Al-Ghazali and David Hume On Necessary Causality

Course: Orient and OccidentTeacher(s): dr. dr. F.L. Roig Lanzillota and dr. S. Travagnin

Author: Anita van der BosStudent number: S2217473

Date of completion: 01-06-15

There are many philosophical problems that are of little or no

importance to the world outside the walls of the faculties of

philosophy. One problem, however, differs with respect to other

philosophical problems. This is the problem concerning

causality, which is seen as a genuine problem that has been of

importance for people who do not call themselves philosophers.1

So, what exactly makes the problem of causality not only urgent

for philosophers but also for natural scientists? In general

the problem is described as follows: we witness the sun rising

in the east and setting in the west, but this does not mean

that we can be certain that the sun will rise and set again

tomorrow. From this the conclusion follows that past

experiences are no guarantee for future experiences. It is

evident that the problem of causation has major consequences

for our daily life and scientific research.

Disproving the notion of causality has been traditionally

linked to the Scottish philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), but

an Arabic philosopher also assessed it 600 years earlier. This

philosopher is Al-Ghazali (1058-1111) and he argues among the

same lines as Hume. 2 It seems like Hume was not that original

after all, and that many scholars of contemporary philosophy

are ignorant of the fact that some of the most important

philosophical issues of the modern period have long before been

discussed. But despite their many similarities, both Al-Ghazali1 See for example Celia Green (2003) and Judea Pearl (2000).2 Al-Ghazali’s influence on Hume when it comes down to causality is pretty clear. Hume knew Islamic philosophy and Islamic religion when he wrote his Treatise in which he said: “To begin with contiguity; it has been remark’d among the Mahometans as well as Christians, that those pilgrims, who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever after more faithful and zealous believers, than those who have not had that advantage.” (Treatise, IX. 62). See also Ariew, R. and Watkins, E. (2000). Vol. II. 270.

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and Hume arrive at radical different conclusions to their

findings. In this paper I will examine the differences and

similarities between both authors and explain in which way

their conclusions differ.

Before I will set out the theories of Al-Ghazali and Hume it is

important to understand what causality means in every day

terms.3 There is causality when a cause occurs and its effect

follows. This is explained by the following formula:

(A) (B) [h (A) h (B)]

This means that for any two events, A and B, when A happens

this leads to B taking place. This formula is applicable in a

lot of fields. Necessary causality is defined as “the idea that

the relation between a cause and its effect is necessary and

always true.”4

1. Al-Ghazali

The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause

and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary.5

Abu Hamid Muhammed ibn Muhammed Al-Ghazali lived in the 11th

century in Persia during the Islamic Golden Age. He was a

Muslim, theologian, philosopher, jurist, and a mystic of 3 Al-Allaf, M. Philosophy of Science and Al-Ghazali’s Conception of Causality, URL = http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/ma/works/ma-gz-ps.pdf. 1.4 Aftab, M. Primer on Islam and the Problem of Causation, Induction, and Skepticism, URL = http://www.muslimphilosophy.com/journal/is-01/primr-ma.htm5 Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 166.

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Persian lineage.

In his book The Incoherence of the Philosophers6 Al-Ghazali

engages in a discussion with the falsafa tradition, a loosely

defined group of Islamic philosophers from the 8th through the

11th centuries, in particular its members Avicenna and Al-

Farabi. Al-Ghazali goes against the falsafa tradition because

he is concerned with the question about how to read the Koran.

This relates to a huge discussion that was going on during that

time, concerning which passages of the Koran should be read

literally. But as soon as you accept that there is a

distinction between the literal and metaphorical meaning, the

obvious question is which passage you have to read as which.

Al-Ghazali uses the following principle: if you can read the

passage literally, you should. According to Al-Ghazali this

goes for the cases where it has not been demonstrated that the

literal meaning is impossible. As soon as the falsafa tradition

has demonstrated something with certainty that goes against the

Koran, then the answer is that we should not read that passage

literally.

1.1. Al-Ghazali on causality and miracles

In the most important discussion, the one about causality,

Al-Ghazali comes up with alternative theories in order to

refute the theories given by the philosophers of the falsafa

tradition. Al-Ghazali denies the existence of necessary

causality because there is, according to him, no necessary

6 Al-Ghazali, A.H.M. (2000). The Incoherence of the Philosophers. (trans., Marmura, M.E.). Utah: Brigham Young University Press.

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connection between a cause and an effect. He states that “the

connection between what is believed to be the cause and the

effect is not necessary. Take any two things. This is not That,

nor can That be This.”7 This means that the confirmation of one

thing does not lead to the confirmation of the other. Likewise,

the denial of the one does not lead to the denial of the other.

When an effect exist, then this is not entailed by the

existence of the cause. Likewise, when an effect does not

exist, then this is not entailed by the absence of the cause.8

Al-Ghazali mentions that there are philosophers who claim

that miracles are impossible, since they are in contradiction

with the natural and established flow of cause and effect.9 Al-

Ghazali wants to defend the possibility of miracles, but why is

the discussion of causality connected with miracles? If

causality is the necessary connection between cause and effect,

then miracles such as Abraham not being burnt by the fire are

impossible. If such miracles are impossible, then parts of the

Koran in which miracles occur should not be read literally.10

Al-Ghazali states that we were too hasty in our

definitions of the terms cause and effect. When two things

happen in conjunction with one another, we assume right away

that the first is the cause and that the latter is the natural

and necessary effect. Al-Ghazali objects this and offers a

distinction between an event happening with another event and

an event actually happening by another event.11 “With” asserts

7 Ibid. 166, 174.8 Ibid.9 Ibid. 166.10 Ibid. 169-170.11 Ibid. 167.

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nothing about one event being the effect of the other. To the

contrary “by” is a claim that one event is the exclusive source

of the occurrence of another event.12 We see, for example, a

person lighting a match. He holds the match near a piece of

cotton which results in the burning of the cotton. We see this

time and time again and in each situation the person lights the

match and brings it into contact with the cotton. The contact

of the burning match with the cotton is what we identify as the

cause. In conjunction with it we also always see the cotton

catching fire, and this is why we call this the necessary

effect. But why do we assign a certain effect to such a cause?

1.2. Custom, habit and the role of God

According to Al-Ghazali “the continuous habit of their

occurrence repeatedly, one time after another, fixes unshakably

in our minds the belief in their occurrence according to past

habit.”13 We assign an effect to a cause out of habit because

we expect a certain effect when given a certain cause; it is

what we have always observed.

In order to allow for miracles to happen, Al-Ghazali

argues that it is not irrational for an effect not to happen

when we see the cause of which we customarily believe it to be

the cause of that effect.14 According to Al-Ghazali “we allow

the possibility of the occurrence of the contact [between

12 Paulsen, D. and Madsen, E. (2000). Review of the Incoherence of the Philosophers, inBrighton Young Studies. URL = https://ojs.lib.byu.edu/spc/index.php/BYUStudies/article/viewFile/6833/6482, 26713 Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 170.14 Ibid. 166-167.

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cotton and fire] without the burning, and we allow as possible

the occurrence of the cotton’s transformation into burnt ashes

without contact with the fire.”15 This means that – and this is

the reason why Al-Ghazali analyses causality – when a miracle

happens, it is something completely rational. We believe a

miracle to be miraculous because it is different from what we

expect. It goes against our experience, and against what we

believe to be natural law.

Thus Al-Ghazali argues that there is no causality involved

in cause and effect. But this gives rise to a major problem. If

the connection is not necessary, what does it stop from being

completely random? How can you claim that there is a regular

conjunction in the first place? Al-Ghazali’s opponents noticed

this is as well. They gave all kinds of weird examples of

unexpected semi-causal events when talking about the

consequences of Al-Ghazali’s position. Al-Ghazali has absorbed

this criticism in his book and explains that his opponents gave

examples of the following kind:

If someone leaves a book in the house, let him allow as possible

its change on his returning home into a beardless slave boy … or

into an animal, or if he leaves a boy in his house, let him allow

the possibility of his changing into a dog; or again if he leaves

ashes, let him allow the possibility of its change into musk; and

let him allow the possibility of stone changing into gold and gold

into stone. If asked about any of this, he ought to say: “I do not

know what is at the house at present. All I know is that I have

left a book in the house, which is perhaps now a horse that has

15 Ibid. 167.7

defiled the library with its urine and dung, and that I have left

in the house a jar of water, which may well have turned into an

apple tree.”16

If we assume these examples to be valid, then anything goes. It

becomes impossible to decide, or to know what is going on.

This is a serious problem, but Al-Ghazali gives us a

solution. According to Al-Ghazali “God created for us the

knowledge that He did not enact these possibilities.”17 We have

seen this regular conjunction which makes us expect the same

thing happening the next time. But what allows us to rely on

this conjunction is that God created in us the faith that

things happen in this way.

What this means is that the causal links we see in nature

by observing her are not necessary causal links. Nature behaves

in a regular way and this makes it possible for us to obtain

certain knowledge about nature. But the uniformity of nature is

not made possible because causality is inherent in natural

things. It is made possible because God wanted it to be so and

he is also able stop the regularity of nature to allow for

miracles to happen.

The causality denied by Al-Ghazali is the one defended by

the philosophers of the falsafa tradition. They hold that there

is a necessary causal order that is essential for nature. Al-

Ghazali argues that there is another type of causality in which

Gods omnipotence is only restrained by the natural order

16 Ibid. 170.17 Ibid.

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created by God himself. When you hold, like Al-Ghazali, that

the uniformity of nature is created by Gods will, then you

allow the possibility for miracles to happen. Because of the

uniformity of nature it is also possible for us to infer causal

relations with certainty. But it should be stressed that these

causal relations are not necessary causal relations.

2. Hume

All belief of matter of fact or real existence is derived merely

from some object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary

conjunction between that and some other object.18

The empiricist David Hume wrote two major works about human

understanding. The first one is the Treatise19 which is more

elaborate and more technically written. This work hardly

enjoyed any response. That is why Hume wrote his second work

the Enquiry20. He adjusted the material of the Treatise and added a

part on ethics. He also wrote it in a less technical manner.

According to Hume we should no longer read the Treatise, since

the Enquiry is the definite texts which will show clearly how

everything works.21 This is why my main focus is on the Enquiry.

2.1. Hume on causality, custom and habit

18 Hume, D. Enquiry, V.I.38.19 Hume, D. (1896). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: Clarendon Press.20 Hume, D. (2007). An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.21 Morris, W. E. and Brown, C. R., "David Hume", in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Zalta, N. E. (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/hume/>. Chapter 2.

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For Hume the issue of the natural connection between a cause

and its effect was one of philosophical curiosity. He tries to

proof in his Enquiry that our knowledge and our thoughts can be

traced back to sensory experience. As a supplement to John

Locke’s theory of ideas Hume claims that all perceptions from

the mind consist of impressions and ideas. Because philosophy

already consists of too much empty assumptions, Hume wants to

use the scientific method of Isaac Newton for his research. By

means of this he introduces his scientific approach to man and

mankind’s experience based on ideas.

According to Hume, people assume that the past looks like the

future and that causes will have the same effects time after

time. But we cannot assume this on the basis of proven

premises. If we cannot do this on the basis of proven premises,

then there must be something else that makes us believe that

the past looks like the future and that causes will have the

same effects. This ‘thing’ is what Hume refers to as custom,

habit or nature. Hume explains that causality is the cause for

something else to happen, but it is not something that you can

detect. At the moment when you do not see causality, there must

be another mechanism that gives you the idea of causality. This

mechanism is again custom, habit or nature. Since we cannot

perceive causality, we do not have an impression of it. But

since, according to Hume, each idea has to be traced back to

one or more impressions, to which impressions can the idea of

causality be traced back to?

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2.2. Hume’s fork

Hume introduces his ‘fork’ to determine to which impressions

the idea of causality can be traced back to. He distinguishes

between relations of ideas and reasoning concerning matters of

fact. An idea is something that the mind perceives in itself,

whether it is the direct object of perception, a thought of it,

or the understanding of it. Perception of the mind consists of

impressions and ideas. Impressions are “all our lively

perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate,

or desire, or will.”22 Ideas are less vivid and less strong

than impressions. They are thoughts, physical representations,

images of the memory or fantasy, imagination and concepts. The

relation between impressions and ideas is that ideas are copies

of impressions, and it is also possible to combine ideas and

impressions. We can reduce complex ideas to singular ideas

which are copies of impressions. When we experience

deficiencies in our organs of perceptions, this results in

deficiencies in our ideas. The possibility to trace ideas back

to impressions is an important criteria for the practicality of

our concepts (ideas). Relations of ideas are to be determined

by their contents, they are propositions that are intuitively

or demonstratively certain. This means that they are

propositions that are known to us a priori, without the use of

the senses. This goes for the sciences of geometry, algebra and

arithmetic. Relations of ideas can be discovered just by the

use of thought and denying such a proposition results in a

22 Hume, D. Enquiry, V.II.1211

contradiction.23

Matters of fact, in contrast, are not to be discovered a

priori. This means that we have to look to the tangible world

and use our senses to get to know them. Matters of fact are

therefore to be discovered a posteriori. Also, the denial of a

matter of fact never results in a contradiction:

The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it

can never imply a

contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility

and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the

sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition,

and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it

will rise.24

When you deny in mathematics, for example, that two and two

equals four, this does give you a contradiction. But when you

empirically, thus by using your senses, deny that friction is

the cause of metal fatigue, this does not give you a

contradiction since there can be many causes for metal fatigue.

2.3. Causal relations

Hume mentions that “all reasonings concerning matter of fact

seem to be founded on the relation of cause and effect.”25

Meaning that reasoning concerning matters of fact consist of

links between things that we can perceive. All our causal

23 Ibid. IV.I.2024 Ibid. (2007). IV.I.21.25 Ibid. (2007). IV.I.22.

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judging is the cause of the fact that we can only make an

appeal to our experience. When we see A following after B, we

assume that B will happen when we see A. It is a feeling that

arises in us, and it happens to us as a kind of necessity. Yet

it is only just a feeling, which does not mean that it is

nothing, but that it is something unreasonable since we have

not conducted it by means of our reason. We have impressions of

things happening after each other, and a feeling that the one

happens after the other. As an example Hume tells us about a

man who finds a watch on an uninhabited island and concludes

that there has been a person on that island. This is a good

example of what we humans do all the time. We constantly

suppose that there is a connection between a present fact and

what is inferred from that fact. The knowledge of this relation

between a present fact and its derivative “arises entirely from

experience, when we find that any particular objects are

constantly conjoined with each other.”26 In the case of the man

who found a watch on a deserted island, he concluded that there

must have been a person on that island because he has the past

experience that a watch is manmade and that only humans wear

them. But our past experience only gives us information about

how things were in the past, they do not give any certainty

about how things will be in the future.

I have explained that according to Hume causality is something

we apply to nature. When we have seen something happening time

and time again, we get the strong feeling to expect that same

thing happening again. According to Hume “all inferences from 26 Ibid. IV.I.23.

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experience, therefore, are effect of custom, not of

reasoning.”27 This is why Hume concludes that “all belief of

matter of fact or real existence is derived merely from some

object, present to the memory or senses, and a customary

conjunction between that and some other object.”28 Since we are

unable to prove by reasoning that there is a connection between

cause and effect, Hume concludes that the problem of causality

is to be found in the domain of matters of fact. But why then

does our experience show us a working connection between a

cause and effect? Hume mentions that it is custom, nature or

habit that makes us believe that the same effect will happen

after a cause. Causality is the force of custom and it is

deeply rooted in our nature. It compels us to believe that when

we have seen the sun rise time and time again, we expect it to

rise again tomorrow.

3. Differences and similarities

As I said in the introduction of this paper, Al-Ghazali’s ideas

on causality are similar to the one’s of Hume. Al-Ghazali

mentions that “the connection between what is habitually

believed to be the cause and what is habitually believed to be

an effect is not necessary.”29 Hume also denied necessary

causality when he mentions that “when we look about us towards

external objects, and consider the operation of causes, we are

never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or

necessary connexion; any quality, which binds the effect to the27 Ibid. V.I.36.28 Ibid. V.I.38.29 Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 166.

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cause, and renders the one an infallible consequence of the

other.”30 Hume is thus far in agreement with Al-Ghazali,

stating that all we can get from observation is the happening

of one event after the other. There is no necessary connection

between the two.

3.1. Custom and habit

Hume also agrees with Al-Ghazali, speaking earlier in his

Enquiry about cause and effect, that people are inclined to make

a link of cause and effect between two events out of “custom or

habit”31 Al-Ghazali mentions, in his religious approach, that

the customary linking of cause and effect is based on nature.

It can be said that Hume would agree with this, because, in his

earlier work the Treatise, Hume mentions the principle of

Uniformity of Nature and this principle states that “we acquire

a general habit, by which we always transfer the known to the

unknown, and conceive the latter to resemble the former.”32

Both Hume and Al-Ghazali allow for nature to generally work in

a uniform way, and both authors state that causality is never

necessary.

3.2. Logic

At times Al-Ghazali’s arguments look very theological, and you

may therefore think that his arguments are not that logical.

For example he states that “the one who enacts the burning [of

30 Hume, D. Enquiry. VII.I.50.31 Ibid. V.I.36.32 Hume, D. Treatise, IX. 84.

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the cotton] by creating blackness in the cotton, causing

separation in its parts, and making it cider or ashes, is God,

either through the mediation of His angles or without

meditation.33 But Steven Nadler argues that Al-Ghazali does

have a logical orientation when he talks about necessary

connections in nature. When you look at it like this, Al-

Ghazali comes very close to Hume’s assert. I have already

mentioned Al-Ghazali’s argument on the existential distinction

and independence between “causes” and “effects” (“This is not

That; nor can That be This”34). Nadler also uses this argument

and concludes that Al-Ghazali deals with logical relations:

“Clearly, this is a logical point; it requires no theological

assumptions; nor does it, for Ghazali, rest upon any.”35 The

difference between Al-Ghazali and Hume is, according to Nadler,

in this regard instructive. According to Nadler Al-Ghazali

denies necessary connections out of ontological concerns, Hume,

on the contrary, had an epistemological orientation: “In the

most well-known use of this argument, Hume concludes only to an

epistemological claim: whether or not there are any necessary

connections in nature, we can never rationally justify our

belief in them… The occasionalists Malebranche and Al-Ghazali,

on the other hand, go further and argue that where there are no

demonstrable causal relations, there are no causal relations

tout court.”36 Nadler explains that Hume’s conclusion is that

we are unable to rationally defend necessary connections in

33 Al-Ghazali. Incoherence, 167.34 Ibid. 166, 174.35 Nadler, S. (1996). “No Necessary Connection”, in The Monist, vol. 79 , no. 3. 45736 Nadler, S. “No Necessary Connection”, 463.

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nature. Hume leaves the question open whether there are such

connections. Al-Ghazali goes further in this manner than Hume

and concludes that it is impossible for necessary connections

to exist in nature because we are unable to justify them.

3.3. Epistemology, ontology, and religion

I wish to argue that, in respect to the relation between

theology, ontology and epistemology, Hume and Al-Ghazali do not

differ as much as Nadler argues. Al-Ghazali’s theological

statements are justified not only by ontological concerns, but

also by epistemological concerns. Both Hume and Al-Ghazali

argue that to follow after does not mean to follow from. Al-

Ghazali explains that God is the one who has established the

arrangement of causality, in that sense God is always the final

cause. This means that the sequencing force in nature is very

important in it, but it surpasses nature at the same time. This

is the essence of Islamic epistemology, meaning that we cannot

fully know nature due to the power that is both inherent and

transcendental in it. Al-Ghazali’s Islam gives us a level of

certainty sufficient for us to get along, but it does not

promise us absolute certainty. The same goes for Hume, his

findings do not give us full certainty concerning causality and

the patterns of nature.

Even though we are unable to decipher nature completely,

both Al-Ghazali and Hume state that we can know things for

certain. In this sense ontology and epistemology are

intrinsically related with one another. According to Hume,

knowledge of pure mathematics is one of those things that we

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can know for certain because it relies only on the relations of

ideas, without making assumptions about the world. Experimental

observations, directed without any assumption of the existence

of material objects, allows us to use our experience in the

forming of helpful habits. Other epistemological efforts,

especially those claiming to achieve useful abstract knowledge,

are pointless and deceptive. Hume accepts the limitations of

human knowledge while following the valid aims of math and

science.37

What do we know for certain according to Al-Ghazali? Why

do miracles not prevent our knowledge of the empirical world?

Admitting that if they did, a man who left a book in his home

would have to say, “I do not know what is at the house at

present. All I know is that I have left a book in the house,

which is perhaps now a horse.” We have already seen Al-

Ghazali’s answer to this problem: God is the source of our

knowledge. It seems like Al-Ghazali contrasts the ‘knowledge’

of experience, which only leads to the habit of expecting a

certain cause after a certain event, with a certain knowledge

created in us by God. According to Al-Ghazali, the habit of

knowing caused by experience is not knowledge necessary things;

only knowledge caused by God is certain.

3.4. Scientific knowledge

Does Al-Ghazali’s stance, just as Hume’s, not allow for

scientific knowledge at all? According to Al-Ghazali, natural

causes can be viewed as causes if we appeal to a weaker notion

37 Ibid. XII, 3.18

of causality. He grants that a natural cause has a nature which

brings about certain effects. So can we say about fire that is

has the nature of burning everything with witch it is in

contact. But by stating this Al-Ghazali does not imply that

fire is a necessary cause, fire in contact with cotton does not

logically entail the existence of the burning of the cotton.

Fire has received its nature from God, and God decides if he

will give rise to the normal effect of that nature or not.38 By

stating that a natural cause has a nature Al-Ghazali leaves

room for scientific knowledge about them. Al-Ghazali denies

that this kind of knowledge creates necessary knowledge –

scientific discourse is limited, because it cannot determine if

some natural cause will be overruled by godly mediation. What

Al-Ghazali does is in fact the same as Hume: showing that

knowledge is not of relationships which are logically

necessary.39

Conclusion

I have explained why the problem concerning causality is such a

pressing one; it is a threat for our everyday live and

scientific research. I have also explained that causality is

described as the relation between a cause and an effect and

that David Hume is the name mostly linked to the problem of

causality. In his Treatise of Human Nature and his Enquiry Concerning

Human Understanding he stated that there is no causality to be

perceived in nature and that we make causal links out of custom38 Al-Ghazali, Incoherence, 167, 169, 17139 Adamson, P. (date unknown). Al-Ghazali, Causality, and Knowledge, URL = https://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Medi/MediAdam.htm

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or habit. But Hume might not be so original after all.

Centuries before him, the Islamic philosopher Al-Ghazali coined

the same ideas. In his text The Incoherence of the Philosophers he also

stated that there is no causality to be perceived in nature. He

also mentions that we assign an effect to a cause out of habit

because we expect a certain effect when given a certain cause;

it is what we have always observed.

The question then is how much Hume resembles Al-Ghazali. I

have already mentioned that they both claim that there is no

causality to be perceived in nature. Concerning the nature of

this causality they are in agreement; causality is never

necessary. But the reasons why they argue this are different.

Al-Ghazali makes this claim out of theological motivations, he

wants to sustain the omnipotence of God and allow for the

possibility of miracles. For Hume the issue of the natural

connection between a cause and its effect was one of

philosophical curiosity. He tries to proof in his Enquiry that

our knowledge and our thoughts can be traced back to sensory

experience.

Hume and Al-Ghazali also claim both that we make causal

links out of habit and they also both allow for nature to

generally work in a uniform way. Hume states this because he

does not fully deny the existence of causality, he just argues

that we cannot perceive it. Al-Ghazali, on the other hand, is

more radical. According to him causality does not exist at all

and the reason why nature generally works in a uniform way is

because God created in us the faith that things happen in this

way. God can stop nature from working in a uniform way, and

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this is how miracles are possible.

According to both authors certain knowledge is possible.

Hume explains that this only goes for the domain of pure

mathematics, while Al-Ghazali states that only a knowledge

produced by God is certain. When it comes down to experiential

knowledge, nothing is necessary.

We have seen two theories on causality that look a lot

like each other. Yet the conclusions resulting from these two

theories are completely different. Al-Ghazali’s theory proves

the omnipotence of God and the existence of miracles while

Hume’s theory proves that everything can be explained within

the boundaries of nature. These conclusions could not be more

different.

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