Algeria's other Islamists: Abdallah Djaballah and the Ennahda movement

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Algeria's other Islamists: Abdallah Djaballah and theEnnahda movementMichael Willis aa Assistant Professor in Political Science, Al Akhawayn University, Ifrane, Morocco

Online Publication Date: 01 September 1998To cite this Article: Willis, Michael (1998) 'Algeria's other Islamists: AbdallahDjaballah and the Ennahda movement', The Journal of North African Studies, 3:3, 46- 70To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13629389808718337URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13629389808718337

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Algeria's Other Islamists:Abdallah Djaballah and the

Ennahda Movement

MICHAEL WILLIS

The Ennahda Party of Algeria led by Sheikh Abdallah Djaballah is an example of anIslamist political party that has been permitted to participate in official politicalprocesses. From clandestine beginnings in eastern Algeria in the early 1970s theorganisation grew and attracted to it many figures who were later to become seniorfigures in the Algerian Islamist movement. Independent of the Front Islamique duSalut (FIS) following the latter's creation in 1989, it remained legally active after theFIS was banned in 1992. From 1992 it participated in numerous efforts by both theAlgerian government and the opposition to restart Algeria's political life and to bringan end to growing violence. As an Islamist party, Ennahda believes in thereintroduction of Islamic values into Algerian society. Although intolerant ofsecularism, the party has consistently denounced the use of violence and stresses theimportance of political pluralism, popular political sovereignty and the rule of law.

An increasing trend in those parts of the Arab and Muslim worlds that havestrong and significant Islamist movements has been to ban and exclude fromthe political process those Islamist elements seen as too extreme or toochallenging to the established order, whilst allowing other less threateninggroups to remain in the system. In the case of Algeria, much attention hasfocused on the exclusion of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) from thepolitical scene whilst the regime has allowed the similarly Islamistmovement and party led by Mahfoud Nahnah {Hamas, which later becamethe Movement for a Peaceful Society) to continue to participate in electionsand even take up junior positions in the government itself.

Comparatively little coverage has been given to the other significantIslamist party whose continued existence and operation the regime has alsotolerated. This is despite the fact that the Ennahda party led by SheikhAbdallah Djaballah, is viewed as far closer to the outlawed FIS bothhistorically and ideologically and, moreover, attracted nearly one millionvotes in legislative elections in June 1997, making it the fourth largest partyin the new National Assembly.

Dr. Michael Willis is Assistant Professor in Political Science at Al Akhawayn University inIfrane, Morocco. In 1996 he published a history of the Islamist movement in Algeria.

The Journal of North African Studies, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1998) pp.46-70PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON

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ALGERIA'S OTHER ISLAMISTS 47

Ennahda is a useful case study of how Islamist political movements andorganisations are forced to react to political change. In Ennahda's casepolitical change in Algeria has taken many varying forms over the pastdecade. The party has been obliged to emerge from clandestine activity,participate in elections and deal with a range of public and politicalpressures that these changes have initiated.

Historical Background

Ennahda's Beginnings

The origins of Ennahda can be traced to a group of young students thatbegan to meet together at Ain El Bey University in Constantine in late 1974.The nucleus of the group comprised four figures - AbdelkaderBoukhakham, Kamel Bezaz, Hussein Mashuma and Abdallah Djaballah.However, it was the young Djaballah who rapidly became the leading lightand prime mover of the group.

Born in May 1956 in the town of Zermana in Skikda Wilaya, AbdallahDjaballah took an interest in the Quran from early age and became involvedin spreading Islamic ideas whilst still at lycee. Although not coming from awealthy background, he was accepted into university to study law andbegan his studies at Ain El Bey University in 1974 at the age of 18, swiftlyestablishing contacts with other Islamic-minded students. Concerned bywhat they saw as the increasing marginalisation of religion in Algeriansociety, the students worked to establish prayer rooms and to constructmosques in and around the Constantine area. Hostility from the authoritiestowards Islamic ideas and organisations, together with the dominance ofleftist trends on the university campuses, forced the group to carry out muchof its work clandestinely and in isolation from other like-minded groups.However, a gradual softening of official pressure allowed the group to growin both numbers and confidence, and to establish contacts with other Islamicstudent organisations that were emerging in Algeria's universities at thistime. In 1976 the first contacts were established with the Jazara - a groupthat followed the teachings of the Algerian Islamic thinker, Malek Bennabi- with whom, according to Abdallah Djaballah the Constantine group'attempted to establish some co-ordination'.' However, despite thisexpansion of activities, comparatively little impact was made by the groupbeyond the campuses and the mosques. Geographically, the Islamistmovement was also restricted: the south and west of Algeria remaineduntouched. As Djaballah recalled, 'there was the east and centre alone - noother areas'.2

In spite of the growth of the movement in the mid-1970s, AbdallahDjaballah left the country towards the end of the decade to study Islamic

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48 THE JOURNAL OF NORTH AFRICAN STUDIES

theology in Saudi Arabia. Although the Saudi kingdom was regarded as farmore Islamic than leftward leaning Algeria, it appears that Djaballahcontinued to be active in unofficial Islamic student groups in Saudi Arabia.In 1979 he was expelled by the Saudi authorities following suspicions thathe had been involved in groups that had dramatically seized and occupiedthe Grand Mosque in Mecca that year.3

Djaballah's return to Algeria coincided with the accession of ChadliBendjedid to the state presidency following the death of President HouariBoumediene. The removal of Boumediene, who had so successfully keptAlgeria's Islamists on the margins of society, and his replacement by afigure who indicated that he wished to move the country slightly away frompredecessor's austere political path, lent encouragement to the Islamists,who were also encouraged by demonstrations of Islamist strength elsewherein the Muslim world, particularly in Iran, where Islamists had played animportant role in ousting the Shah in 1978-79. This new atmosphereprompted the Constantine group - with whom Djaballah had re-establishedcontacts on his return - to put their grouping on a more organised footing.Calling themselves the Al-Jama 'a al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group), theyalso sought to choose an identified leader for the new organisation.Although the senior figures in the group were all roughly the same age -having attended university together - it was Abdallah Djaballah who waschosen to head the association. The reasons for this choice were explainedby another senior member as follows: '[Djaballah] had already beeninvolved in missionary work and was an able preacher and was well-versedin Muslim Brotherhood thought and methodology.'4

In spite of this reference to the Muslim Brotherhood, Djaballah and theAl-Jama'a al-Islamiyya did not constitute a branch of the internationalMuslim Brotherhood that grew out of the movement founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in the 1920s. There was no evidence of organic linksexisting between Al-Jama'a al-Islamiyya and the Brotherhood, andDjaballah himself preferred to refer to himself as an 'independent' MuslimBrother. The same figure who remarked on Djaballah's familiarity withBrotherhood ideas also stated: 'We did not call ourselves Muslim Brothersbecause the Muslim Brotherhood cannot be regarded as the only source ofinspiration in Algeria.'5

The influence of Muslim Brotherhood ideas and practices was, however,apparent in the activities that Djaballah's group embarked upon from 1980.As well as strengthening its base in the mosques and universities in andaround Constantine, the group began to establish welfare, cultural andsports associations linked to the mosques which began to draw in a broaderrange of people beyond students. Workers, merchants and even minorofficials also began to attend the group's meetings organised in schools,

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theatres as well as the mosques themselves. As with the Brotherhood, thefocus of all these interlinked associations was the spread of orthodoxreligious teaching and knowledge - familiarity with Islamic jurisprudenceand doctrine becoming fundamental requirements for all the activemembers of the group.

The growth and expansion of the Constantine group's work and supportformed part of the more generalised resurgence of Islamism across Algeriain the early 1980s.6 This activism culminated in the holding of a mass rallyat Algiers University in November 1982, when several senior Islamistsannounced a written set of demands to the Algerian government whichincluded calls for increases in Arabic and religious education, an end to themixing of the sexes in schools and at the workplace, and a more centralplace for the shari'a in Algeria's legal framework. Although AbdallahDjaballah did not himself attend the November rally (which was largely theclimax of events specifically centred on the capital itself), he personallyread out the 14-point list of demands declared at the rally from a pulpit inthe university mosque in Constantine and arranged for copies to bedistributed throughout the area.

The reaction of the regime to the Islamists' open challenge was the sameboth in eastern Algeria and in Algiers. Following large-scale arrests in thecapital, Djaballah was himself arrested in Constantine and questioned by thepolice. The much less tolerant and more wary stance adopted by theauthorities towards the country's Islamists from 1982 was reflected in theincreased official attention the Islamic group and Djaballah himselfcontinued to attract. Picked up and questioned on an estimated 50 separateoccasions, the young leader spent two significant periods in prison between1982 and 1986 - an indication of official unease at the size and influence ofhis association in the east of the country.

The events of the early 1980s signalled the evolution of Algeria'sIslamists from the long period of small-scale clandestine activity during thereign of Boumedienne into the arena of outright political activism. Theimplications for the Islamic Group in Constantine were several-fold. Awarethat events had begun to confront it with specifically political issues, theassociation began to expand its educational framework from more strictlyreligious subjects to include topics of a more political nature. In 1984 acourse on political science was established by the association and thewritings of major Islamic political thinkers began to be studied in detail.Works by figures such as Mawardi and Ibn Taymiyya became particularlywell-read. As a consequence of this, debate ensued within the association asto future strategy. Some members argued that clandestine work within theinstitutions and organs of the state should be pursued. However, themajority concluded that the ruling Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) was

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so heavily permeated by leftist elements that efforts to change it would bewasted.

An adverse effect of the growing politicisation was an increase incompetition and rivalry between the various Islamist groups andorganisations operating in Algeria. The events of the early part of the decadehad shown for the first time the potentially significant political musclewhich the movement as a whole could flex, with the result that many groupsand individuals sought to claim leadership for themselves. This fractiousatmosphere - which explained the failure of the various Islamist groups tounite or even co-operate significantly after 1982 - soon spread to thevarious organisations themselves. From the mid-1980s Djaballah's IslamicGroup began to experience increasingly serious internal tensions andstruggles over the orientation of the movement, with conflicting personalambitions undoubtedly also playing a part. These culminated in 1987 in asignificant rupture in the association resulting in the departure of manysenior figures.

The Challenge of the FIS

The Islamist movement's concerns with its own internal politics anddivisions was dramatically eclipsed by the events of late 1988, whichcompletely changed the political landscape in Algeria. The large-scaleprotests and rioting that swept Algeria's major cities in the opening days ofOctober, and the consequent decision by Chadli Bendjedid to open upAlgeria's political field to groups and parties other than the ruling FLN,clearly had significant implications for Algeria's long-suppressed politicalopposition. Galvanised by events, Algeria's various Islamist groups inNovember 1988 swiftly formed the Rabitat al-Dawa (League of the IslamicCall), which drew together all the leaders of the major groups, includingAbdallah Djaballah. Despite this show of unity, serious differencesremained between senior Islamist figures and were further widened by thegrowing prospect that Islamists might be allowed to form a political partyor parties to compete in competitive elections.

Abdallah Djaballah participated in discussions surrounding the creationof an Islamist party during the opening weeks of 1989, but remainedcautious and sceptical, counselling patience. Although Djaballah and hisgroup had themselves now emerged from clandestine activity and declaredthemselves an open and official association, Djaballah feared that anyfurther move on the part of Islamists into open political organisation couldcreate problems.7 However, his view did not persuade other Islamists frompressing ahead with the project and formally launching a political party, theFront Islamique du Salut (FIS), on 14 February 1989. He had attendedmeetings up until the very eve of the launch, but had remained unconvinced.

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Nevertheless, many of his senior colleagues in the Islamic Group werepersuaded of the virtues of the project and left the association to join thenew party. As one of them subsequently commented:

Everyone has their own analysis. Abdallah Djaballah believed at thattime that it was not a good time for the establishment of an Islamicparty. I differed from Abdallah Djaballah. I believed that theestablishment of an Islamic party is part of Islam.8

Such an analysis was also shared by most of the senior figures who hadleft Djaballah's Islamic group following the rupture of 1987. As a result, asignificant part of the leadership of the new FIS came to be made up offormer members of Djaballah's association: Abdelkader Boukhamkham,Ali Djeddi and Abdelkader Hachani all assuming positions on the party'sruling council - the majlis shura.9

The phenomenal success that the FIS achieved within 18 months of itscreation - transforming itself into a truly mass party and attracting over 4.5million votes and over half the total vote in the first set of multi-partyelections held for local and regional councils in June 1990 - appeared toindicate that Djaballah's decision to opt out of the new party had beenmistaken. Djaballah, however, remained dubious about the FIS. The verysuccess of the new party was seen as a source of potential weakness byDjaballah and his remaining supporters. In their view, the largelyundereducated mass FIS following did not possess sufficient familiaritywith Islamic doctrine and thought necessary to work constructively andcorrectly towards the desired goals.10 The dangers of this situation wereapparent, in Djaballah's eyes, in the increasingly populist stance the FIStook on issues, preferring to rail against the iniquities of the regime andissue extravagant promises than properly and soberly to articulateestablished Islamist ideas.

At the same time, Djaballah was very aware that the FIS was rapidlymonopolising the Islamist field and discourse, and that his and otherdissident Islamist voices were being pushed to the sidelines by the speedand scale of the new party's achievements. In June 1990 he called on hissupporters to vote for the FIS in the local elections but subsequently hemade a point of claiming a role in the crushing FIS victories. The indignantFIS rejection of such a claim pushed Djaballah into considering action toprevent the party from establishing complete hegemony over the Islamistcurrent. Thus in September 1990 he announced his intention to transformhis association into a formal political party - the Ennahda (Renaissance)Party - which achieved official recognition from the authorities threemonths later in December.

The precise objectives of creating a new Islamist political party -

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besides ensuring that the party's heritage (in the words of Djaballah inOctober 1990) 'should not be eclipsed'" - were not made immediatelyclear. Some figures in the FIS were suspicious that the party's purpose wasto act as a spoiler, splitting the Islamist vote in future elections; they weretherefore wary that the party was collaborating with the regime, which hadbeen alarmed by the FIS success in June 1990. The new party soon made itclear that direct competition was not its objective, joining with the othernew Islamist party created in the wake of the 1990 elections - MahfoudNahnah's Hamas - in calling for the construction of an inclusive 'Islamicalliance' to contest the legislative elections scheduled for 1991. However,the alliance idea was rejected out of hand by the two most senior figures inthe FIS, Abassi Madani and Ali Benhadj, who firmly stated that the FIS wasthe Islamist party in Algeria and that all other Islamists should formally jointhe FIS rather than continue with parties that were essentially divisive. Theoption of joining the FIS was viewed as unacceptable to Djaballah and hadbeen ruled out when the decision to launch Ennahda had been made. Thiswas not solely a matter of his own pride but was also the result ofconsiderations that his organisation would disappear without trace orinfluence once subsumed by the FIS. Moreover, Djaballah believed there tobe significant differences between the two parties' outlooks. As he was laterto comment: 'Between our brothers in the FIS and ourselves, there were nofewer than 21 attempts at unification. All were abandoned because we didnot have the same methods and strategies of work."2

In spite of these differences, Djaballah appeared able to maintain goodrelations with a large part of the FIS leadership, particularly those figureswho had previously belonged to his own organisations. The accession to theleadership of the FIS of one of his former companions, AbdelkaderHachani, following the arrest of a large number of FIS leaders after streetconfrontations between the party and the regime in the summer of 1991,further strengthened relations. In the autumn of 1991 Djaballah joined across-party committee which demanded the release of the imprisoned FISleaders, who included former colleagues Abdelkader Boukhamkham andAli Djeddi. Nevertheless, relations did not improve sufficiently to preventEnnahda fielding its own candidates in the legislative elections ofDecember 1991.

The precise electoral impact that Ennahda was likely to have was thesubject of some speculation in the months following the party's creation. Itwas thought in many quarters that the party's historic strength in easternAlgeria was likely to yield it significant support in and around Constantine.However, an opinion poll published in May 1991 had indicated that theparty was unlikely to do well and could even fail to make any real impactelectorally at all, finding that less than 1 per cent of the electorate was likely

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to back the party in elections.13 In spite of these unpromising auguries, theparty fielded candidates in nearly half (208 out of 430) the constituencies inthe election. As the results of the voting in the first ballot held on 26December became known, it was clear that the party had performeddisappointingly, although not as badly as the poll six months earlier hadsuggested. Overall the party attracted just over 150,000 votes - 2.2 per centof the total vote. None of the party's candidates had been electedautomatically but two had done sufficiently well to proceed to the run-offsecond ballot scheduled for January.14

However, little attention was paid to the electoral performance ofEnnahda in the aftermath of the first ballot. All eyes were focused on theFIS, which once again had dominated the results and seemed poised to winenough seats in the second ballot to achieve a crushing majority in theNational Assembly. Some attention focused in this regard on the possiblerole of Ennahda and how it would direct its supporters to vote in the secondballot. The speculation became academic when, a few days before thesecond ballot was due, senior figures in the Algerian military moved toannul and cancel the elections. Djaballah has since maintained that it wasexpectation of this development that prevented him from issuing votinginstructions to Ennahda supporters: 'When the Islamist current won theelections we were sure that the second and final stage of the elections wouldnot take place.'15

State of Emergency and the Search for Peace

The interruption and cancellation of the electoral process changed the wholepolitical landscape in Algeria. Ennahda joined with virtually all the othermajor political parties in condemning the move and calling for a restorationof the results of the first ballot. The protests went unheeded by the country'snew leadership - the Haut Comite d'Etat (HCE), consisting of seniormilitary figures and like-minded politicians - which proceeded formally tooutlaw the FIS at the beginning of March 1992. Ennahda similarly criticisedthis decision as well as the sweeping arrests of Islamist activists whichaccompanied the ban and which had resulted in the imprisonment of manyof Ennahda's own supporters. Although no official attempt was made to banEnnahda, the party and its journals were subject to increased scrutiny andharassment from the regime, and in June 1993 Abdul Rachid Bouthelejoun,a senior figure in the party, was murdered - an event that was interpreted bythe party as being a warning from the regime.

Along with the other political parties, Ennahda was placed in a state oflimbo by the Algerian regime, unbanned but unable to play any meaningfulrole in the country's political life. The authorities made a number ofovertures to the party - including offers of positions within the government

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- but these were rejected by Ennahda, which viewed such moves as simplyattempts to control the party and give a veneer of legitimacy to the regime.Similarly, Ennahda joined with all the other opposition parties in rebuffingproposals from the regime to become involved in projects like the'Conference of National Reconciliation' of January 1994, which it viewedas disingenuous and pointless without the inclusion of the FIS.16

The massive increase in violence and bloodshed that occurred in themonths following the conference convinced Abdallah Djaballah andEnnahda of the need to launch their own initiative to try to bring an end tothe crisis: on 4 June 1994 the party presented the government with a list of14 measures which it saw as essential to the achievement of an end to theviolence and a solution of the crisis. Foremost amongst these proposalswere demands that the state of emergency (imposed in early 1992) be lifted,and more importantly that the regime release all political prisoners, mostnotably the imprisoned leaders of the FIS. The release of these leaders andtheir involvement in dialogue remained for Ennahda the only feasible routeout of the increasingly uncontrollable crisis. All the other means employedby the regime were doomed to failure, as Djaballah explained:

One is not able to find a remedy in rescheduling [of the national debt],nor in the total security policy and still less in the arbitrary andexcessive exercise of power. The sole means of salvation remains inthe freeing of the chouyoukh (historic leaders), in the rehabilitation ofthe FIS and in dialogue without exclusion.17

The failure of the regime's dialogue with the imprisoned leadership of theFIS pushed Algeria's opposition parties into launching their own peaceinitiative. Ennahda participated in two meetings held in Rome in November1994 and January 1995 which drew up a 'Platform for a Political andPeaceful Solution to the Algerian Crisis'. Signed by most of the mainopposition parties as well as by representatives of the FIS in exile, theplatform or National Contract - which proposed arrangements for an end tothe violence and a return to elections - was presented to the Algeriangovernment, which comprehensively rejected it. The regime ruled that thedocument was unacceptable not only because it represented an attempt tobring the FIS back into the political process, but also because its drawing-up abroad (to avoid official harassment) was seen as an unwarrantedinternationalisation of the crisis. This second fear - of inviting foreigninvolvement in Algeria's internal affairs - was one which had been sharedby Abdallah Djaballah, who had declared at the first Rome meeting that hewas 'firmly opposed' to such an internationalisation of the crisis.18

However, Djaballah believed that the imperative of finding a solution to theever-deepening conflict overrode other considerations and also allowed him

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to forge a common front at Rome with parties, such as the Front des ForcesSocialistes (FFS) and the Trotskyite Parti des Travailleurs (PT), possessingsharply differing ideologies. As Djaballah subsequently explained: 'TheNational Contract is an umbrella grouping which is made up of differentviews and ideologies. What unites them is agreement on the means of asolution.'19

In concert with the other Rome signatories, Ennahda resisted attemptsby the regime to involve them in presidential elections, which they believedto be pointless in the ongoing climate of violence and without the inclusionof the FIS, and called for a boycott of the poll. However, the perceivedsuccess of the election, with an apparently high turnout and substantialsupport for the regime's candidate, Liamine Zeroual, threw the Romeparties into confusion and crisis. Significantly, Zeroual's success haddeprived the parties of the popular legitimacy they had carried with themsince the election of December 1991, when they had collectively receivedover 80 per cent of the votes. For its part, Ennahda - although Djaballahcharacterised the presidential election as a 'mere exercise in window-dressing to provide a legal facade for the government' - recognised theimportance of the results. He believed that people had participated both outof fear of the official consequences if they did not and out of a hope that theelection might possibly signal the start of some new changes.20

To the surprise of many and to the disappointment of its partners in theRome Platform, Ennahda participated in the process of dialogue which theregime launched in mid-1996 and which was to culminate in the holding offresh elections to the National Assembly. It participated not only in bilateraltalks with the regime but also in a series of commissions that wereestablished to work on possible changes to the constitution, which reportedto a National Conference held in September 1996 also attended by the party.Ennahda officially explained its break from the common front of the RomePlatform (which the party still maintained that it supported) by arguing thatinvolvement in the regime's processes provided the party with a platform topress its own criticisms and agenda and thus prevent the regime establishing'an elitist and exclusive democracy'.21 However, it was also known thatDjaballah had become increasingly worried about his party's survival if itcontinued to keep its distance from the regime. Official pressures -including physical harassment of party members - continued and there wasa fear that the authorities might soon find an excuse to ban and break up theparty altogether. A lesser, but still important, concern was that the partymight find itself politically marginalized through holding to the RomePlatform. Djaballah was aware that Mahfoud Nahnah's Hamas had gainedgreatly through Nahnah's participation in the presidential elections, and bymid-1996 he was already publicly indicating that the boycott of the

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presidential elections might have been a mistake, since the move had simplybeen ignored by the regime.22

In spite of its involvement in dialogue with the regime, Ennahdacontinued to restate its support for the Rome Platform and remained highlyand publicly critical of the regime. It opposed official plans to approveamendments to the constitution through a referendum and indicated to theparty's militants that they should vote 'no' when the referendum waseventually held in November 1996." The party stated its opposition to theproposed amendments on the grounds that they sought to further increasethe powers of the president vis a vis the political parties.24 AbdallahDjaballah commented bitterly:

However, the government is determined ... to secure all theconstitutional, legal and political conditions which would prevent theopposition from monopolising and controlling the government andalso wants to provide the conditions for establishing a governmentwhereby control would be in the hands of the regime's current trendand the other parties would only be part of the decor.25

In spite of this criticism, Ennahda continued to believe that total oppositionto the regime's plans was futile because it risked incurring the wrath of theauthorities and thus the destruction of the party. Consequently, when theregime insisted that the party must conform to stipulations in the revised andapproved constitution proscribing any reference to religion in a party's title,programme or founding statutes, Ennahda complied. At the conclusion of ameeting of its majlis shura in March 1997, the party announced that it hadappropriately amended its statutes and had furthermore renamed itself theEnnahda Movement, in place of its previous official name, Islamic EnnahdaMovement. The significance of this decision, which the party had trailedeven before the referendum, was played down by the party, Djaballahmaintaining that the issue of the party's name was simply 'a question ofform and does not bother us'.26

The reward for Ennahda's compliance was participation in the two setsof elections staged in 1997: those for the National Assembly in June andthose for local and regional councils held at the end of October. Althoughthe official results of the Assembly elections accorded a substantially highershare of the vote to Ennahda than it had received in the ill-fated poll ofDecember 1991 (its performance in the local elections was less impressive),the party joined with the other parties in denouncing what it saw as blatantballot-rigging by the authorities in both sets of elections.27

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Ideology, Platform and Organisation

Ennahda's integration into the formal Algerian political system, withelected representatives at all levels, has inevitably raised questions as to theprecise nature of the party's agenda and what it has to say on the majorissues confronting Algeria.

At heart Ennahda is an Islamist party. It believes in the reintroduction ofIslamic beliefs, behaviour and norms throughout Algerian society. As hasalready been indicated, the party, although independent of any formalorganisational links, has substantially modelled itself on Egypt's MuslimBrotherhood. This fact was explicitly acknowledged by the party in itsfounding declaration in September 1990 when it stated that it intended 'toconsolidate the religion of Allah in this country by adopting the method ofglobal transformation inspired by the thought of the Muslim Brothers'.28

This method of transformation was one that involved the spreading ofIslamic knowledge and culture through teaching and social action. As hasbeen seen, it had been practised from the late 1970s by Abdallah Djaballahand his followers and its main tenets were set out in the list of 11 objectivespublished by group in February 1990 following their official recognition asan association.29

The opening-up of Algeria's political landscape in 1988-89 presentedchallenges as well as opportunities to Algeria's Islamists. Ennahda'sdecision to launch itself as political party in 1990 obliged it to explain anddefend its agenda publicly. In its founding declaration the party set out asone of its foremost aims 'the establishment of a free and just Islamic state,which acts according to the statutes of Islam and applies its socialprinciples'.30

Democracy and Pluralism

The fact that Ennahda proclaimed itself to be an Islamist party ensured thatmost popular and media attention focused - as it had with the FIS - on thatpart of the party's agenda dealing with issues of democracy and pluralismrather than on more mundane policy questions. Like the FIS, Djaballah andthe other leaders of Ennahda were consistently quizzed on the party's stanceon these issues and, like the FIS again, they offered responses that appearedcontradictory through appearing both to endorse and to criticise the centralideas of democracy and pluralism. The party, for example, stated on oneoccasion that it was for the establishment of an Islamic state and theapplication of shari'a 'in the framework of democracy and pluralism'.31

However, Abdallah Djaballah was to state barely weeks later that theAlgerian constitution's provisions on pluralism were 'an attempt toestablish a liberal democracy in Algeria', which he saw as a 'conspiracy

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against the Islamity of the Algerian people, and an intrusion in the disguiseof secularity'.32

However, unlike the FIS - whose inconsistency was variously explainedby differences between different leaders views and a populist desire toappeal to every viewpoint - Ennahda's position on these questions wasarguably more coherent than initially appeared to be the case. A widerreading of the party's statements and texts confirms that Ennahda appearsgenuinely to back the establishment of pluralistic politics and democraticstructures in Algeria. However, it is opposed (as Djaballah's statementabove reveals on closer inspection) to some of the ideas of specificallyliberal democracy which it sees as endorsing the ideal of secularism.Ennahda is thus not opposed to differing political ideas, currents and partieswithin Algerian society, provided that they do not endorse a policy of dejure or de facto separation of religion from the state.

It is hostility to secularism that underpins virtually the entirety ofEnnahda's agenda. As has been shown, it was a shared horror at the lowlyplace accorded to religion in Algeria that prompted Djaballah and his fellowstudents to begin to organise themselves on the campuses of Constantineand other universities in the 1970s. Djaballah blamed the multiple travailsof Algerian society since independence, right through to the bloodshed ofthe 1990s, on 'the exclusion of the religious from political, social andeconomic life'." More directly, he blamed these crises on the control andinfluence on Algeria that was exercised by elements he variouslycharacterised as 'secular francophiles', 'the secular-communist current' or'the Westernised trend'.34 Djaballah also believed that as well as dominatingthe Algerian regime in the years after independence this trend also presenteditself through a number of the political parties that were legalised in 1989.He saw these parties as representing a significant challenge and danger toboth the country and the Islamist movement. He branded the newRassemblement pour la Culture et Democratic (RCD) and the re-emergedFFS as 'the agents of the West' and from the outset declared Ennahda'sintention to ban them.35 The explicit secularism of the RCD (the FFS wasmore vague on the issue) particularly raised the ire of Djaballah. In aninterview in February 1990, he declared:

This party loudly proclaimed its faithlessness in pronouncing theprinciples defended by its leaders at their last congress. This issomething foreign to Algerian society These pariahs haveexpressed their cultural and civilisational alienation.36

The antipathy Ennahda showed towards the secular opposition parties andits desire to proscribe them appeared to make a sham of its claim to supportpluralism. However, Ennahda was not opposed to pluralism in itself, only to

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those elements of the political scene that espoused secularism. AbdallahDjaballah was forthright in his support of a multi-party political system,which he viewed as likely to be more stable, more prosperous and moregenuinely popular than one dominated by a single party.37

Ennahda's appeal for pluralism seemed initially to be a reference to thedays of the exclusive dominance of Algerian political life by the FLN.However, whilst Ennahda had been as critical of the FLN's hegemony asmost of the other parties, it was discernible that it was not primarily the FLNthat was being referred to when it argued against single-party rule. It shouldbe recalled that Ennahda's launch as a political party in 1990 was not toprevent the hegemony of the FLN but rather of the FIS, which had recentlysecured over half the votes cast in the local elections of June 1990. Inadvocating pluralism, Djaballah was not so much proclaiming the concept'sinherent virtues, as using it as a bulwark against the clear intention of theFIS to monopolise the Islamist field. He therefore argued: 'Islam is one, butthe paths followed by those who are active in the Islamic field...aremultiple,...and this diversity is due to the nature of religion, human natureand to the nature of language.'38

It would be unfair to characterise Ennahda's endorsement of pluralismas purely tactical and self-interested. As indicated by Djaballah'sphilosophical defence of pluralism (even within the context of Islamism), hegenuinely believed that no one political party, even his own, shoulddominate the political scene and that most political parties were capable ofvaluable contributions. This stance was borne out by the consistentwillingness of Ennahda to co-operate and have dialogue with other parties.Not only was Ennahda enthusiastic about the establishment of an electoralalliance with other Islamist parties such as the FIS and Hamas, but keptlines of communication open to other parties including the FLN. Despite itssecular and leftist past and trends, Djaballah did not rule out dialogue withthe former ruling party because it had an Islamist wing, and in early 1991Djaballah even had discreet discussions with Abderrazak Bouhara, aleading member of the FLN.39

Ennahda's willingness to talk to and co-operate with other politicalparties was increasingly demonstrated after 1992, as Algeria's politicalcrisis became progressively more violent and bloody. The party joined withothers in protesting at the abandonment of elections and, most significantlyof all, participated in the two Rome conferences of 1994-95 and signed theresultant Rome Platform. It was notable that Djaballah signed his namealongside the names of leaders of the FFS and the Trotskyite PT.40 Asalready discussed, his willingness to do this was due in large part to hisexpressed horror at the continuing spiral of violence and a desire to end it.Ideologically, the leader of Ennahda justified his position by portraying the

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Rome Platform as a linking of the 'Islamic' and 'nationalist' (presumablyincorporating the FFS and the PT) trends in alliance against unlslamic andforeign trends.41 Evidence of Djaballah's desperate wish for a politicalsolution to Algeria's increasingly savage conflict was more explicitlyshown in his pleas for compromise and moderation as means for finding asolution to the crisis. In October 1994, for example, he issued an appealmore typical of a liberal democrat than a supposed Islamic 'fundamentalist':

In our view, to get out of the existing deadlock it is imperative on allto believe in the necessity for concessions. Clinging to the samepositions and insisting on only one alternative is not in the interest ofthe country and not in the interest of any party.42

Ennahda's increasing appeals and efforts for compromise and unity did not,however, mean that the party had softened its stance towards the ultimateenemy, secularism. Djaballah enraged Algeria's secularists in his speech tothe party's congress in October 1994 by calling for people 'to eliminate' the'secular communist' parties.43

The Issue of Violence

The country's secularist press publicly interpreted Ennahda's call to'eliminate' certain parties as an endorsement of violence. Thus Le Matincondemned the party for concentrating its efforts on attacking the country'ssecularists rather than condemning Islamist violence.44 However, despitethese accusations it was clear that Ennahda had few links with the armedgroups, whose membership consisted largely of former FIS supporters.45

The party's periodic involvement in usually fruitless discussions with theregime had even attracted the ire of the armed groups, who accusedEnnahda of collaboration and of seeking to steal the mantle of the FIS. Inthe autumn of 1993 Said Mekhloufi, a former member of the FIS majlisshura who had become a leading figure in the armed groups, issued awarning to both Abdallah Djaballah and Mahfoud Nahnah of Hamas that hewould not hesitate to kill either one of them if they tried to negotiate withthe regime in the name of the FIS.46 These appeared not to be empty threats.A number of Ennahda's activists were assassinated over time, and manymore were the recipients of death threats as an apparent result of the party'swillingness to maintain contacts with the regime and for allegedly usingIslamic taxes to fund its party congress. These killings were officiallyclaimed by members of the GIA (Groupe Islamique Arme), the mostextreme of the armed groups; but the party itself suspected that elementswithin the regime - notably Securite Militaire - were the true culprits.

Nevertheless, the leader of Ennahda did not hesitate to condemnunequivocally the murderous excesses of the GIA, whose campaign of

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violence had extended by 1994 to ordinary Algerian civilians. In July 1996he declared: 'No religion or logic can condone the actions attributed to thisorganisation. Islam has nothing to do with targeting the innocent andterrorising the peaceful.'47 Furthermore, whilst maintaining that the FIS was'an unignorable factor in the search for a solution to the crisis', Djaballahwas not afraid to identify the party's culpability in engendering the crisis.Although he placed most of the blame on Algeria's leaders sinceindependence, he observed that 'at the same time the FIS has a share in theresponsibility for the upsurge in violence'.48

Abdallah Djaballah's call for the elimination of the secularist parties didnot on balance, therefore, appear to be a call for violence.49 His rejection ofthe use of violence was repeated on many occasions and was underlined bythe hostility he encountered from those Islamists in the armed groups whocontested this view. In one speech the leader of Ennahda had declared: 'I amconvinced that the attaining and holding of political power should bethrough exclusively peaceful means. The experience of Algeria has shownthat violent means benefit no-one.'50

The Importance of Law

Rather than violence, Ennahda's preferred means of combating its secularistenemies was through the avenue of the law. This was in keeping withDjaballah's legal background. He had attacked the secular parties onideological grounds, but had consistently sought to use reference to the lawas his chief weapon against them. Ennahda argued that Algeria's secularparties were in fact illegal. It was contended that, since the constitution of1989 confirmed Islam as the religion of the state (Article 2), this meant that'from a constitutional point of view' the country's secular parties wereoutside the law." In reply, parties such as the RCD and the communist Partide I'Avant Garde Socialiste (PAGS) were easily able to point to other partsof the 1989 constitution that banned 'sectarian practice' and forbade anyparty organised 'on an exclusively confessional basis'.52

Ennahda's response to the ambiguities and apparent contradictions ofthe 1989 constitution was to call for the document to be amended. Djaballahconsequently stated: 'Once in power we would change the constitution inaccordance with the spirit of Article 2.... The other parties would havefreedom of action within the framework of this article.'33

The importance Ennahda attached to the nature of the constitution - andby extension legalism and legality - was further emphasised by itscontributions to the National Conference of September 1996 and thediscussions and negotiations that led up to it. Although the party argued thatno change should be made to the 1989 constitution before the election of anew National Assembly, once it became clear that the regime intended to

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proceed with amendments before any elections, Ennahda argued stronglyfor the retention of Article 2. Correspondingly, it also argued against anyattempt to introduce amendments that would strengthen the articles thatstood against the existence of parties based on Islam.

Ennahda's efforts to secure a place both for Islam and Islamist partieswithin Algeria's legal and political framework were not the only evidenceof the party's belief in the importance of the law. Djaballah articulated acritique of the years 1989-92 which focused on the failure of those in powerduring this period to set the dramatic political changes that were introducedin 1988-89 on a proper and defined legal footing. The leader of Ennahdadescribed the period as one of 'unchecked openness' which did not possessthe suitable protections needed to prevent the liberalising reforms fromgovernment encroachments and excesses. More specifically, he identifiedimbalances in powers between the President and the country's courts as aparticular flaw.54

Ennahda made no secret of the fact that it viewed the shari'a as theproper basis of Algeria's legal system. However, it indicated that, unlike inother countries, the all-important interpretation of this would not be theexclusive prerogative of a select few Islamist leaders who would dictate thecountry's laws to the rest of the population. In November 1994 Djaballahproclaimed on the issue of state legitimacy:

This legitimacy must be derived from God's shari'a - because we area Muslim people - and from the approval of the people, who possesspolitical authority and are the ones with the right to choose, watch,call to account and dismiss their leaders if necessary.55

The party's endorsement of the 'political authority' possessed by thepopulation was evidence of Ennahda's support for another central plank ofdemocracy: the general principle of popular sovereignty and the ability tovote out of office an incumbent government.56 In supporting the principle ofpopular sovereignty (one which some Islamists viewed as incompatiblewith the ultimate sovereignty of God), a careful distinction was madebetween politics and law:

...we acknowledge that Muslim political thought separated, on theone hand, political powers, which originate from the community, andon the other hand, the general legal system which originates from thelaw of God.57

Society and Culture

In common with many Islamist movements, Ennahda attached particularimportance to social and cultural issues. At the core of its ideology was a

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belief in the need to reform Algerian society through the dissemination ofproper Islamic doctrine and social practices. Traditionally these goals hadbeen achieved through preaching and teaching and adopting a 'grass roots'approach to change. However, the possibility of exercising political poweropened up the prospect of embracing a 'top down' approach. Ennahdaindicated that it would seek to introduce a number of social and culturalmeasures should it ever exercise power.

With regard to the controversial role of women in Algerian society,Ennahda stated that the veil would be reintroduced as required dress forwomen.58 More generally, the party supported the existing Family Code,first introduced in 1984 and criticised by some for the place and restrictedrights it accorded women in relation to marriage, divorce and work. Whenthe question of the Code's reform was raised in early 1997, Ennahdainstructed the women's branch of the party to campaign for its retention inits existing form. Djaballah characterised proposed liberalising amendmentsto the Code as 'contradicting religious precepts...and the civilisational andcultural heritage of the Algerian nation'. A more conciliatory tone, however,was sounded by one of the members of the party's majlis shura, who -underlining the party's commitment to pluralism and democracy - stated:

The majority of the Family Code is drawn from our culture, but thereare some women's organisations which have reacted against this. Ifthere is to be a change, it should not be decided by just one group orparty but should come through debate and the choice of the people.No one party has the right to impose any code on the Algerianpeople.59

On the issue of language, the party called for Arabic to be the nationallanguage and that it be recognised 'as the official language of education andadministration' .60 On the status of the Kabyle Berber language, Tamazigh,Abdallah Djaballah stated that he was not opposed to its use as long as it didnot surpass the level of a regional dialect and attempt to become a nationallanguage.61 In common with other Islamist parties, Ennahda also favouredreplacing French with English as Algeria's second language. The statedreason for this was the English language's pre-eminent international status,62

but the close association of leftist and secular trends with French languageand culture provided a more powerful explanation.

Ennahda also believed that there should be parameters set on artistic andjournalistic freedom. Djaballah stated explicitly that art and culture shouldconform to Islamic norms.63 His view that press freedom had allowedopponents to 'distort the image of the Islamist movement' suggested thatEnnahda would favour curbs on the secularist media.64

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Foreign Affairs and the Economy

Ennahda's focus on political, cultural and social issues led many of itssecularist enemies to allege that the party had no real agenda or policies toaddress Algeria's more immediate concerns in the fields of economics andforeign affairs - beyond vague populist and idealistic pronouncements. Oninternational affairs Ennahda's position was in line with most other Islamistgroups. It advocated support for all 'just causes', particularly those in theMuslim world, and endorsed 'projects of Arab and Islamic unity'.65 On thespecific subject of the Gulf War of 1990-91, Abdallah Djaballahcondemned the conflict as a 'world-wide conspiracy' which aimed to'plunder the wealth of Muslims' and sought 'the protection and military re-enforcement of Israel'.66 As regards Israel, Djaballah contended that theJewish state aimed ultimately to extend itself 'from the Euphrates to theNile'.67 He also claimed that certain elements in the West aimed to disruptAlgeria's national unity and to distort the message of the Islamic revival, butcalled for a 'constructive dialogue' with the West which would recognisemutual differences.68

Ennahda's position on economic policy was more remarkable. This waschiefly because of clear differences between its stance and that held by itsIslamist counterparts in the FIS. Although both parties' economic agendaswere short on detail, the endorsement of liberal economics and the Algeriangovernment's economic reform programme by the FIS contrasted sharplywith the open hostility which Ennahda displayed towards these features.Djaballah condemned the government's reforms for 'opening the nationalmarket to domestic and foreign wolves and demonstrating thedisengagement of the state from the concerns of large sections of thepopulation' .69 The growing involvement of the International Monetary Fundin the Algerian economy was similarly lambasted, Djaballah claiming thatthe Fund's objective was to destabilise Algeria's institutions and make thecountry totally dependent on it.70 While the FIS trumpeted the virtues of amarket economy, Djaballah was anxious to emphasise the values of a mixedeconomy where both private and public sector would play a part. In this wayEnnahda encouraged 'the public ownership of wealth and of strategicindustries' as well as 'a spirit of initiative and the private sector which willbe in the general interest'.71 Away from the issue of economic ownership,Ennahda reverted to standard Islamist rhetoric and stances on economicissues. During debates organised by the government in the summer of 1996as part of the dialogue process, Ennahda restated its belief that the economyshould be based on the shari'a and that interest and existing taxes should beabolished. Djaballah also proposed that external exchanges with otherMuslim and Arab countries should be promoted.72

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In summation, Ennahda suffered the same problem of pious andimprecise generalities that characterised so many other Islamist parties'platforms and agendas. However, in important contrast to the FIS, Ennahdafor its part was far more genuine in both the policies it did put forward andin its attempt to add substance to its programme. It did not indulge in theambiguous double-talk that the FIS's leaders were so prone to in the lead-up to elections - promising all things to all men in the hope of maximisingits support. As one Algerian journalist observed of Abdallah Djaballah:'The discourse of the leader of Ennahda is more moralistic than strategic.'73

The generality and lack of detail in Ennahda's agenda was something ofwhich the party's leadership was aware. Djaballah dismissed as 'lyingpropaganda'74 accusations that the party had no properly worked-outprogramme, but was prepared to admit that these criticisms were notwithout foundation and that more thought and work needed to be put intothe contents of an Islamist agenda. In a startlingly candid admission to theparty congress in 1994, the leader of Ennahda stated:

All the contributions of our ulemas, our scholars, concern the differenttheses allowing access to power. No-one proposes solutions toeconomic, social, cultural and political crises.... On this precise point,the secular-communists have reason to criticise us. It is moreimperative to train and educate our children on these questions.75

Although speaking of the wider Islamist movement as well as of Ennahdaitself, Djaballah expressed his wish to see specialist committees on policyissues established by the party over the coming years.

Party Organisation

The absence of Ennahda specialist bodies was indicative of the still looselyorganised nature of the party. The congress of October 1994 saw the firstmoves towards internal democratisation within the party through theestablishment of a 45-member majlis shura and an 11-strong nationalexecutive. The size of the majlis shura was subsequently expanded toinclude a total of 150 members. The exact size of the wider membership ofEnnahda was more difficult to judge, particularly after 1992 when officialpressures and harassment of the party deterred supporters from joining theparty and made those already members reluctant to publicise theiraffiliation.

The establishment of formal structures within the party helpeddemarcate the distribution of power within the organisation. From itsbeginnings in the 1970s, Abdallah Djaballah had been the pre-eminentfigure within the movement and the departure of many of the other seniorfigures in the late 1980s had served to strengthen his dominance. The

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creation of a majlis shura for Ennahda in 1994 widened the base of theparty's decision-making and did, as Djaballah had promised, bring greaterinternal democracy to the party. The majlis proved willing to disagree withDjaballah on certain issues and capable of overruling him on matters ofpolicy. The debate within the party over its official position towards thereferendum on the amendments to the constitution in November 1996 sawDjaballah's belief in the need to call for a 'no' vote counterbalanced by themajlis's view that a simple non-endorsement of the amendments wassufficient. The resultant compromise - which saw the party issuing differingcalls to its militants and the wider public - illustrated the power of theparty's new structures vis a vis the leader. As one of the other senior figuresin the party, Kamel Laroussi, pointed out: 'The positions taken by thepresident are not necessarily those of the movement. On the big politicalquestions, only the bureau of the majlis is entitled to pronounce uponthem.'76

Conclusion

The Ennahda Party provides an instructive example of the dilemmas andissues facing many contemporary Islamist movements. The history of themovement illustrates the metamorphic pressures it has experienced as it hasmade the transition from clandestine activity through to open participationin official political processes. The first decade and a half of its existence sawthe movement concentrating on the tasks of grass-roots preaching andteaching. The dramatic events of 1988-90 then forced the movement -largely against its primary instincts - to transform itself into a formalpolitical party.

The first year of Ennahda's political existence witnessed the partyarticulating its agenda and interests in the full glare of media and generalpublicity. The pressures that this put on the new party were mild incomparison to those exerted by the Algerian regime and its allies followingthe suspension of the electoral process in early 1992. Official harassmentand the fear of dissolution forced the party progressively to trim itsprincipled stand against the government and become increasingly involvedin the regime's attempts to re-establish legitimacy for itself. The party troda narrow and difficult path in trying to remain critical of the governmentwhilst retaining its place in the legal political arena.

Ennahda also came under pressure on another, rather different, front.Aware of the need to construct as broad as possible a front against theAlgerian regime, the party felt obliged to re-examine and reshape its agendain order to win support and establish alliances with other forces. The mostnoteworthy instance of this was the party's involvement in the 1995 Rome

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Platform, to which the party put its name alongside those of parties to whichit had long been hostile. Similarly, from 1994 Ennahda appeared to embarkon a concerted campaign, both inside and particularly outside Algeria, topromote its vision of how Algeria's ongoing crisis could be resolved. Aspart of this campaign, Abdallah Djaballah, as its spearhead, was obliged toexplain and defend his own party's wider platform and ideology. In sodoing, the party appeared to shift the ideological emphasis of its messageaway from its originally stated priorities concerning social and culturalissues and its abiding enmity towards Algeria's secularists, and towards newissues. Democracy and pluralism became the terms featured most heavily inthe party's speeches and literature. To what extent this change represented agenuine change in the party's agenda, or was simply a shift in emphasis forreasons of public relations, is difficult to judge. It was notable, however, thatDjaballah in particular went to significant lengths to expound the religiousand philosophical basis of the party's newly-emphasised beliefs. Onoccasion, leaders of Ennahda went so far as largely to contradict statementsand positions of the early period of the party's lifetime.77

Overall, Ennahda is typical of many Islamist parties that have had toreorder their priorities and to reorientate their agenda with changingpolitical circumstances. The case of Ennahda is unusual in that it has neverbeen subject to the kind of mass internal pressures from its supportersexperienced by many other Islamist parties (most notably the FIS), whichhave pushed ideologies and platforms towards populist generalities. In fact,the huge presence of the FIS on the Algerian political scene saved AbdallahDjaballah's movement from these pressures, which gravitated towards theFIS. Ennahda has thus been able to continue to formulate and articulate itsviews and agenda in a remarkably sober and thorough fashion - albeit oftenunder intense external scrutiny. Although changes in content and emphasishave occurred, the party's commitment to the virtues of legality, competitivemulti-partyism, popular political sovereignty and non-violence haveremained consistently clear. In this respect, it is possible that Ennahda hasmarked out a course that other Islamist parties may eventually follow.

Since this article has been written, the an-Nahnah party has been split by disagreement within themajlis ash shura over who to support in the April 1999 presidential campaign. Against theleader's wishes, the majlis supported the army-backed Abdelaziz Bouteflika for the presidency.

NOTES

1. Author's interview with Abdallah Djaballah, London, 7 October 1994.2. Ibid.3. The seizure of the Grand Mosque in Mecca took place in November 1979 and lasted for

nearly two weeks before being crushed by the Saudi authorities. Although led by a Saudi,

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Juhaiman al-Utaiba, the seizure had included many non-Saudis amongst its militantlyIslamist supporters and participants.

4. Interview with Rabah Kebir, FCO unclassified document.5. Ibid.6. Although the Islamic Group had continued to fail to establish a national framework for itself -

whilst becoming very influential in Eastern Algeria - a specific aim of the Islamic Group had beento establish an organisational framework comprised of cells responsible to a provincial leader.

7. Djaballah's group had become officially public in 1987 following the regime's authorisationof non-political organisations. In the increasingly open political atmosphere following theevents of October 1988, the group formally named itself the Ennahda Association for Socialand Cultural Reform. Emad Eldin Shahin, Political Ascent: Contemporary IslamicMovements in North Africa ( Boulder CO: Westview 1997) p.124.

8. Author's interview with Rabah Kebir, 27 September 1995.9. It was estimated by Rabah Kebir that approximately 80 per cent of the leadership of the

Islamic Group of the 1980s subsequently joined the FIS. Interview with Rabah Kebir, FCOunclassified document.

10. Two years later, at the height of the general strike organised by the FIS in mid-1991, Ennahdawent so far as to argue in one of its press releases that: 'In the ranks of some of [the] Islamicorganisations are men who do not know Islam and do not follow it.' Bayan 2, 1 Juin 1991(Announcement 2, 2 June 1991).

11. El Moudjahid 19 October 1990, quoted in Jean-Jacques Lavenue, Algerie: La DemocratieInterdite (Paris: L'Harmattan 1992) p.73.

12. Le Matin 8 September 1994. An alternative account explaining why Ennahda and FIS failedto integrate comes from a member of the FIS majlis shura during this period. He argues thatEnnahda's attempts to enter the FIS were in fact blocked by certain members of the FISmajlis shura - significantly, many of those who themselves had previously been members ofDjaballah's association. The reason for their hostility to Ennahda's entry was linked to thealleged ease with which Djaballah revealed information to the security services whenarrested and interrogated during the 1980s. Author's interview with member of the FISmajlis shura in 1989-91, London, 29 June 1997.

13. Algerie Actualite 30 May 1991. The poll also confirmed that Ennahda's base of support wasoverwhelmingly located in the east of the country (over 85 per cent of it) and that the partyregistered no support at all in the south and west. It also indicated that the party's supportwas stronger in rural than in urban areas.

14. These two candidates had stood in Khenchla and Tebessa. They were due to stand,respectively, against candidates from the FIS and the FLN in the planned second round.

15. Author's interview with Abdallah Djaballah, London, 7 October 1994.16. Abdallah Djaballah was later to comment: 'The government entered into national dialogue

to gain international legitimacy and to gain time.' Speech by Abdallah Djaballah on "TheFuture of the Maghrib', London, 6 October 1994.

17. Le Matin 8 September 1994.18. Liberte 22 November 1994.19. Speech by Abdallah Djaballah to Society for Algerian Studies, School of Oriental and

African Studies (SOAS), London, 1 April 1996.20. Ibid.21. El Watan 15 September 1996.22. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, El Hourria 22 July 1996 reproduced in BBC Summary

of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/2688 MED/22 12 August 1996.23. Ennahda stressed, however, that its call to vote against the proposed changes to the

constitution did not extend beyond the party - it gave no direction to the wider Algerianpopulation. This official position of 'non-endorsement' was formulated by the party's majlisshura in an attempt to placate the regime. It did not, however, have the backing of Djaballahhimself who wanted to see the party unambiguously reject the constitutional changes.

24. Ennahda also argued that from a legal point of view only an elected National Assembly wasentitled to this power and thus elections to one must precede any referendum. Djaballahmaintained that this sequence - as dictated by constitution of 1989 - would increase public

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ALGERIA'S OTHER ISLAMISTS 6 9

respect for legal and constitutional processes. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, El Hourria22 July 1996 (note 22).

25. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, Al Hayat 8 July 1996 reproduced in BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts (SWB) ME/2661 MED/22 11 July 1996.

26. El Watan 1/2 November 1996.27. The official results of the election to the National Assembly recorded a total vote of 915,446

(8.7 per cent of the total vote) for Ennahda, resulting in the election of 34 of the party'scandidates to the Assembly. At the elections to the communal APC and regional APWcouncils, the party had officially secured 404,566 (2.6 per cent - 290 seats) and 744,730 (7.5per cent— 128 seats) votes respectively.

28. 'Le Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique: un nouveau parti politique.' Declaration. En-NahdaSeptember 1990 reproduced in M. Al-Ahnaf; Bernard Botiveau and Franck Fregosi,LAlgerie par ses Islamistes (Paris: Karthala 1991) p.57.

29. For the full list see En-Nahda, February 1990, reproduced in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau and Fregosi(note 28) pp.52-3.

30. 'Le Mouvement'. (note 28).31. Abderrahim Lamchichi, L'Islamisme en Algerie (Paris: L'Harmattan 1992) p.107.32. Al- Salaam 15 September 1990 quoted by Bouthenia Cheriet: 'Islamism and Feminism:

Algeria's "Rites of Passage" to Democracy' in John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor, Stateand Society in Algeria (Boulder: Westview 1992) p.202.

33. Le Matin 8 September 1994.34. Le Matin 8 September 1994; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/2165 MED 12-

19, 27 November 1994.35. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, En-Nahda February 1990, reproduced in Al-Ahnaf,

Botiveau and Fregosi (note 28) pp.53-4.36. Ibid.37. See En-Nahda September 1990 reproduced in Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau and Fregosi (note 28)

p.56.38. Abdallah Djaballah at press conference, En-Nahda September 1990 reproduced in Al-Ahnaf,

Botiveau and Fre'gosi (note 28) p.55.39. Lavenue (note 11) p.73.40. Significance was attached to Ennahda's endorsement of the Rome Platform which advocated

all of the main tenets of liberal democracy for Algeria. However, it was rumoured that anumber of the other political parties involved in drawing up the document had had initialreservations about the party's participation. When it came to the actual negotiationssurrounding concerning the content of the eventual platform, it was said that Ennahda'srepresentatives were particularly resistant to some of the articles concerning human rights.

41. Djaballah described the Rome Platform as a 'National-Islamic alliance'. Speech by AbdallahDjaballah to Society for Algerian Studies, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),London, 1 April 1996.

42. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/2140 MED/11 31 October 1994.43. Le Matin 11 September 199444. Ibid.45. One member of Ennahda, Ali Kennouche, a candidate for the party in Skikda in the 1991

elections, was tried and convicted by the authorities in 1993 for having attempted to set upan armed group with the assistance of dissident members of the armed forces. Abed Charef,Algerie: Le Grand Derapage (France: Editions de l'Aube 1994) p.416. There were alsomembers of the armed groups who had once been members of Djaballah's earlierorganisations in the 1970s and 1980s. Foremost amongst these was Madani Merzak who roseto become commander of the Arme'e Islamique du Salut (AIS) - the armed wing of the FIS- in 1995.

46. El Watan 22 November 1993.47. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, Al Hayat 8 July 1996 (note 25).48. Le Matin 8 September 1994.49. Le Matin did concede that Ennahda did not explicitly endorse violence — but argued that this

was only because it did not have the power to use it for itself. Le Matin 11 September 1994.

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50. Speech by Abdallah Djaballah, London, 1 April 1996 (note 19).51. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, L'Observateur 29 May 1991 reproduced in Maghreb-

Machrek (No.133 Juillet-Septembre 1991) p.116.52. Article 5, Loi no. 89-11 du Juillet 1989. Relative aux Associations a Caractere Politique.

Reproduced in Maghreb-Machrek (No. 127, January-March 1990) pp.200-205.53. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, L'Observateur 29 May 1991 (note 51). In the period

1990-92 Ennahda had indicated that the constitution was the only obstacle to theestablishment of an Islamic state.

54. Speech by Abdallah Djaballah, London, 1 April 1996 (note 19).55. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB) ME/2165 MED 12-19, 27 November 1994.56. This position restated similar pronouncements Djaballah had made. In October 1994 he

declared: 'Legitimacy is based on two factors. First, government should be committed toIslam and should be dependent and have all its programmes based on Islam. Second, thepeople should be satisfied with the government. We believe the people have the right tochoose their rulers and have the right to dismiss them when they believe they have failedthem.' Speech by Abdallah Djaballah on "The Future of the Maghrib', London, 6 October1994.

57. Abdallah Djaballah, Conception Islamique de la Theorie de L'Etat± (Conference donnee al'Universite Libre devant les etudiants en etudes superieures section de droit, Madrid, 31May 1995) p.22.

58. Lamchichi(note31)p.l07.59. Author's interview with Sadouki Mahfoud, member of the Majlis Shura of Ennahda,

London, 7 June 1997.60. Harakat al-Nahda al-Islamyah. Al Mu 'atavnar al Ta 'sisi. Nadi al-Sanubarr, 7-9 Septembre

1994. Al-Kilima al-Iftitahiyyah Li R'ais Al Harakah (Islamic Ennahda Movement. FoundingCongress. Club de Pins, 7-9 September 1994. Introductory Speech of the President of theMovement).

61. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, En-Nahda February 1990 (note 35) Ennahda's stance onthis issue once again set it against Algeria's secular parties most of which strongly backedthe recognition of Tamazigh as a national language alongside Arabic. The most activeproponent of this demand was the strongly Kabyle RCD. Djaballah expressed his angeragainst the RCD's propensity to speak in the name of the Kabyles, arguing that historicallythis section of Algeria's population had been renown for 'their zeal for Islam'.

62. Author's interview with Sadouki Mahfoud, London, 7 June 1997.63. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, L'Observateur 29 May 1991 (note 51).64. Interview with Abdallah Djaballah, En-Nahda February 1990 (note 35).65. 'Le Mouvement de la Nahda Islamique: un nouveau parti politique.' Declaration. En-Nahda

September 1990 (note 28).66. Al-Ahnaf, Botiveau and Fregosi (note 28) p.44.67. Nada lil-Sh'ab al-Jaza'iri al-muslim al-mujahid wa-lil-ummah al-muslimah fi kull makan.

Bayan I, 24 Janvier 1991. ('A Call to the Algerian Muslim Mujahid and the Muslim UmmaEverywhere.' Announcement 1, 24 January 1991).

68. Address of Abdallah Djaballah to Conference entitled Securite et Stabilite dans la MerMediterrane, Cyprus, 1 July 1995.

69. Lavenue (note 11) p.73.70. El Watan 1/2 November 1996.71. Lavenue (note 11) p.73.72. El Watan 30 September 1996.73. Ibid.74. Le Matin 11 September 1994.75. Le Matin 8 September 1994.76. El Watan 18 November 1996.77. For example, one member of Ennahda's majlis shura stated that the party would be happy to

accept the election of a government led by the RCD in Algeria - a statement in markedcontrast to the animosity of pronouncements made during the period 1990-91. Author'sinterview with Sadouki Mahfoud, London, 7 June 1997.

Algeria's other Islamists: Abdallah Djaballah and the Ennahda movement

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