More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain - bepress Legal ...

Tel Aviv University Law SchoolTel Aviv University Law Faculty Papers

Year Paper

More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain

Michael D. Birnhack∗

∗Tel Aviv University, [email protected] working paper is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and may not be commer-cially reproduced without the permission of the copyright holder.

http://law.bepress.com/taulwps/art50

Copyright c©2008 by the author.

More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain

Michael D. Birnhack

Abstract

One of the most interesting concepts that emerged from the battle over the con-tinuous expansion of copyright law in the last decade is that of the public domain.After the public domain was identified, many authors struggled to define it, map it,locate its constitutional sources and explain its crucial role in copyright law. Thisimportant work poses a viable alternative to the pro-property or commodificationof information alternative. The public domain project reminds us that at least un-der an instrumentalist view of copyright law, the public domain is not merely—orrather should not be—an unintended byproduct, or “graveyard” of copyrightedworks, but rather a playground for speech-experiments. Copyright is one of themain tools aimed to create the public domain. This domain is a commons, ownedby all and none, a resource which we can use without asking permission. It hasa crucial role in personal self-development, learning, experiencing, imagining,speaking with others, creating new works for the benefit of ourselves and widercircles, starting from the immediate interlocutor and up to the entire community.The public domain is the means and the end to ”promote the progress of science”.It is where knowledge is created and where it lies, awaiting new interpretations,new applications and new meanings.

Once we accept that the public domain is not only a ”negative”, we need to figureout how we would like it to be constructed. In this article I would like to addmy contribution to the construction of the public domain. In performing this task,we need not ignore the elaborate political thought about freedom of speech. Thepublic domain and free speech are two sides of the same coin. Both notions aim atconstructing a communicative sphere, where people can interact with each otherin various circles, whether it is an interpersonal circle, a communitarian one or awider political circle. In this sense, both are derivatives of a political notion, whichis a particular conception of democracy. Accordingly, it is useful to learn from thelessons of the free speech-copyright conflict in our task of constructing the public

domain, within copyright law. What kind of public domain are we interested in?I apply the notions of quality and quantity. These are fuzzy terms. At best, wewould like to have a combination of both: we would like to construct a publicdomain that has more information and more speech of better quality. The articleexplores how these fuzzy terms interact with various theoretical justifications ofboth free speech jurisprudence, and then with various theories of copyright law,and concludes with tying all the ends together – examining how we can betterconstruct the public domain

ChapterIVMoreorBetter?ShapingthePublicDomain

Michael D. Birnhack*

1. INTRODUCTION

Thebattleoverthecontinuousexpansionofcopyrightlawinthelastdecadetakesplaceinseveralandsometimesoverlappingfields.TheissueisfoughtinCongress,inthepopularmediaandinless-popularblogs,incourtroomsandinlengthylawreviewarticles.History,constitutionalandlegislativetexts,economicsandjusticeareallpartofthesophisticateddiscoursethathasemergedfromthese(asyetundecided?)battles.Manyideasandconcepts–somenewandsomerenewed–haveemergedfromthedebateoverthecontoursofthelegalrightwhichenablesanauthor(orowner)tocontrolmostoftheusesofhisorherworkbyothers.Oneofthemostinterestingconceptsthatemergedisthatofthepublicdomain.

Afterthepublicdomainwasidentified,1manyauthorsstruggledtodefineit,2mapit,3locateitsconstitutionalsources,4andexplainitscrucialroleincopyright

* TheauthorwishestothankJulieCohen,GraemeDinwoodie,NivaElkin-Koren,OrenGazal,BerntHugenholtz,KamielKoelman,EliSalzberger,PamSamuelson,BradSherman,andparticipantsattheIViRworkshoponCommodificationofInformation,AmsterdamJuly,2004fortheirhelpfulcomments.

1. D.Lange,‘RecognizingthePublicDomain’,44L. & Contemp. Probs.147-178(1981).See alsohisupdatedthoughtsonthesubject:D.Lange,‘ReimaginingthePublicDomain’,66L. & Contemp. Probs.463-483(2003).

2. J. Litman, ‘The Public Domain’, 39J.Litman,‘ThePublicDomain’,39Emory L.J.965-1023 (1999); Y. Benkler, ‘Free as the Air1023 (1999); Y. Benkler, ‘Free as the Air(1999);Y.Benkler,‘FreeastheAirtoCommonUse:FirstAmendmentConstraintsonEnclosureofthePublicDomain’,74N.Y.U. L. Rev.354-445(1999).

3. P.Samuelson,‘MappingtheDigitalPublicDomain:ThreatsandOpportunities’,66L. & Contemp. Probs.147-171(2003).

4. D.LeenheerZimmerman,‘IsThereaRighttoHaveSomethingtoSay?OneViewofthePublicDomain’,73Fordham L. Rev.297-376(2004).

L.GuibaultandP.B.Hugenholtz(eds),The Future of the Public Domain,59–86©2006KluwerLawInternational.PrintedintheNetherlands.

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

60 Michael D. Birnhack

law.5Thisimportantworkposesaviablealternativetothepro-propertyorcom-modificationofinformationalternative.6Ishallcallthisacademicendeavorthepublic domain project.

Thepublic domain projectjuxtaposedthepublicdomainwiththecommodifica-tionofinformation.Theprojectremindsusthatatleastunderaninstrumentalistviewofcopyrightlaw,thepublicdomainisnotmerely–orrathershouldnotbe–anunintendedbyproduct,or‘graveyard’ofcopyrightedworks,butitsverygoal.7Isubscribetothisprojectandinthisarticlewilltakeittobethebaseline:copyrightisoneofthemaintoolsaimedtocreatethepublicdomain.Thisdomainisacommons,ownedbyallandnone,aresourcewhichwecanusewithoutaskingpermission.Ithasacrucialroleinpersonalself-development,learning,experiencing,imagining,8speakingwithothers,creatingnewworksforthebenefitofourselvesandwidercircles,startingfromtheimmediateinterlocutoranduptotheentirecommunity.Thepublicdomainisthemeansandtheendto‘promotetheprogressofscience’(intheUSConstitution’sformulation),orfor‘theencouragementoflearning’(inthelanguageoftheStatuteofAnne).Itiswhereknowledgeiscreatedandwhereitliesawaitingnewinterpretations,newapplicationsandnewmeanings.Itisnotagraveyard,butaplaygroundforspeech-experiments.

Inthedailyapplicationofcopyrightlawpractitionersandcourtsnaturallyfocusontherightsaccordedtoauthorsandtheirscopeandhencethepublicdomainisoftenviewedasthe‘negative’.Oneofthemaingoalsofthosewhoareengagedinthepublicdomainprojectisto‘reifythenegative’:onlyif‘it’hasaname,anorgan-izingconcept,canitbepartofthecopyrightdiscourse,andnotitsresidue.9Onceweacceptthatthepublicdomainisnotonlya‘negative’,weneedtostudyitslegalroots,10andmoreso,tofigureouthowwewouldlikeittobeconstructed.‘We’inthissense,is‘wethepeople’,forwhomcopyrightlawwasdesigned.Thepublicdomainprojectgearedupwithdefinitions;itisinspiredbytheoriesofcopyrightlawanditsconstitutionalhistory.Itshouldalsobeawareofvariousunintendedconsequences,suchasitsdistributiveaffects.11Thesearethefoundations.Constructingthepublicdomainisamuch-neededtaskandmuchofthescholarlyworkconductedinthisfield

5. J.Boyle,‘TheSecondEnclosureMovementandtheConstructionofthePublicDomain’,66L. & Contem. Prob.33-74(2003).

6. Foracriticalanalysis,see:N.Elkin-KorenandN.WeinstockNetanel(eds.), The Commodification of Information,TheHague,London,Boston,KluwerLawInternational2002.

7. L.R.PattersonandS.W.Lindberg,The Nature of Copyright, A Law of Users’ Rights,Athens,UniversityofGeorgiaPress1991,p.2.

8. J.Rubenfeld,‘TheFreedomofImagination:Copyright’sConstitutionality’,112Yale L.J.1-60(2002).

9. Boyle,supranote5,at69-74(respondingtoE.Samuels,‘ThePublicDomaininCopyrightLaw’,41J. Copy. Soc’y USA 137-182(1993),atp.150whoasked‘whatisgainedbyreifyingthenegativeandimagininga‘theory’ofthepublicdomain?’).

10. Zimmerman,supranote4.11. SeeA.ChanderandM.Sunder,‘TheRomanceofthePublicDomain’,92Cal. L. Rev.1331-1373

(2004)(observingthatthepro-publicdomainscholarsholdaromanticviewthereof,andhenceobscureitsdistributionalconsequences).


More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain 61

inrecentyearsaccumulatestoformsuchaconstruct.InthisarticleIwouldliketoaddmycontributiontothepublicdomainproject.Whatkindofpublicdomainareweinterestedin?Iwillbeapplyingthenotionsofqualityandquantity.

BeforeIfleshoutsomeofthefuzzinessofthetwintermsofqualityandquantity,Iwouldliketodrawaparallelofthecommodification-publicdomainconflict:itistheconflictbetweencopyrightlawandfreedomofexpression(orfreedomofspeech,ortheFirstAmendment,whichwillallbeusedinterchangeably).Theconflictbetweencopyrightlawandtheprincipleoffreespeechisapparenttosome,mostlytothosewhoareengagedinthepublicdomainproject,butnottocourts,especiallynotintheUS.Americancourtshaveroutinelyrejectedtheargumentthatthereisaconflictbetweencopyrightlawandfreespeech.12Thispersistentrejectionhasaccumulatedintoadenialoftheconflict.InpreviousworkIexploredsomeaspectsofthefreespeech/copyrightlawinterface,includinganattempttofindoutwhycourtsdeniedtheconflict.13Oneoftheexplanationsdrawsonadistinctionbetweenaninternal andanexternal conflict.Iarguedthatinsteadofclaimingthatthereisnoconflict,weshouldinfactidentifytwoconflicts.Oneisbetweencopyrightlawandfreedomofexpression,portrayedasaconflictbetweentwoseparatelegalfields,eachderivingfromdistincttheories(andinsomeplaces,fromdistinctconstitutionalsources).Thisistheexternalconflict.Theotherisaninternalconflict,withincopyrightlaw.Itisthetensionthatliesandmotivatestheentirecopyrightscheme,atleastunderaninstrumentalistviewthereof:theconflictbetweenthepublic’slong-termgoalofenhancingcreativityandtheindividualauthor’sshort-terminterestinmaximizinghisorhergainsbyexecutingcontroloverthework.Thisistheinternalconflict.Courtstendtomixthetwo,andespeciallytheytendtointernalizetheexternalconflictintotheinternalone.Oneofthereasonstheyhangoninjustifyingtheinternalizationisthatbothcopyrightandfreedomofspeechsharethesamegoal(‘the shared goal argument’),orastheUSSupremeCourtstated,‘copyrightlaw[is]theengineoffreeexpression.’14However,oncefreespeechconcernsareinternalized,courtstendtodownplaytheroleoffreespeech.Thisisoneofthewaysbywhichthe(external)conflictisdenied.

Inourtaskofconstructingthepublicdomain,weneednotignoretheknowledgewegainedinpoliticaltheory,namely,theelaboratepoliticalthoughtaboutfreedomofspeech.Thepublicdomainandfreespeechsharethesamegoals.15Infact,Iwould

12. SeeM.Birnhack,‘TheCopyrightLawandFreeSpeechAffair:Making-UpandBreaking-Up’,43Idea 233-298(2003).

13. Id.‘CopyrightLawandFreeSpeechafterEldredv.Ashcroft’,76S. Cal. L. Rev.1275-1330(2003);‘AcknowledgingtheConflictbetweenCopyrightLawandFreedomofExpressionundertheHumanRightsAct’,Ent. L. Rev.24-34(2003);‘CopyrightingSpeech:ATrans-AtlanticView’,inPaulTorremans(ed.),Copyright and Human Rights – Freedom of Expression, Intellectual Property, Privacy,TheHague,London,Boston,KluwerLawInternational2004,p.37.

14. ‘Inourhastetodisseminatenews,itshouldnotbeforgottenthattheFramersintendedcopyrightitselftobetheengineoffreeexpression’–Harper & Rowv. Nation Publishers,471U.S.539,558(1985).

15. Zimmermanmakesaconvincingargumentthatthefirstamendmentmandatesthepublicdomain.Seesupranote4,at325.



argue,theyaretwosidesofthesamecoin.16Inthepublicsphere,wherethepartiesarethestateandthecitizen,weoftenasserttheprincipleoffreedomofspeechandwhenweaddresstheprivatesphere,weoftenturntothemarketandtheroleofthepublicdomaintherein.Butthetwoconcepts–thepublicdomainandthefreespeechprinciple–areveryclosetoeachother,eveniftheirparticularconceptionsmightdiffer.17Thisargumentrequiresmuchelaboration,whichIwillnotundertakehere,butforafewratherdensecomments.Inanutshell,boththepublicdomainandtheprincipleoffreespeechconstruct,oraimatconstructing,acommunicativesphere,wherepeoplecaninteractwitheachotherinvariouscircles,whetheritisaninterpersonalcircle,acommunitarianoneorawiderpoliticalcircle.Inthissense,boththepublicdomainandtheideaoffreedomofspeechstemfromthesamesource.Theyarebothderivativesofapoliticalnotion,whichisaparticularconceptionofdemocracy.Bothconceptsaresimultaneouslyliberalandsocialinnature,inthattheyattempttofacilitatethepersonalandpoliticaldiscourse,sotoserveboththeindividualswhotakepartthereinandthepolitytowhichtheybelong.Thepublicdomainandfreedomofexpressionvaryintheirlegalmeaning.Thepublicdomainallowsaprivilegetouseexpressiverawmaterial,whereasthelegalmeaningoffreespeechistoprovidethespeakerwithanegativeliberty,whichisnottobeinterferedwith.Obviously,theassumptionaboutthecloseconnectionofthepublicdomainandthefreespeechprinciplecanbedebated.Iwouldaskthereadertosuspendthedoubts,asIbelievetheargumentthatfollowswillreinforcethisclaim.

If,then,thepublicdomainandfreedomofspeechshareacloseconnection,inshapingthepublicdomainwecanlearnfromthesophisticateddiscourseonfreedomofspeech.Accordingly,thereisnoneedtoreinventthewheelanditisusefultolearnfromthelessonsofthefreespeech-copyrightconflict(theexternalconflict)inourtaskofconstructingthepublicdomain,withincopyrightlaw.InthisItakeseriouslythe(American)judicialinternalizationoftheconflict,whichpointstothesharedgoalofcopyrightlawandoffreespeechtheory.Thepublicdomainrepresentsourfreespeechconcernswithintherealmofcopyrightlaw.

Backtothetoolsofthediscussionthatwillfollow:quantityandquality.Thesearefuzzyterms.Atbest,wewouldliketohaveacombinationofboth:wewouldliketoconstructapublicdomainthathasmoreinformationandmorespeechofbetterquality.Thisisalsotrueofmostphysicalandvirtualassets,suchasourproperty.Itisalsotrueofmoregeneralpoliticalideas,suchasthemarket,whetherthatofgoodsorthatofideas.Theterms‘quality’and‘quantity’arestrangetotheeconomicdiscourse,butIthinktheycanbeappliedwithsomenecessarymodifications.Inthe

16. Iwouldfurtherarguethatthepublicdomainisanoff-springoftheideaofprogress,whichwasadramaticandlivelyideaduringtheeighteenthcentury,andthusservedaspartoftheintellectualbackgroundoftheAmericanconstitutionalizationofcopyrightlaw.TheideaofprogressandtheFirstAmendmentalsoshareacommonintellectualcradle.Forfurtherdiscussion,seeM.D.Birnhack,‘TheIdeaofProgressinCopyrightLaw’,1Buffalo Intellectual Property L.J.3-58(2001).

17. ApplyingDworkin’sconcept-conceptiondistinction:R.Dworkin,Law’s Empire,Cambridge(Mass.),Belknap Press, 1986, p. 70.BelknapPress, 1986, p. 70.1986,p.70.



commercialmarketquantityissometimestranslatedinto‘growth’andqualityissometimestranslatedintoefficiency.Inthemarketplaceofideasquantityistranslatedintovolumeofspeechandqualityistranslatedintotheideaofarobustdiscourse,onethatcanproducethetruth,orinformeddecisionsofthepolity.Eachtermcanbeappliedinrelationtovarioussubjectmatters:tocontent,tospeakers/authors,tolisteners/consumers.Therearerelateddifficultieswiththeseterms,suchaswhodeterminesthequalityandaccordingtowhichcriteria?Asweproceedinourexploration,Ishalltrytounpackthesevariables.

However,inaworldoflimitedresources,quantityandqualityoftenfindthemselvesonrivalsidesofthefenceandareincommensurable.Wemustoftenchoosewhetherweprefertheoneattheexpenseoftheother.Inthecontextofinformationandspeech,weoftenhavetochoosewhetherwewantmorespeechattheexpenseofquality,orarewewillingtosettleforsomewhatless(‘howmuchless?’)information,butofbetterquality.

Theconflictbetweenthe‘more’or‘better’,i.e.,betweenquantityandquality,isnotunfamiliarinclosecontextssuchasthe(old)media.Commercialtelevisionchannelsaredrivenbytheneedtosellasmanyadvertisementsaspossible,andhencetendtoadoptthecontenttofitthecommercialatmosphere.Asaresult,manysuchchannelstendtoaddressthelowestcommondenominator,soastoattractasmanyviewersaspossible.Inotherwords,theygiveupquality,soastoattractquantity.Weendupwith500channels,andnothingtoview.18

Inthepagesthatfollow,Iexaminehowqualityandquantityinteractfirstwithinthefreespeechtheoryandthenwithincopyrightlaw.Recallthatfreespeechhasacloserelationshiptothepublicdomain.Hence,theexternalcopyrightlaw/freespeechconflictismirroredwithincopyrightlawbythecommodification/publicdomainconflict.Freespeechtheoryincludesvariousstrands,someofwhichpresupposeorimplicitlyendorseeitherqualityorquantity.Totheextentthatthesevariablesconflictwitheachother,eachofthevariousstrandshasapreferenceastowhichispreferable.Thispreferenceisextendedtothepublicdomain.Copyrightlaw,inasmuchasitisunderstoodtoreflectamarket-basedtheoryprefersquantityandexpressesadisbeliefinquality.Thispreferenceisinstrumental:quantity,sothesupportersofthecompetitivemarketargue,willproducequality.Thelattercannotbepromotedonitsown.

Thetableisnowloadedwithcomplexconcepts:copyrightlaw,thepublicdomain,commodificationofinformation,andalsofreedomofspeech.Thetaskofthischapteristosorttheseout,sotolearnhowwecanconstructthepublicdomaininthebestpossiblemanner.Thisarticlewillproceedinthefollowingway:thenextsectiondiscussesfreespeechjurisprudenceinordertofigureoutwhetheritsbasicprinciplesprefer(eitherexplicitlyorimplicitly)oneoftheabovediscussedvariables

18. Theapplicabilityofantitrustlawtothemediamarketreflectsthistrade-off.SeeAssociated Press v. U.S.,326U.S.1(1945),andcontemporarydiscussion:D.McGowan,‘WhytheFirstAmendmentCannotDictateCopyrightPolicy’,65U. Pitt. L. Rev.281-338(2004)(arguingthattheFirstAmendmentdoesnotlimitCongressionaldiscretioninenactingcopyrightlaw).



totheother.Thethirdsectionwillundertakethesamemissionregardingcopyrightlaw.Thefourthsectionwilltietheconclusionsfromtheprevioustwosections.

2. SPEECH:MOREORBETTER?

Thissectionexplorestheunderlyingandhiddenassumptionsofthefreespeechprincipletothevariablesofquantityandquality,undervarioustheoriesoffreespeech.Theconclusionswillserveuslaterindefiningthepublicdomain,whichweareconstructing.

2.1. Two ParadIgms of ThreaTs To sPeech

Freespeechisconsideredtobeafundamentalhumanright.Itislistedinmostconstitutionsofliberaldemocraciesandevenifnotenumerateditisneverthelessrecognizedandprotected.19Theparadigmaticunderstandingoftheprincipleoffreespeechisthegovernmentalone:itisconsideredtobeashieldinthehandsofthecitizeninthefaceofacensorialgovernment.Itisasomewhatromanticview,butitisstillavalidone.Therearenumeroustheoriesthatofferexplanationsforthisfundamentalhumanright.Somefocusontheindividual,othersonthepolity.Somefocusonaparticularvalue(tolerance,forexample)20orasocialinterest(lettingsteamoff).21

However,limitingtheFirstAmendmenttothegovernmentalparadigmwouldbeunjustifiablynarrow.22Manynowrealizethatfreespeechisthreatenednotonlybygovernments,butbyprivateentitiesaswell.Callthisthecorporate paradigm.Wheninaremotetownthereisonlyonenewspaper,oneradiostationandoneTVstationandallareownedbythesamepersonorcorporation,thentheprincipleoffreespeechinthattownislikelynottodeliver,eventhoughthegovernmentdoesnotinterfere.IfmostusersuseGoogletofindoutthebestitemintheocean

19. Seee.g.,inAustralia:A.Mason,‘TheAustralianConstitutioninRetrospectandProspect’,inR.French,G.Lindell,C.Saunders(eds.),Reflections on the Australian Constitution,Annandale,TheFederationPress,2003, 7,atp.9andinIsrael,wheretherighttofreespeechisreadintotheenumeratedprotectionofhumandignity.Seee.g.,H.C.2481/93Dayan v. Chief Commander of Jerusalem Police Department,48(2)P.D.456,480.

20. L.C.Bollinger,The Tolerant Society,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1986.21. SeeT.I.Emerson,The System of Freedom of Expression,NewYork,RandomHouse,1970,p.

7.Freedomofspeechismorethanalegalrule.Itdeeplyaffectsthepoliticalcultureofagivensociety.Itdefinestheprivateandthepublicspheres:thecitizens’senseofliberty,andthepoliticaldiscourse.Hence,wemaysaythattheprincipleoffreespeechhasaneducationalrole,andahistoricalonetoo.Buttheseareallotherpartsofthestory.

22. ThiswouldberepeatingatleastoneoftheLochner sins:weshouldnotimmunizethe‘private’realmfromscrutinyjustbecauseitregulatestherelationshipsbetweencitizens,ratherthantherelationshipbetweenthegovernmentandcitizens.Thereisnothingnovelinthisview:thisishowtheSupremeCourtexplaineditsinterferenceinthequestionoflibel,inNew York Times v. Sullivan,376U.S.254(1967).



ofonlineinformation,butGoogleeliminatessomeitemsduetotheircontent,23orchangesthePageRankofsomesites,24thenfreespeechisendangered,eventhoughthegovernmentdidnottellGooglewhattodoornottodo.Whenlibrarypatrons’choiceofaccesstoinformationislimitedbytechnologydesignedtofilter‘obscene’or‘indecent’material,thenfreespeechisnotfullyaccomplished.25

Unlikethegovernmental paradigm, thecorporate paradigm isnotalwaysconceivedasanissueoffreespeech.ThisisespeciallysowithourAmericanfriends.26Thesourcesofthisfocusonthestateandtherefusaltoviewmarket-basedlimitationsasaproblemoffreespeechrequiresaresearchofadifferentkind–ahistorical,socialandculturalone,andIwillnotattempttodosohere.Thosewhofocusonthefirst,governmentalparadigm,designatethegovernmentalimitedrole:itshouldnotinterfereandifitdoes,itshouldbeinanindirectmanneraimedtoachieveothergoals,27orbenarrowlytailoredtoserveacompellinggovernmentinterest.28FreespeechisportrayedasthecounterpartoftheHohfeldiandutynottointerfere:itistherightnottobeinterferedwith.Freespeechisthusanegativeright.29

Thosewhoarenotobsessedwiththeideathatthegovernmentistheonlysourceofallevil,searchforthreatstotheprincipleoffreespeecheverywhere.Theyofferamuchricherconceptoffreespeech.Oncetheyidentifyathreattospeech,theywishtoamendit,nomatterwhetherthethreatemanatedfromthestateorfromaprivateentity.Thesolutionmightbetotakevariousmeasuresandoneoftheseisgovernmentalinterference.Underthismodelthegovernmentisdesignatedanactiverole.Itmightbecalledupontoamendmarketfailures.Thiscanbeintheformofantitrustlaws,preventingonecorporationfromcontrollingallinformationaloutletsinacommunityorcreatingapublicforum,orsupportingpublic,non-commercialbroadcasting.Itmightbeintheformofimposinglimitationsoncampaignfinancing,

23. SeeD.McCullagh,‘GoogleYanksAnti-ChurchSites’,Wired (March21,2002),availableat<www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,51233,00.html>(Googleremovinglinkstoanti-Scientologysitesuponcopyrightinfringementnotification,undertheDMCA);orseeGoogle’sexplanationfornotremovinganti-Semiticresultsforthesearch‘Jew’:<www.google.com/explanation.html>.

24. Search King Inc. v. Google Technology, Inc.(W.D.Ok.,2003)..25. SeeChildren’sInternetProtectionAct(CIPA)andU.S. v. American Library,539U.S.194(2003).

See alsoM.D.BirnhackandJ.H.Rowbottom,‘ShieldingChildren:TheEuropeanWay’,79Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 175-227 (2004).

26. N.WeinstockNetanel,‘CopyrightandaDemocraticCivilSociety’,106Yale L.J.283-387(1996).

27. Thisideaisreflected,forexampleintheAmericandistinctionbetweenregulationofspeechandregulationofbehavior.TheSupremeCourtdevelopedatesttoidentifytheregulationwhichaimsatthebehavioralpartsofanact,eventhoughitmightaffectthespeechelementstherein.SeeUnited States v. O’Brien,391U.S.367(1968).Examplesareflagburning(Texas v. Johnson,491U.S.397,404(1989)andrecentlyfunctionalcode(Universal Studios Inc. v. Corely,273F.3d429(2dCir.2001)).ThisdistinctionhasyettorespondtotheSpeechActtheoryofAustin.

28. Seee.g.Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,124S.Ct.2783(2004).29. ApplyingBerlin’sterms:I.Berlin,Four Essays on Liberty,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress

1969,p.118.



orimposingmandatoryrightsofaccess,asinthefairnessdoctrinewhichusedtobepartoftheAmericanlandscape,butwaslaterabolished.30

Thetwoparadigmaticviewsoffreespeechandofthegovernment’srole–thegovernmental paradigm andthecorporate paradigm–correspondtodifferentconceptionsoffreespeech.Thenextsub-sectionwillexplorevariousconceptionsoffreespeech,inordertofindouttheirunderlyingassumptionorbiastowardsthevariablesofquantityandquality.

2.2. fIrsT (amendmenT) PrIncIPles

Thisisneithertheplacenorthereisaneedtorehearseandsurveythenumerousfreespeechtheories.31Accordingly,whatfollowsisamodestattempttofigureouthowthequality/quantitydimensionactswithinthemainrelevanttheories.Roughlyspeaking,freespeechjustificationscanbedividedintotwogroups:thosethatviewtheidealoffreespeechasanendandthosethatviewitasameanstoachieveanothergoal.

Thevarioustheoriesthatfocusontheindividualspeaker,whichbelongtothefirstgroupofjustifications,arelessrelevanthere,astheyviewtheimportanceofspeechandofmaintainingaregimethatprotectsthefreedomtospeak,intheactualactofspeaking.32Whateverspeechapersonfindstobebeneficialtohimorhershouldbeprotected.RodneySmollacapturedthisideaeloquently,inwritingthat‘theself-realizationthatcomesfromspeechisqualitativelydifferentfromotherformsofpleasure-seeking’,andthedifferenceisthat‘thefulfillmentthatcomesfromspeechisbondedtoman’scapacitytothink,imagineandcreate.’33Accordingly,whatmattersisthateveryonewhosowishescanspeak.Thequalityofthespeechismeasuredonlyaccordingtothespeakerandneveronthebasisofitscontent.Contentisamattertobedeterminedbythespeaker.Furthermore,theoverallqualityorquantityofthespeechissimplyamatterforotherconsiderations,notforthetheoryoffreespeechasofferedbythesescholars.Accordingly,thediscussionthatfollowsfocusesonthesecondgroupofjustifications,thosethatviewtheprincipleoffreespeechinaninstrumentalmanner.34Thesearethe‘Searchforthetruth’theory,associatedwithJohnStuartMill;‘selfgovernmentofthesovereignpeople’,atheoryassociated

30. SeeSyracuse Peace Council v. FCC,867F.2d654(D.C.Cir.1989).31. SeegenerallyF.Schauer,Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry,Cambridge,Cambridge

UniversityPress,1982;K.Greenwalt,Speech, Crime & The Uses of Language,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1989,pp.9-39;W.Sadurski,Freedom of Speech and Its Limits,Deventer, KluwerAcademicPublishers,1999.

32. EdBakerfocuseson‘expressiveliberty’,andarguesthatthestateisrequiredtorespecttheperson’sautonomy.Forhisdiscussioninthecontextofthecopyright-speechrelationship,see:C.E.Baker,‘FirstAmendmentLimitsonCopyright’,55Vand. L. Rev.891-951(2002).

33. R.A.Smolla,Free Speech in an Open Society,NewYork,Knopf,1992,p.10.34. LateronIwilljuxtaposesometheoriesoffreespeechwithsometheoriesofcopyrightlaw,but

willomitthedeontologicaltheories.Thisdoesnotmeanthatundertheseconceptionsofeitherlegalfieldthereisnoconflict;tothecontrary.SeeBaker’sanalysis,supranote32.However,



withAlexanderMeiklejohn,andcontemporarytheories,whichrelyontheoriesofdemocracyandcelebrateparticipationand/ordeliberation.

2.2.1. The Search for the Truth

Thispervasiverationaleoffreespeechiscommittedtothequantitativedimension:itstrivestoassurethateveryspeakerandeveryexpressionentersthemarketplaceofideas.Quantityhererefersbothtospeakersandtocontentofspeech.Thiscom-mitment,though,isinstrumental.Itisthebestway,sothetheoryholds,toproducethebestqualityofspeech,measuredbyonecriteriononly–thetruth.

Theoriginsofthe‘searchforthetruth’theory,oftenreferredtoasthe‘market-placeofideas’theory,isoutlinedinJohnStuartMill’sfamousessayOn Liberty,35thoughcreditbelongstoJohnMilton.36Itistheargumentabouttheabilityofthemarketplaceofideastoproducethetruth.Millestablisheditonthefallibilityofdecision-makers-especiallythestate,whichmightmisjudgethetruthtobefalse.37Insteadofthegovernment,onlythemarketcanproducetruth.Freedomofspeechmarksthelinebetweenthemarketandthegovernmentandforbidsthelattertocrossthatline.Thus,theprincipleoffreespeechisaninstrumenttoachievetruth.38The

thetaskhereistoexaminetheconstructionofthepublicdomainunderthequality-quantityparameters.

35. J.StuartMill,On Liberty 5-9(1869),Knoxville(Tennessee),WordsworthClassics,1996.Thelocationoftheargumentinanessayonlibertyhascausedsomeconfusion.OnlyonecommentofMilltiesspeechtoliberty.Henotesthatsilencinganopinion‘isrobbingthehumanrace’(id.at19).Foradiscussionofthispoint,seeC.EdwinBaker,Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,atp.285.

36. SeeJ.Milton,Areopagitica(1640),SantaBarbara,BandannaBooksedition,1992,atpp.20,32,42.Milton’sargument,however,wasaimedatlicensingonly,i.e.,pre-publicationrestraintsonly.Post-publicationpunishmentdidnotraiseanyprobleminhisview.Seeid.atpp.43-44.

37. Mill,supranote35,at20-36.Otherreasonsarethatevenerroneousopinionsmightcontainaportionoftruth(at46),thattruthrequiresthefalseopinionasabackgroundforsustainingitself(at36)andthatwithoutabackgroundoffalseopinions,thetruthmightbecomedogmatic(at40).

38. Thisrationalehasbeencriticizedonseveralgrounds.Onecritiqueisthattruthisrelativeandnotobjective.Apossibleanswertothisisthatwhateverthemarketproducesisthetruth.Schauernotesthatthisanswerbegsthequestion,foritdoesnotexplainwhyitisthisprocessthatispreferable(supranote31,at20).Sunsteinmakesasimilarpoint:C.R.Sunstein,Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech,NewYork,TheFreePress,1993,p.25:Iftheprocessleadstoanobjectivetruth–Sunsteinaskshowexactlytheprocessoccurs.Ifitcreates(arelative)truth,heasksforadescriptionofthepreconditionsofamarketwhichwouldbecapableofsodoing.Anotherpossibleansweristhat‘thevaluethatistoberealizedisnotinthepossibleattainmentoftruth,butrather,intheexistentialvalueofthesearchitself’–W.P.Marshall,‘InDefenseoftheSearchforTruthasaFirstAmendmentJustification’,30Ga. L. Rev.1-39(1995),p.4.Asecondcritiqueoftherationaleisskepticalofthemarketplace’sabilitytoproducethetruth,especiallyintheshort-run.SeeSchauer,supranote31,atpp.19-20,26.Thisisespeciallysointhefaceofhistoricalexamples,whichshowhowfalsityprevailedforalongandhorribletime.SeeBollinger,supranote20,atp.54.



MillianrationalewasincorporatedintoUSfreespeechjurisprudenceinJusticeHolmes’famousdissentinAbrams v. United States:39

‘Butwhenmenhaverealizedthattimehasupsetmanyfightingfaiths,theymaycometobelieveevenmorethantheybelievetheveryfoundationsoftheirownconductthattheultimategooddesiredisbetterreachedbyfreetradeinideas–thatthebesttestfortruthisthepowerofthethoughttogetitselfacceptedinthecompetitionofthemarket,andthattruthistheonlygrounduponwhichtheirwishessafelycanbecarriedout.’

Therationaleispervasiveincaseswherethegovernmentwishestoregulatespeech.Themarketplacedemandsafreeflowofinformationwithoutanyimposedinhibitions.Itshouldbeaplaceofpurelaissez-faire.Therationaleisindifferenttothequality ofthespeech.Thisindifferenceisdeliberate.Itderivesfromtheskepticismingovernment’sabilitytodistinguishtruefromfalse:Governmentcannotdetermine‘goodspeech’or‘badspeech’.ThisisoneofthesourcesoftheAmericanconstitutionaldoctrineofcontent-neutrality.40Ina1994case,theSupremeCourtstatedthat–

‘Lawsofthissort[content-basedregulation,M.B.]posetheinherentriskthattheGovernmentseeksnottoadvancealegitimateregulatorygoal,buttosuppressunpopularideasorinformationormanipulatethepublicdebatethroughcoercionratherthanpersuasion.Theserestrictions‘rais[e]thespecterthattheGovernmentmayeffectivelydrivecertainideasorviewpointsfromthemarketplace.”’41

Ofcourse,thosewhoholdthisviewarelikelytobeinterestedinhavingabetterpublicdiscourse,buttheydeliberatelyblindthemselvestothecontentofthespeechanditsqualitativeaspect.Themarketplace,theybelieve,willproducethetruthandhencethebetterqualityofthediscourse.

Oneresultisthatthemarketplaceofideasallowsrepetitionsofspeech.Thegovernmentwouldnotbeentitledtosilencesomeone,orpreferonespeakertoanotherbasedonthefactthatthesecondspeaker’sspeechhasalreadyenteredthemarketplace.Oncespeechisinvolved,i.e.,anidea,thegovernmentisprohibitedfrominterferingwithit.Thereasonis,again,theinfallibilityofthegovernment:itisnotforthegovernmenttosaywhetheranideaasutteredbyAisthesameastheideautteredbyB.Thishasanobviousimplicationforcopyrightlaw.

Itisalsoclearthatforthemarkettofunctionbetter,weshouldbeinterestedthatall theopinionsandideasthatstrivetotakepartinitwillfindtheirwayinside.

39. 250U.S.616,atp.630(1919).40. SeeG.R.Stone,‘ContentRegulationandtheFirstAmendment’,25Wm. & Mary L. Rev.189-252

(1983).41. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission,512U.S.622,641

(1994),quotingSimon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd.,502U.S.105,116(1991).See alsoR.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,505U.S.377(1992).



Sotherationaleisinterestedinmaximizingthequantity ofspeech.Barriersonaccesstothemarketplaceofideasshouldberemoved.Butnote,itisamarketplaceofideas.Accordingly,therationalestrivestorecognizeideasanddistinguishthemfromnon-ideas.Anyassertedspeechthatisnotan‘idea’doesnotcontributetotheemergenceoftruthandthusisunworthyoftheprotectionguaranteedbytheFirstAmendment.42

Interestingly,themetaphorofthe‘marketplaceofideas’issooftenused,thatwedonotpausetoquestionit.Oncewedo,itisobviousthatitreflectsthequintes-sentialcommodificationofinformation:itappliesthecompetitivemarkettheory,a-laAdamSmith,tointellectualproducts.43

2.2.2. Democracy

Asecondpublic-orientedrationaleforfreedomofspeechaimsevenmoredirectlyatthepoliticalrealmthanthemarketplaceofideasrationale.Itistheunderstandingthatfreespeechiscrucialformaintaining–atleast–andassistinginnurturingandflourishing–atmost–democracy.Onceunderstoodasaninseparablepartofdemocracy,thequestionbecomes,whatisthebestconceptionofdemocracy?Obviously,thisisafundamentalissueofpoliticalscience.Forourpurposeshere,Ishallexaminetwomainanswers:amajoritarianconceptionofdemocracyandadeliberation-participationconception.44

42. Thisisacategoricalapproachtothesubjectmatteroffreespeech,articulatedbytheCourtinChaplinsky v. New Hampshire,315U.S.568,571(1942).TheCourtlistedafewcategoriesofexpressions,andexplained:‘suchutterancesarenoessentialpartofanyexpressionofideas….’Thefulllistofthe‘lowlevel’speechincludes‘thelewdandtheobscene,theprofane,thelibelous,andtheinsultingor“fightingwords”’–id.Inotherwords,themarketplacerationaletriestoseparateideasfromnon-ideas.Thisattemptiswellillustratedintheareaofobscenity.ForsixteenyearstheCourtstruggledtodefine‘obscenity’:Roth v. United States,354U.S.476,484(1957)definedanexpressionasobsceneifitis‘utterlywithoutredeemingsocialvalue’.ButMiller v. California,413U.S.12(1973),redefinedobscenity(adefinitionwhichisstillvalidtoday–seeReno v. American Civil Liberties Union,521U.S.844(1997)).Roth’stestwasreplacedwith‘Whetherthework,takenasawhole,lacksseriousliterary,artistic,politicalorscientificvalue’.The‘utterlywithout’valuewasreplacedwiththelessrigiddemandof‘lacksseriousvalue’.TheresultisthatmorematerialisconsideredobsceneunderMiller,thanunderRoth,andifobscene–itisnotan‘idea’,andnotprotectedbytheFirstAmendment.JusticeBrennan,whodeliveredtheopinionoftheCourtinRothdissentedinthiscaseaswellasinacompanioncase,andfranklyadmittedgivingupthetaskofdefiningobscenity.SeeParis Adult Theater v. Slaton,413U.S.49,83-84(1973).

43. See alsoSchauer,supranote31,at19-20.44. Emersonbundlesthetwotogether,whenhespeaksof‘participationindecision-makingbyall

membersofsociety’–seesupranote21,at7.BothversionsfindanauthoritativeanchorinBrandeis’concurrenceinWhitney v. California,274U.S.375(1927)atp.375.



Self Government

ThefirsttoarticulateacoherentandinfluentialtheoryoffreespeechbasedonademocraticconceptwasAlexanderMeiklejohn.45Hisbasicpremisewastheprincipleofself-government:itis‘We,thePeople’thatgovern,andgovernmentderivesitspowersfromtheconsentofthepeople.46Thisnotionofthepeople’ssovereigntyshouldbeunderstoodonthebackgroundofthealternative:rulingbymonarchs,aristocratsandothernon-electrulers.47Thisnotionofself-governmentfindssupportalsoinJamesMadison’swords:

‘Apopulargovernmentwithoutpopularinformationorthemeansofacquiringit,isbutaprologuetoafarceoratragedy,orperhapsboth.Knowledgewillforevergovernignorance;andapeoplewhomeantobetheirowngovernors,mustarmthemselveswiththepowerknowledgegives.’48

Basedonthispremise,MeiklejohnexplainedtheprincipleoffreespeechandmodeleditaftertheNewEnglandTownMeeting.49Themeetingisopentoall:‘everymanisfreetocome.Theymeetaspoliticalequals.’Itconvenestodiscuss

45. SeeA.Meiklejohn,‘FreeSpeechanditsRelationtoSelf-Government’(1948),reprintedinPoliti-cal Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of the People, NewYork,HarperBrothersPublishers,1948.TherationalehashadgreatinfluenceonAmericanfreespeechjurisprudence.JusticeBrennan’sopinionfortheCourtinNew York Times,376U.S.at270-271enricheduswiththeobservation/command,thatfreespeechcasesshouldbeconsidered‘againstthebackgroundofaprofoundnationalcommitmenttotheprinciplethatdebateonpublicissuesshouldbeuninhibited,robust,andwide-open.’Againstthisbackground,theCourtaffirmedtherighttocriticizepublicofficials.ThiswasrecognizedasanalmostliteralincorporationofMeiklejohn’sthesis:seeH.Kalven,A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America,NewYork,Harper&Row,1988,p. 67.Inasubsequentcase,theSupremeCourtstatedthat‘[f]orspeechconcerningpublicaffairsismorethanself-expression;itistheessenceofself-government.’–seeGarrison v. Louisiana,379U.S.64,74-75(1964).JusticeBrennanhimselfhintedthatNew York Times echoesMeiklejohn’stheory–seeW.J.Brennan,‘TheSupremeCourtandtheMeiklejohnInterpretationoftheFirstAmendment’,79Harv. L. Rev.1-20(1965),p.18.See alsoJusticeThomas’dissentinNixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,528U.S.377(2000)(affirmingBuckley v. Valeo anditspermissiontorestrictcontributionstopoliticalcampaigns).Hewritesthat‘Thefounderssoughttoprotecttherightsofindividualstoengageinpoliticalspeechbecauseself-governingpeopledependuponthefreeexchangeofpoliticalinformation.Andthatfreeexchangeshouldreceivethemostprotectionwhenitmattersthemost–duringcampaignsforelectiveoffice.’–id.atp.917.

46. Meiklejohn,supranote45,atpp.9-19.47. SeeC.Sunstein,‘FreeSpeechNow’,59U. Chi. L. Rev.255-316(1992),pp.256-257.Inthis

sense,itisakintotheeighteenthcentury’scryforequality:theFrenchcitizenswhotookovertheBastilleinthenameof‘liberty,equalityandfraternity.’Forthem,‘equality’meantself-government,notequalityamongpeopleinthewayweinterprettheEqualProtectionclauseoftheFourteenthAmendmenttoday.

48. The Writing of James Madison,NewYork,G.P.Putnam’sSons,1910,vol.9,p. 103.49. Meiklejohn,supranote45,atp.24.Thismodelandtheextenttowhichitisapplicabletothe

vastandpopulousmodernstateisonegroundofcritiqueofthistheory.SeeSchauer,supranote31,atp.38,43.



politicalissuesandtoreachdecisionsonpublicpolicy.50Thisisapoliticalarena,anditsfinalaimis‘thevotingofwisedecisions.’51Freedomofspeechisrequiredtoassuretheeffectivenessoftheprocess,sothatthegoverned/governingcitizensareinformed(‘theymustknowwhattheyarevotingabout’).52Withoutfreedomofspeechthepoliticalprocesswillfail.

Muchcanbesaid(andindeed,hasbeensaid)aboutthisrationale,buthereweareinterestedinthedimensionofquality/quantity.ThepurposeofthetownmeetingandofthepoliticalprocessinMeiklejohn’sviewistoproduceaninformeddecision.Naturally,wewouldbeinterestedthatthepoliticalprocessproducesthebestpossibledecisionandwemayassumethataprerequisiteforthebestdecisionishavingthebestinformationpossibleandthebestviewsheard.Hence,therationaledeclaresaclearinterestinthequality ofthepublicdiscourse.Wemayfurtherassumethatdiversityenablesvariousideastobetested–anotionborrowedfromthemarketplaceofideasrationale–andsotheself-governmentrationaleisinterestedalsointhequantity ofthespeech.

Meiklejohn’sinterestinthequalityofthepoliticaldebatewasnottranslatedintoaclearprescription.Hewrotethatthegovernmentcan,and‘hasaheavyandbasicresponsibilitytopromotethefreedomofspeech’,butthisisbymeansofeducation,byprovidinginformationandthelike,53notbydirectintervention.Thereseemstobeonlyoneplacewheretheself-governmentrationaleismorewillingtointervene,butMeiklejohndidnotsayhowthisinterventioncanorshouldbecarriedout.Thisisthecaseofrepetition.Theself-governmentrationaleresentsrepetitions.Atownmeeting–orapoliticalprocess–wouldbebetteroffiftenpeopleexpressedtendifferentviews,ratherthanexpressingthesameideatentimes.Meiklejohncalledsucharepetitionawasteoftime,andexplainedthat,‘whatisessentialisnotthateveryoneshallspeak,butthateverythingworthsayingshallbesaid.’54Thisresent-menttowardsrepetitionsreinforcestheinterestinthequalityofthedebate,evenattheexpenseofdisappointingsomespeakerswhohavenothingnewtosay.Itisapreferenceofqualitytoparticipation.Butagain,Meiklejohndidnotclarifyifthisresentmenttorepetitionsallowsinterferencetostopthem.

2.2.3. Participation

ContemporarytheoriesofdemocracybuildonMeiklejohnbutholdadeeperorwidernotionthereof.Ourunderstandingofdemocracymightincludemorethanself-governmentthatisexercisedbythecastingofaballot.Wemightunderstand

50. Meiklejohn,supranote45,atpp.24-26.51. Id.atp.26.Lateron,Meiklejohnreaffirmedhisemphasisontheelectoralaimoftheprocess.

Seeid.at97(1960)(citingArt.I,§2,cl.1oftheConstitution).52. Id.atp.26.53. Id.atpp.19-20.54. Id.at26.



thepoliticalprocessasa‘collectiveself-determination’55orasa‘deliberativedemocracy.’56Thisistheviewthatself-governmentinademocracyiscomposednotonlyofthemomentaryactofvoting,butalsoofwhathappensinbetweenelections;thattheongoingciviclifeisoneofconstantdecisions,public-politicalandprivate-individualacts.Afurthercentralnotionofdemocracy–ifnotthemostimportantone–ispoliticalequality.57ThisisnotjusttheequalityofcitizensinthesensethatnokingrulesthepeopleanditisalsomorethanMeiklejohn’sstatementthattheprocessisopentoall.Itispoliticalequalityinthesensethat‘theidentity,theresourcesandthepowerofthespeakerdonotmatter’,58butwhatmattersisonly‘theforceoftheargument.’59

Thisrichercontentofwhatwemeanby‘democracy’hasdirectimplicationsonourcurrentexploration.Onceweareinterestedintheprocessofdeliberationforitsownsake,asanendandnotjustasaninstrumentaimedatproducingbetterpoliticaldecisions,theconcernforthequality ofthediscussionisparamount.Thisconceptionofdemocracydeclaresamoreexplicitandvigorousinterestinthequality ofthediscoursethantherationaleswehaveseenthusfar.Oncewefurtherinsistontherelevanceofpoliticalequality,wecannotignorethefactthatsomemarkets,sometimes,malfunction.60Themarketsarecontrolledbypowerfulspeakers,whosilence,defacto,lesspowerfulspeakers.Thericherconceptionofdemocracyallowsgovernmentstointerfereinthemarketplaceofideasinsuchsituations,withthegoalofimprovingthequality ofthediscourse.61

SuchinterferenceofthegovernmentinthemarketplaceofideasisananathematotheMillianrationaleoffreespeech.TheMillianobjectionisevenstrongerwhenthegovernmentalinterferencemeansthatthespeechofsomespeakersislimited.TheMillianrationaledoesnotcarewhetherthelimitationofquantity ismeanttoenhancethequality ofthedebate.Thus,theparticipatorytheory’spreferenceofqualityofthepublicdiscoursetothequantityofspeechinthemarketplaceofideasneedsexplanationandjustification.Onerouteistoconvinceusthattheparticipatoryconceptionofdemocracyisbetterthanthealternativeofamajoritarianconception,

55. O.M.Fiss,The Irony of Free Speech,Cambridge(Mass.),HarvardUniversityPress,1996,p.3.

56. Foradiscussionofthisideaanditsshortcomings,seeJ.BohmanandW.Rehg(eds.),Deliberative Democracy – Essays on Reason and Politics, Cambridge(Mass.),MITPress,1999;Sunstein,supra note38,atpp.18-20.

57. SeeJ.Lichtenberg,‘FoundationsandLimitsofFreedomofthePress’,inJudithLichtenberg(ed.),Democracy and the Mass Media,Cambridge, CambridgeUniversityPress,1990,102,atp.111.

58. Sunstein,supra note38,atp.20.59. Id.,atp.245.60. Foraneconomicanalysisoftheprotectionoffreespeech,seeD.A.Farber,‘FreeSpeechWithout

Romance:PublicChoiceandtheFirstAmendment’,105Harv. L. Rev.554-583(1991)(arguingthatintheabsenceoflegalprotectionforfreespeech,themarketwillunder-produceinformation,andgovernmentwillover-regulateit).

61. Seee.g.,Fiss,supranote55,atpp.15-17(arguingthat‘Thecallforstateinterventionisbased…onthetheorythatfosteringfullandopendebate–makingcertainthatthepublichearsallthatitshould–isapermissibleendforthestate.’)



whichis,byandlarge,theconceptionunderlyingMeiklejohn’stheoryoffreespeech.Suchataskexceedsthescopeofthischapter.62

Aninterestinthequalityofthedebatemightjustifytakingactivemeasurestoenhancethequalityofspeechevenattheexpenseoflimitingthequantityofspeakers.Butdoesthismeanthattheinterestinqualityovercomestheinterestinquantity?Thislastquestionisillustratedbyexaminingthecaseofrepetition.Repetitionseemstoenhancequantity,notquality.Soifwearemoreinterestedinthequalityofthediscourse,wouldweallowpeopletorepeateachother’sspeech?63Underaparticipatoryunderstandingofdemocracy,theanswershouldbepositive.Participationisvaluedperse.Quantity,translatedintodemocraticvalues,meanscitizens’participationbywayofspeech.JudithLichtenbergadvocatedthatfreespeechrequiresbothquantityofspeechanddiversity,andcaptureditnicelyinthephrase‘multiplicityofvoices.’64Howwouldthisviewrespondtoasituationofscarcity,when,forthesakeofsimplicity,onlytwopeoplecanvoicetheirviews,forsometechnicalreason,buttherearethreepeoplewhowishtospeak,twoofwhichwishtoexpressthesameidea?Whoshouldgovern:qualityorquantity?Itisimportanttonoticethatquality inthissituationreferstospeech,whereasquantity referstospeakers.Butonceweswitchthelatterelement(quantity)torefertospeechtoo,thenitisclearthatqualityprecedesquantity.

Theideathatthestatecan,andindeeddoeshavearoleinimprovingthemarketplaceofideasisnotforeigntous:copyrightlawdoesexactlythat.Itiswherethelawdeliberatelyinterferesbyprovidingincentivestoproduceoriginalexpression.Inthissense,copyrightlawisindeedtheengineoffreeexpression.65Itisthereforetimetoturntocopyrightlaw.

3. ExPRESSION:MOREORBETTER?

Isthereamatchbetweencopyrightlaw’spreferencesinregardofthequantity/qualityvariablesandthatoffreespeechjurisprudence?Beforewecanaddressthisquestion,weneedtobrieflyexplorecopyrightlaw.Thisareaofthelaw(togetherwithotherformsofintellectualpropertyandnodoubtotherlegalinventions)isthesourceofthethreattotheinformationalpublicdomainandperhapsitisalsotheplacewhereacurecanbefound.

62. R.Dworkinofferssuchanexplanation,throughananalysisoftheproblemofcampaignfinanceandBuckley v. Valeo,424U.S.1(1976).SeeR.Dworkin,‘FreeSpeechandtheDimensionsofDemocracy’,inJ.E.Rosenkrantz(ed.),If Buckley Fell: A First Amendment Blueprint for Regulating Money in Politics,NewYork,CenturyFoundationPress,1999,p.63.

63. Dworkinarguesthattheapproachheadvocates(the‘discriminating approach’) demandsthatthe‘debateisexposedtothewidestvarietyofideas possible;itisnotalsonecessarytomaximizethesheerquantityofspeech.’

64. SeeLichtenberg,supranote57,atpp.113-114.65. Seesupranote14.



Howdoescopyrightlawfareinthissetting?Doesitaimatthe‘more’oratthe‘better’?Atthisearlypoint,aseriesofquestionsarise:Whatis‘quality’?Whodetermines‘quality’?Canitbemeasured?How?Andwhataboutthequantitativeaspect?Doescopyrightlawprefermore?Moreauthorsormoreworks?Theanswersmatter.66Aninitial(andhencesuperficial)observationisthatcopyrightlawprefersquantitytoquality.Indeed,studentsofcopyrightlawlearnthatthequalityoftheworkisirrelevanttothecopyrightprotection.Athree-yearoldchild’sdrawingisprotectedjustasmuchasPicasso’spaintings.Thedifferencewillappearinthatthefirstisunlikelytoattractmuchinterestotherthanthatoftheproudparentsandifcopiedisunlikelytoendupincourt.Butthisdoesnotmeanthatcopyrightlawisindifferenttothequalityoftheworks.Somecopyrightlawtheoriesareinterestedprimarilyinqualityandquantityisonlyameanstoachieveit,whileothertheoriesemphasizequantityandyetothertheoriesareindifferenttoeithercriteriaofourexamination.

Onceagain,theresponsestothequestionsposedhereliewithfirstprinciples.Thefollowingisinevitablyaroughandinstrumentalsketchofsomeofthefamiliartheoriesofcopyright,withasingularfocus–itaimsatexploringitsquality/quantitypreferencesthereof.Inthecourseofthisjourney,Iwilltakeadetourtoexaminethepreferencesofthe‘competitivemarket’viewtothesevariables.

3.1. auThor-based TheorIes

Onebranchofcopyrighttheoriesfocusesontheindividualauthor.Variousandsophisticatedargumentsclaimthatanauthordeservestoownthecreationofhisorhermindduetothispersonal,psychologicalconnectionbetweentheauthorandthechildofherorhismind.67TheLockeantheory,asappliedtointellectualpropertyclaimsthatthelabortheauthorinvestedintherawmaterialmakestheauthortheowneroftheoutcome,sincethelaborisanextensionofthepersona,whichisnowembodiedinthenewwork.68Theseauthor-basedtheoriesviewcopyrightasaparticularcaseofproperty,whichinturnisinterpretedtobeastrong,libertarianhumanright.ThesetheoriesareusuallyaffiliatedwiththeContinent,wherethey

66. PaulGoldsteinwrites:‘Decisionsaboutthescopeofcopyright’ssubjectmatterandthereachofitsrightswillinevitablyaffectthequantity,quality,andcostoffutureliteraryandartisticworks–andwhetherinthefuture,thereisanythingon[television]thatisworthwatching.’,SeeP.Goldstein,Copyright’s Highway: The Law and the Lore of Copyright From Gutenberg to the Celestial Jukebox NewYork,HillandWang,1994.

67. G.F.W.Hegel,Philosophy of Right,[T.Knox(ed.andtrans.),Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress1967],§44;M.J.Radin,‘PropertyandPersonhood’,34Stan. L. Rev.957(1982).

68. JohnLock,Two Treatises of Government – The Second Treatise (1690) §25[PeterLaslett(ed.),Cambridge,CambridgeUniversityPress,1988,atpp.285-286];W.J.Gordon,‘APropertyRightinSelf-Expression:EqualityandIndividualismintheNaturalLawofIntellectualProperty’,102Yale L.J.1533(1993),A.C.Yen,‘RestoringtheNaturalLaw:CopyrightasLaborandPossession’,51Ohio St. L.J.517-559(1990).



arereflectedinpositivelaw,suchasthedoctrineofmoralrights.However,ourdiscussionhere,islimitedinitsscopeandisrathersimpletoo.

Theserationalesareindifferenttothequality/quantitydimension:theydonotconcernthemselveswiththeiroutcomebeyondtherewardtotheauthor.Qualityandquantityarenotatallunderstoodtobeagoalofcopyrightlaw.Rather,itistheauthorwhoislocatedatthecenterofthelegalattention,andwhatevershecreatesisworthprotection(assumingtheconditionsoftherelevanttheoryaremet,suchasmixinglaboretc.),nomatterwhetheritenhancesthequalityofhumanknowledgeorjustthequantitythereof.Inotherwords,qualityandquantityarerelevantonlytothosejustificationsofcopyrightlawthatareinstrumental–thosejustificationsthatviewcopyrightasameanstoachieveagoal,evenifthelatterisdebated.69

3.2. InsTrumenTal vIews of coPyrIghT: The economIc analysIs

Theeconomicanalysisisfamiliartostudentsofcopyrightlaw:itbeginswiththenatureofcreativeworksaspublicgoods,addsthataslongasthecostofcopyingischeaperthanthecostofcreatingtheoriginalworkandintheabsenceofatechnologywhichcanfenceoutpotentialcopiers–theworkwillbecopied.Anauthorwhoseworkwascopiedonce,orassumesitmighthappen,maybehesitantandpossiblyunlikelytoproduceasecondwork,oranyatall.Whenthisoccursitisconsideredtobeamarketfailure.Thelawisinterestedinpromotingthecreationofintellectualworks,usuallyagoaltakenforgrantedandnotspelledout,otherthaninthefamousUSConstitutionalclause(‘Congressshallhavethepower…topromotetheprogressofscience…’.)Accordingly,thelawshouldintervenetoamendthemarketfailure.Itdoessobyprovidingauthors,ormorepreciselycopyrightowners,withadequateincentives.70Thisanalysisassumesthataproprietarycontrolisthebestincentiveandthatauthorsaremotivated(atleastinter alia)byfinancialinterests.71Theimmediateresultofsuchatheoryisaninternaltensionwithincopyrightlawbetweentheauthorwhoisawardedcontroloverherworkandthepublic,forwhosesaketheincentivemechanismwasputintoplaceinthefirstplace.72

Otherstrandsoftheeconomicanalysisfocusnotonpreventingpotentialunauthorizedusesofthecopyrightedwork,butontheflipsideofthisstory.Creativeworksareconsideredtohaveapositiveexternality:someofthemareworthfar

69. Thismeansthatifandwhenthesetheoriesarejuxtaposedwiththedeontologicaltheoriesoffreespeech,andtotheextentthatthereisaconflictbetweenthem,theconflictisexternalratherthaninternal.ThisisclosertotheEuropeansituationthantotheAmericanone.SeeCopyrighting Speech,supranote13.

70. W.M.LandesandR.Posner,‘AnEconomicAnalysisofCopyrightLaw’,18J. Legal Stud.325-363(1989).

71. Cf.S.Breyer,‘TheUneasyCaseforCopyright:AStudyofCopyrightinBooks,Photocopies,andComputerPrograms’,84Harv. L. Rev. 281-355(1970).

72. SeeBirnhack,Copyright Law and Free Speech,supranote12,atp.1292.



beyondthecostofproduction.Thebenefitsofaworkaredifficulttomeasure:howmuchisShakespeare’sworkworthtohumankind?Therightcreatedbythelawandvestedwiththeauthorintendstoenabletheauthortointernalizeatleastpart ofthispositiveexternality.73Afurtherstrandoffersthefamiliareconomicanalysisof(realandallotherkindsof)property:inordertofacilitatetransactionsbetweenpeople,aprerequisiteisthattheassetatstakecanbeseparatedfromothers,defined,evaluatedandistransferable.

Thereareongoingdebatesaboutthemeaningoftheeconomicanalysis,its(lackof)empiricalbasis,itsunderlyingassumptions,anditsimplications:howshouldthegeneraltheoreticalframeworkbetranslatedintoparticularlegalrules?Forexample,whatdoesitimplyastotheoptimaldurationofcopyrightprotection?74Herewefocusontwovariables:qualityandquantity.Theeconomicanalysis,howeverwearticulateit,createsincentivesforproducingnewworksandisindifferenttotheuseoftheworksthusproduced.Inthissense,itislookingforthebestincentivestoproducemore works.Itseems,then,thatthequantitativedimensionismoreimportantthanthequalitativeone.Butcanwesaythatthisrationaleisindifferenttothequalityoftheworks?

Theanswerisnegative.Copyrightlaw,underitseconomicanalysis,doeshaveastrongpreferenceforthequalitativedimension.Variouscopyrightlawmechanismsareappliedtomakesurethattheworkscreatedaredifferentfromeachother.Differ-ence,itissubmitted,servesasaproxyofquality.75Thewholepointoftheincentivetheoryistopreventtheduplicationofthesame works(andthisincludesworksthatareconsideredtobe‘substantiallysimilar’).Repeatingsomeone’sexpressionwithouttheirpermissionunderminestheirfinancialrewardsandunderminestheirincentivestocreateintellectualworksinthefirstplace.Sothemarketviewstronglyobjectsrepetitionsofexpression.76Thepreferenceisapparentinvariouscopyrightlawdoctrines,mostclearlyintherequirementoforiginalityandthedoctrineofsubstantialsimilarity.Asfororiginality,somejurisdictionssettleforatechnician’slabor,othersrequirethattheoriginoftheworkistobefoundwiththeauthorratherthansomeone(orsomething)else,andsomerequirecreativity.77However

73. CooterandUlensummarizethisidea:‘Grantingexclusivepropertyrightstothecreatorofanideaallowshimorhertoappropriatemuchofitssocialvalue’.SeeR.CooterandT.Ulen,Law & Economics,3rded.,Reading(Mass.),Addison-Wesley,2000,p.128;see alsoW.J.Gordon,‘ExcuseandJustificationintheLawofFairUse:CommodificationandMarketPerspectives’,inElkin-KorenandWeinstockNetanel,supranote6,at p.149.

74. SeeEldred v. Ashcroft,537U.S.186(2003),especiallythedissentingopinionofJusticeBreyer.

75. Thisisclearerinpatentlaw,andespeciallythenoveltyandnon-obviousnessrequirements.76. Itdoes,however,allowrepetitionofideas.Thisdistinctionreflectstheidea/expressiondichotomy.

Repetitionsofexpressionsareallowedonlyunderthefairusedefense,whichmakessurethattheuseissociallybeneficial.

77. SeeUniversity of London Press, Ltd. v. University Tutorial Press, Ltd.,[1916]2Ch.601(UK);Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Company, Inc.,499U.S.340,345(1991)(US);Telstra Ltd. v. Desktop Marketing Systems Ltd.,[2001]FCA612(Melbourne,25.5.01)(Au.).



weinterprettherequirementanditstheoreticalunderpinnings,itismeanttoassurethattheworkatstakeisdifferentfromotherworks.Anewworkmeansnotonlythattherearemoreworks(whichonitsownwouldbeaquantitativemeasure),butthatitenrichesthecreativesphere.However,evenonceweacceptthatquantityisaproxyforquality,thisdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatqualityisimproved.Thetaskofsodeterminingislefttothemarket.Sincetheeconomicanalysisaimsatcreatingabetterfunctioningmarket,thiswouldbeagoodpointforashortdetourandforaddressingthemoregeneralquestion:Howdomarketsrespondtothevariablesofquantityandquality?

3.3. markeTs

Domarketsprefer‘more’ordotheyprefer‘better’?Whatdoesitmeantohaveabettermarket?Thesequestionsmightsoundsomewhatobscuretothe(Chicago/MiltonFriedman)trained(capitalist)economist.Whateveranefficientmarketproducesistheoptimalquality.Andastoquantity–wearelikelytohearthesameresponse–whatevertheefficientmarketproducesistheoptimalquantity.Inotherwords,theviewwhichholdstheidealofaperfectlycompetitivemarket,placesitscardsontheefficientmarket.Ofcourse,thisisanunsatisfactoryresponse,onbothitsprongs.Efficiencyneedstobedefinedaswell.Whatevercriteriawechoosetodefinethesetermswillhaveanunderlying,evenifhidden,assumptionastoqualityandquantity.78Letusinquirethislineofthought.

3.3.1. Quality

Qualityissomething,whichcannotbepre-determined.Whateverthemarketproducesisgood.Thisisthesloganoftheeconomist.Thepointatwhichsupplymeetsdemanddeterminesthepriceoftheproduct,anddeterminestheproduct.Itmightnotbethebest,intermsoftheproduct’sproperties:theremightbeaneasier-to-useproduct,orasaferone,oramoredurableone,butproductioncosts,andhenceprice,wouldbemuchhigher.Thecostswouldbetoohightomeetthedemandcurve,andhencetheproductwouldnotbesupplied,orwouldbesuppliedonlytothefewwhocanaffordthehighprice.Thinkofcars:technologicalknowledgetodayenablestheproductionofmuchsafercarsthatwillprovidebetterprotectionoftheirpassengers.Carsmightbeeasiertouse.Buttoproducesuchacarwouldcostmorethanmostcanafford.Inaddition,ourpreferences,riskaversionandthealternativesalsodeterminethepricewearewillingtopay.Sowesettleforacheapercar,whichisnotassafeasitshouldbeandperhapsnotaseasytouse,butitisonethatisaffordableandpreferredchoiceamongstthevariousoptions.Theeconomistwouldsaythatthisisthequalitythat

78. Thenormativeunderlyingassumptionsofeconomics,especiallywhenappliedtothelaw,werethesubjectoffascinatingexchangesome26yearsago.Seearticlesin9J. of Legal Stud.(1980)and8Hofstra L. Rev.(1980).



themarketsettledforandaslongasthemarketforceswerenotmanipulated(asinthecaseofapricecartelbetweenmanufacturers),thisistheonly‘quality’.

Inotherwords,themarketassuchisindifferenttoquality.79Itmightbe,asitoftenis,thatthegovernmentinterfereswiththemarketandrequirescertainlevelsofsafetybywayofsettingstandards.Themarkettheninternalizesthisrequirementandadjustsaccordingly.However,wecouldexplainthisinterferencebythegovernmentinsettingminimalstandardsasacorrectionofvariousmarketfailures.Individualuserslacktheabilitytoevaluatethepotentialrisksofcertainproductsortoobtaintherelevantinformation.Many,evenwheninformedabouttherisks,under-evaluatethemduetocognitivefailures:wetendtoappreciatethe‘hereandnow’muchmorethanthe‘probable’and‘futuristic’.

Thetraditionallawandeconomicanalysisistrainedtoidentifymarketfailuresandtoofferamendments,80butitinstructsusnottointerferewithanun-failedfunctioningmarket.Thisimpliesthateconomictheoryandhenceeconomicanalysisisneutral.Thiswouldofcoursebeaflawedconclusion.Efficiencycanbedefinedinvariousways,someofwhichareincompatiblewitheachother.Thesedefinitionsreflectassumptionsandclaimsaboutinterpersonalcomparisons,rationalityofagents,distributivejustice,aboutthepossibilityanddesirabilityofquantifyingthatwhichisunquantifiableorneednotbesoandotherassumptions.81ConsiderforexampletheParetooptimumcriteriaofwelfare.Itinstructsthatchangesareefficientonlyifatleastonepersonisbetteroffandnooneisinaworseposition.Eventhoughitsinitialappealwasthatiteliminatesinterpersonalcomparisons,itwaslaterunderstoodthatitdoesexactlythat,forexamplewhenapolicychangewillmakeonepersonslightlyworseoffandmanyotherstremendouslybetteroff.82Thisresultsincomparingtheminorlossoftheonepersontothepotentialgainsofthemanyothers.

79. Nowonder,then,thateconomicstextbookslackadefinitionofquality.‘Quality’isthusoftenassociatedwithproductquality.Seee.g.,R.S.PindyckandD.L.Rubinfeld,Microeconomics,3rded.,EnglewoodCliffs(NJ),PrenticeHallInc.,1994,p. 594,orthetermsdefinedinJ.Black,A Dictionary of Economics,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,1997,p.383(‘qualitycontrol’,‘qualityladder.’)

80. SeeS. Breyer,S.Breyer,Regulation and Its Reform,Cambridge(Mass.),HarvardUniversityPress,1982,pp.15-35. Does traditional economic analysis apply to the digital environment? Compare theDoestraditionaleconomicanalysisapplytothedigitalenvironment?ComparetheanalysisofC.ShapiroandH.R.Varian,Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Networking Economy,Boston,HarvardBusinessSchoolPress,1999,tothatofN.Elkin-KorenandE.M.Salzberger,Law, Economics and Cyberspace,Cheltenham,EdwardElgar,2004.

81. Thinkaboutloveormisery.Economistsassumethatmoneycanbuylove,contrarytotheBeatles,andwillrespondthatloveandother‘positive’emotionscanbequantifiedashavinganinfinitevalueandhencebeatallotherinterestsatstake.Miserycanbecompensatedforwithmoney,andcourtsdothatonadailybasis.Apersonthatwasinjuredmightbehappytoreceiveamonetarycompensationexpost.Buthowmanywouldagreetoloosetheirlegforahugesum,exante?

82. SeediscussioninR.O.Zerbe,Economic Efficiency in Law & Economics,Cheltenham,EdwardElgar,2001,pp. 3-4.



3.3.2. Quantity

Economistsarenaturallyhappywhenthenumbersshowgrowthinthemarket:morejobs,moreproducts,moresales,moremoney.Economistsarewillingtoworkhardtoproduce‘more’,butitisnotthequantitythatisvaluedperse.Sometimes‘quantity’isashortcutandmeansforothergoals.

Economistsoftenacttoallowmoreplayerstoenterthemarket.Theyworkhardtoenactantitrustlawsandenforcethem,sothatnooneisexcludedfromthemarketduetoartificialbarrierssetbytheincumbentplayers.Suchantitrustlawsmightbeinterpretedasaimingat‘more’players,butinfact,theyareaimingatcorrectingwhatisperceivedasamarketfailure.Quantityisjustanindication,orashortcut,forcompetition.Whatisvaluedhereisnotparticipationinitself,butcompetition.Competitionisgoodbecauseitisconsideredtobethebestoperatingmodeofthemarket.Itisvaluedbecauseitassuresus,sotheeconomistsassureus,thatthemarketfunctionswell.Thatquantityisjustanindicationandnotagoal,isillustratedinthecasesinwhicheconomistsacknowledge‘naturalmonopolies’.Sometimes,oneisenoughandisthebestmodeofthemarket.Insuchsituationsqualityisachievedthroughminimalquantity.83

Whenwetalkaboutquantityofactivities, thequantityindicatesandservesgrowth.Growthisnotaneutralterm.Itreflectstheenlightenmentideaofprogress,thatmoreisbetter.84Indeed,itoftenis.Moreactivityinthemarketmeansthatmorepeoplehavejobsandmorepeoplehavemoremoneytospendorinvest,andtheseresult–thoughnotalways–inabetterqualityoflife.Inthisuseofthevariableof‘quantity’,itservesasameanstoachieveothergoals,suchasqualityoflife.Quantityisthusanindicationofquality,thelatterreferringnottotheinternalfunctioningofthemarketitself,buttotheexternalaffectsofawell-functioningmarket.

3.4. The democraTIc vIew of coPyrIghT law

Theeconomicanalysisassumesthatmoreknowledgepromotesthesocialwelfareandthusisdesirable.Butitisnottheonlypossibleviewofthegoalofcopyrightlaw.Wemightquerythesocialadvantagesofknowledgeandfindoutthatwecananswerbypointingtodemocraticvalues.

LetuslookattheroutethisviewhastakeninUScopyrightlaw.TheConstitution,legislators,scoresofjudges,scholarsandpractitionershaverepeatedthegoalofcopyrightlaw:itistopromotetheprogressofscienceandusefularts.‘Science’istobeunderstoodas‘knowledge’.85Butfewhavepausedtothinkwhatthisactually

83. SeeM.A.LemleyandD.McGowan,‘LegalImplicationsofNetworkEconomicEffects’,86Cal. L. Rev.479-611(1998).

84. SeeBirnhack,supranote16.85. SeeE.C.Walterscheid,‘ToPromotetheProgressofScienceandUsefulArts:TheBackground

andOriginoftheIntellectualPropertyClauseoftheUnitedStatesConstitution’,2J. Intell. Prop.Prop. L.1-56(1994),p.51.



means.Why,infact,ispromotingtheprogressofknowledgeimportant?Ofcourse,itreflectsanidealofmodernsocietythatvaluesknowledgeperse.Wemeasureprogress,amongotherthings,accordingtoratesofliteracy.Wethinklearningtreatsuswell.Butthenagain,why?Oneanswermightturnontheindividual:themorewelearnandknow,themoreweachievepleasureandavoidmisery.Byknowingmorewecanmakebetterjudgmentsaboutwhatisgoodforus.Thisutilitarianviewishardtoarguewith(ignoringromanticviewsofignoranceasablessing).Butthetheoryof(Anglo-American)copyrightlawisnotfixedontheindividualoratleastnotontheindividualalone.Rather,thecollective liesatthecoreofcopyrightlaw.Thegoodthatwefindinthepromotionofknowledgeshouldbeevaluatedaccordingtothepolity.Inthissense,copyrightlawistoachieveapoliticalideal.Weshouldbeaskingwhyisknowledgeandthepromotionthereofagoodthingforthepolityatlarge?Theansweristhatwebelievethatknowledgeservesvaluesthatwe,inademocraticsociety,cherish.Thisinvitesafurtherquestion:whatarethesevalues,orputdifferently,whatisourconceptionofdemocracy?

Afewscholarsadvocatedademocraticunderstandingofcopyrightlaw.NeilNetaneloffersa‘democraticparadigm.’86Inhisview,copyrightlawservestwofunctions.Oneisthatofproductionandtheotherisastructural function.Thelattermeansthatcopyrightlawcreatesandfostersanindependentsectorofspeech:87itisindependentfromthegovernment.Netanel’smainconcernforthefateoffreespeechfallswithintheclassicgovernmental paradigm:thatwhichisconcernedwithgovernmentalcontrolsoffreespeech.Thisindicatesthedemocraticvaluewhichheseekstoprotectandpromote:thatofself-government.Thisinturnindicatesaspecificconceptionofdemocracy(andhereIdepartfromdescribingNetanel’sview):itisoneofamajoritarianview.Wehavealreadyseenthistheoryinourdiscussionoffreespeech.ItistheMilliandistrustingovernmentcoupledwiththeMeiklejohnianmajoritarianviewofdemocracy.ThisofcoursedoesnotmeanthatthisisallthatNetanelfindsindemocracy.Indeed,hisviewincludesadditionalvaluessuchaspluralismanddiversityandparticipation.88

Forthepurposeoftheargument,Iwillseparatethemajoritarianviewfromthericherconceptionsofdemocracy.Whatistheinstructionofthemajoritarianviewintheshapingofcopyrightlaw?Itseemsthatitisinterestedinfosteringmore privatespeechtocountergovernmentalpower.Theemphasisis,accordingly,ontheproduction andquantity ofexpressions.Thisviewisindifferenttothecontentandqualityofthespeech.

Otherconceptionsofdemocracyareconcernednotonlywiththeriskofgovern-mentalabuseofpower,butofany abuseofpower.Thisisthecorporate paradigm,similartotheonewehaveseeninourdiscussionoftheparticipatoryconceptionoffreespeechtheory.TheseconceptionsareguidedbytheMillianviewthatwishestoprotectusnotonlyagainstthe‘tyrannyofpoliticalrulers’,butalsoagainstthe

86. WeinstockNetanel,supranote26.87. Id.,atpp.288,341,352.88. Id.,atpp.343,362.



‘tyrannyofthemajority.’89Copyrightlawenablesnotonlyfinancialadvantagestoitsholders,butalsoactsasculturalcontrolandpoliticalpower.Thosewhoholdthisconceptionofdemocracyareinterestedinmaximizingthedisseminationofknowledgeandminimizingcontroloverintellectualworks.Thisview,asproposedbyNivaElkin-Koren,drawsonthepoliticaltheoryofHabermassandadvocatesthatwecreateadeliberativespherewhichisinsulatedfromtheeffectsofbothgovernmentand market.90Oncethemarketaffectsthisdeliberativesphereandthusdeterminesdefactoitscontents,thereareimmediatedistributiveconsequences.Noteveryonecanparticipateonanequalbasis.Someparticipants’speechislimited,inthattheirabilitytouserawexpressivematerialtocreatetheirownexpressionislimited.Accordingly,thisviewfocusesnotonlyonproductionofknowledge(speech/expression),butonassuringitsdisseminationandaccess.91

Insteadofamajoritarianviewthatfocusesontheonce-in-every-few-yearselections,wecanviewdemocracytobeinterestedalsoinwhathappensbetweenelections:thisviewholdsthatcitizensformtheirpoliticalviewsnotonlyimmediatelybeforevoting,butinanydailysocialpractice.92Accordingly,theweightoftheself-governmentprincipleshiftsfromthesingularactofvotingtotheon-goingcollectivedeliberation.Accordingly,thepublicdiscoursegainsmoreimportancethanunderthemajoritarianview.Arobustpublicdomainprovidesboththeresourcesofsuchadebateanditsforum.

Thisconceptionofdemocracyinstructsustoconstructcopyrightlawinawaythatwouldmaximizecitizens’abilitytoparticipateinthecollectiveself-governmentanddeliberation.Itiscommittedtopreservingarobustpublicsphere.Thismeansanemphasisondissemination ofknowledgeandaccess toit,butalsoanemphasisonassuringthatothercitizenscanparticipate inanactivewayinthedemocraticprocess,andnotonlyintheroleofpassivelisteners.Participation,inthiscontext,meansactive usage ofintellectualworksandhencerequiresarichpublicdomain.Thisviewisinterestednotonlyinmore speech,butinhavingmoreparticipantsandabetter qualityofspeech,sotopromotethepublicdiscourse.Moreandbetterknowledgeenablesus,collectively,tomakebetterdecisionsaboutour(collective)life.

Thedemocraticviewdepartsfromthemarketviewonthedimensionofquantity/quality.Ittakesafirmerpositionthanthemarketview:bothquantityandqualityarevaluedperse.Thepoliticalgoalofenhancinghumanknowledge(‘promotingtheprogress’)andaninterestintheuse oftheworksasaninseparable

89. Mill,supranote35,atpp.5-9.90. Seee.g.,N.Elkin-Koren,‘CyberlawandSocialChange:ADemocraticApproachtoCopyright

LawinCyberspace’,14Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J.215-295(1996),pp.218-234;Benkler,supranote2;Y.Benkler,‘APoliticalEconomyofthePublicDomain:MarketsinInformationGoodsversustheMarketplaceofIdeas’,inR.CooperDreyfuss,D.LeenheerZimmermanandH.First(eds.),Expanding the Boundaries of Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society,Oxford,OxfordUniversityPress,2001,p.267.

91. SeeBenkler,supra note90.92. SeeElkin-Koren,supranote90,atpp.218-234.



partoftheirproductiondictatesaclearinstruction:themore workswehaveandthemorespeakersparticipateinthepublicdiscourseandthebetter workswehave,themoreweprogress.

Butwehavetofinetunetheseterms,sinceinmanycaseswecannothaveboththe‘better’andthe‘more’atthesametime.Thecaseofrepetitionsharpensthetermsandthedemocraticview’sposition.Whenacitizenrepeatswhatsomeoneelsehasalreadysaid–repeatingMartinLutherKing’sI Have A Dream withoutpermission–thisindeedenhancesthequantityofexpression,butonlyinatechni-calway.Becauseitisanexactrepetitionoftheexpression,itseemsthatitdoesnotaddnewideas.Themarketviewwouldobjecttothisrepetitionforitdoesnotconsidermultiple,identical,expressionstoenhanceeitherthequantityorthequalityofthepublicdiscourse.Atfirstsight,itseemsthatthedemocraticviewagrees:ifwedetachideasfromthepeoplewhoholdthemandfocusontheformeralone,thenrepetitionsofexpressionsmightnotbeconsideredtoimprovethequalityofthepublicdiscourse.Butifwepayattentiontothespeakers andnotonlytothespeech,thentheirparticipation isvaluedperse.Thevalueofparticipationreflectsnotonlythevalueofself-government,butalsothatofequality:thatthereshouldbenolimitationsontheparticipationinthedeliberativeprocess.93Furthermore,repetitionmightdependoncontext.Somerepetitionsofexpressionsmightcreatenewmeanings,andthusnewideas,despitetheuseofthesameform.Hence,althoughitseemsjustaduplicationofspeech,itisinfactnewspeech.

However,todeducethatthedemocraticviewallowsrepetitionsofexpressionperseisahurriedandunwarrantedconclusion.Thedemocraticviewisnotblindtotheeconomicstructureofcopyrightlaw,andsharesmuch(butnotall)oftheideasofthemarketview.Itdiffersinthatitrefusestogiveupothervalues.Sothedemocraticviewmightrunintoaconflict:promotingparticipationthroughallowingrepetitionsmightunderminetheincentivetheory.Thistensionreflectstheinternalconflictofcopyrightlaw.Itissolvedbycopyright’smechanisms,andespeciallythefairusedefense.Thedefenseissupposedtoconsidervariousfactorstohelpusdeterminewhethertheuseunderminestheincentivetheory,andwhetheritenhancesthedemocraticvaluesweareinterestedin.Ademocraticviewwouldinstructustooperatethefairusedefenseinamannerthatbetterreflectsitsbasicvalues,andtoavoidtheflawscreatedbythemarketview.

4. THEPUBLICDOMAINANDTHEMARKET

Thediscussionthusfarmakesitclearthatinorderforustoconstructthepublicdomainwemustturntofirstprinciples,notonlyofcopyrightlaw,butoffreespeechjurisprudenceaswell.Freespeechjurisprudenceandthepublicdomain,derive

93. Inmanycases,wevaluerepetitionsforexactlythisreason.Thinkofpetitions.Theyareanorganizedformofmultiplerepetitionsofthesameidea,expressedinthesameway.Petitionsarepowerfulbecausetheyallowmanytoparticipateandshapetheirownfate.



fromthesamepoliticaltheories.Thefirstprinciplesstemfromourconceptsandconceptionsofthemarketanditsroleinaliberal-democraticstateandfromourconceptionofdemocracyandtheroleofthegovernment,tonamejustafewmainpoints.Hence,weshouldalsomaintaincoherencywhenarticulatingthedetailsanddoctrinesofcopyrightlawandoffreespeechjurisprudence:eachruleneedstofittherespectiveconceptfromwhichitderives,whichinturnneedstofitbasicprinciples.Thetheoriesofeachfieldarenotestranged.Thetwofieldssharethesametheoreticalcradle.94

Thetwofieldscover,toagreatextent,thesamesubjectmatter.Mostofthespeechcoveredbythefreespeechprincipleisalsoconsideredtobean‘expression’undercopyrightlaw.Thetwosubjectmattersarenotentirelycongruent,asfreespeechlawexcludessomekindsofexpressions(suchasobscenityandfightingwordsintheUS,orhatespeechinGermanyandFrance)whichmight,nevertheless,becopyrighted.Freespeechalsocoversideas,whichareexcludedfromcopyrightprotection,andofcourse,copyrightprotectionislimitedinitsdurationandissubjecttosomeexceptionssuchasthefairusedefense.Sonotall‘speech’isalso‘expression’andviseversa,butmostofthetime,mostofthe‘speech’isalso‘expression’andviceversa.

Giventhesebaselines,itistimetotiethelooseends.Doourconceptionsofeachfield,measuredalongthevariablesofqualityandquantityandalongthecrucialissueofgovernmentalintervention,matchinacoherentmanner?Howdowewishtoconstructthepublicdomain:dowewantittohavemoreexpressions,ideasandinformation,ordowepreferthedomaintobearich,diverse,andusefulreservoir?Inotherwords,doweprefermoreorbetter?Wecouldhaveblindedourselvestoourex-antepreferenceastoeachtheoryofeachofthetwofields,copyrightlawandfreespeechjurisprudence,‘mix’thevarioustheoriestogetherandthenfigureoutwhichproducesthebestpair.Buttherequirementofcoherencyobliteratessomeofthesematches.95Accordingly,Iwillfocusontwopossiblepairs:firstly,whathappens(orshouldhavehappened)whenweholdamarketviewofcopyrightlaw,i.e.,thefamiliarincentivetheoryandamarketplaceofideastheoryoffreespeech?Thesecondpairofrationaleswillbethedemocraticones:whathappenswhenweholdamajoritarianoraparticipatoryviewoffreespeechandademocraticviewofcopyrightlaw?96

94. Butnotnecessarilythehistoricalcradle.SeeD.LeenheerZimmerman,‘InformationasSpeech,InformationasGoods:SomeThoughtsonMarketplacesandtheBillofRights’,33Wm. & Mary L. Rev.665-740(1992).

95. Anotherissue,whichIwillnotdelveintoatthispoint,isthatwemightholdaneclectictheoreticalview,i.e.,holdsimultaneouslymorethanonetheoryofeitherfreespeechorofcopyrightlaw(orofboth).

96. Afull-scaleanalyticalinquiryshouldhavecreatedafull-chartofallrelevantrationalesofbothfreespeechtheoryandofcopyrightlaw,andexamineallpossiblematches(ormismatches).However,Ileavethediscussionofthematcheswhichinvolvedeontologicalviewstoanotherday.



4.1. The markeT and The markeTPlace of Ideas

Copyright,whenreadundertheeconomicanalysisandfreespeechjurisprudence,whenreadundertheMillian‘searchforthetruth’theory,visionthemarketasthebestwaytoachievetheirgoals–growthandthetruth,respectively.Duetothebeliefinthemarket,thedimensionofquality/quantitydoesnotraiseanyseriousimplicationsunderthisintersection.Bothrationalesbelievethatthequantityofspeechorexpressionsshouldbeenhanced.Bothshyawayfromdeclaringanexplicitinterestinimprovingthequalityofthemarket(eitherthemarketplaceofideasorthemarketofcommodifiedexpressions).Butquantityservesasaproxyforquality:bothrationaleswishthatthemarketwillimprove,buttheyrefusetodoanythingactivetopromotethiswish.

Thetwolegalfieldsdepartinthecaseofrepetitionsofspeech,orwhatwewouldcall‘copying’incopyrightlawterms.Copyrightlawinsiststhatexpres-sionsdifferfromeachother(thisisevidentintherequirementoforiginalityandinthedoctrineofsubstantialsimilarity).Whilethemarketplaceofideastheoryisindifferenttorepetitions,copyrightlawisnot.Tothecontrary:itstrivestopreventrepetitionsofexpressions.Repetitionofideasisallowedundertheidea/expressiondichotomyandsomerepetitionofexpressionisalsopermittedunderthefairusedefense.Thetaskofexaminingwhetheroneexpressionrepeatsanotherisleftinthehandsofthegovernment–asanenforcerofcopyrightlawandastheproviderofthejudicialsystem.

IntheUS,understoodunderthemarketplacerationale,theFirstAmendmentrejectsthekindofinterferencethatcopyrightlawrequires.Itisthekindofinterferencethatthewell-knowncaseofBuckley v. Valeo overruledinthecontextoflimitationsoncampaignfinance:limitingspeechofsomeelementsofoursocietyinordertoenhancetherelativevoiceofothers.Buckleydeclaredthistobe‘whollyforeign’totheFirstAmendment.97

Onceweareguidedbyamarket-basedanalysisinbothcopyrightlawandinfreespeechjurisprudence,wemightbeabletodeducesomepracticalinstructionsfromthetheoreticalinquiry:thatthegovernment’sroleshouldbeminimizedtosituationsofmarketfailure;thatonly‘more’canserveasalegitimatemeanstopromotethemarket,whilethesemi-declaredgoalofpromotingthe‘better’isdeliberatelyleftunattended.Thisviewleavesuswithaminimalstateandwithapublicdomainthatisrunlikeamarket,andwhichislefttoitself.

Itisabusymarket,withalotof‘noise’andfewqualityfilters:everythingentersthemarketandalltheexpressionsandspeechactscompetewitheachother.Thecriterionisthatofthemarket,whichseemstopreferthatwhichitcanquantifyindollars,i.e.,thatwhichsellsandifwecansellmoreatlowercosts–itisbetter.Theresultisthemarketplaceofideasandexpressionswehavenow:thereisalotofcontent,butmostofitisrathershallow,repetitive,andverymuchonthesideofthemainstream.Itisnotthesortofspeechthatprovokesnewideasorposes

97. 424U.S.1,48-49(1976).



anychallengestothestatusquo.Indeed,entertainmentsellsbetterthanpoliticaldiscussions,sportssellbetterthanin-depthdocumentaries,andsexsellsmorethananythingelse.Thecontentismeasurednotonitsspeech-value,butonitsabilitytoselladvertisements,sowe–thecitizensnowtransformedintoconsumers–canbuymore.Themarketplacesubjectsideastothelogicofthemarket.Indeed,theoff-mainstreamideas,theinnovativeones,oftenstemfromnone,oratleastlesscommercialsettings,suchastheacademia,ormarginalizedindividualsorgroups.

Thisisthemarketplaceofideaswecurrentlyhave,inwhichthepublicdomainisreducedtoservethemarketandisnotconsideredtohaveavalueofitsown.Dowehaveanalternative?

4.2. democraTIc vIews of coPyrIghT and of free sPeech

Underdemocraticviews–withtheirmanynuances–ofbothcopyrightlawandoffreespeechjurisprudence,weneednotshyawayfromexplicitlyattemptingtopromotethequalityofourintellectualreservoirandofourpublicsphere.Thisisasituationofcongruenceofallthedimensionswehavebeendiscussing.Copyrightlawinterferesinfreespeech,butitisexplained,underitsdemocraticview,toservethepoliticalgoalofpromotingprogress,whichinturnisexplainedasareferencetoourconceptionofdemocracy.Soitisinterferenceinthemarketplaceofideasforthesakeofimprovingthequality ofthepublicdiscourse.Thisisexactlythekindofinterferencethattheparticipatoryviewoffreespeechisinterestedinandallows.Assumingwewouldholdconsistentconceptionsofdemocracyunderbothlegalregimes,thecongruenceallowsustomaketheshared goal argument:98wecansaythatthetwolegalregimesdostrivetoachievethesamegoal.Wecanevensaythatcopyrightistheengineoffreespeech.Wecanbasetheshared goal argument andtheenginemetaphoronanormativebasis,voidoforiginalistreferencestothehistoryoftheConstitution,ortoitsstructureandtext.

Thisisthemostattractivepicturewecandraw:itrestsonsolidfreespeechtheory,onsolidcopyrighttheory,achievestheoreticalcoherenceandhasclearlessonsforuswhenshapingthepublicdomain.Readunderthesetheories,bothcopyrightlawandfreespeechjurisprudenceaimatarichanddiversepublicdomain,inwhichdeliberationcantakeplacewithoutanyimpediments,inwhichallwhowishcanparticipate,regardlessoftheirmarketpower.Itisapublicdomain,whichisinterestedintheexchangebetweenthemultiplevoicesandtheirexpressions,whichrealizesthatnewideasformwhenoldideasinteract.Inotherwords,thisisapublicdomainthatrejectsculturalcontrol,whichisexecutedthroughtheuseofpropertyrights;itisapublicdomainthatisrequiredbythebestreadingwecanofferforbothcopyrightlawandforfreespeechjurisprudence.Itisapublicdomainwhichenablesnewparticipantstojoinin,buildontheexistingwork,andthatacknowledgesthat

98. Seesupranote14.



repetitioninadifferentcontextchangesthemeaningofawork,andthusshouldbeconsideredanewwork.99

5. CONCLUSION

Ourpublicdomainkeepsshrinking,althoughmoreworksthaneverbeforearebeingcreated.Itexpandsinquantity,butshrinksinquality.Ifwecareaboutourpolityandaboutthecivilcommunitythatwesharewithourneighbors,weshouldnotgiveupthegoalofhavingthebestpublicdomainpossible.Whenourfreespeechjurisprudenceisinspiredandguidedbysuchaquest,thenarobustpublicdomainis(constitutionally)required.Ifwefurtherbasecopyrightlawonthisbasis(ataskwhichatleastintheAnglo-Americanlegaltraditionispossiblebothasamatterofhistoryandasamatterofstatutoryandconstitutionalinterpretation),thanwehavetwosolidpillarsonwhichtobuildapublicdomainwhichservesitspurpose,i.e.,itservesusasapoliticalcommunity,ratherthanserveveryfew(commercial)stakeholders.Governmentshavearoletopromotethispublicdomain.Unfortunately,theytoooftenfailintheprocess.

99. Onmeaningmakingprocessesandtheirrelevancetocopyrightlaw,seeElkin-Koren,supranote90.Someexamplesofrepetitionswhichproducenewmeaningsareparodies(seeCampbell v. Acuff-Rose,510U.S.569(1994));postmodernart;musicsampling,andspeechappropriatedasidentitybuildingblocks(seeR.Coombe,The Cultural Life of Intellectual Property: Authorship, Appropriation and the Law,Durham(N.C.),DukeUniversityPress,1998).


More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain - bepress Legal ...

Documents

Transcript of More or Better? Shaping the Public Domain - bepress Legal ...