1

Introduction

A Naxal or Naxalite is a member of any of the Communist guerrilla groups in India, mostly

associated with the Communist Party of India (Maoist). The term Naxal derives from the name

of the village Naxalbari in West Bengal, where the movement had its origin. Naxalites are

considered far-left radical communists, supportive of Maoist political sentiment and ideology.

Their origin can be traced to the split in 1967 of the Communist Party of India (Marxist),

leading to the formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist). Initially the

movement had its centre in West Bengal. In later years, it spread into less developed areas of

rural southern and eastern India, such as Chhattisgarh, Odisha and Andhra Pradesh through the

activities of underground groups like the Communist Party of India (Maoist).

In 2006 India's intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing estimated that 20,000

armed-cadre Naxalites were operating in addition to 50,000 regular cadres and their growing

influence prompted Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to declare them to be the most

serious internal threat to India's national security. Naxalites, and other anti-government

militants, are often referred to as "ultras".1

In February 2009, the Indian Central government announced a new nationwide initiative, to be

called the "Integrated Action Plan" (IAP) for broad, co-ordinated operations aimed at dealing

with the Naxalite problem in all affected states (namely Karnataka, Chhattisgarh, Odisha,

Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal).

Importantly, this plan included funding for grass-roots economic development projects in

Naxalite-affected areas, as well as increased special police funding for better containment and

reduction of Naxalite influence in these areas.2

In 2009, Naxalites were active across approximately 180 districts in ten states of India. In

August 2010, after the first full year of implementation of the national IAP program, Karnataka

was removed from the list of Naxalite-affected states. In July 2011, the number of Naxalite-

affected areas was reduced to 83 districts in nine states (including 20 additional districts). In

1 Philip Bowring (18 April 2006). "Maoists who menace India". International Herald Tribune. Retrieved 2009-

03-17 2 Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh (21 September 2005). "The Naxalite Challenge". Frontline Magazine (The

Hindu). Retrieved 2007-03-15

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December 2011, the national government reported that the number of Naxalite-related deaths

and injuries nationwide had gone down by nearly 50% from 2010 levels.

“Communist terrorist groups (Naxals) are by far the most frequent perpetrators and the main

cause of deaths in India. Maoist communist groups claimed responsibility for 192 deaths in

2013, which was nearly half of all deaths from terrorism in India.

History & Origin of Naxalism

The term Naxalites comes from Naxalbari, a small village in West Bengal, where a section of

the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M) led by Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal,

and Jangal Santhal initiated a violent uprising in 1967. On 18 May 1967, the Siliguri Kishan

Sabha, of which Jangal was the president, declared their support for the movement initiated by

Kanu Sanyal and readiness to adopt armed struggle to redistribute land to the landless. The

following week, a sharecropper near Naxalbari village was attacked by the landlord's men over

a land dispute. On 24 May, when a police team arrived to arrest the peasant leaders, it was

ambushed by a group of tribals led by Jangal Santhal, and a police inspector was killed in a

hail of arrows. This event encouraged many Santhal tribals and other poor people to join the

movement and to start attacking local landlords.3

These conflicts go back to the failure of implementing the 5th and 9th Schedules of

the Constitution of India. See Outlook India comment by E.N. Rammohan 'Unleash the Good

Force' - edition July 16, 2012. In theory these Schedules provide for a limited form of tribal

autonomy with regard to exploiting natural resources on their lands, e.g. pharmaceutical and

mining, and 'land ceiling laws', limiting the land to be possessed by landlords and distribution

of excess land to landless farmers and labourers. The caste system is another important social

aspect of these conflicts.

Mao Zedong provided ideological leadership for the Naxalbari movement, advocating that

Indian peasants and lower class tribals overthrow the government and upper classes by force.

A large number of urban elites were also attracted to the ideology, which spread through Charu

3 Diwanji, A. K. (2 October 2003). "Primer: Who are the Naxalites?". Rediff.com. Retrieved 2007-03-15

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Majumdar's writings, particularly the 'Historic Eight Documents' which formed the basis of

Naxalite ideology.

Practically all Naxalite groups trace their origin to the CPI (ML). A separate offshoot from the

beginning was the Maoist Communist Centre, which evolved out of the Dakshin Deshgroup.

The MCC later fused with the People's War Group to form the Communist Party of India

(Maoist). A third offshoot was that of the Andhra revolutionary communists, mainly

represented by the UCCRI(ML), following the mass line legacy of T. Nagi Reddy, which broke

with the AICCCR at an early stage.

During the 1970s, the movement was fragmented into disputing factions. By 1980, it was

estimated that around 30 Naxalite groups were active, with a combined membership of 30,000.

Cause of Naxalism

Naxalite problem at present is the greatest threat to the internal security of India. The root cause

of Naxalism is the glaring inequality in rural India based on unequal distribution of land.The

book Naxalism: Causes and Cure” is a new approach to what and why of this vexed problem

of uncontrolled violence by the Naxal rebels in states like Andhra Pradesh, Jharkhand,

Chattisgarh, Bihar, Orissa, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, Karnataka, Maharashtra, etc.

Equitable distribution of surplus vested land for cultivation purpose is the main demand of the

Naxalites. This is also the centre point of the land reform measures. None can deny this

demand.The problems in implementation of land reforms differ from state to state. Hence the

most important specific component of land reform has been dealt with separately for each state

affected by Naxalite violence. Thus, the book has to be read as an integrated whole.It should

prove as a practical handbook for those who are entrusted with the task of solving the problem

of Naxalism in India.4

4 Pandita, Rahul (2011). Hello, Bastar : The Untold Story of India's Maoist Movement. Chennai: Westland

(Tranquebar Press). pp. 23–24.

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Rise of Naxalism

The exploitation of the adivasi (tribal) homelands for their mineral riches, always to the

detriment of the adivasis, has stoked the biggest and most widespread insurgency t0his country

has known. The adivasi revolts predate the advent of the Naxalites by more than a couple of

centuries. In just the Rampa region of East Godavari district in Andhra Pradesh, more than a

dozen tribal revolts occurred between 1770 and 1924.

In the early years of colonisation, no other community in India offered such heroic resistance

to British rule or faced such tragic consequences, as did the numerousadivasi communities of

what is now Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and Bengal. In 1772, the Paharia revolt broke out

which was followed by a five-year uprising led by Tilka Manjhi who was hanged in Bhagalpur

in 1785.

The Tamar and Munda revolts followed. In the next two decades, revolts took place in

Singhbhum, Gumla, Birbhum, Bankura, Manbhoom and Palamau, followed by the great Kol

Risings of 1832 and the Khewar and Bhumij revolts (1832-34). In 1855, the Santhals waged

war against the permanent settlement of Lord Cornwallis, and a year later,

numerous adivasi leaders played key roles in the 1857 war of independence.

Since the mid 1970s a fire of discontent has been raging in the adivasi homelands in

Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa and

Jharkhand. Much of this anger relates to how the big mining interests have ravaged

theadivasi homelands, and how the people have been forced out of their lands. Worse, little of

the royalty extracted by the State trickles down to the people whose homelands are being

destroyed.

For decades the royalty on iron ore was a meager Rs 27 per tonne. After the troubles in

theadivasi homelands intensified, the Government of India woke up to the realisation that the

exploitation cannot go on as before and in 2009 it increased the royalty to 10 per cent of the

sales price. It is now proposed to raise this to 15 per cent.5

Because of this there is now a huge orchestrated campaign against this and the PR machinery

of the big ore and metals companies are working overtime to have this rolled back. We know

5 Co-ordinated operations to flush out Naxalites soon The Economic Times, 6 February 2009.

5

from experience that governments are always susceptible to the blandishments of the well

heeled. But who is there to speak for the major stakeholders in the game – the adivasis?

That the increase in royalty on iron ore from 10 per cent to 15 per cent would lift the cost for

miners by Rs 150 to Rs 250 per tonne ($2.50-$4.00) is plausible. Dhruv Goel, managing partner

at industry consultancy SteelMint, says: "But they will not be able it pass it on completely to

steelmakers for the reason that imports will be cheaper and people will prefer imports over

domestic ore." This is just nonsense.

In 2009, when it was raised to 10 per cent of the market price, in reality this was raised to Rs

270 per tonne, when it should have been twice that or more. The cost of extraction is estimated

to be not more than Rs 350 per tonne. The export price has never fallen below Rs 5,000 per

tonne. In February 2010 the landed price per tonne of Indian iron ore in China was $128, which

was then over Rs 6000 per tonne. At present the purchase prices are around $100, which is still

Rs 6,000 per tonne. Thus, iron ore margins accruing to the miners and steel companies remain

consistent and huge.

Ideology and Strategy of Naxalism

Although most Naxalite groups today have a distant relationship to China and its ruling

communist party, Maoism is still at the core of their ideology, with protracted people’s war as

its main feature (Mohanti 2006, 3). This means long term revolutionary violent struggle

supported by the rural masses. More precisely during the first phase of revolution, the rebels

try to gain popular support by ideological indoctrination, start building up liberated zones and

start attacking the government. During the second phase the violence escalates and the

revolutionaries increase their influence in rural areas and select bigger targets. In the final phase

conventional warfare is adopted and the cities are encircled from the conquered countryside

aiming to overthrow the government (Ficci 2009, 32). Following this doctrine, the Naxal

revolution appears to be stuck within the second phase. Still today, over 30 years after his death,

the thoughts of Charu Mazumdar, the intellectual father of the movement, play an important

role for the Naxalites. In his “eight historic documents” he points out the necessity of setting

up an armed group in rural areas and to establish liberated zones in order to capture state power.

The participation in the electoral process within the Indian political system was rejected

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categorically. In contrast to the CPI (ML) and the Liberation group that by now participate in

the parliamentary system, the CPI (Maoist) regards themselves as the true successor of the

movement that started in Naxalbari. Instead to the parliamentary process the seizure of power

shall be accomplished through the armed struggle.6

Liberating the countryside and the establishment of self-sufficient base areas are key elements

in the Naxalite strategy towards the gradual seizure of political power. They are aiming on the

expansion of these base areas in order to create a revolutionary compact zone. Although the

so-called red corridor is often regarded as a compact revolutionary zone, doubts can be raised

regarding the varying degree of influence of the Maoist on respective territories (Mohanty

2006, 9).7

The official line of the CPI (Maoist) focuses on the underprivileged, basically poor peasants

and tribals, rejects any caste systems and supports all national movements striving for

independence and self-determination, with a special reference to India’s North East as well as

Kashmir (Mohanty 2006, 4). Recently also feminist positions were introduced. The Maoists

are staffed with a high degree of female soldiers. However patriarchal structures still persist

within the movement (Mohanty 2006, 4). But it must be questioned if the welfare of the

marginalised and deprived as well as Dalits and Adivasis lies at the Naxalite’s heart. Due to

Maoist ideology and Charu Mazumdars teachings, seizure of state power is the ultimate goal

of the movement in order to transform India into a multinational union of equal nationalities

(Mohanty 2006 4). This is also reflected by several official Naxalite documents. (Marwah

2009, 131). In this regard their engagement with the poor primarily appears as a strategy for

mobilising the masses for revolutionary reasons. Also a look on the composition of the highest

party bodies shows that neither Dalits nor tribals are represented; in fact most of the members

belong to high castes (Ranmohan 2010, 2). It appears that a distinction can be made between

on the one hand the intellectual leadership of the movement that is highly convinced of the

Maoist ideology and strives for their ultimate goal of overthrowing the Indian state in the long

run and on the other hand the rural mass supporters, poor peasants, Adivasis, Dalits etc. whose

anger and frustration was instrumentalised that fight for social justice, equality and local

6 Handoo, Ashok. "Naxal Problem needs a holistic approach". Press Information Bureau. Retrieved 2009-

08-08 7 Sen, Antara Dev (25 March 2010). "A true leader of the unwashed masses". DNA (Diligent Media

Corporation) (Mumbai, India). Archived from the original on 7 January 2014

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development in order to improve their individual situation. Both aspects must be seen at the

same time. (Planning Commission 2010).8

Organisations

Although most of the Naxalite groups seem to be under the umbrella of the CPI (Maoist), the

party within is fragmented. The basic organisation of the different outfits still exists within the

party as a consequence of non-profound merger (SATP (A)). Most of the extremists within the

party originally belonged to the MCC while most of the moderate party members can be found

within the ranks of the PWG. There are also armed groups operating under the guise of the CPI

(Maoist) that are criminal gangs rather than revolutionaries as they are highly engaged in

extortion activities. However, despite numerous internal differences the party was able to build

up a highly organised hierarchical leadership.

The highest body of the CPI (Maoist) is the Central Committee (CC). A part of the CC

constitutes the Politburo that gathers the core political leadership. It consists of 13 or 14

members and is led by its secretary general Muppala Lakshmana Rao alias Ganapati. Ganapati

was already secretary general of the PWG and is regarded as one of its first members. Many

commentators do not assess his leadership as very charismatic; therefore he depends on other

strong men within the leadership. Several former members of the politburo were killed or

arrested by the security forces. The most recent victim was Cherukuri Rajkumar, alias Azad,

the number three of the leadership, killed July 2nd 2010.9

The Central Military Commission (CMC) that guides the military actions is likewise composed

by membrs of the CC. Moreover the Central Committee oversees the Regional Bureaus and

State Committees. The subordinated units to the respective bodies are divided into District

committees and Divisional Committees. The local bodies are even equipped with specialised

departments, inter alia for justice, education and agriculture. In addition reports concerning a

special Technology Committee, that is engaged in developing an efficient communication

system and supply lines as well as military assessment and producing weapons reflect the

sophisticated character of the party organisation.10

However, functioning of the leadership and the institutional structure of the party persist

secretly and partly transparently as they have to operate from the underground. Because of this

8 Mukherjee, Arun; (2007). Maoist "spring thunder": the Naxalite movement 1967-1972. K.P. Bagchi & Co.,

Calcutta. 9 "Karnataka no longer Naxal infested". The Times Of India. 26 August 2010 10 Co-ordinated operations to flush out Naxalites soon The Economic Times, 6 February 2009

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fact the organization of the party does not work out smoothly all the times, reflected by several

incidents where local squads had carried out attacks that were later regretted by the central

leadership.

Besides the mentioned contacts to the LTTE, consisting of arms deals and training cooperation,

the leadership of the CPI (Maoist) has established contacts to different armed groups within

and beyond India. There were tight linkages between the Maoists of India and the former

Communist Party of Nepal Maoist, cooperating in terms of training, armament and logistics.

However, since the Maoists in Nepal formally decided to participate in the parliamentary

process in 2007, the relations strained. In addition there exists international cooperation via the

2001 formed Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and Organizations of South Asia

(CCOMPOSA) including extremist left wing parties from Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, India, Nepal

and Bhutan. Moreover there were reports that the Naxalites have established some contacts to

insurgent groups of India’s North East, most prominent to the United Liberation Front of

Asom.11

Once Naxalites have entered the political sphere they start their propaganda work in order to

establish popular support. This means particularly building up of mass organizations

“specifically for mobilising women, workers, students and peasants and, generally, for anti-

caste organisations. Headed by committed cadres, these units indoctrinate people considered

impressionable.” In their area of influence they start slogging money lenders, demanding

landlords to distribute land and hold political rallies. Moreover in some parts they were able to

establish parallel governments that are engaged in imposing of taxes, setting up of people’s

courts, distributing land as well as education through People’s schools that shall guarantee the

indoctrination of the young. Meanwhile they paralyze the functioning of the state institutions

in the respective areas like schools and hospitals as well as communication and they even stop

revenue payment to state authorities. These so-called liberated zones serve as safe havens for

the Maoists.12

In fact Maoists have often destroyed local schools as they claimed that they were used by

security forces as base camps. But they have also forced teachers, doctors and other

11 Ramakrishnan, Venkitesh (21 September 2005). "The Naxalite Challenge". Frontline Magazine (The

Hindu). Retrieved 2007-03-15.

12 Philip Bowring (18 April 2006). "Maoists who menace India". International Herald Tribune.

Retrieved 2009-03-17

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governmental official to fulfil their duty in the remote areas. In addition the Naxalites have

contributed in decreasing exploitation of tribal workers, enforced higher wages for Tendu leave

pickers, a job often carried out by tribals, as well as partly committed in setting up irrigation

for farmland. Recently they have engaged in destroying roads, railway lines and bridges in

order to isolate the target area and deny the state’s claim to power. Their financing derives from

looting of banks, extortion, taxes and royalties of forest producers.

According to Mukherji who analysed the financing of the party, a high amount of the party’s

income that derives from taxes, royalties and are mostly purposed to be spent for development,

are diverted to the military budget. There exist also reports that forest and private contractors,

as well as mining companies that operate in the affected areas, are paying protection fees to the

Naxalites. In this regard the Maoists have introduced the often announced development model

only hesitantly as they still benefit partly from the persisting system. However, the Naxalites

have established parallel power structures in several parts of the country. As long as the

Maoist’s installed ‘governments’ are able to establish social order among the governed and can

guarantee the smoothly running of everyday life, the legitimacy of their imposed political order

is fostered and thus stabilised. But as one major feature of Maoist strategy refers to retreat when

they oppose superior security forces, political control of Maoists in these areas is not persistent,

albeit sympathy and support among the population for the Naxalites endures. The existence of

such areas is challenging the ideal of the Indian state as they limit its influence and power.13

Challenge for the State

The success of the Maoist movement is deeply rooted in the weakness of some parts of the

Indian state to fulfill its ideally functions and responsibilities. Although India, in comparison

to other former colonized states, was able to develop a powerful apparatus of state, state control

remains in large parts precarious in terms of its conception. State administration is especially

in those areas sparsely developed which are most affected by Naxalite violence. This fact is

reflected inter alia by small state budgets, low bureaucratic efficiency as well as prevailing

13 Pandita, Rahul (2011). Hello, Bastar : The Untold Story of India's Maoist Movement. Chennai: Westland

(Tranquebar Press). pp. 23–24.

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corruption (Mehra 2009, 4). There are even some remote areas where state domination is

almost completely absent (Mainstream 2008).14

In these regions that are characterized by weak governance, traditional types of rule were able to persist.

Social elites like high castes, landlords and loan sharks dominate the rural population and benefit from

their exploitation. (Nigam 2010). State-aided rural development programs in these areas have often not

reached the bottom of the society and instead contributed to the persistence of landlordism (Mohanty

2006, 3). Rarely the state is able to comply with its ideally basic responsibilities, such as guaranteeing

security, providing basic amenities as well as ensuring social upward mobility (Frontier 1). Instead

malnutrition is prevalent. The State Hunger index from 2008 shows that the situation regarding food

supply in the whole of India is generally alarming but the starvation rate in the Naxalite most affected

areas is especially high (IFPRI 2009).15

Basic services such as roads, sanitation and electricity are not being provided well. Public

institutions such as schools, health care centers and police stations are underdeveloped

(Mainstream 2008). Government schools do exist but teachers are rarely willing to work in

these respective areas. In addition, the coverage of doctors and the provision of medical

services are very low. Generally police stations are poorly staffed, with only 7-10 officers who

have to dominate an average area of 450 sqm (Dhar 2009). Many state authorities refuse to

work in the remote and conflict torn areas (Marwah 2009, 124). Furthermore the public

administration is frequently affected by corruption (Mehra 2008, 19/Planning Commission

2008, 53). Because of that, in conjunction with inefficient administration, funds that are

assigned for the minor developed parts of India, do not reach the poor (Dhar 2009).

Many state agencies also execute structural violence in terms of restrictive forest policy, as

well as land acquisition for industrial projects that is related to deficient resettlement measures

(Mehra 2008, 21). Several non-violent protests in this regard were suppressed violently by the

security forces (Subramanian 2007, 131). All of these mentioned issues led to the frustration

and loss of confidence in the state by the residents of the respective areas. Because of that the

influence and control of the state is therefore marginal.16

Subsequently the state loses its turf to the Maoists as it was not able to address the basic needs

of the population (Mainstream 2008). In addition, in the federal states of Andhra Pradesh, West

14 "‘Historic low’ in terror, Naxal violence". 31 December 2012. Retrieved 2012-12-31 15 Quoted in Judith Vidal-Hall, "Naxalites", p. 73–75 in Index on Censorship, Volume 35, Number 4 (2006).

p. 74. 16 Chhibber, Maneesh (5 June 2011). "Centre to declare more districts Naxal-hit". Indian

Express. Archived from the original on 7 January 2013.

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Bengal, Bihar and Jharkhand tight relations between Naxalites and political leaders evolved

for their mutual advantage. The politicians sought the help of the rebels during elections while

the Naxalites benefitted from loose prosecution and minor interventions from the state

(Marwah 2009, 120/122/ Mehra 2009, 9). Due to the fact that the Maoists were able to spread

their influence into several pockets within the Indian state, there exist parallel claims to power

over respective regions. This fact, and the direct violent attacks against the agents, institutions

and symbols of the state, apparently challenges the inherent ideals of the state, namely

sovereignty and monopoly on the use of force. Hence, the state’s legitimacy is in crisis.17

This challenge sets the state under pressure to correspond with its ideal. So far the Indian state

interprets this task in a limited way, namely by executing armed force against the challenger.

Heretofore this approach was not crowned with success due to additional weakness of the state

security apparatus, such as lack of training, capacity, equipment and limited mobility. The

coercive reaction by the Indian state on the Naxalite challenge instead contributed to alienate

large parts of the population living in the conflict zone even more from the state (Dhar 2009).18

Solution of Naxalism

This is rather a tough question. It all goes back to why was naxalism born in the first place. There

is no short term or one shot solution for this problem. It comes down to the core values on the

basis on which a nation (society) has to be built.

The roots of naxal revolution in India comes from oppression of a land tiller by the landlord in

rural districts of India. Bonded labor. eg - Telangana armed struggle. Now writing about how to

address this issue will take a who book. These conflicts go back to the failure of implementing

the 5th & 9th Schedules of the Constitution of India. In theory these Schedules provide for a limited

form of tribal autonomy with regard to exploiting natural resources on their lands, e.g.

pharmaceutical & mining), and 'land ceiling laws', limiting the land to be possessed by landlords

and distribution of excess land to landless farmers & laborers.

Huge gap between the rich and the poor. This is a strong subject they use in their training to

compare the lives of the rich and the poor.

17 Judith Vidal-Hall, "Naxalites", p. 73–75 in Index on Censorship, Volume 35, Number 4 (2006). p. 74. 18 Ministry of Panchayati Raj (14 January 2011). "Sixty Tribal and Backward districts in 9 states to get

Central Grant under IAP". Press Information Bureau, Government of India.Archived from the original on 5 September 2012.

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Privatization - for one's benefits. Also the development should not be centered to Urban areas but

to move them to rural areas.

Conclusion

So from the above discussion it is clear that Naxalism is big challenge to Indian Political

System. This is a problem who have socio-economic and Political implications. The issues of

human rights, Democracy, rights of tribes, question of development, internal security and so

many issues involved in this problem. Scholars believe that the naxal movement missed its

path. It is direction less and instead of helping any one it creates hurdles in development of

most underdeveloped areas. Their strategy is violence based and that could not lead in right

direction. Perhaps, that why Kanu Sanyal, one of the founder of naxal movement took his own

life on March 23, 2010. (Remember 23 March, 1931 is Martyrs day of Bhagat Singh). He was

revolutionary, may be his path was not wrong, but now the movement lost its aim and

directions. Kanu Sanyal himself, in many time criticized large scale violence. Kanu Sanyal's

movement was merely anti-feudal.