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British Merchants in New Markets: TheCase of Wylie and Hancock in Brazil andthe River Plate, c. 1808–19Manuel Llorca-JañaPublished online: 17 Dec 2013.

To cite this article: Manuel Llorca-Jaña (2014) British Merchants in New Markets: The Case of Wylieand Hancock in Brazil and the River Plate, c. 1808–19, The Journal of Imperial and CommonwealthHistory, 42:2, 215-238, DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2013.868228

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British Merchants in New Markets:The Case of Wylie and Hancock inBrazil and the River Plate, c. 1808–19Manuel Llorca-Jana

In 1808, after the Portuguese royal family was forced to leave Portugal and move to Brazil,

Brazilian ports were opened to British merchant houses, which were quick to open offices

in the likes of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. By 1810 there were probably over 200 British mer-

chant houses operating in Brazil, but we know very little about them because most of their

historical records have not survived. In addition, scholars have assumed that, on account

of the dominant British economic power, the establishment of new mercantile houses in

South America c. 1808–19 was an easy task. This assumption is challenged in this

paper, which sheds new light on the activities of one of these British merchant houses,

making use of a recently discovered business collection concerned with the activities of

Wylie & Hancock, a Scottish house which operated in Brazil and the River Plate from

1808 to 1819. These papers also provide a unique insight into neglected topics such as:

the nature of managerial mercantile organisations; what the economic actors at the

time actually did and thought; and how strategic and tactical choices were reached.

Introduction

The story of the opening of Brazil to direct international trade in 1808, when the Por-

tuguese court was transferred to Brazil following Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian

peninsula, has been told many times: ‘it was an event unique in the history of Euro-

pean colonialism’.1 The subsequent arrival of many British merchant houses in Brazil is

also familiar.2 By 1810, there were probably over 200 British mercantile establishments

operating in Brazil,3 which is not surprising given that during the late eighteenth

century England was Portugal’s main trading partner, supplying Portugal directly

and Brazil indirectly with divers manufactured goods.4 Of these houses, we know

the story of Lupton & Luccock and Rhodes,5 but very little is known about other mer-

chant houses. Bottcher rightly notes that there is a lack of information about the

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2014

Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 215–238, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2013.868228

Correspondence to: Manuel Llorca-Jana, Department of Economics, Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Chile. E-

mail: manuel_llorca@hotmail.com

# 2013 Taylor & Francis

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British merchants who operated in Brazil c. 1808–27.6 In a similar vein, Eakin com-

ments on the lack of studies of individual foreign enterprises in Brazil during this

period.7 This is the more surprising since Brazil was the main Latin American

outlet for British manufacturers c. 1808–50, and one of Britain’s main partners world-

wide.8 To understand the process by which Brazil became so important for Britain

(and vice versa) it is crucial to improve our knowledge of the actors behind this

development.

Nearly half a century ago, Humphreys asked a key question in relation to British

merchants in South America after independence: what sort of people were these mer-

chants, adventurers and commission agents who laid the foundations of British econ-

omic enterprise in South America in the first quarter of the nineteenth century?9 As far

as Brazil is concerned, the question remains largely unanswered, except by Guenther’s

excellent study, which deals with Bahia only, although it is worth mentioning that

Bahia was the main port trading with Portugal for a long time.10 The difficulties

faced by British merchants operating in Brazil after 1808, when it had only recently

begun to trade internationally, have also been neglected. This topic is relevant

because, since Gallagher and Robinson’s famous article written over fifty years

ago,11 many scholars have argued that, after Spanish American independence and

Brazil’s opening to international trade, in some areas of South America Iberian colo-

nialism was replaced by informal British control, in particular in the River Plate and

Brazil during our period of study. Put simply, some areas of Latin America are seen by

some authors as part of a British informal empire, with Britain exerting control over a

territory over which she did not exercise formal sovereignty, or where an asymmetrical

power relationship was in place.12

Nonetheless, this idea of Latin America belonging to a British informal empire

during the first half of the nineteenth century has been challenged by many authors,

most enthusiastically by Platt,13 and an up-to-date discussion on the topic is now

available thanks to a finely edited collection.14 One difference between advocates for

a British informal empire in the region and those opposed to the idea is to be

found in the assessment of the real importance of the region for the British export

economy during this period (another difference relates to the ability, or lack of it, of

the British to control Latin American markets and/or governments during this

period). For example, for opponents of the idea, such as Platt, the region could not

possibly have been part of a British informal empire because it lacked commercial

importance for Britain.15

Whether the region was commercially important or not for Britain before 1850 (a

puzzle recently solved thanks to new data),16 the contenders (regardless of their pos-

ition) in this controversy implicitly assume that the establishment of British merchants

in Brazil and the River Plate after 1808 was an easy task, if not an automatic process.

That is, British merchants saw a new opportunity to trade, and conquered a market

easily. Whether or not this market can be deemed to have belonged to an informal

empire depends on, among other factors, the importance assigned to the market for

Britain’s trade, but few authors have worried about the potential difficulties for

foreign merchants operating in these ‘new’ lands, even for merchants belonging to

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mighty Britain. Only Guenther has tackled the uncertainties faced by British mer-

chants in Bahia c. 1808–50, emphasising ‘how this happened on a day-to-day

basis’,17 but at the time of writing she did not have access to the main collection

used in this paper, and Guenther was more interested in the process of British mer-

chants’ self-identification in Brazil than in the making of business decisions.18

Indeed, and perhaps surprisingly, the collections used by Guenther do not include

papers from any British merchant house in Brazil. Instead, Guenther concentrated

on consular reports, Bahian government reports, correspondence between British

consuls and Brazilian officials, records of property, burials, baptisms and marriage,

travel narratives and commercial almanacs.

This article, therefore, sheds new light on these topics by concentrating on the oper-

ations of Wylie & Hancock, an (until now) little known merchant house that operated

(albeit briefly) in Montevideo in 1807 (following the British invasions of the River

Plate), Brazil (1808–19) and Buenos Aires (1809–12). The leading man in this enter-

prise was John Wylie and his main partner until 1819 was John Hancock, from whom

Wylie parted ways that year, following the notorious failure of the firm despite the size-

able capital they managed to accumulate during the 1810s. Subsequently Wylie oper-

ated again in Brazil (1820s–30s) and Buenos Aires (1820s), as well as in Mexico

(1820s–30s) and Chile, this time with other partners, although this article concen-

trates on the period up to 1819.

In particular, this article analyses how complex business decisions were taken by the

two entrepreneurs between 1808 and 1819, highlighting the fact that a business

problem usually presents many viable solutions and that, therefore, entrepreneurs

must take crucial decisions,19 often under difficult situations like those faced by

Wylie and Hancock. For example, after arriving in Brazil in 1808, they decided to

open two commission houses, one in Bahia, the other in Rio, at that time the principal

cities in Brazil.20 Yet soon one of the partners (Wylie) was determined to expand the

business by opening a new branch in Buenos Aires (which was still part of the Spanish

Empire), thinking that independence from Spain was imminent and that a new world

of opportunities would open up to them. In contrast, Hancock was reluctant to

expand the business and even preferred to concentrate on the Bahia house only, to

the extent of wanting to close the house in Rio. That is, these two partners and

friends had contrasting views about the best course of action to be taken in an unpre-

dictable situation given the impact of the Napoleonic Wars and the Spanish American

wars of independence. In the same vein, another area of discussion centred on whether

to have headquarters in Britain or operate, instead, with agents in situ. As in the pre-

vious example, both alternatives had pros and cons, as we shall see later on, but in each

case only one option was chosen.

The main sources of information for this article are the Wylie & Co. papers available

at the Glasgow University Archives. These papers have not been used before by other

scholars, since they were largely unknown. For example, Guenther’s work on British

merchants in Bahia made no mention of this collection, even though Wylie &

Hancock’s main house was in that city. If, as Eakin remarked, our ignorance of

Anglo-Brazilian economic relations for the early nineteenth century ‘stems from

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 217

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lack of access to company archives’,21 then the Wylie & Co. papers will be welcomed by

many. Indeed, Jones notes that the main difficulty for researchers of trading companies

is the fact that ‘the historical records of most firms have disappeared or, for one reason

or another, are not available’.22

Furthermore, the Wylie papers are unique in the sense that they contain business

letters from one partner (Wylie) to the other (Hancock), as well as from one

partner to his brother-in-law, who also happened to be a very close friend and who

disclosed unusually rich private and strategic business information, critical infor-

mation which was not present in the sources used by Guenther. Indeed, these

papers provide a unique insight into neglected topics such as: the nature of managerial

mercantile organisations in South America, in particular when conflicts over indepen-

dence were taking place and, some may argue, when the foundations of a British infor-

mal empire were taking shape; what the economic actors at the time actually did and

thought, and therefore the cross-cultural interactions between Britain and Latin

America; and how strategic and tactical choices are reached under difficult situations

by a small group of early global entrepreneurs. That is, the Wylie collection provides an

invaluable opportunity to study entrepreneurs’ decision-making at a micro-level in a

complex business environment, which is relevant both to Latin Americanists and to

business researchers. Finally, if, as highlighted by Fridenson, business history as a

field lacks studies of businesses both during decolonisation and business failures,23

then this story will certainly appeal to a wide range of readers across several disciplines.

After this introduction, the next section deals with Wylie & Hancock’s early adven-

tures in Brazil and Buenos Aires from 1808 to 1812, when they decided to open houses

in Bahia, Rio and Buenos Aires. A third section is concerned with the difference of

opinion between these two partners on the best strategy to follow, in particular as

far as branches were concerned, and with the forced closure of the houses in

Buenos Aires and Rio. Section four is a discussion of how Wylie & Hancock

managed to create a small fortune c. 1812–15, mainly dealing with raw cotton

during the Anglo-American War of 1812–15, and after deciding to open a house in

Liverpool, which in turn became the headquarters of the firm. The last section concen-

trates on the collapse of the business in 1819.

The Early Years of the Brazilian and River Plate Adventure

In 1806, British forces occupied Buenos Aires, albeit briefly, and in early February 1807

the British also invaded Montevideo and occupied the city until September 1807.24

Following this invasion, some British merchants, thinking that the capture was defini-

tive and the future likely to prove prosperous, went to the River Plate and started

trading in Montevideo.25 They were not to blame; after all in September 1806 The

Times had proclaimed that ‘Buenos Ayres at this moment forms a part of the

British Empire’, adding later on that ‘the whole colony of La Plata will share

the same fate’.26 Among them were two young Scots seeking their fortunes: John

Wylie and John Hancock.27 What these two Britons did not know was that the

capture was not permanent but very short-lived, and they had, therefore, to pack

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their stuffs and return to Britain by September 1807. Yet, this short experience did not

stop them coming back to South America a few months later.

In the second half of 1808, following the move of the Portuguese royals to Brazil and

the opening up of this country to direct international trade with friendly nations, the

same two businessmen decided to try their luck in Brazil, which then appeared prom-

ising territory given the strong historic commercial links between Portugal, its colonies

and Britain, and ‘at a critical time for British trade when British goods were being

excluded from Europe’.28 They knew little of Brazil and spoke no Portuguese.

Despite these crucial limitations, they formed a partnership and opened two houses

in Brazil, one at Bahia (managed by Hancock) and the other at Rio de Janeiro

(managed by Wylie). Although we know nothing about Wylie and Hancock’s previous

business activities in Britain, these houses were not branches of an enterprise based in

Britain, since all partners resided in Brazil. Wylie and Hancock’s idea was to import

British manufactures in exchange for Brazilian produce. They were the classic commis-

sion merchants, receiving goods on consignment and charging commission. For this

enterprise, they needed good family connections in Britain. William Dalglish, for

instance, was Wylie’s brother-in-law, and the main partner of William & James Dalgl-

ish of Glasgow, an important supplier of cottons. W. & J. Dalglish was also connected

to (Robert) Dalglish, Falconer & Co., a cottons supplier and calico printer also based in

Glasgow, as William and James were brothers of Robert. Likewise, John Hancock’s

brother, Richard Hancock, was their main connection in Manchester for the supply

of British textiles.

From 1808, Wylie & Hancock was supplied with British textiles and other manufac-

tures by several firms in Britain. In turn, Wylie & Hancock’s main shipping connection

in Liverpool was Humble, Holland & Co., at a time when Liverpool was starting to be

recognised as the principal port for trade to South America. In return, Wylie &

Hancock sent remittances to Britain to pay for these supplies, which were handled

by firms such as Humble & Holland (Liverpool), Thomas Barber (London) and

B. Fayle & Co. (London).29 As this list of connections shows, Wylie & Hancock

lacked a central point of contact in Britain, a point developed below.

During the first few months after becoming established in Brazil, the flow of business

was slow, but Wylie and Hancock, in particular the former, remained very optimistic

about the future, and had good reasons for so being: it was clear, in practice, that ‘at

least until the end of the war, direct trade with all friendly nations meant trade with

England’.30 It was a learning period for both partners, in a new country about which

little was known in Britain. During this early period Wylie and Hancock exchanged

regular correspondence, reporting extensively on the business situation of their

places of residence and in particular on the stocks on hand. It was not unusual for

unsold goods in Bahia to be sent to Rio, and vice versa. Likewise, each partner also

claimed to reside in the most favourable location. For Hancock there was no better

place than Bahia, while Wylie was confident he would ‘convince him [Hancock] I am

right, this being without a doubt the best place in the country for a general trade’,31

and indeed it was the location chosen by Dom Joao to reside in while in Brazil.32

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After opening the houses at Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, and operating there for a few

months, the markets of the River Plate called for Wylie & Hancock’s attention in early

1809. They were not alone: ‘almost all the English in Rio de Janeiro have come to this

place’ [Buenos Aires], wrote Wylie to his partner’s brother a few months later.33 After

the deposition in 1808 of Ferdinand VII by Napoleon’s forces, many conflicts of loyalty

arose in Spanish America, providing ‘a catalyst for the first real independence move-

ments’.34 Not surprisingly then, Wylie had rightly predicted that, following Napoleon’s

invasion of Spain, ‘there is a very great probability of her colonies becoming indepen-

dent. . . . Under these circumstances it would be necessary to have another establish-

ment at Buenos Ayres, which could be easily effected, and would pay well.’35 In

theory, before 1810 British merchants were not allowed to settle in Buenos Aires.

Yet, this did not stop Wylie & Hancock sending goods there by making use of the ser-

vices of a Spanish or Creole merchant at the River Plate. But luck was not on Wylie &

Hancock’s side. In early 1809 the partners decided to forward some goods from Rio to

the River Plate on board the Amelia but ‘owing to the stupidity of the Captain or crew

. . . the vessel was run upon some rocks off Maldonado, went to pieces & every sixpence

worth of the cargo lost’.36 This incident did not stop the British from trying harder.

Indeed, a few weeks later, Wylie was exuberant after discovering that sometimes

theory and practice are far removed from each other, and reported to Hancock

about the extensive contraband trade practised in the River Plate: ‘It is now pretty

well known here that smuggling is carried on with the greatest facility there

[Buenos Aires] in the open day and winked at by the government.’37

But Wylie was not happy with sending occasional consignments to the River Plate;

he wanted a more permanent commercial intercourse. Indeed, after much discussion,

Wylie and Hancock decided to open a house at Buenos Aires too. It is remarkable how

two Britons in Brazil, who had little capital, spoke no Portuguese and no Spanish and

had never been to Buenos Aires, took this decision. Yet the partners’ relationship was

not free of tension. Hancock was reluctant to expand the business, while Wylie thought

that ‘if we were confined to the trade of this place [Brazil] alone, we had much better

stay at home’.38

To undertake this complex enterprise, Wylie left one of their clerks (James Wallis) in

charge of the Rio branch. James was originally employed in the Bahian house, while his

brother John worked for Wylie in Rio. But James’s brother was seen as incompetent,39

and he was eventually dismissed in May 1809. At that time Wylie could not find the

words to explain to James why his brother John was shown the door: ‘It is unnecessary

for me to state what has passed, being convinced it would hurt your feelings even more

than astonish you, but instead of getting better he got the longer the worse.’40 The real

reason for the dismissal, though, could be clearly explained to Wylie’s partner: ‘He is so

addicted to drinking that no dependence whatever can be placed on him.’41

With Wallis ‘the sober’ in charge of the Rio house, Wylie travelled to Buenos Aires,

arriving there on 6 August 1809, and staying for a few months. Because of the extra

responsibilities given to James Wallis, Wylie & Hancock’s partnership had to include

James as a partner, thus becoming Wylie, Hancock & Co. At that time, Wylie did

not regret this decision: the Buenos Aires adventure was paying off. Indeed, business

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went so well in Buenos Aires that Wylie was selling British textiles at a profit of 50, 60,

70 and even 100 per cent over the invoice cost.42 An exuberant Wylie did not even

bother to report to Hancock in Bahia on the state of their business. So busy and

happy was Wylie that he even forgave John Wallis, taking him to Argentina.

As Wylie (likewise John Wallis) could not remain in the River Plate forever, before

departing from Rio to Buenos Aires, Wylie engaged John Parish Robertson. Then an

unknown young Scot, Robertson later on became internationally famous because of

his role in trying to open Paraguay to British trade and more importantly for arran-

ging the 1824 bond issue by Baring Brothers for the Buenos Aires government, as

well as other issues for the Peruvian government. Wylie had first met Robertson in

Montevideo in 1807, following the British invasions of the River Plate. In 1808,

they met once again in Brazil, and once in Buenos Aires in 1809. Wylie decided to

formally hire Robertson, then called by Wylie, in a rather paternalistic fashion,

‘young man’. Robertson was seen as a very cheap alternative to represent Wylie &

Hancock at Buenos Aires: ‘by this plan we shall derive all the advantage of an estab-

lishment at very little expense’.43 This appointment was also strengthened by the fact

that young Robertson was the son of William Robertson, a friend of the Dalglish

family, and thus acquainted with Wylie. Finally, confirming Guenther’s findings,

British merchants in Brazil (and the River Plate too) kept to themselves (in particular

during the late 1800s and 1810s), usually choosing partners and clerks from among

their fellow expatriates,44 and this explains why Wylie preferred to rely on this inex-

perienced country fellow.

Despite selling very profitably during Wylie’s first weeks at Buenos Aires, before the

1810 May revolution in the River Plate it was not easy for British merchants to operate

there. For those unfamiliar with landmark events in Spanish American history, it is

worth mentioning at this stage that with the May revolution the Spanish viceroy of

the Rio de la Plata was removed and in his place a local government was established,

this being one of the earliest and most important events in the Spanish American wars

of independence from Spain.45 Before that, in 1809, in a desperate moment Wylie

wrote home that ‘[t[he negotiations . . . respecting the opening of this port are still

going on & they were expected to have been finished ere now, but the ignorant old

Dogs of Spaniards oppose it so strenuously, that his Excellency is under the necessity

of giving it in some degree to them’.46 In late 1809 things improved, but not as fast as

Wylie had wanted because ‘everything must be transacted in a Spaniard’s name, to

whom we have to pay a pretty decent commission’.47 In particular, Wylie decided

to use the services of the Spanish firm of Cabanyes & Torrents.

Furthermore, apart from these legal restrictions, port facilities in Buenos Aires were

far poorer than in Brazil. According to Wylie, ‘the difficulty of loading and unloading

here being beyond all comprehension to a person who has not seen it. A launch very

often lays three & four weeks in the Chuelo waiting either for wind or water to get out,

and the outward bound cargo is always carried from there by these launches.’48 Like-

wise, Buenos Aires was not yet a safe environment for British merchants to operate in:

‘an English merchant of the name of Bell was murdered here last Saturday night. . . .

Murder is thought nothing of in this part of the world, as it regularly happens every

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night in this city.’49 Yet all these difficulties did not stop Wylie from continuing to ask

for consignments from Britain to the River Plate.

Once Wylie thought that the branch in the River Plate could operate without his

presence, he left Buenos Aires for Rio, on April 1810 a few days before the famous

May 1810 revolution. Before departing he agreed a three-year contract with Robertson

at a salary of £100 per annum. Likewise, in late May 1810 John Postlethwaite, who was

a family friend of the Hancocks, was also sent to Buenos Aires by Wylie & Hancock to

join Robertson in their business there. Wylie trusted young Robertson, but thought

that it was too much work for a single man, in particular considering that remittances

in local produce were very common in the River Plate. Instead of a salary, Post-

lethwaite asked for a 25 per cent share of the business at Buenos Aires. Postlethwaite

was considered to be an expert in remittances in produce for the British market.

Because of the high hopes Wylie had for the Buenos Aires branch, Wylie and

Hancock agreed to make Postlethwaite a partner, despite giving away a part of the

business: ‘I have been obliged to give this gentleman a fourth share of that establish-

ment, to induce him to go as he would not accept if a salary however handsome it

might be.’50 This was a decision the partners came to regret, as explained below. Yet

at that time they trusted Postlethwaite, and buying trust has always been expensive.

But Wylie was not content with limiting his River Plate connections to Buenos Aires

alone. Before leaving Buenos Aires, he wanted to expand his firm’s interests in Mon-

tevideo, a place he knew well from his short stay there in 1807, and which he visited

again in 1809. In an optimistic letter to his brother-in-law, he said that: ‘the knowledge

I have however acquired both of that market [Montevideo] & this [Buenos Aires] will

enable in the future to do business upon more . . . grounds of advantage to you in

point of profit, as well as quick returns’.51 Soon after, Robertson was sent to Montevi-

deo for a while, to promote Wylie & Hancock’s business there.52 The first task

entrusted to Robertson was to buy tallow to remit the proceeds of British textile

sales to Britain. Wylie also took the opportunity to teach his first business lesson to

Robertson: ‘quick returns are the life of business’.53 Eventually, Wylie & Hancock

did not open a branch in Montevideo, but made good connections there.

Divergent Plans: Wylie versus Hancock

That was then the situation in mid-1810. Wylie & Hancock of Bahia and Rio became

Wylie, Hancock, Wallis & Postlethwaite of Rio, Bahia, Buenos Aires and nearly Mon-

tevideo. Yet, this reinvention of the business did not prevent differences of opinion

arising between Wylie and Hancock. The first important discrepancy arose in early

1809. At that time Hancock thought that the business in Bahia was so profitable

and demanding that both Hancock and Wylie should reside there, thus closing the

house in Rio de Janeiro. Wylie was very confident that both houses could be

managed by the two of them: ‘[I] hope you will no longer harbour fear of our

being able to support the two establishments’, he wrote.54 Yet tensions escalated,

with Hancock insisting that the Bahia house was selling far more than the Rio estab-

lishment, and that a single partner was not able to manage the whole Bahian business

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properly. But Wylie did not want to enter into any further discussions on the topic,

adding only that ‘it does not follow, that because you may have done double the

business that I have done, that Bahia is the best place of the two to fix our headquar-

ters’.55 Eventually, this battle was, temporarily, won by Wylie, with both houses conti-

nuing in operation.

A second area of difference between the partners was the nature of their connection

with Britain. Before considering the question, it is worth mentioning that from the

beginning of their operations Wylie & Hancock sometimes found it difficult to

procure manufactures specially suited to the Brazilian market. This is not surprising

given that the Brazilian market was new to many British manufacturers, including

those supplying Wylie & Hancock. This issue became so acute that, as early as February

1809, Wylie and Hancock agreed that one of them should temporarily leave Brazil for

Britain to ensure the ordering of goods suitable for the Brazilian market. At that time

they thought it was enough to spend a few months in Britain to ‘teach’ textile suppliers

about the best products to be sent to the Brazilian houses and the River Plate. They

were not happy with the nature of the textiles being received from Britain, even if

they were eventually sold, as in this example: ‘[I] would by this time have sold

double the quantity if I had had the goods suitable for the market, notwithstanding

all the competition I have had to fight against’.56 These were times when communi-

cations were effected via mail only, and the carriers of information were small

sailing ships. That is, it was very difficult to specify in words (to British manufacturers)

the sort of goods wanted in Brazil. A trip to Britain to meet manufacturers face-to-face

was more than justified, if not crucial, in order to succeed in business.

It is important to understand the nature of Wylie & Hancock’s connections in

Britain. By not having a permanent partner in Britain, Wylie & Hancock was at a dis-

advantage in comparison to other British merchant houses in Brazil, in particular

those with partners at both ends of the marketing chain, or those that were branches

of an enterprise with headquarters in London, Liverpool or Glasgow. By this time

Liverpool was starting to be recognised as the principal port for exports to South

America. It was therefore important to coordinate export operations from the

Mersey, and in particular to have a single point of contact in Britain.

During the early months of their adventure in Brazil, the coordinating role in Liver-

pool for shipments to Wylie & Hancock was mainly played by the firm of Humble,

Holland & Co. Unfortunately, Humble left the firm in January 1809. Wylie & Han-

cock’s connection in Liverpool changed into Samuel Holland & Co.57 The relationship

between the firms becomes complex and unclear at this point. Yet, Hancock wanted to

keep this connection, while Wylie was never happy with the performance of this Liver-

pool merchant house.58 Discussions continued between the two partners on the neces-

sity of having a better connection in Britain. Wylie agreed with Hancock that ‘an

[associated] establishment in England is absolutely necessary, and particularly a ship-

ping connection. I never saw it so clear before.’59 The disagreement was about who

should perform this role. After the dissolution of Humble & Holland, Wylie started

to look elsewhere, as he explained to his brother-in-law, who was regarded as an

ideal candidate to fulfil this role.60 In a later letter Wylie was more explicit, and

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proposed that William Dalglish should act as the firm’s agent in Britain: ‘I would much

rather be connected with you than any stranger and I am convinced Hancock will be

the same.’61 Yet, Wylie made it very clear to William that he should leave Glasgow for

either London or Liverpool.62 This, according to Wylie, would allow that ‘besides the

consignments we have from England . . . we might occasionally procure very consider-

able consignments of produce from this country’.63

Eventually, Wylie’s trip to Britain (where he arrived in late 1810) was successful inas-

much as Wylie was able to give clearer indications to the firm’s suppliers of the goods

needed for the Brazilian market, and, according to Wylie himself, ‘there is nothing like

seeing both ends of ones [sic] business’.64 However, Wylie failed to secure a sound con-

nection in Britain in the terms discussed with Hancock. Wylie once again failed to per-

suade his brother-in-law to play the role of associated house in Liverpool. Wylie &

Hancock was forced to carry on relying on Samuel Holland & Co. as well as other mer-

chants. Indeed, while he was in Manchester in June 1812, Wylie corresponded with

three different shippers from the Mersey, all of whom forwarded goods to Hancock

& Wylie in Brazil, often in the same vessel. These were: Robert Ballingall, Samuel

Holland & Co. and Haworth & Peel. Likewise, Richard Hancock (John’s brother)

formed a new partnership, this time with a Mr Robinson, as Robinson & Hancock

of Liverpool (while also keeping the Manchester establishment). Robinson &

Hancock handled some of Wylie & Hancock’s remittances from Brazil.

Because of Wylie’s failure to acquire a sole associated house in Britain, Hancock

went even further. Hancock wanted to close the house in Rio de Janeiro to further

strengthen the Bahian house, with one of the partners going permanently to Liverpool

to open a branch of Hancock & Wylie there. This move would bring about a radical

change in the organisation of the firm’s business. Hancock wanted to conform to a

more traditional business model, in which a Britain-based house bought manufactures

in Britain and forwarded them to a single branch in a foreign market. In contrast,

Wylie wanted to keep houses at both Brazilian cities (Rio and Bahia). Indeed, as far

as branches on the spot were concerned, Wylie always had a very aggressive and expan-

sionist policy. It was his idea to open the house in Buenos Aires (and he suggested

opening another one in Montevideo). Hancock, in contrast, was very cautious, and

it is clear that he believed that two partners could not possibly have more than two

houses. In the words of Wylie, ‘friend Hancock is not in favour of many establish-

ments’.65 This difference of opinion clearly shows that there was no generally accepted

mode of practice for British merchants in Brazil, and that crucial decisions had to be

taken in order to select one among several sensible alternatives. Indeed, establishments

that operated successfully with all partners residing in Latin America (as Wylie

wanted) were very common.

However, in this particular case Wylie’s over-expansionist policy did not pay divi-

dends, and indeed proved fatal. When the firm had only two branches, in Bahia

and in Rio de Janeiro, both were strictly controlled by a partner each. In contrast,

when they opened the house in Buenos Aires, they were first forced to entrust the

establishment in Buenos Aires to a young man (Robertson) with little business experi-

ence just because he was the son of a family friend. Subsequently, they decided to send

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the supposedly more experienced Postlethwaite to the River Plate, and received him as

a new partner, although little was known about his commercial credentials. Entrusting

the Buenos Aires house to two inexperienced individuals of unproven reputation

meant that the firm’s affairs spiralled out of control. Likewise, leaving Wallis in

charge of the house in Rio for a long spell when Wylie went to Buenos Aires in

1809 and later on after his departure for England in 1810 was also a risky decision,

which Wylie and Hancock came to regret.

Indeed, in 1811, while still visiting Britain, Wylie learnt that, without previous con-

sultation, Wallis (the new partner in the Rio house) had decided to charter the James

from Rio to Buenos Aires loaded with British manufactures, with the idea of selling

them there and uploading River Plate produce for the return journey to Britain.66

What Wallis did not know was that the River Plate was in a state of turmoil because

Montevideo did not accept Buenos Aires’ May revolution and decided to recognise

the Council of Regency in Spain. As part of this policy, Buenos Aires was blockaded

by naval forces from Montevideo after Elıo, who had been appointed as the River

Plate viceroy by the Cadiz junta, declared war on Buenos Aires.67 As a consequence,

the captain of the James was not allowed either to unload her cargo or to take local

produce back to Britain. As a result, the owners of the James asked Wylie &

Hancock for compensation. Wylie held Wallis liable for this incident and potential

losses. This fiasco triggered a conflict between the partners, which proved fatal to

their relationship. The house in Rio, previously entrusted to Wallis, was soon to be

closed. Relations between Wylie and Wallis turned sour, with Wallis being ordered

to send the account books to Bahia and to go to England to salvage his honour.

Wylie’s letter on the subject is revealing: ‘I have to request you will give a power of

attorney to settle such accounts and receive the money that may yet be owing to us

there, and come immediately home yourself to England. This is the last request I

shall ask from you, and the only manner in which you can at all explain or justify

your most extraordinary and unaccountable conduct.’68 Wallis disobeyed these

orders, stopped writing altogether and even stopped remitting the returns of sales

already made. The Rio house was closed, as Hancock had long wanted, but not

because Hancock had won his argument with Wylie; the partners no longer had any

choice in the matter.

Important sums of monies were forfeited during this time, to Wylie’s embarrass-

ment. As Wallis never sent back the account sales of the goods consigned to them,

Wylie was ‘obliged to pay some of our friends there [Manchester] the proceeds of

their goods’, even though remittances had not been received in Britain. Wylie &

Hancock were certainly aware that one of their main assets was their reputation,

but that reputation came at a high price. Wylie wrote to Wallis that ‘I need not tell

you that one and all of them [consigning friends] consider us a set of damned

rascals.’69 The overall estimated losses on account of Wallis’ misbehaviour were put

by Wylie at £25,000. Three years earlier Wylie had presciently told Hancock that

‘there is no friendship in trade’.70 Unfortunately, this incident proved him right.

Likewise, Postlethwaite also took the blame for the incident with the James, with the

result that Wylie & Hancock decided to close the Buenos Aires establishment too. It

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was clearly Postlethwaite’s duty to keep their sister house in Rio informed of the pol-

itical events taking place in the River Plate. Furthermore, even if the blockade took

Postlethwaite by surprise, Wylie expected a more energetic reaction from him: ‘Why

did not you abandon the vessel the moment the blockade took place? Had you

done so, we should have been exonerated without any trouble whatever.’71 Post-

lethwaite was also criticised because a selection of hides sent by him to Wylie as remit-

tances fetched in the British market just 50 per cent of the cost at Buenos Aires. This

came as a surprise given Postlethwaite’s reputation as an expert at handling remit-

tances in local produce.72 In addition, Postlethwaite was accused by Wylie of not

keeping the account sales book up to date and of putting Wylie’s reputation on the

line. The Dalglishs shared part of the loss for the poor remittances sent by Post-

lethwaite, to the embarrassment of Wylie.73 Despite Wylie’s attempts to close the

Buenos Aires establishment immediately, Postlethwaite remained in Buenos Aires at

least until late 1812, and part of their accounts remained unsettled for a while.

Since he was short of funds, Postlethwaite drew unauthorised drafts against Wylie &

Hancock, which further complicated matters.74

Only after this horrible disaster, did Wylie concede to Hancock that a branch house

of their own in Britain, in the previous terms proposed by Hancock, was indeed very

much needed.75 A defeated Wylie had now in mind, among other advantages, the

benefits of selecting in Britain their own goods specially prepared for the Brazilian

market. Being permanently at home allowed either Hancock or Wylie (both experts

on the Brazilian market) to see sample products intended for Brazil. So confident

was Wylie of his knowledge of the Brazilian market, that, according to him, ‘I have

now got a thorough knowledge of the nature of it [the Brazilian market], and

plainly see there is no person in this country [Britain] who knows anything at all of

it, nor goods, generally speaking, suitable for it to be met with’.76 By having a Liverpool

house for the firm, Wylie understood that the firm could handle remittances from

South America by itself, and make the most of opportunities as they arose. An incident

in late 1811, when Wylie was still visiting Britain, is illustrative of the point.

In November 1811, news arrived in Britain of the contents of President Madison’s

Third Annual Message to the US Congress on 5 November 1811, which was inter-

preted as a shift in Madison’s policy towards Britain, which eventually culminated

in the 1812 Anglo-American War. In a spectacular and audacious move, Wylie tried

to make the most of the situation, influenced also by news previously received from

his partner of low prices for raw cotton in Brazil,77 at a time when cotton and sugar

were the main Brazilian exports.78 Indeed, Wylie decided to buy a vessel, the

William, and charter it to Brazil to buy as much raw cotton as possible. It was

obvious to Wylie that a war with the USA (or just an embargo) would inflate raw

cotton prices. Wylie instructed the master of the William to go immediately to

Brazil, as this fascinating letter shows:

I have now only to inform you that on your arrival there [Bahia], the greatest secrecyis necessary with regard to the news of this country . . . and I do positively desire thatyou will neither take nor suffer any of your crew to take a letter, News Paper, or Price

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Current, from any person of this place . . . and upon no account communicate orsuffer any of your crew to communicate to any person at Bahia that the Presidentof the United States message to Congress had arrived in this country previous toyour departure. You had better inform any person who may go on board toenquire after news, of whom there will be a great many, that you sailed on the16th of November, at which time there was nothing new either from the Continentof Europe or America, that the trade of this country was quite at a stand, andproduce of every kind selling for almost nothing.79

Wylie went even further and wrote a fake letter ‘to show to the merchants of Bahia’,

dated 15 November 1811, giving a horrible account of the situation in Britain: ‘the

low prices of produce are merely nominal; being unsaleable at any price’, further

adding that every British merchant ‘will shortly be tired of the Brazils, the trade of

which has pretty nearly ruined every person who has entered into it’.80

Another advantage of being permanently in Britain was that marine insurances

could be handled by the firm, which could also operate on its own account rather

than in consignments only. According to Wylie, by operating on their own account

‘the Dalglish would supply us with any quantity of goods, but without being estab-

lished [in Britain] our bills cannot be easily negotiated in the country’.81 After the

fiascos in Buenos Aires and Rio, Wylie not only conceded that one partner should

reside permanently in Britain, but also that having had too many branches in South

America was a mistake: ‘our business was so mismanaged at Rio & Buenos Ayres so

soon as my back was turned, that they are determined [Wylie & Hancock’s consigners]

not to trust to any more of [our] young men.’82

In short, the partners eventually decided that Hancock (not Wylie, as originally

thought) was the man best suited to be permanently in Britain. In May 1812

Hancock moved to Liverpool, opening a house there under the name of Hancock &

Co. By this time Wylie was also in Britain, so both partners met in Liverpool in

what must have been a remarkable meeting in July 1812. Before departing for

England Hancock had decided to leave one of their clerks, a Mr Edgley, in charge of

the Bahian house. But Wylie was unhappy with his performance and dismissed

him. In his stead, Wylie & Hancock put F. B. Boothby in charge of the Bahian

house.83 Boothby was at that time one of their clerks, and soon after he was made

partner. So good was the joint work of the partners in Britain in selecting textiles to

be shipped to Brazil, that Boothby reported that ‘there is no house here that can

stand in competition with us as all the prints received by them are generally badly

assorted’ for the Brazilian market.84

But the original plan traced by Hancock did not consider both partners as residing

in Britain. Indeed, Wylie thought that one of them should always be resident in Brazil.

A few months before Hancock’s departure from Brazil, Wylie wrote to him that

‘however happy I would be to see you in England, you must not upon any account

think of coming home until I get to Bahia’.85 Hancock disobeyed his partner and

left Brazil in May 1812, though Wylie was expected in Bahia by June/July 1812. Unfor-

tunately Wylie’s arrival there had to be postponed for several months because of the

war between Britain and the United States. In December, Boothby reported that

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‘the [Brazilian] coast still continues to be infested by American vessels of war & priva-

teers’, with many British vessels being captured.86 Wylie was stationed in Falmouth for

several weeks, waiting for a safe passage to Bahia until August 1813. During all this

time, Boothby was in charge of the house in Bahia, and his performance appears to

have satisfied both Wylie and Hancock.

The Making of a Fortune

Following the James disaster and other mismanagements, by 1812 Wylie & Hancock’s

houses in Rio and Buenos Aires were closed. The business had suffered considerably,

with losses put at some £25,000. Yet the firm managed to survive and grew stronger.

For several years, between c. 1812 and 1815, business went very well for Wylie &

Co., to such an extent that it recovered from all the heavy losses ensuing from the

failure of the houses in Buenos Aires and Rio. In a confidential letter sent to his

brother-in-law, Wylie confessed that Wylie & Co. had made £50,000 in profits in

1813 alone, and that the firm was expecting to make another £30,000 in the following

months.87 By any standard, these were sizeable profits. Indeed, according to Wylie, ‘I

have now wherewith, I think, to enable me to live comfortably for the remainder of my

life’.88

The origin of this fortune came mainly from speculations in raw cotton and tobacco

during 1812–15, while Britain was at war with the USA: ‘the American War has

enabled us to coin money here’,89 wrote Wylie to a friend. Cotton and tobacco were

imported by Britain mainly from the USA during peacetime, so that Brazil became

an important alternative source of supply. Such was the importance of Brazil during

this period that in March 1814 Wylie wrote that ‘[w]e have nearly 7000 bags of

cotton and a considerable quantity of tobacco in the two convoys, which, if the

above prices continue and they arrive safe, must yield a clear profit of upwards

£100,000’.90 And so the convoys did, arriving in the safe haven provided by Britain.

The reader may wonder at this stage how Wylie & Hancock, from Brazil, still

managed to benefit in 1814 from the uncertainties of a war started two years earlier,

which would have given enough time to other British merchants to speculate too.

Yet, as is highlighted by Black in a masterful fashion in a recent publication using a

global historical approach, this was not any war. It was a conflict with peaks and

troughs, like, for example, the American campaigns in 1812 and 1813 or the British

counterattack in 1814 and 1815, all of which generated a perfect field for speculators

in American produce also produced in Brazil.91

In order to promote their exports of Brazilian produce to Britain, Wylie & Hancock

established very good connections in Pernambuco, cotton from which was regarded as

of a very high quality in Britain. The links of Wylie & Hancock with Pernambuco

started with the Wallis brothers first, after which the firm cultivated a promising com-

mercial partnership with Richard Scott and Lyon & Preston from at least 1810. Scott

worked for the house of Lyon & Preston, but this did not stop him also serving Wylie &

Hancock as an agent. To Scott they sent British textiles and requested local produce.

Yet, once again, Wylie & Hancock’s judgement of the people they chose as either

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partners or agents went horribly wrong. Scott was dismissed, as Wallis, Edgley, Robert-

son and Postlethwaite had been before him. Soon after Wylie’s return to Bahia he

became suspicious of Scott’s undertakings: ‘I have been reading over his letters since

my arrival here, and I evidently see that he has been playing a curious game.’

Wylie’s thorough investigation produced sound evidence that Scott had been

keeping part of their money. A few months later Wylie obtained further evidence,

which he hoped ‘will be sufficient to convict the rascal. There is nothing [that] can

be more mortifying than that of being plundered by our own servants being an

injury one can scarcely guard against.’92

By this stage, and as far as partners/agents’ betrayals and misbehaviour are con-

cerned, Wylie had seen it all. Apart from the cases of Wallis, Postlethwaite and

Scott, once Wylie and Hancock had closed the house in Rio, they asked a Mr Rigg

to take care of the goods they still had on hand there. But Rigg also misbehaved, as

this eloquent extract reveals:

There are three characters with whom every wise & prudent merchant ought toavoid commercial transactions. The knave, the fool, & the poor man. The knavewill take you in purposely, the fool from stupidity, and the poor man from necessity.I shall not pretend to say which of these characters Mr Rigg inherits most, but onething is certain, that he has the advantage of enjoying all the three to a certaindegree.93

Wylie probably forgot a fourth category to avoid: the drunkard, as his experience with

young Wallis had showed him.

Overall, the hiring of Robert Todd, a Briton resident in Pernambuco, seems to have

been the only sensible decision taken by Wylie & Hancock for a long time, and indeed

he eventually became a partner. After Scott’s dismissal, Todd became the firm’s main

contact in Pernambuco. In exchange, he received a small commission for selling tex-

tiles and for buying cotton and tobacco. A similar role was performed in Maranhao by

Thomas Mahoney, who obtained consignments of cotton for Wylie & Hancock.

Around this time, Hancock, who had won his first battle of ideas between the part-

ners by settling permanently in Liverpool, decided that both he and Wylie were of

more use in Britain than in Brazil. This decision would, again, mark a radical trans-

formation in the structure of the firm. From being both based in Brazil, they would

now be both resident in England. Their acquisition of wealth from speculating in

raw cotton during the 1812 war had convinced both Wylie and Hancock that this

new capital could be employed in a different way. Wylie and Hancock decided to

become manufacturers too, a clear process of early backward vertical integration.

Their plan was to invest some £50,000 in a Manchester establishment in order to

produce cottons for the Brazilian market.94 Hancock would remain in Liverpool

while Wylie would move from Brazil to Manchester. They would also operate on

their own account only.

In order to further engage Boothby (already a partner in Bahia) and Todd (partner-

to-be) in this new adventure, Wylie & Hancock offered £1,000 shares to both Todd and

Boothby, as many as they wanted, with the rest to be taken by Wylie and Hancock

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themselves, an offer that Todd and Boothby accepted. Wylie also offered Todd a part-

nership in the Bahia house and 50 per cent of the business in Bahia to them both: ‘It is

our wish that you and Mr Boothby should manage the business here, in which, I

propose, that we should share alike.’95 Given the good performance of Boothby at

Bahia during the previous two years, Wylie & Hancock’s idea was to ask Todd to

move from Pernambuco to Bahia, to replace Wylie, as they trusted no one else.

They needed Todd in Bahia, ‘one person [i.e. Boothby] being incapable of superin-

tending the business properly, besides the great risk in the event of death’.96

Thus, Todd became a key figure in the firm, even before becoming a partner. Pre-

viously, while visiting Britain in 1813 while working for another house, Robert

Todd was also entrusted with dealing with the James Wallis affair, and had been

given a power of attorney ‘to take everything out his hands [Wallis’s]’.97 Commercial

relations with Todd proved so strong that Wylie & Hancock decided to open a house at

Pernambuco in late 1813 (to be operational in 1814), styled as Wylie, Todd & Co. The

alternative was to carry on relying on another Pernambuco house to obtain the cotton

they needed, but, according to Todd himself, the British houses in Pernambuco at that

time were not to be trusted.

However, Todd’s move to Bahia and Wylie’s plans of moving to Manchester to

administer the manufacturing establishment were delayed for a while. The war with

the USA and the Napoleonic wars kept Wylie in Bahia for longer than he wanted,

and also kept Todd in Pernambuco. During this time the firm continued to speculate

in raw cotton, until peace was declared. Unfortunately, Wylie was caught with an on-

sea cargo of expensive raw cotton and consequently lost some £20–30,000 in a few

months.98 Nonetheless, the firm still managed to retain most of the profits of the pre-

vious two years, totalling over £100,000.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that Wylie & Hancock did not limit its operations to

exporting Brazilian produce to Britain and importing British textiles to Brazil. They

were very much aware of the wider world around them. For example, the firm special-

ised in exports of jerked beef to Havana to feed slaves. Wylie & Hancock also traded

with China, even buying vessels for this purpose. ‘Nothing does so well as the hard

dollars to China’, wrote Wylie to Hancock.99 From China they took tea to

Britain.100 They also had connections in Gibraltar, South Africa and the West Coast

of Africa.101 As Wylie explained to Todd, ‘there are a thousand ways of making

money here besides trading direct to England’.102 After all Rio was now the capital

‘of a worldwide empire stretching as far as Goa and Macao’.103 Yet, the Brazilian

business remained by far the most important of all commercial activities for the firm.

Epilogue: The End of the Brazilian Adventure; New Beginnings for Wylie

Despite the huge profits made during c. 1812–15, in June 1819 the house of Wylie,

Hancock & Co. ceased trading. From the extant evidence it is unclear how exactly

this failure came about, but we do know that in 1819 there was an important trade

crisis in Britain. Indeed, Richard Hancock & Co. of Liverpool went bankrupt a few

weeks earlier.104 We also know that that this house was closely related to Wylie,

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Hancock & Co. Furthermore, from 1814 Wylie & Hancock was mainly operating on its

own account. This system, though profitable, was extremely risky. It required a huge

investment of working capital given that sales of British manufactures in Brazil were

made on credit. The turnover for exports of textiles was usually some twelve

months. Likewise, exports of Brazilian produce to the British market took several

months to cash, from the time Brazilian produce was bought in Pernambuco to the

time remittances were realised in Britain. Wylie & Hancock was neither the first nor

the last house to succumb to this system because of cash-flow problems.

A few weeks after Wylie & Hancock’s failure was formalised, Wylie wrote to a close

friend that ‘our late loses are so enormous, that for the present I am unable to say what

we may have left, or whether there may be any thing. . . . But as yet everything is uncer-

tain, and equally so whether any two of us [the four partners remaining] may form any

future arrangement.’105 Despite this, Wylie did not dismay. He was always prepared for

the worst. Indeed, in 1814, when the partners hoped that the firm would make some

£100,000 in profits by selling cotton and tobacco in the middle of the war between

Britain and the USA, Wylie had prophetically written to his sister’s husband that ‘I

am convinced that no man living can bear losses or disappointments much better

than myself, and were the above to happen [bankruptcy], I should just begin with

as much pleasure to work for more, as ever . . . [while] nothing appears more

foolish in [a] man, than that of building castles in the air’.106 Faithful to his own

words, Wylie’s first reaction to the full collapse of the business in 1819 was to pack

his stuffs and go back to Bahia to work as a commission merchant there, starting

from the bottom. He even asked a friend, Samuel Johnston, to associate with him

in Bahia where they would receive consignments from Glasgow.107 Yet the plan did

not prosper, and after much consideration Wylie decided to try his luck in India,

while Johnston eventually associated with Boothby.

But the failure of Wylie & Hancock did not end Wylie’s adventure in Brazil. The

extant information for the period after 1819 is not good enough because the Wylie

papers contain no information for the period 1819–30. We do not know for

instance if Wylie ever actually went to India or not. However it is possible to con-

clude that during the early 1820s John Wylie was back in action in South America,

being part of Eyes, Miller, Wylie & Co. of Buenos Aires. Furthermore, there is also

evidence that this new partnership had interests in Brazil as well. In the early 1820s

John Wylie, John Miller and Charles Eyes were partners in Goring, Risk & Co. of

Rio de Janeiro, which had as its main partners Anthony T. Goring and William

Risk.108

It is not possible to establish how long the Buenos Aires establishment lasted. We

only know that, unfortunately for Wylie, the adventure with Goring & Risk in

Brazil was a short-lived partnership, dissolved in December 1824, and that the estab-

lishment in Buenos Aires lasted for a bit longer, until 1826. Likewise, both Wylie and

Eyes thought that after Goring & Risk’s dissolution they deserved another opportunity

in Brazil, and joined another partnership there. In this new Brazilian adventure they

were two of the partners of an enterprise, which also included James Dalglish and

John William Cooke, and was styled as Eyes, Dalglish & Co. of Rio. Eventually

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Wylie’s new partnership in Brazil lasted a shorter time than his old one with Hancock,

and by the end of 1832 it too was dissolved.109

In turn, Charles Eyes started to operate beyond the Atlantic coast of South America,

and invited Wylie to participate in these adventures. For example, Eyes, Wylie and

Cooke were partners in a house in Mexico, under the umbrella title of Crawford &

Co., which was dissolved in January 1827,110 following differences of opinion with

Crawford.111 Afterwards, a new partnership was formed among John Wylie, John

William Cooke and Charles Eyes, also incorporating John Cooke Jr., under the firm

of Wylie, Cooke & Co., based in San Luis de Potosi, in the interior of Mexico. Accord-

ing to Wylie, they were the first British house to open offices in that place, after he

moved there in early 1831 to take full responsibility for the business.112

Finally, there is also evidence that Eyes, Miller & Wylie also operated in Chile during

the late1820s and early 1830s as Wylie, Miller & Co., with John Miller’s brother in

charge of the Chilean house.113 It is worth mentioning that, as Eyes, Wylie & Co,

Eyes and Wylie had previously opened a house in Merseyside to support the

Chilean and Mexican establishments. In Chile in particular, the house of Wylie,

Miller & Co. was one of the most important middlemen in the Chilean copper indus-

try during this period. Wylie, Miller & Co. advanced monies to Chilean copper miners

such as Rodriguez & Cea, and subsequently bought their copper production at pre-

viously agreed prices.114 Yet, they were also very active in the British textile trade to

the Pacific,115 as most British houses were during this time.

Alas, we know very little about Eyes, Miller & Wylie’s activities in Chile thereafter,

although judging from the extant evidence it is clear that they did not operate there for

much longer. At this time Wylie’s relations with Eyes had turned sour. Wylie blamed

Eyes for how things developed in Chile, and also complained about the lack of infor-

mation he was receiving in Mexico about their joint concerns in both Chile and

Brazil.116 Months later, in late 1832, J. W. Cooke and Eyes left the partnership in

Mexico.117 Soon afterwards Wylie had also ended his involvements in Brazil and

Chile, while the business in Argentina had already been liquidated.

Yet, Wylie and Cooke junior remained in business at San Luis de Potosi until 1835,

when John Cooke the younger eventually left the partnership as well.118 This was not,

once again, the end of Wylie in Latin America: he decided to move his establishment to

Guadalajara, a more prosperous outlet. Wylie’s establishment in Mexico was based

around his speciality: importing British textiles and exporting local produce. Wylie

was very well connected in Britain, being supplied by Thomas Cooke & Co. of Man-

chester. The Dalglish family also continued to supply Wylie with manufactures from

Glasgow. The correspondence in Wylie’s papers ends in Guadalajara in 1840. This

was the year in which Wylie eventually decided to return home, after more than

thirty years in Latin America.

Conclusions

Most histories of British pre-eminence in the Americas after c.1808 tell us that, after

Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the subsequent collapse of the

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Spanish American empire, Brazil was opened up to international trade, and the British

inherited a vast market. We have also been told that Anglo-Brazilian commercial

relations became very important for both nations. What these histories do not often

tell us is that this process was neither automatic nor easy, as Wylie & Hancock’s experi-

ence in Brazil shows. This article provides a major new case study of early British pen-

etration of Latin America, thus providing a detailed picture of the commercial

activities of an important player, as well as of their outcomes. This is of relevance

because most of the extant literature on the early nineteenth century tends to

discuss the role of British merchants in generic terms with little attention given to

the decision-making process behind crucial and complex business decisions taken

during an unstable political period.

Wylie & Hancock’s experience would suggest that being a merchant in the early

nineteenth century in Brazil and the River Plate was a story of successful and failed

speculations, of many hazards and risks, of problems with partners and almost luck

in choosing the right location for a business given the political and commercial uncer-

tainties of the time. Wylie & Hancock clearly developed the location and product-

specific knowledge that allowed them to prosper for long periods; at the same time

they could become too thinly spread given the small number of competent people

in whom they had trust. They could take advantage of commercial and political

crises but at the same time be sunk by them, and this was down to critical entrepre-

neurial decision-making.

In relation to the informal empire debate, this essay does not pretend to solve the

controversies around it, but it is worth noting that, although it is true that Britain con-

trolled a great deal of Brazil’s foreign trade, Wylie & Hancock’s experience does not

suggest that British merchants colluded to control the market jointly or unfairly to

the detriment of other actors (including local merchants). Rather the reverse was

true: there was a great deal of competition among British and other foreign merchants,

and if bad commercial decisions were taken the price to be paid was very high (regard-

less of your nationality), including dreadful failure. This factor tallies with Guenther’s

conclusion that ‘the reality of British success in the import-export trade of Bahia

depended on individual performance of firms’,119 in what was a very competitive

market. Likewise, I could not find any evidence whatsoever of this important firm

exerting any influence upon Brazilian or Portuguese authorities (or of gaining political

favours), despite the fact that the nature of the correspondence available to us provides

unusual access to truly confidential information. This is in line with recent findings for

Chile and the River Plate during the 1810s–40s, where no evidence could be found of

British merchants exerting undue influence upon local customers or governments.120

Likewise, we knew very little about the British merchants who laid the foundations

of British enterprise in Latin America in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a

crucial period in the region’s political history. Indeed, international trade is usually

approached from its statistics, focusing on bilateral or, at best, triangular transactions

undertaken by countries. Trading houses remain largely in ‘black boxes’. Yet inter-

national trade should also be looked upon as a series of transactions between individ-

uals, at a micro-level. What merchants actually did and thought at a given time, as well

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as the process by which strategic decisions were taken, are often neglected topics. This

article, by focusing on the story of one of these partnerships, has paid special attention

to the factors which lay behind complex mercantile decisions.

Wylie’s and Hancock’s lives are extraordinary stories of many successes and failures,

but also of bravery and a great entrepreneurial spirit. Emigration, still a difficult matter

today, was far more problematic for Scots who spoke only English, and who, despite

this limitation, in 1807 decided to try their luck in Montevideo, and less than a year

later in Brazil. What followed next in their lives is a remarkable succession of

events, including the opening and closure of several branches in many countries;

the betrayal of partners, employees and agents; the making of a fortune; the sub-

sequent bankruptcy of an eleven-year partnership; the formation of new partnerships;

more failures but also new beginnings. John Wylie in particular was a tireless and

enthusiastic merchant who despite all the hardships faced in his commercial life

remained undeterred.

Acknowledgements

This paper was funded mainly by a short-term research grant generously awarded by

the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World of Harvard University,

for which I am very grateful. Additional funding was received from the ESRC (PTA-

030-2005-00308) and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Department of Economics &

Business). I am also very grateful to Pierre Gervais and the organisers of the inter-

national colloquium on ‘Merchant Practice in the Age of Commerce, 1650–1850’

(Paris, June 2011) for fully funding my attendance to this meeting to present an

early version of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank in particular Rory Miller,

but also Herbert Klein, H. V. Bowen, P. L. Cottrell, M. Carmagnani, B. Attard, Mark

Latham, Katharine Wilson, X. Lamikiz, X. Tafunell, B. Batiz-Lazo, Arnold Morrison,

Mark Curthoys and Glasgow University Archives.

Notes

[1] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 170.[2] De Fiore and De Fiore, The British Presence; Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’; Miller, Britain

and Latin America; Haring, Empire in Brazil; Manchester, British Pre-Eminence.[3] In Rio alone there were between 75 and 200 British mercantile houses by 1811. Manchester,

British Pre-Eminence, 76; Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 173.[4] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 157, 161.[5] Heaton, ‘A Merchant Adventurer’; Wilson, ‘The Fortunes’.[6] Bottcher, ‘Casas de Comercio’.[7] Eakin, ‘Business Imperialism’.[8] Llorca-Jana, British Textile Trade, table 2.6.[9] Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt, 106.

[10] Guenther, British Merchants, 12.[11] Gallagher and Robinson, ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’.[12] Guenther, British Merchants, 1–3; Graham, ‘Robinson and Gallagher’, 220; Gallagher and

Robinson, ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’, 8–10; Winn ‘British Informal Empire’.

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[13] Platt, ‘Further Objections’. See also Thompson, ‘Informal Empire?’; Jones, ‘Business Imperi-alism’, among many others.

[14] Brown, Informal Empire.[15] Platt, ‘Further Objections’, 84–85. In the same vein, see Thompson, ‘Afterword’, 423.[16] Llorca-Jana, British Textile Trade, ch. 2.[17] Guenther, British Merchants, 2.[18] Ibid., 6. As far as British sources are concerned, Guenther relied mainly on consular reports

and travel narratives, and did not use business collections.[19] Fridenson, ‘Business History and History’, 12.[20] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 164.[21] Eakin, ‘Business Imperialism’, 697.[22] Jones, International Business, 14.[23] Fridenson, ‘Business History and History’, 14, 17.[24] Miller, Britain and Latin America, 33–36.[25] Williams, ‘Establishment of British Commerce’; Goebel, ‘British Trade’.[26] Quoted in Gott, Britain’s Empire.[27] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia). Rio de Janeiro [Rio henceforth], 15 July 1809, Wylie & Co. papers,

Glasgow University Archives (hereafter UGD/28/1/1). See also The Southern Star, 23 May1807, 20 June 1807. I am very grateful to Arnold Morrison for providing copies of thesenumbers.

[28] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 169.[29] See, for instance, Wylie to Fayle (London). Glasgow, 25 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[30] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 172.[31] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow). Rio, 30 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[32] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 170.[33] Wylie to Hancock (Manchester). Buenos Aires, 1 Nov. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[34] Miller, Britain and Latin America, 34–35.[35] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 22 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[36] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 7 March 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[37] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 26 April, 22 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[38] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 7 Feb, 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[39] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 26 April 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[40] Wylie to Wallis (Bahia), Rio, 18 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[41] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 19 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[42] Wylie to Walliss (Rio), Buenos Aires, 10 Aug. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[43] Ibid.[44] Guenther, British Merchants, 17.[45] Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 52–56.[46] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 8 Sept. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[47] Wylie to Barlow (Liverpool), Buenos Aires, 29 Nov. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[48] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Buenos Aires, 1 Oct. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[49] Wylie to William Dalglish (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 9 March 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[50] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 9 June 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[51] Wylie to Dalglish Falconer (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 22 Aug.1809, UGD/28/1/1.[52] Wylie to Barber (London), Buenos Aires, 22 Aug.1809, UGD/28/1/1.[53] Wylie to Robertson (Montevideo), Buenos Aires, 23 Sept. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[54] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 7 Feb. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[55] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 30 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[56] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 19 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[57] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 26 April 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[58] Ibid.

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[59] Ibid.[60] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 27 April 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[61] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 6 June 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[62] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 23 Dec.1809, UGD/28/1/2.[63] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 6 June 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[64] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Liverpool, 21 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[65] Wylie to Wallis (Rio), Buenos Aires, 27 March 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[66] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[67] See, ‘Proceedings of the British Merchants at Buenos Ayres, in the Rio de la Plata’, The Times, 9

May 1811; ‘American Papers’, The Times, 2 March 1811; ‘Accounts from Buenos Ayres’, TheTimes, 15 April 1811.

[68] Wylie to Wallis (Rio)., Liverpool, 18 July 1812, UGD/28/1/5.[69] Wylie to Wallis (Rio), Manchester, 29 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[70] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 22 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[71] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[72] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 9 June 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[73] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[74] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 3 Sept. 1812, UGD/28/1/5.[75] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811. UGD/28/1/3.[76] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Manchester, 7 March 1812, UGD/28/1/3.[77] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Manchester, 5 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[78] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 161; Guenther, British Merchants, 10–11.[79] Wylie to Maginnis (Liverpool), Liverpool, 12 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[80] Wylie to Maginnis (Liverpool), Liverpool, 12 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[81] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[82] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Manchester, 19 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[83] Wylie to Edgley (Bahia), Glasgow, 6 Oct. 1812, UGD/28/1/5.[84] Boothby to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 1 Aug.1812, UGD/28/1/4.[85] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Liverpool, 19 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[86] Boothby to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 19 Dec. 1812, UGD/28/1/4.[87] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 8 Jan.1814, UGD/28/1/5.[88] Wylie Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 8 Jan. 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[89] Wylie to Page (Madeira), Bahia, 26 Nov. 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[90] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 5 March 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[91] Black, The War of 1812.[92] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 30 Nov. 1813, UGD/28/1/4.[93] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 24 Dec. 1813, UGD/28/1/4.[94] Wylie to Todd (Pernambuco), Bahia, 24 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[95] Wylie to Todd (Pernambuco), Bahia, 24 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[96] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 25 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[97] Hancock to Swan (Cape of Good Hope), Liverpool, 8 March 1813, UGD/28/1/5.[98] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool)., Bahia, 18 May 1815, UGD/28/1/5.[99] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 25 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.

[100] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool)., Bahia, 16 July 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[101] Boothby to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 23 Jan.& 7 Feb. 1813, UGD/28/1/4.[102] Wylie to Todd (Pernambuco), Bahia, 9 July 1814, UGD/28/1/5,[103] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 170.[104] London Gazette, 4 Aug. 1819.[105] Wylie to Johnston (Bahia), Liverpool, 15 July 1819, UGD/28/1/5.[106] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 5 March 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[107] Wylie to Johnston (Bahia), Liverpool, 15 July 1819, UGD/28/1/5.

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[108] London Gazette, 22 Nov. 1825.[109] London Gazette, 1 Jan.1833.[110] London Gazette, 8 June 1827.[111] Wylie to Cooke (Manchester), Tampico, 8 Jan. 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[112] Wylie to Cooke (Manchester), San Luis de Potosi, 14 March 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[113] Wylie to Eyes (Liverpool), San Luis de Potosi, 2 Jan. 1832, UGD/28/1/6.[114] Sociedad Minera de Vallenar de Rodriguez y Valdes, 1828–1834, Fondos Varios, vol. 846,

Archivo Nacional de Chile. See also Notariales Vallenar, vol.6, 14–117.[115] Wylie to Eyes (Liverpool), San Luis, 30 April 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[116] Wylie to Eyes (Liverpool), San Luis, 8 Aug. 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[117] London Gazette, 9 July 1833.[118] London Gazette, 18 Sept. 1835.[119] Guenther, British Merchants, 13.[120] Llorca-Jana, British Textile Trade, 288–90.

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