Nehru as the Sole Arbiter of Indian Foreign Policy: An Analytical Review of the Years 1947-64

UOS Journal of Social Sciences & Humanities (UOSJSSH) ISSN# Print: 2224-2341, Online: 2310-0249 Volume: 2, No. 2 (Winter 2013)

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Nehru as the Sole Arbiter of Indian Foreign Policy: An

Analytical Review of the Years 1947-64

Dr. Mussarat Jabeen

Assistant Professor, Department of IR & Political Science, University of

Sargodha, Pakistan

Abstract: Jawaharlal Nehru was the architecture of modern India after its

independence in 1947.Apart from handling the domestic situation, Nehru’s

major contribution lies in the area of external relations as he kept foreign

affairs under his strict control over seventeen years and made all the major

foreign policy decisions himself merely getting consultation from his

advisers and aides. Constructing the conceptual frame work of foreign

policy, Nehru abrogated to himself the role of the sole arbiter of Indian

foreign policy. His policies were characterized by ideological perspective

including Panchsheel, nonalignment, colonialism and racism. Formulating

the foreign policy, Nehru not only considered the other states’ foreign

policies but also observed the trends in contemporary world politics. These

two traditionally discrete realms known as inter-domestic politics

increasingly influenced the Indian foreign policy jointly highlighting the

need for the leader to integrate his domestic and foreign policies. All

activities occurring beyond India’s borders structured the choices of

Nehru’s policymaking. He wanted India to have an identity without overt

commitment to either power bloc; the USA and the Soviet Union. The paper

is to analyze the internationalist approach of Nehru in foreign policy-

making, which led him to find solution in non-alignment and Punjsheel.

Despite these peaceful looking policy, the question is Indian clashwith its

neighbors; Pakistan over Kashmir and China over the border. Keeping in

view, these two opposite direction, Nehru’s foreign policy has been

analyzeddiscussing different issues and occasions.

Key Words: Non-alignment, border war, security, bloc, communism,

domestic policies, foreign affairs, wars, peace, colonialism.

UOSJSSH. Volume, 2. No. 2 (Winter 2013)

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Introduction

Foreign policy is generally determined by a number of historical,

philosophical, cultural and domestic factors, which shape the objectives of a

nation in different areas. Foreign policyis also influenced by geostrategic

location, ideology, tradition, military might, economic power and system of

government. These dynamics are carried out in foreign policy choices.

However, diverse systems of states make it difficult to generalize the

influence of any one factor or combination of factors within the

contemporary state system. To determine the relative impacts of specific

factors under different circumstances, one must distinguish between the

global and internal influences on policy choices through levels of analysis.

The concept of levels-of-analysis helps to describe the influences of internal

and external factors on states’ decision-making processes. The state and

global systems make two distinct levels. The state level encompasses the

domestic characteristics, and the global system level covers the interstate

relations indicating changes in mutual relations over the time. In

formulation of the foreign policy, not only the states’ foreign policies but

trends in world politics also play their respective roles. Although these two

traditionally discrete realms have become increasingly fused in what has

become known as inter-domestic politics, highlighting the need for leaders

to integrate their domestic and foreign policies at both levels (Mingst,

2004). External influences on foreign policy include all activities occurring

beyond a state’s borders that structure the choices of its policymakers.

These include the content of international law, the number of military

alliances, power of international organizations, deterioration of the global

environment, changing levels of international trade and many others, which

sometimes profoundly affect the choices of decision-makers (Jackson &

Sorensen, 2003). Internal or domestic influences exist at the state level.

There is variation in states’ attributes, such as military capabilities, level of

economic development, and types of government, which usually influence

foreign policy behavior of states. These two levels are useful for purposes

of analysis. Pundit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Indian prime minister, kept in

view the external environment as well as domestic politics in formulation of


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the foreign policy.

Foreign Policy Objectives of Jawaharlal Nehru

Jawaharlal Nehru was one of the most active political figures during

independence movement of India. After independence, he kept foreign

policy under his tight control and foreign office followed the dictum ‘Papa

knows best.’ From the early days of his premiership, Nehru attempted to

prevent India’s Balkanization and he found the solution in different policies,

which were characterized by diverse ideologies as he wanted India to have a

leadership role in world affair without aligning to the power blocs led by the

US and the Soviet Union. Ganguly (2010) wrote the main objectives of

Nehru’s foreign policy were, “….preservation of national interest,

achievement of world peace, disarmament, [and] independence for Afro-

Asian nations.” He himself outlined his foreign policy in his address to the

Constituent Assembly in December 1947 and declared, “Ultimately foreign

policy is the outcome of economic policy, and till that time, when India has

properly evolved her economic policy, her foreign policy will be rather

vague, rather inchoate, and will grope about”(Schottli,2009). For pursuit of

these foreign policy objectives, Nehru moved ultimately to the founding of

the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM). The policy of nonalignment drew

the link between the foreign policy and economic policy enabling India to

get economic assistance from both blocs at the same time. Nehru believed

in internationalism and tried to maintain honesty and goodwill in matters of

international affairs. He wanted a cordial and mutually beneficial

relationship with China and the Panchsheel (five principles) was initiated

between New Delhi and Peking on 29th April 1954 for this purpose

(Shankar, 2007).In Nehru’s words,

“India does not propose to join any camp or alliance. But we wish to

cooperate with all in the quest for peace and security and human

brotherhood…..Peaceful coexistence is not a new idea for us in India. It has

been our way of life and is as old as our thought and culture…..From this it

has naturally followed that we should keep ourselves free from military and


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like alliances and have not joined any of the great power groups that

dominate the world today. It is in no spirit of pride or arrogance that we

pursue our independent policy…..We welcome association and friendship

with all and the flow of thought and ideas of all kinds, but we reserve the

right to choose our own path. That is the essence of Panchsheel” (Schottli,

2009: 267).

However, his faith in Panchsheel was terribly shaken by the Chinese attack

of 1962, which was an open violation of all the clauses of the treaty or five-

point agreement. This breach of faith was a major psychological shock for

Nehru, and was partially the reason for his death. Nehru was greatly

influenced by the non-violence philosophy of Gandhi. In 1927, he attended

the Brussels conference of oppressed nationalities and his political thinking

was influenced by his interaction with various leftist elements but he

committed himself to neither viewpoint in framing the foreign policy. Non-

violence and non-alignment became the cornerstones of Indian foreign

policy along with anti-colonialism and racial discrimination (Quest, 2012;

Schottli, 2009). Nehru was keen to secure an honourable place for India in

the world affair. After the World War II, the West viewed that communism

as a greater threat as compared to colonialism but Nehru condemned all

forms of colonialism and imperialism and rejected the view that

communism was the real question. Having victim of British imperialism

before Indian independence, Nehru viewed colonialism representing the

biggest threat to Asia and Africa leading them to communism. He argued

that both ideologies are of European origin and India’s position was to end

the colonial rule. Therefore, Nehru advocated freedom of Asian and African

nations and decided to extend full support to their cause of freedom. The

Dutch colony of Indonesia had been taken by the Japanese during the WWII

and remained under their control from 1942 to 1945. After Japanese defeat,

Netherland tried to reinstate its rule. India not only opposed it in the UN but

also support the Indonesia (Dutch colonization…, 2006).


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Indian Policy of Non-alignment

Indian policy of non-alignment was the greatest success of Jawaharlal

Nehru’s non-committal international politics. In Nehru’s view, Indian

interests were global in their nature rather than domestic. A significant

milestone in the development of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was

the Bandung Conference of 1955, a conference of Asian and African states.

The conference was hosted by Indonesian President Sukarno, who played a

significant role in promoting the NAM. The participants declared their

desire not to be involved in the Cold War rivalries adopting a declaration

for promotion of peace and cooperation among themselves, which included

five principles or Panchsheel. This phrase was first used by Nehru in 1954

in Colombo (Sri Lanka) in a speech (Non-alignment was coined..,

2006).These five pillars were to lay foundation of Sino-Indian relations,

which were first put forth by Chinese leader Zhou En Lai. Six years after

Bandung, Yugoslav President Josip Broz’s initiative led to the first

Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries,

which was held in September 1961 in Belgrade (Gopal, 1989:

474.).Panchsheellater served as the basis of the NAM. These are mentioned

as following:

Mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty

Mutual non-aggression

Mutual non-interference in domestic affairs

Equality and mutual benefit

Peaceful co-existence

NAM was an alliance of newly independent and long colonized nations.

Singh (1993: 11-12) defines nonalignment as: “India’s determination to stay

out of military alliances with any country of the Western or communist bloc

and to avoid being tied down to a particular line of action because of

membership of a Cold War bloc or of the Commonwealth. It also signifies

Indian attempts to maintain friendly relations with all countries whether


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belonging to military blocs or not. The non-alignment was a move away

from colonial powers specifically British that marked a sharp delineation

between the colonial era and independent India. On a broader perspective,

this was cost-effective method to keep all external powers out of Asia

(Thakar, 1999). The norms included in Non-alignment were inscribed in

Indian history known as anti-colonialism. India’s passive role in colonial

era was visible during the Great Game of the 1850s when Russia and

Britain challenged each other to gain control of strategic locations in South

Asia, grabbing land and extending borders. Many Indian viewed the Cold

War as the new version of the same pre-occupations of the great powers,

albeit the players were changed as the US and the Soviet were participating

in the new game. Indian choice of neutrality inhibited the tactics of the great

powers that tempted the nations offering economic and military aid (Rotter,

2000).

However, the view about the Soviet Union was a little bit different as it was

an Asian power having legitimate security concerns in the region. Nehru

showed such opinion in his visit to Moscow in 1927, “Russia could never

become a threat to India in the foreseeable future and is not a colonial

power and has not a colonial past” (Cohen, 2001: 272).While India

suspected that the US undercut Indian natural and rightful regional

dominance while the Soviet Union was friendly towards it.

Expectations of Superpowers and Non-alignment

Bipolarization of the world between the two superpowers led the whole

world to the Cold War that created tension. Early American policies were

conflicting with Indian approach on issues like Suez war, Hungarian crisis,

Goa, Kashmir and China. Economic aid, social discrimination and support

of colonial nations by the US were also viewed by India in the Cold War

perspective and Nehru was not willing to make his country a part of all

these policies. He preferred to keep himself away from power bloc in the

interests of India. As he commented, “If there is a cold war today, certainly

we are neutral, it does not matter who is right or wrong we will not join in


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this exhibition of mutual abuse” (Nehru, 1952). According to McMahon

(1994), “India had domestic consideration for pursuit of non-alignment as it

was facing social and economic problems and was very badly in need of

foreign aid and investment, which was required to alleviate its crushing

poverty and produce economic relief for its teeming multitudes. The Indian

politicians expected that non-alignment would make it possible for

receiving economic aid from both the Western and Eastern blocs. Such

outcome was beneficial for India not only in terms of economic aid but for

its diversifying geo-strategic relationship by ending its dependence upon

any one particular source of economic support. The pursuit of these goals

was also one reason of keeping Nehru away from the power blocs. He just

tried to maintain friendly relations with both the superpowers. The Cold

War brought foreign military bases in Asia and Africa as allies have to pay

some price in return of military and economic aid. This situation was not

congenial for promotion of international peace and security.

The dogged commitment of Nehru was not viewed positively with either of

the superpowers at its initial stage. It was termed as a type of international

opportunism and branded as ‘neutralism’ by the American public opinion.

The New York Times (1956, July 12) commented that this policy was

adopted to avoid the Cold war and act as ‘one thinks the best’. It was also

argued by American leaders that policy of non-alignment did not imply the

neutralism as it implied a refusal to express positive views on specific

issues and reluctance to pursue the expression of these views with positive

action. The factors for the growth of non-alignment were different. Dulles

declared that this policy was to best gain safety for itself by being

indifferent to the fate of others. He argued that security could be best

preserved though the membership of the UN, which itself committed to the

principal of standing together against aggression. This policy did not

support the political relations between the two countries (Rao, 1985). Times

of India (1960, May 26) shared Washington’s doubts about the policy of

Nixon and Dulles that might drive India and other nations of Asia to the

Soviet camp. It was thought that policy of non-alignment did not imply the

neutralism as argued by the American leaders.


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Nehru opposed the basic American policies of mutual security arrangements

and military alliances, which were designed to contain the Soviet

communism as the US interpreted that Soviet expansionism was threat to

peace, security, international trade and the human freedom. American

focused on this agenda and both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower

advocated it in the early years of the Cold War (Spanier, 1995).However,

Nehru was disgusted about the alliance policy and preceded with his

mission. It was great test of his courage and it was found out that the NAM

was not merely a passive platform of neutral and inactive nations. It had

clear objectives that included the gradual decolonization of the world, and a

strong commitment that the member countries would never become party to

the escalating tension of the Cold War. The Indian leaders ridiculed

American fear of the Soviet Union and regarded Soviet military preparation

as defensive. India on its part inflamed the relationship by charging the US

of responsible for many of Indian problems regarding the perception and

interpretation. American Ambassador Saxbe conceded that old prejudice

would be died hard as “You never read anything good about the US in

Indian papers and you never read badly about Russia.” He also noted that

despite Western fear, Nehru had not granted the base-rights to the Soviet

Union and he predicted that Indo-US economic relations would improve as

there was ‘nothing in the Soviet Union for India’ (Brands, 1972: 61).

However, In American perspective, India lost the opportunity of

establishing strong relations with Washington and was called ‘fence sitter’

by Dulles and Nixon due to differences on fundamental policies (Rao,

1985).

Replying to them for their view of India’s sitting on the fence, Nehru

declared his determination of denigrating with those who opposed him and

commented: “I say we have taken a more active part in the past two or three

years in foreign policy than many other countries, barring the Big Powers. I

do not understand this business, except that these people who talk like that

know nothing about what they are talking of and do not study or read or

understand what is happening around them” (Schottli, 2009: 281).


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On domestic level, it was noteworthy that the subject of non-alignment was

rarely discussed in the Constituent Assembly and a few debates were made

on it. In some of the rare occasions when the topic was discussed, Nehru

spoke of the need to navigate the evolving tensions and fault lines of the

Cold War where “India, in so far as it has a foreign policy, has declared that

it wants to remain independent and free of all these blocks and that it wants

to cooperate on equal terms with all countries” (Nehru, 1947).Despite these

arguments, this policy was criticized at home as Basu (2007: 186) wrote

that Indian policy was wrong at that time and Indian reaction was

contradictory. However, at global level, the NAM was becoming popular

among the various Asian and African countries changing the worldwide

view about the movement. India nor only benefited from this position but

also managed to secure rebuilding grants from member countries of either

bloc. After Nehru’s successful mediation in the Korean War and the Congo

problem by putting an end to a long and violent struggle, his status as a

commendable and efficient statesman was raised. Nehru preached a policy

of issue-based alliance rejecting political and economic dogmas

(Chaturushreni, 1982). He was proud of being an Asian, and wanted Asian

nations to be the primary determinants of their political fate, not guided by

the West(Steele, 2002). As far as Nehru was concerned, he adopted this

policy and succeeded in placing India on a position where it could receive

assistance from both the blocs. India tried to justify its position by

mentioning different reasons. The major reason was the arms race that later

converted into nuclear arms race endangering the world by nuclear

stockpiles. These heavily armed blocs hurdle the economic development of

the former colonies and the poorest regions of the world including South

Asia. India had close ties neither to the US nor to the Soviet Union as it

viewed the US as an overdeveloped and materialistic power following the

British style (Shankar, 2007).

Change in Nonalignment after Border War

Nonalignment underscored Nehru’s preference regarding minimum

presence of superpowers in South Asia and he had to change this view after


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the border war of 1962. India had to gain American assistance for its

security and defense against a communist attack. The US became India's

‘most important source of aid’ until the late 1960s.No doubt, Nehru

desperately accepted American aid as he failed to gain his goals through

Panchasheel and non-alignment but he remained hostile to mutual security

arrangements (Bhatty, 1996: 38).Criticizing it, Satu Limoye (1993: 184)

wrote that “no Indian government could or was willing to give up

nonalignment, and the US appeared to view this as a minimum requirement

for substantive defense [sic] relations.” However, this was not a completely

accurate conclusion. It was not required by either the US or Britain that the

Indians should publicly renounce nonalignment, since this would just add to

already humiliating defeat bringing negative impacts on Indian public

opinion.

Goa, Hungary, Suez Crisis, Korean War and Issues in Indochina

Goa was originally a territory of subcontinent being ruled by Portugal over

400 years till 1960. Nehru tried to liberate Goa but the US did not support

Indian stance because Portugal was member of NATO and an ally of the

US. The Soviet Union condemned European colonialism particularly

Portuguese occupation of Indian Territory. The US Secretary of State

Dulles and Portuguese Foreign Minister Paulo declared Goa as a province

of Portugal. Indian and other countries’ press called it a great diplomatic

blunder. This favor brought worst effects on Indo-US relations than

American military aid to Pakistan (Rao, 1985).On India’s protest; the US

declared that Portugal’s favor did not mean to take any position on the

issue. It explained that the reference in the joint statement to Portuguese

province had no international significance. The issue of Goa was not solved

until 1961. Failing in getting international pressure on Portuguese’s

colonialism, Nehru moved to use of force and expelled Portugal from Goa

in December 1961 (Basu, 2007). The US regretted the Indian action. In

principle, this was the right of the colonies to liberate their territory securing

their freedom ant Nehru had to take unilateral decision. However, another

step by Nehru raised question about his neutrality and advocacy of anti-


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colonialism when he abstained from criticism and condemnation of the

Soviet Union for not following the UN resolution of free elections in

Hungary. This support was just to avoid the same precedent in Kashmir,

which was a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. In return, the

Soviet Union favored India on Kashmir issue in Security Council and the

US was critical on this view (Rose, 1972: 31).The US condemned the

Soviets brutalities in Hungry and was annoyed on Nehru’s strange silence

towards it. Nehru was reluctant to criticize Khrushchev’s decision to use

military force in Hungary. This was also a setback of international

organization by those leaders and powers that claimed to work for freedom

and peace. The relations between the two countries were further worsened

and shadowed the American aid to India as it became an uphill task to

persuade the Congress for releasing even humanitarian aid to India to

reduce the Soviet influence. Other was to prevent India from following

China for economic aid that might turn the Indians to communism (Thakar,

1999).

British and French attacks for occupation of Suez Canal in Egypt were more

offensive than Soviet action in Hungary. About Hungry, it was judged that

New Delhi did not practice what it preached. However, India changed its

position during the Suez crisis and condemned Britain, France and Israel for

their invasion of the Suez Canal. Nehru called the attack on Egypt as

“naked aggression” and a “reversion to the past colonial methods”

(Mukherjee, 2009). Nehru also supported Cairo at the London Conference

but not at the cost of relations with London. India equated the Suez Canal

crisis as a case of colonialism like Hungry. His equation of these two issues

was blamable. Pakistan favored free elections in Hungary; keeping Kashmir

in its view, so it favored the US condemnation of the Soviet Union on

Hungarian issue. Pakistan’s interest was to make India to settle Kashmir

dispute in its favor.

The eruption of the Korean War was a major issue in the Cold War era and

the first international missions for Nehru and India. Nehru’s role was

important because of the fact that his country provided the only link


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between the western and the communist blocs during this era of intense

rivalries. China was a prominent part of the war and Nehru remained in

contact with China considering special relations and member of the UN. He

announced in a speech to the parliament in 1950, “we were in intimate

touch with our Ambassador in Peking and we asked him, as we asked our

representatives in other countries, to tell us how the various Governments

were reacting… and to find out through the Ambassador what the reactions

of the Chinese Government were to the developing events”(Constituent

Assembly Debates, 1948).

As the war escalated, Nehru pursued a just position calling for a UN

resolution of immediate ceasefire and avoided to favour the formation of

UN-led coalition. The UN coalition forces were basically US-sponsored and

supposed to assist South Korea. India also opposed a US resolution in the

UN, which was designed to declare China as an aggressor. At the end of the

war, Nehru took the difficult task of repatriating the forces and provided an

Indian volunteered custodian force to serve this purpose (Schottli,

2009).Indian policy of non-alignment was tested during the course of this

war. First, Nehru had to face the wrath of Soviets and Chinese for voting

the North Koreans as the initial aggressors. Second was annoyance of the

Americans for not joining the international coalition force and then again

opposing the resolution on China in the UN. Third was criticism at home as

Kripalani, leader of the Socialist Party, talked about India’s role in the

aftermath of the Korean war in 1953, he pointed out that India’s dabbling in

global matters had brought anger of all the warring parties and India’s

custodian troops could not even touch the soil of South Korea and had to be

restricted into the neutral zone for airdrops. This criticism was aimed at

Nehru’s style of diplomacy, Kripalani advocated that in times of needs

“when nations are suffering from a kind of hysteria, it will be best for us to

cultivate our garden and confine ourselves largely to the four corners of the

home front” (Lok Sabha Debates,1953). In 1954, Kripalani was a single

voice in condemning China’s actions raising the question of Chinese

trustworthiness. During Chinese intervention in Tibet in 1950, non-

alignment was once again tested, but Nehru tried to keep the West away in


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an attempt to escape from the criticism at home (Basu, 2007). However,

Nehru’s arguments and policy choices were not opposed by the others as

India was in urgent need of American food supplies due to famine like

situation during the Korean War. India adhered to its principle stance on the

non-alignment and continued his support to communist China for its right of

a permanent seat in the UN Security Council as “the Korean War had tested

India’s faith in non-alignment and commitment to peace to the utmost, and

she had not been found wanting” (Mukherjee, 2009).

After passing a few months to the end of Korean War, a new theatre opened

in 1954 between the communists and the West and this time the region was

even closer to Indian borders; Indochina, a French colony at that time.

Nehru first appealed to both the parties to a ceasefire then in Colombo

Conference of April 1954, he convinced a number of Asian leaders to

support his six points in order to end the hostilities. Krishna Menon, the

defense minister, arrived in Geneva Conference uninvited but was

appreciated to the extent that the French prime minister at that time, Pierre

Mendes-France, termed Geneva Conference as “ten-power conference ‒

nine at the table ‒ and India” (Mukherjee, 2009) India played the role of

mediator and the threat of a nuclear war in Asia was minimized. To control

the supply of armaments into Indochina’s countries of Laos, Cambodia and

Vietnam, India was given the responsibility of the International Control

Commission mandated to check the weapon supply (Singh, 1985).

Nehru and the Border War with China

Nehru’s foreign policies towards China have been made subject to much

criticism. To many, Nehru’s faith in transparency for handling the

international relations was the root cause of all problems. Others opined that

there was a wide gap of understanding between Nehru’s perception of

international situation and bureaucracy’s development. There were several

other shortcomings in decision-making process and structure which

ultimately led to debacle of 1962.


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Nehru wanted a cordial and mutually beneficial relationship with China and

the Panchsheel was initiated in 1954 for this purpose. However, China had

reservations on delineation of borders and started patrolling the certain parts

of the Indian border in 1955, which created doubts in New Delhi and it tried

to resolve the issue through peaceful negotiations. While Chou En-Lai

wanted to deal the dispute in its entirety, which was violation of the treaty.

China also refused the arbitration from the International Court of Justice

(Subrahmanyam, 1976).

In the late 1958, Sino-Indian relations were at the breaking point when the

Indian government discovered that the Chinese had built a road across the

Aksai Chin Plateau in Ladakh, the northern part of India, which was one of

the most remote areas but strategically very important to the country. The

area was nestled in the western Himalayas where India, Pakistan and China

had disputed borders’ claims. The Aksai Chin Plateau was important to the

Chinese due to an all-weather road linking the regions of Xinjiang and Tibet

to greater China. Indian government was reluctant to challenge the Chinese

claims to avoid the conflict. Talking to President Dwight Eisenhower,

Nehru commented, India had to “rely on the weapons of peace” being a

poor country (Brands, 1990: 92). However, another step by Nehru

deteriorated the situation when he ordered Indian forces in November 1961

to ‘proceed as far forward as possible behind Chinese-held posts toward the

international border.’ This wrong gesture irritated Beijing (Wilson,

1992).However, several biographers of Nehru are not agreed with this

conclusion as Subrahmanyam (1976) wrote that the Chinese were already

prepared to go to war against India and the Major General Kaul, Chief of

General Staff, informed and warned about it in April 1962. He was of the

opinion that his information was not taken seriously due to lack of

cooperation among the intelligence agencies. About Nehru and Menon, it

was assumed that they had no idea of China’s attack otherwise they never

left the country and Kaul himself went to leave in September 1962. To the

other side of border, everything was planned and well-prepared and there is

no doubt that China had taken a deliberate decision of attack and a huge

number of Chinese forces were deployed along Indian border, which was


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not possible in a few days. It was also argued by several that Nehru

underestimated the Chinese due to wrong information by his close friend

Menon and those officials who were closed to him and above all deliberate

effort by the Chinese to mislead the Indian (Ranganathan, 2000).

Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the then Home Minister, was among the most

prescient. He wrote a long letter to Nehru on November 7, 1950. He tried to

draw Nehru’s attention to the danger erupting from China and gave certain

recommendations to act against it. It is essential to quote that Patel himself

was very ill and near to die at that time but his perceptive analysis at that

time indicated his concern about the country. He wrote, “I have carefully

gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and

our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. There

can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the

Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final

action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy......Even

though we regard ourselves as friends of China, the Chinese do not regard

us as their friends…”(Das, 1971: 344-45).It was observed that in the early

1950s,extensive debates in parliament on international affairs surround

China. Indian strategy towards China was much debated and advocated with

several dissent voices. This is averse to the notion as documents of 1950s

describe Nehru as the sole articulator of Indian foreign policy. There is no

doubt that debates were there but Nehru never followed others in

international affairs except his close friends. He believed in his expertise of

the international situation and made decision himself. Therefore the

accurate assessment about the relations between China and India was made

Patel not the minister of the external affairs and Patel was not claimant of

having the understanding of world factors.

Amidst such tensions, China attacked on India on October 20, 1962, which

was not only shocking for Nehru himself but also for the whole

international community. The Indian military was neither prepared nor well

equipped. The British and American governments began to pursue the

policies favourable to the West. In the 1960s, Britain was not in a position


16

to intervene in the issue without the American support and the US was

interested in the region due to the Korean War, which transferred the Cold

War from Europe to Asia. Earlier, the US acknowledged Britain’s

knowledge of South Asia better to it and generally preferred to have the

British on board as one British official noted in 1940s, “the British would

educate the Americans about the finer points of Asian gamesmanship:

London would supply the brains, Washington the money and the muscle

needed to hold South Asia” (Rotter, 2000: 53).However, shifting priorities

led the Americans to pursue their own policy with or without assistance of

the British. This was evidenced by the bilateral military agreements with

Pakistan. On China’s position, officials of the two countries were agreed

that the Chinese objectives were short term towards India rather than

attempting to establish hegemony over the subcontinent. On 26 October

1962, Nehru turned to the US for military help. For the first time, Nehru

changed his earlier position of non-alignment out of sheer compulsion.

Ambassador B.K. Nehru met President John F. Kennedy and got assurance

of aid without any delay. However, Kennedy inquired about the Russian

assistance. After listening uncertainty about Khrushchev, the Russian

leader, Kennedy taunted, ‘You should ask him, you would know who your

real friends are and who are just content to talk. Tell Khrushchev to put up

or shut up” (Shankar, 2007).India demanded two squadrons of B-47

bombers with trainers for Indian pilots to bomb the Chinese in Tibet. It also

demanded the US Air Force to send 12 squadrons of supersonic fighters to

defend Indian cities in case of the Chinese attack. The request for aid

showed Nehru’s desperation (Subrahmanyam, 1976).

Despite all this, both the US and the Soviet Union extended token help as

they were busy with the Cuban crisis, however, Russian President

Khrushchev did extend more help. The US and Britain had no contingency

plans to respond the border war. After getting reports of the Indian Army’s

retreat, Kennedy and his British counterpart, Prime Minister Harold

Macmillan, agreed that this imbroglio had provided an opportunity to

change the political dynamics of the sub-continent by using aid to gain

leverage over India forcing it to discard nonalignment to veer towards the


17

West. Both leaders avoided to criticize Nehru for his failure to resolve the

border issue or deterring Chinese attack. Instead, the border conflict was

seen through the lens of communist aggression rather than Indian

intransigence (Subrahmanyam, 1976).

The Chinese invasion had far reaching effects on India's foreign policy. It

forced Nehru to change his stance on international affairs. He realized that

unmitigated goodwill was not sufficient to deal the foreign affairs. His

dreams were more or less shattered and led India to strengthen its military

power rather than pursuing peaceful negotiations in matters of international

affairs. The invasion was a shock to idealistic approach of Nehru’s foreign

policy shaking its very base. Domestic problems also kept escalating,

putting a great degree of mental and physical stress on Nehru. Defence

Minister Krishna Menon had to resign in disgrace after border war. He was

accused of not informing Nehru about the warnings from the armed forces,

stationed along the Chinese border, that they had short of the supplies

required to defend India against a Chinese attack (Wilson, 1992:53-

55).China succeeded in puncturing Indian non-alignment disproving

Nehru’s faith in peaceful resolution of conflict. This notion was one of

those strong ideals that placed Nehru high among the Afro-Asian world.

Despite this, Nehru was not prepared to jettison non-alignment even though

he was much disappointed by the nonaligned countries that did not offer

proper assistance and left India in the lurch (Wilson,1992: 56).Despite all

this, Nehru stood firm with his faith in the Punjsheel. The international

community was on his side and China had to withdraw under intense

international pressure and other reason was fear of isolation and global

antagonism. Nehru tried to change the military defeat with a moral one

victory for India.

Border War and Indian Defence

Indian air defense became a key issue for the US and Britain because it was

believed that Nehru would not use his Air Force in support of army for fear

of bombing on Indian cities (Subrahmanyam, 1976).Throughout the war,


18

both the US and Britain tried to prevent India from the purchase of military

aircrafts MIG 21 from the Soviet Union. After Menon’s exclusion from the

cabinet, both powers hoped that Soviet loyalty to India would evaporate at

the end of the war leading to end the deal of MIG 21. This notion was

further strengthened as initially the Soviets were reluctant to help India, but

later in November 1962, when the fighting was continued, Khrushchev

assured to honour the deal. Nehru also showed his trust in the Soviet

commitment of aircrafts. Ignoring all this, the British High Commission

reported to his country on 10 December 1962, that MIG deal was dead as no

serious intention was there to incorporate the planes into the Indian Air

Force (Steele, 2002).But after a few days, he got reports that India would

receive six MIGs in January and this news was a great blow to Britain.

Apart from military value, MIGs were useful for political purposes as it was

observed by R.K. Nehru, an official of the Ministry of External Affairs

(Shankar, 2007). To change Indian decision of the purchase of the MIG 21s,

Kennedy and Macmillan had a meeting to provide long-term military aid to

India valued at over $120 million. However, this aid was to be linked to

settle the dispute of Kashmir as the talks between Pakistan and India were

in progress (Steele, 2002).The British hesitated to offer air defence to India

before Kashmir had been settled because, unlike the Americans, they

believed that India would become intransigent on Kashmir if assured of

Western air defence (Venkatramni, 1984). Other was political and financial

reasons that kept the British away from Indian’s assistance in case of attack.

Ultimately, both parties reached on a compromise that British and American

squadrons would visit India periodically for training missions without

showing any commitment to Indian defense. In late 1962, American

transport planes began to supply arms and equipment for ten divisions of

mountain troops of India along with American instructors, advisers and

technicians. In this period, India received huge American military missions

than Pakistan without becoming a client-state (Brands, 1990: 104).The

American also made promise of additional aid to India in case of future

Chinese attack. But the next war was between India and Pakistan in 1965

rather than China.


19

American officials thought that Nehru was disillusioned with his policy of

nonalignment and the slogan of ‘Hindi-Chini bhai-bhaism’ or Hindu-

Chinese goodwill. Both the British and Americans believed that the card of

military aid would realign India to the West. On the other hand, improved

Indo-Pakistan relations after resolving the Kashmir problem would lead the

two countries to “join together in the task of defending the whole sub-

continent against communist aggression” (Steele, 2002).Anyhow, India

never bowed to this policy and succeeded in maintaining its right of

purchasing arms from both blocs following nonalignment.

The Anglo-American effort to use leverage of aid for gaining control over

India is a question, who gained and who lost? Nehru had pursued a shrewd

line of Indian self-interest on matters closer to its home like Kashmir, China

and Southeast Asia. Other, he sought to manipulate the rivalry between the

superpowers using the West against the East for his nations’ advantage as

well as his own' (Brands, 1990).The British and Americans got nothing but

only to rely on Nehru who exploited one power against other maintaining

non-alignment. In case of the Soviet Union, Nehru became a powerful

figure and was in the position to manipulate the Russians as the Russians

were manipulating him (Gaddis, 1997: 170).The border conflict did not

hinder Nehru’s ability to manipulate the two superpowers and received a lot

from them with returning a very little and a strong critic of American

intervention in Vietnam.

Nehru and the Kashmir Problem

Nehru’s Foreign policies did not augur well when it came to deal with the

neighbors particularly Pakistan and failed to reach any successful

negotiation on Kashmir issue, which made it a perpetual problem. He tried

to negotiate Pakistan through the United Nations but the offer of a plebiscite

was also taken off in 1950. After India’s dogged denial of the two-nation

theory, the Muslim dominated Kashmir became a strategic disaster for

India. In 1961, Lyndon Baines Johnson tried to tackle the thorny question of

Kashmir during his visit to subcontinent as vice president but he was


20

proposed to avoid the discussion on Kashmir dispute because of its long-

standing nature (Shankar, 2007).For the US, resolution of Kashmir dispute

was a key to progress in the subcontinent and the then American

Ambassador, John Kenneth Galbraith, was one of those persons who want

to resolve the Kashmir issue in the aftermath of border war. Both the British

and Americans had fears that the Kashmir issue could be exploited by the

Soviet Union due to its strategic and geopolitical significance (Rotter, 2000:

142).Early efforts of the Kennedy administration were also failed as India

refused mediation, which indicated its satisfaction with the present status

quo (McMahon, 1994: 284). Galbraith admitted in his salutary letter that

settlement on Kashmir was difficult. He commented, “No settlement

between Catholics and Huguenots was possible for fifteen years after the St.

Bartholomew massacre and similarly here” (Steele, 2007).The British

resented American role in the subcontinent taking it their former colony but

scarcity of resources deprived them of maneuvering the situation and talks

on Kashmir were linked to the American aid to the two countries. But the

Kashmir talks never produced any result despite American aid to India. The

US and Britain faced the question of providing the aid to India without

progress on Kashmir but they knew that in case of conditioning aid to

Kashmir settlement, Nehru would turn to the Soviet Union, which was

against their interests as they never wanted the Soviet Union to exploit the

situation. Furthermore, Kashmir might become a target of communist

expansionism (Rotter, 2000: 142-43).To several scholars, Kashmir was the

birth place of Nehru and his family had special romance with the area and it

was quite unlikely for Nehru to relinquish Indian claims.

The Kashmir issue deepened the cracks in the relationships among the

Americans, British, Pakistanis and Indians. Pakistan became closer to

China, which inflamed emotions in India. Observing the situation, the new

American Ambassador to India, Chester Bowles, urged President Johnson

to continue the aid and argued that “the Pakistanis, in spite of all this talk,

are good friends of America, and the China gesture is more a gimmick than

a commitment.” Bowles predicated that aid would lead Pakistan to pursue a

policy of neutrality on the Sino-Indian matters and its collaboration with the


21

Americans would create a suitable atmosphere in the region preventing any

future war with India. But it was not easy (Bowles, 1954).Kennedy had

different viewpoint about India as he argued that Indian support against the

Chinese would promote a Kashmir settlement as he believed that Nehru was

more likely to settle Kashmir ‘if a gun was not pointed at his back’ (Steele,

2002). Despite all this, each round of the Kashmir talks ended without

progress or improvement in Indo-Pakistan relations. The Kashmir problem

remained unresolved, and not even Nehru’s diplomatic expertise could give

any positive direction to the problem. It still continues to be the one of the

key international problems. With Nehru's death, the Americans and British

lost a person whom they might have disliked but knew very well.

Nehru's death coupled with Kennedy's assassination brought new actors on

the scene, whowere either distracted by other critical problems such as

Vietnam or uninterested in dealing the unresolved disputes. By the time

Johnson took over the office, the Indo-US relations were tense due to

American aid to India against China. Pakistan was quite upset with this aid

and President Ayub Khan protested arguing that India would use the

American supplied-weapons against Pakistan. Kennedy tried to pacify Ayub

Khan assuring him that military aid to India was to be used against China

(Singh, 1985).The Americans were tended to discount the Chinese military

aid to Pakistan but nuclear test of 1964 became a major irritant annoying the

Americans as the President Johnson harshly criticized it in his meetings

with Pakistani officials. Nevertheless, American military aid to Pakistan

continued until conditions changed due to the Indo-Pakistan War of 1965

when Johnson stopped deliveries of goods, including wheat, to both India

and Pakistan in an effort to claim a position of neutrality.

Conclusion

Nehru attempted to portray India’s international image to a great degree of a

neutral nation but debacle of 1962 shattered this image. Keeping foreign

affairs under his control, his decisions are made subject to much

controversy and debate. He saw war and violent from very close quarters


22

during the freedom movement and he believed in non-violence and he tried

to guide India to steer clear from any form of violence and militarism. But

he was not succeeded in it. He believed that a newly independent country

must invest all its economic and logistic resources towards development

and not defense and armament finding peaceful solutions to the problems.

But he did not move to a peaceful solution to the Kashmir dispute and used

force in Goa and Hyderabad. He avoided overt commitment to any of the

two blocs but exploited the position by receiving benefits from both the US

and the Soviet Union as he knew that alignment to one would not serve

Indian interests. In this way, he ridiculed his own policies and pursued the

path, which was not necessarily the middle way. The non-alignment did not

prevent the border war and aggression of China and discarding this policy,

India had to turn to the US and UK for aid while the Soviet Union was

already providing aid. Contrary to it, non-aligned countries neither support

nor condemn China except Egypt, Malaysia and Ethiopia but their support

was nominal. Nehru’s role as the sole ‘articulator, formulator and executor

of Indian foreign policy is objectionable as it led him to make decision

without heeding to others’ assessment and advice in international affairs. He

misjudged China while other leaders provided an accurate picture of the

events but he was obsessed with his expertise of international situations and

ignored their opinions throwing the country into war. Nehru’s strategy

towards China was not well-thought and well-designed as he spent little

time on concentrating this subject and remained busy in visualizing Asian

unity with Indian leadership ignoring China’s military power. Panchsheel,

despite its visionary content and high proclamations did not bring some

positive change on Tibet issue and India had to relinquish it. Furthermore,

this instrument did not serve the security interests of the country. Nehru

offered to play the role of mediator in the Korean War but he did not accept

mediation in Kashmir dispute. Nehru remained busy in projecting his

international image and tried to play a special role but his tendency to

respond in ad hoc fashion damaged his role. Despite all this, his ideals

gained much prestige for him and he kept the country on right direction

except on a few occasions. Even today, many challenges facing by India can

be addressed through following Nehruvian values of secularism, pluralism


23

and non-alignment but with their true spirit as compromise on principles

lead to debacles of China, and fate of Tibet in 1950 and unresolved Kashmir

issue.

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Nehru as the Sole Arbiter of Indian Foreign Policy: An Analytical Review of the Years 1947-64

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