PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN TAJIKISTAN

_________

A Paper

Presented to

The 17th Annual Conference for the

International Association for Conflict Management

_________

Program Content Area:

International and Intergroup Conflict

Key word topics:

Sustained Dialogue, Framing, Cultural Autonomy

_________

By

Jonathan K. Zartman Ph. D. Candidate

University of Denver

February 16, 2004

ABSTRACT

PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN TAJIKISTAN

In June 2002, Tajikistan achieved five years of increasing stability after a

peace agreement formally initiated a transition to national reconciliation. Theories of

conflict based only on grievance or those based on fear, incentives and opportunity

fail to explain the continued cooperation of opposition forces in the face of

government antagonism and obstruction. A focus on the competition between groups

defending incompatible frames, or interpretive schemes by which individuals label

and identify events and assign values, reveals the important role of intellectuals in

connecting rational strategy and grievances. In Tajikistan, the competition between

recruitment appeals targeting different identities and interests depended on the

capabilities and values of the intelligentsia. The peace agreement implementation

process and the activity of international donors and humanitarian organizations

created greater autonomy for social activists and those who produce culture. The

Dartmouth Conference “Sustained Dialogue” intervention stimulated the

development of a new political culture of tolerance for public debate. In this

perspective, the frame of political change through social transformation, community

action and education overcame the frame that supported violence.

2

PROSPECTS FOR STABILITY IN TAJIKISTAN

The accomplishment of a peace in Tajikistan seemed distant and difficult

throughout the four years following the denouement of violence. For a considerable

time after an agreement was signed, most writers in the West expressed skepticism

that peace could endure. For four years, insurrections, assassinations and bombings

defied aspirations to peace. The unusual political accomplishment demonstrated by

increasing stability in Tajikistan from the General Agreement until June 2002 merits

an evaluation to compare the application of competing theoretical models.1

Comparing conditions with each model’s expected requirements for durable peace

permits assessing their utility.

The rational-instrumental model argues that continuing satisfaction derived

from the compromise by all (fearful and greedy) parties sustains peace. Peace endures

when it offers rewards greater than the lost opportunity for gains from war, or as long

as the cost of war surpasses prospective benefits. From a rational perspective, foreign

support and economic resuscitation can raise the benefits of peace while security

guarantees from third parties and a “strong-man” leader raise the cost of conflict.2

The rational perspective also emphasizes the consequence of labor migration.

The scientific study in 2003 by the International Organization for Migration found

that 600,000 of the 6.2 million people of Tajikistan work abroad, many on a seasonal

basis.3 The widely publicized absence of most young males from many villages

inhibits regional governors with organizational capacity from pressing political

3

demands and opposition parties recognize the loss of their social base of mobilization.

The government benefits from the economic stimulus of workers’ remittances and

from the absence of potential opposition supporters, which reinforces the short-term,

stabilizing, political consequences of labor migration. This raises popular fears that,

“If relations with Russia deteriorate and these people all come home, there will be a

revolution.”

Fewer constraints encumber Rahmonov’s freedom of action after the

completion of the transition period and the work of the CNR. Prospects for

authoritarianism grow and suggest that Tajikistan will become more like Uzbekistan

—an alienated population suffering under a fragile, increasingly repressive

government. Western institutions and countries have acquiesced quietly to every

fraudulent election in Tajikistan and provided insufficient support for media

development and freedom of dissent.4 Admittedly, the UN and World Bank argue that

they exert diplomatic pressure for the rule of law and observation of human rights,

but in the crucial test of the 2003 referendum on constitutional amendments,

international institutions and foreign states failed to protest. They even pressured

opposition parties not to protest.5 The rational-instrumental model fails to explain the

greater freedom of dissent in Tajikistan in the absence of domestic actors with the

capability to press demands for pluralism, and the lack of effective pressures from

international actors.6

4

The grievance model predicts a durable civil war settlement when

disadvantaged groups receive institutional protection of their rights and provision for

their basic human needs. The transition from an oppressive, socially unresponsive

state to the recognition and protection of minority rights and social freedom

strengthens peace. However, in spite of the political accomplishment of peace, social

protection for the people of Tajikistan remains weak. Changes in the structure and

personnel throughout the state sector reflect the consolidation of power by the ruling

party in Tajikistan. Most Tajiks complain about a Kulobization policy in which the

president has replaced every manager and director of every school or economic

enterprise with someone from his home region of Kulob, but this does not tell the

whole story. State repression of the elites of the Leninabod region and their

complaints of exclusion from power have received press attention, but even in Kulob

people complain that Rahmonov’s rule fails to bring them benefits.

The government of Tajikistan has rejected strategies like federalism to protect

local interests. The government could also use an affirmative action program to

include representatives from each district in the administrative agencies and

government ministries to protect group rights and interests. According to reports in

2001, the president has included representatives from many regions and towns in the

presidential apparatus based on personal allegiance.7 However, this phenomenon does

not represent an indirect and informal parallel channel of governance because many

officeholders purchase their positions and use them for financial gain.8

5

The General Agreement includes prescriptions consistent with rationalism,

such as a form of power sharing with a minority veto and proportionality of political

representation, but fails to provide for values considered important in the grievance

perspective, such as institutions to ensure the development of norms in governance

and legitimacy based on justice.9 The General Agreement makes no provision for

other prerequisites for peace such as support for assimilation, deterrence of

defections, conflict resolution procedures, and procedures for peaceful change.10

In the evaluation of Zoir and Newton, the General Agreement, as

implemented through the work of the CNR, reduced the institutional possibilities for

the development of democracy by creating a new layer of bureaucrats under

presidential control and increasing the concentration of power in the presidency. The

parliament adopted constitutional amendments that failed to provide for any greater

transparency and accountability in executive authority, or curb administrative

discretion, and the process of adoption violated constitutionally mandated procedures.

The concrete mechanisms of the election law give great advantages to central

authorities to limit the participation and influence of opposition forces. After the 2000

elections, over 80 percent of the members of the Majlisi Melli (parliament) consisted

of executive branch officials. In sum, this formal political process eliminated

potential for accountability and political pluralism.

Levels of human rights abuse remain too high to claim that lower levels of

grievance have enabled peace to endure. Rising levels of grievance and declining

6

support for the state have fueled the rise of Hizb-ut-Tahrir, which the IRP considers a

threat that requires closer cooperation with both the informal and the officially

registered ulema (Islamic leaders). Grievances in Tajikistan primarily result in public

attitudes of disgust and anger at government corruption and disregard for the welfare

of citizens. Tajiks recognize that they have more freedom than people in other Central

Asian countries have. Some observers even agree with the description that Emomali

Rahmonov receives authority—public support—in exchange for allowing greater

freedom to complain and criticize publicly.11 The grievance model only explains

sustained peace in Tajikistan as a result of general war-weariness, fear of regional

warlords and the effectiveness of state repression, so this perspective offers little new

understanding of durable peace.12

The conflict resolution literature describes activities to enhance the

sustainability of a peace-agreement as "peacebuilding."13 This reflects recognition

that peacebuilding necessitates not just changes in the power and incentive structures

of political institutions, but also the reconstruction of the complex and interdependent

roles, relations and activities of functional social relationships. For example, Cousens

argues that improved governance, democratic legitimacy, social inclusion and

economic equity would help societies resist falling back into violence. According to

Cousens, the conflict resolution literature promotes democracy, justice, and equity as

well as a self-enforcing cease-fire and peace.14 In other words, factors other than

military power deserve more attention.

7

Issues of democracy, justice and equity fit comfortably within the grievance or

“basic human needs” prescription for sustainable peace, but they also depend on the

activity of citizens reconstructing social relations.15 Michael Pugh asserts the vital

agency of domestic actors, both for war and for making peace, "Indeed, for local

actors, the resort to violence was certainly regarded as an essential process to secure a

change in their destiny."16 He rejects the assumption that external actors have the

power and authority to bring about peaceful change after the war-torn communities

have failed.

In contrast to the lack of attention to the transformation of social relationships

in rational-instrumentalism, Harold Saunders emphasizes the importance of this factor

in claiming that sustained dialogue offers an effective means toward social

transformation to support peacebuilding. He believes that "deep-rooted human

conflicts will be transformed into peaceful relationships only in the context of a

multilevel peace process conducted by whole human beings acting in whole bodies

politic."17 In his view, government cannot succeed unless citizens can change

relationships. Therefore, dialogue affects the character of peace, increasing its

durability. The argument that a successful public peace process includes the efforts of

participants working to create civil society outside of dialogue meetings overlaps with

the work of Paul Lederach.18

Pierre Bourdieu's concept of “relative cultural autonomy” describes the

freedom of social activists to transform social relations by organizing and promoting

8

collective interests in the name of society. In his concept, culture can influence

politics when the state supports universities, allows a free media, and allows

intellectuals to market their services and receive support from a regional base or

faction of society.19 Any movement toward greater agreement of society and state

proceeds through individual choices, which operate best under freedom—cultural

autonomy—in response to incentives. As Larry Diamond observes, political

liberalization begins with an autonomous field for intellectuals.20

In contrast to the pessimistic prediction of growing authoritarianism presented

by the rational-instrumental perspective, the framing perspective holds open the

possibility that Tajikistan can gradually progress to a more stable, open, peaceful

society through three logically dependent conditions. (1) Tajik intellectuals promote a

culture of tolerance and symbiosis of cultures. (2) This frame can support a durable

peace to the extent that their relative autonomy increases. (3) In spite of its military

dominance, the government accepts the opposition’s "frame" as the worldview or

model for state-society relations.

In the present period, cultural autonomy in Tajikistan remains threatened. The

interaction between the media and political activity in Tajikistan does not allow much

support for the development of political consciousness. The popularity and readership

of newspapers covering serious topics like politics and economics is low.21 Most

people get their information from television, which is either Russian or state-

controlled. While most of the media practices self-censorship, competition is

9

increasing slowly. Two newspapers began criticizing the government in 2003, but in

November 2003 the government applied pressure and their publication stopped. The

presence and monitoring of international organizations partly explains the continuing

moderate level of cultural autonomy.

Local political scientists cite two mechanisms for changing attitudes and the

social atmosphere—the process of crisis management and programs instituted by

local civic groups. In the first case, Abdullo observes that three significant crises

developed during the transition period, but politics became more “normalized” as

participants learned about crisis management and as they distributed position

statements instead of arms. He reports, “Attitudes changed through these experiences

of crisis management. Leaders began to recognize that the threat of breakdown was

quite normal in the complicated and difficult transition from civil war to peace.

Bottlenecks are inevitable.”22 In the second case, Mullojanov claims that “Civic

groups have also shouldered the responsibility of implementing conflict resolution,

dialogue and education programmes. Their initiatives are gradually changing the

political, social and even psychological atmosphere in the country.”23 In summarizing

the contributions and observations of Abdullo, Mullojanov and others recording the

consequences of the sustained dialogue, Abdullaev and Barnes conclude, “Thus the

Dialogue provided a unique bridge between the official process and civil society and

complemented the more overtly political approaches to ending the war.”24

10

Most explanations of greater NGO freedom of operation in Tajikistan,

especially compared to the rest of Central Asia, say that the government acts out of

necessity in recognition of its inability to provide social services.25 Tajikistan

provides a well-documented instance of the community-based transformation of

social relationships by citizens working outside of government, supported by the

sustained dialogue intervention. NGO activity provides a concrete measure of

propitious political conditions for social activism. Even though Uzbekistan has four

times the population and ten times the GDP of Tajikistan, from Table 20 one can

observe that Tajikistan has provided a much more hospitable environment for the

development of the nongovernmental sector.26

Table 20. NGOs by Region

Uzbekistan Tajikistan

Tashkent 226 RRS 269Samarkand 42 Leninabod 136Bukhara 23 Khatlon 73Karakalpakistan 65 GBAO 26Farghana Valley 76 Others 22 Total 454 504

Source: http://www.cpart.kz (Accessed May 19, 2003).

Participants in the sustained dialogue have promoted a remarkable number of

peacebuilding endeavors, including organizing nongovernmental organizations to

address community needs. Public associations work to reduce tensions and hardships

and activists ameliorate the adverse institutional environment for democratization

11

created by the Commission on National Reconciliation through extensive

development of round-tables and dialogues for peacebuilding. Civil society

associations have provided the institutional channels for the intelligentsia, as a class,

to receive support from the international community and for Tajik activists to increase

their social influence.

Analysis of the prospects for legitimation compares popular reactions to the

symbols of cultural-identity promoted by the government. Official evaluations of

different arguments commonly made by Tajik cultural nationalists reflect the policy

of the Rahmonov administration.27 For example, in July 2001 the Minister of Culture

argued that the Somonid State, as the present model for Tajikistan, represents

pluralism, tolerance for Christianity and Zoroastrianism, and government built on

spiritualism and intellect. He rejected the historical facts regarding the jihad carried

out by the Somonis and the strength of their Islamic credentials. He also rejected

three other arguments made by Tajik cultural nationalists: (1) The Somonis received

their state through negotiation rather than through conquest, so that their rule

represents the superiority of negotiation over the use of compelling force. (2) The

Somonis represent the benefits for society when ethnicity is not a significant part of

identity. (3) The Somonis symbolized power and control.

In contrast, a government design artist describes the statue of Somoni as

representing the government’s desire to communicate two central, specific ideas: his

protection of religious rights and his ascension to power by negotiation and

12

agreement rather than by conquest in war.28 For these reasons they did not portray

Somoni either as an old man sitting as an image of wisdom, or as a young warrior on

a horse setting out to conquer.29 Somoni in the statue has no weapon and is only

walking forward with his robes trailing behind him. He holds his scepter of seven

stars aloft as “if asking for calm and attention to his words of wisdom.”30 The design

is intended to symbolize coming from the golden age and calling to people to pay

attention to the qualities of that past. In other words, the statue design represents the

influence of Tajik cultural nationalists presenting their concept of self-identity in a

noble light.31 It represents official ideology at least temporarily adopting the vision of

a tolerant, pluralistic Tajikistan fulfilling the historical character of Tajiks.32

This vision contrasts with popular interpretations of the symbolism on the new

currency issued in November 2000 as representing the autocratic, communist values

of the administration.33 The government treated all aspects of the design as a state

secret, even after the fact, and excluded all the professional designers.34 People

interpreted this decision as indicative of standard government policy, imposing

decisions from on high, made by a few people without any trust in the citizens or

consideration of their views. Despite challenging common standards of behavior, the

speaker of the upper house publicly criticized the government for “making mistakes”

in the introduction.35 In a televised presentation attempting to quell the adverse public

reaction, the national bank deputy chairman gave ridiculous, outlandish answers to

public questions.36

13

This summarization of symbols of Tajik identity shows that of the three

conditions for Tajikistan to gradually progress to a more stable, open, peaceful

society, Tajik intellectuals have fulfilled the first by promoting a culture of tolerance

and pluralism. However, their relative autonomy remains threatened and evidence of

government adherence to that worldview remains mixed.37

In the rational-instrumental perspective, the work of the CNR and the content

of the General Agreement strengthened institutional support for centralized state

control, excluded competing political parties and reduced pluralism and participation.

Greater institutional state control in the absence of effective opposition from either

domestic parties or by international donors reinforced the prospects for growing

authoritarianism. The first five years of peace after the June 1997 agreement cannot

be credited solely or even mostly to the consequences of labor migration, which

accelerated late in that period and became politically significant in 2003. While labor

migration removes resources for violent conflict, it does not completely explain the

inadequate international support for a free media and democratic process. It offers no

insight to explain why political leaders failed to overcome internal divisions to protest

the unfair parliamentary elections of 2000, or the lack of effective protest against the

sham referendum that extended Rahmonov’s eligibility to remain in office.

In the grievance perspective, Emomali Rahmonov has satisfied popular

demands for recognition of Tajik national aspirations. However, minorities continue

to complain of discrimination and many repatriated refugees continue to face

14

exploitation and the denial of their property rights.38 The grievance perspective

emphasizes general war weariness more than it does the fear of former warlords.

Increasing bitterness against government corruption has fueled the rise of a new

opposition party, the Social Democratic Party. In general, people express their

opinions on most political and social issues freely. In 2003 two newspapers began

publishing articles critical of the government, but in December 2003 the only

newspaper printing house—government owned--refused to print these newspapers.

Therefore, one cannot attribute sustained peace either to the ferocity of state

repression, as in Uzbekistan, or to the reduction and resolution of grievances.

The framing perspective emphasizes the role of images, but some public

images evolve from events rather than from state policy. Tajiks interpret the poverty

that drives people to work abroad, and the large number of labor migrants killed in

Russia, as proof that the state cannot take care of its own people.39 Therefore, their

image of labor migration impugns the legitimacy of the government. The severity of

poverty that has driven 10% of the population into exile as migrant workers while

hokims build the president new palaces discredits the government. People express

their distaste with these palaces because the government does not instead spend the

money to repair the water treatment plant or the phone system. People blame the

government for not allowing warnings during the 2003 typhoid epidemic while

foreign guests observed the recent “Asian Games” which allowed the epidemic to

grow while vaccines or medicines remained unavailable. The government also loses

15

public support by spending large sums of money hosting international events to raise

its image abroad while failing to meet basic human needs.

Despite the effects of the labor migration, corruption and palaces images,

other powerful images support domestic stability. The state successfully created two

images—“The president is a peacemaker,” and “Tajiks are peaceful people.” The

president’s supporters use the first image to personalize politics and to discredit

potential challengers. The second image deters complaints, protests and the

organization of opposition. It reinforces political passivity and encapsulates war

weariness, fear of conflict, and fear of the warlords now serving as regional

governors.

The creation of a peaceful Tajik self-image has transformed the psychological

landscape. In 2001 Tajiks commonly used rational-instrumental ideas to explain

sustained peace as resulting from warlords’ satisfaction with their portion of material

benefits from the peace agreement—cars, government positions and control of the

drug trade. In 2003, the field commanders’ satisfaction with such petty gains as a

government job—power sharing—evoked mild contempt and government officials

cited this satisfaction as proof of the opposition’s self-interest and lack of ideological

convictions.40

In 2003, Tajiks made very different arguments to explain the durability of

peace. They argue that peace endured because of labor migration and the peaceful

nature of Tajiks. The rise of this image demonstrates a very successful campaign that

16

began with the President’s book, Tajiks in the Mirror of History. The government has

annually organized an international conference on Tajikistan’s experience with

peacebuilding in which the theme of “The Culture of Peace” has grown.41 In 1999,

only one of 21 papers presented touched on Tajik cultural identity, in 2001, 3 of 35

papers promoted “Tajiks are peaceful people,” but by 2003 this idea had become one

of three dominant themes in public consciousness.42

Therefore, in the framing perspective, peace endured in Tajikistan because the

frame of political change through social transformation and education overcame the

frame that supported violence. Public associations work to reduce tensions and

hardships and activists ameliorate the adverse institutional environment for

democratization through the extensive development of roundtables and dialogues for

peacebuilding. Civil society associations have provided institutional channels for

Tajik activists to increase their public influence and for the intelligentsia, as a class, to

receive support from the international community. The sustained dialogue and greater

cultural autonomy created during the implementation of the General Agreement

enabled the development of a political culture of tolerance for public debate.

Conclusion

What enables a negotiated settlement to endure? The rational-instrumental

perspective claims that durable peace requires a strongman leader, economic

resuscitation and strong external political and military support. The grievance model

17

objects that conflicts cannot be resolved without meeting the basic human needs of

citizens. Long-term civic stability requires more than a growing economy, and firm

enforcement of rules, it also depends on citizens’ perceptions of security, and state

recognition of their identity. In the framing perspective, even technically sound

negotiations that lead to an agreement will not be fully implemented or achieve their

intended consequences without a transformation of the political environment. Just as

conditions in Tajikistan failed to meet any of the three conditions required in the

rational perspective for durable peace, they also fell short of resolving grievances.

However, Tajikistan did conform to the expectations generated by the framing

perspective.

The framing model presents a plausible description of sustained peace in

Tajikistan because cultural autonomy improved through intervention by the UN, the

OSCE and Western aid and development agencies. The military victors in the civil

war extended some freedom to cultural nationalists to create and interpret symbols of

national identity and they created a national culture of liberal values, openness and

tolerance.43 The sustained dialogue intervention—consistent with the framing

model—has introduced new influences into the dynamic environment of Tajikistan.

However, the supportive social and cultural environment for peacebuilding developed

largely through indigenous initiatives, with a spark from the sustained dialogue.

These conditions developed in spite of the adverse centralization of state power from

the work of the CNR, the malign neglect of contact group observer states failing to

18

push for the protection of political freedom and the complicity of western states as the

government repeatedly violated democratic values with fraudulent elections.

The proposition that fourteen or fifteen people participating in the sustained

dialogue intervention contributed to sustained peace in a country of 6.2 million may

appear exaggerated. However, the influence of this process extended across

government and society by several mechanisms best explained by example. First,

friends, classmates and former co-workers of sustained dialogue members working in

the administration who share liberal views reportedly soften the draconian aspects of

the president’s policy during implementation. Second, although some people describe

President Emomali Rahmonov as impervious to the views of those around him,

significant testimony claims that he does occasionally accept ideas from advisors who

participated in the sustained dialogue and propose ideas influenced by the culture of

that process. His political opponents testify that both Emomali Rahmonov and

Abdullo Nuri changed their arguments and public presentations as a result of

associating with sustained dialogue participants.44 Third, presidential advisors who

participated in the Dartmouth Conference program created a large number of other

dialogues encompassing a great range of interest groups. In every case, they bring

opposing parties on some issue together and promote the dialogue methodology and

concepts of problem solving. Fourth, even participants who do not feel continuing

commitment to policy debate have actively established dialogues to resolve other

social problems. For example, one formerly ideological Communist intellectual

19

participant became a successful capitalist businessperson and organized many

dialogues including customs officials, government inspectors and bureaucrats and

business people to find ways of improving conditions for traders.

Finally, some of the most active contributors to peacebuilding did not

participate in the sustained dialogue, but from only limited contact with participants

found confirmation for their own ideas, and the support and impetus to embark on

their own programs. For example, UNTOP takes credit for the work of one of the

heroes of peacebuilding in Tajikistan, Abdughani Mamadnazarov, the director of the

Association of Young Political Scientists because the UN contributes partial funding

for his programs and provides security for his organization’s offices in the UNTOP

building. His efforts reinforced peace by providing many people opportunities to

participate in solving problems associated with politics and society. He promoted

organizations that provide conditions for discussion—not just dialogue between

government and former opposition, but also including the Social Democratic Party.

His organization held roundtables organized on the principle of equal rights,

including more than 40 roundtables on the establishment of multi-party system, more

than 20 round tables on the establishment of civil society, and more than 30

continuing political discussion clubs. These efforts included the participation of all

raions—sometimes as many as five at a time and often more than three. Symbolism

plays a big role in this work. Mamadazimov repeatedly organized caravans to gather

roundtable participants from all parts of the republic. For example, in one program,

20

participants from every region brought clay, which organizers mixed and molded into

a ceramic vase to symbolize the unity of Tajikistan.

Sustained peace in Tajikistan represents the coincidence of the Dartmouth

Conference leaders’ decision to extend their experiment to Tajikistan, significant aid

and development organization activity, and a culture with indigenous roots for

openness and pluralism.45 It succeeded in spite of significant failures by external

parties. The lessons of this comparison, applied to other conflict situations to support

cultural autonomy, can improve outcomes. Policies of international donors and

outside countries that give attention to the quality of the national identity and the

ideology of the intelligentsia will create greater support for peace with social freedom

in which the state can confront corruption and people can meet their basic needs.

Up until now, Western policy has operated according to the rationalist

argument emphasizing the necessity of a “strong-man” leader to impose stability, in

essence providing security guarantees to allied governments but giving less regard to

social needs. Neo-liberal international financial institutions primarily channel

economic support directly to the government, conditioned on austerity programs.

Policies based on rationalism establish incentive structures that allow Tajikistan to

drift into a pattern of authoritarian stability similar to Uzbekistan. That future leads

only to economic stagnation and human rights abuse.

If the framing perspective became a source of policy guidance, democratic

Western countries would not passively accept election fraud because pluralism,

21

participation and competition can also lead to a competing form of stability that

supports the protection of human rights. Aid for the literary, cultural and artistic

activities of Tajiks, especially in marketing and distribution, would also sustain the

segment of society that advocates values appropriate to greater human freedom. The

convergence of the interests of Central Asian citizens and the international

community in promoting the ideals of state-society consolidation through education

and tolerance for debate should animate western policy. International intervention in

Central Asia must include support for cultural autonomy as much as meeting basic

human needs and altering incentives toward the path of peace.

In Tajikistan in the fall of 2003, the government initiated a policy to discredit

NGO leaders and supplant the activity of their organizations. These leaders recognize

that the public appreciation and name recognition gained from their service to citizens

makes them appealing candidates for parliament. Many NGO leaders possess the

intellectual capabilities that make them effective communicators who understand the

living world of the voters well. Both government and the former opposition parties

have lost public support, so people now place their trust in the businesspeople and

NGO leaders who provide material benefits. If the international community does not

apply effective pressure against the government’s policy change as a threat to

democratization, many of the gains of post-civil war period will be lost. Furthermore,

by early 2004 the government silenced two critical newspapers that had encouraged

the people of Tajikistan briefly in the summer and fall of 2003. International support

22

channeled through organizations such as the OSCE for social organizations and for

developing pluralism in the media remains the hope of Tajikistanis. They commonly

say, “If the international community loses interest tomorrow, we will have another

Saddam Hussein in a year.”

Formulation of post-conflict policy choices in mutually exclusive terms such

as stability versus human freedom presents an unappealing artificial dichotomy. An

alternate model of post-conflict stabilization focuses on the way that the social

position, resources and cultural values of the intelligentsia influence the path of

political development—authoritarianism, war, or social consolidation. Intellectuals

can become clients of a paternalistic government just as any other strata of society but

also can provide expression for popular sentiments and leadership for movements that

will represent social values. Even international organizations become corrupted and

penetrated by regime agents. However, transparency in awarding support from

international organizations to multiple recipients could help overcome these

problems. Therefore, support for this sector of society should be publicized and

channeled through international organizations to multiple recipients to promote public

consciousness that the international community collectively supports a political

transition to stability and human freedom.

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Hodizoda, Rasul. “The Theme of Unity and Consolidation in Tajik-Persian

Literature.” In Proceedings of the V-International Scientific Practical

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Conference “The Peacemaking Process in Tajikistan: Consolidation and Guarantee of the Peacemaking Process,” 89-90. Dushanbe: Open Society Institute, 1999.

Imomov, Ashurboi. “Mezhtadzhikskii Dialog I Obshenatsionalnii Dialog” [Intern-

Tajik dialogue and All-National Dialogue]. Biznez-I-Politiki [Business and Politics], trans. by Jeremiah Zartman, March 2003.

Kumar, Chetan. "Conclusion." In Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in

Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, 183-220. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001.

Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided

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Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, March 2001. (Accessed June 27, 2003); available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/index.shtml; Internet.

Olimova, Saodat and Igor Bosc. “Labor Migration from Tajikistan.” (Dushanbe:

International Organization for Migration in cooperation with Sharq Scientific Research Centre, 2003).

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Regeneration of War Torn Societies, ed. Michael Pugh, 1-14. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000.

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Tojikiston [Historical Experience of Tajikistan’s Peace]. Dushanbe: Ministry of Culture, 2001.

Saunders, Harold H. A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform

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Conscious of the Tajik People," trans. by Jeremiah Zartman.

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Swartz, David. Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997.

Wagner, Steven. Public Opinion in Tajikistan 1996. Washington, DC: IFES, 1997. Zartman, I. William. "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The

Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

NOTES

1According to Chetan Kumar, "Experts have argued that the most significant question with

regard to civil wars is why certain civil wars do not resume after a cease-fire or an agreement." Chetan Kumar, "Conclusion," in Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001), 195.

2For example, I. William Zartman (1995), advocates 1) re-concentration of central power

(make the powerful legitimate or the legitimate powerful) 2) increase state legitimacy; and 3) raise and allocate economic resources. All three changes require external help. He writes that the combination of a strongman leader, foreign support and economic resurrection are necessary for reconstruction. I. William Zartman, "Putting Things Back Together," in Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, ed. I. William Zartman, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995).

3Saidat Olimova and Igor Bosc, “Labor Migration from Tajikistan,” (Dushanbe: International

Organization for Migration in cooperation with Sharq Scientific Research Centre, 2003). Many Tajiks believe that the number of migrant workers is twice as high—1 million. Refugees from the civil war served as leaders or pioneers in this migration, first discovering transportation routes, how to find work and living accommodations, and then organizing labor brigades from their immediate families and home village. The IOM report authors confirmed the observation that many of the labor migrants were former fighters in the civil war, now with greater capabilities and opposed to the present government.

4For example, USAID subsidizes the Asia-Plus newspaper, which enjoys very new and

modern equipment and furnishings, and a well paid staff, but does not criticize of the government. In 2003 the Ruz-i-nov newspaper began carrying critical articles and editorials, which represents the effort of one man, one computer, and five employees in a bare office.

5According to confidential interviews with opposition party leaders in 2003, an American

diplomat exerted pressure on Lynn Pascoe put pressure on the opposition not to fight the referendum. Kambiz Arman, “Islamic Party Reduces Tension In Tajikistan By Moderating Stance On Upcoming Referendum” Eurasia Insight (June 12, 2003; accessed December 14, 2003); available from http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav061203a.shtml; Internet.

6For example, Marc Gilbert, head of the OSCE mission to Tajikistan, wrote regarding

fraudulent elections: “The conclusions by OSCE ODHIR let appear that during these first multi-party elections in the history of Tajikistan, even if not all OSCE standards were observed, all the former conflicting parties took part in the process.” Marc Gilbert, “The OSCE Mission to Tajikistan,” Tajribai ta’rikhii Sulhi Tojikiston [Historical Experience of Tajikistan’s Peace] Dushanbe: Ministry of Culture, 2001), 248. In contrast to this type of polite half-truth, Tajik opposition leaders demand that

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international donors impose political conditions because the money they spend on Tajikistan has such little effect on the public welfare, with most going directly into presidential pockets, while the citizens will be burdened with the debt incurred.

7Shahram Akbarzadeh, “Abdullajanov and the 'Third Force',” Accord 10: Politics of

Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process. London: Conciliation Resources, March 2001. (Accessed June 27, 2003); available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/ accord10/index.shtml; Internet.

8According to confidential interviews in September 2003, in Dushanbe, representatives in this

office include a diverse mixture of temperaments with some astute and perceptive strategists. Some opposition leaders report that as many as 80% of government officials hold liberal views and use their offices to soften the destructive impact of government policy during implementation and enforcement.

9Fen Osler Hampson, Nurturing Peace: Why Peace Agreements Succeed or Fail (Washington,

DC: US Institute of Peace, 1996). 10Hampson , ibid., cites from Holsti. 11Approximately half of respondents agreed with this formulation of “authority through

magnanimity” during interviews in Dushanbe in September and October 2003. 12Respondents who emphasize these factors work in the area of human rights promotion and

development where they help people intimidated by state officials. Other respondents, including some in the media, NGO leaders and writers, report that persuasion does prevail.

13A concept popularized in An Agenda for Peace (1992) by U. N. Secretary General Boutros

Boutros-Ghali. Peacebuilding developed out of an evaluation of failures of humanitarian and military peacekeeping projects since the 1970s. "Humanitarian aid and military peacekeeping were not enough. They did not address the root causes of conflict or secure social development beyond emergencies" Michael Pugh, "Introduction: The Ownership of Regeneration and Peacebuilding," In Regeneration of War Torn Societies, ed. Michael Pugh (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 4.

14Elisabeth M. Cousens, "Introduction," in Peacebuilding as Politics: Cultivating Peace in

Fragile Societies, ed. Elizabeth M. Cousens, Chetan Kumar, and Karin Wermester (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001).

15Doyle and Sambanis analyze peacebuilding success as a function of the relationship between international assistance, civil war hostility, and local capacity, such as the autonomous capability of civil society organizations. Michael W. Doyle and Nicholas Sambanis, “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and Quantitative Analysis,” American Political Science Review 94, no. 1 (December 4, 2000), 779.

16Pugh, ibid, 3. 17Harold H. Saunders, A Public Peace Process: Sustained Dialogue to Transform Racial and

Ethnic Conflict, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 249. 18Lederach, John Paul. Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies.

Washington, DC, United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997, 94

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19David Swartz, Culture and Power: The Sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).

20"The movements for democracy in Eastern Europe, the USSR and China--and now, on the

periphery of the surviving Communist world, in countries like Vietnam and Cuba--all had their seeds in and have drawn their primary energy from the growth of autonomous organizational, cultural and intellectual life." Larry Diamond, “Introduction: Civil Society and the Struggle for Democracy," in The Democratic Revolution: Struggles for Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World, ed. Larry Diamond (New York: Freedom House, 1992), 12.

21According to the opinion survey group “Center for Sociological Research,” sampling ten

newspapers in Dushanbe. Zerkalo #7, July 2000, pp. 17-22. 22Rashid G. Abdullo, “Implementation of the 1997 General Agreement: Successes, Dilemmas

And Challenges,” Accord 10: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources, March 2001, accessed June 27, 2003); available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/index.shtml; Internet.

23Parviz Mullojanov, “Civil Society and Peacebuilding,” Accord 10: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources, March 2001, accessed June 27, 2003); available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/index.shtml; Internet.

24Catherine Barnes and Kamoludin Abdullaev, “Introduction: from war to politics,” Accord 10: Politics of Compromise: The Tajikistan Peace Process (London: Conciliation Resources, March 2001, accessed June 27, 2003); available from http://www.c-r.org/accord/tajik/accord10/index. shtml; Internet.

25According to Mullojanov, while field commanders had undermined the influence of village councils of elders during the war, the traditional civic networks gradually regained authority during peace negotiations and after the General Agreement. Local governments weakened by civil war were unable to provide basic services, reconstruction or repairs, forcing them to rely on community-based organizations. Traditional grassroots organizations gained influence with the creation of semi-official institutions between mahalla councils and local governments called jamoats.

26The data are listed for May 19, 2003. These numbers cannot be taken as absolute in any sense because some NGOs are merely entities on paper, without a consistent revenue source or stable operation. Abdullojanov claims that 625 NGOs had officially registered by March 2000. Counterpart International Inc. (Accessed June 27, 2003); available from http://www.cango.net/db/navigate.asp? Country=4; Internet.

27Interview in Dushanbe with the Minister of Culture (Abdurahim Rahimov, July 7, 2001), who was promoted to this job as a reward after the President heard his presentation to a symposium on Tajik cultural identity in May of 2001. He was assassinated September 10, 2001.

28Some Tajik cultural nationalists even criticize the use of Somoni as the Shah or king of an

enlightened but medieval state. Instead they argue, one cannot build a modern state on an example from 1000 years ago, because the people cannot understand such a historically distant figure, but need

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a symbol of hope for the future. They also say that using a king as a state symbol is inappropriate for a state that wants to pursue democratization and human rights.

29Georgian artists modeled the face of the statue on a coin that depicted the grandfather of Ismail. Tajiks very commonly say that the statue and other representations of Somoni look just like the president because he wants people to think that he is as great as Ismail Somoni. This reaction reveals a suspicion of the president’s motives of self-promotion.

30Personal interview, Vafo Nazarov, Dushanbe, Thursday April 12, 2001. 31The effectiveness of this effort to communicate can be measured by the response to a survey

question. Respondents were asked to evaluate their knowledge of Ismoil Somoni and the meaning of his statue. The average score was 5.25 on a scale of 1 = total ignorance to 10 = confident knowledge. The average score was 2.33 on an evaluation of feelings on a scale in which one equals “just a historical figure” to ten equals “strong personal connection.”

32There is also public resentment of the large cost of the statue. The base and arch cost $600,000. Cost of the statue itself is not available, but the government put enormous effort into organizing artistic competitions to celebrate the 1100-year anniversary of the Somonid era. Every newspaper for months carried articles on this topic and many workers complained that they did not receive a salary for six months to pay for the statue and celebration.

33Part of the skepticism toward the new currency is related to the large numbers who say that

the declaration of independence was a bad thing (37%). This is linked to 44% saying that Tajikistan is not actually independent and 85% saying that conditions have become worse since independence. Steven Wagner, “Public Opinion in Tajikistan 1996” (Washington, DC: International Foundation for Election Systems, 1997), 31,32.

34According to the televised announcement at the time of its introduction, the new currency and its design were a state secret known only by the President, the head of the national bank and his deputy.

35Galina Gridneva and Valery Zhukov, “Authorities Fail to Clarify Importance of Currency

Reform,” quoting Mahmadsaid Ubaidullayev, November 10, NEXIS. According to Steven Wagner, 53% consider the behavior appropriate and 38% inappropriate, IFES, 11.

36The deputy national bank chairman said that they could not put the portrait of the poet Rudaki on the currency because Rudaki was blind and the IMF requires that portraits on currency show the eyes. This absurd lie constitutes not just stimulation of suspicion against foreigners and a claim of international support of the state against the values of the people, but also government’s admission of its dependence on such support.

37For example, Deputy Head of the Information and Analytical Department of Tajikistan's

Presidential Administration, Suhrob Sharipov, in his dissertation has described the Tajik intelligentsia as in a state of deep crisis and expectant in the pessimistic sense. He acknowledges the difficulty of conditions. “A new process of extinction and the slow destruction of the Tajik intelligentsia began as a result of developing new system of relations. The intelligentsia as a component of society was denied the elementary conditions for existence.” Suhrob Sharipov, "The Intelligentsia and its Role in the

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Transformation of the Conscious of the Tajik People," trans. by Jeremiah Zartman.

38Bozrikova, T. N. “Problemi Ethnicheskikh Menshenst B Tadzhikistana” [Problems of Ethnic Minorities in Tajikistan] (Dushanbe: Open Society Institute, 2003).

39According to interviews conducting in October and November 2003, Tajiks appeal to the social norm that the country and especially the president have a duty to provide for and protect Tajiks. They take it as a dishonor on the country that Tajiks suffer under terrible abuse as migrant workers in Russia.

40This pacific image allows them to avoid their own complicity and blame the war on conspiring outside powers, such as Russia, Uzbekistan, Pakistan or the US. In this image, they blame 20 years of continued fighting by Tajiks in Afghanistan on illiteracy and ignorance of the great Tajik poetic canon.

41In 2001 a prominent independent cultural nationalist made a circuit of embassies and NGOs

seeking funding for a symposium on “ The Culture of Peace.” 42Rasul Hodizoda, “The Theme of Unity and Consolidation in Tajik-Persian Literature,”

Proceedings of the V-International Scientific Practical Conference “The Peacemaking Process in Tajikistan: Consolidation and Guarantee of the Peacemaking Process,” (Dushanbe: Open Society Institute, 1999), 89-90. A. Kh. Samiev, “Peace as a National Idea of Tajik People,” Tajribai ta’rikhii Sulhi Tojikiston [Historical Experience of Tajikistan’s Peace] Dushanbe: Ministry of Culture, 2001).

43According to Deputy Head of the Information and Analytical Department of Tajikistan's

Presidential Administration Suhrob Sharipov, “I see political nihilism, legal determinism and ignorance of the democratic principles of coexistence behind such a turn of events.” He praises the work of opposition parties for displaying a high political culture, the media for presenting different views, and the authorities for showing tolerance to pluralism and freedom of speech. Suhrob Sharipov, “Referendum: they did us more harm than good” Asia-Plus (May 15, 2003; accessed January 21, 2004) available from http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/tajikistan/hypermail/200305/0024.shtml; Internet.

44An Islamist intellectual sustained dialogue member reports that he was shocked at the President’s speech in support of Islam and democracy, as though it was the speech he wrote for Abdullo Nuri to give to an Islamic audience. Then Abdullo Nuri gave a speech in which he advocated democracy in terms that his opponents would have used.

45According to Ashurboi Imomov, a professor of constitutional law, one of the participants in

the Inter-Tajik Dialogue and chairman of the Social Committee for Cooperation of Democratic Processes. Ashurboi Imomov, “Mezhtadzhikskii Dialog I Obshenatsionalnii Dialog,” [Intern-Tajik dialogue and All-National Dialogue,] Biznez-I-Politiki [Business and Politics], trans. by Jeremiah Zartman, March 2003.

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