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GHADARMOVEMENT

IDEOLOGY ORGANISATION

& STRATEGY

HARISH K. PURI

GURU NANAK DEV UNIVERSITY PRESS

HARISH K. PURI 1983

Price : Rs. 80/-

Published by S. Jagjit Singh Khanna, Registrar, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar and printed by S. Jagjit Singh Walia, Manager, Guru Nanak Dev University Press, Amritsar-143005 (Phone 33911)

To

My Parents

CONTENTS

Acknowledgments iIntroduction 1

1. THE BACKGROUND 11The Social Context of Emigration 11The Immigrants and the New World 20Exclusion of Indian Immigrants :Interests of the Empire -27Beginning of Political Consciousness 38

2. THE GHADAR MOVEMENT 1913-18 :A BRIEF HISTORY 54

Formation of Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast 54Propaganda War 57The Cruise or Komagata Maru 7®Rebellion 1915 : Bang and Whimper 31In the German Band-Wagon 38End of the Ghadar Phase 93

3. IDEOLOGY OF THE MOVEMENT 104Har Dayal and His IdeologicalFormulations 104Translation of Ideas into theMother Tongue 116

4. ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 126

5. STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 146Jiwen Dao Lagge Tiwen La Laiyey 146Wartime Activities Outside India 168

6. CONCLUSION 178

BIBLIOGRAPHY 185

INDEX 214

Facsimiles of G kadar and Hindustan Ghadar 7C9

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

My interest in the Ghadar Movement was aroused in 1968 during long meetings with Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna, an important 'organic' leader of the movement and one who, even at the age of 98, exuded the spirit of revolution and idealism. The present work started as a study for Ph.D. during 1972-75 at the Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar. Professor J.S. Bains of University of Delhi guided me and supervised the study. Professor K. R. Bombwall of Guru Nanak Dev University helped me at that stage. I am grateful to them. To Professor J.S. Grewal, I am obliged for providing, during many informal discussions, valuable insights for the understanding of historical reality. Detailed observations and suggestions on the dissertation by Mark Juergensmeyer were very helpful in the preparation of the manuscript for publication. I am also indebted to Randhir Singh, Manoranjan Mohanty, Bipan Chandra, Partha Chatterjee and Indu Banga for reading the dissertation and making valuable comments.

I take this opportunity to express my thanks to the staff's of the National Archives of India, New Delhi; Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi; Hardinge (now Har Dayal) Public Library, Delhi; Punjab State Archives, Patiala, Desh Bhagat Yadgar Library, Jalandhar, Sikh History Research Centre, Khalsa College, Amritsar; Motilal Nehru Library, Amritsar and the Library of Guru Nanak Dev University.

In 1979, an invitation from the Centre for South and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, Berkeley provided me an added opportunity to consult records at various libraries abroad. I am thankful to Juergensmeyer and Kanneth Logan, for

permitting me to go through the unclassified collection for Ghadar History Project and Jane Singh for assistance, at the University of California Library. Dan Neeland of the Federal Archives and Records Centre, San Bruno, California, was particularly helpful in making available to me records of the ‘Hindu-German Conspi­racy’ trial both at the Centre and at the District Court in San Francisco and also in getting valuable material xeroxed at short notice. Some of the tracts published by the Ghadar Press which were not available in India were located at the Ghadar Memorial in San Francisco.

Thanks to a reference by Emily Brown, I was able to locate complete files of G hadar W eekly both in Urdu and Gurmukhi, which is now a rare possession with me on microfilm. Access to old newspapers published from Vancouver and Victoria was available at University of British Columbia Library, Vancouver. The staff of India Office Library and Public Record Office in London provided generous help in getting select documents xeroxed within a very short time at my disposal there. I owe a debt of gratitude to all of them.

My thanks also go to the University Grants Commission for a grant for the purchase of books for the pursuit of work for Ph. D. and to the Indian Council of Historical Research for a contingency and travel grant for the preparation of the present book.

To Ghadarite Babas, I owe a special debt for sitting through hours of often tiring interviews. Their recollections in expressive tones, animated and nostalgic, in some cases blurred and even distorted by age and personal preferences, are on tape.

My father has been a great source of inspiration to me in the completion of this work. Noteworthy is also my obligation to Ram Singh, Hew McLeod, John W ebster, Harsharan Singh, Gumam Singh Rahi, Joginder Singh Rahi and Harsaran Singh Dhillon, from discussions with whom I have b en efited greatly, and to M. S. Dhami, B. S. Hira, Pritam Sidhu and many of other friends and colleagues in my department for encouragement and various kinds of help. I am also thankful to the authorities of Guru Nanak Dev University for accepting this book for

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publication and to J. S. Walia, the Manager of University Press, for his keen supervision of its publication.

Finally, I can at best only record here my gratitude to my wife Vijay who has helped me and supported me in more ways than I could count.

Harish K PuriAmritsar 15 January, 1983.

INTRODUCTION

The Ghadar movement, despite its brief duration, played a significant role in India's struggle for independence. Though it is yet to find its due recognition in the historiography of Indian nationalism, it cannot be said to have remained ‘an unwritten chapter’.of that struggle. More than a dozen published accounts of the movement are already available;1 some of its major landmarks and characteristics have been briefly covered in a number of biographies and autobiographies* and several

1 Randhir Singh's Ghadar H eroes : A Forgotten Story o f the Punjab Revolu­tionaries o f 1914-15 (Bombay : People's Publishing House, 1945). an excellent popular account, based mainly on the author's interviews with a few Ghadar leaders was the only available work until the interest of the serious researchers in the subject began over two decades later. Meanwhile two studies were published in Punjabi: Jagjit Singh's Ghadar Party Lehar (Tarn Taran, 1955) and Ghadar Party da Itihas (Jullundur : Desh Bhagat Yadgar Committee, 1961) by Gurcharan Singh Sainsara ef. al. The second one was, in effect, an official account, sponsored and published by Desh Bhagat group of former Ghadarites. A number of research studies have been published since the mid sixties, for instance, Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, Ghadar 1915 : India's First A rm ed Revolution (New Delhi: R & K Publishing House, 1966); Gurdev Singh Deol, The Role o f the Ghadar Party in the National Movement (Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1969); Kalyan Kumar Bannerjee, Indian Freedom M ovem ent: Revolutionaries in America (Calcutta : Jijanasa, 1969); L. P. Mathur, Indian Revolutionary Movement in the United States o f Am erica (Delhi : S. Chand & Co., 1970); A.C. Bose, Indian Revolutionaries A broad 1905-1922 (Patna : Bharati Bhawan, 1971); Sohan Singh Josh, Hindustan Ghadar Party : A Short History (New Delhi : PPH, 1977); and Anil Baran Ganguli, Ghadar Revolution in Am erica (D elhi: Metropolitan Book Co., 1980).

2 Prominent among these are : Bhai Parmanand, The Story ot My Life, trans., N. Sundra Iyer and Lai Chand (Lahore : The Central Hindu Yuvak Sabha, 1934); Shachindra Nath Sanyal, Bandi Jeew an, (Hindi) (Delhi: Atma Ram & Sons, 1963); Sohan Singh Bhakna, Jeevan Sangram (Punjabi) (Jullundur :

2 GHADAR MOVEMENT

other books relating to India’s freedom struggle.3 Why then a new book on this movement, and what is its relevance to us today ? An explanation may be necessary. That may also help in clarifying the themes chosen for the present study.

The Ghadar movement which was launched in USA in the year 1913 was inspired in its objectives and framework of ideas by the dominant ideological thinking (including its contradic­tions) that prevailed among the Indian revolutionary nationalists during the period 1905-1920. A small number of these educated revolutionaries played a significant role both in the evolution of the movement and the direction given to it. Most prominent among them was Lala Har Dayal who had resigned a prestigious government scholarship for study at Oxford to dedicate himself completely to the nationalist cause. Among the very large number of those who joined that movement, over ninety-five per cent were Punjabi immigrants, mostly Sikhs, who worked on the Pacific Coast of North America as unskilled labourers, farm workers, owner farmers and contractors. Their real life experiences in North America and their early organised community activity made it possible for the revolutionary nationalist propaganda to effectively link the existing oppress­ions of these people with their oppressions at home. That underlined the fact that India's interests and those of the British

Yuvak Kendar Parkashan. 1967); Dharmavira, Lala Har Dayal and Revolu­tionary Movement o f His T im es (New D elhi: Indian Book Co.. 1970); Emily

C. Brown, Har D ayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist (Tucson : The University of Arizona Press,. 1975); Prithvi Singh, Kranti Path Ka Pathik (Hindi) (Chandigarh ; Pragya Prakashan, 1964); Sohan Singh Josh, Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna : L ife o f the Founder o f the G hadar Party (New D elhi; PPH, 1970); Bhai Sahib Randhir Singh Autobiography, trans., Trilochan Singh (Ludhiana : Bhai Sahib Randhir Singh Publishing House, 1971); Jaswant Singh Jas, Baba V/asakha Singh (Punjabi) (Jullundur ; New Book Co., 1979); V.S. Suri, A Brief Biographical Sketch o f Sohan Lai Pathak (Patiala : Punjabi University, 1968); Bhupendra Nath Datta, Aprakashit Rajnitik Itihas (Bengali) (Calcutta : Nav Bharat Publishers, 1953).

3 For instance, R.C. Majumdar, History o f the F reed om M ovement in India, Vol. II (Calcutta : K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, 1963); A.C. Guha, First Spark o f Revolution (New Delhi : Orient Longman, 1971); Balshastri Hardas, A rm ed Struggle For Freedom : Ninety Years War o f Indepen dence, 1857 to Subhash, trans., S.S. Apte (Poona : Kal Prakashan, 1958); Suprakash Roy, Bharter Vaiplavik Sangram er Itihas (Bengali) (Calcutta : DNBA Brothers, 1970); Satya M. Rai, Punjabi H eroic Tradition 1900-1947 (Patiala : Punjabi University, 1978).

INTRODUCTION 3

empire were not reconcilable. There was only one answer : Ghadar i.e., violent revolutionary change; no half measures. It were the Punjabi immigrants who came forward mostly; and they contributed funds. The movement was practically theirs. But for them, there may have been no Ghadar movement. The character of this mass movement for revolutionary change was determined by a close relationship of the two broadly different elements.

As the restless Punjabis started demanding 'more than exhortation to prepare for revolution at some indeterminate future time', and as the chief leader Har Dayal left the scene, Punjabi leaders took command of the movement. The student revolutionaries, wary of what they described as 'illiterate' and 'impulsive Sikhs', stepped back. When the First Great War broke out the two followed broadly different courses. The Punjabi immigrants rallied thousands of fellow enthusiasts and returned to India to launch an impossible revolution and setting such examples of legendary heroism and sacrifice as became a perennial source of inspiration to later generations of revolu­tionary youth in the Punjab. The student revolutionaries joined the German financed and directed Berlin India Committee in what seemed a 'common cause of India and Germany’. The collaboration of the small Ghadar establishment in California with that Committee and with German Government compromised the movement's character, and indirectly contributed to infight­ing and eventual break up.

What we witness in the available accounts of the movement— both at popular and academic levels—is a prominently selective search for facts in the reconstruction of its history which almost neatly divides these accounts into two categories. In one category fall those accounts in which the approach being elitist and focus mainly on Indian revolutionary intellectuals abroad, the Ghadar movement is presented as founded, controlled and directed by the 'traditional intellectuals’ who won over ihat •wonderful human material’—the illiterate Punjabi labourers— as a part of their fabled international schemes.4 Thus the role and activities of the vast mass of Punjabi Ghadarites remained either subsidiary or ignored.

4 For instance, works of A.C. Bose, K.K. Bannerjee, R.C. Majumdar,Bhupendranath Dutt, A.B. Ganguli, listed above.

4 GHADAR MOVEMENT

All of these accounts, following the trails of these student revolutionaries, manifest a misplaced emphasis on the share of the Ghadarites in the 'Hindu-German Conspiracy’. Part of the reason for that may lie in Government of India's obsession with Ghadar’s German connection and documentation of all activities of Indian revolutionaries abroad under Ghadar activity. Scholars found abundant material in the proceedings of Home Department’s Political Branch and in the records of that conspiracy trial. It may be incidental that most works in this category were written by scholars from Bengal and the latest work on Ghadar movement made it largely a Bengali enterprise.5

In the second, category fall those works in which the focus is centred on the masses in the movement and the writers, incidently, all Punjabis.6 Khushwant Singh presented it more sharply as a movement of the Pacific Coast Sikhs which emerged out of the struggles waged by Khalsa Diwan leader­ship with Gurdwaras as storm centres of political activity and which took shape when they were persuaded to lend their ear to radical counsel of Har Dayal. According to him, since the immigrants needed to deal with lawyers and government departments they required spokesmen like Har Dayal who could speak English, and that led to a 'dual leadership’. ‘Friction between Hindu intelligentsia and Sikh workers was inevitable’, because, 'The Sikhs looked down upon the Hindus as English speaking babus who did not have a courage of their convictions. The Hindus treated the Sikhs with the contempt with which lawyers generally treat their rustic clientele’ from whom they drew money.7 Fitting the things in convenient populist mould of a community’s self-image precluded the raising of a whole set of questions, let alone seeking explanation to the Ghadar movement’s point of departure from the archetype of contem­porary socio-political movements in the community. The question, for example, as to what it was which marked the Ghadarites out as conspicuously different from the Punjabis in

5 Ganguli, op. cit.6 These include, for example, the works by Khushwant Singh and Satindra

Singh, Jagjit Singh, Sainsara, Josh and Satya M. Rai.7 Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, op. cif., p. 17; See also Khushwan

Singh, A History o f the Sikhs, Vol. II (Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 17S-76.

INTRODUCTION 5

the Punjab and led the Sikh community organisations to regard them as dangerously anti-Sikh and thus give to the British Government all assistance to suppress it, remained unasked.

A very notable aspect of these accounts of the movement is a marked fascination for heroic deeds and sacrifices, thus presenting it as yet another evidence of ‘Punjabi heroic tradition'. Leaving aside the role played by the Punjab during the First War period as the sword-arm of the Empire, this approach has precluded analysis of the movement’s ideology, organisation and strategy for revolution. So that when it came to explaining why it failed, practically all such accounts turned to a conventional answer: Mukhbar maar gaya (the spy wrecked it).

There are several issues which are crucial to the under­standing of this movement and its place in the development of Indian nationalism. These relate to its goal-culture, i.e., the nature of the desired revolutionary change, the relevance or irrelevance of religion in political violence, the nature of designed or stipulated organisation and strategy chalked out for revolution. During the period when this movement was launched and gained momentum all these issues had come to be raised and more or less seriously debated among the Indian revolutionary nationalists. Sumit Sarkar, in his discussion of the trends during the Swadeshi Movement (1903-1908) in Bengal, vividly points to those controversies. In an age of orthodox and revivalist Hinduism when the influence of religion and spiri­tualism among the revolutionaries in Bengal had reached its apex under Aurobindo Ghose and Sister Nivedita, there existed •a dissident, secular and even anti-religious trend' led by Hem Chandra Kanungo and there were debates within revolutionary circles about the role of religion.8 Another major debate in the secret societies of Bengal centred on methods of achieving freedom. The Indian revolutionaries abroad had started emphasising the need for secular politics for purpose of unity among India’s major religious communities. The ideal pre­sented to them by Italian Risorgimento was of maximum unity among all kinds of nationalists. On the other hand, individual terrorism as a principal method of revolutionary activity was

8 Sumit Sarkar. The Sw adeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908 (New Delhi:PPH. 1973), pp. 484-90,

6 GHADAR MOVEMENT

being seriously questioned and other alternatives of organised mass revolution such as military coup d' etat, backed by foreign powers were discussed. Yet the issues remained unresolved.

All these diverse trends were reflected within the ideological holdall of Ghadar revolutionaries. However, where­as to these revolutionary nationalists in India and abroad such ideas worked in the orbit of elite action, the Ghadar movement became, more or less, a mass movement in which the elite was partially able to bridge the gap between the petite bourgeois revolutionaries and the masses from a peasant stock. This was therefore a new kind of revolutionary movement. Such a movement was a dream of revolutionary nationalists, but was never possible in India. An indepth study of this movement which presented new features, new possibilities and hitherto unforeseen problems becomes significant.

Its study as an instance of political violence and revolutionary change is also relevant for understanding what it was which made a revolutionary movement sufficient or insufficient. The manner in which this movement developed and the character it acquired in practice, raises issues of interrelationships and contradictions in ideology and organisation, heroism and strategy. A study of these issues may be helpful in both the understanding and serious reflection on the organic problems of mass revolutionary movements. The fact that revolutionary youth in India persist in their fascination for the subjective element of individual heroism and sacrifice as the key factor in a revolutionary struggle makes such an analysis particularly relevant to the students of social science.

I have therefore chosen to study the ideology, organisation and strategy of the Ghadar movement and to place the move­ment in the context of the evolution of Indian nationalism. Ideology is taken here as a 'framework of consciousness’, i.e., a more or less integrated set of ideas and beliefs which provide to the leaders and followers the explanation of their problems, a conception of the desired social and political order and more or less specific nature of the action required for affecting that change. It may not necessarily preclude the existence of heterogeneous beliefs. Attempt has also been made to see the difference between the ideas as advocated by the ideologues—'traditional intellectuals’, to use the phraseo­

INTRODUCTION 7

logy of the Italian Marxist theoretician Antonio Gramsci—and the form in which these percolated down to the ‘organic intellectuals'8 and large numbers of their less sophisticated followers.

A probe into the nature of organisation of this movement leads us into a maze of diverse views regarding the structural arrangements, levels of authority and leadership, and an analysis of the emergent structure, operational patterns of leadership and channels of communicatjjjp. The study of strategy of revolution leads us beyond the diversity of stipu­lations to the actually employed methods and the manner in which the Ghadarites went about their actual operations with a view to launching a coup d' etat with the support of disaffected Indian soldiers of the British army. An effort has also been made to put in perspective the nature of inter-relationship between the different groups of revolutionaries, particularly between those of the Indian Independence Committee of Berlin and the Ghadar establishment in California.

The chronological limits of the work are drawn from 1913, the year of the formation of the Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast and launching of the Ghadar (the chief organ of the movement) to 1918 when the movement collapsed following a series of conspiracy trials in India and Hindu-German Cons­piracy trial in USA. These dates appear appropriate also from the context of the international situation. The movement drew its inspiration from the ideological thinking of the Russian anarchist revolutionaries of the earlier period; the Chinese revolution of 1912 and the freedom for anti-British propaganda in USA of early Wilson years. The developments at the close of the War—the end of US neutrality and her active alliance with Britain in 1917, the thunderclap message of the Bolshevik revolution, and the emergence of Gandhian anti-British mass movement in India—suggested to the revolutionists alternative courses for political activity. Even though the ‘Ghadar Party’ continued to function under that name until 15 August 1947, the distinct identity of Ghadar movement during 1913-18 underwent a marked change when it was revived after the end of the First World War.

9 Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith, Selections From the Prison NoteBooks o f Antonio Gramsci (London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), p. 6.

3 GHADAR MOVEMENT

The choice of the theme persuaded me to look closely into the publications of the Ghadar Press and other contemporary writings of Har Dayal. Quite a few of these, marked more for the polemics and diatribe, provided insights as much into the incongruous and paradoxical ideas as to the passion with which these were advocated. Most exciting of these were the files of Ghadar both in Urdu and Gurmukhi editions from November 1, 1913 to the end of September 1917, and the booklets containing Ghadar poems, both of which I was fortunately able to read in the original. Moving from the Urdu edition of Ghadar to the Gurmukhi one, and from that to the simple versifications in the language and idiom of.the Punjabi immigrants was particularly valuable in seeing the process of what Marx described as 'translation of ideas into the mother tongue’—the process of an attempted bridging of the gap between the political orientation of the petite bourgeois intellectuals and the peasant masses.

Among the official records, most valuable were the pro­ceedings of the Government of India's Home Department, Political Branch, with fortnightly reports and special reports from secret agents which helped the CID to build big dossiers on those considered to be more dangerous. Of notable advantage in these records was a heretofore less known excellent report prepared by D. S. Dady Burjor on Indian immigrants in USA. A report prepared by Punjab Police officials F. C. Isemonger and J. Slattery provides a detailed official version of the history of the movement. Included among other government sources were the Sedition Committee Report (1918) and the 'Ghadar Directory’ prepared by Government of India's CID. Records of the Colonial Office in London include besides a number of special reports on Indian immigrants, long correspondence of the Governments of India and Canada with the Secretary of State for Colonies and an important Confidential memorandum of Brigadier-General Swayne. These and the files of the Emigration Branch in the records of India's Department of Commerce and Industry have proved to be of particular value in getting an insight into the political reasons and manifest role of the British and Indian Governments in the adoption of measures for stopping immigration of Indians into Canada. Records of the US State Department, particularly those relating to 'Hindu-German Conspiracy’ have been consul­ted with advantage. These records which include testimonies

INTRODUCTION 9

of a number of Ghadar activists speak about the nature of col­laboration between Berlin India Committee, the German officials and the handful of Ghadar leaders who stayed outside India during the War period.

The newspapers of these times published from Victoria and Vancouver in Canada, San Francisco and Portland is USA and those published in English and vernacular languages in the Punjab proved useful to get at the then popular concerns, images and stereotypes.

Another source, which was found useful despite the known pitfalls of depending on memories distorted by age and later- day formulations consisted of several personal reminiscences and published and unpublished accounts of the prominent leaders and, activists from the two categories of Ghadarites. These facilitated an understanding of their beliefs and notions about their priorities, views of the authority structure in the organisation and the notions of revolutionary strategy they had in mind. Useful accounts by leading men from the category of educated revolutionary nationalists were those of Gobind Behari Lai, Pandurang Sadashiv Khankhoje, Shachindra Nath Sanyal and Bhai Parmanand, letters of Har Dayal and an excellent comprehensive unpublished history by Darisi Chenchiah. As to the recorded recollections of leaders and activists from among the Punjabi immigrants, the accounts of Sohan Singh Bhakna, Harnam Singh ■Tundilat', Jwala Singh and Prithvi Singh Azad were valuable in discussing the major issues of debate and controversies among the Ghadarites. Reminiscences of Teja Singh, later known as Sant Teja Singh of Mastuana, Kartar Singh of Nawan Chand and Hari Singh 'Canadian' provided an insight into a different type of socio-political orientation of a section of the community elite for assertion of its separate identity.10 Gurdit Singh’s Zulmi Katha was a significant source that served as a supplement to Robie L. Reid’s ‘Inside Story of the Komagata Maru’ and the official Disorders Inquiry Committee Report, for a more balanced understanding of the Komagata Maru Story.

10 Teja Singh, Jeewan Katha Gurmukh Piyare Sant Attar Singh Ji Maharaj(Punjabi) 3rd ed. (Patiala : Language Department Punjab, 1970) pp. 292-95;■Written Account of Kartar Singh Nawan Chand' in Ganda Singh (ed.)A m reeka Vich Hindustani (Punjabi) (Vancouver : 1976) pp. 58-83.

10 GHADAR MOVEMENT

I gathered precious information and got a feel of the temper of those times in a series of long interviews with a number of these leaders. Interviews with Sohan Singh Bhakna in 1968 were the first which, in fact, developed my initial interest in this movement. Years later I was able to have planned interviews with Prithvi Singh Azad and Gujjar Singh Bhakna. Prominent among others interviewed were Hanuwant Sahai, an old friend and comrade of Har Dayal; Harnam Singh of 26th Punjabi Regi­ment in which the first shots of the stipulated coup d' etat were expected to be fired; and Gurmukh Singh "Lalton", a passenger of the fateful ship Komagata Maru and one of those few activists who moved in various regimental barracks to win over Indian soldiers of the British army to the cause of revolution.

THE BACKGROUND 1

The Social Context of Emigration

The Punjab was annexed by the British in 1849, and the mid nineteenth century was believed to be the hey day of British capitalism. Punjab, therefore, was opened to a vigorous process of colonization and its incorporation into the vortex of imperialist market economy. That factor, besides political and military considerations became a major reason for its develop­ment as an agricultural appendix of that economy. The strategy which the British Government pursued for the development of agriculture built a strong infrastructure, raised production, but simultaneously unleashed forces of increasing exploitation of the small and middle peasantry. Emigration of several thousand of these peasants to foreign lands in search of labour opportuni­ties, at the beginning of this century, was symptomatic of their - economic distress.1 British revenue officers had already started taking a serious note of the developing situation. Denzil Ibbetson, who later rose to be the Lieutenant Governor of the province, had given a warning in 1889 that ‘the presence of the sturdy peasantry willing to work but unable to support themselves must always be dangerous’.* The Census Report of 1901

1 The accounts of early emigrants point mainly to economic necessity as the reason for their emigration. Another reason was the 'pull effect' of luring economic opportunities. See for instance, Rajni Kanta Das, Hindustan W orkers on the Pacific Coast (Berlin : Walter de Gruyter, 1923), p. 6. 2 * *

2 Selections from a Note by Denzil Ibbetson in Norman G. Barrier, The PunjabAlienation o f Land BUI 1900 (Duke University : Monograph No. 2, 1966), ;p. 106.

12 GHADAR MOVEMENT

considered it fortunate that peasants from congested areas chose to emigrate to foreign countries relieving the pressure on land.*

The process of oppression of the peasantry was set in motion by the new land settlements and the new systems of land revenue, law and justice.4 The Revenue assessment was lower than that of pre-colonial days, but an additional twenty to thirty per cent of the stated revenue was levied for education, police and other community projects.8 9 More repressive, in reality, was the rigorous collection of these taxes in cash on a due date.6 whether the crop was good or bad in a particular year was no consider­ation. Relief of tax during periods of scarcity and famine was considered improper. A section of revenue officers thought that such relief would weaken ‘the moral fibre of the cultivator’.7 Since most peasants hardly saved any cash, money for payment of taxes had to be borrowed and lands mortgaged.

Rise in the price of land8 had increased the credit-worthiness of the peasant proprietor. The privilege, granted by the new revenue laws, for selling and mortgaging of land, further facilitated borrowing from the money-lender. The result was a fast rise in the scale of indebtedness of the peasant and conse­quent alienation of lands. Peasants in West Punjab districts were the most adversely affected. Alarmist reports about the rising incidence of land alienation also came from the districts of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur as early as 1870-71.* 1,20,000 acres of land changed hands through sale and mortgage in the province during the fiscal year of 1886-87 and more than that in the follow­ing year.10 By 1891 four million acres of land was under mort-

3 Report on the Results o f the Census o f the Punjab 1901, (Lahore : 1902), p. 14.4 Barrier, op. cit., p. 9.

5 Ibid., p. 11.6 Barrier, loc. cit.

7 Fauja Singh, 'The Effects of Land Transfers on Rural Economy During the Latter Half of the 19th Century’, Punjab History C onference 1979, P roceed in gs (Patiala : Punjabi University, 1980), p. 258.

8 The price of land rose from Rs. 15 per acre in 1870-71 to Rs. 77 per acre in 1900-1901. Ibid., p. 259. According to Khushwant Singh, it rose from Rs. 10 in 1870 to Rs. 100 per acre by the end of the century. A History o f the Sikhs (Delhi: OUP, 1977), Vol. II, p. 151.

9 Fauja Singh, op. cit., p. 263.

10 Barrier, op. cit., pp. 23 and 103.

THE BACKGROUND 13

gage.u The Financial Commissioner of Punjab reported two years later that 'over large areas the peasantry was already ruined beyond redemption’ .n

As most peasants failed to repay their debts, there began an inevitable process of ejectment of owners from their lands. The growth of occupancy by tenants had been checked by the Punjab Tenancy Acts of 1868 and 1887. What followed as a consequence was a fast conversion of proprietors into tenants-at-will and agricultural labourers. Between 1872-73 and 1902-03, the number of tenants-at-will increased by 360 percent.1®

Once caught in the coils of the bania the poor peasant had little chance of respite, let alone release. The security of the British legal system facilitated expropriation by the money-lender; his manipulation of accounts lay beyond the reach of law.11 12 13 14 The lawyers turned out to augment and share the spoils. The British authorities in Punjab awoke to the destructive consequences of their policies and the legal system. Ibbetson discovered that their rules and regulations had become a ‘new engine of oppres­sion’. The Civil Courts, he feelingly observed, ‘stink in the nostrils of the peasantry.’15 The Punjab Alienation of Land Act 1901 signified the Government’s frantic efforts to deal with the situation. Its objective of protecting the now legally identified agricultural castes only checked the expropriation of land by the money-lender, but permitted transfer to these castes.16 Corruption of tne administrative officials further contributed to that oppression. The officials on tour were normally supposed to live on the country,17 andbegar in the service of the bureaucracy had become a recognised practice.18

11 Sukhwant Singh, Agricultural Development in the Punjab 1849-1946,' (Unpublished M.Phil Dissertation, Amritsar : G.N.D. University, 1979), p. 174.

12 Cited in C.J.O' Donnell, The Causes o f the Present Discontent in India, (London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1908), p. 94.

13 Sukhwant Singh, op. cit., p. 191.14 Sir Malcolm Darling, The Punjab Peasant in Prosperity and Debt (London :

OUP, 1947), p. 82.15 Cited in Barrier, op. cit., p. 108.16 See text in Sri Ram Sharma, Punjab in Ferment, (New D elhi: S. Chand, 1971)

Appendix II, pp. 34-3S.17 Sri Ram Sharma, 'Punjab in Ferment in the Beginning of the 20th Century',

The Punjab Past and Present. Vol. XTV, No. 1, (April 1980), p. 127.18 Ibid., pp. 132-33.

14 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Promotion of indigenous industries in the province did not fit in the imperialist design. These were in fact ‘cruelly ruined by the relentless competition of cheap and showy goods manu­factured in England’, leading to a progressive migration of artisans to rural areas and rise in the proportion of agricultural classes.1*

Nature’s fury against the inequities of the legal and economic systems always fell on the poor. Six famines visited Punjab during the first half century of British rule, causing repeated waves of desolation and increasing number of starvation deaths. The famines of 1896-97 and 1899-1900 were far severer in their ferocity than the earlier ones.*0 While the food became scarce and prices galloped unchecked, the Government did not think it wise to check the export of food grains even during famine years.*1

Economic conditions worsened futher during the first decade of the twentieth century. Drought conditions of 1905-07 and recurrent epidemics of malaria and plague caused unprece­dented mortality. The Lieutenant Governor of Punjab lamented in one of his reports of 1907 to the Governor General of India that plague alone was killing 60,000 Punjabis a week.** The epidemics took a toll of 2 million lives in the province leading to a net reduction of 2.2 per cent in the population between the years 1901 and 1911.*3

The wave of emigration from rural areas of central Punjab to North America started in these conditions of economic distress at the beginning of the twentieth century, Among the most congested areas in the Punjab at that time were the districts of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur. The density of popula­tion in Jullundur in 1901 was 641 per sq. mile,*4 and as for the 19 20 21 22 * 24

19 Bal Krishan,'Progressional Ruralization of the Punjab', R eport o l the Ninth industrial C on ference, Karachi, 25 December 1913, (Amraoti: 1914), p. 298.

20 Inderjit Sharma, ‘Punjab Famines And the British Policy in the 19th Century’. Punjab History C on feren ce 1979, P roceed in g s (Patiala : Punjabi University, 1980), p. 180.

21 Ibid., p. 185.22 Cited in Norman Gerald Barrier, 'Punjab Politics and the Disturbances of

1908’, (Ph.D. Dissertation, Duke University, 1966); p. 233.'23 C ensus o f India 1911, XIV, pp. 41-42 and 59,24 Report, Census o f the Punjab 1901, p. 10. ' ’

THE BACKGROUND 15

density of population on the area under cultivation, Hoshiarpur had a higher rate of 860 per sq. mile than Jullundur’s 846 per sq. mile.25 26 Malcolm Darling was glad that when the size of holding forced a choice between unremitting toil and emigra­tion abroad there was hardly any more enterprising emigrant than the Jat Sikh of this area.28

Large numbers from the districts of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur had earlier found their way to other foreign lands in search of employment.27 They had worked as watchmen, policemen and caretakers in Malaya, Hong Kong, Thailand, Sumatra, Shanghai and Manila. Some had even moved to East Africa and Australia. The discovery of better economic opportunities in North America in 1904 followed the encourage­ment given by the Hong Kong agents of the Canadian steamship companies. They were ‘seeking to replace their diminished Chinese steerage traffic'which had almost ceased after the Canadian Government raised the head tax to $ 500 on the Chinese immigrants.28 According to Mackenzie King’s report submitted to Dominion Parliament in 1908 the first of the Indians came i n induced by agents of Canadian Pacific Company, but he attributed the influx to three reasons: exaggerated advertisements in India ot the prospects offered by British Columbia, to the work of steamship companies and to Indians already settled in British Columbia ‘who tried to exploit their fellow subjects’.29 30

VOnly 45 Indians had entered Canada in 1905, Then the

number swelled; 387 reached there in 1906; 2,124 in the following year and 2,623 in 1908.38 Thereafter the entry of Indians into Canada was practically banned by the Dominion Government. Since many of these Indian immigrants crossed

25 Ibid., p. 12.26 Darling, op. cit., pp. 47-48.27 Report, Census o f the Punjab 1901, p. 14.28 Hugh Johnstone, The Voyage o f Komagata Maru : The Sikh Challenge to

Canada’s Colour Bar, (Delhi: OUP, 1979) p. 2. Also Confidential Report of W.E. Me Innes, 15 November 1907, secret agent in the employment of the Department of Interior, Government of British Columbia, Dominions, Correspondence, Colonial Office Records. 886 ,1, p. 138.

29 Cited from Memorandum by Sir Charles Lucas on Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration, July 1908, Ibid.

30 Das, op. cit., 4-5.

16 GHADAR MOVEMENT

over to the United States, their actual number in Canada at the end of 1908 was around 3,500.31 Fresh emigrants now sought entry to the USA, instead. The officially recorded number of those Indian emigrants, who entered the USA between 1899 and 1913 was 6,6S6.32 33 34 35 36 Many more were likely to have entered illegally. Unaccounted large numbers of them, having left home and dismayed by those restrictions, lay precariously camped in port towns of Hong Kong, Manila and Shanghai, desperately waiting for opportunity to enter USA or Canada.*3

All these immigrants came mainly from five districts of Punjab, largest numbers coming from those of Jullundur and Hoshiarpur.*4 Over 75 per cent of them were Sikhs*1 and of these around fifty per cent were ex-soldiers who had served terms in the British Indian Army.** The Ghadar movement which was founded on the Pacific Coast of America was manned mainly by men from among these immigrants from the Punjab. These people had little political consciousness and nationalist interest when they arrived in North America. They had come from closed village communities and their aspirations related mainly to earning of money.

At the time when this emigration started, the Punjab was in a state of ferment. Protest against the Colonization Bill of 1906, and another bill to amend the Punjab Alienation of Land Act of 1901 and raising of water rate on the Bari Doab Canal led to three distinct agitations : one led by urban politicians was a protest against the amendment to Land Alienation Act and prosecution of the Panjabee, Zamindars' fight against the

31 Nand Singh Sihra reported that the number was 4,300. ‘Indians in Canada', Modern Review (Calcutta) August 1913, p. 144; also The Tribune, 13 July 1913,

32 Das, op. cit., p. 17.33 See a letter from six hundred Sikhs in Hong Kong for friends in America :

'For God's sake help us to get to the United States', cited in Johnston, op. cit., p. 23.

34 S.A. Wais (ed.), Indians A broad, (Bombay : The Imperial CitizenshipAssociation, 1927), p. 648.

35 Report of Daddy S. Burjor, Official 'Hindu' interpreter of the US Immigration Department, Government of India, Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration A, Proceedings, No. 4.

36 Burjor, ioc, cit.’, also Sohan Singh Josh, Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna (Bombay : PPH, 1970), p. 14. Harnam Singh 'Tundilat' believed that 75 per cent of all Indians on the Pacific Coast were ex-soldiers. Unpublished Account, p. 15.

THE BACKGROUND 17

Colonisation Bill was another; and the third one aimed at the overthrow of the British rule was led by Ajit Singh,37 38 39 uncle of the later day legendary hero Bhagat Singh. The farmers, particularly in the districts of Lyallpur, Lahore and Rawalpindi, sensed a whiff of a 'nai hawa’. They were exhorted to boycott government service and the courts, not to pay. taxes and not allow their grain to be exported.3' Administrative authorities panicked on learning of political propaganda in the Sikh regiments. Ibbetson, now Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, had nightmares of repetition of the mutiny,3' and craved for extraordinary powers. Desperate British machinery moved in to warn the Punjabis of what they had 'forgotten’ that 'India was and continues to be held by the sword’.40 Ajit Singh and Lajpat Rai were deported under an old and 'rusty' Bengal Regulation in of 1818. The Governor General vetoed the Colonization Bill at least partly on the intervention of Lord Kitchner who told Minto about the fears of Punjabi soldiers that the Colonization Bill threatened the economic security of their families.41

There is little evidence, however, that these emigrants sensed at that time any relation of their economic problems with the British policies and imperial interests. Hardly a few had heard of Ajit Singh and the agitation led by him. Nationalist political activity was little known to the Punjabi villager before the momentous events of 1919-1920. According to Barrier, the politician of Punjab was concerned mainly with his clan or community and found the secular national programme of the Congress irrelevant.42

The most notable influences for political development in the Punjab at that time were the social reform movements, the Arya Samaj among the Hindus and the Singh Sabha among the Sikhs. By their attempts at reformation of distinct identities these movements had generated in the two communities a new awakening and communal vitality.

37 Barrier, Disturbances o f 1907, pp. IV-V.38 Extract from the Diary of Superintendent Police, Lahore, Home Political A,

Proceedings, August 1907, Nos. 148-235, Appendix B.39 Sir Denzil Ibbetson to Governor General of India, Home Political A,

Proceedings, August 1907, Nos. 148-235.40 Barrier, op. cit-, p. 217.41 Ibid., pp. 257-258; also O'Donnell, op. cit., p. 98.42 Barrier, op. cit-, p. 44.

18 GHADAR MOVEMENT

A section of the educated urban Sikhs in particular felt concerned about the fast erosion of Sikh ideals and insti­tutions since the time of Ranjit Singh. Loss of political power in 1849 and educational backwardness had accelerated their relapse into practices and rituals of Hindu society. It was feared that Sikhism might be completely absorbed in the Hindu community. The Singh Sabhas and the Chief Khalsa Diwan strove to restore Sikhism to its pristine purity, propagate correct principles and teachings of the Gurus and promote modern education in the community.

A crucial support for that purpose came from the British military authorities. Strengthening of orthodoxy amongst Sikh soldiers was considered an essential imperative to maintain their loyalty and 'martial instincts’. 'Any falling off from orthodoxy’, as Macauliffe wrote, ‘detracted from the fighting force of the Sikh soldiers’.43 Discussing the contribution of the British Government to Sikh revivalism, D. Petrie claimed with satisfaction :

Sikhs in the Indian Army had been studiously 'nation­alised' or encouraged to regard themselves as a totally distinct and separate nation. Their national pride has been fostered by every available means.44

The soldiers serving in the Army or those who had retired were the only source for dissemination of Singh Sabha ideology in the Sikh peasantry which had remained largely indifferent to it.45

The movement for reassertion of their distinct identity inevitably took the form of de-Hinduising of Sikh community with obvious separatist repercussions. The pamphlet war—Sikh Hindu Hain and Hum Hindu Nahin Hain—symbolised the con­temporary polemics between the Arya Samaj and the Singh Sabha. A similar process had also been started among the Muslims. Kenneth Jones put it rather sharply :

By 1890 the Punjab was divided into a series of aggressive organisations, each possessing its own ideology, each containing a unique sense of identity. To protect that

43 Cited in D. Petrie, D evelopm ents in Sikh Politics 1901-1911. A Report (reprinted, Chief Khalsa Diwan, n.d.), p. 11.

44 Petrie, loc. cit.45 Harbans Singh, 'Origins of the Singh Sabha', in Harbans Singh and

N. Gerald Barrier (eds.), Punjab Past and P resen t: Essays in Honour o f Dr. Ganda Singh (Patiala : Punjabi University. 1976), p. 28.

THE BACKGROUND 19

identity and its base became the most fundamental drive for educated and marginal Punjabis.4*

A small militant group among the Sikhs laid greater emphasis on the military teachings of Guru Gobind Singh and the tradition of heroic struggles for protection of the community's identity. The British Government’s intelligence men came to look upon that ‘neo-Sikh Party’ as a ‘constant potential source of danger’. Petrie gave a warning in a secret report that, ‘Neo- Sikhism may be regarded no less as a rallying point for the malcontents and the already disaffected1,46 47

The rural Jat Sikhs were, however, largely unaffected by the Singh Sabhas and that militant orthodoxy. A powerful influence in their lives was that of the army. After the ‘mutiny’, the Indian army was re-organised on the 'fictitious theory' of the martial races. The British military authorities, Lord Roberts and Lord Kitchner, considered Punjab as the home of the best fighting material, among whom the Jat Sikhs of central Punjab were a most important element.48 49 The Sikh soldiers were given great credit for the suppression of the 'mutiny' and for their bravery in several imperial wars. Nearly two-fifths of all Indian troops in 1907 were drawn from the Punjab and Sikhs cons­tituted 24 per cent of the total strength.48 Recruitment to army was a major source of employment. Even with a salary of Rs. 7 to Rs. 9 per month, the soldier carried a sense of honour and distinction in the village community. Village maidens dreamt of marrying a soldier : Vasna Fauji de, Bhanwen boo l sane latt m are [ I must live with a soldier though he may kick with shoes on]

Many of these soldiers went abroad on military expeditions. Returning home on leave of absence or after retirement they missed the thrill and excitement of foreign lands and longed to seek new pastures. Their 'wander lust’ became an added induce­ment to emigration when economic difficulties at home forced them to look for alternatives. Many of them had to borrow money for the passage on interest rates ranging from 15 to 20 per cent

46 Kenneth Jones, Arya Dharm : Hindu Consciousness in the 19th Century Punjab (Delhi : Manohar Publications, 1976), p. 315.

47 Petrie, op. cif., p. 53.48 Michael Francis O’ Dwyer, India As 1 knew It, 1885-1925 (London : Constable

& Co., 1925), p. 213.49 Barrier, Punjab Disturbances, pp. 60-61, n .l.

20 GHADAR MOVEMENT

and had to mortgage and even sell their lands.50 Selling of land was often revolting to the ethical sense of a peasant proprietor, but he did not flinch from that choice.

In their decisions to emigrate, one noticed a manifest 'devil may care’ attitude; 'vekhi jaau’, they asserted. It pointed to a typi­cal impulsiveness and self confidence. Saint Nihal Singh wrote at the time that ‘without a thought for the ’morrow or even for those whom they were leaving behind, these emigrants were inspired by this magical lure to overcome the accumulated inertia of ages with a single manful move.51 The reasons behind that large scale emigration may have a ‘diagnostic value’. It was not normal for peasants to plunge into that kind of enterprise. Their urge for liberation and a manifest impulsiveness and courage indicated a potential for aggressive response to felt constraints.

The Immigrants and the New World

It was exciting for the Punjabi peasants to arrive in the new world of the two advanced countries. It was also somewhat embarrassing. The recollections of these immigrants of their early experiences speak vividly about that. They were amazed at the riches, the tall structures, electric lights, smartly dressed women and children and the air of individual self-confidence and freedom. It also aroused in them an awareness of their own backwardness and that of their country, by comparison.52 The contempt and ridicule they experienced in their daily contact with the white residents was a cause for a hitherto unknown kind of predicament. Economic achievement beckoned them, but the social situation was hardly conducive to a feeling of ease. Some felt the anguish more acutely than the others but none could escape the effects of excitement, and embarrassment.

In line with the general pattern of large scale emigrations, the flux from Punjab was more marked in particular areas of

50 Das, op. tit., p. 7.51 Saint Nihal Singh, 'Indians in America', M odern Review , March 1908, p. 205.52 See for instance, poems 1,2 and 10 in G hadar di Goonj, No. 1 (San Francisco :

Ghadar Press, n.d.), pp. 1,2 and 7. See also Barrier, 'Identity and Organisation Among Indians On the West Coast of the U.S.’ (Paper presented at a Symposium on 'The Public Policy Process and the Development of Ethnic Identity : The East Indian Experience', University of California, Barkeley, 23 June 1979), p .l.

THE BACKGROUND 21

the five districts. In some cases all the men in a family and a large percentage of the male population of a particular village were caught by ‘the infection of emigration'.53 Again, arriving in the new world, the new comers generally sought jobs and settled near their relatives or the early comers from their villages. Most of those going to Canada settled in or around Vancouver city and Vancouver Island in the province of British Columbia, where the railway construction work provided opportunities of large scale employment.54 Their first settlement was at Port Moody, to the east of Vancouver and this area be­came the 'East Indian Centre’. Among those who moved to the USA, the largest concentration was on the farms of San Joaquin and Sacramento Valleys in California and around lumber mills in Oregon and Washington States.

In Canada, these people found work in the saw mills, railway construction works, clearing of land and repair of tram lines, and also canneries, in the building trades, dairying, fruit picking and other kinds of farming. In the US they largely farmed lands taken on lease from American owners or worked as farm labourers picking fruits, berries or beetroot or worked as rail road labourers making beds or laying tracks or as labourers in lumber mills.55 Found to be hard working and efficient the ‘Hindus’ were much in demand by rail road companies and owners of lumber mills. Dady Burjor in his detailed survey found that 'they could get all the work in dynamite cap factories, match factories and dairy farms for mere asking’. Owners of large tracts of land in the Sacramento Valley and other counties sometimes went upto Angel Island to hire incoming 'Hindus' for farming their lands. Some of these tracts which were consi­dered barren 'howling wildernesses', too difficult for white labourers to cultivate, were transformed by the 'Hindus’ into 'smiling gardens and prosperous farms’, bringing to their owners such returns as they could never earlier dream of.56

53 Saint Nihal Singh, 'Indians in America', Modern Review, March 1908, p. 205. The Tribune reported that in some cases 60 men had gone out to British Columbia from one single village, 13 October 1906.

54 These included, for example, Naniamo, Wellington, Comex and Esquinmalt. Some of them were spread over Revelstoke, Nelson, working in railway sheds, saw mills and fruit farms; in Calgary and around Edmonton, Alberta etc. working in collieries. Waiz., Indians Abroad, p. 651.

55 Dady Burjor, op. cit., p. 4.56 Burjor, loc. cit., pp. 7-8.

22 GHADAR MOVEMENT

The new comers were generally well looked after by their fellows and veritable langars (open and free kitchens) were run by the well-to-do ones of their community and at the Gur- dwaras in Vancouver, Victoria, Stockton and other places. These institutions and individuals also served somewhat like 'employment bureaus’ for their compatriots. There were short spells of unemployment for some of them but as Hopkinson and Colonel Falkland Warren found in Canada and Dady Burjor in California, they were ‘generally well provided with funds’ and there 'was not one Hindu . . . who ever became a public charge’ .5’

Soon after their arrival, however, these Indian labourers be­came ‘victims of anti-oriental feelings’.68 The new comers did not conform to the Euro-American culture. With their turbans, beards, dark complexion and different personal and social habits, they somewhat naturally aroused the curiosity of the white residents.57 58 59 Another factor was the feeling of superiority in the white man which emanated to a large degree ‘from a heritage of aggressive colonialism’.60 The Indian immigrant was a colo­nised person of colour. Suchen Chang observed that the world had by that time been categorised ‘both by ideology and well- institutionalised practice into a system of social, cultural, political and economic hierarchies’, so the Indian was considered as belonging to 'inferior races’.61

57 Hopkinson's report, Home Political B, P roceed in g s, May 1910, n. 162, p. 4. Col. Falkland Warren stated that those without employment and the new comers stayed in the •Hindu C har’ or with other Indians, 'but are never public charges’, cited Bose, Indian R evolutionaries A broad, p. 44, n. 27. See also Dady Burjor, op. cit., pp. 7-8.

58 According to G.H. Lowes, ‘The Sikhs began arriving in British Columbia in 1904 and almost immediately became the victims of anti-oriental feelings’. The S ikhs o f British Columbia, p. 13, St. Nihal Singh wrote that, 'when the Indian immigrants began to arrive in knots of 20 or more—the cry of the 'Hindoo peril' was raised—British Columbians. became hysterical believing that the Indians would despoil their country as did the Huns. •Indians in America’, M odern Review, March, 1908, pp. 206-207.

59 According to Tundilat, while those coming from the army had taken to the European dress, the rural (sic) Punjabis generally wore their own dress, some of them would go to the bazar dressed in dhoti. Unpublished account, p. 11. See also G.H. Lowes, op. cit., p. 54.

60 Lowes, op . cit., p. 1.61 Suchen Chang, 'Overseas Sikhs in the Context of International Migrations’, in

Mark Juergensmeyer and N. Gerald Barrier, eds., Sikh S tu d ies: Com parative P ersp ectiv e on A Changing Tradition (Berkeley : Graduate Theological Union, 1979), p. 194.

THE BACKGROUND 23

One of the best accounts on the life and working conditions of Indians in California was prepared by Dady Burjor. Accord­ing to him, about 50 per cent of these immigrant labourers from Punjab who had served in the British army in India or in police force in Hong Kong, Shanghai and other places adapted to the new situation more easily. Most of these took to European dress and appeared disciplined and urbane, polite in manners, who it was said, ‘usually create a favourable impression’. The other half who came directly from their native villages with 'their home-staying habits and homely wits’ and belonging to very poor families were dirty and unkempt in appearance. Burjor found the latter class of Indians as ‘densely ignorant and illiterate with uncouth manners’. With their habits of spitting around, clearing their noses or throats, talking loudly on side walks, looking rudely towards ladies and much more ‘alarming’ habit of drinking heavily, they presented, as he stated, ‘a very sorry spectacle’,•* and aroused contempt and ridicule of the white population. A number of them were denied entry and were returned from Angel Island for their ‘habit of telling lies on trivial matters’, being regarded as persons of objectionable character.

A major cause of hostility and prejudice towards them which led to the chant of expelling the ‘filthy interloper’, however, was the fears aroused among the white labour community. The white labour unions believed that vested interests in Canada and USA were importing cheaper labour from India to weaken their bargaining power. Since the Indians could work on lower wages and work harder, it was feared that it would bring down the wages of the white labour and create difficulties of employment during the lean period.62 63 64 Added to this fear was a certain jealousy aroused by the economic success of these stout and hard working people.61

Working in a lumber mill or clearing land in British Columbia or farming in California, an Indian labourer earned from S 1-25 to $ 2.00 per day and when promoted as a foreman

62 Burjor's Report, pp. 4. 8-12. See also Waiz, op. cif., pp. 8-9, and St. Nihal Singh, ‘Indians in America', Modern Review, March 1908, p. 206.

63 Mackenzie King Commission Report, quoted in R.K. Das, op. erf., pp. 8-9; see also St. Nihal Singh, op. cit., p. 20S.

64 Burjor, op. cit-, pp. 4-8.

24 GHADAR MOVEMENT

$ 2.50 to $ 3.00 per day. During the season of picking and packing fruit near Antioch, his wages rose to three or four dollars, equivalent of nine and twelve rupees in Indian currency which was more than a month's salary of a soldier in the Indian army. An official of United States Government told Burjor that in the season of picking beetroot some of the ‘Hindus’ earned as high as five or six dollars a day working from 6.0’ clock in the morning to midnight and that 'they worked like animals’. He was 'astonished by their power of physical endurance'.86 As to the expenses on his living, on the other hand, the Indian labourer, accustomed to living cheaply, could manage within $ 12.00 and $ 15.00 a month.65 66 He could therefore save in a few years, what was by his country's standards, quite a fortune. Nand Singh Sihra reported in 1913 that there may not have been even a single Indian who did not own any landed property and possess seven to eight thousand rupees. Together the Indians living in Canada, had 'seven and a half million dollars invested in real estate and business in Canada alone’.67

The white labourer on the other hand, who tried, as was humourously put by some Americans, ‘to rear champagne appetites on beer incomes’ and for whom high wage was an absolute necessity, felt let down by the ‘Hindu’ for whom even a cheap scale of wages was a luxury. When after a widespread agitation in California a bill was brought in the legislature to debar the Japanese from holding farm land, the chief reason advanced in support of the bill was that the 'white men could not compete with the Japanese’, The same argument actually applied to their agitation against the ‘Hindus’. They were tolerated only so long as they performed low status jobs. The moment the Indians started competing for jobs considered as the domain of white working class, they were perceived as a

65 Burjor, loc. cit.

66 Loc. cit. See also Mackenzie King’s Report in Colonial O ffice R ecords, 886/1, p. 44.

67 His interview with a correspondent, The Tribune, 11 July 1913 and Selections from the Indian News P apers P ublished in the Punjab, Vol. XXVI, No. 28, p. 617, NAI. (Hereafter referred to as Selections). S ee also St. Nihal Singh, 'Indians in Canada', M odern Review , August, 1913, p. 143. G. D. Kumar wrote in 1911 that ‘We have a million dollars worth property here'. Letter to the Editor, M odern Review, October, 1911, p. 399.

THE BACKGROUND 25

threat.68 The fear was that white labour would starve if ‘Hindus’ were freely admitted to their countries.69 That fear came handy to conservative leadership of white labour unions and to the expediency-loving politician who wished to exploit it for netting the labour vote in the elections. As a result, agitations were organised both in Canada and the United States for exclusion of Indian labour and ban on their further entry to these countries.

A precipitation of these fears was caused by the political situation in British Columbia at the time the Indians started arriving in 1906 in large groups. W. W. Baer wrote later :

the time at which they (Indian immigrants) came was the worst that fate could have selected for them to obtain a favourable reception. At that time the whole province was in a state of political turmoil, a provincial election was simmering . . . the labour unions were up in arms against the importation of alien labour and politicians eagerly seized their opportunity to make political capital out of events.70

The vocabulary of prejudice had a quality of the absurd. That was the period when Social Darwinist thought held sway over the minds of men in the West. The hysteria that was raised by the politicians conjured up images of 'peril’ and ‘Fevered Canadian brains visualised a Hindu invasion of British Columbia’. The Indian was characterised as a ‘filthy beast’, whose 'head is devoid of brains', who ‘comes to Canada penni­less’ and therefore, became a charge on the public purse.71 H. H. Stevens, a Conservative member of Dominion Parliament from Vancouver, alleged in a speech, ‘if a Hindu is allowed to bring over his family, he would bring here four girls as his daughters who would really be his wives’.72 On the other hand,

68 Suchen Chang, op. tit., p. 194.69 Burjor's Report, passim.70 Cited in St. Nihal Singh, 'Indians in Canada', Modern Review, August 1913,

pp. 141-42.71 St. Nihal Singh, Modern Review, August 1909, p. 104. 'Being an Indian is

like standing between the devil and the deep sea'. Ibid., p. 99. Sohan Singh Bhakna writes that in Astoria (USA) at times even white children followed Indians in the bazars and streets with the chant of 'Hindu Slave'. Jeew an Sangram, p. 33.

72 Cited in Waiz, op. tit., p. 665. Sohan Singh Bhakna tells that one of the ques­tions asked by the US immigration authorities from a fresh arrival was, whether he had more than one wife in India, and whether he considered polygamy alright, jeew an Sangram, pp. 27-28.

26 GHADAR MOVEMENT

since the immigrant did not bring his wife along, some whites considered that he was' 'apt to be immoral'. A number of doggerels were chanted during the anti-Hindu campaign. One of these which became popular in British Columbia swore in Kipl­ing’s vein to keep it a 'White Canada For Ever’.73 The Immigra­tion Police and Municipal Police chose to pander to the threats and sentiments of the white labour.

There were others in the white community in Vancouver who were considered ‘staunch friends of Indians’ and many more were repulsed by the injustice and callousness of their compatriots towards the ‘Hindoos’. Colonel Falkland Warren C.M.G., for instance, expressed his anguish and anger against the treatment given to them : ‘shame must for ever rest on the name of this city and especially upon those who have engineered the present great scandle’.74 According to Dady Burjor, the treatment of the general public towards the Hindus in the USA was 'humane, kind and considerate’, though often tinged with 'a sense of pity'.75

The Indian labourers, however, felt insecure and subjected to contempt and ridicule. In September 1907 they witnessed ‘anti-Asiatic riots'. The major target of that mob fury were the Japanese. Indians by and large remained practically unscathed. What they witnessed in that 'nightmare’, however, created among many of them a 'grave anxiety'. A number of them crossed into the State of Washington in the USA. But the situ­ation there was no better. The Asiatic Exclusion League which had been relatively quiet after forcing the curtailment of immi­

73 Part of this song, was as under :We welcome as brothers all white men still,But the shifty yellow racewhose word is vain, who oppresses the weakMust find an other place.

XXX XXXTo Oriental grasp and greed We'll never surrender, no, never Our watchword be, 'God save the King'White Canada for Ever.

Cited in Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, op. cif., p. 2.74 Cited in St. Nihal Singh, Modern Review, March 1908, p. 208. Even the

Immigration Officer of Vancouver, Dr. Alexander S. Munro wrote to a leading newspaper of the city : it is a shame (that) these Hindoos are treated as they have been’. Ibid., pp. 206-07.

75 Burjor's Report, p. 12.

THE BACKGROUND 27

gration from China and Japan had once again raised its head; this time to stem, what they described as 'tide of turbans'.76 The labour unions in Canada had developed relations of co-operation with the League in the US and just around the time when anti- Asiatic riots occurred in Vancouver, Indian workers in Bellingham (Washington State) were beaten up by lumpen elements and houses of Indians were raided during the railway strike at Tacoma. Therefore those Indians who had crossed into the US territory were pelted with stones on September 3, 1907 and pushed back into Canadian territory.77

A vigorous anti-Hindu propaganda by the labour organi­sations and their lobbying with their elected representatives for exclusion legislation was backed up by occasional recourse to physical assaults by gangs of hoodlums. That, however, did not deter the Indians eager to go to that world of opportunity. In later years they gave these hoodlums more than equal fight. More than 2600 Indians arrived in Canada during the early part of 1908, the largest number to enter in any one year, and more than 1700 arrived in USA.

The Government of Canada had however taken that year the first steps, by a Privy Council Order, to stop fresh immigration from India. The US Government preferred what was described as a 'strained application of law’ and was able to cut down fresh immigration to only 337 during the whole year of 1909. These Indians were dismayed and angered more by the restrictions imposed on the further entry of their compatriots and the indifference of Government of India to their plight than by the incidents of racial hostility and prejudice they encountered. Their petitions, memoranda and protests, as we will see later in this chapter, focussed almost exclusively on the former.

III. Exclusion of Indian Immigrants : Interests of the Empire

Indians, or East Indians, as they were described in America were inheritors of several decades of hostility towards immi­grants of Asiatic origin, particularly those from China and Japan

76 See Herman Scheffeur, 'Tide of Turbans’, Forum, June 1910, pp. 616-18. Bhakna, op. cit., p. 31; 'Tundilat', op. tit., pp. 15-16.

77 Home Political B, Proceedings, October 1907, Nos. 80-87. See also Bhakna, op. cit., p. 31.

28 GHADAR MOVEMENT

and governments in both Canada and the United States had made concerted efforts to stop or restrict that immigration.78 Bowing to organised pressure, the United States had enacted the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and in 1908 restricted Japanese immigration by a 'Gentlemen’s Agreement’ with Japan.

In Canada, similar steps were initiated in 1900 when on representations made by the white labour unions of British Columbia, including a resolution by the Legislative Assembly, a Royal Commission was appointed on Chinese and Japanese immigration. In its report submitted in February 1902, the commissioners notably identified the imperial interests with white sentiments in British Columbia :

it is in the interest of the Empire that the Pacific province of the Dominion should be occupied by a large and thoroughly British population rather than one in which the number of aliens would form a large proportion. . . . Whatever permanently weakens British Columbia weakens the Dominion and the Empire.79

The Dominion Government thereupon passed the Chinese Immigration Act 1903 restricting Chinese immigration by raising the head tax from $ 100 to $ 500, Immigration of the Japanese was restricted by what the Commissioners described as ’the friendly and opportune action’ by the Government of Japan which stopped issuing passports under the Japanese Immigration Protection Law of 1896. As a result, little was heard of Oriental immigration into Canada between 1903 and 1907.80 Meanwhile the Dominion Parliament had passed in 1906 a General Immigra­tion Act which authorised the Governor General-in-Council to prohibit, by proclamation or order, the landing in Canada of any specified class of immigrants.81

When the East Indians started coming to British Columbia in big groups, there was also a fresh influx of Japanese immigrants from Hawaii which led to anti-Asiatic riots in September 1907. Acting promptly a special mission was sent to Japan in October which led to a fresh agreement between

78 Harold S. Jacoby, 'Some Demographic and Social Aspects of Early East IndianLife in the United States’, in Juergensmeyer and Barrier, op. cil., p. 161.

79 Memorandum on Self Governing Dominions and Coloured Immigration,July 1908, Colonial Office Records, 886/1 Part I. pp. 37-38.

80 L oc■ cit., p. 39.81 hoc. cit■

THE BACKGROUND 29

the two governments. The Government of India, having been approached to follow the Japanese example, chose to leave it to the Canadian Government to take necessary steps but avoid any ‘express discrimination against British Indians’.82 83 On the advice of the Colonial Secretary, W.L. Mackenzie King, Deputy Minister of Labour was sent to England to confer with the British authorities. He submitted his report on 2nd May 1908 and on 27 May, the Governor General-in-Council prohibited, by an order, the landing in Canada of immigrants who came otherwise than by a continuous journey from the country of which they were natives or citizens on through tickets purchased in that country.88 By a further Order-in-Council of 3rd June 1908 Asiatic immigrants were required to have in their possession at least 200 dollars on arrival.84 *

These measures were evidently aimed exclusively at stopping immigration of Indians and were taken with full approval of the Government of India. The Indians, as against the Chinese and the Japanese, were British subjects and it was considered necessary to avoid the impression that they had been prohibited from coming to another part of the Empire. The 'continuous journey’ clause only thinly veiled the design. Governor General o f India Lord Minto and his Council, however, felt satisfied and communicated their appreciation to Lord Morley, the Secretary of State for India, for the manner in which the Canadian Government had approached 'this difficult question’.84 They underlined the effectiveness of the measures by reiterating that there was at that time no direct line of steamship running from Indian ports to western Canada and ‘We believe there is no likelihood of any steamship starting through running from India to a West Canadian port’.86 The other order which imposed the requirement of 200 dollars, further strengthened their position. That, as they wrote, ‘makes it practically impossible for Indian labourers to enter Canada'. Lord Minto expressed satisfaction that a solution had been found ‘without resorting to invidious legislation aimed

82 Ibid., pp. 42-43.83 Lord Minto to Lord Morley, Calcutta 11 March 1909, in Further Corres­

pondence on 'Treatment of Asiatics', Colonial Office Records, 886/2.84 Minto, loc. cit.86 L oc . cit,86 Loc. cit.

30 ' GHADAR MOVEMENT

particularly, at British Indians’ and that the manner in which the delicate problem was handled did not involve them in any controversy.87

A somewhat cautious fervour marked the Government of India's treatment of the Canadian proposal. What could be the reason for their earnestness ? They were, of course, well aware that all that effort was aimed particularly at stopping Indian emigration to Canada and was in that sense, invidious. The 'continuous journey’ regulation had no relevance to the immi­gration from China and Japan because direct steamships from ports in both these countries to western Canada had been running for a long time. They were also fully aware that the requirement of 200 dollars imposed on Indians was discriminatory because that did not apply to the Japanese who were covered by 'treaty right’.88 Brigadier-General E.J.E. Swayne, Governor General of British Honduras, who had earlier served in the Intelligence Branch of Government of India and was deputed in December 1908 to deal with matters affecting East Indians in British Columbia, 'deprecated' that discriminatory measure. In his Memorandum to the Colonial Office, he observed : 'This, when compared to $ 40 imposed upon the Japanese, cannot fail to give rise in India to the cry that British subjects are unfairly treated and it will be difficult to explain it away.’89

India’s eagerness to restrict that emigration from Punjab appeared conspicuously misplaced and suspect particularly in the context of the value and importance which the revenue officers in the Punjab attached to emigration of Jat Sikh peasants from the congested areas of the province.90 The

87 Loc. cit.88 h oc■ cit.89 'Confidential' Memorandum on Matters Affecting East Indian Community in

British Columbia, India Office R ecords, L/P & J/6/1137 Annex 9, n.7. Also, India, Commerce and Industry, Emigration A, Proceedings, Mav 1909, No. 13, p. 37.

90 Census o f Punjab 1901, p. 14. Discussing areas where tiny holdings were innumerable, Sir Malcolm Darling upheld emigration as the one 'remedy' which 'the Punjabi would cordially welcome’ and that 'where, as in Hoshiar- pur and Jullundur, he has gone abroad in large numbers, the whole face of the countryside has been changed by the wealth he has brought back'. There was a tang of regret in his observation : ‘But emigration is now subject to so many restrictions that it cannot be of much assistance’. See Darling, op. cit., p. 254.

THE BACKGROUND 31

number of Indians in British Columbia was around 3,500 at the end of 1908 and much smaller at the time when first steps were initiated to stop their entry. That number, when compared to the presence in that province of around 22,000 Chinese and Japanese immigrants91 who were not British subjects, could hardly be a sufficient cause for India to seek immediate restrictions. The anomaly becomes more pronounced when one notes that whereas 'Indians were barred, larger number of the Chinese and Japanese continued to pour into Canada.92

The Canadian restrictions on immigration from India could not be explained in terms of the stated imperial policy that the question of immigration of aliens into a Dominion was to be determined according to the will of the Parliament and the people of that Dominion. Nor could it be adequately explained with reference only to the said ‘racial policy’ of the Canadian Govern­ment. There were evidently some other weighty considerations which obliged the Government of India and the British authorities in London to take prompt and effective steps. Some meaningful indications of those other considerations were available in the reports of Brigadier-General Swayne and the communications of the Colonial Office with Governments of India and Canada. Dilating upon Swayne's arguments the Secretary of State for India forwarded, for instance, the following as 'some of the strongest reasons for strictly limiting further emigration of Indians to Western Canada' :

(i) That the terms of close familiarity which competition with white labour brings about do not make for British prestige; and it is by prestige alone that India is held not by force;

(ii) that there is a socialist propaganda in Vancouver, and the consequent danger of the East Indians being imbued with socialist doctrines;

91 Me limes, Confidential Report, foe. cif.92 In the year 1911 alone, for instance, 11, 932 Chinese migrated to Canada (This

was double the number of total immigration of Indians from the earliest time upto 1911, and four times the number of Indians resident in Canada at that time); the number of fresh Japanese immigrants in that year was 2986. As for Indians, only one was allowed to enter. See Waiz, Indians Abroad, p. 659.

32 GHADAR MOVEMENT

(iii) labour rivalry is sure to result in occasional outbreaks of feelings on the part of the whites and any dissatis­faction at unfair treatment o f Indians in Vancouver is certain to b e exploited for the purpose o f agitation in India, (and)

(iv) East Indian affairs are sometimes made use of by unscrupulous partisans to serve the cause of their political party.93 94 95 96 *

Swayne made it more clear in an interview with The W orld of Vancouver that the familiarity which the Indians acquired with the 'whites’ made their presence in Canada 'politically inex­pedient' to British interests in India, because 'these men go back to India and preach ideas of emancipation which would upset the machinery of law and order'.98 Making a forthright recommendation, he emphasised :

The political reasons I have given for the exclusion of natives of India, and the importance of this exclusion to India itself, do not admit, I think, of our continuing the immigration of these Asiatics as free labourers. . . .,s

The above description may be a fairly reliable indication of the current thinking of the Imperial and British Indian authorities. The importance of exclusion of Indians to the imperial interests in India appeared to have been at least as weighty a reason as the compulsions of the Government of Canada. Evidently, it was not only with the connivance of the' British authorities but because of their active initiative and intervention that the entry of Indian labour to Canada was stopped.

Given the ‘political reasons' for excluding Indians from North America the British ambassador in Washington, Lord Bryce, also made a demi-official proposal to the US Government 'as early as 1907-08’ that ‘they should exclude the Indians as they had excluded the Chinese'.98 The F ree Hindustan of Tarak

93 Secretary of State for India to Home Department India, No. 37, 26 February 1909, Commerce and Industry, Emigration A, P roceed in gs, May 1909, No. 13. (iem phasis added).

94 Quoted by St. Nihal Singh, 'The Triumph of Indians in Canada', op. cit., p. 105, See also Waiz, op. cit., p. 650.

95 Swayne's Confidential Memorandum, loc. cit.96 Elizabeth S. Kite, 'An American Criticism of "The Other Side of the Medal".

M odern Review, February 1927. p. 169.

THE BACKGROUND35

in t-Nath Das m its first issue of April 1908 condemned 'der'silly proposal’ of Lord Bryce and thanked the US authon, .

for having 'refused' to accept the British proposal.97 Wherk*nhethe Indian Government was sending shiploads of immigrants^ slaves to Fiji Islands to serve the British planters, it wanted' ’ stop their immigration to Canada and USA because, as D;^ argued, these were lands of freedom where Indians couIg learn the principles of liberty.*8

The Punjab from where these Indian emigrants went there was one of the chief recruiting centres for the Indian army and fears had apparently been aroused about the possible repercu­ssions of the importation of ideas of emancipation among members of the ‘martial community’. Their familiarity with the ills and weaknesses of the white labour was not conducive to military discipline in India which hinged largely on the myth of 'white superiority’. Morley had already informed Minto of a communication from Bryce about Indian students having joined hands with Irish-American agitators in anti-British propaganda.99 The imperial interests required that the emigrants must be kept more or less insulated against ideas of liberty and equality. The British fears seemed more real because of the reports of circulation among some of the troops in the Punjab of seditious pamphlets, believed to have origina­ted from 'political agitators' in the USA.100 Lieutenant Governor Ibbetson had been filing almost nervous reports on the political situation in the Punjab in 1907, giving warning of serious danger from a threatened decline in the traditional loyalty of

97 F ree Hindustan (Vancouver), Vol. I, No. 1. (April 1908), p. 1.98 Loc. cit-99 Morley to Minto, 23 April 1908, cited in Diwakar Prasad Singh, American

Attitude Towards the Indian Nationalist Movement (New D elhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1974), pp. 128-29.

100 Minto wrote to Morley on 5 March 1907 that he 'heard to-day of the discovery at Mardan, the Head Quarters of the Guides, of a circular addressed to Native troops pointing out to them how easy it would be to throw off British rule. . . .The circular emanated from some Natives of India now in the United States . . .’. Mary, Countess of Minto, India, Minto and Morley 1905-1910 (London : Macmillan. & Co. 1934), p. 122.The prosecution of The India of Rawalpindi was proposed for the publi­cation of a leaflet in which the troops were asked 'Sipahi na bano' (Do not Become Soldiers) and to'rise, there is no time to lose’. Home Political B Proceedings, luly 1907, Nos. 3-4.

32 GHADAJR MOVEMENT

Sikhs who constituted a major and important portion of the ’.ve army.101 102 Fears of a possible repetition of the events of

37 had been induced among the British officers101 whom E.M. •ster had found to be ‘nervous creatures in India, naturally rvous’.

Apart from the steps taken to stop further entry of Indian immigrants, cautious moves were also discussed between the Government of Canada and the Colonial Office in London, during July-October 1908, to deport a part of the resident Indians to areas outside Canada. That was considered necessary, as J.B. Harkin of the Ministry of the Interior stated, to meet a threatened spurt of unemployment among Indians. He proposed that they may be deported to Panama Canal Zone, Hawaii, Fiji or Cuba.103 The Colonial Office suggested British Honduras as more suitable and recommended that some representatives of Indians should first be allowed to visit that colony and see things for themselves.104

Two representatives of Indian immigrants, Nagar Singh and Sham Singh, left Vancouver for Beliz (Br. Honduras) on

101 In one of his minutes to the Governor General of India, he wrote, for instance;

In the case of the Sikhs, the danger is especially great. It is only sixty years since they ruled the Punjab; it was largely their help that enabled us to put down the mutiny; they occupy all the centre of the province; they supply a large and important portion of our native army and if the loyally of the lat Sikhs of the Punjab is ever materially shaken the danger will be greater than any which could possibly arise in Bengal.

Home Political A, Proceedings, August 1907, Nos. 148-235. para 22.102 Minto referred to those fears in his letter of 29 August 1907 to Lord Morley.

Justifying the new Press Act, to 'safeguard against the contamination of the Indian army’, he reminded Morley that 'the mysterious story of the Chaupattis before the mutiny might have been a warning but not evidence. The facts that stare us in the face are the circulation of leaflets and seditious newspapers in the lines of Native regiments’. Mary, Countess of Minto, op. cit., pp. 151, see also Valentine Chirol, Indian Unrest (London : Macmillan, 1910), p. 117 and Sir Henry Cotton, India and Home Memories,- (London, 1911), pp. 320-321.

103 J.B. Harkin to Superintendent of Immigration Ottawa, 29 July 1908 in India, Commerce and Industry, Emigration A, Proceedings, May 1909, No. 13.

104 Principal Secretary for Colonies, to Governor General of Canada, 19 Sep­tember 1908. Ibid.

THE BACKGROUND 35

October 15, 1908 alongwith Harkin as a Government represent­ative and W.C. Hopkinson as an interpreter, in order ■to find a solution of the difficulty in a friendly spirit'. Harkin was over enthusiastic about the outcome and proposed that the Minister of Interior should negotiate with the Colonial Office, 'for payment of transportation expenses of 1000 to 1500 Hindoos, for I expect we can secure that number to leave British Columbia if Honduras report is favourable’.101 The represent­atives of Indian immigrants, however, did not appear to be satisfied with the given prospects. The colony required labourers, but the living conditions were poor, and wages less than one-third of what one earned on the average in British Columbia.

Meanwhile two incidents accentuated the fears amongst the Indians. Soon after the delegates left for Beliz, the excited leaders of the Conservative Provincial Government leaked out their design to the Press that '1000 of the Hindu community would be forcibly deported', and that created, as Swayne reported, a ‘peculiar political difficulty’.10* An allegation was also made by the Indian representatives in their community gathering at Vancouver that a bribe was offered to them 'to sign a favourable report’. This news which appeared in The Daily Province of Vancouver on 23rd November 1908 caused further suspicions.

In the meantime Indians of British Columbia had invited Teja Singh, a disciple of Sant Attar Singh and a highly educated Sikh preacher who was then a student at the Columbia University of New York, to help them in their hour of crisis.105 106 107 Erudite and soft spoken, Teja Singh addressed a number of meetings of the Indian immigrants organising them to fight strongly against the reported scheme of deportation. He spoke Tike a man who believes he has a sacred mission to perform'. In a most important meeting held in the Sikh temple he was reported to have proudly declared that his coming to Vancouver was providential and that ‘his steps had been directed by Guru

105 Harkin to W.W. Cory, Deputy Minister of Interior, 16 October 1908. Ibid.

106 Loc. cit.107 Swayne's Memorandum, cp. cit. See also, Teja Singh, op. cit. pp. 296-97.

36 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Nanak’.108 109 The Daily Province published a full front page article on 'Mystery and Power of Teja Singh' who was regarded by his people'A s a Demi-God’. Teja Singh warned the Government of India of grave consequences of the suspicions created by their plan of deporting the 'Sikhs' from Canada. Brigadier- General Swayne who, having served in India, understood British Government's stakes in the loyalty of the Sikhs, was worried. 'Should the Sikhs waver in their loyalty', he told in an interview with The W orld on Decem ber 10, 1908, ‘it would require 100,000 white troops to cope successfully with the situation'.109 Incidently on that very day, the Governor General of Canada approved minutes of the Privy Council deciding, 'there is no intention of enforcing the deportation of these people.to British Handuras'.110 St. Nihal Singh described the incident as 'The Triumph of the Indians in Canada'.111 The whole episode, however, created, on the one hand, serious misgivings and fears among the Indians, and on the' other, an urge to stand united to face the challenge.

There was little evidence to suggest that, barring a few educated political activists, Indian immigrants were even vaguely aware of the initiatives taken by the British authorities in these administrative moves. Suspicions were however aroused that the British Government in India was not keen to help them, though many still continued to expect good faith from it.

Across the border, the US Department of Labour found the existing immigration laws inadequate to meet the 'emergency' and recommended what was termed as a ‘strained application of law'. That implied a 'meticulously careful screening’ of all East Indians regarding those physical, psychological, economic and philosophical characteristics which rendered individuals as

108 The Daily Province (Vancouver), 12 December 1908, p. 1.

109 The W orld (Vancouver), 14 December 1908; see also, Nand Singh Sihra,■Indians in Canada’, M odern Review . August 1913, p. 145.

110 See, Commerce and Industry, Emigration A, P roceed in gs, May 1909, No. 13,Annexure 9. See also, Sihra, loc. cit.

111 This was also the title of his article. M odern Review , August 1909,pp. 99-108.

THE BACKGROUND 37

individuals ineligible for entry.112 113 114 115 116 117 As a result, the number of fresh entrants fell to 337 in 1909. The rejection rate for the years 1907-1914, rose to thirty-three per cent, and during the years 1909, 1911 and 1913, fifty per cent of all Indian applicants for entry were rejected.113

The brief relaxation by the immigration authorities in 1910 led to a spurt and 1782 more Indians arrived, the largest number ever to come to the USA in any one year. The anti­oriental agitation was renewed with vigour. Before that time, says ’Tundilat’, there was hardly any noticeable hatred for Indians among the white labourers. Four influential national magazines, having a wide readership, The Collier's magazine, The Forum, The Survey and The White Man—the organ of the movement for expulsion of Asiatics—raised a cry against the said 'unmitigated nuisance’ of 'these most undesirable people’114 and called for an immediate stop to their immigration. Emily Brown noted that ‘The files of the Bureau of Immigration are filled with clippings sent by individuals or organi­sations to support their protests against unrestricted Indian immigration1.113

There were fresh riots in Portland and St. John on 21 March 1910 and the local police appeared to connive at the hooli­ganism.110 In 1913 an Alien Land Law was passed restricting the rights of Indians to own land. But the most effective termination of further immigration came with ‘Barred Zone’ provisions of the Immigration Law of 1917.11’

112 Harold S. Jacoby, in Juergensmeyer and Barrier, op. cii., p. 162.The immigration authorities turned back the coming immigrants on grounds like liability to public charge, suffering from contagious disease, or violating the Alien Contract Labour Law. Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, op. cit. p., 13.

113 Jacoby, loc. cit.114 Emily Brown, op. cit., p. 89.

115 ibid ., p. 90.116 Dady Burjor, Report, cp . cit. See also, Arun Coomer Bose, op. cit., p. 48,

n. 45. Also Bhakna, op. cit., pp. 31-32;' Tundilat’, op. cit. p. 16; Jwala Singh,loc. cit.

117 Jacoby, op. cit., pp. 162-63.

38 GHADAR MOVEM ENT

Beginning of Political Consciousness

The political awakening among Indians in Canada and the United States rose with different types of activities revolving round three main factors : hostility and resentment against the white community for its prejudice and oppression, development of an ethnic identity, and nationalism directed against British colonialism in India. The three factors were inter­related and reinforced one another. Differences betw een identifiable secular-nationalist and communal-parochial orienta­tions were not insubstantial; these were occasionally manifested in contrary priorities, but one central factor of direct experience of oppression strongly influenced all their activities.

Of the two prominent influences which the elite among the immigrants brought with them from home, one related to the spirit of community revitalisation and its boundary demarcation. A predominant majority of them being Sikhs, the early form of community activity in an inhospitable alien environment was inspired by the objectives set forth by the Singh Sabha movement in Punjab118 and was centred round the Gurdwara. Bhai Arjan Singh, a 'venerated soul', established the first Gurdwara near Port Moody. The Gurdwara Committee, later known as Khalsa Diwan Society, which also included Bhai Bhag Singh and Balwant Singh granthi (Sikh priest), was concerned about the corrupting influence of foreign environment and resolved to conduct evangelical work (gurm at p rachar), baptising the non-baptised (sehajdhari) Sikhs and to maintain the purity of Sikh religious norms.119 Concerted efforts were made to fight, what was described as a mowna leh ar— a wave among the immigrants to get clean shaven and wear hats with a view to seek better accommodation in the alien setting. This weighed heavily on the minds of the leaders because, accor­ding to Bhai Kartar Singh of INI a wan Chand, ‘approximately six hundred Sikh brothers had taken to wearing of hats’, by

118 See, Harish K. Puri, 'Ghadar M ovement: An Experiment in New Patterns of Socialisation', Journal o f R egional History, Vol. 1 (1981), p. 122.

119 'Written Account of Bhai Kartar Singh Nawan Chand', in Ganda Singh (ed.), A w reeka Vich Hindustani, pp. 58-83. Also, Teja Singh, op. cit., pp. 294-95.

THE BACKGROUND 39

January 1908.110 The Khalsa Diwan Society decided to boycott such apostates and prohibited Sikhs from accepting or purchas­ing eatables from them or welcoming them in their homes.

The other major influence which these immigrants brought with them was a notion, so assiduously cultivated by the British, of the martial tradition of the Sikhs and their steadfast loyalty to the British Empire. That was considered valuable in facilitating their adjustment and protection of their interests in Canada as a part of the Empire. The fact that nearly half of these immigrants had served short terms in the British Indian army helped to bolster that group image. The British authorities considered those two influences as complimentary for, as Macauliffe observed, 'the orthodoxy of a Sikh means loyalty to his sovereign’.131 In many of the petitions and memoranda submitted to Canadian, British and Indian authorities seeking protection of their interests, repeated reference was made, as we will see later in this section, to the self image : ‘with the name Sikh is linked up fidelity and heroic loyalty to the Empire’.

The encounter with white prejudice, anti-Asiatic riots and threats of exclusion and deportation of Indian immigrants, however, became a new powerful factor which tended to alter their orientation. The fears of deportation which were aroused during the last quarter of 1908 became a major reason for solidarity. 'When people are kicking you’, as St. Nihal Singh wrote, 'you cannot but feel like affiliating with others of your kin and country and pulling together’.132 So that when Teja Singh started mobilizing and organising these people against the reported proposal of sending a number of Indians to British Honduras, the political tenor was conspicuously altered.

Teja Singh talked in a profoundly spiritual idiom; most meetings were held in the Gurdwara, but the dominant mood 120 121 122 *

120 Ganda Singh, op. cit., p. 31. According to him, in one factory at Millside where about five hundred Punjabi Sikhs were employed the number of proper amritdhari Sikhs was only around thirty. Ibid., p. 67.

121 Cited in Baldev Raj Nayyar, Minority Politics in the Punjab (Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press. 1966), p. 65.

122 St. Nihal Singh, 'The Triumph of Indians in Canada', Modern Review,August 1909, p. 105.

40 GHADAR MOVEMENT

was anti-British, defiant and militant.1” He believed that his mission was ordained by Guru Nanak. Somewhat like Aurobindo Ghose's mystical experience in Alipore Jail wherein, as he claimed, Lord Krishna appeared before him to give direction about his mission ,134 Teja Singh reported about Guru Nanak appearing to him in a dream, to ordain : 'Child ! don’t worry, we’ll get their (British) vanity rent through Germany’.135 His autobiographical account tells of a persistent and vigorous campaign of proselytization and establishment of new Gurdwaras which followed thereafter in a series of Indian colonies alongside a more broadbased and secular constitutional struggle for protection of the interests of Indian immigrants in Canada.138

Meanwhile radical nationalist propaganda led by a few Indian revolutionaries which was directed against British rule in India had introduced a new element which contributed to the rise of political consciousness among the immigrants. Political propaganda and organisations of Indian students had been started in New York in 1906 with the assistance of Irish nationalists of Clan-na-Gael, particularly George Fitzgerald 'Freeman’, editor of Gaelic American.1-' On the West Coast, however, the first militant nationalist activity was started by Ramnath Puri, apolitical exile from India.

In 1907, Puri issued a lithographed propaganda sheet Circular-e-Azadi (Circular of freedom) in Urdu language which announced the formation of a Hindustan Association at San Francisco with branches at Astoria and Vancouver.123 124 125 126 127 128 Among its objectives were included political education of Indians on nationalist lines, training in gun firing and use of other weapons, Japanese exercises and fostering American

123 'Mystery and Power of Teja Singh', The Vancouver Daily Province, 12 December 1908, p. 1. Also Swayne's Memorandum, op. cit.

124 R.R. Diwakar, Mahayogi Sri Aurobindo (Bombay : Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1967), pp. 152-53.

125 Teja Singh, op. cit., p. 303.126 Ibid., pp. 358-70,127 Bose, op. cit., pp. 38-40.128 Note of J.C. Ker, (Personal Assistant to Director of Criminal Intelligence

from 1907 to 1913) 29 May 1908, Home Political, Deposit, P roceedings , November 1908, No. 6. pp. 17-18.

THE BACKGROUND 41

sympathy for India.13’ In one of its issues of 1908, the Circular proclaimed ‘we are no longer immersed in Asiatic ignorance... The king is no longer to us the representative of God in the country. We have come to know that the people possess the right of appointing and dethroning kings'. It supported the Swadeshi movement then going on in Bengal, pointing out that 'Swadeshi is for India what Sinn Fein is for Ireland.’129 130

A few of the other revolutionary youths who happened to be in Vancouver at the end of 1907, made it a centre of their political activity. Prominent among them were Taraknath Das, Surendra Mohan Bose, G.D. Kumar and Harnam Singh Sahri. Taraknath Das, a 23 years old Bengali who was a student at one of the colleges in Seattle came to Vancouver at the end of 1907 as an interpreter in the employ of the United States Immigration office.131 132 On a protest from Canadian Government about his attacks on 'British prestige’, Das was dismissed from his job in April 1908.133 Surendra Mohan Bose, another Bengali youth who was in close touch with revolution­aries like Aurobindo Ghose in Bengal and went to USA towards the end of 1907 to specialise in Chemistry, also came to Vancouver,133 Guran Ditt Kumar, a native of Bannu in the North West Frontier Province of India who came into contact with revolutionaries at the National College Calcutta (where he taught Urdu for a short period) arrived in Victoria and set up a grocery shop there.134 Harnam Singh of Sahri who was a sowaar (trooper) of the 4th Cavalary in India before 1904 also arrived in Victoria with Kumar in 1907.135

Taraknath Das started publishing from April 1908, a few days before he was dismissed from his job, an eight page periodical, F ree Hindusthan in English language, first from Vancouver, then from Seattle across the border and later

129 James Campbell Ker, Political Trouble in India, 1907-1917 (Calcutta : Editions Indian, 1973), p. 208.

130 Home Political A, Proceedings, July 1908, Nos. 137-139.131 Swayne's Memorandum, loc. cit.132 Cited from Joan M. Jenson, ‘The "Hindu Conspiracy" : A Reassessment’

Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 1 (February 1979), p. 71.133 Bose, Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, pp. 49-SO. See also Ker, op. cit.,

p. 227.134 History Sheet of G.D. Kumar, India Office R ecords, L/P & J/6/1137 of 1912.135 Ker, op- cit., p. 217.

42 GHADAR MOVEMENT

from New York. Following broadly the ideological framework shared by most contemporary revolutionaries abroad and similar in tone and style to that of Shyamji Krishnavarma's Indian Sociologist, this paper aimed at political education for a revolution by the masses, It carried on its masthead a popular injunction of Herbert Spencer : 'Resistance to Tyranny is Obedi­ence to God’.

On 22 March, Das organised a mass meeting of Indian residents in Vancouver to protest against the unjust treatment by Canadian and Indian Governments and then sent a cable­gram to Lord Morley protesting against exclusion and deport­ation.136 Report of that meeting was the first item in the first number of F ree Hindusthan. It was followed by a piece, 'Our National Life at Stake’, which condemned British Imperial policy of excluding Indians from all self-governing colonies. The British Government should be told in strong terms, suggested Das, that 'if we are not allowed to enter British colonies, Britishers will sooner or later be excluded from Hindusthan’ and concluded with a warning that another act of injustice might bring 'an upheaval which will rend the Empire into pieces’.137

In other articles the paper exposed, what it described as, ‘the murderous commercial policy of Great Britain’ which led to repeated famines killing nineteen million people during the last 25 years, and condemned 'Russian Measures of Oppression’ in India.138 In later issues of the paper, Das advised political work among the Sikh soldiers for an 'organised uprising’.139

Since the F ree Hindusthan was published in English, it could not wield much influence among Indians of the labouring class. Me Innes had a point when he observed in his confidential report that the paper was 'intended for whites to read’, because ■not one Hindu in a hundred of those here knows even the English alphabet’.140

Meanwhile the Canadian Government had hired a Calcutta policeman W.C. Hopkinson, who was on leave of absence from

136 Confidential Cable, W.E. Me Innes to the Minister of the Interior, Govern­ment of Canada, 23 March 1908, Colonial Office R ecords, 886, 1, Enclosure117.

137 F ree Hindusthan, Vol. I. No. 1, April 1908.138 hoc- cit.139 See, for instance, F ree Hindusthan, March-April 1910.140 Me Innes' Report, op. cit.

THE BACKGROUND 43

India, to serve as an 'official Hindustan interpreter’ in Vancouver but actually to conduct investigations of Indian immigrants. He warned the Canadian Government that East Indians were raising money for printing of bomb manuals to be sent to India.141 He had also accompanied two ‘Hindu delegates’ to Belize (British Honduras), returning to Vancouver with them on 4 November 1908. Soon thereafter, in consultation with L.W. Creppin, a correspondent of London Times, he gave to the Press in Vancouver newsy information regarding Das’s anti- British activities at his school at Millside. Following the publicity the school was closed and Das left for Seattle continuing the publication of his paper from there.14*

Swayne considered it important to keep a close watch on the political activities of Indian agitators for which he found Hopkinson to be most competent. On his confidential recommendation143 Hopkinson was appointed in January 1909 to conduct investigations of activities of Indian nationalists in Canada and USA. Hopkinson hired secret, agents including some like Bela Singh from the Indian Community and started sending regular reports to Canada’s Governor General Albert Grey.144 With his reports the CID in India built dossiers on Indian political agitators in North America.

After the departure of Taraknath Das, a Hindustan Associa­tion was formed at Vancouver in 1909 with G.D. Kumar as its Secretary. Following the pattern of Shyamji Krishnavarma’s ‘India House1 at Highgate in London, Kumar set up a ‘Swadesh Sewak Home’ at 1932, 2nd Avenue West. Fairview, Vancouver and started publishing in 1910 a Gurmukhi paper named Swadesh Sewak.us Complete self government for the ‘Hindu­stani Nation’ was announced as the primary objective of this organisation. Among the other objectives were included national education, development of Indian industry, trade and agriculture and end of foreign exploitation in India.146 The Association worked in close liason with the Khalsa Diwan

141 Joan M. Jensen, op. cit., p. 71.142 Swayne’s Confidential Memorandum, loc. cit.143 Loc. cit.144 Jenson, op. cit., p. 72.145 History Sheet of G.D. Kumar, op. cit.146 Rules and Regulations, Hindustani Association Vancouver B.C., Canada in

Home Political B, P roceed in gs, June 1911, No. 103, pp. 7-11.

44 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Society. Kumar, Harnam Singh and some others went to the working places of small groups of Indian labourers and discussed social and political problems with them. Quite a few of those who became prominent leaders of the Ghadar movement believed that besides opposition to exclusion of 'Hindus’, Kumar’s main emphasis was on matters of social and religious reform and that he mainly advised the Indian settlers to stop drinking, rise above caste differences and attend to matters of community welfare.147 According to J.C. Ker, however, the tone of his paper Swadesh Sewak had soon become 'objection­able'. It started addressing chiefly to the Sikh troops of the Indian Army, to rise against the British. Since the paper was sent out to India in ‘considerable numbers’, its entry in the country was prohibited under the Sea Customs Act in March 1911.148 149

Besides propaganda papers, public meetings were held and funds collected for struggle against the ban on the entry of Indians in Canada. One such meeting was held in April 1910 under the auspices of the Hindustan Association to fight against the arrest of Husain Rahim alias Chagan Khairaj Varma. a native of Porbander state in Kathiawar, who arrived in Vancouver in January 1910. Rahim who had commercial interests in Canada was politically affiliated with Das and Kumar. He was arrested on the ground that he had entered Canada illegally, for he had not arrived by a continuous journey. Among those who addressed the meeting were Taraknath Das, G.D. Kumar, Rahim himself and Harnam Singh and Natha Singh of the Khalsa Diwan Society. A memorandum was sent to India office in London.148 A few months plater Harnam Singh Sahri was also arrested and the agitation for the release of the two Indians was intensified.

The secret political work of Kumar and Sahri consisted of winning over some of the more enthusiastic men from the immigrants to the revolutionary work for the overthrow

147 Harnam Singh 'Tundilat', op. cit., p. 20. Bhakna wrote that G.D. Kumar's lectures were social reformist in nature. Bhakna, op. cit.. p . 37.Sainsara, who had the advantage of having had detailed interviews with a number of Ghadarites, made similar observations. Ghadar Party da Itihas, p. 66.

148 Ker, Political Trouble in India, pp. 210-11.149 Ibid., p. 216. See also, Commerce and Industry, Emigration A, proceedings,

June 1910, Nos. 1-1-15.

THE BACKGROUND 45

of the British regime and making a provision for training in the use of arms, manufacture of explosives and collection of arms. Colin S. Campbell, Chief Constable of Vancouver wrote to the Superintendent of Police on 23 January 1908 that there existed in Vancouver an organisation of Indians which preached sedition, under the cover of religious pretexts and that it collected money, ostensibly for the purposes of Gurdwara, but actually for purchasing arms and making other preparations for a violent uprising in India.160 The provincial police believed that Kumar was the head of that secret organisation and that money was sent to the headquarters of the society.

The Vancouver Daily Province published on 31 May 1911 a sensational news item under the heading 'Vancouver Hindus and Plotters in India : Thousands of Dollars Sent from British Columbia to Headquarters; Money to Buy Rifles’.161 Kumar, in a communication to its editor, condemned the paper and its correspondent for publishing a deliberate lie and 'such non­sense without any facts'.150 151 152 153 The arrest of Rahim and later Harnam Singh, ostensibly on the charge of illegal entry, could however be attributed to the above mentioned suspicion of the police. Soon after these incidents, Kumar also left Canada which meant the closure of Swadesh Sewak Home and end of his paper and the Hindustan Association.

After leaving Canada, Kumar joined Taraknath Das at Seattle and a 'United India House’ was set up there in the fall of 1910 with Das as its Secretary. It was reported that about twenty five labourers met at the United India House every Saturday where lectures weie given by Das and other Bengali students.162

The political work of these nationalists appeared to have contributed a new element in the development of a political consciousness among their countrymen. Some of the leading figures from the community of immigrants started thinking that a major part of their problems and miseries were attributable to the British rule in India, and that it was in no sense flattering

150 Home Political Deposit, P roceedings, November 1908, No. 6, pp. 9-11.151 See also, records of D.C.l’s Office, Home Political B, Proceedings, July 1910,

Nos. 196-97.152 The Vancouver Daily Province, 3 June 1910.153 D.C.l.s report ending June 15, 1910, Home Pclitical B, P roceedings, August

1910, Nos. 10-17.

46 CHADAR MOVEMENT

for them that they w ere subjects of a foreign British pow er. As a consequence, the Executive Committee of the Sikh Temple of Vancouver, in its m eeting held on 3rd O ctober 1909, condem ned the British exploitation of India and resolved :

No m em ber of the Executive Committee of the Sikh Temple should wear any kind of medals, buttons, uni­forms or insignia which may signify that the position of the party wearing the article is nothing but of a slave to the British supremacy.1*4

An exercised Bhai Bhag Singh, who had served in the 10th Bengal Lancers for over 5 years and was now Secretary of the Khalsa Diwan Society made a bonfire with his certificate of 'honourable discharge’.154 155 156

Close co-ordination and co-operation now developed between the activities of the Khalsa Diwan Society and purely political nationalist organisations such as. the United India League which was organised in 1911 in place of the defunct Hindustan Association. Both of these had their headquarters in the same Gurdwara at Vancouver. Some of the leaders held important positions in both kinds of organisations.156 Their activities related to agitation against the practical ban imposed on the entry of fresh Indians including the families of those who were already residents in Canada. Prominent other leaders such as Teja Singh and Dr. Sunder Singh who started publishing the Aryan in August 1911, stayed away from the nationalist political activity and the United India League.

Efforts were also made to secure justice in the courts of law. Giving his judgement in the case of Husain Rahim, Mr. Justice Murphy observed that in issuing the Privy Council Order 920 of May 1910, the Governor General of Canada had exceeded the limits of his power, and therefore ordered release of Rahim.157 Soon after, when Hari Singh brought his wife and children from India in 1911, the refusal of entry to the family led to another case in a lower court of Vancouver. But following

154 F ree Hinduslhan, Septsm ber-October 1909. See also D.C.I.'s report for the week ending 18 December 1909, Home Political B. P roceed in g s , February- 1910, Nos: 120-127

155 F r e e Hindusthan, loc.cit.156 Bhag Singh. President of Khalsa Diwan Society was also President of the

Hindustan Association; Balwant Singh the head priest of the Sikh Temple was a treasurer of the United India League. See Sainsara, op. cit., pp. 66-70-

157 Ibid., p. 41.

THE BACKGROUND 47

the 'stay order’, the authorities thought it wise to permit the family to stay 'as an act of grace’. However when Balwant Singh brought his wife and children they were turned back. Teja Singh and Sundar Singh, in order to retrieve their position led a deputation to Ottawa, met the Minister of the Interior, and pleaded in the name of the services rendered by the Sikhs to the Empire and on grounds of morality, to relax the restrictions on the entry of the families of resident Indians.158 Returning to Vancouver, Teja Singh reported triumphantly that the minister had relented and families would be permitted. The news was flashed to Hong Kong. But a month later when Bhag Singh, Balwant Singh and their families arrived, the men were allowed, but their families were detained. Johnston wrote that Teja Singh’s mission had accomplished ‘nothing' and that ■the whole affair cost Teja Singh his standing and he shortly left the city and returned to India’.159 Actually, following the recourse to courts of law, these two families had also been allowed as a ‘further act of grace’, and Teja Singh went not to India but to the University of California at Berkeley to work for his Ph.D,160 161 162 But the prohibition on entry of Indians, including families and children of those already settled, was made more effective.

Helplessness and resentment prevailed in the community when the Duke of Connaught, Governor General of Canada’s visit to Vancouver was announced. Bhag Singh, President of Khalsa Diwan Society rejected an invitation to take part in a rec­eption and military review saying that the Sikhs, retired soldiers from the Indian Army, would not be in a position to attend the reception ‘on many reasonable grounds’ already known to the city officials.181 But another section of Sikhs, ‘breasting medals,’ joined the crowd and presented a welcome address express­ing fealty to the Duke and the King.182

The. Press in Punjab also expressed concern over the anti-Indian measures adopted by Canada. The Loyal Gazette, the Desh, The Hindu, The Tribune, The Panjabee, all published

158 Waiz, Indians A broad pp. 254-55.159 Johnston, The voyage o f Komagata Maru p. 12.160 Teja Singh, op. cit., p. 377. See aiso, Emily Brown, Har Dayal p. 128-161 Bhag Singh to The Mayor, Vancouver, 8 September 1912, India Office

R ecords, L/P & J/6/1137/1912.162 India Office Records, ioc. cit.

48 GHADAR MOVEMENT

from Lahore, and the Khalsa Sew ak of Amritsar wrote editorials on the problems of Indian immigrants and published news items of protest meetings held in Canada.1"* The Loyal Gazette o f 12 May 1912 reminded the Government of India that 'Sikhs shed rivers of blood in 1857 in order to preserve British rule in India' and showed 'loyalty and bravery on every battle field'.It therfore appealed for India's intervention for remedial measures.1"1 The P anjabee used a stronger language : 'It is impossible to conceive of a more wanton piece of obstruction and harassment of the Hindus than to keep out their wives and children.'163 164 165 166

In Vancouver, the Khalsa Diwan Society and the United India League, in a meeting held on February 1913, resolved to send a deputation to meet the Colonial Secretary in London and the Viceroy of India in Delhi. The delegation consisting of Balwant Singh, the head priest; Narain Singh, another official of Vancouver Gurdwara and Nand Singh Sihra, a young engineer­ing student of University of California as the leader, waited in vain for more than a month in London for a meeting with the Colonial Secretary, and then proceeded to India.1"6

On reaching India the deputation sought support of the Indian press and political organisations and met the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab and the Governor General of India. The Tribune, of 11 July 1913 published a detailed resum e’ of an interview with Nand Singh and asked : 'shall we even now awake to a sense of our duty to our suffering countrymen in far off Canada ? Cannot the Indian Association lead the way in this matter ?'

The Panjabee, on the other hand, thought that little purpose would be served by petitions and deputations and wrote indignantly :

We have had enough of appeals to the sense of justice and fairness of the Colonials and to their imperial patriot­ism. Let us now learn the supreme value of self help and.

163 Selections, Vol. XXVI Nos. 9, 13, 20 and 23.164 Ibid., see also The Tribune, 14 November 1912.165 'Hindus in Canada', The P an jabee , 25 February 1913, Selections,.

Vol. XXVI. No. 13, p. 194.166 F.C. Isemonger and J. Slattery, An Account o f G hadar C onspiracy (Lahore :

Superintendent of Printing Press Punjab, 1911), p. 3.

THE BACKGROUND 49

retaliation and let us make up our minds, if other resources fail, to treat every colonial who may come to India as the colonials treat Indians.167

A big public meeting was held at the Bradlaugh Hall Lahore on 18 August in which a number of prominent barristers and notables of Punjab participated. This was followed by meetings in important district towns of Punjab such as Ambala, Ludhiana, Jullundur and Ferozepur. Sir Surendranath Bannerjee submitted to Michael O'Dwyer, the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, a copy of the resolution passed at a public meeting held at Simla.168 However, the keynote of all these meetings, as The Tribune reported, was ‘sobriety and moderation coupled with strong attachment to the empire idea'.169 The deputation met Michael O’Dwyer and the Viceroy Lord Hardinge. The Viceroy gave them a patient hearing and expressed sympathy but politely conveyed to them the inability of the Government to help them in the matter. O’ Dwyer was however rough with them and warned them against their inflammatory speeches.170

The visit of the delegation was a failure in that it could get practically no concession extracted from the authorities. The support from the public and the press gave, however, a great moral encouragement. It appeared that Balwant Singh, one of the most exercised over the British imperialist policy towards Indians, construed from the enthusiastic support of the press and the political organisations that most Indians felt as he did. On his return to Canada, he reportedly told a Vancouver audience that Indian people were ready to join in a revolt to overthrow the British rule.171 The Indian Government was, on the other hand, persuaded to believe that these three men were the advance agents of the Ghadar Party which had meanwhile come up in San Francisco. It was suspected that the delegates had planned to visit various cantonements in the Punjab ‘with a view to bringing their propaganda to the notice of the Indian troops.’172

167 The Punjabee, 24 July 1913. Selections, Vol. XXVI, No. 30, p. 650.168 The Tribune, 1 October 1913.169 The Tribune, 7 September 1913.170 O’Dwyer, op. cit. p. 191.171 Statement of approver Harcharan Das, Second Supplementary Lahore

Conspiracy Case. Home Political B, May 1917. Proceedings. 342-343, p. 149.172 Isemonger and Slattery, op. cit., pp. 5-7. See also Sedition Committee

Report, p. 146.

50 GHADAR'MOVEMENT

The sustained agitation led by the United India League and the Khalsa Diwan Society in Canada created in the Indians living there both a strong sense of solidarity and a conscious­ness of shared hostility to the British. There were still many who based their hopes on 'British good faith’, but generally the trust in the bonafides of the British Government was considerably eroded.

One distinct effect of the political propaganda and the agitation on the issues that affected the whole community of immigrants was a gradual isolation of such leaders as had tended to stress on sectional matters like the purity of Sikhism. The Singh Sabha movement had its followers in Canada, and according to C.I.D. reports, there was in Canada, a section of ‘clannish Sikhs’, whose 'jealousy and bigotry .. . keep alive the ill-feeling between mownas and Sikhs’.1” Teja Singh, for example, was described as 'something of a religious fanatic' though he was concerned not only with religious conversion, but also with making life easier for the peasant. Sunder Singh’s bi-monthly paper the Aryan published from Ottawa, and the Sansar of Kartar Singh Akali published from Victoria also operated within that framework. Men like Uday Ram Joshi who were reported to be ‘making money by more or less shady methods’, associated apparently with political activities of non- Sikh leaders, but remained markedly opposed to religious interests of the Sikhs and to nationalist politics.1” The new political upsurge, however, pushed these people and their ideas into the background.

The arrival of Gyani Bhagwan Singh in Vancouver in the early months of 1913 gave a real spurt to a revolutionary political movement in Canada. Bhagwan Singh had been a Sikh priest in the Gurdwaras at Perak in the Federated Malay States and at Hong Kong, and was an ‘orator of great merit’. He was the first man to deliver vigorous revolutionary diatribes against the British rule, both from the ‘pulpit’ and in open religio- social congregations of the immigrants. He had been considerably influenced by the revolutionary nationalist thinking of his times. Through his speeches in the Sunday congregations, punctuated. 173 174

173 D.C.I's Report of 15 June 1910. Home Political B, Proceedings, August 1910,Nos. 10-17.

174 D.C.I.’s Report, loc. cit.

THE BACKGROUND 51

with quotations from the, scriptures he alluded to the Sikh history of crusades and the war poetry of the.Tenth Guru. He embeL lished these with his own passionate poetical compositions and asked his people to adopt the revolutionary nationalist salutation—Bande Mataram—and ‘filled his audience with revolu­tionary ideas’. He was externedfrom Canada within three months of his arrival. The Special Tribunal, in Lahore Conspiracy Case Judgement, rightly observed that Vancouver became the first centre of seditious propaganda among Indians, until it was eclipsed by that of California with the launching of Ghadar movement.175

For the immigrants living in USA there was far more freedom for carrying on political propaganda than for those in Canada. However, as Harnam Singh 'Tundilat' described, there was hardly any strong anti-British political consciousness upto the years 1911 and 1912.176 Indian students and God men had over a score of small scattered ami interrelated clubs, religio-spiritual and social reformist organisations in various places, but there was no worthwhile political organisation among the Indians. There were thousands of Indian farmers and labourers scattered throughout California, Washington and Oregon. G.D. Kumar expressed in March 1912 : 'we would be glad to see them organised if there is any possible way for them to become united into one organisation’.177 A few politi­cally oriented students who thought of working on those lines hardly established an 'emotional contact’ with those ‘poor educated immigrants'.178

P. S. Khankhoje of Wardha (Gujarat), who stated that"he was inspired by the teachings of Lokmanya Tilak and who was then a student in the state of Oregon, claimed that he set up a centre of his Indian Independence League at Portland. According to him, Kanshi Ram a rich and generous contractor in Portland was 'the real leader and Sohan Singh Granthi (sic) was another

175 Judgement, Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home Political A, P roceed in gs, October 1915, No. 91.

176 'Tundilat', op . cit.. p. 18.177 G.D. Kumar, 'Hindus in the United States : Activities of the Hindu Students'

and Labourers on the Pacific Coast’, The Span o f Life. (Seattle), Vol. V, No. 3, p. 10.

178 A.C. Bose, 'Indian Nationalist Agitation in the U.S.A. and Canada’, Journal o f Indian History, April 1965, p. 238.

52 GHADAR MOVEMENT

leading figure, and the membership jumped to 500.179 180 181 182 Sohan Singh Bhakna, however, failed to recollect if such an organisa­tion was formed.1S0 Taraknath Das had set up a centre in Seattle at the end of 1908 where he joined the University of Washington taking his B.A. in 1910 and his M.A. in 1911. Here he continued to publish his F ree Hindusthan and to preach among the immigrant labourers, until he shifted to Berkeley in 1912 to join the University of California. But he hardly maintained any contact with the immigrant farmers and farm workers in that area.

Meanwhile, organised attacks by white hoodlums on the quarters of Indian labourers during 1910 and the following years organised the latter. In one such case, the Indians, fully armed with sticks, clubs and truncheons, beat back these white labourers, jwala Singh felt happy : ‘tonight the whites learnt a lesson for life time’. The petitions to British Consuls for effective protection of Indians did not evoke much response for intervention at the diplomatic level. Dady Burjor, in his confidential report, specially pointed to the very strong and genuine feelings among the Indian labourers that their Govern­ment was indifferent to their problems. That according to him, became a major reason for anti-British'activities.

The sufferings of their countrymen across the border had already led to informal links of solidarity. Jwala Singh tells of a Sabha formed in California in February 1912 whose members swore to make all kinds of sacrifices for the cause of their country. Initially five members came forward with a promise to devote themselves wholly to that cause. Among them were Jwala Singh himself, Wasakha Singh and Santokh Singh who later became very prominent leaders of the Ghadar movement.1*1

A few months later, a new ‘revolutionary society1 known as Hindustan Association of the Pacific Coast was organised in Portland, with G.D. Kumar as the Secretary and editor of a proposed propaganda paper, Sohan Singh Bhakna as President and Kanshi Ram as treasurer. But Kumar fell sick and the Association did not function at all.1"3

179 Khankhoje’s account in, Bhupendra Nath Datt, Aprakashjt Rainitii: Itihas.Appendix V. See also Balshastri Hardas, op. dt., pp. 238-45.

180 Interview with Sohan Singh Bhakna, 26 No. 1968.181 Jwala Singh, !oc. cit.182 'Tundilat', op. cit., p. 18.

THE BACKGROUND 53

Until 1913 the problems and the struggle in USA related primarily to labour issues and the immigration restrictions which contributed to feelings of nationalism in the process. During that year came the big bang of the Alien Land Law, the signifi­cance of which has not been adequately recognised in the available studies. This law practically prohibited the owning of land by Asians. A depression in 1912 had already ruined the Indian farmers in California. Jwala Singh described that a considerable number of Indians had by that time made heavy investments in land and other trades. The prohibition came as a blight. It was now the relatively better off section of Indians which had been directly hit hard. This occasioned more hectic activity for organised community effort. They could, however, as ‘Tundilat’ perceptively observed, only contribute funds; real political work could be started only by the educated revolutionary nationalists. The ground was prepared. When Har Dayal came in their midst, his encounters with them aroused in him visions of organising a mass revolutionary movement. It transformed him as much as it did his audiences, giving a new sense of destiny to the hopeless Indian farmers and labourers in North America.

THE GHADAR MOVEMENT 1 9 1 3 -1 8 : 2A BRIEF HISTORY

Divergent perspectives on the character of the movement in the hitherto published accounts, as indicated earlier1 2 point to the need of a fresh attempt to describe the course of its history during the brief period of 1913 to 1918. It is also necessary for a discussion on the central theme of this work i.e. its ideology, organisation and strategy as a movement for revolutionary change. The emergence and development of this movement can be explained only with reference to the nature of interaction among the leading actors, particularly the small number of educated revolutionary nationalists and the leaders from the community of immigrants. Given the difference in the ideas and experiences of the two, the role of the latter assumes a crucial significance in the direction of this mass revolutionary movement.

Formation of the Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast

Most accounts credit Har Dayal with the founding of the Ghadar movement. His admiring countrymen know him primarily for that part of his work. He arrived in the USA in February 1911. According to some writers he had come with a considered purpose of organising a revolutionary movement among Indian settlers.1 But it appears from the then state of his mind that he was hardly sure of what was his mission.

1 See Introduction, supra-2 For example, L.P, Mathur, Indian Revolutionary Movement, pp. 18-19; Arun

Chandra Guha, First Spark o f Revolution (New Delhi ; Orient Longman, 1971), p. 436. See also Sedition Comm ittee Report, p. 145.

Immediately before coming, to. the USA, he was in La Martinique (West Indies) where he pursued a 'life of renun­ciation’. A few months earlier he had escaped to Alger (North Africa). In his letters to his friend S.R. Rana, he wrote of the yyeariness of his heart and presentiment of death.3 He wanted to leave Alger but where to, he was not sure; may be Cuba, may be Japan.4 However, he returned to Paris and then went to La Martinque. The only account ofHar Dayal’s short stay in that island comes from Bhai Parmanand,5 6 a self-exiled Arya Samajist missionary from Lahore, who stayed a month with him there. Har Dayal used that time, says Parmanand, to discuss his plan to found a new religion; his model was the Buddha. He ate mostly boiled grain, slept on the bare floor and spent his time in meditation in a secluded place.3 Guy Aldred, a famous English radical and friend, tells of Har Dayal’s proclaimed belief at that time in the coming republic 'which was to be a Church, a religious confraternity.. . . Its motto was to be : Atheism, cosmopolitanism and moral law’.7 8 Parmanand states that Har Dayal acceded to his persuasion to go to the USA and decided to make New York a centre for the propagation of the ancient culture of the 'Aryan race.* Emily Brown called it after Erik Erikson, a 'moratorium’ and a 'crisis of ego-identity' in the life of the revolutionary, involving 'a postponement of a decision as to what one is and is going to b e’.9

From Boston Har Dayal went to California around the month of April. From there he wrote an article on 'Indians in America’ in which he extolled the liberating effect of the climate in the new world on Indians living there.10 However soon after he

3 Har Dayal to Rana, Alger 13 June 1910 in H ar Dayal Papers, NAI.4 Har Dayal to Rana, 12 June 1910, Har Dayal Papers.5 Bhai Parmanand, The Story o f My Life, pp. 49-51.6 Ibid., p. 50.7 Cited in Emily Brown, Har Dayal, p. 33.8 Parmanand, op. cit , p. 51.9 Emily Brown, op. cit., p .84 .10 He wrote of it in a lyrical language;'No one can breathe beneath the stars

and stripes without being lifted to a higher level of thought and action. The great flag of the greatest democratic state in the world's history burns up all cowardice, servility, pessimism and indifference as fire consumes the dross and leaves pure gold behind . . . . Let those who are weary and faint hearted, come to this ethical sanitorium . . . Mighty alchemist, wonderful magician of

BRIEF HISTORY . 55

56 GHADAR MOVEMENT

slipped out to Honolulu in Hawaii. In his letter to Hanuwant Sahai, one of his childhood friends, a neighbour in Delhi and a comrade, Har Dayal said that he stayed there meditating on the Waikiki Beach.11 According to Emily Brown, although he had been persuaded out of La Martinque into the new world, ‘he obviously still cherished the search for spiritual fulfilment associated with the traditional Indian holy man’.12 Once again persuaded by Parmanand—this time through a letter—Har Dayal returned to California in September 1911.

At Berkeley, he associated himself with campus radicals of the University of California and some members of its faculty. In January of the next year, he was invited to join the faculty of the Stanford University as a Lecturer in Philosophy for the current semester (8 January — 15 May).12 This was renewed for one year, 1912-13. His friend Van Wyck Brooks believed that Har Dayal joined there, ‘mainly to conceal his real life work as an organiser of Indian rebellion'.14 Har Dayal tendered his resignation from the assignment in September 1912, because of the embarrassment caused to the University by his public advocacy of anarchist views.15

It was only in the summer of 1912 that Har Dayal began to be identified with nationalist activities. Around this time he reported of his contacts with some of the Indian farmers in the Stockton area. Coming to think of serving Indian national interests, he considered it particularly advantageous to India

this modem age, loadstar of all and every body whom the over-burdened mother earth has rejected in less favoured lands . . . this flag beckons from afar to the old world’s victims and outcastes . . . 'Come unto me that are sick and heavy laden, and I will give you rest’. 'Indians in America’, M odern Review, July 1911. pp. 3-4.

11 Interview with Hanuwant Sahai, Delhi 26 September 1969. See also Dharmavira, Lala Har Dayal and the Revolutionary M ovement o f h is Times, p. 147.

12 Brown, op. cit., p. 91.13 Ibid-, also Dharamvira, op. cit., p. 153.14 Cited in Brown, op. cit., p. 107.15 Ibid., 97. L.P. Mathur believed that Har Dayal resigned from the job to devote

his whole time to the Indian revolutionary movement. Mathur, op. cit., p. 23. Frieda Hauswirth, Har Dayal’s relations with whom assumed, 'scandalous proportions’ among the Indian colony, thought that it was his social revolut­ionary activity in favour of free marriage etc. which caused a demand for his resignation. Cited in Brown, op. cit. p. 112.

BRIEF HISTORY 57

that her young men should go to the USA for scientific and sociological education. With that end in view, he welcomed the offer of Jwala Singh, a rich farmer of Stockton, to donate some money for the support of students from India. Guru Gobind Singh scholarships were instituted. In the scholarship committee were included Har Dayal, Teja Singh, Taraknath Das and Arthur U. Pope, who was a member of the faculty of University of California.1* Among the six students who came in response to the offer were Nand Singh Sihra, who later headed the three- man deputation to India on behalf of Indians living in Canada; Darisi Chenchiah from Nellore (Madras), and Gobind Behari Lai, a cousin of Har Dayal’s wife, who became a devoted comrade.16 17 All of them lived together in a rented apartment near the campus of the University at Berkeley.

During the summer vacation of 1912, Har Dayal was also engaged in vigorous activity, widening the circle of his radical friends among American intellectuals, writing articles, and delivering a series o f lectures on anarchist and syndicalist movements, one of these from the prestigious platform of the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) movement.1* He experienced, what he described as, an 'over stimulation'. Although all this while he alluded to the Indian political problem in his lectures and maintained a lively contact with the Indian students at Berkeley, he was not directly involved in any organisational activity for India’s freedom and had taken practically no interest in the activities of Indian students loosely organised as Nalanda Club.19

The major event which revived Har Dayal's revolutionary spirit was the attempt made in Delhi on the life of the Viceroy Lord Hardinge on 23 December 1912. Har Dayal was 'tremendo­usly' excited with joy. On 25th, he broke the news to the students at the Nalanda Hostel, at dinner time and concluded his lecture with a couplet from the famous Urdu poet Mir Taqi Mir :

Pagri apni Sambhaliyega Mir Aur basti nahin, y eh Dilli hai

(Take care of your turban [symbol of honour] Mir. This is not just any town; this is Delhi).

16 Gobind Behai Lai, 'Personal Reminiscence' ,p. 27.17 Ibid.18 Brown, op. cit., p. 110.19 Ibid. p. 134.

58 GHADAR MOVEMENT

The students turned the event into a great celebration and 'gave vent to their feelings by singing Bande Mataram and dancing about the room for hours’.2* An excited Har Dayal called up a number of his radical friends, and in each instance said, ■have you heard what one of my men has done in India to Lord Hardinge ? ’ And then he related the great event.20 21

He followed it up with a written salute to the Bomb thrower and the Bomb in the shape of a pamphlet, Yugantar Circular (Circular of the New Era). Growing lyrical over the event, he wrote : ‘Hail! Hail! Hail ! Bomb of 23 December 1912 . . . Har­binger of hope and courage, dear reawakner of slumbering souls . . . concentrated moral dynamite . . . the esperanto of Revolution’. Har Dayal evidently spoke as much of its effect on him as on others when he wrote, ’He awakened us from sleep, he flashed a dazzling light before our drooping eye-lids. . . . In the midst of despair and sorrow, he has sent a thrill of joy and hope. . . . It is our resurrection '.2* This was evidently an echo of the anarchist theory of 'propaganda by deed’, which is born of desperation in the absence of a mass movement. Soon, however, Har Dayal was to awaken to the opportunity of organising a mass revolutionary movement.

Some bold men among the immigrant farmers and labourers in California and Oregon appeared restless for some substan­tive political activity. They were looking for a leader to guide them and to organise the Indian settlers under one banner.23

20 Hokinson's letter to W.W. Cory, Dy. Minister of Interior, Ottawa dated San Francisco, 11 January 1913. Also letter of British Consul General A. Carnegie Ross, dated 6 January 1913 to Secy, of State for India. These reports of Hopkinson and Ross were based upon information supplied by Indian student informers at Berkeley. Home Political B, P roceedings, June 1913, 5-17. See also Emily Brown, op. cif., p. 131 and Chenchiah, 'An Authentic Report’, Part I; G.B. Lai, op. cit., p. 33.

21 Hopkinson's letter, loc. cit., See also, Chenchiah, foe. cit.; Lai, op. cit., p. 23.22 Full text of this tract is given in Dharmavira, Lala Har Dayal, pp. 173-178.

See also Ker, Political Trouble in India, pp. 118-17. [Emphasis added].

23 The want of a capable leader had been seriously felt by leading Indians both in Canada and the USA. A communication from ‘A Hindu' to The P an jabee (Lahore) made a request that some great Indian political leader should come to Canada to educate and unite all Indians and 'take the lead here for India’. The P anjabee, 30 March 1912.

BRIEF HISTORY S9

Bhakna recalled that following the illness of G.D. Kumar they thought of inviting Ajit Singh, the famous leader of 1907 agrarian agitation in Punjab. But then Thakar Dass, a revolutionary exile from Punjab who had worked in Paris with Madam Cama and S.R. Rana before arriving in Portland in 1912 suggested the name of Har Dayal. Thus they sent an invitation to him in the fall of 1912 to visit St. John near Portland. However, it was in May of the next year that Har Dayal arrived there accompani­ed by Parmanand, and a Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast was established.**

The accounts of quite a few leading Ghadarites and the official version supplied by British secret agents, appointed to investigate the activities of Indian political agitators, place the formation of Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast in Portland. Har Dayal had in his mind 'Hindu Association’, instead of ‘Hindi’, the name also used by his biographer Emily Brown.*6 There is some difference on the date of its form­ation but official accounts and circumstantial evidence suggest May 1913.16 24 25 26

24 Bhakna, Jeevan Sangram., p. 39. Parmanand, The Story o f My Life, pp. 61-62- Taraknath Da3, apparently not aware of the developments in the State of Oregon and Washington, wrote to a revolutionary friend in June 1913, ‘If Sirdar Ajit Singh is available and willing to come to United States I can send you a ticket from Europe to United States at any time. I have talked the matter with my Sikh friends, and they have promised to do all they can to carry on the work'. Ker, Political Trouble in India, p. 213-14.

25 Har Dayal's interview in The Bulletin (San Francisco), 25 March 1914; Brown, op. ri(.,p . 138. Bhakna, 'Tundilat', Parmanand, Jwala Singh, Prithvi Singh Azad, all of them in their accounts refer to it as 'Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast'. See also Dharmavira, op. cit., p. 187.

26 Har Dayal's report in The Bulletin (San Francisco) 27 March 1914; Parmanand, op. cit., pp. 61-62. Most accounts confirm that Parmanand was there in Portland with Har Dayal for two days before leaving USA for India via England. He says he left after the completion of his studies at the University of California. The last term ran from 8 January to 15 May. It was thereafter that Har Dayal requested him to accompany him to Portland. Ibid. A.T. Steel reported to Hopkinson that he learnt from Har Dayal's friend Riteman on 25 May 1913 that Har Dayal was in Portland. His enquiries again on 30 May revealed that he was still there in Portland. Hopkinson returned to United States in the beginning of June and he reported to the Minister of the Interior, Ottawa that Har Dayal was delivering a course of lectures in Oregon and Washington States. Home Political B, Proceedings, November 1913, Nos. 62-66. See also Brown, op. cit., pp. 138-39. Bhakna, op. cit., p. 39 and

60 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Three of the important accounts of the first meeting Har Dayal had with the Indian labourers and farmers at the place of Kanshi Ram, come from Sohan Singh Bhakna who was chosen President of the Association; Harnam Singh 'Tundilat’ and Bhai Parmanand. All the three were among prominent participants at that meeting, Har Dayal, according to them, discussed 'how they could serve their country'. According to Bhakna and 'Tundilat,' Parmanand proposed that they should institute a few scholar­ships for the purpose of inviting young students from India because India could not attain freedom without the help of educated people.27 Har Dayal appeared to agree with him, but others of the labouring class present there did not appreciate the proposal. Both Bhakna and 'Tundilat' say that doubts were raised about the utility of that proposal and instead, the need of direct and effective political propaganda was emphasised. It was argued that there were several thousand Indians on the Pacific Coast; they were economically well off; most of them were peasants from the Punjab; Sikh Jats were known to be brave people, but they had thus far served only the interests of the foreign rulers. There was a good opportunity available in the USA for political propaganda to be conducted amongst them in their own language.

Leading Ghadarites believed that Har Dayal was astute enough to understand the sentiments and the prevailing temper and sincerity of these people. He expounded his ideas accord­ingly. Har Dayal came to these Indians with the halo of a charisma around him. These people were particularly receptive to such ideas as simplified to them the reasons behind their oppressions and offered a clear course of action.28 Dayal did not consider it prudent that Indians should come into conflict

■Tundilat’, op. cit., p. 24; both gave the place St. John and the time, month of March. Nawab Khan, approver in the Lahore Conspiracy case, told the special Tribunal that the Association was organised at Astoria (Oregon) in May. Judgement, Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home Political A, Proceedings, October 1915, No. 91.

27 Bhakna, op. cit., p. 39. 'Tundilat', op. cit., p. 24. Parmanand, however, says he suggested setting up a free boarding house for Indian students, op. cit., p. 62.

28 Anup Singh says, 'Har Dayal’s simplicity, sincerity and sacrifice captivated them. He became their hero, they the nebulous Cromwellian Army'. 'Har Dayal—Stalwart Champion of Peace is Gone’, New History, Vol. V1IL (1, April 1939), p. 2. See also, 'Tundilat', op. cit., pp. 24-25.

BRIEF HISTORY 61

with the Government of United States. The freedom available to Indian patriots in that land for their political work could not be put at stake. He, therefore, advised them to direct their fight against the British. They could not be treated as equals in America until they were free and were so treated in their own land.29 'Tundilat' recollected what Har Dayal told them : that the root cause of the poverty, degradation and all the other woes of Indians was their subjection to British rule, that the one major objective before them was the overthrow of that government, and that the objective could never be achieved by petitions. The only course open to them was to prepare for an armed revolution, carry their message to the masses and to their brethren in the British Indian regiments, enlist their support, proceed to India in large numbers and uproot the enemy through a widespread armed struggle. Evidence is over-whelming that his ‘ by-no w-standardised- diatribe’ against the British won immediate success in inspiring these people. Jagjit Singh who based his work on extensive interviews with the Ghadar leaders observed that 'Har Dayal served as a focus to hasten the crystallization of a super-satura­ted solution'.30 31

To begin with, funds had to be raised and propaganda started. A working committee was formed and basic decisions were made at that very meeting. These included among others, the publication of the Ghadar for free circulation, and the setting up of a headquarter, Yugantar Ashram by name, at San Francisco. This, to Bhakna, was the beginning of the Ghadar movement.*1

According to these and other accounts including secret reports filed by Hopkinson, a series of meetings were held subsequently at different work centres of Indians in the States of Oregon and Washington. Among these places were Bridal Veil, Linton, Wina etc. The final meeting in this lap was held at Astoria. To this meeting were invited representatives from different places, where similar meetings had been held

29 Lai, 'Personal Reminiscence’, p. 38.30 Jagjit Singh, G hadar Party Lehar, p. 181. See also, O'Dwyer, op. cit.,

p. 186.31 See a hand bill which Bhakna circulated, now reproduced in his Jeevan

Sangram, p. 87.

62 GHADAR MOVEMENT

during the preceding one month and the decisions taken at St.John w ere unanimously approved.31 ‘Tundilat’, among some others, thought that the organisation was set up in that meeting.

In the encounter which Har Dayal had with these discon­certed, raw and well-meaning Punjabi Sikhs of military strata, he seem s to have felt stirrings for a new kind of political activity. Har Dayal regarded the Sikh in America as markedly superior to his counterpart in India, because in America the Sikhs developed 'a keen sense o f patriotism, which manifests itself in deeds of kindly serv ice to their fellow countrymen h ere ’. He was thrilled to have found, what one of his intellectual associates Darisi Chenchiah described as, 'that wonderful human material’.32 33 ‘Tundilat’ writes that at one of the meetings which was held at Wina, an elderly ex-H avildar, got up after Har Dayal’s address to them and rem arked :

...everything is clear to us. Why waste time in publishing a paper from America ? Let some of us go and im press upon the Indians working in Canada and America that they should leave the work and proceed to India in jathas (squads). They should tell the whole thing to their fellow brothers in the army and with their help throw the British out. What is after all the strength of the English­men in India ? One Englishman comes to the share of five hundred Hindustanees.34

Har Dayal had been greaty influenced by V.D. Savarkar who had advocated a popular armed rebellion in India on the pattern of what he had described as 'The Indian War of Independence 1857’.35 Savarkar believed that one of the m ajor factors in the failure of that ‘war’ was the loyal and brave support which the Sikhs rendered to the British at that time. The Sikh soldiers could play a most significant role in the overthrow of the British rule if they could b e won over to the

32 Bhakna, op. cit., pp. 42-43; Isemonger and Slattery, op. tit., p. 90. See also Brown, op. tit., p. £0; Sainsara, op. tit., pp. 89-90.

33. Chenchiah, op. tit., Part III, p. 16.34 'Tundilat', op. cit., pp. 31-32.35 Savarkar explained that his object in writing the book was to inspire his

countrymen with a burning desire to rise again and wage a second and successful war to liberate their Motherland. The Indian W ar o f In d e­p e n d e n c e 1857, 8th reprint (New Delhi : Rajdhani Granthagar, 1970), xiii. See also his call 'Oh Martyrs’, Ibid ., p. 547.

BRIEF HISTORY 03

cause of rebellion.3* That element in political preparation had been emphasised in Shyamji Krishnavarma's Indian Sociologist and Taraknath Das’s F ree Hindusthan and was regarded as crucial among the revolutionary exiles including Har Dayal. What Har Dayal saw of the great potential material for rebellion in these Punjabi immigrants appeared to have revived his spirits and kindled in his heart hopes of translating a dream into a reality. That he came up with Ghadar as the name for the propaganda paper was indicative of the form of political action he had in mind. This was further explained by him in his article 'Our Name and Our Work' in the first issue of the Ghadar. Whereas Har Dayal’s charisma and his lectures to these people worked to infuse in them stirrings for an armed rebellion, his encounter with them appeared, conversely, to suggest to him more clearly the direction of his own political role. It might be a measure of the hopes aroused in him that in an address at Astoria on 4 June he made a declaration that 'in ten years revolution will come in India in actual warfare.’36 37 38 39

There are quite a few other versions different from those - discussed above, of how and on whose initiative the meetings between Har Dayal and these Indian workers were arranged and the first organisational efforts made. Pandurang Khankhoje, for instance, believed that the Indian Independence League which he had founded in Portland in 1910 was the nucleus of Har Dayal’s activities there during 1913 and that his ‘centre’ was converted into 'Ghadar Party'.3* Darisi Chenchiah, a Telugu student who lived at the Nalanda Hostel of the Bengali students at Berkeley believed that the students there, particularly Jatinder Nath Lahiri, goaded Har Dayal to contact the thousands of Punjabis and organise them. The 'Ghadar Party', he says, was formally inaugurated within [three months after Lahiri’s constructive suggestion.3*

36 See his ' Khalsa Pamphlets' issued from London in 1908 at the time of Guru Gobind Singh Day celebrations. N.G. Barrier. The Sikhs and their Literature (D elhi: Manohar Boole Service, 1970), p. 119. See also Source Material lo r a History o f the Freedom Movement in India (Bombay Govt. Records) (Bombay ; 1958), p. 441.

37 Report of the British Consul at Portland. Home Political B, Proceedings, November 1913, Nos. 62-63.

38 Khankhoje's account in Bhupendra Natb Dutt, Aprakashit Rajnitik Itihas, Appendix V, pp. 230-231. See also Dharamavira, op. cit., p. 180.

39 Chenchiah, op. cit., Part III, pp. 16-17.

64 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Gobind Behari Lai gives two different versions of the formation of the organisation. In his ‘Personal Reminiscence’ of the movement, he places the first meeting which he and Har Dayal had with the Punjabi farm worker ‘at or near Yolo,’ near Sacramento, early in the summer of 1913. Minutes after Har Dayal's lecture some men at the meeting started offering dollar bills and a finance committee was constituted to handle funds. Then started preparations to start publication of a nationalist paper.40 In his taped interview with Emily Brown, however, the first meeting with the farmers near Davis, and the formation of the committee a little later, are placed after the launching of Ghadar movement at a dinner meeting at the Shattuck Hotel in Berkeley where sympathetic Americans were invited. In that meeting stated Lai, 'we two—Har Dayal and I—were the only ones involved’. After this, he said Kartar Singh (Sarabha) went around, arranged meetings of Indian farmers, contractors and labourers in California where Har Dayal was invited. 'They were very impressed' with Har Dayal’s argument and sincerity, funds were collected and within two weeks, the first issue of the paper was published.41 Lai, evidently, mixed up things. It was also evident that these students were not aware of Har Dayal's visit to Portland.

One major reason for the conflicting accounts of the first organisational efforts emerged from the confusion between the formation of the 'Hindi Association’ and the ‘Ghadar Party’. Lai, Khankhoje and Chenchiah apparently talked of the latter and were unaware of Har Dayal’s earlier organisational efforts. The term ‘Ghadar Party’ was used by Har Dayal in the first issue of the Ghadar. He did not say or mean that it was a different ‘organisation’. In his narrative the word ‘party’ was loosely used to cover all Indian revolutionary patriots, including Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose, V.D. Savarkar, Shyamji Krishnavarma, Madam Cama, Ajit Singh etc. Four weeks later, writing in the Ghadar of 29 November, he was still suggesting : ‘First we have to make a party’. However, all those, who were associated with the publication of the Ghadar or lived at the printing press and the general headquarters of the movement named Yugantar Ashram appeared to have considered that they

40 Lai, op. cif., p, 39.41 Brown, Har Dayal, pp. 141-142.

BRIEF HISTORY 65

constituted that party. Among these, besides Har Dayal, were Raghubar Dayal, Kartar Singh, Harnam Singh'Tundilat', and a number of students. The students thought high of their role as the real organisers and brains of the movement because, as Chenchiah put it, ‘we were the only intellectuals with whom Lala Har Dayal could discuss plans for achieving India’s independence’.4* The 'Sikh brothers’ were, according to them, patriotic donors of funds and army of Ghadar, not the ones for participating in plann­ing and decision-making.

The leading figures of the Hindi Association, on the other hand, considered that Association which was formed in Portland to be the Ghadar party. Basic decisions about object­ives and organisation were, according to them, taken in their meetings and none of these intellectuals figured in the making of those decisions.

They had decided, stated Bhakna, that the overthrow of the British Government was to be followed by the establishment in India of a democratic republic based on liberty and equality.4* ‘Tundilat’ also mentioned that as the main objective of the Hindi Association; adding further, that the republic was to be secular, similar to that of America.42 43 44 Preparations for the said objectives were to start with the printing and circulation of the propaganda paper in vernacular languages. Most of these leading ghadar- ites particularly emphasised upon the decision that the Association would be secular and political in character, as distinguished from religio-political organisations such as the Khalsa Diwan Society. Bhakna and ‘Tundilat’ believed that one of the decisions taken at the first organisational meeting was regarding prohibition of discussion on religious matters. Religion was to be a matter of private belief.45 Labour of love for the organisation was regarded as yet another accepted axiom for all members.

As to its organisational aspects, most accounts mentioned mainly two or three appointments, viz, Bhakna as President, Har Dayal as Secretary cum editor of the paper and Kanshi

42 Chenchiah, loc . cit.43 Bhakna, op. cit., pp. 40-41.44 'Tundilat', loc. cit.45 Bhakna, loc. cit.; 'Tundilat', op. cit., p. 25 See also his letter to Gurcharan

Singh Sainsara of 24 April 1960. DBY.

66 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Ram as Treasurer. Bhakna also gave a list of 15 members of a working committee formed in the beginning, pointing out the local 'branches' they represented. The number rose to 24 following the inclusion of nine more members, with Jwala Singh as Vice President, at a meeting held at Sacramento on 31 December 1913. Elections to that committee, were to be held every year.46

Among the names of the 24 members of the 'Working Committee' listed by him, all except Har Dayal were from the community of Punjabi immigrants, some of them big farmers or contractors; others mainly labourers.47 Bhakna objected to the use of terms 'Sikhs' or ‘Punjabis' for them. 'We were Hindustanees’, he told the present writer, 'Our religion was patriotism’.

This committee, he stated further, was to elect from amongst its members a ‘secret commission’ consisting of three persons, and the first such commission selected at St. John in the very first meeting, included three top leaders viz. Bhakna, Har Dayal and Kanshi Ram. All secret work was to be per­formed by that ‘commission’. He even likened it retrospectively to the 'politburo' o f the Communist Party of the USSR.48 Bhakna obviously exaggerated. The Working Committee of the Associ­ation, which he referred to, was mainly concerned with collection of funds and distribution of the paper. The idea of ‘secret commission' was, as we will see later, far-fetched.

Evidently, a dual leadership had emerged when the move­ment was substantively launched, with the regular publication of Ghadar. The intellectuals appeared to have arrogated to themselves the guiding role for the illiterate masses, The Punjabi immigrants, on the other hand, largely oblivious of the plans and notions of the other group considered their own leadership of the working committee of Hindi Association as the main directing body. However, as Chenchiah wrote with a hindsight, the 'Sikhs came forward mostly and the movement was practically theirs'.

46 Bhakna, op. cif., pp. 41-44.47 See list in Ibid., pp. 41-42,48 His Presidential speech at the All India Revolutionaries Conference,

Jalandhar, 17 September 1967. Report in Peoples' Path (Jalandhar), Vol. in,No. 10 (October 1967).

BRIEF HISTORY 67

Leading members of the Hindi Association carried hectic activity, travelling from one mill or farm to another where groups of Indians were employed, raising funds and winning adherents for the cause, thus described as 'travelling secret­aries’ by Harcharan Das.

According to most accounts those who worked at the Yugantar Ashram adopted, perhaps after Har Dayal’s preferen­ces and priorities, an examplary life of dedication and utmost simplicity. Bhakna and 'Tundilat' described that some of them cooked meals for all the inmates; others wrote out material for the paper, operated the litho machine, prepared folders for the paper, wrote out addresses and maintained registers. It was according to them, all 'a labour of love’. 'They are splendid fellows', wrote Har Dayal to his friend Van Wyck Brooks, who worked in the press and institute ‘without any thought of recompense’.49

Propaganda War

On 1st November 1913, the first issue of the Urdu and Gurmukhi weekly, Ghadar, inaugurated a propaganda war.. That issue was in Urdu and Har Dayal wrote, 'such wonderful Urdu’, said one of his admirers. The Gurmukhi edition, practically a translated version of the Urdu one, started from 9 December. In a key article of the inaugural issue entitled, ‘Our Name and Our Work', Har Dayal described this beginning as 'a new epoch in the history of India, because today there begins in foreign lands but in the language of the country (India) a war against English rule . . . a cannonade with the strength of the pen’. The mast-head of the paper carried a declaration as to its character, Angrezi Raj Ka Dushman, (Enemy of English Rule), and an exhortation, ‘O manly youngmen of India take to weapons quick’. The Gurmukhi editions carried in place of the latter, an injuction from the tenth Guru of the Sikhs :

J e chit* prem khelan ka chao Sir dhar tali gali m eri aao

(if you have the passion to play the game of love (then) come with the head placed on the palm of your hand).

49 Cited in Brown, op. tit:, p. 143.* Later it was corrected, 'tali', as in orginal, in place of,Arif.

68 GHADAR MOVEMENT

The objective in starting the paper was made clear at the outset: 'Our name and work are identical’, An armed revolution was to be started in India, because the people could no longer bear the tyranny and oppression under the English Rule’. As to when it was to be launched, Har Dayal’s answer was : 'in a few years’. A few months earlier, however, he had told an audience at Astoria that it was to start within ten years. At a big gathering held at Sacramento on 31 December 1913, it was made more explicit. A big war between Germany and England was expected. That would be the proper time for starting a revolution in India.50 Meanwhile the task was, as the paper had already announced, to prepare the country for ■mutiny’ until the time came, and that was to come 'soon', 'when rifle and blood will be used for pen and ink’ , and English rule would be destroyed.

One of the regular features of the weekly was Angrezi Raj Ka Kacha Chittha (A Balance Sheet of English Rule) consisting of fourteen points printed always on the front page.51 The last

50 Reported in the Chadar, 6 January 1914. See also Judgement L.C.C. HomePolitical A, Proceedings, October 1915, No. 91, p. 71.

51 The fourteen points (thirteen in Gurmukhi edition; point 2 being incorpo­rated in no. 1) were as under ;1. The English take away fifty crore rupees to England every year.2. As a result Indians have become so poor that the average per capita daily

income is only 5 paise.3. Land tax is above 65 per cent.4. The expenditure on the 24 crore people is (only) 7.75 crores; on health

care two crores but on military 29 orores are spent.5. Recurrence of famines is increasing under English rule and during tbe

last one decade 20 million men, women and children died of hunger.6. 8 lakh people died of plague during the last sixteen years and the death

rate has risen from 24 to 34 per thousand during 30 years.7. Schemes are executed to promote discord and ruin in Native States and

to extend the (sphere of) influence of the English rule.8. The Englishmen are never punished for killing Indian men and

dishonouring women.9. Christian missionaries are helped with the money realised from Hindus

and Muslims.10. Efforts are made to foment discords between Hindus and Muslims.11. Indian arts and industries are ruined for the benefit of the English.12. Using India’s money and lives of Indians, aggressions are committed on

Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, Persia and China.

BRIEF HISTORY 69

point being 'fifty six years have passed since the 'Ghadar' of 1857, now there is urgent need of the second one’. Another regular feature entitled Ankon k i Gawahi (Evidence of Statistics lit. figures) highlighted the destructive consequences of British exploitation in India. The British rule was characterised as an 'ulcer' and a 'plague' on the nation. There could be no respite, it was argued, until, ‘this base, rascally, evil-doing, vicious government is destroyed’.

The attention of the readers was then drawn to the war which Indians waged in 1857, 'the very name of which makes the English shiver'. That it did not succeed in the objective was attributed to lack of a* complete unity amongst the countrymen. But it taught the English tyrant a lesson. Had there been no such war then, according to Har Dayal, 'the English would have soon swallowed up all the native states, and done their best to spread Christian religion'. It could not destroy the enemy but succeeded in clipping its wings; 'the snake did not die, but became half dead’.52 Excerpts from Savarkar’s The Indian War o f Independ­ence-1 857, were serialised in the Urdu edition of Ghadar from its second issue of 8 November and in the Gurmukhi edition from 23 December. Passages from that book were also read at a public meeting. On every 10th May, the anniversary of the ‘War’ of 1857, a special issue of Ghadar was brought out with a picture of Rani of Jhansi. The Gurmukhi edition of 10th May 1914 was printed on red paper, pointing out that 'Ghadar in saffron’ called upon the people to follow the example of warriors of 1857.

By describing the struggles continued since the 'mutiny', Indians were reminded of the sacrifices of the heroes of many political battles, among whom were scholars and saints. In this context references were made in the Ghadar’s first number to leaders such as Lokmanya Tilak, Aurobindo Ghose, V.D. Savarkar and a number of young patriots of the 'Bengal party'. 13 14

13. The Indian population numbers 7 crores in Native States and 24 crores in British India. There are (however only) 79, 614 officers and soldiers and 38,948 volunteers who are Englishmen.

14. Fifty six years have elapsed since the Mutiny of 1857; now there is urgent need of a second one.

52 Ghadar (Urdu), 1 November, 1913.

70 GHADAR MOVEMENT

According to Har Dayal some of the patriots fled the country to work from abroad. Among them were ‘heroes' such as Shyamji Krishnavarma, Madam Cama, Ajit Singh and Sufi Amba Prasad. Those leading the Ghadar movement were identified as 'a band’ of such patriots who chose to operate from USA, because in that country they could do all those things freely which were prohibited to them in their own, and 'they have now to attack the enemy . . . from here’.

Another element characteristic of the earlier articles in the Gaelic American, the Indian Sociologist and Har Dayal’s own in the Bande Mataram, an example was made of the secret societies of Russia and the punishments given to the bureaucrats for their oppression. The heroes of dramatic political deeds in Bengal, who belonged to Anusilan Samitis and the Yugantar groups, and their sacrifices were admiringly highlighted; because the bomb makers and bomb throwers kept the government under mounting strain.53 Har Dayal was particularly aware1 of 'the spies’ kept by the British Government to watch on them and 'the traitors, who might infiltrate in their ranks. He used the columns of the Ghadar to caution his compatriots against these 'wolves of the British Government’ and advised them that 'arrangements should be made to fix these men first’.54 • >

Indians were frequently exhorted to rise, shed sluggishness’ and temporary comfort and 'to serve your country with tan, man, dhan’ (body, mind and wealth). The appeal in one article of the inaugural issue, ‘The Voice of India’, which was typical of Har Dayal's exhortations to his countrymen read as' u n d er:

My heroes ! O, Lions ! O, brave men ! Recover your senses. How long will you continue to sleep ? How long will you consent to be shoe-beaten by others and put up with their tyrannies.O, Indian young men, look at yourselves, slavery has converted you into pale skeletal creatures. It has eaten up your flesh and left only bones behind. Shame ! Shame [ Shame ! Rise O, Lions ! Rise.Rise O, Lions ! Pluck your courage. Serve your country and do your duty. The enemy is eating you up. Shoe- beat him out of your country . . . come brave men ! Let us unite to avenge Nana Sahib and Rani Lakshmi Bai of

53 Ghadar (Urdu), 16 December 1913.54 G hadar (Urdu), 29 November 1913.

BRIEF HISTORY 71

Jhansi. Rise . . . I am calling you. Preserve the honour of (your) forefathers. Prove yourselves to be worthy sons of Singhs, Khans and Rajputs . . . If you do not show

,. courage now, then you will have to wring your hands. You will not get the opportunity again. So my last (word) to you is : Rise, gird up your loins. Rise, gird up your loins. Rise. This is not the time to delay.

Har Dayal appeared to have a particular taste for dramatic leavening of propaganda. The Ghadar (Urdu) of 23 December 1913 (coinciding with the anniversary of the Bomb thrown on Lord Hardinge) was printed on yellow paper with a leading article Hamara Kesari Labas (Sada Kesari Bana in the inaugural Gurmukhi edition of that date) meaning : ‘Our Saffron Attire’. In the opening words of the article it was explained :

Today, for the fiast time we have come out dressed in saffron because in the history of India this dress has been the dress of martyrs and brave warriors . . . Today this warrior Ghadar has come out with this splendour and brightness and calls on you and tells ! O' brave men ! you also don kesari dress and leaving aside all wordly bless­ings, begin a war against the English Government. . . . discard the old moralist attire and wearing the Kesari jam a, change into new men.

The Gurmukhi translation of this article carried an additional insertion. After referring to the historic battle of Chillianwala and legendary bravery of Sikh warriors, it said in bold print, ‘The descendents of those Sikhs would again wage a war for independence’.

Simultaneously Har Dayal also published a virulently anarchist pamphlet Shabash (Bravo ! ) in commemoration of the Bomb attempt on Hardinge, with an inscription on the top : ■Price per copy : The head of an Englishman’. The reason why Indians should take to bombs and pistols was that there was no other more efficacious way of dealing with the situation. It was the most effective political sermon : ■It is the bomb that frightens the Government into conceding rights to the people. The chief thing is to frighten the Government'.5*

One element in the propaganda which put the British Government on alert and conjured in the minds of its officers. 55

55 See text inKer, op. c il, pp. 119-120. See also Dharmavira, op. c/t., p. 178.

72 GHADAR MOVEMENT

apprehensions of a German conspiracy was Har Dayal’s allusions to the expected war between England and Germany and the help which his party could secure from that enemy of the British Empire. In a meeting of Indians held at Sacramento on 31 December, Har Dayal introduced a high sense of drama, by inviting the German Consul in California and seating him by his side on the dais. Excerpts from a recent publication of General Friedrich Von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next W ar were read out and lucidly explained.86 Whereas the report of the meeting published in the G hadar of 6 January 1914 made practically no reference to this aspect, many in the audience appeared to have carried exaggerated notions of an opportune friendship with Germany.56 57 58 Emily Brown believed that German support for the movement became more evident after the Sacramento meeting and that German agents helped in the distribution of Ghadar propaganda material to places all over the world.56

Articles were also written in the G hadar to inform the readers regarding ‘similar’ militant movements in Egypt, Ireland, Russia, China and the earlier one in Mexico, suggesting pro­pitious possibilities of support from the revolutionaries of those countries in the proposed fight against the British.59 Har Dayal claimed that he was 'a disciple of the Russian revolutionary movement’ and in his speech in a meeting held on the eve of the inauguration of Ghadar, he particularly pointed to 'the lessons they could derive from it’. Chenchiah related that Har Dayal used to bring his Russian, Polish and Irish friends to lecture to them at the Nalanda Hostel.60

A number of small pamphlets and tracts were published both in English and vernacular languages, including the reprint­

56 Judgement, Lahore Conspiracy Case Part III, Home Political A, P roceedings, October 1915, No. 91. See also, Balshastri Hardas, A rm ed Struggle For Freedom , p. 251.

57 Chenchiah, op. cit., Part III, 15., Hardas, loc. cit.58 Emily Brown. Har Dayal, p. 151.59 In an article, 'A Storm is About to Burst in Egypt, Drizzling has Already

Started’, the awakening of Egyptians was said to be highly auspicious for India because the ‘Key of the Suez Canal is in their hands'. Similarly Indians were also advised to learn lessons from and to evince interest in the revolution in Mexico and the struggle going on in Russia. Ghadar, 1 November 1913.

60 Chenchiah, op. cit., Part III, p. 17.

BRIEF HISTORY 73

ing of articles published earlier. Prominent among those of early period were Zulum\ Zuluml G ore Shahi Zulum (Tyranny! Tyranny! White Racial Tyranny) in Gurmukhi—a sharp and bitter condem­nation of forcible deportation of Bhagwan Singh from Canada; Nawen Zamane De Nawen Adarsh (New Ideals of the New Era), a criticism of the politics of Indian National Congress, ridiculing politics of petitions and mendicancy and justifying violent revolutionary action, and The Social Conquest o f the Hindu Race and the Meaning o f Equality. That the rationale and arguments of the two essays contained in the last one, showed marked inconsistency and contradictions was not a matter to be considered. What was prominent in these was a genius for a passioned advocacy of the revivalist and the conservative along- with the liberal democratic and socialistic ideas in the anti-British struggle.®1

More stirring of all the writings were a number of lyrical, poetical compositions in the language of the immigrant workers. These were published in the G hadar and also sung with a dash at various meetings of these people. Soon after, these were collected and published in book form entitled Ghadar di Goonj (Echo of Ghadar)61 62 and distributed free of charge amongst Indians. These poems aroused the indignation of readers against British oppression. ‘Zalam Coolie pukaran Sanoon' (These tyrants call us coolies) and Zalam farangi lai gaye desh lutt ke' (The tyrannous foreigners have looted away the country) were two of the oft repeated refrains in these poems. These poems also reminded the readers of their heritage of valour, their great heroes and their sacrifices; showered shame on the sluggish 'who defiled the great name of the Sikhs' and stirred them to fight, to kill the enemies and die bravely rather than live a cowardly life. One of these poems, for instance read as under ;

Why do you disgrace the name of SinghsHow come ! you have forgotten the majesty of 'lions'Had the like of Dip Singh been alive today How could the Singhs have been taunted ?People say that the Singhs are no goodWhy did you turn the tides during the Delhi mutiny ?

61 See Chap. 3, below.62 The first such collection of 22 Baints, 9 Kabits and some Korara Chhands

running into 28 pages was printed in a book form in April 1914 (San Francisco : Ghadar Press, n.d.j.

74 O H AD AR M O V E M E N T

Cry aloud, 'let us kill the whites’Why do you sit quiet shamelesslyLet the earth give way so we may drownTo what good were these thirty crores born.**

The only need of the hour was to prepare for rebellion. ■Pray for the Ghadar’, was the chief exhortation : 'If you talk, talk of Ghadar; If you dream, dream of Ghadar; It you eat, eat for the sake of Ghadar'. All else must wait. It was foolish to get absorbed in religious feuds or matters of the V edas or the Koran, sang the poets.** Khushwant Singh termed it 'Xenophobic nationalism*.

All the literature thus published was distributed among the Punjabi immigrants in America and sent in bundles to contacts outside. Within a few months the G hadar began to circulate among groups of Indians settled in Canada, the Philippines, Hong Kong, China, the Malay States, Singapore, Trinidad and the Honduras, and was also forwarded to India.'* Har Dayal had written to Van Wyck Brooks, on 8 December 1913. of 'tons of literature' printed for the purpose of smuggling it into India. The G hadar circulated as Sir Charles Teggart put it. ‘with deadly effect among the Sikh immigrants’.** The G hadar spread the ideas, says Prithvi Singh Azad, and the Indian settlers in far off areas, started organising under the 'flag of the Ghadar'. Gurdwaras in Canada and USA and particularly in Shanghai. Hong Kong and Singapore became centres where Ghadar poems were recited and discussions held on political problems after evening prayers.** Most accounts of the former Ghadarites testify to the electric effect which the teachings of the G hadar had on them and their compatriots working abroad and in conver­ting them into fanatical patriots, itching to fight and die for the country. A G hadar poet wrote of its effect in glowing terms : 03 04 * * 07

03 G hadar d i G oon/. No. I . poaro. a04 No Pundm or Mullaha do wo nood

No ptayara or tllonloo wo nood roctto Thaaa will only m ilil* not boot Draw lk* Sword, it l l i lm <0 flghlG hadar di <A«mv. No I . poaro 4. trana Khuahwani Singh.

M Hon* Political A (Sacrol) A n m d a ffr . 8aptambor 1914 No. 110 00 Clod in Brown, op . c it . p 14/07 ) S Bouis. Tho Ohadar Muvomeot . A OMdan Cfeapior c i Indian Nationalism ,

Tho Indian Journal o f Political Sciaao*. Vol XX HI No I, (January* March. 1902). p 40 Atao Chiljar Singh Bhakna tntarvtow <Mtad 30 January 19T4

BRIEF H IST O R Y 7 5

Through a sprinkle on the withered hearts.The G hadar fired a new life into the dead.The pen has done the work of a canon,(and) Shaken the foundation of the tyrannous government.**

Indications are that Har Dayal himself was taken aback or 'got tangled up*, as Lai put it, by the effect of the propaganda. The enthusiastic Punjabi supporters of the movement now asked for action and not merely exhortation to prepare for revolution, 'at some indeterminate future time In the arrest of Har Dayal by the US authorities on 25 March 1914 and on stated ground of his anarchist activities, these supporters saw a hand of the British Government. Har Dayal condemned that 'despicable pro-British subservience of the United States Government at present that is responsible for my arrest . . .*’* The G hadar of 31 March reported the event with a sensational headline :

Congratulations I Congratulations 'I Congratulations 11!Be on the A lert. Enemy's First Blow

The way his comrades felt was depicted in the last poem in G hadar di Goonj

When he broke the news of the warrant (of arrest)(It) Set our hearts ablaze(It) Poured oil on the burning fire(The) Already burning (fire) was fanned all the more.

Leaders of the Hindi Association started crowding in Ylmgan- far Ashram The liberal and radical press in America and a number of revolutionaries and intellectuals protested to the US Government against suspected deportation of Har Dayal, ‘It seems prepostrous*. read a letter jointly signed by leading intellectuals of The Friends of Russian Freedom, 'that in this, of all countries, it was proposed to surrender this Hindu who has been doing for his people what we revere the “fathers** here tor having done for us’ ’•

M C>*riw <ft Goaty. No I. p .38 S i fcown. op. at., p 15170 He mtwvtew mth Tto tutanmmr citod tn toown. op. a t . pp. 163-53 Noe

to*f* m aropW »vKtooc* tmfefcta that tod* cAc* bad txma making fcrmtic aAato m at *a»ty d*»* at Jaruarr IS13 to panutds to* U S Oovwnm*n« to onto* tua *n**« and d*pon*oon Hem* RobUotl A. rroemoebop* Juo* 1513. No* 5-17

I t Citod si fco»n. op. a t . p. tto

76 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Meanwhile Ram Chandra Peshawari formerly editor of India of Gujranwala and Akash of Delhi, and a friend of Master Amir Chand who had masterminded the attempt on the life of Lord Hardinge and was sentenced to death, had arrived at the Yugantar Ashram in January 1914. Chandra took over the editorial work of the Ghadar which from 7 April 1914 was given a new name—Hindustan Ghadar. In a signed article, published in that first number, Har Dayal gloried in the formi­dable strength which the 'Ghadar Party’ had acquired, the support given by American friends and the predicament of the British Government on having disturbed a hornets' nest. He assured his compatriots that since he had completed his 3 years' stay in the United States, six weeks before the date of arrest, he lay safely outside the trap of American law. He concluded with the exhortation : 'Now there is no time to wait. Get ready to leave for the country (India), I’m with you in every situation until my last breath’.72 However he did not wait for the decision in his case and while he was released on bail, he voluntarily slipped out of the United States on 14 April. Next month, Bhagwan Singh, the poet and revolutionary whose deportation from Canada the previous November had aroused a wave of anger, returned from abroad to join the Yugantar Ashram. Along with him came Mohammed Barkatullah of Bhopal who was earlier active in Pan Aryan Association in New York and had later started a militant pan Islamist paper Islamic Fraternity from Tokyo. Both of them had addressed at Yokohama the passen­gers of the fateful Komagata Maru ship which left Hong Kong for Vancouver on 4 April.73 Hereafter it were the events con­nected with the ship which claimed the attention of Ghadarites.

The Cruise of Komagata Maru

Komagata Maru, which became among the Punjabis, a by-word for British oppression, was a Japanese steam­ship which was specially chartered in March 1914 to carry intending Indian emigrants to Canada. There was hardly any political dimension to the venture to begin with, but the fate

72 Hindustan Ghadar (Urdu) Vol. I, No. 1 (7 April 1914), p. 3.73 Ker, Political Trouble in India, p. 219.

BRIEF HISTORY 77

that befell its unfortunate passengers and the indignation which that aroused among their compatriots gave a fillip to the Ghadar movement. An excellent reconstruction of its case history has been done recently by Hugh Johnstone.74 75 76

Gurdit Singh of village Sarhali in Amritsar was a well-to-do contractor in Singapore, who knew that there were hundreds of Punjabis who had left their homes with the object of going to Canada and America and were well supplied with funds for the passage. But they were now spread over Hong Kong and other port towns around, because their entry was barred by Canada and no shipping company would sell tickets to them. He thought of jumping the restriction of ‘continuous journey’ clause by chartering a special ship that would take Indian emigrants from Calcutta to Vancouver on through tickets. His stated objective was to help his compatriots, for ‘I could not bear the troubles of those peoples’ and to serve what he described as his ‘trade interests’. If he succeeded in his venture, he could purchase a ship and run a good business, he thought. And what, if the passengers were not allowed to land in Canada ? He ‘would fight for them in the Supreme Court’; and if he failed, he ‘would take them to Brazil’, he told the counsellors of doubt.74 According to his own account, he was particularly encouraged by a judgement by Chief Justice Hunter of the Supreme Court of British Columbia in re Narain Singh, delivered on 24 November 1913, which allowed thirty five Indians coming by Panama Maru to disembark and reside in Canada.7* Earlier the Dominion Government, fearing that an appeal to the courts might lead to a decision which would result in admitting the East Indians, had unequivocally prevented the courts from interfering with the decisions of immigration authorities by inserting in 1910 a section 23 in the Immigration Act.77 The Government thus faced no problem until 1913. In a writ of habeas corpus in the above case, which Justice Murphy

74 Hugh Johnstone, The Voyage o f Komagata Maru : The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1979).

75 Gurdit Singh, Zulmi Katha, Gurmukhi (Calcutta : Bhai Rai Singh, n.d.) pp. 38, 45, 65-67.

76 In re Narain Singh, 18 (1913), cited in Robie L. Reid, 'The Inside Story of the 'Komagata Maru', British Columbia Historical Quarterly, Vol. V, No. 1 (January 1941), p. 4.

77 For detailed contents of Section 23, see, Reid, loc. cit.

78 GHADAR MOVEMENT

of the same court had earlier refused to entertain, the Chief Justice, declared the above provision as ultra vires, granted the writ, and allowed the newly arrived East Indian entrants to stay. This encouraged those Indians who had been waiting for such an opportunity for a long time. The happy news was flashed all over. The Khalsa Sew ak (Amritsar) congratulated Indians of Canada on their success in the case and announced to its countrymen that it was ‘a valuable opportunity for those brothers who desired to go to Canada.78

Gurdit Singh, therefore, hired a ship on a time-charter and started off from Hong Kong (instead of Calcutta) on 4 April 1914 with 165 passengers on board. More passengers joined at Shanghai, Moje and Yokohama, and the number rose to 376. Except for 21 Punjabi Muslims, practically all of them were Sikhs.

The progress of the ship attached to itself a sense of drama. Many Indians in the islands, nursing subdued hopes of seeing the doors of Canada opened to them, watched its movement with excitement and misgivings. "This ship belongs to the whole of India", a passenger told an enquiring British officer, 'this is the symbol of the honour of India and if this was detained, there would be mutiny in the armies’.79 A few leading revolutionaries of the Ghadar orientation met Gurdit Singh on the way, distributed Ghadar literature and lectured to the passengers. Among these revolutionaries were Bhagwan Singh, Barkatullah and Balwant Singh—a fiery headpriest of Gurdwara at Vancouver, who was one of the 3 delegates sent to London and India to represent the case of Indians in Canada. The press in Punjab pleaded the right of these passengers to land in Canada and warned about very bad consequences if they were returned.80 A section of the Press in British Columbia on the other hand, cried for a halt to 'Mounting Oriental Invasion'.

When the ship arrived on the shores of Vancouver on 23 May, the passengers found it anchored in the roads, away from the coast and cordoned off by the police. The Times

78 Cited in Gurdit Singh, op. cit., pp. 52-55.79 Recorded statement of Harnam Singh Gujjarwal, (a passenger of Komagata

Maru), File 13, DBYJ.80 See The Tribune, The D esb and The Panjabee, in Selections from Native

News Papers, Vol. XXVI.

BRIEF HISTORY 79

(London) of that day carried a categorical statement of the Prime Minister of British Columbia that they would not admit these orientals.81 Meanwhile Orders-in-Council had been re­drawn to overcome the criticism of the Chief Justice.

Leading Indians in Vancouver formed a 'Shore Committee’, with Husain Rahim, Sohan Lai Pathak and Balwant Singh as leaders. Funds were raised and protest meetings held, both in Canada and the USA. At one of the meetings held at Dominion Hall in Vancouver, it was resolved, that if the passengers of the ship were not allowed to land, they should follow them to India and start the rebellion with their help.*2 In the atmo­sphere of heat, even murders of Immigration officers, Hopkinson and B.L. Reid and their notorious Indian agent Bela Singh were advised.8* Across the border, there followed ‘a perfect ava­lanche of meetings’, wherein Bhagwan Singh, Barkatullah, Ram Chandra and Sohan Singh Bhakna informed their countrymen of the developments connected with Komagata Maru, and advised them to get ready for rebellion.84 85

The Shore Committee paid 22,000 dollars as instalment of the charter money for the ship and, preparing a special test case in the name of one passenger Munshi Singh, filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court, hoping to get another favourable verdict. Meanwhile the ship stayed on, and no Indian was allowed to visit the passengers on the ship. On 7 July the full bench of the Supreme Court gave its unanimous judgement, that under the new Orders-in-Council, it had no authority to interfere with the decisions of the Immigration Department.84 That finished their fond hopes of entry to the land of their dreams.

The angry passengers took control of the ship from its Japanese captain, and the government of the province reta­liated by ordering a harbour tug, Sea Lion to push the ship out

81 It said : 'To admit Orientals in large numbers would mean in the end the extinction of the white peoples and we have always in mind the necessity of keeping this a white man's country’. Cited in Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, Ghadar 1915, p, 26.

82 Testimony, Harcharan Dass, Second Supplementary L.C.C. Home Political B, P roceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-343, p. 149.

83 Testimony, Harcharan Dass, loc. cit.84 Judgement, L.C.C., Home Political B (Secret), P roceedings, October 1915,

Nos. 206-238. Appendix II. pp. 106-107.85 Reid, op. cit.. pp. 10-12 and Gurdit Singh, op. cit.. p. 80.

80 GHADAR MOVEMENT

on homeward journey. On 19 July when the tug was tied to the ship, the angry passengers mounted an attack. The Sun of Vancouver reported that 'Howling masses of Hindus showered the policemen with lumps of coal and bricks’, and ‘it was like standing underneath a coal chute'.8‘

The government had meanwhile readied an old cruiser Rainbow of Royal Navy, which had been, for long, out of commission lying at Esquinmalt. On the morning of 21 July it slipped quietly into the Burrard Inlet and was anchored near the Komagata Maru. The warning given, Commander Hose took charge of the operation and the Irish Fusiliers, the 72nd High­landers and 6th DC OR regiments took positions. Albert Foote recounted, in an article 32 years later, the scene on 23rd July 1914 which had attracted thousands of residents of Vancouver to the shore to witness the climax of the drama, many expecting 'the enactment of a battle scene’.86 87 Before the zero hour, 3 O’ clock, the Komagata Maru was on the move.

Its passengers were by this time in a bad temper as most of them had staked all their possessions on this venture. The Indian government felt that ‘this temper had been greatly aggravated by direct revolutionary influences’.88 The ship had not yet touched Yokohama when the War broke out and, on orders from the British Government, no passenger was allowed to land at places from where they had boarded it earlier. In whichever port it touched, the people of the Indian community were swayed by a wave of anger. In the Diwans held in the Gurdwaras at Shanghai and Hong Kong, Komagata Maru formed a central issue and Indians were exhorted to return to India to avenge the insult.89 It was not a mere coincidence that the first jatha of Ghadarites came from Shanghai and reached Calcutta almost on the heels of the Komagata Maru. The Indian Govern­ment applied stringent preventive measures against the fuming Komagata Maru passengers. Provocation by the police resulted in a fracas at Budge Budge and then the troops opened fire, killing 18 passengers. Some including Gurdit Singh dis­appeared and as many as 202 were sent to jail.

86 The Sun (Vancouver), 20 July 1914.87 Albert Foote, 'The Battle of Burrard In let: An Exciting Incident’, The

Vancouver Sun Magazine Supplement, July 1947, p. 4.88 Sedition Committee Report, p. 148.89 Based on interviews with Gujjar Singh Bhakna. and Gurmukh Singh Lalton.

BRIEF HISTORY 81

In Vancouver, the departure of the ship resulted in a ‘trail of violence', and became an accelerator for the demand for immediate armed action against the British Government in India. Bela Singh, a notorious undercover agent of Hopkinson, killed in the Sikh temple on 5 September, Bhai Bhag Singh a most prominent religious and political leader of the community and another leader Badan Singh and injured seven others, when they were kneeling for prayers. During the trial in which Bela Singh was acquitted, Hopkinson was shot dead at the door of the Court by Mewa Singh. The execution of Mewa Singh, on a court judgement later, has been celebrated every year by his countrymen in Canada as a historic martyrdom.90 Efforts had meanwhile been made to purchase arms and mobilise Indians to avenge the atrocities connected with Komagata Maru. Sohan Singh Bhakna, President of the Hindi Association, followed the ship and delivered a box full of 200 pistols and several hundred cartridges when the ship docked for a short time at Yokohama.91

Rebellion 1915 : Bang and Whimper

Close on the heels of the departing Komagata Maru there appeared the clouds of the Great War. The Ghadar of 28 July- informed its readers of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia and the expectations of a rapid development of the situation into a big war in Europe. The next issue of the paper published an article entitled‘The Trumpet of War’. In words full of excitement it proclaimed to Indians living in foreign lands : ‘O, Warriors, the opportunity you have been looking for has arrived.. . ’ The war had now started between Germany and England; all the white troops in India would have to leave for battle fronts. Therefore, ‘Hindustanees should proceed to India forthwith’.

Harnam Singh ‘Tundilat’ refers to a special meeting of leading figures among the Punjabi immigrants to consider the party's plan of action. They were aware of their lack of

90 Ganda Singh, A m reeka Vich Hindustani, pp. 119-23, 142-45; Also, Ker, Political Trouble in India, pp. 226, 229-30 andKhushwant Singh, 'Mewa Singh Shahid—He died for His Countrymen', The Sikh Review, August 1964, pp. 5-6.

91 Sohan Singh Bhakna, Jeew an Sangram, pp. 52-53.

sz GHADAR MOVEMENT

preparation, but the main issue, according to 'Tundilat’, was whether or not to take advantage of the enemy’s trouble. Patriots without any arms decided on waging an immediate armed revolution. There would be lots of arms with the Indian soldiers of the British army, it was thought; so they should be won over to the cause. It was, as he says, unanimously decided that it was better to do something and die than let the opportunity pass unavailed of.92 Bhagwan Singh prepared the Ailan-e-Jang (Proclamation of War) of the Ghadar Party, for purposes of wide circulation.

A series of public gatherings of immigrants were addressed by Bhagwan Singh, Ramchandra and Mohammed Barkatullah, among others. The biggest of these meetings was held at Sacramento. Prithvi Singh Azad who was present at that meeting described it as 'a gathering of true lovers of freedom where our every word and gesture was eloquent of the passion’. It was openly discussed as to what should be done on going to India and how should they go about their work. That, however, says Azad, 'mainly expressed the fire and none of us had any clear idea of revolution’.9* A number of people in the audience were reportedly eager to leave for rebellion at once. The Portland Telegram flashed the news under a front page bannerline : ‘Hindus Go Home to Fight in Revolution’.94 Some of the more impatient ones like Kartar Singh Sarabha, Rughubar Dayal Gupta and a few others had left earlier, without waiting for this meeting.95 96 In the first batch of 60 to 70 Indians who left by S.S. Korea w ere a number of prominent leaders of the community on the west coast of USA.94 Bhagwan Singh was deputed to go to persuade Indians living in port towns of Japan, Philippine, China and Hong Kong. Some of the other leaders were sent to areas in Malay States, Singapore and Burma.

In all these decisions, the student activists were nowhere in the picture. Har Dayal was as yet in Geneva and felt relieved. He had apparently found it difficult to control his more passionate

92 •Tundilat’, op. c/(., pp. 80-86.93 Prithvi Singh, Kranti Path Ka Pathik, pp. 80-81.94 The Portland Telegram, 7 August 1914. See also Ker, op. cit., p. 224.95 Tundilat, op. cit., p . 82.96 Among them were, Jwala Singh and Kesar Singh, two Vice-Presidents of the

Hindi Association. Nidhan Singh, Jagat Ram, Prithvi Singh and Nawab Khan. Sainsara, Ghadar Party da Jtihas, p. 155.

BRIEF HISTORY 83

and precipitant followers. Two weeks after leaving the United States he had written to his friend Van Wyck Brooks : ‘I shall have a quiet and regular life for some time. In California I could hardly sit down and write amidst the multiplicity of executive duties’.1” Although he enjoys the reputation of having forestalled the war between England and Germany and also referred, at the time of his departure from USA, to his plans of making preparations for rebellion in Berlin, it was only at the end of January 1915 that he went there, acceding reluctantly to ‘persuasion of friends’. Meanwhile he had considered that he was not suited for ‘practical activity’ and believed he could do more for his country by working as ‘an independent writer for India’.** He sent articles for the Ghadar and wrote to Brooks that he was very happy that the boys were keeping the printing establishment alright.

Indications of a dichotomy in Har Dayal's concerns were evident. ‘I have come to the conclusion that all propaganda which is based on extreme assertion and ignorance is harmful’, he wrote on 16 June.** Yet that kind of assertion underlined his articles sent to the Ghadar. He suggested to his Ghadarite friends in July 1914 to proceed immediately for rebellion, saying,'I am with you always, even until the end', and next month sent a signed article 'Do Cheezon Ki Zaroorat Hai : Ghadar Aur Bandooqeiri (Two Things are Necessary : Ghadar and Guns).97 98 99 100 But there is hardly any evidence available to suggest that when the War broke out and his men in the USA and Canada decided to leave for their country to launch an armed struggle, Har Dayal ever thought of giving any practical direction or advice regarding the strategy to be adopted or precautions to be taken.

The S. S. Korea left San Francisco on 29 August. While a few of the leading figures broke their journey on the way with a view to follow with batches of more Indians, the rest of them proceeded to India by S. S. Thosha Maru from Hong Kong.101 Bhakna, who had met the Komagata Maru at Yokohama, reached

97 Cited in Brown, Har Dayal, p. 167.98 Ibid., pp. 177-179, 186.99 Cited in, Ibid., p. 177.100 Ibid., p. 178. See also Ghadar (Urdu) 11 August, 1914.101 Prithvi Singh, op. cit., p. 88.

84 GHADAR MOVEMENT

India by S- S. Nam Sang with a group from Shanghai. More Indians coming from Victoria, Vancouver and San Francisco and a number of areas in the Far East followed in small batches in others ships. According to evidence available, en route, they openly preached revolution among Indian soldiers stationed at Hong Kong, Singapore and Rangoon.102 103 104 105 Important among those so contacted were men of the 26th Punjabi Regiment stationed at Hong Kong and the Malay State Guides and the 5th Light Infantry at Singapore.

Meanwhile the Government of India was sufficiently well informed about the designs, movements and the temper of returning Ghadarites and got in touch with the Governor of Hong Kong and British Ambassador in Tokyo.103 It armed itself on 5th September with the 'Ingress into India Ordinance 1914.’ Those who arrived by the returning Komagata Maru on 29 Septem ber were not exactly Ghadarites. But the Budge-Budge episode served as a warning to the authorities that, as the Sedition Committee reported, 'serious consequences would certainly ensue from half-hearted employment of such precautions'.10* So all those who reached Calcutta in the subsequently arriving ships were rigorously inspected, and those suspected to b e dangerous were either arrested or forbidden to reside e lse­where than in their native villages.101 While a number of promi­nent leaders were interned, accurate discrimination was not possible. Many therefore passed unscathed, dodging the police. Since the authorities had not forestalled the possibility of Ghadarites coming via Colombo to ports in South India, numbers of them who came by that route, reached Punjab safely. But one hundred of the passengers of Tohsa Maru and others described as 'most dangerous’ of the shiploads arriving in October, November and Decem ber, w ere interned. According to the Lieutenant Governor of Punjab, out of 3125 emigrants who had passed through the hands of the police at Calcutta and Ludhiana upto the end of February 1915, 189 had been interned and 704

102 Parmanand, The Story o f My L ife. p. 69. Evidence of Nawab Khan, L.C.C., Home Political A, P ro ceed in g s , October 1915, No. 91.

103 Two telegrams from the Secretary of State for India on 14 and 27 August had given detailed information on the stipulated designs of returning Indians. Home Political A, Proceedings, Septem ber 1914, Nos. 211-224.

104 Sedition C om m ittee R eport, p. 149.105 L oc. cit.

BRIEF HISTORY 85

restricted to their villages.10* These measures ‘disorganised’, what the Sedition Committee described as, the 'elaborate arrangements of the returning Ghadarites’. Out of a reported total of about 8000 returned emigants no vigilance was found necessary in the case of about 5000. These men had apparently little fascination for the notions of the Ghadarites and returned to their families and farm lands. Precautionary measures were taken in the case of about 1500 of them. A small number of more committed but without a centralising leadership, made attempts to win over their fellowmen from the peasantry for the cause of rebellion.

Most of the Ghadar men had expected to find their compat­riots in the Punjab in a state of readiness, in the image of their own subjective desires. But they soon discovered ‘to their chagrin’ that they hardly got an audience. The political climate in the country was marked by professions of loyalty, all out effort in the service of the Empire, and a stoic indifference to political ideas. Their fellowmen in Punjab considered the Ghadar men, to be crazy.106 107 108 109 The major institution of the Sikhs, the Chief Khalsa Diwan looked to the British as great benefactors of the Sikh community and called for institution of Akhand Paths (uninterrupted recitations of the Sikh Holy Book) and prayers for the ‘victory of our beloved Sovereign’.103 Reference was made to a believed prophecy by the Ninth Sikh Guru which bound the Sikhs in loyalty to the British. The Diwan leaders condemned the Ghadarites as fallen Sikhs who had played into the hands of agitators and brought disgrace to the community. Committees were constituted to help the government in trackinq down these criminals’.100 The Police Stations in the Punjab were given

special instruction to keep strict surveillance on the movements of the ‘returned Sikhs’ and their communications with local people. The Commissioner of Jullundur Division reported in early December 1914, I do not think there is any chance of

106 Cited in Sedition Committee Report, p. 155. See also. D.C.L's report, 29 December 1914. Home Political B. P roceedings. Nos. 278-282. pp. 3-4.

107 Based on Interviews with Gurmuleh Singh Lalton and Prithvi Singh. See also, Introduction by Trilochan Singh in Autobiography o f Bhai Randhir Singh, pp. XU-XLDC.

108 The Khalsa Advocate (Amritsar). 15 August 1914.109 See The Khalsa Advocate. 15 April 1915, 24 April 1915. 26 June 1915.

86 GHADAR MOVEMENT

disaffected Canadian emigrants receiving any measure of popular support; at least I shall be surprised, if they do so'.110

The undaunted Ghadarites, however, gathered at public fairs of Diwali and Amavas, at Sikh religious places like Amritsar, Nankana Sahib, Tarn Taran and Muktsar and openly exhorted groups of men to rise against the British.111 Some of them, such as Harnam Singh ‘Tundilat’, toured villages, more or less openly preaching rebellion. Randhir Singh of Narangwal, who had led an agitation on the issue of Gurdwara Rikabganj, was the only important convert to the Ghadar idea from among the Punjab Punjabis. But generally, as Michael O’Dwyer recorded, the Ghadarites were regarded with indifference.112 Consequently, they focussed mainly on collection of weapons and winning allies in the British Indian regiments for an early action.

A plan was made to attack the military arsenal at Mian Meer near Lahore, with the help of a few soldiers, and for a general rising thereafter on 15 November 1914. Another plan made subsequently by what was described as the Majha Jatha, consisted of affecting a mutiny in the 23rd Cavalary at Lahore cantonement and the declaration of a rebellion on 26 November. As these plans came to naught, Nidhan Singh’s gang planned a rebellion for 30 November after an attack on the military magazine at Ferozepur.113 In retrospect, these schemes appear little more than fond hopes of visionary optimists. In the midst of these more or less naive and abortive schemes, efforts were afoot to make contact with the terrorists of Bengal.

By mid January 1915 Rash Bihari Bose, a Bengali revolutio­nary and hero of the bomb attempt on the life of the Viceroy Lord Hardinge came down to Amritsar. The British authorities credit Vishnu Ganesh Pingley, a Maratha Brahmin who returned from the USA in November, for establishing collaboration between the Ghadar men and the Bengal terrorist leaders.114 Shachindranath Sanyal, a close associate of Bose at that time, had, however, already been in contact with the Ghadarites. He

110 Home Political Deposit, Proceedings, January 1915, No. 43.111 Evidence and Judgement L.C.C., Home Political A, P roceed in gs, October

1915, No. 91.112 O’Dwyer, India As I Knew It, p. 198.113 Judgement L.C.C.. loc. cit., p. 95.114 Ker, Political Trouble in India, p. 336, Sedition Com m ittee Report, p. 153.

BRIEF HISTORY 87

had been to the Punjab before Pingley met him at Benaras about a fortnight later. Pingley’s arrival facilitated the forging of links.11'

Sanyal was apparently impressed by the fanatical dedication and a death-defying dash of these ‘brave Sikhs’, and equally so by the facility they had in going into Sikh regiments and winning over the soldiers for a ‘mutiny’. He was only worried, as he wrote later, that they might not, by their impulsiveness for action, squander their power too soon.11*

Soon after his arrival at Amritsar, Bose made an assessment of the situation and the available resources of men, money and arms and tried to knot together the small groups of these people who had operated thus far without a headquarter and a central leadership. The evidence available in the autobiogra­phical accounts of Sanyal and ‘Tundilat’ and the statements of the Ghadarites during a series of conspiracy trials indicate a serious and hectic activity for secret preparations. The emissaries sent by Bose to a number of Indian army units from Bannu in the North-west to Lucknow and Faizabad in United Provinces reported back by 11 February 1915. Their assess­ments regarding the readiness of the soldiers for the revolt appeared optimistic. There was no time to lose in doing any more of groundwork or checking the veracity of the reports.

Meanwhile the Ghadarites had also taken to commission of dacoities for the purpose of raising money for the purchase of arms. A very ill-planned and crudely operated dacoity at Chabba on the night of 2nd February appeared to upset the plans. Bose shifted his headquarters to Lahore. His righ-hand man at Amritsar, Mula Singh, was arrested on the 13th. But there could be no rethinking on the timing of the mutiny and the general rising fixed for the night of 21st when there would be simultaneous outbreaks in most of the regiments contacted. There was a fear, as Sanyal wrote, that the 23rd Cavalary, in which lay their major support, might be soon moved out of Lahore.115 116 117 Emissaries were despatched to the contactmen in all those regiments where support was expected, to inform them

115 Sanyal, Bandi Jeewan, pp. 44-45.116 Ibid., pp. 20-28.117 Ibid., pp. 65.

88 GHADAR MOVEMENT-

about the date and the plan. According to O’Dwyer 'the idea' was not fantastic, for it had penetrated as far down as Bengal.'118

Kirpal Singh, newly recruited to the Punjab CID police after the Chabba dacoity, had meanwhile quickly made his way up into the higher decision-making circle of Bose and was reportedly deputed to succeed Mula Singh. On suspicion being aroused by the movements of that person the date was advanced to 19 February. Even that was conveyed to the police and the alert sounded in time to various regiments by. the authorities led to a fiasco for the revolutionaries.11* A raid on the headquarters meant a haul of leading men as also their papers which led to large scale further arrests of most other's connected with the plans. Bose, however, escaped. Popular accounts of the Ghadar rebellion now tend to blame the failure' of the stipulated rebellion on that informer.

According to Punjab Police Officials, 'disaster was only narrowly averted’.120 Michael O’Dwyer reported gleefully that by August 1915, 'we had crushed the Ghadar rebellion', and that, 'Nearly all the leaders and many of their most active adherents were in our hands awaiting trials or were brought to justice later.121

In a series of conspiracy trials in the Punjab and Mandlay (Burma), 42 of these Ghadarites were sentenced to death and over 200 to long terms of imprisonment. Eighteen persons in the 23rd Cavalary were court-martialled. The Ghadarites had come to India to kill the whites, but no white man was killed; The price which they in turn paid for their passion appeared in . retrospect to be fantastic.

In the German Band-Wagon

At the time when 'hordes' of Ghadarites started leaving for India for an instant rebellion, the revolutionary intellectuals

118 O'Dwyer, op. cit. p- 202. See also Sedition Committee Report, p. 154.119 O’Dwyer wrote later, 'We at once wired in cipher to the various

Cantonements, Sialkot, Ferozepur, Rawalpindi, etc. and the military authori­ties took the necessary—in some case perhaps excessive—precaution', op. cit., p. 203.

120 Sedition Committee Report, p. 161.121 O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 206.

BRIEF HISTORY 89

abroad looked for collaboration with Germany. Schemes for a military coup d ’ etat backed by foreign powers had been a part of the thinking of some of the prominent Indian revolutionaries. V.D. Savarkar, Virendranath Chattopadhyaya and Har Dayal had, in their writings in the Talwar (Berlin) and Baade Mataram (Paris) years earlier, looked upon a war between Germany and England as a ‘golden opportunity’ for a coup d' etat in India.18’ On the other hand, aiding an armed rebellion in India appeared to have been considered important by the Germans in their strategy of war against England. Friedrich Von Bernhardi, at one time a general in the German Army, indicated in his book Germany and the Next War, possibilities of a revolution breaking out in India in the event of a European war.12* Like Har Dayal, therefore, many Indian revolutionaries abroad, viewed the end of British rule in India as 'a common cause of India and Germany’.

Soon after the beginning of the war an 'Indian Independence Committee1 led by Virendranath Chattopadhyaya was established in Berlin at the initiative of German foreign office. It was to assist the Germans in making plans and supervising programmes relating to India. With assured supply of abundant finance and with prestige accorded to it by the Germans, the committee attracted to its work a number of Indian revolutionary intell­ectuals. Among them were Barkatullah, Khankhoje, Taraknath Das and Jatindra Nath Lahiri who had had association with the Ghadar Party in San Francisco and who, apparently, had not been happy with the ‘illiterate’ and 'impulsive Punjabi immi­grants’. Darisi Chenchiah wrote of their poor estimation of the Ghadar leader Ram Chandra : ‘We the students were not impressed by his intellectual equipment. He might be alright to illiterate masses, we thought’.122 123 124

Har Dayal, who was considered by some as the founder or chairman of the committee,125 actually joined that committee

122 See, for example, Talwar, February 1910, Bande Mataram, February 1910; See also Ker, Political Trouble in India, pp. 238-40 and Sumit Sarkar, The Swadeshi M ovement in Bengal, p. 490.

123 General Friedrich Adam Julius Von Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War (New York ; G. H. Dovan Company, 1914), p. 150.

124 Chenchiah, 'The Ghadar Party 1913-18 : An Authentic Report', Part II, p. 13.

125 V.C. Joshi, Lajpat Rai : Autobiographical writings (Delhi : University Publishers, 1965), p. 243, and O'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 187,

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only in late January 1915 and that also after much reluctance. He had already been in Constantinople at the behest of Germany but he was disgusted with ‘arrogant and inconsiderate treatment of the German Consul’, and returned to Geneva after five weeks of September-October 1914. 'Now I shall stay here for the remainder of the war period', he had written from there to his friend Brooks.188 His short sojourn in Constantinpole brought forth a clash between his Indian nationalism and the German imperialism. Another important reason ' for his reluctance was given by Har Dayal in that letter; that he was not suited for practical activity. He, therefore, returned the passport, and money supplied to him by the German Consul- General in Geneva. Most accounts of his fellow revolutionaries of that period testify to his preference for propaganda writing than for organising revolutionary activities.117 However, once he joined the committee he appeared to take considerable interest in the big work. Germans were said to have attached great importance to his views. But Har Dayal’s fascination was short-lived and by October of the year 1915 he had practically withdrawn himself from the Berlin Committee. Later he published a ruthless exposition of Turkish Pan-Islamism and German imperialism in which he also alleged that he was kept as a prisoner after October 1915.118

Har Dayal was pursuaded to join the Berlin Committee mainly because of his reputation as a leader of the ‘Ghadar Party'. There was, however, little evidence to show that he played any significant role in affecting the committee’s collaboration with that party. Among those who mattered in any planning and decision making in that committee there was practically none out of those who had a share in decision making at the Yugantar Ashram in San Francisco. Nevertheless, the committee arrogated to itself the commanding role of financing and directing the revolutionary activities and to bring the Ghadar party activities under its influence. That was one of the objectives for which Heramba Lai Gupta was sent to 126 127 128

126 His letter to Van Wyck Brooks dated 24 November 1914. cited, Emily Brown, Har Dayal, p. 184.

127 Chenchiah, op. cit., part I, passim; also part 11, p. 13; Bhupendranath Dutt, Aprakashit Rajnitik Itihas, Appendix V.

128 Har Dayal, Forty Four Months in Germ any and Turkey—February 1915 to O ctober 1918 (London : P. S. King & Sons, 1920), pp. 73-75. .

BRIEF HISTORY 91

United States in January 1915 as the committee’s official representative.18*

Meanwhile new persons had been recruited to the Ghadar staff at the Yugantar Ashram. Among these were Harcharan Das, Godha Ram, Gopal Singh, Sunder Singh Ghalli and Naranjan Singh. Following the departure of leading Ghadarites for India, Barkatullah for Berlin and Santokh Singh and Bhagwan Singh for South-east Asia, Ram Ghandra had become by October-end the single most important Ghadar leader. His readiness to cooperate in German schemes gradually compro­mised the character of the Ghadar movement in USA. ‘The die was cast’, says Gobind Behari Lai, 'the Ghadar news, editorials, comments were vigorously slanted pro-German pro- Turkish.... The handful of misguided young rebels were all tools of the Germans and the Turks, representing nobody in India itself’.129 130

The participation of the Ghadar party in the German schemes was confined mainly to three projects. One of these related to shipping of arms to destinations in India, the second to developing in Siam a base for military training of Indians for intervention in India and a third one to the printing of anti- British and pro-German, pro-Turkish propaganda material for distribution chiefly among British Indian soldiers stationed outside India. In all these projects the Germans were in command and the Ghadar men were treated as enthusiastic errand boys to be financed, advised and ordered about.

Ghadar party’s participation in the first one was nominal. The plot for secret shipping of arms to destinations in Bengal was initiated in response to plans of Bengal revolutionaries and preparations had been made before links of Berlin Committee were established with the Ghadar headquarters.

The German authorities in San Francisco arranged with Ram Chandra to send five Indians with suit cases full of Ghadar literature on S'. S. M averick which sailed from San Pedro near Los Angeles on 23 April 1915 for Socorro Islands off the west coast of Mexico. There it was to receive, from a waiting schooner Annie Larsen, a consignment of arms and then sail to Batavia (Djakarta) where it was to receive further instructions

129 Bose, Indian Revolutionaries A broad, p. 174.'130 G. B. Lai, ‘Reminiscences', pp. 6S-66.

92 OHADAR MOVEMENT

from the German Consul there. However the rendezvous planned at Socorro Islands did not materialise as the two missed the connection. The literature which the five Ghadar men carried was burnt when they suspected search by a team on a British cruiser. Later the cargo of Annie Larsen was seized when it docked at Aberdeen (Washington State) and the Ma verick sailed to Batavia without any arms and without the literature. Among the five Indians, all listed as Persian waiters, were Hari Singh Faqir (Usman) as the leader and Harcharan Das, Mangoo Ram, Gambhir Singh and Harnam Chand. After a stay of three months in Batavia, Harcharan Das and Harnam Chand were sent to Siam where both of them were arrested. Harcharan Das who had worked at Yugantar Ashram, revealed every thing he knew and more, to his British captors and became a star approver in the 'Hindu-German Conspiracy' trial in 1917.131

It is generally believed in popular accounts, following the claim of Hari Singh 'Usman', that the arms shipment to India was planned at the initiative of the Ghadar party. Usman, who claimed that he was 'incharge of the scheme’ believed that it was even financed by the Ghadar party.132 Such an impression was strengthened by the well known assurance of Ram Chandra to Ghadarites returning to India by S. S. K orea : 'arms will be provided to you on arrival in India'.133 The evidence available, however, indicates that Ram Chandra had hardly any more share in the plot than sending five men including Usman on the M averick with Ghadar literature. The evidence in California Trial and recollections of M. N. Roy, Abinash Bhattacharya and Bhupendra Nath Dutt point to the different origin and purpose of the scheme, which the Sedition Committee described as 'German plot in Bengal’.134 Roy, who was specially despatched to Batavia for arranging the onward transmission of arms to Bengal, tells that the revolutionaries were preparing to receive the 'Golden fleece’ for depositing them in secret places. The

131 'The Maverick Enterprise1 in U.S. Attorney General's 'Notes on theAccused'; R ecord o f Trial, Group 118.

132 Recorded Statement of Hari Singh Usman, Desh Bhagat Yadgar, Jullundur.133 Testimony of Nawab Khan, L.C.C., Home Political A, P roceed in gs,

October 1915, No. 91.134 M. N. Roy, M em oirs (Bombay : Allied Publishers, 1954), p. 3; Abinash

Bhattacharya, Europe Bharatiya B ip laber Sadhana (Calcutta ; 1958) Ch. VIII;Dutt, Aprakashit Rajnitik Itihas, Ch. 1; and Sedition Com m ittee R eport, pp.120-23.

BRIEF HISTORY 93

arms were evidently not meant for Ghadarites working in the Punjab. In any case the Maverick moved out from California more than two months after the collapse of the Ghadar enterprise in Punjab and there was hardly any Ghadarite out to receive such a consignment or even having a knowledge of such arrival. The Director of Criminal Intelligence reported on 21 September 1915, ‘we have nothing at present to show that any one in the Punjab is implicated in the plot’.13*

The Ghadar work in Siam, however, had begun about nine months before the too sanguine German scheme was initiated in June 1915. A few Indians in Siam and Burma had been receiving the Ghadar and other propaganda literature for several months earlier. In the months of September and October 1914 a few leading Ghadarites left San Francisco to make preparations in Shanghai, Hong Kong, Siam, Burma, Singapore and Malay States. From among these Santokh Singh, Sohan Lai Pathak and Harnam Singh Sahri operated mainly between Shanghai, Siam and Burma. To begin with, their plans were confined to propaganda among Indians living in these areas as also among the Indian soldiers stationed at Rangoon and Singapore. A scheme for the training of Ghadar men in Siam with the help of the Germans and armed intervention in India was to follow after May 1915.

Meanwhile some members of the Young Turk party also started anti-British secret propaganda among the Muhammedan trading community in Rangoon and among Muslim soldiers for a mutiny against the British.139 The regiments such as the 130th Baluchis which arrived at Rangoon in November 1914, the Military Police of Burma and the Malay State Guides and 5th Infantry at Singapore, consisted largely of Punjabi Muhammedans. The Ghadarites took advantage of the pro-Turkish and Pan- Islamic appeal to this class of soldiers. In collaboration with Turkish leaders, special articles were published in the Hindustan Ghadar at San Francisco. Copies of this paper as also of the Jahan-i-lslam from Constantinople and pamphlets and hand bills, which appealed to the soldiers to become G hazees by declaring Jehad against the British, were distributed. 135 136

135 C.R. Cleveland's note, Foreign and Political, Secret. War, September 1915,P roceed in gs, Nos. 1-46, File p. 43. See also D.C.I.'s report of 17 August1915, Home Political B, P roceedings, August 1915, Nos. 552-556.

136 Sedition Committee Report, pp. 169-171.

94 GHADAR MOVEMENT

According to the Sedition Committee these regiments were soon ‘contaminated by Muhammedan and Hindu conspirator^ belonging to the American Ghadar Party'. The 130th Baluchis; the committee wrote, were in January 1915, thoroughly dis­affected and ready for revolt. A mutiny in this regiment was averted on 21 January 'by timely and drastic action on the part of the military authorities who punished 200 of the plotters'. The Malay State Guides, a few men from which reportedly informed the Turkish Consul at Rangoon of their readiness for revolt, were transferred to another place, ‘before any mutiny! occurred. In the 5th Infantry at Singapore, however, it all started with a sudden shot on 15 February 1915 when they were loading arms to move to Hong Kong. For three days the mutinous soldiers held their own, after killing among others, eight of their European officers. Then, with the arrival of re-inforcement, it was the turn of the British masters to wreck their vengeance on the mutineers. More effective steps were taken to insulate other soldiers stationed abroad from being ‘contaminated’ by revolutionaries.187

In March 1915, perhaps encouraged by these events, a’ serious consideration was given by Germans and representatives of the Indian Independence Committee in the USA to activise the' Siam-Burma centre. By that time collaboration had been established with the Ghadar leadership in San Francisco and- arrangements for secret shipment of arms were under way in California. Heramba Lai Gupta and the German Consul at- Chicago made arrangements for sending a group of Germans to Siam. Among them were George Paul Boehm and Henry Schult alias Sterneck, two ex-servicemen, who were to be military instructors for Indians in Siam, and a third one named Albert Wehde.188 Gupta recommended Jodh Singh alias Hassan Zada and Sukumar Chatterjee to be sent to that centre. Ram Chandra also asked Darisi Chenchiah, then a student at Utah State Agri­cultural College, to go along with them. According to Chenchiah, they met Sun Yat Sen, the leader of the Chinese revolution of 1912 at Tokyo who encouraged them to overthrow the British 137 138

137 Ibid.138 Siam-Burma Enterprise in 'Notes on the Accused’, R ecords o f Trial, Group

118. See also Jodh Singh's evidence, Second Supplementary L.C.C., HomePolitical B, Proceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-343.

BRIEF HISTORY 95

rule in India.139 Bangkok was to be their headquarter, ‘where we should receive the recruits that would be coming from various parts of America and East Asia and send them to Burma over the mountains of Siam.’ A steamer from America was to dump arms in some forests of Siam and then they were to arrange to transport the same to Burma. All this appeared to be a very pro­mising enterprise to Chenchiah, because as he says, 'in those days everything seemed possible . . . . We were ready to believe in any thing.’130 On the way, they received instructions from the German Consul at Manila and reached Amoy in South China on 2nd July and Bangkok on 17th. Meanwhile the German Consul at Shanghai purchased arms and a schooner Henry S. cleared from Manila with cargo and two men of the German group, Albert Wehde and Boehm, on board. However, the ship being checked by the U.S. Customs authorities, the cargo was impounded.141 Neither the arms, nor the Germans reached Bangkok.

The British C harge d' Affairs in Bangkok had been in touch with the Siamese Government which had assured that they would not permit their territory to be used as a base against a friendly neighbouring power. On 1st August the Thai Govern­ment, alerted by the British and helped by Indian detectives, arrested in a scoop four important Ghadarites including Jodh Singh. It was regarded as a triumph of British diplomacy. Boehm, the German instructor was also arrested at Singapore on his way from Batavia. These two and a German paid agent Deus Dekker provided full information to the British including the key to the German secret code of communication. In that abortive scheme, the Ghadarites appeared to have assumed big roles, but the evidence available indicates that all directions came from German Consuls and, in the absence of direction, they had no idea of what to do. A major part of the reason why they were easily arrested lay in their aimless wandering and idle talk in the absence of work.143

139 Chenchiah, op. cit., Part IV, pp. 20-21. See also D.C.I.'s Report of 21 September 1918, Home Political B, Proceedings, October 1918, Nos. 191-94.

140 Chenchiah, op. cit.. Part IV, pp. 15-16 and 25-26.141 Report of the Director Criminal Intelligence dated 3rd August 1915, Home

Political B, Proceedings, August 1915, Nos. 552-56. Also, Sedition Committee Report, p. 124.

142 Evidence of Jodh Singh, Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B, P roceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-343, p. 304.

96 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Another role of the Ghadar party during the war period consisted of printing anti-British and pro-German propaganda material for the use of Germany. Pamphlets were distributed, in some cases ‘air dropped’, among Indian soldiers fighting German forces on various fronts. The point in printing the Hindustan G hadar in Gujarati, Pushtu and Gurkhali languages may have been that of reaching out to the Indian trading communities in South-east Asia, and the Pathan and Gurkha regiments from India. One pamphlet in Pushtu entitled 'Rise and Take Revenge', for instance, was addressed to Mohammedans of the North West Frontier in India, which read :

The wicked English with their allies are now attacking Islam, but the German Emperor and the Sultan of Turkey have sworn to liberate Asia from their tyranny, Now is the time to rise. The Shaikh-ul-Islam has proclaimed a Jehad . The G hadar Party has declared war against the English. Germany, the friend of India, is sitting on the chest of the base-born English. The Sikhs and Rajputs are ready. Only your strength and relig iou s z ea l are required. Future generations will pray for you for having liberated them from slavery, and your name will survive till the D ay o f Judgem ent. Brave men, rise, and break the chains of slavery.143

In a raid on a premises of the Ghadar Party (Bhagwan Singh’s faction) on 4 June, 1918 the US Officials found that a room about 6 feet by 5 feet was packed full of revolutionary pamphlets ■which must have numbered between 150,000 to 200,000’.144 Partly as a result of the propaganda, a few of the regiments were reported to have refused to fight the Germans. Ram Chandra had received an abundant supply of funds from Germany, meant mainly for the printing of literature. When the propaganda of Ram Chandra did not appear to suit the interests of the Berlin Committee and the Germans, he was ordered to stop. His refusal to do that becam e a cause for accentuating the conflict between the two groups of revolutionaries. ‘I endeavoured to induce Ram Chandra to discontinue publication of Ghadar’.

M3 Trans, n D.C.I.’s Report 3 August 1915, Home Political B, P ro ceed in g s , August 1915, No. 552. (Emphasis added).

144 D.C.I.'s Report of 28 September 1918, Home Political A, P roceed in gs, October 1918, Nos. 191-194.

BRIEF HISTORY 97

When he refused, I parted company with him and his method of aiding our countrymen,’ wrote Chakrabarty to the Berlin Committee. When Ram Chandra sent to Berlin a bill for $ 35,000, Chakrabarty advised the Committee not to make the payment.145

In the other few projects and expeditions centred in Constantinople, Baghdad, Kabul, Batavia, areas of Persia, Mesopotamia and Japan and those relating to the secret ship­ment of arms, the participation of the Ghadar party appears to have been hardly more than nominal.

Pandurang Khankhoje was sent to Baghdad, Barkatullah to Constantinople and then to Afghanistan, and a few others nominally associated with Ghadar to Baghdad, Java, Sumatra, Cuba, Panama etc. Har Dayal remained an important leader of the Committee for a little over eight months. Taraknath Das during his eighteen months in Europe travelled in Germany, Holland, Switzerland, Sweden, Rumania, Turkey and Asia Minor, ■a truly remarkable war time itinerary’.146 147 The earlier associa­tion of these people generally attaches to the projects in which they participated, the impression of Ghadar party’s collaboration. One among these projects was the mission to Kabul, known for Mahendra Pratap’s dramatic formation of a ‘Provisional Government of India’.

The Mission was sent by the Germans with the object of winning over the Amir of Afghanistan to the German side, and to make Kabul a base for military training of Indians and their armed infiltration into India. With a German Lieutenant Werner Otto Von Hentig as incharge, Mahendra Partap, Barkatullah and other members of the mission reached Kabul on 2nd October 1915.117

The Amir of Afghanistan bound by treaties with the British Government of India, was fore-warned by the latter about the advance of the German party and was advised to have them ■arrested, disarmed and interned'. The Amir did not do that, but assured Governor - General Lord Hardin ge that he would

145 Quoted in San Francisco Chronicle, 18 April 1918, p. 11.146 ‘Notes on the Accused', R ecords o f Trial, Group 118.147 Mahendra Pratap, My Life Story o f Fifty Five Years (D elhi: 1947), pp. 47-48.

See also Bose, Indian Revolutianaries Abroad, p. 109.

98 GHADAR MOVEMENT

do his utmost to maintain strict neutrality.14* Not sure of the course the war might take, and keen to placate his pro-Turkish counsellors, he did not grudge a semblance of respectability to the members of this mission. Patriotic Indians felt that the mission received a 'right royal reception’. However the Amir kept the mission waiting, did not give the Germans any subs­tantive help and in fact, advised them to leave Kabul in May 1916.148 149 150 151

Meanwhile, Mahendra Pratap had announced the formation of Hukumate-e-Muvaqata-e-Hind (Provisional Government of India) in December 1915 in which he declared himself as the President, Mohammed Barkatullah as Prime Minister and Moulvi Obeidullah as Home Minister. This 'Government', did hardly anything more than writing presumptuous letters to Indian princes, the King of Nepal and the Czar of Russia.160 The only letter that actually reached the destination was the one sent to Nepal and even that was fruitless. Another action that became prominent, more for the ingenious device and less for the quixotic schemes, was the so called 'silk letters conspiracy’.161

In retrospect, the whole Kabul episode appeared to be a chapter from the life of a Knight-errant Don Quixote out on exploits with a bunch of equally ambitious Sancho Panzas. Von Hentig in his letter to the German foreign office gave very interesting details of the eccentricities of Mahendra

148 Lord Hardinge of Penhurst, My Indian Years 1910-1916 (London Murray, 1948), p. 132.

149 Ker, Political Trouble in India, pp . 277 and 279- See also R. C. Majumdar, History o f the F reed om M ovem ent in India, Vol. II, p. 334.

150 D.C I.’s Report, 27 January 1917, Home Political B, P roceed in g s, February 1917, Nos. 397-400. Also Sedition C om m ittee R eport, p. 178. See also Pratap, op. cit., p. 56.

151 These letters were neatly written in Persian on lengths of yellow silk and sewn up inside the lining of the coat of the messenger who was arrested in the Punjab. Giving details of the 'Army of God', proposed by O bei­dullah, one of the two letters to Mahmud Hassan contained a table of names of 3 Patrons, 12 Field Marshals, 2 Generals (the writer and the addressee of the letter), 30 Lieutenant Generals, 16 Maj. Generals, 24 Colonels. 10 LL Colonels. Ker, op . cit., p. 285.

BRIEF HISTORY

Pratap.152 153 What cannot be ignored is the evidence that in all its doings the mission had hardly any connection with the Ghadar party. Barkatullah's association with it cannot be a testimony of the said collaboration.

End of the Ghadar Phase

What made news on the Ghadar party in the USA after the middle of 1915 were mainly the talks of dissentions within the party. Most accounts of that period refer to the alleged autocratic manner in which Ram Chandra managed the party affairs after the beginning of the war.153 Almost all the leading Ghadarites had left the USA. The prominent men of the Khalsa Diwan Society at Stockton, who disliked the unorthodox or irreligious leaders, sometimes described as the 'Arya Samaj element’, accused Ram Chandra of pushing thousands of patriotic Indians into the hands of the enemy without ensuring their safety or success.154 Lajpat Rai found him to be ‘an absolutely unscrupulous man who had cut himself completely from all ethical and moral moorings’, who left 'a very repulsive impression on my mind'.155 A major ground for a campaign against him stemmed from suspicions of mismanagement and bungling regarding the use of funds provided by Germany. Harcharan Das alleged during the

152 Von Hentig in a letter to Auswartiges Amt. (Foreign Office), 4 March 1918 said, for' instance, 'Partap was a man of erratic, eccentric and extremely selfish behaviour, a dreamer not in full possession of his mental faculties’ and that he 'was deliberately irresponsible and behaved dangerously on the march across the desert Respite repeated warnings'. William Stapp, ■Activities, of the Indian Revolutionary Committee in Berlin in the First World War', memeo. pp. 11-12. Jawaharlal Nehru, who met Mahendra Pratap in Switzerland in 1926, said that ‘he was (and I suppose is still) a delightful optimist,' living completely -in the, air and refusing to have anything to do with the realities...he seemed to be a character out of medieval romance a Don Quixote who had strayed into the twentieth century’. An Autobiography (London : John Lane, The Bodley Head, 1936), pp. 150-151. .

153 See Harish Chandra's full statement to the Police. Home Political A, P roceed ­ings, February 1916, No. 201, p. 7,. See also Bhagwan Singh’s Diary and ■Notes on the Accused’, R ecords o f Trial, Group 118.

154 D.C.I.’s Weekly Report, 9 May 1916, Home Political B, Proceedings, May 1916, No. 578. See also Reports of.9 December 19.16 and 24 February 1917.

155 Lajpat Rai, ‘Recollections' (1919), pp. 15-16.

100 GHADAR MOVEMENT

trial later : 'Ram Chandra is the biggest grafter in the world’, and that $ 40,000 described as the ‘national fund’ was actually 'Ram Chandra’s own pocket money’,156 157 By the middle of 1916, both the British and the German governments received reports that the Ghadar party was in the process of breaking up.187

Meanwhile the underlying jealousies between Indians of the Berlin Committee and Ram Chandra also grew in proportion, resulting in a virtual rupture. Failure of those ambitious and fabled revolutionary projects in which many disparate elements had joined for a while, tended to generate accusations and counter-accusations. The Berlin Committee complained, 'the Ghadar men will ruin our work everywhere. They do not understand how to work’.158 The Germans, on their part, felt disgusted with the whole group of Indian revolutionaries.

Bhagwan Singh returned to California in October 1916 and spearheaded a campaign against Ram Chandra. Lajpat Rai who had returned to USA from Japan in December 1915 was a witness to that internal strife. Ram Chandra appealed to Rai for support. But the latter refused to become embroiled in ‘the fight between factions’, and removed himself from California to avoid 'unpleasantness’.159 Chandra’s failure to account for the use of the funds received from Germany eventually broke up the party in California. In effect, the two factions set up parallel organi­sations during January-February 1917 and started publishing parallel Ghadar journals.160 Mutual recriminations continued.

Meanwhile the British diplomatic pressure on the Govern­ment of USA was mounting. The British had been pleading for the arrest of Indian revolutionaries, who according to them were taking advantage of American neutrality to make the latter's

156 Testimony, Harcharan Das; R ecords o f Trial. See also D.C-I-’s Report of 24 February 1917, Home Political B, P roceedings. February 1917, Nos. 397-400.

157 Chakrabarty’s telegram to Zimmerman, 5 September 1916.—Cited in Giles T. Brown, 'The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States 1914-1917', M.A. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1941; p. 63.

158 Cited in John W. Spellman, 'The International Extentions of Political Conspiracy’, as Illustrated by the Ghadar Party’, Journal o f Indian History, April 1959 p. 41.

159 Naeem Gul Rathore. 'Indian Nationalist Agitation in the United States : A Study of Lala Lajpat Rai and the Indian Home Rule League of America'. Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1965, pp. 64-66.

160 Bhagwan Singh formed his new party with a new constitution, on 21 January 1917. Ram Chandra set up anew press at 1017. Valencia Street and published the nrst number of his new Ghadar on 7 February 1917.

BRIEF HISTORY 101

territory as a base for conspiracy against the British Govern­ment in India. The correspondence between the British Ambassador Sir Cecil Spring Rice and the British Foreign Office during that period showed how a persistent pressure was main­tained on the US Government.161 The records of the US State Department demonstrate, however, that until February end of 1917, Secretary of State Robert Lansing and President Woodrow Wilson defended American stand that activities of Indians did not constitute a violation under the US laws on neutrality.161

The German announcement of unrestricted submarine warfare from February 1 and a secret letter of Zimmerman released to the press on 1st March altered the scales of US neutrality. The United States decided to join Britain as an ally against Germany and a little before President Wilson signed the House resolution declaring United States entry in the war, Assistant Attorney General Charles Warren ordered John W. Preston, the U.S. Attorney in San Francisco, to arrest Ram Chandra and other Indians. The New York city police arrested C. K. Chakrabarty and Ernst Sekunna, the German Liason Officer, with the Indian revolutionaries. By April 8 most of the other Indians and German agents including German consulate officials Franz Bopp, E.H. Von Schack and William Von Brincken had been rounded up.

The trial which began at the District Court of California on 12 November 1917 came to be known as the ‘Hindu-German Conspiracy Trial1 and the disclosure provided to the press a most newsy stuff for months. The charge against the 'East Indians’ was the violation of American neutrality during 1914- 1917. Preston was optimistic, because the evidence they had was in ‘very good shape’. 'The British agents have worked very hard in putting the evidence in accessible form and I have every reason...to believe’, he wrote to Attorney General Gregory, 'that the case will result favorably as to all important defendants’.163

161 Don K. Dignan, The Hindu Conspiracy in Anglo-American RelationsDuring World War I', Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XL, No. I (February1971). pp. 55-77.

162 Joan M. Jenson, The "Hindu Conspiracy'' : A Reassessment'. PacificHistorical Review, Vo], XLVIII. No. I (February 1979), pp. 77-79.

163 Ibid., p. 81.

102 GHADAR MOVEMENT

The evidence brought forward during the trial unravelled wide extensions of the conspiracy and collaboration of a variety of elements. This was more marked because 'Heresay evidence rules were relaxed to allow the words of alleged conspirators to be used against each other1. The result was that 'undercover agents, informers and government witnesses demoralised and divided the revolutionaries and made it difficult for them to know whom to trust’.164 What was worse, the trial showed up some of the baser elements in the alloy of patriotism of some of the leading Indian revolutionaries; ‘grafting of money’ being one of them. Disclosures about Chakrabarty, the Berlin Committee chief in the United States, made newsy headlines in the press such as ‘Oily leader of the Oily Revolution locked up in Tomb1.165 The disclosures were 'terribly damaging’, and as Lajpat Rai recorded in his Diary, ‘There was hardly one man who came out unscathed and untainted’. Rai stated that he formed a particularly low opinion of some of the 'Bengalees’ who were 'absolutely unprincipled' and whose patriotism was 'tainted by considerations of gains and profit’.166

The British Government reports indicate, as Juergensmeyer wrote, ‘an absolute obsession’ with the German hand in Ghadar activities.167 Most writers tended to see in the wide extension of anti-British activities of a host of groups, a certain proof that the Ghadar party organised its activities on an international scale. The evidence brought up in the California trial, as also the accounts of some of the former Ghadarites are, however, at variance with these beliefs. As it would seem, Ghadar

164 Ibid., p. 82. . •165 Cited in Roy, Memoirs, p. 41, An interesting repartee between the German

Consul-General Franz Bopp and Dr. Chakrabarty was :Bopp : ‘You say you were inspired by Patriotism?' Chakrabarty : 'Yes'.Bopp : 'Patriotism and 60,000 dollars'.

Cited in Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, Ghadar 1915, p. 52, n. 66. ’Deus Dekker, a German paid agent from Java was more forthright:

•From the very beginning I was in it to knock money out of the Germans.It was a comedy as far as I was concerned from beginning to end and I had no intention to carry out any of their plans...’ Statement in the court, quoted in Giles T. Brown, 'The Hindu Conspiracy...', pp. 19-20.

166 Lajpat Rai, 'Recollections', pp. 44, 49.167 Mark Juergensmeyer : ‘The International Heritage of the Ghadar Party : A

Survey of the Sources', The Sikh Sansar (California), Vol. II, No. 1 (March 1973), p. 11.

BRIEF HISTORY 103

collaboration with Germany was confined only to the Siam- Burma Scheme and financing of Ghadar publication of propa­ganda material. In the rest of the German-Indian projects, Ghadar participation was practically nil.

The first phase of the Ghadar party, that of 'Ghadar' viz : a popular armed rebellion with the aid of mutinous soldiers and the masses ended with the Lahore Conspiracy trials in India and the California trial in USA. Its dramatic finale was sounded in the court chamber itself and on the last day of the trial, when one Ram Singh, a co-accused, shot Ram Chandra dead. Har Dayal, who had inspired thousands of Indian immigrants with an idea-force of revolution, made a complete volte face in summing up his new thesis with the words : 'Asia needs Britain’s strong arm for her safety and progress'.168 This was the end of a revolutionary. Thereafter a leading light being sought from Soviet Russia, the re-organised party in early twenties carried the same name, but thought in terms of a revolution through the organisation of peasants and workers. Khushwant Singh viewed it as a conversion from 'Xenophobic nationalism' to 'Xenophobic Marxism'.169

168 Hai Dayal, 'The Future of the British Empire in Asia’—II, The New Statesman (London), Vol. XII, No. 312, (29 March 1919), p. 575.

169 Khushwant Singh, A History o f the Sikhs, Vol. II, p. 191.

IDEOLOGY OF THE MOVEMENT 3Ideology is taken here as a ‘framework of consciousness’

i.e. a more or less integrated set of ideas and beliefs, which provided to the adherents an explanation of their problem situations, a conception of the desired social and political order and of the action required for affecting the change. It is generally developed in response to a perceived challenge. An ideology of revolutionary change may, therefore, provide an approach to analysis and explanation, a basis for identity and solidarity, and a choice of the required shape of organisation and the strategy to be adopted.1 It may not, however, necess­arily preclude the existence of divergent ideas and beliefs within a broadly integrated framework.

In studying the ideological framework of mass movements it may be pertinent to go beyond the ideas and beliefs advocated by the ideologues and intellectuals, to the substance and idiom of what the masses grasped, the manner in which those ideas w ere ‘translated into the mother tongue’. An attempt is made here to discuss the Ghadar movement’s ideology in two parts, the ideological formulations of Har Dayal and the form in which the 'organic intellectuals' and other activists appeared to carry these in their minds.

Har Dayal and His Ideological Formulations

Har Dayal was the chief ‘Man of Words’ of the Ghadar movement. His ideological formulations were cast in the mould

1 Manoranjan Mohanty, Revolutionary V io len c e : A Study o f the Maoist Mavement in India (New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1977), pp. 10-11.

IDEOLOGY 10S

of a rather loose framework of ideas which prevailed among the Indian revolutionaries of that period. These may be drawn from his propaganda writings and his reflections in some of his articles, including the earlier ones reprinted by the Ghadar press. His leadership of the movement ended early. Ram Chandra who succeeded Har Dayal as the editor of the move­ment's chief organ with an altered name of Hindustan Ghadar, functioned in a more or less similar ideological framework.

Har Dayal derived his inspiration from a wide variety of sour­ces. Early in his youth he was influenced by the Arya Samaj and the Hindu extremist nationalists and advocated a 'Hindu national­ism’.2 His association with Indian revolutionaries such as Shyamji Krishnavarma, Vinayak Damodar Savarkar and Madam Cama appeared to have contributed significantly to his revolutionary orientation. The writings of Mazzini, and also of Marx influenced him.3 The syndicalist and anarchist movements also claimed for a time his active involvement. He became the secretary of the San Francisco branch of the Industrial Workers of the World (I. W. W.) movement4 5 and founded the Bakunin Institute of California which he proudly described as ‘the first monastery of anarchism1.6 One noticed in him a marked propensity for an

2 Lajpat Rai pointed to Har Dayal’s strong belief that the English were undermining Hindu character and destroying their social consciousness and ‘national individuality', and stated further that, 'He would not even mix with Mohammedans and Christians . . . . He aimed at establishing an order of Hindu ascetics to preach his id e a s .. . ' . Young India (1916, rpt., New D elhi: Publications Division, Government of India, 1968), p. 166. Har Dayal's article, 'Social Conquest of the Hindu Race’, pointed to his profound fascination for the restoration of the glory of Hindu race and the values of legendary Vedic age : See below.

3 His article, ‘Karl Marx: A Modern Rishi', was the first ever writing by an Indian on Marx orjhis ideas. Modern Review, March 1912, pp. 273-286,

4 In his prestigious address to a meeting of the I.W.W. in the summer of 1912, he called for a solidarity of the labourers of the whole world and even decried patriotism, which he said, was devised to divide the labourers into their various countries and thus into a false division of society. Cited in Emily Brown, Har Dayal, p. 111.

5 Indulal Yajnik, Shyamji Krishnavarma (Bombay : Lakshmi Publications, 1950), p. 16; Dharmavira, Har Dayal and the Revolutionary Movement o f His Times, p. 163;and Emily Brown, op. cit-, p. 116. In a formal statement of the principles for his 'Fraternity of the Red Flag', he included The establishment of Communism, and the abolition of private property in landand capital through industrial organisation and the General Strike, (the) ultimate abolition of the coercive organisation of Government', and the abolition of religion, patriotism and race feeling. For full statments' see, Emily Brown, op. cit., pp. 114-15.

106 GHADAR MOVEMENT

equally fanatic advocacy of paradoxical notions on important issues of identity, solidarity, nature of organisation and revolutionary strategy. Little attempt was made to seriously discuss and resolve the contradictions. Lajpat Rai described him as ‘more impulsive than consistent in histhought and action . . . quite an uncertain item’.8 Indeed Dayal himself stated at a moment of reflection in November 1914 : 'I am too erratic and explosive to be institutionalised’.6 7 8 He, therefore, brought to use an assortment of diverse arguments and heterogeneous beliefs.

One of the fundamental premises of his argument for a revolutionary change was, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, that the British rule had ruined India and resulted in misery and degradation for its people. Being absolutely fed up with British rule, the people of India were no longer prepared to suffer the oppression and tyranny and were ready to rise in revolt. In two of the regular features of the Ghadar viz. Angrezi Raj Ka Kacha Chittha (A Balance Sheet of the British Rule) and Ankon Ki Gawahi (Evidence of Statistics) and in his articles and pamphlets,8 he spot-lighted the economic ruin augmented by the British and oppression by the bureaucracy and police. The main items on the agenda consisted of accounts relating to the drainage of Indian wealth into England ; excessive expenditure on armed forces and wars of imperial extension ; high rates of taxation and decline of indigenous production ; recurrent famines and staggering death tolls ; and neglect of education, sanitation and public health. The dubious agrarian policy of the government was held responsible for the persistent exploitation of the Indian peasant.

The British rule, it was stressed, was maintained through administrative high-handedness, excessive legal restrictions on civil liberties, press gagging measures, arrest of political leaders, and detentions without trial. Incidents of torture of detenues by

6 Lajpat Rai, Young India, pp. 166-68. Darisi Chenchiah stated in his recollections of his days with Har Dayal, that 'it was a peculiar characteristic of Har Dayal to change his ideas rapidly and act upon them', ‘The Ghadar Party 1913-18 : An Authentic Report’, Part I, p. 12.

7 His letter to Van Wyck Brooks, cited in Brown, op. cit., pp. 111-12.8 Notably, A Few Facts About British Rule in India (San Francisco : Hindustan

Ghadar Press, 1915).

IDEOLOGY 107

the police were cited to support the charges,9 Thus it was said, ■we call it British Vampire and not British Empire’,10

The substance of the whole description was based mainly on the writings of the British and Indian liberal democratic critics of administration such as William Digby, H.M. Hyndman, Alfred Webb, C.J. O' Donnel, Rev. Sunderland, Dadabhai Naoroji and G.K. Gokhale. The arguments which had become common in the armoury both of the 'moderates’ and the ‘extremists’ in India and which had been used primarily to demand reforms in British administration were here used to develop a conviction that Indian and British imperial interests were basically irrecon­cilable. What was needed, therefore, was a surgical operation i.e. a violent revolution to end the British rule. The description was passionately interspersed with epithets like thugee, badmashi, 'a band of thieves', ‘dacoits’ and so on,11 to stress upon their contempt for the British and to drive the ideas home to the less sophisticated audience.

Har Dayal was particularly inclined to emphasise on the moral degradation of the Indian people caused by subjection to foreign rule. In his article, 'The Social Conquest of the Hindu Race', his argument turned mainly to the danger to Hindu tradition and moral order. He virulently decried the situation, whereby 'the beaf-eating Europeans', who were mere cobblers and coolies in England, had ousted high caste Brahmins and Kshatriyas from positions of leadership in the Hindu society. He, therefore warned: 'If the social conquest is completed, there is no hope for our nation’.12 On the other hand, the argument in another pamphlet, Ghulami Ka Zehar (Poison of Slavery), which also focussed on moral degradation, was basically secular in appeal. It was not only the British rule which was condemned but also the social system in which the native Raja and Zamindar were equally responsible for injecting the poison of slavery in the minds of the honest hard-working peasants and labourers.13

9 Chadar, 1 November 1913 and F. Mackerness, M ethods o f Indian Police in the Twentieth Century (San Francisco : Hindustan Ghadar Press, 1915). See also D.C.I.'s Report 15 July 1916, Hone Political B, P roceedings, July 1916, No. 443.

10 Har Dayal’s Speech at Astoria, The Astorian (Portland), 3 June 1913.11 Hindustan Chadar, 4 April 1915. See also Home Political B, Proceedings,

October 1915, Nos. 206-238, Appendix III, Filep. 121.12 Har Dayal, The Social Conquest o f the Hindu Race and M eaning o f Equality

(San Francisco : Ghadar Press. 1914), p. 6.13 Har Dayal, Ghulami Ka Zehar (Urdu) (San Francisco: Hindustan Ghadar

Press, 1916).

108 GHADAR MOVEMENT

A specific reference was also made to the particular grievances of the Muslims in India. Writing in Ghadar, on that topic, it was pointed out that they had been the special target of British oppression. Muslim States were conquered and aristo­cratic families were ruined. The British economic policy caused the greatest havoc to the Muslim weavers of Dacca and Murshidabad. Muslim newspapers like the A] Hilal, the Tauhid, the Zamindar and the Rafah-e-Aam were not allowed to run freely.14 15 The break up of the Ottoman Empire was put up as yet another act of British imperial policy and the Muslims of India were exhorted to avenge the injustice done to their Muslim brothers. The Pan Islamist movement was regarded as a holy war against the ‘Christian Kafirs'.16

Among the goals to be achieved, complete political inde­pendence was, of course, the primary objective. There could be no compromise on that point. In that respect, the Ghadar movement anticipated the direction which the nationalist move­ment in India was to adopt several years later. The Ghadar condemned the contemporary mendicant approach of the Indian National Congress and particularly attacked the 'moderates’ such as Gopal Krishan Gokhale for allegedly misleading the nation.1* As for the shape of the desired social and political order which should be established in India after removal of the British, the Ghadar ideologues had not given a serious thought to it, though occasional ad hocish allusions were made to a variety of intended objectives.

Har Dayal’s conception of political programme of revolution did not include what system would replace the existing arrange­ment. Years earlier, in the first issue of his Bande Mataram (September 1909), he had proposed a three-stage plan of action, which would help his country to 'again establish itself as a member of the community of nations'. The first stage was to be of moral and intellectual preparation; second, of war; and the third, of reconstruction and consolidation. 'After Mazzini, Garibaldi; after Garibaldi, Cavour. Even so it must be with us', he

14 Ghadar, 8 November 1913.15 Ib id - See also, Report of the D.C.I., 3 August 1915, Home Political B,

Proceedings, August 1915, No. 552.16 See in particular, Hindustan Ghadar, 22 August 1915; also Ghadar, 1 Nov­

ember 1913.

IDEOLOGY 109

emphasised, ‘Virtue and wisdom first; then war; finally indepen­dence.’ Emily Brown says it was ‘the first coherent statement of Hardayalism’. Lajpat Rai, who coined the term 'Hardayalism' to describe the ideas of Har Dayal’s variety of Indian nationalists, thought the lack of any positive and constructive political programme was a prominent mark of ‘Hardayalists’.17 It was not that they were not aware of the need, but the thinking about alternative order appeared much less important.

Mazzini’s writings were rather avidly read by the educated Indian patriots of that period, and they would have noticed his insistence upon having a positive programme. It did not, however, acquire a priority with them. One may notice that in a book, Life o f Mazzini, found on Shachindranath Sanyal, one remark of Mazzini on the weakness of the Carbonari was parti­cularly underlined by the reader. In that, Mazzini had concluded: 'It was this want of a positive programme that was responsible for that failure of the Carbonari'. Surely it had caught the attention of the readers amongst whom it was circulated. A note was, however, added, in pencil, by its side : ‘but the programme may not include the form of government after the revolution’.18 It may not be a far-fetched impression that consideration of most of the Indian revolutionaries of that age, including Har Dayal and Ram Chandra, was similar to that of Sanyal. Lajpat Rai, there­fore, remarked that in their belief, ‘someone would rise Sphinx like, who will establish some form of national government.’19

A few years before he assumed the leadership of the Ghadar movement Har Dayal had also expressed to one of his friends a somewhat considered opinion about political propaganda : 'Place a clear issue before the people ; “Such is your state, this is the cause, remove the cause’’. Depend upon it’, he wrote, 'plain speaking carries conviction to the heart, while sophistry only perplexes honest men’.20 That was precisely what he and Ram Chandra attempted to do. But 'plain speaking’ became a way of by-passing the difficult task of preparing a coherent framework of the alternative order. Their writings in Ghadar

17 Emily Brown, Har Dayal, pp. 75-76.18 Exhibit 62. Benares C onspiracy Case, Home Political A, Proceedings

April 1916, No. 471.19 Cited in Emily Brown, op. cit, p. 76.20 Cited in Isemonger and Slattery, An Account o f the Ghadar Conspiracy, p, 1.

110 GHADAR MOVEMENT

and other pamphlets included, nevertheless, references to several ideals.

Living in the USA, a profession of believed American political ideals of democracy, liberty and equality came usefully at hand. These were the ideals which had, as Har Dayal' emphasised, moved the Americans to wage an armed revolution: against the British rule of George III. Ram Chandra therefore stressed that Ghadar weekly was started, solely for the purpose of advocating the principles of political freedom upon which the independence of the USA was founded.

In his letters to the American newspapers, the goal of the Ghadar movement was given as ‘nothing less than the establish­ment of a republic: a government of the people, by the people and for the people in India.’21 The writings in Ghadar included the arguments and advocacy of liberty made by American liberals such as George Washington, Abraham Lincoln, Patrick Henry and Woodrow Wilson.22 That line of reasoning served to win the moral support of Americans which was highly valued by Har Dayal and his circle of Indian students. That also appeared to provide a somewhat romantic illustration to the followers, of the shape of the alternative order of things that should follow the end of British rule. Curiously, even though a major factor which contributed to the founding of the Ghadar movement in USA was the oppression and discrimination of Indian immigrants, yet there was hardly any reference made to that problem in Ghadar weekly. Har Dayal and Ram Chandra did not only avoid any criticism of American people or the US authorities on that count, but also frequently acclaimed the support Americans gave to the cause of India’s freedom. The liberty which Indian patriots enjoyed to carry on their struggle was upheld as an ideal of freedom to aspire for.

In an article, 'The Meaning of Equality', Har Dayal also dwelt on the economic dimension of freedom. It was essential not only to have freedom of thought and political equality but also economic equality. ‘Spiritual equality does not feed the hungry’,

21 Mark Naidis,'The Propaganda of the Ghadar Party', Pacific Historical Review, Vol. XX, No. 3, (August 1951), p. 251'. Ram Chandra's letter to The Times (London), 24 April 1917 (intercepted by the Police), Home Political B, Proceedings, September 1917, Nos, 195-198. See also Bhakna, Jeew an Sang- ram p.44 ; and 'Tundilat', 'Account of the Ghadar Party', p. 28.

22 Naidis, op. cit. pp. 251-52.

IDEOLOGY 111

he emphasised, 'true equality is a function of economic equality’. The peasants and artisans were the ones who created all the wealth, most of which was expropriated by others, and it were the former who deserved a major share of the nation's wealth. Given a certain fascination for anarchist thinking, Har Dayal also condemned the very existence of property and power of any kind. Power, whether of state, religion or wealth was evil, he said; 'it was the source of all exploitation and must be abolished’.23

Alongside the profession of these heterogeneous democra­tic, syndicalist and anarchist notions, however, any sort of rule by any class of Indians appeared a better arrangement than the existing subjection to foreign rule. The Princely States in India were identified, for example, as not only independent parts of India, but also as examples of a better political arrangement. It may appear intriguing that Har Dayal passionately argued that the people living in these principalities were 'more prosperous' than the millions who lived in British India. These were the States where ‘national honour' had been maintained. Thanks to the armed struggle the Indians waged in 1857, Har Dayal affirmed, at least some parts of India remained independent.-4 * The argument for a second rebellion of the same kind did not, evidently, preclude the establishment of many similar principali­ties ruled by different Princes once the British v/ere expelled.

A strong belief in the support of Indian Princes in the national struggle against the British was a significant element in the writing of Indian revolutionaries at that time. One of Savarkar's various pamphlets contained a very specific appeal: •Advance then, O’ Princes of India, boldly and bravely—there is nothing but your chains to lose’.26 Bhagwan Singh was glad to claim that twenty five per cent of Indian Princes had already pledged support to the Ghadar movement and another fifty per cent who had sympathy with the movement were waiting for an opportune moment.2* That, of course was a gross delusion. What was signi-

23 Har Dayal, The Social Conquest o f the Hindu R ace and Meaning o f Equality,pp. 7-8.

24 Ghadar, 8 November, 1913.26 See copy in Home Political (Deposit), P roceed in gs, April 1911, No.7.26 Extracts from Daily Manila Bulletin, 5 March 1915, in Home Political B,

P roceedings, April 1915, Nos. 416-419, File pp. 20-21.

112 GHADAR MOVEMENT

ficant, however was a failure to recognise that after 1857, these Princes were the major support of the British rule. Furthermore, it was not a matter of concern for those revolutionaries or the Ghadar leaders whether largely medieval and feudal princi­palities did at all go well with the advocated ideals of liberal democracy and economic equality.

Paradoxical formulations were also conspicuous in the discussion on social questions in two earlier articles which were reprinted together in the form of a pamphlet by the Ghadar press. The Hindu caste system for example, came for a virulent condemnation at one place. It was regarded as that fatal drug of inequality with which the torpor of death fell upon that society.27 Surprisingly, that argument was supported by a verdict that the ideal social order would be the one which approximated to the legendary Vedic period of Indian history, because, as Har Dayal affirmed, practical equality existed only in that society, where there were no governors and no governed, no priests and no laymen, no rich and no poor. At another place in the same publication the caste system was not only supported but more than that, its defence was advanced as a 'question of national self respect'.28

Conflicting notions were similarly advanced apparently to suggest that all Indians had a common cause in ending the British rule. Whereas a considered stress was laid on the historical factors and common sufferings of Hindus and Muslims suggesting a national unity against the British, emphasis was also simultaneously put on the particularised values of the iwo. The above mentioned article, for example, glorified the separate values of the 'Hindu Race', and included insinuating references to Mohammedan invaders which had implicit suggestions of Muslims being regarded m lechhas or foreigners.29 Perhaps,

27 Har Dayal, The Social Conquest o f the Hindu R ace and Meaning o f Equality, p.7.

28 Ibid., p.6.29 Condemning the Indian National Congress for forgetting India's great heritage,

it was alleged that'it is so devoid of national self respect that it has now and then invited Europeans, who d id not know Sanskrit, who despise our Shastras and eat beef, to preside over its deliberations. . . an assembly of Hindu 'Patriots' in British India under the leadership of an Englishman, a member of the conquering race. Could we imagine a meeting of Hindu patriots under the presidentship of Shahabuddin Gori in the year 1200 A.D. or a National Congress of Hindus held in the year 1660 under ShiastaKhan' ?. Har Dayal. op. cit., p. 6. (Emphasis added).

IDEOLOGY 113

he was conscious of this contradiction and the only way suggested to resolve it was that they forget about their religious differences and fight against the foreign enemy. Following the risorgimento ideal of Mazzini the solidarity of all Indians was sought to be achieved through approving references to separate identities of Jats, Rajputs and Khans; Marathas, Bengalis and Punjabis; Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims,

Frequent references were also made to the revolutionary movements of that time in Ireland, Russia, China and Egypt, with a view to suggest their affinity with and support for the Ghadar movement. The revolutionaries of those countries were descri­bed as 'Ghadarites1 and the success of ‘Mexican Ghadarites’ was acclaimed as a victory of the forces of revolutionary change in the world.30

Har Dayal showed a special fascination for the Russian revolutionary movement. Addressing the luncheon gathering on the eve of launching of Ghadar weekly, he dwelt largely on that movement and claimed that Indian revolutionaries had been the 'pupils of Russian revolutionaries’.31 His ideals, however, were not the leaders like Lenin, or other Bolsheviks but the anarchists, who killed Czar Alexander, and propagandists such as Alexander Herzen,32 a nineteenth century intellectual whom E.H. Carr described as ‘the first Norodnik’.33 Har Dayal thought his Ghadar would use the weapon of propaganda for revolution in India in the same manner as The Bell, jointly edited by Herzen and Ogarov from London, had done for the Russian revolutionary movement. His article on ‘The Indian Peasant', reflected a romantic idealisation of the peasant on the lines of the Norodnik belief invented by Herzen.34 The moralist and subjectivist streak of Narodnaya Volya ( People's W ill) had a strong appeal in Har Dayal’s conception of the revolutionary struggle. The evening when he was served the warrants of arrest, his subject for the lecture was the Russian revolutionary movement, wherein he hailed the assassination of Czar Alexander as an act which

30 Ghadar, 1 November 1913.31 Ibid., See also his replies to the interrogation by the US Immigration

Inspector on 26 March 1914, in Brown, Har Dayal, p. 1S6.32 Home Political A, P roceedings, June 1914, Nos. 75-76. See also Roosi

Ghadrion Ki Dastanen (San Francisco : Hindustan Ghadar Press, 1917).33 E.H. Carr, Studies in Revolution (London : Macmillan, 1950), p. 69.34. Har Dayal, 'The Indian Peasant’, M odern Review, May 1913, pp. 506-9.

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had done considerable good to the human race. Preaching anarchism was a major charge levelled against him by the US authorities.

The fascination for dramatic deeds of individual terrorism remained prominent in the none-too-serious thinking of the Ghadar ideologues regarding the strategy for revolution. The nature of the struggle advocated in the inaugural issue of Ghadar and frequently repeated thereafter was that of armed uprising of 1857. Har Dayal emphasised on the participation by the masses and patriotic elements among the soldiers from the British Indian army. His writings and exhortations showed that he had not given a serious thought to whether it should necess­arily be a well organised assault or a spontaneous popular outburst. Nor did Har Dayal, Ramchandra or any other appear to make a distinction between revolution, coup d ’ etat, rebellion and revolt.

A significant element in the net-work of their beliefs consisted of alluded hopes of a certainty of their success in the revolutionary struggle. These hopes were related to the character of the people who constituted the core of this move­ment and the believed favourable unfolding of the international political situation. It was argued that the ‘Ghadar’ of 1857 failed mainly because the Sikh regiments had then fought on the side of the British. Now the brave Sikhs were the main force behind the projected second 'Ghadar'. Many of these people were ex-army men and most of them had connections in the British Indian regiments and they could win over a large part of the Indian army to turn their weapons against the British at a crucial time.85

Another element was a belief that in the impending big war, Britain would be involved in a life and death struggle. Once the main body of Britain’s armed forces were engaged on various fronts in Europe, it would be the most fateful opportunity for launching the rebellion in India and wiping out the residual loyalist mercenaries. Germany, it was believed, would give all support to their struggle. Britain was also going to have further trouble in Ireland and Egypt, they thought. It was suggested that the awakening of the Egyptians was highly 35

35 Dharamavira, op, cit., p. 188 and Chenchiah, op. cit., part II, passim .;See also 'Tundilat', op. cit., pp. 80-82.

IDEOLOGY 11S

auspicious for India, because the key of the Suez Canal was in their hands. A strong belief that ‘Nemesis is at the heels of England’,36 was a source of strength. Alongside the ideas of mass struggle, exhortations were frequently made to 'kill the tyrants’ and to follow the example of revolutionary terrorists of Bengal.

Har Dayal changed his ideas on individual terrorism very quickly. During his brief association with the Industrial Workers of the World in mid 1912, he appeared to have completely discarded his earlier fascination for terrorism and condemned it as 'a mixture of heroism and folly’. It was regar­ded as 'a waste of force’, which ‘gives the other party a chance for needless persecution’ ,37 But the bomb attempt on the life of Lord Hardinge on 23 December had once again revived the old spirit. During the summer of 1913, he appeared more inclined towards political education of the masses to prepare for an eventual popular armed revolution. On 23 December 1913, the first anniversary of that bomb attempt, however, Har Dayal issued a commemorative pamphlet entitled Shabash (Well Done). Divided into three sections : ‘The Philosophy of the Bomb’; 'The Bomb : A Useful Weapon’ and'The Praise of the Bomb', this pamphlet exhorted the readers to 'kill, wound and disgrace the rulers with bombs, guns, clubs, shoes, bricks, stones, fists and slaps’.

The passionate appeal of his rhetoric apart, Har Dayal’s references to the movement’s objectives and the nature of struggle were also often tangential. In his writings in the Ghadar weekly from 1 November 1913 the primary objective was given as nothing short of the end of British colonial rule in India through an armed mass struggle. In the above mentioned pamphlet, however, the apparent objective appeared to be to frighten the government to stay-put and make some concessions to Indians. The main objective of the philosophy of the bomb was, for instance, described as under :

It is the bomb that frightens the government into concedingrights to the people. The chief act is to frighten thegovernment. Under the whip of fright the government will

36 Ghadar, 1 November 1913.37 His interview with The Bulletin (San Francisco), cited in Brown, op. c/f.,

p. 111.

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reduce the taxes, will spend more money on the protection of health, and will abstain from interference with reforms in native States. Whatever freedom is left in the native States will be maintained by virtue of the Bomb, for then the government will not interfere much in the internal affairs of the native States. . . .3S

In the given framework of inconstancy about strategy and the nature of struggle to be waged, there was little likelihood of a discreet preference for a particular type of revolutionary organisation. The ideologues hardly ever discussed the issue. The real strength of these ideological formulations lay in provid­ing a strong basis for solidarity and collective spirit against an identified enemy who had to be crushed.

Translation of Ideas Into the Mother Tongue

The ideas advocated in the Ghadar and the pamphlets in vernacular were mainly directed towards the thousands of Indian labourers and farmers settled abroad. These were illiterate simple men who looked for straight and simple explanations to the apparently complex problems. The leading men from among the 'organic intellectuals’, in Gramsci’s idiom spelled out and clothed the central ideas given by the educated ideologues in a new vocabulary and stereotypes. They supplied such reasons and normative support for revolution as were more relevant to the cultural properties and understanding of the masses. 'A beginner who has learnt a new language’, as Marx observed, ’always translates it back into his mother tongue’. Much of that sort of translation of ideas was contained in the passionate poetical compositions of leaders such as Bhagwan Singh, Harnam Singh 'Tundilat’ and Munsha Singh Dukhi. These poems published in Ghadar (Gurmukhi), and later printed in the form of booklets entitled Ghadar di Goonj, became a major source not only of fervent emotional appeal but also of develop­ment of a new framework of consciousness for these people. The 38 39

38 Shabash, op. cit.

39 Karl Marx, 'Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte', S elected W orks (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 19(3), Vol. I, p. 398.

IDEOLOGY 117

emphases and justifications in this material tended to be some­what different from those presented by the ‘traditional intellectuals' such as Har Dayal.

One prominent element in the lives and thinking of the immigrants was a bitter awareness of their humiliation and back­wardness. A regular theme in their poems and conversations, therefore, was related to their daily experience that they were called ‘coolies', ‘dirty people’, and were bullied and ridiculed :

We are faced with innumerable miseries We are called coolies and thieves W hereever we go, we are treated like dogs Why is no person kind to us.40

That humiliation was outrageous. But why did they come to such a pass ? Why did they leave their homes ? It was because they were poor ; because they had little opportunity for earning their livelihood at home. They now talked of their compulsions back home and their oppressions in foreign lands. It was recalled in the poems that the farmer in India was burdened with debts and heavy taxes, that little was left to his share at the harvesting of crops, that the plagues and famines had killed tens of millions of people. Instead of talking in terms of generalities about British exploitation, existing oppressions were linked with oppressions back home : 'Harassed in our land and with no support available abroad, we aliens have no land our own'.41 42

The description of British economic exploitation of India and drainage of India’s wealth to England, provided by educated revolutionary leaders, made these illiterate labourers and farmers to raise questions which had lain dormant in their minds. Why was there such a contrast between the social and economic conditions in India and the world of Canada and USA ? The whole world was lit by electric lights. Why did India look so deserted and dark ? The world had manufactured aeroplanes; there was high learning and scientific advancement; the ‘whole world enjoys prosperity and happiness, why is India lying in a stupor’ ?4S That reality, so conspicuous a fact of their country’s

40 Ghadar di Goonj, No. 1, 2nd ed. (1914; rpt. San Francisco: HindustanGhadar Press, 1931 j,p p . 1-2. See also, Harish K. Puri, 'Ghadar Movement;An Experiment in New Patterns of Socialisation’, Journal o f RegionalHistory, Vol. I, No. 1 (1980), pp. 12S-26.

41 G hadar di Goonj, No. I, pp. 1-2 and 25.42 Ibid., pp. 1,2 and 7.

backwardness and poverty deepened their shame and embarrassment. The personal feelings of disgrace and humilia­tion were linked by the ‘organic’ leaders with a whole country's misery and suffering. And it was becoming evident why that was so : It was because, as Har Dayal explained to them, the . Americans were free; they had expelled British rulers by waging an armed struggle. Indians were still slaves ruled by the British, whose government in India was an arrangement for 'loot', 'dacoity' and ‘thuggee’. The Ghadar poets wrote for instance :

In famines our children die of starvation And the English live off our income We grow wheat to eat, bu t'v e to make do with barley The revenue collectors do not leave behind a single pice. .

x x x xCruel English nation is very abnoxious They have looted and eaten up Hindustan, Brothers :

x x x x ;In India a Kaudi is not available if you search And England has grown enormously wealthy The dogs of the F erin g h ee eat to their fill And human beings of- India die of starvation43

So oppressions and humiliation in America appeared as' only a ‘validation1 of their oppression at home. ‘Tundilat’ wrote1 about an understanding driven deep in their consciousness that’ those who were treated like dogs in their own country could not- expect to be treated with respect in foreign lands.44

As a result of that kind of reasoning, these immigrants, who- came under the influence of the teachings of Ghadar, never thought of condemning America for their oppressions. If they were unprotected against white labour hooligans, the reason lay in the complete indifference of British consuls in the USA towards their requests and complaints. The Americans, on the other hand, were regarded as the well wishers of Indians. That was the subject matter of an article, M irkaniay Ki K ahen dey Hun (What do the Americans Say!), which appeared in the first issue of Gurmukhi edition of G h a d ar45 Sohan Singh Bhakna described quite a few incidents of a patronising ridicule, which pointed to the sympathy of individual Americans with these good hard-working Indians. It was stated in their poems, for instance,

43 Ibid., pp. 5-17. See also, G hadar d i G oonj, No. 2, p. 8.44 -Tundilat’, op. tit., pp. 25-26.45 G hadar (Gurmukhi), Vol. I, No. 1. (9 D ecem ber 1913).

118 GHADAR MOVEMENT ‘

IDEOLOGY 119

that 'Many Americans suggested to us, through hints, to rise up, but we simpletons did not catch the hint'.46 The suffering in America was rationalised : 'Americans hate slavery and we are slaves’. It was a shame that Indians were slaves; thus looted, exploited and insulted at home and ridiculed and harrassed abroad. 'A slave has neither religion nor respect. It is better to commit suicide than continue to suffer (as such)', it was repeatedly stressed. It was in that sense that ‘shame’, as Marx put it, became a major source of 'a revolutionary senti­ment’.47

Heaped symbols of shame and oppression were used to generate a certain auto-intoxication of disgrace. They had been robbed of everything, their izzat, above all. The only answer to meet the situation was to draw the sword. 'Deputations are of no avail’, wrote the poets, 'take in your hand the sword and the shield’. Bhagwan Singh explained that the history of the world showed that no people had gained freedom except through armed struggle.48 That was the only way of vindicating their honour. Such an imperative fitted well into the traditionally imbibed self image of these immigrants.

A notion of normative obligation to fight against tyranny was a significant part of the Sikh beliefs about their religion and culture. The Tenth Guru had enjoined upon them to do that : 'It is righteous to take to sword when the situation is past all other remedies'. The Ghadar poets selected and put to use the mythology and symbols of the bravery and sacrifice of the Sikh heroes of various battles. In his 'Eighteenth Brumaire', Karl Marx pointed to the reawakening of the ‘spirits of the past’ when the people seem engaged in revolutionising them­selves. During such periods, 'they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service and borrow from them names, battle cries and costumes in order to present the new scene of world history in this timehonoured disguise and this borrowed language’.49 The persistent reference to tradition became, for Ghadarites, a valuable source of symbolic and normative justification for a violent fight against the British.

m O hadar di Goonj, No. 2, p. 11.47 Cited in Jean Paul Sartre's Foreword to Frantz Fanon, The W retched o f the

Earth, trans., Constance Ferrington (Penguin, 1973), p. 12.48 Bhagwan Singh, Jang A m Azadi (San Francisco: Hindustan Ghadar

Press, 1915), pp. 5-7.49 Marx, op. cit., p. 398.

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The poets and other leaders alluded to a certain moral and religious obligation by reference to the teachings of the Tenth Guru and the objectives for which the Khalsa was created. The headmast of Ghadar (Gurmukhi), carried, as we have seen, a meaningful holy injunction

] e tau prem khelan ka cnaoSir dhar tali gali men aao

Many of the heroes, they frequently referred to among others, were from the history of the Sikh crusades : Banda Bahadur, Dip Singh, Mehtab Singh, Hari Singh and Phula Singh. ‘Had brave Dip Singh or Hari Singh been alive, he would have taken up the sword', the fellow Sikh immigrants were told. Appealing to believed martial bravery of the Sikhs, the Ghadar poets used popular symbols of self-image, interchanging ‘lion’ and ‘Singh' for dramatic purposes : ‘Maintain the honour of the name Singh O' Singh's.60 Arousing them to action on Sikh religious giievances like the reported demolition of the wall of Rakabganj Gurdwara or snatching of ‘Kirpans’ from their brethren in Amritsar,61 was another way of appealing to the sentiments of that community.

That sort of symbolism and martyrology formed a significant element in the exhortations made by the poets. They never thought that the prideful community heritage they referred to could contribute to developing narrower loyalties or what Khushwant Singh called ‘a militant Sikh movement’. It was, how­ever, a hasty conclusion to draw as Barrier did, that it reflected a prominence of communal outlook.*2 ‘Consciousness is', as Marx wrote, 'a social product'. So that when men 'seem engaged in 50 51 52

50 N. Gerald Barrier. The Sikhs and Their Literature, pp. 102, 106, 110; See also, Ghadar d i Goonj, No. 2, p. 19.

51 'You honour the Gurdwaras, but in Delhi the Rakabganj Gurdwara has been demolished O' Singhs'. Poem XI. trans. Barrier, Sikhs and Their Literature, p. 110.

52 According to Barrier, 'The authors (of the poems) frequently did not differentiate clearly between the Sikh nation and the Indian nation, nor did they see the inconsistency of stressing Sikh nationhood at the potential cost of affecting Sikh co-operation with other Indians', op. cff., p. 102; Lajpat Rai made a more or less similar observation that the possible spread of communal consciousness did not appear to bother the propagandists in their efforts to combat British imperialism. Cited in Barrier, loc. cit.

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revolutionising themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service. . . . Thus Luther donned the mask of the Apostle Paul. . ,’.53 54 55 Luther, however, was not simply parodying St. Paul, nor were the Ghadar poets parodying a Hari Singh Nalwa.

-Alongside the select symbols from the cultural heritage of the Sikh community, there were frequent references to Bharat Mata or Ma, thirty crores (300 millions) of Indians, and heroes of Indian nationalist struggle such as Aurobindo Ghose, Lokmanya Tilak and Damodar Savarkar and the Bengali terrorist heroes such as Khudi Ram Bose and Kanhai Lai Dutt. A markedly different orientation was also developed towards the image of their community than that advocated by the Singh Sabhas and the Chief Khalsa Diwan. The Khalsa or the Panth was, to these Sikhs of the Ghadar movement, a force which Guru Gobind Singh had created for ending the oppression of 'Mother Bharat'. For that purpose, the Guru had fought fierce battles and his two sons gave their lives while fighting the enemy and two others chose to be bricked alive. The Khalsa were a fighting force for the defence of Bharat, as were the Khans and the Rajputs, the brave Turks and the Marathas.34 The Panth was to be judged not by its adherence to the ‘five ks' but by the standard of behaviour laid down by the Guru.

The said demoralisation and worsened condition of the country was attributed by these poets to the degeneration of the Panth—its great downfall—when the Sikh Sardars turned 'traitors' and betrayed the nation in 1857. Their 'dirty' role was regarded as a 'stigma' on the fair name of the community; ‘a treachery with fellow Indians'. The Panth was, therefore, reminded of its role and the urgency of washing that ‘stigma’ off. Their exhortations assumed a new form, as under :

The people say the Singhs are very bad Why was the Ghadar of Delhi turned back The country would have, by now, regaled in freedom Why did these traitors commit such abominations.33

x x x x

53 Marx, op. cit.54 G hadar di Goonj, No. 1, p. 11.55 Ibid., Poem 8, p. 6.

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The whole world taunts usLiberate the country soon, O'SinghsLest you mistake again as in “Fifty SevenTruly remember the occasion O’SinghsGet up, let’s wash off the stigma of treacheryIf you remember the Guru’s words O’SinghsJoining with the Marathas and the BengalisAnd to the happiness of Hindus and Musalmans O’Singhs.88

It is interesting to note that whereas in the folklore of Punjab, turkor turkara was a term of opprobrium, the Ghadarites talked of'great Turkish brothers’, who fought zealously for the national cause and who earned great reputation for maintaining the dignity of the country.87

What was more striking, if for its novelty at that stage of Indian nationalist movement, was not only the unequivocal stress on the primacy of the political issues but also a strong condemnation of occupation with religious matters. It was regarded as 'obscurantism', which undermined the primary struggle. It was stressed for instance :

No Pandits or Mullahs do we need No prayers or litanies we need recite These will only scuttle our boat Draw the sword it’s time to fight88

The leaders ridiculed, in the strongest language, the ‘dirty’ .nvolvement in questions of religious and caste disputes, as a low mentality worthy of swindlers and'whores'. Whereas they blamed the British for contributing to divisions among Indians, a greater responsibility was placed on the oppor­tunist countrymen: 'Many amongst us are the dogs of the government which abets hostilities amongst us to destroy (all of) us’.89 Those who controlled and managed religious places of the Sikhs were described as 'commission agents’ who traded their positions for material gains.56 57 58 59 60

Sohan Singh Bhakna and Harnam Singh 'Tundilat' stressed that it was one of the basic rules of the Ghadar party that no religious issues could be raised at the meetings of the'party'.

56 Ghadar di Goonj, No. 2, p. 19.57 Ghadar di Goonj, No. 1, Poem 18, p. 17.58 Ibid., Poem 5, p. 4. trans. Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, Ghadar

1915, p. 20.59 Ghadar di Goonj, No, 2, p. 23.60 Ibid., No. 1, Poem 11, p. 11.

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Their only concern was to be with political matters.61 62 There were indications of a dim awareness of the play of political tricks in the matters of religion. ‘Why don’t we understand the politics of existing arrangements’, the poets asked.63 Though the Sikhs constituted a predominant majority in the movement; some of their leading figures had been Sikh priests, and Gurd- waras became in the early stages, centres for their propaganda meetings, yet there was hardly any evidence of their particular concern with the promotion of Sikh religion, or insistence upon individual conformity to religious norms. Prominent Ghadarites and other writers claimed, therefore, that this movement was 'the first purely secular movement', which aimed at liberating India by force of arms.63

Secularism, in the sense in which we know it today, was a value more or less unknown to these people. They selected particular cultural symbols of Sikhs and Muslims alongside the rejection of matters religious. It was significant, however, that in the heterogeneity of the sacred and the profane, where their compatriots of Singh Sabha orientation looked more to the needs of institutionalisation of religion and a stress upon the purity of religious forms, those of the Ghadar movement chose the opposite.64 Actually the unorthodoxy of the Ghadarites became a major reason for marked hostility between them and what was called ‘the Gurdwara party’ in USA and the Chief Khalsa Diwan in India. There was nothing of that spiritualism, mysticism or predeterminism, so prominent in the earlier and its contemporary militant movements in Bengal and Maharashtra. There was no invocation of deities, as that of 'Kali' in Bengal or 'Maruti'or ‘Durga’ in Maharashtra. Amra m ilechhe sab m ay er dake, Jaya Kali or Har Har Bom Bom, were familiar battle cries of those revolutionaries. Hardly any evidence was available that a parallel religious and battle cry of the Sikhs, Waheguru JiK a Khalsa, Waheguru Ji Ki Fateh, and Jo Bole So Nihal, Sat Sri Akal, was put to use by the Ghadarites. Instead, the slogan Bande Mataram, which suggested a different and wider orientation of nationality

61 Bbakna, op. cif., p. 40; ‘Tundilaf, op. tit., p. 25.62 Ghadar di Goonj, No. 1, Poem 1, p. 1.63 Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh, op. tit., p. 57. See also Tundilat’s

letter to Gurcharan Singh Sainsara, dated 24 April 1960, DBYJ.64 Jwala Singh, R em iniscences. See also, D.G-I.'s Weekly Report, 24 February

1917, Home Political B, Proceedings, February 1917.

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among these folks, appeared to have been used'always'. The older ones do it even now. 'We were not Sikhs or Punjabis', Bhakna told the present author, 'Our religion was patriotism'.81 Emphasis was laid on forging unity and solidarity of all Indians against the foreign rulers.

There was a certain anticipation of Gandhi in the thinking of these simple men that if all Indians withdrew their support to the government, the British rule in India would have no legs to stand on. Indians were therefore asked not to pay taxes to the foreign rulers. The British Toot you and then beat you' ; ■you are the masters of your canals and wells, why should you then pay a tax' ; ‘Leave the service of the Government’ ; thus exhorted the poets.65 66

Since a large number of these immigrants had served in the British army, fought in the British wars of annexation and had gloried in their loyalty and sacrifices, the Ghadar poets pointed to their folly :

We fought many a battle for the Whites That was a grave unwitting mistake, brothers.

They would not be fooled any more : W e will not sing songs of loyalty any more’.67 On the other hand, winning over the army- men to the side of patriotic revolutionaries became a foremost programme on their agenda.

Another factor of which they were acutely aware was the damage done by the power hungry Indian toadies, spies and informers. Particular note was taken of the role of the Rai Bahadurs and Khan Bahadurs, who were described as 'tailed monkeys'.68 Caution was necessary against the mischief of such elements. Killing of such elements was often advocated to be a priority : 'W e’ll deal with the Whites later, let's deal with the traitors first’.69 'Tundilat' agreed that remnants of such a terrorist orientation were present in the 'Ghadar Party’.70

What seemed to be the most important requirement among the patriots was heroism and a readiness to lay down one’s

65 Bhakna, Interview with the author, 20 December 1968.66 G hadar d i Goonj, No. 2, pp. 8, 18, 23.67 Ibid., pp. 14-16.68 G hadar d i Goonj, No. 1, Poem 11, pp. 9-10, 11.69 G hadar d i Goonj, No. 1, Poem 17, p. 16.70 Tundilat’ to Sainsara, loc. cit.

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life for the cause - a prem khelan ka chao : ‘Either we kill them or get killed, but we shall not show our backs’, was a prominent feature of their framework of ideas.

The ideological formulations, therefore, closely linked the national objective of complete independence with an individual’s personal need of peace with himself. If British imperialism seemed irreconcilable with Indian national interests, so did the former appear irreconcilable with one’s honour. Annihilation of the identified enemies became a crucial imperative for vindicating that honour. As against the divergent generalities about the role of religion expressed by leaders like Har Dayal, the Ghadarite masses came to develop a more or less clear aware­ness that focus on religious or caste issues was a patently divisive and obscurantist design of vested interests. A new selection of symbols and mediative interpretation weakened the dissonance between cultural and political identities and empha­sised the prime necessity of putting politics in command.71 This new framework of consciousness jmade these Punjabi immig­rants conspicuously different from the Punjab Punjabis who, on the other hand, thought the Ghadarites were crazy. A serious thinking on the shape of alternative social and political order did not appear so important and little attention was given to a critical analysis of existing social formations. The fact that the arrangement in the Princely States was approvingly mentioned and the native Princes were considered as allies, pointed to the problems of the declared democratic ideals of liberty and equality. In the absence of such an analysis it was not unnatural for the revolutionaries to nurse such illusions about the objective conditions as corresponded to their subjective desires. Considerations of the revolutionary strategy, therefore, could be conveniently by-passed. Simultaneous advocacy of contradictory ideas of terrorist actions, a coup d ‘ etat and a mass revolutionary struggle did not appear out of order. The thinking and effort for building a revolutionary organisation did not form a necessary part of that framework of concious- ness.

71 Puri, op. cit., p. 140.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 4Political action for revolutionary change implies a more- or

less organised effort. Organisation for that purpose has b een generally viewed as a rational structuring of roles and authority for such planned action as is 'both possible and essential' in th e1 considered context of subjective and objective factors. A purely structural view, bearing marks of W eb er’s ideal bureaucracy may be inappropriate to a study of a mass revolutionary organisation; more so, when the masses come from a peasant stratum. Manoranjan Mohanty suggests that the definition of organisation needed to be broadened to include factors of collective will and commitment. It was therefore viewed as ‘a body of people with a collective spirit wedded to a set of ends' and loyalty to the comrades.1 The concept of organisation, which the leadership of a revolutionary movement adopts is also related to its ideology and strategy for revolution. The organi­sation of the Ghadar movement may, therefore, be studied from the perspectives of its leadership—the 'traditional' and the ■organic’.2

Har Dayal, the high priest of the Ghadar movement, came to the Punjabi immigrants with a halo of charisma. His revolu­tionary spirit, a transparent honesty and sincerity captivated them.3 He, on the other hand, was im pressed by these people whom he correctly described as 'peasants'. He saw that they were 'in constant readiness to subscribe large sums of money

1 Mohanty, Revolutionary V iolence, pp. 13-16.2 See in this regard, Harish K. Puri, 'Revolutionary Organisation : A Study of

the Ghadar Movement’, Social Scientist, Nos. 98-99, pp. 53-6S.3 Prithvi Singh Azad, Interview with the author, 10 March 1973; also, Chenchiah,

'The Ghadar Party 1913-18 : An Authentic Report', Fart II, p. 20.

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for the corporate welfare’,4 and found in them a spontaneous element for revolutionary struggle. A politically conscious leader­ship with a considered strategy and organisational skill may generally succeed in preparing a ‘spontaneous element' for a guided political action and transforming it into a well organised army for revolutionary struggle. Har Dayal's strength, however, lay in his being a powerful ‘Man of Words', who blasted the British Rule with his rhetoric. He focussed on generating a deep sense of commitment to the goal and a spirit of solidarity. But a skill in organising the people into an army of revolution was not his forte. Chenchiah recollected : ‘Har Dayal inspired us by his eloquence, but lacked capacity to chalk out a constructive programme1.5 6

With his background of a militant propagandist, Har Dayal (and similarly Ram Chandra, Bhagwan Singh, Barkatullah etc.) conceived that his major role lay in the political education of the masses. In his first series of meetings with groups of these people, when questions like ‘what is to be done ?’ and 'where to begin ?' were raised, the most natural answer, he thought of, was that they should start with a powerful propaganda paper. ‘We have to fight for our country’s freedom’, he declared, ‘with our pen and printing press’. That was to him and to some prominent leaders from the Punjabi immigrants, the most important activity to start with.* Regular publication and circulation of the weekly organ required dedicated workers. There was also the need to collect funds, distribute the paper, enlist supporters and set up 'branches'. These were precisely the immediate tasks for which the first attempt at constituting a 15 member 'working committee' of the Hindi Association was made. According to Bhakna, the three top leaders of this committee i.e. Bhakna, Har Dayal and Kanshi Ram, were entrusted with the handling of secret policy matters. He referred to this body as the 'Secret Commission’.7 That, of course, was a far-fetched belief. Most other accounts show that so long as Har Dayal stayed at the Yugantar Ashram,

4 Cited in Brown, Har Dayal, p. 90.5 Chenchiah, op. cit., Part II, p. 13.6 See Bhakna, Jeew an Sangram, p. 39 and Tundilat', 'Account of the Ghadar

Party', pp. 20, 26.7 Bhakna, op. cit-, p. 42.

128 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Bhakna and Kanshi Ram worked largely in the far away mills near Portland except when they came to San Francisco to attend one or two public lectures of Har Dayal. There was hardly any secret policy matter decided during that period and if Har Dayal had to consult any one, there were quite a few others he preferred to consult such as Kartar Singh Sarabha, G. B. Lai, Raghubar Dayal, Tundilat etc. apart from some close American friends.8 Major task of these m embers of the working committee was to move around amongst their people, collecting funds, preaching rebellion and sacrifice, distributing and reading out the paper to groups and establishing small 'branches’. The evidence available suggests clearly that the printing and. distribution of the paper was central to their organisational work until the issues raised by the treatment m eted by Canada to passengers of Komagata Maru and later the beginning of the War gained prominence.

A movement's organ may as well be used as a medium of educating and training the cadres and organising them for rebellion or revolution. Lenin is known to have made a conscious and skilful use of his Iskra for that purpose. However, for the leaders of the Ghadar movement, the role of G hadar was mainly of a vehicle for political education, spreading an ■epidemic desire’ for violent action and sacrifice, and not of simultaneously acting as an 'organiser'.

Meanwhile, through the writings of G hadar and public meetings, widespread political propaganda was launched in USA, Canada and other foreign lands where Punjabi immigrants had settled. As that propaganda started winning more and more support and securing generous contributions from groups of immigrants in far off areas, the rising strength of spontaneity and the widening scope of the movement, seem ed to have becom e the chief measure of success of their efforts. The 'consciously methodical element' and the need for thinking on revolutionary organisation were pushed into the background. The 'First task is of killing’, the enthusiasts emphasised, 'the rest will b e seen later'.9

It was not a function of the immigrant labourers, sprung from the peasantry, to attend to matters of strategy and orga­nisation, The priority and skill for training cadres and

8 'Tundilat', op. cit., pp. 42-43.9 G hadar di Goonj, No. 1, p. 18.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 129

organising them was generally known to be an attribute of ■traditional intellectuals'. Har Dayal, as we have seen, cast himself in the role of Mazzini. Propaganda was his forte and for 'practical activity’, as he wrote later, he was not 'suited'.10 A handful of those student revolutionaries, who had gathered around Har Dayal, appeared to have given a more or less casual thought to the building of a secret organisation. A few of them claimed, as we shall see below, that such an organis­ation was actually affected and 'strict' rules for recruitment, secrecy and discipline were made. The evidence available in this regard was, however not only scanty but also very divergent.

Darisi Chenchiah, a student living at the Nalanda hostel, referred to Jatindra Nath Lahiri as the chief organiser amongst them. According to him, ‘Lala Har Dayal inspired us by his eloquence . . . Lahiri had the practical experience to organise’.11 Lahiri was a graduate in Chemistry from Calcutta University and was reportedly sent to USA by the 'terrorist party of Bengal’ for the purpose of learning the manufacture of explosives.12 Following the pattern of the secret terrorist organisations of Bengal, the conception of organising for revolution was, to him and to some other fellow students, somewhat akin to 'the organisation of a conspiracy. Cenchiah recounted that strict rules were laid down for recruitment of members to the group, and vows of secrecy and celibacy were strictly observed and that arrangements were made for training the recruits in boxing, wrestling, fencing, revolver and gun shooting and in manufac­turing of cartridges.13

Lahiri’s own account, however, suggests that his interests lay more in the rifle club which he started there than in assuming the organising role.14 He also informed that Tarak- nath Das had also formed a small secret group of his own which had acquired a formula of bomb making used by Russian revolutionaries.15

10 Cited in Brown, op. tit., p. 187.11 Chenchiah, op. tit., Part II, p. 13.12 Ibid., p- 14. See a ls o ‘History Sheet of Jatindra Nath Lahiri’, Home Political

A, Proceedings, February 1916, No. 395.13 Chenchiah, op. tit., Part II, p. 16.14 See in Uma Mukherjee, Two Great Indian Revolutionaries (Calcutta :

K.L, Mukhopadhyay 19661, p. 65.15 Ibid.

130 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Gobind Behari Lai, who lived in another hostel near the University of California in Berkeley believed that only three people formed the nucleus of the Ghadar organisation viz. Lai himself, Har Dayal, and Kartar Singh.16 Pandurang Sadashiv Khankhoje, who was not associated with either of the two groups, also reported about a rational division of roles affected in the 'Ghadar Party’. According to him, the party was divided into two wings : 'propaganda wing’ and 'action wing', the former working under Har Dayal and the later under Khankhoje himself,17 He did not give any more details.

It was apparent in these accounts, that to all those people Har Dayal occupied a central place in the Ghadar movement and also that he appeared to them mainly as a powerful mobi- liser. So that those who saw the need of organisation or training believed that they could assume organising roles. It was evident that in whatever little they thought of, or actually did in that regard, they were operating as individuals and not as one cohesive body of organisers.

Harcharan Das, a close associate of Ram Chandra, who became an important approver for the prosecution during Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case (1917) and at the San Francisco trial, referred to a detailed set of seventeen rules framed for a secret organisation at the Yugantar Ashram. Important among these rules were, that all fresh recruits were to be recommended by at least two members, that none was entitled to know all the party secrets until one had been a member for at least six months and that any one who revealed party secrets or misappropriated party funds was to be killed.18

This statement of Harcharan Das has been a basis of a belief both in popular and academic works regarding a secret and planned organisation of the party. Giles T. Brown described the Yugantar Ashram group, referred by Das, as the ‘inner circle’; and further stated that ‘with this Har Dayal hoped to

16 Emily Brown, op. cit., p. 140. See also Lai, ’Personal Reminiscences', pp. 38-39.

17 Bhupendra Nath Dalt, Aprakashi Rajnitik Itihas, Appendix V. Also Dharma- vira, Lala Har Dayal and Revolutionary Movement o f His Times, p. 196.

18 Evidence of Harcharan Das, Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B, Proceedings, May 1917, Nos. 542-43. File. pp. 150-151.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 131

control the activities of the larger association'.19 There was, however, hardly any other evidence to corroborate the version given by Das. 'Tundilat' and Prithvi Singh Azad who were whole-time workers at the Ashram at one time or another, reported that there were no such formal rules of organisation. According to them it was well understood by all those who worked there that they had to guard themselves against the 'spies', maintain essential secrecy and that embezzlement of funds by anybody would be a serious crime punishable even by death. But no formal organisation was rationally planned or established. Azad told the present writer for instance : 'As for the rules, who should be taken and who should not be taken, it is not within my knowledge that any such rules were made; because I myself joined the Ashram. I required no recommend­ation. Nor any one asked me, who I was and where from I had come. I came and straight started working at the Ashram'.20

Harcharan Das, according to his statement at the San Francisco trial, moved down to San Francisco from Vancouver on 10 December 1914 and lived at the Ashram till 12 April 1915.21 Perhaps he referred to some kind of rules made by. Ram Chandra, who was the only prominent leader left behind after the departure of the main body of Ghadarites for India and of other prominent leaders to East Asia. It was understandable, that following the forging of links with the Germans, Ram Chandra might have emphasised on greater need of secrecy and discipline among those who worked with him at the Ashram., That, however, would hardly be sufficient evidence for the conclusions generally drawn that the ‘Ghadar Party was a rationally organised secret miliant organisation’.

It was evident that when Har Dayal assumed the leadership of the Ghadar movement, there were two partners; a small number of students—the petit bourgeois elements—and a rising numbers of Punjabi farmers and labourers who were settled in. the states of Washington, Oregon and California. The chief common link between the two was Har Dayal (besides varying

19 Giles T. Brown, ‘The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the UnitedStates, 1914-1917', p. 7.

20 Azad, Interview with the author, 10 March 1973, See also 'Tundilat' op. cit.,pp. 42-43.

21 ‘Notes on Witnesses’, R ecords o f Trial, Group 118.

132 GHADAR MOVEMENT

but marginal linkages through Sarabha, G.B. Lai. etc,), until he left the United States and Ram Chandra, Bhagwan Singh and Barkatullah occupied the stage. The students who assisted him at the Yugantar Ashram or otherwise shared their aspirations with him, had a certain exaggerated notion of their organising skill and their guiding role in the movement. ‘We were the only intellectuals . . . with whom Lala Har Dayal could discuss planning for achieving India’s independence’, wrote Chenchiah.22 23 24 The Punjabi immigrants, on the other hand, believed that the Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast was the real 'Ghadar Party’; that they contributed funds for Ghadar and party work and their working committee constituted at Astoria was the real representative decision-making body.

There was a marked difference between the two categories, in terms of their revolutionary consciousness as also of their cultural orientations. The two formed an 'uneasy coalition'. The students regarded the groups of immigrant labourers as ‘illiterate people’ or a 'crowd of rustics', more passionate than thoughtful and treated them condescendingly with a certain cavalier attitude. Conversely, the latter thought little of the students, often called 'Bengalis' or 'Babus' who were regarded as crafty and timid and unprincipled in the use of funds 13 Azad recalled his encounter with a few of those students. When he asked them to get ready for rebellion, one of them retorted, 'well you are going to India; and revolution, that of course you will bring about, but after that you will require some intelligent people to run the government and you will need us, then we will come'.14

Between the two elements, the conceptions of preparing for a revolution or a rebellion were markedly different. Among the middle class intellectuals, the Bengali students conceived of revolutionary action in terms of terroristic activities organised in the manner of a conspiracy. A group of non-Bengali students who lived closer to Har Dayal viz. Gobind Bihari Lai, Kartar Singh, Sohan Lai Pathak, Harnam Singh of Sahri, Jagat Ram, Shiv Dayal etc. thought of organising a mass movement on the

22 Chenchiah. op. cif.. Pari III, p. 16.23 See Chenchiah, op. cit-, Part II. and Statement of Harish Chandra to the

British Secret Police. Home Political A. Proceedings, February 1916, No. 201.24 Acad, Interview, loc. cit.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 133

basis of political education. Most others of the adherents with a peasant’s world view looked upon the stipulated struggle as an enterprise of valour and sacrifice in a more or less spontane­ous and open combat. Har Dayal was the only leader who could have attempted to reconcile and integrate the element of secret conspiracy with that of the mass movement for revolution. But he did not appear to be seriously concerned about that. Stimula­ted by the manifestation of anti-British feelings he allowed every one the freedom to do whatever one thought fit to do for the cause. What de Remusat said of Theirs may be relevant :

He has much more vanity than ambition and he prefers consideration to obedience and the appearance of power to power itself; consult him constantly and then do just as you please. He will take more notice of your deference to him than of your actions.26

That appeared to be true of Har Dayal. He enjoyed the deference and the appearance of power. Most of his admiring followers particularly the leading ones remained individualistic in practice. However, when, thanks to the intensification of discontent and hatred against the British, the numbers of Ghadar enthusiasts swelled and the passion for immediate recourse to arms began mounting, Har Dayal sensed the difficulty of controll­ing his precipitant followers. Now only those leaders could prevail who were in full accord with the 'ruling passion of the masses’. Har Dayal 'got tangled up’, as Lai stated to Emily Brown. He left the stage in April 1914, thanks to the opportunity provided to him by his arrest and release on bail. His successor Ram Chandra, did not impress these students. 'He might be alright to illiterate masses, we thought', stated Chenchiah.

A few of the educated Punjabi individuals such as Kartar Singh Sarabha, Harnam Singh Sahri and Sohan Lai Pathak appeared to have been impressed with notions of secret organisation, military training and 'collaboration with the Bengalees’, for an armed uprising in India. But the Bengali students soon sensed the difficulty in working with the impatient Punjabi immigrants for the designs they had in mind and none appeared to have made a fetish of rational organisation. Even amongst themselves these 'traditional intellectuals' failed to 25

25 Cited in Eric Hotter. The True B eliever, Student ed , (New York : The New American Library. 1951), p. 121.

134 GHADAR MOVEMENT

hold together.215 One of them, Chenchiah, noted with a certain hind-sight that ‘the Sikhs came forward mostly and the move­ment was practically theirs’.26 27

During the War period most of these small number of middle class intellectuals chose to participate in secret conspi­ratorial projects with their fellows of the Berlin-based Indian Independence Committee which was directed and financed by the German Government.28 These people secured a marginal collaboration of the Ghadar leader Ram Chandra in California. The Ghadarites who reached India, secured the guiding hand of Rash Behari Bose for launching the armed struggle. The Ghadar movement, nevertheless, remained predominantly a movement of the Punjabi peasant immigrants. Analysis of the organisational character of the movement may include a perusal of their patterns of recruitment and authority, lines of communication, division of roles and the manifest styles of their collective functioning.

Revolutionary movements, being illegal and subversive of the existing political order, generally maintained a ring of secrecy. Strict rules of recruitment and verification and certi­fication of the required qualities were considered inevitable. Intricate procedures were generally devised for initiation of members. Terrorist organisations considered test ordeals and ceremonial oaths as essential requirements. Swearing before deities and heroes to the accompaniment of symbolic tests and rituals were common, for example, in the Carbonari of Italy, the Dacca Anusilan Samiti of Bengal and the Abhinav Bharat of. Maharastra. The Ghadar movement was of a different order, in which formal initiation or membership rules were hardly, considered significant.

■Membership' as such, was known to be a formal concept. It attached to itself certain formal procedure of recruitment and some prescribed provision of specific and implied obligations. The Ghadar leaders, however, viewed membership as something

26 Giles T. Brown, op. cit. p. 7.27 Chenchiah, op. cit., Part II, p. 14. Similar was the view of Prithvi Singh Azad,

Interview, loc. cit.28 Khankhoje, Taraknath Das, Har Dayal, J. N. Lahiri, Barkatullah etc. for

example, worked under the direction of the Committee and German agents, not that of the Ghadar leadership. See Bose, Indian Revolutionaries A broad, p. 92.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 13S

of a fellowship and comradeship. From that point of view the membership was open to all Indians who appeared to be opposed to the British rule and ready to work for the cause of the revolution. The Ghadar gave an open call to all Indians to join. The paper was read in the Gurdwara at Shanghai, said one of the local Ghadar leaders, Gujjar Singh Bhakna, and 'all those who felt the same way became our comrades’.29 The answer of Prithvi Singh Azad was also unambiguous about it: 'All those who could abuse the British or showed enthusiasm and fire; they joined. All those who wanted to join, joined’.30

Was any sponsorship required or scrutiny made ? Available evidence suggested that the man who rose up to express affinity with the cause or contributed money for the paper was regarded as a fellow Ghadarite, Indications were there that informal care was taken while recruiting men to work at the Yugantar Ashram.31 32 That, however, reflected discretion rather than existence or practice of any formally established rules for building the organisation. And discretion was a function of the priorities in the minds of the particular activists concerned. There was hardly any evidence available whether any list of members was ever prepared centrally or in any of the so-called 'branches'. One list of names, was perhaps carefully maintained at the Ashram. That was the mailing list containing the addresses of those to whom the Ghadar used to be sent. Could that be regarded as a list of members ? Hardly, since it included the names of some of the US Congressmen and renowned writers such as Gilbert Murray.33 It also included the names of such persons as Hon’ble Sardar Gajjan Singh of Ludhiana who hurried to disclaim any contact with the senders, condemned the crazy and seditious ideas in the paper, and passed on the material straight to British police authorities.33

29 Gujjar Singh Bhakna, Interview with the author, 20 January 1974.30 Azad, Interview, loc. cit.31 'Tundilat' op. cit., pp. 42-43,32 Packets containing publications were sent to Professor Gilbert Murray and

five Indian Barristers of Grey's Inn, London. Home Political, Deposit, Proceedings, December 1915, No. 12. The Director Criminal Intelligence reported that copies of all English publications of the Ghadar Press had been sent to every member of the US Senate. D.C.I.'s weekly Report, 15 July 1916. Home Political B, P roceedings, July 1916, Nos. 441-445, File p. 16.

33 Home Political A, P roceed in g s, December 1913, Nos. 42-43.

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All the returning passengers of the ill-fated vessel Komagata Maru were considered to be fellow Ghadarites. Following the departure of this vessel, Amar Singh went around in Vancouver, collecting men to proceed to India.34 Two weeks later, the Ghadar called on all Indians abroad for immediate return to their land for revolution. The first priority at that time was of persuading as many of their fellows as possible to sail by the earliest ship available. '(Only) cowards would remain behind’, suggested the Ghadar. Wherever the home-bound ships of these rebels stopped in ports, the inspired men went out to persuade their compatriots in those areas to accompany them to India.35 Those who prevaricated or hesitated, were ridiculed. Gulab Kaur was reported to have taken off her bangles, at a public meeting in Manila and waved these in the direction of the hesitant ones, suggesting contemptuously, that they were womanish and unmanly.36 Another enthusiast threatened : ‘those who do not join in the rebellion would be shot dead in the Chandni Chowk of Delhi’. Gujjar Singh Bhakna conceded that there was a possi­bility of men of doubtful intentions to join them, but hastened to add, 'that was for us not the time for scrutiny. All those who felt for the country had to be collected’ .37

Arriving in India, they followed, by and large, a similar pattern in enlisting students and villagers. ‘I was asked to go to Doaba and bring all men I knew’, reported Jawand Singh in his evidence before the Special Tribunal Lahore.38 There was hardly any clear indication in the enormous evidence brought forth in a series of conspiracy cases that membership of this movement followed any formal rules or that any one expressing willingness to join was denied his wish. Whereas scrutiny, whatever possible, appeared to have been made in the case of those included in the inner councils of various groups, in its general membership the movement manifested an open system. That marked it out from the archetype of revolutionary organisations.

34 Amar Singh's evidence, cited in L.C.C. Judgement, Home Political A, Proceedings, October 1915, No. 91, File p. 77.

35 Judgement, L.C.C., op. cit., pp. 120-125.36 See, Gurcharan Singh Sainsara, 'A Sikh Heroine of the Ghadar Party,

Gulab Kaur', Journal o f Sikh Studies (Amritsar), Vol. IV. No. 2, pp. 93-98.37 Gujjar Singh Bhakna, Interview with the author, toe. cit.38 Crown Versus Jawand Singh, Fourth Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political A,

Proceedings, September 1918, Nos. 55-57.

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At San Francisco, the chief leader Ram Chandra showed a similar want of selectiveness in deputing men for various projects suggested by the German agents or the Indian Independence Committee. Darisi Chenchiah’s account of how he was despatched with Jodh Singh and Sukumar Chatterjee to Manila was suggestive of an impromptu way of putting men on highly responsible secret work.39

Establishment of branches of the Ghadar Party was said to be one of the important activities of its leadership. Sohan Singh Bhakna and some others toured different areas on the Pacific Coast of the USA for that purpose. According to him, 72 branches were set up in the USA alone within one year of the formation of the party.40 By a ‘branch’, he meant a group of Indians working in one mill, ranch or farm, who received the paper Ghadar and felt a concern for the country. Some of the branches he mentioned were, for instance, Astoria Mill, Monark Mill and Wina Mill.

As teachings of the Ghadar started reaching groups of Indian immigrants in various parts of the world or read out to them by priests in their Gurdwaras or in small congregations elsewhere, they developed some degree of voluntary affinity and association with the Ghadar patriots. The first expression of that feeling was seen in the collection and contribution of funds and requests for Ghadar literature. These spontaneous groupings, known after the relatively more articulate amongst them, came to be called 'branches'. 'Branches spontaneously sprang up in Panama, Mexico and China', wrote Harjap Singh.41 Prithvi Singh Azad also expressed a similar view : 'The Ghadar spread the ideas. The people themselves formed small bands and these of their own accord, started taking organisational shapes’.42

39 Chenchiah recalled that he soon discovered that his companion Jodh Singh was 'an ignorant and timid man devoid of any training for the very responsible work entrusted to him', cp. eft.. Part IV, p. 18. Sukumar Chatterjee, a second companion sent with him, told C.K. Chakratarty at his face, in the Court of the District Magistrate San Francisco, 'My mission was the same as yours'. 'What was that’ ? asked Chakrabarty. 'Grafting money from the innocent people’, was his reply. Cited in Giles T. Brown, p. 99, n. 79.

40 Sohan Singh Bhakna, Jeew an Sangram, p. 46.41 Harjap Singh, 'Meri Pardes Yatra’ (Urdu), (unpublished diary. Gujarat Jail,

dated 19 September 1943j, p. 106.42 Azad, interview with the author, loc. cit.

138 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Such groupings sprang up in a large number of places, parti­cularly in the province of British Columbia in Canada, Shanghai, Hong Kong, Manila and Penang. When questioned about the number of members in their branch, Gujjar Singh Bhakna, a leading Ghadarite from Shanghai said, 'we were four or five people’. That was the branch in China Town. America Town had an other branch, with as many Indians. ‘We started working for rebellion, according to directions received from the paper Ghadar,’ he added.43 Whereas such of the groupings as came up in the USA may have received occasional guidance from one or the other of the known central leaders, the groups in far off places had to be completely on their own.

The Ghadar exhorted them to organise and set up branches, but did not provide any guidelines for the pattern of organisa­tion. There was hardly any evidence to suggest that any of the so called branches constituted formal executive bodies. Generally the person who collected contributions or read out the paper to a group of Indians was considered a leader of the ‘branch’. The ideas of rational building of the cogs, so to say, and forging organisational links between them or of central direction and control, remained outside of their immediate concerns. The California State Senate Committee on Un-American Activities concluded that "each of the Ghadar parties throughout the world was purely autonomous, there being no organisational contact between them. The contacts between these groups in the United States, were informal and indirect’.44 45 Their activities on reaching Punjab, reflected more or less autonomous and separate group activity. These groups were referred to as Jathas, known after one or the other leader or an area e.g. Nidhan Singh’s Jatha, Nawab Khan’s Jatha, Gujjar Singh’s Jatha, Doaba Jatha, Majha Jatha etc. Some of these even annou­nced the dates and places of starting a rebellion on their own.43

A co-ordinated functioning of different groups was possible only with the help of a network of more or less specific and legitimate channels of communication. A reliable communication of policy decisions and direction from the top to various organs

43 Gujjar Singh Bhakna, interview with the author, loc. cit.44 The Senate Fact Finding Committee of California State, 7th Report on Un-

American Activities in the State o f California (San Francisco : 1953), p. 216.45 See chapter V, passim .

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as also a feed-back of information, depended largely on the strength of this factor. The Ghadar, in this case, was the most powerful and a legitimate channel for communication of political messages. Such a channel, however, could not be an effective medium for specific or secret communication to specific leaders for specific actions. That part was assumed by a variety of roving activists, more significant among them being Nidhan Singh, Mathura Singh, Bhagwan Singh and Sohan Singh before the War, and many different ones during the War period. In the near absence of central directing agency there could neither be distinction between legitimate and non-legitimate messages nor between the communicators, nor regard for specificity of communication. Further, that sort of channel could provide for only impromptu and ad h oc communication. There were practi­cally no specific channels for a reliable feed-back of information. As a result, little consideration could be given to a mid-stream correction of a course of action. On the other hand, the liberty of passing on unspecific and unverified information by a multiplicity of self-appointed communicators led to vague and loaded communications.

Largely as a result of that kind of situation, there spread a strong belief among the Ghadarites that most Indians were disaffected and ready for a revolt. ‘We were under an illusion*, said Gurmukh Singh Lalton, 'that the whole country felt as we did and that all would rise at one time*.48 Part of the reason for a fixation of conflicting and separate dates of rebellion by the so called Doaba Jatha and Majha Jatha and separate exploits of small groups in some of the dacoities and the Ferozeshehar clash etc., as we shall see below, may be partly attributable to the lack of attention to the forging of communication links. Whereas the magical pull of the goal and widespread community of beliefs and aspirations provided a potential force for revolu­tionary struggle, the process of analysing the objective conditions and consolidation of the forces, did not acquire a simultaneous urgency and importance.

The pattern of authority which developed in the movement was more informal. When the working committee was formed or men were gathered at the Yugantar Ashram, no need was felt for a simultaneous division and allocation of roles and 46

46 Gurmukh Singh Lalton, interview with the author, 5 November, 1969.

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authority. It was not decided what matters fell under the juris­diction of the working committee of the Hindi Association and the group at the Ashram and whether, and in what respects, these were to function as collective bodies. There was no evidence that any formal meetings of the working committee or of the Ashram group were held for consideration and adoption of plans of actions or for laying down directions for the followers. Nor did available evidence indicate that any formal allocation of functions was made for the members. The members were primarily a band of dedicated workers. The chief advantage to members of these bodies lay in a certain recogni­tion of leadership roles particularly in the separate small groups they belonged to. The working committee did not, however, function as the central executive. Formalism appeared somewhat abhorrent to these people for whom dedication and the spirit of sacrifice were super-ordinate considerations.

Reference has been made by Bhakna to a rule of annual election to these bodies.47 No evidence was available, however, that any formal meeting was ever held for the purpose of any election. Gobind Behari Lai however believed that ‘The Big Three', i.e, Har Dayal, Kartar Singh and Lai himself, had ■practically become the governing body of the Ghadar’, and added that'all this did not happen in a formal fashion'.48 Even changes of incumbents occupying important formal positions were made in an informal manner. The decision to nominate Ram Chandra as editor of the Ghadar, one of the most important positions in the set up, was taken by Har Dayal himself, following informal consultation with a few others, but not by the said working committee or the Ashram group as such. Similarly the appointment of Bhagwan Singh as the President and of Barkatullah as the Vice-President in May 1914, was made more or less in the same manner. It was not known to even the leading figures as to who took the decision to discard the name of Ghadar as the movement's organ and adopt that of Hindustan Ghadar as a new weekly from 7 April 1914. Evidently, Ram Chandra who took over the editorial duties from Har Dayal had a major hand in the decision. It was not clear, however, who else mattered or participated in making that decision.

47 Sohan Singh bhakna, op. tit., p. 40.48 G.B. La], Personal Reminiscences, p. S9.

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Even important leaders seemed to carry conflicting notions of who occupied what formal position. The belief of president Bhakna of the Hindi Association that Harnam Singh 'Tundilat', and not Ram Chandra, became the editor of Ghadar after Har Dayal49, was a major case in point. Similarly, whereas Bhakna and ‘Tundilat’ believed that Santokh Singh became the secretary and chief leader of the party after the departure of Har Dayal,50 all other evidence indicated that the main leader was Ram Chandra51 52 Such divergent beliefs pointed not only to the absence of formal procedure of selection or nomination, but also to the widely dispersed and diffused nature of decision-making authorities.

Let alone the decisions made by individuals and groups outside USA, it was not clear how and by whom some of the important decisions were taken at the headquarters. It was not known, for example, which authority decided that an important leader like Sohan Singh Bhakna should leave for Yokohama to deliver arms to the returning passengers of the Komagata Maru, at the most crucial time, or that Kartar Singh Sarabha should start off for India before the call was given to proceed. Accord­ing to 'Tundilat', a more enthusiastic Kartar Singh left for India with Raghubar Dayal without waiting for party decision.51 Similarly, soon after reaching Punjab, Gujjar Singh Bhakna of the Shanghai group felt that he was free to announce his own date for launching the stipulated rebellion. The conflicting notions,

49 Sohan Singh Bhakna. op. cil., p. 48: 'Tundilat', op. dt.. p. 38.50 Bhakna, loc. cit., Tundilat'. loc. cit.51 Prithvi Singh Azad, interview with author, loc. dt. See also Chenchiah, op.

dt., Part II, p. 13 and evidence of Harcharan Das, Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home Political B, Proceedings, May 1917, Nos. 542-43.Amar Singh believed that after Har Dayal. the chief leaders at the Yugantar Ashram were Barkatullah, Bhagwan Singh and Amar Singh himself. Lahore Conspiracy Case. Home Political A, Proceedings, October 1915, No. 91, File p. 70. Nawab Khan and Mula Singh, two important leaders of groups in India, gave conflicting statements. Mula Singh believed that Sohan Singh Bhakna was the President of a revolutionary society in Oregon State; Har Dayal was secretary of (all) Indian revolutionary societies. Home Political A. P roceedings, October 1915, No. 91, File p. 89. In the same case, lnder Singh told in his confession that there was a society in San Francisco of which Har Dayal was President and Ram Chandra was Vice-President. Evidence in Lahor Conspiracy Case, op. cit., pp. 385. See also Giles T. Brown, op. cit., p. 26 and Bose, Indian Revolutionaries A broad, pp. 61-62.

52 'Tundilat', op. cit., p. 82.

142 GHADAR MOVEMENT

as to who were in command, suggested that a group leaders could take decisions impromptu and informally rather, than follow a central direction or plan of action.

In the USA, on the other hand, Ram Chandra appeared to have enjoyed a position of relatively unfettered authority after large numbers of Ghadarites left for India. The German secret agency and Heramba Lai Gupta (later ,C.K, Chakravarty) dealt chiefly with him. Quite to the contrary, however, the move­ments and the roles assumed by others of prominent standing such as Bhagwan Singh, Santokh Singh, Balwant Singh, Barkatu- lah, Harnam Singh Sahri, Sohan Lai Pathak etc. indicated that they could act autonomously of the directions of Ram Chandra or others.

The authority of the leaders was based, in practice, not on formal positions in the party hierarchy, but on the leadership qualities stereotyped in the minds of the followers. To some of them, the Ghadar seemed to be the chief leader and the ‘Red Book' for all they needed to learn and do.53 Most Ghadarites, as reflected in their evidence before the Special Tribunal at Lahore, seemed to carry exaggerated notions of the authority and leader­ship roles of particular individuals as also ignorance about the roles of many others. In what was a typical writing of Ghadar„ it characterised the 'Ghadar Party’, two years after its formation, in the following words :

The people of this party cannot make the usual arrange­ments for organisation, register, house etc. . . . Outside the country they wander thirsting, starving, clad in rags * but filled with great enthusiasm. Such is the sacred Hindustan Ghadar Party, which, though without any particular place for itself, has its soldiers ready every­where and at everytime . . . ,54

There was apparently no necessity felt for a consideration for rules and co-ordination of collective effort, or direction for maintaining discipline. Bhakna tried to explain thus: 'Each member worked according to his sense of duty every­where because now the members had come to fully understand

53 According to Prithvi Singh Azad, 'The direction for what is to be done and how it is to be done was received from the Ghadar paper. This was the leader personified'. Interview with the author, loc. cit. Also, Gujjar Singh Bhakna, interview with the author, loc. cit.

54 Ghadar, 4 April 1915.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 143

their duties. This was not a discipline of the rod, but of prudence’.55 56

The contention of Bhakna that the three man 'Secret Commission’ was organised like the 'politburo' of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,65 and a subsequent rationalisation by Sohan Singh Josh that it was based on the principle of ■democratic centralism’57 were evidently highly exaggerated formulations of a later date. The legitimacy of most leaders was confined largely to their immediate groups.

When contingents of immigrants poured into India at the beginning of the Great War and when they started working feverishly for starting a revolutionary struggle a loose and unspecified pattern of leadership was rather conspicuous. Small groups of enthusiastic Ghadarites contrived their programmes for action more or less under their separate leaders.

Shachindra Nath Sanyal, who came down to Funjab to make an assessment of the arrangements before Rash Behari Bose took over the command of the preparations, made an observation on their functioning. These Ghadar men, according to him, had immense courage and spirit of sacrifice, ‘but they did not know a (proper) method of working, . . . actually there was absence of a system of collective functioning’. He cited an incident. At a meeting with some of the important leaders, he expressed his desire to talk to their chief. Amar Singh told him frankly : 'To tell you the truth we do not have a real leader, that is why we are in need of Rash Behari Bose'. Kartar Singh Sarabha substantially agreed with that view but turned to assure Amar Singh : 'Look brother, why are you getting so despondent ? When the time comes you will see how many hidden heroes emerge out of you people’.58 That was a notion very characteri­stic of the Ghadarites. It pointed as much to an awareness of the absence of a collective organisation under one chief, as to a persistent belief in the strength of spontaneity and the ruling

55 Sohan Singh Bhakna, op. cit., p. 45.56 His presidential speech at the All India Revolutionaries Conference at

Jullundur on 17 September 1967, reported in P eople's Path (Jullundur), October, 1967. p. 4.

57 Sohan Singh Josh, Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna, The L ife o f the Founder o f the Ghadar Party (New D elhi: PPH, 1970), p. 27.

58 Sanyal, Bandi Jeevan , pp. 20. 51-52.

144 GHADAR MOVEMENT

a conviction that heroism was after all the main consideration in a revolutionary organisation.

Prior to the beginning of the War, propaganda and collection of funds were the chief activities and the leading men went about their work spontaneously. A few of them thought of acquiring and imparting to others, lessons in bomb making, pistol shooting and gun-firing and made the arrangements on their own. The evidence before the Special Tribunal at Lahore pointed to some informal division of functions amongst those who prepared for revolutionary action in India. A few indivi­duals were reported to have worked as contact men of some leaders and were referred to as ‘Post Offices’.59 60 * * * Another group was occupied with bomb making at Lohatbadi and Jhabewal. The British authorities thought that Dr. Mathura Singh was the head of the'Bomb making Department’.64 Only a select few went to the barracks to contact soldiers of Indian regiments and came in personal contact with Rash Behari Bose. A careful reading of the evidence given by under-trials, activitsts turned approvers and other prosecution witnesses in the conspiracy cases at Lahore made it amply clear, however, that in most cases the assumption of particular roles was more ad h o c and sponta­neous than centrally planned and directed, except marginally during Rash Behari’s leadership for a short period. But by that time the ideas of mass revolutionary struggle had been replaced by that of coup d' etat, led by small groups of the armed forces.

On the other hand, the Ghadar leadership in Sail Francisco, while securing German help, practically bargained for the initiative and direction from the latter, through their agents of the Berlin Committe. Ram Chandra could not easily resist German pressure through H.L. Gupta or C.K. Chakrabarty and maintained with difficulty a precarious separate identity of the Ghadar Party. Groups and individuals sent from the head­quarters to Siam, Burma, Shanghai, Swatow etc. or persons like Barkatullah in Constantinople and Kabul worked in substance

59 Judgement, L.C.C.. Home Political A, P roceed in g s. October 1915, No. 91,Filep p . 101-102.

60 Letter of E.D. Maclagan, Chief Secretary, Government of Punjab to A.H-Grant, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. I July 1915. Foreignand Political Department. Secret. F, P ro ceed in g s , March 1916, Nos. 54-59.se e also Sedition C om m ittee R eport, p. 158.

ORGANISATIONAL CHARACTER 145

under the command of the German consuls.61 In the absence of specific directions from the aforesaid sources, many did not know what exactly to do and, as accounts of Jodh Singh and Chenchiah indicated, they attempted to do whatever seemed to them desirable and possible under the circumstances.62

The Ghadar movement was evidently a spontaneous and a pre-organised movement, a characteristic more known to peasant rebellions. The fact that the Ghadarites came mostly from the peasant stock appeared to have largely determined its organisational character. The participation of middle class intellectuals seemed to suggest only vague notions of rational organisation. Azad feelingly observed with a hindsight, ‘The first stage was of propaganda ; organisation was a matter for the second stage and that stage never came’.63 64 In reality, however, the leadership of the movement hardly ever seriously thought that organisation of such a mass movement could be done on any abstract principles of organisation. The leaders recognised the positive value of spontaneity. Their assertions of that element served, to borrow Gramsci’s words, as 'a stimulus’ and ■a tonic' for the movement, 'an element of unification in depth' It underlined the fact that it was not an artificially manufactured venture,81 But the leadership was not given to simultaneously attend consciously to the fact that even in such movements there was the need of creating an essential basis for a guided political action and a co-ordinated functioning of those individuals and groups who were bound by a collective will and wedded to a set of goals.

61 Harish Chandra's statement to the Police, Home Political A, P roceedings, February 1916, No. 201, Filep. 11 and Chenohiah's account of the Burma Project, 'The Ghadar Party 1913-18', Part IV, pp. 30-37.

62 Jodh Singh's evidence, Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B, Proceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-43, p. 304. Chenchiah, op. cit., Part IV, passim .

63 Azad, interview with the author.64 Hoare and Smith (eds.) Selections from the Prison N otebooks o f Gramsci,

pp. 198-99.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 5Jiwen Dao L agge Tiwen La Laiyey

Ghadar, the name of the movement's chief organ, was symbolic of the stipulated design of the revolutionary struggle. It was to be an armed struggle broadly similar to that of 1857. Har Dayal made it clear : ‘Our name and purpose are identical'. The conception of that struggle in the minds of the rank and file appeared to be akin to a form of populism—a violent direct action—in which armed civilians and mutinous Indian soldiers would together annihilate the British rulers and thus end the subjection to foreign rule. For that purpose, as we have seen, the foremost requirements seemed to be, to define the cause and the opponent, to win the sympathies and support of the masses and the soldiers, to legitimise the use of violence and to instil in the adherents a strong passion—a p rem khelan ka chao. Analysis of the existing objective conditions, the military and political circumstances which they were to encounter in India, hardly seemed important. With a death-defying courage, the question before Ghadar men was, to borrow Hobsbawm’s phrase, ■to hack out the way rather than discover it’.1

The G hadar propaganda and the thinking of the leaders on strategy were, however, not clear and specific. Alongside the suggestion for a popular armed revolution, there were indi­cations of a design for a coup d ’ etat, as also for widespread anarchist deeds of terrorism. The ‘traditional intellectuals' appeared to hope for a coup but also suggested preparation for heroic and dramatic political actions.

1 E.J. Hobsbawm, The Bandits (London : Weiden Field and Nicholson. 1969),p. 20.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 147

The pamphlets such as Yugantar Circular and Shabash, particularly the article on the 'Philosophy of the Bomb1, indicated a fascination for terrorism. The writings and poems in Ghadar exhorted the patriots to ‘shine like the Bengalees’, 'set up secret societies', 'commit dacoities on the government and the rich' and 'to deal first with the traitors of the nation and then ride on the chest of the enemy’. 'Tundilat' recollected that ‘Anarchist ideas had a dominant place in the thinking of Har Dayal. He talked admiringly of Russian anarchists. He had a special fascination for Bakunin and his ideas’.2

Whereas Har Dayal’s writings were full of anarchist exhortations, he appeared to think differently during moments of sober reflection. At the time of his interrogation by the US Immigration Inspector, he rationalised that the reference to dramatic actions of the terrorists were made only for the purpose of giving 'examples of courage and sacrifice'. 'Personally, I do not in any way say or do anything to encourage or approve of such acts', because, as he put it, the fear was that 'impulsive youngmen would be led astray and throw away their lives in such futile acts of violence’.3 A few months before the bomb on Lord Hardinge stimulated his passions, he had stated categorically in his lecture to a meeting, of the Industrial Workers of the World, what he described as his 'frank con­fession of faith’, that terrorism was, a mixture of heroism and folly’. Nevertheless, he gloried the anarchist deeds. Benjamin Harrison Sloan, popularly known as Jack or Jacobson among the Ghadar leaders and a friend and admirer of Har Dayal observed that,, in his lectures.- Har Dayal was ‘an out and out anarchist of the confiscate-everything and cut-anybody’s throat type’.4

His exhortations for dramatic deeds were readily imbibed by his admirers and followers. Ghadar poems in Punjabi language made frequent and indiscriminate advocacy of such actions.5 Harnam Singh ’Tundilat’ wrote with a hindsight that whereas they had decided on an organised armed struggle of the masses, element of a fascination for terroristic actions

2 Tundilat, 'Account of Ghadar Party', p. 70.3 Cited in Emily Brown, 'Har Dayal: A Portrait of an Indian Intellectual' (Ph.D.

dissertation. University of Arizona, 1967). p. 308.4 Cited in Emily Brown, Har Dayal, p. 209.5 Ghadar d i Goonj. No. 1, pp. 4,16.

148 GHADAR MOVEMENT

was certainly present.6 Whereas a consciousness of the futility of individual terrorism and political dacoities may have been a part of the thinking of some of the leaders, there was absolutely no evidence to suggest a clearcut rejection or disapproval of that course of action. The Director of Criminal Intelligence, Government of India, therefore, warned in his report of 29 December 1914 : 'we must expect in future, from members of the Ghadar party, not m erely organised rebellion which is strictly speaking their creed, but also outrages of the ordinary terrorist type by individual fanatics among the members’.7 8 9

The stipulated time for launching the armed struggle, according to the leaders, lay somewhere in an 'indefinite future’. They thought of starting it when the British Government would be engaged in an expected war with Germany, and that seemed hopefully far off. Bhagwan Singh stated that they had planned to start a rebellion in 1917.• 'Tundilat' recollected that they believed, as Har Dayal used to tell them, that the war would begin near about 1920. So they had quite sometime, at least five or six years, for making preparations.® Further, the struggle did not essentially need to b e a pre­planned project; it could as well begin ‘spontaneously’.

It was not known for certain if some of the student revolution­aries gave a serious thought to planning their course of action and the order in which particular steps were to b e taken. At least two of them have, however, written about the plans believed to have been made.

According to Darisi Chenchiah, a plan was made by students of the Nalanda Hostel at Berkeley. India, according to this plan, was to be liberated by stages. Liberation of northern India was to be tried first, beginning with Kashmir, followed by NWFP, then U P, then Punjab, and so on. ‘We ■concluded', as he wrote, 'that it would take not less than ten years. So it was finally resolved that we must make Kashmir a Republic by 1925.'10 But why start with Kashmir ? Because, as he

6 Hamam Singh 'Tundilat' to Gurcharan Singh Sainsara, dated 24 April 1960.7 D.C.I.'s Weekly Report, 29 December 1914, Home Political B, P roceed in g s,

January 1915, No. 278.8 Interview, published in D aily Manila Bulletin, 5 March 1915. See text in

Home Political B, P roceed in gs, April 1915, Nos. 416-19: File pp. 20-21.9 Tundilat, op . cit.. pp. 72, 79.10 Chenchiah, 'The Ghadar Party 1913-18: An Authentic Report', Part II, pp. 6-8.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 149

explained, the social, religious and economic inequalities between the ruled and the ruling classes in Kashmir were very wide and it was considered that the Ghadar Party could easily arouse the masses against the exploiters and thus bring about a revolution. Kashmir being a mountainous area was also consi­dered suitable for guerrilla warfare. It was enigmatic that their first target should be the Hindu ruler of a princely state, instead of foreign rulers of British India. The scheme, however, seemed to have remained a freak of a few, because except Chenchiah's account and a brief reference by 'Tundilat', hardly any other reference to it was available in the Ghadar literature, or in the personal accounts of their leading comrades, or in the enormous evidence available in the conspiracy trials.

Khankhoje reported about the formation of an 'action wing’ and a programme of action chalked out by him. The reported plan of action was like this :

the first step was to end communications by mobbing railway stations and cutting telegraph lines; then destroy­ing the police chowkis (police stations), disorganising the military camps and check-posts etc. When this movement gathered momentum, the second step was to establish revolutionary camps in jungles and border areas, in the hills and valleys; and then to start harassing the English administration and the armies. It was also decided that the question of arms and ammunition was to be solved by raiding English military camps and armouries. It was not possible for us to purchase and procure arms and weapons by any other means except by guerrilla raids on army bases of the British. In pursuance of this plan, we began to move our men and leaders.11

That plan, as he wrote, was known only to a few. Perhaps it remained confined to those few. One hardly finds any corroborative evidence. In any case, the adumberated scheme of step-by-step guerrilla operations did not seem to have caught the attention of the main leaders of the movement. As it was, the rapid political developments closed on the Ghadarites so soon that the chances, if any, of an orderly formulation of schemes and methods were suddenly cut down.

The Komagata Maru episode and the Great War, that started ten days after the departure of that ship, became a

11 Hardas, A rm ed Struggle For Freedom , pp. 250-251. See also Dutt, Apraka- shit Rajnitik Itihas, Appendix V.

ISO GHADAR MOVEMENT

catalyst. According to Prithvi Singh Azad, they had, on advice from revolutionaries of other countries, just started making arrangements for a military training of their fellows; when ‘the incident of Komagata Maru washed out our plans’.12

Soon after the shipload of miserable and outraged Indian passengers resumed a return journey on 23 July 1914, the angry leaders of the community in Canada fanned out exhorting Indians to leave for their country 'at once’, to settle scores with the British and avenge the insult.13 14 Some of the groups actually made a move even before the War broke out and before a call was given by the party,

Harnam Singh ‘Tundilat’ recounted the dilemma of the leadership at that time. The party, as he stated, was not at all prepared for an immediate armed action. Every leader seemed to be at a loss to decide what course of action should they choose. They knew that the British government would be soon taking out a major part of Indian armed forces to fight outside India. Should the Ghadar patriots, at that opportune moment, continue to sit back and carry on only oral and written propa­ganda from America ? That would be useless if they could not obstruct the British exploitation of India for the war of vested interests. The leading Ghadarites therefore decided on launch­ing the struggle immediately.11

'Indians do not lose the opportunity’, the Hindustan Ghadar called in its number of 28 July 1914. It announced the arrival of the awaited war and called on the patriots that as soon as the war broke out in Europe they should start a revolution in India.

In its next issue, another article, 'The Trumpet of War’, exhorted them to leave immediately and not to delay for a moment. It explained that all nations of Europe were divided into two parties. On the one side were Germany, Italy and Austria and on the other, England, France and Russia. Since all Britain’s forces would fight against Germany, all 'white soldiers’ would have to leave India for European battle fronts ; •this is the most opportune time to start a war of liberation'.

12 Prithvi Singh Azad, Kranti Path Ka Pathik, p. 80. See also, Parmanand, The Story o f My Life, pp. 68, 76.

13 Statements of Balwant Singh and Harcharan Das, Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B, P roceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-343. Also see Judgement, L.C.C., Home Political A, P roceedings, October 1915, No. 91, pp. 85-86.

14 'Tundilat', op. cit., p. 81.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 151

Next week’s issue carried an advertisement on the title page :

WANTED : Fearless, Courageous Soldiers for spreading Mutiny in India.

Salary : DeathReward : Martyrdom and Freedom Place : The Field of India.

Special meetings were held at Oxnard, Upland, Fresno, Astoria etc. In a big general gathering of Indian immigrants at Sacramento, volunteers were listed and funds collected for their passage.15 Groups of immigrants, fired with a fanatic zeal, started pouring into India. The stage appeared to be set for a spontaneous uprising. How spontaneous is a spontaneous rebellion, is however, a moot point. There must always be some element of organisation and preparation, howsoever vague and insubstantial.

What exactly were they to do ? The Hindustan Ghadar of 4 August provided them the following guidelines :

Go to India and incite the native troops. Preach mutiny openly. Take arms from the troops of the native States, and whereever you see the British, kill them. If you do your work quickly and intelligently, there is hope that Germany will help you. Get help from Nepal and Afghan­istan. Start the war quick. Don’t delay.

Addressing the first batch of rebels, who where leaving San Francisco for India, Ram Chandra added more to the instructions :

Rob the wealthy and show mercy to the poor. In this way gain universal sympathy. Arms will be provided for you on arrival in India; failing this, you must loot rifles from the police stations.16

They were also asked to encourage passive resistance, and induce the people to withdraw their deposits from the banks.17

These instructions indicated hasty improvisations. Recalling the highly surcharged atmosphere at the Sacramento gathering,

15 See the list of meetings given in the Judgement, L.C.C. Home Political A, Proceedings, October 1915, No. 91, File pp. 74-75; See also, Isemonger and Slattery, op. cit., p. 41.

16 Witness Nawab Khan's statement and also Judgement in L.C.C., Home Political A, P roceed in gs, October 1915, No. 91.

17 Hindustan Ghadar, 18 August 1914; also evidence before the Special Tribunal in Mandlay Conspiracy Case, cited in Sedition Committee Report, p. 168

152 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Prjthvi Singh wrote, that every one in that gathering sensed a crusading fire in every body around, 'but none of us had any clear notion in his mind of the framework of our revolutionary programme’,18 So a belief, Jiwen dao lagge tiwen la laiyey (Let us take whatever action seems fit and suitable), appeared to make good sense to the inspired.19

Was it to be a function of individual actors to decide what was suitable or possible at a particular time and place ? Perhaps not. It was generally believed that they were to follow the directions of their leaders. It was not clear however, as to who comprised the leadership for those proceeding to India. Some of the most prominent leaders of the movement had decided to stay behind, apparently, with a view to playing a more crucial role by arranging for expected help from the German Government.20 Who were then to be in command of the various groups of Ghadarites on their arrival in India ? Evidently, some of those leading figures like Jwala Singh and Wasakha Singh, who had returned by the Tosha Maru. Decision to form groups of ten to fifteen members each, under separate group leaders was reportedly taken during the journey.

Many of these leaders were in fact nabbed by the police on landing in Calcutta. Some felt, as Sanyal discovered on meeting them, that when the time came leaders would automatically rise from amongst them.21 Leading figures, including Kartar Singh Sarabha, also appeared to have pinned their hopes on securing guiding-lights from amongst the terrorists of Bengal.22 In any

18 Prithvi Singh, op. cit., p. 81.19 G hadar d i Goonj, No. 1. p. 16. In their interviews with the author both

Gujjar Singh Bhakna and Prithvi Singh Arad affirmed that given the sense of urgency and immediacy of action, it was thought that each one might consider what was feasible under what circumstances.

20 These included, for example, Bhagwan Singh, Ram Chandra, Barkatullah and Santokh Singh. Har Dayal was already away from the scene.

21 Sanyal, Bandi Jeevan , p. 20.22 Kartar Singh Sarabha made a quick trip to Calcutta to find contacts. Pingley

actually went straight to Bengal , and reportedly secured a letter from the legendary hero Jyotindra Nath Mukherjee, for Rash Behari Bose. These efforts brought Bose to Punjab. Sanyal wrote : 'It appeared to me as if these Sikh people were specially attracted to Bengalees.1 Bandi Jeevan, p. 27. Mana Singh stated that the passengers of Komagata Maru had been instructed : 'On reaching our villages we should commence plans for

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 153

case, it was yet to be decided and, an optimitstic dekhi jaoo (it’ll be seen) seemed to be the answer, as they moved in to act.

The shiploads of'turbulent' Ghadar men, who were hardly prepared for the reception the government gave them on arrival, fell into the hands of the British police. Lai Singh 'Kamla Akali’ observed later :

The general behaviour pattern of the simple American Punjabis was such that either they were captured in the way or if they reached Punjab then they talked so loudly of freedom and slavery of the British, that within a few days Zaildars and Nambardars would herd them into the police dragnet .23

The large scale arrests, internments and confinement of hundreds of them to their villages, 'disorganised' the said ■elaborate arrangements'. Around half of those who reached the Punjab, as Sanyal found, ‘got engaged in their family and business affairs'.2* A number of others, without a centralising leadership or a headquarter but passionately committed and loosely knit into jathas, carried on spasmodically, more or less ad hoc operations as considered fit and possible by their different groups either separately or in conjunction.

The political situation in the country appeared distressing to the Ghadarites. Political leaders and other notables vied with one another in loud expressions of loyalty and service in the British war effort; in recruiting soldiers and collecting funds. 'Kamla Akali’ recollected : 'I saw that good educated people were running around hectically recruiting soldiers for the army; one said I got so many people recruited and another that he collected so much of fund'. The Ghadarites had thought that the country would be ready to rise in revolt against the British. On reaching India they found that 'the people were all set in upholding the British with all earnestness'.2‘

The Ghadarites were taken aback, but remained largely undaunted, manifesting greater courage which is born of

rebellion and act as d irec ted by the B e n g a le e s .. .' D.C.I.'s Weekly Report, dated 1st December 1914, Home Political B, P roceedings, December 1914, Nos. 227-232. ( em phasis added ).

23 Lai Singh 'Kamla Akali', Sailani Desh Bhagat (Punjabi), (Ludhiana: n.d.), p. 36.24 Sanyal, op. c ;f.,pp . 8-9. Three fourths of the retumed-emigrants were

reportedly settled peacefully. O' Dwyer's statement, cited in ker, Political Trouble in India, p. 333.

25 Kamla Akali, op. cit., pp. 179-80.

154 GHADAR MOVEMENT

desperation. Bhai Parmanand observed that ’they were working under a blind impulse'.26 Mana Singh of the Komagata Maru told the Police without mincing words: 'Our group was for a rebellion at once’.27

A major concern among these grim and desperate Ghadarites, seemed to be to fix the date of uprising. The dates, therefore, were hurriedly fixed and as soon postponed when the ill-considered anticipations of particular leaders were belied. Among the groups earliest to arrive was the one led by Gujjar Singh Bhakna. It decided at Khasa (Amritsar) that the rebellion would start on 15 November 1914 i.e. two or three days after the expected arrival of a consignment of arms, even though a large number of Ghadarites were yet to arrive. However, as the consignment did not arrive, the date was put off.

Sunder Singh stated that 'All were asking for the date of uprising’28 29 in their gathering at Massaiya fair at Tarn Taran on 17 November. Jhinder Singh complained that Gujjar Singh had done nothing and threatened that they (he and his fellows) would form their own party and fix, 'our own date of uprising’.22

It was difficult for these people to wait. So their attention was, many a time, hastily diverted from one project to another believing one to be more promising or suitable than the other. For example, when the sowars of 23rd Cavalary failed to arrive on time for a rising planned for the night of 26 November, the group of Ghadarites who had gathered at Jhar Sahib decided, instead, to assemble at Kairon the next evening to attack the police station at Sarhali and then loot the treasury at Tarn Taran.30 That plan was, however, miscarried. Similarly, a section of Nidhan Singh’s gang which planned on 27 November that a military magazine at Ferozepur Cantonement would be

26 Parmanand, op. cit., p. 75.27 Statement to the Police. D.C.I.’s Weekly Report, 1 December 1914, Home

Political B, P roceedings, December 1914, Nos. 227-229.28 Statement of Sunder Singh, Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, Home

Political A, Proceedings, May 1916, 219-221, File p. 471.29 Ibid-, p. 472.30 Evidence of Kala Singh, Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political A,

Proceedings, May 1916, Nos. 219-221.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 1SS

raided three days later, proceeded, meanwhile, to loot the Government Treasury at Moga, ‘to fill the time’.31

The impulsiveness of a group of these people which resulted in ‘Ferozeshehar incident’, death of two and arrest of seven of them including the prominent leader Kanshi Ram, and which caused a severe set-back to their work, pointed to a similar lack of method. Sanyal therefore quipped: ‘one cannot but admire their cleverness, that as soon as the eyes of the Police fell upon them, their (Police) suspicion was aroused’.32

To some of these Ghadarites, as Nawab Khan told the Special Tribunal, their revolutionary actions aimed at causing as much trouble to the government as possible.33 Mool Singh stated that to the excited sowars of the 23rd Cavalary the purpose of the stipulated Ghadar rebellion was to kill the Whites and rob the government.34 According to a report of the Director of Criminal Intelligence of 12 January 1915, several of them had made statements showing in great detail the far- reaching scheme of revolution, which they came back in India to carry out, but 'meanwhile they seem to be moving about a great deal, talking wildly and committing crimes here and there'.35

A close study of the movements and actions of the various Ghadarites pointed to a marked joy of defiance, which fre­quently became a substitute for purposeful action. Perhaps, as Znaniecki's study of peasants indicated, certain theatrical glory and exhibitionism was characteristic of them when they were provoked or incited.36 Sanyal believed that because of their loud and conspicuous exhibitionism, ‘warrants of arrest were

31 Judgement, Supplementary L.C.C., op. cif.32 Sanyal, Bandi Jeevan , p. 34. Similarly, on 20th February 1915, three

Ghadarites passing through Anarkali Bazar Lahore, were suspected by a police party. When they were stopped and asked to lay down whatever they had on them; Arjan Singh took out his revolver and saying 'I l'l give you something', killed the head constable and wounded the Sub-Inspector. He was nabbed on the spot. See Judgement in Anarkali Murder Case 1915.

33 Nawab Khan’s testimony, cited in Giles T. Brown, op. cit., pp. 13-14.34 Evidence of Mool Singh, Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy, op. cit.35 Home Political B, Proceedings, January 1915, Nos. 278-282 (280) File, p. 24.

The Sedition Comm ittee R eport stated that ‘Village headmen had reported to the local authorities cases in which these persons were indulging in dangerous or inflammatory language', p. 150-

36 Cited in Eric R. Wolf, 'The Peasantry as a Political factor' in Teodor Shanin (ed.), Peasnats and Peasant Societies (Penguin : 1971), p. 261.

156 GHADAR MOVEMENT

issued for a number of them’.37 Prithvi Singh (Azad), observed with a pang, ‘if we had a capacity for thought in the same proportion as our preparedness to die, the results would have been very much different’.38

A relatively serious consideration of strategy and planning of operations came to be introduced after Rash Behari Bose took over the command around the middle of January 1915. A scheme for apparently large scale simultaneous actions appeared to have been substituted for the earlier sporadic and impromptu operations. But the objectives and nature of struggle became very different from what had been stipulated earlier. Sanyal described the scheme as under :

Actually what we wanted was that suddenly one day without informing anybody of our intentions, an attack would be made on all the British soldiers in the cantone- ments of Northern India on the same one day and exactly at one time and at once; and all those people, who during that turmoil surrender before us should be imprisoned. The revolt should be started at night and at the same time the telegraph wires of the city should be cut and the British soldiers and strong men put into jail and then after looting the treasury, the prisoners be released. Thereafter handing over the management of that city to some selected competent individual, the party of all revolution­aries should assemble in the Punjab.39

He and his comrades were conscious, he stated, that they might not necessarily go on achieving success in their fight against the British, but they had a firm belief that once such a rebellion broke out it would lead to fresh international align­ments. If they could adequately carry on for one year or so, it was possible for them to secure the help of those foreign powers which were hostile to the British and thus they might succeed in liberating India.40

Evidently, here was a thinking aimed at a coup’d etat, and for that purpose, they almost exclusively depended upon the support of pattriotic elements among the Indian soldiers of the British army. Sanyal stated that they were absolutely unfamiliar with war strategy and they had made no efforts for such edu­cation and training as was required. They were also conscious

37 Sanyal, op. cit., pp. 51-52.38 Prithvi Singh, Kranti Path Ka Palhik, p. 87.39 Sanyal, op. cit., p. 67.40 Ibid., pp. 67-68.

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of the fact that soon after the beginning of rebellion, as soon as the soldiers became aware of the fact that whatever arms were available with rebels, were only those which the soldiers had with them and that without the latters’ support the revolution­aries were completely powerless, then the soldiers might behave and act arbitrarily and independently of the revolution­aries. But, as Sanyal observed, it was believed that once the soldiers came out in revolt they would have no other option than to go ahead, in their own self interest, and work for the success of the 'rebellion’. Then they would be compelled to seek the guidance and leadership of educated and determined revo­lutionaries.41

That indeed was a curious rationalisation and a quixotic hope. Most of these revolutionaries recollected with distress the great illusions they had created and the very heavy price they had to pay because of the ignorance that their fight was not with numbers of the Europeans in India but with the advanced western military science and technology.42

It may be useful to see what methods did they follow for the purpose, and how exactly did they go about their work of bringing about a revolutionary change. The Special Tribunal Lahore listed thirteen different activities the Ghadarites chose.43 Though initially there was an equally strong emphasis on preparing the masses for revolution, yet the emphasis had shifted more towards winning over the soldiers for rebellion. Ancillary to these were objectives relating to collection or manufacture of arms and raising of funds through dacoities.

When the decision was made that Indians should return to their country for the revolutionary struggle, persuading and gathering as many of their compatriots as possible, to join in the holy crusade, appeared to be the first task. To that end, as it was, an audacious and passion-rousing propaganda was found to be a natural expedient. 'Fie : on those contemptible

41 Ibid., p. 87.42 'Kamla Akali', Sailani Desh Bhagat, p. 41; 'Azad', Interview with the author;

Sanyal, op. cit., pp. 86-88.43 These included, seduction of Indian soldiers; collection of arms, men and

munitions; obtaining of money by robbing government treasuries and by dacoities; obtaining and manufacturing-bombs; murder of police and other officials. Home Political A, Proceedings, September 1918, Nos. 5S-S7, File pp. 197-98.

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creatures who reconciled with the depraved and miserable state of existence’ : glory for all Indians lay, conversely, in their chivalrous voluntary recruitment to the army of patriots.

Where ever home-bound ships of the Ghadarites, laid anchor in ports, the leading figures among them went out to their fellow countrymen exhorting them to come along. Besides appeals in the name of patriotism, ridicule, derision and even threats to the reluctant ones were considered in order.

Flushed with an auto-intoxication, these patriots cared not, as Prithvi Singh recalled, whether there were any British spies along or what happened if their enemy in India got ready to charge first.14 Even after learning of the 'barbarous treatment' meted out to Komagata Maru passengers at Budge Budge, those following in the Tosa Maru, for example, loudly proclai­med their intentions and designs to Indian soldiers of the British regiment camping at Rangoon.44 45

Soon after their arrival in the Punjab, they started their efforts to win over students and villagers by lecturing more or less publicly.4* Those who went to religious fairs at Tarn Taran, Amritsar, Nankana Sahib, and Muktsar, openly exhorted the people to rise. Harnam Singh ‘Tundilat’ gave graphic details of how he went around with Banta Singh and Rur Singh in a number of villages of district Jullundur and of the princely state of Kapurthala addressing public meetings after collecting people with the beat of a drum.47 Gulab Kaur similarly moved in district Jullundur and in some villages around Hariana (Hoshiarpur) and Nidhan Singh toured the villages of Ludhiana.4* Shachindra Nath Sanyal wrote about similar efforts of Kartar Singh (Sarabha) who was ‘labouring surprisingly hard those days’. Sarabha used to cover, on a bicycle, forty or fifty miles in rural areas each day.49 Randhir Singh of Narangwal (later known as Sant Randhir Singh) devised another novel method. He encouraged the holding of Akhand Paths by his followers

44 Prithvi Singh, Kranti Path Ka Pathik, p. 83.45 Ibid., p. 88.46 See statements of Anokh Singh and Udham Singh of Hans in Supplementary

L.C.C. Home Political A, P roceed in g s, May 1916, Nos. 219-221, pp. 587-590; 635.

47 Tundilat. op. cit., pp. 102-6-48 Sainsara, G hadar Party da Ithas, p. 176.49 Sanyal, op. cit., p. 51.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 159

and admirers in different villages. At a number of such occasions when the ceremonies concluded, he exhorted a section of the audience to perform their religious duty by joining the Ghadarites in expelling the British.50

Bose, Sanyal and other Bengali revolutionaries who came in contact with the Ghadarites felt seriously threatened by the audacity and imprudence with which the Ghadar men went about preaching revolutionary action openly.51 52 Sohan Singh Bhakna rationalised in an interview with the present writer that such audacious haranguing surely involved risks but, as he argued, it was believed that 'that was the only way which carried conviction with our people’.62 In effect, however, Randhir Singh was perhaps the only notable person from among the non­immigrant Punjabis who joined the Ghadarites. His jatha had fifty to sixty steadfast converts from among the villagers.

The common people in the Punjab did not know what it was all about. 'They had the common sense to believe’, as Trilochan Singh observed, ‘that a handful of badly organised adventurists could not topple the British Government’.53 The Commissioner of Jullundur Division reported confidentially, 'I do not think that there is any chance of disaffected Canadian emigrants (sic) receiving any measure of popular support, and indeed I shall be surprised if they do so’.54 55 His assessment was correct. The Ghadar preachers had realised that they had laboured under an illusion.56

Winning over of Indian soldiers of British army was decidedly the most highly valued of their line of action in preparation for the stipulated coup. Greater hope of success in that respect made that line of action as the most prominent.

50 Evidence of Achhra Singh approver, Supplementary L.C.C. op. cit. See also Trilochan Singh, Autobiography o f Bhai Sahib Randhir Singh, p. Lii.

51 Sanyal, op. cit., p. 28.52 Sohan Singh Bhakna, interview with the author, 26 November 1968.53 Trilochan Singh, op. cit., p. Lxii.54 Fortnightly Report on internal political situation, Home Political Deposit,

P roceedings, January 1915, No. 43 File p. 12. The Director of Criminal Intelligence had a similar report to make : 'The returning emigrants are not ingratiating themselves with the people who dislike their manner and over­bearing attitude’. Weekly Report 12 January 1915, Home Political B, P roceedings, January 1915, No. 278-282, F ilep. 24.

55 Gurmukh Singh Laltori, Gujjar Singh Bhakna and Prithvi Singh Asad madepractically similar observations in that regard in their interviews with the author.

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Given the particular conception of revolt, 'Go, and awake the armies’, was a regular refrain in the G hadar propaganda. In the poems the call was frequently made direct to Faujan W aleo (O’ Men of the Armies). 'Give (your) thought to it simple men’, the soldiers were told, ‘you have continued to fight and sacrifice your lives for the vested interests of the foreign oppressor, even as the white soldiers stayed aside. . . Are your lives worth only nine rupees (each) ? . . . Must you remain slaves for ever. . . . Fight for your freedom . . . Let’s not repeat the mistake of 1857'.56 57 They also found that because of their contacts, it was relatively easier to work in the regiments, than among the masses. Sanyal discovered that the main scaffold in their design for revolt were the Sikh regiments.87 The conclusion of the Special Tribunal was also similar : ‘The most essential and dangerous step which the conspirators adopted for the achievement of their object was, without doubt, seduction of troops or attempt to seduce troops’.58 59 60

That, in any case, was the main factor which induced Rash Behari Bose to take over the command of those whom he had otherwise described as 'raw revolutionaries’ of the Ghadar Party.5" Such propaganda was more or less openly carried during the summer of 1914 among sections of the 26th Punjabi Regiment stationed at Hong Kong. En route, where ever the steamers stopped, leading Ghadarites addressed Punjabi soldiers e.g. at Penang, Singapore, Rangoon etc. and persistently exhorted them not to take up arms against Germany. The Muslim soldiers were asked to heed the call of their Khalifa of Turkey, and to launch a jeh a d against ka fir ferin ghees.*0 Converting troops at Lahore and Ferozepur cantonements was among the first of the serious engagements of the Ghadar activists. According to the testimony of ex-sow ar Ganda Singh, within days of the arrival of early groups, a meeting of some

56 G hadar d i C oonj, No. 1, poems 11, 17, 22; Bharat Ka N agara, Vol. I, No. 1. See also D.C.I.’s Report, 5 January 1915, Home Political B, P roceed in gs, January 1915, Nos. 278-282, p. 16.

57 Sanyal, op. cit., p. 20.58 Judgement, L.C.C. Home Political A, P roceed in gs, October 1915, No. 91

p. 119.59 Sanyal, op . cit., pp. 20, 22, 29.60 Parmanand, The Story o f My Life, p. 69; Prithvi Singh, op. cit., pp. 84-88.

See also Judgement, L.C.C.. Home Political A, P roceed in gs, October 1915. No. 91, p. 120.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 16L

of the Sowars of 23rd Cavalary was held near the Lahore cantonement. and plans were discussed for the capture of the Lahore fort.*1 ‘We are satisfied’, concluded the Special Tribunal in its judgement, ‘that one of the earliest schemes of the revolutionists was, to collect men in Lahore on 25th November 1914 and raid the military arsenal at Mianmeer in conjunction with rebellious troops and then raise up a revolt in the whole of the Majha tract'.6'1 There was a miscarriage. Mool Singh, an erstwhile Sikh priest of 23rd Cavalary claimed before the Tribunal that had he not intervened the whole of one troop would have deserted.6*

A few of the Ghadarites managed to be enlisted in regiments with an avowed object of working from inside.64 Some others with a dare-devil audacity, went to the barracks, and secured assurances of support. Harnam Singh of 26th Punjabi Regiment described the hypnotising confidence and courage with which Kartar Singh Sarabha frequently visited them in their barrack, dressed as a sadhu, a sweeper or a fak ir . T h e Punjab Police officials, Isemonger and Slattery noted that ‘the audacity with which they [the Ghadarites] went about this work of seduction, is astounding1.66

The sepoys were captivated by the uncommon boldness and optimism of these Ghadar men, for which Kartar Singh Sarabha's name became a legend in the Punjab. 'The sepoys used to say : 'Look at this young boy; these boys are moving with their lives in their hands; must only we behave like lifeless ones ?’ This used to have a great influence’.67 In a short period small groups of twos and threes had approached a 61 62 63 64 65 66 67

61 Statement of ex-sowar Ganda Singh of 23rd Cavalary, and Judgement, in the Supplementary L.C.C. Home Political A, Proceedings, May 1916, Nos. 219-221. File pp. S9. 509-S10.

62 Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B. Proceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-343, File p. 46.

63 Evidence of Mool Singh ex-Granthi of 23rd Cavalary. Supplementary L.C-C. Home Political A, P roceedings. May 1916, Nos. 219-221, File p. 534.

64 See evidence, Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, op. cit., pp. 532-36.65 Hamam Singh of Kala Singha, interview with the author, 27 January 1974.66 Isemonger and Slattery, An Account o f the Ghadar Conspiracy, p. 105; See

also, M.S. Leigh, The Punjab and the War, p. 19.67 Harnam Singh of Kala Singha. interview with the author. See also Sanyal,

op. cit., p. 92.

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number of regiments stationed at Bannu in the North-West to Lucknow and Faizabad in UP.6*

Much of this work was done in the first ten days of the month of February. The evidence regarding their whirlwind trips gave the impression of a touch-and-go in a number of regiments. At some places, the contacted sepoys responded enthusiastically and assured participation in a rising provided it was started earlier at other places. At some other places like Cawnpore, Allahabad and Ambala they drew a blank; the sepoys being too afraid to join. In the quarter guard of a regi­ment at Delhi, Sucha Singh was promptly turned out. The Sedition Committee reported that the success the Ghadarites achieved in that respect was 'extrem ely small’, but conceded however that they had come within 'an ace of causing widespread bloodshed’.68 69

Most of these batches of Ghadar emissaries, returning to the headquarter by 11 February, submitted such assessments of the expected support among the soldiers as seem ed very promising. There was a fear that some of the regiments, parti­cularly the 23rd Cavalry at Lahore and 26th Infantry at Feroze- pur, the two units wherein lay a major support base of the Ghadarites, may be mobilised out soon. It was therefore decided on the 12th to work swiftly. The uprising was to commence on the night of 21 February 1915. The date was later advanced to 19th. According to Sedition Committee Report, ‘The plotters had designed simultaneous out-breaks at Lahore, Ferozepur and Rawalpindi and it appeared that their operations were intended to cover a far wider area’.70

Besides these, what had constantly exercised the minds of Ghadar leaders was the need of acquiring weapons. Har Dayal had emphasised on two things being necessary, 'the G hadar and Guns'. Ram Chandra had promised to send arms. In case that did not materialise they were to loot rifles from the police stations.

Small weapons were easily available in the United States and thus Sohan Singh Bhakna journeyed post-haste to Yokohama

68 See, the report of the Results of 3rd, 4th, 5th Supplementary LahoreConspiracy Cases. Home Political A, P roceed in gs, September 1918,Nos. 55-57.

69 Sedition C om m ittee R eport, pp. 158, 161.70 Ibid., p. 154.

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to deliver revolvers and cartridges to home-bound passengers of the Komagata Maru. Quite a few of the leading Ghadarites had carried similar type of weapons on their way to India. However, barring some which were hidden in false bottoms of boxes and buckets, practically all these weapons had to be abandoned or thrown into the ocean. Reports of Police search of the luggage of all returning Indians had made extreme precautions necessary.

Collection of weapons, therefore, seemed very important to their programme in India. Bhai Parmanand and then Kartar Singh Sarabha visited Bengal for that purpose, but the efforts proved fruitless. Jagat Ram’s visit to Peshawar in that connection resulted in his arrest by the police. Hasty and ill-conceived projects of capturing arms from army arsenals at Mian Meer and Ferozepur Cantonement, as also the police Thana at Sarhali proved abortive.

On the suggestion of Mathura Singh and Harnam Singh, efforts were therefore made to manufacture bombs. Using the then freely available steel ink pots for covers and mixing potash (Chlorate of Potassium) and sulphuric acid and jaggery etc., manufacture of simple country-made hand bombs was started at Jhabewal in Ludhiana district. The place was later changed to Lohatbadi in the princely State of Nabha."1 Some more destructive bombs were also procured from Bengal through the efforts of Sanyal and Pingley. Commenting on the potency of these bombs, ten of which were discovered on Vishnu Ganesh Pingley at the time of his arrest in the lines of 12th Cavalry at Meerut, a Government explosives expert reported that these were 'sufficient to annihilate half a regiment’.71 72

Curiously, the only other weapons some of them forged or collected, were chhabis (sticks mounted with steel blades). Many of those who gathered to attack the police post of Sarhali, in Amritsar district, carried these chhabis as the main weapons besides some swords.73 These certainly were not the weapons for the big enterprise. The Ghadarites therefore

71 King Emperor vs. Dr. Mathura Singh, Judgement, 3rd Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political A, Proceedings, September 1918, Nos. 55-57, pp. 47-49.

72 Sedition Committee Report, p. 134.73 Evidence Kala Singh, Supplementary L.C.C., op. cit., pp. 498-499.

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relied heavily on the prospect of capturing rifles and bullets from the magazines of the British army. In the scheme of launch­ing the revolt on the evening of 19 February the capture of arms was to be the first step. 'Once the arms were captured the rebellion would start with the massacre of Europeans’, the patriots were told/4 Evidently, nothing could be done until the arms were captured, for let alone the Ghadar men even the regular sepoys had only swords alloted to them; rifles during those days were issued to the sepoys only at the time of training exercises or at the battle front.

It appeared naive on the part of the Ghadarites to have planned a widespread rebellion, relying wholly on the prospect that they would be safely escorted to attack the magazines, loot rifles, distribute them amongst themselves, load them and then pounce upon the Europeans. Given the alert, the friendly sepoys were not available for the project and the Ghadar men, practically without arms and without substitute manoeuvres, had no means of keeping the date.

Severe want of funds which had become a major handicap in their preparations had also meanwhile prompted the Ghadarites to commit dacoities. A total of five such political dacoities were actually committed between 23 January and 3 February 1915. Around an equal number of contemplated or attempted dacoities proved a failure. Commision of dacoities was, however, the only such activity about which doubts persisted whether it was a part of their considered programme or not.

Dacoities by revolutionaries of Bengal were approvingly mentioned in Ghadar, and the Ghadar poems. It was suggested as a legitimate method for raising of funds. Paisa Lutt Farangee

da kam karna76 (work is to be done with money looted from the British), appeared to have been one of the popular notions with many of them. Ram Chandra had instructed them to ‘Rob the wealthy and show mercy to the poor’. Evidence was available that the proposal of committing dacoities for collect- 74 75

74 Statement of Balwant Singh, who got enlisted in the 23id Cavalary for thatexpressed objective. Supplementary L.C.C., op. cit. pp. 532-36, 540. Seealso, Sanyal, op. cit.. p. 87.

75 Ghadar di Goonj, No. 1, pp. 4, 16,19.

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ing money was discussed during iheir journey to India.56 Prithvi Singh stated that the question of how to raise money was a major issue of discussion at their first meeting at Ladowal in the month of November 1914. According to him, Kartar Singh suggested that commission o f , dacoities was a legitimate and necessary course of action for raising funds for purchase of bombs, but Nidhan Singh was positively opposed to it and most others supported the latter.”

One does not know if it was just a coincidence that the first dacoity was committed after the arrival of Rash Behari Bose in the Punjab. It was apparent that the urgent need of funds was more acutely felt at that time. Sohan Singh Bhakna, however, believed that the ‘wrong advice’ of committing dacoities on individuals, ‘came only from the Bengalis’. Looting the government treasuries, was of course, a part of their thinking, he added.76 77 78 The opposition of Nidhan Singh and others to such a course of action and the spirited defence put up by some of them in the court against the charge that dacoity was a part of their programme,79 was however, indicative of an honest dislike of that method among many of them. It appeared that to that class of revolutionaries, most among whom had placed all their hard earned wealth at the disposal of their leaders, dacoity seemed to be a some what repugnant and detestable action. The very concern with matters of money appeared reprehensible to those who were prepared to sacrifice even their lives. Some of them continued to regret the decision of their comrades in that regard. One reason may be the harm done by the dacoity at Chabba which, according to the Desh Bhagat Committee’s history of the party, was in fact responsible for the fiasco of their fond hopes of a revolutionary change.80

Assassination of spies, informers or loyalists, on the other hand, appeared more clearly to have been a part of their

76 Acoording to Nawab Khan, it had been decided on Tosa Maru that 'Loyal Punjabis of substance should be looted.' Cited in Sedition Committee Report, p. 151. See also Judgement, L.C.C. Home Political A, Proceedings, October 1915, No. 91, pp. 165-166.

77 Prithvi Singh, Kranti Path Ka Pathik, p. 93.78 Sohan Singh Bhakna, interview with the author.79 See Judgement, L.C.C., Horne Political A, Proceedings, October 1915, No.91.80 Sainsara, Chadar Party da Itihas, p. :S7. See also Sedition Committee

Report, p. 153.

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programme. It was widely believed that one of the gravest threats to the nationalist struggle came from such selfish and mercenary elements. Ghadar had, therefore, described spies and informers as the progeny of chandals (devils) and exhorted the patriots to deal with the traitors first :

Pichhon dekhange wal gorian d e pehlan desh ghati samjha laiye Ohnan Tukham chandaalde putt jan o Madat karan jo es sarkar wali.sl

It was one of the important rules of discipline among the Ghadarites that anyone leaking out a secret was to be killed. In a meeting held at Vancouver, following the arrival of Komagata Maru, leading speakers had openly advised their countrymen to murder Hopkinson, the hated Inspector in the Immigration Department at Vancouver. Harnam Singh of Bela. Singh’s gang was murdered on 31 August 1914. Mewa Singh who murdered Hopkinson in December 1914 was regarded as a martyr for the national cause.88

The prevailing political situation in the Punjab in which the leading notables, priests and loyal subjects were not only making all-out effort to support the British but also volunteered; enthusiastically in suppression of the Ghadarites, tended to. strengthen the latter’s belief that their major enemies lay among, their own countrymen. As Lai Singh ’Kamla Akali' found, 'for every policeman there were several civilians who, on their own, acted like policemen . . . Such was the condition of; these people that one vied with the others in helping the police and earning higher reputation for treachery'. Ultimately they learnt, as he stated, that until such traitors were effectively tackled it was practically impossible to work effectively. 'Our anger against the Englishmen got rather mellowed and turned toward these Zaildars and Safaidposhes, and we believed, that our business was to fell down a few of these prominent pillars, only then would the people turn away from such deeds'.81 82 83 Therefore, murders of prominent loyalists including Sunder Singh Majithia and Rur Singh of Amritsar were contemp­lated. However, only a few suspected informers or 'toadies’

81 Ghadar di Goonj, No. 1, pp. 4, 16, 19. 20.82 Khushwant Singh, ‘Mewa Singh Shahid", The Sikh Review. Aug. 1964, pp. 5-6.83 'Kamla Akali', op. cit., pp. 36, 180-81.

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such as Zaildar Gandha Singh, Sardar Kapur Singh and Ichhra Singh were actually killed by desperate and angry Ghadarites after the collapse of the stipulated revolution.84

With the break up of the Ghadar apparatus after 19 February, a revolution or rebellion became to remote a possibility. Some of the zealous ones, however, continued to work for whatever action appeared still possible. One of the relatively more signi­ficant among such actions was a stipulated coup in the princely State of Mandi Suket, with the support of some ambitious local people. The objective, as revealed in the evidence in a special trial, was to murder the British resident, capture the magazine and power and, then attempt a Ghadar in the Punjab. The arrest of Nidhan Singh, who was the brain behind it, meant the abortion of that project even before any concrete preparation was started.85

By the middle of the year 1915 practically all the prominent Ghadar activists had fallen in the British hands. In a series of conspiracy trials that followed, 291 accused were tried ; 42 of them were sentenced to death, 114 transported for life and 93 awarded varying terms of imprisonment.86 The sacrifices made were tremendous and the courage and heroism of a quality from which legends are created. On the other hand, the Punjab earned, ironically, great reputation for loyal and courageous service to the Empire. Michael O'Dwyer, the Lie­utenant Governor of Punjab, thankfully acknowledged that ‘great credit’ for collapse of the Ghadar movement was ‘due to the members of the Sikhs Committees’ which were constituted by Chief Khalsa Diwan and village notables. He was more than satisfied with the large scale recruitment from the Punjab and observed that ‘The rush to the colours in Sikh districts was extraordinary’. With Gurdwaras controlled by the government appointed Mahants and with a pampered landed aristocracy and Zaildars and Sufaidposhes at their service, the British rulers identified the Sikh community as the chief support of the raj. It

84 Statement of Puran Singh, Supplementary L.C.C. Home Political A, Proceedings, May 1916, Nos. 219-221, p, 87. See also O’ Dwyer, op. cit. p, 205.

85 See 'Mandi Plot' in Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B, P roceed ­ings, May 1917, Nos. 342-43, pp. 57-60.

86 See Isemonger and Slattery. An Account o f the Ghadar Conspiracy, Appendix.

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was so managed that during the four years of the War, with a population of two and a half million, i.e. less than 1 percent of British India’s total, more than one eighth of all fresh recruits were supplied from among the people of that community alone. The province of Punjab was top on the list, furnishing 3,50,000 i.e. nearly half of the total number of fresh recruits in the country,S7 Soon after the end of the War, when the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh sent shock waves and aroused anti-British fury throughout India, the Diwan and the Sarbrah chose to honour General Dyer with a saropa at the Golden Temple.87 88 The revo­lutionary spirit of the Ghadarites was glaring in the incongruous context in which they worked to overthrow the British rule.

Wartime Activities Outside India

Whereas the strategy and course of action to be pursued by Ghadarites proceeding to India were subjects of discussion at the beginning of the War, no serious thinking was done on the plans or roles of those leaders who had decided to stay behind. It was thought that they would arrange to send arms with the help of Germany to their comrades • in India and would preach among Indian immigrants in other lands. In fact these leaders could not establish contact with their comrades who had been sent to India. As for securing German support for the Indian cause, it was the Indian Independence Committee in Berlin which came in the forefront, not the Ghadar leadership.

Shortly after the departure of the early batches of Ghadarites for India, all the remaining prominent leaders left for other areas of activity leaving Ram Chandra as the sole incharge of the Ghadar headquarter at San Francisco. Barkat- ullah joined the Berlin Committee and was no more obliged to act under directions of the Ghadar leader. Bhagwan Singh left for Manila and Hong Kong and Santokh Singh for work in Southeast Asia, particularly in Siam (Thailand). Harnam Singh Sahri and Sohan Lai Pathak had left earlier for work in Siam and Burma. One of their major activities related to preaching among Indian troops to revolt against the British authorities.

87 O 'Dwyer, op. cit., p. 207 and William Roy Smith, Nationalism and R eform in India (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1938). p. 74.

88 Ian Colvin, Life o f G en era l D yer (London : Blackwood, 1931), p. 201.

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Considerable disaffection prevailed at that time in three different regiments stationed at Singapore. The British government had taken effective steps to check the restiveness in the Malay State Guides in December 1914.89 The mutiny on 15 February 1915 in the Fifth Light Infantry stationed at Singapore, an all Muslim unit, was generally attributed to the propaganda conducted by the Ghadarites and Pan Islamist Turkish emissaries. It was soon quelled, but only after several casualties including eight British officials. A detachment of 36th Punjabi Regiment was also reported to have mutineed. Punjab Police officials believed that the mutiny would have been impossible, ‘without the incitement and misrepresentation of the Ghadar party1.90 91

It has not been possible to find any authentic evidence of Ghadar connection with that mutiny but it was indicative of how favourable the circumstances were for arousing those discon* tented soldiers, who saw ahead of them a prospect of being killed fighting the Germans. Conversely, the circumstances of its failure pointed to the near absence of any political leadership to direct the released energy into planned channels for the achievement of their goal. The revolt failed, as Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn wrote later, 'mainly because the mutineers had no goal, no plan and no revolutionary guidance.*1

The Ghadar activities outside India during the war period were related mostly to such enterprises as were authorised, financed, and directed by German officials, directly or through the Berlin Committee. That indeed compromised the position of the Ghadar party.

Practically all the members of the Berlin Committee were educated young Indians of petit bourgeois class. The Committee offered to serve the German war interests, in the hope of securing arms aid for a revolution in India—a partnership for mutual benefit—as the Indians thought.

Har Dayal, who remained an active member of that committee, albeit for a short period, was very critical of its

89 Sedition Comm ittee Report, p. 170.90 Isemonger and Slattery, op. cit.. p. 132; Sedition Committee Report,

loo• cit.91 Lieutenant General Sir George MacMunn, Turmoil and Tragedy in India,

1914 and Altar (London : Jarrold's. 1935), pp. 113-114.

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manner of functioning and more so of the comfort and luxury which most of its members enjoyed in the name of patriotism. •Their whole life is a hot house growth’,92 he remarked.

Securing the collaboration of Ghadar party in the USA figured prominently in the designs of the German Foreign Ministry and the Berlin Committee. That was necessary for creating troubles for John Bull. A relationship of co-operation was established through the German Consulate in California. Later a liason officer of the Berlin Committee stationed in New York established contact. But the German relationship with Ghadar establishment, as between a cavalier patron and a grudging client, was far from happy.

The Germans, evidently, had their own priorities in the game, Franz Von Papen of the German embassy in Washing­ton wrote about the German motives in his Memoirs :

We did not go so far as to suppose that there was any hope of India achieving her independence through our assistance, but if there was any chance of fomenting local disorders, we felt it might limit the number of Indian troops who could be sent to France and other theatres of war.93

There was a somewhat natural conflict between the strategic and ideological goals of the Germans and Indians. That was more clearly reflected in an open clash between Har Dayal and Oppenheim. Horst Krueger described it as 'a clash between nationalism and imperialism’.9* Emily Brown observed that 'Even in those instances when the Germans made good their promises to supply direct aid to the Indians, they were working at cross purposes with respect to the revolutionaries’ 95 So, it appeared, were the groups of Indian revolutionaries working at odds among themselves,

92 'There were all kinds of people in that association, wrote Har Dayal; 'sincere but misguided patriots, unprincipled adventurers, self-indulgent parasites, scheming notoriety hunters, simple-minded students and some victims of circum stances.... Their whole life is a hothouse growth Nothing great or noble can come out of this effete class. . . . ihey will always be indolent, vain, egoistic and incompetent'. Har Dayal, Forty Four Months in Germany and Turkey, pp. 70-71. See also Jawaharlal Nehru, Autobiography, p. 152.

93 Franz Von Papen, Memoirs, trans. Brian Connell, (London : Andre Deutsch, 1952). p.

94 Horst Krueger, ‘Har Dayal in Germany', The Patriot, 12 January 1964.95 Brown, Har Dayal p. 187.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 171

in the absence of any co-ordinated plan for achievement of their immediate and long-term aims.

Different projects were launched according to priorities of German war strategy. A number of Indians joined these enter­prises and worked at different centres like Batavia, Siam, Constantinople, Baghdad and Kabul. Among them were emissaries of the Berlin Committee, the Ghadarites, and some other enthusiastic Indians. But alongside them were Turkish nationals, Pan-Islamists of a number of countries, German consuls, paid agents of Germany and also of course, the British secret service agents. Perhaps none of the activists had more than vague and perfunctory idea of the plans. As Emily Brown put it, 'it was soon to become apparent that no one really knew what anybody else was doing, nor when, nor why . . . except perhaps the British, whose spies were effectively acting all over the world’.9* There was no particular project which was clearly undertaken on the specific priorities of the Ghadar leadership. The accounts of Raja Mahendra Pratap. P.S. Khankhoje and Bhupendra Nath Dutt, leading Indians in the projects in West Asia, hardly made any reference to significant participation by the Ghadar party.

The secret shipment of arms to India through S.S. M averick appeared to have aroused the interest of the Ghadar leader Ram Chandra. He sent bundles of Ghadar literature and five men on the ship. But all the evidence indicated that it was predicated on priorities laid down by the Berlin Committee which were apparently different from those of the Ghadar men. This was perhaps the only project in which that committee appeared to have been the most interested from the early days of its relationship with the German government.

Apart from the favourite programme of printing propaganda literature and preaching mutiny to Indian soldiers, one project in which the participation of Ghadarites was more clearly evident was that of Siam. It was aimed at, as we have seen, collecting in Siam several thousand Indians to be given military training and supplied with weapons for the purpose of armed infiltration into India. A.C. Bose considered Bangkok to be a Ghadarite centre, in direct touch with the headquarters in California, which 'remained the advance base of the planned

86 Brown, Har Dayal, p. 187.

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Ghadar attack on India’.97 At least some of the inspired Ghadarites seemed to have believed that. In reality, as the private diary and statement of Jodh Singh, account of Darisi Chenchiah and other evidence available in the Hindu-German Conspiracy case revealed, the Ghadarites hardly had any substantive role in planning or decision making. It was all an utopian scheme of a few Germans which appeared to fit into the German government's designs and calculations in the war. They naturally wanted to take advantage of the disaffection among troops in the East, but were not interested in opening a battle front on that side.

Jodh Singh was sent from Berlin with instructions for H.L. Gupta, the Berlin Committee's representative in USA and for the Ghadar leader Ram Chandra. His statement to the police indicated that perhaps he was the one who sold the idea to the Germans that ten thousand Indians could be collected in Siam for the purpose of attack on India.98 The scheme was prepared between the German Consul at Chicago, H.L. Gupta, some German associates including Boehm, Wehde and Sterneck and Jodh Singh. Ram Chandra was asked to send Jodh Singh to Siam. Ram Chandra followed the instructions and also gave to Jodh Singh a coded letter for Bhagwan Singh and another for the German Consul at Manila. The two other persons sent alongwith him were Darisi Chenchiah and Sukumar Chatterjee who was recommended by Gupta. Chenchiah wrote later that he was suddenly called from the Utah State Agricul­tural College at Logan and was asked to accompany Jodh Singh, alias Hasan Zade. The latter was to be the leader of the group, as Chandra told him. 'I studied my companion', stated Chenchiah, and 'to my utter surprise I found him to be an ignorant and timid person devoid of any training for the very responsible work entrusted to him'.99 Among other Ghadarites who reached there were Santokh Singh, Thakur Singh, Shiv Dayal Kapur from Shanghai and Balwant Singh, former head priest of Gurdwara at Vancouver whose legendary heroism, little known to his compatriots in Punjab, has been high­lighted by Chenchiah. Apparently none of these schemers

97 Bose, Indian Revolutionaries Abroad, p. 134.98 Ker, Political Trouble in India, p. 270.99 Chenchiah, op. cit., part IV, p. 18.

s t r a t e g y a n d p e r f o r m a n c e 173

knew how exactly were they to conduct the ambitious programme. Even among themselves they shared little about the scheme.

Bhagwan Singh hardly stayed in Siam. He appeared to have other preoccupations. M.N. Roy who travelled with Bhagwan Sihgh around that time tells that Singh had picked up ‘many vulgarities of the American He-man without losing any of the objectionable native characteristics’. A lusty eater, who drank beer by the gallons, Singh was found by Roy to be very enthusiastic about nocturnal pleasures of geisha quarters in Japan.100 J.C. Ker, Personal Assistant to the Director of Criminal Intelligence in India recorded that 'Bhagwan Singh, whom Ram Chandra Peshawri fondly imagined to be managing the affairs in Siam, never got nearer the centre than Manila’.101

A European employed by the German Secret Service and arrested at Singapore deposed that Chenchiah and Sukumar Chatterjee were supposed to play an important role to ‘do the preliminaries and recommend places and forests where all these operations are to be carried on’.10* Chenchiah, writing forty years later, complained on the other hand, that on reaching Bangkok, they, in the absence of any directions, did not know what to do. Jodh Singh told the Special Tribunal, Lahore : 'I got tired of waiting’. Nor did Santokh Singh know; he said he 'would find out from the German Consul'.103 104 On the 14th day of his arrival in Bangkok, Jodh Singh was arrested, and according to Chenchiah, he blurted out under the influence of drink, to a British secret agent, all what he knew of the scheme.101

The cargo of arms meant for Siam never reached there; nor did Boehm who was supposed to train the Indians and who was later arrested at Singapore on 27 September. Nor were there many Indians to be trained, as Jodh Singh discovered, to his dismay.105 Boehm complained that the Indians he met in that

100 Roy. op. cit., pp. 15, 17. See also, Home Political A, Proceedings, August 1914, Nos. 7-16.

101 Ker, op. cit., p. 269.102 Ibid., p .260.103 Evidence, Second Supplementary L.C.C., Home Political B, Proceedings,

May 1917. Nos. 342-343, p. 304. See also statement of Jodh Singh given to Brig. Gen. Dudley Ridout. Commanding officer of Troops, Straits Settlements, Exhibit A, statements of witnesses, R ecord o f Trial, Group 118.

104 Chenchiah, op. cit., IV. p. 19.105 Ker. op. cit , p. 270.

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connection had'childish ideas'. The scheme failed because it was 'bad ab initio, as it was based on incorrect intelligence and because many of the leading Indian figures and German agents were arrested by the Siamese police early in August 1915.' Starrhunt, an important German agent and Boehm made confessions and disclosed to the British all their schemes. One key-man Vincent Kraft handed over even the key to the reading of German code language of communication with them.10*

Sukumar Chatterjee, who had gone there with Chenchiah and Jodh Singh, summed up after the California trial that 'Ignorant people by the score have been sent to Siam and India to take part in a revolution that never existed, that was an impossible proposition’.106 107 It appeared from the evidence available that Ghadar leaders in California or Siam were labouring under fond hopes, thinking big of their epoch- making roles. The German consuls at Shanghai, Manila and Bangkok controlled the purse-strings as also the direction of the imaginary scheme, treating Indians as well-provided errand boys. Among the men employed by the Germans, there were some who were there on their own admission, 'to knock money out of the Germans'.108 109 The Ghadarites were generally more dedicated of the lot. Chenchiah paid an exceptional tribute to the dedication and uprightness of Balwant Singh, but as it happened, they mattered little in the formulation of plans and their execution.

Count Bernstroff, the German ambassador to the United States characterised the efforts of Indians to bring about a revolt in India with the help of German arms as an ‘absolute wild goose chase’, which of course came to nothing.100 M.N. Roy

106 Ibid., pp. 269-70. See also Bose, op. cif., p. 230.107 Cited in Giles T. Brown, op, cit., pp. 98-99.108 Deus Dekker, an Indonesion nationalist, who was detailed in this project

and given important responsibilities, said frankly ‘I was in it to knock money out of Ihe Germans . , . and I decided to make them pay'.Sukumar Chatterjee encountered C.K. Chakrabarty, the chief representative of the Berlin Committee in USA :

'My mission was the same as yours.''What was that' ? asked Chakrabarty.'Grafting money from the innocent people', replied Sukumar Chatterjee.

Cited in Giles T. Brown, op. cit., pp. 19-20.109 Ibid., p.99, n. 79; See also Emil^ Brown, Har D ayal, p, 204.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 175

who was sent to Batavia for making arrangements for .the delivery of arms to revolutionaries in Bengal, described it as a ■Hoax . . . a veritable swindle', and believed that Indians had been 'dupes of German intrigues’.110

By the end of 1916, all the adumberated schemes had come to naught. That was followed, as we have seen, by intriguing between factions, the conspiracy trial murder of Ram Chandra by a compatriot and what was worse, the exposure of ugly motives of some of those who participated in German schemes.

It was evident from the above review that serious thinking on a strategy of struggle against a powerful and well organised adversary had not appeared to be a priority to the Ghadar leadership. Initially the ideological pronouncements relating to strategy showed a preference for an armed struggle by the masses, with the assistance of patriotic elements in the British government’s armed forces in India. Though it was stated that first of all a party needed to be formed, Har Dayal and others were not clear whether the struggle was necessarily required to be an organised one. It could as well be a spontaneous uprising, he and others thought. Alongside the idea of a populist struggle, such notions of strategy of action were also propagated as appeared to aim at a coup d' etat or merely terrorist squad actions. All these variants were fused together in the thinking of the leaders. A few of the middle class revolutionary intellectuals appeared to have a preference for conspiratorial action and a secret underground organisation for a coup. But the larger mass of adherents who came from the peasant stock as also their leading men—the 'organic’ leaders—thought mainly in terms of open heroic combat with the white rulers.

When the decision was taken at the beginning of the Great War to launch the armed struggle immediately, the goal did not seem to be to necessarily achieve success in the overthrow of the British rule and to establish a new social order, but to take advantage of the enemy’s trouble and to do as much harm to cripple its strength as possible. In the then dominant

110 Roy, op. cit., pp. 4 and 90. The Sedition Committee summed up: 'Our examination of the German Arms Schemes suggests that the revolutionaries concerned were far too sanguine and that the Germans with whom they got in touch were very ignorant of the movement of which they attempted to take advantage’, Report, p. 125.

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orientation regarding strategy of action, the major focus was on persuading Indian soldiers not to fight for the British in the war of vested imperial interests but to join the revolutionary patriots instead, in the latter’s violent assault on the foreign rulers. The Ghadarites carried in their minds a variety of methods of struggle but the ruling idea was to do whatever seemed possible according to the circumstances in India, the circumstances of which they had little knowledge. Practically unarmed hordes of these patriots embarked on waging an armed revolutionary struggle; many of them were very exultant during their journey to India and felt, ‘as if we were going to invade India’.

Oblivious, both of the British Government's strategy and strength on the one hand and the widespread indifference of the masses to revolutionary nationalist ideas on the other, the Ghadarites were hardly aware of the need to formulate any programme of alternative maneouvres. Deep ideological commitment to a here-and-now recourse to action and pre- organisational character of the movement made a fresh formu­lation of strategy of action all the more difficult. As a result, small groups considered impromptu squad actions, which fitted well into the tradition of peasant protest, as equivalent of launching a widespread revolution. Given that frame of mind, the only major handicap, the early squads visualised, was the dearth of weapons. But for that, the group of Gujjar Singh Bhakna might have launched an attack on 15 November 1914, without even waiting for the arrival of more Ghadarites. Quite a few early dates of rising fixed by different squads, with little of coordination, were linked to expected 'availability of arms’.

Once it was made clear that arms could be acquired only from arsenals of Indian army regiments, all the hopes of leading Ghadarties were centred on initiative by disaffected troops. It did not occur to many that such troops in command might act arbitrarily. When the hope was thwarted and most of the leading activists were rounded up, the remaining elements in their desperation believed that punishing of the informers or toadies must be given top priority. That world view of the colonised and oppressed peasant, who saw no other way of overcoming his loss of his world, and recovery of his dignity, also supplied the rationale for the emergence of Babbar Akali movement in the early twenties.

STRATEGY AND PERFORMANCE 177

In the absence of arrangements for a rationally considered strategy of action, predominant emphasis remained naturally focussed on individual valour, heroism and sacrificing spirit. More than that, it fostered a particular quality of mind in which brave expressions and courage of desperation appeared as the major mark of the Ghadar movement’s potential for revolution­ary change. The leading Ghadarites, even in their later day recollections of the movemem, tended to believe that the primary cause of the failure of that movement was the spy who leaked out their plans to the police. In a world view where the ruling categories are heroes and martyrs and toadies and spies, transitional ideas of rational strategy and organisation introduced by middle class intellectuals get more easily blurred and lost.

CONCLUSION 6

The Ghadar movement was significant for a num ber of tendencies which anticipated later developments in the evolution of Indian nationalism and, for setting in motion, a process of political socialisation which transformed the Punjabi immigrants who joined it. The notable courage and optimism of will with which the Ghada rites turned to change the course of India’s history and the failure of the movement, accom panied by such heavy sacrifices as appear tragic in retrospect, point towards some marked contradictions. A review of these contradictions may b e of value to the students of the theory and practice of revolutionary change.

Viewed in the context of the evolution of Indian nationalism, this movement was remarkable in generating among its adherents a consciousness and conviction that the Indian interests and the British imperial interests were irreconcilable. The argument based mainly on the ‘drain theory’, so ably presented by M.G. Ranade and Dadabhai Naoroji, acquired a deeper meaning because of the emigrants’ intimate experien­ces and subjective feelings of backwardness and oppression in a foreign environment. The movement created a dim awareness of the character of imperialism. Not reforms but a 'surgical operation’ was required and the struggle could only b e a violent one. Its objective of complete political freedom was to become an authentic goal of Indian national struggle several years later.

There was an anticipation of Gandhian emphasis in the movement’s underlying belief that the secret of the British power in India lay in the support given to it by the Indian

CONCLUSION 179

people, particularly the Indian soldiers of the British army. Complete freedom was therefore a realisable goal if that support was withdrawn. That required political education and mobilisation of premobilised masses. Development of an Indian national identity by transcending the diverse identities based on religion and region appeared to be a necessary predi­cate of the struggle. Its point of demarcation from the Gandhian movement lay in the advocacy of a violent struggle by the masses instead of a non-violent non-cooperation. The roots of a different strategy associated with the INA's struggle during the Second World War may also be traceable to a most promi­nent emphasis laid by the Ghadarites on winning over the Indian soldiers for an armed struggle. A revolt within the army, it was believed, would divest the enemy of its main weapon of enforcing its control over the people.

An awareness of a world-wide anti-imperialist struggle was also an important element. The Ghadarites were inspired by the revolutionary movements in Russia, China, Mexico, Ireland, Egypt, etc, and developed a sense of affinity with the revolution­aries of those countries who were often described as fellow Ghadarites.

In its emphasis on the primacy of national political interests and its unequivocal condemnation of the existing religio- spiritual pre-occupations and matters of separate communal divisions as dangerous obscurantism, the Ghadar movement manifested tendencies to squarely confront the ideas propagated by the vested interests in the Punjab. Its secularism was remark­able both in the prevailing context of the prominence of religio- spiritual basis of nationalism advocated by leaders such as Aurobindo Ghose and the peculiar variety of secularism of the Gandhian movement of later years.

It may be appropriate, however, to caution ourselves against excessive claims. Some qualifications are necessary and contradictions must be noted. The near absence of a serious thinking on the shape of the alternative social and political order made it difficult and more or less irrelevant for the Ghadar leaders to make a critical analysis of the existing social formations. The references made to the goal of establishing in India a democratic republic like that of USA was accompanied by notions of restoration of benevolent rule by native Princes.

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Given the failure in clarifying the objective, the removal of the British rule became the id ee fixe and made it difficult and less relevant to work out the strategy of action and the nature of organisation.

The idea of an armed revolutionary struggle by the masses was not entirely novel. It had an important place in the serious thinking of the revolutionaries who sought inspiration, particularly under the influence of V.D. Savarkar, from the memories of the uprising of 1857. However, in the absence of the effort for the difficult task of political education, the mobilisation of masses was sought to be achieved through terroristic actions. 'Without blood, O' Patriots ! will the country awake ?’ That dominant belief indicated the preferred course of action of the revolution­aries of that age. On the use of religion and spirituality in nationalist struggle too, the germs of a secular orientation were evident both among the early-day stalwarts in the Congress and a prominent section of the revolutionaries who invoked the martyrs of 1857. ‘Whisper then unto us by what magic you caught the secret of the union’. Even among Hindu Mahasabha leaders the such as Savarkar and Parmanand the consciously anti­imperialist thinking of that period appeared to emphasise more on unity. But the revolutionaries could not substantively over­come the divergent orientation stamped on their minds by tradition and by influences such as those of Bankim Chandra’s AnandMath. The belief that native Indian Princes were the bastions of national honour and thus constituted a strong potential base of strength for the anti-imperialist struggle, indicated the problems of their notions of alternative social order.

The Ghadar movement was influenced by these cross currents; the contradictions were never completely resolved. Since it was organised in USA, the leaders of this movement had the rare advantage of carrying on political propaganda more or less freely. They succeeded in setting a pace of mobilisation of the masses which the revolutionaries in India could not dream of. Distance from the objective political situation within the country, however, also facilitated the nursing of illusions about the readiness of the Indian people to plunge into the stipulated armed revolutionary struggle against the British. The contradi­ction between subjective desires and the objectives conditions

CONCLUSION 181

became rudely manifest at the time of action. That brought to the surface the contradiction contained in the loose thinking on strategy and methods of struggle. The idea of mass struggle gave way to that of a coup d ‘ etat initiated by patriotic troops or that of terrorist squad action.

Nevertheless, the movement was remarkable as a force for such political socialisation as considerably altered the world­view and self-image of the uneducated peasant immigrants. The new process of learning marked the end of an earlier innocence and they started raising questions which men of their class had hardly ever raised earlier. Their own oppressions and the poverty and backwardness of the country was not any more a matter of cruel destiny. They started looking beyond the deceptive appearances to the so far hidden reasons and forces. Awareness of the need for understanding of political and economic conditions and also the need of acting politically emerged as a notable development in their ideas and beliefs. Such men of their community who worried about matters of religious purity and separate identity appeared fools and knaves. Liberation of the country became a necessary condition for an individual’s liberation from his feelings of alienation. An onslaught on the British, therefore, appeared to them to be both a national imperative and a subjective necessity. The effusive expression of valour and collective spirit became the root of an unbelievable courage. It is no wonder that on the return of Ghadarites to their land, the Punjabis in the Punjab were left wondering and cold. The vested interests among the latter made, on the other hand, an all out bid through religious injunctions and alluded community efforts for eliminating the ■menace of the Ghadarites’. That was considered essential to vindicate the arrogated glorious traditions of the Sikh community for loyalty to the empire as also for the apparently primary concerns for religious revitalisation. The present day fondness of such sections to claim the sacrifices of the Ghadarites as an evidence of their contribution to the struggle for India's independence appears in retrospect, ironical.

Our study of this movement also points to issues of relevance to the theory and practice of revolution. The contradictions between the captivating appeal of ideology manifesting a romance of revolution on the one hand, and the

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priorities of building an organisation and formulation of a strategy on the other; the divergence of orientation among middle class intellectuals and the masses who came from the peasant stock; the competitive pressures of subjective desires and the given objective conditions were well known problems of a mass revolutionary movement. The strength of the ideological appeal in the Ghadar movement was underlined in its mediation of the existing conditions of oppression into an irreconcilable hatred against the British rule. The uncompromising passion for the end of the hated rule and readiness for all kinds of sacrifices released an energy which appeared to the actors as a material revolutionary force in itself. The positive role of such a romance—the passions, hatreds and optimism of will—was axiomatic. It was not only a stimulus for action but also the root of an emancipatory interest in the pursuit of scientific study and analysis of existing reality as also of logical organisation of thought and action. That was a necessary predicate for the organisation of masses for changing their history and for the strategy of action in the context of the given circumstances: What the Ghadar movement pointed to was, that in the absence of a systematic analysis of the existing social formations and a more or less coherent framework of an alternative order, th4 romance of revolution may look for whatever action is possible. Attending to the needs of building a revolutionary organisation and formulation of strategy appeared to the inspired rebels as a deviation.

Individual terrorism, or coup d ‘ etat, in preference to a mass revolutionary struggle was a product of such a situation. The inevitable disillusionment among the Ghadarites in India that despite widespread dissatisfaction of the masses there was a marked absence of revolutionary consciousness and readiness to plunge into action was related to the failure to make critical analysis of the existing social formations, The romance of individual heroism and sacrifice and liquidation of 'toadies’ and ■spies', became in that situation a surrogate for mass struggle. The situation in which, as Azad observed about the Ghadar moment; 'our passions were our leaders’, pointed to the failure of leadership in the performance of its tasks,

The theory of revolution could not ignore, as Gramsci argued, the positive role of spontaneity of masses. Spontaneity was a

CONCLUSION 183

vindication of the popular character of the movement; that it was not an ‘arbitrary’ or a 'cooked up venture’. The premium that the Ghadar leadership put on the spontaneous character of the movement served as ‘a stimulus, a tonic, an element of unity in depth’, but it also pointed to simultaneous failure in providing to it a conscious revolutionary direction. Gramsci’s point that voluntary action and passivity of masses often went hand in hand was extremely important. Individual heroism appeared life size when the masses are inert.

Leadership, as this movement indicated, could not be conceived in 'abstract' terms; it was to be related to concrete historical situations and concrete men with their given structure of beliefs and notions. Similarly, the movement also indicated that organisation of a mass revolutionary movement could not be viewed in terms of purely structural arrangement of authority and roles. It may be legitimately conceived as an organic unity of individuals bound by commitment to shared goals and loyalty to symbols of solidarity and to one another. Ideology may play a significant role in creating such conditions. But alongwith the force of the collective will it required what Lenin described as an effort 'from without' i.e. by the intellectual leadership.

Closely linked with these was the question of strategy. Taking strategy in its military connotation tantamounts to an in­appropriate application of a priori abstract principles to concrete situations. However, leaving things to the ruling passion of actors for doing whatever was possible according to circum­stances was not a substitute for strategy. When men decided to make their own history they could not choose their own circumstances, as Marx emphasised, and thus the need to bend circumstances to the advantage of revolutionaries required a serious deliberation on strategy and organisation. In the absence of strategy and organisation the emphasis in the Ghadar movement centred on getting ready for sacrifices and heroism : •come let’s become martyrs’, or 'either kill the whites or be killed’. That kind of development manifested the blurring and distortion of the primary aims and objectives. The students of revolutionary violence may have significant lessons to draw from the study of this movement.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

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187

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Home Department, Political A, P roceed in g s , February 1916, No. 395 : History Sheet of Jatinder Nath Lahiri.

Home Department, Political A, P roceed in g s, April 1916, No. 471 : Evidence and Judgement in Benares Conspiracy Case.

Home Department, Political A, P roceed in g s , May 1916, Nos. 219-221 : Evidence and Judgement, Supple­mentary Lahore Conspiracy Case.

Home Department, Political B, P roceed in g s , May 1916, Nos. 577-580: Reports of controversy and factional struggle relating to the role of Ram Chandra Peshawri.

Home Department, Political B, P roceed in g s , July 1916, Nos. 441-445 : D.C.I.'s weekly reports, includes further information on Ghadar activity, Mrs. Leon- hauser’s letter to Har Dayal on Ghadar establishment.

Home Department, Political A, P ro c eed in g s , Septem ber 1916, Nos. 403-410 : Evidence and Judgem ent in Mandlay Conspiracy Case.

189

Home Department, Political B, Proceedings, February 1917, Nos. 397-400 : Report on Raja Mahendra Partap’s mission and its activities in Kabul.

Home Department, Political B, Proceedings, February1917, Nos. 552-555 : conflict between Khalsa Diwan Society Vancouver and Ghadar Party.

Home Department, Political B, Proceedings, May 1917, Nos. 342-43 : Evidence and Judgement in Second Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case.

Home Department, Political A, Proceedings, September1918, Nos. 55-57 : Third Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case, King Emperor vs. Mathura Singh ; Fourth Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy Case ; Crown vs. Jawand Singh.

Home Department, Political B, Proceedings, October 1918, Nos. 191-194, D.C.I.’s weekly reports which include secret information on Ghadar-German pro­paganda activities in USA, Siam, and Burma.

Home Department, Political, File No. 45/17, 1933 & K.W. : Memorandum on the History of Terrorism in Bengal 1905-1933.

Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration A, Proceedings, May 1909, No. 13: Secretary of State for India's note relating to Brig. Gen. Swayne’s (Confidential) Memorandum on Matters Affecting East Indian Community in British Columbia.

Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration B, Proceedings, June 1910, Nos, 14-15 : Memorandum by G.D. Kumar, Taraknath Das and Husain Rahim to India Office, London.

Commerce and Industry Department, Emigration A, Proceedings, December 1914, No. 4 : Report of Dady S. Burjor, Official Hindu Interpreter of the US Immigration Department, on the conditions of Indian immigrants in the United States; measures to remedy the situation.

Report on the Results o f the Census o f the Punjab 1901, Lahore : Government Printing Press, 1902.

190 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Census o f India 1911 : Part XIV.Ghadar Directory, 1934, (Photocopy available in P. C.

Joshi Archives Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi).

B. India Office Library, London

Public and Judicial Department, 6/1137/1912. History Sheet of G.D. Kumar. Confidential Note on Thakur Das; Short History of Ajit Singh. Confidential Memorandum by Brig. General E.J. Swayne on Matters Affecting East Indian Community in British Columbia; copies of F ree Hindusthan, Bande Mata- ram, Aryan, The Span o f Life.

C. Public Records Office, London

Colonial Office Records 886/1 : Correspondence on Treatment of Asiatics in the Dominions, 7 October 1897—7 January 1909; W.E. Mclnnes Report; Enclos­ures : Correspondence between Governor General of India and Secretary of State for Colonies : India Office to Colonial Office; Secretary of State to Governor General of Canada; Memorandum on Self-Governing Dominions and Coloured Immi­gration by Sir Charles Lucas, July 1908.

Colonial Office Records 886/2-6 : Further Corres­pondence On Treatment of Asiatics, February 1909—1913.

D. Federal Archives and Records Centre, San Bruno, California.

Records of Trial Group 118.File 1972 : 'Notes on the Accused’ by the US Attorney

General. Summary of Hindu Conspiracy.Box 2, Folder II ; Statement of Sunder Singh Ghalli :

Folder III; Points of dispute between Ram Chandra and Taraknath Das. Von Brinken : 'Report of My Activities in the German Consulate’.

Box 4, Folder IV ; Report of the Commission appointed by Justice W.E. Van Fleet, on the mental condition of Jodh Singh, Folder VII : Deciphered messages conveyed in different codes during the war period.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 191

Box 10, Folder I : Statements of George Paul Boehm, Harcharan Das, Shiv Dayal Kapur, C.K. Chakrabarty, Kumud Nath Mukherjee and J.B. Start Hunt. Folder IV : Statements of Jodh Singh and Benjamin Harrison Sloan. Exhibits : Diary of Jodh Singh and Diary of Bhagwan Singh.

Box 12, Folder VI : C.K. Chakrabarty’s papers taken and found at 364 West 120 Street.

Box 15, United States vs. Franz Bopp, Crowley et. al\ investigation reports. CR 6133 : United States vs. Franz Bopp, Wilhelm Von Brinken, Ram Chandra et. al ; Summary of Court cases.

II PRIVATE PAPERS

Rare Records Collection, Jalandhar.

Desh Bhagat Yadgar Library,

Bhakna, Sohan Singh. ‘Notes on the History of the Ghadar Party'. Unpublished MS in Urdu.

^/^Chenchiah, Darisi. ‘The Ghadar Party 1913-1918 : An Authentic Report', Unpublished MS.

Dard, Gyani Hira Singh. 'Suggestions and comments on the History of the Ghadar Party’. Unpublished MS in Punjabi.

Harjap Singh. ‘Men Pardes Yatra’ (recorded Gujerat Jail 1943) unpublished MS in Urdu.

Jwala Singh's reminiscences on tape.■Tundilat’, Harnam Singh. Unpublished. Account of

Ghadar Party : Answers to Questions raised by x the Secretary of the Ghrdar Party History Committee. Letter of Harnam Singh 'Tundilat' to Gurcharan Singh

Sainsara, 24 April 1960.

Recorded statements of the following Ghadarites :

Amar Singh Sandhwan, Ghadarite from Panama, later treasurer of the Desh Bhagat Yadgar Committee.

Amar Singh, Baba, (V. Kotla Naudh Singh) a close associate of Harnam Singh ‘Tundilat’. returned from

192 GHADAR MOVEMENT

vy

Bridal Veil (Oregon) in 1914; sentenced to imprison­ment in 2nd Supplementary Lahore Conspiracy case.

Bhag Singh, Baba, (V. Uppal Bhupa, tehsil Nakodar).Chet Ram, active Ghadarite in Thailand.Genda Singh, Baba (V. Dadehar); joined Malay Police,

Kuala Lumpur, turned Ghadarite.Gurmukh Singh Lalton. A passenger of the Komagata

Maru and one of the most active members of the inner circle of Ghadarites in India, later in-charge of the Desh Bhagat Yadgar at Jullundur.

Gujjar Singh Bhakna, a close associate of Sohan Singh Bhakna—leader of the Ghadar group from Shanghai.

Harnam Singh, Baba, (V. Gujjarwal), of 45 Sikh Regiment, Hongkong, a Ghadar activist and associate of Gurdit Singh of Komagata Maru.

Harnam Singh, Baba (V. Kala Singha, Kapurthala) of 26 Punjabi regiment.

Kartar Singh (V. Latala, Ludhiana), a founder member of the Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast; worker at Yugantar Ashram : close associate of Kanshi Ram.

Niranjan Singh, Baba, (V. Pandori Laddha Singh, Hoshiar-pur).

Piara Singh Langeri returned to India from Vancouver, Canada, sentenced to life imprisonment in Lahore Conspiracy Case, 1915.

Sher Singh, Baba, (V. Veinpoin).Wasakha Singh, Baba, a prominent leader in California,

Vice-President of Hindi Association.

B. Oriental Records Section, National Archives of India, New Delhi

Har Dayal Papers ; Letters of Har Dayal from Algiers to Sardarji and Mrs. Rana.

Raja Mahendra Pratap Papers,Lajpat Rai Papers : Recollections of his life and work for

an independent India while living in the United States and Japan 1914-1917. Handwritten MSS.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 193

C. Ghadar Memorial, S Wood Street, San Francisco

Gobind Behari Lai, ‘The Ghadar Movement—Its Per­sonal Reminiscences’. Unpublished MS.

D. University of California Library, Berkeley

Tape recorded interviews conducted by Mark Juergens- meyer and Jane Singh with Ghadarites—Gobind Behari Lai, Mangoo Ram, Poona Singh and Mrs. Ram Chandra.

Ill PERSONAL INTERVIEWS

Tape RecordedPrithvi Singh Azad, 10 March 1973, Lalru, District

Ambala.Dasaundha Singh, 26 January 1974, Phagwara.Harnam Singh ‘Kala Singha’, 27 January 1974, Kala

Singha, District Kapurthala.Gujjar Singh Bhakna, 20 January 1974, Bhakna, District

Amritsar.Gurcharan Singh Sainsara, 21 January 1974, Amritsar.Harbhajan Singh, 10 June 1979, Chaminda, District

Ludhiana.Gyani Dalip Singh, 10 June 1979, Phullanwal, District

Ludhiana.Makhan Singh, 24 June 1979, Stookton, California.Banta Singh, 26 June 1979, El Sobrante, California.

Notes on Interviews

Sohan Singh Bhakna, 2 October 1967, 26 November 1968, 20 December 1968, Bhakna, District Amritsar.

Gurmukh Singh ‘Lalton’, 5 November 1969, Jalandhar.Hanuwant Sahai, 26 September 1969, Delhi.

S PAPERS, TRACTS PUBLISHED BY GHADAR/HINDUSTAN GHADAR PRESS, SAN FRANCISCO.

Ghadar/Hindustan Ghadar weekly. (Urdu and Gurmukhi) 1 November 1913 - 5 September 1917.

GHADAR MOVEMENT

Ghadar di Goonj : Desh Bhagtan di Bani—No. 1 (Gurmukhi) 1914 rpt. 1931. 28 pp.

Ghadar di Goonj : Desh Bhagtan di Bani—No. 2 (Gurmukhi) rpt. 1931. 28 pp.

A Few Facts About British Rule in India. June 1915 12 pp. (begins with the question 'Why does India hate the British ?’ The answer is given in terms of economic exploitation of India, supported by quotes from British official sources and writings of liberal critics of the regime).

Ankon Ki Gawahi : Angrezi Raj Mein Parja Ke Dukh Ki Kahani. (Urdu) July 1915; 16 pp. (Evidence of Statist­ics viz. The Story of the misery of people under the English Rule).

Azadi Ki Goonj : Guldasta-e-Bhajan. Yugantar Ashram. Post Box 895, nd.. 16 pp. (Being a collection of poems in Urdu).

Bhagwan Singh, Azadi Aur Jang, 1915. 47 pp.Har Dayal. Ghulami Ka Zehar Aur Ghulam Ki Atma.

(Urdu) 1918. 16 pp. (The Poison of Slavery and the Soul of the Slave)

------------- . The Social Conquest o f the Hindu Race andthe Meaning o f Equality. 1914. 8 pp. (The first of the two essays was originally published in the Modern Review, Calcutta, September 1909, pp. 239- 248).

--------------. Ala wen Zamane De Nawen Adarsh. (Punjabi)(New Ideals of New Era) 1914. 47 pp. (Criticism of the Indian National Congress policy; argued that resolutions, petitions, craving for official honours was no solution to the problems of the people).

Mackarness, Fredrick. The Methods o f Indian Police in the Twentieth Century. 1915. 30 pp. (originally written in 1910. Ram Chandra added more inci­dents. Contained some chilling tales of the brutal methods followed by the British in extracting confessions from detenues).

Parmanand, Bhai, Tarikh-e-Hind. rpt. 1918. 383 pp.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 195

Ram Chandra. Exclusion o f Hindus from America Due to ■ British Influence. 1916. 23 pp. (Contained some

extracts from leading American newspapered con­cerning the problem of Hindu immigration including Ram Chandra’s letters to editors of newspapers on the problem).

Ram Chandra, India against Britain. 1916.President Wilson Ki Taqrir : Ek Azim-alshan Tarikhi

Dastan. (Urdu Version of the Pamphlet entitled President Wilson’s war Message to Special Session of the U.S. Congress, 4 April. 1917). San Francisco : Pacific Coast Hindustani Association, May 1918. pp. 14 (Change of the name of the publisher from the Ghadar Press is notable. The editor apparently wanted to avoid the use of ‘Ghadar’.

Roosi Ghadarion Ki Dastanein (Urdu) and Roos di Ghadar Party d e Bir te Birnian di Kahanian (Punjabi) (stories of the heroes and heroines of ‘the Ghadar party of Russia’) issued by Ram Chandra. Hindustan Ghadar San Francisco, 1917. 64 pp.

Surendra Kar. British Terror in India. 1920. (Focussed mainly on British policy following the Rowlatt Committees report; stories of forcible recruitment, air raids on civilians, Jallianwala Bagh Massacre and Hunter Commission’s ‘Questions'; purpose of the Ghadar Party as complete independences for India).

Yugantar, June, 1917. (Writings on heroes of different countries of the world and facts on British exploi­tation in various lands).

Zulam 1 Zulam ! G ore Shahi Zulam ! (Punjabi) (Tyranny ! Tyranny ! Tyranny of White Rulers) 1914. (Bitter comment on the forcible deportation of Bhagwan Singh from Canada; invited Indians to take up the sword and slay the.whites).

fh e Fetva o f the Jeh ad by Sultan Mehmed-Reshad, 29 October 1914. Printed and distributed by Hindustan Ghadar Press.

196 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Rattan Singh. A B rie f History o f the Hindustan G hadai Party. San Francisco : 1929.

V PUBLISHED OFFICIAL REPORTS

Government of Bombay. Source M aterial fo r a History o f the F reed om M ovement in India. 1885-1920, Vol, II, Bombay : Government Central Press, 1958.

Isemonger, F.C. and Slattery, J. An Account o f th e G hadar Conspiracy 1913-1915. Lahore : Superin­tendent Government Printing Press, 1919. (Intelli­gence Report by two senior Police officials of the Government of Punjab).

Ker, James Campbell. Political T rouble in India 1907- 1917. (1917) rpt. Calcutta : Editions Indian, 1973.

Petrie D. D evelopm ents in Sikh Politics 1901-1911 : A Report. (1911) rpt. Amritsar: Chief Khalsa Diwan, n.d.

Report o f the Komagata Maru Commission o f Enquiry. Calcutta : Superintendent Government Printing Press, 1914.

Sedition Committee Report 1918. (Chairman Mr. JusticeS.A.T. Rowlatt). rpt. Calcutta : New Age Publishers, 1973.

Senate Fact Finding Committee : Seventh R eport on Un- American Activities in the State o f California. Sacra­mento : California Legislature, 1953.

Williamson, H. (Director Intelligence Bureau, Govern­ment of India). A Note on Subversive M ovements and Organisations. Simla : Government of India Press, 1933.

VI UNPUBLISHED THESES

Barnett, Richard B. 'Secular vs. Communal Aspects of the Ghadar Movement 1913-18'. M.A. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1967.

Barrier, Norman Gerald. 'Punjab Politics and the Disturbances of 1907'. Ph.D. Thesis, Duke Uni­versity, 1966.

BIEiLIOGRAPHY 197

Brown, Giles Taylor. ‘The Hindu Conspiracy and the Neutrality of the United States, 1914-1917’. M.A. Thesis, University of California, Berkeley, 1941.

Lowes, G.H., 'The Sikhs of British Columbia’. M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1952.

Mayer, Adrian C. ‘A Report on the East Indian Commu­nity of British Columbia', mimeo. University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 1959.

Mohan, Kamlesh. ‘Militant Nationalism in Punjab 1919- 1935’. Ph.D. Thesis, Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1978.

Narang, Surjit Singh. 'Role of Chief Khalsa Diwan in Punjab Politics'. M. Phil Thesis. Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1980.

Prem Singh. ‘The Rise of the National-Liberation Movement in the Punjab from 1905 to 1914'. Ph.D. Thesis, The Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, 1981.

Rathore, Naeem Gul. 'Indian Nationalist Agitation in the United States : A Study of Lala Lajpat Rai and the India Home Rule League of America 1914-1920, Ph.D. Thesis, Columbia University, 1965.

Sukhwant Singh. 'Agricultural Development in the Punjab’. M.Phil. Thesis. Guru Nanak Dev University, Amritsar, 1979.

VII AUTOBIOGRAPHIES AND BIOGRAPHIES

Autobiography : Bhai Sahib Randhir Singh. Trans. & Ed. Dr. Trilochan Singh. Ludhiana : Bhai Sahib Randhir Singh Publishing House, 1971.

Bhakna, Sohan Singh. Jeew an Sangram (Punjabi).Jullundur : Yuvak Kender Parkashan, 1967.

Brown, Emily C. Har D ayal: Hindu Revolutionary and Rationalist. Tucson : University of Arizona Press, 1975.

Chenchiah, Darisi. Nenu Na Desam (Telugu). Vijaywada; Adarsh Grandha Mandali, 1952.

198 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Colvin, Ian. Life o f General Dyer. London : Blackwood and Sons, 1931.

‘Dard’, Giani Hira Singh, Jeevan Desh Bhagat Baba Harnam Singh Ji Tundilat (Punjabi). Jullundur : Giani Hira Singh 'Dard', 1962.

Dard, Hira Singh, Jeevan Charittar Baba Gurdit Singh Ji (Punjabi). Lahore : Akali Agency, n.d.

Dharmavira. Lala Har Dayal and Revolutionary Move­ment o f His Time. New D elhi: Indian Book Co., 1970.

Dharmavira (ed.) Letters o f Lala Har Dayal. Ambala Cantonement: Indian Book Agency, 1970.

Dukhi, ‘Bibi’ Balraj. Dukhi Jeeven (Punjabi). Jullundur : Hamdard Printing Press, n.d. (A biographical sketch of Munsha Singh Dukhi)

Hardinge, Lord, of Penhurst. My Indian Years : 1910- 1916. London : J. Murray, 1948.

Jas, Jaswant Singh. Baba Wasakha Singh : Jeevani (Punjabi). Jullundur : New Book Campany, 1979.

Jordan, J.T.F. Swami Shraddhanand : His Life and Causes. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981.

Josh, Sohan Singh. Baba Sohan Singh Bhakna : Life o f the Founder o f the Ghadar Party. New D elhi: People's Publishing House, 1970.

Joshi, V.G. Lajpat Rai—Autobiographical Writings.Delhi : University Publishers, 1965.

O' Dwyer, Sir Michael Francis : India As 1 Knew It: 1885-1925. London : Constable & Co., 1925.

Minto, Mary, Countess of India. India, Morley and Minto 1905-1910. London : Macmillan, 1934.

Morley, John Viscount. Recollections. London: Macmillan, 1918.

Nehru, Jawaharlal. An Autobiography. London : The Bodley Head, 1936.

Papen, Franz Von. Memoirs. Trans. Brian Connell. London : Andre Deutsch, 1952.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 199

Parmanand, Bhai. The Story o f My Life, Trans. N. Sundera Iyer and Lai Chand Dhawan. Lahore : The Central Hindu Yuvak Sabha, 1934.

Pratap, Mahendra. My Life Story o f Fifty Years. Delhi, 1947.

Pritam Singh. Shamma Jaldi G ayee (Punjabi). Ludhiana : Lahore Book Shop, 1972.

Prithvi Singh (Azad). Kranti Path Ka Pathik (Hindi).Chandigarh : Pragya Prakashan, 1964.

Roy, M.N. Memoirs. Bombay : Allied Publishers, 1964. Sahota, Dharam Singh (ed.) Dhudike d e Ghadari Babe

(Punjabi). Dhudike : Lajpat Rai Study Forum, 1972. Sanyal, Shachindranath. Bandi Jeew an (Hindi). Delhi :

Atma Ram & Sons, 1963.Suri, V.S. A B rief Biographical Sketch ofSohan LalPathak.

Patiala : Punjabi University, 1968.Teja Singh. Jiwan Katha Gurmukh Piyare Sant Attar Singh

Ji Maharaj (Punjabi). Patiala: Languages Department, Government of Punjab 1970.

Yajnik, Indulal Kanaiyalal. Shyamji Krishnavarma : Life and Times o f an Indian Revolutionary. Bombay : Lakshmi Publications, 1950.

VIII BOOKS

Baden-Powell, B.H. The Indian Village Community. (1896), rpt. Delhi : Cosmo Publications, 1972.

Banerjee, Himadri. Agrarian Society o f the Punjab : 1849-1901. New Delhi : Manohar Publications, 1982.

Bannerjee, Kalyan Kumar. Indian Freedom M ovement: Revolutionaries in America. Calcutta : Jijanasa, 1966.

Barrier, Norman G. The Punjab Alienation o f Land Bill 1900. Duke University, Monograph No. 2, 1966.

Barrier, N. Gerald. The Sikhs and Their Literature. Delhi : Manohar Book Service, 1970.

Bernhardi, General Friedrich Adam Julius Von. Germany and the Nex War. New York • G.H. Doran Company, 1914.

200 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Bhagwan Singh, Communist M ovement in Punjab, 1926-47. New Delhi : Anupama Publications, 1979.

Bhattacharya, Abinash. E u rope Bharatiya B ip laberSadhana (Bengali). Calcutta : 1958.

Bipan Chandra, Nationalism an d Colonialism in M odern India. Delhi : Orient Longman, 1979.

Bose, Arun Coomer. Indian R evolutionaries A b r o a d : 1905-1922. Patna : Bharati Bhawan, 1971.

Calvert H. The Wealth an d W elfare o f the Punjab. Lahore : Civil and Military Gazette Press, 1922.

Carr, E. H. Studies in Revolution. London : Macmillan, 1950.

Chirol, Sir Valentine. Indian Unrest. London : Macmillan, 1910.

Cotton, Sir Henry. India and Home M em ories. London :T. Fisher Unwin, 1911.

Darling, Sir Malcolm Lyall. The Punjab Peasant in P rosp ­erity and Debt. (1925), rpt. London : Oxford Uni­versity Press, 1947.

---------. W isdom an d W aste in Punjab V illage. London :Oxford University Press, 1934.

Das, Rajni Kanta. Hindustani W orkers on the Pacific Coast. Berlin : W alter de Gruyter, 1923.

Deol, Gurdev Singh. The R ole o f the G hadar Party in the National M ovement. Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1969.

Diwakar, R. R. M ahayogi Sri A urobindo. Bombay : Bhartiya Vidya Bhawan, 1967.

Dutt, Bhupendranath. A prakash it Rajnitik Itihas (Bengali). Calcutta : Nav Bharat Publishers, 1953.

Fanon, Frantz, The W retched o f the Earth. Trans. Constance Farrington. Penguin Books, 1973.

Ferguson, Ted. A W hite Man's Country : An E x e r c is e in Canadian P reju d ice. Toronto : Doubleday Canada Ltd., 1975.

Ganda Singh (ed.). A m reek a Vich Hindustani (Punjabi). Vancouver : Kesar Singh Khalsa, 1976.

bibliography 201

Ganguli, Anil Baran. Ghadar Revolution in America. D elhi: Metropolitan Book Co. 1980.

Ghose, Sankar. The Renaissance to Militant Nationalism in India. Calcutta : Allied Publishers, 1969.

Grewal J.S. and Puri, H.K. (eds.). Letters ofUdham Singh. Amritsar : Guru Nanak University, 1974.

Guha, A. C. First Spark o f Revolution. New D elhi: Orient Longman, 1971.

Gurr, Ted R. Why Men R ebel. Princeton N. J. : Princeton University Press, 1971.

Gustafson, W. Eric and Jones, Kenneth W. (eds.). Sources on Punjab History. Delhi : Manohar Book Service, 1975.

Gurdit Singh. Zulmi Katha (Punjabi). Calcutta : Bhai Rai Singh, n.d.

Harbans Singh. The H eritage o f the Sikhs. Bombay : Asia Publishing House, 1964.

Hardas, Balshastri. Arm ed Struggle For F reed om : Ninety Years War o f Independence, 1857 to Subhash. Trans. S.S. Apte. Poona : Kal Prakashan, 1958.

Har Dayal. Forty Four Months in Germany and Turkey, February 1915—O ctober 1918: A R ecord o f Personal Impressions. London : P.S. King and Son, 1920.

Hoare, Q uintin and Smith, Geofrrey Nowell (eds.). Selections From the Prison N otebooks o f Antonio Gramsci. London : Lawrence and Wishart, 1973.

Hobsbawm E.J. The Bandits. London : Weiden Field and Nicholson, 1969.

Hoffer, Eric. The True Believer. New York : The New American Library, 1951.

Jagjit Singh. Ghadar Party Lehar (Punjabi). Tarn Taran, 1955.

Johnstone, Hugh. The Voyage o f Komagata Maru : The Sikh Challenge to Canada's Colour Bar. Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1979.

Jones, Kenneth. Arya Dharm : Hindu Consciousness in the 19th Century Punjab. Delhi : Manohar Publi­cations, 1976.

202 g h a d a r m o v e m e n t

Josh, Sohan Singh. Hindustan G hadar Party. 2 Vols. New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1977.

Josh, Sohan Singh. T ragedy o f K om agata Maru. New Delhi : People’s Publishing House, 1975.

Juergensm eyer, Mark and Barrier, N. Gerald (eds.). Sikh Studies : C om parative P ersp ectiv es on aC han ging Tradition. Berkeley : Graduate Theological Union, 1979.

Karunakaran, K.P. R elig ion an d Political A w aken in g in India. Meerut : Meenakshi Prakashan, 1965.

'Kamla Akali’, Lai Singh. Sailani D esh Bhagat (Punjabi). Ludhiana : Lahore Book Shop, n.d.

Khushwant Singh. A H istory o f the Sikhs. Vol. 2., 1839- 1974. Delhi : Oxford University Press, 1977.

Khushwant Singh and Satindra Singh. G h ad ar 1915 : India's F irst A rm ed Revolution. New Delhi : R. & K Publishing House, 1966.

Lajpat Rai. Young India. (1916), rpt. New Delhi : Publi­cations Division, G overnm ent of India, 1968.

Leigh, M.S. The Punjab an d the W ar. London : 1912.

Macmunn, Lt. G en Sir G eorge. TurmoU a n d T ra g ed y in India, 1914 an d A fter. London : Ja rro ld ’s, 1935.

Majumdar, R.C. H istory o f the F r e e d o m M ov em en t in India. Vol. II. Calcutta : K.L. M ukhopadhyaya, 1963.

M arx and Engels. S e le c t e d W orks. Vol. I. M oscow : P ro gress Publishers, 1973.

Mathur, L.P. Indian R ev o lu tion ary M ov em en t in th e United S tates o f A m er ica . D elhi : S. Chand & Co., 1970.

M c le o d , W .H . T h e E volu tion o f th e S ikh C om m un ity . D e lh i : O x f o r d U n iv e r s ity P re s s , 19 75 .

M is r o w , Jo g e s h C . E ast In d ian Im m ig ration on th e P ac ific C oast, San F ra n c is c o : R & E R e s e a rc h A s s o ­ciates, 1 9 7 1 .

M o h a n ty , M a n o ra n ja n . R ev o lu t io n a ry V io le n c e : A Study o f th e M aoist M ov em en t in In d ia . N e w D e lh i : S te rlin g P u b lis h e rs , 1 9 7 7 .

BIBLIOGRAPHY 203

Mohinder Singh. The Akali Movement. Delhi: Macmillan, 1978.

Morse, Eric Wilton. Immigration and Status o f British East Indians in Canada : A problem in Imperial Relations. Kingston : Queen’s University, 1936.

Nayyar, Baldev Raj. Minority Politics in the Punjab. Princeton N.J. : Princeton University Press, 1966.

O’Donnell, C.J. The Causes o f the Present Discontent in India. London : T. Fisher Unwin, 1908.

Panchhi, Pritam Singh, Ghadar Party Ka Itihas (Banarsi Das Ed.). Delhi : Atma Ram & Sons, 1961.

Rai, Satya M. Punjabi Heroic Tradition. Patiala : Punjabi University, 1978.

Randhir Singh. Ghadar H eroes : A Forgotten Study o f the Punjab Revolutionaries o f 1914-15. Bombay : People’s Publishing House, 1945.

Roy, Suprakash. Bharter Baiplavik Sangramer Itihas (Bengali). Calcutta : DNBA Brothers, 1970.

Sainsara, Gurcharan Singh et al. Ghadar Party da Itihas (Punjabi). Vol. I. Jullundur : Desh Bhagat Yadgar Committee, 1961.

Sarkar, Sumit. The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal 1903- 1908. New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1973.

Shanin, Teodor (ed.). Peasants and Peasant Societies. Penguin Books, 1971.

Savarkar, V.D. The Indian War o f Independence 1857. (1909), rpt., New Delhi : Rajdhani Granthagar, 1970.

Sharma, Sri Ram. Punjab in Ferment. New Delhi : S. Chand & Co., 1971.

Singh, Diwakar Prasad. American Attitude Towards the Indian Nationalist Movement. New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers, 1974.

Singh, Harbans and Barrier, N. Gerald (eds.) Panjab Past and P resen t: Essays in Honour o f Dr. Ganda Singh. Patiala : Punjabi University, 1976.

Uprety, Prem Raman. Religion and Politics in Punjab in the 1920's. New Delhi : Sterling Publishers, 1980.

204 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Waiz, S.A. (ed.). Indians A broad. Bombay : The Imperial Indian Citizenship Association, 1927.

Waiz, S.A. (ed.). Indians A broad Directory. Bombay : The Imperial Indian Citizenship Association, 1934.

Wolf, Eric R. Peasant Wars o f the Twentieth Century. London : Faber and Faber, 1970.

IX. ARTICLES

Anup Singh, ‘Har Daval—Stalwart Champion of Peace is Gone’. N ew History, Vol. III. No. I (April 1939).

Bains, J. S. 'The Ghadar Movement: A Golden Chapter of Indian Nationalism'. The Indian Journal o f Potitical Science, January-March 1962, pp. 48-59.

Bal Krishan. 'Progressional Ruralisation of Punjab’. Report o f the Ninth Industrial C onference, Karachi, 25 December 1913. Amroati : 1914.

Barrier, Norman G. 'The Hindustan Ghadar : Identity and Organisation among Indians in the West Coast of theU.S.’. Paper presented at the symposium on 'The Public Policy Process and the Development of Ethnic Identity : The East Indian Experience’, Uni­versity of California, Berkeley, June 1979.

■Bhai Bhan Singh Ji'. Kirti (Punjabi), July 1926.•Bhai Santokh Singh’. Kirti (Punjabi), May 1920.Bhakna, Sohan Singh. 'Presidential Speech’ at the All

India Revolutionaries Conference, Jullundur, 17 September 1967. People's Path (Jullundur) : Vol. Ill No. 10. (October 1967) pp. 3-4.

Bipan Chandra. 'Elements of Continuity and Change in the Early Nationalist Activity. Studies in History Vol. I. No. I (January-June 1979), pp. 73-88.

Bombwal, Amir Chand. 'Ram Chandra Bhardwaj - Father of Revolutionary Movement in N. W. F. P.’, The Frontier Mail (Dehradun), 7 December 1958, p. 4.

Bose, A.C. 'Efforts of the Indian Revolutionaries at Securing German Arms Across the Seas During World War I'. The Calcutta Review, January 1962, pp. 33-43.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 205

-------- . ‘Indian Nationalist Agitation in the U.S.A. andCanada'. The Journal o f Indian History, April 1965, pp. 227-241.

Brown, Emily C. 'Ideology of Har Dayal'. Punjab Journal o f Politics, July-December 1980, pp. 146-170.

-------- .'Students, Sikhs and Swamis : Punjabis in theUnited States 1899-1914', inHarbans Singh andN. G. Barrier (eds.), Panjab Past and P resen t: Essays in Honour o f Dr. Ganda Singh. Patiala : Punjabi Uni­versity, 1976.

Chan, Sucheng. 'Overseas Sikhs in the Context of International Migrations', in Mark Juergensmeyer and N. Gerald Barrier (eds.), Sikh Studies Compara­tive Perspective on A Changing Tradition. Berkeley : Graduate Theological Union, 1979, pp. 191-206.

■Desh Bhagat Baba Harnam Singh Kala Singha da Bayan. Phulwari (Punjabi), June 1957,

Dignan, Don K. 'The Hindu Conspiracy in Anglo- American Relations During World War I’. Pacific Historical Review, XL : I, February 1971.

Fauja Singh. ‘The Effects of Land Transfers on Rural Economy During the Latter Half of the 19th Century’. Punjab History Conference 1979 : Proceedings, Patiala : Punjabi University, 1980, pp. 258-269.

Foote, Albert. 'The Battle of Burrard Inlet: An Excitinjg Incident’. The Vancouver Sun Magazine Supplement, 23 July 1947, p. 3.

Gardner, Ray. 'When Vancouver Turned Back the Sikhs’. Maclean's Magazine, 8 November 1958, pp. 31, 63-67.

Har Dayal. 'Indians in America’. Modern Review, January 1911, pp. 3-11.

-------- . 'Karl Marx - A Modern Rishi'. Modern Review,March 1912, pp. 43-50.

-------- . ‘The Indian Peasant’. Modern Review, May 1913,pp. 506-509.

-------- . 'The Future of the British Empire in Asia. TheNew Statesman, 22 March and 29 March 1919, pp. 542-44 and 573-75.

206 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Irfan, M. 'Maulana Barkatullah — Profile of a Revolu­tionary’. People’s Path, (Jullundur), October 1966, pp. 47-53.

Jacoby, Harold S. 'Some Demographic and Social As­pects of Early East Indian Life in the United States’, in Juergensmeyer and Barrier (eds.). Sikh Studies : Comparative Perspective on a Changing Tradition, Berkeley : Graduate Theological Union, 1979, pp. 159-172.

Jensen, Joan M. 'The "Hindu Conspiracy” : A Reassess­ment’. Pacific Historical Review,XLVIII : 1, February 1979, pp. 65-83.

Joshi, Narendra K. ‘BabuHarnam Singh Sahri’. People's Path, February 1969, pp. 41-45.

Juergensmeyer, Mark. 'The International Heritage of the Ghadar Party : A Survey of the Sources’. The Sikh Sansar, March 1973, pp. 7-13.

-------- . 'The Ghadar Syndrome : Nationalism in anImmigrant Community’. Punjab Journal o f Politics, October 1977, pp. 1-22.

-------- .'An Organizational Theory of RevolutionaryChange’. Journal o f Contemporary Revolutions, Spring 1970, pp. 70-79.

--------. 'India's Berkeley Radical’. Times o f India,6 March, 1977.

Kapur, J. L. 'The Ghadar Conspiracy'. The Illustrated W eekly o f India, 2 October 1966, pp. 21-23.

Khankhoje, P. S. 'An Adventure During My Fight For Freedom. The Frontier Mail, 14 January 1961, p. 4

Khushwant Singh. 'Mewa Singh Shahid—He Died for his Countrymen’. The Sikh Review, August 1964, pp. 5-6.

Kite, Elizabeth S. ‘An American Criticism of "The Other Side of the Medal” ’. Modern Review, February, 1927.

Krueger, Horst. ‘Germany and Early Indian Revolu­tionaries’. Mainstream, 5 January 1964.

--------. 'Har Dayal’s Efforts in Germany’. The Patriot,12 January 1964.

Kumar, G. D. 'Hindus in the United States : Activities of the Hindu Students and Labourers on the Pacific

BIBLIOGRAPHY 207

Coast’. The Span o f life (Seattle) Vol. V : No. 3,pp. 6-11.

Machado, David. 'The Ghadar Party and Hindu-German Conspiracy’, mimeo, 1973.

Mukherjee, P. C. ‘The Demise of a Great Patriot — T. N. Das’. Modern Review, January 1959.

Mukherjee, Uma, 'Rash Behari Bose as a Revolutionary’. Modern Review, March and April 1966, pp. 190-200 and 273-383.

'Mystery and Power of Teja Singh’. The Vancouver Daily Province, 12 December 1908, p. 1.

Naidis, Mark. 'The Propaganda of the Ghadar Party’. The Pacific Historical Review, August 1951, pp. 299-310.

Omvedt, Gail. 'Armed Struggle in India : The Ghadar Party’. 3 parts. Frontier (Calcutta), 9, 16 and 23 November 1974.

Puri, Harish K. 'Ghadar Movement : An Experiment in New Patterns of Socialisation'. Journal o f Regional History, 1980, pp. 120-41.

-------- . 'Revolutionary Organization : A Study of theGhadar Movement’. Social Scientist, Nos. 98-99 (September-October 1980). pp. 53-66.

-------- . "Daleri, Vichardhara te Jathebandi’. Samta(Punjabi), October 1980, pp. 9-15.

Raucher, Alan. 'American Anti-Imperialists and the Pro- India Movement, 1900-32’. Pacific Historical Review, February 1974, pp. 83-110.

Raju, R.K. ‘Dr. P.S. Khankhoje-A Great Indian Revolu­tionary’. The Fiontier Mail, 2 March, 1959.

Reid, Robie L. 'The Inside Story of the "Komagata Maru''. British Columbia Historical Quarterly, January 1941 pp. 1-23.

Sahai, Hanuwant. ‘The Ghadar and After'. The Hindustan Times, 18 August 1957.

Sainsara, Gurcharan Singh. ‘A Sikh Heroine of the Ghadar Party-Gulab Kaur' Journal o f Sikh Studies, IV : 2 August 1947 pp. 93-98.

208 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Saint Nihal Singh. ‘The Triumph of Indians in Canada, Modern Review, August 1909, pp. 99-108.

Saint Nihal Singh. 'Indians in America’. M odern Review, March and April 1908. pp. 204-209, 312-314.

Samras, K.R. 'Indian Revolutionaries in California'. The Frontier Mail, 7 December, 1958, pp. 4-5

-------- . ‘Harish Chandra—Who sabotaged Ghadar Party'.The Frontier Mail, 19 March 1961. p. 3.Scheffauer, Herman, ‘The Tide of Turbans’. The Forum,

June 1910. pp, 616-618.Sharma, Inderjit. ‘Punjab Famines And the British

Policy in the 19th Century’. Punjab History Confe­ren ce 1979 : Proceedings, Patiala : Punjabi Uni­versity, 1980, pp. 175-189.

Sharma, Sri Ram. ‘Punjab in Ferment in the Beginning of the 20th Century’. The Panjab Past and Present, April 1980, pp. 121-145.

Sihra, Nand Singh. ‘Indians in Canada’. M odern Review, August 1913, pp. 140-145.

Smedley, Agnes. ‘The Exiled Indians'. Kirti, May 1926, pp. 201-203.

Spellman, John W. ‘The International Extensions of Political Conspiracy as Illustrated by the Ghadar Party’, journal o f Indian History, April 1959, pp. 23-47.

Teg, Amar Singh, 'Ghaddaar Bela Singh da Katal’, Nawan Zamana (Punjabi), 13 April 1963.

X. THE NEWSPAPERS/ PERIODICALS CONSULTED

Aryan, 1911.Bande Mataram, (Geneva) 1910.Daily Province Vancouver, 1908-1910F ree Hindusthan (Vancouver, Seattle), 1908-1910.Khalsa Advocate (Amritsar), 1914-1915.Kirti (Amritsar), 1926-28.San Francisco Chronicle, 1917-1918.The Sun (Vancouver), 1907-1910,Swadesh Sewak Vancouver), 1910-11.The Tribune (Lahore), 1913-1915.The W orld (Vancouver), 1908-1910.

FACSIMILES

1. G hadar (Urdu), Vo]. I., No. 22., 24 March 1914.Har Dayal was arrested on 25 March 1914. The G hadar of 24 March, evidently printed a few days later, carried details of his arrest, interrogation and comments of daily news­papers published in San Francisco.

The 'Soldiers of Ghadar’ were called upon to rise, awak­en and work more swiftly than earlier. The address of the editor/publisher was given as Secretary Yugantar Ashram.

A ngrezi Raj Ka Kacha Chittha - a regular feature of the weekly is seen in first column. (See also text, pp. 68, 75)

2. Hindustan G hadar (Urdu), Vol. I., No. 1. 7 April 1914.The name of the paper was changed, suggesting a new beginning. Since Har Dayal was accused of spreading anarchist ideas in USA, the change of name to Hindustan G hadar indicated it was the organ of Indian revolutionary movement.The print line omitted Yugantar Ashram and the address given was Editor, 'Hindustan-Gaddar San Francisco. A note above asked the readers to take serious note of the change in address given below.

Ram Chandra replaced Har Dayal as editor of the paper but the content and style of propaganda remained similar.

3. Hindustan G hadar (Urdu), Vol. I., No. 18., 11 August 1914. Gave the call to fearless soldiers for launching rebellion, lit. spreading mutiny. (See text p. 151).The language of exhortation is notable. A note by the Editor, last paragraph, pointed to the support of revolutionaries of Ireland, Germany, Turkey, France and Russia who wanted Indians to launch a rebellion in India atonce.

4. Hindustan G hadar (Gurmukhi), Vol. IV., No. 16. 28 March 1917 Acclaimed the Russian Revolution of Fetruary-March 1917 and expresses the hope that India also would be free very soon.

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INDEX

Ailan e-Jang, 82Ajit Singh, 17, 59, 64, 70.Aldred, Guy, 55.Alien Land Law (USA 1913) 37, 53 Amba Prasad, Sufi, 70.Angrezi Raj Ka Kacha Chittha, 68, 106. Anushilan Samiti, 70, 134.Aryan, 46, 50.

Babbar Akali Movement, 176.Balwant Singh, 38, 47, 48, 49, 78, 79, 142, 172.Bande Mataram, 70, 108.Barkatullah, Mohd.,

and Ghadar Party 76, 82,127. and Komagata Maru incident, 78, 79.and Indian Independence Commi­ttee, 89, 97, 140, 142, 144, 168. Provisional Govt, in Kabul, 97-99.

Barrier, N. Gerald, 17, 120.Bernhardi, General Friedrich Von, 72, 89.Bhag Singh, 38, 46, 47.Bhagwan Singh,

and Ghadar movement (USA), 76, 82, 116, 119, 12/,- 139, 140, 142, 148; and Komagata Maru, 76, 78, 79; parallel organisation, 100, revolutionary propaganda in and deportation from Vancouver, 50-51, 73on support of Princes, 111. and Siam-Burma project, 172-73.

Bhakna, Sohan Singh,early political activity, 51, 52, on formation of Hindi Association/

Ghadar party, 59, 60, 65, 67, 127, 137, 139, 140, 143; and Komagata Maru, 79, (81, 162; on religion in Ghadar movement, 122-23.

Bhakna, Gujjar Singh, 10, 135,. 136, 138, 141, 143, 154, 176.Bose, ArunjCoomer, 171.Bose, Rash Behari, 86, 87, 88, 134, 143, 144, 156, 159, 160, 165.Brooks, Vernon Van„Wyck, 56, 74, 83, 90.Brown, Emily 37, 55, 56, 59, 109, 133, 170.Burjor, Dady S., 8, 21, 22, 23, 26, 52.

Cama, Bhikari, 59, o4, 69.Canada

Indian immigrants in, 20-37; anti Asiatic riots in, 26, 27, 39; employment situation in, 21, 23-24; gurm at p a rch a r in, 38, 40. hostility and prejudice in, 22-27, 37, 38, 78,118.political awakening among Indians 50, 51.restrictions on Indian immigration, 15, 16, 27-36, 46; deputations against, 47-49; Honduras scheme, 34-36;Privy Council Order, 27, 46; political reasons of, 8, 27, 31-34; protest in India against, restrictions 47-49.See also Komagata Maru, Khalsa Diwan Society,

Chakrabarty, C.K., 97, 101, 102, 137n, 142, 144.

INDEX 215

Chan, Sucheng, 22, 25.Chatterjee, Sukumar, 94, 172, 173. Chattopadhyaya, Virendra, 89. Chenchiah, Darisi,

Guru Gobind Singh Scholarship 57 on founding of Ghadar movement, 62-66, 129, 137;on Har Dayal, 72, 127; on Ram Chandra 89;on scheme of liberation of India, 148-49; on Siam-Burma project, 94-95, 145, 173, 174.

Chief KhalsaDiwan, 18, 8S, 121, 123, 167.Circular-e-Azadi, 40-41,

Das, Taraknath, 33, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 57, 63, 89, 97, 129.‘Dukhi’, Munsha Singh, 116.Dutt, Bhupendra Nath, 92, 171.

Emigration from Punjab, causes of, 11-20 diagnostic value of, 20

Erikson, Erik, 55.

Ferozeshehar incident, 155.FreeHindusthan, 32-33, 4 1 ,4 5 n ,5 2 , 63.

Gaelic American 40, 70.Germany, See under Indian Independ­ence Committee, Har Dayal, and Ghadar movement.Ghadar, 7, 8, 61, 63, 64, 67-72, 74. 75,

81, 83, 93,96, 105-8, 128, 135, 137, 139, 140, 141, 142, 147, 151,162.

Ghadar MovementAmerica/Americans, attitude to­wards of 118, 119; anarchist ideas in, 105, 113, 125, 147-48; end of, 99-103, 175and Germany 8-9, 68, 72, 88-99, 101-03, 114, 117-18, 128, 131, 145, 152, 160, 169; Ideology of; 4-6, 67- 68, 104-25, 145 on the Khalsa, 121. on religion, 65, 6, 122-24. symbols and tradition in, 119-124, 123.launching of, 59-64.

Organisational Character of, 6 ,7 , 114, 126-145; branches, 137-38; communication, 138-39; membership 134-36; leadership 3 6, 59-64, 132-33,141, 145, 150, 159, 175. split in party, 100.

Strategy and Methods, 125, 128, 146- 177 bomb manufacturing 144, 163; decoities 87-88, 147, 164-65; pro­paganda, 86, 158;work among troops, 87. 160-62- See also Har Dayal, Indian Inde­pendence Committee, Komagata Maru etc..

Wartime activities outside India, 168- 67.

Ghose, Aurobindo, 40, 41, 64, 69, 121. Gramsci, Antonio, 7, 116, 145.Gupta. Heramba Lai, 142, 172.Gurdit Singh. 9, 77, 78, 80.Gurmukh Singh, Lalton, 10, 139.Guru Gobind Singh Scholarships, 57.

Har DayalAmerica/Americans, attitude to­wards of, 55, 111, 118-119; anarchist thinking of; 57, 58, 71, 105, 113-115, 147; anti-British pro­paganda, 7, 106-112, 129; arrest, 75; and Bakunin, 105, 147; dichotomy, in the ideas of, 73, 83. 112-115; and formation of Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast, 59-63;Germany, attitude towards, 68, 72, 83, 89-90, 97Ghadar, launching of, 61, 64, 72; propaganda in, 67-72, 105-116, 128, 162.ideological formulations of, 104- 116, 125, 146,and Indian Independence Commi­ttee (Berlin), 90, 97, 169, 170; and Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). 57, 105, 147 on Meaning of Equality, 110-111; new religion, plan to found, 55-56 on organisation, 126-130

216 GHADAR MOVEMENT

and his propaganda, 69, 90, 104- 116,125,145,146:Philosophy of the Bomb, 115-116, 147;on Prinoes and princely states, 111; Revolution, conception of, 114, 175 Russian revolutionary movement, fondness for, 75; syndicalist ideas, 57; volte (ace of, 103.

Hanuwant Sahai, 10, 56.Hardinge, Lord, 49, 57, 71, 97, 115,

147Hindi Association of the Pacific Coast,

7, 58-64;Working Committee of, 61-62, 66, 67,127, 139,140.

Honduras scheme, 34-36, 43. Hopkinson, W.C-,22, 35,42,43, 61, 79,

81,165.Herzan, Alexander, 113.Hindu-German Conspiracy 4, 7, 8,

101,131.Husain Rahim, 44, 46, 79.

Ibbetson, 11, 13, 17,33-34.Indian Independence Committee (Ber­

lin), 3, 7, 9, 89-99, 100, 109, 134, 137, 144, 169, 171.

Indian Sociologist, 42, 63, 69.Indian War o f Independence 1857, 3,

7, 62, 69.

Industrial Workers of theWorld(IWW) movement, 57, 105, 147.

Intellectuals, two different elements, 3, 6. 8, 63, 64,132, 133, 146,175.

Isemonger and Slattery, 8.Iskra, 128.

Jacobson (Benjamin Harrison Sloan), 147.

Jagat Ram, 132,163 Jagjit Singh, 61.Jodh Singh, 94, 95, 137, 145, 173, 174. Johnstone, Hugh, 47.Jones, Kenneth, 18-19.Josh, Sohan Singh, 143. Juergensmeyer, Mark, 102.Jwala Singh, 9, 52, 53, 57, 66, 152.

Kabul, Provisional Government o India in, 97-99, 144-117.

■Kamla Akali’, Lai Singh, 153, 166. Kanungo, Hem Chandra, 5. KanshiRam, 51, 62, 60, 65, 66, 127,

128, 154.Kartar Singh Sarabha,

among founders of Ghadar move­ment, 64-65;and organisation of the movement, 128, 130, 132, 140, 143; preparation in India, 152,158, 161, 163,165;return to India, 81, 141.

Khalsa Diwan Society (Vancouver), 4, 38, 39, 43, 46, 47, 48, SO, 65, 99.

Khankhoje, P.S., 9, 51, 63, 64, 89, 97, 130,149.

Khushwant Singh, 4, 74, 103,120. Komagata Maru, 9, 76-81, 83,128, 136,

141, 149, 150, 158, 163,166. Krishnavarma, Shyamji, 64, 70. Krueger, Horst, 170.Kumar, G.D., 41, 43, 44, 45. 51, 52, 59.

Lajpat Rai, 17, 99, 100, 102, 106, 108. Lahore Conspiracy Cases, 51, 88, 103,

130, 157, 167,Lahiri, Jatinder Nath, 63, 89, 129.Lai, Gobind Behari, 9, 57, 64, 91, 128,

130, 132, 140.Lenin, V. 1, 128.

Macauliffe, 18, 39.Mackenzie King Commission Report,

23n., 24n., 28, 29.Marx, Karl, 8, 105, 119, 120-121. Mathura Singh, Dr., 139, 144, 163. M averick enterprise, 91, 92, 93, 171. Mazzini, 101,108-109, 113, 128, 129. Mewa Singh, 81.Minto, Lord, 17, 29,33, 34.Mahantv, Manoranjan, 126,Morley, Lord, 29, 33, 42.

Nawab Khan, 156.Nidhan Singh, 86, 139, 154, 158, 165. Nihal Singh, Saint, 20, 36, 39. Narodnaya Volya, 113.

O' Dwyer, 49, 86, 88, 167.

INDEX 217

Parmanand, Bhai, 55, 56, 59, 60, 154, 163.

Pathak, Sohan Lai, 79, 93, 132, 133, 142, 168.

Petrie, D„ 18, 19.

Pingley, Vishnu Ganesh, 86, 163.Pratap, Raja Mahendra, 97-99, 171Prithvi Singh Azad,

on commitment to revolution, 82; on organisation, 74, 131. 132,135, 137, 145; on preparation for revolu­tion, 150, 152, 156, 158, 165.

Punjab :Economy after British annexation, 11-15; emigration from, 14-15; agrarian agitation in, 16-17, 33-34, Singh Sabha movement, 17-19, 38; Arya Samaj, 17; Political situation during the War in, 85, 153, 166; public propaganda of Ghadarites in, 86, 158. See also Ghadar move­ment, Lahore Conspiracy Cases.

Puri, Ram Nath, 40Ram Chandra Peshawri,

arrival at Yugantar Ashram, 76; Chenchiah on, 89; conception of revolution of, 114; controversy on role of, 99, 100; editor of Ghadar, 140-141; and German connection, 94, 96, 97, 131, 134, 172; instruc­tions to returning Ghadarites, 150, 164; and Komagata Maru, 79; Lajpat Rai on, 99, 100; on organi­sational aspects, 130,131, 132, 137, 142, 168, 173; propaganda by, 82, 92, 109, 110, 127.

Randhir Singh, I n.Randhir Singh Narangwal, 86, 158,

159.Reid, Rebie L., 9, 79.Revolutionary violence, 6-8, 181-83;114, 124, 133, 182-83. spontaneity,Roy, M.N., 92, 173.Russian revolutionary movement, 7,

72, 113.

Sahri, Harnam Singh, 41, 44, 93, 132, 133, 142, 168.

San Francisco Trial, 130, 131, 174. Sansar, 50.

Santokh Singh, 52, 93, 141, 168, 172, 173.

Sanyal, Shachindranath, 9, 87, 109, 143, 152.

Sarkar, Sumit, 5.

Savarkar, V.D., 62, 64, 69, 89, 111, 121, 153, 158, 160.

Sedition Committee Report, 85, 92, 94, 162.

Shabash, 71, 147.

Siam-Burma Centre, 93-95, 103, 171, 173-74.

Sihra, Nand Singh, 48, 57.Singapore, Mutiny in, 94, 169.

Singh Sabha, 17-19, 38, 50, 123. Swadesh Sewak, 43, 44.

Swadeshi movement, 5 Swayne, Brig. Gen. E, J. E., 8, 30, 31-

32,35, 36.Teja Singh, 35, 36, 39, 46, 47, 50, 57. Tilak, Bal Gangadhar, 64, 69, 121. Thakur Das, 59.

Tundilat, Harnam Singh,early political activity, 37, 51; founding of Ghadar movement, 60, 61, 62, 65, 67;on organisational aspects, 131, 141; on plan of action, 81, 82, 148, 149, 150;Poet of Ghadar d i Goonj, 116; on preparation for revolution in India. 8 6 ,1S8;on terrorist element in the move­ment, 124, 147-48.

United India League, 46, 48.United States of America,

Alien Land Law, 37, 53; anti-Asiatic riots in, 26-27, 37, 52; Briitish pressure for restriction on

218 GHADAR MOVEMENT

Indian immigration in. 36; employment of Indians in, 23-25; entry in the War 1917, 101; British diplomatic pressure for, 100-101; pressure for trial of Indians, 101. See also Hindu German Conspi­racy, Har Dayal, Ghadar Move­ment

Usman, Hari Singh, 92.Vancouver, see Canada.

Wasakha Singh, 52, 152.

Yugaatar Ashram, 61,64, 67 ,75 , 76, 90, 91, 92, 127, 130, 131. 132, 135, 139, 140.

Yugantar Circular, 58,147.