Nicolai Hartmann’s Concept of Causality

(Draft)

Introduction

Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of causality is, in many ways,actual. Recent discussion of causality (mainly inanalytic philosophy) stresses the complexity of causalconnections. However, their dependence on ontologicalbackgrounds and their diverse roles across varioussciences are not topics that are equally well elaborated.Hardly anyone accepts, anymore, the positivistic view ofcausality as simply a law-bound, deterministic chain.Yet, there are no new ontologically-based theoriesconcerning causality. Analytic concepts of causalitystill rely firmly on logical atomism, in which causalconnection is between ‘events’ or ‘facts’, and to whichtraditional logical analysis of truth-values can easilybe connected (see Mackie 1974, 248-269 and von Wright1984, 113-115) without further sophisticated ontologicalanalysis.

It is true that analytic philosophy has made quite areturn to metaphysics in recent decades. The main problemwith this ‘metaphysical turn’, though, is that it hasbeen a turn to a kind of pre-critical, boldly speculativemetaphysics that is closer in spirit to Leibniz than to

Kant. On the other hand, there is also a global move awayfrom the philosophy of language towards the philosophy ofmind (Williamson 2015). Whatever the case, these trendshave not led to deeper ontological analysis – currentanalytical metaphysics is still largely pre-critical andnaturalistic and offers, in my mind, not much possibilityfor complex, stratified ontologies developed in post-Kantian German philosophy, for example, in Hegel,Heidegger, Hartmann and Lukács.1

With the metaphysical turn in analytic philosophy,interesting new aspects of causality have arisen.Counterfactual causality especially has elicited livelydiscussion in analytical metaphysics as well as inspecial sciences. Outside philosophical mainstreams newscientific developments, like the rise of environmentalsciences, has challenged traditional views of causality.What we urgently need, though, is new research concerningthe ontological foundations of these embryonic scientificparadigms and their alternative forms of scientificexplanation. Classical views of causality are not able tohandle the most pressing and difficult questions, forexample, the causes of climate change, in which complexinteractions of causal chains and simultaneouscauses/effects across different ontological levels mustbe analyzed.

Hartmann’s pluralistic ontology, his modal analysis anddeep reflections concerning the categorical foundationsof natural and human sciences – although almost entirelyforgotten – appear to be crucial theoretical resources

1 In extreme cases, quite traditional physicalistic and reductionistic positionslike Armstrong’s, ‘Strong Physicalism’ (Juti 2001, 202-203).

for recent philosophy of science. I completely agree withthe estimation by the important German analyticphilosopher Wolfgang Stegmüller, in his standard work oncontemporary philosophy, Hauptströmungen derGegenwartsphilosophie (Stegmüller 1975), when he stressesthe importance of the “cosmic total view” (kosmischeGesamtstimmung) in Hartmann’s thinking. According toStegmüller, Hartmann’s critical, anti-reductionist andstratified ontology is a far better alternative than theanthropocentric existential ontology á la Kierkegaard(Stegmüller 1975, 243-244). In contemporary philosophy,especially in environmental philosophy, scholars haveaccepted the same non-anthropocentric view. Inconsideration of these collective developments, it isthus clear that now is a fruitful moment in which to(re-)evaluate the classical work of Hartmann and,building on Stegmüller’s analyses, demonstrate the wideimpact and continuing significance of Hartmann’s work.

Hartmann connects causality to his stratified materialontology. Causality is the simplest and most elementaryform of real determination. It is not, however, the onlyform of real determination, because the real world isstratified, and the higher strata’s relations ofdetermination are different from those of the lower. Thecausal nexus is also contained in the higher forms ofdetermination as a subordinate factor. Two higher formsof determination, a planned system characteristic ofcertain organic processes and the purposeful action ofhumankind, presuppose the causal nexus. It is, however,especially in human action that a purpose and a selectionof means (as ‘causing’ the desired result) lead the way.

Hartmann describes different forms of causality andexplores their relative merits. He discerns, for example,law-bound causality and manipulative causality as specialforms of causal thinking. Law-bound, mechanisticcausality has been particularly important for classicalnatural science. Manipulative causality is not onlyimportant in science, but also for human purposefulaction in general (means of action are based oncausality). But in the last analysis, these forms ofcausality are too narrow – the causal nexus isfundamentally an expression of individual processes ofreality. According to Hartmann, real being is, firstly,temporal: “the interplay of change and persistence,causing and being caused by, exists only within the flowof time”. Secondly, individuality distinguishes realbeing from ideal being: “everything real is individualand it exists only once” (Poli 2012). Therefore,causality is, in the last analysis, an individual andirreversible processual connection in time. It isimperative to stress the importance of this basicontological aspect of causality since it allows, forexample, the possibility of human freedom. Causalconnections are, so to speak, weak and neutral, ready forbeing manipulated by the purposeful actions of humans (ofcourse, Hartmann is very well aware of the manydifficulties involved in this).

The limits of causal thinking become explicit not only inregards to human action (teleology), but also already inHartmann’s analyses of the concept of interaction(Wechselwirkung) and of higher forms of determination innature, especially in dynamical ‘central determination’

(Zentraldetermination) and ‘holistic determination’(Ganzheitsdetermination) (Hartmann 1950, 464-473, 486-494,passim). This is may be the most original, and, forrecent problems in science, vital, aspect of Hartmann’stheory of causality, because it connects causal ‘chains’to more comprehensive explanations on different levels ofreality. The moment of causality corresponds to the“chain of conditions” that is successively filled out,but the moment of interaction corresponds to thesimultaneous “complex of conditions”. The former is alongitudinal connection, but the latter is already a kindof holistic connection (Hartmann 2013, 255). The conceptof interaction is, in our time, methodologicallyinteresting for many cross-disciplinary projects, such asthose engaged in environmental research (fromenvironmental science to environmental humanities).Interaction is, one could argue, a first step inconnecting causality to a wider ontological background;‘central determination’ is, in this respect, an even morecritical step by which causal relations can bequalitatively contextualized within different ontologicallevels.

On the metaphysics of causation

It is always important to place current philosophicaldiscussions into wider historical contexts. In the caseof causality, current discussion relies heavily on the

modern idea of material causes: chain-like connectionsbetween cause and effect that are law-bound anddeterministic processes. This physicalistic view has beencriticized and modified in various ways in recentanalytical metaphysics (for a good overview see Schaeffer2014) – but the overall ontological background ofcausality is still an open problem. Following David Hume,causal thinking is still empiricist and anti-essentialist. This has made it difficult to properlycontextualize causal thinking on different levels ofreality, on which causal connections play differentroles. To clarify these, we need not only to ask, “Whatmust a world be like to host causal relations” (Schaffer2014, p. 1.), but also, what kind of roles causalconnections play on different levels of reality, “whatkind of causal connections are typical for differentstrata”, and how cause, effects and their relations aremodified on different levels of reality. Hartmann’sconcept of causality poses these kinds of fundamentalquestions. It is, therefore, perhaps the most promisingalternative to recent analytical discussion (which nevermentions Hartmann’s position). As noted, analyticalconcepts of causality still rely still largely onatomistic and physicalistic ontology: cause and effectare interpreted as singular ‘events’ or ‘facts’. From theviewpoint of stratified ontology, this is an overlysimplistic view.

Analytical metaphysics of causation, as such, is acomplex discussion of the possible interpretationsconsidering the causal relata and the causal relation.Considering the relata, for example, the following

questions are posited: are the relata immanent in space-time, how fine-grained are they (individuation) and howmany are there. Questions about the causal relationinclude those pondering how causally-related andcausally-unrelated sequences differ and how, if at all,sequences involving causes differ from those involvingmere background conditions (Schaffer 2014). These kindsof questions, however, do not further illuminate or helpto answer the question of the ontologicalcontextualization of causality on different levels ofreality.

In my mind, the most promising new (ca. 1970-2015)analytic theories of causality are (a) contrastivecausality (and the closely related counterfactualcausality), (b) network theory of causality and (c)different hybrid models of causality. Without discussingthe problems stated in the literature, the basic ideas ofthese new theories are as follows (Schaeffer 2014).

(a) Contrastive causality breaks the traditional tworelata model (A – B) and introduces three or fourrelata. Causal relata must build an effectual difference:causal relations have the form A causes B rather thanB*. A four relata model yields the form A rather thanA* causes B rather than B*. This model isontologically relevant because “just as motion claimsonly make metaphysical sense when relativized to aninertial frame, one might think that causal claimsonly make metaphysical sense when relativized tocontrasts”. Contrastivity matters because it“diagnoses a range of context-dependencies in causaldiscourse” (Schaeffer 2014). This view is, in a way,

discussed already by Mackie (1974), who developed anidea of causal field, in which the so-called “backgroundconditions” play an important role (Mackie 1974, 34-37, 63-64, passim).

(b) Network theory of causality can easily beenunderstood if we think of causal chains as strings ofa net. A causal process is always connected to manypartial causes and produces many side effects. Themain line of the string consists of the researchsubject’s most important connections, but even inthis case it is problematic to speak anymore of thecausal ‘chains’. A causal process resembles more of arotten rope, some strings haven broken and some stillsolid. Solid strings interweave with each other,building a complex total determination.

(c) Considering hybrid models, one of the centralquestions asks, what is the metaphysical basis forcausal connection? How is it possible to make adifference between causally-related and causally-unrelated sequences? Alternatives are many. One findsanalyses of causation at least in terms of nomologicalsubsumption, statistical correlation, counterfactual dependence,agential manipulation, contiguous change, energy flow, physicalprocesses and property transference. Hybrid models connectsome of them to a bigger picture.

According to this analytical discussion, a crucialmetaphysical problem is the causal selection. How is itpossible to make a difference between real causes andmere background conditions? Is there a metaphysical basisfor the selection? Following John Stuart Mill, manyrecent theorists, like Lewis, see the selection as

capricious, without any serious theoretical ground. Butsome selection must be made, at least in order to have ameaningful concept of causality. One promising idea isthe aforementioned idea of causal field, presented byMackie, if you apply it to the idea of causal models, inwhich only certain events are represented via variables.Selection then depends on the fixed conversationalcontext (Schaeffer 2014). This idea does justice to thedifferent role of causality in different sciences anddifferent research projects, but has no more complexontological background. In my mind, ontologicalbackground is crucial in defining the scope of causalfields: for instance, in searching the causes of climatechange, a relevant causal field combines both natural andcultural aspects to an interactive holistic explanationof this complex phenomenon. However, in the case of thegrowth of a single organism, it is enough to combinegenetic and local environmental aspects to anexplanatorily relevant modal field. In the socialsciences and humanities, causal fields must beconstructed differently: they have a minor role and theyoften build merely background conditions for relativelyfree human actions. These background conditions can alsobe changed through human purposeful action.

In order to connect causality to different ontologicallevels, it is better to speak of level-dependent modal fields(see Väyrynen 2013) and to connect causality – and causalfields - to those. Modal fields refer to the totality ofreal possibilities and necessities in a certainontologically independent context. Modal fields must bebound to concrete material ontology in the sense of

Hartmann, and causality must be interpreted through thespecialities of those fields. The classical concept ofcausality is originally formulated in the very narrowcontext of physical possibilities. But if we think aboutbiological, ecological, psychological and socialpossibilities, for example, causality takes verydifferent forms. As do the causal relata (cause, effect),their interpretation (number, quality) and selection, asthe relation itself varies, depending on whether wequestion how a billiard ball, animal, man, a socialgroup, an artefact (car, cell phone) or institutionalstructure (capitalistic competition) is the cause ofsomething. If we want to connect causality for example tohistorical explanations, as many analytic philosophershave done (especially von Wright 1972), we must takethese stratified ontological questions seriously. Historyis a field of study, which nowadays connects almost alllevels of reality – especially environmental history(Donald Worster, Clive Ponting, Jared Diamond et alia) andthe so-called ‘big history’ (Christian 2005), whichconnects cosmological and environmental questions totraditional human-centered history.

If we take seriously the question of ontologicalbackground, it is worth reiterating the almost forgottenAristotelian idea of causality. In Metaphysics (1044a-b,1070a-1071a), Aristotle discerns four types of causes(aitia): (1) material causes which constitute a being (lat.causa materialis), (2) formative or structural causes (causaformalis), (3) an entity causing a change or rest (causaefficiens) and (4) the end of something, the final cause(causa finalis). In order to fully know what something is, we

must know all of these causes. The role of causes alsovaries on different levels of reality: if, for instance,we ask, “what is the cause of an eclipse”, we mustconclude that there is no matter causing it, no finalcause and no formal cause, but only “the moving causewhich destroys the light … the earth” (Metaphysics,1044b10-15). Modern science has concentrated solely onthe research of effecting causes: on the one hand, theempiricist critics of essentialism have diminished themeaning of formal and material causes, while, on theother hand, the development of physics (Galileo, Newton)and biology (Darwin) have tried to eliminate final causesfrom scientific explanations (Niiniluoto 1983, 236-237).

In the philosophy of Hartmann, causality is only onespecific (and the most elementary) form of determinationand its significance – how strongly it is subordinated toother forms of determination depends on the specific‘laws’ or ‘tendencies’ in the biological, societal,psychological or spiritual strata. Referring primarily tomaterial processes (strata of inorganic being), it ispresupposed by the higher strata, but, on the other hand,causality is in different ways super-formed (Überformung)or super-posited (Überbauung) by higher strata.

Building on this understanding, I will now analyze themain forms of causality and its basic super-formations ininteraction and human teleology. For this, I will relyparticularly on the extensive analysis represented inHartmann’s Philosophy of Nature (Philosophie der Natur 1950) and,on the role of causality in human action, the analyses inhis Teleological Thinking (Teleologisches Denken 1950). Hartmannsketched the main lines of his theory of causality

already very early: his excellent early work on thephilosophy of biology (Philosophische Grundfragen der Biologie1912) analyzes causality and interaction in naturalsciences, notably in biology. This work is developed uponthe Neo-Kantian discussion of causality and interaction(especially on those by his Marburgian teachers, HermanCohen and Paul Natorp) and represents, therefore, in thisrespect, not the final view of Hartmann. That honorshould be bestowed upon his Philosophy of Nature, in whichHartmann presents his mature and detailed view ofcausality. Nevertheless, it was already in the 1920s thatHartmann deviated from the Neo-Kantians in emphasizingthe metaphysical meaning of Kant’s philosophy and, likeHeidegger, claiming that there is no theory of cognitionwithout ontology and metaphysics (Pietras 2011, p. 238).

Main forms of causality according to Hartmann

As with many philosophical questions, Hartmann begins byappealing to commonsense. Thus, he first asks, why iscausality as theoretically as practically so important inhuman life? According to him, causality represents thebasic order of reality; it organizes the processualcontinuum in such a way that anticipation is possible. Theprocess without causality would be totally contingent(zufällig). This is also practically fundamental: withoutcausal order human life would not be possible (Hartmann1950, 318-319). The real process has a linear form ofdetermination, which connects later events with earlierones. This form of determination is causality. It is not

the only form of determination, but it is the most basic,not only for natural processes, but also “a firstcondition for all other forms of dependence” (Hartmann1950, 319).2

Hartmann describes different classical aspects ofcausality and accepts most of them as moments in totaldetermination. In this sense, he represents the ‘hybrid’view of causality, to use a contemporary term. However,he also makes some critical comments on the classicalforms of causality, which are worthy of mentioning. NextI will analyze, in consideration of Hartmann’s criticalcomments, law-causality and determinism, manipulativecausality and causality in human action and itsconnection to teleology. I also critically interrogateHartmann’s determinism, which seems to deny thepossibility of counterfactual causality.

(a) law-causality and determinism; nocounterfactuals?

The rise of causal thinking at the beginning of modernitywas, according to Hartmann, one of the most importantrevolutions in the history of human thought, and whicharoused fierce opposition from traditional positions. Theconcept of causality gained importance through the riseof mathematical and mechanistic natural sciences. Itsnear connection with mathematical natural science was apeculiar faith (Schicksal eigener Art): a big historical2 ”Sie ist die für den Naturprozess grundlegende, und sie bleibt für alleweiteren Formen der Abhängigkeit die erste Voraussetzung”.

victory, which also had its negative aspects (Nachteile).The concept of causality was bound to the concept ofmathematical laws in nature, especially to the idea ofmechanism. This connection was so strong, that one couldno longer envisage a difference between a mechanistic anda causal concept of the world: one started to speak abouta “mechanical causality”. This narrow concept affectedstill Kant’s concept of “causality through laws ofnature” (Kausalität nach Naturgesetzen) (Hartmann 1950, 376).

Working from his theory of modalities (Hartmann 1966,2013), Hartmann stresses the determinative strength ofcausal relation. This can be seen in cases in which verysmall causes or very small changes in causes produceunexpected and significant effects. Such can happen forexample in systems in dynamical balance – minimal changescan even destroy the whole structure (the principle of“kleine Ursachen – grosse Wirkungen”). Hartmann sees here a law-like aspect (Gesetzescharakter) (Hartmann 1950, 322), butnot in a sense of laws in natural sciences, rather, as amodal aspect of necessity (Modalitätsmoment der Notwendigkeit).This means, that causal necessity is “totally differentthan the necessity of laws”. It is, “as all realnecessity, in every case different; law has only thenecessity of generality” (Hartmann 1950, 324).3 Causalprocesses are therefore mostly individual processes, butalso can be, in that case, very effective determinativeprocesses.

This means that causality is the core of productivity innature: modifying, ironically, the language of Heidegger,3 ”Denn Kausalnotwendigkeit ist eine ganz andere als die Gesetznotwendigkeit;sie ist, wie alle Realnotwendigkeit, in jedem Falle eine andere, während dasGesetz bloss die Notwendigkeit der Allgemeinheit hat”.

Hartmann says that considering the essence of causality,important is “the productivity in it, the ‘producing’(Hervorbringen) as such. What time cannot do to producetime (das ‘Zeitigen’), the causal process can”. Causalityhas, therefore, a speciality which other categories donot have, the “form of continuous productivity” (Hartmann1950, 324). This creative process differs essentiallyfrom mechanical processes, which are ‘sterile’ and notcreative (Hartmann 1950, 326). As a creative process,causal process expresses, far better than mechanicalprocess, the real essence of natural processes: “Naturalprocesses are not machine-like processes … on thecontrary, they are causal processes” (Hartmann 1950,328).

This strong determinism in causal processes has a curiousimplication for Hartmann’s view of causality, that thereis no place for counterfactual causality.4 He poses thisproblem in the classical form of modus deficiens (negativeKausalfaktoren, negative causal factors) (Hartmann 1950,345). This conception is connected to his ontologically-grounded view that our common belief in isolated causesand isolated causal chains is illusory. We know of, inthese cases, only partial causes (Teilursachen). In totalreality, there are no such things as isolated causes orcausal chains. There is ultimately only the total, all-inclusive causal process of a dynamic world.5 ‘Cause’, in4 This is an extensive discussion initiated in the analytic philosophy by DavidLewis’ Counterfactuals (1976). I refer here to counterfactual causality in abroader sense in which it is used, for instance, in the discussion over possibleor virtual history in the humanities. For example, see Ferguson (1997).5 “Es gibt letzten Endes nur den allumfassenden Kausalprozess desWeltgeschehens” (Hartmann 1950, 343). This view is closely connected toHartmann’s high appreciation and life-long studies of astronomy. On this, seeHarich (2000, 80-87).

the strong sense of the word, is only the total causerooted in the total world-process.6 This total cause isnot simply a sum of partial causes. It is rather anetwork-like whole, a dynamic totality.7 This aspect isvery hard to know, although the total cause is actually aproductive cause (causa efficiens). It seems to vanish intothe endless real context of the interweaving of causalchains.8 Also, science works only with partial causes,trying to isolate causal chains, in experiments, torelatively “closed systems”. This possibility ofisolation makes anticipation of natural processespossible, but is, of course, always limited. Factors fromoutside this isolated system can suddenly occur (Hartmann1950, 344-345).

How, then, does this doctrine of a ‘total causality’ makecounterfactual causality impossible? The specific humantendency to isolate causal chains and partial causes(Teilursachen) is connected to their positive or negativeevaluations. In reality, there is, according to Hartmann,no negative aspects: “in a real causal connection, thethings are different: all background conditions, whichaffect in a total cause, are totally affirmative … thereare no negative factors of causality … no modus deficiens”(Hartmann 1950, 345).9 The idea of negative factors is ahuman illusion. We expect certain effects from causal

6 ”Ursache im strengen Sinne ist stets nur die im Ganzen des Weltprozessesverwurzelte Gesamtursache” (Hartmann 1950, 343)7 ”Sie ist ein Geflecht, ein Gefüge, wennschon ein flüchtiges, - eine Totalität”(Hartmann 1950, 344)8 ”… in dem uferlosen Realzusammenhang der sich kreuzenden Kausalreihenverliert” (Hartmann 1950, 344).9 ”Im realen Kausalzusammenhang herrscht ein anderes Gesetz: alle Bedingungen,die in einer Gesamtursache zusammenwirken, sind durchaus affirmativ … Es gibtkeine negativen Kausalfaktoren … es gibt keinen modus deficiens”.

chains and when this expectation is not fulfilled we saythat there was some missing aspect in the causes.However, “in the real natural process, there is nothing‘missing’, because there is nothing that ‘should’ havehappened”.10 Real causal connections are complete: “Wherethere is no modus deficiens, there is completeness … allreal complexes of causes are absolutely completed. Thereare no holes.”11

This concept of causality is grounded in Hartmann’soverall ‘actualistic’ modal ontology. He stresses thatthe affirmative nature of causal factors is “a specialcase of a more general ontological law”, which denies thereality of ‘non-being’ (“seienden Nichtsein”) and which hasbeen discussed since Plato, or at least Hegel’s “Macht desNegativen”. In reality “there is only ‘another-being’, andthis is something totally positive”.12 In the case ofHegel, this critique is not very accurate becausecontradictions are always real contradictions, meaningthat ‘negations’ are objective entities which deepen ourunderstanding of a contradictory whole. Hartmann’sposition is quite close to Hegel’s, in my mind.

In the modal ontology of Hartmann, this doctrine isconnected to the extensive discussion of realpossibilities, in which possibilities are bound tonecessities and actuality (Hartmann 2013, 181-263). Onlyin Chapter 32 (b)-(e), where he discusses the aspect of

10 ”Im natürlichen Realprozess aber ’fehlt’ gar nichts, denn in ihm gibt esnichts, was herauskommen ‘sollte’.” (Hartmann 1950, 345).11 ”Wo es keinen modus deficiens gibt, da ist Vollständigkeit … alle realenUrsachenkomplexe sind absolut vollständig. Sie enthalten keine Lücken.”(Hartmann 1950, 346)12 ”da gibt es im Realen nur das Anderssein, und das ist etwas durchausPositives”. (Hartmann 1950, 346)

future, strict determinism seems to pave way to a morepositive role of the “multitude of possibilities” in hismodal thinking. He proposes a widening of the “real lawof possibility”, which earlier stressed that the possibleis only that which is actual – now “the law must meanthat the possible is only that which is actual or will beactual”. This is, according to him, a better formulation:“This relation now also satisfies the idea of the‘future-loadedness of the present’ far better thanadherence to the concept of partial possibility does.Indeed, one must admit, it is only here that thisdynamically beautiful idea completely comes into its own”(Hartmann 2013, 263). In Philosophie der Natur, though,causality is again closely connected to the doctrine ofreal possibilities. “The modal definition of causality”is here short and very exact: “(Causality) is that formof determination of the real process, according to whicheverything, which becomes in it real possibility, alsohappens necessarily” (Hartmann 1950, 336).13 Hartmann’smodal definition of causality clearly rules out thepossibility of counterfactual causality.

Contrary to Hartmann, counterfactual causality andcounterfactual thinking in general14 is a very valuabletheoretical tool in estimating the meaning of different‘real’ causal processes. In physics, as in other naturalsciences, counterfactual thinking is, at leastmethodologically, an important tool: it consists of“confronting the consequences of our ideas with

13 ”sie (die Kausalität) ist diejenige Determinationsform des Realprozesses, nachder alles, was in ihm realmöglich wird, auch notwendig geschieht”.14 Different cases of counterfactual thinking in general (from physics to thehumanities) are represented in Birke et alia (2011).

observations, extending our ideas over the domain whereobservations are technically possible with currenttechnology, and searching for inconsistencies of variousaspects in the whole set of our ideas”. Computersimulations use often counterfactual ideas when, forexample, a meteorologist would like to stop therevolution of the earth to see how the climate wouldchange. This is physically impossible, but a simulationon a computer is possible. In such cases “we see thatcounterfactual thinking can, in principle, be used totest theories”. The counterfactual aspect is alreadyimportant in experimental research in general: “in asense, every experiment is in itself counterfactual, asin an experiment an environment is constructed that doesnot actually exist” (Elwenspoek 2011, 63-64).

In the last analysis, Hartmann’s modal theory of realpossibilities is unsatisfactory. We should not simplyequate real possibilities and necessities with each otherlike his “Real Law of Possibility” does in insisting,that “in the real there is no “merely possible,” butrather the possible here is only that which is alsoactual; and the real law of necessity says: in the realthere is no “merely actual”, but rather whatever isactual here is also necessary … There is in the real nofree-floating, detached possibility that is not thepossibility of an actual thing” (Hartmann 2013, 203;Hartmann 1966, 183). I would rather define the scope ofreal possibilities as a modal field, in which a level-dependent modal variation is possible: some possibilitiesinside the field become actual and some remain ‘merepossibilities’ (see Väyrynen 2013).

Let’s take a look at some examples. In the case ofclassical mechanistic physics, the variation is strictlylaw-bound and deterministic. In the case of ecology,there is no deterministic laws, and therefore there is afield of ecological possibilities, which are not yetactualized, but which are real possibilities for thefuture. For example, the dynamical balance of anecosystem is a real possibility although it is an ideal-typical (Weber) concept which, as such, will never beactualized. The real dynamical variation in ecosystems ispossible in certain limits – if the limits are exceededthe ecosystem breaks. Real ecological possibilities aredefined through these limits; it is necessary to remainwithin those limits, but it is also really possible tomove ‘freely’ inside the field. Real ecologicalpossibilities build an ideal field, in which some realpossibilities are never actualized. ‘Necessity’, in thiscase, means the limits which should not be exceeded. Inthe case of human ecology, various technical and culturalpossibilities make the situation more complex. Freedom toact exceeds the range of possibilities for human speciesand is larger than that for ants or other animals. Thefield of cultural possibilities is more strongly fictivethan the field of ecological possibilities and therefore,in culture, even more ‘mere possibilities’ never becomeactual. There will never be a real centaur or Golden Agein the total determination of the world.

Today, popular counterfactual questions, like “What wouldour recent world be like if Hitler had won the SecondWorld War?”, have, for Hartmann, no positive function. Inthis respect, his concept of causality is overly

deterministic. Counterfactual causality andcounterfactual thinking in general are important aspectsof scientific practice. For example, so-called ‘virtualhistory’ (Ferguson 1997) questions, concerning possiblealternatives to what actually happened, help toilluminate and understand better the meaning andsignificance of factual history or realized causalprocesses in history. It is also important to understandthat “what really happened” is always a more complexwhole than we can ever know. Sources are alwaysincomplete and historians must therefore “fill the gaps”with the help of rationally grounded imagination –estimations over what could have happened and whatprobably happened in a certain historical period.Hartmann’s concept of real possibilities is in thisrespect far too deterministic.

(b) manipulative causality and human action

The causal nexus is also contained as a subordinatefactor in the higher forms of determination, especiallyin the planned systems (Anlagesystem) of certain organicprocesses, and for the purposeful action of humankind.The organic planned system is a pre-existing and absolutereal structure. Hence, its effects on the process aredirect, causal effects throughout. By no means, though,does it contain all real conditions for thematerialization of the mature organism. This processremains, in each stage, dependent on certain externalfactors, such as the presence of warmth, humidity,

nutrients, etc. Hartmann typically stresses that“narrowly understood” there is an illusion of manypossibilities, for example, the possibility of theindividual’s perishing, but, “broadly understood, theycontain at every moment a totality of complexes ofconditions, which as such leave only one possibility”(Hartmann 2013, 256-7).

Also, on a higher ontological level, in the activerealization of purposes grounded in human anticipation,the actual realization is “not only a real process butalso a causal process”. The means of action are chosen byactive consciousness, whether they cause the desiredresult (the purpose) or not. What greatly differentiatesthis from other causal processes is “just that here apurpose and a selection of means guided by this purposehave led the way”. However, as in the case of organicdevelopment, here too “factors can emerge at every stageof the process that move events in a different directionfrom what had been anticipated – factors that were notforeseen”. Even in this case, Hartmann stresses that“narrowly understood, much is ‘possible’ in every stage,but broadly understood, only one thing is possible”. Butone thing is modally different: in the choosing of theend itself and in the selection of means “there isanother order” (Hartmann 2013, 257), there is place forhuman freedom.

Hartmann criticizes the traditional forms of teleologicalthinking15 and reserves for it a scientific role only in

15 See especially his last work Teleologisches Denken 1951; also Aestheticswas not completed by himself. It is clear that Hartmann’s deathbroke an intensive research period.

human sciences. In nature, causal processes are dominant.Although causal processes have some ‘direction’ they areessentially ‘blind’. It is important to note, that thisdeterministic blindness of causal processes makes humanfreedom possible. If natural processes would have theirown goals, humans couldn’t use them so easily as meansfor their higher purposes. Only humans are capable offinal determination and that is the reason why they areabove nature (Hartmann 1950, 333). Why are the causalprocesses able to being manipulated? According toHartmann, causality is simple and neutral, “the mostsimple basic form of linear real nexus”, and is based ona “minimum of linear determination”. It is, therefore,able to be super-formed (überformbar) without limits byhigher forms of determination. It is, for them, onlypassive matter, not able to resist the formation(Hartmann 1950, 334). This form of giving and directingof causal chains is also easy because the causal complexis not a closed system: we can choose those causalcomponents which are for us useful and direct the causalchain to a direction which is for us important. Causalcomplex does not have its own goals (Hartmann 1950, 337).

In Hartmann’s theory of human action, causal processeshave an important role. Like Kant, Collingwood andrecently von Wright (1971), Hartmann represents here theso-called manipulative concept of causality. He analyzesthe final nexus in three aspects (Hartmann 1951, 69):

“1. Act: Positing a goal in consciousness, transcendingthe limits of time in anticipation of future;

2. Act: Selection of means starting from posited goal inconsciousness (backward determination);

3. Act: Realization through the row of chosen (seligiert)means; real process to the right outside consciousness”

The final nexus is much more complex than the causalnexus. Anyway, the final nexus has an important causalaspect in Act 3. The realization of a goal happens inreal time and is a pure causal process. The meanssuccessively affect each other and realize, at the end ofthe process, the goal; together they form a causal row(Hartmann 1951, 70).16

It is important to stress, that causality is a necessarycondition of final action: the “causal nexus is anecessary condition of the final nexus and also itsfundamental categorical presupposition. If the meanswould not affect each other causally, no goals could berealized; it would remain only a positing of the goal,but the poseur (der Setzende) would be impotent to realizeit” (Hartmann 1951, 72). This general importance ofcausality demands a revision of traditional metaphysics,which saw in causal dependence a violation of humanfreedom. Hartmann writes: “Thorough causality does notprevent action, it is, on the contrary, itspresupposition. If the world would not be totally16 Von Wright’s famous ‘quasi-causal’ explanation resembles Hartmann’s model. VonWright stresses that the starting point of historical action is causallydetermined. Historical conditions make only certain kinds of actions reasonable.Means of action can also have such causal role: for example, changes intechnology or changes in the means of production make it causally possible toaccomplish things which before could not be done (Von Wright 1971, 143-144).Contrary to von Wright, this can also limit our possibilities. In our time, forexample, the internet has this kind of causal role: it helps us to pay bills,but, on the other hand, it makes the traditional ways to pay bills moredifficult. All people are finally forced to use the internet.

determined by causality, there could be no finalprocesses. Also striving, action, acts of free will areonly possible in a world, which is totally causallydetermined” (Hartmann 1951, 73).17 On the other hand,Hartmann stresses the meaning of the super-formation(Überformung) for this general role of causality. We mustask in every level of reality, what kind of special formsthis causal aspect takes. The final nexus is a super-formation of the causal nexus. This means that the finalnexus “directs the in-itself-blind causality towardscertain goals; it puts limits on causality, directs andarticulates it, gives it a meaning, and subordinates itto the values” (Hartmann 1951, 73).18

It is therefore meaningful to speak of different forms ofcausality depending on the ontological level. Philosophieder Natur mentions, besides physical causality, also“organical, psychical and historical causality, andcertainly also many types of special modifications ofthem” (Hartmann 1950, 358). As in the case of the problemof psycho-physics, it is enough to take into account“specific moments of causality” in the overall autonomicpsychical form of determination at the level ofpsyche/soul (Eigendetermination des Seelischen) (Hartmann 1950,360). On the other hand, at the level of history, thelower forms of determination are often in conflict withhigher forms, but not necessarily in a chaotic way17 ”Durchgehende Kausalität lähmt das Handeln keineswegs, sie ist vielmehr seineVoraussetzung. In einer Welt, die nicht durchgehend kausal determiniert wäre,könnte es keinen Finalprozess geben. Auch Wille, Streben, Handlung, die Akte derFreiheit, sind darum nur in einer schon durchgehend kausal determinierten Weltmöglich”.18 ”Damit eben überformt er ihn, lenkt ihn, den an sich blinden Kausalprozess,auf Zwecke hin; er begrenzt ihn zugleich, leitet, artikuliert ihn, gibt ihmeinen Sinn, spannt ihn in die Formgebung unter Werten ein”

(regellos). Historical determination often producesunintended consequences, which must be taken into account(Hartmann 1964, 288). Historical causality is mostlyindividual causality or complex network causality and cantherefore exemplify different aspects of causality muchbetter than, for example, a mechanistic law-causality inclassical physics.

History is, for us, of special interest, in that it isontologically a kind of mixed domain, in which differentlevels of reality interact. Contingency (Zufälligkeit) has,therefore, a major role in it, and predictions are inmost cases impossible. As Hartmann stresses in his theoryof modalities, contingency becomes a common phenomenon atthe limits of the spheres. He describes the role ofcontingency as follows: “An ontological sphere’s modalstructure may very well be understood without drawing incontingency … One must keep a place open for it at thelimits of the sphere. For, here, it takes the place ofnecessity” (Hartmann 2013, 99). For instance, inenvironmental history it is clear that suddenenvironmental changes, such as the cooling climate afterthe warm period of the Middle Ages, necessitated, forexample, the collapse of Norwegian settlement inGreenland (ca 1400) because cattle breeding becameimpossible. This effect was contingent at that time,since people had no idea how the climate works overextended periods.

Causality and interaction: a first step towards higher forms of determination

Compared to classical Humean causality and the lateranalytic discussion, the German discussion on causalitystressed the importance of ontological and categoricalcontextualization of causality. Especially the mostbrilliant thinkers of Classical German Idealism, Kant andHegel, introduced the concept of interaction(Wechselwirkung) as a first step to contextualize causalityto the more comprehensive system of human knowledge. Kantconnected, in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Kant 1974, 242-246), causal chains which exist in time to interaction ina spatial dimension. Hegel contextualized causality inhis onto-logical system of categories developed inWissenschaft der Logik (Hegel 1975, 237-240) and in the Logicof Enzyklopädie (Hegel 1983, 300-306) through interaction toa higher ontological level of the concept (Begriff).Hartmann refers to the discussion of interaction by Kantand by the neo-Kantians (his teachers Cohen and Natorp),but does not mention Hegel. In my mind, his basic idea ofinteraction is also Hegelian in the sense that causalityis, through interaction, sublated (Aufgehoben) as a momentin a higher ontological strata, for example, in anorganic whole, as in his first analysis of the concept(Hartmann 1912).

The basic idea of interaction, in Hartmann, is alreadyclear in this early work on the philosophy of biology.Here Hartmann defines nature as an “infinite complex ofcausal chains”. Causality is only a “one-sided expressionof this total law-like structure (Gesetzesstruktur) (ofnature)”. The problem is that causality “says nothingabout the connections of causal chains to each other”; itneeds, therefore, according to Kantian interaction

(Wechselwirkung), a complementary category that connects toit a second dimension (Hartmann 1912, 16-17). As does thenetwork model of causality, Hartmann interpretsinteraction as a multiple causation of one effect. Anatural entity is determined “through a whole complex ofpartial causes (Teilursachen)”. A natural entity(Naturgegenstand) is now understood as a “system of effects”, orspecifically determined movements. “A specific type offorming a system”19 is here essential. The concept of lawtransforms here to a concept of system (Cohen) (Hartmann1912, 17).

Hartmann develops the concept of interaction moreextensively in Philosophie der Natur. Interaction is, here, thefirst categorical step that connects causality to higherontological levels, their specific categories and formsof determination. Hartmann follows, and develops further,Kant’s basic definition in Kritik der reinen Vernunft when hedefines interaction as “the continuous, determinativecross-connectedness of all simultaneous events” in space.It bounds causal chains to more comprehensive wholes:“Only together with such cross-connectedness doescausality constitute that comprehensive linkage ofeverything appearing in the process that we know astemporally continuous dependency”. The difference betweencausality and interaction can be described in thefollowing way: “Causality corresponds to the “chain ofconditions” (Bedingungskette) that is successively beingfilled out, but the moment of interaction corresponds tothe simultaneous “complex of conditions”(Bedingungskomplex). The former is a longitudinal

19 … die besondere Art der Systembildung …

connection, but the latter is a holistic connection”(Hartmann 1950, 419-420, Hartmann 2013, 255, Hartmann1966, 232).

Moreover, in interaction the idea of causal determinismis changed. As a form of determination, interaction formsno row-like linear ‘nexus’, but rather, a“multidimensional, network-like simultaneity ofconditioning and being conditioned, and togetherness inthis unity.”20 This relatively new form of determinationis called a ‘total determination’ (Gesamtdetermination) towhich simple causal chains are harmonically united. Butthere can be also conflicts, as not all possibilities canexist simultaneously – interaction also means selectionof that which is really compossible (real Kompossible)(Hartmann 1950, 421-422).

This means that interaction is not so stronglydeterministic, like singular causal connections. But, atthe same time, it is not chaotic or totally free to formany possible combinations. Causality limited the many‘possibilities’ in its successive process to only one.Interaction limits the multiple possibilities ofcollocations (Kollokationen) to some basic types. Thisreturn of the same collocations in time is, of course,important for the possibility of the knowledge of nature:the same kind of typical processes repeatedly returnacross time (Hartmann 1950, 426-427). This extensiveprocessual connection expresses, in the end, also thereal meaning of causality in nature: without interaction20 ”Sie bildet keinen reihenhaft linearen ’Nexus’, der immer weiter läuft … sieist Determination im Sinne eines mehrdimensionalen, geflechtartigen, in derGleichzeitigkeit gegenseitigen Bedingens und Bedingtseins, sowie des in dieserBedingtheit zur Einheit gebundenen Zusammenbestehens.” (Hartmann 1950, 421).

causality would be only linear and ‘abstract’. In nature,on the contrary, the real fullness (reale Fülle) of causalprocesses has its content only in its coexistence withinteraction. In the last analysis, this depends on thecategorical structure of real connections(Realzusammenhang) (Hartmann 1950, 434).

Even this is not the whole story. As Hartmann notes inhis Teleologisches Denken (Hartmann 1951, 90), the richproblematic of interaction becomes totally manifest inthe category of dynamical structure (dynamische Gefüge),which also has been analyzed extensively in Philosophie derNatur. Natural systems, like the Earth (Erdkörper) orplanetary system (Planetensystem), are examples of suchprimary structures (primärer Gefüge). For example, a singlemountain is not a primary system, because it is producedthrough the geological dynamics of the primary system,the Earth (Hartmann 1950, 445-446). In addition, the ideaof dynamic system is – in Neo-Kantian terminology –presented by Hartmann, already in 1912, when he says thata planetary system is a typical example of a system ofmovements and forces (Bewegungs- und Kraftsystem) to whichinteractive causal chains are connected in a higher level(Hartmann 1912, 18).

In closing, what I have tried to show is that Hartmann’sconcept of causality is constructed, in all its aspects,in reference to his stratified ontology in general.Interaction is the first step in contextualizingcausality within different aspects of nature and itssystems. Compared to the contemporary discussion ofcausality in analytic philosophy, this reference tostratified ontology and the analysis of interaction are

very fruitful theoretical resources. For example, inenvironmental research, interactive connections betweencausal processes are very important to analyze. Questionsconcerning the causes of climate change also demand aconnection between different levels of reality, fromchemistry to economic analysis to the humanities.Ontological analysis is crucial to this kind ofmultidisciplinary work. Hartmann’s philosophy, as awhole, is able to show how this ontological approach ispossible, and serves, therefore, as an important sourceof inspiration for researchers now and into the future.

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