Notes on Friedrich Schleiermacher's "Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts"

16/11/14 19:33Notes on Schleiermacher's HERMENEUTICS

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NOTES ON

Friedrich Schleiermacher's

Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts

Ed. Heinz Kimmerle (1977).

Page numbers on the left-hand column refer to the English edition by James Duke and Jack Forstman.Atlanta (GA): Scholars Press, 1986.

NOTES (taken 1993, pub. 2013) byJosé Angel García Landa

University of Zaragozahttp://www.garcialanda.net

Note: Parenthetical comments in italics, between brackets, are added by J. A. GarcíaLanda

Translators' Introduction (1-18).

James Duke: "Schleiermacher: On Hermeneutics" (1-15)

The Art of Understanding

2- Schleiermacher constructs his theory in debate with Enlightenmenthermeneutics on the Classics and Biblical exegesis—which areunsystematic and fail to do justice to the phenomenon of understanding.

3- They take understanding as a matter of course; Schleiermacher warnsagainst the equal possibility of misunderstanding. He analyzesunderstanding in ordinary conversation: based on a shared language(universal) plus a personal message (a particular element); they interactand complement themselves. "The established linguistic system 'allows'one to speak, and by the same token it channels and otherwise conditionsone's pattern of thought".

http://www.garcialanda.net/



4- "Yet the message one thinks and articulates is one's own. It varies fromone's own experience, one's perspective on the world and one's specialdesigns". Three phases: general hermeneutics, grammaticalinterpreatation, and psychological interpretation.

5- "In effect the interpreter is to trace the stages in the composition of thework, from its original inception to its completion." —To see the author'sidea and his decision to comunicate. But there is an interplay of grammarand psychology. A dynamic process— and also an interplay, a dialecticalmovement, between the comparative and divinatory methods. (The authoror text are compared with similar authors or texts). "The interpreterneeds some talent for 'feeling' or 'divining' how language as a living,organic power has affected the fabric of thought and the mode ofpresentation", and must have an insight into the author's personality. Themetaphor of the hermeneutic circle: "The logically vexing propositionthat the whole is understood from its parts and the parts from the whole".

6- Part/whole relationship in word vs. sentence, and in text vs. language;in a given statement vs. the personality development or life of the author.This circular "motion" from part to whole makes hermeneutics an art.Agility is necessary. A perfect or ideal understanding is never attained.

Schleiermacher's Biblical Hermeneutics

7- Schleiermacher was a lecturer in Biblical hermeneutics at halle andBerlin. His New Testament hermeneutics is warranted by a general theoryof interpretation (in a way like his Englightenment predecessors). Aspecial hermeneutics is only justified by a special language and content.—e.g. Christianity (a language-producing power).

8- Schleiermacher is in favour of understanding the New Testamentauthors within their context—but they also create and reshape thatcontext. "Thus the New Testament texts illustrate how universal and



particular features intersect to produce a unique literature". Pro seeing thespecificity of both a "school" and of authors inside it. Schleiermacher isrooted in a hermeneutic tradition (because of the problems he deals with,etc.).

9- Kimmerle's Interpretation of Schleiermacher

A contribution to the post-Heideggerian reassessment of thehermeneutical tradition. Kimmerle's thesis: "Schleiermacher shifted froma hermeneutics oriented toward language to one oriented toward thesubjectivity of the author". The first relies only on language; the second isideal: its expression is language. Now language does not equal thought.

9-10: "Thought", as a purely ideal reality, is by necessity modified whenrendered in the form of empirical language." The Lücke edition isweighted towards the later Schleiermacher, a psychological emphasis. ForKimmerle, "Schleiermacher's preoccupation with pure understandingleads him to abstract hermeneutics from its historical matrix"—

11- this happens both regarding the historicity of the object and that of theinterpreter. Schleiermacher's "shift" is challenged by the translators.There is also psychology in the early manuscripts—perhaps developedlater? There is a greater continuity than Kimmerle suggests.

12- From the start we find both objective and subjective factors inSchleiermacher's hermeneutics. Are they both in language, or is languagefully objective? A crux. And "does attention to the process of compositionafford a better grasp of the text itself?" Role of sujective factor ininterpretation: how to take it into account?

Schleiermacher's Hermeneutical Legacy

13- Founding hermeneutics on the problem of understanding as a whole.A tension between difference and commonality between persons—hermeneutics spans distances. "For Schleiermacehr, the historical text is



not addressed directly to the present interpreter, but to an originalaudience. The present interpreter is to understand that originalcommunication in terms of its historical context."

14- Dialogue with the past, etc. A relation between historical distance andauthority: the classics appear as a norm for the present, or the Bible, buton the other hand there is the problem of applicability, a differentquestion [Cf. Ed. D. Hirsch's notions of "meaning" vs. "significance" inValidity in Interpretation and The Aims of Interpretation].Schleiermacher's orientation to understanding is still valid now.

The Text and Translation (by James Duke and H. Jackson Forstman, 15-18). Only the Academy Addresses in this volume were meant forpublication. The rest are lecture notes by Schleiermacher.

Foreword to the German edition by Heinz Kimmerle (19-20)

19- "The present practice of understanding in the sciences—and even inlife itself—is determined by the image of historical-ontical research thatdeveloped in the previous century" [meaning of course the 19th century—JAGL].

20- Schleiermacher tries to develop a science of understanding, but this"methodizing" separates understanding from life and from the applicationof what has been understood (due to his psychologism).

Editor's Introduction by Heinz Kimmerle (21-40)

Schleiermacher's manuscripts; dating, etc. Ms. on criticism is not suitablefor publication (dealing with philological criticism, previous tohermeneutics, in order to secure an authentic text).



The development of Schleiermacher's Thought on Hermeneutics

27- Schleiermacher is now seen through Dilthey's "Die Entstehung derHermeneutik" (by Odebrecht, Bultmann, etc.). But Dilthey's description isonly valid for the late Schleiermacher, from 1819 ms. on; based on"psychological reconstruction" for understanding, and directed towardsthe creative process of the origin of a work.

28- The early emphasis on grammatical interpretation is not properlyrecognized, nor his evolution.

Hermeneutics as a 'philological discipline'

In Kurze Darstellung der theologischen Studiums, 54 (1811), the "art ofinterpretation" is a "philosophical discipline which deends on principlesas those in any other (art)". Idea of hermeneutics as a systematic whole—not a loose collection of rules.

29- Schleiermacher advocates a general hermeneutics; vs. dealing onlywith special problems. Vs. normative assumption of Ernesti (Biblicalinterpretation) and Ast & Wolf (classics), which give a special status totheir texts. But also from the start, "Schleiermacher's conception of auniversal hermeneutics was linked to a fruther, questionable view thathermeneutical method should not be concerned at all with the historicalparticularity of the item to be understood". Understanding as a special,self-enclosed process. One must become the immediate reader of the text,but somehow historical knowledge is irrelevant for that.

30- "Just as Schleiermacher tried to separate the process of understandingfrom the appropriation of historical knowledge in order to distill itsuniversal principles, so too he wants to detach the pure conception fromthe further task of assimilating the thing conceived and to confinehermeneutics to the first" [Cf. Hirsch's 'objective meaning' vs.'significance' - JAGL]. Vs. Ernesti's inclusion of subtilitas explicandiwithin hermeneutics. Pure comprehension must precede judgment.



31- Schleiermacher tries to leap over historical distance and be absorbedin the view of those who lived in the past. Language is the onlypresupposition in hermeneutics. Vs. Ernesti's linguistic theory that oneword has only one sense (sensus) which unflods into various meanings(significationes)—for Schleiermacher every word has a general sphere ofmeaning which can be 'felt' in its concrete applications—'feeling' insteadof completeness. Hermeneutic circle:

32- "According to Schleiermacher, one can escape this apparent circle.One must begin by ascertaining the usage of the given word from thecontext of the sentence in which it occurs. Then, by comparing all knownapplications of the word, one can determine the general sphere in aprovisional way. This provisional grasp of the general meaning becomesthe point of departure for the hermeneutical operations, specificallydirected towards determining the special application in each particularcase." A comprehensive hermeneutics, dealing with the whole oflanguage, starting with children's acquisition of language.

33- Understanding "is structured as a complex coinherence of universaland particular acts of reason (inner symbol or idea, & language).Grammatical interpretation interprets a word as general language, and"technical" interpretation does so "'positively', as it is dependent on thepower and mode of speech of a particular person".

34—individuals thereby develop language through their expressionswhile remaining bound by the possibilities of language. Technicalinterpretation interprets style.

35- Hermeneutics as a 'doctrine or art' [Kunstlehre] or a 'technique'[Technik].In Kurze Darstellung des Theologischen Studiums, 53 (1830),Schleiermacher writes "The full understanding of a discourse or writing isan artistic achievement and this requires a doctrine of art or technique,



which we designate by the term 'hermeneutics' . . . Such a doctrine of artonly exists insofar as its rules from a system based directly on clearprinciples drawn from the nature of thinking and language."Schleiermacher tried to incorporate his hermeneutics into his concept ofethics.

36- As with other disciplines, Schleiermacher inadequately posits forhermeneutics "a discrepancy between the ideal inner essence and theempirical external appearance." —> The object of hermeneutics is splitinto internal thinking and external language—> "Schleiermacher backsoff from the thought that dominated his earlier herrmeneutical sketchesand that he could formulate as late as 1813: "thought and expression areessentially and internally entirely the same". Now, no longer a concernabout how general, external language is individualized. Language is nowonly the expression of individuality. "More and more the process bywhich thinking emerges into empirically graspable linguistic formbecomes the proper object of hermeneutics, with special reference to howin thies process of the externalization of thinking the individuality of thespeaker comes to be known."

37- For Kimmerle, our thinking is determined by language, andSchleiermacher gives up this insight. A knowledge of the state oflanguage, and a knowledge about the life and thought of the author arenecessary for interpretation. In Schleiermacher's "Introduction to the NewTestament", he wants to

38- "place us (by gathering historical knowledge) in the position of theoriginal readers for whom the New Testament authors wrote" [But wasn'the supposed to ignore history? I.e., what Schleiermacher ignores is theproductive work of hindsight and historical distance- JAGL]. This ispreparatory, separate from actual exegesis . In the 1819 account,technicall interpretation does not concern itself with individuality, butwith style (even if individuality appears fully represented there). Themodification of general language is seen as the individuality of thespeaker.



39- Later (in the "Academy Addresses") the work is seen as an act, theobject of interpretation is individual and internal thought; the aim is"understanding how something is an empirical modirfication of an idealreality."

40- A whole series of processes to this end (ms. 6) but only one moresection is added, "psychological" interpretation (subdivided into'psychological' and 'technical').

Friedrich SchleiermacherMANUSCRIPT 1:

THE APHORISMS OF 1805 AND 1809-10

41- [Note: Numbers in boldface in this section refer to paragraphnumbers, page numbers are in plain typeface throughout]

1) Against Ernesti's conception - For Schleiermacher, hermeneutics isconcerned only subtilitas intelligendi. Subtilitas applicandi involves theproduction of texts, "and is itself subject to hermeneutics"; "hermeneuticsmay offer suggestions for the proper use of commentaries, but not forwriting them".

3) "Two divergent maxims for understanding: (1) I am understandingeverything until I encounter a contradiction or nonsense. (2) I do notunderstand anything that I cannot perceive and comprehend [construiren]as necessary. In accordance with this second maxim, understanding is anunending task"

42-4) The failure to understand is failure to understand words—some aspectof "The entire schematic view [Anschauung] present in a word-sphere."



6) "Strictly speaking, grammatical interpretation is the objective side;technical, the subjective. Consequently, grammatical interpretation playsa negative role in hermeneutical construction, masking the boundaries;technical interpetation is positive. These two sides of interpretationcannot always coincide, for that would presuppose both a completeknowledge of and completely correct use of language. The 'art' lies inknowing when one side should give way to the other."

7) Vs. axiomantism in method.

8) "In interpretation it is essential that one be able to step out of one'sframe of mind into that of the author"

43-9) "In reality, each word, even a particle, has only one meaning[Bedeutung], and the various meanings of words must be understood bytracing them back to their original unity" [vs. Ernesti].

10) Thought is to be treated as an act, not as a thing. Various "senses" of aword can be avoided.

11) 'Sense' as a more precise determination of a word's meaning, "aspecial instance drawn from its general sphere".

12) "The interpreter must try to become the immediate reader of the textin order to understand its allusions, its atmosphere, and its special field ofimages."

13) Relation author / reader (a serious work vs. occasional writing) issignificant.

14) Some thoughts [images?] are to be seen only as signs of a [subjective]impression or state of mind, a means of representation:44-"often the form of a thought is what is being stated, while its substance is



merely part of the means of representation"

15, etc.— A concern with understanding the author not the same asunderstanding parts of the text, a concern with barbarisms, etc.

19) Narrowing extent of Ernesti's hermeneutics, and extending its scope.Pro reconstruction and an understanding of the peculiarities and thecommon ground of author and reader. (3 parts: 1: common ground; 2:peculiarities of author; 3: peculiarities of reader).

45-21) 2nd part: two tasks: "The general task is to investigate the idea, theunity of what has been put together, the individuality of the text. Thespecial task is to investigate the various ways in which the elements arecombined, the psychological and the personal aspects".

22) Language is not a "general phenomenon"; it fluctuates betweengeneral and specific. [vs. Kimmerle's notion? JAGL ]

46-26) The problem of assuming emphasis in the text.

27) "The deeper one probes into its elements, the more unexplored thelanguage seems".

28) "An objective view of words leads to a mistaken view of figurativeterms".

31) "within the meaning of words, much that was originally organicbecomes again inorganic with the passage of time, and therefore one mustknow in which period an author writes". Etymology should be taken intoaccount.

47-32) Origin of words, figurative expressions, etc.



35) "To be sure, different styles give rise to different rules ofinterpretation, but lex narratio and dogma are poor distinctions." (Vs.Morus).

48-41) Need to know language as a whole and its history too.

42) "One cannot understand a spoken statement without knowing both itsmost general and its most personal and particular value"

43) Speaking as an elaboration and transformation of "somethingintensive" into "something extensive".

49-46) [Schleiermacher conceives of a language as something organic, witha genius of its own]. Observations on speech modes.

48) "If every spoken statement is viewed with language as the center, allpersonal nuance disappears, except in the case of the true artist oflanguage who individualizes the language anew".

49) Previous terms take understanding as given, and are therefore sets ofarbitrary rules, 'special expedients' in the case of misunderstanding.

50) Schleiermacher argues that if we aim at understanding an artist wedisregard what is objective and given, except insofar as it leads us to thatindividuality.

50-51) Christianity as a language-creating force.

52) "Hermeneutics in the reverse of grammar and even more."

53) "The technical meaning of a term is to be derived from the unity of



the word-sphere and from the rules governing the presupposition of thisunity" [Note: presupposition.]

55) "Language is the only presupposition in hermeneutics, and everythingthat is to be found, including the other objective and subjectivepresuppositions, must be discovered in language" [Does this includehistory?]

56) [Here, "technical" seems to have a more general sense, similar to themodern sense of "technical term"]

51-59) "Just as one must begin with the moral law in order to understandman, so in order to understand a language one must begin with itsstructural law".

60) "Everything complex must be referred back to what is simple: amultiplicity of meanings must be quite consciously reduced to theirunity."

61) Language usage is not the same as language rules, and must berespected.

63) On multiple meanings, etc. "In the case of an ambiguous reference,the more grammatical and correct an author is, the more the most naturaland most obvious meaning is to be preferred. Often in the New Testamentthis cannot be determined."

52-64) Complete understanding needs to appropriate the entire originalmeaning [i.e. not merely verbal meaning.]

67) "Figurative meanings are subjective meanings which, having emergedfrom an actual, definite image, have become objective."



68) "Every child comes to understand the meanings of words onlythrough hermeneutics."

69) In grammatical interpretation, the unity of signification is the mainprinciple. In technical interpretation, multiple meanings.

53-72) "One can speak of figurative meanings only when there already existsa literal expression for what is indicated."

54-79) History must be dispensed with in the interpretation of things whichhave not yet happened. [??]

80) The view of language as an abstract entity determines grammaticaldescriptions.

81) "In order to determine the particular from the universal, one must dealwith the formal element first, because that determines how everythingcoheres." [The grammatical element - particles, etc.]

82) "There are two kinds of determination, the exclusive, which comesfrom the whole context, and the thetic, which comes from the immediatecontext."

85) Problem of determining subjective/objective meaning in particles —Limits of technical interpretation.

55-89) Language is modelled by literature. E.g. the modes in Greek fromepic poetry.

91) "When rightly understood, the infinite significance of the HolyScriptures is not in contradiction to its hermeneutical limitations."



92) The meanings of words do not expand.

56-94) "For the technical limitations one must locate the major passages".

95) Notion of school: consists in viewing several authors as one to someextent—a hermeneutical concept.

99) "One must already know a man in order to understand what he says,and yet one first becomes acquainted with him by what he says."

100) Subjective combinations, genres, etc.: there are no fixed distinctions.

57-101) "The statement of the subject matter and the form in general givesrise to an expectation which is open-ended, like a schema. The schemawhich arises is only subjective."

102) Predictable authors are poor. "The productive spirit always bringsforth someting that could not have been expected."

104) "Lyrical poets, who are said to be the most subjective, are the mostdifficult authors among the ancients to interpret technically. They speakfrom epic and gnomic heights."

106) Language: concept or intuition? (passive vs. active combination orarrangement of work).

107) "The claim that an author's style is arbitrary corresponds to theusual opinion of how words are used."

108) Style must respect the laws of genre (otherwise, it is a mannerism).

58-109) The unity of the work too must respect genre. Different types of



works: formal, linguistic...

111) Mannerism is imitation which doesn't gasp the original individualcontext of a work.

114) In interpreting literature or the New Testament, "one must considerhow in any style the speaker thinks of the combination of thoughts andthe way in which the hearers understand. No text is intended in such away that its hearers could not possibly have understood it."

59-115) "In dealing with historical writings, determining what is puredescription and what is mixed with judgments is a matter for technicalinterpretation, insofar as the author himself is assumed to have beenconscious of the difference."

116) An author's distinctive use of language modifies the genre withinwhich he writes.

119) "every individual constructs language; . . . every understanding of agiven text contributes to understanding the language. Consequently, thesame principle operates in both [grammar and hermeneutics]."

120) "The understanding of a given statement [Rede] is always based onsomething prior, of two sorts—a preliminary knowledge of humanbeings, a preliminary knowledge of the subject matter"

121) "The understanding of a particular is always conditioned by anunderstanding of the whole."

60-122) One should start with a study of the beginning of the text, whichseparates its specific sphere from generality.

123) Understanding must stand the text in the sphere of common life.



124) "The whole is frist understood as a genre" Genres develop from life.

125) The meaning of a word is contextually affected.

126) "How to approach indeterminate elements: the less certain one is ofthe meaning, the more strictly must one hold to the given usage."

61-128) "The two sides of the hermeneutical task must be separated evenbefore the grammatical operation begins."

129) Definition of meaning as the mutual determination of elements.

62-133) The author is both free and guided by the power of the subjectmatter.

135) Grammatical interpretation is the reverse of grammar; technicalinterpretation is the reverse of composition.

137) "To some extent in every work a special terminology is formed."

138) Different spans cause differences in writing. Narrow span betweensubjective and objective elements in literature. Wide span in philosophyor history [? Obscure or vague].

63-139) "Study the era." Simultaneous interpretation of individual unity andof the train of thought. Interpretation must take into account the extent ofleeway allowed by the genre (as regards subjectivity).

64-142) Problem of 'subjective' element when we know only that author ofhis class or age: "One comes to have a feeling for what is distinctive, but



it will remain a difficult statement."

143) The interpreter must combine the subjective and the objective so asto "put himself 'inside' the author." "On understanding an author betterthan he understands himself"—increasing and correcting thatunderstanding. Difficulty comes from both objective and subjectivecauses.

Friedrich SchleiermacherMANUSCRIPT 2

THE FIRST DRAFT OF 1809-10

67-Introduction

Holy Scripture must be submitted to the rules of interpretation. Is itsubject to a special hermeneutics? OK, "But a special hermeneutics canbe understood only in terms of a general hermeneutics."

68- Ernesti is self-contradictory. Schleiermacher is against the usualextension of hermeneutics: "Presenting what one has understood to othersis itself a production, therefore a 'text', and so it is not hermeneutics, butan object for hermeneutics." [One might argue that presenting it ishermeneutics, and that reading makes it an object, rather—JAGL].Widespread problem of understanding: not only in foreign languages. "Infamiliar languages, difficult places arise only because the familiar oneswere misunderstood" [Not the case—JAGL]. The task of hermeneuticshas a twofold origin: "understanding by reference to the language andunderstanding by reference to the one who speaks." It is an art, since bothare incomplete by themselves—"Grammatical and technicalunderstanding". "Forgetting the author in grammatical interpretation and



the author in technical". "Praise of speech as a language-forming spirit."

69- Variation between the two extremes (grammatical and technical,objectivity and subjectivity). Combining them: "Since each operationpresupposes the other, they must be directly combined"—in subjective orin objective texts, since we do not know beforehand. Grammaticalinterpretation deals with elements, subject matter; technical one withoverall coherence, grouped by reading. On misunderstanding: quantitativeor qualitative. "Every error is productive." "One must understand as wellas and better than the author." [Derived from Schlegel, Athenäum].Grammatical and technical interpretations are simultaneous butconceptually and methodologically distinct.

70- Grammatical interpretation is first "because in the final analysis bothwhat is presupposed and what is to be discovered is language". The goalis to avoid misunderstanding.

Grammatical interpretation

"It is the art of finding the precise sense [Sinn] of a given statement fromits language and with the help of language." First canon: "One shouldconstrue the meaning from the total pre-given value of language and theheritage common to the author and his reader, for only by reference tothis is interpretation possible". Nobody possesses the whole language.[Cf. Saussure - JAGL]. "The richness of meaning depends on when andwhere a work arose"; "every effort to determine and fix the meaning ofparticular passages by interpreting them separately should be part of acumulative process that ultimately determines the precise meaning of anyparticular passage in terms of its context" (70-71).

71- Grasping particular meanings of terms under a common solemn andgeneral meaning: "This contradicts the customary view of the plurality ofmeanings according to which in many cases the original meaning isregarded as only a distant occasion for the other meanings." This view isnot linguistic. It distorts language with a conceptual logic, while language



is related to intuition [Anschauung] which determines the range of everyword.

72- Problem of the multiplicity of meanings (one word as origin, or asphere of intuition). Or perhaps:

73- Figurative terms everywhere (vs. the ideal of 'exactness'): "even whenthat does not seem to be so, it is only because the terms are no longergrasped genetically." Ossification and renewal [—both necessary?]

74- Another reason for multiplicity is allegory; allusions develop fromwords retaining their literal meaning. Grammatical interpretation isapplied all right, but word meaning requires technical interpretation. "Themost common example here is when the thought itself, as explained bygrammatical intepretation, is not part of what is represented, but only partof the representation, itself a sign. Where and how this occurs can bediscovered only by technical interpretation." The unity of meaningprinciple also applies to structure words [closed system words], particleshave a structure, identity, etc.

75- Particles are not the same as modes of inflection. Language graspsobjects not as fixed and objective, but as living and developing. Theopposition eternal/transient does not apply to individual elements oflanguage—the unity of meaning holds for both formal and materialelements of language.

76- "Each usage is related to this basic meaning as a particular to thegeneral and each usage relates to another usage as one particular toanother." Each particular usage mixes an essential unity (which neverfully emerges) with an accidental element —"an unknown usage can bedetermined only with the aid of the essential unity"—but the essentialunity is not manifest; it is not a presupposition, then, but something toseek. A double task of grammatical interpretation: "(1) the task ofdetermining the essential meaning from a given usage and (2) the task ofascertaining an unknown usage from the meaning" [already a



hermeneutic circle]. First getting hold of meaning is the most difficultoperation, and we accomplish it in childhood.

77- Grasping unity of meaning from particulars is an unending task. Onlyfeeling can grasp that unity: "Thus this feeling must be the substitute forcompleteness." Primitive people ground the correctness of this feeling intheir proximity to nature. "One who has lost his philological innocencemust for the common cases rely on philological science." "The task canbe completed only by approximation." The evolution of a wholelanguage, collective, is analogous to the hermeneutical development ofunity in individual person (phases): 1) not yet unity; 2) consciousness ofunity; 3) Richness leads to confusions. The unity of words developshistorically. "To derive a given usage, one must proceed from that clarityand determinacy of the unity of words which could be common to theauthor and the original reader." [Note "a reader" as a step which ensuresthe possibIlity of objectivity].

78- Dictionary compliation: 1) it may rely on a mass of particulars or 2)assume a central unity in the word. Common error of taking mostcommon instance as the true unity. The dictionary "must have a masteryof the spirit of its language". They tend to confine themselves to theirsingle language. Schleiermacher would deny all identification of worldspheres here, making them oneself, and discovering unity.

79- At best, "the way of viewing the world [Anschauungweise] peculiar toa given people must emerge." Careful when dealing with stages ofdevelopment: they may coexist. One should not try to equate elementsfrom different languages—but comparison is all right.

80- "a particular usage is not an expansion or derivation but a delimitationof the entire sphere" —> "this delimitation is determined in each case bythe context" (a general rule for grammatical interpretation). "Eachelement [in the sentence] is the condition for understanding the other"—>also approximation.



(1-) Material elements help determine formal elements—whether theyintroduce a new topic or not limiting the range of meaning of formalelements. [Genre] too. Also, opposed formal elements help determineformal elements— e.g. the use of particles or inflections.

81- Mastery of language is necessary. The French language is deaf anddumb: too connected, not free, it is only a tool. Schleiermacher opposesthe idea of a universal language.

"The more comprehensive the unity, the more difficult it is to graspt theconcrete individual usage".

82- An author's degree of linguistic consciousness must be taken intoaccount. Problem when images coming from two languages mix (as in theNew Testament).

(2-) Determination of material elements: through formal elements, or bythe material context. Subject matter and form determines the relationshipbetween primary and secondary themes.

83- Main rule: "the subject must be clarified by the predicate and thepredicate by the subject." Or, the subject may be clarified by the predicateof its antithesis, etc., for parallel contests or passages. [From Ernesti andMorus.]

84- But there is never a precise identity here: the problem of more or lessdistance (passages in the same or in another context).

85- It is easier to decide in scientific, systematic texts. Keeping in accounthere the difference between authors (or genres in some author) whenlooking for parallelisms— "a group of authors who belong to the samesphere, period, or school are to be regarded as a single author and used toexplain each other." "But this, naturally, belongs to a higherunderstanding of which the author himself was unaware."



86- Use of parallel passages. Difficult when language is not technical.Both similarity and difference must be taken into account here.

Up to now we have dealt with the quality of meaning. Now we deal withthe problem of the quantity of meaning—seeing too much, or too little.The middle period of development of languages is the most adequate tothe orderly presence of higher meanings. The whole language is stillunified but a duplicity of expression has already arisen. Wrongness ofprinciples in interpreting the New Testament (first period, and a bit of thesecond).

Appendix

88- Problem: Understanding is not the same as the task of resolvingcontradictions in doctrine. How to resolve them? Dogmatic contradictionsare not the same as historical contradictions, due to different reports, etc.

89- (Vs. trying too much to resolve dogmatic or historical contradictions;it is not the role of hermeneutics. E.g. the problem of not harmonizinggospels).

Use of previous interpreters is all right, "to direct attention to matters thatthemselves would have been overlooked," but those opinions must beproven hermeneutically [re-interpreted]. Etc.

91- A loose page from 1810-11. "The task. To discover the distinctivecharacter of the composition from the idea of the work." Taking intoaccount genre, popularity, etc. "One must know all the possibilities thatwere at the author's disposal."

92- In linguistic interpretation, two tasks: "1) determining the linguisticsphere of the author" and 2) "Determining the distinctive use of languagefrom the linguistic sphere"—

93- —through the use of "Immediate intuition and comparison". Each is



insufficient on its own. [Divination of individuality as aim]


HERMENEUTICS: THE COMPENDIUM OF 1819 AND THE MARGINAL NOTES OF

1828

95- Introduction

I.1. "At present there is no general hermeneutics as the art ofunderstanding but only a variety of specialized hermeneutics." (1818:Hermeneutics and criticism presuppose each other —but the task ofcriticism ends in theory, "whereas the task of hermeneutics is endless";"special hermeneutics is only an aggregate of observations and does notmeet the requirements of science". Schleiermacher against its use onspecial occasions.

96- "Hermeneutics deals only with the art of understanding, not with thepresentation of what has been understood." Hermeneutics presupposes a familiarity— not dealing only with foreign languages.

2. Problem of assigning a place to hermeneutics—not logic (appliedscience), and not philosophy (positivistic)—

97-3. —but hermeneutics is philosophical.

II.4. "Speaking is the medium for the commonality of thought, and forthis reason rhetoric and hermeneutics belong together and both are relatedto dialectics." Speech as developed thought. Dialectics relies onhermeneutics and rhetoric, because the development of all knowledge



depends on both speaking and understanding.

97-98-5. "Just as every act of understanding is related to both the totality of thelanguage and the totality of the speaker's thoughts, so understanding aspeech always involves two moments: to understand what is said in thecontext of the language with its possibilities, and to understand it as a factin the thinking of the speaker" ;

98- "language develops through speaking".

"In every case communication presupposes a shared language andtherefore some knowledge of the language"; "each person represents onelocus where a given language takes shape in a particular way, and hisspeech can be understood only in the context of the totality of thelanguage. But then too he is a person who is a constantly developingspirit, and his speaking can be understood as only one moment in thisdevelopment in relation to all others.6. Understanding takes place only in the coherence of these twomoments."(1828): Grammatical and psychological interpretation make use of eachother).

99- III.7: Are they "higher" and "lower"? Not in themselves: only inrelation to each intepretive task.

100- 8. Each can make the other superfluous.

9. "Interpretation is an art" —a construction of something definite (orfinite)= for something indefinite (or infinite). (Language is infinite, andintuition, external influence on people too). Complete knowledge of eachis impossible; we need to move back and forth between the grammaticaland psychological sides, and no rules can stipulate exactly how to dothis."



101- 10. "The success of the art of interpretation depends on one'slinguistic competence and on one's ability for knowing people."Competence in rhetoric is necessary too, but it is a different kind ofcompetence. Knowing people is here a "knowledge of the subjectiveelement determining the composition of thoughts."

102- IV.11. Some acts of speaking are more interesting than othershermeneutically. (Business discussions, conversations about theweather...). Significance for either side of hemrmeneutics: linguisticcreativity (classics) or high individuality (original texts).

103- We find both in works of genius. All three must be influential.

12. Each side, grammatical or psychological, may weigh differently.Objective (public) genres require a minimum of psychologicalinterpretation, and vice versa. (Epic vs. lyric or letters).

104- There are no other types of interpretation apart from these. Nor forthe New Testament. Schleiermacher advocates the historicalinterpretation of the New Testament, it does not negate the power of theNew Testament to create new concepts.

[Note (245): J. A. Turrentinus first called for this and for a generalhermeneutic in 1728]

V. Gathering of historical data is only previous work for a historicalinterpretation. Interpretation cannot begin until data have re-created "therelationship between the speaker and the original audience."

[Note (245): Allegory is used in the Bible as a means to explaincontradictory or difficult passages or increasing the significance of trivialevents. Luther gave priority to the literal sense. Protestant hermeneuticsrestricts allegorical interpretation.]

"Allegorical interpretation does not deal with allegories where the



figurative meaning is the only one intended, regardless of whether thestories are based on truth, as in the parable of the sower, or as fiction, asin the parable of the rich man, but to cases where the literal meaning, inits immediate context, gives rise to a second, figurative meaning." (Vs.Ernesti's refusal to accept allegory). Allusions introduce a secondmeaning,

105- —allusions intended by the author, enwined in a mere train ofthough which makes them recognizable (the author thinks). Parallelisms[Here one might include metafiction, mise en abyme, etc.— JAGL] "are tobe noted only when figurative expressions indicate them." Schleiermacheropposes the common notion that there are no errors or mistakes in theBible. It is both a divine and a human work.

106- Unmarked allusions are found in Homer and in the Bible as a resultof authorship being indefinite: myth in one case, the Holy Spirit in theother. There is the question whether the Holy Scripture should be treatedin a different way.

107- "This question cannot be answered by a dogmatic decision aboutinspiration, because such a decision itself depends upon interpretation."[One would think rather that it depends upon affiliation to a dogma whichsets the limits to interpretation- JAGL]. The Apostles wrote not only foreverybody, but also more specifically for their own age. "Ourinterpretation must take this fact into account." The Holy Spirit spokethrough them as they would have spoken.

108- VII. Schleiermacher opposes the tendency to find hidden meaningseverywhere—cabalistic interpretations too; one must take into accountthe interpretation of the original readers. But one should not restrictinterpretation to this, either. Interpretation begins only after we removeour differences from the original readers. (But he suggests that the firstphase goes along through the second, too).

109- Hermeneutics is not only for written texts—since oral traits, voice,



and gesture, must be interpreted too. Artistic interpretation and ordinarylistening are alike in aim.

110- VIII. 15 ['Light' or 'soft'] interpretation involves an assumption ofunderstanding, easy aims. It is based on a shared language and thought bythe speaker and hearer.

16. Rigorous interpretation, on the other hand, presupposesmisunderstanding. [To be compared with Ricœur's hermeneutics of trustvs. hermeneutics of suspicion.] It uses the two phases; it presupposesdifference in the use of language or thought, but also an underlying unity.

111- 17. Qualitative vs. quantitative misunderstanding; also, objective vs.subjective (4 types in all combining them). Qualitative misunderstandingderives from quantitative misunderstanding. Interpretation as avoidingmisunderstanding. Are there any positive rules? Interpretation as "thehistorical and divinatory, objective and subjective reconstruction of agiven statement." The combination of these terms gives us 4 kinds ofinterpretation:

112- Objective historical interpretation: The statement is considered as a(historical) product of the language.

Objective prophetic interpretation studies how a statement will stimulatedevelopments in language.

Subjective historical interpretation sees the statement as a product of aperson's mind.

Subjective prophetic interpretation studies how the statement willinfluence the author in the future.

The task is "To understand the text as well as and then even better than itsauthor." Since we have no direct knowledge of what was in the author'smind, we must try to become aware of many things of which he himself



may have been unconscious, except insofar as he reflects on his own workand becomes his own reader. An infinite task, which needs inspiration, anart. The text must evoke inspiration. How far to go in interpretation issomething to be determined in each case (it is not a subject for generalhermeneutics).

113- 19. "Before the art of hermeneutics can be practiced, the interpretermust put himself both objectively and subjectively in the position of theauthor" (I.e. beyond the original reader)— "Knowing the inner and outeraspects of the author's life" & language. Only possible throughinterpretation.

20. The author's works are a part of a bigger whole: the age in which hewrote. "Complete knowledge always involves an apparent circle, thateach part can be understood only out of the whole to which it belongs,and vice versa. All knowledge which is scientific must be constructed inthis way." Reading the text several times increases understanding, aboveall in significant texts. There is a movement from part to whole also in thesense of putting oneself in the author's position.

114- There are aids to get understanding of an author's language(dictionaries, prolegomena —i.e. introductions,— etc.) —but firsthandknowledge must be gained.

115- Prolegomena themselves depend on interpretation. Schleiermacheradvocates using the original sources themselves; it is safer. In all cases,"the interpreter must contribute to extending and verifying thisinformation." Various ways of using background information give rise tocritical schools (or rather fads).

XI. 23. A cursory reading is necessary before more careful interpretation.

116- A circle: knowledge of the particulars first which come only from ageneral knowledge of the language.



[Obsérvese que en su noción de interpretación Schleiermacher no incluyela aspiración a contestar interpretaciones previas: la crítica es para él unobstáculo - JAGL]

The interpreter must identify the leading ideas and a basic train ofthought. There is a conceptual separation between grammatical andpsychological interpretation.

116-17- "Each side of interpretation must be developed so thoroughly that the other becomes dispensable, or, better, that the results of the twocoincide."

Part 1: Grammatical Interpretation

117- XIII.1. "First canon: A more precise determination of any point in agiven text must be decided on the basis of the use of language common tothe author and his original public." Every element is in itself indefinite,and must be contextualized. "Some term what a word is thought to mean"in and of itself" it meaning [Bedeutung] and what the word is thought tomean in a given context its sense [Sinn]. ¿Does a complete text havepurport [Vernunft] while an isolated sentence can have only sense? If thetext is self-enclosed this distinction disappears.

118- But the whole is determined by the reader. [?? - a matter ofindividual decision?]

The era, the language, etc., of an author are his 'sphere'—this is not foundwhole in every text, and varies "according to the kind of reader theeauthor had in mind." [Schleiermacher's version of the concept of theimplied reader - JAGL]. We identify that through a cursory reading.Archaisms and technical expressions are exceptions.

XIV. Consciously grasping the author's sphere, as opposed to otheraspects of his language, "implies that we understand the author better thanhe understood himself" [Is tradition not included in this 'grasping' — A



difference with Gadamer, who takes this into account. —JAGL.].

119- "we must become aware of many things of which the author himselfwas unaware." Errors must be due to the author's carelessness, or to us(from early mistakes or from inadequate knowledge of the language). Themultiplicity of meanings is inadequately dealt with in dictionaries. "Thusthey do not trace the meaning back to its original unity." A distinction isnecessary: literal vs. figurative meaning.

120- Figurative use retains literal meaning.XV. Etymological meanings and relationships are not an hermeneuticalquestion. There is the problem of the relationships between non-literalmeanings and sense objects, to decide which are figurative and which not,or the distinction between general and specific meanings (e.g. of "foot",etc.).

121- There is a need to identify the unity of a word—"its determination isnot derived from itself, but from its context." Full explanation of a word'sunity is impossible.

122- XVI. Grammar and dictionaries are fragmentary. They provide onlya guide to the unity of formal or sense elements. One must work them outoneself.

2. Application to the New Testament

A special hermeneutic must be systematic and governed by generalhermeneutics.

123- A work must be included in the general development of a language,and we must ask "which is greater, his influence on the langauge or theinfluence of the language on him." The New Testament in the Greeklanguage, etc. (dialects, development...).

124- XVIII. A period of decay of Greek. Common language in the New



Testament, so authors do not try to reconstruct classical Greek. The extentof Aramaic influence.

125- The authors fail to make full use of the richness of Greek, andsometimes we find incorrect usages.

126- XIX. The newness of doctrine of the New Testament is not a matterof hermeenutics, but of judgment of meaning and feeling. Still, it needs tobe supported by philological and philosophical research. Differentlinguistic spheres should be kept in mind all through interpretation.

127- XX. There are Hebrew anomalies, e.g. in religious terminology.

3.

"Second Canon. The meaning of each word of a passage must bedetermined by the context in which it occurs." (The first canon was thatteh linguistic sphere of the word limits meaning). Meaning, more or less,that the text is the context.

128- Parallel or similar passages while remaining inside the same spherehelp to determine meaning. Meaning is created by determination: eachdetermination modifies it and excludes others.

XXI. A passage is 'parallel' when it can be considered as identical, "andso can be considered part of a unified context."

129- Determination of formal elements; kinds of formal elements: thosethat combine sentences and those that combine parts of speech, etc. Typesof combination, more or less organic. The extent and object of theconnection must be identified.

130- XXII. Etc. The divisions and cohesiveness of writing are variable;

131- "one ought never presuppose that an author has merely tacked the



whole together. Mere connection predominates in description andnarration, but even there not completely, for this would make the writernothing more than a transcriber." "Even if no organic connection isevident, it must be implicit."

XXIII. Application to the New Testament. Special attention to themixture of Hebrew and Greek.132- Taking loose style and individual differences into account.Connection:1) Leading ideas, with materials as the key at a general level.2) "In the immediate context the way in which the formal elements havebeen put together is the key; that is, the construction explains the partiles,and vice versa." Attention to coordinations and subordinations.133- The same inside sentences: subject/predicate or complements, etc.

134- Syntactic connections and determinateness: "Subject and predicateare mutually determinative, but not completely": sometimes there areloose relations, etc.

135- Adjectives help rule out various possible meanings in nouns, etc.But the decisive element for all is "the train of thought".

136- Identities (tautologies) and oppositions, etc.; "the more perfectly theinterpreter attends to the whole at every point the better the work willprogress".

137- The immediate context is the sentence or sentences with the samesubject or predicate. Divide secondary thoughts from the main train.

138- Problem of articulating philological and 'collective' views of theNew Testament—one author, or several? The philological view mustrecognize the importance and value of doctrine;

139- —e.g., Paul is not to be studied before and after his conversion as ifnothing had happened. There are limits to both philological and dogmatic



views.

150- "Every passage is an interlacing of common and distinctive traits,and so it cannot be explained correctly solely by refereence to thecommon ones." And the identification of identity and difference itselfresults from interpretation; —"the greatest probability ofmisinterpretation lies with these passsages which do not agree with theothers"—but Schleiermacher opposes the use of the dogmatic canon as asolution.

141- Use of similar linguistic spheres, parallels, etc.; "the old rule, that'one should not look outside of a text for a means of explanation until allof the clues within the text have been exhausted' is considerably limited."[Note: A Luteran rule originally directed against tradition.] Use of othertexts: the authors of the New Testament related to their society, etc."Since meaning is not vested in the individual parts of speech but in theirconnection, the closest parallels are those in which the parts of speechhave been combined in the same way."

142- XXV. Quantitative and qualitative understanding. "The minimum ofquantitative understanding is 'pleonasm' [das Abundiren], the maximum is'emphasis'." The reasons for each—and problems to determine them.

143- Emphasis is relational. Schleiermacher is against the false maxismwhich would have us take material tautologically or emphatically a priori.The first tendency is more recent, the second is related to the notion thatthe Holy Spirit does nothing in vain.

144- Both pleonasm and emphasis are possible and normal. Be carefulwith the emphasizing of similes—"The meaning of a simile must besought from the sphere within which the simile plays. Otherwise, oneends up merely with application and imposed meanings." Pleonasm, etc.,depend on genre and development of subject matter;

145- —new subjects uise more redundant language to avoid ambiguity.



The sentences in explanation are not identical. Quantitative understanding: major vs. secondary thoughts: "A majorthought is a statement made for its own sake. A secondary thought is astatement made to explain something, even though it may be far moredetailed than a major thought." Attention to context and to connectivesshould be paid here.

147- Grammatical interpretation and technical interpretation supplementeach other. Both language and a knowledge of critics is necessary to makeuse of criticism.

Part 2: Technical Interpretation

147- 1. Overview in which "the unity of the work, its theme, is viewed onthe dynamic principle impelling the author, and the basic features of thecomposition are viewed as his distinctive nature, revealing itself in thatmovement." A unified work is artistic. "Extremely loose and extremelytight language are outside the scope of interpretation." "Preliminary task:to know in advance the aim of a work, its circle, and its ideas." The unityof a work depends on a construction of the linguistic sphere [cf.Kimmerle's reading - JAGL]. Chief feature of composition: "the way theconnectives between the thoughts have been constructed. Technicalinterrpetation attempts to identify what has moved the author tocommunicate." The author's thought is reflected in the arrangementchosen;

148- —especially in the secondary ideas. Language is renewed by newcombinations of subjects and predicates, etc. Complementarity ofgrammatical and technical interpretation.

2. The ultimate goal is to interpret the whole of the author's thought interms of its parts, "and in every part to consider the content as whatmoved the author and the form as his nature moved by that content."Meaning can be exhausted.



3. "The goal of technical interpretation should be formulated as thecomplete understanding of style"—not only "language".

149- 4. Complete understanding is only approximated. Mannerisms, adefect, result when an idea is inherited, not developed by the author.

5. Before technical interpretation, we must learn about the subject matterand language as they were received by the author: literature, genres, etc.(But be careful with the prolegomena written by critics).

150- On this basis, "the interpreter develops a provisional conception interms of which the distinctiveness of the author is to be sought." Twomethods which refer back to each other: "By leading the interpreter totransform himself, so to speak, into the author, the divinatory methodseeks to gain an immediate comprehension of the author as an individual.The comparative method proceeds by subsuming the author under ageneral type. It then tries to find his distinctive trait, by comparing himwith the others of the same general type. Divinatory knowledge is thefeminine strength in knowing people; comparative knowledge, themasculine." Divinatory knowledge is based on the assumption that theindividual is not only unique, "but that he has a receptivity to theuniqueness of every other person." A presupposition "that each personcontains a minimum of everyone else, and so divination is aroued bycomparison with oneself."

151- Infinite process of comparison or divination. They arecomplementary; alone, divination is fanatical, and comparison does notprovide a unity. "The general and the particular must interpenetrate, andonly divination allows this to happen."

7. The idea of the work is understood by considering: 1) The content ofthe text; 2) The range of its effects. The intended effect on the originalaudience is an "aim" of the work; it determines composition;interpretation is easy if we know how it was and who they were.



153-

Friedrich SchleiermacherMANUSCRIPT 3'

A DRAFT FOR THE PRESENTATION OF THE SECOND PART

General Survey

"I. By a knowledge of the individuality of an author, grammaticalinterpretation can be brought to a level that it could not reach on its own."

"II. The goal is to reproduce the subjective bases for the combination ofparticular elements of a text in order to learn how to grasp the train ofthought." Grammatical interpretation opposes wrong understanding; technicalinterpretation opposes quantitative defects.

154- "Searching for too much meaning is due to false application of thedistinctiveness of an author or from an incorrect grasp of thatdistinctiveness."

Attention to the objective train of though and "everything that expressesthe author's immediate relation to the subject matter of the work and all ofthe elements essential to the composition", but also consider thesubjective train of thought, "secondary representations" related to hispersonality.

The maximum extent: imitation of train of thought. [A suggestion that itis governed by antitheses, and that we must recognize the identityunderneath ].

155- —Showing the guiding principles of primary and secondarythoughts and their relations.

Objective and subjective trains of thought are not clearly distinguishable



in confused authors; "it is especially important to trace, in addition to theactual train of thought, the sequence of the leading and secondary ideas asthey are interwoven."

156- Usually, there are no secondary thoughts (they are not essential).Exceptions: when the leading idea has degeenrated into or occasionalsecondary ones, and must be gleaned from them—or when the authoryields himself to a secondary train of thought. [!] There may be a returnto the previous idea, or a move on to the next. Schleiermacher appreciatestransition as artistic. "Throughout the process one should sense what willfollo" Knowledge of secondary thoughts or of author's taste are necessaryto determine "the range and complexity of the leading thoughts." Themain thought gives an idea of the work. It is difficult to discoversecondary ideaas—they were improvised. Thus, 'divination' can extendonly to what is nearest at hand.

157- The division is common in ordinary life. Allusions to secondarypurposes are not the same as secondary ideas. Secondary ideas aredifferent when improvised merely on the stimulus of the moment andwhen they are viewed as a special task. E.g., they are frequent "in themany authors who always let their personality come into prominence"and "in the presentation of a topic which is inseparable from its externalrelationships" and also "in circumstances where the author is restrictedsuch that not everything can be stated straightforwardly." "The interpretermust distinguish between the character of a pure presentation and that ofan occasionalistic effusion, between objective and popular writings [hedescribes each.]. Objective writings are organized "in accordance withthe author's special point of view [!!!!] as opposed to the popular ones(which follow the subject and interest of the moment). The interpretermust attend both to the whole and to the quality of the parts, and details.

159- Examples from the New Testament.




THE SEPARATE EXPOSITION OF THE SECOND PART (1826-27) PART 2: ON TECHNICAL INTERPRETATION

161- "Grammatical interpretation. To understand the discourse and how ithas been composed in terms of its language. Technical interpretation: Tounderstand the discourse as a presentation of thought. Comoposed by ahuman being and understood in terms of a human being." From thestandpoint of grammatical interpretation, the person is seen as "an organof the language"; for technical interpretation, language is an organ of theperson. They are not possible without each other. Ideally, each would aimat complete understanding.

162- Grammatical interpretation builds details into a whole; technicalinterpretation goes from the whole to the details. Two tasks in each: 1,discovering individuality; 2, how it is expressed. Grammaticalinterpretation sees the text as a unity, technical interpreation sees theauthor's works as a unity— all, vs. parts. Unity results from joiningpartial views. Grammatical interpretation is oriented towards language,technical interpretation towards thoughts, not in the sense of logic,

163- —"but as a function of the nature of the individual person."Only following rules (of grammar, of logic) does not lead tointerpretation. What contradicts the rules would not be understandable. Itis not a "method"; the theory is the result of previous explanations.Grammatical interpretation: "The distinctive nature of a language is thespecific modification of its view of the world (Anschauung)."Technical interpretation: an individual character is a modification of thegeneral ability to think. Grammatical interpretation: the individuality of a language is connectedto other aspects, the individuality of a people—but this is not a concernhere [Schleiermacher will focus instead on the role of the author'sindividuality].



164- Differences in both Grammatical interpretation and Technicalinterpretation result from comparing different languages and authors. The"center of a language" (grammatical interpretation) and the "character ofan author" (technical interpreatation) as the keys to completeunderstanding.—But this goal is reached only approximately.Sometimes, for easy expressions, grammatical interpretation is enough."These provide the first general insight into the individuality, and in turnthis insight makes the more difficult expressions understandable, therebyimproving on the interpreter's initial grasp of the individuality, and so oninto infinity."

165- Grammatical interpretation needs technical interpretation, precedingunderstanding... etc. —Interpretation is an art. Most evident individualityrests on subject matter and form, genre... They are not the author, but theauthor's style can be recognized beneath. If there appear traits of stylecontrary to the author0s character, this is as defect (mannerism). Mannerisms are conspicuous and inauthentic; Schleiermacher opposesimitation of this kind.

166- "This is the origin of all florid style, flor orationis." He opposes theclassical notion that form (genre) is linked to individuality. Nowindividuality is best expressed thorugh variety; now authors give upmechanical perfection. "This individual unity remains the most importantconsideration, and all other matters must be found in terms of it." Eachauthor (or group) has his style, to be grasped intuitively, not conceptually.Beginning with the overall organization, and moving to the peculiar wayof using language.

167- One should not omit the first step; a stylistics which pays attention tothe second only will emphasize minutiae. "Style refers to both thecomposition and the treatment of language" (mixed).Two methods: "Comparing the text with others, and considering it in andfor itself). (The second goes first). Only to be used to direct attention to



the author's individuality. Elements must be compared to the whole and"Considering what an author has excluded pays a role in the procedure".Also, compare him with the whole of language, and with the whole of thetheme.

168- Discovering individuality: "The unity of the whole is grasped", andthen seen in its relation to the various sections within the whole." Theauthor's idea is the basis of composition [Schleiermacher emphasizesintentionality and deliberation throughout, but see below —JAGL]. "Thedegree of harmony between the general view and the details determinedthe literary merit of the author". The interpreter's insight is corrected asthe process goes on.

1) Finding the inner unity and theme is not the same as finding thepurpose. [See just above - JAGL]. "The more arbitrary the production ofthe work, the greater the difference between its idea and purpose." If theyare equated, purpose becomes a mere means. Schleiermacher warns usagainst trusting the author's statements in the work [see just above too]."In many writings what the author declares to be his subject matter is infact quite subordinate to the actual theme". The purpose is not the same asthe idea of the work.

[On this displacement in thematics, see my paper "Retroactivethematization, interaction, and interpretation: the hermeneutic spiralfrom Schleiermacher to Goffman".—JAGL]

169- (1) Different kinds of relationships of beginnings to ends in works.(Genres, etc.). There are elements in each which are related to thepurpose, as against those which are realted to the idea of the work.[Schleiermacher's version of deconstruction, or his analysis of intendedvs. unintended elements in works—JAGL]. The "true beginning" vs. thebeginning, the true end vs. the end too, etc. Question of boundaries: theend as the end of a section, vs. the end of the whole. Is the work separableinto wholes?

http://unizar.academia.edu/Jos%C3%A9AngelGarc%C3%ADaLanda/Papers/92673/



(2) "Accentuated passages" next. Identified through grammaticalinterpretation, they lead to technical interpretation.

170- Problem of works with no accentuated passages, of false accents,etc. —on, "until one reaches as it were a point of rest that forms theimmediate context," "the more the degree of emphasis deviates from andclashes with the presupposed idea, the more suspect the presupposition."Schleiermacher argues against presupposing imperfection (e.g. lack ofunity) for the moment.

171- 2) Finding individuality of composition. This is the first trulysubjective aspect. The same idea is presented with different aspects in twoauthors, etc. This is done in two ways. through immediate intuition[Auschauung] and through comparison. They are to combined.Comparison with others shows the unity of parts in the work, etc. Finding the era's context (evident when the author enlarges it creatively).But the individuality of the nation and era is the basis for the author's ownindividuality. "Therefore, an author is to be understood in terms of hisown age." The era's context is found through other works of the age, etc.

172- Sometimes either comparison or intuition must be emphasized.Individuality remains indescribable—it is a "harmony". Main points: thedistinctive way of selecting and arranging materials, the inclination toausterity or grace, etc. (Such is "the author's formal literary intention"). Itis a function of the individuality of the era.

173- Digressions from the main idea. Their nature and origin, etc.


THE ACADEMY ADDRESSES OF 1829: ON THE CONCEPT OF HERMENEUTICS, WITH REFERENCE

TO F. A. WOLF'S INSTRUCTIONS AND AST'S TEXTBOOK



The First Address (August 12 [13], 1829).

175-Three levels of human activity: the mechanical, the experiential, andthe artistic. Also in interpretation.

1) "wherever people converse about common topics in such a way thatthe speaker always knows almost immediately and with certainty whatthe other will respond, and language is tossed back and forth as a ball."

2) In schools and universities. But philologians sometimes overlook thebest passages of works.

No systematic method of interpretation exists—only compilations of rules(Ernesti)—sometimes ambiguous and arbitrarily arranged. Ast and Wolfare the best.

177- Wolf is asystematic, Ast is systematic. Wolf presents grammar,hermeneutics and criticism as preparatory studies to philology. (Ast seesthem as appendixes). In any case, both see that grammar, criticism, andhermeneutics are closely related.

178- Classical works and the Bible are great subjects for hermeneutics.The possibility of hermeneutics contributing an organon for Christiantheology—but neither is the essence of the matter. Nor juristichermeneutics, which is more limited: "in the main it is concerned onlywith determining the extent of the law, that is, with applying generalprinciples to particular cases which had not been foreseen at the time theprinciples were formulated."For Ast, hermeneutics, like all cultural activities, is directed towards theunification of the Greek and Christian life. For Schleiermacher also, butthen it is directed owards oriental texts (at the root of both traditions), andto "Romantic literature, which is clearly close to the unity of the two."



179- —Are there any higher origins for all four of them?

Wolf advocates practical investigation (as the ancients), against generaland abstruse accounts on the nature and basis of the art. ButSchleiermacher sees the need for a theory, "in order that we maydetermine the extent to which the rules should be applied"—this willalways have some influence as practice.

180- (Wolf, Ast, etc.): for Wolf, "hermeneutics is the art of discoveringwith necessary insight the thoughts contained in the work of an author."This is to be applied to all works—and must have general principles. Theproblem of interpreting "something foreign" is relative: "If what is to beunsderstood were so completely foreign to the one trying to understand itthat there was nothing in common between the two, then there would beno point of contact for understanding at all." And no reason forhermeneutics either if there is nothing strange, if understanding alwaystook place by itself.

181- Schleiermache agrees, but the whole central are is for hermeneutics,versus the further restricvtions of Ast and Wolf. "foreign works", "worksof genius", etc.— even "newspaper reporters or those who writenewspaper advertisements." Hermeneutics is relevant whenever there arestrange elements to be made intelligible. "Indeed I must reiterate thathermeneutics is not to be limited to written texts"—it is applied inordinary conversation too,

182- in fact "whenever we have to understand a thought or a series ofthoughts expressed in words." In our native language too, "endeavoring tohear 'between' their words, just as we read between the lines of originaland tightly written books." (When gifted people are listened).Hermeneutics involves understanding in an artistic way. These are "twodifferent applications of the same art" We grasp the main points, graspcoherence, and pursue subtle intimations in both books and conversation.

183- Both aspects of hermeneutics need each other. The hermeneutics of



conversation is more lively and fresh. The problem is not only one ofstrange elements—we need to grasp the coherence of what is being said,both in speech and in written texts. Schleiermacher rejects Wolf'sdefinition of the task of hermeneutics as ascertaining the thoughts of theauthor. This is all right, it is not too stringent a definition, even, but itoverlooks many cases. For instance, it ignores investigation into thenature of word-meanings.

184- Sometimes, achieving a "necessary insight" (Wolf) is not possible,and interpreters come to equally probable meanings. And if we seehermeneutics beyond the establishing of factual historical details, to see italso as the grasping of the coherence of a work, of the transition ofthoughts, no talk of exactness is possible; "it would be futile to try to passthis account off as a demonstration" even if its convincing. This is notmeant to disparage criticism, as "an assertion is much more than a proof"[Schlegel].

185- "Moreover, there exists a completely different sort of certainty thanthe critical one for which Wolf is praised, namely, a divinatory certaintywhich arises when an interpreter delves as deeply as possible into anauthor's state of mind." E.g. Plato's Ion: interpreters are not equallycompetent in all areas; they are best on their favourites. And there arekinds of interpreters, one dealing "more with the language and historythan with personalities", the second kind "primarily with the observationof persons", with language regarded as an expressive medium. Thesecond class are less susceptible to polemical discussions.

186- But Wolff is sometimes attentive to this; e.g. he requires fluency inclassical languages from the interpreter, and knowledge of meter,

187- –if one is to gain "a correct and complete understanding in thehigher sense of the term." Therefore, he presents a two-phase entry to thescience of antiquity, 1) through grammar and fluency of style; 2) throughhermeneutics and criticism.



188- A less demonstrable aspect of the sicnece of interpretation is opened.

Periods in the history of literature. First, formation, development of formsand styles [He also means "registers" —JAGL.] It is necessary to knowwhether an author belongs to this period, whether he is creating the fromfrom his own resources.

188-89- "However, the more a writer belongs to the seciond period and sodoes not produce the form but composes works in forms which arealready established, the more we must know these forms in order tounderstand his activity. Even in the initial conception of a work, an authoris guided by the established form."

189- The form guides both expression and content; it opens or closescertain areas. Expression and content cannot be fully separated. Formsunderstood here as helps in creation—a stimulation and guide for thewriter; so they must be known by the interpreter.

190- So something more than training in classical languages is necessary(vs. Wolf); "whenever we practice this art, we must remain conscious ofboth methods, the divinatory and the comparative . . . even the mostcomplex applications of the art of interpretation involve nothing otherthan a constant shifting from one method to the other. In this interactionthe results of the one method must approximate more and more those ofthe other." The first is more grammatical, the second more psychological;but is each appropriate for either technical or grammatical interpretation?

191- This is not clear in Wolf. [Wolf seems to suggest a divination ofgrammar - JAGL]. The aim in interpretation is to confine what is notunderstood within narrower bounds, and to understand the "intimateoperations of poets and other artists of language by means of graspingtheir entire process of composition, from its conception up to the finalexecution." This is understanding another better than he understoodhimself; it is achieved through comparison, and divination.



192- Also whenever an expression is truly created by a gifted author. [Ahighly psychological and punctual notion of creativity.—JAGL]. Thereexist virtuosi in each kind of interpretation, all right, but still bothmethods should be used.

193- [It is unclear from Schleiermacher's account how one can divinatewhat one does not already know. Apparently a thought is intuited and itgoes together with a linguistic configuration, —JAGL]—since "there is nothought without words". Cf. children's understanding since the beginning:no comparison is possible; they begin through divination.

193-94- "This divinatory operation, therefore, is original, and the soulshows itself to be wholly and inherently a prescient being."Schleiermacher admires the interpretive energy of children. When wedon't understand, we act like children, "we can always begin with thesame divinatory boldness", though in later phases more points ofcomparison are available.

195- But also, "since each person, as an individual, is the not-being of theother, it is never possible to eliminate non-understanding completely."The first human operation is fast and divinatory, later it is slower andmore deliberate. Finally, a theory develops (a later phase ofhermeneutics). Only when the author is well known guidelines areoffered, not "until we have penetrated the language of the author in itsobjectivity and the process of producing thought, as a function of the lifeof the individual mind, in relationship to the nature of thinking."Ast's notion [of the hermeneutic circle:] "the notion that any part of a textcan be understood only by means of an understanding of the whole, andthat for this reason every explanation of a given element alreadypresupposes that the whole has been understood." This is a centralprinciple to hermeneutics.

196-The Second Address



The hermeneutic circle applies to many rules (e.g. the rule that the sameword is to be interpreted the same way in the same context):a) to determine the sense of a word within its range of meanings, and inthe sentence [This is Schleiermacher's version of the paradigmatic andsyntagmatic axes of structuralist linguistics—JAGL.] There is theproblem of determining which contexts are similar; it is difficult to decidehow far one can go. b) Also to determine the sense of a sentence in a text. The contextmodifies the meaning of aphorisms, etc.

197- c) It also applies to combinations of sentences; e.g. the interpretationof irony, etc. —through the way clues in sentences are related to thewhole. Other cases too. The problem is to reconstitute the whole to whichparts belong, the inherent principle governing a set of sentences.

198- And larger sets of sentences are also conditioned by larger wholes.We begin with provisional understanding, see each section as a unity,encounter difficulties, and begin again. "It is like starting all over, exceptthat as we push ahead the new material illumines everything we havealready treated, until suddenly at the end every part is clear and the wholework is visible in sharp and definite countour." According to Ast, weshould begin with a presentiment of the whole.

199- There is the problem of how to gain it. Through prefaces and critids,or thumbing through the book. But this is insignificant, the understandingof the whole must be gained otherwise. There are different kinds ofwholes—looser texts, etc. We start from our general acquaintance withgenre and author.

200- And "Even when a provisional grasp of the whole is not possible, wemay still come to understand the whole from the parts." (Memory isanalogous to writing in its work, there is the same role in keeping thewhole present—but writing corrupts memory). The process is spontaneous until understanding takes place by itself, andno hermeneutical operation is performed consciously.



201- In more difficult texts, more shifts from parts to whole will berequired. The problem of secondary thoughts: "parts that cannot be fullyunderstood in relation to the overall organization of the text." They do notconstitute a whole in relation to the genre, but they do so in relation to theauthor's individuality.The most difficult works are the greatest, "each of which in its own wayis organized in infinite detail and at the same time is inexhaustible in eachof its parts." Interpretation would be complete (which is impossible) if wecould treat these works as the minimal ones.

201-2- The interpreter must be skilled in composition, since thedivinatory method is awakened mainly by one's won productivity.

202- Ast still raises the level: "every speech and every text is a particularor part that can be completely understood only in relation to a still largerwhole," 1) In the body of literature; 2) In the author's life—to beunderstood only from the totality of his acts. The reader who knows theauthor has a better understanding.

203- We return to the work and we view it anew; now we oppose theguidance of other opinions, and rework the initial conception throughdivination. Critics can help us with parts, not with the whole, withcharacter, etc.

204- Linguistically oriented vs. individualist-oriented interpreters. Thelatter are more divinatory; they have a deeper understanding of identityand of personal existence; they give attention to secondary thoughts. Thework's relation to language recedes into the background. Schleiermacherfavours attention to both sides of interpretation;

205- —otherwise, the latter class would become "nebulists", sn the moreso the more significant the author was to the development of thelanguage. "And we might advise all those who want to be interpreters towork at both sides, even at the expense of virtuosity in either, in order to



avoid one-sidedness."

206- In some areas (classical learning) one side may predominate due tothe lack of biographical information. The text is foremost.

207- The latter method (technical interpretation) seems restricted; itconfines us within individual, instead of comparing the work with allliterature. The aim is not knowledge of the man itself, as this is a meansto achieve an objective consideration of his mode of thinking. Divinationis used more extensively here, but one must be careful: it is only usablewhen no contradictions are found, "and even then only provisionally."

208- The other method (linguistic interpretation) is predominantlycomparative. But there is also a measure of divination, in the ways ofposing a question about the work. [Cf. H. G. Gadamer's commentary oninterpretive "prejudices" in Truth and Method, esp. chapter 9—JAGL.]Here Schleiermacher distances himself from Ast and Wolf. Ast's ultimate"whole" to be interpreted is "the spirit of Antiquity"

209- —this is a vague notion for Schleiermacher—and is not specificallya linguistic whole. (For Schleiermacher hermeneutics only pertains tolinguistics): "hermeneutics deals only with what is produced in language.Schleiermacher oppposes Ast's vagueness aand his use of technicallanguage coming from other spheres.

210- Ast distinguishes the following kinds of understanding:

- historical- grammatical- of the spirit: - of the individual author - of Classical Antiquity as a whole.

Are there any phases, kinds? He speaks of a threefold hermeneutic: of theletter, of the sense, and of the spirit). And for him (Ast), understanding of

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speech is the basis of interpretation (not the same as interpretation)—which is confusing.

211- For Wolf, hermeneutics is merely "the act of discovering themeaning of the text" (S). A confusing division in Ast: Schleiermacher willconsider the explanation of words and of contents only elements ofhermeneutics, not the whole; "no explanation, that is, no determination ofmeaning is correct unless it is supported by an examination of the spirit ofthe author and the spirit of classical antiquity."

212- Actually, Asts offers us a single hermeneutics, hermeneutics of thesense; that of the letter is not yet hermeneutics, and that of the spirit goesbeyond his hermeneutics. Cf. Wolf, but for the latter "we must not onlyexplain the words and the content, but comprehend the spirit of the authoras well" (S). Wolf divides interpretation into grammatical, historical andrhetorical (but for Schleiermacher it is best named "aesthetic", including"poetic" too). Five hermeneutics? No: Grammatical and historicalinterpretation should not be made special and distinct in themselves. .

213- Cf. in theology: "grammatical-historical" versus allegorical anddogmatic interpretation. But these latter may not be justified.Schleiermacher opposes the notion that allegorical meaning is"additional", and opposed to the simple one (versus Ast). "If a passagewas intended to be allegorical, then the allegorical meaning is the onlyone and the simple one." If allegory is unintended, either the interpreter isdeliberately applying (not interpreting) the text, or is being inadvertent,and then the interpretation is false. The tradition of "moral" interpretation,etc.— Schleiermacher is against the belief "that there are various kinds ofinterpretation from which interpreters can freely choose. But were that so,it would no longer be worth the effort to speak or write." The badinfluence of these [supplements, pace Derrida's Of Grammatology -JAGL] in hermeneutics will be removed when it is systematized andhermeneutics is a self-contained discipline.



Friedrich Schleiermacher

MANUSCRIPT 6THE MARGINAL NOTES OF 1832-33

Notes to Ms. 3

214- Etc.: Both "linguistic" and "personal" sides of interpretation arenecessary, both should reach the same results, both require a knowledgeof language and human nature. "The rules are to be regarded as 'methods'for 'recognizing' difficulties rather than as observations for overcomingthem."

216- The Bible is not special, neither in its double layer of meaning, norin inspiration. It requires no special hermeneutics, unless it is onedependent on the general one. Etc. Familiarity with the original audienceis necessary. Skepticism is necessary, since assumptions change.

217- "The understanding we draw from the beginning of a text is to beconfirmed by the rest." "In order to understand the first part correctly, thewhole must have already been understood." Initial misunderstanding is"like a skeleton or outline" A need then to reconstruct the process of theauthor. Quantitative vs. qualitative misunderstanding. An instance of the first:not grasping the whole. Of the second: seeing irony when it is not there.

218- Kinds of misunderstanding, etc. Priority is given to one side ofinterrpetation at last. Grammatical interpretation: "The common area oflanguage is the act of using language". New words are also subject to thecontext in which they appear. "Condition for undisturbed progress in asentence is the complete determinability of each element in terms of allothers. If this condition can't be met, it is necessary to consult a lexicon."

219- Figurative meaning: "Such expressions as coma arborum are notfigurative [??]. To translate the expression as "leaves" is a quantitative



misunderstanding. "There are no figurative meanings at all." [!!- JAGL].

The hermeneutic principle must be modified according to the the text. Inscientific texts, all text is a detail of a main thought. In lyric, "where thethought is only a means of representation", details are essential. Inscientific texts interpretation must try to understand as much as possibleall at once. There is a gradation:

lyric - epistolary - didactic - historical - scientific texts.

220- Secondary thoughts are not essential. They are recognized bycomparison, etc.

221- On the New Testament. One should not hastily extract passagesfrom their context.

Notes to Manuscript 2

223- Psychological and technical interpretation are closest "when anauthor stuck to his original decision and avoided all accidental interests."Differences: Psychological interpretation focuses on how thoughtsemerge from the totality of the author's life. Technical interpretationfocuses on a particular thought or or intention creating thought. Theauthor's initial decision is important, as it determines the form—althoughit may later be set aside. Discovering of an author's decision:psychological interpretation tries to understand the realization (meditation/ composition).

224- Secondary thoughts result from "the on-going influence of thetotality of life." [Schleiermacher places great emphasis on the work'sunity resulting from the initial choice made by the author as regardsgenre.] A work is thus initially adjusted to a genre, even when the genreis invented by the author.

225- Sometimes works show a hidden unity, a hidden purpose. [Again,



Schleiermacher's version of deconstruction or emergence of hiddenpatterns, a hidden coherence, in a work—JAGL]. The relation betweenform and contnet is important only in art [!!].

226- The case of digressions, in the New Testament, etc.—there may bean intentional lack of coherence too.

—oOo—

Afterword of 1968 (Heinz Kimmerle)

Individuality appears as the basic kernel of Schleiermacher's philosophy.

Histories of hermeneutics by Patsch and Dilthey understate the originalityand importance of Schleiermacher's philosophy of language; it is seen astoo psychologizing.

According to Dilthey, "The aphorisms present to us . . . the compellingthought from which his hermeneutics is developed: the essence ofinterpretation is the reconstruction of the work as a living act of theauthor."

—oOo—

Works Cited (J.A.G.L.)

Ast, Friedrich. Grundlinien der Grammatik, Hermeneutik und Kritik. Landshut: Thomann, 1808.

Derrida, Jacques. Of Grammatology. Trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins UP,1974. 2nd. ed. 1976.

Dilthey, Wilhelm. "The Rise of Hermeneutics." 1900. In Selected Writings. Ed. H. P. Rickman.Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1976.



Ernesti, Johann August. Institutio Interpretis Novi Testamenti. 1761. 4th. ed. Leipzig: Weidmann, 1792.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Truth and Method. Trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming. New York: SeaburyPress - Crossroad, 1975. 1988. Trans. of Wahrheit und Methode. 2nd. ed. (1965).

García Landa, José Angel. "The Hermeneutic Spiral from Schleiermacher to Goffman: RetroactiveThematization, Interaction, and Interpretation." BELL (Belgian English Language and Literature) ns 2(2004): 155-66.

_____. "Retroactive Thematization, Interaction, and Interpretation: The Hermeneutic Spiral fromSchleiermacher to Goffman." Online PDF at Social Science Research Network 2 June 2011.* http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856427 2012

_____. "Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts. (Notes on Schleiermacher)." In García Landa,Vanity Fea 13 May 2013. http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2013/05/hermeneutics-handwritten-manuscripts.html 2013

_____. "Notas sobre Verdad y Método de H.-G. Gadamer." Social Science Research Network 9 Dec.2013. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364913 1013

Hirsch, E. D., Jr. Validity in Interpretation. New Haven: Yale UP, 1966.

_____. The Aims of Interpretation. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1976.

Ricœur, Paul. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Trans. Denis Savage. New Haven (CT):Yale UP, 1970.

Saussure, Ferdinand de. Course in General Linguistics. Ed. Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye. Trans.Wade Baskin. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966.

Schleiermacher, F. D. E. Hermeneutik. Ed. Heinz Kimmerle. Heidelberg: Winter, 1959.

_____. Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts. Trans. Terrence N. Tice. Atlanta: John Knox Press,1966.Wolff, Christian. Vernünfftige Gedanken von den Kräfften des menschlichen Verstandes und ihremrichtigen Gebrauche in der Erkänntnis der Wahrheit. Halle, 1713.

—oOo—

J. A. García Landa, "The Hermeneutic Spiral from Schleiermacher toGoffman"

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1856427

http://vanityfea.blogspot.com.es/2013/05/hermeneutics-handwritten-manuscripts.html

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2364913

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Notes on Friedrich Schleiermacher's "Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts"

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