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RADICAL ISLAMISTS: ISLAM‟S RASHIDUN OR HIJACKERS GROUPS?

María José Juárez Becerra

Insituto Tecnológico y de Estudios Superiores de Monterrey Campus Querétaro, Mexico

María José Juárez is an International Relations student at the ITESM Campus Querétaro. In

2014 she received the UAM-Santander scholarship in order to study a term on anthropology at

the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Spain. She has been part of the editorial board of

Grupo Retos Internacionales since 2010. She has also collaborated as a volunteer in migration-

NGOs at Querétaro and Madrid. Various articles of María José have been published by the

ITESM Querétaro and the Golden Gate University School of Law, San Francisco, CA.

Contact: mari.juarezb@gmail.com

Abstract:

Are Islamists truly representing Islam‟s nature? Or are they, in the end, hijacking Islam? Does

Islam foster violence more than any other religion in the world? There are several narratives

around these debates which had their peak during the 9/11 attacks. The first part of this essay

will analyze how Islam has been hijacked by Islamists groups, arguing that Islam is a religion

of peace. The second part, will examine the current Islamist scenario in the Middle East,

focusing on ISIS as a main character, which raises the question again about Islam‟s nature as

this group claims to be following the right path of Islam because of the several achievements

that it has reached so far. In addition, the essay argues that through the erroneous use of

concepts such as Islam, Islamism, jihad and terrorism the prestige of Islam is being damaged.

Keywords: Islamism, Islamists movements, ISIS, Terrorism, Islam, Jihad

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Every region in the world has its own everlasting debates, in relation to the Middle East

Region one of these debates (besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is that associated to

radical Islamists‟ nature: are they a Rashidun (Rightly Guided) group in representing Islam?

Or are they, in the end, hijacking Islam? This debate also underlies the question about the

nature of Islam, whether if it is a religion of Sword or peace1. This essay will be divided into

two main topics by comparing different narratives in order to respond to these questions. The

first part will explain why radical Islamists are hijacking Islam while the second part will

focus on ISIS as an example of the radical Islamists organizations and how it claims to be the

Rashidun Islamist group.

1. - Hijacking Islam:

The globe was deeply alarmed about the terrorist attacks to the World Trade Center in

September 2001, discourses about this major event overrun media, some blamed Islam‟s

nature, others al-Qaeda‟s suicide bombers among others. In addition, everyone was too

affected by the events that they did not notice that the terms Arabs, Muslims, Islamists,

jihadists and terrorists were used carelessly as synonyms. Nevertheless, there were some

profound analysis of the tragedy. Martin Kramer, in September 19, 2001 wrote for the

National Review: “Islam, the religion of more than a billion believers, has been hijacked”.

Following the same argument, Thomas Friedman argued in his article World War III

published in the New York Times:

Where are the Muslim leaders who will tell their sons to resist the Israelis-but not to

kill themselves or innocent non-combatants? (…) Surely Islam, a grand religion that

never perpetrated the sort of holocaust against the Jews in its midst that Europe did, is

being distorted when it is treated as a guidebook for suicide bombing. (September 13,

2001)

1 Bar-On, T. (2014). The spread of Islam in the Arab world and beyond. Middle East Politics.

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One year after, Salman Rushdie also wrote in relation to the hijacked Islam:

Where, after all, is the Muslim outrage at these events? As their ancient, deeply

civilized culture of love, art and philosophical reflection is hijacked by paranoiacs,

racists, liars, male supremacists, tyrants, fanatics and violence junkies, why are they

not screaming?...Muslims in the West, too, seem unnaturally silent on these topics. If

you‟re yelling, we can‟t hear you. (2002)

These three authors, among others, emphasized the positive nature of Islam. They argued that

Islam had been hijacked provoking the association of Islam with the terrorism within the

Western social imaginary. But what is Islam‟s nature?

1.1. The nature of Islam

Islam as a monotheistic religion “and as an ideology of change and societal living, is

akin to the two other main revealed religions: Christianity and Judaism” (Akbarzadeh and

Mansouri, 2007, p. 14). Islam officially emerged when Muhammad, the Prophet, migrated

(hijrah) from Mecca to Medina in 622 AD, having Allah as the only god and Quran as its holy

book. But besides these important facts, one of Islam‟s main characteristic is that it is

“monolithic at a doctrinal level”, Islam in fact “does not recognize compartmentalization of

life in terms of racial, political, social, cultural and territorial divisions, and essentially calls

for the creation of a unified source of earthly power and authority as a reflection of those of

God. (Akbarzadeh and Mansouri, 2007, p. 15) As Islam establishes that there should not be a

division between politics and religion, this causes diverse interpretations among its adepts on

how these aspects should be put together, some of these interpretations attempt peaceful ways

while others, like ISIS, sustain that the only way to achieve this is through jihad or violent

techniques.

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Disputes about the nature of Islam have remained through history, one of the debates

relates to the question: “is it a religion of peace or a religion of the sword?”2 Evidently, this

discussion gained importance since the events of 9/11 in New York. After 13 years of these

attacks, Islam (as a religion) has been losing its legitimacy because of the terrorist tactics that

the Islamist group Al-Qaeda applied. This, at the same time, has caused confusion among

people (especially in the western hemisphere) about the differences between Islam and

Islamism, or even, in an extreme position, confusing Islam with terrorism. Some academics

sustain that Islam, because its history, is a religion of sword while others may argue that this

statement responds to the orientalism3 perspective and interests.

On one hand, authors like Bale sustain that Islam “due to its peculiar and in many

respects extraordinary pattern of historical growth, has often been more prone to adopt a

hostile and belligerent attitude towards on-believers even than other missionary monotheistic

religions (…) For this very reason, it is likewise arguably more prone to produce violent

extremists, as is painfully obvious in the preset era. (Bale, 2009, p. 77) Even well-known

discourses like The clash of civilizations? by Samuel Huntington, have contributed to this

debate. Huntington mentions that the relationships between the Western and Islamic

civilizations are conflictive. Javier Cordán and Luis de la Corte (2007) affirm that indeed,

there have been conflicts between these civilizations and that Huntington did well in

emphasizing the role of religion on the political conflicts because religion has been usually

undermined.

2 Questions were discussed by Bar-On, T. (2014) in the lecture of the week #5 in the Middle East politics

course: Expansion of Islam. 3 Orientalism, criticized by Edward Said, for providing a Western colonialist study on the Middle East,

describing it as different and inferior and thus justifying the Western intervention on the region.

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Nevertheless, Cordán and de la Corte sustain that in his discourse, Huntington

oversimplifies Islam by exalting the jihad phenomenon. (2007, p. 19) In fact, jihad does not

represent the majority of Islam‟s adepts, within Islam there is a clash among its different

branches (just like happens within Judaism, for instance, between Orthodox and Non-orthodox

Jews). Following the same line, Mustapha Chérif (2008) argues that discourses like The clash

of civilizations? seeks to confirm the idea that violence could be inherent to the Muslim

culture and that the Quran could be one of its sources (2008, p. 139). In addition, authors like

Akbarzadeh and Mansouri mention that the main three monotheist religions: Judaism,

Christianity and Islam, are “rich in fundamental moral and social principles from which strong

notions of universal ethics, justice and dignified existence can be drawn, and in relation to

which a virtuous life can be organized on earth”. (2007, p. 14). Thus, Martin Kramer

(September 19, 2001) rejects the Islam as a religion of sword argument by stating that “Islam

is no more inclined to terrorism than any other monotheistic faith. Like its sisters, Christianity

and Judaism, it can be both merciful and stern in practice; (…) Islam has served as the bedrock

of flourishing, tolerant, and peaceful orders”. So Islam, just as any other religion in the world,

is susceptible to be hijacked by extremist adepts. Nevertheless, no other religion in the world

has been so demonized like Islam.

1.2 Islam, Islamism, jihad, terrorism: how come they have been treated as synonyms?

Islam‟s negative perception around the globe responds to the fact that the concepts of

Islam, Islamism (including its radical versions such as jihad) and terrorism have been unjustly

seen as interchangeable concepts. This confusion (or intended plan?) occur as result of various

reasons, some of them have been appointed by Johns and Lahoud: “because Islamism

constantly reiterated claim to authenticity, a superior commitment to the Islamic revelation”

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and also because of “the political configuration of the world, and the popularity of expressions

such as “Islam and the West”, has resulted in the general use of the word of Islam as an

abstract noun which phonetically is suggestive of Islamism”(2005, p. 17) This

misunderstanding on those concepts is one way in which Islam is being hijacked.

But then, what is Islamism and what is its relation with jihad and terrorism? For

Mozzafari, “Islamism is a religious ideology with a holistic interpretation of Islam whose final

aim is the conquest of the world by all means.” (2007, p. 21) According to the same author,

Islamism have different variations, the “division inside the universe of Islamism is around two

axial pillars: division determined by sub-religious affiliations” which he divides into Sunni,

Shi‟a and Wahhabi, “and division emanating from the diverse scope of claims and ambitions”

relating to national and global Islamism. Nevertheless, “Islam itself is not necessarily the

prime reason or eve the catalyst for [Islamism]” (Johns and Lahoud, 2007, p. 19) it can be

argued that the political context in which Islamists groups emerge and the external factors that

surround them take also an important role for establishing their origins. For instance, Graham

Fuller considers that US‟ policies have contributed to the radicalization of Islamist

movements. (Johns and Lahoud, 2007, p. 20)

When Mozzafari talks about the final aim of the Islamists: to conquest the world by all

means he sustains that the Islamists‟ “spectrum of means to reach the goal is quite wide,

expanding from propagation, peaceful indoctrination and political struggle to violent methods

such as assassination, hostage taking, terrorist and suicide actions” (2007, p. 24) and he

emphasizes that the use of violence by Islamists is not a golden rule. In fact, Bar-On (2014)

argues that there are three types of Islamists: Takfiris, who declare other Muslims as impure

and excommunicate them from the faith; nationalists, like Hamas who seek the independence

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of Palestine and pragmatics, such as the Muslim Brotherhood who−in a non-violent way− are

part of the civil society and politics of their countries. The use of violence depends on what the

strategy of the Islamist group is. For the purpose of this essay, I will focus only on the branch

of the radical Islamists groups which claim that the only way to achieve their objectives is

through jihad and therefore recur to violence.

Nevertheless, it is important to mention three aspects about jihad. First, it is not one of

the five pillars of Islam but it is also an important element for the religion. Second, Jihad

“literally, means „exertion‟. For the individual believer, it is a spiritual exertion that makes

him better and more pious; for the mystic it is the ecstasy that leads towards a fusion with

God.” (Kepel, 2003, p. 92) Third, jihad traditionally has a distinction between:

Offensive jihad – giving a religious cover to the military expansion of the Islamic

world, to conquest and then exploitation of the land of the unbelievers – and a

defensive jihad, proclaimed by the ulama (the Islamic religious establishment) and

jurists: a general mobilization for the „homeland under threat‟, whenever the country

is under attack from the infidels.(Kepel, 2003, p. 92).

While the offensive jihad is “within the realm of political authority and has no relevance for

Muslims as a whole” (Kepel, 2003, p. 93), Islamists usually proclaim defensive jihad, so

then “fighting becomes the supreme virtue, and regulates the mobilization of all energies. All

means justify the end, the safeguarding of the community.” (Kepel, 2003, p. 93) These last

meanings of jihad are the ones that prevail in the media, while the exertion jihad −which, as

mentioned before, is a peaceful and personal path to become a better Muslim− has been

mostly neglected.

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According to Fregosi, jihad is not a recent phenomenon:

The Jihad has had a long presence on our planet, going back to the early 600s when

Muhammad preached the Quran, ruled over Medina and sent his followers to fight

against the pagan Arab tribes of the peninsula, demanding they acknowledge his

suzerainty and convert to Islam. (…) the terrorism called jihad we know today I

linked, with these Muslim holy wars which began more than 1300 years ago in

Arabia and spread during the next 13 centuries to the Middle East, Europe, Africa,

and Asia, and which are now also part of the North and South American scene. (1998,

p. 14)

Also, terrorists in the 11/S for example, had their own interpretations of Islam, as Hotaling

said: “neither the Quran nor any other Muslim teaching gave Bin Laden or Al Qaeda the right

to conduct a jihad, or holy war” (2003, p. 152) actually the mission of imposing an Islamic

regime goes against the Quran‟s “no coercion in religion” Hotaling keeps arguing that some

terrorists “have based on the hadith: I have been commanded to fight against the people till

they testify that there is no God but Allah”. (2003, p. 153) Other of the most appealed suras

from the Quran by the radical Islamists are the following ones:

The pagans wherever ye find them,

And seize them, beleaguer them,

And lie in wait for them

In every stratagem (of war) (Quran: 9:5)

Fight in the cause of God

Those who fight you,

But do not transgress limits:

For God loveth not transgressors. (Quran: 2:190)

In fact these radical groups (terrorists or not) can justified their violent actions by interpreting

any sura or hadith from the tradition of Islam. Tony Blair said days after the terrorist attacks

in New York: “It angers me, as it angers the vast majority of Muslims, to hear bin Laden and

his associates described as Islamic terrorists. They are terrorists pure and simple. Islam is a

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peaceful and tolerant religion, and these people are contrary to the teachings of the Quran”4.

This is very important because not all the terrorist acts are related to Islamists groups. There

are different types of terrorism that can even be applied by States to its own citizens. So

terrorism is neither Islam nor, necessarily, jihad.

2. - ISIS a Rashidun group

In the first part of this essay, I have analyzed what the academics sustain about Islam

and how it has been hijacked by radical Islamists. Now I would like to examine how ISIS5,

considers itself as a rightly-guided group. For doing so I am going to first, consider briefly the

history of ISIS and then analyze its arguments through their official magazine Dabiq.

2.1. - What is ISIS?

Aaron Zelin (2014, p. 1) sustains that since the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)

took Mosul -one of the richest oil-areas in the region- invading at the same time the news

worldwide, many people have been confused over how to describe ISIS per se and what its

relation to al-Qaeda is. For Zelin, ISIS and al-Qaeda “are now in an open war for supremacy

of the global jihadist movement. ISIS holds an advantage, but the battle is not over yet”.

(2014, p. 1) So in order to have a better understanding about ISIS, a brief analysis of ISIS

history and its relation with al-Qaeda will be provided in this essay. Zelin points out that:

Both Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded Jamaat al-Tawhid wa-l-Jihad6(JTWJ) in

1999 and al-Qaeda head Osama bin Laden came of age during the Afghan jihad against

the Soviet Union in the 1980s, but their respective organizations have distinct genetic

4 Retrieved from: Hotaling (2003, p. 55).

5 I have chosen ISIS because it has been the most “successful” radical Islamist group and for

its importance in today’s international affairs.

6 JTWJ was the first name of what nowadays we know as ISIS. Zelin has provided a

historical research of ISIS’ names that can be consulted in the Chart 1 annexed to this essay.

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material, attributable in part to their different backgrounds7, leadership styles, and aims.

(2014, p. 2)

This ideological division between the leaders: bin Laden and Zarqawi, was determinant for al-

Qaeda and ISIS‟ divorce. Brian Fishman explains that:

part of this was because Zarqawi felt that the only way to save the umma (global

Islamic community) from itself was through purging it, whereas bin Laden‟s number

two, Ayman al-Zawahiri, believed that Muslims were not the problem, but that

instead the “apostate” institutions needed to be changed (Zelin, 2014, p. 3).

In addition, Zelin sustains that another important division is the generational one, because

some of the jihadists were trained al-Qaeda during the 1980s and 1990s in Afghanistan while

other jihadists were trained within AQI (al-Qaeda in Iraq, another of the historical name of

ISIS) so these jihadists have different strategies, aims, and leaders.

When during the last decade both sides were still working together, the group headed by

Zarqawi (AQI) “controlled resources and the flow of foreign fighters, helping it gain loyalty

from individual fighters” in Iraq (Zelin, 2014, p.2). So those new loyalties are meaningful to

understand how ISIS was able to consolidate itself and stablish a different agenda with its own

followers. In fact, the formal divorce act was signed on February 2, 2014, when “al-Qaeda‟s

general command (AQGC) released a statement that said: ISIS is not a branch of the Qaidat

al-Jihad [al-Qaeda’s official name] group, we have no organizational relationship with it, and

the group is not responsible for its actions”. (Zelin, 2014, p. 5)

Only two months later of the divorce, the fitna (state of discord) started between al-

Qaeda and ISIS when Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi (ISIS‟ current leader) announced that he was

“extending the Islamic State of Iraq into Syria and changing the group‟s name to the Islamic

State of Iraq and al-Sham. He also noted an open secret that ISIS and JN [Jabhat al-Nusra in

7 On one side, bin Laden grew up in the upper middle class and did receive university

education, on the other side Zarqawi grew up in a poor and uneducated background.(Zelin, 2014,

p.2)

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Syria] were one and the same”. (Zelin, 2014, p. 5) But the true is that JN was not consulted for

this expanding plan of the Islamic state into Syrian territories8.

Since then, the dispute among ISIS and al-Qaeda is about who has more authority in the

region and which methodology is the best to achieve their Islamists goals. In this fitna, or

warfare, some Islamists groups such as “Ansar al-Sharia in both Tunisia and Libya as well as

jihadists in Gaza/Sinai and Indonesia have posted pro-ISIS propaganda” while many “other

independent jihadist ideologues, such as Abu Qatada al-Filistini, Iyad Qunaybi, and Hani al-

Sibai, have disavowed ISIS”.(Zelin, 2014 , p.4).

2.2. ISIS explaining itself through Dabiq

In order to complement its religious, political and military strategies, ISIS has been

publishing the Dabiq magazine during wartime. Beyond being an ordinary magazine, Dabiq is

a great tool of propaganda for ISIS. The first edition was published on July 5, 2014 only after

ISIS overtook Mosul. Within Dabiq the reader can find the religious base of the Islamic

Caliphate that ISIS is aiming to implement and at the same time it provides social, religious

and military arguments that legitimize this group as the Rashidun (rightly guided) group for

implementing an Islamic State, moreover it calls all Muslims to support ISIS and to execute

hijrah9 from their homes (within the Middle East or abroad) to the Islamic State.

ISIS tries to demonstrate that it is the religiously rightly-guided Islamist group. “ISIS‟s

global expansion likely depends on its ability to wrest religious authority from rival

organizations such as al-Qaeda by demonstrating that its own methodology is both more

successful and more justified” Gambhir (2014, p. 2) In addition, Gambhir mentions that ISIS

8 After this action, JN leader- Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani-, mentioned that he didn’t agree

with Baghadi’s statement and reaffirmed his allegiance to Zawahiri’s al-Qaeda. Zawahiri tried to

maintain ISIS only in Iraq and leave Syria for JN, but he didn’t succeed on this task. 9 Isis is currently demanding the implementation of hijrah (migration) especially of well-

prepared Muslims such as doctors or scientists.

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aims to have solid religious authority as it “takes care to use only either Quranic verses or

hadiths from the major and most trusted collections”(Gambhir, 2014, p. 6) these verses are

wisely selected and used in Dabiq to legitimize the Islamic Caliphate, leaded by Baghdadi, as

the correct government that unites political and religious power. In the first publication of

Dabiq the reader can find the following:

[The Islamic State] “has carried out the command of Allah – as much as it can – in

the best possible manner. It established the religion in the areas where it exists and

continues to pursue this effort vigorously. All this, after Allah had granted the imam

of The Islamic State the blessing of performing hijrah and fighting jihad in His cause,

on top of already having been characterized by his noble lineage, sound intellect, and

a prestigious level” (2014:1, 27,)

The Islamic State, Dabiq argues, has been “blessed” with victory, which means Allah

approves ISIS as the only one fighting His cause. So beyond ISIS military strategies and

Baghdadi‟s leadership, Allah‟s desire and support are the reason why they have been so

successful on implementing the Islamic State. And as they have Allah‟s unquestionable

blessing, those who fight ISIS, or do not support it, are infidels that must be punished. In

addition, ISIS‟s Dabiq in its second edition mentions that they will stop following Baghdadi

only when he orders them to disobey Allah, and they will punish anyone who attempts to

usurp his leadership.

Dabiq also appeals to an apocalyptic vision in order to gain the support of many

Muslims. Its second edition has “The Flood” in the cover and narrates the story of the Ark of

Noah, where The Islamic State is the ark who will save the good Muslims and those infidels

will die in the flood. Dabiq, as a propaganda weapon, emphasizes the virtues of ISIS and of its

members (its leader, administrative groups and adepts) while on the other hand completely

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rejects those non-supporters and repel them by threatening them, making clear that they will

be chastised10

.

ISIS claims that it is not only a military/terrorist organization, but also that it has its own

political façade. ISIS “is a proto-state that is testing out the best ways to get the world‟s

attention, and broader support from the Muslim community abroad” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 2) and

for this proto-state ISIS has implemented its own political institutions supported on religious

justifications and not only that, ISIS is even including minority groups such as tribes:

ISIS seeks to demonstrate that it can win the allegiance of popular tribal leaders in

Iraq and Syria, both in order to persuade other groups, and to retain control of

territory. To initiate and maintain tribal relationships in Syria‟s Aleppo Wilayat, or

governorate, ISIS set up a public affairs office. An ISIS tribal affairs representative

works underneath the Wilayat‟s head of Public Relations, indicating that the group

has a sophisticated, hierarchical infrastructure set up to interact with different local

groups. (Gambhir, 2014, p. 5)

Doesn‟t Islam calls for unity? This could be an argument for ISIS to demonstrate that, under

Baghdadi‟s leadership, the organization has the right political system which includes

minorities groups and that aims to be home to those loyal Muslims.

Following the same political line, ISIS proposes a welfare society. As the representatives

of ISIS go around convincing people to support ISIS, they explain to the tribal audiences that

“the Islamic State would enforce property rights, provide security, distribute aid, and ensure

the availability of food and goods for civilians.” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 5). For instance, in the

first edition of Dabiq, the report “Halab tribal assemblies” (1, 12-15) shows that once the

leaders of the tribes have pledge bayat (alliegancie) to ISIS, the Islamic State asks for the

collection of zakat in order to help the less fortunate within the communities.

10

The reader can even find corpse-pictures on the defeated in the magazine.

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ISIS‟ scope is global (following Mozaffari‟s proposal for Islamism division). On one

side through e-Sword –using modern tools such as the internet− ISIS is recruiting immigrants

abroad to populate the Islamic State, besides it is gaining the support of the regional and tribal

groups -as I have mentioned before-. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, has emphasized the global nature

of the Caliphate, even he invites Muslims around the globe to perform hijrah to the Islamic

State with their whole families: “There are homes here for you and your families. You can be

a major contributor towards the liberation of Makkah, Madīnah, (...) Would you not like to

reach Judgment Day with these grand deeds in your scales” (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 3). Again, by

appealing to salvation and propaganda ISIS seek to consolidate itself as the Rashidun

organization.

In relation to a plan to expand the Islamic State to the near neighbors-like Palestine-

ISIS‟ Dabiq mentions: “massacres taking place in Gaza against the Muslim men, women, and

children, then the Islamic State will do everything within its means to continue striking down

every apostate who stands as an obstacle on its path towards Palestine” (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 4). If

ISIS keeps accumulating victories and occupying territories, “it is only a matter of time and

patience before it reaches Palestine to fight the barbaric Jews and kill those of them hiding

behind the gharqad trees – the trees of the Jews”. (Dabiq, 2014: 2, 4). ISIS declares itself as

the most successful Islamist group, son in consequence, it has the moral and military

legitimacy to protect Muslim land from those who are attempting Muslims‟ rights. This,

nevertheless, doesn‟t mean that ISIS will unite forces with Hamas. In fact, ISIS seems to be

struggling for power among other Islamist organizations.

One strategy for ISIS to gain religious, political, economic and military power is through

discrediting of the opponent Islamist movements (or political parties). ISIS, for instance,

criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas in Dabiq‟s first edition for implementing a

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weak methodology, after the old jihadi leaders‟ death, which “never fuel the jihad caravan on

its path to Khilafah (Caliphate), rather it only brings indecision and fear, thus ruining the

caravan‟s ability to persist, and naively filling the road with obstacles that only serve the

tawaghit”. (2014: 2, 39) In addition, ISIS accuses them of “abandoning Shari‟a

“fundamentals” in an effort to gain popularity” (Gambhir, 2014, p. 9) so these movements can

be attacked by ISIS at any moment. If ISIS keeps growing, and its attitude in relation to other

Islamists movements remains the same, there can hardly exist an alliance with other ones, so

as Gambhir points out, “If ISIS refuses to interact with any organization or leader it deems

impure, then it will likely have to pursue military, rather than political forms of expansion in

the region”, which is very worrying for the West and the near neighbors of ISIS.

What does ISIS says about Jihad? It‟s an essential question for this research. According

to Dabiq‟s first edition: “Jihad would be based upon hijrah [migration], bay‟ah, sam‟

(listening), ta‟ah (obedience), and i‟dad (training), leading to ribat and qital (fighting), then

Khilafah [Caliphate] or shahadah [Islamic creed]”. (Dabiq, 2014: 1, 35) In ISIS‟ strategy,

military and violent forces play an important role. We can even notice this violent philosophy

in ISIS‟ Dabiq. At the end of the magazine, they emphasize the military victories of the period

adding some illustrative pictures that can appeal to its readers-target support and enthusiasm

easily. In fact, Gambhir (2014, p. 10) declares that this tactic within the magazine is coherent

because one part of ISIS‟ Caliphate vision claims that this religious authority is “based upon

military success and the ability to retain control in held territories”.

2.3. - Future scenarios for ISIS

As I have explained before, ISIS and al-Qaeda (AQ) have different strategies, “even Al-

Qaeda considers ISIS‟ tactics as extremely violent” (Bar-On, 2014). ISIS‟ success to

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implement a proto-state, its triumphs over some regions in Iraq and Syria, the economic

power11

that it has and the increasing number of followers and jihadist combatants it is gaining

represent a difficult time for al-Qaeda and those who oppose to ISIS around the world. In fact,

Zelin points out that:

The composition of foreign fighter flows to Syria (and now to Iraq again) indicates that

the movement‟s future is being decided by Saudis, Libyans, Tunisians, and Jordanians.

In terms of Westerners, most of whom come from European Union countries (three

thousand–plus), most are now with ISIS. Any plots or attacks in the West will thus more

likely emanate from ISIS than from al-Qaeda. (2014, p. 7)

In addition, we are facing a different historic context which is full of technology and military

facilities but at the same time lacks of a “force like the United States on the ground [like in

Iraq in the 1990s] to consolidate insurgent gains against ISIS” (Zelin, 2014, p. 7). And as long

as ISIS keeps collecting victories in the region, and continues investing in effective

propaganda it would be difficult to impose a counterforce to ISIS.

Conclusion

Radical Islamists organizations will always found their way to justify its existence

within the Quran and hadiths, nevertheless, these groups did not emerged independently to

their political -regional and international context, so they are not a merely result of Islam. In

fact, we as students and as academics share certain responsibility on the hijacking of Islam as

we don‟t raise our voices when the leaders or the media use wrongly the concepts of Islam,

Islamism and terrorism as if they had the same meaning. A new wave of radical Islamism has

begun, and this is the right moment to stop the demonization of Islam. Today, the world media

is infested of news related to ISIS and, with the participation of the social media, it is easy to

11 Some sources like CNN, mention that ISIS’ oil sales are rated between $1 million and $2

million per day.

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interchange those concepts at any time by anyone, damaging Islam´s image. Gambhir (2014)

stated: “ISIS wants to be seen as the jihadist group that will lead the Muslim community into

worldwide domination”. In the case that ISIS continues succeeding and it can achieve its goal

of implementing the Islamic Caliphate, we should pay attention on how badly this would

affect Islam and its adherents. If ISIS succeeds, would Islam be hijacked to a point of no

return?

18 | P a g e

Annex:

Source: Zelin, A. (2014). The War between ISIS and al-Qaeda for Supremacy of the Global

Jihadist Movement.

19 | P a g e

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