014 hpblogforeignpolicycomposts20140119the_nine_lives_of_russias_bin_laden


the operaonal capacity of the CE This was proved by three terror-ist aacks in the Volgograd region at the end of 2013 despite several successful counter-terrorism operaons in the North Caucasus Vol-gograd was not the only planned locaon of aacks Russian security services reportedly averted other aempted aacks in Rostov-on-Don and Krasnodar Nonetheless they uerly failed in the case of the Vol-gograd bombings Aer the 29 December bombing at the Volgograd train staon a spectacular counter-terrorism operaon was launched Security forces checked more than 6000 buildings and detained 700 people However the terrorists successfully executed a second aack in a trolleybus the next day15 This quesons the ability of Rus-siarsquos intelligence and security services The second aack occurred in the same city within less than 24 hours despite the massive security operaon Most tellingly of all a previous suicide bombing had hit Vol-gograd in October and in all three cases the suspected bombers were known to Russian secret services who sought to monitor their acv-ity16 Nevertheless they proved unable to trace the suspectsrsquo locaon and to ancipate the bombings

Volgograd was chosen probably because it is considered a gateway to the North Caucasus and a symbol of the victory in the Second World War Moreover it is far easier to get from Dagestan or Chechnya to Vol-gograd than to Rostov-on-Don because there are not so many internal borders on the way Above all the socio-economic situaon of the Volgograd region was rated the worst in Russia according to the Rang of social well-being of Russiarsquos regions in the previous year17 Paradoxi-cally the poor socio-economic situaon in the region and Moscowrsquos unwillingness to show its own weakness regarding the poor state of its security and intelligence services may hinder any sensible counter-ter-rorism cooperaon with the EU Russiarsquos negave bias against West-ern NGOs could play a significant role as well Internaonal NGOs are perceived by Russian policians as extensions of a Western campaign against Russiarsquos interests Unless Moscow ceases to consider them to be ldquoWestern agentsrdquo their work will be significantly hindered despite their avowed chief aim of helping Russia

Spill-over of terrorist activities

Five years aer the official terminaon of the counter-terrorism oper-aon in Chechnya radical Islamists connue to expand their acvies into other Muslim regions of the Russian Federaon The revelaon that the suspected perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombings in April 2013 had clear connecons with North Caucasus radical Islamists shows that the North Caucasus insurgency can no longer be consid-ered as exclusively Russiarsquos internal problem There are also hundreds of radical Islamists from Russia in the ranks of the Free Syrian Army and in central and northern Iraq18 Moscowrsquos connuous support for Shia Muslim regimes in Syria and Iran led hundreds of its own Sunni Muslims to leave Russia and join the fighng either in Syria or else-where in the Arab world As soon as the civil war in Syria ends these seasoned fighters could return to Russia to resume their struggle with

ldquoinfidelsrdquo Moreover these radical Islamists are backed by the Sunni powers of the Persian Gulf that oppose Russiarsquos foreign policy in the region19

Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov first admied that Chechens had taken part in the Syrian Civil War on the side of the Free Syrian Army in July 2013 reversing his previous vociferous denial of any Chechen parcipaon in the conflict Leaders of the North Caucasus insurgency such as Doku Umarov were at first categorically against any involvement of their subordinates in Syria However they gradually changed their minds For one thing they began to perceive involve-ment in Syria as a preparaon for the ldquorealrdquo struggle against Vladimir Punrsquos regime Secondly they were angered by Moscowrsquos unequivo-cal support for Bashar al-Assadrsquos regime because of its Shia Muslim character Almost all North Caucasian Muslims are Sunnis Hundreds of fighters from the North Caucasus most from Chechnya and Dag-estan are in Syria along with naonals of Central Asia especially Tajiks and Uzbeks and also Muslims from the Volga-Ural region and Azerbaijan20

The Kremlin seems oblivious to the threat that sooner or later these jihadists will return to Russia An added complicaon is the coming withdrawal of the NATO-led ISAF mission from Afghanistan at the end of 2014 North Caucasian jihadists could travel to Iraq and Af-ghanistan and hence undermine the US-sponsored regimes Moscow was probably content with their absence at the me of the Sochi Win-ter Olympics but this approach might soon prove to be short-sighted To take one instance the aacks in Volgograd were partly planned by North Caucasus jihadists with bases in northern Iraq21 For another the North Caucasian insurgents have found new ideological allies in the Persian Gulf thanks to their engagement in Syria They have com-mon foes in the form of Shia Muslim regimes in Syria and Iran that are backed by Russia Hence the civil war in Syria is a blessing for the North Caucasus jihadists since they can ldquotrainrdquo their troops there and make contact with valuable allies from the Persian Gulf

Afghanistan aer the withdrawal of the ISAF represents both threat and opportunity for the Central Asian region as well as for the reset of relaons between Russia NATO and the EU Russia has proved to be NATOrsquos valuable partner in the Afghanistan conflict It made possible the establishment of the Northern Distribuon Network that supplies ISAF forces from Europe22 This notwithstanding Russia and NATO have to find common ground in Afghanistan aer 2014 because Mos-cow will not be able simply to stop radical Islamists from Afghanistan on its own The spill-over of militants from Afghanistan to Central Asia and consequently to Russia proper represents one of the most appall-ing scenarios for Kremlin policy-makers This possible development has to be seen also in the context of the increased threat from radical Islam in the North Caucasus Tatarstan and Bashkortostan

Moscow views the departure of NATO from Afghanistan with a mixture of concern and enthusiasm On one hand the withdrawal of the US-led force from Afghanistan will enable Russia to boost its influ-ence in Central Asia In July 2014 US troops will leave the airbase in Manas Kyrgyzstan ndash the last US military base in Central Asia23 Manas

15 ldquoRussia is losing against radical Islamrdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpwwwusatodaycomstoryopinion20140108russia-suicide-bombings-sochi-olympics-column4345829 16 Emil Souleimanov ldquoVolgograd bombings demonstrate the inability of Russiarsquos security servicesrdquo17 ldquoRejng regionov po kachestvu zhiznirdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpriarutrendregions_rang_17122013 18 ldquoOtvetstvennost za vzryv v Volgograde vzjala na sebja irakskaja bandgruppardquo last modified February 28 2014 hpwwwnovayagazetarunews284076html

19 Emil Souleimanov ldquoNorth Caucasian fighters join Syrian civil warrdquo CACI Analyst August 21 201320 Ibid21 ldquoOtvetstvennost za vzryv v Volgograde vzjala na sebja irakskaja bandgruppardquo22 ldquoNorthern Distribuon Networkrdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpscsisorgprogramnorthern-distribuon-network-ndn 23 Jacob Zenn ldquoWhat opons for US influence in Central Asia aer Manasrdquo CACI Analyst June 3 2013


became pivotal to the NATO presence in Afghanistan aer the closure of the US airbase in Karshi Khanabad Uzbekistan in 2005 as the West reacted to the Andijan massacre Aer July 2014 NATO will have only two smaller bases in Central Asia ndash Germanyrsquos in Termez Uzbekistan and Francersquos near Dushanbe Tajikistan On the other hand Moscow is well aware that if the Kabul regime falls into Islamist hands it might not be able to deal with this threat on its own24

According to Uzbekistani polical scienst Murod Ismailov there are three possible scenarios for post-2014 Afghanistan25 The best-case scenario reckons with internal splits in the Taliban leading to the presence of moderate Talibanis in Afghanistanrsquos government Second the ldquobusiness as usualrdquo scenario assumes that Kabulrsquos government will have to resume the armed struggle with Islamic insurgents on its own Third the worst-case scenario would be the fall of Kabul under the Talibanrsquos sway In this case Russia will have to step in and offer security guarantees to its southern neighbours and allies in the Collecve Se-curity Treaty Organizaon (CSTO) However it is doubul whether the CSTO will be able to contain the flow of radical Islamists from Afghani-stan26 In parcular the Ferghana Valley of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could become a new hotbed for the rise of radical Islam in the region Both Tajikistan and the Ferghana Valley were at least briefly under control of radical Islamists in the beginning of the 1990s Besides Rus-sia is the largest consumer of narcocs in the world with 25 million drug addicts and Afghanistan is the biggest world exporter of opiates since 2000 It was the export of opiates that enabled the Taliban to resurrect itself aer the US invasion in late 200127

The blurred perspective of cooperation

The Partnership and Cooperaon Agreement between the EU and Russia entered into force in 1997 and since that me has constuted a legally binding framework for bilateral cooperaon The Road Map for the Common Space on Freedom Security and Jusce that was launched in 2005 has so far been the principal document to set out the EU-Russia security agenda regardless of its non-legally binding nature28 The proposed new EU-Russia agreement could be the first legally binding framework for security cooperaon between the EU and Russia29 Nonetheless it remains in queson if this agreement will be concluded in the short term The same holds true for the fi-nalizaon of the working agreement with Europol and Eurojust This agreement would be important for the broadening of cooperaon on counter-terrorism However the EU will not sign it unless Russia sets up an independent body to monitor informaon exchange30 There are five priority areas for enhancing EU-Russia cooperaon and the fight against terrorism is amongst them31 However any sensible coopera-

on between the EU and Russia or the CSTO in this field will be pos-sible only when Moscow is able to consider counter-terrorism as the sole aim regardless of polical context

Since the beginning of this millennium Moscowrsquos authoritarian re-gime has legimized its existence by promong internal stability and increasing living standards According to many Russian economists such as Alexei Kudrin the economy based on export of hydrocarbons is untenable because of the shale gas revoluon32 This means that the living standards of ordinary Russians might soon deteriorate along with the security situaon in the country Hence Punrsquos regime returns to the legimizaon of its existence through foreign policy achievements as visible during the annexaon of Crimea Moscow will likely launch a more aggressive approach to the West that would decrease any possible cooperaon with the EU on counter-terrorism In May 2013 Vladimir Pun claimed that the West had failed in its aempt to destroy the Taliban and that the Afghan army is too weak to manage this threat itself According to Pun this is one of the prin-cipal reasons why integraon under the auspices of the CSTO should be deepened33

Moscow aspires to become the principal security guarantor in the post-Soviet area Its two most important tools in this endeavour are the CSTO and the SCO Both organizaons focus on the struggle with terrorism yet their cooperaon with the EU and NATO in this field is extremely weak This is true partly because the SCO was designed by Russia and China as a major tool to diminish the US presence in broader Central Asia aer 911 In addion NATO is not willing to accept the CSTO as its equal because of the possible polical con-sequences of this step This situaon however opens manoeuvring space for the EU According to Russian polical scienst Lilia Shevtso-va Punrsquos regime first revealed its neo-imperial ambions during the Russo-Georgian War in August 2008 However only the annexaon of Crimea showed to the internaonal community the actual dimensions of Vladimir Punrsquos ambions Moscow clearly showed that it will not tolerate Western influence or even presence in what it considers as its sphere of influence34 Many supporters of the current regime such as polical scienst Sergei Karaganov believe that Russia can become a global power only aer it gains regional power status35

That does not leave much space to the iniaves of the EU How-ever as was shown in this paper the deteriorang security situaon in the North Caucasus and other regions of the Russian Federaon could change this Intergovernmental cooperaon on counter-terrorism has to uncondionally precede cooperaon on the NGO level in order to gain Russiarsquos trust Nonetheless cooperaon on counter-terrorism between the EU and Russia represents the best opon for the reset of mutual relaons if there any reset is possible in the near future In the first place such cooperaon is highly depolicized and therefore could be easily implemented Second both pares have a paramount inter-est in increasing mutual cooperaon in this field Finally this coop-eraon and its successful implementaon could in the end persuade Russiarsquos policy makers that the strategy of building their own Eurasian

24 Richard Weitz ldquoNATO in Afghanistan ndash Paralysis as policyrdquo CACI Analyst Octo-ber 30 201325 Murod Ismailov ldquoPost-2014 Afghanistan A security dilemma for its northern neighborsrdquo CACI Analyst May 9 2012 26 Ibid27 ldquoRussia fights addicon to Afghan heroinrdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpwwwthemoscowmescomnewsarclerussia-fights-addicon-to-afghan-heroin480593html 28 Raul Hernandez i Sagrera and Olga Potemkina Russia and the Common Space on Freedom Security and Jusce (Brussels Centre for European Policy Studies 2013)29 Rossija ndash Evropejskij sojuz vozmozhnos partnerstva (Moscow Rossijskij sovet po mezhdunarodnym delam 2013) 30 Irina Bushigina Analysis of EU-Russia Relaons (Moscow MGIMO University 2012)31 Ibid

32 ldquoKudrin ndash On the moneyrdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpvostokcablewordpresscom20130416kudrin-on-the-money 33 ldquoPun slams ISAF for turning blind eye to Afghanistan drug produconrdquo last modified February 28 2014 hprtcomnewspun-terrorism-threats-radical-ism-001 34 Lilia Shevtsova ldquoPunrsquos aempt to recreate the Soviet empire is fulerdquo last modified February 28 2014 hpwwwcomintlcmss0c7ed1c04-76f6-11e3-807e-00144feabdc0html 35 Sergey Karaganov ldquoAziatskaja strategijardquo last modified February 28 2014 hpwwwrgru20110617karaganovhtml


ANDREI RYABOV

Gorbachev Foundation Russia

Rivalry between Russia and the European Union for influence in the post-Soviet space has recently become a major source of tension between Moscow and Brussels The situaon was further aggravated in the run-up to the November 2013 EU summit in Vilnius where As-sociaon Agreements between the EU and three post-Soviet states ndash Ukraine Moldova and Georgia ndash were to be signed under the auspices of the Eastern Partnership Program The Russian polical establishment regarded this as Greater Europersquos aspiraon to weaken Moscowrsquos leading posion in the post-Soviet space In parcular the Ukrainian governmentrsquos intenon to sign the Associaon Agreement was considered the main threat This is quite understandable Ukraine is the second largest country in the post-Soviet space in terms of pop-ulaon and economic development second only to Russia itself As Russian policians saw it Ukrainersquos progression toward Europe would inevitably lead to a gradual estrangement of Russia from Europe and to its dri toward Asia At the same me on the Asian connent be it the Far East or the Central Asian region Russia would have to face growing compeon from fast-developing countries first and fore-most China The unexpected refusal of official Kiev to proceed with the agreement just days before the summit began seng off a major polical crisis in Ukraine further aggravated the tension between Russia and the EU Moscow reacted far more calmly to Georgiarsquos and Moldovarsquos signatures to their respecve agreements reasonably so since Russia has virtually no polical influence over Tbilisi while Rus-sian economic and polical interests in Moldova are rather limited Furthermore these countries are too small to be able to influence the posions of other post-Soviet states

Subsequent events such as revoluonary regime change in Kiev in February 2014 the war between government forces and pro-Russian separasts in the East of Ukraine and democrac elecons of the new Ukrainian president in May led to the most acute crisis in EU-Russia relaon In April and May there was a real threat of entry of Rus-sian troops in the East and South of Ukraine In response to Russiarsquos acvies towards Ukraine the USA and EU imposed economic and diplomac sancons against the Russian Federaon However aer presidenal elecons in Ukraine has been possible to reduce tensions in EU-Russia relaons

In evaluang the prospects of Russia-EU relaons it is important to consider whether the current increasingly acute conflict and rivalry are a result of a chance conjuncon of events or whether the underly-ing causes are more significant and more fundamental Only then can we ask what ldquocorridors of opportunityrdquo are available to the civil socie-es of Greater Europe and Russia for the construcve development of a relaonship between these two major actors in world polics

Russia and the European Union in the Post-Soviet Space From Rivalry to Cooperation

security zone lacks merit and that it would be more sensible to create one common European security zone from Lisbon to Vladivostok

Conclusions

bull The threat of internaonal terrorism is equally important for the EU and Russia

bull Not every security threat to the EU member states can be solved through NATO

bull Any reset of relaons between the EU and Russia has to start with security quesons which are of paramount importance for Moscow

bull A deteriorang security situaon in Russia could represent the ideal incenve for the reset of cooperaon with the EU aer the Ukrainian crisis The Volgograd bombings clearly showed up the decreasing ability of Russiarsquos intelligence and security services to avert such aacks

bull Terrorism in Russia is no longer an internal problem of one state but is becoming global as militants from the North Caucasus spill over to Syria Iraq and other countries even playing a role in the Boston Marathon bombings The zone of potenal hotbeds of internaonal terrorism stretches from Mali to Afghanistan This threat can be contained only through common acon by several states

bull The EU should broaden its counter-terrorism cooperaon with the CSTO and SCO

bull The return of Western NGOs to the North Caucasus should be seen as part of the soluon but not as its principal component

bull The increased presence of NGOs in the North Caucasus would contribute to building trust between the EU and Russia NGOs could focus on the agenda of human rights that would be ill-fated if voiced too quickly on the intergovernmental level

bull A new EU-Russia agreement and the working agreement with Europol should represent priories both for the EU and for Russia


Sources of Current Problems

It might be reasonably assumed that the current worsening of Rus-sia-EU relaons stemming from their rivalry in the post-Soviet space is the result of the interacon of many short- and long-term factors Two events might be considered starng points for an analysis of the contemporary situaon the Russian-Georgian war of August 2008 and the world economic crisis of 2008ndash9 The armed conflict with Georgia created many foreign-policy problems for Moscow and led to a confrontaon with the United States and NATO At the me pros-pects for further cooperaon with the EU including those related to the post-Soviet space were viewed in Moscow as a posive factor for Russiarsquos foreign policy that could promote new room for maneuver and stabilize its relaons with Western countries Within this context some Russian policians and experts expressed the opinion that the probable eastern enlargement of the EU into the post-Soviet space would not be harmful to Russiarsquos interests

The world economic crisis of 2008ndash9 was another turning point in Russia-EU relaons It has deeply affected the countries of Southern Europe (Greece Spain Portugal and Italy) forcing the EU into con-centrang mainly on its internal problems and sharply cung back its foreign policy acvies including those related to the post-Soviet space During that period many leading European policians stressed that consideraon of the Unionrsquos enlargement would be postponed for at least ten or fieen years Shortage of resources has impelled the EU to re-evaluate its policies towards its immediate neighbors Instead of massive financial and economic assistance to the post-Soviet states and their governments priority has been shied to supporng demo-crac and market reforms The very philosophy underlying relaons with the countries that aspire to a future integraon into European structures has been changed While before the crisis post-Soviet coun-tries based their strategies of relaons with Greater Europe on what they might receive from the EU from that point on their ruling elites have been faced with the necessity to think primarily of what they could bring to the EU

The crisis-related changes in European policy have also brought new problems for the ruling circles of the post-Soviet states Formerly many polical actors in those countries based their policies on the promise of integraon into Europe understood first and foremost as membership of the European Union The new situaon however made it obvious that the achievement of that goal was postponed indefinitely beyond the planning horizon of the current generaon of policians At the same me the crisis has seriously affected the weak post-Soviet economies that were in dire need of concrete financial assistance not in an indefinite future but right now The only pos-sible source of such assistance in the changed condions was Russia which though having also suffered in the crisis managed nevertheless to retain certain financial and economic resources for maintaining its influence in internaonal polics

It thus becomes clear why Moscow gave the cold shoulder to the official establishment of the Eastern Partnership program in May 2009 in Prague aer five years of preliminary discussions of the idea The program involved six countries ndash Azerbaijan Armenia Belarus Georgia Moldova and Ukraine of which Belarus and Armenia were Russiarsquos closest allies The reason for such a reacon was that Russian government circles regarded the Eastern Partnership as violang the principles of mutually beneficial cooperaon between the EU and Russia in the post-Soviet space Such a view was grounded on two major assumpons Moscow believed that the EU would aempt first to use the Eastern Partnership as a polical tool for enforcing its

influence among the post-Soviet states to the detriment of Russiarsquos interests and second to use the program to promote its new energy diplomacy The main goal of the program was seen as searching out new routes to transport energy from Central Asia to Europe circum-venng Russian territory

In truth however the goals of the Eastern Partnership were not as ambious as Moscow assumed The EU saw the programrsquos most important task as the creaon on its eastern borders of a stability belt encompassing post-Soviet states that would gradually move towards Greater Europe while implemenng appropriate economic reforms Reflecng on this goal many European policians and experts during both the development and the implementaon of the program have quesoned its efficiency arguing that in the absence of prospects for EU membership the Eastern Partnershiprsquos reforming potenal would be quite insignificant and its aracveness quite low for the elites of the post-Soviet states So from the outset the programrsquos ability to compete with Russiarsquos integrang projects in the former Soviet Union seemed less than obvious at best

The Eastern Partnershiprsquos goals largely overlapped those of other regional organizaons such as the Black Sea Forum for Partnership and Dialogue (BSF) and the Organizaon of the Black Sea Economic Cooperaon (BSEC) tasked with preparing the countries undergoing post-Communist transformaon for possible EU membership It is no surprise that the discussions on the Eastern Partnership saw Bulgaria and Romania express cauous concerns that its implementaon might render the BSF and BSEC pointless

A Russian Competitive Advantage

Sll Moscowrsquos displeasure with the Eastern Partnership did not be-come a springboard for worsening relaons with the EU At that me Russian officials were busying themselves with developing their own plans for integraon in the post-Soviet space The idea was that at a me when powerful new economies were emerging in the world arena and compeon in the world economy was geng fiercer Rus-sia would be able to retain and even enforce its influence in the world if only it could offer and lead certain economic integraon projects to those of its post-Soviet neighbors that had socio-polical systems similar to its own There have been several projects of this type the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) the Unified Economic Space (UES) and finally the Customs Union (CU) By the beginning of this decade the Customs Union took lead posion among Russian economic integraon projects The constuent instrument of the CU was signed in 2007 Its original parcipants were Russia Belarus and Kazakhstan while Armenia signed instruments of accession in 2013 Based on the CU a new and more integrated economic and polical associaon the Eurasian Union (EAU) is to be created in 2015 As Russian officials saw it economic integraon of the post-Soviet states was supposed to be supplemented by integraon in the field of in-ternaonal security To that end back in 2002 the Collecve Security Treaty Organizaon (CSTO) was formally inaugurated with Armenia Belarus Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan as members along with Russia Uzbekistan joined the CSTO in 2006 but severed itself from the organizaon in 2012

There was a view in Russian governing circles that following the global financial and economic crisis of 2008ndash9 the Russian Federaon obtained a marked compeve advantage over the European Union in its drive to strengthen influence in the post-Soviet region Moscow was well aware of the EUrsquos internal hardships and of its reluctance


to develop any short-term plans for further eastern enlargement by means of incorporang post-Soviet states According to Russian poli-cians and officials the EUrsquos aracveness as both a priority partner and a role model for development was thus significantly diminished in the eyes of polical and business establishments of the post-So-viet states As menoned above in accordance with the new foreign policy approaches the Eastern Partnership program aimed to deliver assistance in implemenng democrac reforms and development of an open market economy However the ruling circles in the majority of the post-Soviet countries had no interest in any reforms In such a situaon Russia remained the only reliable economic partner able to promptly save the post-Soviet economies from collapse and help retain their established polical orders based on coalescence of power and property absolute dominance of the powers that be over polics and business and social paternalism Russia unlike the EU never de-manded of its post-Soviet neighbors any reforms but instead promised stability and the status quo It must be admied that during the early years of the post-crisis period such goals were in tune not only with the interests of those countriesrsquo establishments but also with grass-roots senments The global crisis which dealt a hard blow to peo-plersquos incomes and social status has also made the idea of connued democrac and market reforms less aracve Many believed that the source of their troubles lay in the reforming polics of the previous pe-riod consequently they supported restoraon of more understand-able forms of polics and social paternalism Incidentally it was on the de of just such grassroots senments that Victor Yanukovich came to power in Ukraine by winning the presidenal elecon of 2010

It would seem that the subsequent years should have given Russia a unique chance to actualize its integraon projects without fearing any rivalry on the part of the European Union Yet Russia has achieved no notable progress toward that end even though the whole setup of the Customs Union was already fully formalized in its polical and legal aspects and has in recent years been acvely promoted by the parcipang countries The reasons for that are many and various

Limiting Factors of Eurasian Integration

In the polical sphere the most important obstacle in the way of de-veloping integraon processes within the CU has been the authoritar-ian character of the parcipang countriesrsquo polical systems which by the very logic of their existence create obvious limitaons for in-tegraon Their very survival largely depends on their ability to retain control over key assets of the naonal economies As soon as a threat of losing control emerges the authoritarian regimes become prone to make decisions that might damage the interests of integraon An illustrave example of this can be seen in the Belarusian governmentrsquos steps to retain control over the leading export-oriented asset of the naonal economy the Belaruskali company As soon as a threat of its takeover by the Russian company Uralkali appeared the Belarusian authories did not hesitate to trigger a row with their main economic partner Russia by arresng Uralkalirsquos general manager It is not ac-cidental that an efficient supranaonal body within the framework of the CU has never been created since the existence of such a body might by its very nature challenge the total dominion of the parcipat-ing countriesrsquo governments over their naonal economies

The CU founders have never been able to develop an aracve po-lico-ideological plan for an integraon body that would be perceived as an aracve alternave to the European Union even at the level of grassroots senment On the contrary certain parts of the parci-

pang countriesrsquo populaons have come to perceive the very idea of the Union as an aempt to set off the dominant economic and social orders of those countries (their ldquosingularityrdquo) against the worldwide trends Tellingly at the me of a profound crisis of Ukrainian President Yanukovichrsquos regime which was typically post-Soviet by its very nature the idea of an approach to the European Union through the Eastern Partnership program and signing the EU-Ukraine Associaon Agree-ment came to be seen by Ukrainian society as a real alternave to the exisng social order and to the prospects of convergence with Russia

In the economic sphere a major obstacle to achieving deeper in-tegraon within the framework of the CU has been the uniformity of the parcipang countriesrsquo post-socialist economies Trade turnover among the CU parcipang countries as opposed to that with external partners has actually diminished as a percentage of total trade the total trade of Belarus and Kazakhstan with the European Union is al-ready higher than that with Russia

No economy within the CU including Russia possesses the po-tenal for modernizaon or is able to serve as an engine of develop-ment for the other countries In Kazakhstan furthermore a rather widespread view within polical and business circles holds that the country has not obtained the expected economic benefits from its membership in the CU Largely due to these factors no powerful private corporaon or business group has arisen in the CU that sees concrete steps toward integraon as a strategic interest That is why it is primarily state bureaucrac structures that serve as the drivers of integraon projects

In consequence Russia which due to the global financial crisis of 2008ndash9 obtained carte blanche to push ahead with its integraon projects in the post-Soviet space has never been able to take full advantage of it

Lessons of the Ukrainian Crisis

The polical crisis of November 2013 ndash May 2014 led to tremendous changes in this country and internaonal situaon around it Simulta-neously the crisis became a major challenge for the relaons between Russia and the EU As menoned what triggered the crisis was the refusal of the Ukrainian authories to iniate the EU-Ukraine Associa-on Agreement instead of which they accepted $15 billion in financial aid from Russia In the course of the crisis the Russian government obviously sympathized with the Yanukovich team while the European countries their appeals to both pares for dialog notwithstanding showed more sympathy for the opposionrsquos demands Nevertheless in spite of different views of the situaon and different polical incli-naons the ruling circles of Russia and the European Union managed to establish a degree of cooperaon during the crisis This breathed new life into prospects for greater cooperaon elsewhere in the post-Soviet space as well

However aer regime change in Kiev in February 2014 Russia switched to a policy of rigid pressure on Ukraine that provoked harsh reacon of the USA and EU The resulng confrontaon strengthened pessimisc assessments of prospects of EU-Russia relaons that were wide-spread in the internaonal polical circles and expert communi-es This pessimism is also based on the convicon that since the EUrsquos and Russiarsquos integraon projects in the post-Soviet space have a com-peve character (some believe that the struggle for influence is car-ried out on the principle of a zero-sum game) there can be no room for cooperaon here This type of reasoning assigns a special role


ImprintThis report was prepared by

E B Centre for German and European Studies St Petersburg State Unviersity RussiaN K Associaon for Internaonal Affairs Czech RepublicP K Instute of Public Affairs PolandV L Associaon for Internaonal Affairs Czech RepublicA R Gorbachev Foundaon RussiaJ L PASOS ndash Policy Associaon for an Open Society Czech Republic

The elaboraon of the study rdquoPotenal of Civil Society Actorslsquo Engagement in Different Aspects of EU-Russia Relaonsrdquo was supported by the Naonal Endowment for Democracy and by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic Department of the Human Rights and Transion Policy ldquoTRANSITION Promoon Programrdquo

to Ukraine Thus one school of thought asserts that Moscow would never consent to the European integraon of Ukraine as that might create a powerful and permanent source of irritaon in relaons with the EU This asseron is usually based mainly on the assumpon that the key integraon project within the post-Soviet space the Customs Union cannot exist without Ukraine However such reasoning by all appearances contains an aempt to mechanically apply to contempo-rary reality assessments and opinions predominant during the disinte-graon of the USSR The Soviet Union indeed could not exist without Ukraine the referendum that was held in that republic on Decem-ber 1 1991 where the overwhelming majority of its cizens voted for its independence deprived the USSR of its last chance of survival The CU project on the other hand is largely Asia-oriented and aspires to become a link between the fast-growing Pacific region and Europe The presence of Ukraine in that project for Moscow would be desir-able but far from crical

At the same me the reality is such that Ukraine while heading for European integraon will sll be closely ed to Russia economically And this polico-economic ambiguity creates opportunies to foster social demand for increased cooperaon between the Russian Federa-on and the European Union in the post-Soviet space This could in varying degrees be applied also to relaons of Russia and the EU with other post-Soviet countries Unfortunately there is a notable shortage

of ideas in this respect The situaon is also aggravated by the factor of polical distrust among the governing circles of the ldquotrianglerdquo Rus-sia ndash EU ndash post-Soviet Eastern Partnership parcipants Offseng this trilateral cooperaon among think tanks could become instrumental in creang proposals aimed at the development of mutually beneficial economic soluons In addion it might help to gradually overcome the confrontaonal mindsets and confirm the value of a win-win game strategy Within the framework of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum (EaP CSF) it seems reasonable in this context to ex-pand the agendas of certain working groups Thus Working Group 2 devoted to economic integraon and convergence with EU policies could address the topic of mutually beneficial soluons toward co-development in the Russia ndash EU ndash post-Soviet Triangle For Working Group 4 (contacts between people) we propose the topic ldquoseling disputes over language and common history and ensuring rights of ethnic cultural and religious minoriesrdquo This range of problems must be de-policized to the maximum extent possible which is why it seems reasonable to discuss them within Working Group 4 instead of Working Group 1 on democracy human rights good governance and stability These debates could be extended through joint analy-cal reports and conferences and Internet discussions all aimed at the development of topical proposals for both social and government actors

DEMAS ndash Associaon for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights was awarded the grant by the Naonal Endowment for Democracy to implement a project tled ldquoAssisng Civil Society in Russiardquo The project was implemented in 2013 ndash 2014 focusing on facilitaon of cooperaon between civil sociees in the EU and Russia One part of this project was the elaboraon of studies with an overarching topic ldquoPotenal of Civil Society Actorslsquo Engagement in Different Aspects of EU-Russia Relaonsrdquo In this publicaon authors evaluate opportunies of mutual cooperaon of civil sociees from EU and Russia and recognize the areas where they can successfully advocate the role of civil society in the official EU Russia dialogue

The views expressed in this publicaon are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of DEMAS or its donors

copy DEMAS ndash Associaon for Democracy Assistance and Human Rights 20132014


The Role of NGOs in Cross-Border Cooperation between the European Union and Russia

ELENA BELOKUROVA

Centre for German and European Studies St Petersburg State Unviersity

This paper presents some reflecons on the role played by non-gov-ernmental non-profit organizaons (NGOs) in relaons between the European Union and Russia with special emphasis on cross-border cooperaon In comparison to the other more policized lsquohighrsquo policy areas the cross-border cooperaon shows an example of the lsquolowrsquo policy with more pragmac approach on the local level Usually such policy fields are developing differently and more successfully than polical ones

These mechanisms of cooperaon as well as the role of NGOs were elaborated during the 1990s and 2000s and the first part of the paper will analyze these processes before in the second part evaluang the current and potenal role of NGOs As a result some conclusions about the main factors influencing the NGOs role in the cross-border cooperaon are made as well as the recommendaons for its strengthening are given

The 1990s Building Mechanisms of EU-Russia Relations Cross-Border Cooperation and the Role of NGOs

The EU and the newly constuted Russian Federaon established rela-ons at the beginning of the 1990s a special me both for Russia and the EU Russia had declared and implemented a radical policy shi to-ward democracy and the market economy Aer the Maastricht Treaty the EU has got opportunies to be involved into the external relaons as the EU These circumstances influenced every aspect of coopera-on including the role played by NGOs

In legal terms the first step in the establishing of formal coopera-on between the EU and Russia was the EU-Russia Partnership and Cooperaon Agreement (PCA) which was signed in 1994 came into force in 1997 and was planned for ten years but prolonged in 2007 unl a new agreement is negoated and signed The PCA defined the basic fields and instuons of EU-Russia cooperaon and reflected both the situaon of the transional economy and polical system in Russia and efforts to harmonize Russian legislaon with the EU acquis communautaire1

During this period the EU acvely supported the Russian transi-on with financial and technical assistance chiefly through the TACIS program (Technical Assistance for Newly Independent States) thus giving a boost to cross-border cooperaon and the acvies of NGOs TACIS was established in 1990 and started its acvies in 1991 Russia has been the biggest beneficiary of support to the countries in the post-Soviet region receiving about half of all funding Between 1991

and the end of the program in 2006 Russia received 27 billion euros in TACIS funding for 1500 projects in 58 regions2 The program sup-ported projects for the development of human resources instuonal reforms and infrastructure restructuring and privazing industry and agriculture and combang so security problems In the case of Rus-sia the EU technical assistance was not made condional on legislave approximaon to the EU acquis communautaire as in the other CEE countries preparing for EU membership but rather on cooperaon on increasing stability and security on their common borders To that end TACIS placed significant emphasis on cross-border cooperaon in its programs for border regions of the EU and northwestern regions of Russia In the NGO sphere the 1990s were also characterized by very acve establishment and development of independent organizaons which started to emerge from the polical protest movements in the late 1980s built around ecological social ethnic cultural and human rights issues3 Some of these NGOs have become highly profession-alized and now occupy leading posions in their fields of acvity4 Another impetus for NGO development grew out of the urgent need for self-help in the difficult mes of the economic and social crisis of the 1990s

Because of the crical economic situaon Western foundaons especially from the United States and the EU became a very impor-tant and oen the only source of funding and training for newly estab-lished NGOs Branch offices of American and European foundaons were established in Russia and these provided not only funding but also training capacity-building and networking opportunies

The approach of the US foundaons differed slightly from the emphasis of EU programs US organizaons were more acve in sup-porng NGOs while the EU concentrated more on the strengthening of state instuons and social partnership Partly this was because American funders drew on the American model of a more acve NGO sector primarily funded by private sources while the EU and EU mem-ber states brought their experiences of a tradionally stronger state to bear on the idea of more effecvely influencing Russian policies through state instuons Even when working with NGOs the Eu-ropean foundaons and partners promoted cooperaon with state instuons

The difference between the US and EU strategies could be also seen in the regions where they were acve US organizaons chiefly operated in more ldquofamiliarrdquo areas with relavely high levels of de-mocrazaon such as Novgorod Nizhny Novgorod and Ekaterinburg oblasts5 while EU-funded programs were mostly implemented in re-gions bordering the EU ndash for instance the Russian Republic of Karelia bordering Finland which benefited from very high levels of financial and expert support ndash as well as some regions with a high level of ur-banizaon and social capital6 Russian NGOs were part of this process

2 Data of the Delegaon of the European Commission to Russia see hpwwwdelruseceuropaeuenp_259htm 3 Zdravomyslova E Sociologija obwestvennyh dvizhenij ndash stanovlenie novogo issledovatelrsquoskogo napravlenija [Sociology of Social Movements ndash Establishing a New Direcon] in V Jadov (ed) Sotsiologija v Rossii Moscow IS RAN 1998 pp 545ndash568 4 Beljaeva N Grazhdanskie assoziazii i gosudarstvo [Civil Associaons and the State] in Soziologicheskie issledovanija 1995 11 pp 109ndash117 Sungurov А (ed) Grzhdanskoe obshestvo ndash v poiskakh puty [Civil Society ndash In Search of Its Way] St Petersburg Norma 1997 5 McMann K Internaonal Influences on Russian Regional Democrazaon in Tabata S and Iwashita A (eds) Slavic Eurasiarsquos Integraon into the World Economy and Community Hokkaido Slavic Research Center Slavic Eurasian Studies 2004 2 pp 413ndash4346 Lankina T Explaining European Union Aid to Russia Post-Soviet Affairs 2005 21(4) pp 310ndash329

1 Bordachev T Romanova T Russiarsquos Choice Should Provide for Liberty of Acon in Russia in Global Affairs 16 May 2003 hpengglobalaffairsrunumbers3470html















































Introduction


























Freedom of Assembly


























Recommendations













































Conclusions









Introduction













































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions



























































































Introduction


























Freedom of Assembly


























Recommendations













































Conclusions









Introduction













































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions



























































Freedom of Assembly


























Recommendations













































Conclusions









Introduction













































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions



























































Recommendations













































Conclusions









Introduction













































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions










































































Conclusions









Introduction













































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions
















































Introduction













































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions

















































































ANDREI RYABOV







Conclusions













































Recent Key Developments in Russian Human-Rights Law

Documents

Transcript of Recent Key Developments in Russian Human-Rights Law