Position Statement (1) Accessing the London Bus Network

Position Statement

Accessing the London Bus Network:

Implementing the Equalities Act 2010

Clive Evans BSc(Open & Reading), MRes, MAAT

Department of Geography and EnvironmentalScience

University of Reading

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Contents

Abstract.....................................................3

1. Introduction..............................................4

1.1 Accessing Bus Services.................................4

1.2 Disability Legislation.................................6

1.3 Aim and Objectives.....................................7

2. Literature Review.........................................7

2.1 Measuring Social Exclusion.............................8

2.2 Researching Disability.................................9

2.3 Provision of Local Bus Services.......................12

2.4 Corporate Governance within the Public Sector.........13

3. Methodology..............................................14

4. Quality Incentive Contracts..............................18

4.1 Introduction..........................................18

4.2 Excess Wait Time......................................19

4.3 Reporting of Excess Wait Time.........................24

4.4 Questioning by the London Assembly....................26

5. Discussion and Conclusion................................27

6. Bibliography.............................................31

APPENDIX 1.................................................39

APPENDIX 2.................................................40

APPENDIX 3.................................................41

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AbstractThis working paper briefly examines one element of the QualityIncentive Contracts issued by Transport for London to buscompanies wishing to operate bus routes within London’sregulated bus network and the potential effects thesecontracts may have on accessibility. The social interpretationof disability would argue that it is the way in which anorganisation within society arranges how it operates that candiscriminate against disabled people in a way that preventsthem from accessing society in the same way as non-disabledpeople. The Social Model of Disability together with theEquality Act 2010 attempts to make organisations think abouthow they should arrange themselves so as to allow access totheir services or facilities by disabled people. This researchattempts to show that whilst there are accessibility policiesin place, the Mayor of London and Transport for London are notproviding sufficient information to Transport for London’sBoard; the London Assembly; or their customers, to adequatelyevaluate the effectiveness of their accessibility policies andthe ability to find a resolutions to the day to day problemsof operating a complex bus service within London.

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1. Introduction

1.1 Accessing Bus Services

The ability of any individual to gain access to a bus withinLondon at certain times of the day can be at best problematicand at worst virtually impossible. Whilst an able-bodiedindividual may be able find alternative methods or routes toreach their destination, for a disabled people this may not bepossible. As a result a barrier can be created that preventsthem from gaining access to health facilities; work;educational facilities and friends and family (Church, et al.,2000) which are viewed as important to society.

Specific barriers to accessing public transport generallywithin the United Kingdom were identified by the DisabledPersons Transport Advisory Committee (2001) and morespecifically to London by the Transport Committee of theLondon Assembly (2010), through the use of questionnaires andinterviews with disabled people (table 1).

Barriers to Access

Attitude of Staff and Passengers

Poor driving standards

Buses not stopping

Use of wheelchair space by otherpassengers

Accessible Buses

Reliability

Pedestrian environment

Cost of fares

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Table 1. Barriers restricting access to London’s buses

Difficulties in accessing London’s bus network is beingfurther compounded by an increase in the number of reportedpassengers using the services (figure 1) which can in part beexplained by the increase in the population of London (figure2) which is expected to continue rising (Greater LondonAuthority, 2010a).

2006/2007

2006/2007 - 13

2007/2008 - 12

2008/2009 - 11

2009/2010 - 10

2010/2011 - 9

2011/2012 - 8

2012/2013 - 7

130,000,000.0140,000,000.0150,000,000.0160,000,000.0170,000,000.0180,000,000.0190,000,000.0200,000,000.0

Bus Journeys travelled5year rolling average of Bus Journeys Travelled

Year

Passenger Journeys (Millions)

Figure 1. Bus Journeys travelled within London (2006 – 2013)(Greater London Authority, 2013(a))

1931 1939 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991 2001 20110.01.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.09.010.0

Year

Population (millions)

Figure 2. Population of London (sourced from Office for National

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Statistics data) from 1931 to 2011 (Trust for London and New PolicyInstitute, 2011)

Whilst an increase in the population of London might imply anincrease in bus usage, this cannot be presumed as other formsof transport are available such as the car. However, theproportion of households within the capital who have access toa car, whether owned or lifts being available from friends andfamily, is less than that in the rest of Great Britain (figure3). It can therefore be concluded that with a greater numberof people within the Capital not having access to a car, anincrease in the population will result in a continued increasein demand.

2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07051015202530354045

LondonRest of Great Britain

Year

Households without car (%)

Figure 3. Households without access to a car (Transport for London,2013)

1.2 Disability Legislation

The approach adopted by the Mayor of London, Transport forLondon and private bus companies in providing an accessiblebus services has been governed by the DisabilityDiscrimination Act 1995, the Disability Discrimination Act2005, the Equality Act 2006 and more recently the Equality Act2010. These acts have required organisations to make

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reasonable adjustments to allow disabled people access to theservices they provide and in respect to buses a timescale asto when all buses should be wheelchair accessible.

Whilst all of the acts have deemed direct and indirectdiscrimination illegal, disabled people can only bring redressfor discrimination through the courts. This can prove to beproblematic, as in the case of Black verses Arriva North EastLimited (2013), as the arguments put to the judge have to bebased upon a valid legal argument as to whether or not theactions taken by the service provider were unreasonable andwhether the service provider could have provided morefacilities to accommodate disabled passengers.

A public body, however, has additional requirements over andabove those of a private company. Section 149 of the EqualityAct 2010, which came into force on 5th April 2011, imposed anumber of requirements on public bodies (Appendix 1) such asTransport for London and the Mayor of London and requires themto have ‘due regard’ to those covered by the act, includingdisabled people. Hepple (2010) argued that the phrase ‘dueregard’ allowed public bodies only to consider the legislationbut not to enact it. However based upon case law the courtsrequire public bodies to follow specific procedures to provethat they have met their obligations under the act (Appendix2). The act therefore, places a responsibility on every memberof a public body, from those on the Board to those providingthe services, to ensure that due consideration is made in thedecision making process (The Equalities and Human RightsCommission, 2010).

1.3 Aim and Objectives

The aim of this working paper is to examine the policies andpractices adopted by the Mayor of London and Transport forLondon with respect to the London Bus network to establish ifattention is being paid to the requirements of the Equalities

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Act 2010 and the close association the legislation has withthe Social Model of Disability. The objective is to answer thefollowing questions:

What are the policies and practices of the Mayor ofLondon and Transport for London in respect of disabilityaccess to London Buses?;

What level of information is provided to the Board ofTransport for London and ultimately the Mayor of Londonwho is Chair of the Board?;

What level of information is held by the Management ofTransport for London?; and,

Are the policies and practices of the Mayor of London andTransport for London periodically reviewed in line withthe Equalities Act 2010?

For the purposes of this working paper, one aspect of theMayor of London’s accessibility policy, that of reliability,will be examined. Chapter 2 will briefly discuss some of theunderlying issues that can affect how disability is researchedand discussed; issues surrounding the pricing of fares andcontrolling costs; and finally the underlying principles ofcorporate governance within the public sector. Chapter 3 willdiscuss the decision making process of how this research wasdeveloped together with the methodology used in collectingdata. Chapter 4 will then examine the assimilation andreporting of Excess Waiting Time, which is used to determinenot only the reliability of bus services but also if bonusesor penalties are issued to the bus companies. Chapter 5 willconclude with a discussion on the potential risks to providingan accessible bus network when using Excess Waiting Time andpossible solutions.

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2. Literature ReviewThe approach adopted in describing the inability of disabledpeople to gain access to buses is very dependent upon theperspective taken (Finkelstein, 1980), either that of theservice provider or that of the customer. Central toFinkelstein’s debate was that disability was the result of anoppressive social relationship between the helper and disabledpeople (Finkelstein, 1980, p. Summary; UPIAS, 1976).

When this oppressive relationship is examined in respect ofthe policies and procedures surrounding the accessibility ofLondon’s bus network, four key concepts can be identified forfurther investigation. The first examines the issues faced byresearchers in measuring the level of exclusion faced bydisabled people when trying to gain access to those aspects ofsociety that are deemed to be important. The second relates tohow the disabling effects of social exclusion are examinedthrough the Medical (individual) Model of Disability and theSocial Model of Disability. The third examines the practicesof bus companies in determining their fares and level ofservice which can directly and indirectly influence the levelof access, and the fourth examines corporate governance forwhich the Mayor of London and Transport for London arerequired to follow.

2.1 Measuring Social Exclusion

All decisions made by the Mayor of London and Transport forLondon are in part governed by the Greater London AuthorityAct (1999) which requires the promotion of social developmentand equality of opportunity (Her Majesty’s Stationery Office,1999). The problem faced by authorities and academics has beenhow to accurately define social development and equality ofopportunity in order to assess whether or not they have beenachieved (Burchardt, et al., 1999).

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One of the first serious attempts to measure poverty andsocial exclusion within the United Kingdom was made by theJoseph Rowntree Foundation, who with the New Policy Institute,developed 46 indicators which would allow organisations andgovernment to assess the success or failure of social policies(Joseph Rowntree Foundation, 1998). Whilst an effective methodof measuring poverty, the indicators could not provide anexplanation of the causes, only that it existed. Burchardtattempted to narrow the indicators down to five dimensions(table 2) in order to provide an improved measurement(Burchardt, et al., 1999). Even this attempt still relied uponanalysing economic data without providing any explanation asto why individuals and groups were being excluded.

Burchardt’s Five Dimensions of SocialExclusion

Consumption activity

Savings

Production

Political

Social

Table 2. Burchardt’s Five Dimensions of Social Exclusion(Burchardt, et al., 1999)

An improved explanation came from an analysis of previousresearch by Cass et al. (2005). They noted that the priority forthose experiencing some form of social exclusion was tomaintain their relational networks with family and friends,

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and that these networks were blocked by up to seven factorsthat were outside of the control of the individual (Church, etal., 2000). The seven factors: economic; geographical;physical; exclusion from facilities; time; fear; and space(Church, et al., 2000, pp. 198-200), did not in themselvesexplain the reasons for exclusion but were able to highlightthe areas where further investigation could take place toestablish the underlying reasons.

2.2 Researching Disability

How disability research should be performed has been subjectto a much polarised debate focusing around the Social Model ofDisability and emancipatory research methods. A key issuewithin the debate surrounds the way in which researchers treatdisabled people as the subject matter rather than asparticipants of the research (Kitchin, 2000). This problemfirst manifested itself in the 1960’s when residents of LeCourt, a Leonard Cheshire home, situated outside ofPetersfield, Hampshire, requested the services of TheTavistock Institute to investigate how the home was managed(Hunt, 1981). The residents of the home were at the time ofthe initial contact in dispute with the management over theremoval of what were seen as the residents’ basic human rightssuch as when to go to bed or being able to go to the local pubfor a drink. The hope for the residents was that theresearchers, Eric Miller and Geraldine Gwynne would agree thatthe management were acting irresponsibly and should not removethese rights.

The pilot study for Miller and Gwynne’s research took place in1966 where they interviewed members of the managementcommittee, staff and residents as well as observing whathappened within the home. The researchers were well acquaintedas social scientists to the risk of becoming personallyinvolved in their research and had established mechanisms thatwould allow for some element of objectivity to occur in the

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evaluation of the results (Miller & Gwynne, 1972, p. 6). Thesemechanisms were, according to Miller & Gwynne, severelystrained during the research period as they encountered daysof feeling sympathetic to the residents and the life stylethey found themselves in, and days of feeling sympathetic tothe staff as residents made ‘selfish demands’ on the staff(Miller & Gwynne, 1972, p. 7). As a result the final reporttended to focus on the processes which operated both withinsociety and the institutions and not as the residents hopedfocusing on their rights. The view of the residents or morespecifically Paul Hunt on the final report was scathing (Hunt,1981). He viewed academics as ‘parasites’ and the relationshipMiller and Gwynne had with the residents of Le Court being oneof ‘exploiters and exploited’ (Hunt, 1981, p. 39).

Whilst Paul Hunt may have criticised Miller and Gwynne’s work,they did identify that two approaches to care, the‘humanitarian and liberal defences’ (Miller & Gwynne, 1972,pp. 82-84), were operating within the institutions. Thehumanitarian defence or ‘medical tradition’ (UPIAS, 1975, p.5) treated the resident as having received a social deathsentence and it was the responsibility of the medicalprofession to keep them physically alive for as long aspossible. It was suggested that the use of this approachresulted in what was called a ‘warehousing model’ beingadopted where the institution operated more like a hospitalthan a home (Miller & Gwynne, 1972, pp. 85-86). The liberaldefence or ‘the right kind of help’ (UPIAS, 1975, p. 5)treated the residents as having the potential to be acceptedby the rest of society. It was suggested that the use of thisapproach resulted in what was called a ‘horticultural model’being adopted where the residents were allowed to develop(Miller & Gwynne, 1972, pp. 85-86).

The term defence was used by the authors because it was feltthat the institutions were there to meet the demands ofsociety and that the way in which they treated the residents

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was viewed at the time as the best way of dealing with thatdemand, even though neither approach adopted was actually bestsuited to all individuals. The conclusion reached was that theinstitution should be there to enable the resident ‘to findhis own best way of relating to the external world and tohimself’ (Miller & Gwynne, 1972, p. 90).

An explanation of what happened at Le Court comes from the ofthe work of Vic Finkelstein, who with Paul Hunt, in the 1970’sdeveloped the social interpretation of disability which arguedthat their disability was not as a result of their physical(or mental) impairment but as a direct result of howorganisations within society organised themselves (UPIAS,1976, p. 14). Finkelstein had studied Psychology at Oxford inthe 1950’s (Finkelstein, 1972, p. 1) and was aware of the workof the psychologist George Kelly, who proposed that thereaction of individuals to a given event is based upon pastexperiences which are constantly updated enforcing futurereactions (Finkelstein, 1972, p. 2).

Finkelstein went on to expand Kelly’s theory to explain whydisabled people were reacting in the way they were to thetreatment offered by the medical profession. He argued thatwhilst the medical profession’s approach was not necessarilywrong, the real barriers disabled people faced were socialsuch as the inability to gain access to buildings or theattitude of society towards disabled people (Finkelstein,1972, p. 6) and these were not being addressed.

Finkelstein would have been aware of the problems that Millerand Gwynne faced when conducting their research at Le Courtand recognised that the apparent conflict between thoseemployed or wanting to help disabled people and disabledpeople themselves creates a paradox. A paradox is where theexistence of two truths that are in opposition to each otherexist at the same time, and in the case of disability it isnot possible to have disabled people fighting for independence

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and yet at the same time having to rely on others(Finkelstein, 1980). He also recognised that the researcher,who is important in identifying the problems surrounding therelationship, cannot be independent (Finkelstein, 1980, p. 5)because of the formation of a helper/helped relationship andthe prior knowledge and experiences of the researcher beingbrought into that relationship.

If the researcher therefore becomes part of the paradox orultimately potentially the problem as occurred with Miller andGwynne, how should a researcher conduct their research intodisability? Three different approaches that the researcher cantake have been recognised. The first is from the perspectiveof the helper where the research is directed towards thedisabled person and what can be done for them. The second isfrom the perspective of the disabled person where the researchis directed at identifying the experiences of the disabledpeople within their environment. Finkelstein argued that thesetwo perspectives were examining the same problem but from twodifferent perspectives. Considering that the problems arepotentially as a result of a relationship, his thirdsuggestion of how disability should be researched was todirect the research into examining the relationship itself(Finkelstein, 1980, p. 9).

At this point Finkelstein begins to loose what is potentiallyan important idea. His suggestion was that the focus ofattention for the researcher when examining relationshipsshould be to change attitudes (Finkelstein, 1980, p. 15). Theproblem he finds is that whenever researchers attempt to focuson the relationship, that focus of attention shifts to eitherthe disabled person or on their environment. What was notpresent in his argument was a possible solution to thisproblem, possibly because it was not clear as to how anysolution could be achieved.

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Finkelstein’s discussion took place at a time when there waslittle academic interest in disability issues within theUnited Kingdom. An important exception to this was in theacademic field of training social workers and it was from thisthat the now accepted terms of Medical and Social Models ofDisability originated. Mike Oliver, a disabled lecturertraining social workers at the University of Canterbury,developed the models to assist social workers in understandingthe needs of disabled people (Oliver, 1981). Oliver’s argumentwas that the way in which the medical profession vieweddisability was based upon a framework, the Individual orMedical Model of Disability, which treated the disabledperson, based upon their physical condition and flawed medicalunderstanding of how disabled people coped with theirimpairment. His answer was a model, based upon the socialneeds of the disabled person, the Social Model of Disability,where the social worker not only had to be prepared to assistin dealing with the physical attributes of an individual’simpairment but also helping the individual and family dealwith the social barriers that they may encounter (Oliver &Sapey, 1999; Oliver & Sapey, 2006).

Initially Oliver’s models of disability remained unheard ofuntil he attempted to develop a social theory of disability(Oliver, 1990; Oliver, 1996). It would be easy at this stageof the literature review to discuss Oliver’s ideas for asocial theory and the debate that then ensued, however, animportant issue was raised by Oliver that has not beenadequately discussed within the literature. Whilst Oliver wascorrectly highlighting the social issues that social workersshould be considering when dealing with disabled people, heraised the difficulties faced by social service departmentswith the introduction of the National Health Service andCommunity Care Act 1990 (Oliver & Sapey, 1999, p. 175). Theact introduced the concept of the marketplace within theNational Health Service and social service departments with

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the objective of introducing efficiency and cost effectiveness(Stewart & Walsh, 1992). The act was changing the relationshipbetween the disabled person and the service provider (Oliver &Sapey, 2006, p. 178) and was creating a situation wheredepartment managers were required to focus more on the costsof providing the service than the benefits to disabled people.

Oliver’s answer to this problem was simple, disabled peopleshould be treated as citizens with rights and that publicauthorities should treat them accordingly. This approach,however, creates a problem in that if an individual has theright to determine what they purchase and where they purchaseit from, the relationship a council has with a disabled peoplebecomes that of provider and end-user (Beattie, et al., 2005,p. 71). What Beattie highlighted was that services within thistype of relationship can be restricted due to the lack offinancial resources and in the case of the recent reductionsin Government funding, councils such as Birmingham CityCouncil have to make decisions that are difficult, althoughsometimes wrong (British Broadcasting Corporation, 2011).

What Oliver ultimately developed was a model that could beused to examine how organisations considered disability.However, the use of the Social Model of Disability to examinehow organisations operate has been limited, with the majorityof research using the model to focus on the issues faced bydisabled people such as accessing cities (Bromley, et al.,2007; Hoven & Elzinga, 2009) or influences on disabledchildren at school (Holt, 2004; Holt, 2007).

The first recorded attempt to use the Social Model ofDisability as a method of examining an organisation was byOliver himself when he was asked to scrutinise why BirminghamCity Council’s attempt to adopt the Social Model of Disabilitywas proving to be ineffective (Oliver, 2004). His researchidentified that departments within the council were adoptingthree different approaches towards disabled people, the

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humanitarian, compliance and citizenship approaches with thetwo most common approaches being the humanitarian andcompliance approaches.

Oliver found that departments operating under the‘humanitarian approach’ were ignoring the needs of disabledpeople in the belief that what services they were providing,was in their professional opinion, what was required.Similarly departments operating under the ‘complianceapproach’ were ignoring the needs of disabled people in thebelief that they were to provide only what the law required(Oliver & Sapey, 2006, pp. 39-40). As a result Birmingham CityCouncil found themselves with dissatisfied and angryresidents. The third approach, which was Oliver’s preferredapproach, was the citizenship approach which required theservice provider to treat disabled people with social,economic and political rights (Oliver & Sapey, 2006, p. 41)and was found to operate in areas such as the direct paymentsystem (Oliver, 2004, p. 17).

Oliver did not give a clear indication within the article asto why staff within the council did not implement the SocialModel of Disability, but it was noted that departments did nothave a clear corporate strategy to operate by (Oliver, 2004,p. 17). With the model having no clear guidelines as to how itshould be implemented and being a practical tool forrestructuring services (Oliver, 2004, p. 13), it is quitepossible that the staff felt threatened. Tregaskis points outthat in these circumstances staff believe that what is beingasked of them is difficult to achieve and that seniormanagement are undermining the expertise of the operationalstaff (Tregaskis, 2004b), and therefore without a clearexplanation of what is being asked of them they fail to fullyimplement management policy.

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2.3 Provision of Local Bus Services

The relationship between customer and service provider is animportant one, not just for councils but for businesses suchas bus companies. It is the customer that creates the demandfor the service or product which has to be at a price that isacceptable to the customer (and makes a profit for theorganisation), and meets the demands or needs of the customer(Brassington & Petitt, 2003). If any of these elements are notpresent then a relationship between the service provider andthe customer cannot exist resulting in a loss for thebusiness.

The report by the Transport Committee of the London Assemblyon the accessibility of London transport network indicatedthat one of the barriers to access has been the cost of fares(London Assembly, Transport Committee, 2010). However, thebasic problem for the bus companies is determining the levelof fare to be charged for each journey. It has beenacknowledged since the 1970’s that the fare cannot becalculated based upon the use of fixed and variable costsbecause of the variability of assets used (Jansson, 1979). Asa result the ability of bus companies to cover their coststhrough the collection of fares alone is not always possibleand the need for public subsidy of routes has been necessaryto ensure that services are maintained (Turvey & Mohring,1975).

A public subsidy may not always be available and therefore theonly way in which bus companies can ensure a profitableservice in those circumstances is to focus on those routeswhere the demand is greatest, resulting in bus corridors andspatial gaps in services to those areas in need of improvedsocial welfare (Currie, 2010). Certainly within the UnitedKingdom, following deregulation in 1985, the requirement to beprofitable has created a situation where the power to controlthe level of bus services, outside of London, has been with

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the bus companies (Dibben, 2006; Preston, 2005). An economicargument to overcome this dominance has been made suggestingthat when the quality of the service, for example frequency,is improved the bus company’s profit is increased (Preston,2005) and there is the view that this may be the way in whichto increase the level of service to those areas outside of thebus corridors. This may in reality be an oversimplification ofa complex argument as the level of fare paid can influence thedemand especially when fares have a high value, and anyimprovement in services has to meet a demand that is alreadypresent (Dargay & Hanly, 2002; Holmgren, 2013).

2.4 Corporate Governance within the PublicSector

With the quality of service, level of fares and level ofsubsidy paid to bus companies within London all controlled bythe Mayor of London and Transport for London (Travers, 2009),London presents a unique situation where every aspect ofproviding a bus service can be investigated. The focus of thisworking paper, however, is on the level of information that istransmitted to the Board of Transport for London, the Mayor ofLondon and the London Assembly.

Within the private sector responsibility for controlling acompany rests with the Board of directors, who are responsibleto the shareholders for the stewardship of the company andensuring that the management of the company are adequatelycontrolled (The Financial Reporting Council, 2012). A publicauthority does not have shareholders, but the governing bodyor Board still remains responsible for ensuring that theorganisation operates within the rules and guidance laid downby government (Cornforth & Chambers, 2010). A public authoritymust therefore have ‘robust systems and processes, effectiveleadership and high standards of behaviour, a culture based onopenness and honesty and an external focus on the needs ofservice users and the public’ (Oxfordshire County Council,

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2013, p. 1). Whilst the Board may be responsible for governingthe organisation, the Board cannot micro-manage the day to dayoperations, responsibility for which is transferred to thesenior management of the organisation (Bart & Bontis, 2003).

This raises serious questions as to how effective the Boardcan be in performing its responsibilities, as the Boardbecomes heavily reliant upon the integrity of the seniormanagement to report accurately (Endacott, et al., 2013). Thisbecomes a serious issue when the senior management take theview that they are ultimately responsible for making thedecisions within the organisation and the Board are onlyresponsible for holding the organisation to account (Wright,et al., 2012). Unless the Board members are experts in everyaspect of the organisation the risk to the Board is that theirover reliance on the integrity of senior management can becomemisplaced. This can result in the Board being unable tochallenge the senior management, and as with the Mid-Staffordshire Foundation Trust, serious failings within theorganisation can go undetected (Wright, et al., 2012, p. 367).

3. MethodologyOver the last four years of this research project asignificant amount of time has been spent in debating thevirtues, or not, of the Social Model of Disability and whetheror not this research adds new knowledge. Whilst the debate hasbeen profitable a problem was identified that needed to beaddressed in order to progress this research satisfactorily.Central to researching disability issues, using the SocialModel of Disability as the main premise, is the use ofemancipatory research which requires interviewing primarilydisabled people, but could also include service providers suchas staff within Transport for London. The overall objective ofusing such a method was to identify the barriers faced bydisabled people in order that they could be empowered toremove those barriers (Barnes, 2008). Whilst this methodology

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has proved very successful over the last twenty years, from aprofessional perspective this methodology presented a dilemmawhich had been identified by the authors of the originalsocial interpretation of disability.

In the discussion between UPIAS and the Disability Alliance in1975, reference was made to the approach scientists make intackling a problem. The argument posed was that if disabilitywas socially caused, then in order to remove disablingbarriers it is important to understand how society organisesitself resulting in barriers to access being present (UPIAS,1976, p. 13). This argument, however, can be interpreted intwo ways. The first, being the way in which many disabilitycampaign groups and academics have taken it to mean,identifies the effects the barriers have on disabled people inthe anticipation that in highlighting them action would betaken to remove them. The response from UPIAS was to rejectthis interpretation on the basis that it diverts attentionfrom the actual cause of the barriers faced by disabled people(UPIAS, 1976, p. 13).

The alternative interpretation, which has been adopted by thisresearch, was provided by UPIAS in an example of a possiblecause of poverty. They argued that the inability of disabledpeople to earn an adequate income, the effect, was as a resultof the way in which the labour market was organised, thecause, which is then further enhanced by the way in which theeducation system was organised preventing disabled people fromgaining the appropriate qualifications (UPIAS, 1976, p. 14).It was therefore not the effects felt by disabled people, suchas poverty or lack of education that UPIAS wanted identifying,but the actual processes within organisations and society thatallow for these effects to occur, which could then beaddressed.

Using the UPIAS perspective in order to examine disabilityaccess to the London bus network, the direction of the

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investigation turned to the decision making processes of theMayor of London and Transport for London. The intentioninitially was to interview staff within Transport for London,together with disability groups and individual disabled peopleto obtain personal opinions on what was happening. With thisinformation it was then planned to examine printeddocumentation such as minutes of meetings and otherpublications to establish the processes taking place withinthe organisation. There was however a risk that key members ofstaff within Transport for London would not provideinformation either because they were not prepared to beinterviewed or the staff responsible for a particular functioncould not be identified. This risk materialised and thereforethe original research plan could not be achieved.

The research plan was then changed to perform a contentanalysis of the official publications from Transport forLondon, the Mayor of London and the London Assembly toestablish and discuss the level and quality of informationavailable. No formal research questions had been formulated sothe first objective was to analyse what documentation wasavailable and to codify the contents. The procedure foridentifying the relevant documents was straightforward. Thewebsites of Transport for London and the Greater LondonAuthority were interrogated to locate the official minutes andsupporting documentation of Board and committee meetings forthe period January 2009 to July 2012. The websites were alsointerrogated for any further publications or information thatwas felt to be relevant to the issue of accessibility. All thedocuments and publications, which to date number over 2,000,were then electronically stored based upon their source.

Codification of all the documents was performed using thequalitative analysis package Atlas.ti under each of the storedsubject areas. Specific quotations within each document werehighlighted and codified accordingly. This method ofcodification presented two problems. The first was to ensure

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that a consistent use of codes was used throughout all of thesubject areas. To achieve this, a Microsoft Excel spread sheetwas maintained detailing all of the codes used. Thismethodology automatically created the second problem in thatall of the data was located in numerous subject area files andcould not easily be interrogated as one data source. In orderto resolve this, the computer program Microsoft OneNote wasused to consolidate the data. This was achieved through thecreation of a page for each subject area that would be coveredby the research and then sub-pages created for each code usedin the document analysis. The quotations for each of thestored subject areas were then posted to each of the correctpages, ensuring that the original document was clearlyidentified.

During the course of the initial analysis and codification areference to the case of Judy Brown (2008) highlighted therules by which High Court Judges would evaluate whether or notpublic bodies had implemented the Equality Act 2006 correctly.The rules surrounded the legal definition of ‘due regard’ andsince the case in 2008 the Equality Act 2010 has now come intoforce and as a result the new legislation was checked for theterminology, which was found to be present throughout the act.This meant that at all stages of the decision making processeswithin Transport for London and by the Mayor of London, thereis the legal requirement to consider whether or not anydecisions made will influence those covered by the EqualityAct 2010, including disabled people, what those influenceswould be and how they would be dealt with. The Equalities andHuman Rights Commission made it clear within their guidancethat this responsibility extends to the Board of eachorganisation (The Equalities and Human Rights Commission,2010). As a result, whilst it may not always be possible toidentify the decision making processes at the lower levels ofTransport for London and the Mayor’s Office, the decisionsmade by Transport for London’s Board and by the Mayor,

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together with the level of information being passed onto tothem, can be checked for compliance with the Equality Act2010. In addition to this, through the Freedom of InformationAct 2000 (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2000), additionalsupporting information can also be obtained direct from theauthorities.

A further line of investigation was identified when examiningthe report by KPMG, commissioned by the Board of Transport forLondon, to review the London bus network. The report waspresented to the Board in July 2009 and mention was madewithin it concerning the Quality Incentive Contract. Thiscontract provides the bus companies operating under licence toTransport for London either incentives or penalties forimproving or not meeting key targets (Transport for London,2009a; Transport for London, 2011b). The authors of the reporttook the view that this type of contract was effective inimproving the bus service within London but it did notidentify the pressures being placed upon staff to meet thesetargets.

These pressures were identified within a BBC documentary onTransport for London (The Route Masters: Running London'sRoads - On the Buses, 2013) and comments made within theIndependent Disability Advisory Group (Transport for London,2012c). Whilst it has to be accepted that use of televisiondocumentaries as evidence cannot be taken as an exact recordof situations that may have occurred because of the editorialprocess, certain aspects of programme 3, which examined themechanisms in place to ensure the bus network operatedefficiently could be taken as evidence. Whilst not clearlyidentifying that pressures being placed on staff to maintainreliability were resulting in some of the problems faced bydisabled people, there was sufficient evidence to suggest thatthe contracts, how they are implemented and the level ofinformation supplied to the Board and Mayor of London shouldbe further investigated.

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The purpose of this working paper is to briefly examine one ofthe issues directly associated with the use of QualityIncentive Contracts that of Excess Waiting Time, as a means ofcontrolling the level of service on key bus routes. The aim isnot to specifically identify difficulties that may arise as aresult of using Excess Waiting Time, but to identify whatinformation is being reported to the Board and thenidentifying the potential risks in implementing the policy ofExcess Waiting Time.

The first task in evaluating Excess Waiting Time was toestablish how it was calculated. This proved to be problematicbecause Transport for London has not, as far as can beestablished, published details of how they calculate ExcessWaiting Time. A possible explanation for this is that in linewith all other local authorities, Transport for London isrequired to provide periodically to the Department forTransport, Excess Waiting Time data calculated in a prescribedmanner (Appendix 3). Comparing the terminology used byTransport for London in their Quality of Service publications(Transport for London, 2013(h)) against the Department ofTransport methodology would suggest that they are the same andtherefore this methodology would be used.

Excess Waiting Time, whether calculated over a four hourperiod or a four week period, is an average and as such can bestatistically unreliable. It was therefore felt that it wouldbe necessary to perform actual testing at key bus stops. Thebus route selected for the purposes of this working paper wasroute 38, a high frequency route (more than 5 buses per hour)which operates between Clapton Pond and Victoria Station. Theservice has over the last three years sustained major changesto the type of vehicles being operated, with articulated busesbeing replaced with double decked buses in November 2010(London Assembly, 2010 (a), p. 25) and the new Routemaster busat the end of February 2012 (London Assembly, 2012, p. 70).

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The methodology for calculating Excess Waiting Time requiressurveys of departure times to be taken at predetermined busstops selected by Transport for London (Transport for London,2012e). Instead of using the official monitoring points thoseinitially selected for the trial testing were the majorinterchanges of Dalston Junction (westbound) and Angel,Islington (westbound) in order that the process could betested. Each stop is given a unique identification number byTransport for London and through the iBus system each bus canbe positioned in respect to that stop and its estimated timefrom that stop can be calculated. This information is providedas a live feed to the Transport for London website and can beused as a means of monitoring departures from bus stopswithout being present at the stops themselves.

The test monitoring took place on 13 August 2013, each sessionlasting 90 minutes, using the online departure times for eachbus stop listed on the Transport for London web site. The timeused was when each bus shown on route 38 was deleted from thescreen indicating that the vehicle had left the stop. Fromthis data the Excess Waiting Time for samples could then becalculated, using a website dedicated to providing the fulltimetable for all London buses, which were checked against thesummary timetables provided by Transport for London, andcompared against Transport for London’s official reliabilityreports.

The next stage of the report then required focusing on thereporting of Excess Waiting Time to the Board. The minutes ofBoard and committee meetings of Transport for London, togetherwith reports produced by Transport for London, were examinedusing both the codified data already produced and the use ofthe search facilities in Atlas.ti, using the search terms of‘excess waiting’ and ‘reliability’, for a period betweenJanuary 2009 and July 2012 to establish the level and qualityof information passed onto those committees and what decisionscame from those committees based upon that evidence. In

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addition the minutes of the London Assembly and its TransportCommittee, who are responsible for holding the Mayor andTransport for London to account, were also reviewed for thesame period to establish the level of information provided andthe types of questions asked in respect to Excess WaitingTime.

4. Quality Incentive Contracts

4.1 Introduction

Quality Incentive Contracts were introduced by Transport forLondon in 2001 as a method of improving the overallreliability and quality of bus services within London(Transport for London, 2009a, pp. 8-9). The contracts for eachservice route are tendered every five years to bus companiesthat appear on Transport for London’s approved contractorlist, and require the bus companies to provide a quote as tohow much they are prepared to charge for supplying apredetermined level of service, with vehicles that meet apredetermined specification at a fare level that is approvedby the Mayor of London.

When the Quality Incentive Contracts were introducedreliability of the service overall was deemed not to besatisfactory (Transport for London, 2000). As a method ofimproving the reliability of the service Transport for Londonoffered bus companies a bonus of 1.5% of the contract value(up to a limit of 15%) for an improvement in the ExcessWaiting Time of 0.1 minutes for high frequency services and animprovement of 2% for other services. Similarly if the ExcessWaiting Time worsened by the same levels then a penalty of 1%of the contract value (up to a limit of 10%) would be levied.In addition to the bonus payments, if quality was improved andmaintained, the service provider could request an extension ofthe contract from five to seven years (Transport for London,2009a).

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A second phase of the Quality Incentive Contracts wasintroduced in 2009, on a trial basis, which paid bonuses tobus companies for improving driving standards and the qualityof the vehicles (Transport for London, 2009a). The trial wasterminated in 2012, in part due to financial cut-backs.

As has been shown within the literature review, the ability ofbus companies to make a profit is dependent on the level ofdemand being high and that the level of demand can beinfluenced by the quality of service. Despite £58million beingprovided to operators in the form of bonuses (Transport forLondon, 2009b, p. 19) and the number of passengers increasing(Greater London Authority, 2013(a)), the bus companies stillreceived a subsidy of six pence per kilometre travelled in2010/11 (London Assembly, 2011c, p. 8). With the bus subsidydue to be reduced by a third over the next ten years (LondonAssembly, 2010 (b), p. 6), the likelihood of profits beingmade by the bus companies becomes more problematic unless thenumber of passengers continues to increase and the quality ofservice maintained or improved.

The financial position of the bus companies’ is furtherexpounded by the practices that are possibly being used to winthe contracts. Transport for London are required under EU lawto accept either the lowest bid for each route tendered orprovide justification for accepting a higher bid (Transportfor London, 2009b). In an independent report on the busservice provided within London, accountants KPMG made thefollowing comment:

‘Views have been expressed to us that operators factor in QICs bonuseswhen pricing their bids and that acts to reduce the cost of the prices theybid to TfL.’ (Transport for London, 2009b, p. 19).

Such was the concern of KPMG that they reviewed a sample ofwinning tender bids and noticed in a small number of casesthat the bid price; the number of buses required to providethe peak service; and cost per mile were lower than the

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previous contract for that service. KPMG recommended thatTransport for London should monitor the financial position ofeach of the operators (Transport for London, 2009b, p. 63).

KPMG’s concerns over the finances of bus companies were wellfounded. In April 2013 First Bus sold its operations withinLondon giving their reasoning as:

‘Amongst the disposals we announced the sale of eight of our London busdepots in April 2013. Whilst we have been a presence in London for manyyears, we have decided to focus our business on the deregulated marketoutside of the capital where we see greater opportunity for improvedgrowth and returns.’ (First Group PLC, 2013, p. 25)

Arriva who operate route 38 (Clapton Pond to Victoria)reported loses of £3million for the year ended 31 December2011 (DueDil Limited, 2013) and Go-Ahead Group reported thatthey are utilising their resources in London by providingbuses to be used for rail replacement (Go Ahead London, 2013).

4.2 Excess Wait Time

All bus companies that operate under licence to Transport forLondon are required under their service contract to ensurethat they provide a reliable service and their contractpayment can be increased or decreased depending on the levelof reliability achieved. There are two methods used byTransport for London in evaluating reliability depending onwhether or not the level of service is greater than 5 busesper hour.

For a route where the level of service is greater than 5 busesper hour, Excess Waiting Time is used to evaluate thereliability of the service. Excess Waiting Time is based uponthe assumption that passengers wishing to join a highfrequency service are not interested in the time a bus arrivesbut in their being a reliable and frequent service. Developedfor use in London and adopted by the Department for Transport

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(Hine & Mitchell, 2001), the formula used to evaluate thelevel of reliability (figure 4) is based upon the assumptionthat an individual arrives at the bus stop at a time that ishalfway between two buses.

ExcessWaitingTime=∑i=1

nH×H /2

T2−T1−

602BpH

Where

H = Headway (Time between two buses departing)

T2 – T1 = Departure time of last bus monitored – Departure timeof first bus monitored

BpH = Scheduled buses per hour

Figure 4 Formula for calculating Excess Wait Time (Department forTransport, 2010)

The benefit of using this methodology is that the averagewaiting time accounts for variations in departure times ratherthan the straightforward average

The second method of monitoring reliability is used for thoseservices which operate at a service level of less than fivebuses per hour. The method of calculation is to monitor thedeparture times of buses at fixed points and then comparingthose times to the scheduled time of departure (Department forTransport, 2010a). A bus will be deemed to be on time if itarrives at a specified timing point within five minutes of itsscheduled time, and punctuality reports are presented as apercentage of the total service that is likely to arrive ontime or late.

Transport for London operates a computerised monitoring systemknown as iBus which allows London’s 8,500 buses to be‘tracked, monitored and told what to do’ (The Route Masters:

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Running London's Roads - On the Buses, 2013) and submits dailyreports from the bus to the central iBus system.

Figure 5. iBus control screen at Transport for London’s centralcontrol (The Route Masters: Running London's Roads - On the Buses,

2013)

All the services can be monitored both from Transport forLondon’s central control centre (figure 5) and also at each ofthe bus depots where controllers are responsible forcontrolling specific routes (The Route Masters: RunningLondon's Roads - On the Buses, 2013). These controllers usethe iBus system to ensure that the high frequency services areevenly distributed, and more importantly identify whenservices are running late and take appropriate action torectify the situation. The route diagram identifies each busthrough a unique numbering system which identifies the vehiclenumber (for example DW257 which is located at Arriva’s ClaptonDepot (London Bus Routes, 2013)) and the time the serviceshould be operating to (figure 6).

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Figure 6. iBus route diagram at Clapton bus depot, Hackney (TheRoute Masters: Running London's Roads - On the Buses, 2013)

This information is then compared against the actual positionof the vehicle and determines whether or not the bus is early(showing a minus sign) on time or late (showing a positivesign).

How this monitoring is viewed is dependent upon whether or notyou are the controller or the bus driver. A controller at theClapton depot took the view that for drivers (9.19 minutesinto the programme) ‘its not asking them to, you know, fartgold or anything like that, it’s just drive your bus on yourtime card if you can. It’s not a rocket science job.Controlling is though. Oh yeah, we’ve got degrees and stuff.Well we’ve got a BTEC. Does that count as a degree? It’sadvanced’ (The Route Masters: Running London's Roads - On theBuses, 2013). In response one driver commented ‘They tell youto turn somewhere, you just do it. They’re running the show,you know what I mean. They go on a bit, they get on yournerves you know what I mean’.

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From the data produced from iBus, the headway for each servicecan be calculated at the predetermined bus stops which the buscompanies have been advised of through their contracts(Transport for London, 2013(b)). In order to initially testthe data produced by Transport for London and publishedquarterly on their website, a sample route, service 38, a highfrequency service operating between Clapton Pond in the LondonBorough of Hackney and Victoria Station in the City ofWestminster, was selected. The location of the bus stops usedfor the official monitoring of route 38 is as follows (Table1):

Monitoring Points towardsClapton Pond

Monitoring Points towardsVictoria

Victoria Clapton Pond

Tottenham Court Road Station Hackney Central

Islington Angel Islington Angel

Hackney Central Cambridge Circus

Table 3. Excess Wait Time Monitoring Points for Route 38. (Transportfor London, 2012d)

The reported Excess Waiting Time for this service for the fourweeks ended 31st March 2013 was 0.95 minutes and 0.83 minutesfor the four weeks ended 30th June 2013 with a minimum standardof 1.3 minutes required of the service (Transport for London,2013(f)). The hourly level of service for Route 38 variesdependent upon the time of day but is usually between 18 and21 per hour (Transport for London, 2013(a); Munster, 2013).

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The sample testing of Excess Waiting Time were taken at twostops, Dalston Junction (2 miles from Clapton Pond) and TheAngel, Islington High Street (4 miles from Clapton Pond), attwo different times of 13 August 2013 (Table 2).

Scheduled WaitTime

Actual WaitTime

Excess WaitTime

DalstonJunction (0800– 0930)

1.50 minutes 1.99 minutes 0.49minutes

The Angel,Islington(1000 – 1130)

1.58 minutes 1.99 minutes 0.41 minutes

Table 4. Excess waiting times at Dalston Junction and TheAngel, Islington

The difference in scheduled waiting times can be explained inpart to a reduction in the level of service from 20 buses perhour to 19 buses per hour, reflecting the end of the morningrush hour. The results also start to suggest the control onthe distribution of services and whilst the actual wait timesmay appear the same a difference was recorded of 0.0002minutes between the two stops. These results are within the1.3 minutes excess waiting time required as the minimumstandard for the route (Transport for London, 2013(b)) but arehalf of the Excess Waiting Time data provided by Transport forLondon.

One possible explanation for this could be that increaseddelays are being incurred the closer to Victoria the serviceis. Excess Waiting Time can also be influenced by otherfactors such as the length of the bus route (Salek &Machemehl, 1999) and delays occurring on route (Currie, etal., 2012). This level of variability can be controlled

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through the dwell time, or the time a bus spends at a busstop. The length of time spent at a bus stop is not normallydistributed which means it can vary from stop to stop and onthe time of day. As a result of this variability of the dwelltime can be used by controllers to evenly distribute the levelof service on the route and keep the Excess Waiting Time to aminimum (Wong, 2012). This controlling of the level of servicecould be seen in some of the testing performed as the time thebus was reported due and the time it left the stop variedsignificantly.

4.3 Reporting of Excess Wait Time

An important aspect of managing any organisation must be toensure that the product being supplied is both meeting theneeds of the customer and at the level of quality required. Inorder to achieve this, the Board and management of anorganisation require accurate and timely information (Boddy,2005). As has been previously discussed it is important toensure that there are systems in place which ensure thatinformation can flow up to the Board to allow them to makedecisions based upon correct information. The objective ofthis section is to ascertain the systems in place whichprovide information on Excess Waiting Time, and the level ofinformation provided to the Transport for London Board andultimately the Mayor of London concerning the reliability ofLondon Buses and its effect on disabled passengers.

Responsibility for regulating the bus network within Londonhas been delegated by Transport for London to London BusesLimited, which is a directly owned subsidiary of Transport forLondon (Transport for London, 2007). The Managing Director ofLondon Buses Limited is required to provide updatedinformation on the performance of the bus network to theSurface Transport Panel of Transport for London. These panelswere established by the Board to monitor certain aspects ofthe operation of the organisation and advise the Board

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accordingly (Transport for London, 2013(e)). This advicetogether with the information supplied by London Buses Limitedis submitted to the Board in the form of copy minutes andwhere necessary supporting documentation. The Board can thendiscuss any matters raised by the panel or accept the minutes.

The main method of reporting Excess Waiting Time data to theSurface Transport Panel is through Managing Director’s report,presenting the data in the form of a graph (figure 7).

Figure 7. Excess Wait Times for Period 2 2012 (Transport for London,2012b)

This information is passed onto the Board through thequarterly financial and performance statistics report (figure8).

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Figure 8. Operational Performance Report to Transport for LondonBoard

(Transport for London, 2012f)

A review of the minutes and reports to both the SurfaceTransport Panel and the Board noted that the only commentsmade throughout the period 2009 to 2012 were briefexplanations of whether or not there had been an improvementor worsening of the Excess Waiting Time and any possiblereasons for those changes. There was found to be no referenceat any Board meetings of the requirement to assess policiesunder the Equalities Act 2010 or any possible implications inimplementing the practice of Excess Waiting Time.

4.4 Questioning by the London Assembly

Central to the Corporate Governance of the Greater LondonAuthority and Transport for London is the London Assembly.Consisting of 25 elected members the London Assembly is theofficial legal ‘watchdog’ of the Mayor, his advisors and

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statutory bodies (London Assembly, 2012a). In addition to theformal questioning of the Mayor of London, the London Assemblyhas several sub committees which can investigate specificareas of official policy including transport.

With regard to Excess Waiting Time a review of the minutes ofMayor’s Question Time indicated that whilst the reliability ofthe bus network was raised, it was always in connection withpunctuality and overcrowding. For example, in February 2012 aquestion was raised by Assembly Member Valarie Shawcrossconcerning the reliability of buses running along Clapham Roadduring the morning peak. She was reporting that parents inStockwell were complaining that there could be gaps in theservice of 20 minutes on routes 155 and 333 resulting inchildren arriving late at school (London Assembly, 2012a).

There is evidence to suggest that members of the LondonAssembly are becoming more aware of the requirements of theEquality Act 2010. On 14 December 2011 Assembly MemberJennette Arnold asked if the Mayor had conducted an EqualityImpact Assessment on the proposed increase in bus fares due inJanuary 2012 (London Assembly, 2011). This followed previousrequests for a copy of the Equality Impact Assessment, thelast being made on 16 November 2011 (London Assembly, 2011d),where she was directed to Mayoral Decision 886 which formallyapproved the fare increases. As Jennette Arnold pointed out inher December question, this Mayoral Decision referred to thefare increase being in line with the appropriate legislation.The response from the Mayor to Jennette Arnold’s December 2011question was that ‘Officers are drafting a response which willbe sent shortly’ (London Assembly, 2011, p. 86). Despitereported attempts to obtain the Equality Impact Assessmentfrom Transport for London, Jennette Arnold had to formally askthe Mayor again on 23 May 2012 for a copy of the EqualityImpact Assessment (London Assembly, 2012, p. 105). Theresponse from the Mayor was ‘I understand TfL has already

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written to you about this matter’ (London Assembly, 2012, p.105).

A suggestion as to what was actually happening can beestablished within Jennette Arnold’s second question and areply to another Assembly Member’s question on highwaydevelopment (London Assembly, 2011b). Jennette Arnoldacknowledged in her second question that the Mayor’s view ofwhen the Equality Impact Assessment was performed was at theimplementation of the Transport Strategy in 2010. This wouldsuggest that advisors to the Mayor, including Transport forLondon, had failed to fully understand both the requirementslaid out by the courts (Judy Brown, 2008) and the newrequirements of the Equalities Act 2010. Therefore by relyingon a previous Equality Impact Assessment without reviewing thepolicy’s implementation meant that ‘due regard’ potentiallyhad not been considered. However, if the matter had been takento the courts the case would probably have failed becausedisabled people as well as the elderly have the ability toobtain free travel on the bus network so any fare increasewould not have had any material effect. If that is the casewhy raise the question?

The answer lies in previous questions raised by AssemblyMembers on the 14 December 2011 concerning the 2012 fareincreases. Within the Oral question session three questionswere raised by Assembly Members Caroline Pidgeon, John Biggsand Richard Tracey. The questions from Caroline Pidgeon andJohn Biggs were asking ‘Are your fares fair for Londoners?’and ‘Should Londoners be pleased with George Osborne’scorrection to your large fare rises?’ and were an attempt tocriticise the Mayor and his policy of regularly increasing thefares to a point where they believed Londoner’s could notafford them (London Assembly, 2011b, pp. 1-10).

A further indication as to why the Mayor could not produce anEquality Impact Assessment came from a response to a question

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posed at the Mayor’s Question Time on 23 March 2011 concerninghighways development schemes and whether an Equality ImpactAssessment is performed for each scheme. The response from theMayor was:

‘All projects which would have a potential impact on our customers orstaff, including highway development schemes, would require an EqualityImpact Assessment (EIA) screening. Where the screening identifies theneed, a full EIA is then carried out. EIAs are an iterative process and arereviewed whenever there is a scope change to the project.’ (LondonAssembly, 2011a, pp. 49-50)

This answer reiterates the guidance provided by Transport forLondon in conducting Equality Impact Assessments whichindicates that screening should take place at the commencementof each project and be reviewed during the course of theimplementation of the project (Transport for London, 2004). Anassessment is not required for routine operations which isclearly contrary to the Equalities Act 2010 which requires theMayor to have ‘due regard’ when exercising his functions,which means every function the Mayor and Transport for Londonare required to perform.

5. Discussion and ConclusionThe focus of this working paper has so far been on one aspectof the policy of paying bus companies incentives to improvethe reliability of the bus network within London. The questionthat has to be posed is can this financial policy present abarrier to disabled people and be subject to the Equality Act2010? The London Assembly were made aware of the problemsfaced by disabled people when preparing to produce theirreport into the accessibility of the transport network in2010. Their final report highlighted the problems faced bydisabled people, parents and the elderly at every stage of thejourney from planning the journey in advance to arriving atthe final destination (London Assembly, Transport Committee,

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2010). Disabled people frequently complained of driversfailing to allow wheelchairs onto buses; wheelchair ramps notworking; poor attitude of drivers towards disabled people;street furniture impeding access to or egress from buses. Thisreport clearly identified what was happening but it failed toanswer the basic question of why it was happening and withrespect to Excess Waiting Time, how it was influencing thelevel of accessibility.

In programme 3 of British Broadcasting Corporation’s seriesThe Route Masters – Rinning London’s Roads (2013) an attemptwas made to show how Transport for London together with thebus companies are trying to improve the reliability of the busnetwork using technology to monitor the system. What thisprogramme did reveal were the pressures being placed on thedrivers in maintaining a reliable service. This pressure,together with the pressures created from passenger behaviour,dealing with traffic congestion, poor posture whilst drivingand irregular hours is known to cause health conditions suchas cardiovascular disease and depression (Chung & Wong, 2011).More importantly it has been recognised that drivers can adoptcoping strategies for the stress that they encounter which canresult in poor driving practices (Dorn, et al., 2010). It istherefore possible that the attitude drivers have towardsdisabled people, and the poor driving practices seen to betaking place, may not be as a result of discriminatoryopinions but just reflecting the stress that the drivers areplaced under by Transport for London to provide a reliableservice and the bus companies attempting to mitigate loses.With the level of subsidy being given to bus companies beingreduced by a third over a ten year period (London Assembly,2010 (b), p. 6) further pressures will be placed on the buscompanies to control or reduce their costs. It is thereforequite plausible that bus companies are or will be applyingfurther pressure on staff to ensure that their costs are

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reduced, including improving and maintaining reliability and areduction in the number of kilometres lost.

However, is Transport for London aware of these pressures andthe possible implications on passengers? From the informationobtained and presented there is a suggestion that thepressures being placed upon bus companies are known andunderstood at the operational level of Transport for Londonbut are not being relayed to the Board and the Mayor ofLondon, resulting in the necessary challenges and review ofpractices required by the Equalities Act 2010 not beingcarried out. The only reference found to support this was madein the meeting of the Independent Disability Advisory Groupheld on 1 February 2012 (Transport for London, 2012c). At thismeeting a comment was made concerning bus journeys being cutshort by controllers to ensure that targets were met but withlittle regard to what was believed to be a disproportionateeffect on disabled people. Later in the meeting a furtherquestion was posed as to whether bus drivers felt that theywere being supported in trying to carry out Transport forLondon policies surrounding accessibility. Stephen Golden ofTransport for London’s Equality and Inclusion Unit indicatedthat following training, drivers felt that their controllersdid not respect or support them and were only concerned withmeeting targets (Transport for London, 2012c, pp. 7-8).

With little evidence of either Transport for London’s Board orthe London Assembly being fully aware of the potentialimplications of the Quality Incentive Contracts, it would beeasy to conclude that the Equalities Act 2010 is not beingfully implemented. That would, however, be a dangerousconclusion to reach as the social interpretation of disabilityand the Social Model of Disability clearly indicate thatdisability is the result of a relationship that is incorrectlyfocused. Using Finkelstein’s argument concerning disabilityresearch (Finkelstein, 1980), Transport for London’s focus ofattention has been to provide an accessible service and

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everything they have carried out, such as making all of thebuses wheelchair accessible, is directed to achieve thatobjective. The focus of attention for disabled people is to beable to gain access to public transport in order to performwhatever task they are requiring to achieve.

The problem is that the focus of both parties ultimatelycannot change because of the service provider, customerrelationship. Any attempt to change attitudes whichFinkelstein suggests should be the purpose of any research isproblematic because there is a tendency to focus on one orother party and not on both. If this perspective were toremain true then there would be ultimately no hope fordisabled people as the service provider, customer relationshipwould remain unchanged. There is a solution and the answerlies within a statement that Baroness Tanni Grey- Thompsongave to a meeting of the Transport Committee of the LondonAssembly in March 2010 (London Assembly, 2010 (d)).

This was her first meeting with the Transport Committee as amember of the Transport for London Board and the discussionwas concerning the Dial-a-Ride scheme operated within London.She was asked to explain to the meeting what her role on theBoard of Transport for London was. Her response was

‘In terms of the discussions, I sit on the Board but I also sit on the Surface Committee, Corporate Governance and a couple of other Panels. We have had a number of discussions about Dial-a-Ride and other aspects and looking at how we can make improvements. What I did not understand, when I joined, because, from the outside, you think how complicated can Dial-a-Ride be? Then you look at the complexities and it is huge, it is absolutely huge, in terms of the number of people - and there have been anumber of discussions about this - about the cancellations and about howwe can make improvements’ (London Assembly, 2010 (d), p. 2)

She further commented on the complexity of the task ofproviding the dial-a-ride service

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‘It is a huge area. I think my conclusion was that it was incrediblycomplex and from my recollection of being at the Panel and alsodiscussions at Board, it is something we need to look at very closely andcome up with a solution in terms of providing the best possible servicewithin the budget that we are able to allocate. Transport for London’sbudget is very complex and there is a lot of pressure on it. It is a lot ofmoney that goes into this for the service.

I would love to say that there is an easy solution; that we can wave amagic wand and in the next couple of months this can all be sorted.Actually it is not going to happen. If you take into account all the differentgroups that are involved in providing different levels of service acrossLondon, before you even get into the different needs of different disabledpeople and people who are older, it is huge.

Part of the reason I welcomed coming here today was to listen to usersbut also to talk about solutions and about how we can make this work. Weknow there are lots of issues over this. I welcome listening to how we canget to a solution and a resolution on this so we can provide the bestpossible service that we possibly can because, to hear some of thesestories, it is horrific’ (London Assembly, 2010 (d), pp. 28-29)

What Tanni Grey-Thompson’s comments begin to show is thatthere is a difference between wanting a specific type ofservice and actually providing it, and more importantly thereis a lack of information provided between the service providerand the customer. There appears to be a focus by the serviceprovider, in this instance Transport for London, to obtaininformation from the customers as to what is happening withthe service, but it requires an investigation by the TransportCommittee of the London Assembly to establish what problemsare being encountered within Transport for London. Whilst itis important to keep Londoner’s informed of what is beingachieved within the transport network, it is equally importantthat they are kept informed of the problems organisations suchas Transport for London face. However careful an organisationis in planning a service or facility there will always be

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consequences, some that are expected and planned for, and somethat are unintended and need to be fully understood andexplained (Merton, 1936). In keeping those using the servicesinformed of all the issues faced, there is the possibility ofcustomers, especially disabled customers, understanding whysituations occur and where possible assisting in rectifyingthose problems.

It would be very easy to conclude that despite their bestefforts the Mayor of London, Transport for London and theLondon Assembly have failed to protect disabled people fromthe poor organisation of the bus network. In reality, theissues faced by everyone are far more complicated and therelationship between all of the parties needs to be one whereeveryone is not only kept informed but everyone becomes partof the solution.

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7.

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APPENDIX 1

Section 149 of the Equality Act (2010) contains the followingrequirements in respect of the Public Sector Equality Duty:

Subsection (1) requires public bodies in the exercise of their functions to have due regard ‘to the need to:

(a) eliminate discrimination, harassment, victimisation and any otherconduct that is prohibited by or under this Act;

(b) advance equality of opportunity between persons who share arelevant protected characteristic and persons who do not share it;

(c) foster good relations between persons who share a relevantprotected characteristic and persons who do not share it.’ (HerMajesty's Stationery Office, 2010, p. 96)

Subsection (3) requires the public body, when it isconsidering issues of equality, to have due regard ‘tothe need to:

(a) remove or minimise disadvantages suffered by persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are connected to that characteristic;

(b) take steps to meet the needs of persons who share a relevant protected characteristic that are different from the needs of persons who do not share it;

(c) encourage persons who share a relevant protected characteristic to participate in public life or in any other activity in which participation by such persons is disproportionately low.’ (Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 2010, p. 96)

Subsection (5) require the public body to foster goodrelations between those who share a characteristic thatis protected under this legislation, such as disability

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and race, and in particular to have due regard ‘to theneed to:

‘(a) tackle prejudice, and

(b) promote understanding.’ (Her Majesty's StationeryOffice, 2010, p. 96)

Section 149 also permits protected groups to be treatedmore favourably over others but not to the extent thatthe legislation is not complied with.

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APPENDIX 2

It is now accepted that in order to meet the requirements ofsection 149 of the Equalities Act public bodies must abide bythe following requirements (The Queen on the application ofJudy Brown and (1) Secretary of State for Work and Pensions;(2) Secretary of State for Business,Enterprise and RegulatoryReform, 2008):

1. Those responsible for making decisions that might affectdisabled people must be made aware of the ‘due regard’responsibility and the need to consider section 149 of theEqualities Act. The Equality and Human Rights Commission,in their guidance on the Public Sector Equality Duty,stipulated that all public sector bodies must consider ifany decision they are making will affect individualsprotected by the Equalities Act and if the decision doesaffect those protected by the Equalities Act then the dutyof ‘due regard’ must be carried out (The Equalities andHuman Rights Commission, 2010);

2. The ‘due regard’ duty must be performed before or duringthe decision making process;

3. The duty must be performed in a careful and conscientiousmanner;

4. The duty cannot be delegated. In the event of a thirdparty being tasked to carry out specific policies thenthat third party must agree to the ‘due regard’ duty andbe monitored by the authority responsible. In respect ofLondon, the Mayor of London remains the authority chargedwith the duty of ‘due regard’ and must ensure that bodiessuch as Transport for London not only carry out thatduty, but also must be monitoring it.

5. The duty is continuous. This is further explained withinthe Statutory Guidance that was produced by theDisability Rights Commission. The duty does not require apublic body just to consider policies that are being

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adopted but also review previous policies in order thatfailures can be identified. This means that whenever apolicy or practice has been adopted there should be aperiodic review to ensure that those covered by theEqualities Act are not facing undue discrimination(Disability Rights Commission, 2006).

6. There should be adequate records of the decision makingprocess. This was acknowledge by the courts to be themost effective way of protecting public bodies wheneverchallenges are made.

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APPENDIX 3Calculation of Excess W aiting Tim e (EW T): Exam ple of Typical Scenario

For a bus service with a scheduled frequency of 6 buses per hour, the following observations were made

Bus departure times Headway (minutes)

Average wait time for each bus

W eighted average wait time

[A] [B] [C=B/2] [D] = [BxC]0802 EW T = AW T-SW T0811 9 4.5 40.50819 8 4 32.0 Excess W aiting Time0830 11 5.5 60.5 1.19 minutes0850 20 10 200.0 [G-I]0900 10 5 50.00913 13 6.5 84.50918 5 2.5 12.50930 12 6 72.00941 11 5.5 60.50950 9 4.5 40.51000 10 5 50.01020 20 10 200.01020 0 0 0.01030 10 5 50.01038 8 4 32.01050 12 6 72.01058 8 4 32.0

Total (sum of [D] square of headways/2) [E] 1,089Time between 1st and last observed bus [F] 176

Average W aiting Time (AW T) in minutes [G=E/F] 6.19

Number of buses scheduled per hour [H] 6Scheduled W aiting Time (SW T) in minutes [I=Hx60x0.5] 5.00

Figure 9. Department for Transport guidance on Excess Waiting Time(Department for Transport, 2010)

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Position Statement (1) Accessing the London Bus Network

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