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Merantau: Imagining Migration in the Malay World. International

Seminar in Honour of Prof. E.U. Kratz. University of Frankfurt,

Germany, 30-31 March 2011.

Title:

Migration of the people from Brunei to Limbang after the

annexation of Limbang by Charles Brooke of Sarawak in 1890

Between 1847 and 1882, Brunei’s experienced rapid

disappearance of its territories to James Brooke (and later his

nephew Charles Brooke) and the British North Borneo Company. The

loss of Brunei’s territory was as a result of Britain’s imperial

policy which allowed Brooke to expand his territories with

limited interference from Britain. At this time, Britain did not

raise objections to the private efforts of British citizens or

British sponsored trading companies to own settlements in

Northern Borneo as Britain could exercise indirect control over

new territories that were strategically and commercially

important to them.

It was during this time James Brooke acquired half of

Brunei’s territory. It began in July 1842 when James Brooke

obtained the area of Sarawak (i.e., the portion of what is now

Sarawak extending from Cape Datu to the Sadong River) which was

rich in antimony for an annual tribute of $2,500. This was as a

result of Pengiran Muda Hashim’s (the Sultan’s minister)

agreement with James Brooke that the former would make James

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Brooke a governor of Sarawak if he could put an end to the

rebellion in Sarawak. After Sarawak was officially surrendered to

him by Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin II (r. 1824 – 1852) in 1847,

James Brooke (who then known as Rajah Brooke) began to expand his

territory to the seven rivers of Samarahan, Sadong, Lingga,

Skrang, Krian, Saribas and Rajang. These areas were rich in

jelutong1, beeswax and rice. In 1861, James Brooke expanded his

territory between Rajang and Bintulu Rivers which were rich in

jelutong, beeswax and rice including Rivers Mukah (a centre of

sago trade) and Oya.

In order to counter the activities of Brooke in

Sarawak, in 1865, Sultan Abdul Momin leased almost the whole of

North Borneo to an American Charles Lee Moses. The territory

changed hands several times before it was retained by Alfred Dent

and his associates of London who then formed the North Borneo

Company. In 1868, when Charles Brooke (who replaced James Brooke

in 1864) attempted to expand his territory by acquiring the Baram

River from the Sultan (who was at that time Sultan Abdul Momin,

r.1852 – 1885), the latter protested at Brooke’s attempt,

referring to the 1847 Agreement between Brunei and Britain.

According to Article X of the agreement, ‘His Highness the Sultan

engages not to make any similar cession, either of an island or

of any settlement on the mainland, in any part of his dominions,

to any other nation, or to the subjects or citizens thereof,

1 The jelutong (Dyera costulata) is a species of tree in the oleandersubfamily. It is used for its wood and its latex is a basic ingredientof chewing gum.

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without the consent of Her Britannic Majesty.’ Consequently, the

Foreign Office placed a ban on Brooke from acquiring any further

territories for the next ten years.

In November 1881 however, when a charter was granted to the

North Borneo Company, Britain could no longer continue its ban on

Brooke's expansion imposed in 1868. This was because, at this

time, there was increased competition especially between Britain

and France in Africa and the Far East and those powers which

possessed no colonies, Italy and Germany. In 1882, Peter Leys,

the British Consul General in Borneo, applied diplomatic pressure

on the Sultan to cede Baram to Charles Brooke. The Sultan, who

realized that further opposition was futile, gave in,

transferring all the rivers from Kidorung to Baram. The Baram

cession subsequently initiated a period of intense competition

between Sarawak and North Borneo for the control of the few

territories now remaining to Brunei. In 1884, the British North

Borneo Company obtained the lease of the Padas region from Brunei

for $3000 per year. Private individuals also began to get in on

the act when in 1882 W.C. Cowie acquired from the Sultan of

Brunei a lease of mineral rights at Muara, the coal-rich

peninsula at the mouth of the Brunei River. In 1884 A.H. Everett,

a former employee of the North Borneo Company and since 1881

Rajah Brooke’s agent in Brunei, acquired mineral rights and the

revenue rights of the Padasan River.

Due to the alarming rate of the loss of Brunei’s

territories, Sultan Abdul Momin called a meeting of his ministers

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in 1885 where they made an oath or Amanat not to cede anymore of

Brunei’s territories to foreigners. In this oath, the Limbang

District was especially mentioned. It says ‘Now concerning

Limbang and other countries which still remained under the

Government of Brunei, cannot be leased or given away to any other

nation, but must remain under our rule and that of our

ancestors’.2 In order to further protect Brunei’s remaining

territories from Brooke in Sarawak and the British North Borneo

Company in North Borneo, in 1888 Sultan Hashim, who succeeded the

throne in 1885, entered into an agreement with Britain. By this

agreement Brunei handed over the conducting of its foreign

relations to Britain. Brunei also agreed not to cede any

territory without prior British consent. However, Britain gave

protection to Brunei not to save Brunei from Sarawak and North

Borneo, but to secure Brunei against foreign interference and

eventually to absorb it within Brooke and the British North

Borneo’s colonies. That is why when Brooke annexed Limbang in

1890, Britain did not protest. Instead it gave legal recognition

to the annexation.

Indeed when Brooke annexed Limbang, Sultan Hashim whose rule

was influenced by the Amanat, sought Britain’s protection.

However, the British government, which was committed to the

absorption of Brunei either by Sarawak or North Borneo, did not

rescue Brunei. Instead, it urged Sultan Hashim to give his

consent to the annexation of Limbang by Brooke. Sultan Hashim,

2 D.E. Brown, ‘Sultan Momin’s will and Related Documents’, Brunei MuseumJournal, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969.

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however, made it clear that his consent would not be forthcoming.

His objections maintained the policy of the late Sultan (Sultan

Abdul Momin), who did not want any more of Brunei’s territories

to be divided among other powers.3 In his despatch to the

Governor of the Straits Settlements dated 11 February 1891,

Sultan Hashim stated that ‘in accordance with the wishes of the

late Sultan we have always refused to cede to any other nation

the River Limbang and other rivers and territory’.4

In order to validate the acquisition of Limbang by Sarawak,

a survey was carried out by the British government to determine

the independence of Limbang. This was because the annexation of

Limbang by Brooke was based on his contention that the Limbang

people had been independent of Brunei for years and the

inhabitants of Limbang preferred Sarawak’s rule to Brunei’s.5 In

Brooke’s despatch to Sir C. Smith, the Governor of the Straits

Settlement who was also the High Commissioner for Borneo, Brooke

stated that ‘I base my occupation principally on the will of the

inhabitants of Limbang and their right to choose a protecting and

ruling power, these people having maintained their independence

against the Bruneian Government since 1884’.6 Subsequently, the

report on Limbang’s independence was revealed by Noel P.

Trevenen, the British Consul General in Borneo (1898-1900), who

was chosen as the British representative to investigate the case.

3 FO12/87, Sultan Hashim to the Governor of the Straits Settlements,Enclosure 2 in No. 3, 11 February 1891. 4 Ibid., 11 February 1891. 5 FO12/87, Lord Salisbury to Sir C. Smith, 29 November 1890.6 FO12/87, Rajah Charles Brooke to Smith, 30 January 1891.

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In his report, he stated that Brunei had not been practising its

sovereignty over Limbang for seven years, the people of Brunei

had been ‘hopelessly bad and corrupt’ and ‘the people of Limbang

had been in periodic revolt’.7 In his report, he also stated that

the people of Limbang favoured Sarawak’s rule than Brunei. He

based his statement from a referendum which he carried out to the

headmen of Limbang whereby from that referendum twelve out of the

fifteen headmen preferred Sarawak rule, two favoured Brunei rule,

and one abstained.

Sultan Hashim however, contended that the voting was the

other way round and that Trevenen was drunk when the vote was

taken. R.E. Stubbs emphasised that the headmen were all Bisayas

which meant that the views of the rest of inhabitants were not

taken into consideration. Moreover, there were only fifteen

headmen at the meeting whereas in 1886 the number of headmen in

the district was thirty-three. Furthermore, the proceedings at

Limbang were doubtful value as Trevenen was attended by Brooke’s

officers.8 For many years before 1904, relations between Sultan

and the British consul had been strained, principally because of

the tendency of the latter to forward the interests of Sarawak at

the expense of those of Brunei. Regarding Trevenen’s statement on

Brunei’s loss of power over Limbang, indeed Sultan Hashim had

never given up Limbang. Although in 1884, Sultan Hashim while he

was Pengiran Temenggong (Sultan Abdul Momin’s minister) had ceded7 CO12/87, P. Trevenen to Salisbury, 30 April 1891. 8 R.E. Stubbs, ‘Two Colonial Office Memoranda on the History ofBrunei’, Journal of the Malaysian Branch Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. 41, Pt. 2,1968, p.p. 101 – 102.

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his rivers including Limbang to Brooke, the cession on the latter

was invalid since it did not have the Sultan’s chop. His action

for ceding Limbang which was somewhat reckless was later

regretted by Sultan Hashim. His action was mainly because he had

not received the payment of Padas from the British North Borneo

Company in North Borneo. When Sultan Hashim became a ruler his

attitude towards Limbang changed. This was largely because of the

Amanat or the oath of the earlier ruler Sultan Abdul Momin.

On 12 August 1891, Smith informed Sultan Hashim that the

British government had recognised and confirmed Brooke’s

possession of Limbang with the condition Brooke would pay

compensation to the Sultan.9 In Smith dispatch to Brooke dated 10

August 1891, he mentioned that ‘this high-handedness proceeding

has complicated the situation…but having in view the incapacity

of the Brunei Government to establish its authority, and the

consequent anarchy which would ensue were the Sarawak government

required to withdraw…and the expressed wishes of the Limbang

people…Her Majesty’s Government decided to recognise Your

Highness’ possession of the Limbang upon the condition of your

entering into an engagement to pay adequate pecuniary

compensation to the Sultan of Brunei’.10 Rajah Brooke offered

Sultan Hashim $6000 per annum for Limbang; by offering

compensation, the British hoped that the Limbang issue could be

closed.11 Sultan Hashim however, refused to accept the offer. He9 Sarawak Document, Smith to Sultan Hashim, 12 August 1891.10 Sarawak Document, Smith to Rajah Brooke, 10 August 1891.11 FCO12/88 also in CO144/69, Smith to Salisbury, 11 December 1891,

No. 4.

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sent petitions to the British monarch Queen Victoria and to

prominent British officials for the return of Limbang.12 In his

petitions, he denounced Trevenen’s report, which supported Rajah

Brooke’s action, and did not consider the difficulty of Brunei.

He also condemned Britain for interfering in the internal affairs

of Brunei.13 In his despatch to Trevenen, he objected that:

If any of Brunei’s subjects rebel against the

Bruneian Government, it is not right altogether for

other nations or governments to interfere, to go

between, or to consult Brunei subjects who are in

rebellion so they may be forced in denying the

Bruneian Government.14

In order to cover up the controversial action of the

British, the latter reminded Sultan Hashim of Article III of the

1888 Agreement: ‘If any difference should arise between the

Sultan and the Bruneian government of any other state, the Sultan

of Brunei agrees to abide by the decision of Her Majesty’s

Government, and to take all necessary measures to give effect

thereto’. To Sultan Hashim, however, Britain had violated

the 1888 Agreement it had made with Brunei. This was because

Brunei’s purpose for seeking protection was to preserve the

kingdom; this was the spirit behind the negotiations. However, by

sanctioning Brooke’s annexation of Limbang, Britain had actually

broken its treaty with Brunei. Moreover, if Brunei were to cede12 FO12/95, Sultan Hashim to Governor Sir C. Mitchell, Enclosure 1 in No.1, 16 February 894.13 FO12/87, Sultan Hashim to Trevenen, 29 April 1891.14 Ibid., 29 April 1891.

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Limbang it would violate the 1888 Agreement, especially Article

VI of the agreement, which says that ‘no cession nor any other

alienation of any part of the territory of the State of Brunei

shall be made to any foreign state’.

The loss of Limbang was damaging to Brunei’s politic

and economy. Since the acquisition of Baram by Brooke in 1882

Brunei’s politic and economic survival depended on Limbang.

Limbang according to Sultan Hashim ‘is the body of Brunei and

Brunei is the soul of Limbang’. 15 It was the place where the

‘inhabitants have always earned their livelihood from generation

to generation’;16 it was according to Sultan Hashim ‘periok nasi’

or ‘rice pot’ of Brunei.17 To Bruneians ‘Limbang is Brunei, and

Brunei is Limbang’; (The Limbang is) ‘the true river of Brunei

Town’,18 ‘Limbang has no ulu’19 and ‘Limbang is the life of

Brunei’. According to M.H.S. McArthur, the Acting British Consul

in Borneo in 1904, ‘the loss of Limbang has been the final step

towards the ruin of Brunei.’20

Limbang was rice and fruits producing district. In

1858 both rice and fruits were being planted in Pengkalan Tarap,

in the Limbang District in a large scale and these products were

15 The Straits Times, Singapore, 18 April 189016 Ibid., 18 April 1890.17 The Singapore Free Press, 7 April 1890.18 A.V.M. Horton, ‘The Development of Brunei During the BritishResidential Era 1906-1959: A Sultan Regenerated’, Unpublished PhDthesis, University of Hull, United Kingdom, October 1985, p. 18. 19 M.H.S. McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, Introduced and Annotatedby A.V.M. Horton, Monographs in International Studies, Southeast AsiaSeries, No. 74, Athens, 1987, p. 30.20 Ibid., p. 144.

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supplied to the people of Brunei. Apart from rice and fruits,

Limbang also produced beeswax which was collected by the people

of Murut who later sold them to the Brunei’s traders. Limbang was

also the place where the people of Brunei obtained materials for

housing and fishing.21 According to McArthur, ‘Nibongs, bamboo,

and rotans, which were extensively --- almost, in fact,

exclusively ---used for house-building, fishing etc., in Brunei,

are all obtained from the Limbang.’22

It was also the practice for the people of Brunei to

take up goods up the Limbang for barter with the native races

there. For example, the people of Brunei in 1858 exchanged salt

with beeswax with the people of Murut from Kampung Adang,

Limbang.23 According to Peter Leys, the British Consul General in

Borneo (1888 – 1890), Brunei’s Malay traders also carried out

trade activities with the people of Kedayan and Bisaya who lived

in the remote Limbang River.24Limbang was also a sago producing

district. Sago production was carried out by Brunei’s Malays,

Murut and Bisaya. According to Harriet W. Daly who visited

Limbang in 1888 ‘this is a sago growing county. We soon had ample

evidence of the staple wealth of the District, for at the

junction of the Brunei and Limbang rivers, a sago raft some three

21 Ibid., p. 30.22 Ibid. p.139.23 St John, Spencer, Life in the Forests of the Far East, Vol. II, London, Smith,Elder & Co. reprinted Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1974;Singapore Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 33 – 35. 24 F.O. 12/59 Consul General Leys to Earl Granville, Labuan, May 5,1883.

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or four hundred feet long, lay moored, waiting for the flood tide

to carry it on to its destination, the sago factory in Brunei.’25

After the annexation of Limbang by Brooke, the export

of sago decline tremendously. If before the fall of Limbang to

Brooke, Brunei could export 2000 bags of sago, in 1898 it

exported only 600 to 700 bags.26 In 1904, McArthur reported that

Brunei had lost annual revenue estimated at about $200,000,

because of the annexation of Limbang by Brooke.27 By 1903, almost

all of the four sago factories in Brunei had to be closed down as

the trade shifted from Limbang to Kuching.28 They shut down

because they were no longer able to compete with their rivals in

Sarawak, who obtained their raw materials free of export duty.29

The owner of the last sago factory in Brunei claimed that since

he could not get sago from Limbang without export duty, he found

it hard to compete with the Sarawak traders and because of that

he had to close down his factory.30 Sago workers from Brunei had25 Simon Francis, Pictures of the Palace: Travellers’ Account of Sultan Abdul Momin andSultan Hashim between 1881 and 1906, Hull, University of Hull, Centre forSouth-East Asian Studies, Occassional Paper No. 23, 1993, p.11.26 No. 2322 Annual Series, Diplomatic and Consular Reports: “Borneo,Reports for the year 1898 on the Trade of Borneo and Sarawak” (London:Harrison and Sons, 1899), pp. 4 -5. Cited in Haji Abdul Karim bin HajiAbdul Rahman, ‘Cabaran Ekonomi Brunei Pada Abad 19: Implikasi dariDasar Perdagangan Bebas Inggeris di Borneo’, paper delivered at theInternational Seminar on External Challenge and Local Response: ModernSoutheast Asia In Historical Perspective, organised by Department ofHistory, Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, University BruneiDarussalam, 20-22 September 1997, p. 13.27 McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, p. 123.28 B.A. Hussainmiya, Brunei: Revival of 1906, 2006, Bandar Seri Begawan:Brunei Press Sdn. Bhd., p. 22.29 McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, p. 30.30 Ibid., p. 124.

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to report their arrival and to pay a tax of 1 dollar –a-head, or

2 dollars if they work for more than six months.

Sarawak officers however, claimed that Limbang was

open to all. According to McArthur ‘I do not of course wish to

imply that special pains are taken to exclude Brunei trade, I am

only concerned to point out that various restrictions and taxes,

petty in themselves, but in combination important, have tended to

destroy that trade with the Limbang and to accentuate the injury

caused to Brunei by the alienation of the district.’31 Since the

area from Tanjung Datu to Kidurong Point had been acquired from

Brunei (1847-1865), Kuching became a trading port for Sarawak.

Kuching attracted traders from within Sarawak. Labuan, although

was not thriving, attracted outside traders which might otherwise

gone to Brunei. As a result, Brunei was reduced to serving a very

small hinterland.

Many Bruneians who depended their livelihood on Limbang

and who wanted to escape from the political and social misery

migrated to the district. According to Arthur Keyser, British

Consul General in Borneo (1898-1900), because of the

deteriorating state of affairs in 1890 ‘whole families have left

for Limbang and North Borneo and the exodus continues.’32 As a

result of the annexation of Limbang and migration of the people

of Brunei to Limbang, further oppression and rebellion occurred.

With the small population left, the Sultan, the nobles and the

31Ibid., pp. 138-9.32 HCO, Borneo 36/1900, Keyser to the High Commissioner for Borneo, 23January 1900.

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ministers had no choice but to impose high taxes on the people.

Like the population, the Sultan, the nobles and the ministers

were also in economic distress. The Sultan and the nobles for

example, had mortgaged their cession money in advance for lumps

sums, which were quickly exhausted. They were also in the

tightening grip of money-lenders who demanded extortionate rates

of interest.33 The Sultan and nobles who had monopoly rights

over the products and trade of districts used them as collateral

for loans from the Chinese where later they fell further into

debt, dependence, and need for more loans to satisfy their

retainers.34

The Sultan and the nobles normally had to finance

their household and retainers whom they depended for their

powers. If they failed to provide for their dependents, they

would desert them for that of a rival and they would experience a

corresponding decline in their own powers and influences.35 For

example in 1904, Sultan Hashim had to maintain a household of 172

persons36 and was dismissing retainers whom he could no longer

support. It should be borne in mind that in 1904, Sultan Hashim

was only left with four rivers, having lost no fewer than 18

districts to Sarawak alone. He was deeply in debt; he was living

33 A.V. M. Horton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei 1904-1908 or "A DyingKingdom" Reprieved’, Brunei Museum Journal, Bandar Seri Begawan, BruneiMuseum, Vol. 6, N0. 4, p. 99. 34 G. Saunders, A History of Brunei, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press,1994, p. 86.35 J.M. Gullick, Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malay, London, AthlonePress, 1953, p. 98.36 McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, p. 134.

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on advances from his creditors, which were increasingly difficult

to obtain as he had less to offer as security.37 He was so

impoverished that he had to borrow $10,000 from Charles Brooke in

1901. As a result of being so impoverished, they (as what they

did to the population of Limbang) had to impose high taxes on the

people of Belait and Tutong. This caused dissatisfaction among

the population which led to the outbreak rebellion in 1899 and

1901 in Belait and Tutong districts respectively.38

In Belait, Pengiran Bendahara (the Sultan’s ministers)

was collecting three years’ taxes in advance for the marriage of

his daughter with Sultan Hashim’s grandson. This marriage was

considered to be important as a way to resolve years of

differences between Pengiran Bendahara and the Sultan. As a

result of heavy taxation, the Pengiran Bendahara’s collectors

were murdered in Belait. The relatives of the tax collectors,

unable to obtain redress from Sultan Hashim, raised the Sarawak

37 Ibid., p. 134. 38 Belait in the 1890s was mostly the Tulin property of the PengiranPemancha, whilst Bukit Sawat (a portion of the district) was Kuripan ofPengiran Bendahara until its transfer in 1901 to the Pengiran Pemanchain return of a cash payment. Tutong by contrast was mainly Kuripan ofPengiran Di-Gadong, but after his death in January 1900, the rightsreverted to the crown. The Pengiran Bendahara also owned property inTutong. There were in addition numerous areas under Tulin rightsthroughout the two districts. The districts and the population inBrunei were governed in three ways. Those known as the Kerajaan werecontrolled and taxed directly by the Sultan and officials acting onhis behalf. Those known as Kuripan were the appanages of the particularofficial positions whose holders taxed them for the duration of theirterm of office. Kuripan passed to an official’s successor in thatoffice. Tulin were the private possession of a particular noble, wereadministered and taxed by him, and passed from father to son.

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flag at Burong Pingai, and some 150 people from the ward crossed

into Sarawak territory from Belait.39G. Hewett the British Consul

General in Borneo (1900-1904) described the festivities which

lasted for three years ‘a baneful influence,…the direct cause of

the two rebellions, the pretext for robbery and extortion, the

excuse for abduction and outrage, the cause for conspiracy and

murder, and the fons et orgio of all the grossest acts of tyranny

and misrule.’40

Some local leaders crossed into Baram appealing to the

administration of Sarawak to take their district under its rule.

Charles Brooke made representations to the British Government on

their behalf, but he was not successful.41 In 1901, there was an

outbreak of rebellion in Tutong. The rebellion occurred when two

major rebel leaders Dato di Gadong and Dato Kallam who had been

living under the protection of one of the Brooke’s Residents

launched the rebellion. Consequently, the Sultan sent an

expedition of two hundred men to Tutong to crush the rebellion.42

The leader of the expedition was Pengiran Tajuddin. According to

Hewett, Pengiran Tajuddin was rather ruthless towards the rebels.

He reported that the expedition was ‘…behaving in the most

scandalous manner’.43 Instead of attacking the rebels, the

39 Saunders, A History of Brunei, p. 94.40 FO12/114, Hewett to Swettenham, No. 31, 10 April 1901, paragraph 5cited from ibid., p. 99.41 Horton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei 1904-1908, p. 97.42 HCO, Borneo 29/01, Hewett to the Acting High Commissioner forBorneo, 29 March 1901.43 Hewett to the High Commissioner for Borneo, 29 March 1901, HCO,Borneo 64/01.

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expedition concentrated itself to ‘indiscriminate looting and

burning of houses (and) committing wanton murder and outrage’.44

However, what Hewett said about the Sultan and his ministers’

cruel act was no difference with what he and Brooke did to the

people in North Borneo and Sarawak respectively. Before becoming

consul in 1900, Hewett had been an officer of the British North

Borneo Chartered Company which administered North Borneo. During

his tenure as an officer, he had been partially responsible for

the massacre of 130 people at Kinabatangan River in 189045and the

looting and firing of Inanam Valley in 1897. Charles Brooke also

adopted precisely the same tactics as Sultan Hashim when faced

with rebels that is by looting and burning of rebels’ houses by

an expeditionary force.46 Moreover, it was believed that the

rebellion in Belait and Tutong were Brooke’s conspiracy.

As a result of the disturbances in the Belait and

Tutong Districts, many inhabitants of the districts fled to

Limbang. In the annual report for 1901, the Resident of Limbang

confirmed that at one time or another in that year two hundred

families had crossed the border from Tutong.47 Nonetheless, by

September 1901, the Belait chiefs began to surrender to Brunei

44 CO 144/75 (20879) Consul G.Hewett (1859-1932) to High Commissioner)Sir Frank Swettenham (1850-1946), No. 28, 29 March 1901, Para. 2 citedfrom Horton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei 1904-1908, p. 97.45 I.D. Black, A Gambling Style of Government: The Establishment of Chartered CompanyRule in Sabah, 1878-1915, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1983, p.105.46 Ibid., p. 105. 47 A.V.M. Horton, ‘The Disturbances in Tutong and Belait Districts ofBrunei (1899 – 1901),’ Journal of Southeast Asian Studies. Vol. XVIII, No. 1,Singapore University Press, 1987, p. 102

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and paid an indemnity. Most of the Tutong chiefs also gave up

‘not having arms or ammunition to continue the struggle’48 while

others moved into Limbang in order to avoid paying the fine.49

Here it should be borne in mind that before 1911 there was no

official figure as to the total number of population of Belait

and Tutong Districts.50 According to Keyser, in 1899, Tutong

District was more populous than Belait. He estimated that the

population of the Tutong and Belait Districts was about 2,000 and

3,000 respectively.51 McArthur who visited the two districts in

1904 estimated that the population of Belait and Tutong Districts

was 1,000 to 1,500 people in each district. During his visit to

both districts McArthur was told by the Chinese who had been

trading for years with both districts that the population was

less by half than it was ten years ago. In McArthur’s interview

with some of the inhabitants of the Tutong district they said ‘if

it were not for their attachment to the place of their birth they

also would emigrate.’ 52 Not only the people in Belait and Tutung

were migrating to Limbang, the people from Brunei Town were also

48 Sarawak Gazette, 2 January 1902, p. 14. 49Horton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei 1904-1908, p. 9850 McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, p. 80. In 1911, at the time of thefirst census, Brunei’s population totaled only 21,718 people of whomthree-quarters lived in the vicinity of the capital Brunei Town.Almost ten thousand of these inhabitants lived in Kampong Ayer (WaterVillage). 3, 423 lived in Tutong. The least populous regions wereBelait (1,126 people), and Temburong (1, 259 people). . CO531/3(34002) W.H.Lee-Warner to High Commissioner Sir Arthur Young, No. 254,17 May 1911 (enclosing the Brunei Census 1911). 51 CO144/73 (19517) Consul A.L. Keyser to High Commissioner Sir CharlesMitchell, 7 June 1899.52 Ibid., p. 80.

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transferring to Limbang. Indeed, the troubles in Tutong and

Belait districts also affected the Brunei Town. In 1900, Keyser

reported that hundred of houses were empty and in ruins and that

the town was disappearing.53

Apart from political and social misery, Brooke

inducement was also a factor for the migration of the people of

Brunei to Limbang. Brooke offered immigrants into Sarawak, free

passages when asked for and once they arrived in Sarawak’s

territory, the immigrants were free of all taxes except an annual

head tax of two dollars. 54 As a result, there was a steady flow

of immigration to Limbang. The fact that Brooke only collected a

yearly head tax for two dollars attracted many people in the

Belait and Tutong Districts to Sarawak. In Brunei there were

several taxes imposed on the people by the Sultan. One of them

was the poll tax which was charged at about 2 dollars per adult

(but it was not imposed universally). Next, was the chukei basoh

betis (which literally means washing of the feet tax) which was

imposed when the pengiran (the Sultan’s ministers) visited their

rivers. It was charged at about 2 dollars per male adult. Then,

there was the chukei bongkah sauh (which literally means weighing

the anchor tax) which was collected when the pengiran left his

river. It was charged at about 2 dollars per male adult. Lastly,

was the chukei tolongan (which literally means the tax in aid) which

was collected on the occasion of any important event taking place

in the Pengiran’s family such as marriage, death and the building

53 Saunders, A History of Brunei, p. 104.54 Ibid., p. 80.

19

of a new house. It was charged at about 3 dollars per family

annually.55 According to McArthur ‘the frequent complaints from

the people were they had to pay in a year sums varying from ten

to twenty dollars, whereas in Sarawak the only charge was a poll

tax of two dollars each.’56

As the Sultan was unable to satisfy his subjects’

grievances, the Belait people appealed to Brooke

administration.57 As being mentioned before, some local leaders

of the Tutong District had crossed into Baram appealing to the

administration of Brooke to take their district under his rule.

Charles Brooke made representations to the British Government on

their behalf, but he was not successful.58 In April 1901, Hewett

forwarded to the High Commissioner a document purporting to come

from all the Tutong headmen, renouncing allegiance to Brunei and

asking to be placed under Sarawak.59 Shortly afterwards a ‘large

gathering’ of Tutong people declared that under no circumstances

would they again submit to the Brunei’s flag.60 According to

McArthur ‘there was no doubt that the people looked to Sarawak

for protection but this happened because they were ignorant of55 Peter Leys, ‘Observations on the Brunei Political System 1883 –1885.’ Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Vol. XLI, Pt. 2,1968, p. 137.56 McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, p. 85.57D.S.R. Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: The Problems of Political Survival, Singapore,Oxford University Press, 1984, p. 9058 Horton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei 1904-1908, p. 97.59 CO144/75 (33046) Hewett to Swettenham, No. 39 (Confidential), 23April 1901, para. 1, cited from Horton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei1904-1908, p. 98.60 Ibid, No 49 (confidential), 10 June 1901, para. 3-4, cited fromHorton, ‘M.S.H. McArthur and Brunei 1904-1908, p. 98.

20

other governments and their interests would be served equally, if

not better, by a British Resident’.

As the rebels wanted Sarawak’s rule; and with Brooke

ever willing to make political capital out of such incidents,

Brunei faced an extreme danger of extinction. Brooke offered

cession money of $3,000 for the Tutong and Belait Districts, with

a further $1,000 if Brooketon, the coal mining district of Muara,

were included. In June 1902, Brooke extended his offer to include

all of Brunei, including the capital; the Sultan and the

remaining two ministers were to retain their honours and titles

and receive annual pensions: the Sultan $12,000 and the Pengiran

Bendahara and the Pengiran Pemancha $6,000 each (half of these

amounts being paid to their descendents after their deaths).61

Sultan Hashim however rejected the offers considering them a

breach of the 1888 Agreement. In his letter to the British

monarch King Edward VII, the Sultan stated that ‘I absolutely

refuse the proposal, more especially as he has no written

authority from Your Majesty or Your Majesty’s Ministers to

support his action. Even if he had such authority, I would not

approve a proposal equivalent to the casting away of my crown, my

good name and power’.62

After the annexation of Limbang by Sarawak, both

officials at the Colonial and Foreign Offices debated the future

of Brunei. Most of the debates on Brunei centred on whether

Brunei should be absorbed by Sarawak or preserved as a kingdom.

61McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, pp. 21 – 22. 62 CO144/77, Sultan Hashim to King Edward VII, 24 August 1902.

21

Charles Mitchell, British High Commissioner for Borneo, suggested

that no changes be made in Brunei until the Sultan’s death and

that following his death, Brunei be handed over to Sarawak.63 His

suggestion was supported by Lord Salisbury, Britain’s Prime

Minister who before the 1888 Protectorate Agreement wanted to

‘finish off’ Brunei.64 According to Salisbury ‘I think we better

let them finish it, and make no agreement with the Sultan of

Brunei which would stand in the way of consummation which is

inevitable, and on the whole desirable’.65According to K.G.

Tregonning, ‘in 1900, instructions were given that on the death

of the Sultan, if not earlier, the existing administration should

be brought to an end and the country partitioned completely.’66

Brooke in many ways had played an important role in influencing

the British Government to allow him to absorb the rest of Brunei.

He argued that ‘when a country is so badly governed by its own

sovereign as to become a nuisance to its neighbours it is

legitimate for the country which suffers to take the law into its

own hands and proceed to set up a government of its own to

supplant that which has proved itself incompetent to rule…if

Britain could not reform Brunei, Sarawak should have a free hand

to replace the government’.67

63 Ranjit Singh, Brunei 1839-1983: The Problems of Political Survival(Singapore/New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 92.64 FO12/78, Salisbury Minute, 1 January 1888.65 Ibid.66 PRO, FO12/113, FO to High Commissioner for Borneo territories, 27April 1902, cited in K. G. Tregonning, “The Partition of Brunei”,Journal of Tropical Geography, 11 (1958): 88.67 Sarawak Gazette, 1 August 1899.

22

In 1903 when Hewett reported that Sultan Hashim had

asked for Turkey’s protection in a letter which the consul had

intercepted, the Colonial and Foreign Offices in London became

concerned about Brunei.68 Although the Colonial and Foreign

Offices did not take the Sultan’s appeal seriously, what worried

them was Brunei could turn to another power for help especially

the Americans, who were at that time in the Sulu Islands.69

According to Nicholas Tarling, ‘the U.S. was not only the

occupant of the Sulu islands, but also the only major power,

apart from Britain, with which Brunei had a treaty’.70 Both

Britain and the United States of America entered into treaty

relations with Brunei: Britain in 1847, when a Treaty of

Friendship and Commerce was signed, and the United States of

America in 1850 when a similar treaty was signed. Consequently,

the Sultan was warned not to enter into communication with other

powers.71 Moreover, oil was discovered at Brooke’s coal mine on

Berambang Island in 1903. This development also worried the

Colonial and Foreign Offices. Although Brooke’s right s on the

Berambang Island were secured, others might still acquire

concessions elsewhere. Brooke’s agent had made an offer for a

concession, but the Sultan could not give a definite answer.

Hewett thought that the Sultan might turn to others. In his

68 Nicholas Tarling, Britain, the Brookes and Brunei, Kuala Lumpur: OxfordUniversity Press, p. 5.69 Ibid., p. 5.70 Ibid., p. 506.71 HCO, Borneo 57/03, Hewett to the High Commissioner for Borneo, 23 August 1904.

23

dispatch to Lansdowne he mentioned ‘the Sultan neither refused

nor accepted. I have no doubt he will do all he can to sell it to

other people first before accepting the Rajah’s offer’.72 In the

dispatch of the Colonial Office to Foreign Office, Britain’s

concern of the oil concession is clear: ‘ it would appear to

Mr.Chamberlain to be very desirable that whatever influence can

be legitimately brought to bear upon the Sultan, should be used

to prevent a concession for working this oil from falling into

the hands of a private adventurer’.73

Following these developments, some British

officials at the Foreign and Colonial Offices started to consider

introducing the Residential System in Brunei. Residential System

was a system of indirect British rule which was introduced in the

Malay States that had accepted British protection.74 Frank

Swettenham, the Governor of the Straits Settlement,75 made the

recommendation but had reservations for he did not believe that

Brunei would be able to afford the resident's pay and other

necessary expenses. This thought was similarly shared by F. H.

Villiers of the Foreign Office who argued that so much of ‘the

ancient kingdom has been acquired by Sarawak and the British

North Borneo Company’.76 Most officials at the Foreign and

Colonial Offices thought that the best solution to Brunei’s72 CO144/77, Hewett to Lansdowne, 28 March 1903.73 HCO, Borneo 29/03, Swettenham to Consul for Brunei, 19 June 1903.74 Under the Residential System a resident was posted in the Malaystate to advice the Sultan in all matters of administration exceptthose dealing with Malay customs and religion.75 PRO, CO144/77, FO to CO, 26 February 1903.76 PRO, CO144/77, FO to CO, 26 February 1903.

24

problem was the absorption of Brunei by Sarawak. Consequently, in

1904, McArthur was dispatched to Brunei to study the situation

and to make recommendations about Brunei’s future.

McArthur (whose full name was Malcolm Stewart Hannibal

McArthur), was a British official in the Malayan Civil Service.

He was sent to Brunei in April 1904 and was to spend three months

in Brunei. However, he was forced to extend his stay in Brunei by

another three months because of the deadly outbreak of smallpox

in June to August 1904. When he visited the Belait and Tutong

Districts, he found them more prosperous than he had expected.

This could be because circumstances had changed. According to

McArthur ‘Before starting on my trip I had carefully studied the

correspondence quoted in the margin and expected to find

everywhere great misery and want and grave discontent. My

expectations were not realised’.77 Regarding the government,

according to McArthur ‘there is no government in the usual

acceptance of the term—only ownership. The Sultan has no real

power except over his own districts and people’78. The Sultan

according to McArhtur whose defiance was always subject to

uncomplimentary report by the previous consuls was as a result of

the Limbang episode: ‘His attitude is, in the main, the result of

the Limbang episode, the decision in regard to which has

impoverished his country, weakened his prestige among his

subjects, and destroyed his faith in His Majesty’s Government.’79

77 McArthur, Report on Brunei in 1904, p. 83.78 Ibid., p. 126.79 Ibid., p. 131.

25

Nonetheless, McArthur gathered from numerous hints that the

Sultan ‘would not be averse to a large measure of British

protection so long as he was left nominally in supreme

control.’80At the end of his report, McArthur suggested the

following options about the future of Brunei. The options were:

‘(i) To support the present regime, trusting to the

personal influence of a Consul on the spot to prevent or

check abuses.

(ii) to encourage the British North Borneo Company to

acquire what remains of Brunei

(iii) to consent to the absorption of Brunei by Sarawak

(iv) to establish British protection’81

For the first option, he feared that it would be

‘foredoomed to failure’ as the Sultan faced difficulties in

exercising efficient control over districts where he has no real

rights and the consul who was forbidden to interfere in the

internal administration.82 For the second option, he found the

Brunei chiefs on the whole favorably disposed towards British

North Borneo Company.83 McArthur did not believe that the

administration of North Borneo had been particularly successful

and he did not really think this as an option. For the third

option, he argued that the absorption of Brunei by Sarawak was

not appropriate because Brooke was ‘generally disliked and

80 Ibid., p. 133.81Ibid., p. 156.82 Ibid., pp. 156 -157.83 Ibid., p. 157.

26

distrusted’.84 The Sultan disliked him because of his

encroachments upon Brunei’s territory, most particularly Limbang.

According to McArthur, ‘they look upon the Rajah’s interference

as wanton aggression in the face of the rights of internal

independence which they had secured by the Treaty of the 18

September 1888’.85 He also argued against leaving matters as they

were because this would lead to the loss of Brunei’s

sovereignty.86 According to McArthur ‘to attempt to leave matters

as they are is only to postpone for a short time the final loss

of Brunei independence, and in the meantime to increase

sufferings of the inhabitants’.87 On the other hand, McArthur

recommended the British protection as it would be ‘less obnoxious

to them than loss of identity as a mere part of Sarawak or North

Borneo’.88 He also recommended that Brunei be administered with

Labuan as Labuan depended to a large extent on Brunei for its

trade. Moreover, communication with the outlying districts of

Brunei was easier from Labuan.89 Regarding the cost, he explained

that ‘it could not be hoped that the country would prove self-

supporting at first, but it does not seem unreasonable to suppose

that…a substantial volume of trade, a fertile soil, and natural

and mineral resources hitherto hardly tapped, its future would

ultimately be one of prosperity’.90 Thus, by revealing the full84 Ibid., p. 166.85 Ibid., p. 161.86 Ibid., p. 156.87 Ibid., p. 156.88 Ibid., p. 172.89 Ibid., p. 172.90 Ibid., p. 177.

27

depth of opposition to Rajah Brooke in Brunei, the Sarawak option

was finally eliminated. And by suggesting that after an initial

loan, Brunei might soon become self-supporting, the principal

objection to the Residential System was removed. Subsequently, in

1906 an agreement was made between Sultan Hashim and John

Anderson on behalf of the British government. The treaty provided

‘full’ British protection, the succession of the Sultan’s dynasty

and the appointment of a resident. With ‘full’ British

protection, Brunei’s search for security against Brooke in

Sarawak and British North Borneo Company in North Borneo finally

materialized. According to McArthur ‘when it is remembered that

these evils flourish under nominal British protection, and it is

that protection alone which keeps Brunei in existence as a

separate state’.91

References:

1. Unpublished Primary Sources

CO12/87

CO144/69

CO144/73 (19517)

CO144/77

CO531/3 (34002)

FO12/87

FO12/88

91 Ibid. p. 154.

28

FO12/78

FO12/95

FO12/114

HCO, Borneo12/88

HCO, Borneo 29/01

HCO, Borneo 29/03

HCO, Borneo 36/1900

HCO, Borneo 57/03

HCO, Borneo 64/01

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33

Map of Brunei

34

35

Map of Brunei, Sabah and Sarawak

36