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“Nuclear Syndrome” and The United States Strategy

in the Persian Gulf

Trial Edition

Lasha Bazhunaishvili

PHD of History

Assistant Professor of Batumi Shota Rustaveli State University

Please, Save Copyright Rulses

Batumi - 2015

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Table of Content

Chapter 1. Iranian Nuclear program in the 1970s --------------------------- 4

Chapter 2. Main points of the US-Iran strategic partnership in the 1960s-

1970s ----------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22

Chapter 3. The US-Iran nuclear cooperation ------------------------------- 29

Conclusion -----------------------------------------------------------------------54

Illustrations –-------------------------------------------------------------------- 56

References -----------------------------------------------------------------------58

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Introduction

“The principal determinant of the extent of nuclear weapons

proliferation will, however, be political considerations – including

the policies of the superpowers with regard to proliferation, the

policies of suppliers of nuclear materials and technology, and the

regional ambitions and tensions.”

CIA Estimate, 23 August, 1974

Every nuclear program named peaceful or not presents potential possibility of

creating a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD).

Since the World War II and the use of Nuclear Weapon against Japan by the

US, Nuclear weapon has become the worst, although real factor of so-called “violent

peace” deterring major states during the Cold War. Analyzing the extents of

destructive results brought by the Weapon of Mass destruction, the great powers of

world agreed about non-proliferation of nuclear weapon and on March 5, 1970 Non-

Proliferation Treaty was signed. However this agreement was weakened when great

powers’ strategic interests dictated to act in contrary. The leader nuclear supplier

countries foster proliferation as a matter of national policy, which probably was

proved susceptible to the lure of the economic and political advantages to be gained

from exporting materials, technology and equipment relevant to nuclear weapons

programs. Moreover, regional powers which were encouraged by superpowers joined

into nuclear race. Each of these countries had a different set of motivation and

pressures. Some had enemies making efforts in nuclear weapon field; some were

interested in nuclear weapons for their presumed prestige value.

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In 1974 Iran announced intention of nuclear program development in order to

seek alternative energy sources. In August 1975, the Shah of Iran stated, “Petroleum

is a noble material, much too valuable to burn… We envision to producing, as soon as

possible, 23 000 megawatts (MW) electricity using nuclear plants”. During the 1970s

the Shah of Iran argued, like current Iranian leaders today, for the capability of a

peaceful nuclear energy on the basis of national rights. What were the reasons of

starting such a huge nuclear program? Was it only peaceful or was it directly intended

for military purposes? What was the attitude of the US?

The aim of my paper is to investigate the Iranian Nuclear Program and the US

policy in the 1970s. Because the Iranian Nuclear Program and the US policy

nowadays still present a problem not only for the Middle East countries, but also for

neighboring countries (including South Caucasian countries). In order to investigate,

analyze and foresee what will happen in the future, proper knowledge of historical

background of this issue is important. This paper provides discussions and analyses

on the bases of origin sources.

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I Chapter

Iranian Nuclear program in the 1970s

I. First steps of Iranian nuclear program

After the World War II in the global political arena new strength of order

appears – Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD). Since this period every great and

regional power has tried to acquire WMD and got political or economical dividends.

The Middle East countries (Israel, Egypt, and Iraq) in the 1970s nuclear program

development began. This was a “nuclear syndrome” which extended over Iran, which

had aspiration for regional hegemony in Persian Gulf.

The first time Iran started its investigations in the nuclear field at the end of

the 1950s and in the beginning of the 1960s on the basis of peaceful use of nuclear

energy with cooperation of American scientists. The Tehran’s Nuclear Research

Center had only scientific basis.

In the beginning of the 1970s when it turned out that Israel was working on

nuclear weapon and after the Indian „Peaceful Nuclear Explosion”, Shah of Iran

announced Iran’s desire to start developing of nuclear energy capacity. During the

energetic crisis in the mid of the 1970s the officials of Iran made a statement about the

beginning of nuclear energy capability development on the basis of national rights.

Government of Iran (GOI) argued that nuclear energy had vital importance for Iran in

the future for the following reasons: 1) They predicted, that Iran’s oil resources will

be decline in about 15-20 years, 2) much of Iran’s huge gas reserves will be needed in

the oil fields for secondary recovery, 3) both, oil and gas, are ultimately more valuable

as raw materials than as fuel. (Department of State: 1976a; p.9)

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From 1974 Iran began developing rapidly its nuclear program from “Zero

Ground” like India. At this Time Iran’s plan for future was to construct approximately

20 power plants which would have generated 23 000 megawatts (MW) by 1994 with

strong support of the US, France and GDR.

In 1974 Atomic Energy organization of Iran (AEOI) was established. AEOI

was founded directly by Shah of Iran, according to his special imperial decree in

April, 1974, during the peak of the world energy crisis. AEOI was formulated as

autonomous government agency headed by a President who had the rank of Deputy

Prime Minister. Because of Shah’s strong personal interests in the nuclear program,

the President of the AEOI reports directly to His Imperial Majesty (HIM), and all

major problems referred to him for the ultimate decision (Department of State: 1976a;

p. 9-10). AEOI was important governmental agency at the imperial government

system, for its significant role, which had annually growing budget (in billions) and

large autonomy rights as well. From this it evidently seems that for Shah of Iran the

nuclear program was primary and most significant purpose.

The AEOI had both developmental and regulatory authority and has been

empowered to carry out the following functions:

1. “To generate from nuclear power plants for the national gird.

2. To carry on atomic research.

3. To train specialists needed in all phases of nuclear science and

technology.

4. To promote applications of radioactivity in medicine and agriculture.

5. To study and make recommendations for development of an alternative

source of energy.

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6. To represent Iran in international conferences dealing with atomic

energy.

7. To determine participation of Iran in joint projects dealing with atomic

energy.” (Department of State: 1976a; p. 2)

This was declared purposes of Iranian nuclear program at the first stage.

In the first two years of its existence the AEOI has following achievements in

science and engineering:

1) – “Grown into a bureaucracy of over 1.000 employees. Although in the

beginning of development of nuclear program the principal problem for Iran was a

dearth of trained and experienced manpower. From the outset priority has been placed

upon attracted back from abroad Iranians already trained in nuclear sciences and

engineering. In the two years since the AEOI was founded, Dr. Etamad (President of

AEOI) reports considerable success in luring such people into his organization.

2) – Signed letters of intent for four large nuclear power plants;

3) – Initiated an intensive research for sources of uranium within Iran and

abroad. To satisfy the requirements of its nuclear program and achieve planned

purposes there was necessary quite enough source of uranium. The GOI made

significant investment and diplomatic efforts to got agreement with uranium

producing states about bilateral exploration of uranium deposits.

4) – Arranged training of large numbers of Iranians in nuclear sciences and

engineering abroad. Moreover, during the 70s about hundreds of Iranian students were

sent at nuclear research centers abroad. Principally, the Iranian students were sent in

the US, UK, France, West Germany and Austria.1

1 .”The Government of Iran spent millions of dollars to train and educate Iranian specialists and to have

own skilled manpower in the nuclear energy field.

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5) – “Started development of nuclear research center at home (in Iran L. B.).

The first already functioning research center was Tehran’s Amirabad Nuclear

Research Center. It was previously the Tehran University Nuclear Center and was

taken over intact the AEOI was formed. Center was equipped with a 5 MW

swimming pool reactor and a Van de Graaf particle accelerator. The Tehran’s

Amirabad Nuclear Research Center had long range of nuclear research purposes.

Nuclear Center’s main goal was to controlled “thermo-nuclear fusion using laser

technology”, and the AEOI was strongly interested in working cooperatively with the

Los-Alamos Laboratory of ERDA on this endeavor (Department of State: 1976a; p.

12). Moreover, during the middle of 1970s AEOI embarked to build Radioactive

Materials Research Center of Yousefabad, Tehran, and Nuclear Technology Center in

Esfahan. The former budgeted for $300 million and was expected to employ 1,200

people when completed.

6) – “Entered into bilateral relationships with several foreign Atomic

authorities”2( Department of State: 1976a; p. 12).

This was the first significant steps which were made in order develop Iranian

nuclear program. Abovementioned efforts gave basis to fulfill the hugest nuclear

program in the Middle East.

At an early stage in its planning the AEOI decided to concentrate on Light

Water Reactor (LWR) technology for the following reasons: 1- it was commercially

advanced, 2- it had proven in the US and elsewhere, and 3- there were more vendors

from whom to buy reactors. It was also likely that this technology was attractive to the

GOI for the reason that it tended to dampen the suspicions of NPT watchers.

2 Especially with the US, UK, France and GDR.

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Thus, in the 1970s Iran unexpectedly embarked to construct his nuclear

infrastructure from “Zero Ground” and after 2-3 years the Iranian Nuclear program

became one of the world’s most ambitious nuclear power programs.

II. The relations with nuclear supplier countries

Iran could not reach its plans and purposes without high developed countries,

which had high technological development in nuclear field. Hence, the AEOI and the

GOI made diplomatic and economic efforts to establish close ties with Western

European and in whole with countries of west hemisphere. It must be indicated that

Iran tried to avoid contacts and collaboration in nuclear field with countries which

were included in so-called „Socialites Camp”.

During the 1970s close partners and key supplier countries of nuclear

technology for Iranian Nuclear Program became the USA, France, West Germany,

particularly the UK. Iran had also relations with Argentina, Canada, Australia, Brazil,

Pakistan and India as well. These countries developed there nuclear programs and

Iran’s purpose of relationship with this these countries was to share experience in

nuclear field.

Tehran was in close collaboration with France in nuclear field from starting its

nuclear program; because of French companies were one of the large suppliers of

nuclear technology. In 1950s-1960s the French companies were participating in

Israel’s nuclear program development and they were unlimitedly supplied Israel with

nuclear technology, devises and with fuel sources. In the beginning of 1950s from

strategic outlook France needed strong support of Israel in Near East and in North

Africa, namely in Algerian problem, where Egypt was involved as well. Soon, after

Suez Crisis in 1956 France agreed to construct nuclear reactor in Dimona (desert of

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Nagev) working on heavy water and underground radiochemical plant, which was

capable to produce Plutonium. As a result, in the beginning of the 1970s Israel

acquired Weapon of Mass Destruction. „We believe that Israel already has produced

Nuclear Weapon” stated CIA in his Special National Intelligence Estimate (Top

Secret) of 1974 (Central Intelligence Agency: 1974; p. 2) There was coincidence of

strategic interests between Israel and France which played important role in creating

of Israel’s nuclear weapon.

The coincidence of strategic interests was a key factor in case of Iran’s nuclear

program. That’s why French agreed to take part in Iran’s nuclear program

development. France had interests that by developing Iranian nuclear program Tehran

would really implement his plan about saving oil for trading with western European

countries, which were great consumers of Iranian oil. In addition, France was

interested to become large partner of Iran in field of nuclear program and get more

political and economical dividends from Iran such as trade with so-called saved oil in

a proper prices and expansion of political influence on Iran. Herewith nuclear

program was profitable business which counted billions.

The French, in turn, had become a significant source of nuclear knowledge

and equipment. They also permitted possibility to use French-supplied nuclear

materials and equipments for military purposes. During the 1960s-1970s their

officials had often stated that „the spread of nuclear weapons was inevitable, and one

rationale for their own nuclear force has been that true independence requires such

weapons”. …The French have refused to sign the NPT, they have declared their

intention of abiding by its provision (Central Intelligence Agency: 1974; p. 39)

Relation with France in nuclear filed was useful for Iran. France had one of the

most modern and developed nuclear technology after the US and USSR. The

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Government of Iran made agreement with French company „Framatome” which was

obliged to build two power plants of 900 MW each. It was planed to complete

constructions was planned in 1981 and 1984.

France and Iran had close collaboration in field of, exploration, production and

Enrichment of Uranium. The earliest significant uranium exploration in Iran itself was

carried out by the French in the 1960s. When the prospect did not look promising the

project was terminated (Department of State: 1976a; p. 9). In the middle of 1970s

project update was funded by the AEOI, in order to found domestic sources of

uranium ore.

Although the AEOI was originally contemplating building an Uranium

enrichment plant within the country, it soon realized this was not really feasible.

„Instead, the AEOI has looked abroad for investment opportunities which would

secure for it the enrichment services its large program would require”. France had

been only too happy to obliged. Through a holding company (SOFIDIF- Société

Franco-Iranienne pour l’enrichissement de l’uranium par diffusion gazeuse) jointly

owned by France and Iran, Tehran had 10 percent participation in EURODIF

(European Gaseous Diffusion Uranium Enrichment Consortium). Previously

Sweden’s had 10 percent share in EURODIF, which withdrew from the project in

1974. In the same year, the Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi lent 1 billion dollars (and

another 180 million dollars in 1977) for the construction of the factory, in order to

have the right to buy 10 percent of the production (Department of State: 1976a; p. 9).

Aftermath this share was transferred to Iran as a result of an agreement between

France and Iran in 1975.

In addition, the GOI took 25 percent participation (20 percent directly and 5

percent trough EURODIF) in COREDIF, a company which was studying the

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feasibility of building another uranium enrichment plant in France. (Department of

State: 1976a; p. 10)

Thus, Iranians had closest and the most satisfactory relations in the nuclear

field with the French. Between two states some significant agreements were signed. In

June, 1974 an agreement which had quite general nature was concluded which was

about peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Subsidiary agreements have been signed later

covering sale of two nuclear power plants (November, 1974), Uranium Enrichment

(January, 1975), the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Center (May, 1975) and joint

participation in foreign uranium prospecting and exploitation (November, 1975). It is

obvious that the agreement with France (signed in June, 1974) obliged the latter to

consider cooperation with Iran in all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. The sub-

agreements on particular areas of cooperation had the advantage of taking difficult

hurdles one by one rather than attacking the whole mass of issues frontally

(Department of State: 1976a; p. 14).

Referring to the Franco-Iranian general agreement signed in 1974, the Shah of

Iran stated that „they (agreements) were the most important ever signed between an

oil producing and an industrialized country” amounting to over 8 billion dollars.

Furthermore, he added that the French have an important role to play in Iran now that

„certain Arab countries are closed to them, especially since Mr. Nixon’s visit to

Riyadh and Cairo” (National Military Command Center: 1974a; p.2).

The second western European country which collaborated with Iranian

Nuclear program was West Germany. Germany was the first country to sell Iran a

nuclear power plant. Nevertheless, relations between these two countries were some

troubled. The West German firm, Kraftwerk Union, agreed to build Iran Nuclear

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Power Plants Nos. 1 and 2, actually two 1,200 MW stations at the same site. The end

of construction was planned in the 1981 and 1984. (Department of State: 1976a; p 11)

However, negotiations on a firm contract between the AEOI and Kraftwerk

Union were broken off in March, 1976, due to mainly escalating the costs. With the

concurrence of the Shah, the letter of intent has been extended for an additional three

months. Finally the price for the twin plants had been agreed about $3 billion but

AEOI was still dissatisfied and was seeking other firms which finished construction of

reactors. The conclusion of general bilateral agreement between Iran and West

Germany was delayed. Negotiations were held up for a while by the London

suppliers’ meetings in 1975. They were taken up again in February, 1976, but were

inconclusive. (Department of State: 1976a; p 11)

Iran also had close cooperation with other countries in various nuclear sectors

such as uranium producing and exploration, technical cooperation, share experience,

exchanges of students and technical personals and visits to the countries which were

working on the nuclear program.

During the 1970s Iran concluded arrangements for exploration and production

of uranium deposits in Niger and Gabon, Australia agreed to sell Iran uranium “under

favorable conditions”. Agreement included purchasing from Australia 15 000 to 20

000 tons of Australian uranium ore (Joint Chief of Staff: 1978; p.1)

The third important country with which Iran had close cooperation was South

Africa. According to the CIA estimates South Africa was a potential supplier of

nuclear material and technology. “It controls large uranium deposits, and it apparently

has developed a technology for enriching uranium that could be used for producing

weapon-grade material” (Central Intelligence Agency: 1974; p. 4). Iran’s “Agreement

with South Africa was kept secret at the latter’s insistence‟. Moreover, the Western

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press of the 1970s has reported that Iran had signed an agreement to purchase $700

million worth of uranium from the Republic of South Africa. This story had been

denied publicly, but in confidence an AEOI official has confirmed that there was a

secret agreement to purchase uranium from South Africa. It was evidently being kept

under secret at the instance of South Africa (Department of State: 1976a; p. 15).

Iran tried to have close relation with India, which hardly worked at its nuclear

program in the 1970s to acquire weapon of mass destruction. Atomic energy officials

of Iran and India had exchanged visits, and there appeared considerable enthusiasm on

the Iranian side for cooperation, particularly in the fields of research and training.

Officials of the AEOI especially admire India’s Bhabha Atomic Research Center at

Trombay. There were negotiations in order to cooperate with India’s nuclear program.

In January 5, 1976 the president of AEOI Dr. Akbar Etamad, met with officials of the

US embassy in Tehran. In the meeting with the American officials Dr. Etamad told

that Iran was particularly interested in closer relations with India in the nuclear field,

because Iran felt that its situation was analogous to India’s in the sense that both

started from virtually ground zero in the development of nuclear expertise. “India has

now developed an impressive body of experience in this field and a large, maybe

superfluous corps of technical experts, Iran believed that it might well benefit from

India’s experience and that it might be able to utilize some of the experts’ surplus to

India’s own needs” (Joint Chief of Staff: 1976a; p.2).

The AEOI had two agreements with atomic authorities in the UK. One of

these involved cooperation programs of research which was carried out at the Nuclear

Research Center at Amirabad, Tehran, and the other covered research-type training of

Iranians at the Harwell Institute, UK.

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To achieve purposes in the nuclear field the Government of Iran and His

Imperial Majesty spent millions annually. There are notifications about Iranian

nuclear budget relevant to nuclear program. It shows that that the Government of Iran

from 3.21.1975 to 3.20.1976 (Fiscal year of Iran) spent $38.8 million, and from

3.21.1976 to 3.20.1977 expenditures increased to $1,027.7 million. Only for purchase

of uranium 171.7 million dollars were spent (Department of State: 1976a; p. 8). This

was only part of the whole expenditures which was spent for nuclear program

development from 1974 up to 1978. In addition, the Government of Iran explored

various financial arrangements for the purchase of other nuclear reactors and nuclear

equipments, including oil barters and supplier credits (Joint Chief of Staff: 1977a;

p.2).

All in all, Iran which embarked nuclear program expected such huge scales

that its main supplier of nuclear technologies besides the US would be Western

European powers, exactly France, the UK and West Germany. From the point of its

security and strategic interests Tehran excluded cooperation with so-called Socialist

Camp in the nuclear field.

III –The real purposes of Iranian nuclear program

What interests were the bases and what were the reasons of starting such a

huge nuclear program?

The Iranian nuclear program had following major interests:

First, the AEOI and GOI declared there interests that Tehran was seeking

alternative source of energy to save its oil and gas recourses for future commercial

purposes. In August 1975, the Shah of Iran stated, „Petroleum is a noble material,

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much too valuable to burn… We envision to producing, as soon as possible, 23 000

megawatts (MW) electricity using nuclear plants” (Public Intelligence: 2010;). By the

1970 the Shah had established the principle that Iran’s oil resources constituted its

national wealth, and that the government had the right to take whatever measures it

found necessary to use that wealth for benefit of nation’s development (Garver: 2006;

pp. 30-31). Moreover, during the energetic crisis oil price unrepentantly increased and

it became more valuable than before. For example, during this crisis Iran’s oil

revenue, which had stood at $885 million in 1971, had doubled to $1.6 billion in

1972, reached $4.6 billion in 1974 and then skyrocketed to $17.8 billion in 1975 and

the $36 billion originally allocated for the Shah’s Fifth Development Plan was

suddenly doubled to $63 billion (Pollak: 2004; pp.106-109). The best chance to

realize expensive nuclear program appeared. If reviewed energetic balance of Iran in

the 1970s it become evident that in this period 80 percent of electricity was generated

by thermal power plants and 20 percent by hydro-electric plants. Iranian government

planned generate 70 000 MWe electricity by nuclear power plants in the end of XX

century and with this to reduce share of electricity in national grid produced by

thermal power plants.

Second, there were undeclared interests of Iran about its nuclear program and

they were conditioned by nuclear factor in Middle East and its neighboring countries.

From the 1950s Middle East countries began hard working on development nuclear

programs. As it was mentioned Israel worked hard with collaboration of France and as

a result in the beginning of the 1970s acquired nuclear warheads and delivering

vehicles such as multistage ballistic missiles. Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Syria, Jordan and

Iraq were working on there nuclear programs as well. From North there was super

power Soviet Union with nuclear weapon, which presented jeopardy for Iran’s and

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namely for Shah’s regime. Soviet Union was dangerous not only in face neighbor

with nuclear weapon, but with its politics in the Middle East such as supporting Iraq,

Egypt and other radical Arab States with Marxist ideology.

Why do states build nuclear weapon? Nuclear weapons, like other weapons,

are more than tools of national security; they are political objects of considerable

importance in domestic debates and internal bureaucratic struggles and can also serve

as international normative symbols of modernity and identity.

There are three alternative theoretical frameworks – models why states decide

to build or refine from developing nuclear weapons: 1- “the security model”,

according to which states build nuclear weapons to increase national security against

foreign threats, especially nuclear threats; 2- “the domestic politics model,” which

envisions nuclear weapons as political tools used to advance parochial domestic and

bureaucratic interests; and 3- “the norms model,” under which nuclear weapons

decisions are made because weapons acquisitions, or restraint in weapons

development, provides an important normative symbol of state’s modernity and

identity.(Sagan D.: 1997; pp. 55-56)

All varieties of these models were met around Iranian nuclear program. Let’s

separately discuss these three models from the point of Iranian nuclear program.

First, the “the security model” of Iranian nuclear program:

According to the neorealist theory in political science, states exist in

anarchical international system and must therefore rely on self-help to protect their

sovereignty and national security. If one state develops nuclear weapons to balance

against its main rival, it also creates nuclear threat to another state in the region, which

then has to initiate its own nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security.

The proliferation of nuclear weapon becomes like nuclear chain reaction. George

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Shultz once nicely summarized the argument of proliferation of nuclear weapon:

“proliferation begets proliferation (Sagan: 1997; pp.57-58).

During the 1960s the turmoil political and military events (Sino-Indian

military conflict in 1962-1967, India-Pakistan war in 1965 and in 1971) forced China,

India and Pakistan embarking nuclear program such as „chain reaction”. In October

16, 1964 China realized first nuclear weapon test. After the Chinas nuclear test, hence

from India’s national security and strategic interests, New Delhi began active working

in order to acquire nuclear weapon. In 1967 India started its nuclear program and in

May 18, 1974 India detonated his first experimental nuclear devise. Soon after the

India at the same reasons and interests Pakistan began develop of its nuclear program

in order to produce WMD. As Israel already had Nuclear Weapon, Iraq, Syria and

Egypt also try to started there nuclear programs for the same purposes. In August 23,

1974 CIA, in his Special National Intelligence Estimate (Top Secret) titled „Prospects

for Further proliferation of Nuclear Weapons” stated that „Iran’s course will be

strongly influenced by Indian Nuclear programs” (Central Intelligence Agency: 1974;

p. 38).

In the Middle Eastern balance of power main line was drawn at the holding of

nuclear capability. On the other hand in the Iranian security issue appeared new

challenges – to acquire WMD to keep its position in the Persian Gulf.

In July 29, 1975 the staff of the Hudson Institute Lewis A. Dunn and staff of

the Pentagon (Office of Director, Near East/South Asia Region, ISA) Major General

Gordon Semner, Jr. published research about „Iran and Nuclear Weapon”. In this

research the authors discuss the main points and reasons why Iran might acquire

weapon of mass destruction. Major factors might dictate to produce WMD by Iran in

the mid of the 1980s were:

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A. “Dismemberment of the Pakistan Buffer-State, leading to direct

confrontation with a nuclear-armed India3;

B. Traditional fears of the Soviet Union, reinforced by Gallois-type

arguments in favor of an undefended Nuclear-weapon capability;

C. Quest to be recognized as „the Fifth Great Power”

D. A decision by its fellow Muslim States, Pakistan, to develop nuclear

weapon;

E. Iranian desire for political-military hegemony within the Persian Gulf;

F. Weakened constraint of foreign dependence.” (Dunn & Sumner: 1975,

p. 2-3)

Thus, from 1950 up to the end of 1970s „Nuclear Syndrome” was extended

over the South line of Eurasia and North Africa, from China to Morocco. This

political situation dictated Iran’s national security to start and develop nuclear

program. It was significant challenge for Iran in the 1970s because Iran had arrogance

to become great power of Persian Gulf and be hegemonic force in region.

Second, “The domestic politics model” – A second model of nuclear weapons

proliferation focuses on the domestic actors who encourage or discourage

governments from the bomb. Whether or not the acquisition of nuclear weapons

serves the national interests of a state, it is likely to serve the parochial bureaucratic or

political interests of at least some individual actors within the state. Three kinds of

actors commonly appear in historical case-studies of proliferation: the state’s nuclear

energy establishment (which includes officials in state-run laboratories as well as

civilian reactor facilities); important units within professional military (often within

3 Iran feared further dismemberment of Pakistan would eliminate a buffer between itself and India. In January,

1973 during visit of Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in Iran Mohamed Reza guaranteed Pakistan’s

security and stated that “… the State of Pakistan is vitally important to us… The reason for this is not only our

fraternal affections for you as a Muslim nation, but because of Iranian interests. We (Iranians) would not be able to

tolerate other changes and difficulties in Pakistan (Garver : 2006; p. 43)

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the air force, though sometimes a navy bureaucracies interested in nuclear

propulsion); and politicians in states in which individual parties or the mass public

strongly favor the government’s decision-making process-either through their direct

power or indirectly through their control of information-nuclear weapons programs

are likely to thrive. For example, in the 1970s Indian government refused to create

WMD. Besides existing of Chinas nuclear arsenal Lal Bahadur Shastari argued

against developing an Indian atomic arsenal, in part because the estimated costs ($42-

84 million) were deemed excessive; Contrary to Prime Minister Homi Bahabba, the

head of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) loudly lobbied for the development of

nuclear weapons capability, claiming that India could develop a bomb in 18 months

and that arsenal of 50 atomic bomb would cost less than $21 million. (Sagan: 1997;

pp. 63-66)

In the Iran’s case the domestic actors interests coexist around the Shah’s

authority. Shah was first major domestic actor and supporter around which military

and scientific establishments interested to create Weapon of Mass Destruction were

gathered. He was the first militaries of country and first decision-maker figure in the

government regarding the nuclear program. He was personally interested in each step

of the program, by his initiative the Atomic Organization of Iran became an

autonomous government agency headed by President who had the rank of Deputy

Prime Minister and the President of AEOI reported directly to Shah, and all major

problems were referred to Shah for the ultimate decision.

Third, The Norms Model – this model provides an important normative

symbol of state’s modernity and identity (Sagan: 1997; p. 73) and also was connected

with Shah. Generally, if briefly reviewed Iran’s foreign purposes in the 1960s – 1970s

it’s became evident that exactly Shah had personally strong desire and tried to achieve

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goals which was significant for Iran’s regional hegemony and prestige, which were

legitimated and appropriate in international relations. For Shah nuclear weapon was

not only guarantee of Iran’s national security, also was the issue of prestige. The

question was as follow: if in the Middle East region Israel, India already had WMD,

Iraq, Libya, Egypt and Syria are working why Iran should stand alongside?

In conclusion, Tehran had both internal and external reasons to have strong

aspiration to start its nuclear program. All abovementioned factors existed and played

significant role in determining Iran’s nuclear policy which was directed to produce

WMD. When the correspondent of journal “La Monde” asked whether Iran would

have nuclear weapons: “without any doubt, and sooner than one would think” -

responded Reza Pahlavi. When the Washington meet this statement with big concern,

the Shah interpreted its statement as follow: „If in this region (Middle East) each little

country tries to arm itself with armaments that are precarious, even elementary, but

nuclear, then perhaps the national interests of any country at all would demand that it

do the same…” (National Military Command Center: 1974a; pp. 1-2). The same

statement was made officially by the Iranian Government Spokesmen and Minister of

Information and Tourism Gholam Reza Kianpour on June 24, 1974. „Iran could not

stand idly if other nations like Israel and Egypt should go nuclear” (National Military

Command Center: 1974c; p. 1).

This was hidden term (or promise) toward the world community that Iran would

not develop its WMD until the other regional countries did not obtain WMD.

Nevertheless, development the WMD by Tehran was inevitable for the following

processes which developed around the nuclear weapon in the Middle East. In the

middle of the 1970s, not officially but actually in the 1970s Israel held nuclear

weapon already. According to the CIA Special National Intelligence Estimate, under

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the title „Prospect for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapon,” Israel in the 1970s

produced a certain number of nuclear warheads. “We believe that Israel already has

produced and stockpiled small number of fission weapons” stated in CIA estimate

(Central Intelligence Agency: 1974; p. 7). India held WMD also; Egypt, Syria, Iraq

and Libya announced intention to develop nuclear capability in the basement. In this

case Tehran would nullify its “conditional obligation” and its aspirations in the

nuclear field has been appeared “fair base”, because of the other regional countries

such as Israel acquired WMD and abrogated power of balance in the Middle East.

Moreover, statements of Iranian key political figures which were made later asserted

as well that Iran was working on project which would give them opportunity to

acquire WMD. According to Dr. Etamad, the Tehran Nuclear Research Center

(TNRC) carried out experiments in which plutonium was extracted from spent fuel

using chemical agents (important process to create weapon grad material). It was also

believed that the Shah assembled at the TNRC a nuclear weapon design team.

Asadollah Alam, the long-time Imperial Court Minister and the Shah’s close

confident, wrote in his memoires that the Shah had envisioned Iran having nuclear

weapons. The foreign Minister and later ambassador in the US Ardeshir Zahedi in the

interview with Wall Street Journal (June 25, 2004) stated that the “Iranian strategy at

the time was aimed at creating what is known as a “surge capacity, that is to say to

have the know-how, the infrastructure and the personnel needed to develop a nuclear

military capacity within a short time without actually doing so. …The assumption

within the policy-making elite was that Iran should be in a position to develop and test

a nuclear devise within 18 months” (Zahedi: 2004)

23

Chapter II

Main points of the US-Iran strategic partnership in the 1960s-

1970s

The 1960s of the XX century was very turbulent and strained. There was

Cuban Missile crisis, Berlin crisis, Iran-Iraq and Sino-Soviet rivals, start of Vietnam

War and Middle East conflict in this period. In the beginning of the 1970s there were

remained old problems from the 1960s. „The Arab-Israeli conflict had been left

unresolved after Six Day War, Vietnam War; Decolonization in Africa was creating

civil wars from which the Soviets (or even the Chinese) could possibly benefit. In

south Asia, an old hostility between India and Pakistan was adding to regional

instability already provoked by Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the Indo-Pakistan War

of 1965 and major problem Cold War still remained. It was, in brief, an unstable

world full of challenges. In 1970s Washington’s nuclear superiority in jeopardy,

America’s influence over its allies in decline, and the impact of decolonization on

international relations unresolved. At this time between Washington and Tehran there

were some misunderstandings cause by Kennedy-Johnsons politics toward Iran.

Kennedy and Johnson’s Democratic administrations had pressed Shah for

political reforms and economic development, attempting to limit arms sales to

immunize the country against communism. Not surprisingly, the Shah was irritated by

American demands, fearful that the Americans might prefer democratic government

in Iran to his autocracy, and troubled by what he perceived as American pandering to

radical Arab nationalists such as Nasser. In such circumstances, Shah of Iran tested to

rapprochement with Moscow to avoid Soviet’s provocations against Iran and defend

24

its vulnerable position. The Shah made these steps because of its security was under

jeopardy.

In September 1962 Shah delighted Soviets by announcing that he would not

permit foreign missiles to be based in Iran, the first such assurance the Soviets had

received from an ally of the United States. Moreover, November 1963, on the eve of

Kennedy’s assassination, Khrushchev sent Soviet top official, Leonid Brezhnev and

his wife, to visit Tehran. In 1964 a Moscow –Tehran Air link was opened. In 1965,

the Shah traveled to Moscow, and the Soviet Union and Iran negotiated an economic

agreement in which the Soviets offered to build a major metallurgical complex in

exchange for Iranian natural gas. And in 1966 the Shah purchased $ 110 million

worth of Soviet military equipment. The massage was not very subtle. The United

states Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara resented the Shah’s transparent efforts

to blackmail, and the Secretary of State Dean Rusk, uneasy about the extent of the

American commitment to the Shah, argued for loosening the ties (Cohen & Tucker:

1994; p. 286).

In the beginning of the 1970s the US was still involved in Vietnam War,

Middle East, South-East Asia (conflict between Pakistan and India) and the US-USSR

relations still remained turmoil. As well as there was Congressional rivalry about the

US foreign policy toward this processes. In the 1969 the UK announced that at the

end of 1971 British forces withdrew from Persian Gulf.4

The British withdrawal would unleash: Independence for Kuwait, Oman,

Bahrain, Qatar, and the other Sheikhdoms in the Gulf, whose new regimes were

bound to be vulnerable and unstable, open to tampering or worse from radical Iraq,

Nasser’s Egypt, or Soviet-backed local Marxists. The US main interests were kept in

4 Namely from Aden

25

the Middle East stability and balance of power to make resolution around Vietnam

War. In this condition Iran appears as a main pillar in order to maintain peace and

balance of power in the Middle East Iran considered strategic partner of the US in

both regional and global terms.

Nixon and Kissinger’s policy was simple, proceeding from Nixon’s Doctrine,

which was announced in Guam June, 1969. Considered more broadly however, the

Nixon Doctrine had a more far-reaching significance. It quickly became considered a

global, rather than a purely Asian doctrine. And the flip side of the Nixon Doctrine’s

affirmation of support for friendly governments that were involved in a war (such as

South Vietnam) was the presumption that one could, if acting properly, preempt

Vietnam-like situation from arising in the first place. In practice this meant that the

Nixon administration would act as the guarantors of stability in their specific corners

of the globe.

According to the Nixon’s Doctrine there was the US strong interest to treat the

Shah of Iran, and hence Iran, as an especially favored friend. It was Realpolitik unlike

Kennedy’s and Johnsons Democratic administrations, which have purposes to keep

stability in the Middle East, resolve Vietnam’s problem, deter Soviet’s expansion in

the Middle East and in the far East toward China, and restore the US prestige. Both

Nixon and Kissinger agreed that Iran’s military strength could and should be built up

with the United States preferred supplier. This was also attempt to gain truth of Iran.

Between 1950 and 1970, Iran received a total of $1.8 billion worth of the US

military aid, over the next six years it bought from the United States a total of another

$12.1 billion in military-related goods and services, 80 percent of this going to new

equipment. (Bundy: 1998; p. 136)

26

In his Memoirs Kissinger wrote, ”It was imperative for our interests and those

of the Western World that the regional balance of power be maintained so that

moderate forces would not be engulfed nor Europe’s and Japan’s (and as it is later

turned out, our) economic lifeline fall into hostile hands. We could either provide the

balancing force ourselves or enable a regional power to do so. There was no

possibility of assigning any American military forces to the Indian Ocean in the midst

of the Vietnam War and its attendant trauma. Congress would have tolerated no such

commitment; the public was not having supported it. Fortunately, Iran was willing to

play this role. The vacuum left by British withdrawal was to be filled by a local power

friendly to us. By strengthening Iran “…Iraq was discouraged from adventures against

the Emirates in the lower Gulf, and against Jordan and Saudi Arabia. A strong Iran

could help damp India’s temptations to conclude its conquest of Pakistan. And all of

this was achievable without any American resources, since the Shah was willing to

pay for the equipment out of his oil revenues” (Kissinger: 2000a; p. 1264).

By reinforcement Iran the US tried to keep Israelis security, which was

surrounded by hostile Arab states. After the British withdrawal from Aden, between

Iran and Israel common interests, which were to deter radical Arabs states and keep its

security, appeared. Strategically Iranian-Israeli friendship rested on the mutual aim of

countering Arab influence, which included keep Iraq weak. In explaining his

willingness to have close relations with Israel despite the Jerusalem issue and others

of deep concern to his Muslim subjects, the Shah used to say: „Neither Iran nor Israel

wants be alone in a sea of Arabs” (Neff: 1991; p. 24)

On the other hand by strengthening Iran Washington tried to make balance of

power in South-East Asia between Pakistan and Soviet-baked India. There was other

jeopardy from Afghanistan, which appeared after the coup in Kabul that had brought

27

Mohamed Daoud to power. The officers close to Daoud were pro-Soviet. Moreover,

Afghan irredentism against neighboring Pakistan and Iran, even if not Soviet-inspired,

would serve Soviet designs. It would weaken Pakistan and Iran and give Moscow a

corridor to the Indian Ocean (Kissinger: 2000c; pp. 667-68).

There was other basis in Nixon-Kissinger’s Realpolitic, the Geopolitical

theory of Halford Mackinder about Hartland and Rim land. In this theoretically

system Iran had an important strategic stature; Iran is a land bridge between East and

West from China to Mediterranean area, and from North to South to the Oil riches

countries and to the Indian Ocean. Iran is main ring in the Rim land, with the other

Southern countries of this system (Turkey, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and

Indochina) as well as Iran is main deterrent of extending to the south Hartland’s

influence.

In addition with strengthening Iran Washington’s Realpolitic tried to enhance

and strengthen all rings of Rim land during the Cold War, including moderate Arabian

states, Afghanistan and Pakistan; defend Israel from destruction, and keep power of

balance regarding Iraq, United Arab Republic (by unification of Egypt and Syria)

under Nasser’s government and India. These efforts had two main purposes 1 - global

significant in the deterring of Soviet Union to enhance its influence to the South and 2

- keeping political and military balance between regional countries.

Presidents Ford and Carter encouraged the Shah’s military strength for the

same reason that Nixon approved the first increment: It was considered in the

overwhelming strategic interests of the United States, Iran, and the stability of the

region (Kissinger: 2000c; pp. 670).

Iran had also Strong interest to strengthen its forces and defend its position

over the Persian Gulf and South Asia.

28

On the other hand Shah had also strong desire to realize so-called idea of

„Great Civilization” and restore Iranian greatness. The idea included both 1 -

development of domestic economic condition and continuation of reforms; 2 – the

Shah’s goal was for Iran to create and preserve in the broader Persian Gulf region an

environment favorable to achievement Iranian interests, and then to use Iran’s

enhanced position in Gulf as stepping-stone to global political status.

To achieve this purposes Iran had rivalry with Arabian States, especially

with Soviet-backed Arab radical states, such as Iraq, Egypt, and Syria, which were

jeopardy for the Iran’s Pahlavi monarchy. Iran, like great powers (the US and the

USSR), with other Arabian states was drawn into regional arms race. These rivalries

strengthened after British completed the historic withdrawal of its forces and military

protection from Persian Gulf at the precise moment when radical Iraq was being put

into a position by Soviet arms to assert traditional hegemonic aims; In Egypt still

remained 15 000 Soviet troops and Syria had been long since a major recipient of

Soviet arms.

In the South Asia Iran had rivalry with India, which tried to extend its

hegemony over the Pakistan by Indian Ocean by supporting the Soviet Union. The

Pakistan was a key arena of rivalry between India and Iran. Iran and Pakistan were

allies in the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and from Iran’s perspective,

alliance with Pakistan allowed Tehran to keep Iran’s Eastern frontier relatively trouble

free (considered to put down Baluch’s rebellion, kept stability, cut off contact

between Baluchi insurgency and Iran’s regional adversaries: India and Afghanistan,)

allowing Tehran to concentrate on Iraq and the Persian Gulf. Iran considered the

security of Pakistan vital of Iran’s own security. A strong Pakistan also served as a

buffer with India. The Shah believed that the Soviets were behind the campaign to

29

break up Pakistan and elevate India to dominant position in South Asia and the Indian

Ocean (Garver: 2006; 43). All in all in broader sense, Iran under the Shah and India

under Indira Gandhi were rivals for regional status in the 1970s.

The Shah, a shrewd analyst of foreign policy, based Iran’s security not on

maneuvering ambiguously among the superpowers but on alliance with America. At

the same time, having seen Britain abandon its presence in the Gulf and America

become mired in Southeast Asia, he foresaw that Iran would have to rely as well on

its own strength. He therefore, sought modernization and economic development

partly to anchor his own rule in popular support, partly to enable Iran carry its own

share of defense burden. He realized that outside assistant was more likely in a gross

emergency if Iran could by itself resist threats from within the area and could force

even the Soviets, if they chose to menace Iran, into a scale of adventure that would

leave no doubt about their design (Kissinger: 2000c; p. 668).

30

Chapter III

The US-Iran nuclear cooperation

I - Nuclear policy of the US during the 1960s and 1970s

In the end of 1960S and in the beginning of the 1970s in the Southern rim of

Asia the turbulent political events laid the basis for nuclear proliferation. There were

new challenges which the US and its ally countries faced.

What were attitude of the US toward Proliferation of the nuclear programs and

WMD as well? There were differences between Democratic and Republican

administrations, as for the Congress of the United States had always rigorous

dependence toward proliferation of nuclear weapon.

The Kennedy and Jonson’s administrations in the 1960s recognized the need

for policies to slow the threat of nuclear proliferation. They had severe position even

to ally countries.

In the beginning of the 1960s on the basis of national security Ben Gurion’s

Government with strong support of France began build a nuclear reactor at Dimona in

the Nagev Desert south of Beersheeba. The main purpose of Israeli’s nuclear program

was to produce WMD warheads and missile delivering system to defense Israeli state

from future aggression of Arab states. In May, 1963 the US president Kennedy sent

strong-worded letter to Ben Gurion, saying that the United State’s “deep commitment

to the security of Israel could be seriously jeopardized if this Government was unable

to obtain reliable information on subject so vital to peace as Israeli’s effort in the

nuclear field”. July, 1963 Government of Levi Eshkol forced to agree with Kennedy’s

demand of semiannual inspections of the plant by American scientists (Engelhardt:

31

2004; p. 57). In consequence of such rigorous Nonproliferation policy the US

remained sidelined from Israel’s nuclear program.

After Nixon’s Republican administration came in Oval Office of White House

the political approaches with ally countries in nuclear field was changed.

Generally, what was the attitude of the new administration to nuclear

nonproliferation? Nixon opposed the NPT during the campaign. Neither Nixon nor

Kissinger believed proliferation could be halted if states really wanted to go nuclear.

Early in 1957, Kissinger argued that a nonproliferation treaty would be unenforceable.

The president himself argued that “treaties don’t necessary get us very much” and that

if a country wanted to “make their own weapons” they could “abrogate the treaty

without sanction” (National Security Council: 1969a). Some in the Nixon’s

administration actually argued that the United States should help friendly states

acquire atomic weapons. If it were decided, “the NPT was not in U.S. interests.”

When Nixon did finally send the NPT to the Senate for ratification, he told his staff to

downplay its importance, and that the United States should not pressure other

countries.

For the President and his national security advisor, the subject of armaments

could not be separated from the question of their political use. Arms races did not lead

to war: “Our reading of history indicates that all crises have been caused by political

conditions, not by the arms race as such.” (National Security Council: 1969b)

“History makes it clear that wars result from political differences and problems.”

(Foreign Relations of United States: 1969-1977; p. 40). It is evident that Nixon partly

was wrong. Any political crises are backed by military bodies. If a country does not

military strength in most cases it is not going directly to the conflicts.

32

The ambivalence that Nixon administration displayed to broader nuclear

Nonproliferation policy turned to hostility in specific cases. Soon after De Gaulle left

office, the Nixon’s administration decided that they would “like to give assistance to

France nuclear program”. Kissinger told the French ambassador, “It is too dangerous

to have one country as the repository of nuclear weapons. We would like France to be

a possessor”. The United States also ended pressuring Israel to get rid of its nuclear

weapons. This policy change emerged after an apparently unrecorded, undocumented

meeting between Nixon and Israel Prime Minister Golda Meir, which led to a secret,

mutual, and as yet unrevealed understanding on Israeli’s nuclear weapons program.

Nixon visited Israel’s nuclear industry in Nagev desert as well (Logevall & Preston:

2008; pp. 138-140).

Nixon and Kissinger placed goals well ahead of the aim staunching nuclear

nonproliferation. When Secretary of State William Rogers argued the NPT required

the United States to pursue nuclear arms reductions, Nixon rejected this view (The

White House: 1969).

What was the reason of this policy? It was Realpolitik of Nixon and Kissinger,

which reflected in nuclear field as well. Neither Nixon nor Kissinger thought halting

nuclear proliferation merited sacrificing other geopolitical goals. Nixon and Kissinger

had ambitious geopolitical goals at a time of declining the US power, shrinking

military budgets, and decreased domestic support for American engagement in the

world. American prospects in the global order were dim: the administration inherited

a disastrous war in Southeast Asia and pressure retrenchment in East Asia; conflict

and Soviet encroachment in the Middle East; and distrust of America’s closest

European allies. These issues shaped the Nixon administration’s views on nuclear

questions. In order to reverse these trends, arms control was a useful tool, but not an

33

end in itself. At the same time, Nixon and Kissinger believed that – in the absence of

strategic superiority – nuclear threats, and the strategies that gave them credibility,

could be deployed to advance the US interests. And in a dangerous world, neither

Nixon nor Kissinger saw much to gain spending valuable political capital trying to

prevent states from acquiring their own nuclear weapons.

After the Watergate political crisis the Congress became more rigorous and

Ford’s administration was forced to carefully implement internal and foreign policy

and did not go directly against the Congress, including Nuclear Nonproliferation

policy.

Ford accepted only peaceful uses of nuclear capability. “More than 30 nations

have or plan to build nuclear power plants to reap the benefits of nuclear energy. The

1973 energy crisis dramatically demonstrated to all nations not only the dangers of

excessive reliance on oil imports but also the reality that the world's supply of fossil

fuels is running out. As a result, nuclear energy is now properly seen by many nations

as an indispensable way to satisfy rising energy demand without prematurely

depleting finite fossil fuel resources. We must understand the motives which are

leading these nations, developed and developing, to place even greater emphasis than

we do on nuclear power development. For unless we comprehend their real needs, we

cannot expect to find ways of working with them to ensure satisfaction of both our

and their legitimate concerns… The United States has a special responsibility to share

the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy with other countries. We have sought to serve

other nations as a reliable supplier of nuclear fuel and equipment. Given the choice

between economic benefits and progress toward our nonproliferation goals, we have

given, and will continue to give priority to nonproliferation. But there should be no

incompatibility between nonproliferation and assisting other nations in enjoying the

34

benefits of peaceful nuclear power if all supplier countries pursue common nuclear

export policies” (Ford: 1977).

Ford’s policy was directly appealed to the proliferation and reproduction

toward nuclear materials which was useful for producing WMD. He made a statement

about Nuclear Policy5 October 28, 1976 that “we have made important new progress,

particularly in efforts to control the proliferation of nuclear weapons capability among

the nations of the world”. It his new initiative he formulated that “strengthening the

commitments of the nations of the world to the goal of nonproliferation an building

and affective system of international controls to prevent proliferation” (Ford: 1977).

As it seems Ford’s administration took relatively different attitude toward the

proliferation of nuclear materials.

Carter’s administration fundamentally changes the approaches toward the

policy nuclear cooperation, by the Non-Proliferation Act of 1978.

Regarding the cooperation with other nations in the reprocessing, fuel supply

and trade with nuclear technology and equipment the US policy severely determined.

The Act stated that “The United States, as a matter of national policy, shall take such

actions and institute such measures as may be necessary and feasible to assure other

nations and group of nations that may seek to utilize the benefits of atomic energy for

peaceful purposes that it will provide a reliable supply of nuclear fuel to those nation

and groups of nations which adhere to policies designed to prevent proliferation. Such

nuclear fuel shall be provided under agreements entered into pursuant to section 161

of the 1954 Act or as otherwise authorized by law. The United States shall ensure that

it will have available the capacity on a long-term basis to enter into new fuel supply

commitments consistent with its non-proliferation policies and domestic energy

5 Statement # 987

35

needs. The commission (Nuclear Regulatory Commission) shall, on a timely basis,

authorize the export of nuclear materials and equipment when all the applicable

statutory requirements are met (Non-proliferation Act: 1978; sec-101).

In this section the contemplation on the fuel assurances “fuel assurances

contemplated by this section shall be for the benefit on nations that adhere to policies

designated to prevent proliferation. President shall, in particular, seek to ensure that

the benefits of such undertakings are available to non-nuclear-weapon states only if

such states accept IAEA safeguards on all their peaceful nuclear activities, do not

manufacture or otherwise acquire any nuclear explosive device, do not establish any

new enrichment or reprocessing facilities under their de facto or de jure control, and

place any such existing facilities under effective international auspices and

inspections.” (Non-proliferation Act: 1978; sec-104),

Moreover, Carter’s policy was focused on the critical activities of spent fuel

reprocessing and plutonium fuel recycle, and aims to limit them to as few countries as

possible. “Any facilities within the territory of any nation or group of nations, under

its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere for the necessary short-term storage of

fuel elements containing plutonium, uranium 233, or uranium enriched to greater than

20 percent in the isotope 235 prior to placement in a reactor or of irradiated fuel

elements prior to transfer as required in subparagraph (1) shall be placed under

effective international auspices and inspection.”(Non-proliferation Act: 1978; sec-

403)

On March 10, 1978 President Carter approved “Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

of 1978”. While signing the Act he made his next announcement about his nuclear

policy. “On April 7 and 27 of last year, I outlined the policies and programs which we

would implement to diminish proliferation risks. Today, I want to reaffirm this

36

administration’s strong commitment to that policy… Enactment of this legislation

takes us a major step toward fulfillment of an objective which the United States shares

with other nations – a halt in the spread of nuclear weapons capability while

preserving the peaceful use of nuclear energy… The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act

sets the conditions and criteria which will govern US cooperation with other nations

in our efforts to develop the peaceful use of nuclear energy.” (Carter: 1978)

II –The US-Iran’s cooperation in the nuclear field

As it was mentioned, Iran began investigations in nuclear field tight

cooperation of the US at the end of 1950s and in the middle of 1960s. The US support

in this field was determined in the frame of agreement on cooperation for civil uses of

nuclear energy. On March 5, 1957 Between the US and Iran was signed an agreement

on „Cooperation for Civil Uses of Atomic Energy” and amended in 1964. It covered

principally research matters. Moreover, on the basis of this agreement and under the

Atoms for peace program USAEA (U. S. Atomic Energy Agency) a scientific

research reactor was passed to Atomic Research Center of Tehran’s University.

5 Megawatt, pool-type, water-moderated nuclear research that was supplied to

Iran by the US firm GA Technologies started full operations at Tehran Nuclear

Research Center (TNRC) in November 1967, using 5.58 kilogram of 93% enriched

uranium supplied by the US. In additions, the US supplied Iran hot cells which were

heavily shielded rooms with remotely operated arms used to chemically separate

material irradiated in the research reactor, possibly including plutonium laden targets.

TNRC reactor could produce up to 600 grams of plutonium per year in its spent fuel.

It can be assumed that Iran wondered to start own nuclear program in huge

scale early than 1974 to guarantee its security demands. However, there was no

37

chance to start Nuclear Program in the period of Kennedy-Johnson’s administration

because Democratic administration of the 1960s provided strong Non-Proliferation

policy toward the US ally countries. In addition, the Kennedy-Johnson’s

administration pressed Iran for its military expenditures to purchase conventional

weapon which was cheaper than acquisition of WMD.

The events of the early 1970s were however, instrumentally shaping and

accelerating the development of Iran’s nuclear program. In 1973, the Arab-Israeli War

was followed by energetic crisis and subsequent huge increase price of oil encourage

Shah of Iran to realize the most ambitious nuclear program. There was another factor

which impacted Tehran to start its nuclear program - R. Nixon & H. Kissinger’s

Realpolitik toward Iran. Iran got clear a massage from Nixon’s administration that the

US would support Iran’s peaceful nuclear initiatives.

Tehran of course expected that main supplier of Iranian Nuclear Program

inevitably will be the US. In the early months of its existence, officials of the AEOI

frequently spoke of their expectations that American companies would win the

contracts for construction of the first Iranian nuclear power plants. Iran also expected

that R. Nixon would permit Iranian PNE.

It should indicated that despite of Nixon’s different approaches toward nuclear

policy (discussed above chapter, chapter III, subchapter I, pp. 32-33) the first time

President Nixon tried to correct situation with announcement in his Asian Doctrine

that in deterring strategic nuclear warfare, primary reliance will continue to be placed

on U.S. strategic deterrent forces. „We shall provide a (nuclear L.B.) shield if a

nuclear power threatens the freedom of nation allied with us or nation whose survival

we consider vital in our security”(Nixon: 1969 p. 224).

38

However, in the same Nixon’s Doctrine there were other significant details

such as sharing responsibility and maintaining each country’s security without

interference the US. “The defense and progress of other countries must be first their

responsibility and second, a regional responsibility. Without the foundations of self-

help and regional help, American help will not succeed” (Nixon: 1969 p. 224). “In

deterring theater nuclear warfare, the U.S. also has primary responsibility, but certain

of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear

capabilities” (Liard: 1972; p. 10).

Despite of Nixon’s Realpolitik in the nuclear field, some of the key members

of government and governmental agencies of Nixon’s administration as well (in the

following Ford’s and Carter’s administrations too) worried that Iran’s nuclear

program was not so reliable and could have caused opposite results, for the following

reasons:

A) The appearance of nuclear weapon would impact the stability of Middle East

and it would become the reason of further proliferation.

B) In 1974 Department of State officials predicted that if the Shah's dictatorship

collapsed and Iran became unstable, "domestic dissidents or foreign terrorists might

easily be able to seize any special nuclear material stored in Iran for use in bombs."

Moreover, "an aggressive successor to the Shah might consider nuclear weapons the

final item needed to establish Iran's complete military dominance of the region" (Burr:

2009).

The Congress’ of the United States opposed the administration for its every

trial to encourage and support other countries in nuclear filed, including Iran. There

position was influential on the Nixon’s policy.

39

All in all Shah of Iran well adjusted himself the main points of Nixon’s

Doctrine and decided to develop own nuclear capability with support of the US. It

was proper time to realize his purposes in the nuclear field. With foreseen of political

situation in the Middle East and its neighboring regions it was impossible that the US

could deter Iran to achieve its purposes in nuclear sphere.

After the Nixon resignation, Shah of Iran expected that Ford would continue

Nixon’ policy but Ford took rigorous policy unlike Nixon. He announced that “the

United States will, at a minimum, respond to violation by any nation of any

safeguards agreement to which we are a party with an immediate cutoff of our supply

of nuclear fuel and cooperation to that nation. We would consider further steps, not

necessarily confined to the area of nuclear cooperation, against the violator nation.

Nor will our actions be limited to violations of agreements in which we are directly

involved. In the event of material violation of any safeguards agreement, particularly

agreements with the IAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with all interested

nations to determine appropriate action.”(Ford: 1977)

Although Ford’s administration faced same challenges particular key factors

and forced him to maintain Iran’s peaceful nuclear program. These key factors were:

1- strategic economic interests (trade with nuclear technology and equipments and

reliable supply of Iranian oil). 2 – Geopolitics, which situated in the saving power of

balance in Middle East profit to the US, Israel and Iran, 3 - Interests and insistence

from Iranian side to support its nuclear initiative and Iran’s achievements in the US-

Iranian relation. The USG could not reduce drastically Iran’s aspirations to the

Nuclear Program. It was possible to sharply chang Iran’s attitude toward partnership

in the strategic and economic relationship, especially in oil supply and in supporting

of Israel.

40

It must be indicate that Washington’s supporting policy during the 1970s

excluded to produce Weapon of Mass Destruction by Iran. The US nuclear policy

exclusively for Tehran was directly addressed to reproduce alternative energy sources.

Interests in developing Iran’s peaceful nuclear program appeared after the energetic

crisis of the 1970s.

The US expected that if Iran developed its peaceful nuclear capability to

satisfy the growing requirement of internal energetic market, there would be a great

chance to save oil for trade under profitable terms. Iran was a really reliable partner

for the Western industrial democratic countries. During the oil embargo of Arabian

courtiers in 1974 which was followed by energetic crisis Shah of Iran made

significant steps for Western countries. He offered to sell the US and its ally countries

oil beyond the OPEC quota at a hidden discount.

Besides saving oil resources by Iran one of the reasons of Washington’s

support to the Iranian Nuclear program was strategic Economic calculations. The US

tried to restore balance of trade between Iran and the US during and after the energetic

crises from 1973 to 1975. During the energetic crises Western industrial developed

democratic countries, including the US, lost their position in the balance of trade with

oil production countries. Results were catastrophic. OPEC countries increased oil

price up to $11.65 per barrel (for 276%). It was astronomical price for that time; The

New York Stock Exchange lost $97 billion in value in six weeks (the equivalents of

more then $400 billion), (Pollak: 2004; pp. 107-108) Arabian countries and Iran as

well fully completed the nationalization of oil companies which operated the oil

industry in those countries. As a result, the Arab states and also Iran’s revenue

increased and money came to run side producing countries.

41

To improve existed abolished balance the US (soon following her Western

European countries) encouraged Tehran to start its nuclear program and purchase the

most expensive nuclear technology and equipment. Concurrently to nuclear deal trade

with arms, military goods, other equipments and technologies still remained. During

this period Washington reduced its aid program toward Iran from $103 million up to

$4 million.

All in all Iranian oil was significant for Western countries and for Japan as

well. In his memoires Henry Kissinger noted that Iranian oil was necessary in an

emergency (Kissinger: 2000b; p. 671). When the Shah toppled five years later, oil

again doubled „because the market quite reasonably feared for the long-term stability

of the entire region” (Kissinger: 2000b; p.:672).

On the other hand there was other key factor why the US government during the

1970s was forced to support Iran’s nuclear program. It was persistent demand of Shah

to support his nuclear program.

As it was discussed for the reasons of Kennedy-Johnson’s rigorous policy

Tehran made unprecedented steps in the rapprochement with Moscow. The Nixon’s

administration which had to resolve critically important issues (resolution of Vietnam,

restore balance of power in the middle East, deter the USSR, defend Israelis

existence, and „open” the China) feared that if it refused Tehran to support in nuclear

sphere, Iran this time would conduct the same and make rapprochement steps toward

Soviets in nuclear sphere as well.

Washington’s strong Nonproliferation policy towards his ally countries such

as Israel during the Kennedy-Johnson’s left the US outside from significant political

and economic processes and made impact on America’s strategic interests. Like

Israelis political scenarios it was expected to develop the same in Iran.

42

On the other hand Iran was reliable strategic partner of the US in the most

critical situation. „Iran’s influence was always on our side; its resources reinforced

ours even in some distant enterprises – in aiding South Vietnam at the time of the

1973 Paris agreement, helping Western Europe in its economic crisis in the 1970s,

supporting moderates in Africa against Soviet-Cuban encroachment. In the 1973

Middle East war, for example, Iran was the only country bordering the Soviet Union

not to permit the Soviets use of its air space – in contrast to several NATO allies. The

Shah absorbed the energies of radical Arab neighbors to prevent them from

threatening the moderate regimes in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the Persian Gulf. He

refueled our fleets without question. He never used his control of oil to bring political

pressure; he never joined any oil embargo against the West or Israel” – wrote in his

memoirs H. Kissinger (Kissinger: 2000a; p. 1262).

Iran under the Shah was one of America’s best, most important and most loyal

friends in the world. Iran has done great service to the US and Washington could not

apprise at its true worth. Otherwise Iran repeated rapprochement steps toward Soviet

Union, which could be vulnerable for the US and its Western allies.

All in all Ford’s administration made correction in Non-proliferation policy of

the US contrary to before existed. Herewith Presidents’ freedom in nuclear issue was

restricted by the Congress after the Watergates scandal. J. Ford sought to provide

balanced policy and satisfy both interests and demand on the one hand Shah’s and on

the other hand the Congress of the US, which constantly had a rigorous attitude

toward the proliferation of nuclear technologies.

43

III - The US-Iran negotiations about nuclear cooperation agreement

In the beginning of 1975 Government of Iran announced that Iran would spend

15 billion petrodollars to purchase from the US various goods and services over the

next five year. According to the plan Iran was going to spend over $5 billion on

normal trade import, $5 billion on American military goods ($1.5 billion per year)

(Burhnam: 1975a; p. E3). The main deal of this agreement was purchase of 9 nuclear

reactors for $6.4 billion and to make a major investment, estimated at $1 billion, in a

private uranium enrichment facility to be built in the United States (Department of

State: 1975; p:1).

When the Government of Iran decided to launch a nuclear power program, in

the course of which singing enrichment services contracts with the AEC and

contemplating purchase of nuclear power plants from the US industry, it became

necessary to negotiate a new, more inclusive bilateral agreement. In order to reprocess

new agreement the US-Iran Joint Commission on Atomic Energy was created.

Mainly negotiations between the US and Iran were about 9 nuclear power

plants and uranium enrichment facilities as well as trade with enriched uranium. Iran

had strong desire to acquire own complete fuel cycle and reprocessing facilities.

During the negotiations Iranians insisted the US to support them to establish the own

reprocessing facility.

The USG suspected that Iran tried to acquire all cycle of nuclear capability in

order to acquire WMD. “The fact that the Shah takes likely strong personal interest in

each steps of the program is a fair indication of nuclear power’s high standing among

nations priorities… The AEOI has been very active in attempting to secured sources

of Uranium ore, enrichment services, and the like. The components of the GOI

motivation to acquire this complex and expensive technology are not entirely clear…

44

It is possible that Iran’s interesting acquiring nuclear knowhow and plutonium is, in

part, motivated by desire to preserve the option of developing nuclear weapons should

the region’s (Middle East) power balance shift toward the nuclear…” (American

Embassy in Tehran: 1975; p. 2)

For more broadly review of differences between Peaceful and Military nuclear

program it should be indicated that country A which had only peaceful purposes

regarding to the nuclear program tried to acquire only part of nuclear facilities such as

nuclear power plant. To complete its project with other nuclear facilities country A

took part in the multinational reprocessing process and had agreement with supplier

countries about “Buy Back” and storage of spent fuel. In contrary, country B which

had strong aspiration to acquire WMD and other nuclear military facility tried to

construct complete own perfect nuclear facility with its all components such as

Nuclear power plants, Uranium Enrichment Services, own or reliable source of

Uranium ore and storage of spent fuel on its sovereign territory. Moreover, country B

refuses to participate in the multinational enrichment services.

Thus, Iran tried to acquire its own nuclear capabilities to preserve its nuclear

purposes, as well as military, from further unhappy factors which might arose toward

Iran from International Community, from its neighbors and its ally countries.

Nuclear talks became more complicate because of differences between

Washington’s and Tehran’s policy toward nuclear proliferation. Iran tried to achieve

its goals when the US government in contrary attempted to reach with Tehran such an

agreement which would satisfy Tehran, NPT, its Non Proliferation goals and the

Congress of the US. The Congress was criticized the USG for its Nuclear policy since

R. Nixon. After R. Nixon Congress outfit itself with the authority under new

legislation to reject nuclear agreement by concurrent resolution (Department of State:

45

1975; p: 2). Generally, the Congress was limiting factor on the US flexibility on this

issue.

While Secretary of State H. Kissinger already had signed a policy position, the

Iranian deal had to go through a major review so that it would have the support of all

of the relevant agencies. During the early spring of 1975 the agencies considered

possible approaches to the reactor sales and reprocessing services as well, trying to

secure an optimal balance between proliferation “principles and objectives” and such

goals as export business and good relations with the Shah.6 Moreover, the US

Government treated various versions and approaches of new nuclear cooperation

agreement with Iran. In December 6, 1974 the US State Department staffs (generally

NEA and OSE staffs) Alfred L. Atherton Jr. and Nelson F. Sievering Jr. represented

to the Secretary of State Henry Kissinger action memorandum under the name

“Nuclear Agreement for Cooperation with Iran”. The NEA group proposed to

Secretary of States four options of future Nuclear Energy Agreement with:

1 - Option one – Standard Agreement with IAEA Safeguards, which

considered standard safeguard of IAEA. This agreement was consonant to the US

special relationship with Iran and was emphasis that Washington views Iran as a

mature and stable power. On the other hand standard agreement does not provid the

US veto over the reprocessing, fabrication and storage of the plutonium generated by

the reactors or special physical security features to protect the nuclear material from

theft.

6 The US companies tried to establish there places in the Iranian nuclear industry market, but there

were strong competitors such as Western European companies. In addition, for American companies

according this agreement was bad factor s for further cooperation.

46

2 - Option two – Standard Agreement with Addition of Physical

Protection Features. This agreement was interpreted as fulfilling any obligations

made to Congress, at least for the imposition of additional measures. At the same

time, Shah should be receptive to the argument that mounting international concern

about increased terrorism requires the establishment of mutually agreed security

procedures (which are not part of the NPT or IAEA safeguards).

Nevertheless there was expectation that some members of Congress who

were gradually anti-nuclear might not be satisfied with the inclusion of physical

security conditions alone. In addition Shah might felt that Iran is being singled out for

harsher treatment than the countries of Western Europe, Japan and etc.

3 – Option three - Standard Agreement with Addition of Some of the

Bilateral Controls over Materials Proposed for Egypt/Israel. Under this option,

the US had veto right over the reprocessing, fabrication and storage of the US

materials and plutonium produced from the use of the US supplied material or

equipment. By this agreement Washington would be able to minimize proliferation

risks associated with the US-supplied fuel and reactors. This option would deal with

certain of the Congressional concerns that might arise from the sale of the US reactors

or nuclear fuel to Iran.

However, the Shah might strenuously object to having Iran treated differently

from the countries such as Israel and Egypt, with which Washington already had

standard agreements. So-called „New Standard” was risk that Washington would lose

Iran’s investment in the US private enrichment plant, and might lose the sale of

enrichment services as well.

4 – Option four - Tightened Conditions Identical to the proposed

Israeli/Egypt Agreements. Congress would be pleased. Although, tightening of

47

physical security requirements might not be well received, but the extension of the

special conditions to explicitly preclude reprocessing, fabrication, and storage of the

US fuel and plutonium or equipment in Iran would be seen by the Shah as especially

onerous. (Atherton & Sievering: 1974; pp. 1-5)

It can be concluded that the US Government tried to achieve such agreement

with the GOI which would serve to its Nonproliferation policy and give good

opportunity to the American companies to participate in the high costly Iranian

nuclear project.

The Action Memorandum of NEA was passed to the NSSM for more broadly

discussions.

On March 14, 1975 National Security Study Memorandum (NSSM) 219

Working Group presented to the Government of the US the NSSM 219. Five were

given option for further policy of the US and frame of Nuclear Cooperation

Agreement with Iran with the pros and cons. The third option was important because

Working Group suggested the USG following: „Retain the explicit the US right of

veto over the reprocessing but drop our multilateral conditions. However,

concurrently give Iran our general approval if she agrees to treat any facility

processing materials as if it were obtained as a safeguarded facility acquired from the

US under our agreement for cooperation. This would help assure that our bilateral

safeguards would apply to the plant and its products if IAEA controls are terminated

for any reason. It also would be understood that the actual reprocessing would be

contingent on the normal mutual finding that facility is safeguarded.” (National

Security Council: 1975; p. 12)

The NSSM 219 working group made its study about Nuclear Cooperation

Agreement with Iran and passed the report to the Department of State.

48

The Department of State was opposed to make agreement according to the

option three of NSSM 219. In his response to the NNSM 219 (Nuclear Cooperation

with Iran, March 14, 1975) Department of State noted „Department would oppose the

US negotiators being given authority to conclude an agreement based on option 3,

which would retain the US veto, but concede the Iran being permitted to reprocess the

US plutonium in a nationally owned reprocessing plant”(The Deputies of State: 1975;

pp. 4-5).

Consequently the US cared to allow „New Standard” agreement in the nuclear

field cooperation. „New Standard” were been precedent for other supplier countries to

conclude with potential client of nuclear facilities.

A first draft of a new agreement was presented to the GOI in February, 1975,

and after a round of negotiations the second one was presented in May, 1975. Draft

included rigorous articles connecting with reprocessing, fabrication and storage of the

plutonium generated by the reactors supplied by the US and about own reprocessing

facilities.

The US government presented to the Iranian side an agreement which offered

Iran to construct multinational reprocessing facilities out of Iran’s territory, „Buy

Back” reprocessing fuel (Plutonium), and had a right veto over the reprocessing,

fabrication and storage of the US materials and plutonium produced from the use of

the US supplied material or equipment.

Tehran meets this draft with great protest. Shah of Iran told the US officials

“In atomic energy you are asking as for safeguards that are incompatible with our

sovereignty, things that French or Germans would never dream of doing… Such

safeguards are absolutely unnecessary because Iran is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-

proliferation Treaty” (American Embassy in Tehran: 1975; pp. 1-2). In other words

49

Iran felt a threat than that her military nuclear desire might be deadlocked. Iranians

began arguing that jointly managed and operated plant would be unworkable, and

agreement which was suggested by Washington was discriminatory.

Discussions continued at Vienna (Austria) disclosing serious disagreements

over the nuclear cooperation agreement, with Iranian atomic energy chief Etamad

rejecting Washington’s insistence that, through the multinational plant, the US

participate in decisions on reprocessing of the US-supplied spent fuel. The Secretary

of State H. Kissinger was not ready to back down from this position; in a telegram

that he sent to Ambassador Richard Helms he asked to explained the US motives to

the Shah and make point that “we are not in any way singling out Iran for special,

disadvantageous treatment;” the issue at stake was not technical ones but “directly

related to security and stability in the region.” The National Security Advisor of

President Brent Scowcroft recommended to President Ford to approve further option

– “If Iranian rejected “Buy-back”, and then the United States could, as fall back, insist

on bilateral measures that supplemented the safeguards of the International Atomic

Energy Authority. Ford approved that Recommendation (Scowcroft: 1976; p.1).

After the April’s visit of Dr. Etamad and next negotiation provided in

Washington on May 28, 1976, Energy Research and Development Administration

(ERDA) and State department sent the American Embassy in Tehran a draft

agreement. According to the draft the United States proposed buying back spent fuel,

with payment in money or in the equivalent value of reactor fuel (Uranium enriched

in isotope U-235). Alternatively, Iran could transfer spent fuel to another country or

group of nations, as long as it was used for peaceful purposes under mutually

acceptable safeguards. In addition to the safeguards imposed by the IAEA to prevent

diversion into military applications, the US draft spelled out additional arrangements

50

to safeguard nonproliferation interests. For example, the United States would have

right to review design of any reactor or other equipment and devices determined to be

relevant to the effective application of safeguards. Moreover, the designated the US

personnel would have “access in Iran to all places and data necessary to account for

… special nuclear material” (Department of State: 1976d; pp. 4-5).

Besides the agreement, the US included a note designed to reflect “special”

aspects of the US-Iran relationship. If the US did not exercise the buy-back option and

Iran chose to establish reprocessing facilities, Tehran would be required to “achieve

fullest possible participation in the management and operation of such facilities of the

nation or nations which serve as suppliers of technology and major equipment”.

Moreover, Iran would invite the United States to “participate fully and actively in

[the] management and operation” of the facilities. (Department of State: 1976c; pp. 3-

4)

On July 22, 1976 Dr. Etamad gave Ambassador Helms his government’s

response to the US draft agreement. As officials of American Embassy later

characterized Tehran’s response was “extreme”, probably because of they rejected the

US veto of Iranian reprocessing of the spent fuel supplied by the United States. “…

That participation, however, should not undermine Iran’s effective control of its fuel

cycle program; it thus has to be minority voting right without a veto power,

furthermore, while Iran does not see any reasons to express this view in bilateral

agreement.” “Iran should have right to decide whether to reprocess or otherwise

dispose or treat the materials provided under the agreement” (Department of State:

1975; pp. 4-5). Nevertheless, the US “Buy-Back” option of spent fuel remained still

open.

51

In early August, 1976 Henry Kissinger and other US officials traveled to Iran

for meetings of a joint the US-Iran Economic Commission, the details of the US-

Iran’s major economic agreement were discussed. It was announced in March, 1975

and was estimated about $15 billion, including nuclear sales. Among other issues,

there were discussions about nuclear agreement draft. Dr. Etamad held on to his

position about a US “obligation to assist Iran in all areas of nuclear technology” and

his view that Iran would not accept discriminatory treatment. The US officials could

not make assurance about anything, because the Presidential elections started and the

Ford’s Administration did not want to make the important decision. The US officials

only explained that they wanted the agreement to reflect “the US intent to perform”,

within “necessary practical and legal limits” (Atherton & Sievering: 1974; p. 2).

Besides meeting with the Joint Economic Commission, H. Kissinger had

meetings with the Shah to discuss the nuclear deal. Records of Kissinger’s discussion

with the Shah are not yet declassified, but a State Department memo includes some

significant details on the negotiations. Apparently, Kissinger explained to the Shah

that “purely national” Iranian reprocessing plant would not be acceptable. The nuclear

cooperation agreement would provide following alternative options instead of national

reprocessing: “Buy Back”, “binational reprocessing” and “reprocessing in a third

country” (of course considered only the US ally - Western European Countries).

Kissinger assured the Shah that the US veto rights would not involve significant

commercial risks, and accompanying problem of “Buy-Back” option would be settled

beneficial for Iran. Moreover, if, at some point, the commercial value of enriched

uranium and plutonium increased, the spent fuel rods would be worth more and the

Iranians would have made money if they had held on to them. The US would

52

compensate Iran for “any loss it has suffered as a result of our (the US) reprocessing

of the spent rods.” (Robinson: 1976; pp. 3-4)

With the 1976 presidential campaign putting under way, the US-Iran nuclear

negotiations came to halt. The President Ford defeated, Richard Helms and H.

Kissinger were resigned from there posts. A new administration intended to make

major changes in nuclear proliferation policy. The Government of Iran was waiting

with interest for the US announcement about new nuclear policy. The Iranian side was

waiting an initiative by the Carter administration for resumption talks about purchase

of 9 the US nuclear reactors.

During the press conference on February 6, 1977 Dr. Etamad, perhaps

realizing that the Carter administration would also oppose reprocessing, declared that

Iran had given up the option of a national reprocessing facility and was, instead,

looking closely at binational and multinational options, but also added that “no

country or group or countries, has a right to dictate nuclear policy to another.”

(Department of State: 1977; p.2)

To the response of the Iranian side the US diplomats in Tehran announced that

the nuclear negotiations with Iran could not be resumed until the Carter White House

had finished its nuclear proliferation policy review. Moreover, Dr. Etamad was

assured that “the new administration is moving along expeditiously in its

comprehensive policy review” (Department of State: 1977b; p. 1) and that decision

would be made in March or April, 1977. In was clear massage from Washington that

the US nuclear policy would change. Moreover, it was inevitable because Carter

during the campaign criticized Republicans nuclear policy; he promised that curbing

the spread of nuclear weapon would be among his highest foreign policy priorities.

53

On April 7, 1977 President Carter issued his first official policy statement on

nuclear proliferation. The key announcement was the decision to defer indefinitely

commercial reprocessing in the United States in order to discourage other countries

from reprocessing. Otherwise, to show that the United States would be a reliable

supplier of nuclear fuel, after that his administration completely formed its nuclear

policy, Carter announced that he would be proposing to Congress “legislative steps to

permit us to sign… supply contracts and remove the pressure for the reprocessing of

nuclear fuels” (American Consulate in Shiraz: 1977; pp-1-2). After announcement

soon the “Non-proliferation Act of 1978 followed.”

In May 1978 Carter’s administration presents to the Iranian side a draft of

nuclear cooperation agreement according to the principles of the Act of 1978.

Generally, it was similar to the agreement of 1976, although Carter administration

took slightly a different approach to reprocessing. In the article 6, Iran would not

reprocess spent fuel or enrich uranium supplied by the US “unless the parties agree”.

Moreover, the 1978 version was more detailed then 1976. The veto was retained, but

issues of physical security, expeditious NRC (National reprocessing cycle) action on

license, and international fuels cycle studies, the agreement provided alternative

arrangements for spent fuel resulting from the US-supplied material: “1- storage in

Iran, 2-storage in the US, or 3- storage, reprocessing or other disposition… in

accordance with internationally accepted arrangements.”

Furthermore there would be no reprocessing in Iran under any circumstances

and “buy-back” was no longer an option. Moreover, to a great extent, reprocessing in

a third country (generally in Western Europe) could occur only if storage was not

possible in Iran. It was so-called “an option of last resort”.

54

Carter’s administration became more rigorous regarding to the nuclear issue. It

dictated its terms. Iranian side expressed less concerns because Iran was involved in

internal turmoil processes. In the end of 1978 and in the beginning of 1979 in whole

country revolutionary movement began which ended with the Islamic Revolution.

Revolutionary crises put an end to the nuclear negotiations and the US-Iran

nuclear cooperation as well.

55

Conclusion

All in all it is evident that besides the peaceful purposes officials of Tehran and

His imperial Majesty had a strong desire to acquire WMD by the means of Peaceful

Nuclear Explosion (PNE), like India for the following reasons: 1) ambitions of

regional hegemony, 2) extension of “nuclear syndrome” over the Middle East.

Investigations of various origin sources made it possible to conclude that Tehran

had elaborated well-calculated plan - to unexpectedly start its nuclear program,

installed more than 13 power plant, own reprocessing facilities, own or reliable

diversified uranium resources, nuclear research centers and storages of spent fuel.

Moreover, any restriction agreement suggested by the US was unacceptable for Iran.

Tehran tried to acquire full cycle of nuclear industry which gives to Iranians

possibilities to collect sufficient quantity of Plutonium for producing WMD

Furthermore, Iran tried to purchase from Israel surface-to-surface missiles capable to

carry nuclear warhead.

The US nuclear policy was Non-Proliferation, especially regarding to sensitive

region such as Middle East. Washington pursued Non-proliferation policy toward its

critically important ally countries like Iran, because the risks of destabilization always

existed. Out of strategic interests the US was forced to support to its reliable ally

country only peaceful nuclear project through the close and strict control over the use

of the US-supplied nuclear materials by Iran. Washington also tried to achieve such

cooperation agreement which gave Washington opportunity to delay Iranians peaceful

nuclear program in case if they would transform into military.

The US policymakers were determined following policy toward the Iranian

nuclear program to enter into a close relationship with Iran which would have the US

as its principal supplier for fuel and plant once so situated. The US ultimate sanction

56

against an Iran desire to develop a nuclear weapon capability would be the cut of fuel

and plant maintenance and replacement parts. Moreover, Washington worked hard for

a tacit veto by acquiring „a voice in management decisions” in a reprocessing plant to

avoid the surprising PNE from Iran.

57

Shah of Iran and US Leaders

58

Documents revealed Iran’s Ambitious Nuclear Program in 1970s

59

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