PHALANX VERSUS LEGIONAnalysis of the Greco-Roman conflict in the Hellenistic era

By Stephanos Sakrmintzos

The conflict between the Greeks and the Romans in the Hellenistic period brought inconflict not only two people but also two different approaches to warfare. To understandthe nature of this conflict, we must study the military system of each side separately.The Greek approachIn the Aegean basin regular armies have appeared from the Bronze Age. The infantryfought in close order and used long spears. The collapse of the Palace Societies broughtup a chaotic way of battle, where the well trained heavily armored aristocrats dominated.The nearly cataphract lord, after neutralizing the best enemy fighters, led his followers inthe obliteration of the less well armed and trained enemy units. By the time of Homer, thedeep formation that checked effectively the enemy rush reappeared. (1) According toHerodotus, the Argive king Pheidon transformed the deep spearmen-formation into anoffensive weapon. The mass of spearmen repulsed and crushed the thinner enemyformations. The attempts of raising the number of heavily armed infantrymen, who mustbuy their own equipment was one of the reasons of the introduction of the democratic rulein the Greek city-states.

4th century hoplite Courtecy of the Living History Association "Hetairoi"

The effectiveness of the hoplite phalanx was demonstrated during the Persian Wars, whereit literally preserved with its success the Western Civilization. The martial philosophy ofthe East was the crushing of the enemy from heavy cavalry units, after “soften him up” byinfantry archers. The battle of Marathon proved that the lightly armored infantry of theEast could not face up to hoplites in the open field. Modern experiments proved that thearrows of the era could not penetrate the 15 layers of cloth composing the Greek armor;much less the metal armors. As long as the hoplites were in locked shields formation, itwas almost impossible to be neutralized by archers. The battle of Platea proved that noteven the mounted aristocratic warriors could break infantry that could maintain itscohesion. During the Peloponnesian War the hoplites moral and their training were thefactors determining the outcome of battles. The Spartans dominated this type of battle, buttheir defeat at Sfacteria proved that a good general and the correct usage of light troopscould neutralize the phalanx. The only modernism was the use by the Beotians of the deepranks formations for gaining of local superiority. The method was called “oblique”phalanx and it is attributed to the Theban general Epameinondas, although Thukididesconsiders as first user the Beotarch Pagondas at Delion. The revolution in tactics camefrom Philip II king of Macedonia. Philip, who once lived as a hostage in Thebes, noticedthat only the first two ranks were engaged in the “oblique column”. The rest of thehoplites simply aided in the application of pressure upon the enemy column. Philip doubledthe length of the column and called it “sarisa”. This had as a result the shifting of thegravity center and the need to use both arms while handling the weapon. The shieldbecame smaller and it was now hanging with a leather stripe from the shoulder, notessential anymore in pushing and shoving the enemy. In contrast though to the hoplitephalanx, the first five ranks could engage the enemy. This gave local superiority five vs.two in evenly file of opposing fighters. The new formation showed its teeth crushing thePhokian army in Thessaly and the only time that faced problems was when the Phokiansbeat the phalanx using their catapults as field artillery. (2) Phillip and Alexander realizedthe limitations of the new formation and developed other troop types like cavalry and lightinfantry. Alexander covered the phalanx flanks with light infantry especially in areas whereterrain was unsuitable for solid formations. Alexander used the phalanx to pin the enemydown and forced victory by using his cavalry.

Contact with the Indians introduced a new weapon, the war elephant. The elephantsterrorized men and horses but proved no match for light infantry. The eastern Hellenistickingdomspreferred to spend their money on elephants and cavalry and neglected theinfantry. The phalanx was kept because of its low maintenance cost and the ease oftraining the troopers. This attitude was destined to have consequences in the future.Plutarch in “life of Flamininos” describes the phalangites of the Seleucids as timid Syrianswho bear Macedonian weapons. The only innovation of the Hellenistic period was the“Thyreophoroi”. They were peltasts carrying an elliptic or rectangular shield called“Thyreos”. By the second century B.C. they bore armor and they were called“Thorakitae”.

phalanx reconstruction courtecy of the Living Hisotory Association "Hetairoi"

The Roman approachAt the end of 6th century B.C. the Romans experienced the effectiveness of the phalanxwhen their Cymean allies helped them to beat the Etruscans. The Romans swiftly adoptedthe Greek way of battle. But, in 390 B.C., their badly led and inadequately trained phalanxwas crushed by the ferocious Celtic warbands by the river Allia. (3) According to PlutarchCamillus is considered the reformer of the Roman armybut probably the reforms were aproduct of many years slow evolution. Descriptions of the Roman army of the era comefrom Polyvius. (4) The Romans abandoned the rigid spearmen formations for the moreflexible manipular system and gave priority to the individual soldier’s ability to cope in thebattlefield. They obliged every citizen less than 46 years of age and income above fourhundred drachmae in ten years of service in the cavalry or sixteen years in the infantry.Responsible to enforce this, were the censors and the tribunes. No one was allowed to runfor public office until he had first serve in at least twelve campaigns. The fact that nonecould advance without first had seen action was producing good leaders of proven value.

Roman hastatus Source: http://www.romanarmy.net

The legion of the Hellenistic erahad in its strength about 4000 infantrymen and 300horsemen and was a combined arms unit, namely light infantry, heavy infantry and cavalry.The light infantrymen (velites) were armed with javelins and daggers. They wore animalskins to be recognized and their protection was around shield with a metal boss in thecenter. The men of the heavy infantry were divided in two subcategories: the hastati andthe principes. The first wore helmet and carried a rectangular shield that covered a largepart of the body and were armed with the “Spanish sword” and two heavy javelins. Theironly armor was a square plaque on the chest, suspended with leather stripes. The principeswere armed like the hastati but they additionally wore full chain mail (lorica hamata).Lastly the older and most experienced were called triarii and were armed with spearsinstead of javelins. Six hundred triarii were posted in each legion.

Roman princeps. Source: http://www.roman-empire.netThe heavy infantry javelin was called pilum and was composed from a heavy wooden shaftand had a very thin iron point. The point bent on impact and many times was hooked onthe shields. It was very difficult to be removed during the fight wand made the enemyvulnerable to the legionaries that charged with their swords. The sword was carried infront the right thigh and the legionary could use both the point and the edge. Additionally,the hastati, the principes and the triarii wore bronze helmets decorated with feathers thatmade them look taller and more terrifying to the enemy. Τhe Roman cavalry initially, wasa type of fast moving infantry. Other missions included scouting and raiding. Patrollingand sentry checks at night, was also responsibility of the cavalry. Gradually the mountedarm was transformed into heavy cavalry with the addition of armor and light shields likethe Greek cavalry. Usually the Romans recruited good cavalry from their allies, as they didnot excel in this type of service.

Roman skirmiser (Veles). Source: http://www.romanarmy.netThe Romans also took very seriously safety during the night. If any sentry was foundnegligent, he was executed in the morning. They never pitched tents before they fortifiedtheir camp. Each soldier carried two wooden stakes and entrenching tools to make a ditch.This allowed them to fortify their camp wherever it was positioned in contrast to theGreeks who tried to find a naturally strong position and fenced the perimeter loosely withfallen tree logs-if they found them. The organization of the Roman camps always the sameso every soldier to know his place and the position of his superiors, wherever he is, even ifhe was transferred in another formation. The Romans made sure that the system ofdiscipline and camp regulations was enforced to their allies too.The tactic of the Romans was to cover the flanks of heavy infantry with cavalry andskirmishers. The infantry was the main offensive weapon. The hastati entered the battlefirst. They cast their pila and then charged with their swords. If they fail to drive off theenemy, the principes engaged in their turn and fought in the same manner. If the battle didnot turn well they retreated covered by the triarii spearmen. This prevented the generalroot that ended in disaster in case of a defeat.The ConflictΑs we saw previously the approaches of the Greeks and the Romans towards war differedsubstantially. The Greeks, accustomed from fighting between them concluded the outcomeof a war with one or two decisive battles. If they couldn’t conquer they capitulated only tofight again later in more favourable conditions. Their experience was derived from thePersian Wars and Alexander’s conquests where everything was decided in three at themost battles in every case. On the contrary, the Romans were struggling to grab arableland from their neighbors and fought to annihilate their opponent so that he wouldn’tchallenge them in the future. Their aim was to impose their own peace terms. Theirpolitical system was exceptionally stable for the time and allowed them to fight theirenemies without internal policy distractions. The star of Rome rise when in its neighbourswas only darkness and chaos because of the political instability. The constant civil wars

had sapped the strength of Hellenism. The majority of the populations were bankruptlandless masses upon which tyrants had forced themselves with the aid of mercenaries.The landless citizens either revolted creating an almost permanent source of unrest or seektheir fortune in the armies of the Hellenistic Empires leaving mainland Greece bereft ofmen. In the Italiotic colonies, the citizens had abandoned their military duties and relied onmercenaries for their defence. They considered the mainland Greeks as simple peasantswho paid them to take the war risks but they also suspected them as potential tyrants. Thetreatment of Pyrrhus by the Tarentines is a typical example. (6)

King Pyrrhus of EpeirosRivers of ink have been used to explain the superiority of the legion versus the phalanx.The scholars “barricade themselves” behind Polyvius analysis (5) that it was written mainlyfor his Roman readers and miss many details. The pila by themselves, failed to break thephalanx. Modern research has shown that only Olympic class athletes with modern madejavelins could easily penetrate armour. The reconstructed pila yielded poor results.Furthermore, the conflict between phalangites and legionaries was just apart if the wholeconflict and did not by itself determined the outcome of the battle. The frontage of thelegion, because of the javelin use had greater width that of the phalanx. That meant thatthe Greek light troops faced armoured legionaries and naturally retreated exposing thephalanx. This fact was many times the deciding factor in the battles, as the analysis willshow. The conflict between Pyrrhus and the Romans at Herakleia is the first time that thetwo different systems of waging war come into collision. It seems that the phalanx ofPyrrhus held the legionaries initially on the river Siris. (7) Pyrrhus could not interfere as hewas attacked but an Italian horseman and nearly got him killed. His idea to change attirewith one of his officers nearly cost him the battle when his subordinate was killed. (8) Inthe meantime the Romans probably inflict heavy casualties to the light troops that probablycomposed Pyrrhus flanks and only the intervention of the elephants turned the tide in hisfavor. (9) The Romans, thanks to the triarii spearmen manage to retreat in an orderlymanner and avoid annihilation. That battle proved if nothing else that the legion was notdefeated easily and that the phalanx had difficulties with water obstacles but it also provedthat the legion could not penetrate the front of the phalanx. If Pyrrhus believed that theRomans would bow to his demands, the stance of the herald Favrikius, which reflected the

Roman spirit of the Era, dispelled his illusions. The Romans do not accept doubt abouttheir military prowess. Favrikius warns Pyrros about the conspiracy of his doctor Niciasagainst him so that anyone can see and especially the allies that the Romans couldvanquish him in combat. (10) Pyrrhus overestimating his strength and in his haste toadvance and speedily beat the Romans He faced them at Asculum. Plutarch describes thebattlefield as unsuitable and mentions the battle as a two-day conflict. (11) But Dionysiosof Alikarnassos gives us more details and describes it as a one-day event. (12) Theunsuitability of the ground presented problems for the phalanx. Pyrrhus neutralized the“anti-elephant” wagons of the Romans but they concentrated their efforts against hisunwilling allies. They kept Pyrrhus cavalry occupied at the flanks of the formation andgave time to their infantry to attempt to gain the upper hand. Again the legionaries couldnot break the front of the phalanx but the phalanx suffered from flank attacks. Pyrrhussince he could not overpower the Roman flanks was entangled in a fight of attrition in thecentre and only the intervention of the elephants and the reserves stabilized the situationalbeit with heavy Greek losses. The loss of also of the Greek camp increased thecasualties, as the wounded could not be properly treated from the loss of supplies.

Battle of Heracleia. Source:http://www.comicartfans.com/GalleryPiece.asp?Piece=682412&GSub=104283

The Romans lost the battle but they had learned their lesson and proved it a bit later atBeneventum where they chose the ground. It is true that Pyrrhus had suffered losses fromhis conflict with the Carthaginians at Sicily and the losses suffered by his fleet affected anumber of his units (13) but it seems that his scouts were not up to the task since they lethim to fight in such unfavorable ground. The Romans exploited the maneuverability oftheir formation and put pressure on the phalanx flanks. They also forced the elephants ofPyrrhus who were left unsupported to fall on Greek units. The value of the flexibleformations had been proven. If they couldn’t break the phalanx front they could fight it infavorable ground. It was now clear that the Greeks had no generals of the caliber of PhilipII or Alexander the Great. After the neutralization of Carthage, the Romans were ready toexpand. Rome posed as a democracy that would aid the Greeks in their struggle againstthe autocratic despots of Macedonia and the Hellenistic empires. The contribution of

Rome’s Greek allies in the roman successes is usually ignored. Philip V had correctlypredicted that the Romans with the aid of the Aetolians would attempt to invade from thewest following the rout of the Apsos valley. Here we have a tragic repetition ofThermopylae. The Roman alliance started facing difficulties as the terrain was favoring thedefenders. But the anti-Macedonian fraction of Epirus sent a guide to Flamininus thathelped him surround and neutralize the defenders of the pass. (14) The Archaic spirit ofunity against the barbarian was dead. The Romans with the Aetolian cavalry invadedThessaly and Philip attempted to stop them in the place called “Kynos Kefalae”. Again thephalanx overpowered the front of the legion. But when the Aetolians charged on theMacedonian flank, the phalanx was crushed. Livy believes that the phalanx was in nodanger from the legion in a frontal clash and mentions the example of Atrax where thephalangites repulsed the legionaries, despite their numerical disparity since they had theirflanks covered. (15) But Livy stresses the poor performance of the Greek light troops andthe insufficient fortification of the Greek camps. (16) Poor camp security was the reasonof the Roman victory at Thermopylae in 191 B.C. The nightly Roman attack surprised theAetolians, who guarded the Annopea Pass. But it is almost certain that sentries werenegligent resulting in the annihilation of the garrison and the breach of the pass. Similarcase of poor security that lead to breaching a pass we see in the war against Perseus in168 B.C. when the Romans destroyed the army of Milo. (17)Plutarch presents Perseus, with “black colors” in life of Aemilius Paullus. Truth is that hewas worried about the legitimacy of his success and in order to become agreeable to theGreek people he abandoned the traditional philo-oligarchic policy of his father andsupports the popular or “populist” to some demands of the majority. Polyvios andPlutarch consider him perhaps with some justifications as a demagogue and not a king.The information about Perseus actions in Pydna is contradictory. They all agree though,that the Macedonian army was poorly led at that time. The legionaries initially had a hardtime with the pikes, but Paullus had probably learned well from Alexander the Great. Hechecked the phalanx in the center and when he realized that he couldn’t break its front heput pressure on the flanks especially to the point where the elephants of the Aetoliansfought. The elephants beat the cavalry of Perseus and exposed the flank of the phalanx.Some officer Sallius led his men in the gap and outflanked the Macedonians. (18) The wayfor conquering the rest of Greece was now open. No effort for the creation of an antiRoman front was made. They leaders of Greece were on only interested in brutallyexploiting the citizens as it appears in Polybius accounts. (19) Greece in 146 B.C.collapsed in the midst of conflicting interests and opportunism. The generals of theAchaean League recruited slaves into the ranks because of manpower shortages. It israther unlikely that they had organized phalanx and if they did, the men were inadequatelytrained and equipped. The last Greek armies were nothing more than armed mobs thatwanted only to loot and not fight the Romans. (20) The crushing of the generals Critolaosand Dieos from the legions is hardly a surprise. The triumph of Rome, as mentioned beforeit was more the result of the ability of its commanders and the stability of its politicalsystem and not the superiority of the legion versus the phalanx. The Roman commanderslearned from their mistakes and adapted their tactics so as to neutralize the advantages ofthe Greek armies. The Roman army was led by officers and not by demagogues. On the

contrary, the Greeks could not rise above fraction politics and came to the point ofbecoming allies of the Romans in order to exterminate their opponents.Sources:1. Homer HILIAD 22 131-133, 145-1502. Polyenos 2 38, 23. Plutarch Camillus 18, 19 Loeb Classical Library19204. Polyvios “Military Institutions of the Romans” The Library of Original Sources, OliverJ. Thatcher 1901), pp. 172-1865. Polyvios Vol. 2, translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh (London: Macmillan, 1889), pp.226-230.6. Plutarch Pyrros 13 2-6 Loeb Classical Library19207. Dionysios of Alikarnassos19 11.1-12.6 Loeb Classical Library 19508. Plutarch Pyrros 16.6 –18.2 Loeb Classical Library19209. Frontinus “Stratagems” 2 4.9 J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 190510. Plutarch Pyrros 21 7-15 Loeb Classical Library1920 Dionysios of Alikarnassos1911.1- 12.6 Loeb Classical Library 195011. Plutarch Pyrros 20 1-10 and 21. 1-6 Loeb Classical Library1920 Livy Romanhistory13.a 13b 13c J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 190512. Dionysios of Alikarnassos 20 1 1-37 Loeb Classical Library195013. Plutarch Pyrros 23.7- 24.8 Loeb Classical Library1920 Polyvios 1.23.4 translated byEvelyn S. Shuckburgh London: Macmillan, 188914. Plutarch Τίτος Φλαμινίνος 4.4 – 5.2 Loeb Classical Library1920 Livy Roman history32 11.1 – 12.1 J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 190515. Livy Roman history 32 17.4 – 18.9 J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 190516. Livy Roman history 36.17.1 J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., London, 190517. Plutarch Paullus16 Loeb Classical Library1920 Dio Cassius19 τομ.2 Loeb ClassicalLibrary1914 pp. 31318. Plutarch Paullus23.8 36.4 Loeb Classical Library192019. Polyvios 20.4-6 38.1 translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh London: Macmillan, 188920. Polyvios 36.17, 38.15-16 39.8 translated by Evelyn S. Shuckburgh London:Macmillan, 1889 Pausanias “Description of Greece”7.16.3 translated by John DreydenLondon: Macmillan, 1889