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British Merchants in New Markets: TheCase of Wylie and Hancock in Brazil andthe River Plate, c. 1808–19Manuel Llorca-JañaPublished online: 17 Dec 2013.
To cite this article: Manuel Llorca-Jaña (2014) British Merchants in New Markets: The Case of Wylieand Hancock in Brazil and the River Plate, c. 1808–19, The Journal of Imperial and CommonwealthHistory, 42:2, 215-238, DOI: 10.1080/03086534.2013.868228
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British Merchants in New Markets:The Case of Wylie and Hancock inBrazil and the River Plate, c. 1808–19Manuel Llorca-Jana
In 1808, after the Portuguese royal family was forced to leave Portugal and move to Brazil,
Brazilian ports were opened to British merchant houses, which were quick to open offices
in the likes of Bahia and Rio de Janeiro. By 1810 there were probably over 200 British mer-
chant houses operating in Brazil, but we know very little about them because most of their
historical records have not survived. In addition, scholars have assumed that, on account
of the dominant British economic power, the establishment of new mercantile houses in
South America c. 1808–19 was an easy task. This assumption is challenged in this
paper, which sheds new light on the activities of one of these British merchant houses,
making use of a recently discovered business collection concerned with the activities of
Wylie & Hancock, a Scottish house which operated in Brazil and the River Plate from
1808 to 1819. These papers also provide a unique insight into neglected topics such as:
the nature of managerial mercantile organisations; what the economic actors at the
time actually did and thought; and how strategic and tactical choices were reached.
Introduction
The story of the opening of Brazil to direct international trade in 1808, when the Por-
tuguese court was transferred to Brazil following Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian
peninsula, has been told many times: ‘it was an event unique in the history of Euro-
pean colonialism’.1 The subsequent arrival of many British merchant houses in Brazil is
also familiar.2 By 1810, there were probably over 200 British mercantile establishments
operating in Brazil,3 which is not surprising given that during the late eighteenth
century England was Portugal’s main trading partner, supplying Portugal directly
and Brazil indirectly with divers manufactured goods.4 Of these houses, we know
the story of Lupton & Luccock and Rhodes,5 but very little is known about other mer-
chant houses. Bottcher rightly notes that there is a lack of information about the
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2014
Vol. 42, No. 2, pp. 215–238, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03086534.2013.868228
Correspondence to: Manuel Llorca-Jana, Department of Economics, Universidad de Santiago de Chile, Chile. E-
mail: [email protected]
# 2013 Taylor & Francis
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British merchants who operated in Brazil c. 1808–27.6 In a similar vein, Eakin com-
ments on the lack of studies of individual foreign enterprises in Brazil during this
period.7 This is the more surprising since Brazil was the main Latin American
outlet for British manufacturers c. 1808–50, and one of Britain’s main partners world-
wide.8 To understand the process by which Brazil became so important for Britain
(and vice versa) it is crucial to improve our knowledge of the actors behind this
development.
Nearly half a century ago, Humphreys asked a key question in relation to British
merchants in South America after independence: what sort of people were these mer-
chants, adventurers and commission agents who laid the foundations of British econ-
omic enterprise in South America in the first quarter of the nineteenth century?9 As far
as Brazil is concerned, the question remains largely unanswered, except by Guenther’s
excellent study, which deals with Bahia only, although it is worth mentioning that
Bahia was the main port trading with Portugal for a long time.10 The difficulties
faced by British merchants operating in Brazil after 1808, when it had only recently
begun to trade internationally, have also been neglected. This topic is relevant
because, since Gallagher and Robinson’s famous article written over fifty years
ago,11 many scholars have argued that, after Spanish American independence and
Brazil’s opening to international trade, in some areas of South America Iberian colo-
nialism was replaced by informal British control, in particular in the River Plate and
Brazil during our period of study. Put simply, some areas of Latin America are seen by
some authors as part of a British informal empire, with Britain exerting control over a
territory over which she did not exercise formal sovereignty, or where an asymmetrical
power relationship was in place.12
Nonetheless, this idea of Latin America belonging to a British informal empire
during the first half of the nineteenth century has been challenged by many authors,
most enthusiastically by Platt,13 and an up-to-date discussion on the topic is now
available thanks to a finely edited collection.14 One difference between advocates for
a British informal empire in the region and those opposed to the idea is to be
found in the assessment of the real importance of the region for the British export
economy during this period (another difference relates to the ability, or lack of it, of
the British to control Latin American markets and/or governments during this
period). For example, for opponents of the idea, such as Platt, the region could not
possibly have been part of a British informal empire because it lacked commercial
importance for Britain.15
Whether the region was commercially important or not for Britain before 1850 (a
puzzle recently solved thanks to new data),16 the contenders (regardless of their pos-
ition) in this controversy implicitly assume that the establishment of British merchants
in Brazil and the River Plate after 1808 was an easy task, if not an automatic process.
That is, British merchants saw a new opportunity to trade, and conquered a market
easily. Whether or not this market can be deemed to have belonged to an informal
empire depends on, among other factors, the importance assigned to the market for
Britain’s trade, but few authors have worried about the potential difficulties for
foreign merchants operating in these ‘new’ lands, even for merchants belonging to
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mighty Britain. Only Guenther has tackled the uncertainties faced by British mer-
chants in Bahia c. 1808–50, emphasising ‘how this happened on a day-to-day
basis’,17 but at the time of writing she did not have access to the main collection
used in this paper, and Guenther was more interested in the process of British mer-
chants’ self-identification in Brazil than in the making of business decisions.18
Indeed, and perhaps surprisingly, the collections used by Guenther do not include
papers from any British merchant house in Brazil. Instead, Guenther concentrated
on consular reports, Bahian government reports, correspondence between British
consuls and Brazilian officials, records of property, burials, baptisms and marriage,
travel narratives and commercial almanacs.
This article, therefore, sheds new light on these topics by concentrating on the oper-
ations of Wylie & Hancock, an (until now) little known merchant house that operated
(albeit briefly) in Montevideo in 1807 (following the British invasions of the River
Plate), Brazil (1808–19) and Buenos Aires (1809–12). The leading man in this enter-
prise was John Wylie and his main partner until 1819 was John Hancock, from whom
Wylie parted ways that year, following the notorious failure of the firm despite the size-
able capital they managed to accumulate during the 1810s. Subsequently Wylie oper-
ated again in Brazil (1820s–30s) and Buenos Aires (1820s), as well as in Mexico
(1820s–30s) and Chile, this time with other partners, although this article concen-
trates on the period up to 1819.
In particular, this article analyses how complex business decisions were taken by the
two entrepreneurs between 1808 and 1819, highlighting the fact that a business
problem usually presents many viable solutions and that, therefore, entrepreneurs
must take crucial decisions,19 often under difficult situations like those faced by
Wylie and Hancock. For example, after arriving in Brazil in 1808, they decided to
open two commission houses, one in Bahia, the other in Rio, at that time the principal
cities in Brazil.20 Yet soon one of the partners (Wylie) was determined to expand the
business by opening a new branch in Buenos Aires (which was still part of the Spanish
Empire), thinking that independence from Spain was imminent and that a new world
of opportunities would open up to them. In contrast, Hancock was reluctant to
expand the business and even preferred to concentrate on the Bahia house only, to
the extent of wanting to close the house in Rio. That is, these two partners and
friends had contrasting views about the best course of action to be taken in an unpre-
dictable situation given the impact of the Napoleonic Wars and the Spanish American
wars of independence. In the same vein, another area of discussion centred on whether
to have headquarters in Britain or operate, instead, with agents in situ. As in the pre-
vious example, both alternatives had pros and cons, as we shall see later on, but in each
case only one option was chosen.
The main sources of information for this article are the Wylie & Co. papers available
at the Glasgow University Archives. These papers have not been used before by other
scholars, since they were largely unknown. For example, Guenther’s work on British
merchants in Bahia made no mention of this collection, even though Wylie &
Hancock’s main house was in that city. If, as Eakin remarked, our ignorance of
Anglo-Brazilian economic relations for the early nineteenth century ‘stems from
The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 217
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lack of access to company archives’,21 then the Wylie & Co. papers will be welcomed by
many. Indeed, Jones notes that the main difficulty for researchers of trading companies
is the fact that ‘the historical records of most firms have disappeared or, for one reason
or another, are not available’.22
Furthermore, the Wylie papers are unique in the sense that they contain business
letters from one partner (Wylie) to the other (Hancock), as well as from one
partner to his brother-in-law, who also happened to be a very close friend and who
disclosed unusually rich private and strategic business information, critical infor-
mation which was not present in the sources used by Guenther. Indeed, these
papers provide a unique insight into neglected topics such as: the nature of managerial
mercantile organisations in South America, in particular when conflicts over indepen-
dence were taking place and, some may argue, when the foundations of a British infor-
mal empire were taking shape; what the economic actors at the time actually did and
thought, and therefore the cross-cultural interactions between Britain and Latin
America; and how strategic and tactical choices are reached under difficult situations
by a small group of early global entrepreneurs. That is, the Wylie collection provides an
invaluable opportunity to study entrepreneurs’ decision-making at a micro-level in a
complex business environment, which is relevant both to Latin Americanists and to
business researchers. Finally, if, as highlighted by Fridenson, business history as a
field lacks studies of businesses both during decolonisation and business failures,23
then this story will certainly appeal to a wide range of readers across several disciplines.
After this introduction, the next section deals with Wylie & Hancock’s early adven-
tures in Brazil and Buenos Aires from 1808 to 1812, when they decided to open houses
in Bahia, Rio and Buenos Aires. A third section is concerned with the difference of
opinion between these two partners on the best strategy to follow, in particular as
far as branches were concerned, and with the forced closure of the houses in
Buenos Aires and Rio. Section four is a discussion of how Wylie & Hancock
managed to create a small fortune c. 1812–15, mainly dealing with raw cotton
during the Anglo-American War of 1812–15, and after deciding to open a house in
Liverpool, which in turn became the headquarters of the firm. The last section concen-
trates on the collapse of the business in 1819.
The Early Years of the Brazilian and River Plate Adventure
In 1806, British forces occupied Buenos Aires, albeit briefly, and in early February 1807
the British also invaded Montevideo and occupied the city until September 1807.24
Following this invasion, some British merchants, thinking that the capture was defini-
tive and the future likely to prove prosperous, went to the River Plate and started
trading in Montevideo.25 They were not to blame; after all in September 1806 The
Times had proclaimed that ‘Buenos Ayres at this moment forms a part of the
British Empire’, adding later on that ‘the whole colony of La Plata will share
the same fate’.26 Among them were two young Scots seeking their fortunes: John
Wylie and John Hancock.27 What these two Britons did not know was that the
capture was not permanent but very short-lived, and they had, therefore, to pack
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their stuffs and return to Britain by September 1807. Yet, this short experience did not
stop them coming back to South America a few months later.
In the second half of 1808, following the move of the Portuguese royals to Brazil and
the opening up of this country to direct international trade with friendly nations, the
same two businessmen decided to try their luck in Brazil, which then appeared prom-
ising territory given the strong historic commercial links between Portugal, its colonies
and Britain, and ‘at a critical time for British trade when British goods were being
excluded from Europe’.28 They knew little of Brazil and spoke no Portuguese.
Despite these crucial limitations, they formed a partnership and opened two houses
in Brazil, one at Bahia (managed by Hancock) and the other at Rio de Janeiro
(managed by Wylie). Although we know nothing about Wylie and Hancock’s previous
business activities in Britain, these houses were not branches of an enterprise based in
Britain, since all partners resided in Brazil. Wylie and Hancock’s idea was to import
British manufactures in exchange for Brazilian produce. They were the classic commis-
sion merchants, receiving goods on consignment and charging commission. For this
enterprise, they needed good family connections in Britain. William Dalglish, for
instance, was Wylie’s brother-in-law, and the main partner of William & James Dalgl-
ish of Glasgow, an important supplier of cottons. W. & J. Dalglish was also connected
to (Robert) Dalglish, Falconer & Co., a cottons supplier and calico printer also based in
Glasgow, as William and James were brothers of Robert. Likewise, John Hancock’s
brother, Richard Hancock, was their main connection in Manchester for the supply
of British textiles.
From 1808, Wylie & Hancock was supplied with British textiles and other manufac-
tures by several firms in Britain. In turn, Wylie & Hancock’s main shipping connection
in Liverpool was Humble, Holland & Co., at a time when Liverpool was starting to be
recognised as the principal port for trade to South America. In return, Wylie &
Hancock sent remittances to Britain to pay for these supplies, which were handled
by firms such as Humble & Holland (Liverpool), Thomas Barber (London) and
B. Fayle & Co. (London).29 As this list of connections shows, Wylie & Hancock
lacked a central point of contact in Britain, a point developed below.
During the first few months after becoming established in Brazil, the flow of business
was slow, but Wylie and Hancock, in particular the former, remained very optimistic
about the future, and had good reasons for so being: it was clear, in practice, that ‘at
least until the end of the war, direct trade with all friendly nations meant trade with
England’.30 It was a learning period for both partners, in a new country about which
little was known in Britain. During this early period Wylie and Hancock exchanged
regular correspondence, reporting extensively on the business situation of their
places of residence and in particular on the stocks on hand. It was not unusual for
unsold goods in Bahia to be sent to Rio, and vice versa. Likewise, each partner also
claimed to reside in the most favourable location. For Hancock there was no better
place than Bahia, while Wylie was confident he would ‘convince him [Hancock] I am
right, this being without a doubt the best place in the country for a general trade’,31
and indeed it was the location chosen by Dom Joao to reside in while in Brazil.32
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After opening the houses at Bahia and Rio de Janeiro, and operating there for a few
months, the markets of the River Plate called for Wylie & Hancock’s attention in early
1809. They were not alone: ‘almost all the English in Rio de Janeiro have come to this
place’ [Buenos Aires], wrote Wylie to his partner’s brother a few months later.33 After
the deposition in 1808 of Ferdinand VII by Napoleon’s forces, many conflicts of loyalty
arose in Spanish America, providing ‘a catalyst for the first real independence move-
ments’.34 Not surprisingly then, Wylie had rightly predicted that, following Napoleon’s
invasion of Spain, ‘there is a very great probability of her colonies becoming indepen-
dent. . . . Under these circumstances it would be necessary to have another establish-
ment at Buenos Ayres, which could be easily effected, and would pay well.’35 In
theory, before 1810 British merchants were not allowed to settle in Buenos Aires.
Yet, this did not stop Wylie & Hancock sending goods there by making use of the ser-
vices of a Spanish or Creole merchant at the River Plate. But luck was not on Wylie &
Hancock’s side. In early 1809 the partners decided to forward some goods from Rio to
the River Plate on board the Amelia but ‘owing to the stupidity of the Captain or crew
. . . the vessel was run upon some rocks off Maldonado, went to pieces & every sixpence
worth of the cargo lost’.36 This incident did not stop the British from trying harder.
Indeed, a few weeks later, Wylie was exuberant after discovering that sometimes
theory and practice are far removed from each other, and reported to Hancock
about the extensive contraband trade practised in the River Plate: ‘It is now pretty
well known here that smuggling is carried on with the greatest facility there
[Buenos Aires] in the open day and winked at by the government.’37
But Wylie was not happy with sending occasional consignments to the River Plate;
he wanted a more permanent commercial intercourse. Indeed, after much discussion,
Wylie and Hancock decided to open a house at Buenos Aires too. It is remarkable how
two Britons in Brazil, who had little capital, spoke no Portuguese and no Spanish and
had never been to Buenos Aires, took this decision. Yet the partners’ relationship was
not free of tension. Hancock was reluctant to expand the business, while Wylie thought
that ‘if we were confined to the trade of this place [Brazil] alone, we had much better
stay at home’.38
To undertake this complex enterprise, Wylie left one of their clerks (James Wallis) in
charge of the Rio branch. James was originally employed in the Bahian house, while his
brother John worked for Wylie in Rio. But James’s brother was seen as incompetent,39
and he was eventually dismissed in May 1809. At that time Wylie could not find the
words to explain to James why his brother John was shown the door: ‘It is unnecessary
for me to state what has passed, being convinced it would hurt your feelings even more
than astonish you, but instead of getting better he got the longer the worse.’40 The real
reason for the dismissal, though, could be clearly explained to Wylie’s partner: ‘He is so
addicted to drinking that no dependence whatever can be placed on him.’41
With Wallis ‘the sober’ in charge of the Rio house, Wylie travelled to Buenos Aires,
arriving there on 6 August 1809, and staying for a few months. Because of the extra
responsibilities given to James Wallis, Wylie & Hancock’s partnership had to include
James as a partner, thus becoming Wylie, Hancock & Co. At that time, Wylie did
not regret this decision: the Buenos Aires adventure was paying off. Indeed, business
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went so well in Buenos Aires that Wylie was selling British textiles at a profit of 50, 60,
70 and even 100 per cent over the invoice cost.42 An exuberant Wylie did not even
bother to report to Hancock in Bahia on the state of their business. So busy and
happy was Wylie that he even forgave John Wallis, taking him to Argentina.
As Wylie (likewise John Wallis) could not remain in the River Plate forever, before
departing from Rio to Buenos Aires, Wylie engaged John Parish Robertson. Then an
unknown young Scot, Robertson later on became internationally famous because of
his role in trying to open Paraguay to British trade and more importantly for arran-
ging the 1824 bond issue by Baring Brothers for the Buenos Aires government, as
well as other issues for the Peruvian government. Wylie had first met Robertson in
Montevideo in 1807, following the British invasions of the River Plate. In 1808,
they met once again in Brazil, and once in Buenos Aires in 1809. Wylie decided to
formally hire Robertson, then called by Wylie, in a rather paternalistic fashion,
‘young man’. Robertson was seen as a very cheap alternative to represent Wylie &
Hancock at Buenos Aires: ‘by this plan we shall derive all the advantage of an estab-
lishment at very little expense’.43 This appointment was also strengthened by the fact
that young Robertson was the son of William Robertson, a friend of the Dalglish
family, and thus acquainted with Wylie. Finally, confirming Guenther’s findings,
British merchants in Brazil (and the River Plate too) kept to themselves (in particular
during the late 1800s and 1810s), usually choosing partners and clerks from among
their fellow expatriates,44 and this explains why Wylie preferred to rely on this inex-
perienced country fellow.
Despite selling very profitably during Wylie’s first weeks at Buenos Aires, before the
1810 May revolution in the River Plate it was not easy for British merchants to operate
there. For those unfamiliar with landmark events in Spanish American history, it is
worth mentioning at this stage that with the May revolution the Spanish viceroy of
the Rio de la Plata was removed and in his place a local government was established,
this being one of the earliest and most important events in the Spanish American wars
of independence from Spain.45 Before that, in 1809, in a desperate moment Wylie
wrote home that ‘[t[he negotiations . . . respecting the opening of this port are still
going on & they were expected to have been finished ere now, but the ignorant old
Dogs of Spaniards oppose it so strenuously, that his Excellency is under the necessity
of giving it in some degree to them’.46 In late 1809 things improved, but not as fast as
Wylie had wanted because ‘everything must be transacted in a Spaniard’s name, to
whom we have to pay a pretty decent commission’.47 In particular, Wylie decided
to use the services of the Spanish firm of Cabanyes & Torrents.
Furthermore, apart from these legal restrictions, port facilities in Buenos Aires were
far poorer than in Brazil. According to Wylie, ‘the difficulty of loading and unloading
here being beyond all comprehension to a person who has not seen it. A launch very
often lays three & four weeks in the Chuelo waiting either for wind or water to get out,
and the outward bound cargo is always carried from there by these launches.’48 Like-
wise, Buenos Aires was not yet a safe environment for British merchants to operate in:
‘an English merchant of the name of Bell was murdered here last Saturday night. . . .
Murder is thought nothing of in this part of the world, as it regularly happens every
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night in this city.’49 Yet all these difficulties did not stop Wylie from continuing to ask
for consignments from Britain to the River Plate.
Once Wylie thought that the branch in the River Plate could operate without his
presence, he left Buenos Aires for Rio, on April 1810 a few days before the famous
May 1810 revolution. Before departing he agreed a three-year contract with Robertson
at a salary of £100 per annum. Likewise, in late May 1810 John Postlethwaite, who was
a family friend of the Hancocks, was also sent to Buenos Aires by Wylie & Hancock to
join Robertson in their business there. Wylie trusted young Robertson, but thought
that it was too much work for a single man, in particular considering that remittances
in local produce were very common in the River Plate. Instead of a salary, Post-
lethwaite asked for a 25 per cent share of the business at Buenos Aires. Postlethwaite
was considered to be an expert in remittances in produce for the British market.
Because of the high hopes Wylie had for the Buenos Aires branch, Wylie and
Hancock agreed to make Postlethwaite a partner, despite giving away a part of the
business: ‘I have been obliged to give this gentleman a fourth share of that establish-
ment, to induce him to go as he would not accept if a salary however handsome it
might be.’50 This was a decision the partners came to regret, as explained below. Yet
at that time they trusted Postlethwaite, and buying trust has always been expensive.
But Wylie was not content with limiting his River Plate connections to Buenos Aires
alone. Before leaving Buenos Aires, he wanted to expand his firm’s interests in Mon-
tevideo, a place he knew well from his short stay there in 1807, and which he visited
again in 1809. In an optimistic letter to his brother-in-law, he said that: ‘the knowledge
I have however acquired both of that market [Montevideo] & this [Buenos Aires] will
enable in the future to do business upon more . . . grounds of advantage to you in
point of profit, as well as quick returns’.51 Soon after, Robertson was sent to Montevi-
deo for a while, to promote Wylie & Hancock’s business there.52 The first task
entrusted to Robertson was to buy tallow to remit the proceeds of British textile
sales to Britain. Wylie also took the opportunity to teach his first business lesson to
Robertson: ‘quick returns are the life of business’.53 Eventually, Wylie & Hancock
did not open a branch in Montevideo, but made good connections there.
Divergent Plans: Wylie versus Hancock
That was then the situation in mid-1810. Wylie & Hancock of Bahia and Rio became
Wylie, Hancock, Wallis & Postlethwaite of Rio, Bahia, Buenos Aires and nearly Mon-
tevideo. Yet, this reinvention of the business did not prevent differences of opinion
arising between Wylie and Hancock. The first important discrepancy arose in early
1809. At that time Hancock thought that the business in Bahia was so profitable
and demanding that both Hancock and Wylie should reside there, thus closing the
house in Rio de Janeiro. Wylie was very confident that both houses could be
managed by the two of them: ‘[I] hope you will no longer harbour fear of our
being able to support the two establishments’, he wrote.54 Yet tensions escalated,
with Hancock insisting that the Bahia house was selling far more than the Rio estab-
lishment, and that a single partner was not able to manage the whole Bahian business
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properly. But Wylie did not want to enter into any further discussions on the topic,
adding only that ‘it does not follow, that because you may have done double the
business that I have done, that Bahia is the best place of the two to fix our headquar-
ters’.55 Eventually, this battle was, temporarily, won by Wylie, with both houses conti-
nuing in operation.
A second area of difference between the partners was the nature of their connection
with Britain. Before considering the question, it is worth mentioning that from the
beginning of their operations Wylie & Hancock sometimes found it difficult to
procure manufactures specially suited to the Brazilian market. This is not surprising
given that the Brazilian market was new to many British manufacturers, including
those supplying Wylie & Hancock. This issue became so acute that, as early as February
1809, Wylie and Hancock agreed that one of them should temporarily leave Brazil for
Britain to ensure the ordering of goods suitable for the Brazilian market. At that time
they thought it was enough to spend a few months in Britain to ‘teach’ textile suppliers
about the best products to be sent to the Brazilian houses and the River Plate. They
were not happy with the nature of the textiles being received from Britain, even if
they were eventually sold, as in this example: ‘[I] would by this time have sold
double the quantity if I had had the goods suitable for the market, notwithstanding
all the competition I have had to fight against’.56 These were times when communi-
cations were effected via mail only, and the carriers of information were small
sailing ships. That is, it was very difficult to specify in words (to British manufacturers)
the sort of goods wanted in Brazil. A trip to Britain to meet manufacturers face-to-face
was more than justified, if not crucial, in order to succeed in business.
It is important to understand the nature of Wylie & Hancock’s connections in
Britain. By not having a permanent partner in Britain, Wylie & Hancock was at a dis-
advantage in comparison to other British merchant houses in Brazil, in particular
those with partners at both ends of the marketing chain, or those that were branches
of an enterprise with headquarters in London, Liverpool or Glasgow. By this time
Liverpool was starting to be recognised as the principal port for exports to South
America. It was therefore important to coordinate export operations from the
Mersey, and in particular to have a single point of contact in Britain.
During the early months of their adventure in Brazil, the coordinating role in Liver-
pool for shipments to Wylie & Hancock was mainly played by the firm of Humble,
Holland & Co. Unfortunately, Humble left the firm in January 1809. Wylie & Han-
cock’s connection in Liverpool changed into Samuel Holland & Co.57 The relationship
between the firms becomes complex and unclear at this point. Yet, Hancock wanted to
keep this connection, while Wylie was never happy with the performance of this Liver-
pool merchant house.58 Discussions continued between the two partners on the neces-
sity of having a better connection in Britain. Wylie agreed with Hancock that ‘an
[associated] establishment in England is absolutely necessary, and particularly a ship-
ping connection. I never saw it so clear before.’59 The disagreement was about who
should perform this role. After the dissolution of Humble & Holland, Wylie started
to look elsewhere, as he explained to his brother-in-law, who was regarded as an
ideal candidate to fulfil this role.60 In a later letter Wylie was more explicit, and
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proposed that William Dalglish should act as the firm’s agent in Britain: ‘I would much
rather be connected with you than any stranger and I am convinced Hancock will be
the same.’61 Yet, Wylie made it very clear to William that he should leave Glasgow for
either London or Liverpool.62 This, according to Wylie, would allow that ‘besides the
consignments we have from England . . . we might occasionally procure very consider-
able consignments of produce from this country’.63
Eventually, Wylie’s trip to Britain (where he arrived in late 1810) was successful inas-
much as Wylie was able to give clearer indications to the firm’s suppliers of the goods
needed for the Brazilian market, and, according to Wylie himself, ‘there is nothing like
seeing both ends of ones [sic] business’.64 However, Wylie failed to secure a sound con-
nection in Britain in the terms discussed with Hancock. Wylie once again failed to per-
suade his brother-in-law to play the role of associated house in Liverpool. Wylie &
Hancock was forced to carry on relying on Samuel Holland & Co. as well as other mer-
chants. Indeed, while he was in Manchester in June 1812, Wylie corresponded with
three different shippers from the Mersey, all of whom forwarded goods to Hancock
& Wylie in Brazil, often in the same vessel. These were: Robert Ballingall, Samuel
Holland & Co. and Haworth & Peel. Likewise, Richard Hancock (John’s brother)
formed a new partnership, this time with a Mr Robinson, as Robinson & Hancock
of Liverpool (while also keeping the Manchester establishment). Robinson &
Hancock handled some of Wylie & Hancock’s remittances from Brazil.
Because of Wylie’s failure to acquire a sole associated house in Britain, Hancock
went even further. Hancock wanted to close the house in Rio de Janeiro to further
strengthen the Bahian house, with one of the partners going permanently to Liverpool
to open a branch of Hancock & Wylie there. This move would bring about a radical
change in the organisation of the firm’s business. Hancock wanted to conform to a
more traditional business model, in which a Britain-based house bought manufactures
in Britain and forwarded them to a single branch in a foreign market. In contrast,
Wylie wanted to keep houses at both Brazilian cities (Rio and Bahia). Indeed, as far
as branches on the spot were concerned, Wylie always had a very aggressive and expan-
sionist policy. It was his idea to open the house in Buenos Aires (and he suggested
opening another one in Montevideo). Hancock, in contrast, was very cautious, and
it is clear that he believed that two partners could not possibly have more than two
houses. In the words of Wylie, ‘friend Hancock is not in favour of many establish-
ments’.65 This difference of opinion clearly shows that there was no generally accepted
mode of practice for British merchants in Brazil, and that crucial decisions had to be
taken in order to select one among several sensible alternatives. Indeed, establishments
that operated successfully with all partners residing in Latin America (as Wylie
wanted) were very common.
However, in this particular case Wylie’s over-expansionist policy did not pay divi-
dends, and indeed proved fatal. When the firm had only two branches, in Bahia
and in Rio de Janeiro, both were strictly controlled by a partner each. In contrast,
when they opened the house in Buenos Aires, they were first forced to entrust the
establishment in Buenos Aires to a young man (Robertson) with little business experi-
ence just because he was the son of a family friend. Subsequently, they decided to send
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the supposedly more experienced Postlethwaite to the River Plate, and received him as
a new partner, although little was known about his commercial credentials. Entrusting
the Buenos Aires house to two inexperienced individuals of unproven reputation
meant that the firm’s affairs spiralled out of control. Likewise, leaving Wallis in
charge of the house in Rio for a long spell when Wylie went to Buenos Aires in
1809 and later on after his departure for England in 1810 was also a risky decision,
which Wylie and Hancock came to regret.
Indeed, in 1811, while still visiting Britain, Wylie learnt that, without previous con-
sultation, Wallis (the new partner in the Rio house) had decided to charter the James
from Rio to Buenos Aires loaded with British manufactures, with the idea of selling
them there and uploading River Plate produce for the return journey to Britain.66
What Wallis did not know was that the River Plate was in a state of turmoil because
Montevideo did not accept Buenos Aires’ May revolution and decided to recognise
the Council of Regency in Spain. As part of this policy, Buenos Aires was blockaded
by naval forces from Montevideo after Elıo, who had been appointed as the River
Plate viceroy by the Cadiz junta, declared war on Buenos Aires.67 As a consequence,
the captain of the James was not allowed either to unload her cargo or to take local
produce back to Britain. As a result, the owners of the James asked Wylie &
Hancock for compensation. Wylie held Wallis liable for this incident and potential
losses. This fiasco triggered a conflict between the partners, which proved fatal to
their relationship. The house in Rio, previously entrusted to Wallis, was soon to be
closed. Relations between Wylie and Wallis turned sour, with Wallis being ordered
to send the account books to Bahia and to go to England to salvage his honour.
Wylie’s letter on the subject is revealing: ‘I have to request you will give a power of
attorney to settle such accounts and receive the money that may yet be owing to us
there, and come immediately home yourself to England. This is the last request I
shall ask from you, and the only manner in which you can at all explain or justify
your most extraordinary and unaccountable conduct.’68 Wallis disobeyed these
orders, stopped writing altogether and even stopped remitting the returns of sales
already made. The Rio house was closed, as Hancock had long wanted, but not
because Hancock had won his argument with Wylie; the partners no longer had any
choice in the matter.
Important sums of monies were forfeited during this time, to Wylie’s embarrass-
ment. As Wallis never sent back the account sales of the goods consigned to them,
Wylie was ‘obliged to pay some of our friends there [Manchester] the proceeds of
their goods’, even though remittances had not been received in Britain. Wylie &
Hancock were certainly aware that one of their main assets was their reputation,
but that reputation came at a high price. Wylie wrote to Wallis that ‘I need not tell
you that one and all of them [consigning friends] consider us a set of damned
rascals.’69 The overall estimated losses on account of Wallis’ misbehaviour were put
by Wylie at £25,000. Three years earlier Wylie had presciently told Hancock that
‘there is no friendship in trade’.70 Unfortunately, this incident proved him right.
Likewise, Postlethwaite also took the blame for the incident with the James, with the
result that Wylie & Hancock decided to close the Buenos Aires establishment too. It
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was clearly Postlethwaite’s duty to keep their sister house in Rio informed of the pol-
itical events taking place in the River Plate. Furthermore, even if the blockade took
Postlethwaite by surprise, Wylie expected a more energetic reaction from him: ‘Why
did not you abandon the vessel the moment the blockade took place? Had you
done so, we should have been exonerated without any trouble whatever.’71 Post-
lethwaite was also criticised because a selection of hides sent by him to Wylie as remit-
tances fetched in the British market just 50 per cent of the cost at Buenos Aires. This
came as a surprise given Postlethwaite’s reputation as an expert at handling remit-
tances in local produce.72 In addition, Postlethwaite was accused by Wylie of not
keeping the account sales book up to date and of putting Wylie’s reputation on the
line. The Dalglishs shared part of the loss for the poor remittances sent by Post-
lethwaite, to the embarrassment of Wylie.73 Despite Wylie’s attempts to close the
Buenos Aires establishment immediately, Postlethwaite remained in Buenos Aires at
least until late 1812, and part of their accounts remained unsettled for a while.
Since he was short of funds, Postlethwaite drew unauthorised drafts against Wylie &
Hancock, which further complicated matters.74
Only after this horrible disaster, did Wylie concede to Hancock that a branch house
of their own in Britain, in the previous terms proposed by Hancock, was indeed very
much needed.75 A defeated Wylie had now in mind, among other advantages, the
benefits of selecting in Britain their own goods specially prepared for the Brazilian
market. Being permanently at home allowed either Hancock or Wylie (both experts
on the Brazilian market) to see sample products intended for Brazil. So confident
was Wylie of his knowledge of the Brazilian market, that, according to him, ‘I have
now got a thorough knowledge of the nature of it [the Brazilian market], and
plainly see there is no person in this country [Britain] who knows anything at all of
it, nor goods, generally speaking, suitable for it to be met with’.76 By having a Liverpool
house for the firm, Wylie understood that the firm could handle remittances from
South America by itself, and make the most of opportunities as they arose. An incident
in late 1811, when Wylie was still visiting Britain, is illustrative of the point.
In November 1811, news arrived in Britain of the contents of President Madison’s
Third Annual Message to the US Congress on 5 November 1811, which was inter-
preted as a shift in Madison’s policy towards Britain, which eventually culminated
in the 1812 Anglo-American War. In a spectacular and audacious move, Wylie tried
to make the most of the situation, influenced also by news previously received from
his partner of low prices for raw cotton in Brazil,77 at a time when cotton and sugar
were the main Brazilian exports.78 Indeed, Wylie decided to buy a vessel, the
William, and charter it to Brazil to buy as much raw cotton as possible. It was
obvious to Wylie that a war with the USA (or just an embargo) would inflate raw
cotton prices. Wylie instructed the master of the William to go immediately to
Brazil, as this fascinating letter shows:
I have now only to inform you that on your arrival there [Bahia], the greatest secrecyis necessary with regard to the news of this country . . . and I do positively desire thatyou will neither take nor suffer any of your crew to take a letter, News Paper, or Price
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Current, from any person of this place . . . and upon no account communicate orsuffer any of your crew to communicate to any person at Bahia that the Presidentof the United States message to Congress had arrived in this country previous toyour departure. You had better inform any person who may go on board toenquire after news, of whom there will be a great many, that you sailed on the16th of November, at which time there was nothing new either from the Continentof Europe or America, that the trade of this country was quite at a stand, andproduce of every kind selling for almost nothing.79
Wylie went even further and wrote a fake letter ‘to show to the merchants of Bahia’,
dated 15 November 1811, giving a horrible account of the situation in Britain: ‘the
low prices of produce are merely nominal; being unsaleable at any price’, further
adding that every British merchant ‘will shortly be tired of the Brazils, the trade of
which has pretty nearly ruined every person who has entered into it’.80
Another advantage of being permanently in Britain was that marine insurances
could be handled by the firm, which could also operate on its own account rather
than in consignments only. According to Wylie, by operating on their own account
‘the Dalglish would supply us with any quantity of goods, but without being estab-
lished [in Britain] our bills cannot be easily negotiated in the country’.81 After the
fiascos in Buenos Aires and Rio, Wylie not only conceded that one partner should
reside permanently in Britain, but also that having had too many branches in South
America was a mistake: ‘our business was so mismanaged at Rio & Buenos Ayres so
soon as my back was turned, that they are determined [Wylie & Hancock’s consigners]
not to trust to any more of [our] young men.’82
In short, the partners eventually decided that Hancock (not Wylie, as originally
thought) was the man best suited to be permanently in Britain. In May 1812
Hancock moved to Liverpool, opening a house there under the name of Hancock &
Co. By this time Wylie was also in Britain, so both partners met in Liverpool in
what must have been a remarkable meeting in July 1812. Before departing for
England Hancock had decided to leave one of their clerks, a Mr Edgley, in charge of
the Bahian house. But Wylie was unhappy with his performance and dismissed
him. In his stead, Wylie & Hancock put F. B. Boothby in charge of the Bahian
house.83 Boothby was at that time one of their clerks, and soon after he was made
partner. So good was the joint work of the partners in Britain in selecting textiles to
be shipped to Brazil, that Boothby reported that ‘there is no house here that can
stand in competition with us as all the prints received by them are generally badly
assorted’ for the Brazilian market.84
But the original plan traced by Hancock did not consider both partners as residing
in Britain. Indeed, Wylie thought that one of them should always be resident in Brazil.
A few months before Hancock’s departure from Brazil, Wylie wrote to him that
‘however happy I would be to see you in England, you must not upon any account
think of coming home until I get to Bahia’.85 Hancock disobeyed his partner and
left Brazil in May 1812, though Wylie was expected in Bahia by June/July 1812. Unfor-
tunately Wylie’s arrival there had to be postponed for several months because of the
war between Britain and the United States. In December, Boothby reported that
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‘the [Brazilian] coast still continues to be infested by American vessels of war & priva-
teers’, with many British vessels being captured.86 Wylie was stationed in Falmouth for
several weeks, waiting for a safe passage to Bahia until August 1813. During all this
time, Boothby was in charge of the house in Bahia, and his performance appears to
have satisfied both Wylie and Hancock.
The Making of a Fortune
Following the James disaster and other mismanagements, by 1812 Wylie & Hancock’s
houses in Rio and Buenos Aires were closed. The business had suffered considerably,
with losses put at some £25,000. Yet the firm managed to survive and grew stronger.
For several years, between c. 1812 and 1815, business went very well for Wylie &
Co., to such an extent that it recovered from all the heavy losses ensuing from the
failure of the houses in Buenos Aires and Rio. In a confidential letter sent to his
brother-in-law, Wylie confessed that Wylie & Co. had made £50,000 in profits in
1813 alone, and that the firm was expecting to make another £30,000 in the following
months.87 By any standard, these were sizeable profits. Indeed, according to Wylie, ‘I
have now wherewith, I think, to enable me to live comfortably for the remainder of my
life’.88
The origin of this fortune came mainly from speculations in raw cotton and tobacco
during 1812–15, while Britain was at war with the USA: ‘the American War has
enabled us to coin money here’,89 wrote Wylie to a friend. Cotton and tobacco were
imported by Britain mainly from the USA during peacetime, so that Brazil became
an important alternative source of supply. Such was the importance of Brazil during
this period that in March 1814 Wylie wrote that ‘[w]e have nearly 7000 bags of
cotton and a considerable quantity of tobacco in the two convoys, which, if the
above prices continue and they arrive safe, must yield a clear profit of upwards
£100,000’.90 And so the convoys did, arriving in the safe haven provided by Britain.
The reader may wonder at this stage how Wylie & Hancock, from Brazil, still
managed to benefit in 1814 from the uncertainties of a war started two years earlier,
which would have given enough time to other British merchants to speculate too.
Yet, as is highlighted by Black in a masterful fashion in a recent publication using a
global historical approach, this was not any war. It was a conflict with peaks and
troughs, like, for example, the American campaigns in 1812 and 1813 or the British
counterattack in 1814 and 1815, all of which generated a perfect field for speculators
in American produce also produced in Brazil.91
In order to promote their exports of Brazilian produce to Britain, Wylie & Hancock
established very good connections in Pernambuco, cotton from which was regarded as
of a very high quality in Britain. The links of Wylie & Hancock with Pernambuco
started with the Wallis brothers first, after which the firm cultivated a promising com-
mercial partnership with Richard Scott and Lyon & Preston from at least 1810. Scott
worked for the house of Lyon & Preston, but this did not stop him also serving Wylie &
Hancock as an agent. To Scott they sent British textiles and requested local produce.
Yet, once again, Wylie & Hancock’s judgement of the people they chose as either
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partners or agents went horribly wrong. Scott was dismissed, as Wallis, Edgley, Robert-
son and Postlethwaite had been before him. Soon after Wylie’s return to Bahia he
became suspicious of Scott’s undertakings: ‘I have been reading over his letters since
my arrival here, and I evidently see that he has been playing a curious game.’
Wylie’s thorough investigation produced sound evidence that Scott had been
keeping part of their money. A few months later Wylie obtained further evidence,
which he hoped ‘will be sufficient to convict the rascal. There is nothing [that] can
be more mortifying than that of being plundered by our own servants being an
injury one can scarcely guard against.’92
By this stage, and as far as partners/agents’ betrayals and misbehaviour are con-
cerned, Wylie had seen it all. Apart from the cases of Wallis, Postlethwaite and
Scott, once Wylie and Hancock had closed the house in Rio, they asked a Mr Rigg
to take care of the goods they still had on hand there. But Rigg also misbehaved, as
this eloquent extract reveals:
There are three characters with whom every wise & prudent merchant ought toavoid commercial transactions. The knave, the fool, & the poor man. The knavewill take you in purposely, the fool from stupidity, and the poor man from necessity.I shall not pretend to say which of these characters Mr Rigg inherits most, but onething is certain, that he has the advantage of enjoying all the three to a certaindegree.93
Wylie probably forgot a fourth category to avoid: the drunkard, as his experience with
young Wallis had showed him.
Overall, the hiring of Robert Todd, a Briton resident in Pernambuco, seems to have
been the only sensible decision taken by Wylie & Hancock for a long time, and indeed
he eventually became a partner. After Scott’s dismissal, Todd became the firm’s main
contact in Pernambuco. In exchange, he received a small commission for selling tex-
tiles and for buying cotton and tobacco. A similar role was performed in Maranhao by
Thomas Mahoney, who obtained consignments of cotton for Wylie & Hancock.
Around this time, Hancock, who had won his first battle of ideas between the part-
ners by settling permanently in Liverpool, decided that both he and Wylie were of
more use in Britain than in Brazil. This decision would, again, mark a radical trans-
formation in the structure of the firm. From being both based in Brazil, they would
now be both resident in England. Their acquisition of wealth from speculating in
raw cotton during the 1812 war had convinced both Wylie and Hancock that this
new capital could be employed in a different way. Wylie and Hancock decided to
become manufacturers too, a clear process of early backward vertical integration.
Their plan was to invest some £50,000 in a Manchester establishment in order to
produce cottons for the Brazilian market.94 Hancock would remain in Liverpool
while Wylie would move from Brazil to Manchester. They would also operate on
their own account only.
In order to further engage Boothby (already a partner in Bahia) and Todd (partner-
to-be) in this new adventure, Wylie & Hancock offered £1,000 shares to both Todd and
Boothby, as many as they wanted, with the rest to be taken by Wylie and Hancock
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themselves, an offer that Todd and Boothby accepted. Wylie also offered Todd a part-
nership in the Bahia house and 50 per cent of the business in Bahia to them both: ‘It is
our wish that you and Mr Boothby should manage the business here, in which, I
propose, that we should share alike.’95 Given the good performance of Boothby at
Bahia during the previous two years, Wylie & Hancock’s idea was to ask Todd to
move from Pernambuco to Bahia, to replace Wylie, as they trusted no one else.
They needed Todd in Bahia, ‘one person [i.e. Boothby] being incapable of superin-
tending the business properly, besides the great risk in the event of death’.96
Thus, Todd became a key figure in the firm, even before becoming a partner. Pre-
viously, while visiting Britain in 1813 while working for another house, Robert
Todd was also entrusted with dealing with the James Wallis affair, and had been
given a power of attorney ‘to take everything out his hands [Wallis’s]’.97 Commercial
relations with Todd proved so strong that Wylie & Hancock decided to open a house at
Pernambuco in late 1813 (to be operational in 1814), styled as Wylie, Todd & Co. The
alternative was to carry on relying on another Pernambuco house to obtain the cotton
they needed, but, according to Todd himself, the British houses in Pernambuco at that
time were not to be trusted.
However, Todd’s move to Bahia and Wylie’s plans of moving to Manchester to
administer the manufacturing establishment were delayed for a while. The war with
the USA and the Napoleonic wars kept Wylie in Bahia for longer than he wanted,
and also kept Todd in Pernambuco. During this time the firm continued to speculate
in raw cotton, until peace was declared. Unfortunately, Wylie was caught with an on-
sea cargo of expensive raw cotton and consequently lost some £20–30,000 in a few
months.98 Nonetheless, the firm still managed to retain most of the profits of the pre-
vious two years, totalling over £100,000.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that Wylie & Hancock did not limit its operations to
exporting Brazilian produce to Britain and importing British textiles to Brazil. They
were very much aware of the wider world around them. For example, the firm special-
ised in exports of jerked beef to Havana to feed slaves. Wylie & Hancock also traded
with China, even buying vessels for this purpose. ‘Nothing does so well as the hard
dollars to China’, wrote Wylie to Hancock.99 From China they took tea to
Britain.100 They also had connections in Gibraltar, South Africa and the West Coast
of Africa.101 As Wylie explained to Todd, ‘there are a thousand ways of making
money here besides trading direct to England’.102 After all Rio was now the capital
‘of a worldwide empire stretching as far as Goa and Macao’.103 Yet, the Brazilian
business remained by far the most important of all commercial activities for the firm.
Epilogue: The End of the Brazilian Adventure; New Beginnings for Wylie
Despite the huge profits made during c. 1812–15, in June 1819 the house of Wylie,
Hancock & Co. ceased trading. From the extant evidence it is unclear how exactly
this failure came about, but we do know that in 1819 there was an important trade
crisis in Britain. Indeed, Richard Hancock & Co. of Liverpool went bankrupt a few
weeks earlier.104 We also know that that this house was closely related to Wylie,
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Hancock & Co. Furthermore, from 1814 Wylie & Hancock was mainly operating on its
own account. This system, though profitable, was extremely risky. It required a huge
investment of working capital given that sales of British manufactures in Brazil were
made on credit. The turnover for exports of textiles was usually some twelve
months. Likewise, exports of Brazilian produce to the British market took several
months to cash, from the time Brazilian produce was bought in Pernambuco to the
time remittances were realised in Britain. Wylie & Hancock was neither the first nor
the last house to succumb to this system because of cash-flow problems.
A few weeks after Wylie & Hancock’s failure was formalised, Wylie wrote to a close
friend that ‘our late loses are so enormous, that for the present I am unable to say what
we may have left, or whether there may be any thing. . . . But as yet everything is uncer-
tain, and equally so whether any two of us [the four partners remaining] may form any
future arrangement.’105 Despite this, Wylie did not dismay. He was always prepared for
the worst. Indeed, in 1814, when the partners hoped that the firm would make some
£100,000 in profits by selling cotton and tobacco in the middle of the war between
Britain and the USA, Wylie had prophetically written to his sister’s husband that ‘I
am convinced that no man living can bear losses or disappointments much better
than myself, and were the above to happen [bankruptcy], I should just begin with
as much pleasure to work for more, as ever . . . [while] nothing appears more
foolish in [a] man, than that of building castles in the air’.106 Faithful to his own
words, Wylie’s first reaction to the full collapse of the business in 1819 was to pack
his stuffs and go back to Bahia to work as a commission merchant there, starting
from the bottom. He even asked a friend, Samuel Johnston, to associate with him
in Bahia where they would receive consignments from Glasgow.107 Yet the plan did
not prosper, and after much consideration Wylie decided to try his luck in India,
while Johnston eventually associated with Boothby.
But the failure of Wylie & Hancock did not end Wylie’s adventure in Brazil. The
extant information for the period after 1819 is not good enough because the Wylie
papers contain no information for the period 1819–30. We do not know for
instance if Wylie ever actually went to India or not. However it is possible to con-
clude that during the early 1820s John Wylie was back in action in South America,
being part of Eyes, Miller, Wylie & Co. of Buenos Aires. Furthermore, there is also
evidence that this new partnership had interests in Brazil as well. In the early 1820s
John Wylie, John Miller and Charles Eyes were partners in Goring, Risk & Co. of
Rio de Janeiro, which had as its main partners Anthony T. Goring and William
Risk.108
It is not possible to establish how long the Buenos Aires establishment lasted. We
only know that, unfortunately for Wylie, the adventure with Goring & Risk in
Brazil was a short-lived partnership, dissolved in December 1824, and that the estab-
lishment in Buenos Aires lasted for a bit longer, until 1826. Likewise, both Wylie and
Eyes thought that after Goring & Risk’s dissolution they deserved another opportunity
in Brazil, and joined another partnership there. In this new Brazilian adventure they
were two of the partners of an enterprise, which also included James Dalglish and
John William Cooke, and was styled as Eyes, Dalglish & Co. of Rio. Eventually
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Wylie’s new partnership in Brazil lasted a shorter time than his old one with Hancock,
and by the end of 1832 it too was dissolved.109
In turn, Charles Eyes started to operate beyond the Atlantic coast of South America,
and invited Wylie to participate in these adventures. For example, Eyes, Wylie and
Cooke were partners in a house in Mexico, under the umbrella title of Crawford &
Co., which was dissolved in January 1827,110 following differences of opinion with
Crawford.111 Afterwards, a new partnership was formed among John Wylie, John
William Cooke and Charles Eyes, also incorporating John Cooke Jr., under the firm
of Wylie, Cooke & Co., based in San Luis de Potosi, in the interior of Mexico. Accord-
ing to Wylie, they were the first British house to open offices in that place, after he
moved there in early 1831 to take full responsibility for the business.112
Finally, there is also evidence that Eyes, Miller & Wylie also operated in Chile during
the late1820s and early 1830s as Wylie, Miller & Co., with John Miller’s brother in
charge of the Chilean house.113 It is worth mentioning that, as Eyes, Wylie & Co,
Eyes and Wylie had previously opened a house in Merseyside to support the
Chilean and Mexican establishments. In Chile in particular, the house of Wylie,
Miller & Co. was one of the most important middlemen in the Chilean copper indus-
try during this period. Wylie, Miller & Co. advanced monies to Chilean copper miners
such as Rodriguez & Cea, and subsequently bought their copper production at pre-
viously agreed prices.114 Yet, they were also very active in the British textile trade to
the Pacific,115 as most British houses were during this time.
Alas, we know very little about Eyes, Miller & Wylie’s activities in Chile thereafter,
although judging from the extant evidence it is clear that they did not operate there for
much longer. At this time Wylie’s relations with Eyes had turned sour. Wylie blamed
Eyes for how things developed in Chile, and also complained about the lack of infor-
mation he was receiving in Mexico about their joint concerns in both Chile and
Brazil.116 Months later, in late 1832, J. W. Cooke and Eyes left the partnership in
Mexico.117 Soon afterwards Wylie had also ended his involvements in Brazil and
Chile, while the business in Argentina had already been liquidated.
Yet, Wylie and Cooke junior remained in business at San Luis de Potosi until 1835,
when John Cooke the younger eventually left the partnership as well.118 This was not,
once again, the end of Wylie in Latin America: he decided to move his establishment to
Guadalajara, a more prosperous outlet. Wylie’s establishment in Mexico was based
around his speciality: importing British textiles and exporting local produce. Wylie
was very well connected in Britain, being supplied by Thomas Cooke & Co. of Man-
chester. The Dalglish family also continued to supply Wylie with manufactures from
Glasgow. The correspondence in Wylie’s papers ends in Guadalajara in 1840. This
was the year in which Wylie eventually decided to return home, after more than
thirty years in Latin America.
Conclusions
Most histories of British pre-eminence in the Americas after c.1808 tell us that, after
Napoleon’s invasion of the Iberian Peninsula and the subsequent collapse of the
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Spanish American empire, Brazil was opened up to international trade, and the British
inherited a vast market. We have also been told that Anglo-Brazilian commercial
relations became very important for both nations. What these histories do not often
tell us is that this process was neither automatic nor easy, as Wylie & Hancock’s experi-
ence in Brazil shows. This article provides a major new case study of early British pen-
etration of Latin America, thus providing a detailed picture of the commercial
activities of an important player, as well as of their outcomes. This is of relevance
because most of the extant literature on the early nineteenth century tends to
discuss the role of British merchants in generic terms with little attention given to
the decision-making process behind crucial and complex business decisions taken
during an unstable political period.
Wylie & Hancock’s experience would suggest that being a merchant in the early
nineteenth century in Brazil and the River Plate was a story of successful and failed
speculations, of many hazards and risks, of problems with partners and almost luck
in choosing the right location for a business given the political and commercial uncer-
tainties of the time. Wylie & Hancock clearly developed the location and product-
specific knowledge that allowed them to prosper for long periods; at the same time
they could become too thinly spread given the small number of competent people
in whom they had trust. They could take advantage of commercial and political
crises but at the same time be sunk by them, and this was down to critical entrepre-
neurial decision-making.
In relation to the informal empire debate, this essay does not pretend to solve the
controversies around it, but it is worth noting that, although it is true that Britain con-
trolled a great deal of Brazil’s foreign trade, Wylie & Hancock’s experience does not
suggest that British merchants colluded to control the market jointly or unfairly to
the detriment of other actors (including local merchants). Rather the reverse was
true: there was a great deal of competition among British and other foreign merchants,
and if bad commercial decisions were taken the price to be paid was very high (regard-
less of your nationality), including dreadful failure. This factor tallies with Guenther’s
conclusion that ‘the reality of British success in the import-export trade of Bahia
depended on individual performance of firms’,119 in what was a very competitive
market. Likewise, I could not find any evidence whatsoever of this important firm
exerting any influence upon Brazilian or Portuguese authorities (or of gaining political
favours), despite the fact that the nature of the correspondence available to us provides
unusual access to truly confidential information. This is in line with recent findings for
Chile and the River Plate during the 1810s–40s, where no evidence could be found of
British merchants exerting undue influence upon local customers or governments.120
Likewise, we knew very little about the British merchants who laid the foundations
of British enterprise in Latin America in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, a
crucial period in the region’s political history. Indeed, international trade is usually
approached from its statistics, focusing on bilateral or, at best, triangular transactions
undertaken by countries. Trading houses remain largely in ‘black boxes’. Yet inter-
national trade should also be looked upon as a series of transactions between individ-
uals, at a micro-level. What merchants actually did and thought at a given time, as well
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as the process by which strategic decisions were taken, are often neglected topics. This
article, by focusing on the story of one of these partnerships, has paid special attention
to the factors which lay behind complex mercantile decisions.
Wylie’s and Hancock’s lives are extraordinary stories of many successes and failures,
but also of bravery and a great entrepreneurial spirit. Emigration, still a difficult matter
today, was far more problematic for Scots who spoke only English, and who, despite
this limitation, in 1807 decided to try their luck in Montevideo, and less than a year
later in Brazil. What followed next in their lives is a remarkable succession of
events, including the opening and closure of several branches in many countries;
the betrayal of partners, employees and agents; the making of a fortune; the sub-
sequent bankruptcy of an eleven-year partnership; the formation of new partnerships;
more failures but also new beginnings. John Wylie in particular was a tireless and
enthusiastic merchant who despite all the hardships faced in his commercial life
remained undeterred.
Acknowledgements
This paper was funded mainly by a short-term research grant generously awarded by
the International Seminar on the History of the Atlantic World of Harvard University,
for which I am very grateful. Additional funding was received from the ESRC (PTA-
030-2005-00308) and Universitat Pompeu Fabra (Department of Economics &
Business). I am also very grateful to Pierre Gervais and the organisers of the inter-
national colloquium on ‘Merchant Practice in the Age of Commerce, 1650–1850’
(Paris, June 2011) for fully funding my attendance to this meeting to present an
early version of this paper. Finally, I would like to thank in particular Rory Miller,
but also Herbert Klein, H. V. Bowen, P. L. Cottrell, M. Carmagnani, B. Attard, Mark
Latham, Katharine Wilson, X. Lamikiz, X. Tafunell, B. Batiz-Lazo, Arnold Morrison,
Mark Curthoys and Glasgow University Archives.
Notes
[1] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 170.[2] De Fiore and De Fiore, The British Presence; Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’; Miller, Britain
and Latin America; Haring, Empire in Brazil; Manchester, British Pre-Eminence.[3] In Rio alone there were between 75 and 200 British mercantile houses by 1811. Manchester,
British Pre-Eminence, 76; Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 173.[4] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 157, 161.[5] Heaton, ‘A Merchant Adventurer’; Wilson, ‘The Fortunes’.[6] Bottcher, ‘Casas de Comercio’.[7] Eakin, ‘Business Imperialism’.[8] Llorca-Jana, British Textile Trade, table 2.6.[9] Humphreys, Tradition and Revolt, 106.
[10] Guenther, British Merchants, 12.[11] Gallagher and Robinson, ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’.[12] Guenther, British Merchants, 1–3; Graham, ‘Robinson and Gallagher’, 220; Gallagher and
Robinson, ‘Imperialism of Free Trade’, 8–10; Winn ‘British Informal Empire’.
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[13] Platt, ‘Further Objections’. See also Thompson, ‘Informal Empire?’; Jones, ‘Business Imperi-alism’, among many others.
[14] Brown, Informal Empire.[15] Platt, ‘Further Objections’, 84–85. In the same vein, see Thompson, ‘Afterword’, 423.[16] Llorca-Jana, British Textile Trade, ch. 2.[17] Guenther, British Merchants, 2.[18] Ibid., 6. As far as British sources are concerned, Guenther relied mainly on consular reports
and travel narratives, and did not use business collections.[19] Fridenson, ‘Business History and History’, 12.[20] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 164.[21] Eakin, ‘Business Imperialism’, 697.[22] Jones, International Business, 14.[23] Fridenson, ‘Business History and History’, 14, 17.[24] Miller, Britain and Latin America, 33–36.[25] Williams, ‘Establishment of British Commerce’; Goebel, ‘British Trade’.[26] Quoted in Gott, Britain’s Empire.[27] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia). Rio de Janeiro [Rio henceforth], 15 July 1809, Wylie & Co. papers,
Glasgow University Archives (hereafter UGD/28/1/1). See also The Southern Star, 23 May1807, 20 June 1807. I am very grateful to Arnold Morrison for providing copies of thesenumbers.
[28] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 169.[29] See, for instance, Wylie to Fayle (London). Glasgow, 25 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[30] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 172.[31] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow). Rio, 30 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[32] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 170.[33] Wylie to Hancock (Manchester). Buenos Aires, 1 Nov. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[34] Miller, Britain and Latin America, 34–35.[35] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 22 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[36] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 7 March 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[37] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 26 April, 22 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[38] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 7 Feb, 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[39] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 26 April 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[40] Wylie to Wallis (Bahia), Rio, 18 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[41] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 19 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[42] Wylie to Walliss (Rio), Buenos Aires, 10 Aug. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[43] Ibid.[44] Guenther, British Merchants, 17.[45] Lynch, The Spanish American Revolutions, 52–56.[46] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 8 Sept. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[47] Wylie to Barlow (Liverpool), Buenos Aires, 29 Nov. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[48] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Buenos Aires, 1 Oct. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[49] Wylie to William Dalglish (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 9 March 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[50] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 9 June 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[51] Wylie to Dalglish Falconer (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 22 Aug.1809, UGD/28/1/1.[52] Wylie to Barber (London), Buenos Aires, 22 Aug.1809, UGD/28/1/1.[53] Wylie to Robertson (Montevideo), Buenos Aires, 23 Sept. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[54] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 7 Feb. 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[55] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 30 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[56] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 19 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[57] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 26 April 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[58] Ibid.
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[59] Ibid.[60] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 27 April 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[61] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 6 June 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[62] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Buenos Aires, 23 Dec.1809, UGD/28/1/2.[63] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 6 June 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[64] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Liverpool, 21 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[65] Wylie to Wallis (Rio), Buenos Aires, 27 March 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[66] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[67] See, ‘Proceedings of the British Merchants at Buenos Ayres, in the Rio de la Plata’, The Times, 9
May 1811; ‘American Papers’, The Times, 2 March 1811; ‘Accounts from Buenos Ayres’, TheTimes, 15 April 1811.
[68] Wylie to Wallis (Rio)., Liverpool, 18 July 1812, UGD/28/1/5.[69] Wylie to Wallis (Rio), Manchester, 29 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[70] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Rio, 22 May 1809, UGD/28/1/1.[71] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[72] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Rio, 9 June 1810, UGD/28/1/2.[73] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[74] Wylie to Postlethwaite (Buenos Aires), Glasgow, 3 Sept. 1812, UGD/28/1/5.[75] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811. UGD/28/1/3.[76] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Manchester, 7 March 1812, UGD/28/1/3.[77] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Manchester, 5 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[78] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 161; Guenther, British Merchants, 10–11.[79] Wylie to Maginnis (Liverpool), Liverpool, 12 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[80] Wylie to Maginnis (Liverpool), Liverpool, 12 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[81] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Glasgow, 5 Nov. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[82] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Manchester, 19 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[83] Wylie to Edgley (Bahia), Glasgow, 6 Oct. 1812, UGD/28/1/5.[84] Boothby to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 1 Aug.1812, UGD/28/1/4.[85] Wylie to Hancock (Bahia), Liverpool, 19 Dec. 1811, UGD/28/1/3.[86] Boothby to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 19 Dec. 1812, UGD/28/1/4.[87] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 8 Jan.1814, UGD/28/1/5.[88] Wylie Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 8 Jan. 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[89] Wylie to Page (Madeira), Bahia, 26 Nov. 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[90] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 5 March 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[91] Black, The War of 1812.[92] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 30 Nov. 1813, UGD/28/1/4.[93] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 24 Dec. 1813, UGD/28/1/4.[94] Wylie to Todd (Pernambuco), Bahia, 24 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[95] Wylie to Todd (Pernambuco), Bahia, 24 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[96] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 25 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[97] Hancock to Swan (Cape of Good Hope), Liverpool, 8 March 1813, UGD/28/1/5.[98] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool)., Bahia, 18 May 1815, UGD/28/1/5.[99] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 25 May 1814, UGD/28/1/5.
[100] Wylie to Hancock (Liverpool)., Bahia, 16 July 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[101] Boothby to Hancock (Liverpool), Bahia, 23 Jan.& 7 Feb. 1813, UGD/28/1/4.[102] Wylie to Todd (Pernambuco), Bahia, 9 July 1814, UGD/28/1/5,[103] Bethel, ‘Independence of Brazil’, 170.[104] London Gazette, 4 Aug. 1819.[105] Wylie to Johnston (Bahia), Liverpool, 15 July 1819, UGD/28/1/5.[106] Wylie to Dalglish (Glasgow), Bahia, 5 March 1814, UGD/28/1/5.[107] Wylie to Johnston (Bahia), Liverpool, 15 July 1819, UGD/28/1/5.
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[108] London Gazette, 22 Nov. 1825.[109] London Gazette, 1 Jan.1833.[110] London Gazette, 8 June 1827.[111] Wylie to Cooke (Manchester), Tampico, 8 Jan. 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[112] Wylie to Cooke (Manchester), San Luis de Potosi, 14 March 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[113] Wylie to Eyes (Liverpool), San Luis de Potosi, 2 Jan. 1832, UGD/28/1/6.[114] Sociedad Minera de Vallenar de Rodriguez y Valdes, 1828–1834, Fondos Varios, vol. 846,
Archivo Nacional de Chile. See also Notariales Vallenar, vol.6, 14–117.[115] Wylie to Eyes (Liverpool), San Luis, 30 April 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[116] Wylie to Eyes (Liverpool), San Luis, 8 Aug. 1831, UGD/28/1/6.[117] London Gazette, 9 July 1833.[118] London Gazette, 18 Sept. 1835.[119] Guenther, British Merchants, 13.[120] Llorca-Jana, British Textile Trade, 288–90.
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