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Author produced version of a paper accepted for publication

Qualitative Inquiry and the Debate Between Hermeneutics and Critical Theory

James A. Shaw1, Ryan T. DeForge2

1 Toronto Rehabilitation Institute, Toronto, ON, Canada

Email: james.shaw@uhn.ca

2 St. Joseph’s Health Care, London, ON, Canada

Corresponding Author:

James A. Shaw, Toronto Rehabilitation Institute, Suite 11-175, 550 University Ave,

Toronto, ON, M5G 2A2, Canada

Email: james.shaw@uhn.ca

Shaw, JA & DeForge, RT. (2014). Qualitative Inquiry and the Debate Between

Hermeneutics and Critical Theory. Qualitative Health Research, 24(11): 1567-1580.

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Abstract

Two issues have been central to ongoing disputes about judgments of quality in qualitative

inquiry: (a) the ways in which paradigmatic orientations are understood to guide procedural

decisions, and (b) the meaning and intelligibility of paradigmatic incommensurability. In this

article we address these two key issues through an exploration of the debates between

hermeneutics and critical social theory, including the exchanges between Hans-Georg Gadamer

and Jurgen Habermas, and between Richard Rorty and Thomas McCarthy. We suggest that the

key epistemological issue addressed in these debates is the nature of interpretation, separating the

two philosophical camps based on beliefs about whether foundational knowledge is possible to

achieve. We conclude the article by discussing the implications of these different positions for

beliefs about quality in qualitative inquiry, and comment on the role of judgment in assessments

of the value and quality of different approaches to qualitative research.

Keywords

critical methods; hermeneutics; interpretive methods; language/linguistics; research design;

research evaluation; research, qualitative

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The concept of “paradigm” is a challenging one for qualitative researchers across health and

social science disciplines, as it has been taken up in discussions of applied qualitative inquiry in

a variety of ways (Eckberg & Hill, 1979; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Masterson, 1970). The term

paradigm as originally used by Thomas Kuhn (1962) has been classified into three primary

levels, roughly corresponding to (a) broad metaphysical beliefs about reality and truth, (b)

disciplinary practices that are accepted by and define a community, and (c) conceptual or

practical accomplishments of a scientific community (Masterson, 1970; Eckberg & Hill, 1979).

Notwithstanding Kuhn’s own resistance to the usage of “paradigm” in the broadest metaphysical

sense (Eckberg & Hill, 1979), it is nonetheless this philosophical belief-encompassing sense of

the term that has come to be seen as central to understanding one’s orientation to inquiry, and to

the world (Morgan, 2007).

Indeed, Guba and Lincoln (1994) defined the term paradigm in relation to qualitative

research as “a set of basic beliefs (or metaphysics) that deals with ultimates or first principles”

(p. 200, emphasis in original), justifying the centrality of metaphysical and philosophical

discussions to subsequent debates about quality in qualitative health research. Although we hold

in question whether paradigms necessarily deal with “ultimates or first principles,” for the sake

of this article we take a “paradigm” to be a collection of relatively enduring philosophical beliefs

about knowledge and the physical and social world(s) that are tacitly held by every individual

(including researchers). We say “relatively” enduring because we believe that these collections

of beliefs are subject to evolution and change based on the ways in which we are oriented to the

world around us.

What we read and experience, who we talk to, the questions we ask, and above all,

whether we are open to pitting and pursuing new philosophical insights that depart from our own

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existing beliefs (Davies, Browne, Gannon, Honan, Laws, Mueller-Rockstroh et al., 2004) can

potentially lead to a deeper and more flexible understanding of what constitutes excellent

research. Throughout this article, we question the nature of qualitative health researchers’

philosophical beliefs – how they are justified and how they might be understood to impact

qualitative inquiry – with the hope that exploring these paradigmatic issues will help to provide

insight into how and why we judge the quality of qualitative health research.

Paradigmatic Coherence in Qualitative Research

In one of their seminal discussions of the impact of paradigmatic beliefs on the conduct of social

inquiry, Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggested that paradigms operate by determining “what falls

within and outside of the limits of legitimate inquiry” for a particular researcher (p. 108). The

“inside versus outside” metaphor illustrates a central feature of Guba and Lincoln’s version of

the paradigm concept: that strict boundaries exist between paradigms rendering each one

incommensurable with any other (Morgan, 2007). According to this position, the quality of

qualitative inquiry is to be judged only within the boundaries of the paradigm in which it is

situated, as the transfer of indicators of quality between paradigms is considered to reflect a

misunderstanding of incommensurability and the paradigm concept (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). In

this view, quality in qualitative inquiry is to be understood within each paradigm individually as

the strongest possible resonance between study procedures and the paradigmatic beliefs that

inform the way the study is done (Denzin & Lincoln, 2005; Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Holloway &

Todres, 2003; Seale, 1999).

Seale (1999) critiqued the strict version of paradigms discussed by Guba and Lincoln

(1994), suggesting that qualitative inquiry ought to be understood as a craft skill that is

“relatively autonomous from social theory or philosophy, yet draw[s] on these arenas of

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discourse as a resource” (p. 466). Seale’s discussion of quality suggests that writings in social

theory and philosophy might be used to provide insight into new questions, techniques, and

interpretations for inquiry, but that theoretical and philosophical beliefs should not be understood

as determining qualitative methods in the strong “paradigmatic” sense. As with other craft skills,

quality in qualitative inquiry might be better viewed as developed through practice and sampling

from different techniques, philosophies, and schools of thought (Eisner, 1976).

As opposed to being determined through a paradigmatic set of criteria (as Guba and

Lincoln would have it), judging quality in qualitative inquiry might require a broader

consideration of the substance of qualitative research findings and the context in which the

research was crafted. Such a view of quality in qualitative research more strongly resonates with

contemporary discussions about judging the aesthetic products of craft skills in the arts

(Potgieter, 2003; Rugoff et al., 2007), and has been emphasized by some commentators in

relation specifically to qualitative health research (Eakin and Mykhalovskiy, 2003).

From these differences regarding judgments of quality in qualitative inquiry we see two

interrelated issues arise that are central to disagreements regarding the status of rigor in

qualitative inquiry. The first is regarding the nature of the relationship between paradigmatic

beliefs and the methodological procedures followed during the course of a study. Our first goal

in this article is to critically explore the question of how certain philosophical or epistemological

beliefs might be understood to dictate the procedural decisions made in qualitative inquiry. In the

case that such philosophical beliefs are held to dictate methodological decisions in the strong

paradigmatic sense (as per Guba and Lincoln), philosophical consistency and coherence would

seem to be the strongest indicators of quality in qualitative research. In the case that

philosophical beliefs are not understood to dictate methodological decisions in this strong sense,

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we might have to look beyond the traditional understanding of paradigmatic consistency and

coherence and instead judge qualitative inquiry from a broader perspective that considers the

substance of qualitative research findings and the context in which the work was completed

(Carter & Little, 2007; Eakin & Mykhalovskiy, 2003).

The second related issue is the notion of incommensurability between paradigmatic

beliefs. Incommensurability between paradigmatic positions relies on an uncompromising and

insurmountable difference between the implications of epistemological beliefs, but what makes

these beliefs insurmountably different? To answer this question is to explore the meaning and

intelligibility of incommensurability, and we will address this question with the second goal of

this article: to explore the key issues underlying some of the philosophical debates that have

helped to establish the oppositions between two popular paradigmatic positions – hermeneutics

and critical social theory – so as to illustrate and make sense of their apparent

incommensurability.

Drawing specifically on the exchanges between Jurgen Habermas and Hans-Georg

Gadamer as published in English in 1986, and between Thomas McCarthy and Richard Rorty in

the 1990’s, we will explore the implications of the debates between critical social theory and

hermeneutics for both (a) the relationship between paradigmatic beliefs and methodological

decisions in qualitative inquiry, and (b) the meaning and intelligibility of the notion of

paradigmatic incommensurability. By examining in detail the arguments offered in support of

these different philosophical positions, we are able to gain insight into the central issue of

“epistemological foundationalism” as it relates to efforts to know “the truth” about the social

world. By epistemological foundationalism we mean the belief that it is possible to have an

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ultimate justification for knowledge claims (whether instrumental, moral, or philosophical) that

validates such claims beyond local, interpretive contingencies of truth.

Debate over whether an ultimate foundation for human knowledge is possible turns out to

be crucial to understanding the debates between hermeneutics and critical social theory, and has

equally important implications for the conduct of qualitative inquiry. After discussing the

implications of the debates for the issues of paradigmatic coherence and incommensurability, we

will conclude with a discussion of the role of judgment in both engaging in qualitative health

research and assessing its quality.

Introducing Ourselves and the Debate(s)

Before providing an orientation to the debates, we offer first some insight into our own

perspectives as authors. Sharing an interest in knowledge translation and exchange, we are a

researcher of health care practice (James) and a critical gerontologist (Ryan) who believe that

qualitative health research is a key means of questioning dominant approaches and assumptions

in health and health care. Our experiences in health care and health research have brought us to

view these dominant approaches as largely remaining ignorant to the actual experiences, wishes,

and beliefs of individuals and often neglecting the families, communities, and socio-economic

contexts in which they are situated. As colleagues, we have engaged in a great deal of discussion

and debate to push forward each other’s approaches to scholarship with the ultimate goals of

both critiquing and informing the evidence-based health care epoch of which we are a part

(Sandelowski, 2004).

The debates we address in this article are particularly appropriate for our own relational

scholarship, as we have each tended to identify primarily with opposing positions as stated in

each debate (James with Gadamer and Rorty, and Ryan with Habermas and McCarthy). We have

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tried to do justice to each philosopher discussed by putting the debates into the context of their

broader philosophical programs, but of course these accounts of their philosophical positioning

are partial and emphasize those points that seem to most help achieve our rhetorical purpose – to

provide insight into understanding quality in qualitative health research. We recognize that the

arguments put forth throughout this article are necessarily truncated and interpreted versions of

the full philosophical attention devoted to these issues – and we encourage readers to familiarize

themselves with more detailed philosophical descriptions of each position.

We have tried to temper any authoritative tone with our own express intent to mutually

understand the motivation and rationale behind the philosophical positions we each identify with,

and through our conviction to remain open to examining and shifting paradigmatic beliefs

through the process of critical dialogue and debate. Perhaps we present the debates and our

reactions in a way that implies the acceptability of particular positions over others, and that is for

the reader to remain aware of and to decide. Despite our philosophical differences, our

commitment to critical dialogue is present throughout what we intend to be a well-balanced

article, and we invite and anticipate further discussion and debate on this matter. With that, we

now turn to providing introductions to the philosophical camps with which we respectively

identify.

Hermeneutics and Critical Social Theory

The debates between hermeneutics and critical social theory have taken many forms and

involved many participants, and could certainly not be considered resolved (Kinsella, 2006;

Nuyen, 1992, 1995; Piercey, 2004). In this article we will focus on two exchanges in this

ongoing debate to concentrate our analytical frame on the central issue of epistemology as it

relates to human inquiry. The core of this debate, epistemologically speaking, relates to the

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nature of interpretation and its role in establishing human knowledge. As we will suggest,

reflexively understanding tacit philosophical beliefs about interpretation is crucial for two

important reasons. First, because the different positions taken by scholars identifying with

hermeneutics or critical social theory (on political commitments, moral obligations, and

methodological orientations) are understood to derive in part from their respective beliefs about

interpretation. Second, although interpretation is considered central to both critical and

hermeneutic approaches to qualitative health research, whether we take interpretation to be

primarily ontological or primarily epistemological has crucial implications for the kinds of

claims we seek to make. We will be exploring these key issues throughout this article.

Each of the participants in these debates more or less agreed that interpretation is central

to human knowing, but there are clear differences between them regarding whether foundational

knowledge is possible. Jurgen Habermas and Thomas McCarthy defended an essentially

foundationalist stance in which rationality and methodical discourse are deemed essential for

sustaining political emancipation and democracy. Herein, rationality is taken as a universally

shared capacity of humanity that can give rise to universal laws and norms in moral and political

domains. As such, if one were to, for example, logically require others to respect his/her freedom

as an autonomous rationality, and if one also acknowledges others as autonomous rationalities,

reciprocity demands that each party respects the other’s freedom (Ess, 1996). Thus, what

characterizes Habermas’ universal worldview is the notion of democracies that seek to establish

social norms that rest on the consent of those being governed.

Moreover, in seeking to establish that consent, Habermas points out that articulating

normative, “ought to” statements carries with it an assumption that the contested norm is valid

for all people: we persuade others by convincing them of the validity of the proposed norm. This

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process of giving and criticizing reasons for holding or rejecting claims lies at the heart of

Habermas’s theory of communicative action; the point here though is that such giving and

criticizing of reasons relies on a tacitly held assumption that one’s claims are universal or

foundational. Without such foundational claims, Habermas’ contention is that the project of

democracy and emancipation would be suspended in light of our diminished capacity to be

critical of norms and politics that contradict the notions of democracy and freedom; in other

words, Habermas suspects that authoritarian politics would proliferate if relativist arguments

(that no such universal human characteristics or norms exist) were to win out over universal

arguments.

As part of the next generation of critical social theorists, Thomas McCarthy brought the

ideas of Habermas into closer contact with American pragmatism by further developing the

methodological underpinnings of universality with respect to social practices and institutions in

the empirical context of racism and imperialism (see McCarthy, 2009). In doing so, McCarthy

both defends and extends Habermas’ worldview by continuing to contend that it is necessary to

establish particular criteria for determining the foundational validity of knowledge claims if a

more just society is to be enacted. Indeed, critical social theory explicitly requires the possibility

to “distinguish better from worse understandings” in some rational, objective way (Sayer, 2009,

p. 778); this is central to the critical thrust of emancipatory social research methodology, and is

not possible without some sense of foundationalism.

Gadamer and Rorty, conversely, shied away from making any such foundational claims.

Although Gadamer’s writing conveyed a more realist tone about the possibilities of hermeneutics

to uncover and illuminate “truth” (Bernsetin, 1982), Bouma-Prediger (1989) suggests that “Truth

and Method is [nonetheless] clearly a polemic against the usual attempt to secure a firm

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foundation or grounding for knowledge” (p. 319). As Gadamer himself stated, his approach to

hermeneutics “does away with that naive objectivism that falsified not only the positive theory of

science but also any project of laying either a phenomenological or language-analytical

foundation for sociology” (1986, p. 285). As such, Gadamer might be understood as suggesting

that all knowledge is always already grounded in interpretation, implying an anti-foundational

approach to the treatment of epistemology (Bouma-Prediger, 1989; Nuyen, 1992).

Rorty’s route to anti-foundationalism, however, was as a self-proclaimed neo-pragmatist

focused on the integration of the philosophy of John Dewey, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Martin

Heidegger, and later, Jacques Derrida. In his Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty drew

on Gadamer’s discussions of hermeneutics to suggest a move away from efforts to “figure out”

an epistemology that could justify traditional notions of objectivity and transcendental rationality

(Rorty, 1979). In so doing, Rorty transformed Gadamer’s hermeneutics into a distinctly “post-

modern” kind of theory on interpretation, claiming that inquiry did not need to be anything more

than conversation oriented to solving problems that are relative to each individual inquirer

(Bouma-Prediger, 1989). As such, Rorty openly rejected any sentimentality for foundationalism,

advocating for a hermeneutics that moves further away from the idea of interpretation as

providing access to some kind of real “Truth.”

Yet although both Gadamer and Rorty were vocal defenders of the central place of

hermeneutics in thinking about knowledge and knowledge claims, we must add an important

qualification to our positioning of these two philosophers as being “on the same side” throughout

this article. Gadamer was a “student, and later disciple and friend” of Martin Heidegger (Kremer,

2013, p. 131), and many scholars agree that Gadamer’s philosophical work is primarily devoted

to extending Heidegger’s idea of hermeneutics to expand on its ontological and universal nature

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(Bernstein, 1982; Bouma-Prediger, 1989; Hollinger, 1985; Kremer, 2013). Drawing on

Heidegger’s phenomenology so extensively, Gadamer’s view of interpretation was situated in the

distinctly phenomenological recognition of the intimate and primordial human connectedness to

the world (and thus to the history that constitutes the world in which we presently live) that

precedes all efforts to know. This fundamental connectedness to the historically conditioned

world constitutes the “forestructures of understanding” that figure so prominently in Gadamer’s

theory of interpretation, embodying the ways in which our historical situation constitutes the

very resources we have available to establish our human understanding.

This fundamental ontological stance forms a key basis on which Gadamer built his

philosophical program, and particularly his writings about hermeneutics. Yet there is virtually

nothing in Rorty’s writing that invokes the phenomenological foundation on which Gadamer’s

hermeneutics is built. Rather, Rorty’s focus remained on articulating the implications of a

Darwinian worldview, marking a key element in which Rorty and Gadamer diverge

philosophically. Nonetheless, on what we take to be the crucial issue of epistemological

foundationalism, we see the views of Gadamer and Rorty converging in their defense of (perhaps

different flavors of) an anti-foundationalist view. Although we continue to describe how

Gadamer and Rorty defend this anti-foundational view in the debates discussed herein, we

nonetheless emphasize that their defense of this view is the only philosophical similarity we are

suggesting in this article (for a more thorough discussion of their similarities and differences, see

Bernstein, 1982). Indeed, we position Rorty’s philosophy as extending Gadamer’s hermeneutics

much further in an anti-foundational direction, and address the implications of this extension in

the final sections of the article. Considering this basic introduction to the two “sides” of the

debate, we now turn to explore the exchanges between Habermas and Gadamer.

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The Gadamer-Habermas Debates

Although Gadamer and Habermas disagreed on a number of important points, they shared a great

deal in common with respect to their different philosophical programs when compared together

with the dominant, positivist philosophy of the 20th

Century (Mendelson, 1979; Scheibler, 2000).

Both intended their work as a comprehensive critique of the overly objectified and

decontextualized nature of positivism and instrumental reason, and thus both explicitly

recognized the productive role of the subject in creating and acquiring knowledge and

understanding. This also led both scholars to recognize the fundamental role that language plays

in establishing and altering meaning, but a key element of their debate relates to the extent and

means by which language and tradition shape meaning.

As was already described, Gadamer’s primary philosophical work, Truth and Method

(2004), built on the work of Martin Heidegger in elaborating both the ontological status of

hermeneutics and its implications for the interpretation and constitution of everyday life.

Gadamer described interpretation as

a limitless medium that carries everything within it – not only the “culture” that has been

handed down to us through language, but absolutely everything – because everything (in

the world and out of it) is included in the realm of “understandings” and

understandability in which we move (1986, p. 283).

Being so deeply rooted in the notion of historical tradition and language as constituting

the forestructure of understanding, Gadamer’s work stands in contrast to Habermas’ position that

is rooted in explanatory theory inspired by figures such as Karl Marx and Sigmund Freud

(Schrader, 1987). Habermas was expressly opposed to the totality of historical tradition and

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language in being able to understand the interactions between people and the world, and

advocated for a methodological approach that emphasized understanding the objective conditions

in which interpretation occurs.

The first of Habermas’ (1986) central critiques of Gadamer’s discussion of hermeneutics

focused on Gadamer’s resistance to advocating a specific methodological approach to social

science. Gadamer did not consider methodological discussions to be fruitless, but insisted that

espousing a methodological approach would detract from the proposed universality of the

hermeneutical phenomenon (Mendelson, 1979). Relying so heavily on Heidegger’s work meant

that Gadamer viewed hermeneutic interpretation as essentially and universally ontological:

Gadamer himself stated in Truth and Method that “Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology

and his analysis of Dasein’s historicity had as their aim renewing the question of being in general

and not producing a theory of the human sciences” (p. 258).

Habermas, on the other hand, strongly believed in the necessity of establishing

methodological grounds on which to base rational judgment; moreover and along with Karl Otto

Apel (Habermas, 1986), Habermas argued that if Gadamer’s hermeneutics did not have direct

and explicit implications for the human sciences, then the philosophical notion would fall into

irrelevance (Habermas, 1986; Mendelson, 1979). Despite this, Gadamer maintained that his

philosophical program was focused on the universality of hermeneutics and the ontological

forestructures of understanding, and that demonstrating this was a more important philosophical

goal than establishing methodologies of the human or social sciences.

Related to the discussion of methodology, Habermas’ (1986) second criticism was that

Gadamer failed to appreciate the role and power of cognitive reflection in permitting people to

understand the influence of their historical tradition on their knowledge and understanding.

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Gadamer proposed that we always already bring our historical being with us to any new

interpretation, in the form of our forestructures of understanding. These forestructures of

understanding constitute a historically effected consciousness, suggesting that all efforts to know

are mediated by our historical tradition and the language by which it is guided: hence the

universality of hermeneutics. This ontological situatedness within a particular historical tradition

and language is for Gadamer always prior to acts of knowing and reflecting, and so for him it

made no sense to consider reflection as a means to get outside of or to see through hermeneutics;

for Gadamer, there is no “outside of” hermeneutics.

Habermas, however, stated that the “right of reflection demands that the hermeneutic

approach restrict itself. It [reflection] calls for a reference system that goes beyond the

framework of tradition as such; only then can tradition also be criticised” (1986, p. 270). At the

center of this point seems to be different notions of how totalizing the concept of hermeneutics

can actually be. In calling for a reference system that goes beyond the framework of historically

effected consciousness, Habermas asserted his belief in the possibility of establishing meaning

while departing from historical tradition by critically reflecting on it. For Habermas, this was the

power of rationality in communicative action – to be able to rationally evaluate one’s tradition to

critique its effects in contemporary life. Gadamer amounted this assertion to an “illusion of

reflection,” elaborating his belief that rationality was simply a prejudice of the Enlightenment.

He believed that “[f]or the Enlightenment, the key prejudice was the belief in reason itself, i.e.,

the belief that it could free itself from all involvement in tradition” (Mendelson, 1979, p. 60).

The third and perhaps most philosophically important point of the debate focused on the

centrality of language to meaning and interpretation. Gadamer held that language was

fundamental in its influence on all understanding, such that “language is not only an object in our

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hands, it is the reservoir of tradition and the medium in and through which we exist and perceive

our world” (Gadamer, 1986, p. 286). This represents a fundamentally important point of

Gadamer’s philosophical position, closely related to the notion that hermeneutics is ontological

and thus not only pervasive of human experience, but constitutive of it. Taking language to be

essential to hermeneutics and historical tradition in human existence, Gadamer conceived of

language as more profoundly ontological than as an object to be reflected on. For Gadamer, we

cannot conceive of human experience outside of language – it is woven into the very fabric of

everyday human life.

Habermas opposed this position through a discussion of ontological forces that constrain

human existence outside of language. He outlined two types of constraint: external forces found

in the real world, such as the physical stubbornness of our immediate surroundings, and internal

forces, such as the impact of social class on the ways in which we understand our lives.

Habermas stated that

[t]hese two categories of constraint are not only the object of interpretations; behind the

back of language, they also affect the very grammatical rules according to which we

interpret the world. Social actions can be comprehended only in an objective framework

that is constituted conjointly by language, labor and domination (1986, p. 273).

Thus Habermas believed that certain social forces, such as labour and power, are not

reducible to language in the way that Gadamer purports; Habermas suggests that these forces

have a different ontological status than language, and thus must be considered as separate from

language but equally important. In this way, Habermas suggests that we ought to apply our

capacities for rational discourse to gain insight into the forces that impact our knowledge over

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and above language. Again, in this instance the key disagreement appears to be focused on the

extent to which the hermeneutical phenomenon, inclusive of language, history, and prejudice,

might be considered universal to being-in-the-world; if Gadamer was successful in establishing

the universality of hermeneutics, then any attempts to justify foundational claims to knowledge

would be undermined. If Habermas was successful in advancing his position, then we have no

choice but to look beyond language and seek to better understand the forces that shape the very

language we use – thus seeking a more foundational kind of knowledge that is grounded in a

reality “beyond” language.

Some authors claim that Gadamer and Habermas actually misunderstood each other’s

work and the responses that constitute this debate (Mendelson, 1979; Nuyen, 1994). Cumming

(1991) observed that “the relation between the two philosophies appears differently from the

perspective of either one” (p. 15), and this recognition should be integrated into any account of

the Gadamer-Habermas debate. Ricoeur suggested that each author was relying on his own

theoretical presuppositions while engaging with the other, limiting their ability to see the warrant

in each other’s positions (Piercey, 2004). Specifically, Habermas’ theory of interests and

Gadamer’s reliance on false dichotomies detracts from their capacity to identify a third way that

could more fully demonstrate the “critical resources of hermeneutics” to redress social inequities

(Piercey, 2004, p. 265).

That said, the sorting out of Gadamer’s and Habermas’ particular views gives rise to at

least two central and closely related considerations regarding one’s own position and practice as

a qualitative researcher. The first consideration relates to the role and power of reflection in

limiting the effects of prejudices on the interpretations that constitute social inquiry. The second

consideration relates to what we understand the products of our qualitative research to be –

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representations of reality that are hopefully unaffected by prejudice in important ways (with

Habermas), or interpretations of reality that are situated directly in the prejudices that constitute

the context in which we understand anything at all (with Gadamer).

Reflexivity is widely understood to be a cornerstone of qualitative research, and is

practiced by qualitative researchers following the philosophical approaches of both Habermas

and Gadamer (Finlay, 2002; Finlay & Gough, 2003). However, drawing on the debate just

discussed, the application of reflection and reflexivity would likely look very different for

researchers situated in each position. For researchers following Habermas, reflexivity would seek

to limit as much as possible specific beliefs about the phenomenon being studied to rationally

identify the central uses of language, labor, and domination that structure the study’s focal issue.

The philosophical assertions that constitute Habermas’ position would be used to explicitly guide

social inquiry, necessitating the limitation of prejudices directly related to the phenomenon of

study and focusing on identification and critique of any oppression discovered. In so doing,

researchers following Habermas would seek to accurately represent the issue or phenomenon

through a critique of the authorities that dictate the reality being studied in a particular way. In

other words, the findings of a study following a Habermasian approach would seek to “uncover”

and “illuminate” real meanings in the world that exist separate and apart from researchers’

efforts to describe them (Frost et al, 2010).

Conversely, researchers following Gadamer’s work would seek to identify as much as

possible the historical tradition and prejudices in which their work is situated, recognizing the

impact of their horizons of meaning on their eventual interpretations as opposed to trying to limit

their impact. Of course researchers following Gadamer seek to remain open to the phenomenon

being studied by reflexively considering the way their existing knowledge of the issue being

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studied impacts their interpretations. The key point is not that Gadamerian researchers would

simply present research findings that easily resonate with all their existing beliefs about the focal

phenomenon, but that they reflexively recognize that their entire approach to inquiry, their

assumptions about knowledge, and their beliefs about their chosen research topic are situated

within a particular history and horizon of meaning that encourages particular ways of knowing

over others. Thus although researchers following a Gadamerian approach might still be

interested in identifying oppression and supporting emancipation, they would present their

research findings within an interpretive context that recognizes the fusion of horizons in the

constitution of any meanings at all.

Although discussing reflexivity in this way implies a dichotomous view of the practice of

reflection, we believe it is an important way to emphasize the different views held by Gadamer

and Habermas in relation to the nature of language and interpretation. The views of Habermas

and Gadamer have much overlap related to the interpretive nature of knowledge and the

importance of language in constituting meaning, however the differences we have highlighted

between their central arguments bring into relief the central issue of foundationalism versus anti-

foundationalism. This crucial element of the debate for qualitative researchers serves as an

invitation to consider whether interpretation is something that just is – i.e., interpretation as

ontological (with Gadamer) – or something that one does – i.e., interpretation as epistemological

(with Habermas). If and when a researcher tends toward the latter stance, one presumably tends

to make claims that there is a rightness or a Truth to their claim. Conversely, when one sees

interpretation as ontological and as universal, one presumably forfeits any claim to knowing “the

Truth” about a phenomenon; rather, the claims one makes are anti-foundational.

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This discrete but fundamental difference between the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the

critical social theory of Habermas provides a central insight into the first goal of our article by

highlighting that a researcher’s fidelity to either one of these philosophical orientations might

dictate very different purposes and questions on which entire research projects rest. Such an

insight is presupposed by acceptance of the notion of strong paradigmatic coherence as a key

indicator of quality in qualitative research (Guba & Lincoln, 1994), and indeed, the apparently

rigid nature of the Habermas–Gadamer debate seems to further lend itself to a view of coherence

as rigor. Further implications of these beliefs and their impact on the notion of

incommensurability become more clearly discernable in the debates carried on between Thomas

McCarthy and Richard Rorty, to which we now turn.

The Rorty-McCarthy Debate

Thomas McCarthy has been referred to as the defender of Habermas in North America (Nuyen,

1992), and has built directly on Habermas’ work in establishing comprehensive philosophical

justifications for critical social theory. McCarthy’s work is considered to maintain the

universalistic ideals of rationality while reframing these ideals in terms of a pragmatic

recognition of inter-subjective and cultural diversity (Hoy, 1993). Habermas himself stated that

“McCarthy opposes not only the iconoclastic deconstructionism that throws the baby out with

the bathwater, but also an overly normative reading of Kant that leaves the illusion of pure

reason intact” (Habermas, 2001, p. 11). McCarthy thus advocated for a form of objective

rationality that is situated within practical contexts, maintaining its authoritative status in

facilitating consensus across cultural groups. In this way, McCarthy continued Habermas’

pragmatist tendencies without embracing the radical relativism that Rorty claims to be

characteristic of an authentically pragmatist approach (Rorty, 1979).

21

One of McCarthy’s (1990a) points of contention in his debate with Rorty was Rorty’s

deflationist claim that philosophy ought not maintain a privileged presence in the priority setting

of public agendas (nor, by extension, in dictating methods for social science). This view reflects

the emphatically hermeneutic position on truth that Rorty took, claiming that philosophy has no

‘more important’ or ‘more necessary’ a place in politics than any other system of truth-claims

within a given culture. To consider philosophy as deserving a prioritized position would be to

consider it as an institution that comes progressively closer to moral, social, and political Truth;

de-stabilizing this view of philosophy was the primary goal of much of Rorty’s work. Rorty

expressed clear disagreement with the objectivity required of critical theory when he stated that

objectivity should be seen as conformity to the norms of justification (for assertions and

for actions) we find about us. Such conformity becomes dubious and self-deceptive only

when seen as something more than this – namely, as a way of obtaining access to

something which “grounds” current practices of justification in something else (Rorty,

1979, p. 361).

By rejecting critical theorists’ criteria of objective rationality that could justify

philosophy’s guiding role in politics, Rorty positioned himself within a re-description of

Gadamer’s hermeneutics that precludes the possibility of accessing or generating foundational

knowledge and truth behind the back of language. For Rorty, drawing on Wittgenstein, selecting

epistemological positions, political orientations or particular methodological approaches to social

inquiry are simply matters of adopting one language game over another, and do not reflect any

ultimate philosophical “rightness” or “wrongness”.

22

McCarthy’s (1990a) central point in his critique of Rorty’s position focused on the very

language Rorty used in proposing his relativist perspective on epistemology and moral

justification. McCarthy (1990a) suggested that Rorty “presents us with just the sorts of reasons

we are accustomed to receiving for claims such as he makes, reasons meant to support their truth,

not just for us, but for their truth ‘period’” (p. 361). Rorty’s apparent hypocrisy is an obvious

point of vulnerability from McCarthy’s critical perspective that focused on recognizing and

establishing the context-transcendent elements of communicative action and language.

McCarthy claimed that “ordinary language communication is everywhere structured

around idealizing, context-transcending presuppositions” (1990a, p. 368), such as the assumption

that logic and rationality can resolve disputes across cultures. As a direct result of these

presuppositions, we assume those around us have the context-transcending practical rationality

that is built into the language they (and we) use to make sense of the world. Thus, McCarthy

argued that context-transcendence is built into the very structure of language and into our sense-

making system of the world around us, and also that context-transcendence is the very source of

inter-subjectivity that permits interaction with others. On this view, by rejecting any context-

transcendence of language Rorty put himself in a position of contradiction and paradox any time

he appealed to context-transcending language claims by participating in philosophy.

Rorty’s critiques of philosophy in general led him to ground all epistemology and

language in the social practices that produce them, a grounding he referred to as

“epistemological behaviorism” (Rorty, 1979). Rorty argued at length that all language is itself

contingent on social practices we inherit from our social history and context, and thus focusing

on language as the unit of analysis in which one might find meaningful Truth is simply a step

sideways, a distraction from the more fundamental point for Rorty that the meaning of a

23

vocabulary only arises out of its position within a broader context (Rorty, 1989). Thus,

rationality only exists as such within the context of a certain language-game that is agreed on by

those who use it, and so McCarthy’s assertion that elements of this language are “context-

transcendent” loses its significance. For Rorty, rationality as a characteristic of language can

only be discussed and justified from within the bounds of the very same language game from

which it arises. It is from this background that Rorty provided his reply to McCarthy.

Rorty (1990) gave up the quest for truth in any universal or unconditional sense in favor

of a view of truth as warranted alternative descriptions or assertions; this also meant rejecting the

notion of transcultural validity of language in any important intransitive sense. This “neo-

pragmatist” theory of truth included his views on the relationship between rationality and

transcultural validity in his response to McCarthy:

As long as one thinks of “reason” as the name for a faculty capable of attaining

transcultural validity, one will want a theory of the nature of rationality. But if one gives

up on transcultural validity, then one will suspect that we have said enough about

rationality when we say that any fool thing can be made to seem rational by being set in

an appropriate context, surrounded by a set of beliefs and desires with which it coheres

(Rorty, 1990, p. 640).

Thus Rorty suggested that although McCarthy claimed to reject a God’s eye view of language

and rationality, he neglected to take this rejection through to its conclusion, insofar that a

rejection of a God’s eye view should also entail a rejection of philosophy being the key

intellectual space for discussions about politics and morality (and again by extension, social

inquiry).

24

From McCarthy’s view, the discussion of whether or not rationality exists merely within

a language game was beside the point. For him, what mattered was that rationality and

assumptions of transcultural validity are characteristics of language that exist across cultural

contexts, and these characteristics permit communicative interaction that can facilitate rational

consensus regarding moral obligations. In a continuation of this debate later in the decade,

McCarthy (1996) asserted that we have to “understand the rational properties of our practical

activities as ongoing accomplishments, for all practical purposes, in ever changing

circumstances, and at the same time as oriented to context-transcending ideas of reason and

based on idealizing presuppositions” (p. 98). For McCarthy, this not only resonated with the

apparent rationality present in language across cultural contexts, but it permitted the

establishment of socio-political ideals.

McCarthy believed that because empirical truth claims have a “validity that transcends

the particular contexts in which they are raised” (1990b, p. 646), they can be weighed against

other rationally valid truth claims to determine which is a “better” and which is a “worse”

understanding. If this viewpoint of language and rationality is applied to politics or

methodologies for social inquiry, one presumably would arrive at a “better” political or

methodological position. Thus McCarthy (1990a; 1990b) asserted that although we might only

be able to conceive of rationality, validity, morality, politics, etc. within our own cultural

framework of language, this particular framework of language nonetheless permits us to critique

all the meaning it produces to achieve more rational and valid positions.

The central issue in the Rorty-McCarthy debate focused on whether rationality as a

characteristic of language permits us to arrive at foundational Truth. McCarthy, building on the

work of Habermas, suggested that regardless of the philosophical justifications for objective

25

rationality and foundational truth, we nonetheless find ourselves applying the notion of context-

transcendent rationality in our philosophical discussions and everyday lives. Rationality is a

cornerstone of contemporary human life, and is not something to be abandoned for culturally

relative approaches to truth, politics, and social science.

Expanding on Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Rorty countered this position by claiming that it

is not helpful to base our views of such crucial issues on a fallacious attempt to establish ultimate

foundations of Knowledge. Instead, we are obligated to recognize the impossibility of any kind

of ultimate foundation, and understand that all our views of truth, morality, and politics are based

on interpretations situated within a totality of history and language. For Rorty, this is the more

moral approach to understanding social life, and is incompatible with the strong political position

of critical social theory.

Such a discernment of Rorty and McCarthy’s respective views sheds further insight on

the issue explored through the second goal of our article: the intelligibility and meaning of

incommensurability. One cannot at one time hold onto the (anti-foundational) belief that all truth

claims are always and only based on relative, language-derived interpretations while at the same

time holding the (foundational) belief that transcendent rationality permits groups of people to

arrive at socio-political ideals that apply across contexts. In the former case, any one

interpretation is seen as no better or worse than another in any absolute sense, whereas in the

latter case, the mechanisms of rationality enable certain claims to rise above others.

These very different orientations to what kind of knowledge it is possible to achieve

perform a key function in framing entire qualitative studies: they lead qualitative researchers to

either seek out theories and principles that can redress oppression beyond the local context in

which the study takes place (in the case of critical social theory), or to simply relay the multiple

26

narratives and interpretations that constitute the substantive area of inquiry to emphasize its

intimate relationship to the contexts in which it occurs (in the case of hermeneutics). By

elaborating on the implications of believing that interpretation is essentially ontological (with

Gadamer) or essentially epistemological (with Habermas), the Rorty-McCarthy debate shows

that the different positions lead to incompatible and incommensurable orientations to the nature

of rationality and the possibility of achieving foundational knowledge in the practice of

qualitative inquiry. In the next section, we extend this discussion of incommensurable

worldviews in terms of its implications for qualitative inquiry.

Philosophical Beliefs and Qualitative Inquiry

Two inter-related issues of rigor in qualitative inquiry have framed this article: the relationship

between paradigmatic beliefs and methodological decisions, and the notion of

incommensurability. To illustrate the significance of these issues, we have examined two camps

of philosophical thought, one of which (heralded by Habermas and McCarthy) methodically and

reflectively strives to influence how power, labour and language all intersect at moments of

moral and political discourse, the other of which (held variably by Gadamer and Rorty) forfeits

the authority of any and all language-derived interpretations of the world. Thus, despite the

commonly held ground between these two worldviews that covers the significance of language,

the rejection of instrumental reasoning, and the prominence of interpretive acts, the respective

tenets of hermeneutics and critical social theory appear to render them incommensurable.

This is important for qualitative researchers to recognize insofar that rigor in qualitative

inquiry is largely attributed to strong coherence between one’s worldview and one’s

methodological decision-making (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Holloway & Todres, 2003); but for

those who see value in crafting research with multiple paradigmatic beliefs (e.g. Kinsella, 2006;

27

Piercey, 2004), the question before us is one of understanding whether the tenets of these two

worldviews can co-exist at all, let alone in harmony. For McCarthy and Habermas, a

commitment to a critical social worldview is directly related to epistemological beliefs about the

nature of rationality and the possibility of foundational knowledge about what is True and what

is Right. As such, critical scholars might readily buy into Guba and Lincoln’s strong sense of

“paradigm,” suggesting that it is their particular epistemology that justifies and guides qualitative

inquiry into social inequalities and social justice.

As quoted earlier, Habermas claimed “social actions can be comprehended only in an

objective framework that is constituted conjointly by language, labor and domination” (1986, p.

273). Thus, for Habermas, qualitative inquiry must attend not only to the texts that become

qualitative data (interview transcripts, social policies, field notes, etc.), but also to power

relations embedded in the structures of a capitalist, classed society. On this view, labor and

domination are considered to belong to different ontological categories than language, and thus

ought to be thought about in different ways; not as mere texts to be interpreted, but as the very

forces that structure the ways in which we imagine texts should be interpreted. From this

perspective, rigor in qualitative inquiry would be judged at least in part by how exhaustively and

critically economic, race, gender, and political structures are themselves interrogated throughout

the process of a qualitative study.

Another example of how researchers applying a critical social theory lens might advocate

for a strong sense of paradigmatic coherence in qualitative health research is found in the

purported power of reflection to enhance rationality and enable the finding of truth that

transcends particular contexts. The critical social theory of Habermas and McCarthy suggests

that the reflection permitted by the rational powers of language can be applied to arrive at better

28

understandings and descriptions of the social world. The observation that the powers of

rationality and reflection persist across cultural contexts is enough for McCarthy to dismiss

Rorty’s point that we are simply playing a particular language game as irrelevant.

McCarthy is not concerned that we are playing a language game, but simply with

describing this language game, and McCarthy argues that this particular language game that we

play is structured around the notion of context-transcending rationality. As such, qualitative

health research ought to be oriented to the reflective and rational analysis of health-related texts,

cultures, and experiences, with a recognition of the structures of labour and domination (and

other oppressive forces) to arrive at better understandings of social action and strategies for

social change. While remaining aware of the importance of variations in the structures of labour,

domination, and oppression, these understandings and strategies that are the fruits of qualitative

inquiry might nonetheless provide insights that transcend the particular contexts in which they

first occur.

In elaborating the anti-foundational implications of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, Rorty

suggested that it is naïve to permit philosophical beliefs to dictate qualitative inquiry so strongly.

The anti-foundational view represented clearly by Rorty deflates the importance of

epistemological philosophy in the first place, suggesting that it is simply another area of

discourse in which we choose to participate. Because, for anti-foundationalists, the

epistemologies to which we claim to subscribe are simply a matter of participating in particular

language-games, profoundly influenced by our histories and contexts, they cannot have any

special claim to authority over our approaches to qualitative inquiry. According to this view,

epistemological beliefs do not dictate procedural decisions in qualitative inquiry any more than

the variety of other concerns bound up in a given qualitative research project (e.g. applicability

29

of the findings, the need to publish, influence of academic peers and of peer reviews, etc.).

Because the importance of philosophy is deconstructed by anti-foundationalists and especially

Rorty, so too is the importance of paradigmatic beliefs in engaging in qualitative research.

The anti-foundationalist position introduces a paradox that is central to the issue of

whether and how paradigmatic beliefs impact the conduct of qualitative inquiry. Although anti-

foundationalist scholars might suggest that philosophical beliefs ought to be considered

unimportant in determining decisions in qualitative inquiry, it is only through their philosophical

beliefs that they arrived at that position. This is the primary point on which McCarthy criticized

Rorty: he suggested that Rorty was relying on the very characteristics of philosophical discussion

(context-transcendent rationality) that he was simultaneously claiming are unimportant. As such,

the anti-foundationalists appear to be burning the platform on which they stand, using their

philosophical beliefs to claim that philosophical beliefs can be put to no very important use (and

for our purposes, thus cannot be considered the driving force behind qualitative health research).

However, continuing this line of reasoning, the anti-foundationalists claim to have

nonetheless used philosophical rationality to arrive at a position that undermines that rationality,

and to have done so by following the rules of the philosophical language-game. In this way, they

have turned philosophical rationality in on itself, seeking to show how the very notion of

context-transcendent rationality is itself bound up in paradox and contradiction. They “allow” the

rules of rationality to apply only for as long as it takes to show that rationality cannot stand up to

the rules it sets for itself, and in so doing they deconstruct the importance and value of the

epistemological beliefs arrived at through the application of such rational thought and discourse.

In place of these rationally determined epistemological beliefs, anti-foundationalists position

history, language, and practical human interests as the key forces driving inquiry. As such, they

30

would view qualitative inquiry as a form of interpretive practice, navigating through a messy,

practical, iterative process that is responsive to the many influences of history and context – not

solely or even primarily determined by philosophical beliefs (Rolfe, 2006).

Having engaged with the philosophical issues of ontology and epistemology leads the

anti-foundationalists to deconstruct the “metaphysical paradigm” in which qualitative inquiry is

determined by ontological and epistemological beliefs (Morgan, 2007). Anti-foundationalists

suggest that even the decisions of philosophers regarding these beliefs are profoundly formed by

the many influences of history and context. In this way, Rorty and Gadamer would encourage

researchers to place the entire qualitative research enterprise into a much wider context,

understanding how their own approaches to qualitative health research are profoundly shaped by

the varied histories and contexts of which they are a part.

Quality in qualitative research for this anti-foundational hermeneutic position would thus

demand to be judged using means other than paradigmatic consistency and coherence, whether

these “other” criteria are aesthetic, moral, practical, substantive or otherwise. Furthermore, the

meaning and intelligibility of the notion of incommensurability breaks down from this anti-

foundationalist perspective, because it assumes the primacy and importance of philosophical

(paradigmatic) orientations. It is not that anti-foundationalist researchers would believe they can

simply and easily do work that crosses paradigmatic boundaries (from hermeneutics to critical

theory and back again), but that these paradigmatic boundaries are themselves constructed,

dynamic, and undeserving of authority (Rolfe, 2006).

Conclusions: On Judgment

It is not that one side thinks judgments have to be made and the other side does not. Both

agree that inevitably they make choices about what is good, what is useful, and what is

31

not. The difference is that one side believes that “objective” methods and procedures can

be applied to determine the choices we make, whereas the other side believes these

choices are ultimately and inextricably tied to our values and our subjectivities. (Bochner,

2000, p. 266)

Arthur Bochner made the above statement in the context of a discussion about the criteria we use

to judge quality in qualitative inquiry, suggesting that the very idea of criteria often separates

qualitative researchers into (at least) two different camps. Among the divisive beliefs illuminated

by the key issue of quality criteria is one we have addressed at length in this article, i.e.

foundationalism versus anti-foundationalism (Bochner, 2000). The debates between Gadamer

and Habermas and their continuation by Rorty and McCarthy illustrate the importance of taking

a stance on foundationalism in helping to articulate beliefs about quality in qualitative inquiry.

For foundationalists who identify with the critical social theory of Habermas and

McCarthy, the procedural decisions made in a qualitative study are derived directly and

explicitly from critical philosophical beliefs, advocating for rigor to be judged as consistency and

coherence within that paradigm and reaffirming the strict boundaries between incommensurable

philosophical worldviews. Such a view supports Guba and Lincoln’s (1994) strong sense of

“paradigm” and the establishment of criteria, principles, and methods to be followed for the

judgment of quality in qualitative health research. These criteria, principles, and methods serve

to guide researchers inspired by foundationalist critical social theory to identify and describe

means to subvert dominative forces and achieve less oppressive social institutions.

Although debates about the nature and role of rational discourse and inquiry are

philosophically important for critical social theorists, they are valued only insofar as they

32

contribute to justifying the commitment to social justice and eliminating oppression throughout

society. Qualitative researchers drawing on critical social theory thus tend to situate themselves

strongly within their paradigmatic position to justify their commitments to social justice,

supporting judgments of quality in qualitative inquiry that assess the degree to which study

procedures align with this foundationalist commitment to social justice and reform.

For anti-foundationalists, particular those who identify with Rorty, the very philosophical

worldviews that are claimed to dictate procedural decisions in qualitative inquiry are themselves

deconstructed for relying on “faulty” notions of rationality and objectivity. From this

perspective, it is not fidelity to a philosophical paradigm that should determine the quality of

qualitative inquiry (as per Guba and Lincoln), but any variety of other concerns motivating the

researchers, such as practicality, aesthetics, or richness of contextual description (Amis & Silk,

2008; MacLure, 2011; Seale, 1999). Because anti-foundationalists move away from the

“metaphysical paradigm” in which paradigmatic beliefs dictate approaches to qualitative

research, they also reject the notion of incommensurability for constructing a philosophical

exclusivity that is based on the same “faulty” metaphysical notions of rationality and objectivity.

Anti-foundationalists thus try to place the entire qualitative research enterprise into the

context of deconstructed paradigmatic and philosophical beliefs, reaching beyond traditional

discourses of rigor in qualitative research toward a more contextualized, imaginative, and

flexible orientation to understanding quality in qualitative inquiry. Building on this, anti-

foundationalist researchers would then offer their own criteria according to which their work is

to be judged, encouraging readers to understand their inquiries as bound up with multiple

interpretations and contexts (Amis & Silk, 2008; Kvale, 1995; MacLure, 2011; Seale, 1999).

33

Bochner refers to “judgments” and “choices” in his comment quoted above, which we

believe points to a key message arising out of an exploration of these philosophical debates and

their implications for assessing quality in qualitative inquiry. Assuming that the participants in

the debates discussed in this article have understood one another (to the extent that such

understanding is possible), they nonetheless arrived at particular central issues that were deemed

to be philosophically irresolvable; these are the issues that ultimately draw the dividing lines

between the two philosophical camps.

At the root of the continued disagreements expressed by the debaters is the nature of

language in interpretation and the role of philosophically robust inquiry in guiding society: either

language permits a rationality that transcends local interpretive contexts, or it does not; either we

can clearly see the ontological workings of labor and domination, or we cannot; either we

envision insights that appeal to an ultimate rationality as means toward social betterment, or we

do not. There is no universal standard to which the debaters or we have access that can

demonstrate which side is true or correct, and thus only judgment, informed by our own personal

and philosophical histories, will do to justify commitments one way or the other.

Despite the impossibility of knowing which of these sides is ultimately “better,” the

participants accordingly expressed judgment by aligning their beliefs with either a foundational

or anti-foundational worldview. Indeed, as Ceci et al. (2002) suggested (drawing on John

Caputo), the need to express “judgment” on anything “presumes a context of undecidability” (p.

718). The key point here is that “undecidability is not understood as a problem to be solved but

rather the prior and necessary condition of our being called on to decide anything at all” (p. 718).

Just as Gadamer, Habermas, Rorty, and McCarthy expressed judgment on their philosophical

commitments, drawing to varying degrees on rational discourse, historical tradition, and

34

purposeful interpretation, so do researchers express judgment in a context of undecidability

about what we believe to be the most important considerations of quality in qualitative health

research. By choosing to align ourselves with particular philosophical camps and with particular

communities of practice in qualitative inquiry, we express judgments about what beliefs and

strategies we consider to be central to our qualitative research practice and what beliefs and

strategies we consider to be misguided and misinformed.

Although we have described a reflexive and rationally-ordered situation in which a

“simple” choice is to be made regarding which side of this ongoing debate resonates more

strongly with a particular researcher’s beliefs, we of course recognize that our academic and life

contexts rarely (and probably never) permit such “clean” decision-making. If our actions and

circumstances (or histories and contexts) contribute so significantly to constituting our

paradigmatic orientations, then there is a process of mutual constitution at play between the

practice of qualitative health research and the refinement of paradigmatic beliefs; the more we

put particular beliefs into practice in our research the stronger and more tacit those beliefs likely

become.

As scholars on both sides of these philosophical debates have moved well beyond

conceiving a person as a rational, self-contained, decision-maker, we must also recognize that we

are not simply “free to choose”, in a Cartesian sense, to side with one philosopher or another.

This amounts to recognition of the fundamental ambiguity that characterizes the judgments and

decisions to which we refer in this article, ambiguities that make their way into every judgment

of quality in qualitative health research. Again echoing Ceci et al (2001), this is not a problem to

be dealt with, but a context to reflect on when engaging in and judging qualitative inquiry.

35

What the exploration of these debates suggests is that at some point we must nonetheless

make judgments (whether tacit or explicit) about whether we place our beliefs and assumptions

with a reflective rationality that can justify foundationalist approaches to inquiry and the

assessment of qualitative rigor, or with an interpretive history and context that rejects

foundationalism both philosophically and practically. These judgments might be far from clear

and simple, but they are nonetheless a part of every conversation that constitutes qualitative

health research. To keep the conversation about political ideals, moral defensibility, and

methodologies for social inquiry alive, we would do well to keep the judgments of others in

mind, doing everything we can to empathize with and recognize the contexts, motivations and

rationale for opposing positions in these ongoing debates. In so doing, we offer our colleagues in

various communities of qualitative health research practice the same respect we offer our

research participants: a commitment to understanding their experience, meaning, and motivations

to the best of our abilities.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship,

and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship,

and or publication of this article: None.

36

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Bios

James A. Shaw, PT, PhD is a post-doctoral fellow at Toronto Rehabilitation Institute, Toronto,

ON, Canada, and a visiting post-doctoral fellow in the School of Health and Social Care at

Brunel University in London, United Kingdom.

Ryan T. DeForge, PhD is a research associate at the Aging, Rehabilitation, and Geriatric Care

Research Centre at St. Joseph’s Health Care, London, ON, Canada