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Democratic deficit in the European UnionFrom Wikipedia, the free encyclopediaJump to: navigation, search

European Union

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v t

e The concept of a Democratic deficit within the European Union is the idea that institutions of the European Union lack democratic accountability and legitimacy compared to the national governmentsof its member states. The term was initially used to criticise thetransfer of legislative powers from national governments to the Council of ministers of the EU. This led to an elected European Parliament being created and given the power to approve or reject EU legislation. Since then, usage of the term has broadened to describe newer issues facing the European Union.

Opinions differ as to whether the European Union has a democratic deficit[1] or how it should be remedied if it exists.[2][3] Proponentsof Pro-Europeanism or European unification argue that the EuropeanUnion should reform its institutions to make them more accountable, while Eurosceptics argue that the European Union should reduce its powers.

Contents [hide] 

1 Use and meaning of the term o 1.1 European executive o 1.2 European parliament o 1.3 European elections

2 Development of democratic legitimacy and transparency

3 See also 4 References

5 Further reading

[edit] Use and meaning of the termThe phrase democratic deficit is cited as first being used by the YoungEuropean Federalists in their Manifesto in 1977, which was draftedby Richard Corbett. It was also used by David Marquand in 1979,

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referring to the then European Economic Community, the forerunner of the European Union.[4] 'Democratic deficit' in relation to the European Union, refers to a perceived lack of accessibility to theordinary citizen, or lack of representation of the ordinary citizen, and lack of accountability of European Union institutions.[5][6]

The democratic deficit has been called a 'structural democratic deficit', in that it is inherent in the construction of the European Union as a supranational union that is neither a pure intergovernmental organization, nor a true federal state. The German Constitutional Court, for instance, argues that decision-making processes in the EU remain largely those of an international organization, which would ordinarily be based on theprinciple of the equality of states. The principle of equality of states and the principle of equality of citizens cannot be reconciled in a Staatenverbund.[2] In other words, in a supranational union or confederation (which is not a federal state) there is a problem of how to reconcile the principle of equality among nationstates, which applies to international (intergovernmental) organizations, and the principle of equality among citizens, whichapplies within nation states.[3]

[edit] European executive

One criticism of democratic illegitimacy focuses on the role of the EU "executive", the European Commission, in initiating legislation. This criticism has, in turn, been criticized, using comparisons with the situation in national governments where few members' bills are ever debated and "fewer than 15% are ever successfully adopted in any form", while government proposals "generally pass without substantial or substantive amendments fromthe legislature".[7]

According to R. Daniel Kelemen, fragmented power systems like the European Union and the United States may tend to produce more detailed regulations that give member states less discretion in implementation.[8]

Voting in the council is usually by qualified majority voting, andsometimes unanimity is required. This means that for the vast majority of EU legislation the corresponding national government has usually voted in favor in the Council. To give an example, up

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to September 2006, out of the 86 pieces of legislation adopted in that year the government of the United Kingdom had voted in favor of the legislation 84 times, abstained from voting twice and nevervoted against.[9]

[edit] European parliament

One criticism of democratic illegitimacy focuses on the alleged weakness of the European Parliament. This has been countered by political scientists who have compared the systems of governance in the European Union and the United States and concluded that thealleged powerless or dysfunctional nature of the European Parliament is now a "myth.[7] It is argued that there are importantdifferences from national European parliaments, such as the role of committees, bipartisan voting, decentralized political parties,executive-legislative divide and absence of Government-opposition divide. All these traits are considered as signs of weakness or unaccountability, but these very same traits are found in the US House of Representatives to a lesser or greater degree, the European Parliament is more appropriately compared with the US House of Representatives.[7] In that sense, it is now a powerful parliament, as it is not controlled by a "governing majority": majorities have to be built afresh for each item of legislation byexplanation, persuasion and negotiation.

Legislative initiative in the EU rests solely with the commission,while in member states it is shared between parliament and executive; however less than 15% of legislative initiatives from MEPs become law when they do not have the backing of the executive. The European Parliament can only propose amendments, but unlike in national parliaments, the executive has no guaranteed majority to secure the passage of its legislation. In national parliaments, amendments are usually proposed by the opposition, who lack a majority for their approval and usually fail. But given the European Parliament's independence, and the need to obtain majority approval from it, proposals made by its many parties (none of which hold a majority alone) have an unusually high 80% success rate in the adoption of its amendments.Even in controversial proposals, its success rate is 30%, something not mirrored by national legislatures.[7]

Liberal Democrat (ELDR) MEP Chris Davies, says he has far more influence as a member of the European Parliament than he did as an

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opposition MP in the House of Commons. "Here I started to have an impact on day one", "And there has not been a month since when words I tabled did not end up in legislation."[10]

[edit] European elections

“ Turnout across Europe (1999) was higher than in the last US presidential election, and I don't hear people questioning the legitimacy of the presidency of the UnitedStates ”

—Pat Cox [10]

According to some observers,[11][dead link] the EU does not have a formal democratic deficit, but an informal one due to a social deficit. People believe that there is a democratic deficit so they do not go to vote, and thus create the democratic deficit by thinking there is one, a self generating situation, for which formal reformcan do little to help.[11][dead link][need quotation to verify]

[edit] Development of democratic legitimacy and transparencyOver time, a number of constitutional changes have been introducedto increase democratic legitimacy:

The Maastricht Treaty introduced o the status of EU citizenship, granting EU citizens the

right to vote and stand in elections to the European Parliament and municipal elections in their country of residence, irrespective of their nationality (subject toage and residency qualifications).[12]

o the legislative procedure known as the "co-decision procedure", giving the directly elected European Parliament the right of "co-deciding" legislation on an equal footing withe the Council of the European Union.[12]

The Treaty of Lisbon, which came into force on 1 December 2009 introduced

o a separate treaty title confirming that the functioning of the EU shall be founded on representative democracy and giving EU citizens both direct representation through the European Parliament and indirect representation via national governments through the Council of the European Union[13]

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o the establishment of the co-decision procedure as the standard ("ordinary") legislative procedure[13]

o a significant increase in the powers of the European Parliament[13]

o Any EU citizen or resident now has the right to petitionthe European Parliament "on any matter which comes within the Union's field of activity and which affects him, her, or it directly".[Article 227 TFEU].[14]

o Meetings of the Council are now public when there is a general debate and when a proposal for a legislative actis voted on. These debates can be viewed[15] in real time on the Internet.[16]

o The Lisbon Treaty enhanced the role of national parliaments in EU legislation.[17]

o With the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which was solemnly proclaimed by the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the European Commission in the year 2000 was given full legal effect.[18]

[edit] See also Democratic deficit

[edit] References1. ̂ The Myth of Europe's Democratic Deficit, Princeton

University2. ^ a b "Press release no. 72/2009. Judgment of 30 June 2009"

(Press release). German Federal Constitutional Court - Press office. 2009-06-30. http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/press/bvg09-072en.html. Retrieved 2009-08-06. "The extent of the Union’s freedom of action has steadily and considerably increased, not least by the Treaty ofLisbon, so that meanwhile in some fields of policy, the European Union has a shape that corresponds to that of a federal state, i.e.is analogous to that of a state. In contrast, the internal decision-making and appointment procedures remain predominantly committed to the pattern of an international organisation, i.e. areanalogous to international law; as before, the structure of the European Union essentially follows the principle of the equality ofstates. [. . .] Due to this structural democratic deficit, which cannot be resolved in a Staatenverbund, further steps of integration that go beyond the status quo may undermine neither theStates’ political power of action nor the principle of conferral. The peoples of the Member States are the holders of the constituent

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power. [. . .] The constitutional identity is an inalienable element of the democratic self-determination of a people."

3. ^ a b Pernice, Ingolf; Katharina Pistor (2004). "Institutionalsettlements for an enlarged European Union". In George A. Bermann and Katharina Pistor. Law and governance in an enlarged European Union: essays in European law. Hart Publishing. pp. 3–38. ISBN 978-1-84113-426-0. "Among the most difficult challenges has been reconciling the two faces of equality – equality of states versus equality of citizens.In an international organization [. . .] the principle of equality of states would ordinarily prevail. However, the Union is of a different nature, having developed into a fully fledged 'supranational Union', a polity sui generis. But to the extent that such a polity is based upon the will of, and is constituted by, itscitizens, democratic principles require that all citizens have equal rights."

4. ̂ Marquand, David (1979). Parliament for Europe. Cape. p. 64. ISBN 978-0-224-01716-9. "The resulting 'democratic deficit' would not be acceptable in a Community committed to democratic principles."Chalmers, Damian; et al. (2006). European Union law: text and materials. Cambridge University Press. p. 64. ISBN 978-0-521-52741-5. "'Democratic deficit' is a term coined in 1979 by the British political scientist . . . David Marquand ."Meny, Yves (2003). "De La Democratie En Europe: Old Concepts and New Challenges". Journal of Common Market Studies 41: 1–13. doi:10.1111/1468-5965.t01-1-00408. "Since David Marquand coined hisfamous phrase 'democratic deficit' to describe the functioning of the European Community, the debate has raged about the extent and content of this deficit."

5. ̂ "Glossary: Democratic deficit". European Commission. http://europa.eu/scadplus/glossary/democratic_deficit_en.htm. Retrieved 2009-08-06. "The democratic deficit is a concept invoked principally in the argument that the European Union and its variousbodies suffer from a lack of democracy and seem inaccessible to theordinary citizen because their method of operating is so complex. The view is that the Community institutional set-up is dominated byan institution combining legislative and government powers (the Council of the European Union) and an institution that lacks democratic legitimacy (the European Commission)."

6. ̂ Chryssochoou, Dimitris N. (007). "Democracy and the European polity". In Michelle Cini. European Union politics (2nd ed.). Oxford University Press, 2007. p. 360. ISBN 978-0-19-928195-4.

7. ^ a b c d Kreppel, Amie (2006). "Understanding the European Parliament from a Federalist Perspective: The Legislatures of the USA and EU Compared". Center for European Studies, University of

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Florida. http://web.clas.ufl.edu/users/kreppel/COMFEDFINAL.pdf. Retrieved 2008-09-26.

8. ̂ Kelemen, R. Daniel (2012). The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond. Harvard University Press. pp. 21–22. ISBN 978-0-674-01309-4.

9. ̂ http://www.consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?id=1279&lang=EN

10. ^ a b "The EU's democratic challenge". BBC News. 2003-11-21. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/3224666.stm. Retrieved 2010-05-01.

11. ^ a b http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef/avbelj

12. ^ a b Schütze, Robert (2012). European Constitutional Law. CambridgeUniversity Press. pp. 31–32. ISBN 978-0-521-73275-8.

13. ^ a b c Schütze, Robert (2012). European Constitutional Law. Cambridge University Press. pp. 43–44. ISBN 978-0-521-73275-8.

14. ̂ Schütze, Robert (2012). European Constitutional Law. Cambridge University Press. p. 99. ISBN 978-0-521-73275-8.

15. ̂ video.consilium.europa.eu16. ̂ "The Council of the European Union".

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/council?lang=en. Retrieved 2012-1-12-07).

17. ̂ "IPEX Interparliamentary EU Information Exchange". http://www.europarl.europa.eu/webnp/webdav/site/myjahiasite/users/jribot/public/ld_ipex_brochure_en_web_NEW.pdf. Retrieved 2012-1-12-07).

18. ̂ Craig, Paul; Grainne De Burca , P. P. Craig (2007). "Chapter 11 Human rights in the EU". EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4thed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 15. ISBN 978-0-19-927389-8.

[edit] Further reading Corbett, Richard; Jacobs, Francis; Shackleton, Michael

(2011), 'The European Parliament' (8 ed.), London: John Harper Publishing, ISBN 978-0-9564508-5-2

Follesdal, A and Hix, S. (2005) ‘Why there is a democratic deficit in the EU‘ European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No. C-05-02

Kelemen, Dr. R. Daniel; (2004) ‘The Rules of Federalism: Institutions and Regulatory Politics in the EU and Beyond‘ Harvard University Press

Majone, G. (2005) 'Dilemmas of European Integration'. Marsh, M. (1998) ‘Testing the second-order election model

after four European elections’ British Journal of Political Science Research. Vol 32.

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Moravcsik, A. (2002) ‘In defence of the democratic deficit: reassessing legitimacy in the European Union’ Journal of Common Market Studies. Vol 40, Issue 4.

Reif, K and Schmitt, S. (1980) ‘Nine second-order national elections: a conceptual framework for the analysis of European election results’ European Journal of Political Research. Vol 8, Issue 1.

E:\(Ne)demokracia v EÚ (16-1-13)\EU Politics - The Democratic

Deficit.mht

The Democratic Deficit Page history last edited by Jasmine Ganeshalingam 1 year, 8 months ago

Overview

Within Institutional

Framework

Between Citizens and

European Institutions

Arguments for

Arguments Against  

Proposed Solutions

Treaty of Lisbon  

References

Overview

 The Democratic Deficit, in the context of Europe, is the ideathat an individual or body has only limited opportunities to exercise their influence over the European Union. However thesubject of the Democratic Deficit is multi-faceted, with not

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only different actors involved in the debate but also different approaches in understanding the dimensions of the Democratic Deficit, such as through institutions interactionswith one another or through the citizens link with the European Union's Institutions. The Democratic Deficit is thusa complex subject matter that not only has implications and importance with the interactions of actors, but also on topics such as future integration of new member states, and treaties such as the Lisbon Treaty. As such the Democratic Deficit is not simply a debate within the European Union, it is a recognised issue that the European Union appears to wantto be addressed which is exemplified by the proposals within the Lisbon Treaty. 

 

 

Within Institutional Framework

 

The Democratic Deficit can be seen, not only in the inequality between European Institutions, but also through the different structures of the institutions, for instance ifthe membership is directly elected or not. Arguments such as the European Parliament (EP) having a limited legislative authority despite being the only fully directly elected institution, which has the effect of undermining the EU as a whole in terms of legitimacy, by rendering it not fully democratic, (Dinan: 259) show more than a debate about the powers of the European Unions institutions. The debate aroundthe limited power of the European Parliament illustrate a viewpoint that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit as this is the basis for the argument for an enlargement of the EP's legislative authority "Using the argument of a lack of democratic accountability in the EU - the so called democratic deficit - as a potent weapon" (Dinan: 259). The debate also highlights the assumption that as the European

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Parliament is directly elected it is more accountable and thus increases opportunities for individuals to exercise influence over the European Union's workings.  

It has been argued that a lack of democracy can be found amongst the Communities legislative procedures (Barrass: 83).  The core executives body (The European Commision), holds the power to formulate and initiate legislation despitethe fact that its members have not been granted this authority through democratic means. However the main argumentis that the EU is undemocratic as “citizens do not participate in the Community decision-making process”. In other words, as the council, which is widely considered the major decision maker, is not directly elected, it has been argued that therefore the Union has a democratic deficit. (Moussis, N 2007) In contrast, it can be argued that the decision-making process is not undemocratic, as the European Council is elected, on a national level. "In addition, citizens have a direct say in the election of the members of the European parliament, which has an important participationin the legislative process". (Moussis, N 2007)  

  

 

Between Citizens and European Institutions

 

Arguments for

 

A democratic deficit can also be seen not only between memberstates and institutional framework but also in the interactions (or lack thereof) between citizens and the institutions of the European Union. Authors such as McCormickhave noted how a number of significant decisions are taken

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through negotiations by national leaders who do not put decisions to a national referendum (McCormick: 119). The effect of national leaders taking decisions without a democratic test or element to the process, creates a democratic deficit, as citizens cannot directly influence thedecisions taken by national leaders. An example of the democratic deficit in regards to a lack of public participation is outlined by McCormick “Less than half the EU-15 member states asked their citizens whether they wanted to join the European Community or the European Union” (McCormick: 124).  

The topics of a lack influence and accountability are centralto an understanding of the democratic deficit. The European Union's traditionally 'stronger' institutions have little direct public accountability such as the European Commission and European Court of Justice, due to public control being indirect. (McCormick: 119) Institutions that the public have direct influence upon, such as the European Parliament are also traditionally seen as weaker, however with the recent Lisbon treaty and the growth in power of the European Parliament, this view is being challenged. (McCormick: 119) (Avbelj in: eumap.org, 2005) 

The democratic deficit is often talked about in regards to the European Unions institutional set up, even when in relation to citizens. However the democratic deficit can be seen to encompass more than just the European Unions institutional set up, it can be seen to have a social component too. Avbelj outlines the idea that the poor turnoutat EU Parliament elections is a visible example of the democratic deficit to which Avbelj attributes to a poor understanding of the European Union, it's institutions and workings by the citizens of the European Union. (Avbelj in: eumap.org, 2005) As such Avbelj links a knowledge deficit to low motivation and a lack of interest in the European Unions

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affairs, thus creating a democratic deficit due to citizens not taking part in the democratic process in which they can take part. (Avbelj in: eumap.org, 2005). As such the democratic deficit can be seen to be somewhat 'self-inflicted' and not solely the responsibility of the European Unions institutions.  

Arguments Against 

 

Most of the debates around the democratic deficit issue arguethat the EU is suffering from a ‘democratic deficit’. However, Andrew Moravcsik challenges this theory and explainsthe reasons for there to be a perceived democratic deficit, even though this may not be the case. The notion of a democratic deficit is false as the ‘institutions are tightly constrained by constitutional checks and balances; narrow mandates, fiscal limits, super majoritarian and concurrent voting requirements and separation of powers’ (Moravcsik 2002:603).The European Constitutional Settlement reinforces the idea that the EU is not a ‘superstate’ as it poses tight constraints on EU policy. Treaties also act as a limitation on the activities the EU wants to carry out as ‘the most fundamental constraint lies in the requirement of unanimity, followed by electoral, parliamentary or administrative ratification, to amend the Treaty of Rome’ (Moravcsik 2002:609).Even on the day to day decisions the EU makes high level of support is needed especially in the Council of Ministers.   The EU also primarily focuses of economic issues, therefore much is excluded from their agenda and governments are able to exempt themselves or act unilaterally where they find thatthe EU has not been effective in legislating (Moravcsik 2002)). Whatever policies the EU makes, it ultimately relies on member governments to implement them. The member states decide upon which issues the EU will deal with e.g. it has

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strongest constitutional prerogatives are in the area of goods and services. The fact that the EU has no police and military force reinforces the fact that the EU is only strongin a limited number of policy areas. Therefore, EU policy is highly influenced by member states interests.   

The notion of separation of powers within the EU institutionsalso challenges the idea of a ‘democratic deficit’. ‘Power isdivided vertically among the Commission, Council, Parliament and Court, and horizontally among local, national and transnational levels- requiring concurrent majorities for action’ (Moravcsik 2002:610). 

The fact that only one institution is directly elected may cause one to question the democratic nature of the EU. However, Moravcsik argues that there is direct accountabilitythrough the European Parliament and indirect accountability through the elected national officials, therefore should not be seen as an unaccountable technocracy either. Especially since there has been an increase in the European Parliament’spower e.g. co-decision procedure.  The lack of public participation in the EU also reflects why the EU maybe viewed with scepticism to European citizens. However, many of the decisions made by the EU do not require public participation. However, increased participation may generate more support for the EU (Moravcsik 2002). However, the issues the EU deals with lack salience therefore does notinterest citizens and motivate them to get involved. Overall,Moravcsik argues that currently there is no democratic deficit, and the main reason there is perceived to be one is due to critics comparing the EU ideal parliamentary democracies. 

 

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Proposed Solutions

 

There have been a number of proposed solutions to the democratic deficit, one important proposition involves increasing the power of the European Parliament by widening the range of topics the co-decision procedure can be applied to. By increasing the number of topics covered by co-decision, the intended effect will be an increase in power for the European Parliament, allowing for a directly accountable institution to have increased input in decisions made by European Institutions (Avbelj in: eumap.org, 2005). However simply increasing the power of the European Parliament is not the only possible solution to the democratic deficit, as increasing the power of just one of several institutions, and targeting efforts at only one levelof participation will not necessarily reduce the wider issue of democratic deficit. "Tacking the democratic deficit therefore requires an imaginative blend of public representation and participation at the regional, national, and European levels, involving parliamentary and other bodiesfrom all three spheres.” (Dinan: 286). The problem of low turnout at elections for the European Parliament can also be seen to undermine the solution of giving increased power to the European Parliament "Indeed, the consistently low turnout(by European standards) in direct elections seriously weakensthe European Parliament’s image and undermines parliamentarians’ arguments in favor of greater institutionalauthority.” (Dinan: 287) 

 

Treaty of Lisbon  

 

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References

 

1. Dinan, D (2005) Ever Closer Union, Basingstoke: PalgraveMacmillan 

2. William, N (1994) Understanding the New European Community, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf

3. Lodge, J (1993) The European community and the challengeof the future, London: Pinter

4. Barrass, R and Madhavan, S (1996) European economic integration and sustainable development : institutions, issues and policies, London : McGraw-Hill 

5. Bekkers, V. Fenger, M. and Korteland, E (2007) Governance and the democratic deficit : assessing the democratic legitimacy of governance practices, Aldershot : Ashgate

6. Moravcsik, A. (2002) 'In Defence of the Democratic Deficit' Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 20 (4): 603-24

7. Moussis, N (2007) Guide to European Policies, European Study Service, Rixenhart

8. Avbelj, M. Eumap.org. "Can the New European ConstitutionRemedy the EU "Democratic Deficit"?" 2005. "http://www.eumap.org/journal/features/2005/demodef/avbelj" (February 27, 2008)

9. McCormick, J (2008) Understanding The European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan

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above.

http://www.civitas.org.uk/eufacts/OS/CIT5.htm

Democracy in the EU [print sheet] Last updated: 02/12/11

The concept of 'democracy' refers to the involvement of thecitizens in political decision-making. In practice, this isusually achieved through general elections, whereby all citizensare able to elect representatives to make decisions on theirbehalf in the national parliament. Another important aspect ofdemocracy is the ability of the citizens to hold theirrepresentatives to account. Often this is also through elections,when the citizens are able to reflect on the decisions that havebeen made by their representatives and decide whether or not tore-elect them. Governments are usually held accountable tonational parliaments, so the citizens can encourage theirrepresentatives to criticise any decisions that have been made bythe government that they do not agree with.

The Debate about Democracy in the EU

The EU impacts upon the everyday life of all of its citizens.Many national laws originate in the EU, and the range of areas inwhich the EU can make laws is already large and increasing. Inaddition, laws made by the EU have supremacy over national laws.Because of this, it is important that EU citizens are involved inthe decision-making process and that the EU is democratic. Thereare a number of ways through which the EU claims to be

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democratic; however, just how democratic its decision-makingreally is is the subject of debate.

How the EU is Democratic

The most obvious way in which the EU is democratic is that theEuropean Parliament (EP) is composed of MEPs who are directlyelected by the EU citizens. Since 1979, every five yearselections are held in which EU citizens are able to elect MEPs torepresent their views in the EU. A system of proportional

representation is used to elect MEPs in all member states. The UKcurrently has 72 MEPs, and the last elections were held in 2009.Being able to elect MEPs also means that they are accountable tothe people and citizens can choose not to re-elect them if theyare unhappy with their performance.

Another way in which the opinions and interests of the citizensare represented in the EU is in the European Council and theCouncil of the European Union (also known as the Council ofMinisters). Both of these institutions are made up of people fromthe national governments of the member states. As most nationalgovernments are elected by the people directly (the President ofFrance is directly elected) or indirectly (the UK government iscreated from the political party that wins the majority of theseats in a general election), they are indirectly representingtheir citizens at the EU level. By voting to change the nationalgovernment, citizens are also changing the way their views arerepresented in the EU, and so these institutions are alsoindirectly accountable to European citizens.

Thirdly, the Lisbon Treaty (2007) contained a section onimproving democracy in the EU - Title II Provisions on Democratic

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Principles. Included in this is the introduction of a procedurecalled the 'Citizens' Initiative' whereby citizens of the EU caninvite the European Commission to initiate a piece oflegislation. At least one million citizens from a majority of themember states need to sign an initiative for it to be consideredby the European Commission. In this way the citizens are able tobecome directly involved with decision-making at the EU level.

The Lisbon Treaty also increased the powers of the EuropeanParliament, so that the elected representatives of the citizensget a greater say in decision-making, and increased the role ofnational parliaments in law-making. National parliaments now havethe power to consider and to challenge any EU laws that theythink should be made at a national rather than an EU level:thereby enforcing the subsidiarity principle.

Where the EU fails to be Democratic

The idea that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit is widelysupported in academic circles. One cause of this complaint isthat the EU appears too distant from its citizens. It isconsidered too complicated for the citizens to be sufficientlyinvolved in its decision-making and a lack of transparency andeducation prevents them from understanding the nature of the EUand how they can influence it. Although the Lisbon Treatyimproves transparency, the introduction of the Citizens'Initiative is not expected to be effective enough to improve therelationship between the EU and its citizens, as it is unlikelythat many citizens will be aware of the opportunity that itprovides.

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Secondly, the powers of the EP, as the only directly elected EUinstitution, are weaker than those of other institutions. The EPis unable to propose legislation and only has the power topropose amendments to laws. Elections for the EP also suffer froma low turnout (in the UK only 34.7% of people voted in the 2009EP election), so many citizens are not accepting the opportunityto influence decision-making. In addition, those who do vote tendto vote more on the basis of their opinions on national issuesrather than European issues, due in part to a feeling of distancefrom the workings of the EU.

Thirdly, the European Commission is an entirely appointedinstitution, not democratically elected, and it has the monopolyof proposing laws: there is no competition over who has politicalauthority and sets the agenda at the European level. EU citizensdo not get a choice over who is part of this powerful body, andthe Commission is only accountable to the European Parliament inits entirety: individual Commissioners who are performing badlycannot be sacked. The Commission lacks legitimacy: it is much toopowerful for an institution that is not democraticallyrepresentative of the EU citizens or accountable to them.

Quotes

'The resulting 'democratic deficit' would not be acceptable in a Community committed

to democratic principles. Yet such a deficit would be inevitable unless the gap were

somehow to be filled by the European Parliament.' Labour Politician DavidMarquand, 1979: the first recorded use of the term 'democraticdeficit' in relation to European Economic Community, precursor tothe EU.

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'The functioning of the Union shall be founded on the principle of representative

democracy.' Treaty of Lisbon, 2007, Title II Article 8A.1

'Every citizen shall have the right to participate in the democratic life of the Union.

Decisions shall be taken as openly and as closely as possible to the citizen.' Treaty ofLisbon, 2007, Title II Article 8A.3

Technical Terms

Supremacy: the principle that EU law is superior to national lawswhen the European Court of Justice has jurisdiction.

Subsidiarity: the principle that decisions should be made at thelowest level and as close to the citizens as possible.

Democratic Deficit: the idea that the EU is deficient in democracyand lacks democratic principles such as representation andaccountability.

Proportional representation: an electoral system whereby the number ofvotes a party receives is directly proportional to the number ofseats they are given in the parliament.

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http://www.plurilogue.com/2011/08/real-world-of-eu-accountability-

what.html

Plurilogue

Politics and Philosophy Reviews

The Real World of EU Accountability Mark Bovens, Deirdre Curtin, and Paul ‘t Hart (eds.), The Real World of EUAccountability: What Deficit?, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, 240pp., $85 (hbk), ISBN 9780199587803

Oxford University Press, Amazon

Fabienne Zwagemakers, LUISS University, Rome

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The European Union is gradually shaking off its democratic deficit.This is the encouraging conclusion of The Real World of EU Accountability, theresult of an impressive and groundbreaking research projectundertaken by the Utrecht University School of Governance in theNetherlands. At the heart of this project is the question of how theEuropean Union’s legislative and executive powers are constituted andlegitimated, and subjected to checks and balances. The projectfocuses on one particular aspect of the EU’s democratic governance –namely, its accountability structures.

Accountability is a key signifier of legitimacy, and thus central todiscussions of the alleged ‘democratic deficit’ marking the EU. Inparticular, it is increasingly alleged in both political and academiccircles that the EU’s democratic legitimacy is in jeopardy due to alack of public accountability, and that new accountability mechanismsare unlikely to enhance public belief in it.

The Real World of EU Accountability offers a valuable empirical contributionto these discussions, which are often rather ‘fact-free’. Itcomplements existing literature by analyzing how accountabilitymechanisms in the EU institutions work on a daily basis and how theyare monitored and evaluated, and thus assessing the extent to whichthere actually is a deficit of accountability. It provides extensiveempirical data, based on interviews, surveys and analyses of debatesand other relevant documents. Indeed, it is the first empiricalsocial-scientific assessment of accountability in the EU in acomparative perspective. Moreover, the study is not merely focused onformal accountability procedures, but also describes how theseprocedures operate in practice and how lines of accountability can beevaluated as social relationships.The editors start by offering an extensive conceptual framework ofaccountability. This is based on EU integration theories and theorieswithin public accountability studies, and it is used throughout thebook as a tool to evaluate the empirical findings and to compare theresults among the respective institutions. In subsequent chapters,accountability is mapped out in the European Commission, the EuropeanCouncil, comitology committees and European agencies, the latterbeing a relatively new subject of research. Through a number of casestudies depicting the multilevel character of the EU, these chaptersexplain how channels of checks and balances operate, from theEuropean Council to national parliaments. By means of an examinationof the three features of ‘information’, ‘debate’, and ‘judgment’, theeditors describe how accountability is realized in the relationbetween the European Council, the Dutch Delegation to the European

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Council and the Dutch Parliament. Their conclusion is thataccountability is always present, but it can be more extensive insome contexts than in others. In the final chapter, the empiricalresults regarding the four institutions are juxtaposed and compared,revealing several patterns and trends in EU accountability dynamics.

It might be surprising that in a study of accountability in the EU, asingle chapter is not given to the European Parliament (EP), as it isto the European Commission or the European Council. The editorsindicate that one of the main causes of the EU’s legitimacy deficitderives from the beliefs and judgments of EU citizens. If there isone institution that may be held accountable to the public, thevoting citizen, it would be the parliament. Yet here the EP istreated primarily as an institution holding accountability powers,which have increased particularly since the Treaty of Lisbon wasendorsed, coming into force in 2009, and which particularly affectthe EP’s relationship with the European Commission. In this regard,according to the editors, one could even speak of an ‘accountabilityoverload’, rather than an accountability deficit. But, in defense ofthe editors, it is understandable that the accountability of the EPis not covered by this project: since the EP represents Europeancitizens, it is ultimately the voting European citizen that may holdthe EP accountable, and this has no direct relation to theaccountability structures that operate within the maze of EUdecision-making procedures.

According to the editors, then, ‘the real world of EU accountability’is imperfect, but does not display a ‘democratic deficit’. Indeed, intheir conclusion, the editors make a plea for more accountabilityforums not merely to function as watch dogs, but also to avoid anaccountability overload in the future. The Real World of EU Accountability isa fine book, therefore, which will be essential reading for thosetrying to keep abreast of the ever-changing dynamics of decision-making in the EU.

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