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SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTIN LATIN AMERICA:

ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTIN LATIN AMERICA:

ISSUES FOR PUBLIC POLICY

CARLOS SoJo (EDITOR)

MAYRA BUVINIC, ROLANDO FRANCO, SARA GORDON,EDGAR E. GUTiERREZ, ANDREW MORRISON, MARiA BEATRIZ ORLANDO,

JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ, ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ, CARLOS STRASSER.

FLS DECs~EACnEJCCSTAosrKA THE WORLD BANK

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

II. THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA .......................................... 76

1. Towards more equalitarian societies ................................................... 76

2. Integration to consumer society .................................................... 80

3. Poverty Reduction ............. ....................................... 84

4. Social Mobility .................................................... 83

III. HOW CAN THE AGENDA BE FULFILLED? ...................... ................ 85

Public Policy Perspectives ................... ................................. 85

Principles Guiding Social Policy ......................................... ........... 90

CONCLUSION ..................................................... 98

REFERENCES ..................................................... 99

CHAPTER IISOCIAL INDICATORSA BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-EsPELETA

INTRODUCTION ................................................... 105

The social within the predominant sphere ............................................. 105

Social Indicators: can a single system be created? ................ 11................ I

United Nations, The Social Issue and Social Indicators . .................. 115

Social Indicators and Latin America .................................................... 126

National and international challenge .................................................... 129

ANNEX AMenu of Indicators .................................................... 133

ANNEX BMillennium Development Goals .................................................... 137

ANNEX CFundamental Principles of Official Statistics ...................... ................. 141

CHAPTER IIISOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTSSARA GORDON

INTRODUCTION ................................................... 145

Poverty in Latin America .................................................... 147

COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPTION AND SOCIALRIGHT PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA . ............................. 148

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights ....... 149

6


Debate ................................................. 152

Validity and applicability of the ICESCRin the international legal context ................................................. 158

The concept and practice of rights in Latin America .............. .............. 161

Social citizenship as construction of democracy ................................... 168

PROBLEMATIC AREAS RELATED TO THEECONOMIC MODEL AND TOCERTAIN STRUCTURAL FEATURES IN LAC ........................................ 173

OBSTACLES, DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONSRELATED TO THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC,SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS ................................................. 185

Market logic versus rights logic ................................................. 185

-Employment ................................................. 187

-Taxation ................................................. 188

-Social Spending ................................................. 190

FINAL REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................. 193

Recommendations ................................................. 195

REFERENCES ................................................. 197

APENDIX ................................................. 204

CHAPTER IVYOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLICPOLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIESERNESTO RODRfGUEZ

INTRODUCTION ................................................. 207

Latin American youth: strategic actors of development ........................ 207THE CONTEXT: MAIN PARAMETERS FOR ANALYSIS ....................... 210

What are we talking about?: Some basic concepts on youth .......... ...... 210

Youth and society: Diverse aspects of a complex link .......................... 216

YOUTH IN LATIN AMERICANEXCLUSION AND PROTAGONISM ................................................. 220

Public youth policies: Hypothetical models and historic review .......... 225

YOUTH POLICIES: A BALANCE OF THE 90'S ...................................... 231

Programmatic Evaluation:Sectorial, Limited and Discontinuous Progress ..................................... 231

Institutional Evaluation: Confusion of roles and disarticulation ........... 236

7


Resources Invested: How many, on GAT and How they are spent ....... 241The Vision of the Participating Actors:Between Discourse and Effective Practice ............................................ 246

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGESAT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ERA ................................................ 251

Demographic Bonus, Youth and HumanDevelopment in the 21 st Century ................................................... 251The Construction of the Knowledge Society ........................................ 256Financing Public Youth Policies ................................................... 265

A GENERATIONAL APPROACH TO PUBLIC POLICIES ...................... 270Basic criteria and foundations forthe design of alternative policies ................................................... 270Four substantive priorities for this first decade of the century ............. 273Youth volunteering, citizen's participationand human development ................ ................................... 278Regional cooperation and public youth policies:the W orld Bank Role ................................................... 284

REFERENCES .................................................... 289

CHAPTER VVIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENTIN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEANMAYRA BUVINIC, ANDREW MORRISON AND MARiA BEATRIZ ORLANDO

INTRODUCTION .................................................... 301CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ........................................ 302

Definition of violence. Difference between crime and violence.Types of violence ................................................... 302Causes of violence. Risk factors and protection factors ........................ 305

THE CURRENT SITUATION OF VIOLENCEIN LATIN AMERICA ................................................... 310

Indicators of Violence in Latin America and Main Trends .......... ........ 311Violence according to gender ................................................... 316Violence and socio-economic groups ................................................... 319Ethnic violence in Latin America ................................................... 322Violence by age ................................................... 323

8


-Social and domestic violence against children ..................................... 323-Youth as aggressor and victims .................................................... 326

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COST OFVIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA .................................................... 328

Direct costs of violence .................................................... 330Non monetary costs .................................................... 333Multiplying economic costs .................................................... 334Multiplying social costs ..................................................... 335

RISK FACTORS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS FOR VIOLENCEIN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN ...................... ................. 339

Epidemiological surveillance system .................................................... 341Violence risk factors and long-term solutions .. ..................................... 342Short-term violence risk factors and solutions ... ................................... 345Violence control and social answers .................................................... 347

A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR STRATEGIES TO REDUCEVIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA ................................................. ... 349CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 355BIBLIOGRAPHIC AND ELECTRONIC REFERENCES ... ........... 357

CHAPTER VILATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION. DEMOCRATICINSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCETHE OBSTACLES AND THE ISSUESCARLOS STRASSER

INTRODUCTION .................................................... 365The essential concepts .................................................... 368RESHAPING (AND ADDING COMPLEXITY TO)THE ISSUE OF OBSTACLES ..................................................... 373

On the capability of politics .................................................... 375On the ongoing political practices (and ideas) ........................ .............. 380- On Democracy .................................................... 380- On the political class .................................................... 383- On the Citizenry .................................................... 385On some conditions and over determinationsof the politico-cultural order .................................................... 389- On genes and crossbreedings ........................................ ............ 390- Political consequences of the same .................................................... 394

9


THE CIRCLE OF REALITY, POLITICS ANDGOVERNANCE ............................................. 397

Multilateral organizations, NGO's or third sector,and democratic politics ............................................. 401What alternatives are there in any case?Possible positive ventures versus a hard and dense web ............ .......... 404In the picture, what policies? ............................................. 410The two faces of the non state public field ............................................ 418Government, governability, governance and State ................................ 420

CONCLUSIONS THAT ALSO MAKE A SUMMARY .............................. 423REFERENCES ............................................. 427

ABOUT THE AUTHORS ............................................. 433

10


PROLOGUE

SHELTON H. DAVISESTANISLAO GACITUA MARIO

Social Development Unit, Department of Sustainable Social and Environmental Development,Latin American and Caribbean Region, World Bank

Since the Social Development Summit in Copenhagen, in 1995,there has been a progressive search for mechanisms to incorporatethe social dimension systematically in the development agenda.Three core themes have marked the debate. First, the persistence ofpoverty and inequity during a period of economic growth andincreased liberalization of markets. Second, the unbalance betweenmacro economic reforms and social policies, that have primarilyfocused on the mitigation of crisis and not on the existing inequityboth in the global system and national societies. Third, the need tostrengthen democratic governance both in the public administrationand in reaffirming citizen's rights.

All these issues have resounded in Latin America and theCaribbean as well as in the development agencies working in theregion. In the case of the World Bank, this has translated into theestablishment of a Social Development Department that has recentlybegan to prepare a social development strategy. At the general level,the principles of that strategy are outlined in the 2000/1 WorldDevelopment Report of the World Bank. The report proposes attack-ing poverty considering three fundamental issues: Opportunity,

11


Inclusion and Security. The process has coincided with the workcarried out in the region in connection with the subject of povertyreduction and social inclusionl. Within that context, the SocialDevelopment Unit of the Latin American and the Caribbean Regionof the World Bank has cooperated with social research organiza-tions, the public sector, civil society organizations and other inter-national agencies in defining a social development strategy for theWorld Bank in the region.

As an input for the development of this strategy, the support ofFLACSO Costa Rica was requested to identify regional specialists thatcould help in the analysis and development of proposals referring tocertain issues that the Social Development Unit had identified as pri-orities. Particularly, the aspects identified included a general panora-ma of issues relevant for the social development of the region, indica-tors of social development, governance and citizen's rights. Also con-sidered were two specific issues with high visibility in the region'scontemporary social context, which are youth and social developmentand the prevention of crime and violence.

The papers published in this volume are highly stimulated and gen-erate a basis for debate towards the formulation of a social develop-ment strategy for the region in the first decades of the 21 st. Century.Likewise, these papers contribute to thinking on the MillenniumDevelopment Objectives and the instruments of public policy requiredfor their attainment. The above is a challenge which requires breakingthe existing unbalance between social and economic aspects, whichneeds the will and the belief to face up to the structural problems ofthe region characterized by persistent poverty, inequality and socialexclusion.

We wish to thank FLACSO and the authors for an excellent workthat reflects the better qualities of the region's sociological imagina-tion. We hope it will serve to promote the dialogue on social policyalternatives among the various actors in the region, other multilateralinstitutions and the World Bank.

I See the joint volume World Bank/FLACSO Costa Rica, Social Exclusion and PovertyReduction in Latin America and the Caribbean, published in Spanish (2000) andEnglish (2001).

12

INTRODUCTIONREINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION

IN LATIN AMERICA

CARLOS SOJOJUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ

"It was the 'invention of the social dimension' that tamed themarket and humanized capitalism." With clairvoyance and this happyturn of phrase, Castel (1997:442) marked the importance of the socialdimension. Taming makes reference to the control of the self-regulatedmarket, "... that satanic mill" in Polanyi's words (1992:82); whilehumanizing suggests that the material and symbolic reproduction ofsociety continues being historically possible. At the current point intime, this relevance of the social element is heightened since, assuggested by Filgueira (1999)1, it is possible to draw a sort ofhistorical parallel between the disintegration impacts of the expansionof the market over precapitalist peasant communities and the currentprocess of globalization and its effects on the Nation-State and itsfunctions of social protection. That is to say that the historicachievements of the social sphere, in terms of taming the market andhumanizing capitalism, are being challenged. In this sense, the greatsocietal challenge of our times is to prevent the social sphere fromvanishing by "reinventing" it, so that it continues to perform itscivilizing functions.

I This author vindicates, with certain caveats, the "moral economic approach".

13

REINVENTING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION IN LATIN AMERICA

Castel's statement also invites us to explore variousinterpretations of the social dimension that may help understand thechallenge and face up to it. In this sense, it may be said that the socialdimension implies the existence of a community and the need ofguarantying through a dynamics of integration, the material andsymbolic reproduction of its constituents. This approach implies thatthe analytical challenges of the social dimension are fundamentallytwo-fold. On the one hand, it relates to how we define the communityin question and the condition of member in the same. And, on theother, to determining which are the dynamics of integration, but alsoof exclusion, at work. Two almost obvious methodologicalclarifications need to be added. First, integration and exclusion are notabsolute but rather relative processes. And second, these analyticalchallenges should not be undertaken in the abstract, but withinconcrete historical contexts; that is, the criteria of communitymembership and the mechanisms that make it possible or hinder itchange over time. In this case we are concerned with Latin America atthe current time that we will qualify as a time of globalized modernity.But before making that analysis it is necessary to clarify, at leastbriefly, what is meant by globalized modernity.

It simultaneously assumes continuity and rupture. Continuityinsofar as it posits that the historical horizon to approach the socialsphere is still the modernization process, that has a different startingpoint and pace for each country. In spite of the foreign debt crisis andthe implementation of structural adjustment programs, Latin Americais still immersed in a modernity that has not been left behind but ratherredefined 2. While we believe that, for Latin America and during thefirst stage of modernization, the social dimension was expressed in theconstruction of the Nation on the basis of the State, at the presentinstance of globalization this expression has changed, since bothelements have lost their previous centrality. Although still importantand not superfluous, social integration processes are not limited to the

2 The reality currently observed is not that of posmodernity, but rather of a redefinedmodernity. It has a reflective nature that questions its limits as opposed to the past,when there was an unlimited faith in progress, as a result of the Enlightmentthought.

14

CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ

constitution of the Nation and they are not fundamentally driven by thestate's actions 3. It is in this sense that we speak of globalizedmodernity to draw a distinction with the former, that we qualify asnational modernity.

This brief clarification makes it possible to formulate two basicanalytical propositions, that will be explored further in the followingpages, to begin thinking about "reinventing" the social dimension inLatin America during the current globalized modernity. The first oneposits that the loss of centrality of the Nation-State makes it necessaryto revisit it in light of globalization: the nation with its territorialfoundations and the State based on citizenship. In this sense, we willsee that with globalized modernity the limits that define thecommunity of integration have become more blurred and, a betterknown aspect, state actions loose the protagonic role they had in thepast. The second analytical proposal is that, in this new globalizedmodernity, societal dynamics become affected by the primacy of themarket. And, in this sense, the labor market takes center stage in thedynamics of social integration and exclusion in the region4 . In thisrespect we posit, on the one hand, that the exclusion trends (formalemployment crisis, emergence of structural unemployment andpersistence of a poverty economy) tend to predominate over theintegration trends and, on the other, the very nature of the integrationdynamics is changing and is currently expressed in terms ofemployability. An analysis of these transformations of employment

3 In fact, what is being discussed is the persistence of the Nation-State as one of themajor debates on globalization. In this sense, we take distance both from the"hyperglobalizing" positions that assert that, currently, only globalized markets andtransnational business count and that neither can be "governed" by the nationalStates (Ohmae, 1990, 1995) as well as from "skeptical" interpretations arguing thatthe current changes simply reflect a highly internationalized economy, but withoutsupposing any radical transformation of capitalism (Hirst and Thompson, 1996.) Inthis sense, we identify with Sassen's (1996) more balanced formulation positingthat globalization has pushed sovereignty off center and partially denationalizedterritory. That is, these two elements, sovereignty and territory continue beingessential elements of the international system, which implies that the Nation-Statecontinues configuring such system, although without the same strength as of old.In the same sense, see Perraton et al. (1997), Gray (1998) and Held et al. (1999).

4 This is confirmed in many places in this text.

15


will provide us with a privileged vantage point to understand the

configuration of the social dimension in Latin America during this

new period of globalized modernity.

Territoriality and citizenship

National modernity relates to what is known as the stage of

inward growth with a process of accumulation based on import

substitution industrialization. The social dimension, understood as the

constitution of the Nation on the basis of the State, assumed that the

community of membership was the Nation and that the means for

integration, to a great degree, resulted from actions by the State and

the political system, in general terms. This integration was

consolidated through a certain harmonic triangle that linked labor

market with social policies and welfare situation. Concretely, such a

triangle presupposed the mutual interplay of three phenomena: formal

employment, state regulation and social integration. Urbanization and

social mobility gave rise to the creation of a social citizenship, which

was processed through the formal segment of the urban labor market,

that was consolidated by the State, specially through social security

coverage. Various modalities of modernization (early, fast and late),

and the corresponding arrangements at the national scale, provided

different outcomes in each country (Mesa-Lago, 1994; Roberts, 1996).

Obviously, the populist contract was the most refined expression of

this integration dynamics of a socio-political nature.However, its integration achievements, albeit with differences

between one country and another, were limited. The countryside, the

non-privileged scenario of modernization, was characterized by a re-

peasentryfication. This was not only due to the maintenance of the

traditional small land-holding or indigenous communities, but also to

the generation of new family productive units through agrarian reformor colonization processes. That is, the peasant unit, in its differentforms, played the role of a haven for that labor which was neither

absorbed into the modern agrarian sector nor migrated to urban centers.But owing to the modernization of agriculture itself (especially, export-oriented agriculture) it produced a greater seasonality of work(PREALC, 1991; G6mez and Klein, 1993.) That is, the majority of

16


rural sectors were imperfectly integrated and in some cases there wasextreme impoverishment5 . But, this exclusion dynamics also affectedurban sectors which became the structural surplus of labor that wasforced to self-generate low productivity employment, giving rise to theemergence of the so-called informal sector. That is, the construction ofthe Nation as a community of social integration was limited.

The crisis of this national modernity in the 80's inevitably led toa breakdown of the harmonic triangle of integration that wasmentioned before. Thus, on one side, state intervention became gearedtowards constructing a social citizenship that did not necessarilyoperates through the employment structure. The targeting logic thatredefined the social policies in the region focused directly on certainsocial groups (preferably the extremely poor) in terms of certain typesof deficits (education and housing, mainly)6. And on the other, thesubstitution of the State by the market, has made it the core of societalconstruction. In this sense, the labor market emerges, stronger thanbefore, in configuring the dynamics of social (dis)integration.However, its effects are different since the very structure ofemployment has suffered important transformations in the aftermathof the crisis and the subsequent processes of structural adjustment thathave incorporated the economies and societies of the region to theprocess of globalization. We will refer to such transformations later.

As mentioned, in spite of having lost their centrality, State andNation have not disappeared, but they need to be reinterpreted at lightof globalization: the Nation from perspective of territoriality and theState on the basis of citizenship.

In territorial terms, the first thing to recall is that the foremostterritory of national modernity was the metropolitan environmentnurtured by migration flows from rural areas, considered the scenariosof tradition. It was in the large cities that formal employment and

5 In Central America, this extreme poverty was combined with the existence ofauthoritarian regimes, thus generating the conditions for the armed conflicts thatoccurred later.

6 Reflecting on the realities of the North, Castel ( 1997) has described this change asa shift from "integration" policies, designed to homogenize society on the basis ofan institutionalized employment relationship, to "insertion" policies underpinnedby a positive discrimination logic.

17


public services tended to concentrate, making social integration

possible. This spacial primacy is being challenged by globalization.

These changes are taking place both at the supranational level with

transnationalization processes, and subnationally, with the

revitalization of local territories. Let us consider each of these

phenomena separately, together with their consequences for the

processes of social integration and exclusion.In supranational terms and with reference to the social sphere,

what comes to the forefront is, without doubt, that of transnational

migration. In its origins it supposes an extreme exclusion that implies

territorial expulsion but in its effects, paradoxically, it implies direct

integration into the globalization process although at a very high social

cost. Although international migration is not a new phenomenon,

currently it has three new features as compared to previous migration

patterns. First, migration is the outcome of global capitalism since it

responds to the demand for labor from the North. Secondly, it is a

social phenomenon different from traditional migration adaptation

patterns. And thirdly, it offers greater possibilities for popular

initiatives (Portes et al., 1999.) It not only affects those who

transmigrate and their respective households, but the community as a

whole, which by participating in this transmigration dynamics,

becomes a differentiated socio-territory in globalization. That is, is

results in the generation of transnational communities.This transnationalization introduces new elements with respect

to the social dimension. It is possible to mention at least three. The

first one relates to the importance of cash transfers in terms of coping

with poverty for the targeted households 7. The second element refers

to the existence of collective remittances, transfers made by

associations of immigrants in the North, providing collective goods to

their communities of origin. In that sense, there is an unprecedentedsupply of this type of goods. And finally, transnational communities

operate not only with the standards of living of their respective

country, but also under those of the host country, giving rise to

complex perceptions of integration and exclusion.

7 A phenomenon that, in countries such as El Salvador, at a macro level, has resulted

in significant reductions of the poverty levels.

18


Therefore, there is a transnationalization of the social sphere thatredefines the intervention field for social aspects beyond the nationalframeworks. This phenomenon also has implications in terms ofcitizenship, as we will see below 8.

In connection with the second dynamics challenging thecentrality of the national territoriality, it is already commonplace tostate that globalization has revitalized the local environment. Asopposed to an expected homogenization at planetary scale, induced bythe global market, there emerge locations showing different conditionsof materialization for globalization, thus emphasizing their socio-cultural peculiarities. The literature, usually from the North, points atthe appearance of two types of local socio-territorialities inglobalization: the so called global cities9 and the regions qualifying aswinners that have managed to generate successful economies10 . InLatin America it is difficult to speak of global cities although attemptsmay be made. On the other hand, certain regions are being redefinedin ways that lead to thinking about their (re)insertion in globalization(Panadero Moya et al., 1992; Curbelo et al., 1994; De Mattos et al.,1998; ILPES/CEUR, 1999). But there is a modality of local socio-territoriality that is not contemplated due to its invisibility. We refer tothe neighborhood community that has managed to structure its localeconomy around a cluster of small firms dedicated to a globalized

8 It is in this sense that the distinction between formal citizenship (merelymembership in a Nation-State) and substantive citizenship (actual exercise ofrights) is made (Bottomore, 1998).

9 These would be characterized by the following traits: transnational companiesdeveloping strategic activities (design, management, marketing, etc.); localizationof financial markets (dominant form of globalized capital); important presence offoreign migrant labor; concentration of intellectual elites providing prestige to therespective city and important flow of international tourists (Sassen, 1991; Castellsand Hall, 1994; Borja and Castells, 1997: Garcia Canclini, 1999).

10 Noted examples of this are the so-called industrial districts (Pyke et al., 1992; Pykeand Sengenberger, 1993; Benko and Lipietz, 1994).

19


activity11. Like transnational migration, this type of local socio-

territoriality shows that there are globalization insertion processes that

do not result from the action of multinational companies (the actors of

globalization par excellence) and/or of state policies. This explains, to

a great extent, their invisibilityI2 .

But, together with such socioeconomic dynamics, it is also

necessary to take into account the policies of administrative

decentralization linked to the reform of the State, that also tend to

revitalize the local level. The discussion of decentralization in Latin

America is very broad but, in summary, it may be said that it has

centered along three lines. The first has to do with the desire to

increase popular participation in public affairs. The second is more

geared towards a greater control and accountability of local authorities.

And the third relates to the supply of public services through the

cooperation of sundry actors (the State itself, the multilateral

international agencies, the private sector and the NGOs). It is important

to note that these discussions take place within the framework of two

basic parameters: on one hand, the transition from authoritarianregimes to liberal democracies and, on the other, the reform of the

State imposed by structural adjustment programs (Donner and

Hershberg, 1999).As in the case of cross-borders migration, this revitalization of

the local level results in new social elements arising. Two may be

underlined. First, the restricted socio-territoriality has the effect of

inducing social processes through more concrete relations in which

demands and responsibilities are more clearly outlined than at the

more abstract national level. And, second, socio-territorialities with

greater social integration are more likely to achieve consensus

11 The term neighborhood community comes from classical sociology. It is a type of

site community, based on geographical proximity links and having a village as its

space. Its insertion in globalization takes place through various activities such as

new agricultural exports, manufacturing subcontracting, handicrafts, tourism, etc.

For an analysis of this type of socio-territorialities in Central America, see Perez

Sainz et al. (2000).

12 There are answers to globalization provided by society itself that have managed to

acquire visibility. We refer to international labor migration and to the phenomenoncalled "bottom up" transnationalism (Smith and Guarnizo, 1998; Portes et al., 1999).

20

CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO P lREZ SAINZ

around local projects for an insertion in the globalized market. Thisassumes having the advantage of collective action regarding suchinsertion. That is, social integration can become a factor ofcompetitiveness vis-a-vis globalization.

Therefore, we see that with globalized modernity, communityoutlines have become more diffuse. There still exists a nationalcommunity, with diminished integration possibilities both due to thecrisis of formal employment and the limitations of stateintervention, as we will see later. But simultaneously, the possibilityof new community memberships opens up in a double sense. Onone side there is translationalization, creating a sense of multiplebelongings. And on the other, there appear very concrete localreferences where the community is clearly and materialityimaginable because it is demarcated along social-territorial lines.That is, in globalized modernity, social integration and exclusioncan have multiple meanings.

But this multiplicity is even more leveraged by the fact that theblurring of the Nation's contour, as a result of the dialectics betweenglobal and local, challenges a basic logic of the concept of nationalcommunity: its homogeneity. Such homogeneity was never trulygeneral since there were always manifest differences, specially classdifferences. But currently, the level of heterogeneity has grown withthe appearance of new differences (gender, ethnicity, age, etc.)which tended to remain hidden in the past. This means that themakeup of the Nation, as is the case of any other community, needsto incorporate diversity and this makes the problem of definingcommunity and membership -and therefore the socialdimension- increasingly more complex.

In terms of citizenship, as a key to read the State in globalizedmodernity, the first thing to be highlighted is that in the previousperiod of modernization, it could be said that social citizenshipprevailed over civil or political citizenship. Meaning that LatinAmerica did not follow along the English path of citizenshipdevelopment (from civil to political to social) as presented byMarshall (1998), but rather veered towards the Prussian path. Thatis, in the region, the construction of citizenship fundamentally tookplace on the basis of social citizenship. The populist contract would

21


appear as the most highly developed expression of this

phenomenonl3 . However, this primacy was challenged by the

authoritarian regimes that followed in the wake of the populist crisis.

First, such regimes suppressed rights and, above all, the possibility of

demanding them. Second, as a consequence of the former there arose

movements advocating for rights more basic than social ones, i.e.

human rights. And third, the fact that such regimes were not viable

gave rise to processes for a transition towards democratic regimes,

resulting from more or less competitive elections, which presupposed

an unprecedented development of political citizenship in the region.

That is, the other types of citizenship have displaced social citizenship

(Roberts, 1995, 1996)14.This new situation raises two questions regarding the loss of

primacy of social citizenship: what are its relations with other types of

citizenship and which are its internal transformations1 5 .

In terms of the relationship between civil and social citizenship,

the most evident link was proposed by Marshall himself (1998) by

considering the right to work as a basic civil right. With the historical

development of labor regulations, such right has become enriched: it

is the right to a dignified job complying with certain standards. In that

sense, there is an unbreakable articulation between civil and social

citizenship. But, with globalized modernity, the right to a dignified job

is affected by two things. The first relates to the process of

deregulation of labor markets that tends to undermine it, an issue we

will discuss later. The second phenomenon has to do with the

transnationalization of labor standards. This becomes manifest in new

export activities, specially those that are part of global chains driven by

buyers. In these cases, different types of actors in the countries for

which the products are targeted (trade unions, NGOs or consumer

13 Populism was accompanied by corporatism, while patronage and political parties

played a more secondary role in this popular representation arrangement

(Chalmers et al., 1997).

14 Garcia Delgado (1998) posits that there has been a shift from social citizenship to

a postmodern consumption citizenship.

15 For a discussion of the use of the concept of citizenship in Latin America, see Sojo

(2002).

22

CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PEREZ SAINZ

associations) can influence the adoption of minimum labor standards,at the risk of stigmatizing the product brand16 .This raises the issue ofuniversally valid labor standars as an attempt at moralizing economiclife in globalization. In this respect, the issue is to differentiatebetween types of rights. Portes (1994) proposed postulating theexistence of four types of rights: basic rights (against child labor,physical coercion and forced labor); civil rights (association andcollective representation); survival rights (minimum wage,compensation for labor accidents and regulated work day); andsecurity (against unfair dismissal, retirement compensation andindemnification of relatives in case of death). The author proposes thatthe first two should constitute international standards, while the otherswould be applied in a flexible manner according to the context17. Inthis sense, maintaining basic rights assumes a continuity of the State'sregulatory function with the expectation that it will be effective, i.e.that the legal enforcement of such rights is achieved. As has beenshown, in a context of generalized deregulation as the one that hascharacterized the Latin American region in the 80's and 90's, theState's protective intervention becomes important for labor conditions(Itzigsohn, 2000).

As for the relationship between social and political citizenship, itis necessary to recall the close and contradictory articulation betweenmarket and citizenship development that was pointed out by Marshall(1992); on one side, the market strengthens individual rights, since itdepends on them, and therefore reinforces citizenship; but, on theother, it generates inequalities, besides undermining the traditionalmechanisms for social protection. According to the author, politicalcitizenship can serve to partially mitigate such contradiction, since

16 The best study on the issue in Latin America is Quinteros (2000) on thetransnationalization of labor action, with the State taking a backstage role and theimportant presence of both local and extralocal non union actors, in the CentralAmerica garment manufacturing maquila.

17 Similarly, the World Bank (The World Bank, 1995) proposed differentiatingbetween basic rights (freedom of association and collective bargaining, eliminationof forced labor, child labor and other forms of discrimination) and other standards(e.g. minimum wages). The first would have a universal scope, while the secondwould be linked to national development conditions.

23


those affected would express themselves through their vote and, above

all, through political organization. The question to be answered is

whether, today in Latin America, political citizenship, stemming from

democratic transitions, can play such role of partial mitigation. The

answer would seem to veer towards the negative.Three phenomena need to be highlighted. First, this social voice

had a certain presence during the 1980's, with the crisis and the initial

implementation of structural adjustment measures when, in certaincountries, the trade union movement made an ethical defense of the

poor (Touraine, 1988; Calder6n, 1995). But this action had notranslation into the electoral field and in the 1990's, unions have lost

that protagonic role, with the exception of the Brazilian CUT and its

influence on the Workers' Party. Secondly, faced with this vacuum,social discontent has had a perverse electoral expression in the so-

called "neopopulist" phenomenon. However, its integration proposal isless ambitious than that of traditional populism (the construction of the

Nation) and therefore less contentious and with more possibilities ofbecoming institutionalized (Novaro, 1996). And thirdly, there is a

phenomenon with a wider scope. We have argued in the sense that theconstraints of the political environment affect social integration. In that

sense, using a non-dichothomic conception of social integration, we

have postulated that the later related to the phenomenon of an activecitizenship, while exclusion would be associated to phenomena such

as corruption and patrimonialism. On its part, vulnerability, the

intermediate area between the poles of integration and exclusion,relates to problems such as the growing abstentionism, elitism and therule by political parties nomenclaturas as political elements with a

negative influence on social integration (Sojo, 2000).The second question regarding citizenship has to do with

changes within social citizenship itself. In the national modernity,there was a double protagonism. On one side, in the public sphere, theState appeared very visibly with its social policies, but with a limitedscope, as we have already pointed out. And on the other, as a corollaryof those limits, households deployed, in a very silent manner, multiplecoping strategies that were analyzed by numerous studies in theregion. Currently, the scenario has become more complex. At leastfour situations may be identified that would express the same

24


of types of social citizenship in the region, taking into account both theform of participation (collective or individual) and the definition ofresponsibility (public or private). The first situation corresponds to thevoluntary sector and to social movements which combine collectiveparticipation with public responsibility. The same responsibility is foundin the State's action and the sponsorship by social bureaucracies where,participation, however, is individual. A third situation comprises thestrategies of linking communities and households with privateresponsibility, but with collective participation. And finally, the marketimposes a contractual social citizenship, where participation isindividual and responsibility is, obviously, private (Roberts, 1998).

Therefore, this regard across citizenships shows a State that isloosing the central role it had in the integration dynamics of the previousmodernization. This loss is reflected in a three-fold manner. First, thedefinition of welfare standards extends beyond the limits of the State'ssovereignty as is the case of international labor standards18 Secondly,the current democratic dynamics and- therefore -the politicalsystem as a whole - does not appear to be a functional mechanism tomitigate the contradictions between the market and citizenship. And,finally, the delivery of social welfare takes place in different scenarios,with the State becoming relegated to simply one.

Labor Market and Social (dis)integration

No one refutes that currently, the market has displaced the Statefrom the central role it had in the construction of modernity in LatinAmerica. Regarding the social dimension, this shift is fundamentallyexpressed in the centrality that the labor market has acquired in thedynamics of social (dis)integration. In this respect, there seem to be fourtransformations of the labor markets in the region that have importantsocial consequences: the crisis of formal employment; the emergence ofstructural unemployment; the persistence of the economy of poverty; andemployability as a new labor integration dynamics (Perez Sainz, 2000).

18 In this respect, Bottomore ( 1998) has proposed that citizenship should be redefinedin terms of worldwide human rights.

25


The crisis of formal employment has a double dimension. The

first relates to the lesser importance of public employment, the

mechanism -par excellence - of social integration since it has been

the melting pot that gave rise to the constitution of middle sectors.

Marshall (1996) has pointed to three factors that have played a role in

the impact of the first wave of state reforms on public employment.The first one relates to the internal composition of public employmentin terms of the difference between central and local governments. In

this respect, it is important to mention that the state reform itself has

implied reinforcing local institutions with the possibility of increased

occupation at that level. Second, in the current democratizationclimate characterizing the region, electoral clientalism has, to a certain

degree, neutralized fiscal discipline. And, finally, the resistance of

public employees and of their unions is a third factor to be taken into

accountl9. However, as a regional average, the weight of publicemployment within the overall non-agricultural EAP has fallen from

15.5% in 1990 to 13.0% in 2000. Panama and Argentina appear as the

cases where the reduction has been more dramatic (ILO, 2001, table

6-A). In this respect, it is important to recall the role that has been

played by this type of occupation in reducing the gender gap in terms

of labor earnings20 . This means that this function of gender equity will

be reduced in the future21 .

19 The emphasis in the next (the second) wave of reforms (fiscal, electoral andjudicial) would not have a direct effect on public employment, although the

elimination of job stability can effect, overall, the employment levels in this sector(Fleury, 1999).

20 The World Bank, in a series of studies of the region for the 1970's and 1980's,identified two cases (Costa Rica and Panama) where such gaps were smaller thanin the rest of the countries. In both situations, the weight of public employment intotal employment and access by women to the same were underlined as theexplaining factors (Psacharapoulos and Tzannatos, 1992).

21 However, Weller (2000) has argued that the reduction of the salary gap betweenmale and female labor is the only substantive labor achievement of the structural

adjustment strategies in the region.

26


The second dimension relates to the precariousness of wagelabor. This is an issue that has, as a minimum, three facets, althoughwe will deal with only one: labor deregulation 2 2. It may be stated thatthe deregulation of labor relations constitutes one of the basic featuresof the new economic model prevailing in the region, inspired in the so-called Washington Consensus (Bulmer-Thomas, 1997; Lozano, 1998).The World Bank, the institution that has more strongly advocated forthis deregulation trend, evaluated this process in the region towards themid 1990's. The main conclusion is that a majority of the countries stillshow labor rigidities. Thus, on one side, there appear to be twoexceptions to such rigidity. The first one is Chile that would haveattained a flexible labor market at the beginning of the 1990's. Peruwould be the other case, representing the most radical deregulationprocess in the 1990s. At the opposite end are Mexico and Nicaragua(Burki and Perry, 1997). On its part, the International LaborOrganization offers a different perspective of the scope of laborreforms in the region (ILO, 2000). Mostly, the change of rules hasaffected individual relationships, specially in terms of new hiringmodalities and severance requirements. In Peru and Argentina, thereforms have been drastic, while in Brazil, Colombia and Panamathey have had a more limited scope. Neither have countries with aprotectionist tradition such as Venezuela or the Dominican Republicescaped the winds of reform. In fact, eleven out of the seventeencountries studied2 3 , representing 70% of the wage employment inthe region, can be said to have adopted labor reforms with aflexibility approach.

A phenomenon linked to the labor reforms and of greatimportance in terms of social integration is that linked with to socialsecurity. In terms of the total EAP, in 1990 the coverage was low,scarcely 29.2% and it dropped to 26.9% ten years later. But in termsof wages labor, the percentage rose to 80.6% by the beginning of thatdecade, with a very slight decrease (79.0%) through time. However, in

22 The other two are the productive restructuring with the labor flexibility it fostersand the weakening of the role of unions.

23 Chile is an exception, since the labor reform, under a democratic government.improved the existing legislation passed by the previous authoritarian regime.

27


several countries, some of them with an important weight in theregion, coverage fell, as was the case of Argentina, Brazil, Chile andCosta Rica. But, without doubt, the greatest crisis in this regulatorydimension is the case of Ecuador that by 1990 had 72.1% of wageslabor paying in, while ten years later, the coverage had fallen to only49.8% (ILO, 2001, table 8-A). In this respect, Tamez and Moreno(2000) have pointed out that it is very difficult to speak of regionalpatterns and that each national case presents peculiarities. However,the authors emphasize a common trend that has a great relevance: theprevalence of mixed models that has resulted in a redefinition ofpublic and private, with the first financing while the second deliversservices. And, specifically for the pension scheme, an inverse relationhas been posited between the degree of democratization and the

privatization of such scheme (Mesa-Lago, 1999).The second phenomenon to be underlined, in terms of

transformation of labor markets in the region, is that ofunemployment. Although it did not constitute the major mechanism oflabor adjustment during the crisis of the 1980's, it represents one of the

most prominent features of the current labor dynamics. During the1990's high open unemployment rates have persisted in the face ofeconomic recovery. Thus, regional weighted averages show a level ofurban unemployment of 8.4% in 2000, identical to that of 1985, whenthe region was immersed in the midst of the debt crisis. By the end ofthe decade, eight countries present the most alarming situations withtwo digit rates of open urban unemployment: Argentina (15.1%),Colombia (17.2%), Ecuador (14.1%), Panama (15.3%), Paraguay(10.0%); Dominican Republic (13.9%); Uruguay (13.6%) andVenezuela (15.3%) (ILO, 2001, table 1-A). As in the past, women and,above all youths, are the social-labor groups more deeply affected inthis respect. As for the female labor force, the unemployment ratesacquire more relevance since, starting the 1980's, there has been angrowing process of feminization of employment in the region(Tardanico and Menjivar Larin, 1997)24.

24 Of these eight countries, only in the case of Argentina is the rate of unemploymentfor men higher than that for women. It should be mentioned that there is no genderdisaggregated unemployment data for the case of Ecuador.

28


The importance of this issue extends beyond the adjustment ofthe labor market and relates to four key issues for social integration.

The first one is connected with the nature of the new economicmodel and its inability to generate sufficient jobs (Tokman, 1998;Stallings and Peres, 2000). In this respect, two phenomena should benoted. One the one hand, labor deregulation processes are under way,so that such levels of unemployment cannot be merely attributed to therigidity of labor markets. But on the other, currently the self-generationof employment has become more limited and will not be able to playthe same role of absorbing the labor surplus that was played byinformal employment in the preceding decades. Even worse, theopening up of the economy, inscribed within structural adjustmentprograms, has subjected a series of self-employment activities tointernational competition, making them no longer viable. Thus, thecounter-cyclical function that the informal sector played in the past,making possible labor market adjustment effects, has now becomelimited and this type of activities progressively acquire a rather pro-cyclical behavior (Cerrutti, 2000).

The second issue connects with the erosion of social capital and,concretely, of the networks to access the labor market. This reminds usthat the resources mobilized by poor households to face poverty arenot immune to significant social changes and there seems to be a shiftunderway, from a situation in which there existed "resources ofpoverty" to one where what prevails is the "poverty of resources"(Gonzalez de la Rocha, 1999).

The third issue ties into the subject of identity. It is known thatlabor identities are central in a society, where work is sociallyrecognized through remuneration. Following the identity- shapingmodel proposed by Dubar (1991), unemployment supposes, in termsof internal transaction2 5, the prevalence of rupture over continuity in

25 This author proposes that there are two types of transactions in shaping laboridentities. The first one is internal and has to do with how an individual evaluateshis/her current occupational situation as a function of past experiences and futureaspirations. This transaction is ruled by the opposition between continuity andrupture. The second transaction, in turn, is external and is linked to the exposure ofthe internal transaction to "the other". In this case the opposition takes place interms of recognition and denial.

29


the case of workers loosing their job. And unemployment, for new

entrants into the labor market, presupposes a non-recognition that

makes the external transaction impossible. Consequently, identity

processes become mutilated and embrittled. The result is the

development of anomyc behaviors, a recurrent phenomenon among

youths, the group most severely impacted by unemployment, who may

opt for perverse violence paths in view of the pressures of

consumerism. This is an issue on which it is worthwhile to make a few

reflections since it also reflects the current primacy of the market in

societal construction.This phenomenon relates to the fact that, progressively, social

distinctions would seem to operate through the differentiation of

consumption. That is, consumption would be displacing production

from the center of social action26 . In Latin America the phenomenon

does not appear so evidently since, in national modernization, the mass

consumption corresponding to the Fordist contract of the societies of

the North did not fully materialize. However, changes in consumption

patterns began to become apparent due to globalization. The point that

seems to be critical in order to reflect on the future is the possibility of

a shift in the criteria that define social integration that, in terms of

modernization, meant having the production of wealth and its

distribution as the ultimate reference. In this sense, there seem to be

glimpses of a possible breakdown of the historical horizon of

modernity and the social dimension would be radically redefined. This

phenomenon is insinuated in youths, who are submitted to a double

process. On one hand, their historical difficulties in joining the labor

market are currently becoming more acute, as already noted. This

entails that it is impossible to gain access to traditional identity

references based on the world of labor. But on the other, it is precisely

the new generations that have a worldview that is more sensitive to the

26 In tnis sense, it has been argued that consumption has become the new mechanism

for social mobility (Cerny, 1995) and that the consumer has become fetichized

(Appadurai, 1990), leading to a shift in the emphasis of identity construction from

production to consumption (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2000). Consequently it is not

surprising that together with business (specially, multinationals) consumers have

become the actors of globalization although their possibilities of a protagonic role

are much more limited than in the case of business. For a provocative discussion of

the phenomenon of consumerism in the countries of the North, see Storper (2000).

30


dynamics of global consumption. But this consumerism is not definedin terms of moral standards that relate to the basic material andsymbolic reproduction that social integration historically implied untilnow. That is, there are processes of identity assertion on the part ofyouths that imply dynamics of integration to communities which donot correspond to the classical parameters. Being is centered onconsuming and it can be achieved by transgressions to the rules and byresorting to violence. Individualism takes precedence over collectiveaction, competition over cooperation, and there is an estrangementregarding the public sphere, with reclusion into the private world(Garcia Delgado, 1998).

Finally, unemployment is strongly linked to poverty andvulnerability. Its positive correlation with impoverishment has beendemonstrated in numerous studies. It acquires a perverse bias in thecase of youths since it has the possibility of developing mechanisms ofintergenerational poverty transmission that challenge the historicaltrends of poverty reduction (Tokman, 1998). Less studied is its linkwith vulnerability. This phenomenon recalls that in societies which donot have a very high social polarization, it is necessary to overcomedichotomic visions and incorporate a third analytical and empiricalcategory of vulnerability (Minujin, 1998). The phenomenon that can beunderstood as the relation between the capability of mobilizingresources and the structure of opportunities existing in society. Thelatter refers both to the market (employment, income, etc.) and to theState (series of public policies with redistributive effects) and to societyitself (in the social-cultural and political levels) (Filgueira, 1999).

This phenomenon relates to the risk of impoverishment thataffects a certain segment of integrated households. The origin of suchrisk, in the current modernity, would precisely lie in unemploymentbased on its income reduction impacts, as opposed to hyperinflationwhich was the main source of risk in the 1980's. In this respect, itbecomes necessary to expand the concept of unemployment to captureits full import in terms of labor exclusion. Thus, open unemploymentshould be complemented with discouraged unemployment. This makesit possible to recover a more structural perspective of this phenomenonunlinked to the economic cycle. Besides, since discouraged people arerecorded as "inactive", there is a challenge to the distinction between

31


work and employment imposed by the market. Likewise, this

provides visibility to women, who are usually the majority in terms

of the discouraged unemployed, enclosed in the domestic sphere. But

also, an expansion of this concept makes it necessary to incorporate

the phenomenon of visible underemployment, as involuntary partial

unemployment. This is a phenomenon that can become significant

given the trend towards greater precariousness of the labor markets in

the region. Therefore, in societies lacking a major socio-economic

polarization, and where the middle sectors continue having a

significant weight, there may exist a band of social integration

characterized by vulnerability. It comprises domestic units that are

not poor, but have income levels that in case of composite

unemployment (open, discouraged and partial, involuntary) can drop

under the poverty line. That is, they are households at risk for poverty

(Perez Sainz and Mora, 2001).The third phenomenon to be underlined in the current

configuration of labor markets is the persistence of a poverty economy

in self-employment activities that fail to generate a dynamics of

accumulation. It is a matter of the poor producing for the poor and

therefore it is an occupational environment marked by exclusion

which, to a great extent, constitutes an extension of the subsistence

activities of the preceding modernity. In this respect, it is important to

take into account its rural expression as well as the urban one.

The data available for the 1990's suggests a close association

between poverty and self-employment in agriculture which would be

a proxy for subsistence farming. However, there are differences to be

noted between groups of countries. Costa Rica and Chile are the

countries where the incidence of impoverishment is lowest, less than

one third of this occupational category. At the other end, Bolivia,

Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico show levels

above two thirds; i.e. the large majority of all peasants have become

impoverished. The remaining countries (Brazil, Panama, Dominican

Republic and Venezuela) are placed at an intermediate position

(CEPAL, 1999; table 19). In this sense, two effects of the new economic

model on rural labor markets have been highlighted. The first is that, in

those cases in which peasants owned communal lands, the policies

to create land markets have had a negative effect, influencing the

32

CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PtREZ SAINZ

proletarization of peasants. And the second is linked to the introductionof new, capital-intensive technologies, that have displaced labor, thusincreasing the seasonality of agricultural employment (Thomas, 1999).This last effect reinforces a historical trend that was already present inthe preceding modernization (G6mez and Klein, 1993).

This relationship between self-employment and poverty is lessmarked in urban environments since there, the incidence of poverty isless than in rural areas. Microbusinesses (units that employ less than 5individuals) appear as the occupational environment (together withdomestic employment) where the incidence is greatest. But it is alsonecessary to mark differences by groups of countries. The percentageis less than one fourth of that occupational category in the countries ofthe Southern Cone and Costa Rica, while in the other Central Americanand Andean countries, the level increases to more than half; the rest aresomewhere in between (CEPAL, 1999; table 18). That is, there is asuggested link between the types of previous modernization (early, lateand fast) and the impoverishment of the urban self-employment. Thesetrends are accentuated when productive self employment is considered(manufacturing and construction), where half the labor force is poor.

This modality of self-employment is, to a great extent, anextension of the past, specially in its urban component, i.e.subsistence informality. However, there are novel elements since theeconomy of poverty can incorporate the so-called new poor. Theseare sectors that, as a result of the crisis and the adjustment policies,have fallen into a situation of poverty. The term designates groups,consisting specially of urban workers, who although having theirbasic needs satisfied as a result of being located in cityenvironments, have seen their income decrease below the povertyline as a consequence of the crisis of the 1980's. As Katzman(1989), to whom this denomination is owed, has pointed out, theyare different from the structurally poor for two reasons; on one hand,they are not subject to mechanisms - specially intergenerational ones- of poverty perpetuation; and secondly, because they can come outof their poverty situation if the economic context changes.

Consequently, the exclusion trends seem to appear strongly andaffect important portions of the region's labor force. For that reason,we posit that in the current globalized modernization, such trends, with

33


their social disintegration effects, tend to predominate. However, this

does not mean to say that the integration trends have disappeared, but

their nature is changing since the emphasis, as indicated, would be

shifting from the demand (the generation of jobs in the old formal

sector, currently in crisis) to the supply (generation of employmentopportunities resulting from the workers own initiative). It is in this

sense that the term "employable labor force" is used (Novick and

Gallart, 1997; Leite and Neves, 1998; Gallart, 1999). Human capital,

where its general component (schooling) is important to acquire the

specific components imposed by the volatility of the global market.

Latin American empirical evidence shows that for the crisis and

adjustment period of the 1980's, this relation is confirmed albeit with

cross-country differences (Berhman, 1996).Secondly, it is also possible to speak of employability as an

attitude towards the labor process. The introduction of post-tayloristorganizational models implies changes in terms of the participation of

workers that is no longer merely passive. In this respect, the notions

of multifunctionality and involvement come into play. Employability

thus refers to "knowledge about being" (competencies) in the labor

process as a more important attribute than the traditional "knowledgeabout doing" (skills) (Carrillo, 1995; Mertens, 1996; Hirata, 1997;

Leite, 1999; Carrillo and Iranzo, 2000; Hualde, 2001). However, the

organizational innovations implemented in the companies of the

region do not seem to foster this manifestation of employability to a

great extent. Thus, such innovations do not become systemic since

they arise from initiatives by individual firms; they are unilaterallyimposed on workers without much negotiation; and as a corollary of

the above, the involvement of labor is limited (Carrillo, 1995).Thirdly, it is possible to think of employability in terms of the

birth of a new work ethics and culture, in which workers demonstratethe capacity to create jobs or to modify the current labor conditions. In

this respect, employability would be synonymous with trajectories that

do not seek job stability and a protected and regulated work

environment. A labor mobility that assumes risk as its own in the

ethymological sense of the word in Portuguese: daring (Giddens,1999). This implies redefining the "normal" old day biographies(Beck, 1998) and, therefore, the process of identity building.

34


And finally, employability implies, in terms of social citizenship,that a shift is taking place, from rights (adequate employment) toduties. In the previous modernity, the emphasis lied on labor rights,codified in the respective national rules, that fundamentally protectedformal workers. The counterpart (the duties of workers) was theacceptance of the populist type contract (a sort of pseudo-Fordistarrangement) guaranteed by the State that emerged as the main player.This type of alliance, as well known, hit a crisis in the 1970's with thedevelopment of authoritarian regimes that evidenced the historicallimits of such contract. The 1980's crisis and the implementation ofstructural adjustment programs have generated a new context ofhegemonic uncertainty that have turned poverty and exclusion intobasic governance problems (Lozano, 1998). In labor terms, it hasmeant a shift from rights to duties and, in this respect, four factorshould be noted in such a redefinition. First, rights and duties aredefined in connection with the market, in this case the labor market and,therefore, the State is no longer the major arbiter. Second, the market issubject to a deregulation process, as already argued, that makesflexibility the key issue at stake. Third, this pre-eminence of the marketimplies individuation, and rights and duties progressively loose theircollective nature. And, finally, the shift of emphasis from rights toduties brings forth the question of what type of citizenship is beingbred. But the issue is even more complex, since the consideration ofrights and obligations also implies symbolic and ethical aspects thatare played out in the public sphere (Jelin, 1996).

Therefore, the importance of employability with reference to thesocial dimension is two-fold and this reflects its two faces. On oneside, it displays this shift of focus, from rights to duties, in the currentconfiguration of social citizenship. In that sense, it expresses one ofthe dimensions of what has been called negative individualism; in thiscase, the one associated with independence from institutionalarrangements 27 . And, on the other, as a positive side, employabilityarticulates the social dimension with globalization's strategic resource:knowledge. That is, in globalized modernity, the big challenge of the

27 The other expression is individuation due to lack of social protection and links(Castel, 1997).

35


social dimension is, fundamentally, how to arrive at institutionalitiesthat provide democratic access to such resource. It is around that

fundamental core that we believe it is possible to "reinvent" the social

dimension, for the market to remain tamed and capitalism humanized.

This volume

The works in this volume cover a thematic horizon that

simultaneously attempts to be integrated and specific. In a good share

of the contemporaneous social debate, the observation of general

aspects and concrete issues does not presuppose "alternative" thinking,

different approaches, but the need to recognize differential spheres for

action. Specialization is common and well known both for social

thinkers as for economic operators. Likewise its advantages and

limitations.The first three chapters deal with general aspects: the agenda of

social development, entrusted to Rolando Franco, a Uruguayan

sociologist, who, as head of CEPAL's Social Development Division

has enjoyed a privileged vantage point of the challenges of social

development and its demands on public policies in the region in the

next few years. The second chapter reflects around the issue of social

development indicators, with the analysis of Edgar Gutierrez, who,

from the Development Observatory of Costa Rica University, has been

actively involved in this field. The third chapter, entrusted to Sara

Gordon, from the National Autonomous University of Mexico,analyzes the issue of citizenship and its links to development in an

approach that is simultaneously extremely popular in the environmentof political discourse while not very clear in its conceptual implicationsand therefore its consequences for public policy decision making.Then follow two chapters that are more specific in their approach, but

essential in their consequences for the region's social development. Inthe fourth chapter, Ernesto Rodriguez has systematized the issue ofdevelopment from the perspective of youth. Undoubtedly, the issuerefers to a core aspect of social development policies that concerns the

generation of opportunities for social mobility that demand short term

fiscal resources, but with yields that are observable in the medium and

36

CARLOS SOJO. JUAN PABLO PItREZ SAINZ

long term. The fifth chapter, entrusted to Mayra Buvinic, AndrewMorrison and Ana Maria Orlando, elaborates on urban violence,without doubts one of the major threats to Latin Americans quality oflife. The volume concludes with a reflection by Carlos Strasser,academic of FLACSO Argentina, on the centrality of politics. Heexamines the possibilities of governance for the States in the regionand its implications for the achievement of better thresholds of socialdevelopment and welfare.

Rolando Franco recognizes in his contributions progress andlimitations in the development of the region along the last decade.There are significant increases in social investment, but sharpinequalities between the countries persist and the mobilityopportunities have not been substantially improved. Therefore, theregion continues to be immersed in poverty and in the multiplicationof barriers to the attainment of the objectives of social equity andwelfare. It is very hard, in general terms, for the bounty of growth tomove towards the public action spheres that have to distribute it, but itis very easy for the consequences of stagnation or recession totranslate into serious social consequences. Apparently, the trickledown only operates under conditions of economic crisis and recession.Franco puts it this way: "in one year of recession, between four andfive years of growth are lost". Of no less importance is the linkbetween socioeconomic development and political situation. In theeighties, recalls Franco, the concern seemed to focus specially in theprecariousness of income and the weakness of purchasing power underinflationary conditions. The control thereof also provided clearpolitical yields for the successful governments and penalties to thosethat failed in this regard. However, today, when the threat of inflationhas not be dispelled, there is evidence of a greater concern regardingthe structural characteristics of the model and its effective capacity toproduce welfare that can be transferred to all social sectors. This hasnot yet produced a sanction to the democratic form of government, butundoubtedly, as indicated by the Argentine crisis, it broadens thepossibilities of ingovernability, by reducing citizens' tolerance marginto the consequences of economic and political leadership crises. Thewill to resist new costs is reduced in view of the uncertainty,increasingly greater, that these will not be clearly compensated in the

37


good times. This is linked to the manner in which the social assistance

resources are managed (the so called "safety nets") and their

erroneous pro-cyclical behavior in a majority of the countries of the

region that is denounced by Franco.Franco's article, after a brief diagnosis, goes deeper into the

identification of strategic themes and public policy orientations that

could allow for new possibilities of growth with welfare and equity.

The axis he considers essential to mobilize means for social integration

and welfare in his judgment relate to four factors: Latin America,

recognized as the most unequal region of the world, it is so in times of

crisis and growth and becomes more acute at a particularly regressive

moment at a global scale. In his analysis, Franco proposes examining

inequality from the basis of identifying four factors that are hardly

sensitive to short term political variations. Access to assets -he points

out- is more unequal than access to income; the size of poor

households, on average larger than non poor ones, generates an

additional demographic burden; access to educational capital damaged

by supply restrictions and the pressure that is implied in the need to

expand the family level, the fourth factor, referring to the

"occupational density" relating to the number of employed per family,

substantially higher among those families in the lower quintiles.

The last part of the article refers to the forms of a public policy

committed to social development. Franco asserts the need to recognize

a cooperation link between economic policies and social policies,

recognizing the primary component of income generation derived

from labor markets in expansion under situation of economic growth.

He also points at the importance of differentiating between the

functions of social policies in three areas: investment in human capital,

social compensation and social cohesion.The first area, human capital, relates to the issue of traditional

social investment within an innovative framework focusing on the

importance of the "inter-generational transmission of opportunities"affected by factors associated to the "household of origin"; school,

affected by the combination of "educational devaluation" understood

as the inter-generational ratio between the level of education and the

employment or income obtained, and the "educational threshold",

relating to the number of years required to enjoy comparable levels of

38


welfare. The third dimension affecting households is employment,closely related to opportunities for access to the educational system.

The second area underlines the importance of social compensationmechanisms that -to start with- do not compete, but rathercomplement, universal services that have a relevance for the attainmentof long term integration objectives that is unquestioned. Second, thatcompensation mechanisms have not been sufficiently stable andparticularly, have been unable to manage an adequate distribution offiscal resources in the periods where the demand is the greatest.

The third area referring to social cohesion implies the need todesign strategies for social development that while aspiring to createand maintain communities of goals and standards "make room for awide range of particular goals" associated to issues of discriminationand social exclusion.

Franco ends his contribution by pointing at four "principles toorient" social policy: the emphasis on universality; the institutionalarrangements whereby it is executed; the concern for impact and theeffectiveness of management. Shaping a social policy that attempts tosatisfy the needs of all does not necessarily suppose equality ofintervention. Affirmative action and targeted compensation areinstruments and not alternatives of a universalistic social policy. Theinstitutional issue refers to a needed reflection on decentralization andthe participation of individuals and communities as mechanisms tomodernize social policy. The issue of impact relates to the magnitudeand the use of the available resources, specially deepening the actionsaddressed at strengthening the redistributive capacity of socialspending as a whole. This is a factor closely linked to the four element,referring to the efficiency of social programs understood as themaximization of outputs to be obtained with the limited resourcesavailable. Here, Franco recalls, the challenge lies in understanding thatsometimes the outcomes confuse means with ends, like in education,when the need for fostering knowledge and values is forgotten in thehaste to have classrooms built or teachers hired.

The chapter by Edgar Gutierrez, director of the projectObservatorio del Desarrollo of Universidad de Costa Rica, proposesa historical and analytical review of the issue of setting up socialindicators. Several elements are highlighted in Gutierrez' analysis. It is

39


relevant to point at what might be called the social and disciplinarian

determination of data. As instruments of scientific approach to the

understanding of a social reality, the indicators enunciate a status of the

disciplinarian debate. Social indicators are further the product of the

degree of development of the demands for social welfare, and their

evolution through time is the expression of the search for welfare

thresholds that societies aspire to individually and globally. Their

formulation is, therefore, the result of a social tension towards the

scientific demonstration of "realities" that are intended to be modified,

while resulting from a paradigmatic competition (Kuhn, 1971) which

determined the basic consensus of the scientific community on what

is observable. This link between the political and the scientific is not

exclusive of the human or social sciences, as it is mistakenly believed,

but it becomes manifest in them with less symbolic and argumentativemediations. Even because common sense becomes the criterion of

validity of social knowledge. But, in at the bottom, social data are the

product of what society demands to know, governments weigh and

publish, and the scientific community proposes and analyzes.A second relevant aspect in the analysis by Gutierrez points at

the clear difficulties to identify indicators that are acceptable in

common. In general, there is a lack of sufficient consensus amongthe scientific community and the operators of social policy on the

manner of approaching social knowledge in several fields. Generalaspects such as quality of life, or even specific manifestations such

as the crowding indicator (that can range from 2, 3 or 4 people perroom), illustrate the diversity of approaches to the social dimensionthat underlay political and conceptual discrepancies. The history of

how social indicators have evolved and their transformation is

indicative of the degree of development attained by countries and of

the social demands that become organized. The preeminence ofcertain information over other possibilities of explanation resultsfrom competition and interest and is closely linked to theprescriptive orientation of administrative actions. If the dominantperception of poverty or human deprivation is the insufficiency ofincome with regards to a threshold considered minimum, then theassessment of the corresponding social policies and the distributivecapacity of markets will be closely referred to the expansion of

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income. Other manifestations of social life that cause inequalitysuch as sex, race and ethnicity, age, are not - in this sense - subject toscrutiny or analysis.

The third aspect is connected with the capacity and possibility ofbuilding indicators. The responsibility of the state is essential and ingeneral, institutional weakness decreases the possibilities of States ofhaving quality data on social development. Here, the link withinternational cooperation shows that there is a relationship between thegeneration of indicators and the availability of resources to producethem. It is not coincidental that in the economic field, where theinterest of the financial and production operators is concentrated, theglobal data are more homogeneous and generalized. Therefore theimportance of the role of multilateral agencies to generate scientificconsensus and the resources to develop new measurement instrumentsthat will, in time, make it possible to overcome the lack of informationand generate new data according to the times.

The article by Gutierrez examines the status of the debate and thehistorical evolution of the building of social indicators in the first threesections. First, it shows how the building of social indicators developsin a permanent dispute with economic indicators to capture broaderdimensions of human development. The second part is a reflection onthe difficulties to set up a single measurement system and the thirdanalyzes the role of the United Nations in generating and proposingindicators based on establishing the main limitations observed, in thisrespect, at a global scale: connected with availability (coverage, dates,existence); international comparability; clear definitions of indicators;clear gathering and processing guidelines and quality control.

When observing the particular situation of Latin America andpondering on the offering of indicators from three multilateralagencies with involvement in the region (the Economic Commissionfor Latin America and the Caribbean, ECLAC, the United Nationsand the World Bank), the study verifies the little commonality of theavailable indicators, which limits the possibility of comparisons,and the heterogeneous sources of information that determine thateach entity process in their own way the data that have been gathered.

Gutierrez further verifies that the available indicators coverscantly the commitments undertaken in the international conferences

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and summits, which poses an important deficit in what is consideredto be the minimum capacity to account for the evolution of socialdevelopment in the region. The three sources consulted cover betweentwo thirds and one half of the indicators forming the "minimum set ofnational social data" recommended by the United Nations StatisticsCommittee.

The author concludes on the need to continue advancing inidentifying and developing the indicators required to account for socialdevelopment appropriately, but recommends doing so within anenvironment sensitive to cultural differences. Comparability cannotsacrifice the specificity required to account for certain socialcircumstances, linked to phenomena that are little or rarely measurablesuch as spirituality, social capital, life experiences. In terms of thechallenge of social indicators, he concludes that "moving in the rightdirection depends on which is that direction and who has defined it."

The issue of citizenship, explored in chapter 3 by Sara GordonRapoport, for many years the editor of the prestigious RevistaMexicana de Sociologia, contains the outlines of a debate that is at thecenter of any contemporaneous reflection on social development. Theissue of rights is at the core of a new regard on the link between socialdemands and public responsibilities that implies reviewing some of thereferents of the social development model propounded in the periodprior to the Latin American debt crisis. With the advent of the newdemocratic regimes, the issue of rights acquired a new dynamismparadoxically in a stage marked by the fiscal restrictions with whichthe Latin American States emerged from the lost decade. Thus, at thetime when rights acquired citizenship charter, the possibilities of theireffective realization by the State suffered a significant breakdown.Therefore the importance of the review proposed by Gordon oncitizens rights, specially economic, social and cultural, in a regionmarked by centrifugal forces that allow for the build-up ofexpectations and aspirations to an improved social status in the midstof material conditions that are constantly precarious. Perhaps the mostrelevant link between citizenship and social development is preciselythe paradox of an age that has made it possible for new demands tobecome visible and emerge, while the capacity of the State toguarantee them through institutional means is reduced.

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Gordon's text begins with a review of the sociological origin ofthe definition of citizenship, which is attributed to British academic T.H.Marshall, based on his lectures at Cambridge University in 1949. InGordon's opinion, that is the source of the main enumerations whichcurrently typify the issue of rights. However, this aspect is not exemptfrom controversy Marshall's tripartite formulation has been broadlyquestioned, among other things, for assuming a sequential relationshipin the definition of rights in their various fields; for disregarding thepolitical and historical determinations of their definition and for takingfor granted inadequate equivalences in the degree of standardization ofthe definition of civil and political rights, the definition of which is quiteuniversal, with social ones which, in light of the preceding chapter,display an extreme diversity in the selection of their enunciationvariables and the degrees of development that are aspired to.

In the first part of the article, Gordon assesses the implicationsof the critiques to Marshall on the basis of the adoption ofinstitutional framework for the international aspiration to defendeconomic, social and cultural rights fostered by the United Nations.In general, the rationale of the critiques are based on the lack of basicagreements around issues of principle such as what is an economicand social right, how is it attained and who protects it. The debatequestions the definition of universal parameter to define welfarethresholds the adoption of which is extremely sensitive to historicalexperiences and cultural coordinates. Here, the issue of "indicators"is also present in terms of the lack of consistency in the effective,standardized and universal operationalization of social rights.Besides, the role of the State as generator of conditions to "assist inthe realization of the rights, in terms of outcomes" is unclear. Finally,it is not clear when the realization of a result relates mostly to theoperation of markets than to public management and there frequentlyexists a tense and contradictory relationship between the integrationpurposes of public policies for the promotion of rights and theexclusion effects of market operation.

On the basis of this analysis, Gordon explores variousdimensions of the difficulty in setting up social policies gearedtowards satisfying economic, social and cultural rights in the LatinAmerican region. She links the appearance of notions of rights

43


associated to socioeconomic conditions to the link betweenindustrialization and labor markets that were developed in the Latin

American countries throughout the XX century. This results in an

extremely important characteristic of the history of social citizenshipin Latin America: "the combination of workers in the formal markettogether with the criterion of fundamentally serving organized sectors

with pressure capacity, contributed to configuring welfare provision as

a privilege to which access is gained through an organization or a

clientelistic relation, and not as a universal right." The combination of

workers the formal market together with the criterion of fundamentallyattending to organized sectors with pressure capacity, contributed to

configuring an approach to welfare as a privilege that is obtained bymeans of an organization or a clientelistic relation, and not as a

universal right." This gestational trait remains current and it

constitutes one of the main barriers for the effective setup of rightsthresholds and institutional frameworks for their safeguard.

The evolution of citizen rights is condition by structural featuresof which the author underlines, in coincidence with Franco's article,

aspects such as the unequal distribution of wealth; the unfavorableevolution of labor markets and remunerations; the worsening of the

welfare indicators at light of the situation of those groups subject to

situations of exclusion such as women or ethnical groups; the

precariousness and sustained deterioration of the quality of life andopportunities in rural areas that together with the concentration in urban

spaces lead to a sustained trend towards "geographical fragmentation";and the diminished possibilities of access to education. Summarizing,the author concludes that the theoretical difficulties to apply theconcept of social citizenship are confirmed by the evidence gatheredon the modes of access to social citizenship in the region and can besummarized as a) the "corporatist pattern" governing the identificationof rights thresholds and their enforcement in a anti-universalistic andexclusion framework; b) the "insufficiency of fiscal resources" as aresult of a precarious public management in terms of capture andmodest in terms of distribution as well as consequentially ofmercantile operations and c) "the high proportion of population withserious deficits" that makes it necessary to develop differentialpolicies prioritizing the satisfaction of needs and not following criteria

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of satisfaction of social rights. To face up to these challenges, sheproposes adopting Bellamy's category of "institutional rights",resulting from limited "political deliberation" that is translated intoparticular laws instead of constitutional norms of doubtful application.

The article by Ernesto Rodriguez on the link between the issueof youth, social development and public policies is broad and profoundin terms of analysis and proposals. At the center of his concern is theneed of identifying public policies with a generational approach thatmay contribute to stopping the exclusion processes affecting LatinAmerican youths while simultaneously unleashing their creativeforces, by tapping into the force of lack of conformity thatcharacterizes youth. The reader will find here a clear link between theyouth issue and the general components of the precedingcontributions. Also clear is the contact - frequently tragic -betweenthe violence and the social exclusion that youths experience; likewise,the importance of their active incorporation into political managementand the decision-making process not restricted to the electoral means,and even to the management of other social policy areas through theirparticipation in "volunteer" networks.

The general proposal, both in conceptual and normative terms,postulated by this work is directly opposed to one of the dominantapproaches, certainly under review, the characteristics of which arewell summarized in the following paragraph. Rodriguez says "Themodel centered on education and leisure time, characterized in the firstpart, is an adult, conservative and functionalist approach, in thestrictest sense of the three terms, to the extent that the existing societyis taken for granted, and the specific objective defined in connectionwith the young generations is their future integration into such society,to ensure the reproduction of that society through time and space. Thisapproach, furthermore, operated with certain fluidity in the frameworkof expansive and dynamic economies that ensured a certain degree of"upwards social mobility" specially for those youths who were"integrated", while showing severe limitations to respond to the issuesof the "excluded" youths, specially during times of crisis" (betweeninverted commas in the original).

The basis of the alternative argument proposed by Rodriguezsurrounding youth and the challenges for social development policies

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begins with the definition of condition of youth itself. As already

established in this volume, the definition of the life cycle corresponding

to "youth" is not absolutely clear. The ambiguity permits defining a

space that extends from 10 to 29 years of age, from the beginning of

the physiological changes up to the transformation of the social

condition; according to Rodriguez "from the attainment of

physiological maturity to the attainment of social maturity" extremes

that each society and each age construct in a completely different way.

For that reason, the author prefers the identification of specific youth

groups, since "youth" in abstract does not exist. They are the university

students; the popular urban youth; the rural youth and the young

women with the caveat that all these should be sensitive to the ethnical

dimension permeating the other situations. From that option,

undoubtedly, an essential consequence is derived for research and

public policies, connected with the need for identification and

effective action on the diverse conditions within which the experience

of youth takes place. On the contrary, as Rodriguez observes, policies

tend to be generalistic, rather insensitive to the peculiarities and

disregarding the actual needs of youths in favor of the future

expectations of the system.The formulation of youth policies, first associated to job training

and to the administration of leisure time, has evolved, as a result of the

reaction of youths to the more excluding manifestations of the social

and political systems. The satisfaction of the right to education in

relatively significant degrees, as illustrated by the doubling of the

secondary schooling rates and the five-fold increase of the higher

education rates in the second half of the XX century, has created the

conditions for new "youth" demands to emerge that, in turn, triggered

new public responses. First, designed to decrease students

autonomous mobilization capability and then to attenuate the material

needs of urban youths, squashed by the crisis, poverty and the

economic reform programs by means of social compensationprograms that are only apparently disconnected for the issue of youth.

Currently, the predominant trait of youth policies tends to respond to

the dissatisfaction for the lack of expectations for social improvement

as a consequence of the economic recession and the reduction and

deterioration of labor markets. These are policies designed to

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strengthen "youth's labor and social inclusion". For that reason,mediated through political and "social control" programs of youth'smovements and demands, the policies have shifted from educationcentered on roles preassigned by the adult thought structure andproduction to job training, sensitive to youth's capacity to adapt toshifting social, political and economic demands.

Rodriguez then explores the analysis of the status of youthpolicies in the region, drawing distinctions between the programmatic,fiscal and purely policy dimensions. The program dimension, thatrefers to production and relation between sectorial interventions in thefield of education, employment, health and recreation, the conclusionis that the lack of consistency and articulation in the implementationof the initiatives has diminished their capacity for an effectivetransformation of youth's situation. He points at the limitedintervention in fields of primary importance such as violencemitigation and fostering participation.

In the institutional aspect, the author's main concern relates to theconfusion of roles and the lack of constructive relations between thespecialized institutions and the administration, in general. Amongthem there arise problems of competition and duplication, the firstbecause of their attempt to address all the dimensions of the issue andthe second due to their lack of sensitivity to particular social situations.

The fiscal issue, on its side, refers to the availability and use ofresources to address youth issues. Rodriguez points out that, in spiteof the lack of comparative studies for a sufficient number ofcountries, two trends may be observed: a) insufficient investments,and b) their overwhelming concentration on regular educationwhere the corporatist pressure of teachers for salary increases,coupled with the fiscal restrictions under which governmentsoperate, reduce the quality of educational services in terms ofinfrastructure, materials and resources.

Finally, the political dimension leads to an underlying problem inthe emergence of youth antagonism. Youths do not act in a corporatistfashion and their representation environment, more than referring tomaterial needs, responds to symbolic horizons that do not have an easylinkage with the fiscal services with which States "address" socialissues. This problem of political representation and construction of

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demands becomes more acute at light of the evidence, as Rodriguez

finds, that "the corporatist actors involved (in decision-making) are

not interested in leveraging youth policies". Rodriguez infers a core

institutional implication: "the role of the institutions specializing in

juvenile promotion is much more important than in the case of any

other public policy since they have to act as surrogates of the

corporatist role that organized beneficiaries play in other areas

(women policies, for example)."The fifth chapter examines the situation of violence and crime in

Latin America and its implications for social development. The

centrality of this reflection, that is abundantly documented by Buvinic,

Morrison and Orlando, lies in the magnitude and intensity of the

phenomenon of violence. Latin Americans have a long history of

social coexistence marked by violent acts and criminal behavior. In the

past, the State perpetrated illegal violence against citizens under a

national security cover. In many countries, the reaction of citizens led

to military action. As a result, the link between citizens and State was

shaped through fear and dissuasion, where the use of force frequently

substituted for dialogue and appeals to reason. Currently, Latin

American societies no longer face militarized state apparatus that are

therefore aggressors to human security; however, violence continues

undermining intersubjective trust, eroding public resources and

decreasing the possibilities of economic growth. In some regions, such

as Central America, the advent of peace has not translated into

overcoming violence nor increasing security.The new approaches to tackle violence and crime, specially

severe in urban environments, requires a very close contact with the

source issues and the social context that generates and nurtures

criminal behaviors and violence of different types. As opposed to the

narrowly legalistic viewpoints that are centered on the reliance on

rules and punishment as social control mechanisms, contemporary

approaches start by recognizing the heterogeneity of violence and its

causes. In general, in the shaping of social violence phenomena,

understood by the authors as "the use of force with the intent to

damage" are the result of the confluence of motivations associated to

the family and the community, as well as the capacity for control and

creation of welfare by the State. But, furthermore, violence is

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extremely sensitive to individual circumstances that are frequentlyoverlooked in the analysis of other social problems and which refersto psychosocial aspects connected with the shaping of violentbehaviors, the weight of psychogenetic factors and the influence ofrisky habits connected with practices such as drug and alcohol abuse.

The authors of this chapter present, in this sense, twoclassifications of violence, one that classifies violence according tocriteria such as the characteristics of the victims, the aggressors, natureof the act, purpose, localization and relationship between the victim andthe aggressor, the later a central aspect in identifying the forms ofviolence associated to family and gender. The second classificationlooks at risk factors, drawing a distinction between individualsituations, where the maleness and alcohol abuse are, for example,recurrent conditions that have triggering effects over other factors suchas having been exposed to violence or biological conditioning factors.The second order of risk factors relate to the condition of the household,where the size, the structure and a history of violence are the centralaspects. The third element integrates community-social factors in amore complex set that ranges from access to weapons, control thereon,social violence, income inequality, cultural standards, etc.

The definition of the diversity of phenomena associated to crimeand violence in society, is combined with the difficulty of obtainingadequate and sufficient information to account for this diversity ofmanifestations. In general, the authors observe that in Latin Americathere is information available on homicide rates and some surveys onvictimization. They warn about the care needed when working withinformation that in general is gathered using sundry registrationmethods and debatable quality. Some expressions of violence,specially domestic violence and violence against women, arerecognized as largely underestimated by limited reporting andregistration practices. In any case, the hard evidence agrees with thecitizen's perception of insecurity given the high rates of homicides thatexist in Latin America as compared to other regions, in excess to 50per 100,000 inhabitants in some countries, something like six timesthe world mean. The article examines closely the dimensions ofviolence in the region, distinguishing its manifestations based ongender, unequal distribution of wealth and poverty; violence against

49


dominated ethnic groups or minorities; and forms of violenceassociated to the life cycle.

The socioeconomic implications of violence are one of the main

challenges for public social development policies for two reasons atleast: first, because violence has direct economic implications, since itproduces consequences on productive and social activities thatgenerate costs associated to their combat or prevention. Ranging fromthe build up of an economic sector devoted to security including frominsurance companies to surveillance firms; up to individual and familyinvestments that are made at the expense of other consumption, inconnection with the need of satisfying the demand for security. Theindirect implications relate to the allocation of resources that, thus, arenot invested in productive or distributive activities of a public orprivate character and thus become "economic multiplication effects ofviolence" at the macroeconomic level. The magnitudes of direct costsare alarming, such as for example in Colombia, where the costs ofviolence, including armed conflict, reach proportions that are close toone fifth of the gross domestic product. The multiplication effects can,in turn, have different characteristics depending on whether theirimpact is felt at the macroeconomic, family or individual level. Thus,for example, violence reduces the possibilities of accumulating socialand human capital and mitigates the opportunities of generatingincome due to such apparently unlinked aspects as the decision of notworking night hours or attending educational and job trainingactivities after working during the day.

In the area of proposals, the article by Buvinic, Morrison andOrlando associates the risk factors with possible solutions,distinguishing between those that suppose short term interventions,specially dear to the rationality of the governments of the day, that haveto provide answers to this acute problem within the time horizon oftheir administration, and long term interventions that addressstructural issues. As expressed in the multidimensional approach toviolence, its causes cannot be merely attributed to economic factors;however, addressing the problem in the long term requires attending tothe more important social integration deficits presented by LatinAmerican societies: the extreme inequality not only of income but also

in terms of assets and opportunities, and poverty, aspects that once

50


again make reference to the importance of sustained economic growthwith distributive capacity. They also mention interventions relating tounemployment and educational dropping out as risk factors that can bebetter addressed by improving the link between work and school andthe relationships between the training-education environment andcommunity and family. In the short term, addressing the risks forviolence is connected with dealing with the triggers that are "close tothe individual" and the "situational factors" referring to the relativeadvantage of the aggressors in committing the offenses. In the firstcase, the measures refer to controlling the markets for alcohol andweapons, as well as a stricter regulation of the permits to carry guns.In the situational environment, they mention improvements in theavailability of collective services such as street lighting or wide streetsand sidewalks, as well as the promotion of "safe" practices in theindividual field that, together with greater patrolling and closeness oflaw-enforcement forces to the community, are the means to overcomeconditions which favor violence and crime.

There remains pending in this issue a broad investigation agendathat also illustrates the need of having more information available onthe forms of violence, their magnitude and evolution, as well as theeffect of public and private actions designed for risk mitigation.

For a reason that is not random, the volume ends with a profoundreflection on politics and its forms that is not always present in debateson "social" issues but that is integrated in the citizen's vision of thepublic sphere. It is not by chance that the sources of legitimacy ofpolitics are associated to the performance of the social institutions andsuch performance, as Carlos Strasser acutely explores it, is notunrelated to the practices of governments and States and to theformulas with which their relationship with society is defined.

Strasser's analytical journey to account for the issue ofgovernability, governance and their interfaces with social developbegins, as in the case of the other contributions, with a review of basicconcepts that are frequently taken for granted, not less explanatory forthat reason, but subject to ambiguity and argumentative prejudice.Strasser proposes a minimum consensus to begin with on threeconcepts: democracy, governability and governance. For the first, heresorts to the normative and procedural conception, based on Bobbio

51


and Dahl. The idea of governability refers to the attainment on the part

of the political regime of a balance between the administrative actions

of the political regime and social consequences that "absorb" the

conflict or "contain" social indiscipline. Governance relates to the

adoption of participatory modalities to improve the legitimacy of

governmental action or designed to more efficiently manage the social

demands made on the State. "Good governance - says Strasser -

would in itself imply governments that are "really" legitimate and that

provide room for social participation in terms of a collection of public

governmental and non governmental actors, consensus between such

parties, bureaucracies and effective and efficient institutions and

administrations, and transparency. Ending his chapter, Strasser makes

an additional conceptual clarification of extreme importance: the

distinction between State and Government, a common sense stop for

the sciences on political affairs, but extremely eluded by technical

discourses and by governmental rhetoric itself. This preoccupation is

always essential when attempting to distinguish the challengesthrough time: the goals to be attained, the resources to achieve them.

It is a paradox that this reference to these four dimensions of

political life is regularly noted by political actors and international

organizations at a time in which the "space for politics" is clearlybeing questioned. The deliberation is today understood as a reformrestoring the practice of democracy and not as its constitutivefoundation, for example. The economic reform has taken up the fulltime of governments in an apparently technical exercise that, asStrasser clearly points out, is essentially political, as is the case of the

decision on the costs and benefits of the reform and their distribution

among the population.To examine the current situation of politics in Latin America, the

author proposes an approximation to political practice based on threedimensions: the properly democratic one, the one relating to the

political class and that of citizenship. Regarding the first dimension, heobserves that, democracy being the predominant form of governmentin the region, it is so in a barely hegemonic manner: i.e. it coexists with

a set of "forms of government" which do not reflect the basicprinciples of democratic competition summarized by the author as"majority and constitution." The identification of these forms of

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government that coexist with democracy in our societies is also anindication of the limits of governability and the exercise of a "goodgovernance". These forms gather reminiscences of the past, distant orclose, that have stood the test of history and others that have emergedin the last two decades as a result of the socioeconomic transformationsunder way. Among the first we can mention oligarchy (omnipresentand possible made more acute by the concentration trends of theeconomic model summarized in the preceding chapters of thisvolume), and bureaucracy and neocorporatism, both a product of theexpansion of the State and the production activities that developedunder its protection and which gave rise to that combination of welfareapparatus with military authoritarianism that entered a period of crisisat the beginning of the 1980's. The other two forms of governmentidentified by Strasser correspond to more recent evolutions: the rule ofthe political parties nomenclatitra and technocracy. The first onebecomes stronger with the deterioration of the corporatistarrangements and the trend towards the diminution of the social andideological underpinning of political parties, which, in turn has led totheir crisis and potential dismemberment. The second one arising fromthe economic transformation driven by the first generation of reformsthat placed the technical-economic rationality above the political needof re-election and the demand by citizens for welfare, to usePrzeworski's terms.

This gave rise to the practices that organize the situation of thepolitical class and citizen's actions in the region. The first one affectedby the gross corruption or patrimonial approach to the goods of theState. The second one consumed in the mundane need for survival,disregarding progressively the political issue that has thus been left inthe hands of intermediate representations such as those exercised bynon-governmental organizations.

Propositionally, Strasser's work points out that the policies to befosters should be first and foremost "shaped, formulated andimplemented" in a democratic-participatory way. Then he underlinesa series of related preconditions such as the critical dimensions of thecurrent political practice to be promoted: the return of politics asaffirmation of the common good; democracy without cohabitation; therestoration of representative politics that presupposes a restored

53


political class and parties; and last but not least, the expansion of the

"sense of citizenship" of the population.It is not inappropriate nor exaggerated to think that in the end, the

issues of social development, in terms of central action of public

policies, should be tackled based on a new driving force, not even

fiscal, or administrative. Possibly connected with the final phrases in

Strasser's text: "a task of political education" leading to recognize and

confront "the dense web of power".The six chapters provide a contribution for the reinvention of

the social dimension. It is not exclusive nor absolute, because

inevitably there are issues that slip away and problems that are

pushed to the sides by justified and necessary generalizations.Reinventing the social sphere is a permanent task and certainly, not

only a responsibility of academia. The social sphere is thought,

done and invented by subjective action, political practice and

discourse shaping. No more and no less.

54

CARLOS SOJO, JUAN PABLO PtREZ SAINZ

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60

CHAPTER IMAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT

OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

ROLANDO FRANCO

ROLANDO FRANCO

INTRODUCTION

It is usually said that Latin America has had world's mostregressive income distribution ever since the relevant statistics havebeen maintained (Morley, 2000). Recognizing this structural and longstanding characteristic should not, however, make us forget how muchprogress has been achieved, which places the region at an intermediatestage of development, or the slow but ongoing improvementsevidenced by its social indicators, nor is it possible to disregard thatchanges in the world economy -the process that has come to beknown as globalization- have introduced new specificities, whichneed to be taken into account in order to explain what is occurringtoday in the region and the challenges to be faced in the future.

This paper analyses the current state of social development, basedon equal opportunities and certain minimum assurances of well beingfor all. As this requires overcoming demographic, economic and socialbarriers, what it is happening in the region in those aspects isexplained. We also we propose an agenda of the key themes formaking progress in overcoming the inequalities which hinder theactualization of each individual's potential and the achievement of asociety with more social equity.

63

MAJOR THEMES IN THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

THE REGION'S RECENT EVOLUTION

The eighties form a watershed in Latin American history. It wasthen that the long period of import substitution collapsed, as a result ofthe debt crisis that was mainly created during the previous decade bythe private and public sector, and it was the beginning of the stage ofreforms that were, designed to recover macro-economic balances,redefine the function of the State, expand the ground for privateplayers, and orient these economies towards the international market.The new period has been marked by progress, stagnation and setbacks,the most outstanding characteristics of which will be analyzed later. Itshould be noted that this all took place within a framework ofrestoration of democracy.

The demographic framework

The Latin American region has gone through an acceleratedchange of key demographic values. On the one hand, there has beenan attenuation of the rate of population increase, which makes it thefirst region in which an advanced demographic transition takes placein a context of economic and social underdevelopment. Today it is atthe peak of the expansion of the youth segment, but given the rapidmoderation of growth of the young population, the trend will be for itsweight in the total population to decrease, thus facilitating theaccelerated expansion of the proportion of older adults and thesubsequent accelerated demographic aging. These transformationstake place within the framework of an "urbanization" of thepopulation and the public agenda, with a strong metropolitan focusand intra-metropolitan segregation and mobility processes.

Instability of growth

Latin America had a significant economic recovery after the "lostdecade", that peaked in 1997 with a 5.3% rate of GDP growth. Later,international financial volatility was reflected in various crises thatevidenced the vulnerability of the region, with the average growth rate

64

ROLANDO FRANCO

decreasing to 2.6% between 1995-2000 (Figure 1). This rate ofexpansion was lower than the historical rate (5.5% per annum between1945 and 1980) and also lower than that recommended for the regionin order to ensure growth, job generation and social development.

Figure 1Latin America: Annual Average Growth Rate (1954-2000)

6,0 5,7 5.6

5,0

50

1951-1960 1961-1970 1971-1980 1981-1990 1991-2000

Source: ECLAC.

A bnref recovery began in 2000, and was interrupted in 2001,when the regional product barely grew (0.5%), generating ratherdiscouraging expectations. The positive aspects are that, despite theadverse factors, the region's economies have in general managed toavoid a return to serious imbalances, inflation has continued to dropand the increase in the external deficit has been manageable.

65


Unemployment and informality

Another problem in the region lies in a high level ofunemployment that in increasing (Figure 2). This is explained not onlyby the slow economic growth, but also by the rapid incorporation ofnew technologies and the re-engineering of production processesbased-among other factors- on greater flexibility of the systems tohire and dismiss workers. The characteristics of this unemploymentare also noteworthy: it affects more people, over longer periods, thusdecisively eroding the wealth of households, producing acutepsychological effects and family problems, and forcing workers to acceptsignificantly lower salaries in order to be able to rejoin the labor market.

Figure 2Latin America: Evolution of the Rate of Open Unemployment

(1991 - 2000)

10

s,s .... .............. . ..... , ............................... ............. ... .. .. .

9- 88

1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000

Source: ECLAC

66

ROLANDO FRANCO

As for unemployment trends in the region, two situations shouldbe distinguished. Whereas Mexico and some Central American andCaribbean countries experienced considerable economic growth and areduction in unemployment, the number of unemployed increased inthe South American countries that faced stagnation problems. InChile, the unemployment rate went from 6.4% in 1996 to 10.6% in2000, and to then taped off slightly. In Argentina, a fall of 3% in theproduct increased unemployment to 14.3%, and then came the 2002collapse which, according to the Chief Economist at the Inter-American Development Bank, is the worst crisis the world has seen intimes of peace.

There has also been an increase in precariousness. This can beseen in the increase of non-permanent employment, although thereexists a very wide heterogeneity among the national cases; in 1997 itranged between 9.5% (Costa Rica) to 45.1% (Ecuador), and had anextreme increase in Colombia, where it went from 6.6% in 1980 to20.0% en 1997. This type of temporary employment is more commonin micro-businesses and among those aged under 30, women, andpersons with a low level of education (Martinez and Tokman, inECLAC, 2000:99).

By the same token, the number of employees without a laborcontract increased. In 1996, the proportion of employees in thissituation fluctuated between 22% and 65% according to the countries.A large proportion of workers do not have social security and healthprotection. There are marked national differences: they range fromover 60% in Bolivia and Paraguay to almost universal protection inUruguay (ECLAC, 2000: 101).

Unemployment also affects relatively more women, youngpeople and individuals from the lower and middle-income sectors,they encounter greater difficulties in competing in the labormarket (Figure 3).

67


Figure 3Profile of urban unemployment in countries most affected by

unemployment between 1994 and 1999

30,0

1 1994 j1999 gs 278

1 24,8 Argentina25,0- - * t Brazil

4 ~~~~~~~~~Chileot ' * ' ColombiaiVi , , Ecuador

C 20,0 - ParaguayC | | | Uruguay

E Iss | | g as ,5,8 Venezuelaiss 4 5,8 15.6

oE is |_j__

E

Etoth Men Women Young Quintile 1 QOuintile 2 QOuintle 3 Quintd. 4 Quintile 5genders people

aged 15-24

Sources: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys of therespective countries.

Poverty and indigence

Poverty is defined and measured in different ways. In LatinAmerica the concept of absolute poverty is usually used, which takesinto account the household income, and estimates whether it covers thebasic needs that are expressed as the cost of a minimum basket of foodto measure indigence, and two minimun basketsI to estimate poverty2.

This measurement, appropriate for market economies, has been carriedout for some time for a large number of countries in the region.

I The Orshansky coefficient is the value by which the cost of the food basket is multiplied toaccount for other basic needs. This value increases with the country's level of development andis estimated by means of special surveys, to determine the share that food has in the consumptionof these population strata. For more details, see ECLAC 200 1.

2 Note the difference both in the definition and in the way of measuring it as compared to thosenormally used by OECD, the World Bank and other international agencies and governments.

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ROLANDO FRANCO

During the 1990s, poverty decreased in 11 and increased in 4countries. In the period under consideration, 43.8% of the LatinAmerican population was below the poverty line; this implied animprovement over the situation at the end of the 1980s (48.3%), but itis still greater than the proportion of the population that was poorbefore the debt crisis, which was 40.5% (Figure 4). The absolutenumber of poor reached 211,400,000 in 1999 (Figure 5), which is wasmainly due to the fact that demographic growth was still high(ECLAC, 2001b). In that year, there were 89 million extremely poorpeople, which was 18.5% of the total population, a proportion higherthan two decades previously.

Figure 4Latin America:

Percentage of the population living in poverty and indigence

60

50

4040,5% 48,3% 45,7% 43,5% 43,8%

0)

E

0)

20

1980 1990 1994 1997 1999

D Poverty

Indigence

Source: ECLAC

69


Figure 5Latin America: Numbers of poor and indigent in the population,

1980-1999 (in millions)

240

200

CO 160135,9 200,2 201,5 203,8 211,4

120

93A4 g1.6 68,8 80,41

4: -

62.4

1980 1990 1994 1997 1999

j Indigence Poverty

Source: ECLAC

The generational factor is relevant. Between 1990 and 1999, thetotal number of poor aged under 20 increased from 110 to 114 million.This creates a major regional challenge since "most of the lifetimeopportunities are determined by the start in life" (ECLAC/UNICEF/SECIB, 2001).

The geographical or regional location is also important. Theincidence of rural poverty is higher than that of urban poverty (64%and 37% of the population, respectively), despite which the number ofurban poor is almost double that of rural poor (134 million and 77million, respectively), as a result of the remarkable urbanizationprocess that has taken place in Latin American countries.

70

ROLANDO FRANCO

Income Distribution

During the 1980s, governments focused their concern oneconomic growth and poverty alleviation. It was assumed that bothobjectives would be achieved by regaining macroeconomic balances,ending inflation, withdrawing the State from certain areas, andexpanding the spaces for the private sector. Income distribution wasnot a public policy objective. Today, however, it has regained space,both because economic growth has not improved it, and because

economic debate relates it to three relevant issues.As opposed to the traditional argument that, at least during the

initial phases of the development process, income tends to concentratein those with the capacity to save and invest, it is asserted that a moreequalitarian income distribution promotes economic growth: the moreunequal a country, the less effective growth will be in reducing poverty(Lustig et al., 2001). Others state that it is not possible for LatinAmerica to grow at rates higher than 3% or 4% precisely because halfof its population does not take part in the growth effort, owing its lowshare of national income and its poverty (Birdsall, 1998).

It has also been argued that there is now "unnecessary" poverty inLatin America (Berry, 1997) since if the [already concentrated]income distribution of the beginning of the eighties had beenmaintained, the increase in the number of poor derived from the crisiswould have been 50% less (Londonio and Szekely, 1997). It has alsobeen recalled that if Latin America had the income distributioncorresponding to its level of development in accordance withinternational standards, the incidence of poverty would be half of whatit actually is" (IDB, 1998).

Lastly, it is asserted that the reduction of inequality increases thestability of democratic political systems, while concentration createsrisks derived from the reaction of the groups that loose out.

This new importance given to income distribution has led to

greater interest in looking at the situation of Latin America in the1990s, making use of several indicators.

71


The percentage of households with an income of less than halfofthe below society 's average increased in 9 countries and only decreasedin 3 during the 1990s (Figure 6), which also indicates an increase ininequality as a characteristic of the region as a whole (Figure 6).

Graph 6Latin America (16 countries): Percentage of persons with income of less

than half the average a/, 1990-1999

1990 1999Colombia _ i

Brazdl 74.6 ;u 77.6Guatemala 3 _.ENicaragua 72.9 ; _ii. 74.9

Chile 74.0 74.5Mex-co 752 F D__ _-____ _creased -- I :

Argentina b, 72.0 ; I|_ _ 73

Ecuador 609.8 , i . ._ .*Panama 70.5 ; iEi== =i_ 71.t

Bolivia c/ 71.3 7i ,,| 1Honduras 73.4 1 d 71 6

Panaguav dv 68.4 70.6Venezuela c/ 69.4 *,75

El Salvador 69.8 Iereased X 68.1

Uruguay 7223 Decreased i 67.9

Costa Rica 64.7 67.4

100 60 60 40 20 0 20 40 60 60 100

a/ The blue bars indicate an increase in income concentration, and the yellow barsindicate a decrease.

b/ The initial year is 1994.c/ The figure for the initial year (1989) refers only to eight major cities and El

Alto.d/ Greater Buenos Airese/ Urban totalf/ Metropolitan area of Asunci6n in 1990

Source: ECLAC, on the basis of special tabulations of the household surveys of therespective countries.

The Gini coefficient shows that in the period 1990-99, inequalityincreased in 8 countries and was reduced only in 3 (Figure 7), but withmajor differences among the countries of the region. In this respect,the extremes are represented by Brazil and Uruguay.

72

ROLANDO FRANCO

Figure 7Latin America (16 countries):

Changes in the Gini Coefficient of income distribution, a/ 1990-1999

1990 1999

1raz-l 062; r I 05640

Bom 053b / l __ 0 58

Nicaragua 0.50 2 l 0 584

Guatemala 0.582 0 I82

Colomb,a c: J w1x Decreased 0 572

Paraguay d' 0 447 0.565

IHonduras 1 5 . . Decreased 0 564

Chile t 4 0558

Panama 0.5i60 0 557

Argentma e, I ol 0 542

Mestca 0.536ll 0 539

Ecuador C l 461 0.621

El Salvador 1I 507 0.518

Venezuelac/ 0 471 0.493

Carta Rica 0.438 . 0 473

Uruguay f J492 lDecreased 0.440

1C 0 0S 0.6 04 0.2 C0 02 0.4 o.e os 1.


a/ Calculated on the basis of the per capita income distribution for the country asa whole. The blue bars indicate an increase in income concentration, and theyellow bars indicate a decrease.

b/ The figure for the initial year (1989) refers only to eight major cities and ElAlto.

c/ The initial year is 1994d/ Metropolitan area of Asunci6n in 1990e/ Greater Buenos Airesf/ Urban Total

The ratio between the income obtained by the richest 10% of thepopulation and the 40% with lowest income is very expressive of

distribution problems in Latin America: the upper 10% receives, inmost countries, over 35%, and in general, the income of that segmentis 20 times that of the poorest 40% (Figure 8).

73


Figure 8Latin America: (17 countries): Share of total income of the 40% poorest

and the 10% richest households, 1999 a/ (in percentages)

A,g ent- bl

\en«rtaeIs - _,BSo ci

Liuua cI 4 -, Brail

Dommican Republ, C, V' i.

Proouoy (. /j Z

Panama ;c .1.N -. 1r 9 u ' ' , ' ' ;.E -1fd C

| 4 0 .do n' 3S r o b r e t ' > / on'xRh

-40% ns>: pobre __Mexico >_

4Slvod.r

10% wa, riCOFronnaurOs Gu .ton&sl


a/ Households throughout the country, ranked by per capita incomeb/ Greater Buenos Airesc/ Urban Total

Political unrest

Public opinion has been affected by the economic and socialfluctuations that have occurred over the past decade. At the beginningof the 1990s, Latin Americans' main concern was on the inflationaryprocesses that were eroding their income. Those governments thatachieved success in stabilization received electoral backing (Mora yAraujo, 1992). Workers in some sectors, especially in the publicsector, reacted to the relative losses of salaries and benefits (ECLAC,1996). The rest of the people expected to receive their share of thefruits of growth in the future.

Today, in contrast, uncertainty prevails. The economic and socialsituation described above has contributed to diluting hopes and in

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ROLANDO FRANCO

many cases has made people weary of permanent adjustment.Opinion surveys conducted in 16 countries point out thatapproximately 67% of the respondents considered that the distributionof wealth is unfair and 61% said their country was not developing(ECLAC, 1998a).

Obviously, such opinions are strongly rooted in the personalexperiences of those who express them. The feeling is not the sameamong emerging groups as among those coming out of poverty, oramong the members of now impoverished middle sectors, that cancompare their current standard of living with what they enjoyed in thepast. There are also other differences. The current generation feels thatthere are less opportunities available to it than those offered to theprevious generation and to the succeeding one (Latinobar6metro,2000:11). It is very common for young people to express dissatisfactionon account of the difficulties they face in finding a job that correspondsto their aspirations. This perception seems to be based on thedevelopment of the labor market and the difficulties of findingemployment for young people with insufficient educational capital.

In Chile -where the economic reforms have matured more thanelsewhere and where significant levels of growth have been attained,there are indications of a growing concern regarding inequality thathas tended to displace poverty conceived in terms of a lack ofresources. This change implies that the population pays particularattention to the different pace at which the benefits of economicprogress reach different sectors in society (Manzi and Catalan,1998:555). The respondents from low and middle sectors considerthat the current levels of poverty and inequality are not consistent withthe growth achieved. They believe that this disparity derives from thedynamics of the system itself and from decision-makers, who arecriticized for their lack of sensitivity.

This all results in disenchantment with political activity, whetherbecause of disappointment or because it is no longer perceived to bethe apppropriate arena to conduct the defense of group interests.However, there is still support for democracy as the best system ofgovernment, although only 37% of Latin Americans are satisfied withits performance (Latinobar6metro, 2000:6).

75


THE SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AGENDA

The complex social scenario described above shows that the LatinAmerican challenge for the new century will be the construction ofmore developed and more equitable societies, in which equality beforethe law is ensured, and the economic and social limitations that hinderthe realization of each individual's potential are compensated.Inequality in access to goods and services and, in general, toconsumption, is usually based on some attribute (ethnicity, age,gender, social economic origin, etc.) that, under certain circumstances,is used to justify discrimination that goes against human rights. Thelack of participation in societal decision-making by those who suffersuch situations constitutes a double obstacle for the realization of theindividual's potential, because it hinders the exercise of politicalcitizenship and likewise prevents the defence of individual and groupinterests and obstructs social citizenship (Marshall, 1950).

Social development requires an agreement between the variousplayers taking part in economic and social decision-making, around anagenda with the following main issues: developing more egalitariansocieties, that are concerned with overcoming poverty andincorporating into the consumer society those sectors that today areexcluded from it, and that allow for social mobility.

Towards more egalitarian societies

The recent decades have not allowed for progress in the reductionof inequalities. It is important to emphasize however, that theseproblems do not exist only in this period since they also characterizedthe previous one and those that preceded it. Thus, they reflect, and thisshould not be concealed, fundamental problems of the economic andsocial structure (Ocampo, 2000: 125).

Likewise, the trend towards inequality is not -at least today-exclusive to Latin America. It is also present in the developed world,although at other levels of concentration. In the United States ofAmerica, for example, several analysts have underlined that information

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ROLANDO FRANCO

technologies increase employment and income opportunities for"symbolic analysts", the designation given to highly qualifiedworkers dedicated to the production of knowledge-intensiveimmaterial goods (Reich, 1993). Conversely, the workers on theassembly line are affected by the growing demand for computerskills, and because companies transfer routine productionprocesses to other countries (Thurow, 1992). Likewise, strikingdifferences have been perceived in the European Communitybetween the level of compensation of the better-off sectors of thepopulation, which is increasing in a significant manner andemployment opportunities, the characteristics of the type of jobsthey obtain and the remuneration of individuals in the bottom 40%(Dahrendorf, 1996:44). This has given rise in those societies to adebate on "tolerable" inequality and feasible alternatives todevelop (or maintain) the protection of those who are vulnerable(Giddens, 1998).

The efforts to make progress in reducing inequality in LatinAmerica are affected by the characteristics imposed by globalizationbut also by specific factors in the region which are not modifiable inthe short term. There are four of special relevance. First, thedistribution of wealth in the region is even more concentrated than that

of total income. Its average concentration is in the 8 5th percentile(ECLAC, 1998a), which indicates that 85% of the Latin Americanpopulation has access to wealth that is lower than society's averagelevel. Secondly, there is also a demographic component, since thelower income households have more members (on average five ormore people) than higher income households. Thirdly, there is still ahigh concentration of the educational capital. Only half of those whostart primary school complete it and those who do manage to completeit have a much lower performance than their counterparts inindustrialized countries. Also, the rate of those repeating school yearsis high. Of the 9 million children who begin their schooling on anannual basis, around 4 million fail in the first year. It is calculated thatthe additional cost of teaching those who repeat amounts to 4.2 billiondollars per year. Fourthly,, the occupational density, i.e. the number

77


of people in relation to the total household members, accounts to agreat extent for the differences in household income. In somecountries, the value of this indicator for the high segment is double thatof the low segment. Given the importance that labor income has in thetotal household income, this difference would explain a good share ofthe high distribution concentration. The gaps separating those foundin the first decile of income distribution and those in the bottom 40percent is increased by the already-noted growing gap between thelevels of remuneration for modem occupations and for lowproductivity jobs (Figure 9).

Figure 9Latin America: Labor compensation gaps between skilled

and unskilled workers (1990 - 1997)

350 - t 1990

300- 1994 294,6 3031997

250- 241,3

200- 178,6 181,8

154,7

150-

Professionals / Formal workers Proiessionals t Informal workers

Source: ECLAC.

Emphasis is usually placed on the importance of education for

competitiveness and also for improving income distribution. This is

undoubtedly an appropriate recommendation, but any efforts made inthat direction will not translate into distribution improvements within

the next decade. The reason for this is that the turnover of individualsin the labor force takes place at a rate of 2% or 3% per year, meaning

that 80% of the workers who will be in employment until the end of

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ROLANDO FRANCO

the next decade are already incorporated in the labor market. Theywill not benefit from the educational improvements.

The concern for building more egalitarian societies extendsbeyond the areas of the economy and material well-being. There areother forms of equality without which no good society can exist.Some are even prerequisites for the good operation of the marketitself. This is the case of equality under the law, which is proclaimedin Latin American Constitutions but far from occurring in reality. Thereforms in the justice systems that are taking place in some of thecountries of the region constitute a recognition of the existing deficits,that also occur in other places where no progress has yet been made.Another inescapable requirement is to secure equality ofopportunities, which implies removing the connections existingbetween the possibilities of well-being and certain personalcharacteristics that cannot be modified or are only altered withdifficulty (ethnicity, gender), or which are derived from being born ina family with certain attributes (socio-economic level, caste, etc.).

Summing up, even when priority is given to freedom, the equalityof freedoms should be ensured; that is to be equally concerned, atwhatever level, for all the individuals involved (Sen, 1999:7).

It is also necessary to promote the equality of opportunities forexpressing thoughts. In any country, there are many perspectives onhow society should be organized, and individuals, communities andgroups of different types should be able to take their own perspectiveand develop their "differential acts", which leads to cultural pluralityand to the right to express their preferences and to organize themselvesto uphold them in democratic debate.

Many of these principles are fundamental for an adequatefunctioning of democracy. The principle of "one man, one vote" hasto be respected for democracy to work. There is therefore arequirement for civic equality. Although there is talk of the "politicalmarket", it is not acceptable for the (economic) market to determinepolitical decisions. Thus, safeguards should be instituted so that thosewho have different weights and values in the market on the basis ofwhat they have, acquire equal weight and value at the time ofexercising their civic and political, social and labor, judgmental and

79


The United Nations Millennium Summit has set the goal ofreducing extreme poverty by half in the coming 15 years. What arethe possibilities of the Latin American and Caribbean countries ofdoing so? To go from 18% to 9% indigence, the region has so maintainan annual economic growth of 3.8% (Table 1). If the region isconsidered to be at an intermediate development stage, however,perhaps the challenge should be greater. ECLAC has therefore insistedthat the goal should be to reduce poverty (not indigence) by half. Inthat case, the necessary level of economic growth would be 4.4% peryear. The recent economic performance, however, as has been seen,is far from permitting the attainment not just of the more ambitiousgoals, but also of those less challenging.

Table 1Latin America: Economic growth rate required to reduce by half the

proportion of the population in extreme poverty over the next fifteen years(target of the Millennium Summit)

Extreme poverty (%) Growth (yearly average)

Current Target Total GDP GDP p/c

Latin America 18 9 3,8 2,3

Countries with 11 5,5 3,5 2,2

least poverty

Countries with 25 12,5 4,5 2,7most poverty

Source: ECLAC.1/ In relation to the regional average in 1999.

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Social mobility

An open and modem society, concerned with equity, should becharacterized by the fluidity of its social mobility. One way ofensuring a good performance of social roles is for possibilities orincentives to exist for access to better paid or higher status positions,on the basis of personal merit. In traditional societies, in contrast, rolesare assigned on the basis of principles that reserve such positionsaccording to factors determined by birth.

In the first phases of development, there is a sort of "structural"mobility, whereby new positions of a better level are rapidlycreated, to which access is gained even without sufficient training toexercise such functions. In more advanced phases, mobility becomes"circular", in the sense that less new positions are generated andchange occurs by turnover; that is, some of those occupying higherpositions leave them (owing to retirement, death or unemployment)and the individuals who replace them must have adequatecredentials (Pastore and Silva, 2000:5).

Studies show that, in the region, only two out of each four urbanyouths had educational mobility, and one of each rural four. Conse-quently, it may be concluded that the probability of social mobility hasremained is practically unchanged since 1980 (ECLAC, 1998a).Changing this pattern is strongly linked to the educational system.

It should be noted here that merit-based societies, where positionsare performed as a consequence of possessing certain capabilities,may result in exclusion and poverty for those who do not have them.

Special reference should be made to a form of horizontal socialmobility which is international migration. It has shown strong andsustained growth between the countries of the region and from variouszones of Latin America towards the developed countries, in spite ofthose countries' restrictive entry policies.

Migration, on the one hand, generates problems of illegality,border control and vulnerability of the immigrants, who on occasion arethe victims criminal groups. But, on the other hand, it tends to generateimprovements in the living conditions of those who migrate, because

83


they move to countries needing labor and with salary levels that arehigher than those prevailing in the areas of origin of the migrants.These migrants have also demonstrated a saving capacity whichallows them to send money back to their relatives remaining in thecountries of origin. These remittances, undoubtedly, have a greatsocial and economic potential. According to the IDB MultilateralInvestment Fund (MIF) the region receives annually some 20 billiondollars from emigrants living in the United States. For six LatinAmerican countries, the remittances represent over 10% of their grossdomestic product. It is calculated that in 2001, the money sent bySalvadoreans residing abroad amounted to more than the cost of theeconomic damage caused by the earthquakes that the country sufferedduring that year. In larger countries such as Mexico, they undoubtedlyrepresent a lesser proportion of the national income, but they still areone of the main sources of hard currency. Such remittances can alterincome distribution in the receiving countries, because the likelytargets are low income families.

The links with the emigrants are an important connection for theircountries of origin. In the first place, they form a market for traditionalgoods -especially food products- which stimulates the productionof those goods in the country of origin. Secondly, they boost the localeconomy of small rural communities where the recipients of theremittances live. Thirdly, qualified emigrants (whose training wasfinanced by the underdeveloped countries of origin and will be takenadvantage of by the developed receiving countries) who maintain linkswith their country can become a transmission link contributing to thecountry's modernization and to the establishment of academicnetworks.

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HOW CAN THE AGENDA BE FULFILLED?

Public policy perspectives

Public policies are critical for the achievement of the objectives ofgrowth and equity by means of appropriate economic and socialdecisions. A good economic policy has positive social effects, since ittranslates into growth, which is a fundamental condition for creatingjobs and improving salaries. Even if only occupations with lowproductivity and low income are created, as has predominantly been thecase over the last few years, they allow poor households to increasetheir occupational density and, consequently, their per capita income,which increases the probability that they will be able to escape poverty.The importance of the existence of a second contributor to householdincome becomes evident when extreme quintiles of distribution arecompared (Figure 1). Likewise, growth generates more publicrevenues that can be used to finance social policies.

Figure 1 1Latin America: Primary families with more than one income earner,

1999 (percentages)

H§ j10. 1'

;0l-> ~~~~I 0 Q- . 0 I t e w

Source ECA, bae on 1 seil tblan of th _oshlssreso h

re spe ctv countries.rn 8 -

~~~~~~~.~~~~~ D. - un12 . Cun,,2

Source: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of the households surveys of therespective countries.

85


On the other hand, it is clear that social policies assist economicgrowth by generating human capital and have an influence, directlyand indirectly, on poverty reduction and improving living conditions.However, they cannot be considered exclusively responsible for thewell-being of the population. The latter can only be the result of acombination of good economic policy with the right social policies.

The three basic functions of social policies, which it is important toemphasize here, are investment in human capital, social compensationand social cohesion.

a) Investment in human capital: education, health, housing.When the main production factor is knowledge, it is no longernecessary to resort only to ethical, philanthropic or solidarityarguments to justify the convenience of implementing socialpolicies. Countries cannot become competitive if they lack a welleducated and trained labor force, that can incorporate suchknowledge in their work. It is therefore possible to think ofcompetitiveness and equity as objectives that can be pursuedsimultaneously and are mutually reinforcing. From this point ofview, social policies geared to investigating in human capitalbecome a prerequisite for economic growth.

Human capital is also crucial for the purpose of having welfareopportunities. However, it is necessary to recognize that in thesesocieties it is an inherited asset. There is an intergenerationaltransmission of welfare opportunities (ECLAC, 1998a), throughseveral linkages.

First of all, the household of origin has a fundamental role ineducational performance. Several factors are influential: i) the socio-economic level which affects nutrition and access to health; ii) theliving conditions (whether there is crowding or not) which underlinesthe importance of housing policies; iii) the family organization (whichcan be single-parent, or with both parents present, and the type of unionalso has an influence); and iv) educational climate, defined as thenumber of years of schooling completed by adults in the household.

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Secondly, school is a critical link, which demonstrates theimportance of policies for infrastructure construction, expansion ofcoverage, student retention and improvement of the quality ofeducation, such as student training, classroom dynamics and teachingmethods, libraries and curriculum. At this point, it is important to notethe effect of non-school factors, which require efforts designed tocompensate for them. This is the only way to prevent the educationalsystem from operating as a mechanism for the reproduction of pre-existing differences.

Another two phenomena of education that need to be consideredin the process of generating human capital are educational devaluationand the educational threshold.

Educational devaluation is the loss of importance of certainacademic levels as their attainment becomes widespread; in the end, itaccounts for the need to have ever more years of formal education inorder to gain access to the same job or to obtain a salary similar towhat the preceding generation attained with a lower level of formaleducation. Experience shows that the lower the educational level, thegreater the devaluation.

The educational threshold, in turn, is the minimum number ofyears of schooling required at each point in time to obtain a job thatensures a high probability of avoiding poverty throughout life.Currently it is around 12 years (CEPAL, 1999b) and is only attainedby one third of young people in urban areas and one tenth in ruralareas. This aspect is critical for establishing the responsibility of theState regarding the years of schooling that should be made available tothe population. What was reasonable for the previous generation istotally insufficient today. Basic education is no longer enough for areasonable entry into the labor force.

Occupation is another link in the chain. Those with less than 8years of schooling will only be able to obtain jobs providing incomein the region of around two and a half poverty lines, which isinsufficient for a minimum level of well-being. At the other extreme,those with 12 or more years of schooling will become technicians,managers or proprietors, and, in those occupations, will obtain incomeabove four poverty lines. Those who are in an intermediate position

87


(9 -11 years of schooling) in general will work as salespersons or insimilar professions, receiving an income which, at certain stages of thelife cycle -when they have formed a family and their children reachadolescence- may not provide them with a minimum welfare level(CEPAL, 1998a).

Thus, the future of the new generations is decided at an early stage,with a division between integrated and the excluded, the latter beingthose with insufficient education to occupy well-paid jobs. They willnot obtain adequate living conditions, nor will they be in a position tocontribute to competitiveness, as they lack the knowledge and theflexibility to use technical progress into contributing to production.

b) Social compensation: social protection networks. The fight toovercome poverty and indigence will remain a core issue. Socialprotection networks i.e. those sets of compensatory interventionswhich increase income and other wealth by means of targetedtransfers, and are specifically designed to sustain or increase thewelfare of the poor or vulnerable groups in periods of economictransition [or crisis] (Graham, 1994), acquire importance.

Such networks should be stable. For that reason they need to bepart of permanent institutional systems, with specialized staff andeligibility mechanisms for the beneficiaries of their services, as well asproject portfolios to be implemented, with proven monitoring andevaluation methodologies. Otherwise, they will not be in a position toprovide a timely response to protection needs at times of crisis.

Since the eighties, such protection has been based on emergencyemployment programs, programs to combat poverty, and socialinvestment funds, in an attempt to supplement traditional socialassistance programs. Yet it is also appropriate to use measures to maintainemployment, by moving forward scheduled infrastructure investments orpromoting public works in communities that have faced natural disastersor unfavorable economic circumstances (Iglesias, 2001).

It is inherent to the nature of such programs that they operateduring periods of recession; that is to say, at times when the economyis contracting. Yet little attention is usually paid to this aspect, although

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it has been demonstrated that in a typical recessionary process, socialexpenditure focused on the poor decreases 2% for each 1% ofcontraction of the product (Hicks and Wodon, 2001). Summing up, theresources that would be necessary to overcome the emergency were notforeseen. The counter cyclical feature that should characterize thenetwork was not considered.

The decision on resources goes beyond social policy and relates tofiscal polices, which are usually procyclical, basically becausegovernments find it hard to resist political pressures to increaseexpenditure during times of economic boom. This not only prevents thesetting up of a pool of reserves that could finance a social protectionnetwork at the time it needs to operate (during recession), but alsoaffects the government's credibility vis-a-vis creditors which becomereluctant to grant new loans or demand higher interest rate.

The solution could be found in the establishment of a flexiblefiscal rule that requires maintaining a moderate and forecasted surplusduring boom periods and the creation of a stabilization fund to financesocial protection networks during times of crisis (Perry, 2002).

c) Social Cohesion. An integrated society is one in which thepopulation behaves according to socially accepted patterns and itgenerates an adjustment between the cultural goals, the structureof opportunities to attain them and the generation of individualskills to take advantage of such opportunities. Clearly, there arealways behaviors which do not adjust to such guidelines, that canaffect social cohesion or produce disintegration processes, andthey are usually connected with exclusion phenomena; that is, tocircumstances in which society does not make available adequatemeans (opportunities) to achieve the goals of the respective culture(ECLAC, 1997:111.73).

The concern for cohesion does not imply a search forhomogenization. On the contrary, it is important to ensure respect forindividual cultural identities and to value diversity together with thecontributions derived from creativity. For that reason, a cohesivesociety is one that shares global objectives and standards, and makes

89


room for a broad gamut of particular goals of individual and groups.This has special importance in multi-ethnic and multi-culturalsocieties.

The incorporation of those who are excluded as a result ofdifferent types of discrimination (ethnic, gender based, etc.) is apending task. In this regard, affirmative action or positive discriminationis a fundamental means of making progress in overcoming ascribedinequalities and the problems of low levels of integration in the region(poverty, social segmentation, residential segregation), with theaddition of phenomena that are perhaps not new, but have currentlyreached a heightened relevance, such as the different forms of violence,urban insecurity, drug trafficking and corruption.

Principles guiding social policy

Social policy should pursue universality and impact. To this end itneeds to resolve the issues of the institutional framework, throughwhich its programs will be carried out, and efficiency in employing theresources available. Instruments such as targeting and appropriatemethodologies for monitoring and evaluation will be used.

Universal coverage has been part of the traditional discourse ofLatin American governments, and it has been interpreted as the effortto deliver equal services to all, as a way of contributing to socialintegration. But Latin American practice has always shown notoriousdelivery inequalities, and for these reasons there are references tocases of exclusionary universal coverage and stratijied coverage(Gordon, 1996). The former gives emphasis to those who are leftunprotected; while the second accentuates that although many aretaken care of, the service provided varies in terms of quality andquantity. Such differences do not relate to greater or lesser needs, butto the status of the beneficiaries. Those who are better covered belongto the more educated, better informed, more organized sectors, or theylive in areas with better service delivery and have the resources to

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afford the transaction costs (transportation, time), that are incurred inreceiving the services. In contrast, access to services has always beendifficult for those who, although having greater needs, lack the abovecharacteristics.

In the field of education, for example, although the Constitutionsestablish that the State has the obligation of ensuring a certain numberof years of schooling for the population, there is a sizeable proportionof each cohort which does not even start school and another whichdrops out rapidly. The lower income groups are overrepresentedamong the excluded.

Universal services thus understood have high costs and lowimpact. It is evident that providing equal service to all will be veryexpensive. To adjust it to the resources available, the quality of servicesis usually decreased and, therefore, almost surely the impact of theprogram on the beneficiaries is degraded, or, instead, "universality" iscut back on the basis of non-transparent criteria which orient servicestowards the groups mentioned, to the detriment of the neediest.

Universal services should therefore be understood as seeking tosatisfy the actual needs of all people. To overcome the existingdifferences, it is necessary to provide equal treatment to those who aresocioeconomically unequal, by means of affirmative action or positivediscrimination. Thus, for the children of poor families to go to schooland stay there, requires assigning, in addition to good quality education,more extended school hours to compensate for the limitations thatoriginate at home. It likewise requires providing nutritional programsand, even, grants for the opportunity cost implied in choosing schoolrather than a job (Levin, 1995). Programs such as Bolsa Scola of Brazilhave precisely the purpose of tackling that aspect.

These details are necessary because in the last few years greatconfusion has been generated between the instruments -such astargeting- and the principles which should guide social sectorreforms (Ocampo, 2000). Fortunately, there is now a growingconsensus that targeting is not opposed to the universalisation of socialrights and even less it implies disassembling acquired rights, rather itis a form of positive discrimination for particular groups in thepopulation that need special attention if they are to be effectively given

91


access to socially produced wealth and goods and services, that canplace them in a decent situation (Silva and Silva, 2001:14). There hasalso been agreement on the fact that targeting does not mean reducingexpenditure on social programs, but rather increasing the effectivenessof social spending (Draibe, 1997:24, in Silva and Silva et al, 2001:139).From the above, it may be concluded that there is a growing consensusthat targeting should be considered an instrument for social services togain universal coverage, and never a substitute for universality(Ocampo, 2001).

Along the same lines, Barry (2001:52), when attempting to recoverthe "difference-blind" classic liberal principles states that theuniversality of economic and social rights constitutes an advance withinthe tradition of Enlightment. He understands that this frameworkincludes affirmative action, to assist those groups whose memberssuffer systematic deprivations, provided that 'deprivation' is defined inuniversal terms, such as the lack of things (resources and opportunities),possession of which would generally be considered advantageous. Andhe concludes by asserting that such targeting on those suffering fromsystematic deficits would be a way of helping satisfy the egalitarianliberal demand that certain individuals should not have less resourcesand opportunities than others when inequality has been the product ofcircumstances in the generation of which they had no responsibility.

The institutional framework relates to the role of the State and ofother actors in social policy. In the last few years, civil society and themarket have been given more participation, and it has been sought thatother jurisdictions assume responsibilities and use their own andtransferred resources for social policy However, in practice the Statehas continued to have great importance and this has surely had aninfluence in the growing abandonment of the more radical positions inthe contemporary theoretical discussion.

The Latin American historical trend has been one of centralization,both in the typical predominant unitarian matrix, and in the hiddencentralism characterizing those countries which adopted federalstructures. In the last few years, however, the experiences of socialpolicies, especially those designed to overcome poverty, have revealedmany of the defects of centralism, which leads to decision-making

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without adequate consideration of local characteristics and preferhomogeneous solutions for heterogeneous realities. This has led tomany decentralization efforts that attempted to promote localparticipation and to create conditions for programs and their executionto be controlled by the beneficiaries. It also showed, that at the locallevel it is possible to calculate more accurately the costs and benefitsof the actions to be implemented and that there is even room forexperiments with alternative methods to deliver the same service. Notall decentralization experiences were successful. Perhaps in many ofthe failures, the lack of experience in decision-making regardingissues in their own interest played a role. It is usually said that theproblems of democracy are only solved with more democracy,although attention should also be drawn to the community utopia lyingbehind many decentralization approaches that seem to believe that atthat level there is no power, or infighting for scarce resources, orcorruption risks. In that sense, the future perspective in terms of theinstitutional framework should lean towards avoiding generaldecisions, learning from existing experiences, taking into account localcapacities on a case-by-case basis, and reinforcing that level where itshows weaknesses that prevent an adequate execution of projects,while defining the quantum of decentralization which is possible ineach case. There will always be functions more suited to a central level,that should not be delegated, such as those of a normative, orsurveillance nature, and others such as those relating to funding which,even if desired, cannot be totally transferred. But it is necessary toovercome the attitude, that the State knows best, which are theproblems and how to solve them, and create spaces for the participationof other social actors and other jurisdictional levels, asserting that thecapacity to innovate is disseminated throuighout society.

It is not possible to carry out effective social policies withoutresources. For that reason, it is appropriate to review what hashappened with social spending. As a consequence of the crisis of the1980's, many countries, although not all, have reduced socialspending. During the 1990's, in contrast, Latin America and theCaribbean devoted a record amount of resources to social issues, bothin terms of the share of GDP (Figure 12) and in the amount of dollars

93


per capita allocated for that purpose (Figure 13). Social spending perinhabitant increased by 50% during the 1990's going from 360 dollarsto 540 dollars per capita as the regional average, with only twocountries recording a decrease in real terms. The increase was higherthan the growth of the product per inhabitant. Over the decade, therelative importance of social allocations thus increased from 10.4% to13.1% of GDP.

Figure 12Latin America (17 countries): Social public spending as a percentage of

GDP, 1990-1991 and 1998-1999.

C,E

'A~ l181'Prg- --tin- -- -

Pananma1?7 1S*

- 186b, 127

Mexa ico a18 'e10§10

t6axica _, - 71124 , 6l

Penu_.

Do-,mca Aepbkri 6 e 7.

; [33~~~~8

62~~~~~2R Meninioa 16 6 *16

El Sabk11-1 _ 4 3

AMERICA LATINAt bl

oa so roo lso16 200 25 0

Social spending as a % of GDP

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social spending data base

a/ The initial figure is the average for 1994-1995

b/ Simple average of the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador.

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ROLANDO FRANCO

Figure 13Latin America (17 countries):

Social public spending per inhabitant, 1990-1991 and 1998-1999(in 1997 dollars) Social spending per capita (1997 dollars)

Argentna i : , ;

Uruguay um mmmBnazil 1011

Chile " 4.0; 2

Panama a#4

Colombia 211E §o1c

Venezuela e 2 , , 0 1C

Domnican Rgpub-c *3

Paraguay 122

El Salvadora - on ,

Nicaragua * 7 §

Ameonca Lorina bi sod1 1'

C.I-N~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~' C I

0 200 4100 bOO 600 1000 120U 14JO 16O0 B800

Source: ECLAC, Social Development Division, social spending data basea! The initial figure is the average for 1994-1995b/ Simple average of the countries, excluding Bolivia and El Salvador.a

It should be noted that there are significant variations in themagnitude of spending, among the countries. While Argentina andUruguay had social spending in excess of 1,500 dollars per inhabitant,Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala were below 100dollars. These are clearly different situations. Some countries need toincrease the available resources, which requires a commitment fromboth Government and civil society, and the support of internationalcooperation. In others, the greatest concern should focus on maintaining-given the prevailing economic situation the level of resources forsocial purposes that were made available during the 1990's.

In both situations, however, it is essential that efforts be made tomake better use of the available resources in order to increase theirredistributional impact. Although some budget items may be

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redistributive, social spending as a whole is not so to a sufficientdegree. If a monetary value is given to the services people receive as aresult of public policies, excluding social security, distributionimproves and it may be stated that the 20% poorest householdsreceive a fraction of social spending that on average is six-fold their

share of primary income distribution (28.2% of social spending ascompared to 4.8% of total income). Such transfers represent 43% ofthe receipts of the lower income strata. In spite of this, the less needycontinue to receive a huge proportion of social spending, when socialsecurity is included.

The "window of opportunity" that the increased social spendinggave to the region, which was furthermore accompanied by what has

been called the "demographic bonus" 5 has not been fully takenadvantage of. A high level of spending does not necessarily correspondto wise spending. Resources can be used with greater or lesserefficiency and programs can produce different impacts: they mayimprove the deficits existing at the time the program was started, be

neutral, or even make things worse.For that reason, the pending tasks of Latin American social policy

include improving the efficiency of use of the scarce resources, and the

impact of programs.Efficiency seeks the alternative that will minimize the costs per unit

of output (goods or services) supplied by the program. Many times thisis considered "narrowly economic", which overlooks the fact thatresources are always scarce, while needs are growing. What is badlyspent in one case will not be available to cover a different need.

Yet pure efficiency does not justify programs. They have to reachthe objective for which they are implemented. In education, forexample, the aim pursued is not building schools or paying teachers.

5 The "demographic bonus" is the advantage for the Latin American region derived from a slowerpopulation growth, which causes an increase in the proportion of adults in the total population,so that, in theory, there is a reduction of the dependency rate (CEPAL/CELADE/IDB, 1996).

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These are only the means to achieve the true end, which is to provideknowledge and values to the students. Therefore, in social policy thekey issue is the impact, which consists of the magnitude of the benefitreceived by the target population as a result of the program. Thus, in anutritional program, it is about assessing the percentage of reduction ingrade 1 and 2 malnutrition in the target group (Cohen and Franco, 1992).

The concern for efficiency and impact demands paying specialattention to targeting. To target is to identify the potential beneficiariesas precisely as possible and to design the program with the objectiveof ensuring a high per capita impact on the selected group, usingmonetary transfers or delivering goods or services (Franco, 1 990a and1995). This is the way to improve program design, since the moreprecisely identified the problem (deficits to be covered) and those whosuffer from them (target population) the easier it will be to designdifferential and specific measures for their solution; besides, the scarceresources are used more efficiently; and the impact produced by theprogram is enhanced by concentrating resources on the population atthe highest risk level.

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CONCLUSION

The Latin American economic, social and political situation is notsatisfactory. Economic growth is not achieving the necessary pace toimprove the standards of living of the population as a whole. Socialpolicies, for their part, have received very significant levels ofresources and it will not be easy to maintain them if economic growthis not sustained. At the same time it is necessary to improve efficiencyin their use, as well as their effectiveness in meeting objectives and theimpact of programs on the beneficiary population.

It is necessary to insist on the importance of democracy and itsquality. Democracy is a basic ingredient for a good society. Illiteratedemocracies are not such democracies and they very easily open upthe way to clientage and to populism. Exclusionary societies are alsoa breeding ground for violence and urban insecurity and eventuallyhave an impact on the functioning of democracy. They degrade theliving conditions not only of the poor but also of those integrated intosociety, who are forced to live in behind walls, and cannot walk thestreets freely in their own city, and it promotes the development of theprivate security business.

One of the current European debates centers on the two-thirdssociety; i.e. a society where only two out of every three people areintegrated. In Latin America today, one-third societies prevail. Theconcern is therefore heightened.

As stated above, a good society and social development cannotbe achieved by means of social policies alone. Economic policy has todo its share, and generate good-quality growth; that is, create formaljobs. It is evident that the region exhibits great vulnerability tounpredictable shifts in the international financial market, but it alsoneeds to be recognized that there are degrees of freedom to makethings better or worse through public policies. It is crucial forgovernments and other societal actors, to take on that responsibility inorder to achieve success in the areas discussed above.

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(2000b) La brecha de la equidad. Una segunda evaluaci6n. Santiago, CEPAL(LC.G.2096, May). Presented to the Second Regional Conference of FollowUp to the World Summit on Social Development.

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CEPAWUNICEF/SECIB (2001), Building Equity from the Beginning: The Children andAdolescents of Ibero-America (LC/G.2144), September.

Cohen, E. and R. Franco (1992) Evaluacion de proyectos sociales. Mexico D.E. Siglo XXIEditores.

Cohen, E. and R. Franco (2002) Gesti6n social: XC6mo lograr eficiencia e impacto?Forthcoming Mexico, Siglo XXI Editores/ECLAC.

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Franco, R. (1996), "Los paradigmas de la polftica social en America Latina", in Revista de laCEPAL. No. 58, Santiago de Chile, pags. 9-22.

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Lustig, N. et al. (2001), Reducci6n de la pobreza y crecimiento econ6mico: la doblecausalidad. Document presented to the Seminar on Development Theory,ECLAC, Santiago, Chile.

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Morley, S. (2000), La distribucion del ingreso en America Latina y el Caribe, Santiago,ECLAC/Fondo de Cultura Econ6mica.

Ocampo, J. A. (2000), "Nuestra Agenda", Presentation by the Executive Secretary at theforum commemorating the fiftieth anniversary of ECLAC, Santiago, Chile,October 26, 1998. In La CEPAL en sus 50 anios. Notas de un seminarioconmemorativo. Santiago, ECLAC (LC/G.2103.P).

Pastore, J. and N. do Valle Silva, Mobilidade Social no Brasil. Sao Paulo, Makron Books.

Perry, G. (2002), "Reglas fiscales y volatilidad macroecon6mica en America Latina", InformeNo. 211, www.asuntospublicos.org.

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Silva e Silva, Maria Ozanira, Coord (2001) 0 Comunidade Solidaria: 0 Nedo-Enfrentamentoda Pobreza no Brasil, Sao Paulo, Cortez Editora.

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CHAPTER IISOCIAL INDICATORS

A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIRSTATE OF DEVELOPMENT

EDGAR E. GUTIERREZ-ESPELETA


INTRODUCTION

It would seem that social indicators have become once again ofinterest for social researchers, policy makers and bankers. After alethargic period of over 25 years, and for many reasons, they are beingrediscovered within a more promising and challenging context forsocial scientists.

This chapter attempts to provide a context for the development ofstatistics and social indicators within the framework of the evolutionof the term "development" and its relation with the predominantorder in international spheres. Next, an effort is made to present asummary of the United Nations' efforts, especially in connectionwith the world summits. Likewise, the state of statistics and sourcesof data for Latin America and the Caribbean will be reviewed.Finally, there is an indication of which might be the current andfuture challenges.

THE SOCIAL WITHIN THE PREDOMINANT SPHERE

The issue of social indicators cannot be looked at in isolation fromthe evolution of the concept of development itself, which explainstheir slow evolution towards effective decision-making tools.

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SOCIAL INDICATORS A BRIEF INTERPRETATION OF THEIR STATE OF DEVELOPMENT

As from 19491, the word development became a perception shapingreality, a myth comforting society, a fantasy that unleashes passions.However, perceptions, myths and fantasies rise and fall independentlyfrom empirical results and rational conclusions; they appear and fadeaway, not because they are correct or incorrect, but because they arepregnant with promise or become irrelevant.

To outline the evolution of the term, Wilfred Benson, of the ILOSecretariat was probably the first to refer to the countries in the Southas underdeveloped countries in 1942. Rosenstein-Rodan, in 1944,called them "economically backward areas". On that same year, ArthurLewis was already speaking of the gap between rich and poor nations.The term continued to pop up here and there in United Nationsdocuments, but it wasn't until Harry Truman's speech of January 20,1949, that it took on force and effect.

Next, many thinkers proposed other definitions. For example,when Rodolfo Stavenhagen proposed the concept of ethno-development, recognizing that in order to shape national development,it is necessary to look inward and into one's own culture instead ofusing borrowed or foreign ones. When Omo-Fadaka proposed "fromthe bottom up" development, he recognized the disappointment andfailures of the "from the top down" model in achieving the objectivesestablished in various parts of the world. Or when Orlando Fals Bordaand Anisur Rahman insisted on development with participation, theyrecognized the exclusion that development was causing.

In parallel, a very pragmatic attention evolved with the purpose offinding causal explanations for underdevelopment; these mentioned:trade balance factors; unequal trade; dependency; protectionism;market imperfections; corruption; lack of democracy or entrepreneurialspirit. Some of these opinions continued to be echoed in the spheres ofmakers of public opinion.

Between 1950 and 1970, we had in Latin America the Peace Corp,the War on Poverty, the Four Point Program, the Alliance for Progress,among other programs, which did nothing but embed the notion ofunderdevelopment in popular perception and deepen the lack of

I The Development Dictionary. 1993. Ed. W Sachs. Witwatersrand Univ. Press, SouthAfrica. 3rd. edition.

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capacity created by such perception. Here, the theoreticians ofdependence had their own share of responsibility, since the explanationthey provided to underdevelopment was fundamentally the exploitationof one nation by others; the plundering of its resources in the past;underdevelopment as the creator of development among otherarguments. On the basis of the lack of criticism, their critiques to theambiguity and hypocrisy of development gave its colonial character anadded strength.

The concept of development was taken up by the United Nationssince its creation in 1946, connecting its meaning with economicgrowth. During the fifties, the national accounts and the concept ofGross Domestic Product (GDP) begin to prevail in the analysis of thedevelopment of the countries in the South. By 1962, the UnitedNations Economic and Social Council proposed that the social andeconomic aspects be integrated as fundamental components ofdevelopment. During the 60's that vision was maintained, but therecommended path to opt for development was economic growth goingthrough various phases where the social element was integrated. Bythe end of that decade, it had become evident that rapid growth hadbrought about numerous inequities and, therefore, the attributes thatthe integration of the social and economic aspects demanded hadbecome expanded (by that time, social conditions had become socialobstacles to development).

By 1970, Robert McNamara, the World Bank President,recognized that for the 70's it was necessary to analyze somethingelse apart from the growth of the Gross Domestic Product; however,there was no consensus, either international or academic, oralternatives for other definitions.

While during the first decade development conceptualized theeconomic and the social elements separately, in the second decadethey needed to become integrated. Therefore, a new paradigm hadto be formulated, under the recognition that there was an interactionbetween physical resources, technical processes, economic aspectsand social aspects.

The second decade of development that began under the unifiedapproach, turned out to be quite the contrary: dispersion. Relevantthemes or issues, such as the environment, population, hunger, women,

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habitat or employment, were placed on the discussion tablesuccessively; each problem followed an independent career in focusingthe attention of the public and the institutions. Later, it was recognizedthat the problems had a common denominator and that efforts wererequired towards unifying them. This gave rise to a new difficulty:Which of these issues was going to be considered at the core of theothers? Disputes emerged in the different burocratic instances, sincethat determined survival and resource allocation in the UnitedNations spheres.

Then, in 1970, the international development strategy wasannounced, while the United Nations proclaimed the need for aunified development approach, and for planning that would fullyintegrate the economic and social components in the formulation ofpolicies and programs. But it wasn't until 1974, that the CocoyocDeclaration 2 , in Mexico, emphasized that development should notdevelop things but human beings. Any growth process not leadingto the satisfaction of basic needs or, even worst, interrupting them, isa parody of development. The Declaration also emphasizes theneed for diversity and the search for different pathways todevelopment as well as the goal of developing confidence in selfreliance and the requirement of a fundamental change in thepolitical, economic and social fields. By 1975, development wasalready focused on human beings.

2 In October 1974, the United Nations Environmental Program and the United NationsConference on Trade and Development, brought together an important group of worldpersonalities in a symposium on "Patterns of resource use, environmental anddevelopment strategies ". The result of this symposium was the Cocoyoc Declaration,which reads: "Development should not be limited to the satisfaction of basic needs.There are other needs, other goals and other values, the right to imparting andreceiving ideas and stimuli. There is a profound need to participate in setting the basisfor one own existence and making some contribution to the consolidation of theworld s future." In Cocoyoc it was established that the objective of development isMankind and not material goods, so that over consumption was strongly questionedas opposed to the search for the satisfaction of needs and a harmonic differentialgrowth for countries, since it is in direct relation with the cultural and environmentalcharacteristic of each region.Sources:http.//cederul. unizar es/revista/num Ol/pagl 8. htm; www.neticoop. org. uv/lapalo-ma/vidart.htm; www:semarnat.gob.mex cecadesu/ldigital/desarrollo sustentable_3.shtml

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In the second half of the 70's, many declarations and definitions ofdevelopment emerged. It was even recognized that developmentwould not solve the problem of extreme poverty and hunger, or even,quite the contrary, it would make them worse; therefore, it wasproposed that instead of trying to solve this problem, what was neededwas to try to satisfy, as far as possible, the basic needs. This gave riseto the idea of group goals, very attractive to the World Bank that, since1973 had already began working with the rural poor and small landholders. Around that date, the end of the 70's, UNESCO experts beganpromoting the concept of endogenous development, that was opposedto the concept of development as a linear process which led thedifferent nations to follow in the footsteps of industrialized societies.

The next decade, the 1980's, was called the "lost decade" in LatinAmerica and the Caribbean. The adjustment processes meant formany countries forsaking the partial or totally many achievementsobtained in the past, all in the name of development.

During the 90's, a new paradigm originates called redevelopment inthe North, meaning to say by this that it is necessary to develop thatwhich was not well done in the past. The concept of competitivenessgains strength and is based on the fear of being left behind in thetechnological race. In the South, this meant maquiladoras and sinkgrounds for the waste from the North and the organization of theinformal sector. From the conceptual and political point of view,redevelopment is re-interpreted as sustainable development, acommon future as suggested by the Brundtland Commission.

Sustainable development was conceived as a strategy for sustaineddevelopment, not to support the flourishing and persistence of aninfinitely diverse social and natural life. The Human DevelopmentIndex is likewise born out of the United Nations, which bases itscalculation in measures of adjusted income, life expectancy andeducational attainments of nations. With it, over 130 countries havebeen ranked using a numerical scale. The Human DevelopmentReport also provides varied quantitative information of thosecountries, but does not solve the problem of using the GDP in theindex, so that the choice is to recognize the limitations and suggestan improvement of the same. Currently, the report offers measurescomplementing the HDI, such as the Index of Human Poverty, the

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Index of Gender Related Development, the Index of WomenEmpowerment, among others.

The concept of GDP expresses the belief that the world is anenormous market, in which nations compete for economic respectabilityand a preferential spot. Considered the standard of behavior,productivity has become the new anthropological condition of eachperson's legitimacy. The GDP extends that condition to a national scaleand thanks to the magic of numbers, experts see the world economy asa game in which a country's GDP marks the scoring.

In spite of all this, as far back as the beginning of the 70's, the GDPhad its enemies. Robert Kennedy had the following to say on the useof the GDP: "For a long time it would seem we have renouncedexcellence and community values for the mere accumulation of materialthings...the GDP includes air pollution and cigarette advertising, andambulances cleaning our streets of accidents. It considers the speciallocks in our doors, and the prisons for those who break them. The GDPincludes the destruction of the pinewoods and the death of LakeSuperior It rises with the production of NAPALM and missiles andnuclear heads.. .And if the GDP includes all this, there is more that isnot comprised. It does not include the health of ourfamilies, the qualityof education, or the enjoyment of games. It is indifferent to the decencyof our factories and the safety of our streets. It does not include thebeauty of our poetry or the bonds of married couples or the intelligencein public debates or the integrity ofpublic officials... The GDP does notmeasure our ingenuity or our courage, our wisdom or our learningNeither does it measure our compassion nor our devotion to thecountry. To sum up, it measures everything, except what makes lifeworth living; it can tell us all aboutAmerica -except if we feel proudto beAmericans-. In our days it would be hard to imagine somebodydisagreeing with an opinion such as Robert Kennedy's. However, thepredominant ideology, even in the spheres of the United Nations, inpractice leads to the adoption of positions and scenarios where percapita income continues to be the only accepted pathway for theresolution of contemporary social problems and inequities. Withinthat scheme, the broad development and political support thateconomic indicators have had is then justified.

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Social Indicators: can a single system be created?

An indicator is an instrument constructed on the basis of a set ofstatistics, allowing us to tell a story about phenomena that are notdirectly measurable or evident.

The evolution of social indicators and statistics does not yet satisfythe expectations of social fora. "Poverty", for example continues to beanalyzed only from the perspective of income. The "auxiliary" role ofthe social to the economic has resulted in the development of socialindicators being subordinated to explaining how resources areinvested and not to explaining the satisfaction of people in oursocieties. Although there is still talk of the development paradigmfocused on human beings, there still are no international mechanismseffectively surveying and reorienting the future of the current andfuture generations towards higher levels of satisfaction, whilerespecting cultural diversity.

Perhaps one of the most acute problems that social measurement hashad to face is the lack of internationally agreed standards, with a slightexception in the demographic and labor fields. Referring to thelimitations faced by social measurement, O.D. Duncan3 points out that-with the possible and in any case, limited exception of theeconomy- the social sciences do not have a measurement system thatcan be consistently described in terms of a small number ofdimensions. As in the case of physical scientists, there are thousand of"instruments", but they are intended to measure thousand of variables;there is no system of units (much less standards) that, at least inprinciple relate all variables to a common set of primitive quantitieslogically constructed. The social sciences do not have the counterpartsof mass, length and time and to these physical dimensions, as Duncancontinues pointing out, economics has added money as a unit. The factthat Social Sciences, beyond economics, do not have a measurementsystem is, perhaps, another way of saying that theory in this field is

3 Duncan, O.D. 1984. Notes on social measurement: Historical and Critical. New York:Russell Sage Foundation. Quoted by Martin Blumer. 2001. Social Measurement:GATT Stands in Its Ways? Social Research (Consulted in May 2002 inwwwfindarticles.com/cf O/m2267/2_68/77187771).

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fragmented and undeveloped and that knowledge is broadlycorrelational rather than theoretical.

At the beginning of the 60's, and as a result of the success in themanagement of economic policies, the analytical or deductiveapproach prevailed over the descriptive or inductive one in the UnitedStates. J. F. Kennedy's decision in 1964 to cut down taxes and theapparent accuracy of the predictions of econometric models about itseffects on the United States' economy turned economists into a veryinfluential group in the management of public policy in that country.

The work of groups such as the Council of Economic Advisers(CEA) of the U.S.A. government, became a model to apply SocialSciences in public policy matters, assuming that if the same attentionand support had been provided, then social policy would have beenrationalized in the same way as economic policy. This argumentstimulated the birth of the social indicators movement in the 60's andbeginning of the 70's. On the basis of these events, academic groupsand social scientists began developing systems of social statisticscomparable to those existing in the economic field, producing suchimportant publications as Social Indicators in 1966, developed byNASA and Toward a Social Report in 1969 by the Health and WelfareDepartment of the United States, or Social Trends, produced in GreatBritain since 1973. Later, Senator W Mondale and others legislatedbetween 1967 and 1973 to set up the Council of Social Advisors, thatwould have the function of preparing an annual report such as ThePresident's Economic Report, believing that with the creation of theCEA, economic information and the power of economists had beeninstitutionalized4 . At the beginning of the 70's, the Organization forEconomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) established aprogram on social indicators until the publication of Living Conditionsin the OECD countries in 1986, while in the United Nations, therelationship between economic development and human developmenthas been explored in different ways, to which reference shall be madein a later section.

4 Cobb, C. W & C. Rixford, 1998. Lessons learned from the history of social indicators.Redefining Progress. San Francisco CA (consulted in May 2002:www.rprogress.org).

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The movement of social indicators was an ambitious attempt toproduce precise, concise and neutral measurements evaluating thestate of society and its change, using a variety of data, many of themoriginating in government. This movement had attractive ideas.According to Andrews5 , it is important to monitor changes along timein a number of life qualities, both at the level of the population as awhole, and for significant subgroups, since such information, whencombined with other data, may generate new knowledge about how toincrease the quality of life through more effective social policies. Thisidea demanded two fundamental changes in the preceding practices.One was the expansion of the environment of the phenomenon beingmonitored beyond traditional economic indicators, as well as anexplicit recognition in the sense that "quality of life", regardless ofhow it is defined, implied more than only economic considerations.The second change had to do with the intention of focusing directly on"production" indicators i.e., indicators showing how affluent peoplereally were, beyond the more traditional indicators of "factors ofproduction" that reflected budgetary distribution, procedures andprocesses that are assumed to increase welfare.

An attempt was then made to build standard measures about thestate of health, crime, welfare, education and other socialcharacteristics of the population. According to Blumer (op. cit.), ina special 1989 issue of the Journal of Public Policy, a group ofcommentators agreed that the social indicators movement had failedas a consequence of its ambitious goals. Some of the reasons forthis related to the political skepticism of right-wing governments inGreat Britain and the United States during the 80's, regarding thevalue of the social indicator programs. But there also existed seriousconceptual limitations, including the problems of developing a socialindicators system and the absence of a common measurement unit inconnection with social phenomena such as education, households,health or crime.

5 Andrews, F. M. 1989. The evolution of a Movement. Quoted by Martin Blumer.2001. Social Measurement: GAT Stands in Its Way? Social Research (consulted inMay 2002 in wwwfindarticles.com/cf O/m2267/2_68/77187771).

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Blumer pointed out that the difficulties to make more precisesocial measurements are, actually, the most important obstacles inconstructing indicators. One condition has been missing in order tocreate a system of social indicators: the existence of a commonmeasurement unit. It is also pointed out that the government doesnot constitute an ideal scenario on which to implement theapplication of Social Sciences to public affairs and that the poorharmonization between countries are the causes of the failure of thesocial indicators movement. He contrasts this with economicindicators and their success both in the public and the private field,and summarizes it in the fact that they have a common unit: money,which provides a unifying thread. This type of common unit has notyet been found for fields such as education, health, crime orhousing. He assumes that the public scenario is the object ofdiverse political interests and that, therefore, it is subject tosubstantial budgetary cutbacks according to short-term politicalagendas. Furthermore, the bifurcation of approaches makes the taskof harmonization more difficult: there is a trend towards objectivemeasurements (such as in the Scandinavian school of buildingindicators, centered on how the population lives) and another ofsubjective measurement of quality of life experiences andevaluations, more characteristic of Western Europe and the USA.Summarizing, the social indicators movement failed in its goal ofinitiating a harmonic international system of "social accounts".

The difficulties in establishing a system of social indicators, suchas the national accounts, are linked with the fact that socialmeasurements go beyond the mere establishment or definition ofunits or variables. The national accounts and the "system" ofeconomic indicators used currently respond to a concept of State andnational interrelations that have been emphasized for the last 50years. They respond to a way of seeing the world, which haspreviously been agreed upon in international fora, such as those ofthe United Nations and trade fora. Once the rules to "play" the gameof world economy were derived, the "players" (countries) followedthem and established their statistical systems to that end. In otherwords, the system of economic indicators is possible because itresponds to a previously established conceptual model. For that

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reason, Marris6 could design a system of coupled pipes and tanks asthe basis of a general statistical image of the economy, wheremeasurements would respond to three types: rates of flow ofquantities of goods and services, rates of flow of payments in cashand average price levels. On the basis of such a system, it ispossible to design not only a "consistent anatomic description", butalso a common unit.

In the social field, there is and there will not be a preconceivedsystem on how social behaviors and interrelations should operate for acountry in particular. In this "game", the actors are the inhabitants,human beings, everyone different and with different aspirations whichcollectively make up the social aspirations in their environments.Interrelations appear in a spontaneous and free manner and becomeexpressed in a thousand ways. In a scenario such as that, it is notpossible to build a "system of coupled tubes and tanks" representinginputs, flows and outputs. In the social field, the challenge of buildingindicators requires creativity and a new development model.

In such a situation, the government is not, in effect, the best scenarioto develop social indicators; more players are required. Theparticipation of the various organized groups and the window forindividual participation, are necessary to define a system to monitornational progress, although the government may be responsible forstandardizing the data for their systematic and quality collection.

UNITED NATIONS, THE SOCIAL ISSUE ANDSOCIAL INDICATORS

As indicated from the beginning, the social has taken second placein the world sphere since the start of the development era. However,in the last few decades important efforts have been made to constructrules of the social game as was done in the economic field, thus settingthe basis for further initiatives.

6 Marris, R. 1958. Economic Arithmetic. McMillan, London.

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As part of the preparation for the World Summit on SocialDevelopment (June 1995), the Conference of European Statisticians(CES)7 presented the Declaration on Statistics for Social Progress. Itcontains a historic overview of the contribution of statistics to theformulation of economic and social policies. It recognizes theusefulness of data sources originating in the administrative systems ofgovernment in areas such as social protection, health, education andcrime. However, it also underlines the fact that these developmentshave not gone hand in hand with the need of counting with comparable,reliable and relevant statistics, in a timely manner, for policy makingand monitoring: "Governments have often had to sail in the dark."

Moreover, the CES recognizes that within the wide range ofstatistics, social statistics have tended to take backstage as compared toeconomic statistics. "The best estimate of the number of dispossessedin the European Community ranges between 3 and 6 million people atthe time when the number of whales in the ocean has been carefullyestimated and monitored". It is further recognized that social statisticstend to be seen as subordinate to economic indicators and that is aparadox of fundamental consequences for public policy, that whilegigantic efforts are made to design or redesign social programs, thecollective empirical knowledge in this area is at an elementary level.

In this situation, the Declaration underscores that statistics shouldexplicitly aim at attaining two objectives of the greatest interest forpublic policy:

* Monitoring the attainment of outcomes of social policies andprograms (e.g. changes in unemployment levels; incomedistribution; population's health);

* Identifying those factors that seem to be linked to specificoutcomes (desirable or undesirable) and that are a target forintervention via social programs and policies.

7 The Conference of European Statisticians is an intergovernmental organization whosemembers are the directors of the statistics offices of European and North Americancountries. Its secretariat is the Statistics Division of the United Nations EconomicCommission for Europe and it is also a subsidiary agency of the United NationsStatistics Committee.

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According to the Declaration, the mission should also include thedevelopment of relevant conceptual frameworks from the point ofview of policies and the corresponding measurement systems. ThisDeclaration was made seven years ago and, as we shall see in the nextparagraph, the situation that then existed within the framework of"developed" Western countries still prevails in our region.

In its 28 th Session, of April, 1996, the Statistics Commission of theUnited Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCECOSOC)asked its Working Group on Coordination and International StatisticPrograms to follow up on the World Summit for Social Development(Copenhagen, March 1995). It likewise established an Expert Groupon the Statistical Implications of United Nations Conferences toextract a work program reflecting the most important areas of actionidentified in the Summit and indicate where the international statisticalwork in the social field should be concentrated, with properconsideration to the Program of Action of the International Conferenceon Population and Development (Cairo, September 1994) and theFourth World Conference on Women (Beijing, September 1995)8.

This Working Group, made up of statisticians of several parts of theworld, but fundamentally from Europe and North America,recommended the adoption, on the part of the United Nations StatisticsCommission, of a list of five policy themes and major social areasresulting from the three world conferences mentioned above, namely:

1. Population and developmenta. Healthb. Material welfarec. Education

2 Poverty eradicationa. Income and expendituresb. Economic resources

8 UN Economic and Social Council. 1996. Social Statistics: Follow-Up to the WorldSummit for Social Development. 18th Session Working Group on InternationalStatistical Programmes and Coordination. New York.

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3 Expansion of productive employment and unemploymentreductiona. Laborb. Labor environmentc. Education and training

4 Social Integrationa. Housingb. Workc. Crime and criminal justice

5 Condition of women and mena. Health care, educationb. Workc. Income

It is recognized that the policy themes are closely linked,emphasizing the need to develop a conceptual framework to integrateand articulate the concerns expressed in these world events.

Likewise, the adoption of a list and menu of social indicators wasrecommended to set up a Minimum National Social Data Set(MNSDS), compiled based on the following criteria:

* Direct relevance with respect to the five identified

policy themes

* Internationally accepted definition and classification

* Indicator executable by the majority of countries

* Feasibility of breakdown per sex.

Since the World Summit for Social Development recognized thateach country should define its own poverty indicators, the MNSDSproposal does not include specific poverty indicators. However,many of the indicators included are relevant to assess the degree of

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disadvantage in participating in key areas of the economy and society.The 15 indicators suggested for the MNSDS are:

* Population estimates by sex, age and, where appropriate andfeasible, by ethnic group

* Life expectancy at birth, by sex* Infant mortality, by sex* Child mortality, by sex* Maternal mortality* Percentage of infants weighing less than 2,500 grams at birth,

by sex* Average number of years of schooling completed by sex and,

when feasible, by income category* Gross domestic product per capita* Household income per capita (level and distribution)* Monetary value of the food basket required for minimum

nutritional requirements* Unemployment rate by sex* Employment - population ratio by sex and, where appropriate,

formal and informal sector* Access to safe water* Access to sanitation* Number of people per room, excluding kitchen and bathroom.

It is also pointed out that the above list should be reported brokendown into urban and rural, when the rural population is greater than25% of the total population. The absence of process indicators, inspite of their importance, is due to the lack of international consensuson definitions and to the absence of data gathering mechanisms inmany countries.

This Working Group also recognized that an appropriate socialstatistics system is vital for the effective development of socialpolicies, to inform the decision making process on policy issues andin order to evaluate the impact of social and economic policies.However, it was also recognized that inadequate social statisticssystems constitute a major obstacle for an effective social

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development. The lack of awareness on the importance of the linkbetween policy development and social statistics, the need for moreinternationally harmonized statistical standards and guidelines, andto improve conceptual frameworks on which to summarize policyresults, all points to the need of giving social statistics a higherpriority, both at a national and international scale.

Finally, it is important to mention that the MNSDS is suggested asa minimum data set; its adoption, according to the Working Group ofreference, should not become a precondition for assistance indeveloping social statistics in a particular country. Nationalcircumstances and priorities differ, and this must be accepted andrecognized as a potential source for different statistical priorities.The MNSDS may be seen as a menu out of which countries canselect items of the highest national priority (See Annex A). But thesuggested MNSDS was kept as small and basic as possible toimprove the likelihood of adoption by as many countries as possible.

At the 30 th meeting of the United Nations Statistics Committee(March 1999) a report was presented on the experimental compilationof the minimum national social data set (MNSDS), which had beenadopted in the previous session9 . This compilation was initially basedon official national data reported to the international organizations orgathered by the same, and complemented with national reports. Thetrial period went from 1985 to 1998 for the majority of indicators. Noadjusted data, model-based or otherwise estimated data were included,the same as projections prepared by international organizations. In theend, "three indicators were left aside because of lack of internationaldata, namely, average number of years of schooling completed,monetary value of a food basket needed for minimum nutritionalrequirements and household income per capita... In general, the dataavailable and reported in international publications on the countries ofAfrica, America, Asia and Oceania are not as recent as thosecorresponding to European countries. Regarding the indicators of theminimum national social data set, with the exception of estimateddata for total population and access to drinking water and sanitation,

9 United Nations Statistics Commission. 1998. Statistical implications of recent majorUnited Nations Conferences. E/CN.3/1999/14

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the latest available data for most of the countries in Africa, America,Asia and Oceania, go back to the period comprised between 1985and 1994, while those corresponding to the European countries arealmost all for 1995 or beyond".

Some of the conclusions drawn by the Working Group are thefollowing:

* There are many data gaps in the international field

* Coverage problemsa Date of data* Scarcity of data

(specially in Africa and Asia)

* For some indicators it is necessary to consider the quality,comparability and usefulness of the indicator at aninternational scale (i.e. household per capita income), whilefor others no clear standards of calculation have been found(i.e. monetary value of the basket of food needed for minimumnutritional requirements).

* It does not suffice to provide countries with a list of indicators.It is also necessary to provide clear definitions for eachindicator.

* There is lack of consistency among the countries regarding theconcepts and the methods used in data gathering andprocessing and in the presentation of the correspondingreports.

* The quality of the statistical data which are reported to theinternational statistics systems varies enormously amongcountries.

As an illustration, the following chart shows the availability of datain the international field, by indicator and region. The StatisticsCommittee accepted the set of indicators with the replacement of the

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indicator "percentage of infants weighing less than 2,500 grams atbirth by sex" with the indicator "contraceptive prevalence rate".Annex B indicates the availability of data in the international field byindicator, region and date of the data.

Availability of data at the International LevelBy indicator and region

Indicator Number of Countries

Total Africa America Asia Europe Oceania

(Total No. of countries) (195) (54) (39) (48) (42) (12)

Total Population 191 52 39 46 42 12

Population by gender & age 158 36 35 38 40 9

Life Expectancy at Birth 104 10 24 28 37 5

Infant Mortality Rate 93 6 21 23 38 5

Child Mortality Rate 96 8 25 22 36 5

Maternal Mortality Rate 78 4 22 15 35 2

Contraceptive Prevalence Rate 128 40 29 36 17 6

Mean Number of Peopleper Room 37 3 11 8 13 2

Percentage of People withaccess to Safe Water 155 52 34 42 18 9

Percentage of People withaccess to Sanitation 167 51 32 42 32 10

Per Capita Gross DomesticProduct 172 50 39 39 36 8

Unemployment Rate 87 5 26 17 36 3

Ratio of employment-population aged 15 to 64 66 3 26 12 23 2

* Number of indicators per dominion and priority level.

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The United Nations Social and Economic Council asked theStatistics Commission, in its capacity as official technical advisorybody to submit a report providing orientation on the conferenceindicators; conduct an in-depth technical analysis of the conferenceindicators; formulate recommendations on a limited list ofconference indicators, and draft and recommend to the Council astatistical examination mechanism of indicators proposed in thefuture. This report was prepared by the Friends of the Chair of theStatistics Commission and it was presented to the Commission forinformation in its 3 3 rd period of sessions held in March 200210.

This report, which includes comments from a large number ofindividuals from 34 countries, besides the contribution of membersof various international organizations, subdivided 280 indicatorsinto the following dominions: demography, health and nutrition;environment and energy; economy and poverty; education, andother social indicators. The indicators were classified, furthermore,into three priority categories: indicators fundamental for surveillanceof policies of the highest world and national importance, thegathering of which is recommended to all countries (first category);indicators adding information to that contained in the first categoryand comprising different policy objectives than those comprised inthe highest priority indicators (second category), and indicatorsneeded to establish a more detailed image of the situation in thedominion according to national circumstances (third category). Themajority of the remaining indicators were classified in the fourthcategory of additional indicators1 1.

10 United Nations Economic and Social Council, 2001. Report of the Friends of theChair of the Statistics Commission on an evaluation of statistical indicators resultingfrom the United Nations Summit. E/CN.3/2002/26

II The technical evaluations of eaeh indicator may be found in http://esa.un.or-g/unsd/indicatorfoc/

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The distribution of indicators per dominion was the following:

PRIORITY

Dominion First Category Second Category Third Category

Demography 2 0 2

Demography/health 4 4 2

Health and nutrition 7 1 8

Environment and energy 6 13 8

Economy and Poverty 6 6 4

Employment and Labor Force 5 12 8

Education 5 2 4

Other social indicators 3 4 7

TOTAL 38 42 43

Source: ECN3/2002/26 of the United Nations Economic and Social Council.

This study includes the indicators resulting from the MinimumNational Social Data Set; the United Nations Framework of Assistancefor Development-System of Country Common Evaluations for theCountries Assessment; International Development Objectives; BasicSocial Services for All; Indicators of the Commission on SustainableDevelopment and Millennium Development Objectives, which isintended to follow up on the Millennium Declaration, that is includedin this section as Annex B.

As already seen in this section, the efforts within the context ofthe United Nations have fundamentally been unidimensional,disintegrated and focal; that is, the indicators proposed to follow upeither action plans of world summits or initiatives of the EconomicSocial Council itself, have revolved on specific issues that aremeasurable on the basis of data collection whether by way of surveys

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or census, or by means of administrative records. This assembly ofinitiatives also shows the absence of a conceptual framework allowingnot only for assessments to be made on the condition of society, but alsoevaluations of the impacts of public policies. One characteristic thatmakes social measurement very complex is its multidimensionalcharacter and perhaps, for that reason, and due to the difficulties inarriving at consensus among nations in this field, the task has notbeen approached with the necessary enthusiasm. However, webelieve that the effort by the Statistics Commission to initiate theprocess of harmonization between the information requirements ofthe major United Nations conferences is a very suitable step forwardtowards a better conceptualization of a minimum internationalsystem of social statistics.

Within the United Nations there is an initiative, as alreadymentioned, intending to offer a multidimensional and integratedresponse to the situation of human development and its trends in theWorld. I am referring to the Human Development Index, that requiresvery basic statistics for calculations. Even so, there are 29 memberstates of the United Nations that were excluded from the HDI for lackof data, which is "indicative of the lack of data in a broad range ofregulatory fields"12 . Among the conclusions of this study, specialattention was drawn to the following: lack of data and low quality ofavailable data, inconsistencies between statistics published at thenational and international scale, which undermines their usefulnessand credibility and, the metadata accompanying the statistics that arepublished must include notes covering any other uncertainties.

In spite of this effort, still pending is the substantive task offormulating conceptual frameworks to integrate unidimensional socialmeasures in an instrument that will make it possible to analyze theprocesses and outcomes of social interaction.

12 Economic and Social Council. 2001. Reportfrom the Qffice in charge of the UNDPHuman Development Report. Document E/CN.3/2002/27

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SOCIAL INDICATORS AND LATIN AMERICA

In order to make an assessment of the social indicators available forLatin America and the Caribbean, the following sources ofinformation were consulted:

United Nations* Human Development Report 2001* http://www.un.org/Deps/unsd/social/index.htm* Statistical Annuary 1996* 1998 World population projection* 1998 Demographic Annuary

World Bank* World Indicators CD-ROM 2000

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean* Statistical Annuary 2000* Social Panorama 1999-2000.

For the case of the first two sources, the data used correspond tothose variables that showed data for a good numbers of countries in theregion and at least one year in the last two decades. In total, a set of113 social variables was obtained, which is made up of 79 variablesfrom the United Nations sources, 35 from the World Bank and 48 fromthe ECLAC. The following table shows the number of commonvariables; that is, variables that are available in the sources consulted.

SOURCES United BankNations World ECLAC

United Nations 79

World Bank 23 35

ECLAC 21 15 48

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This table clearly underlines the scarce commonality between thesources, indicating very different interests among them. Of the 113indicators, United Nations shares 21 indicators with ECLAC, while itshares 23 social indicators with the World Bank. The World Bank andthe ECLAC only share 15 indicators. Only 10 indicators are shared byall three sources. Regarding the values of these shared indicators, itmay be stated that, in general terms, their comparability does not reachsatisfactory levels. Since the primary data are generated by differentmeans at a national scale, the various organizations use differentmethods or protocols to incorporate the data into their respectivedatabases. Of the 13 indicators, 34 come from surveys (of households,income and expenditure, fertility or nutrition); 66 are derived fromadministrative records (vitals, education, health, judicial, others); 5indicators are built on the basis of census information and 8 come fromthe national accounts. The problem pointed out here was alsounderlined by the Working Group which made the experimentalsummary for the United Nations Statistics Commission.

If the purpose was to follow up the indicators that emerged from theInternational Conference on Population and Development (ICPD), theWorld Summit for Social Development and the 4th World Women'sConference, the information available in the region, according to thesources mentioned above, shows the following:

Conference Total No. of United World ECLACindicators Nations Bankproposed

International Conference 8 4 3 1on Population andDevelopment

World Summit for Social 42 3 2 9Development

4th World Women's 9 6 5 6Conference

If it is accepted that the conclusions or recommendations of theseConferences synthesize the concerns of an international ensemble;that is, not only of the governments, but also of other relevant players

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in social dynamics, Latin America and the Caribbean would be in debtwith the submittal of the respective follow up reports, or even more,knowing that some of the data for the indicators in these sourcesrespond to projections or estimates made in the headquarters ofthose agencies.

An interesting exercise has been the experimental compilation ofthe minimum national social data set (MNSDS) by a Working Groupof the United Nations Statistics Commission. For the case of 39countries of The Americas and using the sources indicated for theexperimental compilation, it was found that for one of the 15indicators, there were no recent data in 72% of the countries; i.e. 28 ofthe 39 countries of The Americas that were included in this exercisedid not have recent data for Number of people per room. Thepercentages of countries without available data are shown below:

% of countries withoutrecent data available

Total population 0

Population by sex and age 10

Life expectancy at birth, by sex 38

Infant mortality, by sex 46

Mortality of children under 5, by sex 36

Maternal mortality 44

Contraceptive prevalence ratio 26

Number of people per room, excluding kitchen and bathroom 72

Access to safe water 13

Access to sanitation 18

GDP per capita 0

Unemployment rate, by sex 33

Ratio of Employment-population, aged 15-64 33

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This exercise did not include three of the indicators in the MinimumSet, which were not considered part of the experimental compilation.

Both this exercise and the one shown previously, show a deficitscenario when attempting to make an assessment of the condition ofsociety and its trends based on the proposals of the internationalconferences.

With respect to the Minimum National Social Data Setrecommended by the United Nations Statistics Commission, it wasverified that the United Nations sources consulted provided data for 10of the 15 indicators proposed; the World Bank supplied informationfor 7 of the indicators and the ECLAC sources gave information for 9of the 15 indicators. It should be noted that for two indicators (Averagenumber of years of schooling completed and Monetary value of thefood basket needed for minimum nutritional requirements) no data arerecorded in any of these sources.

THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CHALLENGE

In the previous paragraphs it was noted that an indicator makesreference to a set of statistics that serve to approximate, or build ametaphor, on social phenomena which are not directly measurable.Likewise, indicators are instruments to visualize a concept, orapproximate an assessment of the same in a very factual manner; i.e.through statistics. Therefore, indicators are supporting instrumentsrequired not only to explain the conditions or the state of a society, butalso to answer why those conditions exist.

Social indicators have been conceived to respond to very particularconcerns, previously defined as unidimensional, when, in reality,social dynamics are complex and require the integration andmeasurement of the synergies between the various components thatinteract within a society. Indicators, therefore, cannot stand asisolated items of information, but in response to a concept. As theirname indicates it, they tell a story about something, but thatsomething has been previously defined. Consequently, there is asubstantial difference here with some other groups of thinking. If"something" is to be measured, this should be done to the extent that

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this "something" may be explained or analyzed in greater depth, andnot merely to describe the phenomenon. There are groups ofinvestigators proposing indicators with the intention of having themhelp elucidate the essence of the problem, without having previouslydefined which was the problem of interest the problem of interest was;that is, they use an inductive approach. These groups focus onmeasurement for its own sake. Many consider that the gross domesticproduct is used as a measure of economic welfare, although it was notdesigned for that purpose, and for that reason they look for alternatives(namely, True Genuine Progress Indicator or Social Health Index).

The field is so varied that the construction of social indicatorssometimes responds to very disparate interests. For example, thesocial activists of community movements would like to haveindicators showing the impact of public spending reduction on thelevels of social welfare. Others, such as the institutions traditionallyinvolved in social policy at a national scale, would like to count withinformation instruments allowing them to define new social roles inpolicy making. It is common for this group to speak of "social audits",which, in spite of having many definitions, almost always refer to a setof social indicators designed to increase social responsibility andaccountabilityl 3 .

The Economic Commission for Europe14 alleges that there still is amajor gap between the state and the use of statistics for socialdevelopment. This is particularly evident when comparisons are madebetween economic statistics and indicators and social ones. This gapis more evident and profound in the development of internationalpolicies, as part of the abyss between the integration of the worldeconomy and the discourse on the social conditions and implicationsof globalization. Among the difficulties that relate to this situation the

13 Social Watch (Citizens Control) is an example of this. This movement is the result ofcoalitions of citizens of over 40 countries that every year since 1995 (since the WorldSummit on Social Development) asks governments what have they done toimplement the commitment of eradicating world poverty and report on what has beenachieved and what has not. See http://www.socwathc.org.uy/indicators/queryhtm

14 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. 2000. Statistics and Indicatorsfor Social Progress. Outline of a proposal for the Geneva 2000 Special Session on

Social Development.

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follow ones are pointed out:, the large number of different sources ofdata and players are pointed at, both public and private; administrativeand based on sarnple baseds; national and local; the "conceptual"issues that are reflected in the statistical definitions, accountingframeworks, classifications, etc. and the lack of internationalstandards.

There is therefore a dilemma between satisfying the internationaldemands for social information in a world that is ever closer, moreglobalized and the national and even local requirements. It isnecessary to have a common classification language, but on the otherside there is the need to maintain the diversity which enriches cultures.We find very particular phenomena, at least in the case of LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, where spiritual and religious elementsplay a fundamental role in social dynamics, particularly in theircapacity to support the construction of solidarity and safety nets at thelocal level with clear expressions at the regional scale, as well asmigratory movements originating from many diverse reasons, rangingfrom urban insecurity, to environmental displacements and even thosemerely motivated by individual and consumption aspirations. Theexperiences of social life are obviously not the same between the cityand the countryside, between the "more advanced" countries and theless advanced ones. We also face situations where we are told that thegrowth of this or that country is surprising, but its nationals do not feelthis to be true. We are told that countries have good to excellentbehaviors but, again, nationals feel the contrary. The economicdiscourse has become divorced from social reality and, as previouslymentioned, the social has been subordinated to the economic, becauseit has lacked the instruments enabling society to chart the desiredcourse, in a robust and sustained manner.

Such complexity means that when an assessment of reality iseffectively attempted through information items that may be easilybecome knowledge items, the task is neither simple nor easy. On thecontrary, it is complex and requires creativity and forsaking theconceptions of the past. We therefore face the reality of an initiative atan international scale, conducted by the United Nations, making aproposal such as the minimum social indicators set and that, on theother side also recognizes the need for countries to define their own

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indicators, at least in the field of what has come to be called"poverty". Faced with this situation, there is the challenge ofproviding, in the first place, for the satisfaction of a set of demandsfrom society regarding itself, in the sense of being able to makeappropriate assessments of its integration, its inclusion and itsparticipation in the decision making process, and on the other, ademand from the international community to be able to providetracking for a set of issues that are fundamental for humandevelopment. The support to generate official statistics is fundamentalin that sense (See Annex C).

In some initiatives relating to the social indicators movement, it wassaid that the definition of indicators was important to tell us if weare heading the right way, that they should be relevant in policy-making and help in effectively evaluating social programs. However,going in the right direction depends on what that direction is and whohas defined it. Within that context, the right direction is that which hasbeen defined by the social ensemble formed by the participation oforganized groups (non governmental organizations, labor, business,professionals, etc.) and the government and the political classrepresented in political parties.

Although it is true and needs to be recognized that social indicatorsare lagging behind and that there lacks a conceptual framework tointegrate them, it is also important to recognize that society, itsorganizations and windows for individual participation are those thatshould define the desired orientation ; the goals at five, ten or fifteenyears time, and consequently support those indicators that allow forthe tracking down of the social ensemble in that journey. That isimportant and fundamental, if social indicators are truly to serve for aneffective assessment of the social parameters considered relevanttowards a society for all.

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ANNEX AMENU OF INDICATORS

Document E/CN.3/AC. 1/l 996/R.4 of the United NationsEconomic and Social Council

General

Population estimates by sex, age and, where appropriate andfeasible, ethnic group

1. Population and development* Life expectancy at birth, by sex* Child mortality, by sex* Under-five mortality, by sex* Maternal mortality* Percentage of underweight infants at birth, by sex* Average number of years of schooling completed, by

urban/rural, sex and, where possible, by income classes* Percentage of pregnant women who have at least one ante-

natal visit* Percentage of pregnant women who have a trained attendant

at delivery* Percentage of pregnant women immunized against tetanus

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* Contraceptive prevalence rate* Incidence and prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases* Quality of family planning services* Access to, and quality of, maternal health services* Incidence of female genital mutilation

2. Eradicating poverty* Physical and mental health* Literacy* Family conditions* Unemployment* Social exclusion* Homelessness* National and international causes underlying poverty

Absolute poverty* Number of people per room, excluding kitchen and bathroom* Access to safe water* Access to sanitation* Monetary value of the basket of food needed for minimum

nutritional requirements* Percentage of the population in poverty (poverty or poverty

line defined nationally)* Access to services related to health, nutrition, and community

infrastructure* Income* Education* Possibility of entering the labor force* Food* Food prices* Access to productive assets, especially land and water* Geographic location* Public transfers

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Relative poverty* Families below a minimum standard of income (poverty line)* Poverty gap* Families with less than 25 per cent of mean income* Gini coefficients* Percentage of the population in the lowest income quintile* Percentage of the population in the highest income quintile

3. Expansion of productive employment and reduction ofunemployment

* GDP per capita* Household income per capita (level and distribution)* Unemployment rate, by sex* Employment rate, by sex and, where appropriate, formal and

informal sector* Wage employment as a percentage of the population aged 16

and over, where possible by sex* Formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment* Median and average length of job tenure in years, where

possible by sex* Index of real wages in manufacturing and in the economy as a

whole where possible* Ratio of average wage in the formal sector and GDP per person* Wage dispersion in manufacturing industries, measured by

the coefficient of variation, for males and females separatelywhere possible

* Ratio of average female to average male wage inmanufacturing and in the economy as a whole wherepossible

* Unpaid work outside of the market economy* Non-wage compensation (fringe benefits)* Time-use* Precariousness of employment* Visible underemployment* Invisible underemployment* Training data, including informal kinds of training

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4. Social integration* Number of people in vulnerable groups* Age/gender structure* Occupational profile* Economic activity profile* Income levels* Position within overall income distribution* Housing standards/amenities, such as access to safe water,

sanitation and floor space per person* Health status, such as infant mortality rate, age-specific

mortality rates, expectation of life and nutritional intake* Educational standards, such as adult literacy rate, number of

years of formal education and participation rates (forchildren)

* Crime victimization rate* Proportion eligible to vote

5. Status of women and men* Data distributed by sex on:* Population and housing* Health* Diseases and causes of death* Education* Enrolment rates* Drop-out rates* Highest level education by subject* Time-use* Child health care* Gainful employment* Wage, salary and income* Informal sector* Income control* Access to land and credit* Influence and power* Decision-making* Violence and crime

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ANNEX BMILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

Document E/CN.3/2002/25 of the United Nations Economicand Social Council

Goals and Targets Indicators

Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger

Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, 1 Proportion of population whose income isthe proportion of people whose below $ la day.income is less than one dollar a 2 Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of poverty.day. 3 Share of poorest quintile in national

consumption.Target 2. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, 4 Prevalence of underweight children (under five

the proportion of people who years of age)suffer from hunger. 5 Proportion of population below minimum level

of dietary energy consumption.

Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education

Target 3. Ensure that, by 2015. children 6 Enrolment ratio in primary education.everywhere, boys and girls 7 Proportion of pupils starting grade I who reachalike, will be able to complete a grade 5.full course of primary 8 Literacy rate of 15-to-24-year-olds.schooling.

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Goals and Targets Indicators

Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women

Target 4. Eliminate gender disparity in 9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, secondary andpnmary and secondary education, tertiary education.preferably by 2005, and to all 10. Ratio of literate females to males of 15-to-24-levels of education no later than year-olds.2015. 11. Share of women in wage employment in the

non-agricultural sector.12. Proportion of seats held by women in national

parliament.

Goal 4. Reduce child mortality

Target 5. Reduce by two thirds, between 13. Under-five mortality rate.1990 and 2015, the under-five 14. Infant mortality rate.mortality rate. 15. Proportion of 1-year-old children immunized

against measles.

Goal 5. Improve maternal health

Target 6. Reduce by three quarters, 16. Matemal mortality ratio.between 1990 and 2015, the 17. Proportion of births attended by skilled healthmatemal mortality ratio. personnel.

Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases

Target 7. Havehaltedby 2015 and begun 18. HIV prevalence among 15-to-24-year-oldto reverse the spread of pregnant women.HIV/AIDS. 19. Contraceptive prevalence rate.

20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/AIDS.21. Prevalence and death rates associated with

malaria.Target 8. Have halted, by 2015, and 22. Proportion of population in malaria risk areas

begun to reverse the incidence using effective malaria prevention andof malaria and other major treatment measures.diseases. 23. Prevalence and death rates associated with

tuberculosis.24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected and

cured under directly observed treatmnent shortcourse.

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Goals and Targets IndicatorsGoal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability

Target 9. Integrate the principles of 25. Proportion of land area covered by forest.sustainable development into 26. Land area protected to maintain biologicalcountry policies and programs diversity.and reverse the loss of 27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for energyenvironmental resources, efficiency)

28 Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) [PlusTarget 10. Halve by 2015 the proportion two figures of global atmospheric pollution:

of people without sustainable ozone depletion and the accumulation of globalaccess to safe drinking water. warming gases]

29. Proportion of population with sustainableTarget 1. By 2020 to have achieved a access to an improved water source.

significant improvement in the 30. Proportion of people with access to improvedlives of at least 100 million sanitation.slum dwellers. 31. Proportion of people with access to secure

tenure.[Urban/rural disaggregation of several of theabove indicators may be relevant for monitoring

|__________ _ improvement in the lives of slum dwellers]

Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development

Target 12. Develop further an open, rule- [Some of the indicators listed below will bebased, predictable, non- monitored separately for the least developeddiscriminatory trading and countries (LCDs), Africa, landlocked countriesfinancial system. and small island developing States]Includes a commitment to good Oficia development assistancegovemance, development, and 32. Net ODA as percentage of OECD/DACpoverty reduction - both donor's gross national product (targets of 0.7%nationally and intemationally. in total and 0.15% for LDCs)

Target 13. Address the special needs of the 33. Proportion of ODA to basic social servicesleast developed countries. (basic education, primary health care, nutrition,Includes: tariff and quota free safe water and sanitation)access for least developedcountries' exports; enhanced 34. Proportion of ODA that is untiedprogram of debt relief forHIPCs and cancellation ofofficial bilateral debt: and moregenerous ODA for countriescommitted to poverty reduction.

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Target 14. Address the special needs of 35. Proportion of ODA for environment in small

landlocked countries and small island developing States

island developing States. 36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in

landlocked countries.(through the Programme ofAction for the Sustainable Market AccessDevelopment of Small Island 37. Proportion of exports (by value and excluding

Developing States and the arms) admitted free of duties and quotas

outcome of the twenty-second 38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricultural

special session of the General products and textiles and clothing

Assembly) 39. Domestic and export agricultural subsidies in

OECD countries

Target 15. Deal comprehensively with the 40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build trade

debt problems of developing capacity

countries through national andintemational measures in order Debt Sustainabilityto make debt sustainable in the 41. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt

long term. cancelled42. Debt service as a percentage of exports of

goods and services

Target 16. In cooperation with developing 43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt relief

countries, develop and 44. Number of countries reaching HIPC decision

implement strategies for decent and completion points.

and productive work for youth 45. Unemployment rate of 15-to-24-year-olds

Target 17. In cooperation with pharma- 46. Proportion of population with access to

ceutical companies, provide affordable essential drugs on a sustainable basis

access to affordable essentialdrugs in developing countries.

Target 18. In cooperation with the private 47. Telephone lines per 1,000 people

sector, make available thebenefits of new technologies, 48. Personal computers per 1,000 people

especially information andcommunications

a [Other indicators to be decided]

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ANNEX CFUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

OF OFFICIAL STATISTICS

United Nations Statistical Commission:

1. Official statistics provide an indispensable element in theinformation system of a society, serving the government, theeconomy and the public with data about the economic,demographic, social and environmental situation. To this end,official statistics that meet the test of practical utility are to becompiled and made available on an impartial basis by officialstatistical agencies to honor citizens' entitlement to publicinformation;

2. To retain trust in official statistics, the statistical agencies needto decide according to strictly professional considerations,including scientific principles and professional ethics, on themethods and procedures for the collection, processing, storageand presentation of statistical data;

3. To facilitate a correct interpretation of the data, the statisticalagencies are to present information according to scientificstandards on the sources, methods and procedures of thestatistics;

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4. The statistical agencies are entitled to comment on erroneousinterpretation and misuse of statistics;

5. Data for statistical purposes may be drawn from all types ofsources, be they statistical surveys or administrative records.Statistical agencies are to choose the source with regard toquality, timeliness, costs and the burden on respondents;

6. Individual data collected by statistical agencies for statisticalcompilation, whether they refer to natural or legal persons,are to be strictly confidential and used exclusively forstatistical purposes;

7. The laws, regulations and measures under which thestatistical systems operate are to be made public;

8. Coordination among statistical agencies within countries isessential to achieve consistency and efficiency in thestatistical system;

9. The use by statistical agencies in each country of internationalconcepts, classifications and methods promotes the consistencyand efficiency of statistical systems at all official levels;

10. Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in statistics contributes tothe improvement of systems of official statistics in allcountries.

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CHAPTER III

SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ANDCITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

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INTRODUCTION

The difficulties being experienced by the economies of LatinAmerican countries to consolidate an ongoing growth allowingsubstantive achievements in social welfare have driven the debateon the most appropriate ways to shield the majority of thepopulation from poverty in a constant manner and withoutinterruptions or discontinuities.

Starting with the processes of democratization and reformsdesigned to establish regulation by the market, the use of the conceptof citizenship and social rights related to the same has becomeincreasingly more frequent, as a criterion to address social welfare. Inthe debate involving various political and social regional andinternational actors, committed to or involved in the fight againstpoverty, the notion has become disseminated that the appropriate wayof protecting the most vulnerable population and preventing deficitsbeyond certain limits is guaranteeing economic and social rights; thus,they say, government policies will focus on satisfying people's basicneeds, and solid safety nets will be established to ensure lastingwelfare. Other modes of providing welfare, such as charity orgenerosity, lack the mechanisms to guarantee continuity and fostergratitude and dependence.

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SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND CITIZENSHIP RIGHTS

Undoubtedly, appealing to citizenship and to social and economicrights as allocation criteria indicates common social objectives to beattained, and the bearing towards which society wishes to be steered,thus becoming guiding principles. In Marshall's words: ".... societiesin which citizenship is a developing institution create an image of idealcitizenship against which they may compare the achievements attainedand that becomes the object of aspirations" (1950). This process isstrengthened because citizenship contains a strongly integratingcharacter and because numerous social services, such as, e.g. healthand education, by addressing the interests and welfare of individualcitizens, satisfy the needs of the community as a whole (Hindess,1993:28). The allocation of welfare, in accordance with the criteriaof rights, will in turn make it possible to build conditions to makethe development model feasible and facilitate consensus in favor ofdemocracy.

As a result of the growing use and influence of citizenship andsocial rights, it is essential to reflect on the power of such principlesto become distribution criteria and on the feasibility of applyinginternational legal instruments with a view to their attainment inLatin America and the Caribbean.

This paper has the purpose of reflecting on the advantages anddifficulties of this approach to address needs, a task which impliesanalyzing the postulate of economic, social and cultural rights in thelight of the main perspectives of the debate in the international andLatin American scene and the components of the vision over thosethat prevail in most of the countries of the continent. Likewise, itimplies an approach to the operating conditions and an evaluation ofthe extent to which the international legislation signed by thecountries in the region is an effective instrument for the realizationof such rights.

We shall start from a general description of the socio-economicsituation of the countries in the region, with special emphasis onpoverty related variables, with the aim of keeping in sight themagnitude of the task ahead, and will approach the reflection in twoplanes: one, theoretical-conceptual and the other, instrumental, withthe latter linked to operating conditions. In the conceptual plane wewill go back to some approaches to citizenship developed in the

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international analysis, the manner in which they have becomeembodied in agreements signed within the framework of internationalorganizations and the main components of the debate that has resultedfrom them. Likewise, we shall refer to the validity and applicabilityof the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights (ICESCR) in the international field, and, regionally, we shallanalyze the fundamental traits of the conceptions and practicesrelating to those rights. To develop the instrumental plane, we willselect essential variables linked to these concepts and illustrate somewith empirical references.

Poverty in Latin America

In general terms, the economic recovery experienced by thecountries of the region after the financial crisis of the eighties has beenweak, with irregular growth rates and discontinuities, that have hadlittle effect on poverty (IDB, 1997:18). Few countries in the regionhave achieved a high and sustained growth rate, and only Chile andColombia grew by more than 5% per year for four consecutive years(IDB, 1997:9-10) and only five countries -Brazil, Chile, Colombia,Costa Rica and Uruguay- managed to reach a level of per capitaincome higher than that of the period prior to the crisis (Ibid.).Although the resumption of growth during the nineties made possiblea slight decrease of the poverty rate in most of the countries of theregion, the number of poor has risen due to population growth.According to ECLAC data, the reduction of the relative incidence ofpoverty, both at a household and individual level, was not sufficient tofully counterbalance the demographic growth of the period, sincebetween 1990 and 1999, poverty increased by 11 million people.However, what was achieved was a reduction of the quantity ofpopulation in a situation of extreme poverty, by almost 4 millionpeople (CEPAL, 2001:15).

The lack of growth stability and of achievements in povertyreduction is also evidenced when we observe briefer periods.According to the same source, towards 1999, "43.8% of thepopulation in the region (211 million people) were in a situation of

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poverty, three tenths of one percent more than in 1997" I, while in thatperiod the population in a situation of extreme poverty went from 19%to 18.5% (a little more than 89 million), which in absolute terms meantan increase of 0.6 million people (CEPAL, 2001:13).

These characteristics of the development model and the difficultyin abating poverty rates, have contributed to build a consensus aroundthe urgency of applying measures to make it possible to ensuresubsistence minimums to the population. One approach to materializethis consensus is that of guaranteeing access to certain aspects ofwelfare by the effective application of economic, social and culturalrights as citizenship rights. However, this approach presents obstaclesand difficulties that should be known and, as may be the case,overcome, with the purpose of clarifying the conditions under whichthe rights can be applied as an allocation criterion.

COMPONENTS OF THE CONCEPTION AND SOCIALRIGHT PRACTICES IN LATIN AMERICA

Although we cannot speak of a homogeneous notion of economic,social and cultural rights in Latin America, there are undoubtedlycommon sources and similar traits. We will touch upon the mostimportant ones. This conception is shaped by the perspective ofinternational organizations, embodied in the legislation of the majorityof the countries, the social protection tradition of each nation, and bythe notion of citizenship as a construction process that resounds withthe democratization struggles of several countries. It also involves thepractices and modalities of service delivery, clientalistic or corporatist,with the development that is specific of each country and is expressedin the political culture of each of them.

1 With respect to 1997, this figure represents an increase of 7.6 million poor (CEPAL,

2001:13).

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The perspective of the international organizations is contained inseveral documents that the countries of Latin America and theCaribbean2 have signed and ratified, above all the United NationsCovenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Declaration ofthe Right to Development, and several conventions sponsored by theILO. This perspective is regained by several United Nations agencies,such as UNICEF and UNRISD, as well as by The World Bank(Apodaca)3 . Indigenous rights have been reflected in specificdocuments, notably the 1989 ILO Convention No. 169 on Indigenousand Tribal Peoples, and the declarations on indigenous rights draftedby the United Nations and the OAS.

These documents, but above all the Covenant, condense the mainelements of the liberal and democratic conception about the rights; forthat reason, we will discuss it in some detail.

International Covenant on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights

The Intemnational Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights (ICESCR) was adopted by the UN in December 1966 andbecome effective in January 1976 (Craven, 1998:22). Like theInternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also adopted onthe same date, the Covenant on Economic Rights emanates from theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights, signed in 1948 within theframework of the United Nations Organization.

On the basis of recognizing that human beings are the core subjectof human rights and fundamental liberties and should be the mainbeneficiaries of such rights, three categories of rights are recognized:economic, social and cultural. Within the economic field, Statesrecognize classical labor rights, contemplated in various agreementssponsored by the ILO, such as the right to work, which comprises the

2 Besides the above, the Convention against the Discrimination of Women, and theConvention for the Protection of Children and Adolescents.

3 UJNRISD, UNICEF and The World Bank have considered some rights to be basic andfundamental. Among others, the right to health and welfare, to basic education, theright to work and to a just remuneration and to an appropriate standard of living.

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right to earn a living by means of freely elected or accepted activities(Section 6); fair salaries, equal pay for equal work, equal access formen and women to State promoted opportunities (Section 7),prerogatives linked to the exercise of civil rights, such as those oforganizing unions for the protection of interests and strikes4 (Section8) and various characteristics relating to adequate work conditionssuch as safety and hygiene, maximum working hours, weekly rest,periodical paid vacation and social security, etc.5 (Craven, 1998:226).With the aim of guaranteeing the safeguard of such rights, Statesshould apply appropriate measures, among others, vocationalcounseling, training programs, and policies to achieve developmentand full productive employment (Craven, 1998: 194).

Social rights to be protected include: the right to an adequatestandard of living including food, clothing and housing and acontinuous improvement of living conditions. Also recognized is theright not to go hungry, wherefore States are responsible for taking thenecessary steps to ensure its enforcement 6 . Likewise, recognized arethe rights to physical and mental health (Article 12), to basiceducation 7 (Article 13) and equal access to higher education andfinally, the right to participate in cultural life (Article 15). (Craven,1998: 22-23, and Alston and Quinn, 1987:185). States should satisfy,as a minimum, the basic needs of the population and guarantee equalrights for men and women to all the rights contemplated withoutdistinction of race, sex, color, language, religion, political opinion,

4 Also recognized is the right of trade unions to setting up national federations orconfederations and of becoming part of international labor organizations, as wellas to operate freely under the sole limitation of the law (Section 8, in A and Q,198:209-210).

5 Also contemplated is providing equal opportunities for promotion at work, under thesole criteria of capacity and seniority.

6 This includes: a) improving the methods to produce, preserve and distribute food,using scientific and technological knowledge, dissemination of nutritional principlesand development of land reforms to achieve a more efficient development andutilization of natural resources; b) taking into account the problems faced by countriesboth in terms of food imports and exports to ensure an equitable food distribution inconnection with the needs (Article 11, in Craven, 287). Also contemplated is theimportance of international cooperation for the achievement of this end.

7 States undertake to develop detailed plans to instrument mandatory primaryeducation where lacking (Article 14).

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social or national origin, equity, birth or any other status. (Craven,1998:153, Chapter II, Articles 2 to 5).

The above rights were confirmed and expanded by theDeclaration on the Right to Development, which asserts the right todevelopment as a universal inalienable right, that is part of humanrights8 . At the same time, it establishes the right and the duty by Statesof formulating national development policies, based on socialparticipation, to improve the welfare of the population.

In the area of indigenous rights, the 1989 ILO Conference adoptedan orientation which reasserts the right of tribal and indigenous peopleto continue existing and developing as they better understand it. It alsorecognizes the aspiration of indigenous peoples to "have control oftheir institutions, their way of living and their economic development,besides maintaining and developing their identity, languages andreligions within the framework of the States in which they live" (Plant,2998:8). A similar guideline inspires the UN's Declaration ofindigenous rights, emphasizing the rights of indigenous peoples tohave their own and separate functions and institutions, while ensuringfor them all human rights recognized internationally, as well as theopportunity of participating in the State and its political institutionsshould they so decide (Plant, 1998:9).

8 "Declaration on the Right to Development", Resolution 41/128, December 4, 1986,United Nations. Web page: http://unhchrch/spanish/html/menu3/b/74-sp.htm. Theright to development was confirmed by the World Human Rights Conference held inVienna in 1993. The Conference recommended assigning priority to national andinternational actions to promote democracy, development and human rights, anderadicate illiteracy and direct education towards the comprehensive development ofhuman beings (Vienna, 1993).

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Debate

As evidenced by the above list, the rights comprised in theICESCR clearly evoke the formulation of T.H. Marshall, especiallybecause they are considered to be an extension of human rights. Forthat reason, the debate that this Covenant has triggered leads to thediscussion generated by the conception of this author about socialrights.

Marshall approached the issue of rights within the framework ofhis concept of citizenship, that he conceived as a status of fullmembership of individuals in a society, that is conferred to thosewho are members in full right of a certain community, by virtue ofwhich they enjoy rights in three realms: civil, political and social.The civil realm comprises the rights required for individual freedom(personal freedom, freedom of speech, thought, faith, property andpossibility of entering into contracts and the right to Justice); thepolitical realm involves the right to participate in exercisingpolitical power, either as a member of a body endowed with politicalauthority, or as an elector of the members of such body. The socialrealm comprises both the right to a modicum of economic welfareand security, and the right to partake in the social heritage and tolive the life of a civilized being, in accordance with the standardsprevailing in society (Marshall, 1950).

Including the various types of rights under a single concept, thatof citizenship, allows Marshall to bring together the values andprinciples of liberal democracy (civil and political) with theconcerns for material welfare (social), and to incorporate into themembership derived from citizenship the possibility of compensatingfor market effects. The core idea is that there is a type of socialequality associated to the concept of full membership in a communitythat is not consistent with the inequities that are seen in the variouseconomic levels of society. The equality of individuals linked tosocial citizenship is an equality of status and is considered byMarshall to be more important than equality of income. Thus, thebasic human equality of membership is enriched with new contents,endowed with a series of rights and identified with citizenshipstatus. The economic feasibility of a universal application of social

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rights is fundamentally derived from the participation of individualsin the labor market, which is explained by the fact that Marshallsystematized his conception at a full employment stage.

Several authors have pointed at the theoretical weakness ofMarshall's postulate. Although it has received several critiques9, weshall focus on those that are linked to the debate resulting from theICESCR. The main criticism resides on the fact of confusing rightsthat have a different structure within the same concept. Social rightscannot be placed at a same level as civil and political rights, which inthe liberal tradition are universal. Although not all civil rights areuniversal, since the right to property and to sign contracts are notapplicable to all, given that people may hold such rights or not, and thepolitical rights give rise to obligations that the State must respect: theright to people's immunity, to the sanctity of domicile. In that sense,its action or lack of action is clearly demarcated. Social rights, instead,require the State to provide specific services that are only possible ifthere is prior compliance with complex economic, administrative andprofessional conditions (Barbalet, 1988). Questions such as: whichparticular services should be incorporated into social rights and bedistributed according to non-mercantile criteria? or which should bethe level of benefits granted? cannot be established with the samemethodical character that is applied in the case of civil and politicalrights. While the latter establish the rules of the game, social rightsrepresent the operation of these rules in interaction with the market(Sgritta, 1993).

9 Among other critiques, the strong evolutionary content of this concept has beenpointed out, since Marshall presented the development of citizenship rights as agradual process, occurring in a spontaneous manner on the basis of market institutionsand thanks to the benevolent protection of the State. and not as a product of politicaland social conflict. (A. Giddens, 1982). The Anglo-centric character of his analysishas also been underlined since he only focuses on the English experience (Turner,1986, Mann, 1987), and he has been criticized for not elaborating a causal explanationof why citizenship develops (Turner, 1993), and for not making a profound analysisof the State and the political conditions that favor its emergence and persistence(Turner, 1986). In the area of rights what has been highlighted is the heterogeneouscharacter of civil rights, since the right to strike cannot be equated to the right toproperty (Giddens, 1982).

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On the other hand, social rights are not in and of themselves theright to participate in a common national community, but onlypractical conditions enabling such participation. Besides, as opposedto civil and political rights, which are universal and formal, socialrights only make sense if they are conceived as aspirations to concreteservices and these cannot be universal but particular and selective(Barbalet, 1988, Zolo, 1994). Linked to this specific character is thefact that it is not clear how the right to health, to education or tohousing should be embodied. In general, such rights are defined interms of minimum or mean services, such as a minimum level ofinstruction, or a minimum health care level, but the right to work is anexpectation which is not realizable, with respect to which publicarrangements lack effective long term means, unless they intervene inmarket rules, from where, to a good extent, the resources required topay for the services arise (Zolo, 1994).

Additionally, since social rights imply expectations that are set atpublic services (transfers, minimum education, health and welfarelevels, etc.), they bring about organizational and proceduralrequirements, and demand a high amount of resources. Theirenforcement is closely related to the existence of a well-developedmarket economy, a solid administrative and professional infrastructureand an efficient fiscal system.

The definition of the contents and amounts of social servicesdepends, to an extent greater than civil and political rights, on theavailability of economic and financial resources generated in themarket, and it is also linked to discretional decisions by the publicadministration, to the interplay of power balances and to political andsocial claims which frequently arise in a conflictive manner withinsociety. As a result of their high cost and their incidence on themechanisms for the accumulation of wealth and fiscal capture, socialrights have a much more random character than actions directed atprotecting civil and political rights. Thus, while the lack ofeffectiveness of the right to work is a completely normal feature in thesocial rule of law, the sanctity of domicile or the guaranties on privateproperty are not (Barbalet, 1988; Zolo, 1994).

Several of the criticisms to Marshall's conception have also beenaddressed at the ICESCR and have given rise to a broad debate.

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Mention is made of the fundamental points of that debate, becausethey embody the problematic issues contained in the Covenant andprovide the guidelines of the matters to be approached. We will returnto some of these points when reflecting on the enforcement difficultiesin Latin America.

As opposed to Marshall's formulation, the ICESCR does notconfuse civil and political rights and economic, social and culturalrights within the same group because in providing an implementationprocedure for each, the distinct nature of both categories of rights isrecognized: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rightsand the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights (Craven, 1998: 7). However, by referring them both to humanrights, they are conferred universality. This is so argued by someauthors when fundamenting the importance of social rights, when theypoint out that they are valuable in themselves, independently fromtheir contribution to the enjoyment of civil and political rights. InCraven's words: [the rights] "... may be considered universal humanrights to the extent that they relate to fundamental elements of thephysical nature of individuals be they their material needs or thecapacity to enjoy social goods" (Craven, 1998:13)

The issue of universality has been the crux of the discussion ofeconomic, social and cultural rights. Several authors have statedthat such rights are not universal, since they lack an absolutecharacter, and, as opposed to civil and political rights, they cannotbe applied in an immediate and total way, but need to be applied ina progressive manner in specific sectors of the population (Bossuit,quoted by Craven, 998:15). For that reason, they are conditionalopportunities, that is, instruments providing access to the effectiveexercise of civil and political rights (Barbalet, 1988, Santoro,1994:109). Those who state they should be considered universalargue that precisely because freedom can only have meaning ifindividuals enjoy a certain degree of material security, the rightsshould be considered as such; in that sense, they agree with the ideathat they are conditional opportunities providing access to otherrights. Supporting the interdependence between both categories ofrights, President Franklin D. Roosevelt's well-known phrase in his1944 speech to Congress is quoted: "We have arrived at the clear

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understanding of the fact that true individual freedom cannot existwithout economic security and independence. Men in need arenot free men"1 0 .

A path proposed by those who assert the universal character ofeconomic rights and recognize the distinct nature of these as comparedto civil and political rights, is stating that the difference between themis not categorical, and their implementation should not becategorically distinguished, since in many cases civil and politicalrights also imply actions on the part of the State (Craven, 1998:13).By the same token, there are social rights that to become effectiverequire the regulation of private agents more than economic resources,such as labor and trade union rights (Abramovich and Curtis,2001:151). However, this solution does not solve the fundamentalproblem: that of specifying how should expectations be translated andto what extent should they be satisfied?

Such difficulties have been reflected in the lack of internationallegal frameworks and, of course, in national legislations. That is why,with the exception of labor rights, there is no detailed legal analysis ora specification of into what in particular should the rights to health,food, clothing, housing, education, etc. be translated. Neither at theinternational nor the national level (Alston, 1987: 351-352). The onlystipulation is the obligation of protecting the most vulnerable groups(people with disabilities, the elderly, children, HIV patients, thementally ill, the victims of natural disasters, etc.) and to give thempriority, especially at times of economic adjustment (Abramovich,Courtis, 2001:188).

This lack of precision is expressed in the formulation of somerights in the Covenant; thus, as some specialists have pointed out,while some rights are established in detail, with steps to be followedon the part of the State, such as the right to health (Article 12), and toprevent hunger (Article 11); in others there is simply a recognition tothe right to social security (Article 9) and no step to attain it ismentioned. (Alston and Quinn, 1987: 165)1 1.

10 Roosevelt, ED.,11 To enforce the right to health among other steps the prevention, treatment and control

of occupational, epidemic, endemic and other diseases is recommended (Craven,1998: 108).

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The lack of specifications of the Covenant, due to the very natureof the economic, social and cultural rights, has been expressed in otherinternational documents which reassert the right to development,where, although some priorities have been established1 2, these areonly pointed out in a general way, and certain objectives of theCovenant are repeated or new ones are added, as in the fight againstextreme poverty, the obligation by the States of "...creating andmaintaining measures at a national level in the fields of education,health and social support, to promote and protect the right of people invulnerable sectors ( ... ) and ensure the participation of those interestedin finding a solution to their problems". (Vienna 1993, paragraph 14).There is also a reiteration of the nights to an adequate standard of livingfor health and well being, including food, health care, housing and thenecessary social services (Ibid. paragraph 31).

Linked to this problem is the fact that two issues are confused: themeasures, actions or behaviors needed to assist in the realization of therights, are confused with the results thereofl3 . An example of that isArticle 6 mentioned before, containing the right to work which in turnpoints at some of the steps to be followed to achieve full employment;that is, an outcome obligation, while another paragraph in the samearticle prohibits forced labor, which implies a behavior obligation.

Finally, in the field of social and economic processes relating tothe conditions for the enforcement of the rights, several economicprocesses that should eventually lead to the realization of the rightsrespond to logics that the State cannot control, such as the right towork, or else go against economic policy objectives, as in the case ofthe fight against the inflation, one of the major measures of which,wage containment, is opposed to the right to a compensatory salary.By the same token, the fact that in the framework of privatization

12 Specially in the declaration issued as a result of the World Conference on HumanRights, held in Vienna in 1993.

13 A "behavior obligation" is understood by the International Law Commission as thatin which a State agency is obliged to embark on a specific course of action orbehavior, be it through an action or lack thereof, which represents a goal in itselfInstead, the "outcome obligation" requires that the State obtain certain results and thecourse of action is left to the discretion of the State (Craven. 1998: 107).

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processes various public services changed to being operated by privateagents and to depending on market forces, subordinates access to suchservices to income distribution which entails a clear disadvantage forpoor sectors. Later, when analyzing the difficulties to instrument therights in Latin America and the Caribbean, we shall return to this issue.

Validity and applicability of the ICESCRin the international legal context

The ambiguity of many norms, the programmatic nature of somerights and the consequential absence of national institutionsspecifically committed to promoting the rights as rights, make theirenforcement difficult (Alston, 1987:333). Also, the complexity ofseveral issues related to the enforcement of the rights should be noted.That, even when evaluation instruments have been developed.

In effect, the consensus on the need to institute surveillance of thecommitments undertaken by the signatory countries and verify thedegree of social progress achieved, led to the establishment of thereporting mechanism, which is the only form of internationalsupervision that has received the formal support of the party States andhas been institutionalized (Alston, 1987: 355)14. States should report,in accordance with a program established by the Economic and SocialCouncil, on the measures adopted and the progress attained in theobservance of the rights recognized in the Covenant (Articles 16-22).Such reports are reviewed by a Committee of experts on Economic,Social and Cultural Rights (Alston, 1987)15, a body that determineswhether a State has complied with its obligations and issues generalrecommendations.

14 States are required to submit reports in stages specifying the steps taken and theprogress achieved in the observance of the rights, as well as the difficultiesencountered (Craven, 1998: 37; 38).

15 The Committee, set up in 1996, is made up of 18 experts in the field of human rightselected by secret vote for 4 years, and renewed by half every two years. To preserveits independence the members are paid by UN (Alston, 1987, 349-350).

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This mechanism offers several advantages; among others, it hasmade it possible to establish and develop the standards to be applied toverify compliance with the rights. Thus, as a result of arecommendation by the Committee reviewing the reports, Statesbegan providing data per gender which affords a more preciseknowledge of the situation of women, and led to the introduction ofnew measures to capture gender gaps in the enforcement of the rights,such as the Gender Development Index which quantifies humandevelopment achievements, and the Gender Empowerment Index,evaluating women's participation in political and economic life, 6.

On the other hand, the report requires government officials toperiodically compare the Covenant with national practices and laws,which favors the increased dissemination of the need of enforcementof the rights by governments. It also facilitates decision-making onthe basis of certain principles, since the preparation of the reportrequires drafting documents on government policy in a certain socialor economic sector. Likewise, the fact of evaluating the degree towhich States comply with their obligations makes it possible to designactions to prevent or correct situations to insure the enforcement of therights (Craven, 1998: 31). Likewise, it provides the basis to stimulatepublic debates in connection with the adequacy of existing policies withthe enforcement of the rights, thus giving various sectors in society theopportunity of commenting on the government's assessment of thesituation. In an implicit manner, it is expected that publicity will triggerpressure for enforcement by the States (Craven, 1998: 55).

Since the main responsibility of ensuring compliance with theobligations contained in the Covenant rests on governments, theyare given considerable discretion to determine the measures to beapplied and the amount of resources to be allocated for theachievement of the objectives.

16 Recommendation No. 9 confirms that sex differentiated data is extremely useful inassessing compliance with clauses found in both the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and in the Convention on theElimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women that mandatenondiscrimination and equality of treatment (Apodaca, 1998: 140-141).

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The difficulties involved in the enforcement of the economic, socialand cultural rights, including the fact that their achievement depends onthe availability of resources and the magnitude of the tasks ahead, areimplicitly recognized in the criteria ruling the action by the States in theachievement of the commitments: the principle of phased realization,that refers to the continuous improvement of the rights and that theStates should take steps ". . .to the utmost of their available resources".

The States undertake to develop the steps individually and bymeans of international assistance, specially technical and economic, tothe utmost of their available resources, with the goal of progressivelyattaining the full realization of the rights recognized by the Covenantthrough various appropriate means, specially the adoption of variouslegislative measures (Article 2(1), Alston and Quinn, 1987: 165).

Without doubt, the surveillance mechanism instituted by theCovenant as well as the notion of progressive compliance contained inthe same, have influenced the fact that States make efforts to graduallyapproach the observance of economic rights. However, such notiondoes not manage to guarantee continuity in the delivery of servicesduring periods of difficulties and the economic crises that haverepeatedly accompanied the establishment of the new developmentmodel. Calculations made on the basis of official figures on the effectsof the Covenant on the enforcement of rights on the part of the States,do not make it possible to establish a clear and definite influence.Regarding enforcement of the rights of women, in general terms, theevidence finds a positive correlation between the economicdevelopment attained by countries and the realization of the rights ofwomen. The proportion of women with paid jobs, as compared to thenumber of men employed, increased between 1975 and 1985, whichindicates a progressive advance in the economic rights of women.However, between 1985 and 1990 the rate experienced a slight drop,from 56% to 55%. Although women's economic activity hasincreased with time, the average employment level of women is onlyhalf than of men (Apodaca, 1998: 151). Recent data on the GenderEmpowerment Index (GEI) indicate that in general, countries holdingthe first places of the ranking according to the Human DevelopmentIndex (HDI), are also topmost in the GEI. In developed countries thereis a certain correspondence between the place each of the countries

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holds in the Gender Empowerment Index (GEI) and the HumanDevelopment Index (HDI). Six of the countries found in the first tenplaces of the GEI, are likewise ranked in HDI, and four are among thefirst twenty. Instead, there is no such correspondence in Latin Americaand the Caribbean. In general, countries have a better ranking in theGEI than in the HDI. Of the 19 countries for which both indexes havebeen calculated, five are ranked in the first places for the region in GEIand HDI, but in the assembly of nations they are ranked differently.Thus, for example, Venezuela holds place number 20 in GEI, but 65 inthe HDI, and Bolivia is 54 in GEI but 114 in HDI. Conversely, Chileis 51 in GEI and 38 in HDI (See GEI Chart in the Appendix)17 .

On the other hand, in terms of effective delivery of reports,Craven mentions that in ten years (up to 1997), 14 countries haddelivered no report to the Committee in charge of monitoring theobservance of the rights, and 72 countries were delayed in the deliveryof their reports (Craven, 1998: 57).

The concept and practice of rightsin Latin America

Besides the perspective of international agencies, the LatinAmerica concept has been shaped by institutional practices referringto the organization of social protection, by modalities of service andbenefit delivery and by social objectives pursued by organized sectors.

A core element in the concept is the belief on the capacity foreconomic growth through industrialization to create paid employmentand thus absorb population increases. Through import substitution,

17 Source: ww4 undp.org/hdr2000/spanish/presskit/gem.pdf.The GEI is calculated based in four variables:

a) the percentage of parliamentary sits held by women (data as of February29, 2000), b) percentage of women in executive and administrative positions(the most recent year available); c) professional and technical positions, andd) Women's GDP per capita (PPA in dollars).

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the domestic market was protected from external shocks and policiesdesigned to promote employment were implemented. The confidencein growth by way of import substitution was materialized in thecreation of social security, and in the preference for granting welfarebenefits to the workers and middle sectors belonging to the formalsector of the economy.

Similarly, the process of creation of social security systemscomprised the regulation of the labor market by means of labor codesguaranteeing certain levels ofjob security, establishing minimum wagesand setting safety and hygiene standards. The labor rules adoptedcontemplated protecting workers from business; they set a premium onseniority, since severance payments increased proportionally with theduration of employment.

The economic growth and the expansion of formal employment forworkers and middle sectors, experienced after the Second World Warand until the 1980's, provided social mobility opportunities for thepopular sectors and made it possible to incorporate new social categoriesto the enjoyment of benefits and expand the services provided. Between1950 and 1980, in Latin America, on average, 60% of the new jobs werecreated by the formal sectors of the economy, with the governmentbeing responsible for 15%, while mid-sized and large private companiesgenerated the remaining 45%. The informal sector contributed with40% of the new jobs (ILO, 1996, cited in Klein, 2000: 18).

Social benefits comprised health care, insurance against workaccidents, death, disease, maternity, retirement pensions and, in somecountries, family allowances, and extended many of the benefits to thedependents of the direct participants (Abel and Lewis, 1993, Cruz-Saco, 1998: 1). As a result of this processes, poverty decreased from50% of urban families in 1960, to 35% in 1980 (PREALC, 1991: 81).The welfare of the population, as expressed in the HDI, progressedvery slowly, closely linked to GDP evolution. A study that calculatesthe HDI for Latin America as from 1900, points out that improvementsbegan in the 1930s and accelerated until the 1970s in coincidence withimprovements in life expectancy, literacy rate and GDP growth. Themain variable in the slow progress of the social variables has been thepace of GDP growth. In some countries, the positive changes of thesevariables are attributed to spectacular improvements in the GDP, as

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was the case of Venezuela starting from 1930, with the exploitation ofoil fields (Yanez, 2002: 10).

The classification of social security regimes that Mesa Lagorecovers (1986) where the stage of creation of social security systemsis linked to the type and quantity of benefits provided, is anappropnate approach to establish the main features and the differencesof protection systems and, in that sense, the economic and social rightsin force in Latin American countries. The first group comprisescountries that pioneered the creation of social security in the 1920'sand 1930's, which had the most extended set of rightsl8 . Chile,Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil and Cuba are included in that group.Uruguay (1914) and Chile (1924) were the first countries in the regionto adopt legislation that protected workers from the risks ofoccupational accidents and diseases (Uruguay) and against the risks ofold age, disablement, death and ordinary disease (Chile). From thebeginning of the Twentieth Century, these two countries graduallyexpanded the coverage of health, education and social securityservices and, together with Argentina, developed the social securitysystems with the greatest degree of universality of the region. (MesaLago, 1986: 133). In these countries, an employment insurance wasinstituted. This first group of countries achieved a coverage of 62 to96% (Cruz-Saco, 1998:7).

The second group is comprised of Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico,Paraguay, Ecuador, Panama, Bolivia, Peru and Venezuela, countries inwhich the social security system was established during the 1940's andachieved an intermediate level of coverage. The countries withgreater relative development in this group had social securityinstitutions that protected the most powerful pressure groups: themilitary, civil servants, teachers, power and railroad workers, beforethe creation of the general management institute (Mesa Lago, 1986:134). This second group reached coverage rates in the range of 18 to50% (Cruz Saco, 1998: 7).

18 Roberts suggests that the organization of social security systems is linked to thedifferentiation between countries with early, rapid and slow development, based onthe pace and period of urbanization and economic growth of the region (1996: 47).

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Finally, the social security systems of the third group, DominicanRepublic, Haiti, Guatemalal9 , El Salvador, Honduras andNicaragua20 , developed during the 1950's and 1960's and reached thelowest coverage level of the region. This group showed the lowestcoverage rates, between 2 and 19% (Ibid.).

The labor bias of social security institutions, based on three-partycontributions (State, workers, employers), determined that not thewhole population of the region be covered: according to an ECLACstudy quoted by Mesa Lago, by 1980, 61% of the total Latin Americanpopulation had health coverage and a similar percentage (61%) of theeconomically active population (EAP), had pension coverage.However, if Brazil is excluded from the calculation, the regionalcoverage drops to 43%, and in the majority of the countries, it is below25% (Mesa Lago, 1986:135). At the same time, until the 1980's,governments emphasized social policies addressed at the wholepopulation, based on the assumption that economic growth wouldbring about social development. In most countries, only the basiceducation and primary health care services had universal coverageobjectives, closely linked with development related objectives.

The organization of social security, fundamentally connected withthe insertion in the formal market, determined that those sectorsmarginalized from the formal market, both urban and rural, wereexcluded; among others, agricultural workers, the self employed, theemployees of very small businesses, domestic workers and theunemployed as well as the dependents of all of the above, wherefore

19 During the mid 1990's, the Guatemalan Ministry of Health covered approximatelyone third of the population, the Institute of Social Security of Guatemala, 17% andthe rest was covered by the private sector. The attainments of this country in healthcare are very reduced: it has the third lowest life expectancy at the birth of LatinAmerica (64.5 years in 1999) and diarrhea and respiratory infections are the maincauses of children mortality (Cruz-Saco, 1998: 10-1 1).

20 In Nicaragua, the Nicaragua Social Security Institute (INSS), established in 1957,served mainly middle class sectors and its services were concentrated in urban zones.Sollis (1993) underlines that in 1979 the INSS was responsible for 50% of theeffective spending of the health sector, but less than 10% of the total population or16% of the EAP had access to the same. The INSS covered 67% of the salariedpopulation of Managua, mostly the regime's burocrats (Ibid.).

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the more needy groups lacked social security in almost all countries(Mesa-Lago, 1986: 135-36, Roberts, 1996). Besides, the socialsecurity structure based on a family model assuming a male providerand a care-taker woman, led to reduced benefits for working women.The insured were the urban employees and their close dependents.

Regarding the informal sector2 lit should be recalled that theproportion represented by this sector vis-a-vis the urban EAP of LatinAmerica in 1960, around 31%, had not changed towards 1989(Oliveira and Roberts, 1994, quoted by Roberts, 1996: 48). There aresignificant differences by country: while in Chile the informal sectorexperienced a progressive reduction as compared to the urban workingpopulation between 1960 and 1980, this was not the case in Argentinaand Uruguay (PREALC, 1982). Data from Mexico indicate that atleast 99 of the workers in small informal businesses lack the coverageof the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) (Mesa-Lago, 1990).In Brazil, the social welfare system implemented at the beginning ofthe 1930's has excluded an important proportion of the population,basically the rural and urban poor, who represent almost 50% of theEAP In El Salvador, 1992 data point at the system's very low coveragecomprising only 17.6% of the EAP (Mena, 1995), and the subsequentexclusion of informal workers, both rural and urban. In 1991, only6.5% of the workers in the agricultural sector and 11.7% of theworkers in the sector of personal and social services -a sectorpresenting a high level of informality- was covered by the ISSS withhealth programs (Mesa-Lago, 1994). Costa Rica, instead, representsan exception in Central America, both for having a relatively smallinformal sector -that remained constant at around 12% of the EAPbetween 1950 and 1980 (PREALC, 1982)- and an active socialpolicy. According to Mesa-Lago (1990), the Costa Rica SocialSecurity Institute (CCSS) provides one of the broadest pension andhealth service systems of the region. The whole of the informal sector

21 According to criteria established by PREALC, the informal sector is made up of self-employed workers, unpaid family workers and workers in companies with less than5 employees (PREALC, 1982).

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was covered in 1986 by different health programs of the CCSS,although the pension coverage was very restricted: almost 97% of theinformal workers lacked pensions (Mesa-Lago, 1990).

A very important characteristic of the organization of the socialsecurity systems and of welfare systems in general that contributed toshaping criteria about welfare allocations is the corporate modalitythat it has assumed in most of the countries. On the one hand, thepolitical power of trade unions and the importance of the sector(economic or political), have been essential criteria to extend socialbenefits, which generated a distribution logic based on power and thecapacity of organizations to exert pressure, whereby the systemgranted earlier and more complete coverages, more generous benefitsand more advantageous financing to the groups with greater powerand mobilization possibilities (Mesa Lago, 1986: 133). At thebeginning of the eighties it was estimated that Argentina, Chile andVenezuela had between 30 and 40% of their EAPs unionized, Mexicoand Colombia between 30 and 40%, while El Salvador and Guatemalahad less than 10% (Roberts, 1996: 50-51).

On the other hand, in several countries the State developed formsof corporatism, according to Schmitter's definition, based onhierarchical union and sectoral structures which co-opted members bymeans of social security benefits, such as health insurance, pensions,housing, etc. Thus, the welfare care and protection institutions wereused as instruments to co-opt, neutralize and control various groups inorder to reinforce the legitimacy of a certain regime and maintainsocial order (Ibidem). This model of welfare supply established acertain type of State-society relationship in which certain socialintegration mechanisms were characterized by the stratification andthe verticalism of social benefits, which generated a paternalistic andclientalistic relationship of beneficiaries with the State22.

The access of the popular sectors lacking social security to thesocial benefits provided by the State, also took place throughclientalistic relationships. The complex assembly of patron-client

22 The "regulated citizenship" in Brazil, the industrial worker of Peronism in Argentinaand the sectoral organization of the official party in Mexico, to mention just the betterknown cases. illustrate this modality.

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networks with State officials or political leaders represented one of themain sources of social capital for marginalized and informal sectors.Malloy (1993) underlines that, in spite of rules that might say that thebenefits are citizenship rights, in practice, the decision-makingstructures insure that many, if not the majority of the low-incomesectors, operate as clients of some patron at an intermediate level,which explains why the relationship of popular sectors with the Statewas expressed more in terms of clientalism or paternalism than interms of rights and duties, which contributed to hindering access towelfare proposed in terms of rights (Jelin, 1996: 82-84).

Such characteristics influenced the fact that citizenship, in thesense of access to diverse and varied forms of welfare, is only fullyacquired by belonging to certain organizations or associationsrecognized by the State, and that socially, the privilege of organizeddemands towards the State was socially accepted over and aboveindividual revindications. Organizations with official recognition thusfunctioned as strong subjects of citizenship, according to Zolo'sformulation (Zolo, 1994: 28).

This modality of access to satisfactors by way of the organizationsdetermined that in many countries no universal forms of individualaccess be specified except in the case of social security, that was basedon individual contracts, and in services related with the requirementsof development, such as basic education and primary health care.

For the purpose of our reflection, it is necessary to note theimportant pressure capacity of organized groups in the obtention ofsocial benefits: middle sectors, large union groupings and, in certaincountries, political parties. Thus, the combination of workers in theformal market together with the criterion of fundamentally servingorganized sectors with pressure capacity, contributed to configuringwelfare provision as a privilege to which access is gained through anorganization or a clientalistic relation, and not as a universal right.Besides, the manner in which the social service systems wereorganized, according to the criteria of providing for social categoriesin stratified and fragmented systems, brought about a reinforcement ofthe profound social inequities and contributed to strengthening a civicculture that undermined social solidarity, and to defending access tobenefits as a privilege by resorting to the capacity for pressure or

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mobilization. The recurrent economic crises and the structuraladjustment measures experienced by the countries in the region, bycausing losses in the purchasing power of the population covered bysocial security (workers and middle sectors) would make this traitmore acute, as well as heightening the distribution conflicts linkedwith access to welfare.

Social Citizenship as Construction of Democracy

The processes of political change and democratization in LatinAmerica have brought about a reflection around citizenship and theexercise of rights linked to the same, as well as the insertion oractualization of economic, social and cultural rights in theConstitutions of the countries, fostered within the framework of theinternational agencies.

Economic, social and cultural rights are the object of analysis andaffirmation, at two levels: in their character as conditions allowing foraccess to the exercise of other rights and in the sense of membership,which in turn contributes to configuring the concept of economic,social and cultural rights that are linked to the debate on theuniversality of the rights, as already pointed out in the section on theinternational debate. An aspect of the concept is given by the idea ofdemocracy as a construction, and within that framework, citizenship isunderstood as the product of the struggle, as a process, in whichvarious social actors gain access to the revindication of their demands.To the extent that the realization of the rights is conceived as a processunder construction, it comes together with the progressive character ofenforcement of the rights expressed in the ICESCR.

The reflection on the issue of the conditions necessary for theexercise of civil and political rights is condensed in the question: "Cancivil and political rights be enjoyed without having access to the basicconditions (the elimination of hunger, but also access to education andinformation) that ensure the possibility of exercising those rights?"(Hershberg and Hershberg, 1996:233). Extreme poverty places peoplein a situation in which they cannot "assert themselves", which leads tothe reformulation of the liberal and autonomic notion of citizenship

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and gives it a paternalistic bias, an ingredient inherent in the idea of"social protection" and the social dimension, as such, of citizenship.(Reis, 1996: 138)

Economic and social rights as requirement and expression ofbelonging to a community are based on Hannah Arendt's argument inthat the human condition implies belonging to a political community.This perspective implies starting from the premise that the basic rightis "the right to have rights". There can be no democracy with extremelevels of poverty and exclusion, since extreme poverty and exclusionare the denial of fundamental rights and are opposed to the idea ofactors (Hershberg and Hershberg, 1996: 233).

On the other hand, citizenship conceived as a process refers to aconflictive practice linked to power and exercise, and that of the rightswhich are part of the transition to democracy, the construction ofinstitutions linked to the democratic regime. In this task, civil societyorganizations have an important role to play. It is for them to demand,promote and monitor that construction (Jelin, 1996: 116, 118). Citizenshipinvolves a process of defining and redefining rights and expanding thebase of participation (Roberts, 1996: 39). Implicitly, democracy is seenas a pre-requisite of social justice, based on the idea that a greaterpossibility of participation by people in political processes increasesthe opportunity of taking part in the distribution of economic goodsand, therefore, may lead to a more equitable distribution. Nohlenrecalls that this expectation is supported by the experience ofdevelopment of the welfare State in the democracies of theindustrialized countries after the war, a phenomenon associated to theextension of universal vote and to the growing participation of theorganizations of the lower classes in the process of shaping thepolitical will (Nohlen, 2001: 338-339).

This combination of objectives still provides an excessivelygeneral and abstract, vague, character to the concept of rights in mostof Latin America. A condensation of objectives is deposited on socialrights. It is taken for granted that the definition of citizenship shouldalso incorporate the acceptance which refers to the conditions favoringsocial equality and participation, eluding the discussion on thenecessary specifications. That is, they include in the definition ofcitizenship both the formal equality of individuals and the conditions

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that make the equality possible. Thus, rights are confused withintegration objectives. It should be noted that although this currentof thinking has fundamentally extended in the 1990's, it hasinfluenced the growing use of rights and citizenship on the part ofvarious social and political actors. In spite of the ambiguities towhich we have referred, their use is explained because it expressesobjectives to be attained and gives visibility to a very serious problemof deficits, while attempting at the same time to provide a strongargument to address it and solve it.

The two references mentioned have had their expression in thework of several Latin American authors, disseminated both inacademic publications and in documents of regional agencies, suchas ECLAC. These papers start from the triad of rights postulated byMarshall and understand economic and social rights as an extensionof individual human rights into a social scale, without questioningtheir differences in nature. As can be understood from the abovestatement, the sources of the concept of rights prevailing in LatinAmerica have a diverse and opposed character, when not acontradictory one, over which liberal thought traditions are overlaidwith corporate modalities, and highlight the objectives tending tothe prevalence of criteria of social ethics.

These concepts have had their legal expression in documents ofa regional character, and in the Constitutions of some countries. Insome of them, economic and social rights have a long tradition as aguiding objective of society, as in the case of Mexico, and in othersthey have become recently embodied, in a close relationship withthe democratization processes, as in the case of the BrazilianConstitution, that goes back to 1988, while indigenous rights wereincluded in the nineties.

Economic, social and cultural rights have been incorporated ina succinct manner in an OAS Agreement, incorporating thesubstantive aspects of the ICESCR; Article 26 of the AmericanConvention on Human Rights reads:

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"The member States undertake to adopt provisions bothdomestically and through international cooperation, speciallytechnical and economic, to progressively achieve the fullenforcement of the rights derived from the economic, social,educational, science and culture standards contained in the Charterof the Organization of American States, as amended by the BuenosAires' Protocol, to the extent of the available resources, throughlegislation or other appropriate means" 23.

Most of the Latin American Constitutions include in their texts therights contained in the ICESCR. They recognize the freedom toorganize trade unions, the right to strike and they establish themaximum work day. Out of those consulted24 , the ChileanConstitution is the only one that in a brief manner mentions "freedomto work and its protection" and does not contain a formulation of theright to a minimum salary or compensation. Argentina has notenshrined the right to health and education in the Constitution. TheCosta Rica Charter includes specifications on the funding ofeducation and the minimum percentage of the GDP to be spent inthat sector, and in the Constitution of Ecuador there is an indicationof the percentage of government expenditure that has to beallocated to education up to high school (no less than 30%).Brazil's Constitution, in turn, details the percentage to be spent bythe Union (18% of fiscal revenues) and the States, the FederalDistrict and the municipalities (25% of fiscal revenues). It furtherorders the collection from private companies of a contribution forelementary education. Although in the Charter of Guatemala it isdeclared that literacy is a "national urgency and social obligation"the only specification is the percentage to be allocated to theUniversity of San Carlos (5%).

23 American Human Rights Convention, San Jose de Costa Rica, issued on November22, 1969. www.oas.orgISP/Prog/pg29-58.htm

24 The source for this Section were the Constitutions of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua,Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

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With regards to the right to social security, a good share of theConstitutions in the region contain it, and the way it will be funded,and in some as in the case of Ecuador, the progressive incorporation ofthe whole population is contemplated, including people who do notparticipate in the formal labor market. Costa Rica and Panama haveno record of social security in their Constitution.

Additionally, some Constitutions, as the Colombian one,contemplate the supply of a food grant during pregnancy and afterbirth to unemployed and dispossessed women. Explicit mention of theelderly as a specific sector for care is found in the Constitutions ofGuatemala, Honduras and Venezuela, while the Peruvian Constitutiononly grants protection to abandoned elderly people. The disabled areonly mentioned in the Charter of Nicaragua. With regards to housing,several countries consider it a right: Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras,Mexico, Paraguay, Nicaragua and Uruguay.

Finally, the right of the population to the protection of theenvironment is recognized in the Constitutions of Ecuador, Guatemala,Nicaragua and Uruguay.

The rights included in Convention 169 of the ILO, referring toindigenous communities, have been the subject of legal coverage inseveral countries during the 1990's, and the multicultural character ofthese countries has been recognized. Besides, in 1994, Bolivia providedfor the strengthening of indigenous institutions at the local level in thepopular participation reforms, so that indigenous institutions, set upaccording to their traditional customs and uses, can receive legalrecognition allowing them to participate in municipal governments, andindigenous municipal districts have been set up with subunits of themunicipal structure of local government (Plant, 1998: 26). Peru's 1993Constitution, in turn, states (Article 149) that the authorities of the"peasant and native communities" can have jurisdictional functionswithin their territories following their traditional law (Plant, 1998:27).Although in Mexico, social development has received special attention,indigenous communities have not been awarded legal standing. InGuatemala, since the signature of the final peace agreement in 1996,which includes the signature of a separate agreement in March 1995,on the Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, indigenous rightsare recognized (Plant: 28).

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PROBLEMATIC AREAS RELATED TO THEECONOMIC MODEL AND TO CERTAINSTRUCTURAL FEATURES IN LAC

The main features which represent problematic areas for therealization of rights in Latin America are well-known. These featuresare expressed both in the difficulties inherent to economic, social andcultural rights as universal human rights, and in the obstaclesconnected with their implementation.

The first feature is, without doubt, the inequitable (unequal)income distribution prevailing in most of the region. Althoughbetween 1970 and 1982 Gini's coefficient decreased 10%25, and"the income ratio between the richest 20% of the population and thepoorest 20% was reduced from 23 to 18 times" (IDB, 1998: 16),these trends were reverted during the debt crisis of the 1980's, whenthe highest income decile increased its share by over 10%, while theincome of the other deciles decreased. The income share of thepoorest decile dropped 15% (Ibid., 16-17). The highest increase ofGini's coefficient occurred in the three largest countries of theregion, Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. (Filgueira, 1996:15, quotedby Portes, 2001:76).

Although the trend towards the worsening of income distributionstopped in some countries during the 1990's the concentration ofincome continues being very high. According to IDB calculations, thepoorest 20% of the population in each country only receives 3% of thetotal income, while the wealthiest 20% gets 60% (IDB 1997, 43);between 1990 and 1995, the poorest 10% in the region had a loss in itsincome share of 15% and the following 10% of 4%. (IDB, 1998: 17).

The countries with greatest inequity are Brazil, Chile, Ecuador,Guatemala, Mexico, Panama and Paraguay. Three countries of theEnglish-speaking Caribbean -Jamaica, Bahamas and Trinidad andTobago- show lower concentration indexes than the Spanish-speaking

25 Approximated estimates of IDB, on the basis of findings available for 13 countrieswhich, according to the source, represent four fifths of the Latin American population.

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countries, but only Jamaica has an inequality level that is significantlybelow the international pattern (IDB, 1998: 15). In fact, in the ninetiesthe countries having the worst initial distributions, such as Brazil,Guatemala and Panama, became even worst, while those that had thebest distributions, such as Uruguay and Jamaica, continued improving(IDB, 1997: 43). Colombia, that had a remarkable improvement inincome distribution between 1980 and 1986, later remained stable(Filgueira, 1996: 15, quoted by Portes 2001: 76).

The increased income concentration is associated to the economicchanges developed within the framework of globalization, and to theadjustment, de-regulation and privatization policies, promoted withthe purpose of shifting to an open economy model. Althoughglobalization has opened up new possibilities for growth and jobcreation, it has affected the factors determining employment andsalaries. At the same time, the region's economy began to becharacterized by a great volatility, with the most serious repercussionsbeing felt by the lower income population (Klein, 2000: 8)26.

These changes have contributed to worsening inequality as a resultof the modifications caused in the labor market. According toKlein over 55% of the income differences are explained by the resultsof this market; the increased unemployment, the shift towards lessproductive and more unstable jobs and the increase in salarydifferences have increased income inequalities because they affect thepoorer households more. Unemployment rates are higher among poorhouseholds: in Chile, in 1996, the unemployment rate of the poorestquintile was 2.7 times that of the richest quintile (Klein, 2000: 21).Similarly, unemployment affects women and youth more severely.While the unemployment rate for women is approximately 30%higher than the average, in the case of youth, it is usually double thenational level (Klein, 2000: 12)27.

26 According to IDB studies, "the positive relationship between volatility and incomeinequality is significant in statistical and economic terms. The statistical relationsuggests that a reduction of three percentage points in the volatility of the real GDPgrowth would approximately reduce Gini's coefficient of income inequality by twopercentage points ". (IDB, 1998: 107).

27 The average variation for the whole of Latin America is 1.5 times (IDB, 2000).

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The slow and discontinuous economic growth has showninsufficient job creation capacity, to be able to absorb the growingparticipation of women in the work force and the growth of the EAP,of 2.6% per year. The work force in the region, which comprised atthe end of the 1990's close to 212 million people, grew by 44 millionin the last decade, representing in 1999 42% of the total population,three percentage points above the figure recorded in 1990 (CEPAL,2001: 20). Discontinuous economic growth and increasedpopulation led to the increase of the unemployment rate from 6.7%on average in 1980, to 8.8% in 1999, with fluctuations in theintermediate period (Ibid.,12), although some countries have hadhigher figures: at mid 1996, Argentina had a 16% officialunemployment rate, 10 percentage points higher than five yearsbefore. Other four countries recorded rates above 10%, thatincreased or remained static during the nineties. Only four countries-three of them in Central America- recorded reductions of 2 to 3percent in unemployment during the same period (Latin AmericanWeekly Report, 1996c, quoted by Portes, 2001: 77). By the end of1998, the situation had not improved: Argentina, Colombia andVenezuela experienced two digit unemployment rates (IDB, 2000).

The processes of growing informality, precariousness andflexibilization, related among themselves, have contributed toconfiguring a labor market in which job security is lost: very lowsalaries are paid to unskilled workers and precarious employmentconditions proliferate (Klein, 2000: 13).

In view of the international competition faced by industries in themodern sector based on labor intensive procedures, the payment ofvery low salaries and the elimination of employment benefits isfrequent, so that workers opt for a job in the informal sector, wherethey lack benefits but have better salaries. This has been the case inthe Dominican Republic, where the labor conditions in exporting free-trade zones are so bad that they cause a considerable flow of laborreturning to informal jobs and to self employment. Thus, the informalsector, that during the import substitution industrialization period wasconsidered a haven for those unable to find a job in the modern sectorof the economy, has now become a haven of free market in themodern sector (Portes, 2001: 78).

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Another process that has developed in connection with therequirement of business competitiveness is outsourcing, whichprovides greater flexibility in response to fluctuations in the economicenvironments. The results in terms of salaries and labor conditions arediverse: occasionally there are improved salaries at the cost of lost jobsecurity, but in others no improvements are recorded. In Chile's Statemining sector, where there were mass layoffs to reduce productioncosts, many workers were then rehired by subcontractors. They lostjob security and benefits, but gained in terms of working conditionsand lower accident rates. However, in many cases, the employmentand income conditions were deteriorated, associated to the installationof maquiladoras, companies in which labor standards and even humanrights are not always respected. Currently, precarious jobs and sectorsin which subcontracting becomes the common characteristic of thelabor market are abundant. In those cases, temporary jobs, lack ofsocial security, inexistence of unions, collective bargaining andtraining mechanism are frequent, although they may also beaccompanied by high salaries (Klein, 2000: 25-26).

As a result of the increased precariousness of employment, theproportion of salaried workers with permanent contracts has beenreduced; in Chile (1996) and Venezuela (1995) only 38% of salariedworkers are employed under that modality, and in Mexico (1994) itonly represents 19% of the employees. The differences between menand women are considerable. In Chile, Venezuela and Mexico, 55%,56% and 27%, respectively of the salaried men have a permanentcontract; for women the respective figures are 25%, 26% and 12%(IDB 1998: 157-158).

In the nineties, employment in the informal sector (self employed,non-paid family workers and workers in micro-businesses, i.e. withless than five workers, or in domestic service) recorded an importantincrease, going from 51.6% of the total active population in 1990 to56% in 1995 (ILO, quoted by Lustig, 1998: 303)28. Only Argentina,Chile and Honduras succeeded in preventing the expansion of the

28 Other calculations indicate that informal employment has only expanded from 44%to 48% between 1990 and 1998, Klein, 2000: 16-17.

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informal sector. For the region as a whole, 61 of each 100 jobsgenerated in the nineties were informal and those created by micro-businesses were specially dynamic (Klein, 2000: 17).

In spite of the valid employment option represented by micro-businesses, since in general they pay better salaries than other sectors,the working conditions offered are, however, inadequate. Theyprovide no job security or social protection and violations of basiclabor rights (child labor, freedom to unionize, collective bargainingand forced labor) are more frequent than in larger companies. It iscalculated that the mean income of micro-businesses is close to 90%of the mean income in modem activities, but only 55% of the meanincome of mid and large companies. Between 65% and 95% of thoseworking in micro-businesses lack a written employment contract, andbetween 65% and 80% have no health insurance or security. They alsotend to work longer hours and have more labor accidents. In Chile,30% of the workers had no contract or had atypical contracts; inArgentina and Colombia the proportion increased to 40% and 74% inPeru. Most worked in micro-businesses: 50% in Chile, 65-70% inColombia and Argentina, and 80% in Peru (Klein, 2000: 17).

A phenomenon which has characterized the performance of LatinAmerican economies is the reduction in purchasing power of theminimum salary in most countries. Currently it is much lower than itwas at the beginning of the 1980's. The debt crisis and the subsequentadjustment processes led to the drop of the minimum wage that wasonly partially corrected in the nineties. On average, "minimum salariesin 1999 were 26% below those of 1980, but in manufacturing industrythey have increased by 2.9% over the same period" (Klein, 2000: 11).Only Colombia, Costa Rica and Panama have managed to maintain theminimum salary relatively stable in real terms (IDB, 1998: 169).

These trends are expressed more acutely in women's laborparticipation, since they show a greater probability of working inthe informal sector and in badly paid professions. "In fact, there isa high correlation between the proportion of women employed in acertain job and its remuneration as compared with otherprofessions" (IDB, 2000, 78).

In all of Latin America there is a wide salary gap between maleand female workers. In all employment categories, women receive

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lower pay, although the greatest differences are found in informal jobs,both rural and urban. In the formal sector, women earn 10% less thanmen for the same job, and in informal occupations, women receive25% less for work hour than men with the same level of age andeducation (IDB, 1998: 43). It should be noted that the informal sectorallows people, and above all women, to perform activities offeringmore flexibility to adjust working hours and enabling them to takebetter advantage of some skills, which helps explain the growth of thissector, although the enforcement of the rules is low and it does notprovide conditions of stability (Ibid., 154). Less educated womenjoining the labor force tend to be concentrated in informal sector jobsthat pay less than in the formal sector for women with comparableeducation levels. The greatest share of women in informal companiesthat on average have low productivity, would help explain women'slower income (IDB, 2000, 78). Besides, due to the influence of theeducational level on the share in the labor force and the probability ofworking in the formal or informal sector, women's incomes vary morewidely than men's (IDB, 1998: 68).

This situation becomes worst in the case of the indigenous andblack population. In Guatemala, towards 1996, the indigenouspopulation of the capital represented 12% of the population, wasconcentrated in precarious jobs and had less possibilities of socialsecurity coverage than the mixed-race population (Perez Sainz et al.,1992). In the case of Brazil, the black population is concentrated inthe poorest segments of the rural and urban population. In spite of thestatement that in that country race has less significance in producinginequality than in others, the black population continues to be at thebottom of the scale of poverty indicators (Roberts, 1996).

Certain trends in salary behavior, related to educational orspecialization levels, have tended to increase the inequality and todeepen the disadvantages of the poorest sector. We refer to thehigher increase recorded in industrial salaries, as compared withminimum wages. Industrial salaries grew at the pace of 1.4% peryear between 1990 and 1997, while minimum wages only grew by0.3% (Klein, 2000:19).

On the other hand, considerable differences are recorded amongcountries with respect to agricultural salaries; although in all countries

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the agricultural sector pays workers less than the industrial sector, thedifference is very little in Panama, less than 10% in Honduras, butmore than 40% in Peru and Mexico (IDB, 1998: 44).

In 1995 or 1996, the majority of the countries in Latin Americahad minimum wage levels representing less than half the averagesalary. In Bolivia, Brazil and Argentina it was below 30%, and inChile, Mexico and Peru between 30 and 40% of the average salary.These proportions are low as compared to those of developedcountries. However, in several Latin American countries, minimumsalaries were above 50% of the average, while in the extreme case ofVenezuela, in 1995 they represented close to 90% of the average salary(IDB, 1998: 170). Where minimum salaries are higher in relation withthe average salary non-observance of the rules is higher: in Paraguayand El Salvador, close to half the workers have salaries under 80% ofthe minimum, and in Honduras and Venezuela out of every 100workers, between 30 and 40 are in the same situation (Ibid., 171).

On the other hand, in several countries, the behavior of incomehas led to a non-reduction of inequality, but rather to its persistence ashas been the case in Chile, where, in spite of the increase in jobs andreal salaries between 1983 and 1995, inequality has not decreasedbecause the income of the richest ten per cent grew even more rapidly.Its Gini coefficient of .479 in 1994, was only slightly below that ofBrazil, the country with the most unequal income distribution in theregion (Filgueira, 1996: 16, quoted in Portes, 2001:77).

The educational condition is another trait closely related toincome concentration. The close relationship between education andincome distribution is illustrated by the fact that in those countrieswith the highest inequity rate, there are also the greatest educationalgaps. The more pronounced educational gaps between the two richestdeciles are found in Brazil, Mexico and Honduras, where they are inexcess of 3 years, and only in Peru they are below 2 years. Andbetween the richest decile and the 30% at the bottom of the incomescale, the average educational gaps are in excess of 9 years in Mexicoand between 8 and 9 years in Brazil, Panama and El Salvador,countries with a very high concentration of total income. The lowesteducational gaps between rich and poor are found in Uruguay,Venezuela and Peru, which have moderate income concentrations, as

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compared to the standards for the region (IDB, 1998: 20).Such educational gaps produce high returns for the few that

receive higher education, who benefit from a greater quality educationthan the low income sectors, which in their majority attend publicschool and cannot gain access to better quality private education.Since a deficient education translates into lower performance andlower income during an individual's work life, education is anadditional channel for the concentration of labor income andcontributes to the reproduction of inequality (IDB, 1998: 56). Ineffect, it has been documented that in those countries with a greaterproportion of unskilled labor, inequality tended to remain invariable orto increase slightly between 1989 and around 1995, as was the case ofBrazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Mexico and Venezuela (Lustig, 1998:306). Thus, the deeply stratified education characterizing LatinAmerican countries is reproducing income inequalities, instead ofcorrecting them.

The low performance of basic education expresses the influenceof globalization related factors. In effect, the incorporation of Chinaand other less developed countries to world trade has pushed downthe pay for basic education jobs. At the same time, the tradeliberalization implemented by countries in Latin America and otherregions has contributed to increasing the relative price of localnatural resources, with negative effects on worker's relative income."And together with macro-economic policies, trade liberalization inLatin America seems to have fostered the adoption of technologicalchanges that have displaced labor demands towards more skilledjobs". These demand factors have also interacted with a strongexpansion of the non-skilled labor supply for demographic reasons,which has not been compensated for with an improvement ineducational levels (IDB, 1998: 55).

On the other hand, poor households have a high rate of schooldrop outs. An IDB study (1998), quoted by Klein, states that "94% ofpoor children in countries with high educational development, enrollin the first year of school, as opposed to 76% in less developedcountries. School enrollment rates decrease respectively to 63% and32% in the fifth year, and to 15% and 6% in the ninth year. Entryrates are similar among poor children and those of families with higher

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income, but the latter remain in school for longer periods. By the fifthyear, the rates were 93% and 83%, while in the ninth year, they were58% and 49%, respectively" (Klein, 2000: 21).

A research comparing the educational attainments as of 1995 ofindividuals born between 1968-70 (who were then between age 25 and27), with the education of those born thirty years earlier, found thatprogress had been on average, only some 3 years of schooling, whichrepresents approximately one year per decade. In this slow change,progress among women has been faster than among men, but it islimited (IDB, 1998: 49).

In that period, the improvement has been in excess of 3 years formen and 4 years for women in Chile, Peru and Mexico. But it has onlybeen around 2.5 years for men in Brazil, Costa Rica, Honduras andVenezuela, and between 3 and 3.5 years for women in Brazil andCosta Rica. Although as a result of the faster rate of increase ofwomen's education, currently women have overtaken men in averageyears of schooling in almost all countries, there are still seriousexceptions in the region. The data mentioned do not includeGuatemala, or the rural zones of Bolivia, where the enrolment of schoolaged girls is far below that of boys; in both countries, the deficits infemale education is concentrated in the indigenous populations. This isalso the case of the indigenous population of Panama, where in 1990female illiteracy rates were 53%, as compared to 11% for all women inthe country, or 10% for men (IDB, 1998: 49-50). According tocalculations based on official data, in Guatemala, the average years ofschooling for women aged 15 to 24 in rural zones went from 2.4 to 3.1between 1989 and 199829.

The profound social inequalities are also associated with theconcentration of the main productive activities and metropolitanzones, and with spatial and ethno-linguistic fractures which determinedegrees of ethno-linguistic and geographical fragmentation. Thesetwo lines of social fracture make the gender and ethnic inequity andthe inequality in several countries of Latin America even worst.

29 CEPAL, Indicadores comparados. Cuadro America Latina (17 paises): promedio deafios de estudio de la poblaci6n de 15 a 24 anos de edad segin sexo, zonas urbanasy rurales, 1980-1999. http.//wwu:cepal.org/muier/proyectos/perfiles/comparados/t-educacion 7.htm.

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Although Latin America is not an extremely fragmented regionfrom the ethno-linguistic point of view, since there is a predominantlanguage (Spanish, Portuguese or English) in the most of thecountries, in some of them this fragmentation is important: Surinam,Bolivia, Guatemala and Peru (IDB, 2000: 209). The majority of theestimates of indigenous population in the region agree in placing itaround 40 million natives (8% of the total population). In Bolivia andGuatemala, the indigenous people represent more than half thenational population, although official figures differ from those ofindependent analysts. In the case of Guatemala, the official estimateis that it represents 42% of the population, according to the most recentcensus, while the HDIC of the OAS indicates it is 48% and othersources mention 60% (Plant, 1998: 5). This population lives inconditions of extreme poverty30 . In other countries, although lesssignificant, it is still very relevant: in Ecuador, the indigenouspopulation represents between 35 and 45% of the population, themajority of which is in a situation of extreme poverty; in Mexico,around 10% of the population speaks indigenous languages, resides ina third of the country's municipal districts, representing 82% of themunicipalities with very high marginality (CONAPO, 1999). InBrazil, indigenous people only represent 0.2% of the population, buttheir living conditions are extremely precarious and have becomeworst in the last few years 3 1.

Poverty has driven the indigenous peoples of most countries inLatin America to take part in the labor market, both urban and incommercial agriculture. Studies undertaken in several countrieswith indigenous population report the development of similarprocesses: growing decrease of the cultivation of their own land asmain activity and increased participation in commercial agriculture,in regional and international labor markets, in formal and informaltrade in urban zones of their own countries and neighboring countries,

30 In Guatemala, 77% of the population is below the poverty line and it is calculated thatalmost all the Maya Quiche are in that situation. Report of the Inter-AmericanHuman Rights Committee http://wwwcidh.org/indigenas/indice.htm

31 Life expectancy dropped from 48.3 years in 1993 to 45.6 years in 1997. Plant,1998:5.

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in the service sector, in transport, and in Guatemala in extractionactivities (Plant, 1998: 18-19). A survey conducted in Guatemala in1989 estimated that only a fourth of the indigenous population ofGuatemala's western plateau participated mainly in cultivating theirown land, while a study in Ecuador found that the poorest obtain22% of their income from agriculture, 16% from livestock, 9%from manual production and 53% from migratory jobs (Ibid., 19).An investigation of the Bolivian southern plateau, based oncommunity interviews, estimated that 18% of the population hademigrated since 1983, 45% to the city of Sucre, 18% to the urbanportion of Santa Cruz, 7% to the rural part of Santa Cruz and 10%to Argentina. The same trend is seen in Guatemala, where severalhundred thousand new immigrants into the City of Guatemala havebeen recorded during the 1990's32 (Plant, 1998: 24).

Temporary migration to commercial agricultural fields does notalways imply a substantive improvement in the situation of poverty,since the forms of recruitment, transport, living and workingconditions of indigenous temporary workers in agriculture are asource of concern in humanitarian terms. Although with salarieshigher than the average income in the communities of origin, thecost is also high in terms of health, hygiene, children's losteducation and social disarticulation (Ibid.).

This fracture line has effects on the education and labor marketvariables, specially in connection with the unequal terms with whichindigenous populations have entered the market as compared to othersectors (Plant, 1998:13). According to the conclusions of an analysisof inequalities in the schooling of Mexican children, indigenous boysand girls finish primary school in a lower proportion, which ... "showsthere is a language barrier that some children cannot overcome" (Miery Teran and Rabell: 20). However, the fact that children who arespeakers have greater probabilities of entering high-school than thenon-speakers and that the indigenous girls have the same probabilitythan the non-speakers, indicates that the indigenous tongue has adifferent effect on attendance to secondary school. With reference to

32 Although migration is also partially due to the flight from the plateau during theyears of intense civil conflict, it is also attributed to current economic factors.

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the participation of minors in work, indigenous families are forced tosend their children to work at earlier ages in a greater proportion thanthe families which do not speak an indigenous language; in effect,among males aged 12 to 14, 51 % of the indigenous language speakerswork, while the proportion is 37% among non-speakers (Ibid., 21).

Since the ethno-linguistic line is combined with differences incultural standards with respect to the mixed society, this feeds intodiscrimination behaviors which erode social cohesion.

Geographical fragmentation in turn, helps explain the territorialconcentration of urban productive activities in a few areas, which hasbrought about intense migratory currents from the countryside intothe cities and disorderly urbanization processes that favored thesprawling of settlements in zones that initially lacked urban services,so that the policies targeted to the poorest sectors have benefited, asa priority, urban zones. This characteristic is expressed in the factorsthat determine the greater availability of health services on the partof the population: place of residence, according to the geographicaldistribution of services, and membership in some of the socialsecurity systems.

Geographical fragmentation has also affected the isolation of vastareas that once open to colonization have not been incorporated intodevelopment, with the perpetuation of regional inequalities: Brazil isa case in point, where in 1960 the poorest state was Piaui, in thenortheast, with a per capita GDP equivalent to 11% of Sao Paulo's,the richest state in the Southeast. In 1995, thirty five years later, Piauicontinued being Brazil poorest state and its per capita GDP amountedto only 16% of Sao Paulo's which continued being the richest one(IDB, 2000, 168). From the point of view of the extension of thephenomenon, geographical fragmentation is very important.According to data from an IDB, Latin America is the mostfragmented region in the world, although, of course, there aresubstantial differences within the region. The countries with thegreatest degree of geographical fragmentation are Ecuador, Colombiaand Peru, and the least fragmented ones are Uruguay, Bahamas andEl Salvador (IDB, 2000, 209).

The deepening of the inequality traits described are at the sametime the core of the issues to be addressed and the mark of the

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obstacles to be surmounted with the purpose of guaranteeing universalattention by way of rights to the satisfaction of certain needs. Suchtraits mark the contours and the limits of the policies' scope. Thefollowing section analyses the way in which such contours configurethe obstacles to be overcome for a policy based on rights.

OBSTACLES, DIFFICULTIES AND LIMITATIONSRELATED TO THE APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC,SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS

Although the concept of economic, social and cultural rights givesrise to ideal goals that play the role of guiding standards, focusing onthis aspect of the ideal to be attained, leaving aside a discussion of thefoundation of the rights, leads to leaving the conditions andrequirements in the background, and to disregarding the design ofspecific forms of realization of the rights, formulated on the basis ofthe essential traits of the issues to be addressed, the limits arising as aresult of the market's configuration and the fiscal resourcesconstraints, or from the relations of power or demand processes, bethey political, social or both.

Market logic versus rights logic

The first set of obstacles refers to the divergence of the logic ofmarket and efficiency criteria and the logic of rights, which isexpressed in several fields. Such divergence, inherent to the operationof the rights and to the market's criteria of efficiency and rationality,have become more acute with the reforms designed for the opening ofthe economies and with the volatility that has characterized theiroperation. The objective of "improving economic efficiency, morethan any other social protection or even macro-stabilization purpose"prevailed in the implementation of the reforms (IDB, 1997:37). Some

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countries such as Guatemala, Paraguay and Peru, added to their

Constitutions norms designed to avoid economic mismanagement,

prohibiting the use of expansive monetary policies to cover fiscalrequirements and the State monopoly in the supply of social security(Cruz-Saco, 1998:6).

Although some globalization processes have caused LatinAmerican countries to assume stronger commitments with theinternational organizations for the realization of the rights, others havecontributed to hindering that task. How can the right to employmentbe guaranteed within the recessionary context in which the economiesof the region operate, where unemployment continues to be high eventhough the economy recovers after each external shock? The goal ofprogressive enforcement of rights that is established in the ICESCRpresupposes that governments can achieve sustained growth over along period, an assumption which is not realized. And regarding thegoal of a compensatory salary, included in the legislation of themajority of Latin American countries, it faces restrictions, since it isopposed to the logic of competitiveness required by the internationalenvironment, in which there are countries where salaries even lowerthan those of the region are paid. But, furthermore, several studieshave found that although increases in minimum wages may effectivelyreduce poverty in the short term, they cannot be used indiscriminatelywith that purpose, because they may generate unemployment andreduce growth, damaging the poor in the long term (Morley, 1992 and1997; Lustig and McLeod, 1997, quoted in IDB, 1998:169).

On the other hand, the fact that within the framework ofprivatization processes, several public utilities have come to beoperated by private agents and to be dependent on market forces,contributes to subordinating access to such services to incomedistribution, which implies a clear disadvantage for the poorer sectors.In those cases in which the private participation schemes do notinclude clear solidarity principles, as is the case of the health systemin Chile, an adverse selection operates, both based on socio-economicstrata and on health risks related to the age of the population covered(Ocampo, 1998: 12-13).

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-Employment

Comprised within the framework of the opposed logics of themarket and the rights, is the issue of employment, which has severalaspects. A first and more general one concerns the lack of adequacyof labor regulation -protecting the rights of workers in the formalmarket- to the requirements of international competition andwomen's growing participation in labor markets. This lack ofadequacy has led several countries to approve labor reformsrepresenting a challenge to the economic, social and cultural rightsenshrined in the Constitutions.

The above lack of adequacy of labor regulations comprises theworkers protection rules on which job security has rested, such as therestrictions to trial periods, temporary and fixed term contracts andpenalizations to the termination of labor contracts, that have made itpossible to increase labor stability and have protected against the lossof income associated with unemployment for the workers covered bythe law. However, such rules are being questioned since they areapplied very little, favor better educated, more experienced and betterpaid male workers (IDB, 1998: 153) and tend to limit femaleparticipation in the labor market, as women have to balance their jobswith other activities. Among others, the high cost of contracttermination is underlined, the rules that imply imposing maternitycosts on business and those which force them to maintain facilities forchild care at the work place3 3. Young workers are likewise affectedby this form of job protection, since their unemployment rates are 1.5times higher than the overall unemployment rate (IDB, 2000, 78)34.

Labor reforms were undertaken in the 1990's in Colombia (1990),Peru (1991), Nicaragua and Argentina (1995) and Venezuela (1997),

33 That was the case of Peru, where the law required that companies with over 25women maintain child care facilities, involuntarily fostering the employment of alower number of female workers. The law was repealed in 1991.

34 The measures suggested to adjust labor legislation to the new requirements andprocesses consist above all in replacing the protection that is enjoyed today by someworkers by broader systems that are based on the basic needs for protection, equity andcompetitiveness, separating the regime of penalties for unjust dismissal from the regimeto protect unemployment income, and collectivize the costs so they are not exclusivelyborne by business. Cf IDB, 2000, page 78. IDB, 1998: 154, 159 and IDB, 2000: 69-70.

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incorporating more flexible employment contracts by reducingseverance costs and introducing contracts with less payroll taxes. As

a result of the reforms, the percentage of employment contractsgranting full benefits over total employment has decreased and moreprecarious forms of employment have expanded (IDB, 2000: 71).

As derived from the above reflections, the various processesrelated with job generation and with the quality of jobs are beyond thepossibility of control by governments, implying an important obstaclethat can only be modified partially to achieve the enforcement of laborrelated rights.

-Taxation

The funding of the services relating to the enforcement of social

rights involves, besides an extended market economy, a very solid tax

system, managing to collect the necessary resources. This requires a

strong tax collection capacity on the part of the State -essential to

make effective the obligation by citizens of paying taxes- comprisingmechanisms to prevent tax evasion and to collect from workers in theinformal market in a position to pay.

Table 1 shows the average composition of fiscal revenues in Latin

America, as compared with OECD countries, with the aim of

establishing an international reference point.

Table 1Structure of fiscal revenue, consolidated Central Government, 1990-94

(Percentages over total income)

OECD Latin America

Non tax revenue 8.1 15.9

Tax revenues 90.2 71.8

Income tax 35.0 20.4

Social security contributions 32.2 23.5

Indirect taxes 20.4 26.3

Taxes on trade 1.0 5.2

Source: Gavin et al. (1996), taken from IDB, ibid., 1997, page 1 14. The figure represents

averages of the countries' data, weighted by population.

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The table clearly illustrates the differences between the revenuestructure of Latin America and that of industrialized countries. To startwith, it is seen that Latin American governments are more dependenton non-tax revenue sources than the governments of the OECDcountries (almost 16% as compared to 8%). The composition of taxrevenues also presents differences, above all, income tax represents aconsiderable lower percentage in Latin America as do social securitycontributions, while indirect taxes and taxes on trade imply greaterproportions than in the OECD (IDB, 1997: 114-115).

The lower percentage of income tax in Latin America over totalfiscal revenues, is explained because income tax rates in the region arevery low; on average around 25%. It has been calculated that(maximum) tax rates of 25 to 30% generate revenues in the range of3.5 to 4.5 of GDP when according to the level of development of thecountries they should generate 8%35. In the region, only Barbados,Belize, Chile (and Honduras until 1997) have maximum personal taxrates of 40% or more. The trend in corporate taxes has been similar3 6.This insufficient revenue based on income tax drives federal or centralgovernments to depend on non-tax income for an important proportionof their budgets, obtained from the income derived from naturalresources and State-owned company revenues. On the other hand,since, as already mentioned, these governments also depend to agreater extent on indirect taxes, and in turn, these are associated to theoperation of the economies which have been characterized in the lastfew years by volatility, the result is that government budgets aresubject to the effects of such volatility. As a consequence, LatinAmerican governments have a poor tax collection capacity, which isevidenced in the ratio of tax revenues to GDP. It is 18%, whenaccording to the levels of development of the countries it should be24% (IDB, 1998: 203-204; IDB, 1997, 114-115).

35 These rates are lower than those of any other region; in developed countries the toptax rates are, on average, in excess of 40% and in Asian countries they are slightlybelow that figure Cf. IDB, 1998, page 204.

36 The average of maximum corporate tax rates in Latin America is currently around27%, below the averages of all other groups of countries, with the exception ofEastern Europe. IDB, 1998: 203.

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This poor tax collection capacity has an ingredient of tax evasion,

expressing the lack of confidence of citizens in the authorities, as well

as the degradation of social solidarity, connected with the profoundsocial gaps that were considered in the previous section (IDB, 2000:

211). The lack of confidence is also connected with citizens'dissatisfaction with the performance by government in solving the

economic, politic and social problems of their respective countries.This satisfaction varies in a close relation with the manner in which

governments perform, and shows clear differences between countries.According to data of Latinobar6metro, the level of satisfaction with

democracy has decreased, because the region's average went from 37%

in 2000 to 25% in 2001. The country with the highest satisfaction is

Uruguay with 55%, and least satisfied are Colombia and Paraguay with

10. In Chile, 71% of the citizens are not satisfied with democracy37 .

-Social Spending

Funding for the services addressing welfare relating to social

rights implies two aspects of spending: the level of spending and its

distribution or allocation.With reference to the level of spending, on average, Latin America

is slightly above the world pattern of social spending, and in Uruguay,

Costa Rica, Panama and Nicaragua it is substantially higher than

might be expected in accordance with their levels of development(IDB, 1998: 201). ECLAC calculations indicate that Argentina and

Uruguay have the highest per capita social spending (in 1997 USdollars) of the region, although it is necessary to point out that given

their demographic structure, characterized by a larger proportion of

older population, these two countries have the highest social securitybudgets (CEPAL, 2001: 268-269). In fact, of the countries wheresocial spending is high, a very high percentage of the social spending

increase has been allocated to social security, especially to the

payment of pensions (IDB, 1998: 201).

37 The question asked is: "In general, Would you say you are very satisfied, rather satisfied.

not too satisfied or not satisfied with the operation of democracy in your country?."

See Press release. Encuesta Latinoh6rometro 2001, www.latinobarometro.org.

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A second group of countries is made up of Brazil, Chile andPanama, where the levels of social spending, in the fiscal year1998/1999 were in the range of $647 to $1011 per capita. Theremaining 17 countries analyzed by ECLAC have levels of spendingbelow $500 per capita, and some, such as El Salvador, Honduras andNicaragua are below $ 100 and Guatemala is slightly above that figure($107). There are, besides, other countries in which social spending isvery insufficient in accordance with their level of development:Colombia, Mexico and Dominican Republic (IDB, 1998: 201). In thefirst two, the per capita spending in the above period was $ 381 in thefirst, $406 and $135 (CEPAL, 2001: 268-269).

On the other hand, the economies' volatility, by affecting fiscalrevenues, also has an impact on the fluctuations of expenditure, inperiods of external shocks. Of the 15 countries analyzed by ECLAC,for which there were comparable data between 1990 and 1999, socialspending had falls at some point in time in 12 (Ibid.).

Such spending fluctuations, as well as the loss of jobs associatedwith recession, has produced reductions in the HDI in some countries,as indicated in the following chart:

Human Development Index for Latin America1997 and 1999Selected countries

Classification HDI Classification HDIby HDI 1997 1 99 7 a by HDI 1999 1gggb

Barbados 29 0,857 31 0,864Bahamas 31 0,851 42 0,820Chile 34 0,844 39 0,825Antigua and Barbuda 38 0,828Argentina 39 0,827 34 0,842Uruguay 40 0,826 37 0,828Costa Rica 45 0,801 41 0,821Trinidad and Tobago 49 0,797 49 0,798Venezuela 48 0,792 61 0,765

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Classification HDI Classification HDIby HDI 1997 1997 a by HDI 1999 1999b

Panama 49 0,791 52 0,784

Mexico 50 0,786 51 0,790

Colombia 57 0,768 62 0,765

Cuba 58 0,765

Ecuador 72 0,747 84 0,726

Saint Vicent andGrenadines 75 0,744

Brazil 79 0,739 69 0,750

Peru 80 0,739 73 0,743

Jamaica 82 0,734 78 0,738

Belize 83 0,732 54 0,776

Paraguay 84 0,730 80 0,738

Dominican Republic 88 0,726 86 0,722

Guyana 93 0,704 99 0,701

El Salvador 107 0,674 95 0,701

Bolivia 112 0,652 104 0,648

Honduras 114 0,641 107 0,634

Guatemala 117 0,624 108 0,626

Nicaragua 121 0,616 106 0,635

Haiti 152 0,430 134 0,467

Sources: a. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, Washington D.C;

b. Human Development Report 2001 www.undp.org/hdr200l

Between 1997 and 1999, of the 25 countries for which

comparative data are available, 15 had a slight improvement of the

HDI, but in six of them the improvement was very small, less than five

thousands (Uruguay, Trinidad and Tobago, Mexico, Peru, Jamaica and

Guatemala). In ten countries the index values dropped.

The issue of universality of the rights introduces the discussion of

the progressive or regressive character of the expenditure, and posses

dilemmas on its allocation, since the various types of expenditures

have very different distributive effects. Ocampo recalls that "in

absolute terms, the higher income sectors benefit more from social

spending (although)... as a proportion of the income of each stratum,

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the subsides that are channeled through said expenditures are greaterfor the poorer sectors of the population". The expenditure allocated tothe poor in connection with the share of population in a situation ofpoverty is progressive in the case of health, primary education and, toa lower extent, secondary education. However, expenditures in socialsecurity and higher education generally have a regressive trend.Housing expenditures are at an intermediate situation, since theyespecially benefit the middle segments of income distribution(Ocampo, 1998: 11).

Targeting social spending primarily to social security, as is thecase of Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Argentina, poses distributionaldilemmas in connection with the progressive or regressive nature ofthe expenditure, especially because of the proportion of the populationthat is left unattended. However, the demographic structure of thepopulation in which the percentage of individuals over age 65 hasincreased, requires orienting expenditures towards social protectiondemands, the cost of which tends to be very high. According to IDBdata, for every percentage point of increase of the elderly populationpublic spending raises 1% (IDB, 1998: 200).

These difficulties have led to the fact that, although in the majorityof the countries in the region, social rights are enshrined in theConstitutions and there has been a process of harmonization of thelegal-political instruments with respect to international legislation, thishas not translated into radical improvements in the indicators for suchrights, such as the human development index. Only a progressive, butnot continuous, increase.

FINAL REFLECTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A review of the main criticisms to the concept of social citizenshiphas shown the theoretical difficulties inherent in this concept, whichwere confirmed by the analysis of the modalities of access to socialcitizenship prevailing in Latin America, and point to threefundamental findings:

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* The prevalence of a corporatist pattern for access to collectivegoods, fundamentally by way of the organizations, restrictingthe universality of welfare satisfactors delivery;

* Insufficient fiscal resources, both due to the scarce taxingcapacity of the State and to the characteristics of theeconomy, favoring the expansion of the informal productionof resources;

* The high proportion of population with serious deficitsindicates the convenience of orienting distribution criteriaaccording to the needs, by addressing the magnitude of thedeficits, rather than according to social rights.

Regarding this final point, Latin America has a vast bibliographyidentifying needs on the basis of measurements that have been carriedout in a more and more systematic way at least from the beginning ofthe 1980's.

Given the difficulty implied in establishing welfare services by wayof universal rights proclaimed but not specified, an interesting option tosustain distributive criteria is found in Bellamy's proposal, who suggestsspecifying so called "institutional" rights, instead of social rightsemanating from human rights. According to this author, institutionalrights are born from political deliberations and translate into particularlaws and conventions with which citizens participating in the politicalprocess agree, and make it possible to refer to the dimension of theduties and obligations contained in citizenship. Such rights representadvantages over the rights of man since, as opposed to the latter, theyexpress socially determined ends that can be reformulated as required inthe face of changing circumstances. Besides, it is possible to uselegislation to grant specific rights, addressing the demands from thevarious fields of social life, as in the case of women's reproductiverights, instead of being limited to a homogeneous standard. On the otherhand, when the rights are institutionalized, the corresponding duties canbe precisely allocated to resolve conflicts. Such characteristics of"institutional rights" make them more adaptable to social heterogeneitythan the rights of man (Bellamy, 1994: 225,250).

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SARA GORDON R.

The concept of institutional rights makes it possible to consider in aclear manner aspects that are ambiguous in the case of social rights andthey unify integration objectives with social policy criteria taking intoaccount constraints, limitations and goals. They also take into accountthe conditions in which such rights will be enforced. On the basis of thedebate on institutional rights, it is possible to return to Alston's proposal(1987: 358), who suggested adopting a programmatic approach thatwould require that the progressive realization of several rights becomesthe objective of a clearly defined program.

Finally, the specification of such rights should be oriented topreventing the circuits of exchange of political support for welfareservices -set up by political parties, trade unions, public burocracies,etc.- providing a systematic discrimination in favor of the interests ofthose organizations endowed with greater organizational and advocacypower and, to a lesser extent, of the associations with a lowerorganizational capacity, to the detriment of the large majority of citizenswho lack organizational resources to press their claims. In other words,the satisfaction of social expectations should not be dependent on thepossibilities of corporate membership of various sectors, so that the morepowerful the organization involved, the more effective the claim, whichleads to the defacto exclusion of those with little affiliation capacity.

Thus, it would be possible to give effect to a general commitmentof society to work for the proper operation of economic, political andsocial arrangements to favor rights as recommended by Sen (2000: 123).

Recommendations

The high incidence of poverty determines the need to implementprograms targeted at lower income sectors, both to develop individualcapacities and to expand such sectors' opportunities. But, furthermore,the existence of serious social inequities makes it necessary to applyspecific policies allowing wide sectors of the population to emergefrom the low place they occupy in income distribution. Framed by thecharacteristics of access to rights in Latin America which makeorganizations the core subject of citizenship, attention to inequitiescannot be approached only through universal social rights.

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It is necessary to address the basic needs of the population with lessresources: basic education 38 and basic health care for the poor,particularly those living in backward areas or belonging todisadvantage groups such as the indigenous population. Regardingeducation, some of the findings of the research on that populationshould be recalled, in the sense that once the children who speakindigenous languages succeed in completing primary education, theyhave higher probabilities than those who are non-speakers ofcompleting secondary education, which is grounds for optimism.With respect to health, it is necessary to take into account that none ofthe reforms of the health care system carried out in various LatinAmerican countries in the nineties, have achieved substantial successin expanding coverage to those sectors of the population traditionallyexcluded by social security schemes (Cruz-Saco, 1998:4).

On the other hand, it is necessary to provide minimum pensions tothe extremely poor, and in that sense direct transfers are of majorimportance to prevent the transmission of extreme poverty from onegeneration to the next. According to some calculations, "if it waspossible to set as a goal the allocation of less than 0.5 to 2% of GDPto individuals living in extreme poverty conditions, they would stopbelonging to that class" (Lustig, 1998: 307).

Indigenous communities require specific attention through theformulation of indicators defining poverty in terms of unsatisfied basicneeds, taking into account the nature of subsistence economies, whichare characterized by low cash income levels and by the fact that to agreat extent, basic needs are satisfied by way of mechanisms ofredistribution of goods outside the market (Plant, 1998: 34). Suchmeasures should respect and promote the greatest possible degree ofcontrol by the indigenous communities of their own development(Ibid., 30)

Funding should also be provided to day-care and other healthprograms that favor the education of children and the participation ofwomen in the work force. Finally, investments in water, sanitation andelectricity services for the lower income households (IDB, 1998: 199).

38 Given the low performance of basic education, an attempt should be made to expandthe coverage of medium level education (high school)

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APENDIX

Gender Empowerment Index by selected countries

Ranking per Value of Ranking per Seats in Female Female Women'sGender Gender Human Parliament Administrators Proffesional GDP per

Empowerment Empowerment Development held and and Technical capita (PPPIndex Index Index by women Managers Workers US$) b

(%) a (%) b (%) b

I. Norway 0,825 2 36,4 30,6 58,5 22.4002. Iceland 0,802 5 34,9 25,4 52,8 22.0623. Sweden 0,794 6 42.7 27,4 48,6 18.6054. Denmark 0,791 15 37,4 23,1 49,7 19.9655. Finland 0,757 11 36,5 26,6 62,7 17.0636. Germany 0,756 14 33,6 26,6 49,0 15.1897. The Netherlands 0,739 8 32,9 22,8 45,7 14.9028. Canada 0,739 1 22,7 37,3 52,2 17.9809. New Zealand 0,731 20 29,2 36,6 51,5 13.64610. Belgium 0,725 7 24,9 30,2 47,1 15.951

16. Bahamas 0,633 33 19,6 31,0 51,4 11.57717. Barbados 0,629 30 20,4 38,7 51,2 9.03720. Venezuela 0,597 65 28,6 24,3 57,6 3.28122 Trinidad and Tobago 0,583 50 19,4 39,7 50,5 4.13124. Costa Rica 0,553 48 19,3 29,9 45,1 3.12630. El Salvador 0,527 104 16,7 34,9 44,3 2.77935. Mexico 0,514 55 18,0 20,7 40,2 4.11237. Colombia 0,510 68 12,2 40,4 44,6 4.07939. Dominican Republic 0,505 87 14,5 30,6 49,4 2.33340. Belize 0,493 58 13,5 36,6 38,8 1.70443. Ecuador 0,481 91 14,6 27,5 46,6 1.17345. Uruguay 0,472 39 11,5 24,0 63,1 5.79146. Panama 0,470 46 9,9 33,6 48,6 3.03448. Honduras 0,460 113 9,4 54,4 48,5 1.25250. Peru 0,446 80 10,8 26,9 41,6 2.10451. Chile 0,440 38 8,9 22,4 50,5 4.01152. Surinam 0,482 67 15,7 13,3 69,0 2.73554. Bolivia 0,422 114 10,2 24,9 42,6 1.21757. Paraguay 0,406 81 8,0 22,6 54,1 2.058

Antigua and Barbuda 37 8,3Argentina 35 21,3Brazil 74 5,9 62,0Cuba 56 27,6 18,5Dominica 51Grenada 54 17,9Guatemala 120 8,8Guyana 96 18,5Haiti 150Jamaica 83 16,9Nicaragua 116 9,7

a. Data as at February 29, 2000. b. Data corresponding to the most recent available year.Source: www.undp.org/hdr2000/spanish/presskit/gem.pdf

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CHAPTER IV

YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT ANDPUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA

AND THE CARIBBEAN:CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ

i

i

II

iIII

ERNESTO RODRiGUEZ

INTRODUCTION

Latin American youth:strategic actors of development

In the 2 0th. Century, Latin America witnessed a dynamics eminentlycentered in the consideration of youth as simple beneficiaries of publicpolicies, designed to incorporate them into the process of social andbiological reproduction of our societies. The 21 St Century, instead,should focus on the understanding that youth, far from being part of theproblem (as they are usually seen from the perspective of the adultworld), can be part of the solution to the acute problems we are facingat all levels, in their capacity as strategic actors of development. Theabove is mainly connected with the development style that prevailedthroughout the last century, as opposed to the development style thatis beginning to emerge forcefully at this turn of century and millennium.While in the past, the main premise was reproducing and maintainingthe existing rules of the game (forged within the framework of theimport substitution industrialization model), in the future, thefundamental rule will be "ongoing change"; i.e., the permanent andsystematic transformation of the existing rules of the game.

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YOUTH, SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICIES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Although it may be seen an irrelevant statement, the truth is thatthe change of paradigm this implies can have enormous repercussionsin the logic of public policies and on the place that young generationsmay come to have in the societies of which they are members.Whereas in the past and based on the logic of reproduction, youth onlyhad to prepare to become adults (gradually assuming adult roles,mainly as workers and citizens) in the knowledge society (currentlyunder construction) they must be the champions of social change andmodernization. The demographic transition in which our countries areessentially involved offers, besides, the best conditions to process thisradical change of paradigm, to the extent that the enormous cohorts ofchildren that we had to incorporate into our societies in the last fiftyyears are no longer being born, and we are not yet facing thesignificant masses of elderly adult population that will decisivelyweigh on the overall population in the second half of this new century.We therefore stand at the best ratio between active and passivepopulation from the point of view of development.

The next twenty years, therefore, will witness the existence of thelargest young generation of the whole of Latin American demographichistory, that will have to become dynamically integrated into thedevelopment process, assuming the role of protagonists in driving thechanges that our countries inevitably will have to process, within theframework of building the knowledge society. In turn, this will bepossible because youths are infinitely more and better prepared thanadults to deal with the new information and communicationtechnologies (the fundamental tools in the construction of theknowledge society) and have a much greater flexibility to adapt to theongoing changes that in the future will characterize the dynamics ofour societies, without being conditioned by sterile links to the present;i.e. quite the opposite of what is now and will in the future be the casewith the adult population, whose general and specific skills willbecome obsolete at an increasingly faster pace.

If these elements of analysis are adequately perceived by theleading classes of our society, totally renovated youth public policiescould be promoted, in a decided bet on youth participation in theconstruction of the knowledge society; clearly abandoning thetraditional past approaches that fundamentally mistrusted the role of

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youth, on the basis of their evident protagonic role in the more radicalsocial and political challenges to the established system(fundamentally, from the university student movements). In this way,it would be possible to construct bridges between the new youthmovements (less politicized and more centered on the welfare of thewhole) and public policies designed to address the main developmentdeficits in our societies. A renewed emphasis on youth volunteeringcould become a cornerstone of the fight against poverty, the main goalof development in all our countries. In this way, it would be possibleto achieve a positive impact on the growing gap between youth andpublic institutionality (elections, parliament, justice, police, etc.) whileat the same time the generous willingness to cooperate of youth wouldbe harnessed to overcome the major problem being faced at present bythe whole of Latin America.

Naturally, it would be necessary to maintain and expand (withrenovated approaches) those public policies designed to achieve thesocial insertion of youth (through education, employment, health andrecreation services, as the major ones) but this needs to be driven onthe basis of integrated, articulated, decentralized and targetedapproaches, to be able to respond in an effective and relevant mannerto the various issues that affect the new generations, visible in theevident social exclusion that they face, and leaving behind in adecisive manner those sectorial, centralized and supposedly universalapproaches of the past, that only manage to provide partial, transientresponses addressed at some youth sectors in particular (belonging tothe middle and upper classes). An adequate articulation between theprocesses of State reform and the design and implementation of theserenovated youth public policies could significantly leverage thisdynamics, to the extent that it would be possible to modernize andstrengthen public management itself in these realms (as in manyothers) attempting to construct new relations between the State, themarket and civil society; reformulating the interrelations betweenYouth Culture and School Culture (with an adequate incorporation ofthe mass media in the actions to be deployed) and with a professionalupgrading of the work of the people acting in these fields.

It is therefore urgent to include these issues to a greater and betterextent in academic reflections, the public debate on development and

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the design and implementation of public policies, on the basis ofrenovated approaches; reverting the stigma placed on youth, betting ontheir creativity and generous willingness, and opening up more andbetter spaces to channel their active participation at all levels. We willthus be able to address in a more effective and appropriate manner themain problems that our societies face (for example, urban insecurity)which in all cases have an evident youth component. Youths arecurrently the main target of unemployment and social exclusion, whileat the same time they are at the core of all movements linked toviolence; but they can become the main constructors of peace, equityand prosperity if we change the coordinates under which we haveoperated so far.

THE CONTEXT: MAIN PARAMETERSFOR ANALYSIS

To begin, it is important to characterize the context within whichthe issue is placed, reviewing some of the basic concepts, analyzingthe complex link between youth and society, characterizinggenerically the current condition of youth in Latin America and brieflyreviewing the history of the main models of public youth policiesadopted in our countries in the last decades.

What are we talking about?:Some basic concepts on youth

Youth has been analyzed from very different theoretical andmethodological perspectives, on the basis of the contribution of verydiverse scientific disciplines. In its more general conception, the term"youth" refers to the period in the life cycle in which individuals movefrom childhood to an adult condition and during which importantbiological, psychological, social and cultural changes occur. Suchchanges vary according to societies, cultures, ethnias, social classesand genders. Conventionally, in order to compare the condition of

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youth in different contexts and to track down its evolution along time,age limits are established (a simple but rigorous criterion) with evidentadvantages: measuring them does not imply major reliability problemsand it is a variable researched in most of the available sources ofperiodical data gathering. But, where are these limits? In order toestablish the age of youth onset a reasonable consensus is observed,granting priority to criteria derived from a biological and psychologicalapproach, under the understanding that the development of sexual andreproductive functions represents a profound transformation in thephysical, biological and psychological dynamics that clearlydifferentiates adolescents from children. It is in establishing the upperlimit, however, that important doubts arise.

In order to clarify the issue, it is necessary to recognize thegrowing breadth of the field of youth, recalling that as societies shiftfrom rural to urban, from agricultural to industrial and from industrialto the current knowledge society, the field becomes wider and includesdimensions that are unprecedented in the history of mankind. Butwhat is more relevant is that the set of conditions that constituted thecore nodes of identification of the adult world have lost consistency.In the past, entering the adult world implied the coming together intime of economic, social, cultural and political behaviors thatconverged around well-established patterns of behavior. At present,however, at least three processes which modify the nature andcharacteristics of adult roles may be observed: (i) they are less centralin economic and cultural production; (ii) they are less consistent (thenumber of people who assume typically adult and typically juvenileroles increases) and (iii) their meaning losses clarity with the changesin family structure and labor participation.

From a demographic point of view, youths are, above all, a groupin the population that corresponds to a certain age environment andvaries according to particular contexts, that is generally placedbetween the ages of 15 and 24. In the case of rural or acute povertycontexts, the environment shifts downwards to include the group aged10 to 14. In several cases, in the context of urban middle and uppersocial strata, it is expanded upwards to include the group aged 25 to29. From this perspective, youths -according to several particularcircumstances-may be identified as the group of people having

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between 10 and 29 years of age. The chosen age group has sufficientsubstantive foundations to the extent that the entry and exit from thatstage in life coincide with extremely relevant processes. Thus, thelower limit of the selected environment considers the age at whichsexual and reproductive functions have already developed, clearlydifferentiating adolescents from children and having profoundrepercussions in their physical, biological and psychological dynamics.The upper limit, on its part, is identified -with the above mentionedcaveats- with the time at which individuals arrive- under diversespecific circumstances and at various paces in each particular sphere-to the end of the formal education cycle, facing entry into the labormarket and the establishment of their own household, becoming adults.

By virtue of such processes, and from a psychological andbiological approach, youth would be defined -in any individual's lifecycle-as the period ranging between the achievement of physiologicalmaturity up to the attainment of social maturity. But not all individualsof the same age cover this vital period in the same manner nor do theyachieve their goals at the same time, so that from Sociology andPolitical Sciences, the need of incorporating other variables into theanalysis of the juvenile phenomenon has been underlined. Thus, it hasbeen shown with sufficient eloquence that youth has very differentmeanings for people belonging to each specific social sector and thatyouth is experienced in very diverse manners, according to thecircumstantial contexts in which people grow and mature. And recentstudies have gone even further, including criteria from Anthropologyand other related disciplines, with the purpose of demonstrating theexistence of true juvenile cultures, and specially underscoring theproblems of youth identity as an axis to characterize youth as a socialgroup. From this viewpoint, the existence of juvenile groups withcommon characteristics has been shown to extend beyond thedifferences among their members in terms of belonging to differentsocial strata, increasingly influenced by mass culture.

However, which are the essential aspects to be underlined in theanalysis, with the purpose of having a precise and usefulcharacterization to design and apply public policies that are youthrelated? To begin, one of the most relevant is the type of roles andfunctions that youths should play in the society in which they live, and

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in this sense, at least four crucial elements are defining: (i) theobtention of an adult condition as main goal; (ii) emancipation andautonomy as a path: (iii) the construction of one's own identity as coreproblem and, (iv) intergenerational relationships as a basic frameworkfor the attainment of these goals. A schematic and summarized reviewin this respect may provide relevant elements of judgment for theanalysis at hand.

It seems clear that obtaining an adult condition is the main goal,processing in the best possible way this transit between childhood andadulthood that every youth has to cover. No longer a child but not yetan adult, and however the juvenile condition is stretched in temporalterms, by remaining longer in the educational system, delaying entryinto the work market and constituting new households, what isinevitable is for youths to become adults. By definition, youth is atemporary condition and it is rapidly lost with the passage of time(even the differences between youths of different ages are evident).Within this framework, emancipation becomes the central axis of thepath that youths have to cover between the total dependency onparents and tutors typical of childhood and the full autonomy of anadult condition. In this sense, that journey will have to face multipleand complex challenges -resulting from the change of roles inprocess- that will add significant difficulty to shaping their ownidentity (not constructed by parents and tutors as in children) whichconstitutes the central problem in this process.

As asserted in numerous ECLAC studies "on one side, thenature of the transition itself assumes the existence of an ongoingprocess of role change; on the other, such changes imply the risk ofaffecting the identities constructed. In other words, individuals aresubject to a particular tension: they have to change while remainingthe same. Otherwise, in the face of the decisions that need tobe permanently taken in their emancipation process, they could goadrift in any direction" (Filgueira, 1998). Besides, in this process,youths shift from interacting with the society in which they live ina growing and almost always conflictive manner, especially with thepreceding adult generations that are already integrated in the societaldynamics and are scarcely willing to facilitate the incorporation of theyounger generations into that complex dynamics, to a context in

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which -paradoxically- such incorporation is key to ensure theprocess of biological and social reproduction of a society dominatedby adults. Such perspective confers on generational conflicts asignificant relevance, to the extent it largely explains the tensions thatpermanently arise in our societies.

As may be gleaned from many of the above remarks, it is possibleto assert that youth does not exist as such. Actually, there are many

and very sundry juvenile sectors or groups, with particular and specificcharacteristics that clearly differentiate them. In this sense, it isimportant to differentiate at least four specific groups of youths.

(i) University students. Evidently, these form one of the mainjuvenile groups; the only one -in factthat was sociallyrecognized until the 1970's. To a good extent, they weretraditionally the prototype of youth, insofar as they alwayscomplied fully with the substantial conditions to be recognizedas such. During decades, this was the only youth sector thatparticipated in the social and political scenarios of ourcountries as an actor, through student movements, but itsessential characteristics have varied with time and themassification and segmentation of our universities, and theyno longer have such hegemonic recognition.

(ii) Popular urban youth. In parallel, especially starting fromthe 1970's and 1980's our countries witnessed the socialirruption of the other youth; that is, urban popular youth,excluded from access to middle and higher education, livingin sprawling and extended marginal zones and withcompletely different methods from those of their universitypeers, who began to become organized in corner groups andeven juvenile gangs, and to deploy their own identificationprocesses together with practices linked to various forms ofviolence as an expression of their rejection of thatintegrated society of which they are not a part.

(iii) Rural youth. After enjoying certain privileges granted aspriorities of public policies in the 1940's and 1950's, rural

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youth have lost protagonism and visibility -from the hand ofthe growing urbanization and social modernizationprocesses- until becoming a minority. Subject to strongprocesses of transformation in their essential characteristics,increasingly influenced by modem urban culture and by thechanges happening in the rural societies in which they reside,they still retain, however, extremely relevant singularcharacteristics while presenting a better inclination towardsinnovation and higher educational levels than previousgenerations, all of which can become an importantcontribution to the modernization of the rural environment atthe family, community and production levels.

(iv) Young women. Finally, another sector having its own verymarked characteristics, and affected by intense processes ofexclusion and reclusion, but with a clear trend towards socialintegration, is that formed with young women. Affected by adouble exclusion (age and gender-based), without their ownidentity in juvenile movements or in women's movements andbearing the load of extremely conservative traditions in termsof their roles in the household and society, they have wonrecognition, as a result of their growing incorporation intoeducation and in particular to work, although still fromsubordinated positions.

But this list would not be complete if we fail to include the ethnicvariable, to the extent that the conditions in which indigenous and AfroAmericans youth (for example) grow and mature have their ownspecificities, making them clearly different from youths belonging tothe dominant white cultures. An even though we may take intoaccount that some specialists assert with solid foundations that thestatus of youth does not exist or is very short-lived in these groups, thetruth is that they are clearly identifiable and visible individuals inseveral Latin American societies (in which they are far from being"ethnic minorities") affected by acute social exclusion and seriousidentity conflicts that cannot be disregarded within public policies.

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Finally, it is important to underline that the above classification isfar from being exhaustive, to the extent that there are several relevantoverlappings that may be easily observed, leading to the assertion thatwhen we focus on poor women belonging to ethnic groups and livingin a rural environment (for example) we are in the presence of the mostserious situations of social exclusion. The opposite is the case withwhite urban males who are students from the middle and upperclasses, who enjoy all the advantages.

Youth and society:Diverse aspects of a complex link

As it is known, youths are not isolated. In reality, they live andinteract permanently with the society to which they belong, andreceive from it many and extremely varied influences. One of thelinkages takes place within the framework of juvenile socialization,understood as the process of transmission of standards, values andhabits from adult society to the new generations, performed with theobjective of ensuring biological and social reproduction, through"socializing agents", significantly through family, school, peer groupsand the mass media.

Traditionally, the family has been the main socializing agent,concentrating even some functions linked to basic education.However, with the passage of time and in the framework of socialmodernization processes, formal education gradually absorbed someof these domestic education functions while families experiencedprofound transformations, that specially affected the stability andnuclear model, opening the way to multiple diverse family schemes(complete and incomplete) where both spouses participate in the labormarket. In this way, families lost influence in the socializationprocesses and receded in the face of the growing influence of otheragents, such as the educational system (which has not succeeded incomplying with its socialization functions beyond the frontiers oftransmitting knowledge) and the mass media.

Something similar occurred with the emergence of the masscommunication media, particularly television, that in the course of a

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few decades came to exert a decisive influence in juvenilesocialization, competing with families within their own homes, andeven with the formal educational system, and developing methods andinstruments that are much more attractive for youth, as well as valuesand standards that are different and even opposed to those transmittedby families and the formal education system. Until today, the educationsystem has not managed to resolve this growing and challengingcompetition -to which the content of information technologynetworks is now added- and has not yet succeeded in incorporatingsuch media massively in its daily dynamics as instruments of greatpotential for the development of its own purposes.

On their part, the so called peer groups have always played adecisive role in the socialization of youth and constitute one of the fewproperly juvenile agents that have little adult control, but it is difficultto identify a unique sign of their incidence on youth generationsbecause the very constitution of juvenile groups is extremelyheterogeneous (student movements, more informal groupings in thepopular urban and rural scale, church-linked juvenile movements, etc.)and they have been increasingly influenced by the mass media, blurringinternal differences. Therefore, the rule in this case is diversity.

But, together with receiving various influences from the society inwhich they live, youths try to influence society's dynamics throughvery diverse strategies, whether by attempting to become social andpolitical actors or by implementing various forms of identity andexpression that they try to impart to the rest of society. However, mostof the forms that this youth participation urge has adopted throughhistory has been characterized by its transitoriness, alternating periodsof major public visibility and protagonism with others where a strongretraction and invisibility prevail. Everything seems to be closelyconnected with the transitoriness of the juvenile condition leading to,as opposed to the case of workers or women, who are guided by thematerial dimensions of their existence, based on youths being orientedby the svmbolic dimensions of their existence, without developingcorporatist practices as women and workers do. From this basis, it iseasier to approach a more objective analysis of the controversial issueof the actual or assumed youth apathy (particularly in connection withtheir political participation) as compared to the supposed interest of

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previous youth generations, fundamentally during the 60's and the70's. The available evidence indicates that there effectively exists amarked estrangement of youth from the main public institutions(political parties, parliament, justice, police and others), but it alsopoints at the little distance with the perceptions -likewise verycritical- that other sectors of the population hold (as shown, forexample, by the Latinobar6metro surveys), which would indicate thatit is a problem linked to these institutions and their specific dynamicsin the current society and not an antidemocratic challenge specific ofyouth (Balardini coord., 2000).

Actually, everything seems to indicate that the actual or assumedjuvenile apathy is related to the disenchantment produced byinstitutions which are increasingly operating within the frameworkof routines more boring than spectacular in terms of innovations(corresponding to the democracies that are becoming settled down inalmost all the region), which contrasts with the mentality prevailingin youths who would wish to witness rapid and fundamentalchanges. The truth is that when youths perceive real possibilities ofmaking a difference in the decisions, they participate withenthusiasm, as was the case of Colombian youths with the NationalConstitutional Assembly of 1990 or Paraguayan youths in theMarch, 1999 crisis, for example, where they were major protagonistsin blocking the frustrated coup attempts.

On the other hand, it is important to assume that the link betweenyouth and society allows for a third approach strategy, connected withthe difficulties in the social integration process that youths attempt totravel in their transit towards adult roles, and that public policiesthemselves try to facilitate through various initiatives. In this case,there are four dimensions that are particularly critical: education, work,health and housing. In connection with education, the importantattainments achieved in Latin America in terms of coverage areevident, as are also the considerable deficits that are still recorded interms of equity and quality. This is an explosive combination, since onthe one hand it allows youth to duly note the opportunities andpossibilities existing in society, while, on the other, it places them atprecarious conditions to take advantage of the same. The outcome is agreat frustration, which discourages youths and drives them to drop out

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of school (above all in the poorer and more excluded strata). This isclosely related with the issue of work insertion of youths, since one ofthe main difficulties they face is linked to the lack of training, which isadded to youths' lack of experience (placing them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis adults) and the high selectivity available to those having highlevels of education at the time of looking for a job. If we add to this thelittle interest of the main actors in the production process (trade unions,business and governments) for incorporating youths (under thepressure of other priorities) we have a very difficult panorama foryouths going forward. The other aspect of concern is related withhealth, where youths face serious difficulties in several fieldssimultaneously, visible in terms of risk behaviors that need to beaddressed through prevention and the promotion of healthy lifestyles. Car accidents, sexually transmitted diseases, consumption oflegal and illicit drugs and early teenage pregnancy are some of themain problems, but only a few countries and certain specific sphereshave developed integrated responses consistent with the dimension andcomplexity of such problems (PAHO's studies are a fundamentalreference on these issues). Finally, youths face serious difficulties inconnection with access to their own housing, when considering thepossibility of establishing new households, independent from theirrespective households of origin. This leads to reinforcing two types ofextremely worrying behaviors on the part of youths: on the one hand,setting up new households that do not become independent from theparental households (the new couple lives together with the parents ofone of its members) and, on the other, the increasinigly more frequentdevelopment of transient relationships that are constantly beingbroken and reconstituted, giving the process a very evident shortterm tendency.

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YOUTH IN LATIN AMERICA:EXCLUSION AND PROTAGONISM

How do all these concepts apply to the current situation of youthin Latin America? As underlined in numerous recent diagnoses, "themain signs of the times are the institutionalization of change and thecentrality of knowledge as the engine of growth". The same diagnosesemphasize that "both factors place youth in a situation of privilege tocontribute to development", so that the issue is extremely relevant inthe context of these notes. Why are these parameters underlined inrecent papers on the subject? The arguments are many, but, essentiallythe idea is that in this new century that is beginning, "youth hasbecome the segment of the population with a dynamics that naturallyfits with the pace of the times (while) the opposite is the case with theadult population, for which the speed of the transformations in theworld of production reduces the market value of their cumulativeexperience and places their skills at the permanent risk of becomingobsolete". "In this manner -it is underlined-the focus of the dynamicsshifts to the new generations" (CEPAL-OIJ, 2000). As it is known, thesubject of knowledge and information as pillars of the new developmentstrategies are being analyzed in all the international fora and in this sameline, the World Bank dedicated the 1998-1999 World DevelopmentReport to these subjects (knowledge at the service of development) as didthe UNDP in their 2001 Human Development Report (puttingtechnological progress at the service of human development).

Within that framework, and in what strictly relates to the coresubject of this report, the CEPAL-OIJ document states that "there areseveral reasons making it possible to assert that globalization as well asthe growing expansion of the competitiveness frontiers in a scenario ofaccelerated incorporation of technological innovations is accompaniedby a notable increase of the potentiality of youth contribution to thedevelopment of their societies. Certainly, the main of those reasons isthe major role of knowledge as the engine of transformation andfundamental resource of societies to address the challenges that theybring about. Youth -it is underlined- is the stage in life essentially

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dedicated to acquiring knowledge. To that end, society grants a rolemoratorium, that is, a temporary suspension of obligations favoringboth the flexibility to adjust to new situations (by experimenting withthem and drawing a rapid balance of their advantages anddisadvantages) and the rapid incorporation of innovations, a processwhich does not face, as is usually the case in adult generations, theresistances stemming from ingrained habits or practices, interests thathave already taken root in institutional structures".

The arguments are striking, although they have not yet beenproperly incorporated into the logic of public policies. This is veryvisible, if the current condition of youth is looked upon, as theCEPAL and OIJ, 2000 text does, when underlining that "while theimplementation of the current development styles requires anoptimum leveraging of the type of assets that are concentrated inyouth, paradoxically the social exclusion of youth increases",remarking as main evidence the high levels of juvenileunemployment in the region, which double and even triple, inseveral cases, adult unemployment. In Labor Panorama of LatinAmerica and the Caribbean, the ILO gathers more updated evidencein this respect, and it is not necessary to dwell too much on it (ILO,2001). It is sufficient to recall that juvenile unemployment clearlyhas structural characteristics, and has persisted at extremely highlevels for the last forty years (at least) both during times of crisis andin stages of sustained economic growth, and it is explained bystructural reasons, linked to the attitude of fundamental actors in theoperation of the labor market, that are guided by other priorities(trade unions prioritize those workers who are already integrated inthe labor market, business people prefer to hire adults, andgovernments prioritize attention to the heads of households, whoare also adults).

But "the heterogeneity among the asset portfolios (especially inhuman capital and social capital) of youths placed in different socialpositions of the national stratification systems -underscores theCEPAL-OIJ text- seems to be becoming more acute. While onesector manages to acquire the resources needed for a rapidadaptation to the new qualification requirements, others do not. Onone hand, because the speed of the demand for this type of skills

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seems to move faster than the capacity of societies both to generatea labor supply with sufficient competences and to create theconditions that make it possible to develop the skills and the attitudesfavoring a flexible adaptation to change and a rapid incorporation ofnew knowledge. On the other, because the weakening of some of theprimary institutions, such as the family and the community, isgreater among youths from poorer households than in the rest,which translates into a widening gap in terms of the skills of thefamilies to invest in the education of their children and to performa socializing role complementing that performed by school".

"A second element to be considered -adds the report- is thegreater degree of institutional and political articulation of adultgenerations as compared with younger generations. In a situation ofgrowing employment uncertainty, those segments of the populationthat act as corporations tend to close ranks around the defense of theirconquests and, in particular, the positions attained in the market. Suchactions generate rigidities that hinder both the full utilization of youthhuman resources and a higher investment by the State in developingtheir capacities, all of which poses a serious question on the level ofintergenerational inequity existing in our societies" (idem). However,the subject is not found among the substantive priorities of thestrategies designed to achieve greater levels of social equity, whichfocus almost exclusively on the differences of social stratification, to acertain extent on the urban-rural dichotomy and lately only to a certainextent on gender inequities.

The elements included in the above quotes are very relevant, anddeserve some additional comment, going back to the concept ofsocial exclusion as a complex and integrated phenomenon, that isnot mechanically limited to the lack of work opportunities, and thatis fed by many other problematic dimensions, linked to the crisis ofthe traditional juvenile socialization systems and to the issue of theintergenerational reproduction of poverty, subjects that have beenincreasingly analyzed by the main international organizations(especially by those of the United Nations).

The CEPAL-OIJ report specifies these processes, whenhighlighting that currently, youth from popular urban strataexperience a historically unprecedented level of social exclusion

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risk (...) the result of a confluence of determinations by the market,the State and society which tend to concentrate poverty among theyouth, isolating them from other society strata", among which theyunderline: "(i) the growing incapacity exhibited by the labor marketto absorb people with few skills and to guarantee the coverage ofthe social services traditionally linked to the performance of stablejobs; (ii) the difficulties faced by the State to reform education andtraining systems at a pace in accordance with the requirements fornew skills and capacities; (iii) the transformation of families and thecomposition of neighborhoods (...) affected by a reduction of theircompetence to generate in children and youths stimuli andconfidence on the virtues associated with investing efforts ineducation as the primary means to attain the desired goals; (iv) theearly emancipation of youths with low educational levels andhigher fertility rates than those of their peers with highereducational levels, which contributes to concentrating poverty inthe first stages of the family life cycle; (v) residential segregation,producing a growing spatial concentration of households withsimilar standards of living, homogenizing inwardly and creating anoutward gap; (vi) a separation of the public spaces for informalsociability outside the market, which reduces the frequency of faceto face encounters between people of different socio-economicorigins; and (vii) the segmentation of basic services, among whichthe case of education is especially noted because of its significance inthese issues.

What are the consequences of all this? "First of all, the weakparticipation in the educational system and the precarious laborinsertion prevent both systems from operating as transmitters ofstandards and values that order daily life, structure aspirations anddefine goals to be attained. Secondly, the phenomena of instabilityand incompleteness that are affecting families in these sectors,which also contribute to reducing their socialization capacity andthe performance of a complementary role to reinforce the functionsof educational institutions. Thirdly, the isolation from society'smainstream that deprives youths from close success models linkedto an adequate leveraging of the estructure of opportunities. That is,the social isolation of popular urban youth occurs within a context

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of normative void caused by the degradation of the primaryinstitutions, the weak and precarious participation in education andwork and the growing estrangement of the success models which linkefforts to achievements" (idem).

But in analyzing the consequences of the above elements, it isimperative to go one step further and wonder about the influence ofother factors which play a role in juvenile dynamics. The CEPAL-OIJreport does so, underlining that within the framework of the abovecircumstances, "youths remain available, open to other influences thatallow them to construct an identity which helps to shore up their selfesteem and provides a sense of belonging or being part of thecommunity", a subject which has been analyzed at the light of theconsiderations on juvenile tribes. From this perspective, tribes are -above all- "the outcome of innumerable tensions, contradictions andanxieties which flood contemporaneous youth", and are thereforeviewed as "a social and symbolic response to the excessive rationalityof present life, the individualistic isolation to which large cities subjectus and the coldness of an extremely competitive society. Adolescentsand youths tend to see in the tribes the possibility of finding a new wayof expression, a manner of taking distance from the normalcy whichdoes not satisfy them and, above all, the occasion of intensifying theirpersonal experiences and finding a gratifying core of affection. It is,from many points of view, a sort of emotional haven as opposed to thecontemporaneous urban exposure, which paradoxically leads them tothe street" (Costa, Perez and Tropea, 1996).

Which are the goals and aspirations they may have under thesecircumstances? wonder CEPAL and OIJ. "Another paradox ariseshere -they respond- because the conditions of social exclusionwhich particularly affect urban popular youths are accompanied by anunprecedented level of exposure to massive consumption proposals,and an equally unprecedented centrality of youth culture in society.All of this defines a situation of structural anomy, in which youthshave a relatively high symbolic participation in a society that shapestheir aspirations and a material participation which does not allow forthe satisfaction of such aspirations by legitimate means".

"The combination of all these elements -adds the report-contributes to the emergence of marginal subclultulres, gangs and

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cliques having they own codes, subcultures that usually incorporateand consolidate, through time, habits and behaviors which emerge associally disruptive reflections of the situations of social exclusion andmarginality. The crystallization of marginal subcultures does not onlyprevent youths from contributing to the operation of society, but furthererode the social fabric and the standards of coexistence, and ultimately,fuel a vicious circle of reinforcing of segregation and segmentation"(idem). Summarizing, we stand before a quite reasonable andtransparent explanation to one of the more concerning currentproblems: the growing violence in which -in their capacity as victimsas well as aggressors- youths are clearly and unfortunately, theprotagonists. Public insecurity, juvenile exclusion and normative voidare, therefore, three elements closely linked in terms of rationalexplanation, but they do not appear as it should at the time ofdesigning relevant and timely responses through public policies.

Public youth policies:Hypothetical models and historic review

How have youth policies responded to this particular set ofproblems? In this respect it is possible to characterize, at least fourhypothetical "models".

A first model of public policies with fundamental characteristicsthat became evident during the three decades with the largest and mostsustained economic growth in Latin America (between 1950 and1980) was concentrated in two particularly important spheres of thecondition of youth: education and leisure time. The achievementsobtained are evident, specially with regards to the growingincorporation of wide juvenile sectors to the benefits of education,specially at the basic level and, more recently, to middle and highereducation. Thus, while at the beginning of the 50's, schooling rates inthe primary level were close to 48%, by the end of the 90's they hadreached 98%; during the same period, secondary education gross ratesincreased from 36% to almost 60% and for higher education they wentfrom 6% to 30%. However, the quantitative achievements have not

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been attained in qualitative terms to the same extent, since as time wenton, the opportunities of upward social mobility provided by educationnarrowed. On one side, the investment in infrastructure, equipment andteacher training was relatively insufficient and led to the degradation ofits quality. On the other, an important part of the middle and uppersectors abandoned the public system, choosing private options andgiving rise to a growing segmentation of the system.

In the meantime, and together with the expansion of theeducational system, govermnents attempted to provide more and betteropportunities for the use of youths so-called leisure time. Suchinitiatives were directed in an explicit or implicit manner, at avoidingcertain behaviors in youth such as drug and alcohol abuse, irresponsiblesexuality and any other type of "antisocial" behavior that, besidesplacing their welfare at risk, could have negative consequences on thehealth of the social fabric. Thus, various sporting, recreational andcultural activities began to be developed, designed to occupy youth'sleisure time creatively. In parallel, health services were established foradolescents, emphasizing risk prevention and the promotion of healthylife styles and not only addressing care for existing diseases, withdifferential failures and successes in each individual national case.The benefits, ultimately, have been evident but, in any case, whatneeds to be highlighted is that the essence of this youth policy model,conceived as valid for all youths, was only effective for those whowere integrated in society, in general, and in education in particular,limiting its real scope.

With the growing incorporation of youth to the educationalsystem, a great juvenile mobilization began to emerge based on thestudent condition. The following have influenced the roots of thismobilization: the changes in the social composition of the universitystudent body; the first signs of exhaustion of the import substitutionindustrialization model and the consequent reduction in upwardmobility opportunities of the labor market; the prevalence of twoantagonic conceptions, within the framework of the Cold War, for thedevelopment of societies; and the echoes of the Cuban revolution. Inthis context, juvenile mobilization rapidly took on traits of acutedefiance, in open challenge to the established political and socialsystem, and in response to the serious situation existing at the end of

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the 60's, visible in almost all the countries of the region, independentlyof their degree of development. Although the mobilization of LatinAmerican youths was influenced by developments in other parts of theworld -such as those associated with the "French May"- itsassociation with some popular movements consolidated gradually.That was particularly the case of the movements led by the tradeunions that had developed in almost all the countries of the region inthe shadow of import substitution industrialization. Although to alesser extent, some agreements were also reached with peasantmovements, basically translating into supporting their strong claims foraccess to the land. University students, additionally and increasinglyorganized, also began to have an influence in the constitution of left-wing political groupings and even the guerilla movements thatboomed in the 60's and 70's.

In a context of strong polarization worldwide, such processes werelogical, as were also the reactions of the dominant sectors. Thus, therebegan to emerge some variations on the youth policy modelspreviously described linked with the functions of social controltraditionally performed by the Home or Government ministries. Giventhe eminently juvenile character of the rebel demonstrations of thetime, the work of those agencies needed to be supported by otherinstitutions more closely linked to the promotion of youth, and thestrategy, consisting in isolating student movements and limiting themto university facilities, was successful since the expansion of themobilizations was curtailed, preventing them from joining with thoseof urban popular youths. The eminently autonomous nature of studentmovements (an element that was not present in the model oriented toeducation and leisure time, which was a response by the State to thenew generations and not an initiative originated and driven by youthsthemselves) explains, to a good degree, the rapid and widespreadpolitization of student movements, that demonstrated a capacity ofstriking alliances with other non-juvenile social organizations,although this did not happen with other youth organizations with adifferent social sign, such as those that developed in the popular urbanenvironment, as already noted.

On the other hand, and as it is known, the growing student andtrade union mobilization-together with the development of left wing

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parties and sundry guerrilla movements-derived, to a good extent,in the establishment of military governments in most of thecountries that had had populist experiences in Latin America, a factthat coincided with the beginning of the economic and socialrecession and the expansion of poverty in the 1980's. The democraticgovernments that began to become generalized -specially in SouthAmerica- received a heavy burden, that forced them to attempt tostrengthen the new born political regimes and to put in practiceextremely unpopular economic adjustment programs that werepostulated as necessary in order to pay the large foreign debt andreorder the national economies. In Central America, instead, theadjustment was processed in parallel with the development of thecivil war, sustained on the East-West polarization.

New juvenile movements were born within this framework, thistime having youths from the marginal populations of the main cities ofthe continent as protagonists, for the major part excluded fromeducation and society in general, as has already been noted. Inparallel and as a reaction to widespread poverty, new socialphenomena emerged, which at the end of the 80's derived in truenational uprisings, including supermarket lootings and the siege ofpublic offices. Although the events that took place in Caracas at thebeginning of 1989 were the most striking, there were similarreactions in Argentine and Brazilian cities and in all cases theprotagonism of youth was clear (like in the more recent events inArgentina). As a transitory remedy for the acute social problemscaused by the structural adjustment measures, various programsagainst poverty were implemented, based on the direct transfer ofresources to the most impoverished sectors, food and healthassistance mechanisms and the creation of temporary jobs. To thisend, social compensation agencies (emergency funds) were set upoutside ministerial structures and although none of those initiativeswas ever catalogued as a youth program, in almost all the countriesthe majority of beneficiaries were youths (the emergencyemployment programs benefited thousands of them).

Such programs had the clear purpose of preventing criminalbehaviors, since the relaxation of the repressive social controls on thewake of the military regimes in various countries -coupled with the

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representation crisis of social and political institution- left a hugevoid. However, the successes were undermined both by the majordimensions of the crisis and by the tension between the short-termcharacter conferred to these programs and the persistence of theeconomic restrictions. This seems to have influenced in thereimplementation of such programs, this time with more integratedstrategies and greater stability in time and with measures designed toaddress the growing urban insecurity; that is the sense of the recenturban security programs, which have explicit components targetingthe youth population that have began to multiply in different countriesof the region (we will return to this subject).

Finally, a fourth model of youth policies seems to have beganoperating since the beginning of the 90's, underscoring the importanceof human capital for development, and structured around youth's laborand social insertion. German Rama (1992) justified these orientations,arguing that "dealing with youth is a crucial dimension of society'ssurvival and development. A society's capacity to safeguard thebiological equity of the new generations, socializing youths on thefundamental values which define its existence as a society, educatingthem in the culture and knowledge appropriate for the level ofdevelopment of the countries that are at the frontier of scientific andtechnological transformations, establishing conditions of equity in theaccess to material and cultural goods to preserve the social foundationsof democracy, preventing the loss of future human resources throughadequate education and training for all and providing those who will beits citizens with capacity and responsibility to exercise their sovereignrights will determine the future development of the current nationalsocieties", adding that "in an ever changing world, youth acquires amore relevant role than in the past".

"For society -adds the author- it is no longer a matter ofensuring its collective reproduction, but rather of addressing the problemof counting with individuals capable of learning to learn throughout theirlives (... .) The flexibility of youth to learn permanently and to adjust, withthe flair of the initiated, to the new forms of social organization, in thetransformation has become a capital of equal value as the economic one.The capacity of our societies to educate them for a changing world andthe skill of appealing to youth to incorporate them into activities that

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require modem procedures and technologies will determine theadaptability of societies to a type of social modality that will surelyprevail throughout the 21st Century, that will be defined by a permanentimpregnation of science and technology in social exchanges and aconstant change in the ways of feeling, thinking and doing".

On the basis of this type of rationale important consensus wereachieved during the last decade on the centrality of education indevelopment processes and the issue of labor insertion of youths wasgiven a high priority. The job training program "Chile Joven", beganin 1990, was a pioneer in this field and is being replicated in manyother countries. In general, these are measures designed to providetraining in relatively brief periods and through new operating modes,concentrating the focus on the pertinence of the traits selected and theeffective labor insertion of youth rather than in the mere technicalqualification. These programs are executed through sundry public andprivate institutions, within a competitive framework; governmentsparticipate in the design, supervision and evaluation functions,separate from execution and the objective is to incorporate youths tothe social modernization and productive transformation required bythe current processes of internationalization of the economy. Asindicated, this model is based on a different approach from the others,clearly associated with the transformation.

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YOUTH POLICIES:A BALANCE OF THE 90'S

Let us now make a balance of the youth public policies implementedover the last decade, differentiating programmatic from institutionalaspects, reviewing the investments and analyzing the social perceptionsthat were generated.

Programmatic Evaluation:Sectorial, Limited and Discontinuous Progress

From the programmatic point of view, substantial progress can beseen in several specific spheres; however, since this progress wasnot adequately articulated nor maintained for sufficient time, itseffective repercussions on the target population -youths- havebeen few and not constant. As could be expected, the primaryspheres are education, employment, health and recreation. Instead,there is little progress recorded on the issues of civic participationand prevention of violence among youths, aspects that are currentlybeginning to be more widely addressed.

With regards to education, the main achievement is expanding thecoverage of the target population, particularly among women. Thisprogress has been attained, to a good extent, thanks to the majorincrease in education investment, since the public expenditure in thesector grew -in the regional average- from 2.9% to 4.5% of thegross domestic product (GDP) between 1970 and 2000. Progress interms of social equity and quality of education, however, has been less.This is evidenced in the serious repetition and dropping out rates andthe deficits in fundamental learning, especially with respect tolanguage and mathematics. The UNDP (1998) identified five problemareas in education: (i) slowdown of the enrollment growth rate; (ii)unequal coverage of education among countries, subnational regionsand social groups; (iii) poor academic performance of children andyouths, especially those coming from low income households and lowlevel of social capital; (iv) concentration of the investment on the

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better-off, as illustrated by the development of higher education; and(v) multiple inefficiencies which explain the existing paradox betweengrowing levels of investment and decreasing levels of school

performance, even after controlling for the massification effects. TheInternational Commission on Education, Equity and Economic

Competitireness in Latin America and the Caribbean (several authors,2001 c) recently arrived at similar conclusions.

In the field of health, important progress was recorded in severalspecific items. The programs for the prevention and treatment of drug

consumption (legal and illicit), for example, have made strides in

several countries. Something similar may be said of the programs for

care and prevention of sexually transmitted diseases (notablyHIV/AIDS) since some countries have managed to stabilize and even

reduce the levels of contagion and prevalence (Brazil, for example). In

the case of teenage pregnancy prevention, there were also advances,although there is still a long way to go, partly due to the persistence of

cultural habits and social structures which concentrate the greatestquantity of cases in the sectors affected by the more acute situation of

extreme poverty. The same may be said about traffic accidents -one

of the main causes of death among youths- in spite of the efforts by

public authorities and in direct connection with the growing complexityof road traffic operation in the main cities of the region (PAHO, 1998).

Also visible are the progresses obtained in the dominion of recreation,culture and sports, spheres from which healthy life styles for the youthsare promoted. The advances have been achieved both as a result of

specific public policies of a few decades ago -specially in the 1950'sto 1970's- and as a consequence of private efforts (for profit and non-

profit) more recently, in the following decades. The mass media have

exercised a growing influence in this field; articulated with the businessinterests of transnational private companies, they have discovered abroad and sophisticated youth consumer market, that is very attractivefrom the profit point of view.

The work in the area of care and prevention of the variousexpressions of juvenile violence has been relatively less, although it is

an increasing phenomenon. The initiatives adopted in the last fewyears in this dominion coincide with the enforcement of urban securityprograms -mainly in Colombia, El Salvador and Uruguay- that

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include relevant youth-linked components in their dynamics. In thiscontext, an effort is made to work more intensively on the basis ofpreventive approaches and not simply repressive ones as wastraditional, with the purpose of reinserting those youths whocommit offenses, assuming the complexity of the phenomenon andavoiding simplistic explanations. But perhaps the greatest progresscorresponds to the sphere of creating awareness in public opinionand decision makers in connection with the need for providing moreand better care in the area of reproductive health of adolescents andyouths. Although there is much that remains to be done on thisissue, a good share of the progress has been achieved throughadvocacy campaigns in which youths have been present and wheretheir participation is part of the efforts directed at including them asstrategic actors in development (Burt, 1998; Rodriguez, Russel,Madaleno and Kastrinakis, 1998).

On the other hand, progress has also been achieved in the laborinsertion of youths, particularly in connection with job training.Thus, on the basis of the pioneering experience of the Program"Chile Joven ", several countries of the region now have a widegamut of new programs, demanding major investment efforts andthe design of orderly execution and targeting strategies, to ensureaccess by youths from poor households. The evaluations conductedhighlight the progress obtained by these programs and underscorethat targeting has been good, both in social and gender terms. Theyouths that participated in these programs enjoy advantages whichare not within reach of those who did not: they have greaterfacilities to enter the job market, more stable employment, moreappropriate working conditions and better social relations. Comparedwith control groups, the participating youths achieve betterperformance, get a job faster, remain in their positions and improvetheir income in a higher proportion than non-participants (who sharethe same social profile of participating youths). This is evidenced inthe various available studies that focus on national cases.

Additionally, such programs achieved extremely relevant socialimpacts, fostering the return to the education system of a good shareof the youths participating in these initiatives, improving therelationships of the beneficiaries with their families and the

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community environment and their peer groups, and significantlyleveraging the social capital of these youths for the purpose ofprocessing their social integration in a more dynamic and faster way.The satisfaction of the beneficiaries with their experience is veryhigh. Besides, since these programs have not been applied in thesame manner in all countries, the variety of experiences has providedlessons on the potentialities and weaknesses of each, which willmake it possible to improve these efforts in the immediate future.Thus, the PROJOVEN program of Uruguay seems to achieve bettertargeting (which seems to relate to the reduced scale in which itoperates), while the program in Argentina has shown seriousshortcomings, probably because of its broad scope (several authors,200 lb; Gallart et al., 1999; several authors, 1998).

The progress in programs designed to promote productiveventures for youths have, instead, been more limited. Although norigorous evaluations are available, the evidence suggests seriouslimitations in the implementation of several of these programs andthe oldest ones show lack of articulation between training, creditsand technical assistance for management. Besides, the strongproduction reconversion processes and the recent economic crisisimpose adverse conditions on micro and small businesses, adversitiesthat are scarcely compensated by the public policies designed to thateffect. In recent years, measures were adopted tending to overcomethe above limitations, but their effective performance cannot yet beevaluated, so that future developments will need to be awaited in orderto provide informed opinions on their results.

Finally, it should be noted that the work carried out with regardsto the education of youths as citizens and promoting their activeparticipation in development is relatively minor, in spite of the concernby decision makers regarding the real (or assumed) juvenile apathy,including their growing estrangement from most of the democraticinstitutions. What is actually happening? How can these processesbe explained? First of all, it should be recalled that the immensemajority of Latin American and Caribbean youths are totallyoutside the existing youth organizations and movements. Barelybetween 5 and 20% declare participating specially in some.Besides, the huge majority of those who do participate are

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concentrated in sporting and religious organizations. Althoughmany attend rock concerts or other similar musical events, the mainactivities they carry out in their free time have to do with "hangingout with friends", watching television or going to the movies or todance. This is indicated by all known surveys, while they alsoindicate that the presence of youths in student, trade union, politicalparties and community organizations is negligible.

However, when consulted on their interest for participating in saidorganizations, the positive answers are overwhelmingly high whichshows that what they reject are the practices with which theseorganizations are managed and not their concrete ends or objectives.This is extremely relevant: youths wish to participate (and they do sovery actively when called upon in a transparent and shared manner)but they do not wish to feel they are being manipulated. However,it is important to recognize that among those who participate thereis always a great lack of constancy: in the majority of cases, theyparticipate in specific activities, for certain periods, while notbecoming involved in membership in the organization as such. Thisis evidence of another relevant characteristic: youths live thepresent with great intensity, and the notion of the medium and longterm is not too important in their daily life (although adults alwaysidentify youths with the future).

We are, in any case, faced with a new paradigm of juvenileparticipation (Sema, 1998), totally different from the traditional one:while in the past collective identities were built around socioeconomicand ideological-political codes, now they are built around action spacesrelated with daily life (women's rights, defense of the environment,etc.); while in the past, the demands referred to improving livingconditions (in education, employment, health, etc.) now they arestructured around the exercise of rights (in sexuality, coexistence, etc.);while in the past, the prevailing values had a messianic and globalflavor (social change should modify the structure for individuals tochange) they are now more linked to the here and now, from a logic ofindividuals, groups and structures (simultaneously); and while in thepast, participation was highly institutionalized, now more flexible andtemporary horizontal modalities and informal networks are vindicated,avoiding bureaucratization.

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Institutional Evaluation:Confusion of roles and Disarticulation

Although the achievements obtained in several spheres areimportant, their attainment has come about in an unarticulated manner,as a result of the design and execution of sectorial policies that rarelyinteract and mutually reinforce one another; and in institutional terms,this lack of articulation is usually associated with a confusion ofcompetencies between the executing agencies and those in charge ofthe design, monitoring and evaluation. Although the theories oninstitutional development underline the differentiation of roles andfunctions between the agents implied in any public policy, the actualdynamics of our institutions attempt to do everything simultaneouslyso that it is frequent to find efforts overlapping at various operatinglevels while others are disregarded. These problems become evidentwhen an attempt is made to establish links between institutionsspecializing in youth affairs (national institutes, general directoratesand youth ministries or viceministries) and the sectorial secretariats orministries (health, labor, education, and others).

On the side of the specialized institutions, the attempt to "do itall" brought about more problems than advantages. On one side,they have faced serious competition problems with the large Statesecretariats, when trying to put in practice health, education oremployment programs for youths, in parallel and without thenecessary linkage with the respective ministries. These competenceproblems have always ended with the victory of the large Statesecretariats, that to all purposes have more power, legitimacy anddevelopment that the national institutes or directorates, morerecently created and with little actual implementation. On the otherhand, specialized institutions have, in the majority of cases,confused their role, attempting to become representatives of theState before youths and representatives of youths before the State,without having the legitimacy and the tools to perform these roles.This has happened, to a great extent, because such youth institutesand directorates have, since their beginning, been led by youthleaders of the political parties in government, without having

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previous experience of management in the public administration,and too previously accustomed to the logic of conflict for spaces ofpower, with adults in their same party and with youths in other parties,practices that they have transferred to the dynamics of these newinstitutions, as a simple continuation of the former. One of theconcrete modalities in which this confusion operates, is linked with theexcessive focus of several of these youth directorates or institutes inshort term activities dedicated to organizing and mobilizing youths,while neglecting the development of medium and long term programsthat promote access by youth to the various social services (education,health, employment, recreation, etc.) and generating problems withvarious social and political actors which do not accept the presence ofthe State in this type of dynamics.

In the case of the large State secretariats, on their part, theproblems are not minor either, but the explanations seem to bedifferent. On the one hand, there is evidence of a prevalence ofsectorial approaches that barely differentiate the sectors of thepopulation with which they operate, while the prevalence of simplisticand stereotyped approaches regarding youths is maintained, showing aprofound ignorance of juvenile dynamics as they actually are.Additionally, there are management problems. Since many agenciesact as a monopoly, their concern for rigorous program design andappropriate tracking mechanisms tends to be limited, and under thoseconditions it is difficult for ex-post evaluations to have the necessaryobjectivity. Likewise, the discretionality and lack of articulation ofefforts prevents the type of impact that would be derived from thecoordinated operation of the various institutions, which areexcessively isolated one from the other in terms of their operationalmanagement. The available evaluations further point out that sectorialprograms are excessively concentrated on problems and individuals,loosing sight of the integrality of institutional interventions, even morenecessary on the basis of the existence of evident linkages betweendiverse problems such as a context of economic difficulties,disfunctions and limitations in the family dynamics and risk factorswhich predispose in favor of developing atypical behaviors.

PAHO insists on the need of overcoming such methodologicallimitations in its Plan ofActionforAdolescent and Youth Development

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and Health in the Americas 1998-2001. Quoting Catalano and

Hawkins, this report identifies some risk factors "common in the case

of drug consumption, crime, teenage pregnancy, dropping out of

school and violence: extreme deficit of economic resources, familyconflict, a history of problematic behavior in the family and difficultyin handling family conflicts. Besides, drug abuse, crime and violencehave in common certain neighborhood characteristics that provide

opportunities to develop problem behaviors: community standards and

rules favoring criminal activities, drug consumption and the obtentionof firearms, peer groups involved in problematic behaviors, a

favorable attitude from parents towards problematic behavior, little

sense of belonging to the community, and in general, social

disorganization (...) Under these circumstances, youths struggling to

develop their identities, skills and lifestyles, have easy access to the

social activities considered problematic, and a restricted access to

activities favoring their development. The more adverse the context

in which adolescents develop, the greater the need for support that will

allow them to survive and prosper in the future" (PAHO, 1998). If this

rationale is applied to any other sphere of juvenile development,

similar conclusions are arrived at, therefore, it is necessary to draw

clear consequences in this regard.On the other hand, in the last few years, in several countries of the

region, specific offices and spaces for youth promotion have emerged

at the municipal level, designed to implement actions from a local

space. The basic assumption which has guided this type of efforts, in

accordance with the decentralization processes in many other spheresof public policies, has been the actual or assumed greater proximity to

the problems and the expectations of youths, as compared to central

institutions; but, in some national cases they have been driven by

broader alternative orientations. Although in several specific casesextremely relevant actions and programs have been deployed, it is also

true that serious problems have been faced in connection with

institutional management at this level. In some cases, the problemshave been connected with the same type of competence conflictsmentioned above in the case of central level institutions, in this case

in relation with other secretariats or departments of the respective

municipalities. In other cases, instead, the problems have been

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generated by the almost "natural" tendency of adults (in charge ofthe other municipal agencies) to considering youth as "cheap labor"(as it is usually called) and to assign to youth secretariats andoffices, logistic support tasks in the development of other moregeneral plans and programs.

The types of activities very commonly promoted from this type ofoffices have been rock concerts and recreational and sportingactivities. While certainly guided by a diagnosis which emphasizesthe absence of an offering specifically centered on the leisure time ofthe new generations, such offices have tried to fill the void while, atthe same time, attempting to work with orientations drawn from theprevailing youth culture (many times as a reaction to the morebureaucratic orientations, more distant from the juvenile culture whichactually or supposedly prevail at the central level). The truth is that,in any case, in many cases these activities end up being censured bythe adult authorities of the same municipalities (and by the adultpopulation as a whole) for fostering practices that are censured by theadult world, such as the consumption of drugs and alcohol, or violenceamong youths. All this has resulted in serious challenges to suchdynamics and questions on the specificity and sense of the former innumerous meetings between the operators of this type of institutionalinstances. In theory, they are instances that should operate within theirspecific local field within the framework of a broader and moreeffective coordination with the specialized instances of the centrallevel (the national youth institutes or directorates) and with the otherinstitutions at the municipal level, but in fact, and due to severalspecific circumstances, in most cases this is not the case. There arealso serious doubts about the real specificity of such offices, that in theimmediate future will have to face the challenge of defining rigorouslythe role and functions to be performed, as well as the work strategiesand methodologies to be deployed, leveraging the advantages andminimizing the restrictions of the local level.

Finally, it is important to add some comments in connection withthe participation of civil society organizations in the design,implementation and evaluation of public youth policies, with specialemphasis on youth organizations and non-governmental organizationsfor youth promotion, framing the reflections in the corresponding

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historical context. Undoubtedly, the differences between the

various national processes are in this case, equally or more marked

than in other areas analyzed; but, in any case, some general

comments may be made, recalling that in most cases, civil society

has emerged with great strength in the last few years, within the

framework of the processes of State reform currently underway,

through very diverse modes of operation. But together with this

''emergence" that provides visibility to the dimension of these

phenomena, it is necessary to underline the changes in the models

deployed in the last decades. Thus, everything seems to indicate

that in most cases, youth organizations and specialized NGOs have

followed a path that has led them from opposing the established

governments (clearly in the case of the military dictatorships and

authoritarian governments of the 70's and 80's in Latin America), to

a growing involvement in the design, implementation and

evaluation of youth public policies, for the most part, in cooperation

with governments in the 90's.Such process has been facilitated by the changes in the "rules of

the game" with which this type of organizations have operated.

While in the 70's and 80's they received important political and

financial backing from international organizations and development

cooperation agencies of highly industrialized countries, in the last

years they have had to fund their activities on the basis of "selling

services". This in turn has been linked with the opening of the

national States, that in the framework of processes of outsourcing

different components of public polices, have shifted to contracting

with this type of organizations with a certain regularity, leaving

aside their past confrontations. These processes are undoubtedlynot without their share of problems, but the truth is that in most

cases, extremely interesting experiences of complementation of

efforts between public and non-profit private organizations have

developed, which will in the future allow for an even greater

strengthening of youth polices. This is very visible in the case of

youth job training programs, for example, which are executed by a

broad range of private training institutions, hired by State agencies

that retain the role of defining the major policy guidelines and the

monitoring and evaluation of the work effectively performed. In the

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same line, there have been experiences in other spheres, specially inadolescent health and in the development of urban securityprograms, from which it will be possible to accumulate richexperiences to deploy similar efforts in the future.

Resources Invested:How many, on What and How they are Spent

If to the analysis of institutional management we add theevaluation of the investment made in public youth policies in thelast decades, it is possible to arrive at a more comprehensivediagnosis. And although there are no comparative studies for asufficient number of countries, the available evaluations show atleast two clear trends: (i) the investment on youth, in a broad sense,is significant but limited when compared with the investment inother population groups; (ii) such investment, as opposed to thepriorities defined on the basis of the design of public polices, areoverwhelmingly concentrated on regular education. Although themethodologies used until now are still approximations anddissimilar from one another, studies conducted in Brazil, PuertoRico and Uruguay illustrate such trends and indicate that what isapplied is the implicit public policy, inherent in budget appropriations,even if it differs from the explicit public policy.

At a more generic level, ECLAC's 2000-2001 Panorama Social deAm&ica Latina shows the trends of public expenditure (GP) in generaland social public expenditure (GPS) in particular, highlighting thatin the 90's, it increased in 14 of the 17 countries analyzed. Thisrecovery has compensated for the losses recorded in the 80's, but inthe last years it has slowed down as compared to the first part of the90's. Almost half the increase recorded in the last decade wasfocused on health and education (areas of progressive spending),while the other 40% was concentrated in social security (area ofregressive spending in terms of income distribution). In thecountries with low social spending, the increases in education and

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health expenditure prevailed (60% of the total), while in thecountries with medium and high expenditure the increases in socialsecurity (50%) have been predominant.

In aggregate terms, the above trends are relevant to examine thedistribution of GPS among different population groups. Thus, theinvestment in social security -that prevails in the countries withmedium and high social expenditure- is almost completely related tothe adult and elderly population, a statement that is also valid for agood share of the health investment; only in the case of education itcan be said that it is an investment significantly focused on childrenand youths. Likewise, it can be stated that the largest investments(social security) are predominantly regressive, while there isprogressiveness only in some spheres of education (mainly primaryeducation) and health (primary and secondary care, fundamentally).This is in clear contrast with the priorities that should be set from thelogic of constructing the knowledge society that is in full developmentand requires major strategic investments in education, technologicaldevelopment and knowledge.

A second element to be considered is that connected with theinvestment on education, since it is the sphere that, in spite ofconcentrating a small proportion of the overall social spending,concentrates the major youth investment. There appear to be at leasttwo problems at this level: an excessive concentration of the increaseof education public social spending was targeted at improvingteachers' salaries (which has precluded increases in infrastructure andmodernization) and the regressiveness of the high expenditure inhigher education, from the point of view of income distribution. Inconnection with the first of the problems mentioned, the explanationsare very simple: to the extent that teachers are adequately organized incorporatist terms, their demands are heard and in general addressedby public authorities, to avoid having an excessive number ofprotest days during the school year and the closing down of courses.For that reason, when more resources are obtained for education,the actors involved in the decision making process rapidly agree toassign them fully to improving teacher salaries. Implicitly, however,it is also simultaneously decided not to invest in schoolinfrastructure and modernization, so that educational institutions

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become systematically degraded, and loose their necessary drivetowards change and adjustment to the challenges. The consequencesof such trends are extremely concerning.

On the other hand, although there is sufficient evidence todemonstrate that public spending in higher education is regressivein terms of income distribution (to the extent that society overallfunds the education of youths belonging to the highest incomefamilies), not only does this trend not change but it becomes evenmore acute through time. Also in this case, the explanations relateto corporatist dynamics since our societies operate on the basis ofan agreement, going back several decades already, wherebygovernments transfer large resources to universities, withoutbecoming involved in the use and allocation of such funds (theuniversities are self governed) in exchange for maintaining "rebel"attitudes contained within the university institutions.

In any case, the supposedly equalitarian use of the resourcesassigned to higher education, as the result of non payment for theeducation provided by public universities, widely favors youths fromthe middle and upper classes, to the extent that the equal opportunitiesthat are generated by non payment are not sufficient to secure equalaccess to youths of all social classes. Thus, youths belonging to thelow and impoverished social strata do not have access touniversities and when they do, they only remain in them for a shorttime, dropping out at some point in the cycle, so that in the end thissocial bias in favor of upper class youths becomes even moreevident. Ultimately, what is needed is to ensure equal opportunitiesby "dealing unequally with the unequal" through scholarshipprograms, specially targeted at youths belonging to poor familiesand distributing expenditure better among the various branches ofeducation, with a focus on secondary education.

Equally urgent is the need to assign growing quotas of resourcesto other policies different from education, that are prioritized in thedesign of public policies but do not receive adequate consideration innational budgets, as is the case of job insertion programs, promotionof youth civic participation and prevention of risk behaviors. In theseareas, it is possible to see major contradictions between the prioritiesset in the youth policies as defined by political operators (in the youth

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institutes and ministries) and the priorities that are expressed in theresource allocation by national parliaments. In general, the formerstrongly prioritize youth job insertion and civic participation, whilethe second continue to clearly prioritize (one might say, almostexclusively) education and leisure (fundamentally recreation andsports). This is not intended to suggest that the investment ofresources in education should be decreased. Rather, the purpose isto provide the grounds for an expansion of the public expenditureallocated to the new generations, while at the same time providinggreater balance between the different spheres in which saidexpenditure should be concentrated, with more significant increases ofthe appropriations for youth job training and civic participation, sincethese are the spheres to which, until now, the greatest priority has beenattached from the political point of view but have had purely symbolicbudgetary allocations.

The problem is seen to be even worst since the resourcesultimately assigned to youth job training and civic participation havecome, in most cases, from international organizations which, bydefinition make short term investments that then need to be directlyundertaken by the national States if they are to be maintained and/orincreased. When making this type of allocations, the expectation isthat they will make it possible to demonstrate the advantage andimportance of this type of investments, and facilitate the decision ofmaintaining them through time, once the international cooperationceases to operate. It is also true that it is always easier to assignextra budgetary items (such as those resulting from internationalcooperation) to "new programs" (as the ones being now prioritized),but the main risk is the lack of sustainability of said allocations intime, once the international cooperation ceases to operate (if theState does not assume medium and long term commitments). It istherefore essential to work intensively in searching for genuinefinancing for this type of initiatives, that need to be stable if effectiveimpacts on the beneficiaries are to be obtained. On the other hand,it is evident that the prevailing practices are overwhelminglyconcentrated on financing the supply of services, without therebeing in practice, relevant experiences of financing the demand, amuch more common -and certainly more efficient- practice in the

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private field. We are referring, in particular, to the extended existenceof "vouchers" which facilitate access to different public services-fundamentally in health and education- which are given to the endbeneficiaries (the consumers themselves) to use in the institutionthey may decide. Naturally, this is only possible in non-monopolicmarkets where there effectively exist different alternatives for thesame service. For this reason, several countries are working todemonopolize public services and simultaneously create open andcompetitive markets for the participation of different servicesuppliers. In the area of youth policies, this is only being attemptedin the case of job training programs.

On the other hand, some studies indicate it is possible to usedifferent concrete mechanisms for investment. In health, for example,it has been demonstrated that the investment is more efficient whenassigned to preventive programs than when it is allocated to programsthat directly cure. In the case of youths, besides, this is particularlyrelevant, since -as it is known- the prevailing conditions andproblems are significantly concentrated in the so called "riskbehaviors" (traffic accidents, for example) and less in diseases of thetypes that affect adults. Similarly, it has been highlighted that theinvestments associated with prison policies are more efficientlyapplied to preventive measures instead of punitive practices. In thearea of youth issues, in particular, this is very evident when comparingthe costs and results of the two types of interventions referring toyoung offenders: on the one hand, traditionally they have been jailedin special prisons, but on the other and more recently, work is beendone in different "assisted freedom" programs, that have shown betteroutcomes and lower costs than the traditional ones. The example of theJuvenile Justice in Costa Rica is a paradigm in this respect and marksa road to be followed by the other countries, with the correspondingadjustments. However, the tendencies prevailing in the region areexactly the opposite. This is so to the extent that the institutionstraditionally involved in providing youth services, embark on acorporatist defense of their traditional practices, as a form ofdefending their jobs and institutional existence, regardless of the factthat the result is greater costs or negligible marginal impacts in thetarget population. For that reason, changes in these areas will hardly

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come from the institutions involved themselves. They will have to bepromoted through the process of State reform, by means of incentivesdesigned to achieve the cooperation of the institutions as such.

The Vision of the Participating Actors:Between Discourse and Effective Practice

This analysis would not be complete if it did not include someremarks on the attitudes prevailing among the actors implied in thedesign and execution of public youth policies. Some of these attitudesare known, but are only expressed indirectly and remain subsumed inmore restrictive circles in terms of their effective influence and scope.It is not possible to examine the cases that need to be considered oneby one, but it is important to, at least, compare the attitude of some ofthe corporatist structures with the attitude of youth movements andsome relevant State institutions, without neglecting the attitudes ofparents and the community, who operate as core references in youth'sdaily life, in all the countries of the region.

In the case of youths, everywhere and at very different times of therecent history some very marked traits have been noticeable. Amongthem, at least in the case of the better organized and more mobilizedyouth (who express their points of view publicly by different means)is their wide annoyance with the leading classes that tend to identifyyouths with "the future". For that reason, they persistently insist thatyouths are "the present", making reference to their interest at beingaddressed in connection with their current dynamics and not only as afunction of their preparation to undertake various adult roles in thefuture (as workers, citizens, etc.). This type of rationale prevailsamong the leaders of public institutions specializing in the area ofyouth, those at the level of central administration (youth institutesand ministries) and in the case of the provincial, municipal and localyouth offices. Undoubtedly, this has been one of the major toolsthey have used to differentiate themselves from the rest of thepublic administration (the sphere where the discourse they criticize

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is predominant) and trying to get as close as possible to the worldof youth, attempting to take into account the dominant youthculture, including the perceptions, expectations and demands thatyouth themselves formulate either implicit or explicitly.

However, this discourse is very difficult to put into practicethrough specific and concrete measures. For that reason, many timesit turns against those who disseminate it, to the extent that it becomesas inoperative as the opposite one, with the added caveat that, in thiscase, it is not based on erroneous or critizeable conceptions. As aresult, it has lately been perceived to be almost empty of effectivecontents, and it has tended to become relegated in practical terms, justlike the discourse of the leading class. In this sense, there is a growingawareness of the intrinsic limitations of the juvenile condition in itself,very difficult to apprehend due to the evident "volatility" of this"transitory" social condition (lost with the passing of time). Thepractical consequence could be to give greater emphasis to the shortterm in the design of programs, within the framework of a broaderlogic provided from the adult world, regarding the manner in whichthe more stable and less autonomous juvenile movements operate (inthe style of those linked to church dynamics, for example).

The discourse of the leading classes in turn, is focused on thepreviously criticized rationale: youths are the future and they haveto be prepared so that in the future they may live better andparticipate dynamically in the society of which they are members.Therefore, at present, what youths need is not much more thanpreparing to be "grown up" and "stay out of trouble" in their freetime. The issue has all sorts of implications that are extremelycomplex. On one side, it could be argued -as organized youthsand specialized institutions do -that the argument is extremelyconservative and has no other purpose but "disregarding" thepresent of youths. Taken to its extreme, this sort of arguments maybe made explicit by saying that in fact, youths are denied thepossibility of participating, here and now, in the dynamics of thesociety to which they belong. This has very profound implicationsin terms of non recognition of rights and corporatist practices thathave the sole purpose of persisting in time, without effectingmodifications in the established rules of the game. On the other

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side, the core argument we refer to has a real foundation, especiallyif these dynamics are looked at from the logic of the protagonicroles that youths should take in constructing the knowledge society(as we will see later). From this point of view, it is true that youthshave to become prepared to undertake roles and responsibilitieswhen they become adults, but, in any case, the key is in "how" theyprepare themselves. From the traditional perspective, thepreparation and the undertaking of roles are completely dissociatedand separated in time (first they prepare and later they assumeresponsibilities), while within the more modem and innovativevisions, the preparation and taking on of roles is progressive andsimultaneous (youths learn to participate by participating).

In the end, what seems to exist is an underlying but tangiblegenerational conflict, in which what is at stake is who makes thedecisions. From this point of view, the traditional attitude of theleading classes is determined by the fear of being displaced frompower by youths, and in the facts this is expressed through practicesthat try to delay as long as possible the necessary and inevitablegenerational relay. At the same time, it is an attempt to convey to thenew generations all the elements that will allow for the establishedrules of the game to persist in time, to prevent radical changes thatcould move outside that logical framework. Within the frameworkof societies that replicate themselves over the decades (as was thecase in the long stage of substitution industrialization in LatinAmerica between the 30's and the 70's), this has some logic, but ata time when societies are trying to adapt to "ongoing change" (as iscurrently happening throughout the world due to the technologicalrevolution currently underway), such logic is completely destroyedand the argument becomes dysfunctional to the new societaldynamics at all levels. It is therefore advisable to avoid the trap ofthis false dilemma (future or present).

The issue deserves an additional twist, incorporating the attitudeof the leading classes as it is expressed in various corporatist practices.The studies available do not dwell on these issues, but tend to upholdtwo main arguments: youth movements do not act in corporatist termsand the corporatist actors involved are not interested in leveragingyouth policies. Some analysists attribute that attitude to circumstantial

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explanations, trusting that such circumstances may change; in others,the interpretations are based on more structural arguments and are lessoptimistic regarding the possibilities of future change. From thatperspective, it is assumed that political parties are only marginallyinterested in youth issues, since age is not a relevant variable forelectoral purposes. In those countries where youths form a relativelyminor sector of the population of a voting age, that relevance is limitedin quantitative terms; in the countries with large youth populations, thecondition of youth is not expressed in an electoral behavior and therelevance of the issue is limited qualitatively.

Trade unions and business associations fail to express greatconcern regarding the issue of youth. The former prioritize theworkers that are already included in the production process, and thelatter prefer to hire adult, more experienced workers. The same lineis followed by labor ministries, that prefer to focus on adult headsof households, even if that means neglecting youths, because theydo not have the same responsibilities. In any case, the previousargument is also valid here, to the extent that such positions couldoperate in a traditional society, one that no longer exists as it wasstructured at times of greater dynamism. Families today aredifferent from the past, and the model where there is a singleincome earner (the adult male, head of the family) no longeroperates; this function is now shared by both spouses as well assome of the older children.

The same can be said of State institutions, more concernedabout their own existence than about decisively incorporating thenew generations in their operations. Within a context in which theusers who really count are the adults -because they can have aneffect on those dynamics- youths have no voice (in the sense thatHirschman gives to the concept) to a sufficient degree to be heard,so that (continuing with Hirschman's terminology) they can onlyfluctuate between the exit and the loyalty: accepting the rules of thegame or remaining outside it. The scenario becomes disquietingwhen to the above we add the structural limitations of youthmovements, which are the only ones in a position to become thevoice of youth, but fail because -as already said- they are guidedby the symbolic and not by the material dimensions of its existence.

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Therefore, the combination of all these "logics", leads almostinescapably to a sort of "dead end", that precludes action.

It might even be convenient to go further in the analysis andincorporate other dimensions, in particular, the vision of someactors that do not always express themselves in a corporatist waybut are relevant. That is the case, for example, of youth's parentswho almost always follow with more concern than their ownchildren the situation in which they grow and mature. Parentsconduct no public demonstrations in the style of trade union strikes,or publish messages to the Government and public opinion asbusinessmen do. But, for example, when consulted in publicopinion polls, their appreciations and points of view emerge veryclearly. Parents, who do have an influence in other levels, also failto have a voice of their own, so they are not considered in theeducational system, the electoral processes or even in the setting ofpriorities regarding public policies. In any case, their collaborationcan become decisive. Because of all of the above, the role of theinstitutions specializing in juvenile promotion is much moreimportant than in the case of any other public policy since they haveto act as surrogates of the corporatist role that organizedbeneficiaries play in other areas (women policies, for example).This situation seems paradoxical, specially in connection withapproaches that postulate youth participation as the driving force intransforming production, social modernization and democraticconsolidation. However, the truth is that exaggerated bets onjuvenile organization and mobilization have generally ended in clearfailures in different contexts and diverse historic circumstances.

These factors have not been adequately considered in publicpolicies, since the experience shows that the majority of theinstruments made available -information centers, for example-are used more intensely by parents, who employ them to orient andbetter support their children. Such mediators, as the roles thatteachers perform and may carry out in educational institutions, orthe promoters and leaders of youth movements, the preachers andpriests and some sensitized journalists are key for the developmentof youth public policies. However, so far they have barely beenaddressed in a partial manner and in a few concrete cases, so they

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remain as another challenge for the reformulations to be made in thefuture. From that point of view, it can be strongly argued that theonly youth organizations and movements that persist in time arethose which operate with some adult "logic", as is the case of theYouth Pastoral Movement or the Young Christian Association or theScouts Movement. By the same token, the only NGOs that persistin time and accumulate useful lessons and experiences are thosethat know how to combine their proximity to the world of youth,without remaining exclusively enclosed in it, with its integrationinto society as a whole. The same is true for specialized publicinstitutions, that do not attempt to comply with roles that are nottheirs, and focus their efforts in those areas in which they areeffectively irreplaceable (global vision, driving processes,articulating efforts, etc.).

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGESAT THE BEGINNING OF THE NEW ERA

Before moving on to the formulation of some alternativeproposals, it is convenient to analyze the context in which publicpolicies will operate at the beginning of this new century. To that end,an analysis of the implications of the demographic bonus and the newinformation and communication technologies is included, connectingyouth policies with the reform of the State and looking at thedifficulties surrounding the complex issue of financing these publicpolicies. For reasons that are explained below, it is evident that westand in front of a great historical and structural opportunity, thatshould be taken advantage of immediately.

Demographic Bonus, Youth and HumanDevelopment in the 21 st Century

The first big opportunity to be analyzed relates to the so calleddemographic "bonus" or "dividend". Beyond the terms, what it ishighlighted is that the past, present and future demographic trends

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are providing a great opportunity for development, since theoverwhelming amounts of children that were the demographicprotagonists of the last fifty years are not longer being born, and asyet there are no excessively significant groups of elderly population,especially in developing countries. The United Nations Fund forPopulation Activities in its 1998 Report on the Status of WorldPopulation, has underscored the current existence of "the largestyouth generation ever". "In the developing countries, it adds, lowerbirth rates offer the possibility of a demographic dividend in thecoming 15 to 20 years, as an inflow of youths enters the activepopulation, while, simultaneously, a lower quantity of children areborn" Undoubtedly, that is an opportunity for development. "If jobscould be found for these youths, the affluence of the active populationcould serve as the basis for greater investments, greater workproductivity and fast economic development", it emphasizes.

On its side, at a regional scale, the IDB has noted the phenomenonwith the same emphasis. "Most of the countries in Latin America standnow at a favorable moment of demographic transition. Fertility ratesare dropping and a large cohort of children are being incorporated tothe ranks of the active population. With less children to raise and as yetfew retired elderly people, it may be said that the current generation ofLatin Americans are really in a favorable position to become theengine of economic growth and a social change agent", adding that "inthe next 20 years there will be a decrease in the proportion of childrenwith respect to the number of workers, before the increase in theproportion of retirees with respect to the number of active workersbegins to represent a much heavier financial burden. This indicates -it concludes- that we are faced with two decades to acceleratedevelopment, get people to work, finance educational improvementsand save for the future". The IDB citations belong to the 1998-99report on Economic and Social Progress in Latin America (AmericaLatina Frente a la Desigualdad), and the issue was revisited witheven greater force and depth in the 2000 Report (Desarrollo mcis allade la Economia). In the latter, it is once again underlined that "in theperiod 2000-2030 the total dependency coefficients of Latin Americawill reach record low historical levels", but warns that the region"cannot passively await the greater potential benefits generated by the

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change in age structure, but has to actively apply policies to leveragesuch benefits". From that point of view, "the main policy aspects thatrequire immediate attention for Latin American countries to takeadvantage of this demographic opportunity include employment,crime, education, health, savings and pensions issues".

As can be noted, it is indispensable to include these dimensionsinto our analysis, since a good part of the elements of judgment thatwill determine the definition of priorities for public policies and thecorrespondent allocation of resources pivot on the same. If we lookat the priority that the youth issue has had in the last fifty years, itcan clearly be seen that children have always taken first place andthat in almost all relevant fields, attention and resources wereassigned to them. If on the basis of such evidence we project thistype of analysis to the next fifty years, we can verify with certainease that in the future the priority can come to be the elderly, withno intermediate stages. If we take into account the core axes of thedebates and public actions in the last few years, we can easilydetermine that this is already occurring in practice. What in anycase is important is to demonstrate that the challenge of the elderlywill affect us forcefully towards the middle of this century (and ofcourse, it is necessary to prepare for it) but emphasizing -at thesame time- that the juvenile challenge is alreadi' among us, and itwill have a core prevalence during the next twenty years, so itshould be addressed as a priority in these two key decades. If theinertia of the past continues to be dragged (caring for childrenpredominantly) and the concerns about the future are added(focusing exclusively the issue of the elderly), we are at risk ofneglecting the situation of the young generations, with all theasynchronies that this has, visible in the social emergence of theyozung (demanding spaces that society does not give them, throughall sort of strategies) without public policies responding adequately.

Of course, the issue has different implications for each particularcountry, depending on how each of them is placed in the demographictransition as such. For that reason, and beyond not being able to makea detailed analysis of each national case, it is important to make somecomments taking groups of countries, differentiating the cases of"early modernization", from those of "late modernization" and the

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ones that are at "full transition" in an intermediate stage. The firstcategory clearly comprises the countries of the Southern Cone(Argentina, Uruguay and Chile) together with Costa Rica, Cuba and toa lesser degree, Panama. In this case, the demographic transition (incomparison with the other categories) is more advanced, and thechallenge of the elderly is more established, but in any case the issue ofthe younger generation is very relevant and will need to be addressedas a priority. In the intermediate category, we find the largest countriesin Latin America (Brazil, Mexico, Colombia) together with otherswhich are not less relevant (Venezuela and Peru, for example) and it isin them where the trends that we are underlining (the "demographicbonus") can be seen in a clearer and more categoric way. The contrastsbetween demographic trends and public policies are evident in all ofthem: while the young generations are emerging socially everywhere,public policies continue operating with the inertias of the past. Theresult is an unprecedented development of violence, with an evidentprotagonism of youth (in Colombia, as it is known, this is one of themain "occupation" of youths). Definitely, these countries will have toaddress these trends as a priority and with the greatest urgency if theywant to be up to the major challenges of the new century. Finally, in thecategory of countries with "late modernization" (Guatemala,Nicaragua, Honduras, Bolivia and Paraguay, among others) there, stillexist, very numerous groups of children, but the change in trend isbecoming significantly accelerated, due to the drop in birth andmortality rates and the consequent increase of life expectancy at birth.In these cases, the "demographic bonus" will come a bit later (ascompared to the rest) but will have an effective prevalence in thesecond and third decades of this new century. The advantage will lie,above all, on the relative delay in the increase of elderly populationgroups, that will only begin to be significant in the second half of thiscentury. For this reason, the priority of public policies should clearlyshift from early infancy towards adolescence and youth.

The theme we are analyzing poses two groups of relevantchallenges: one relating to public policies as such and the otherconnected with the actors that shall take the lead in these debates in theimmediate future. Regarding the substantive dimension, it seems clearthat the areas already mentioned (employment, crime, education,

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health, savings and pensions) must be analyzed at the light of thesechallenges. Clearly, it is not the same to analyze employment issuesfrom the rationale of business and trade union corporations than fromthe dynamics of incorporating young generations to our societies, andthe same could be said regarding health public policies (it is verydifferent to work to fight infantile mortality than to address riskbehaviors among the young). The same could be argued in connectionwith crime, since conditions change radically in an scenario wherelarge groups of excluded youths exist (or not) available to organizedcrime (drug trafficking, for example). Of course, the problem is notsolved with more and better opportunities of social integration foryouths, but it would significantly contribute in this respect. Likewise,the challenges change radically if in the area of education a shift ismade from the historical priority on basic education to focusing onsecondary education. And even in the case of the policies relating tosavings and pensions (one of the more relevant forms of savings) thescenarios are changing markedly, and with them, the public policies.The issue is undoubtedly very different if it is analyzed from the logicof the public structure (preoccupied with the chronical deficit ofpensions systems) or from the perspective of the pensioners andretirees (preoccupied with collecting decent pensions) or if it isanalyzed from the point of view of the new generations, that in mostof the countries in the region are being incorporated to new pensionsystems, with an uncertain future, loosing the "privileges" enjoyed bycurrent pensioners and increasing their contributive burden to reducethe deficit of the system, without anybody having thought through theconsequences that this has in terms of their social incorporation andthe processing of the necessary autonomy of the new generations.

On its side, the issue of "actors" is also relevant, to the extent thatorganized youths will not be those who will work on these issues(youth movements do not have corporatist positions as we havealready noted) and for this reason institutions specializing in youth(both public and private) are forced to assume representation roles(informally but very effectively) for the purpose of incorporating theseapproaches to the current debates. To that end, these issues need to berigorously analyzed,from the logic ofyouth, leaving behind the classiccorporatist or the particular political-institutional approaches.

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YOUTH. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND PUBLIC POLICES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

The Construction of the Knowledge Society

The second big opportunity for development in general and foryouth policies in particular, stems from the potential of the newinformation and communication technologies, and their decisiveinfluence in all dimensions of societal dynamics. As it is known, thesenew technologies imply innovations occurring simultaneously atvarious levels: microelectronics, computers (both hardware and

software), telecommunications and fiber optics (microprocessors,semiconductors, fiber optics). What is relevant is that theseinnovations are making it possible to process and store ever moreinformation and to distribute it with increasing speed, throughnetworks around the world. The specialists state that the capacity ofcomputers will double every 18 to 24 months (thanks to the rapidevolution of microprocessors) and that every 6 months the capacity ofcommunications will double (based on an explosion in bandwidth,sustained by advances in the technology of fiber optics networks).Both trends will, besides, take place in parallel with huge costreductions and significant increases in the speed and quantity ofinformation to be distributed.

Undoubtedly, the most evident symbol of all these trends is thedevelopment of the Internet, that has managed to interconnect millionof people in the most remote parts of the world in a few years, (in 1995the users were barely 20 million, and in 2000 there were already 400million, and it is forecasted that by 2005 they will be one billion). But,as it is also known, access to the Internet is distributed in a veryunequal manner (three fourths of the users are in highly industrializedcountries, members of the OCDE, that have only 14% of the worldpopulation). Thus, while in the United States, the users are 54% of thetotal population, in Latin America and the Caribbean they are only3.2%. The other divide exists within countries: the majority of theusers live in urban zones (80% of the users in the Dominican Republiclive in Santo Domingo), they are better educated and have more money(in Chile 89% has had higher education), are young (between the agesof 18 and 24 they are five times more likely to be users than those over25 years of age) and the majority are men (in Latin America, two thirds)

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although this divide is being reduced (in Brazil, women were one thirdin 1995 and by 2000, they were already half). But what is relevant isnot the dimension, but the practical implications of the subject, to theextent that the ICT are giving greater transparency to planning andtransactions, they increase political participation (both in terms offormulating proposals and in the development of citizen controlmechanisms), can be used to develop distance education verysignificantly, as well as remote medicine, telecommuting, etc. For allof this, the process underway opens important opportunities to be takenadvantage of, and generates new risks that will need to be controlled.

The technological progress index (TPI), developed by UNDPmakes it possible to determine in comparative terms at what stage ourcountries are, in this regard. In operating terms, the TPI is structuredbased on four key dimensions, measured around eight specificindicators: creation of technology (per capita number of patentsgranted and per capita income collected from abroad for the conceptof royalties and license fees), dissemination of recent innovations(dissemination of the Internet and exports of high and mediumtechnology products), dissemination of old inventions (telephones andelectricity), and specialized knowledge (years of schooling and grossrate of tertiary students enrolled in sciences, mathematics andengineering) and "attempts to reflect the extent to which a country iscreating and disseminating technology and building a foundation ofhuman knowledge, and therefore, its capacity to take part in thetechnological innovations of the Internet age" (UNDP, 2001).

The scale built by UNDP includes 72 countries, grouped in fourcategories: leaders, potential leaders, dynamic followers andmarginalized. The first one comprises 18 countries (all of them highlyindustrialized), while the second has 19; 26 are in the third one and 9more in the fourth (marginalized). At the top of the global list isFinland, followed in the ranking by the United States, Sweden, Japan,Korea, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia,Singapore, Germany, Norway, Ireland, Belgium, New Zealand,Austria, France and Israel. The list of the potential leaders starts withSpain, and the following spots are held by Italy, several countries ofEastern Europe (Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Eslovaquia,Bulgaria, Poland, Croatia and Rumania) other "Asian tigers" (Hong

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Kong, Malasia) and other European countries (Portugal, Greece,Cyprus). This category also comprises four Latin American countries(Mexico, Argentina, Costa Rica and Chile), while several others are inthe group of "dynamic followers", led by Uruguay. There is only oneLatin American country in the group of the marginalized (Nicaragua),but what is relevant is to note how the combinations of specificindicators are clearly different in each case. Thus, while Mexico andCosta Rica have important percentages of their exports in thetechnological field, Argentina and Chile are noteworthy for their highlevels of university enrollment in sciences (like Bolivia, Peru, Ecuadorand Dominican Republic within their group). Likewise, Uruguay isnoted by its number of Internet hosts and also for its wide telephonyand electricity coverage (in this last aspect, like Panama and Brazil).

Within the frameworks of these notes, it is convenient to return toan item remarked in passing in the previous pages, with the purpose oftaking adequate notice of the evident protagonic role of youth in theconstruction of the knowledge society. We refer to the over-representation of youths among Internet users, that also relates to theevident link existing between the enrollment in scientific highereducation (one of the indicators used for the construction of the TPI)and the dynamics of the highly qualified youths, that constitute ahuman capital of great relevance in our countries. If youths belong tohouseholds affected by acute scenarios of poverty and exclusion theymust be the target of public youth policies, from the angle of youths asbeneficiaries, while the highly qualified youths must be a target fromthe angle of youths as strategic actors of development. Clearly, theseyouths are the protagonists of the major research and developmentprocesses, while they are decisively collaborating in developing thenew tools in this area and are the protagonists of the dynamic use ofthe new information and communication technologies; the averageage of those working in such fields and incorporating these new toolsin their daily life clearly indicates it. Ultimately, it may be stated, withabsolute certainty and conviction, that we are in the presence of a truerevolution at all levels, significantly different from the development ofminor changes associated to post modernity and this revolution hasyouths around the world as its clear protagonists. In the end, it is aboutthe new tools that within the framework of glocalization (globalization

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and local development simultaneously) make it possible to bring theworld to any individual or human group, anywhere in the world and atany time. The very concepts of space and time change radically, indimensions that it is still very difficult to imagine effectively, so thatwe stand before a true epochal mutation, even more relevant than theindustrial revolution in its time.

The realms in which it would be possible to analyze thesechange trends are infinite, but what is important here is to return tothose relating to education (defined in a very broad sense), given theangle with which this report is structured. And in that sense, westand before the opportunity of radically reformulating everythingthat has until the present been done with the so called distanceeducation, for example. Although it has existed in our countries fordecades, with the incorporation of the new information andcommunication technologies it has acquired an unheard-ofrelevance that was not imagined by its original promoters(Several authors, 2000c). Clearly, this is one of the most relevantspheres of development, and for that reason, the major internationalorganizations, governments, business, families and individuals,around the world, are investing more and more resources indeveloping individual, group and institutional capacities in theseareas, to avoid being left on the sides of these strong change trends.Universal access and a dynamic and innovative use of these newtools are the main challenges and in the realm of public youthpolicies (as in many others) no relevant steps have yet been taken.

Public Youth Policies andState Reform: a Link that Remains to be Constructed

The third big process in terms of challenges and opportunities, atthis beginning of a new century and millennium, relates to the reformof the State that is currently underway. Many structural reformsundertaken in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 90's were drivenunder the umbrella of the Washington Consensus and were mainlyfocused on matters of fiscal discipline, liberalization of trade policy

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and investment regimes, deregulation of domestic markets andprivatization of utilities. But, as stated in a World Bank report "theWashington Consensus policy dictums ignore the function theinstitutional changes could play in accelerating economic and socialdevelopment in the region" (World Bank, 1998). In essence, theregion's priorities during the debt crisis of the 80's were centered on thesearch for economic stability and in pulling apart the scaffoldings ofthe protectionist development model. However, a new opportunity forchange arises at present, based on the fact that the sustainability ofeconomic reforms is conditioned by institutional reforms.Organizations such as the World Bank foster and provide financialsupport to the so-called "second generation reforms", including thereform of the judiciary, parliaments and the public administration.They further posit that the transformation should, above all, change thesystem of incentives and strictures on which bureaucrats andpoliticians operate. Within this framework, the concerns relating todemocratic governance become consolidated and an attempt is madeto apply various instruments to achieve a more active participation ofcivil society in development processes, trying to expand theprotagonism of the "non-State public sector" (Bresser Pereyra andCunill Grau Ed., 1998).

As for the first dimension, the priorities refer to modernizingpolitical parties and electoral systems, for representation and popularparticipation, and they try to incorporate citizens' perception more andbetter in the dynamics of the democratic strengthening processes inwhich almost all the countries in the region are immersed. And withregards to the participation of civil society, the mechanisms that arebeing put in practice focus on two fundamental roles: servicedelivery and interest representation. In the sphere of social policies,the demonopolization of utilities is thought of as an alternative toprivatization (the "publicization") and the representation of interestsis linked to the development of social control mechanisms forpolicies or participation in their design, such as the experiences of"participatory budgeting" in Brazil, that Porto Alegre pioneeredmore than ten years ago.

In the narrower sphere of public youth policies, the distribution ofroles and functions may be thought of as the main response to the lack

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of articulation of institutional efforts, approached on the basis ofstructuring efficient institutional systems. At the central level, theyouth institutes, general directorates or ministries should devote muchof their efforts to understanding the issues affecting youth and to asystematic tracking down of the dynamics of public policies targetedat them. Similarly, they could play a decisive role as facilitators of thearticulation and shared work of several public institutions. They couldalso provide information and counseling to youths to contribute totheir fluid insertion in society, and work in training human resourcesat all levels, homogenizing strategies and approaches. In order toperform these tasks it is necessary to carry out studies and researchsystematically, do a continuous evaluation of the public policieslinked to the issue, and of course, have suitable human resources. Inturn, the State, Provincial and Municipal counterparts of the youthinstitutes, directorates and secretariats should devote themselves toexecuting programs and projects, carefully avoiding competition withother execution instances at their same level (the education or healthdirectorates in the subnational administrative divisions) with whichthey should cooperate in the broadest possible way, also articulatingtheir work with the national levels.

How can this intermediation role be defined? One way of doingit is by promoting youth participation, which requires assuming theidea that youths are strategic actors of development and not merelybeneficiaries of policies, for example, as development volunteers, aswe will see later. It is also possible to think of mechanisms for thevarious youth groups and movements to express criticisms, proposalsand points of view on all those issues of their interest so that, with thenecessary support, they may implement the initiatives considered apriority. But it is necessary to avoid the risk of incurring in extremesthat can be negative such as manipulation by the State or theirresponsible promotion of opposition actions. In any case, it isessential to accept that youth movements are ephemeral in theirexistence, extremely changing in terms of interests and expectations,"lacking discipline" (seen from the outside) and, above all, reluctant toreceiving external directives, specially when they are perceived asauthoritarian. On the other hand, the ministries, secretariats andgeneral directorates, as agencies responsible for the execution of

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sectorial policies -on education, health, employment and others-should have specialized technical teams on youth issues, capable oflooking at their activities from the viewpoint of their target and opento working with a modem and appropriate mentality. And to completethis rapid "overview" of spaces and institutions existing in the realmof youth promotion, it is also important to consider another sphere towhich little attention is paid in this type of analysis: the locus for youthsocialization and meetings. If there is one place where public policiesdesigned for youth effectively operate it is there, but the operationaldynamics are only exceptionally analyzed, many times they are loadedwith serious "perversions" to be addressed (for example, in the lastfew years Youth Houses have multiplied throughout the region, withvery relative success).

But, how can these efforts that are so autonomous be effectivelybrought together? How to attain pertinent results from such logic?What mechanisms would prevent the problems that arise when tryingto coordinate actions between diverse institutions? The answersshould be sought in operational management, deciphering the keysand designing alternative mechanisms in those cases where it ispertinent. One of the keys refers to the financing of public policies, asphere in which it is necessary to recognize the importance both ofseparating financing from execution and of the diverse ways ofallocating resources. In connection with the separation betweenfinancing and execution, the rationale seems categorical: if the sameparty finances and executes, there are no objective mechanisms todetermine if what is being done is good and if the strategic andmethodological paths chosen to operate are the best. Therefore, it isfundamental to split both functions and operate on the basis of tendersthat foster the broadest competition and the most effectivetransparency. Actually, in no case is it possible to be certain that thechosen path is the only (and the best of those possible) to address anyproblem so it is pertinent to convene various actors, inviting them tosubmit diverse proposals to resolve the issues to be addressed.Likewise, if instead of financing the institutions (the service supply)the management of the resources was given to the beneficiaries (thedemand) better tools would be available to avoid the "routinization" ofprograms and the bureaucratization of the institutions charged with

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operating them. Additionally, it is essential to separate financing andexecution from the evaluation function, that needs to be performed bya third institutional agent. When the evaluation is done by the samefinancing agency, it will always have the last word and the party incharge of execution will not be able to operate with autonomy andindependence, a situation that defines a de facto monopoly, even ifthere is a separation between roles and functions. All of the aboveseems to make clear that these proposals contain measures directlyoriented towards decentralization, but it is important to note that theyare intended to go beyond the mechanisms that have been put in placeuntil now and that have presented very evident limitations andproblems. Decentralization pure and simple does not bring aboutbetter living conditions for the population at the local level, and manytimes, it contributes to worsening territorial inequalities (as has beenthe case in the sphere of education and health, in various national casesin the last few years) and towards the development of negativeautarchic trends (some national processes have been paradigmatic inthis sense). Therefore, it is advisable for decentralization to beaccompanied by a true agreed distribution of roles and functionsamong central, intermediate and local levels.

Finally, if everything said so far is adjusted to the cross-cuttingcondition that youth policies share with those referring to otherspecific groups in the population-children, women, ethnic groups,the elderly, migrants and others, such changes in the specificmanagement could have extremely relevant impacts to modernizepublic management as a whole, since they would become a locus toaccumulate experiences of simultaneous and coordinated work inseveral specific spheres. Youth policies could complement the limitedvision of specific sectorial policies, such as educational policies -thata focus exclusively on teaching (and neglect the effective learning)-or employment policies, that a focus exclusively on the head ofhousehold (the typical adult male integrated into the formal sector ofthe economy), neglecting the situation of women and youths (thosemost severely affected by unemployment and precarious employment)-or health, that focuses on addressing the disease instead of healthimprovement and prevention. This type of approach will contribute tothe formulation of more realistic public policies, supported on a

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socio- demographic segment that is so necessary to ensure that theactions are pertinent and enforceable. Thus, public youth policies-as those referring to childhood and the elderly- could follow strategicapproaches similar to the programs of equal opportunity for women,which managed to articulate -through facts and in the face of largeinstitutional and political resistances- sectorial programs that hadnever been addressed head on.

Within this framework, having a clear generational perspectiveof public policies might be essential, attempting to dynamicallyarticulate the various phases of people's life cycle (childhood,youth, adulthood, old age) for the purpose of responding withspecific policies that are part of an articulated array of generalpublic policies. The experience of the National Population Councilof Mexico, the National Population and Development Commissionof Brazil and the Secretariat of Generational and Family Affairs ofthe Ministry of Human Development of Bolivia, can makesubstantial contributions in these areas, and need to be evaluated incomparative terms with greater rigour, for the purpose of extractingthe corresponding lessons and be in a position to replicate theseapproaches in other countries of the region.

In this line of action, it may be essential to count with technicaland operating skills for a rigorous analysis of the approaches thatshould be applied in each and everyone of the public policies from thisgenerational perspective, while it could also be extremely productiveto be able to take a position from the perspective of youth in the majornational debates, something that could be extremely productive inareas such as labor reform and pension systems, that in no case areneutral for the youths in the region, and however, are almost neverprocessed taking into account that type of angle. Thus, temporarywork may, for example, be looked upon critically by the tradeunions (with an adult logic), but could have a more favorableevaluation when looked upon from non corporatist positions (with ayouth logic) and even with a logic more dynamically related to thechallenges of the future (derived from the internationalization of theeconomy) than linked to the privileges of the past (built under theumbrella of protectionist and clientelistic systems within theframework of closed economies).

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Financing Public Youth Policies

A few other challenges, more specifically centered on thecomplex issue of financing should be added to the challenges we haveidentified so far. Here we intend to estimate the magnitude of thenecessary investment, rank the priority areas in which futureinvestments should be made, propose the reformulation of theoperating strategies with which said investment should effectively beutilized and warn about the consequences that may be derived fromnot carrying out the necessary investment in a timely manner and inthe spheres prioritized on the basis of a social and political consensus.

Starting with the dimension of the necessary investment, it isnecessary to point out that we face the need of substantiallyexpanding the level of public spending dedicated to youth untilnow. For the reasons presented above, it is not possible to attemptto construct the knowledge society with the current levels ofinvestment in the new generations, as compared to what is investedin the elderly, to give an example. Such relationship should bereviewed from every point of view, in an attempt to structure betterbalances in this respect, at least if the aim is to build more prosperousand equitable societies. This is very simple to enunciate, but at thesame time very difficult to bring about. Extremely powerfulinterests will operate in the opposite sense, trying to prevent suchchanges from occurring. For that reason, it will be necessary to actin a realistic manner, trying to link the improvements in the level ofpublic spending allocated to the new generations with improvementsin economic performance. This is particularly evident with respect tothe priority spheres, approached from the angle of the futurechallenges: education, knowledge, science and technology.

To bring about such changes, it will be essential to arrive atpolitical and parliamentary agreements that provide feasibility andstability through time. From this point of view, these orientationsshould cut across the competitive logic with which political partiesoperate, attempting to develop a consensus as broad and solid aspossible. But such agreements will not be enough. It will be necessaryto add to them the support of society as a whole, for which purpose,

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public policies may employ specific incentives, demonstrating theadvantages of a greater democratization in the access to goods andservices between generations. This can be done in different spheres,in the field of labor and in the area relating to access to housing andin connection with formal and informal education as well asspecifically centered on aspects linked to recreation, sports andculture, or in connection with the media. In any case, what isimportant is to create awareness about the close relation that existsbetween youth investment and development, based on thearguments that we have presented above.

Increasing investment in youth is, therefore, a fundamentalcondition. But, a second initiative of great relevance will need to beadded to the former: prioritizing those areas in which the increasedinvestment will be focused going forward. From the basis of thelogical framework within which these notes are structured, suchpriorities should be clearly set around access to services (education,health and employment) going back to the notion presented aboveregarding the need for support from society as a whole (a process inwhich public policies can cooperate). Concretely, it would benecessary to count with a greater inclination by business to hiringyoung personnel, while it would also be essential to incentivate thelabor incorporation of youths within the context of familydynamics, through modalities that allow them to continue studying.To this end, public policies could generate specific legal and taxincentives, promoting temporary and part time jobs, exemptingcompanies from paying certain taxes to be identified in eachconcrete case (for example). In this way, youths would dispose oftheir own income (with all the implications that this has in terms ofautonomy and greater self esteem).

In the same line, it would be essential to provide greaterfacilities for young couples who are trying to start their householdsto have access to their own housing. Thus, the process would befacilitated at the most critical time of our society's biological andsocial reproduction, and also at this level public policies canprovide specific incentives, in this case, starting from setting longerterms for the repayment of the corresponding loans (if there issomething that youths have in their favor is more years of life ahead

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to pay back their debts) including differential grace periods inaccordance with particular needs. The same could be done in thefield of health, confronting the perverse logic that states that, sinceyouths fall sick less than children and adults, there is no reason forthem to be a priority from the point of view of the allocation ofresources devoted to the population's sanitary care. From this pointof view, the development of preventive programs should beincentivated, to save future resources by addressing already existingproblems (an advertising campaign or the development of specificinformation programs are infinitely less expensive than direct carefor cases linked with drug consumption, HIV AIDS or attemptedsuicides, for example). Of course, within the same line, it would beindispensable to expand and improve education investment. In thiscase, public policies can incentivate technical orientations (todecongest universities) while prioritizing secondary education (overand above higher education) and develop broad scholarshipprograms for students belonging to low income households, whoare competing in very unequal terms with the more advantaged(who should be charged for the services they receive) compensatingfor the existing inequities. Defending "free" education, based onequalitarian arguments actually conceals a defense of the privilegesof middle and upper class youths in an evident manner.

A third dimension that would need to be substantiallyreformulated is that connected with the modes of utilization ofresources that have prevailed so far. From this point of view, it isimportant to go back to the remarks made above in connection withfinancing the supply and/or the demand of the services targeted atthe new generations. From this viewpoint, the "voucher" systemshould be promoted forcefully and decisively, since the decisionpower on how to use resources is transfered to the end usersthemselves, at the expense of the power of the institutions thatprovide such services. This is particularly relevant in the field ofeducation. Continuing to finance service supply (budgetary itemsallocated to the various branches of education and from them to thedifferent educational institutions) will continue incentivatingmonopoly practices which impoverish the services provided. Sincethey have no competition, there 7re no incentives to try and develop

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ever more pertinent responses at the lowest possible costs. In thiscontext, it makes no sense to question whether what is being doneis well done or could be improved, or if more or less could be donewith the available resources. The "voucher" shifts the decision ofwhere to invest resources to the user, and in this way, the institutionrendering the service will have to demonstrate that it is the best inits area (for the purpose of getting "customers") and do it well (toprevent their customers going with their voucher to anotherinstitution). The same is applicable to any other service.

However, the experiences so far have faced several relevantproblems, so it will be essential to organize such systems trying toavoid those problems. Among the major ones is the trend to wideningthe differences between regions and social groups. For this purpose itis essential to employ active compensation mechanisms, promoted bythe public policies themselves. In the same line, problems have beenfaced linked with the reformulation of the dynamics of supply, inwhich framework the more powerful institutions are in a position todominate the market that opens up. Also in this case, it will benecessary to deploy compensation mechanisms, to support theinstitutions with less relative power, enabling them to compete withthe more structured ones. Finally, the same is true in those cases inwhich markets are opened up, but there are no institutions to take overthe operation of the corresponding programs. Also in this situation,public policies should be active, promoting the setting up of specificinstitutions (for example, as was the case in the field of job training).We are talking, in global terms, of driving demand financing, whilesimultaneously supporting the supply to avoid negative distortions andat the same time provide for the best conditions for the reformulatedservices to be rendered from the point of view of management. Thiswill make it possible to combat the problems that are generated withinbureaucratic and monopolic schemes, while avoiding the emergenceof new problems in these regards. And for all of this to operateadequately, the State should also have efficient regulations andcontrol tools, designed to avoid the replacement of public monopolieswith private monopolies and the degradation of the services beingdemonopolized as a consequence of the irresponsibility of thecompanies or the institutions that benefit within that framework.

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Finally, it is convenient to go one step further and include somereflections on what would happen if the changes we are proposing arenot introduced. And, in this respect, it is important to underscore atleast two types of relevant costs: those that would be derived from notbuilding the knowledge society and those resulting from neglectingyouths who would then fall into different types of problem behaviors,censured by the adult world. In connection with this last dimension, itis evident that if the coordinates with which the investment of resourcesin the area of youth public policies are not changed, the costs will behuge. Studies conducted in the United States clearly demonstrate thatthe costs of maintaining a criminal in jail are infinitely higher than thoseinvolved in probation and social reinsertion programs. Likewise, it isevident that it is infinitely less expensive to finance spaces for anadequate use of their leisure time by youths, that any ex-post programdesigned to address the consequences of developing "problembehaviors": drug abuse, juvenile violence, reckless driving, attemptedsuicide, early pregnancy, etc. On its part, in the area having to do withthe first of the dimensions described, the evidence indicates that severalof the major challenges to be addressed in connection with theconstruction of the knowledge society are not resolvable without theparticipation of the younger generations, so that, if their participation isnot promoted, the expected impacts will not be obtained.

Through a different route then, we arrve at the same type ofconclusions and effects. And what is most relevant is that, in bothcases, it is society as a whole that loses out. The resources targeted ataddressing the various problem behaviors censured by the adult worldwill have to be pulled out from other priority spheres, so that otherprograms and services will suffer. On the other hand, the lack ofsubstantial progress in the field of constructing the knowledge societywill widen the existing divides between our countries and highlyindustrialized one, which will count with more and better instrumentsto perpetuate their domination of the most backward ones, and in ourcase, we will be depriving ourselves from having modem tools toaddress the many extremely complex problems that we face. In theend, we stand before the eternal dilemma: whether to invest in theshort term, solving problems momentarily, or invest in the mediumand long term, based on explicit and agreed strategic choices, within

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the framework of robust "fiscal covenants" that can bear the test ofelectoral evaluation (if all the players are committed, none will paycosts). The issue is extremely complex in itself, but much more insituations of crisis as those faced in almost all of Latin America atpresent, but that only reaffirms the pertinence of the approach that weare proposing, and the urgency of trying out alternative mechanisms asthe ones described here.

A GENERATIONAL APPROACHTO PUBLIC POLICIES

Finally, it is important to present some alternative proposals,describing the foundations and basic criteria to be taken into account,together with the main substantive priorities to be addressed, analyzingthe potential of youth volunteering in the combat against poverty andthe regional cooperation that could be deployed in the future.

Basic Criteria and Foundations for the Designof Alternative Policies

The model centered on education and leisure time,characterized in the first part, is an adult, conservative andfunctionalist approach, in the strictest sense of the three terms, tothe extent that the existing society is taken for granted, and thespecific objective defined in connection with the young generationsis their future integration into such society, to ensure thereproduction of that society through time and space. This approach,furthermore, operated with certain fluidity in the framework ofexpansive and dynamic economies that ensured a certain degree of"upwards social mobility" specially for those youths who were"integrated", while showing severe limitations to respond to theissues of the "excluded" youths, specially during times of crisis.For that reason it was only partially successful and within theframework of certain concrete circumstances, difficult to sustain intime, as the experience of the last decades has demonstrated.

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In any case, the world has changed radically in the last decadesand in the new international context a growing importance isattached to the development of human resources that are fit toprocess the changes that need to be promoted. It is about havinghighly skilled workers, modern and dynamic entrepreneurs,responsible and active citizens, and pertinent strategies for the bestutilization of those "human resources" in the search for economicgrowth, social equity and democratic consolidation, implementingnew development strategies. In this context, in the area of youthpolicies, it no longer makes sense to design "conservative" responses(because now change is pursued) and "functional" (because what isnow desired is to transform the existing rules of the game); so itmakes no sense to design policies intended to incorporate the newgenerations into a process of "reproduction" of the prevailingsociety. Now, it is about designing policies that make it possible toincorporate the new generations into the process of changes that weare trying to promote. For that reason, it is necessary to designprograms that attempt to prepare youths in the best possible way tobe the protagonists of said changes. And, if this is so, it makes nosense to continue imagining policies and programs where youths aresimply receiving objects; it is essential to promote the involvementof youths as protagonists, holders of rights and strategic actors ofdevelopment. And why youths? Because they are infinitely betterprepared than the adults to deal with the new technologies becausethey are tied to nothing in the framework of the currently existingsociety and because they are more and better willing to worktowards the transformation of the prevailing "rules of the game".For that reason, the future youth policies should be structured witha strong emphasis in the present of youths as protagonists and notcentered in their preparation for the performance of adult roles inthe future.

There are ten core criteria: (1) public policies should look uponyouths from a double perspective: as the target of services and asstrategic actors of development, participating as protagonists in themodernization of their countries; (2) they should operate on thebasis of an authentic and broad partnering of efforts among all theactors involved with their effective dynamics, leaving aside efforts

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that are isolated and exclusive of one another; (3) they shouldoperate on the basis of strengthening the existing institutionalnetworks and/or creating others where they do not exist,putting in practice the above consensus; (4) they shouldoperate on the basis of a profound and extended territorial andinstitutional decentralization, prioritizing the local level; (5) theyshould adequately respond to the heterogeneity of the existingyouth groups, rigorously targeting differential actions in response tothe existing particularities; (6) they should promote the widest andmost active involvement of youths in their design, implementationand effective evaluation; (7) they should clearly have a genderperspective, providing equal opportunities and possibilities to menand women; (8) they should make a deliberate effort to sensitizedecision makers and public opinion in general, showing juvenileexclusion as a handicap for society as a whole; (9) they should alsodevelop deliberate efforts to learn collectively from the work of all,fostering comparative evaluations, the exchange of experiences andthe horizontal training of human resources; and (10) it is necessaryto define accurately and on a consensus basis an effectivedistribution of roles and functions among the various institutionalactors involved, for the purpose of avoiding overlapping efforts inconflict while leaving areas uncovered.

As a result of the above, it is underlined that public policies asa whole should include a generational perspective, decisivelyovercoming the restrictive approach that has prevailed so far(sectorial, monopolic, centralized, etc.) thus avoiding falling intoexclusive spaces and programs for adolescents and youths as untilnow, and try to include these particular issues in the best possibleway into each and every one of the public policies, emulating thegender perspective adopted by women, which has had more andbetter results from every point of view, in most countries.

What type of implications can this alternative approach have?First of all, it is necessary to have population policies that not onlytake care of the main sectorial dimensions in this respect (fertility,migration, mortality, etc.), but that, besides and fundamentallyprovide a dynamic articulation between the different phases inpeople's life cycle (childhood, youth, adulthood, old age) to be able

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to respond with specific policies that are part of a coordinated set ofgeneral public policies. From this point of view, it is essential toattack the inter-generational inequalities, which are very significantin almost all the countries of the region. This is clearly evidencedwhen analyzing the region's poverty levels, breaking down thetypes of family composition and stages in the life cycle in whichthey are. In Brazil, for example, poverty in unipersonal householdsis 4.9%, while in the case of families with children under 12 andbetween 13 and 18 years of age it stands at 49%, which is also thecase in Mexico, where the respective figures are 2.8% and 37.7%(in the case of families with adolescent children) and in Colombia,while poverty in unipersonal households is 6.6%, in the cases offamilies with children under 12 it is 51% and in households withadolescent children it is 52.5%, according to ECLAC's SocialPanorama of Latin America. Secondly, a rigorous analysis shouldbe made of the approaches required to work in each and everyone ofthe public policies in connection with adolescents and youths, tryingto achieve the largest and best impacts in each particular case. Fromthis angle, secondary education institutions -for example- are notonly the natural environment to develop the corresponding learning,but besides and above all, privileged environments of adolescent andjuvenile socialization, in which a good share of the students spendmost of their productive time (apart from that devoted to rest andleisure) and where they are prepared to undertake adult roles asworkers and citizens.

Four Substantive Priorities for this FirstDecade of the Century

As it is known, the investment in human resources is a coreelement in the process of sustained economic growth and theattainment of social welfare, both because of the growing returns onproductivity levels and as a result of the externalities associated totheir improved attributes. The two key factors for an appropriatedevelopment of human resources are education and health.

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Recognizing the well-known difficulties that the new generationsface both in the sphere of health and in the sphere of education,while, at the same time, taking into the account the significantrelevance that youths have, in their capacity as skilled and healthyhuman resources for the implementation of development strategies,it is obvious that in the field of youth public policies these two areasshould be emphasized.

In connection with education, it seems clear that the priorities willbe different for each country; but, in general, there are four majorchallenges: (i) extending universal access to basic and speciallysecondary education, (ii) ensuring adequate school performance andquality standards, tackling forcefully the problems of school drop-outsand learning, (iii) substantially improving equity among the varioussocial groups in an attempt to slow down and, eventually revert theprocesses of educational segmentation, and (iv) expand kindergarten tothe four and five-year old population with the double purpose ofcompensating for the deficit in socialization capacity of the lowerincome households and facilitating the entry of young mothers to thelabor market. For all of this to be possible, it will be necessary toexpand and deepen the educational reform processes that are currentlyunderway, modernizing the management and involving the actors thatare not yet actively participating in the process (parents, communitiesand fundamentally students) giving them the voice that they still lackand promoting their empowerment. A key aspect to be emphasized inthis sense relates to the evident divorce that exists between the juvenileculture and school culture, spheres that will have to be betterarticulated in the future, building bridges and promoting mutualdialogue (teachers should learn more about youth culture and studentsshould understand better the logic of school culture). In the area ofhealth, the priorities will also vary on a country-basis and even withinthem, but there are at least another three major challenges: (i) adequateand timely focus on sexual and reproductive health, with specialpriority to the issue of early teenage pregnancies and sexuallytransmitted diseases, (ii) timely detection and treatment of the mainrisk behaviors, with special emphasis on those connected with caraccidents, the abuse of legal and illicit drugs and the development ofactivities linked with different forms of violence, and (iii) promoting

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healthy lifestyles, by fostering all sorts of recreational, cultural andsports activities in healthy environments for socialization, growth andpersonal and social maturation of the target population, developing theresilience factors that exists in youngsters of both genders.

The second priority should focus on the labor insertion ofyouths, which is the key to break the exclusion that affects them andto make them less vulnerable. Since the problems are very diverse,different measures are required, adjusted to the particularities ofeach of the priority youth groups, and since the causes that explainthese problems are not homogeneous either, specific strategies arerequired in each case.

A first major response will have to continue being job training,linked to the development of the first work experiences. In this way,a response will be provided to two of the main reasons for youthunemployment: lack of experience and lack of training. The countriesthat already have large scale programs in these areas will face thechallenge of perfecting their operating strategies, correcting thedefects detected within the framework of the past experiences, andexpanding their scope, to be able to obtain in the future greater andbetter impacts on their beneficiaries. In the case of those countrieswhich do not yet have this type of programs (the majority) thechallenge is to design them and implement them. The essence of thistype of program initiatives is still completely valid. Therefore, it isnecessary to continue emphasizing strongly the targeting strategy (onthe most vulnerable youth sectors), the decentralized mode of operation(giving a primary role to the municipalities), through non monopolystrategies (with the cooperation of the widest range of traininginstitutions, public and private) in support of integrated proposals(training, internships and support to enter the job market) developedthrough market agreements (between training institutions andbusiness, fundamentally) and backed up with demanding monitoringand evaluation mechanisms.

But it is necessary to take into account that training does notgenerate jobs. Therefore, it is essential to implement initiatives linkedto the generation of jobs, specially self-employment, given theexisting difficulties to create employment. The road continues beingthat of fostering micro and small butsiness, but without idealizations

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and with a clear economic approach, with any social or cultural goalssubordinated to the former. Subsistence micro ventures (linked to theinformal sector) can assist in combating poverty and promoting thesocial integration of youths, provided they are efficient and integratedinto wider and more comprehensive programs to fight poverty,because it is essential to avoid the poverty reproduction circuits thathave plagued many experiences of this type in Latin America.Development micro ventures (incorporated into the formal sector ofthe economy), on their part, can have extremely dynamic roles in theeconomies of the region, provided they locate the niches in which theycan grow, by implementing -for example- the Spanish approach ofthe new employment repositories.

A third major priority should focus on the perverse link betweenyouth and violence. Naturally, the specific contexts in which juvenileviolence is effectively deployed are very different, and for thatreason, the measures to be taken should also be different. In thosecases in which the issue has acquired significant dimensions andoverwhelming characteristics such as in Colombia, the prioritiesshould center on unlearning violence among youths already linked tothe phenomenon, together with the development of a peace culturebased on educational and preventive activities at all levels, while inthose countries in which the phenomenon is still restricted to somespecific spheres as in Uruguay, the priorities should very speciallyfocus on preventive measures (without discarding the treatment of theexisting cases, improving and modernizing the establishedarrangements). The Urban Security Programs put in practice in bothcountries in the last years are setting a course to be emulated in thefuture by many other countries. They work simultaneously in theretraining of the police, the attack on domestic violence (whichgenerates the conditions for violence to be later used in any otherenvironment), the implementation of disarmament measures andunlearning of violence, the promotion of alternative mechanisms forconflict resolution (for example, social mediation), the modernizationof justice (to break the image of partiality and impunity that prevailsin several national cases), the supply of peaceful alternatives foryouth socialization (youth houses and clubs, for example) andimproving the way in which the media deal with the issue.

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It is not necessary to recall that purely repressive methods are notefficient (in fact, the number of inmates is constantly increasing whileurban insecurity increases much faster, for example) but it is not idleto insist once again that, besides, these are the most expensivemethods; for that reason, designing and implementing this type ofalternative programs is much more feasible from the point of view ofthe necessary investment of resources, and fosters the hope of beingable to obtain better outcomes for the beneficiaries. Similarly, anotherkey is the permanence and credibility of the institutions operating inthese areas. For example, in the case of youth gangs, an importantfunction of the institutions that address the problem is enforcing andsupporting any non aggression agreements that may be reached withthe parties in conflict, since if that is not the case, it will not be possibleto uphold these measures due to lack of credibility.

Fourthly, it should be recalled that juvenile exclusion also exists atthe level of citizen's participation, and therefore it needs to beaddressed by promoting new channels and more effective andattractive instances for the development of these rights. The reasonsare many and varied, but, fundamentally, it is a privileged way topromote the democratic consolidation of the various countries of theregion; for that reason the responsibility should be shared by manydiverse actors. Of course, one of the most relevant dimensions is theone linked with the political participation of youth, that can and mustbe promoted simultaneously in several dimensions. In terms ofelectoral participation, the central issue is the devaluated credibility ofpolitical parties and leaders, that will have to be addressed bymodernizing the traditional political practices. But besides, in parallel,it would be possible to promote some initiatives linked to civicdevelopment in formal and informal education with a protagonicparticipation by youths themselves. An effective support by themedia, creating spaces for youths to voice their opinions and discusscurrent issues could be helpful.

But the political participation of youths cannot be restricted to theelectoral field. In parallel, it would be possible to instrument otherspecific and concrete measures among which, because of theenthusiasm they generate, are those linked with the creation of Youthparliaments, in the style of those existing in Chile and Paraguay

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(among others). In the same line, the creation of consultative instancesat a community and municipal level, based on priorities for actionand/or the design and reformulation of plans and programs, couldallow for the development of experiences that can become graduallyconsolidated. In any case, the key is for youths not to feel manipulatedand at the same time, to perceive that their involvement makes senseand plays a role in decision-making. In parallel, participation can befostered by creating or modernizing specific roles and institutions ororganizations to work actively in these fields. In the area of students,for example, it seems clear that it is essential to revitalize (bymodernizing) their participation in university co-government, whichhas fallen on bureaucratic and excessively politized practices, leavingthe bulk of students estranged. In secondary school, in turn, someinnovative experiences, as that of the student representatives ofColombia, are very promising.

Reviewing the operating schemes of youth organizations andmovements is a different chapter. Although the creation of Nationaland Local Youth Councils, bringing together the existing organizationsand movements and granting them powers to represent interests beforethe public powers and other civil society organizations seems to be anextremely productive alternative, extreme care should be taken toavoid clientelistic practices and the various forms of manipulationwhich always appear in this type of processes, the same as thetendencies in certain youth sectors of monopolizing an exclusiverole in these issues, "privatizing" participation spaces that should, bydefinition, be broad and plural.

Youth Volunteering, Citizen's participation andHuman Development

But the substantive priorities should not be restricted to areas inwhich youth are seen as beneficiaries of public policies. Besidesand fundamentally, they should look at youths as strategic actors ofdevelopment and, in that sense, youth volunteering is a clearpriority. It is necessary to take firm strides in this area, promotingit as a core axis of youth public policies and development strategies

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themselves. Thus, there should be large scale youth participation inthe programs against poverty, literacy campaigns, care of parks,construction of infrastructure or defense of the environment, toname just a few of the initiatives that could be carried out. Thisvolunteer work could have several simultaneous effects that wouldfeedback in a positive way, provide experiences that would helpyouth mature and learn more about their respective environments,and clearly provide visible contributions both to the developmentof their communities and the country. Besides stimulating theconsolidation of participation with a meaning valued by youths,such initiatives would oppose the existing social stigmas, centeredon the widely disseminated image of problem vouths.

In summary, it is evident that youth volunteering programs are anambitious initiative with a great potential for youths and for society asa whole. It is a viable initiative since it can be based on activities thatare already being carried out in several countries of the region, and themultiple examples of youths participation in response to naturalcatastrophes (floods, volcano eruptions, hurricanes, earthquakes) inCentral America, Chile and Venezuela are concrete experiences thatmerit consideration, as is the generous youth contribution to thedefense of the environment in cases of oil spills, forest fires and otheraccidents that have ocurred in a large scale in the last few years.Therefore, youth volunteering may become an excellent option totransform collective suffering into solidarity and mutual support. Theycan also help to show communities that it is possible to improve thequality of life by developing practices in which everybody should andcan be involved in a creative and protagonic way, here and now,through proactive approaches, overcoming the limitations of purelyreactive practices (claiming for others to take action) always thinkingon the basis of medium and long term structural perspectives, as seenfrom the interest of society as a whole and not only or mainly from thelogic of particular corporatist groups who always put their particularinterests before the interests of society.

Within the framework of this type of initiatives, severalconcominant problems could be addressed. For example,conscientious objectors to mandatory military service, that althougha complex issue, is a subject for analysis and debate in almost all the

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countries of the region. It is also possible to review the universityextension programs that operate in several countries of the regionunder the form of "internships". Many of these programs are beingrun in a bureaucratic routine way which satisfy none of theintervening parts, but this practice could be revitalized throughyouth volunteering.

In connection with the development of civil service substitutingfor mandatory military service, by decisively assuming theobjection that according to the legislation existing in each countryyouths may have several problems could be addressed. From thepoint of view of the mandatory military service, many modificationshave already been incorporated. From its pure and simpleelimination as in the case of Argentina (placing this country in thegroup of those that do not have mandatory military service like CostaRica and Uruguay), to countries that have made it non mandatory (asHonduras) or have legislated on conscientious objection but havenot yet regulated it (as Paraguay). In this context, the civil servicesubstitute (mandatory or voluntary) could avoid extremely seriousproblems of military service (such as repeated cases of death ofyoung recruits in always complex circumstances) giving those whodo not wish to participate an acceptable alternative that retains itspositive aspects (in several cases, military service has become anopportunity for education and social recognition for young peasantsectors, for example).

On its part, in the area of renovating and redimensioning universityextension services, it is clear that on the basis of volunteers relevantreforms could be devised, that would greatly leverage these practices.As it is known, they exist in almost all the countries of the region,specially in large national universities, but with very few effectiveimpacts, to the extent that students look upon them as one morecurricular obligation and the institutions that receive them as internsuse them in unimportant tasks. With a renewed approach, bothparties could be better prepared and the experiences could beframed within the context of major public policies, so internshipscould then be implemented with greater pertinence, achieving betterand greater effective impacts. The same could be said of severalexisting forms of voluntary work (voluntary firemen, for example)

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which are not recognized by public policies and have few incentivesfor effective development. With renewed approaches, betterrecognition could be provided to make these initiatives moreattractive and expand their effective range, integrating them moreclearly within the operation of public policies.

But, in connection with what type of schemes could theseefforts be deployed? For many reasons, the fight against povertycould be a priority scenario, since, as it is known, at this beginningof a new decade, century and millennium, poverty continues beingthe region's major problem and in this context, the most badlyaffected sectors are children and adolescents, without specificmeasures being taken for a more equitable distribution of theresources that are invested on the various population sectors.Furthermore, this is the sphere in which more resources are beinginvested in terms of social development. All of our countries havespecific programs in this respect and the targets set within theframework of the Millennium Summit are a major challenge for all.On the other hand, the evaluation of the strategies employed in thisarea so far, show evident signs of dissatisfaction with the resultsobtained, not only because poverty persists or decreases marginally,but because the instruments and the methodologies employed havenot been appropriate. One of the factors in this regards is linked tothe actors responsible for implementing the programs and strategiesof the fight against poverty, a sphere in which "State" approachescontinue to prevail (with little participation of civil society anddriven by public servants, without much interest). Undoubtedly,very diverse approaches have been attempted, but in almost allcases with a limited scope. Thus, the universal policies werecriticized (proposing targeted intervention approaches as analternative), then the ineffectiveness of the large State secretariatswas criticized (and social funds were created in parallel) includingthe excessive compartamentalization of institutional efforts (creatingthe so called "social authorities"), passing on to recognizing theevident limits of government management (calling upon theparticipation of civil society organizations). But all of this has beeninsufficient and more pertinent and timely responses are still beingsought, for greater effectiveness and efficiency.

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Youths could be the foundation of the solution that is beingintensively sought. Bolivia, for example, has recently obtained animportant cutback in its external debt on the basis of which it will beable to invest some 1.5 billion dollars in programs against povertyduring the next 15 years. Given the current institutional and politicalsituation in Bolivia, these resources will be invested with a strongfocus on local development, supporting the program actions ofmunicipalities throughout the country; but as in many other countriesof the region, the municipalities do not have the capacities to take onthese opportunities and for that reason several modernization andinstitutional actions will be developed at that level, for a maximumleveraging of the work to be carried out. Within this framework, thegovernment has decided to support the design and implementation ofa Youth Volunteering Program, in partnership with interested nationaluniversities, as a typical university social service (to be included aspart of the general curriculum) using advanced students and recentgraduates to cooperate with municipalities in those specific spheresthat are prioritized in each case and that are linked to their acquiredskills (professions). The Secretariat for Generational and FamilyAffairs will be the government sector responsible for implementingthe initiative and the example could be replicated in any other country(Honduras, for example) without difficulties.

The White Book on Youth in Europe recently approved as themajor guide for the development of horizontal cooperation actionsamong all members countries of the European Union, places asignificant emphasis on the need for extending youth volunteeringin the immediate future, and this is done from a solid foundationbased on the experience developed in the recent past, showing thatthis is an important mechanism of youth participation with verypositive simultaneous impacts in several spheres of thedevelopment of society as a whole. On its part, in Latin America,there are also relevant experiences in this regard, but, as opposedto the European, our countries have not processed systematicevaluations in this respect. For a long time this was due to the factthat for some sectors, volunteering is not an attractive participatorymethod because, they believe, it fosters the use of "cheap labor"destroying jobs. Along the same line, other sectors have alleged

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that, as opposed to what is the case in Europe and other highlyindustrialized countries, Latin America does not have the necessaryresources to develop this type of initiatives. Evidently, neither theone nor the other are true. There is no evidence of the former (onthe contrary) and the latter is refuted from the time that volunteeringis placed at the service of public policies that have thecorresponding financing (the fight against poverty, for example).And if we go one step further, the accusations that try to show theseinitiatives as a disguised way of State manipulation of juvenileparticipation are not valid either. On the contrary, volunteering cancooperate to a great extent in developing relevant experiences forall the sectors involved.

The Latin American experiences also show that youthvolunteering is not a simple mechanism for entertainment that onlyachieves marginal impacts in the dynamic of our societies. This isdemonstrated in the National Literacy Campaign of Guatemala,which has been categorized as a large national youth movement. Ineffect, with the creation of the National Literacy Movement(MONOALF/GUA) in October 2000, based on strategicpartnerships between State agencies and civil society, 50,000youths (middle education students) have been mobilized and haveprovided literacy to 180,000 people. A little over 10 years agosomething similar happened with the Ecuador National LiteracyCampaign, in which 100,000 youths participated with extremelyrelevant impacts; and if we go further back in time, the same wasthe case in Cuba in the first stages of the revolution. It is notnecessary to continue mentioning specific examples, the truth is thatthe debates on these issues are too ideologized and pragmatized,without incorporating a minimum rationality, based on serious andrigorous evaluations, showing the potentiality and limitations ofwhat so far has been done. It is therefore extremely important toprocess these evaluations to have better elements of judgment, andbe in the best position to promote such initiatives anew, correctingmistakes and channeling the rich contribution potential of the newgenerations to the development of our societies, in theunderstanding that youths do want to participate, but in specificinitiatives with visible impacts in the short term.

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Regional Cooperation and Public YouthPolicies: the World Bank Role

To end, it is important to analyze some of the main parameters ofregional cooperation in the area of youth, with a view to its expansionin the immediate future. In this sense, four specific priorities to bedeveloped are established here.

The first one relates to an extremely relevant sphere: as we havealready tried to demonstrate in the previous pages, there is a huge gapbetween youth exclusion and calls to being protagonists inconstructing the knowledge society and simultaneously we havesocieties that operate based on corporatist pressures and youths thatare guided on the basis of the symbolic dimensions of their existence(and not its material dimensions). We will need to develop significantefforts to provide public youth policies with a greater focus on thefuture and with a higher priority in the public agenda.

Of course, this is the task in which the national and local efforts,promoted by the institutions specializing in the area of youth in eachcountry, are fundamental and irreplaceable but the truth is that regionalcooperation can provide an important assistance in this regard. Severalapproaches could be employed, but we would like to underline two thatare particularly relevant: (1) incorporate dynamically the issue of youthin all international general and sectorial meetings that are regularlyheld, with special emphasis on intergovernmental meetings, in whichministers and technicians specializing in various areas of developmentmeet periodically, cooperating in this manner with the institutionsspecializing in youth issues in each country; and (2) use the major massmedia, in a regular and systematic manner, within the framework of anexplicit policy in this regard, with special emphasis on the main TVnetworks that have coverage in most of the countries of the region,since the regular dissemination of appropriate messages addressed atparents, teachers, social and community leaders, youth leaders andyouths in general could also clearly cooperate with this dynamics.

The World Bank has cooperated in this type of initiatives in otherspheres of development or in connection with other sectors of thepopulation. It could therefore assists in the development of useful

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tools for this type of work. But to achieve relevant impacts, it wouldbe necessary to have solid arguments, adequately presented for eachtarget audience, that are attuned to the respective audiences, and ofwhich they can take ownership, as a part of the process ofempowering the actors with which interaction is sought as a priority.As indicated, the communication strategy we are proposing should bestructured on the basis of proactive and not reactive proposalsassuming that the logic of communication is more emotional thanrational. Experiences so far, generated by formal education whichmerely transfer the logic of the classroom to television screens (forexample) have shown serious limitations caused by disregarding thiselementary principle of communication.

A second priority should be centered on expanding andsystematizing the efforts already underway in connection with themodernization of public management, specially but not exclusively inconnection with youth specialized institutions. Also in this case, itwould possible to operate in the future in several spheres, but amongthe most relevant the following could be pointed out: (1) support thedesign, monitoring and evaluation of plans, programs and projects(to decisively overcome the high level of improvisation that stillprevails in a good share of youth specialized institutions, whichcontinue operating almost exclusively within a framework ofresponding to daily emergencies and deploying short term initiatives);(2) support the development of human resources (establishing anarticulated policy that provides a sequence of training, with flexibleentry and exit points to develop processes and ensure the highest levelsof specialization and retention of the participants, with an intense useof distance education); (3) support the development of managementtools (national youth surveys, institutional directories, service guides,bibliographies and states of the art, statistical summaries, integratedyouth plans, information centers, bulletins and specializedmagazines, etc.; and (4) support for the development of networking(developing dynamic and effective processes for interinstitutionalpartnering, changing the still dominant culture that focuses efforts onthe development of the complete cycle (design, execution andevaluation) of any initiative and shifting to an agreed distributionof roles and functions.

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On the other hand, for the development of these and othersimilar initiatives, it will be indispensable to make an intensive andinnovative use of the new communication and informationtechnologies (ICT) and that is another sphere in which regionalcooperation could prove decisive. This can also be brought aboutin different ways and from different specific spheres, but thefollowing should be underlined as the most relevant: (1) installationof a Major Internet Youth Portal (combining information about andon youth and dynamically integrating all the existing relevant sites,offering all sort of services and using the experience developed bythe World Bank in the Program World Links for Development); (2)Installation of a Permanent Virtual Observatorv on Youth Policies(offering systematically and regularly, information and comparativeanalysis of the situation of youths, youth public policies, the mostsuccessful management models, the most noteworthy promotionexperiences, the most pertinent tools and the most rigorous programdesigns, developed in the various countries of the region); and (3)Installation of a Distance Learning University on Youth Policies (asa fundamental reference for the development of the policy onhuman resources development, articulating in a dynamic andcreative manner the local capacities scattered in the variouscountries of the region).

Ultimately, a good part of the success in the futuremanagement at all levels will reside in the development of this typeof initiatives, that will require the investment of a significantensemble of resources (available on the basis of the variouscooperation programs in these fields that almost all specializedagencies have) but, above all, a radical change of mindset, for whichpurpose it will be necessary to have an impact on the dominantculture that still clings to the use of traditional technologies that,besides obtaining less relevant impacts, are more costly and complexto maintain and develop (printed publications, personal courses andseminars, use of telephone, fax and traditional mail, etc.). There aremany examples showing that the mere installation of "computerclassrooms" in educational institutions (for example), guaranteesnothing without the necessary culture (in teachers, in this case) tomake intensive use of them.

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Of course, with the current levels of development of the existinginitiatives, it will be impossible to put in practice the proposalsformulated so far. Therefore, it will be necessary to bring together awide gamut of international actors (that are already working withinthese areas in their respective specialization fields), setting up with andbetween them strong strategic alliances, from which everybody maywin. Among them, four are particularly relevant: (1) Partnershipwith Intergovernmental Networks (incorporating these issues betterand further in the Summits of Heads of State and in the SectorialConferences of Ministers, Governors and Majors, with specialemphasis on the Ibero American Youth Organization which is the morehighly specialized regional network in this regard); (2) Alliance withthe United Nations System and the Inter American Svstem (withECLAC, ILO, CINTERFOR, PAHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO,IICA and IIN, among others); (3) Alliance with Civil Society, Networks(with the Latin American Youth Forum, the CLACSO Youth WorkingGroup, the Rural Youth Network supported by IICA, the LatinAmerican and Caribbean Network of Youth for Sexual andReproductive Rights and the Latin American Confederation of YoungChristian Associations to name just a few); and (4) Alliance withInternational Cooperation Agencies and Foundations (for example,Germany's GTZ, Spain's AECI, CIDA of Canada, USAID, theInternational Youth Foundation, the Kellogg's Foundation, the FordFoundation and the Inter American Development Bank).

In the end, as we have attempted to demonstrate, it is essentialto shift to considering youths as strategic actors of development(promoting their active participation at all levels) and modernizemanagement at all levels, from the basis of integrated approaches thatdecisively leave behind the prevailing sectorial views, that can onlyprovide partial and inconstant progress in some of these problem areas.The main challenge in the new century will be the construction of theknowledge society, and to that end, substantial progress will have to bemade in the fight against poverty and exclusion. In both fronts, as wehave already underlined, youths can play active and protagonic roles,but to that end, it is essential to generate the necessary spaces andincentives. The World Bank can play a leading role in this respect,encouraging the various actors to work in that direction.

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CHAPTER V

VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIALDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA

AND THE CARIBBEAN

M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M. B. ORLANDO

AS previously expressea, reasons auouiiu tu cuumuc LU 11; 1UUU%L1U%11

of the levels of violence as one of the primary objectives in a social

VIOLENCE, CRIME AND SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

development strategy for Latin America. The objectives of this chapterare: to offer a diagnosis of violence and its negative impact ondevelopment in the region, to present a set of public policies and civilsociety programs for violence prevention and control in LatinAmerica, and to identify research priorities.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

This section defines violence, describes its various types andmanifestations and reviews different theoretical approaches. Theconceptual framework summarized in this section has been used,during the nineties, as a basis for the analysis of violence in LatinAmerica and to formulate policies designed to prevent and control thisphenomenon. The various manifestations of violence are, in turn,linked to fundamental variables within a social development strategy,such as education, health and economic opportunities.

Definition of Violence. Difference between crimeand violence. Types of violence

In the current literature there is a consensus on violence regardingits definition as "the use or threat of use of physical or psychologicalforce, with a damaging intent" (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999) 1.This definition includes both the use of force and the threat of use offorce that plays a key role in the perceptions about violence and theperception about security in a certain context. Such perceptions areimportant because they contribute to the causes for other acts ofviolence. The intentional character of violent behavior excludes

I See also Concha-Eastman and Villaveces (2001), Inter-American DevelopmentBank, Londofio, Gaviria and Guerrero (eds) (2000), Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter(1999) and World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loyza (eds) (2001).

M. BUVINIC, A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO

accidents from this definition and includes the use of aggression forconflict solving. This definition includes suicide and other self-destructive phenomena. It is important to note that violence may bephysical or psychological and that the use of force to damage includessexual abuse. Likewise, violence thus defined can occur betweenstrangers or acquaintances and even between members of a familygroup (domestic or in-family violence).

Violence and crime, defined as a certain illegal action accordingto the legal system, are intimately related, but are not equivalent.The definition of violence emphasizes the use (or threat) of forcewith a damaging intent, while the definition of crime places greateremphasis on the description of certain illegal behaviors. Thus, thereare both non-violent crime (fraud, burglary, prostitution withoutcoercion) as non-criminal violence (certain cases of violenceexercised by the State, and in some countries, domestic violence hasstill not been included in the criminal system) (Buvinic, Morrisonand Shifter, 1999).

Violence is a complex, multidimensional phenomenon, stemmingfrom multiple psychological, biological, economic, social and culturalfactors. The phenomena, which accompany violent behaviorconstantly, cross the borders between individuals, family, communityand society. In turn, violence has consequences, which compriseseveral individual, family, community and social environments. Themultidimensionality of violence itself generates various manifestationsor different types of violence. The most common criteria to classifyviolence together with the typology stemming from them aresummarized in Table 1. Categorizing violence is useful for its study andto design and implement policies for prevention and control of one orseveral types of violence combined.

The following sections contain an analysis of the types of violencemore afflicting for Latin America, given the available information,especially forms of urban violence. Another form of violence prevailingin the region that will be discussed more extensively is domesticviolence. In many cases, violent situations respond to a combination ofdifferent types of violence. For example, gang violence is mostlyphysical and psychological instrumental violence, with economic andsocial ends, within an urban context. Domestic violence against women

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Table 1Criteria to categorize violence and corresponding types of violence

Criterion Types of Violence

Violence Victims * Violence against Children* Violence against Women* Violence against the Elderly* Violence against Youth* Violence against the Excluded* Violence against Property (burglary, theft or

vandalism)

Violent Agents * Individuals (young men, young women,adults)

* Youth Gangs* Drug Traffickers* Criminal Gangs* Police or Military Authorities* Crowds (during protests and lynching)* Political Movements (guerrilla groups,

political parties, local strongmen)* Ethnic-Religious movements

Nature of Violence * Physical (beatings, cuts, etc.)* Psychological (insults, threats, yelling)* Sexual (forced sexual activities)* Deprivation of Freedom (kidnapping,

unjustified arrest)Intent of Violence * Instrumental: violence is a means towards

other ends (political, economic, religious andsocial)

* Emotional: causing damage is an end in itself

Place * Urban* Rural

Relationship between Victim and Aggressor * Social: Unknown or unrelated known people* Domestic or in-family: relatives and partner

Source: Own development based on Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison Editors (2000: Note 1) and McAlister (2000).

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by the partner is, in certain cases, instrumental violence to obtaincontrol over the household's economic resources or to exercise controlover women. But both forms also frequently have an emotionalcomponent (harming) which feeds back onto violence if it issuccessful. Additionally, the various manifestations of violence showprofound causal interrelations. There is theoretical evidence (modelsof behavior learning) and empirical evidence on the determininginfluence of domestic violence suffered or witnessed by children onthe development of violent behaviors as adults (Berkowitz, 1996,quoted in Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison Eds., 2000).

Causes of ViolenceRisks factors and protection factors

Violence is a complex phenomenon that has multiple causesand, in turn, such causes are related among themselves. From the pointof view of the design and implementation of public policies to fightviolence, it is necessary to identify the risk factors of violentbehavior2. In analyzing the risk and protection factors, it is useful todistinguish among those operating at the following levels: individual,household, and community (see Table 2).

In analyzing violent behavior using a sequential approach, thefactors associated to violence can be grouped in biologicalpredisposition and social background, situational characteristics, andtriggering event. The main causes of violence according to variousdisciplines are summarized below.

Biological Basis for Violence: Genetic and biological factors, aswell as alcohol and drug consumption increases the predisposition toexhibit aggressive and violent behavior. It is thought that geneticinfluences involve several genes and strong interaction with the

2 Some of these risk factors are direct causes of violence, while others areassociated factors. Empirically, the concept of risk factor is analogous to that offactors that increase the likelihood of a violent event. From the point of view ofpolicy design, actions on associated factors may be very useful in violenceprevention and control.

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Table 2Risk (protection) factors for violence

Individual Household Community Society

Demographic (age, gender) Household Size -Density Markets (legal or illegal) forarms and drugs

Biological Household Structure, Dynamics * Violence in the Mediaand Standards

Early Exposure to Violence History of Family Violence * Effectiveness of Public andPrivate Institutions of SocialControl

Socioeconomic and Educational * Cultural StandardsLevel

Employment Situation * Neighborhood Crime Rate

Alcohol and Drug Abuse * NeighborhoodSocioeconomic Level

* Neighborhood EnvironmentalCharacteristics

* History of Social Violence* Inequality

Source: Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison Eds. (2000: Note 3)

environment (Reiss and Roth, 1993). But studies demonstrate, moreand more, that there is a link between violence and brain andneurological anomalies, preventable for the most part. Factorsincreasing the brain activity or reactivity (traumas) or decreasing itscapacity to moderate impulses (child abuse or neglect, alcohol ordrug abuse) increase the individual's capacity to respond in a violentway (Perry, 1996). The experiences of early childhood have adisproportionate importance in the organization of the adult brain.Physical and/or emotional neglect in the prenatal and early childhoodstages, as well as the exposure of infants to traumatic violence, alterthe development of the central nervous system, predisposing toviolence. These events also contribute to its learning, underlying theinteraction between biological and environmental aspects. Even

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though cerebral damage in itself or child abuse in itself do notnecessarily lead to violence and violence appears without the presenceof brain damage or prior abuse, the combination of cerebral anomaliesand child abuse significantly increase the likelihood of future violentbehavior. The consumption of alcohol and certain drugs "modifiesinformation processing and evaluation processes... reducing thethresholds, limiting the review of options and preventing rationality"(McAlister, 2000). Results for 16 countries confirm the existence of thelink between alcohol consumption and violent crime (see Markowitz(b), 2000). According to Markowitz (a) (2000) an increase of the taxon beer would reduce the probability of assaults, while legalizingmarihuana and reducing the price of cocaine would result in increasedthefts and hold-ups in the United Stated. In the case of cocaine, one ofthe main effects is the increase in robbery and other crimes againstproperty by addicts with the aim of obtaining funds to purchase drugs.On the other hand, in the case of crack, an inexpensive substitute forcocaine, Grogger and Willis (1998) found a direct relationship betweeninterpersonal violence and consumption, but not a linear relationbetween violence against property and consumption.

Violence as a Learnt Behavior: Violent behavior is learnt, andthe first opportunity to learn to behave aggressively arises at home,observing and imitating the aggressive behavior of parents, otherrelatives or even characters appearing in mass media shows (Bandura,1973). The reactions of parents which reward the aggressive behaviorof their children and child-abuse on their part are some of themechanisms whereby children learn to express in a violent way at anearly age (Berkowitz, 1996). Children learn to associate an aggressivestimulus with violent behavior and to respond with violence tofrustrations or other negative events. Studies show a significantrelationship between victimization during childhood (both childrenwho are victims of abuse and those who witnessed the chronic abuseof other relatives) and the later propensity to violent behavior(Dahlberg, 1998). Violence is also learnt at school and on the street.

Demographic Factors: Age, population density and gender,influence the environment through different mechanisms and canserve to predict, in a very general way, the trends of violence insociety. In Latin America, as in other regions of the world, homicides

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are mostly perpetrated by young men. Among the factors predisposingyouth to choose violent careers are high rates of juvenileunemployment, impunity in the court system and easy access toalcohol, drugs and firearms. We may add to this a culture of violencein the communications media, which leads to the imitation of violenceand the reduction of social inhibitions. The growth and the increase ofthe population density, especially in large cities increases stress,frustration and anonymity that instigate violent behavior(Calhoun,1962). One difference between the sexes that emergesbefore two years of age is aggressive behavior. Girls are lessaggressive than boys (Maccoby and Jadelin, 1974). In LatinAmerica, authoritarian family patterns, derived from theNapoleonic Law, emphasize and reinforce these differencesbetween the sexes. The father is master over the life of women andchildren, a situation leading both to a great vulnerability toviolence. Women are furthermore conditioned by legal systems thatprotect men and women in an unequal manner. This legal biasagainst women becomes an important obstacle to prevent violenceagainst them (Mahoney, 1994).

Economic Factors: The economic approach to crime is based onBecker's work (1968), according to which the aggressor makes arational decision of incurring in illicit or violent activities, afterexamining their costs-benefit and trying to maximize the benefit. Thatis, given the assessments and objectives of the potential aggressor, theaggressor responds to the expected benefit and expected punishment ofviolent behavior. Several empirical studies in the continent lendground to the conclusion that violence responds to changes in theexpected punishment (see Elrich, et al., Levitt, et al., quoted in WorldBank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza Eds., 2001). Another groupof economic studies concentrates on the benefits of crime and violence(ibid.). These studies find, in the case of violent acts with economicmotivation, that the greater the income inequality the greater is theexpected benefit arising from the difference between the income of thevictim and the income of the aggressor, and therefore the greater theprobability of violent behavior. Although there is no conclusiveempirical evidence with respect to the impact of poverty on violence,some conditions that are present in poverty situations, such as

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crowding and unemployment, significantly increase the probability ofviolence (see Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999). Fajnzylber,Lederman and Loayza (2001) study the macroeconomic determinantsof violence worldwide, using a panel of 45 countries during the period1970-19943. The estimated model largely accounts for the variationin the homicide rate and the variation in robbery rates worldwide. Itsresults indicate that: the rate of growth of the Gross Domestic Productreduces violence, income inequality increases violence and the rate ofviolence in the past determines the rate of current violence. On theother hand, the average income level of each country and the averageschooling do not have a conclusive effect on the countries' levels ofviolence, although the differences in income and schooling distinguishviolent from non violent groups within countries. Given these results,the authors conclude that the current level of development of a countryis not so important to explain the levels of violence as the reduction ofinequality, economic growth and the pre-existing level of violence. Theempirical presence of violence inertia is evidence of inter-generationviolence transmission, as well as the time interaction between differenttypes of violence, the environment and the standards in a society.

Protecting Factors. Social Capital: Effective social controlinstitutions play a central role in dissuading violent behavior. Suchinstitutions include the police and the legal and court system in thepublic sector as well as the churches and social and communityorganizations in the private sector. In Latin America, the weakness ofthe social control institutions in the public sector and the consequentimpunity of criminal behavior is seen by many as one of the major riskfactors for the high rates of criminal violence (Sanjuan, 1999).Although there is growing evidence that the severity of thepunishment does not have a significant dissuasive effect, theprobability of being apprehended and processed may have an impact,and the probability of acting in a violent form increases to the extentthat the negative costs or incentives decrease. A similar social controlrole is played by private groups and institutions which promote whatis currently called "social capital", understood as the characteristics of

3 This study is summarized in the first chapter of World Bank, Fajnzylber,Lederman and Loayza Editors (2001).

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the social organization, including trust, social standards andnetworks that, by facilitating coordinated actions can improve theefficiency of social performance (Putnam, 1993). It can thereforebe concluded that communities with little or deficient social capitalshould be more susceptible to violence. High migration rates seemto contribute to the reduction of social capital since they represent abreakdown of community links. Crime reduction may be moresuccessful when the solutions involve community participation. Bythe same token, domestic violence care and prevention can be moreeffective when there are strong social networks. The study of therelation between social capital and violence is recent and confrontsthe problem of the double causality existing in both variables.Studies in Jamaica, Moser and Holland (1997), Guatemala, Moserand Mclllwaine (2000 a), and Colombia, Moser and Mclllwaine(2000 b), report that violence destroys social capital. These studiesalso evidence that the weakness of social capital and the existenceof perverse social capital to compensate for such weakness form anenvironment that fosters violent behavior.

CURRENT VIOLENCE INDICATORS INLATIN AMERICA

Quantifying violence or constructing precise indicators ofmagnitude for each of its multiple manifestations presents importantdifficulties. Some sources of information are law enforcementagencies, court statistics, and health statistics that present remarkableunder-recording. Among the official statistics, the most reliable andwidely used is the annual rate of gross mortality due to homicide per100,000 inhabitants. However, homicide statistics should be interpretedwith caution, since they are very sensitive to changes in data gatheringmethodology that have been common in many countries in the region.Homicide is the most serious violent act, but its relation with otherviolent acts is not necessarily linear, and in many countries theincidence of crime against property, on which there are few reliablestatistics in Latin America, bears no direct relation with homicide.

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Additionally, there are violent events, such as rape and domesticviolence that are rarely reported, even when they are recognized ascrimes by the legal system. The lack of reporting is due, partly, to theactual or perceived lack of capacity of the competent authorities tocombat violent behavior and provide protection to the victim againstfuture retaliation on the part of the aggressors. For that reason, besidesthe official statistic, it is necessary to have victimization surveys, aswell as special surveys to detect domestic violence, for which arepresentative sample of the population is interviewed. Although thereare few victimization surveys in the region, those that have beendeveloped give evidence of the high level of under-reporting of violentevents in official statistics. Rubio (1998) estimates that in LatinAmerica the proportion of violent incidents that are reported is barelybetween 15% and 30%. The lack of information systems on themagnitude of violence for each type of violent behavior in the region,both at the aggregate and the local level, does not contribute to thedevelopment of better policy interventions for prevention and control.

Indicators of Violence in Latin America and Main Trends

The omnipresence and heterogeneity of violence in Latin Americacan be verified both from the point of view of the victims (widespreadperception, media and victimization surveys), as from the point ofview of official statistics, such as the homicide rate. The homicide ratein Latin America and the Caribbean is very high compared to that inthe rest of the world. At the end of the 90's (World HealthOrganization, 2002), at least ten countries in the American continentrecorded homicide rates in excess of the world rate of 8.9 per 100.000.At least four countries recorded homicide rates above 20 per 100.000(see Table 3). In absolute terms, it is estimated that in Latin Americaand the Caribbean, between 110,000 and 120,000 individuals die as aresult of homicide each year (Concha and Villaveces, 2001).4

4 It should be noted that the suicide rate in Latin America is relatively low ascompared to developed countries. Suicide is directly related to higher levels ofincome and social welfare (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000).

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The high average homicide rate for Latin America concealsimportant differences between countries. Guatemala and El Salvador,in Central America, and Colombia, in the Andean region, recordedhomicide rates above 50 during the 80's and the 90's. The opposite isthe case of the countries of the Southern Cone (Argentina, Uruguay,Paraguay and Chile) that recorded relatively low homicide levels (ratesunder 10).

Table 3Homicide Rates (per 100,000 inhabitants) in the American Continent.

Comparison among Countries and with Worldwide Homicide Rate

End of 70's Beginning of 80's End Beginning of 90's Mid -of 80's End of 90's

(a) (a) b)

Central America

Guatemala .. 150.0

El Salvador .. 138.2 55.6

Nicaragua .. 18.3 8.4

Honduras .. 9.4

Costa Rica 5.7 5.6 5.4

Panama 2.1 10.9 10.9

Andean Countries

Colombia 20.5 89.5 61.6

Venezuela 11.7 15.2 16.0

Peru 2.4 11.5

Ecuador 6.4 10.3 15.3Brazil and Guyana

Brazil 11.5 19.7 23.0

Guyana .. .. 6.6

Caribbean

Cuba .. .. 6.2

Puerto Rico .. .. 20.6

Trinidad & Tobago 2.1 12.6 12.1

Dominican Rep. .. 11.9

Jamaica .. 35.0

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End of 70's Beginning of 80's End Beginning of 90's Midof 80's - End of 90's

(a) (a) (b)

North America

Mexico 18.2 17.8 15.9

Canada .. 2.2

U.S.A. 10.7 10.1 6.3 (c)

Southern Cone

Argentina 3.9 4.8 4.7

Uruguay 2.6 4.4 4.4

Paraguay 5.1 4.0 12.3

Chile 2.6 3.0 3.0

World Level(d) 5.5 6.4 8.9

Sources: (a) Pan American Health Organization (1997), (b) World Health Organization(2002), (c) US Department of Justice -Bureau of Justice Statistics (2000) y (d)Buvinic y Morrison (2000) (Living in a More Violent World). Note: The ratesfor each country correspond to a specific year within the indicated period andthe same year is not available for all countries.

Table 3 also shows that the homicide rate had a worldwide increasein the three decades represented, as a consequence of demographicfactors, the greater integration of legal and illegal markets at a globallevel and the very inertia of violence in time (Buvinic and Morrison,2000). In Latin America, the incomplete information available does notmake it possible to establish clear trends at a country level. However,it may be noted that during the 70's and the 80's, increases in thehomicide rate were recorded in many countries, especially the Andeancountries. Such increases in homicides within the Andean area areassociated to the guerrilla conflict and the dissemination of drug-trafficking in Colombia, as well as to macroeconomic and structuralreforms that produced significant increases in inequality andunemployment (Buvinic and Morrison, 2000, Arriagada and Godoy,1999, World Bank, 2002). The data corresponding to the 90's in Table3 are not directly comparable with those of the previous decades;however, it is possible to note reductions in the homicide rates of some

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Central American countries, while substantial increases were recordedin Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Paraguay. 5

National homicide rates do not reflect the large urban-ruraldisparity of violence, as well as the disparity between various regionsand cities. As seen in Table 4, Medellin, Cali, Ciudad de Guatemala,San Salvador, Caracas and Rio de Janeiro record homicide rates above50. For some cities there are other statistics available besides thehomicide rate.6

Armed robbery is one of the most common events, as well as otherviolent crimes against property. The rates of victimization in Bahia,Cali, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, San Jose, San Salvador and Santiagooscillate between 10.6% (San Jose) and 38.5% (San Salvador), whichimplies a greater exposure to violence than what is indicated by thehomicide rate.

The inhabitants of Latin America, especially in urban areas, livewith a permanent sense of insecurity. This feeling is reflected in publicopinion polls such as those of Latinobar6metro (see Latinobar6metro,2002), in which crime appears as one of the most important problemsin each country together with unemployment, inflation, poverty andcorruption. According to the same source, the levels of interpersonaltrust in the region are low since less than 16% of the respondents in theregion for the year 1997 expressed that it was possible to truststrangers. This average figure hides major differences betweencountries. In Brazil, less than 5% of the study's population expressedthat it was possible to trust strangers, while in Uruguay over 30% wasof the opinion that you can. The levels of trust constitute a measure inconnection with social capital, which has deteriorated between theyears 1996 and 2000 for the majority of Latin American countries.

5 Although no data are available for 2000 and 2001, it is possible to speculate thatthe homicide rate in Colombia suffered new increases due to the heightening ofthe armed conflict between the guerrilla, the paramilitary and the military forces.

6 The Pan-American Health Organization, under the program of ViolenceEpidemiological Surveillance Systems, has sponsored victimization surveys inseveral cities.

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Table 4Urban violence in Latin America. Homicide rates

(per 100,000 inhabitants)

Country- Year RateUrban centers (per 100,000)

Brazil 90 23,0Rio de Janeiro 1995 63,5Sao Paulo 1995 48,5

Colombia 90 61,6Bogota 1997 49,2Cali 1995 112,0Medellin 1995 248,0

El Salvador 90 55,6San Salvador 1995 95,4

Guatemala 90Guatemala City 1996 101,5

Mexico 90 15,9Mexico City 1995 19,6

Peru 90Lima 1995 25,0

Venezuela 90 16,0Caracas 1995 76,0

Source: Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) (2000).

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Violence according to gender

Both for biological reason (hormonal and physiological) and dueto economic, social and cultural reasons, the majority of aggressors aremen (World Health Organization, 2002). Violence against women isdefined as: "any act of gender-based violence that produces or couldproduce, physical, sexual or mental damage or suffering in women,including threats.. .coercion or arbitrary deprivation of freedom, bothin public and private life" (United Nations, 1993, quoted in Garcia-Moreno, 2000:7). Social violence against women includes rape andsexual abuse (on the part of strangers, during street assaults, at home oras the result of a strategy during armed conflicts), robberies, genitalmutilation, trafficking (forced prostitution), and psychological,physical and sexual violence in the workplace. It also includesdomestic violence against women, consisting in the physical,psychological or sexual mistreatment of women on the part of arelative or her partner7 .

Both social and domestic violence against women are related togender patterns which comprise the patriarchal structure which placeswomen in a position of subordination with regards to man and the lackof equity between genders from a legal, economic and social point ofview. These gender patterns may be maintained in different regions,cultures, social and educational levels (Garcia-Moreno, 2000).Traditional gender patterns link the notion of maleness to authority,honor, and aggression. Violence against women is different frominterpersonal violence against men in terms of its modalities, effectsand social tolerance as well as that of the victim to its presence. At aworld scale and in Latin America, adult men tend to be the victims ofstrangers or an occasional acquaintance, while for women there is a

7 The manifestations of domestic violence of women towards adult men are notconsidered because they are infrequent and in many cases the result of self-defense. Neither are the manifestations of social and domestic violence againsthomosexual men and women considered in this paper because of lack of data.

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higher probability of being a victim of a relative or partner (Heise,Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999).8 According to the informationavailable, the problem of domestic violence against women is thepredominant form of violence against women in Latin America(Garcia-Moreno, 2000), for that reason greater attention will be paidto it in this section. However, the importance of other forms ofviolence on which there is no statistical information such as violencein the work place and violence during armed conflicts is not discarded.

As a result of some 50 comparable surveys around the world,between 10% and 50% of the women declared having been beaten orphysically mistreated by a current or previous partner (Heise, Ellsbergand Gottemoeller, 1999). Additionally, physical domestic violence isalmost always accompanied by manifestations of psychologicalviolence and sexual violence (almost in half the cases). For LatinAmerica, Table 5 summarizes the results of its prevalence according tovarious studies, with a rate of up to 40% of women being victims ofphysical violence on the part of a partner throughout their life(Nicaragua). The data relating to psychological and sexual violenceare equally alarming, specially when considering that in many casesthe three types of violence are combined.

8 Perhaps during armed conflict periods, during which both men and women arevictims of an exacerbated social violence, women have a greater probability ofbeing the victims of strangers, above all when the different parties used systematicrape as a war weapon. There is also evidence of increased domestic violenceduring periods of conflict (Moser and Mclllwaine, 2000).

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Table 5Prevalence of domestic violence against women in

the American Continent. Studies conducted during the 90's

Country Sample type Sample %

Barbados (1990) National 264 women age 20-45, including women 30%*who have never had a partner

Bolivia (1998) 3 districts 289 women above age 20 17%

Chile (1997) Santiago 1,000 women aged 22-55 with a partner 26%for over 2 years

Colombia (1995) National 6,097 women aged 15-49 with a partner 19%

Haiti (1995) National 1,705 women 36%

Mexico (1996) Monterrey 1,064 women aged 15 and over who 17%*have had a partner

Nicaragua (1998) National 8,507 women aged 15-49 who have had 12%a partner

Peru (1997) Lima 359 women with middle and low income 31%level, aged 17-55 currently having apartner

Puerto Rico (1996) National 5.755 women aged 15-49 who have had 13%a partner

Uruguay (1997) Montevideo and 545 women aged 22-55 currently having 10%*Canelones a partner

United States (1993) National 8,000 women aged over 18 including 22%those that have never had a partner

Canada (1993) National 12.300 women over 18 who had a 25%partner at some point

Source: Heise et al. (1994); Handwerker (1998); PAHO (1999); Ordofiez et al. (1995);Granados and Shiroma (1996); Rosales Ortiz et al. (1998); Gonzalez de Olarteand Gavilano (1999); Davila (1998); Traverso (2000) and Population Reports(I 999).

* Physical or sexual abuse.

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In her seminal work on domestic violence, Heise (1998) uses anecological model of the factors specifically related with domesticviolence. At a social level, the author points to the following factors:standards granting men power over women, acceptance of violence asa form of resolving conflicts, and rigid gender structures. At thecommunity level, the major risk factors are poverty andunemployment, crime, and isolation of the woman and the familyfrom community interactions. Risk factors at the household includemarital conflict, quarrels with relatives, control over economic assets,and exclusive household decision making by the man. From theindividual aggressor point of view, common factors increasing the riskof violent domestic behavior are: being male, witnessing marriageviolence in childhood, being a victim of child abuse, rejection orneglect, and use of alcohol. Table 6 shows a summary of the riskfactors present for women who are victims of domestic violence,according to various studies conducted in the region9 .

Violence and socio-economic groups

Latin America is the world's region with greater income inequality(Inter American Development Bank, 1998), which contributes to thehigh levels of violence in the region. Inequality generates socialtension and economic incentives which are important factors forrobbery, street muggings, kidnapping and armed robberyl 0 . Amongthe main causes of earnings inequality in the region are the differentialsin quantity and quality of education within the population (Ibid.).

9 These studies are quoted in Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) (2000): Americas Watch (1991) (Brazil), Larrain (1997). Valdez-Santiago and Sanin (1996) (Mexico), Ellsberg (1996) (Nicaragua), Larrain andRodriguez ( 1993) (Chile) and Traverso (2000) (Uruguay).

10 See the section Conceptual Framework.

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Table 6Risk factors for domestic violence

against women in Latin America

Risk Factor Presence

Individual Level

Age A majority of women victims are aged 24 to 45

Pregnancy Up to 33% of pregnant women are subject to abuse

History of Domestic Boys and girls who witness or are victims of abuse at home

Violence tend to be aggressors or victims in their future homes

Alcohol consumption If a man abuses alcohol, the probability of mistreatment of

his partner is up to 6 times greater than in households were

men consume alcohol with moderation

Household Level

Predominance of man Women do not take part in decision making in violent

households. The majority of mafital abuse begins in the first

years of marriage

Isolation of the woman and Women suffering aggressions tend to be isolated from

family interactions with relatives, friends and the community

Family income There is a greater incidence of physical violence in low

income households

Socio - Cultural Level Rigid gender patterns with male domination are transmitted

through the family, school, workplace and media. Tolerance

on the part of health and justices agencies.

Source: Summary based on Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison(eds.) (2000)

At an aggregate level, poverty, in itself, does not necessarilycause violence (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999 and Fajnzylber,Lederman and Loayza, 2001). However, poverty originatesfeeling of stress and frustration that may unleash violent behaviors

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if they are accompanied by unemployment (economic exclusion)crowding in recently set-up neighborhoods (breakdown of socialcapital) Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999 and Moser andLister, 1999). In Latin America, the poorer districts, and in somecases those recently formed in the cities, record levels of differenttypes of violence above the rest of the urban area (Pan AmericanHealth Organization, 1996 and McAlister, 2000).

At an individual level, the differences in income and schoolingdistinguish the more violent from the less violent groups,especially regarding homicide victimization rates and probabilityof committing homicide. In urban United States, the probabilityof being a victim of homicide or assault is three times greater forindividuals from families with incomes below 7,500 dollars peryear, as compared to individuals from families with incomesabove 50,000 dollars per year (Rosenberg, 1999: 13 in Moser andLister, 1999).

An imperfect indicator of the probability of committinghomicide or other crimes is the profile of the individual arrestedor convicted according to judicial statistics or criminologicalstudies based on surveys of criminals. This indicator is imperfectsince the capture of criminals by the police and the judiciary systemis a biased process by nature. The profile of those convicted orarrested for various types of crimes in the region is young, singlemen from low social economic strata. In the case of Chile, 71.5%of those arrested for homicide declared having no job or beingmanual workers (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999) while in Cali,Colombia, a high percentage comes from households where themother is the single head (Inter American Development Bank,Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000).

The different socio-economic groups experience violence indifferent ways. Crimes against property are more common inmiddle and high income Latin American neighborhoods, whilehomicide, physical injury from violent conflicts and physicaldomestic violence are more common in low income neighborhoods(Gaviria and Velez, 2001 and Inter American Development Bank,Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000).

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Ethnic violence in Latin America

Ethnic diversity is a historical characteristic of Latin Americagoing back to the colonial past, the migration movements after theFirst and Second World War, and the migration flows within the region.In many Latin American countries there are no statistics (at a census orhousehold survey level) to allow for national studies on the existence ofracial discrimination and problems of ethnical coexistence in theregion. The case of violence is no exception and there are no homiciderates by ethnic groups. However, there is evidence at a local scale ofthe levels of social and cultural exclusion of certain indigenous andAfro-Latin groups (Borjas, 1995; Katzman, 1999).

The Latinobar6metro opinion poll found low but significant levelsof ethnic intolerance in one of its questionnaires. The questionnaireasked whom would you not like to have as neighbor. A great majorityof the respondents in the region (between 43% and 67%) answered thatthey would not like to live close to drug addicts, homosexuals, orpolitical extremists. However, an important minority (between 6% and12%) indicated they would not like to live close to a specific ethnicgroup (Africans, Muslims, Asians or Jews, according to the case).

The recent more documented cases of ethnic violence in the regionare closely linked to political violence and have taken place duringarmed conflicts between a group holding political power and guerillaor rebel groups1 1. In the case of Guatemala, the indigenous populationwas decimated and terrorized, to a greater extent than the rest of thepopulation, by State forces during the civil war lasting 36 years whichended in 1996 (Moser and Mclllwaine (a), 2000). The reason tocombat indigenous was the actual or assumed link between them andthe revolutionary guerrilla people (Guatemala National RevolutionaryUnit) as part of a counterinsurgency policy. During that period,indigenous people were executed (up to 150,000) and other terror

11 Another type of ethnic violence with a political component is police abuse andjudicial discrimination against indigenous or black race individuals.

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policies were adopted such as the systematic rape of indigenouswomen and the forced displacement of indigenous people (destructionof 440 villages) leaving a legacy of a culture of silence to avoid violentrepercussions which implies greater tolerance to other forms of socialand domestic violence (Moser and Mclllwaine (a), 2000)12.

Ethnic tensions are framed, in some countries, within ancestralproblems of land tenure and social and economic exclusion (Easterly,2002). For example, the Zapatista National Liberation Army ofChiapas (Mexico), has the objective of protecting the indigenouspeople from exploitation and land holding problems. In Brazil, thelandless movement represents groups descendent from Africans whohave been systematically excluded from the property of land orexpelled in a violent way from the lands they inhabited (Sutherland,2001). Da Silva (2001) and Rivera (2001) consider that agrarian andland holding reforms are necessary to improve coexistence betweendifferent ethnic groups together with dialogue and mediation.

Violence by age

Age is one of the demographic factors more severely affecting theprobability of being an aggressor or a victim. This section contains asummary of two types of violence that are common in Latin America:violence against children and juvenile violence.

Social and domestic violence against children

Social and domestic violence against children and adolescents(under age 18) is defined as: . . ."all the forms of physical and emotionalmistreatment, sexual abuse, abandonment, neglect in care, commercialor other type of exploitation, resulting in actual or potential damage to

12 In the case of the confrontation between the Peruvian State against SenderoLuminoso and other guerilla groups in Peru, it is reported that three of fourvictims were peasants of the Andean region and the Amazonian region, mostlyindigenous (The Economist, "Digging for Truth". 27 April. 2002:38).

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the health, survival, development and dignity of children, within thecontext of a relationship of responsibility, trust or power"... (WorldHealth Organization, 1999). Within that definition, the forms ofchild abuse present some peculiarities that distinguish them fromadult abuse:

* emotional abuse includes, besides mockery and humiliation, thefailure to provide the child with an appropriate environmentsupporting the child's development and a role model;

* neglect includes omitting health care and lack of appropriatemonitoring and protection;

* sexual abuse includes all sexual activities that the boy or girlcannot understand, is physically immature to engage in or is notprepared to give consent about, including child prostitution andpornography of any type;

* commercial exploitation includes child labor.

Worldwide, it is calculated that every year, around 10 millionchildren have psychological sequelae as a consequence of war andother types of violence (including violence against children) (PanAmerican Health Organization, 1996). In the United States alone, in1992 over 2.9 million cases of child abuse or neglect were reported(Pan American Health Organization, 1996). Physical domesticviolence against children is committed, mostly, by mothers, whilesexual domestic violence is committed by fathers or other male figuressuch as brothers, uncles and other relatives.

In Latin America and the Caribbean there are some incompletestatistics available relating to child abuse. In connection with sexualabuse, the following studies (compiled by Heise, Ellsberg andGottemoeller, 1999) give an idea of the magnitude of the problem:

* in Barbados 30% of the women interviewed have experiencedsexual abuse as children;

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in Costa Rica, 32% of the women and 13% of the men;

* in Nicaragua, 26% of the women and 20% of the men.

One of the few children surveys conducted reveals that 63% ofChilean 8th grade children (according to data of a nationalrepresentative sample of 1,533 children) indicated having experiencedphysical violence at home; 34% of them mentioned having sufferedsevere physical abuse. This seems to indicate that severe abuse againstchildren is equal or higher to similar abuse against women (Larrain,Vega and Delgado, 1997).

The existence of some 7 million "street children" in the region islinked to different forms of child violence (neglect, domestic violencethat drives them to run away from home, exploitation, etc.) (PanAmerican Health Organization, 1996). Street children are also theobject of police violence and murder (social cleaning) by deathsquads13 . In turn, street children have a high probability of becomingcriminals, given the emotional and economic deficits they face andtheir lack of opportunities in society.

Domestic violence against the elderly is common in the UnitedStates, where it is estimated that one in 25 elderly people suffersabuse (Pan American Health Organization, 1996). Although no dataare available for Latin America, it is suspected that it is a relevantissue, due to the high degree of economic dependence of seniors asa result of the failed social security systems and the little savings ofthe population.

13 In Brazil, 4 street children are murdered per day (Pan American HealthOrganization, 1996).

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Youth as aggressors and victims

In Latin America, as in the rest of the world, young men(between ages 18 and 24) perpetrate most crimes. The profile of theapprehended, in the following cases, corroborates the previousstatement:

* in Cali, over 70% of convicted murderers are between the agesof 20 and 29 (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) 2000);

* in Chile, 48,6% of the murderers, 28.1 % of rapists and 61.4%of robbers are between 15 and 24 years old (Arriagada andGodoy, 1999).

Young men also record the highest homicide mortality rates in theregion, becoming its main victims. Worldwide, men between the agesof 14 and 44 record the highest mortality rates for homicide (seeFigure 1). Among the risk factors for juvenile crime, are dropping outof secondary school (or poor school performance) and juvenileunemployment, which imply the lack of economic and socialopportunities. An important role in juvenile violence is also played bythe impunity of the system, access to alcohol and drug consumptionand the availability of firearms. Another risk factor for youths islearning about violence as a means to resolve conflicts at home(domestic violence), school, the community and the communicationmedia (which disseminate attitudes in favor of aggression amongyouth) (McAlister, 2000).

Youth violence is a phenomenon that can appear in individuals orgroups of youngsters or urban gangs. Youth gangs reach differentlevels of organization in Latin America and normally belonging to agang is not merely a means to commit violent acts but an end in itself.(McAlister, 2000, Concha and Santacruz, 2002, Moser and Mclllwaine(a) and (b), 2000) and Rodgers, 1999 in Moser and Lister, 1999)14. At

14 According to our review, there are no cross-country comparable data for theregion on the number of youths in gangs and the information that is summarizedbelow is derived from the case studies mentioned.

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M. BUVINIC. A. MORRISON & M.B. ORLANDO

Figure 1Homicide Mortality Rates According to Age

(per 100,000 inhabitants). Men. World Level. 2000

20.0

16.0

14 0T 1 .

12.0

a10.0S

8.0a6.0

4 0

0-4 5-14 15-29 30-44 45-59 60+

AGE

Source: World Health Organization, 2000.

the root of the formation of gangs are, besides the individual riskfactors of youth, social disintegration, lack of access to public services,poverty and crowding (Ibid.). Gangs spring up, in part, due to society'sincapacity to address youth concerns and relate to high risk juvenilegroups (concretely, the failures of the educational system to integrateyouths from poor neighborhood) (Ibid.).

Latin American youths who are members of gangs and similargroups look for a lifestyle in them ("style", fashion, access to drugs, asense of belonging, "hanging out", and having fun) that may servethem as an escape and protection from the harsh environment in whichthey live. By defending one another, and creating violent situationswith members of other gangs, they constitute a form of "perverse"social capital (Moser and Mclllwaine, (a) and (b), 2000 and Rodgers,1999). The gang is a surrogate for a certain order within the chaoticlife at the neighborhood and a means to identity development. Thegang is, simultaneously, an outcome of the breakdown of a previoussocial order (many gangs emerge in recently formed neighborhoods

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during migrations to the city) and a form of socialization that usesviolence for its purposes. Gangs disseminate values through asubculture including music, garments, their own jargon, and the use ofcrack, marihuana, and cocaine.

From the economic point of view these groups can offerinteresting incentives to the youths of poor neighborhoods sincesometimes gangs are involved in drug trafficking (McAlister, 2000and Concha and Santa Cruz, 2002) and other black markets that reportunusual profits although at a very high risk. From a psychologicalpoint of view, studies about violent youths find that they justify theirown violence by attributing it to the others and dehumanizing theirvictims (McAlister, 2000). Once the gang member has left early youthbehind, he may abandon the gang to rejoin the life of the community,become a chief in his gang, start a new gang, or become part of acriminal "professional" gang (Moser and Mclllwaine, (a), 2000).

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC COST OFVIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

Besides constituting human rights violations, the different typesof violence in the region generate profound negative impacts fordevelopment and different types of costs for society as a whole. Thecosts of violence have an inter-temporal impact, worsening thefinancial and social burden for present and future generations. At amacro economic level, it reduces foreign and domestic investmentand decreases internal savings, thus damaging long-term growthpossibilities. At a microeconomic level, violence disincentives theinvestment of time and money in education and induces some todevelop criminal skills instead of studying. It can also dissuade somepeople from studying in the evenings for fear of violent crime.Domestic violence against women and children also hinderseconomic development. Abuse affects children's school performanceand, therefore, their future productivity and the performance of

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national investments in education. Women suffering from domesticviolence are less productive at their workplaces, which is also adirect loss for national production.

Caring for the consequences of domestic and social violenceimplies using the scarce resources available to society. Spending inpolice and judicial systems and the supply of social services couldotherwise be allocated to more productive purposes. Determining theimpacts and the cost of violence is an important step for the design ofa social strategy, since it contributes to setting priorities in theformulation of public policies and is one of the elements to guideresource allocations.

There are two possible approaches to measure the cost implied inviolence for society. The first approach, the "global" approachattempts to capture the totality of the costs of violence. The secondapproach, the "partial" approach, intends to capture only an aspect ofthe total cost. The partial approach is used when it is impossible toimplement the global approach, be it as a result of the lack of data orthe complexity of the methodology, or when it is necessary to highlighta specific impact of violence. Within the global approach, threemethodologies have been developed to calculate the social costs ofviolence:

* the accounting approach, specifying cost categories andestimating the costs of the different categories, has theadvantage that it can be used when there is only partialinformnation, and the disadvantages of the risk of doubleaccounting and the inevitable arbitrariness of costcategorization;

* the hedonic models of housing or land, measuring the impact ofneighborhood security on the value of the house or land, thusattempting to measure the population's willingness to pay for theabsence of violence, has the advantage of precision in themeasurement, and the disadvantage of requiring very detailedand good quality statistical information. In the United States,some estimates that employ this methodology establish aninverse relation between the crime rate in a zone and the value of

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housing (Clark and Cosgrove, 1990). For Mexico City, Teruel,Villoro, Morrison and Hammitt (2002) found that residentswould be willing to pay more than 20% additional in housingrental to live in a neighborhood with a rate of homicide 50%below the current one;

the method of contingent valuation, attempting to measure thevalue that the market would assign to the reduction of violence,assuming security was a tradable good, has the advantage ofbeing able to generate information where there is no otherindicator for the costs of violence, and the disadvantage of thefact that people's valuations depend on their income level sothat the estimates will depend on the income level of theparticipants in the study.

The following subsections present some data of the cost ofviolence in Latin America estimated using the accountingmethodology. To facilitate the reporting, we have classified these costsinto: direct costs (monetary), non monetary costs, multiplyingeconomic costs and multiplying social costs. However, there areother categorizations possible.

Direct costs of violence

Using an accounting approach, the direct costs of violencecomprise the value of the goods and services used to prevent it, offertreatment to its victims or capture and/or convict the perpetrators. Inthe Inter-American Development Bank's publication, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) (2000) there is a summary of the result of variousstudies with estimates of direct costs of violence:

In Colombia, public spending in security and criminal justiceamounted to 5% of GDP in 1996; private security expenditure

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represented 1.4% of GDP (CEDE-UNIANDES. 1997:23-5)15.According to a study of the National Planning Department, thecosts of violence between 1991 and 1996, including both urbanviolence and armed conflicts, is estimated in 18.5% of GDPThe loss of lives has a greater weight in this cost with 43% ofthe total, followed by the excess in military spending with 30%,security spending with 23%, terrorism with 3% and health with1% (National Planning Department, 1998).

* In El Salvador, the expenses of government institutions, legalcosts, personal injuries and prevention activities representedover 6% of GDP in 1995 (Cruz and Romano, 1997:32).

* In Venezuela, public spending in security was approximately2.6% of GDP in 1996 (IESA, 1997:25-7).

* In Chile, private security expenses amounted to close to 238million dollars in 1994, equivalent to 17 dollars per capita.These expenditures are broken down as follows: private securityservices (66.8%), robbery insurance (7.7%) and other insuranceproducts (14.4%) (UNDP, 1998).

* In Mexico City, expenditures relating to public and privatesecurity measures added up to 181 million dollars in 1995(Fundaci6n Mexicana para la Salud, 1997); the administrationof justice and jails accounted for other 128 and 690 milliondollars respectively.

* In Lima, the national government's public spending in police,courts and prisons was approximately 1% of the regionalproduct of the metropolitan area in 1997, while private spending

15 If all the expenses of the systems for law enforcement and criminal justice areconsidered as "direct costs of violence", this would exaggerate the actual directcosts, since some of these expenses would exist even if there was no violence.Besides, the very existence of law enforcement and criminal justice could preventsome of the violence.

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in security measures represented another 0.41% of the regionalproduct (Instituto Apoyo, 1997: 26-8).

Table 5 shows a summary of violence costs for some LatinAmerican countries based on comparable estimates that include directcosts. It is important to take into account that these cost categories arenot mutually exclusive (the willingness of citizens to pay may includethe value of better health), nor complete (they do not explicitly includethe cost of a lower level of savings and investment). The mostconservative estimates of the direct costs of violence in terms of lossesof health and material losses reach a magnitude of up to 8.4% of thenational GDP in Colombia and 9% of the national GDP in Venezuela.

Table 5Economic costs of violence in Latin America

(expressed as a percentage of 1997 GDP)

Brazil Colombia El Salvador Mexico Peru Venezuela

Health Losses 1.9 5.0 4.3 1.3 1.5 0.3

Material Losses 3.6 8.4 5.1 4.9 2.0 9.0

Intangibles 3.4 6.9 11.5 3.3 1.0 2.2

Transfers 1.6 4.4 4.0 2.8 0.6 0.3

Source: Londono and Guerrero (2000)

The consequences and costs of domestic violence against womenand children and adolescents are summarized in Table 6. There is aseries of significant impacts on the mental and physical health of thevictims and possibly their children. Sexual violence against womenand children includes rejecting the use of condoms and othercontraceptives within the context of unexpected and undesired sexualrelations, with severe consequences for sexual and reproductive health(see Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999, Buvinic, Shifter and

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Morrison, 1999, Garcia-Moreno, 2000). The high frequency of abuseduring pregnancy increases pregnancy complications and affects thehealth of the fetus (Ibid.).

These effects on health represent significant direct costs for thehealth system and society as a whole in Latin America (see Table 6).Additionally, the direct costs caused by domestic violence are usuallyrecurrent since, as stated by Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller(1999:18), the consequences for health have three fundamentalcharacteristics:

* health impacts persist through time (even after the abuse hasended);

* the more serious the abuse, the more severe the health impacts;* the impact of the different abuse episodes is cumulative

through time.

Non monetary costs

The non monetary costs include health impacts that do notnecessarily generate demand for the use of health services, such as, forexample, greater morbidity, greater mortality due to homicides andsuicides, alcohol and drug abuse and depressive disorders. In theInter-American Development Bank publication Buvinic and Morrison(eds.) (2000), the result of several studies with non monetary costestimates of violence are summarized:

* Annually 9 million years of disability adjusted life years(DALY) are lost in the world for the concept of rape anddomestic violence, a figure that is greater than the total womenvictims of all existing types of cancer and more than twice thetotal DALY loss by women in motor vehicle accidents (WorldBank, 1993)16.

16 The DALY not only include years lost due to premature mortality, but also theyears the person has been affected by disability or disease.

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In El Salvador, 178,000 DALY were lost in 1995 as aconsequence of violent deaths (Cruz and Romano, 1997:30). InPeru, the figure was 60,792 (InstitutoApoyo, 1997:16); 163,136for Rio de Janeiro (ISER, 1998:42), and in Mexico City 57,673(Fundaci6n Mexicana para la Salud, 1997:14). In Caracas,

casualties were not included in the calculations (only deaths);even so, 56,032 potential life years were lost in 1995 as a resultof homicides (IESA, 1997: 31).

In Colombia, between 18 and 27% of all the DALY lost duringthe period 1989-1995 were caused by homicides, while theworld average is only 1.4% (CEDE-UNIANDES, 1997:12-16).

Violence generates a serious of psychological damages, similar tothose experienced in war zones (Cardia, 1998).

Multiplying economic costs

The multiplying economic effects of violence are significant andimply a lower accumulation of human capital, a lower rate ofparticipation in the labor market, less productivity at work, greaterabsenteeism and lower income. There is evidence, in the case ofwomen suffering from domestic violence, of higher rates ofabsenteeism and a greater probability of being dismissed or quittingtheir jobs (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). The impacts on productivityare owed to the difficulties in concentrating, lack of motivation and thedanger implied in working overtime or attending evening trainingclasses. This reduction in productivity has intergenerational impactsand its negative effect on economic growth is significant (Cotte-Poveda, 2001, estimates the loss for Colombia).

At the macro economic level, violence implies a lower savingcapacity and lower investment in physical capital (Buvinic, Morrisonand Shifter, 1999) with the consequent impact on economic growthCotte-Poveda, 2001). Violence also causes efficient economicprojects to be omitted or the location of plants and ventures in sites that

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are suboptimal from an economic point of view but safer. Anothermacro economic impact is the reduced effectiveness of economicpolicies, specially fiscal policy, since violence hinders tax collectionand prevents an appropriate targeting of public spending (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000).Crimes against property imply sub-optimal transfers betweenindividuals that can represent up to 4.4.% of GDP in the case ofColombia (see Table 5).

Domestic violence has multiplying economic impacts by affectingwomen's insertion and productivity (as well as that of adults that weresubject to child abuse) in the labor market. Table 6 mentions someeffects on productivity such as health-based absenteeism and lack ofconcentration. In some cases, the abusing partner even goes to thevictim's workplace to intimidate her and control her actions. Thisproductivity reduction has an incidence on the income level, accordingto the economic compensation models, that could be demonstrated inthe case of Nicaragua and Chile (Morrison and Orlando, 1999). Byadding income losses based on domestic violence, according to theapproximate percentage of victims nationwide, the cost for society asa whole represents between 1.6% of GDP for Nicaragua and 2% ofGDP for Chile (Ibid.).

Multiplying social costs

The multiplying social effects include the intergenerationaltransmission of violence through learning, the erosion of social capital,a reduced quality of life and a lower participation of the population inthe democratic processes. The privatization of police functions is oneof the negative effects of the transmission of violence which hasimpacts on inequality and future violence (Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000)17.

17 In Guatemala, for example, there are close to 200 private security companies, witha staff of nearly 11,000, a figure equivalent to the officers in the National Policeat the end of 1996 (UNO, 1998).

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The low self-esteem of women who are victims of domesticviolence tends to maintain them isolated and hinders their participationin the labor market, access to credit, political participation and theirinvolvement in community programs and projects (Morrison andOrlando, 1999 and Heise, Ellsberg and Gotemoeller, 1999). Manytimes these women do not participate in the parent associations of theirchildren's schools. This scarce participation of women in the economic,political and social arena constitutes a barrier for economic and socialdevelopment since it has negative impacts on the labor market, thecapacity to overcome poverty, democratic institutions and the successof costly social programs and projects. Domestic violence plays a

fundamental role in the intergenerational transmission of violentbehaviors at a social and domestic level.

The intergenerational transmission of violence has been broadlydocumented (see conceptual framework section). Adults, the mediaand society in general, in many cases depict violence to children andyouth, as a quick way of solving conflicts and gaining control,accumulating wealth and acquiring approval (gangs). Thus, theindividual incorporates norms and attitudes that allow violentbehavior according to certain environmental stimuli and specificemotional circumstances.

Political violence, where police forces and/or paramilitarygroups became agents of violence perpetrated against certaingroups, especially against street children, undermines democracyand generates more violence. Political violence in some countrieshas generated a culture of silence and a greater tolerance to all typesof violence. State impunity in the face of violence generates, inturn, individual and group violence to "get justice by their ownhand" in street fights between gangs and lynching (McAlister, 2000and World Bank, 2000).

The erosion of the social and human capital existing in societies,as well as the reduction of its accumulation rate, has multiplyingnegative consequences for development since it increasesinequality, reduces economic growth and decreases the investmentin physical capital (affecting future economic growth) (World Bank,2000). Violence also has negative effects in the establishmentinstitutions that would lead to a better climate for development (World

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Bank, 2000). Finally, violence generates a vicious circle since theerosion of capital for development and institutions generates greaterfuture violence.

Table 6Consequences and costs of domestic violence

against women and children

Type of consequence or cost Presence in Latin America

Physical health: * Important cause of DALY (third cause of DALY* Injuries in Mexico City)* Chronic Pain Syndrome * Greater use of public emergency rooms by* Gastric and intestinal disturbances women victims (up to 8 times more in Uruguay)* Consumption of tobacco, e Greater use of health services (specialists, X-

alcohol and drugs rays, hospital admittance) (up to 10 times more* Weight excess or deficiency in Uruguay)* Lack of physical activity

Sexual and reproductive health * Victims of sexual abuse in childhood or* Undesired, teen-age and high risk witnesses of domestic violence have greater

pregnancies probability of teen-age pregnancy (Barbados)* Sexually transmitted diseases including * Lower use of condoms and contraceptives in

HIV-AIDS violent couples imply a greater number of* Complications during birth and post- undesired pregnancies (Barbados and Brazil)

partum and maternal deaths * More than double the probability of* New born health experiencing sexually transmitted diseases* Gynecological disturbances: infections, (Brazil and Haiti)

inflammatory pelvic disease, * Three times more complications at birth andhemorrhages, sexual dysfunction post partum (Mexico)

Mental Health e Greater depression (Nicaragua)v Problems of self-esteem * Higher suicide rate (Nicaragua)

* Depression * The effects of post traumatic stress syndrome in* Anxiety the case of domestic and child violence are* Suicide comparable to those of torture and kidnappingv Somatization

* Eating disorders

* Paranoia, phobias, addiction* Post traumatic stress syndrome

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Work-Productivity-Community* Lower labor participation

* Labor absenteeism * Women suffering severe physical violence earn

* Lack of concentration only between 39% and 57% of the eamings of

* Lack of initiative to assume non abused women in Chile and Nicaragua,

responsibilities respectively

* Apathy and lack of enthusiasm * Greater loss of work days for health reasons

* Acceptance of violence at the work site (Mexico)* Low income

* Difficulty to succeed in organizations

* Lower political participation* Lower participation in community and

school programs

Welfare of Children and * Children of abused women can be born withFuture Generations weight deficiencies of up to 560 grams

* Physical, mental and reproductive health (Mexico)

problems * Children of abused women present health and

e Problems in school and dropping out of school problems

school * Many street children run away because they are

* Alcohol, tobacco and drug consumption abused at home (Brazil, Venezuela)

* Running away from home * Aggressors and victims of domestic violence

* Precedent for future domestic and social were childhood witnesses or victims (Chile,

violence Nicaragua)

Source: Own development based on Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) (2000), Heise, Ellsberg and Gottemoeller (1999) and GarciaMoreno, (2000). For specific studies quoted in Inter American DevelopmentBank, see footnotes on pages 16 to 22.

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RISK FACTORS AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONSFOR VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICAAND THE CARIBBEAN

Interventions to combat violence are based on the prevention ofviolent behavior, through actions on risk factors and social control(including police and imprisonment actions) that are exercised onindividuals who have already committed or are considering committingacts of violence. Primary prevention actions are addressed at thepopulation at large with the aim of avoiding aggressive behaviors.Secondary prevention is targeted at high-risk groups and tertiaryprevention addresses individuals who have already displayed violentbehaviors or have been the victims of violence.

These definitions indicate important differences betweenprevention and control but, in reality, actions designed to combatviolence are part of a continuum that goes from prevention to control.There are preventive actions, such as teaching techniques for peacefulconflict resolution, which may be control strategies if they areimplemented on groups of people who have already committed violentacts. Likewise, police control actions, such as arrest or fines, have insome cases an important dissuasive impact that acts as prevention offuture violence on the part of other actors.

Strategies for violence prevention are based on an epidemiologicalapproach to violence. Epidemiology conceives violence as a publichealth problem since it is the cause of death and disability, it increasesthe frequency of consumption of alcohol and psychotropic substances,increases the risk of sexually transmitted diseases (sexual violence)and has impacts on depression and other mental conditions. Thesocial "generation-transmission" of violence increases in thepresence of certain risk factors and is reduced in the presence ofother protection factors (World Health Organization, 2002 and PanAmerican Health Organization, 1996). The risk factors, whetherindividual or environmental characteristics, increase the probability ofoccurrence of a violent event, although they are not the ultimatecause of the same. Through empirical studies, it is possible to

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determine, in a rather precise manner, the probability of occurrenceof certain violent events and the incidence of certain factors on thatprobability18 . Once the most important risk factors have beenidentified for a certain community, epidemiology proposes publicinterventions on them with the aim of preventing violence andreducing its frequency. The last stage in the epidemiological approachconsists of the analysis and evaluation of the effectiveness of theviolence preventive actions conducted in a particular context.

The epidemiological approach emphasizes a combination ofmultiple strategies in wide population groups since broader effectsmay be expected when several risk factors are treated simultaneouslyand when there is an early intervention (in the early years ofchildhood) (PAHO, 1996 and Rosenberg, 1999 in Moser and Lister,1999). In general, violence prevention is more efficient than violencecontrol actions; for example, in the United States it is estimated thatfor every dollar invested in prevention, it would be possible to save atleast 6 dollars invested in control programs (Buvinic, Morrison andShifter, 1999). Greenwood, Model, Rydell, and Cheese (1998)compare the effectiveness and the cost of four early violenceprevention programs with the law that requires permanentimprisonment after three serious offenses in California (USA)19 . Thisinvestigation concludes that the new penalization policy has an impactin reducing criminality rates; however, preventive programs(especially incentives to graduate from high school) have aremarkably higher cost-effectiveness (they prevent more crimes perdollar invested).

18 The following recent studies estimate statistically, using different methodologies,the impact of certain risk factors of violence in the United States: Markowitz, aand b (2000) and Grogger and Willis (1998). Studies of risk factors in LatinAmerica: Inter American Development Bank, Londofio, Gaviria and Guerrero(eds.) (2000) and World Bank, Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (eds.) (2001).

19 The early prevention programs considered were visiting and providing day care tobabies of poor single mothers, training parents in the peaceful resolution ofconflicts, providing incentives to continue highschool and supervision for juveniledelinquents.

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The following sections present a set of policies that have beenimplemented with success or can be implemented in Latin America,emphasizing the role of prevention related policies. First of all, itis necessary to have timely and detailed information of the typesand levels of violence at a local scale as well as on the major riskfactors within a community. In the framework of an integratedviolence prevention strategy, we have classified the range ofoptions available into policies with incidence in the long term andpolicies with incidence in the medium and short term. Finally, theviolence control and response actions of greater relevance for theregion are summarized.

Epidemiological surveillance systems

The Pan American Health Organization has establishedguidelines to set up Epidemiological Surveillance Systems tosupport preventive actions against violence. Such systems allowfor the systematic, ongoing, timely and reliable collection ofinformation and the analysis and interpretation of data not only toprovide a better analytical foundation for the design of preventivestrategies but also to evaluate the programs adopted (Concha andVillaveces, 2001). These systems can have a universal or localcharacter and be based on sample information or derive data frominstitutional records, depending on the case. For some types ofviolence, such as domestic violence, a "sentinel" epidemiologicalsurveillance system is suitable, in which one or more selectedinstitutions determine the trends of that type of violence and reportthem to the community and violence prevention agencies (Concha andVillaveces, 2001). Both the Pan American Health Organization and theInter-American Development Bank emphasize the role of localgovernment as the basic unit for violence surveillance, prevention, andcontrol programs in Latin America. These programs requirecoordination and support at a regional and national scale (Concha andVillaveces, 2001 and Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) 2000). In Colombia, the municipalities of Bogota andCali have developed, within their integrated programs to combat

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violence, epidemiological surveillance programs with timely andperiodical information (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinicand Morrison (eds.) 2000).

Violence risk factors and long-term solutions

Risk factors that play a role in the long term and involve changesin society as a whole are the so-called structural risk factors. Otherfactors that require long-term solutions are of the social type and thesocial development policies to mitigate them act on groups ofindividuals at high risk of becoming aggressors or victims.

The first structural risk factor for violence in Latin America is theinequality of income, assets and opportunities (Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, 1998). The countries with less equitable incomedistribution within the region are Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Guatemalaand Panama, while the countries with the lowest inequality are CostaRica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Mexico and Uruguay (EconomicCommission for Latin America, 1999). Inequality affects theopportunities to which individuals have access and the expectedbenefit of committing violent acts against property. Within theeconomic and social policies aimed at reducing inequality in LatinAmerica, increased access to primary and secondary education,improved educational quality in public schools and policies for thereduction of regional and sector income disparities should beunderlined (Inter American Development Bank, 1998).

Another risk factor for violence is poverty, even though it is not adirect cause of violent behavior. Poverty can generate perceptions ofdeprivation and feelings of frustration, as well as overcrowding andhigh household population density in major cities, all of which areviolence risk factors. One of the necessary conditions to reducepoverty in the long term is sustained economic growth and providingaccess to health and education to poor groups (World Bank, 2000)

Other risk factors with an important structural and socialcomponent are unemployment and juvenile school desertion (youthswho neither study nor work). Juvenile unemployment and droppingout of secondary school affect at least 8% of youths between ages 13

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and 17 in the majority of Latin American countries (EconomicCommission for Latin America, 1999). Since most of the crimes arecommitted by youths, lack of employment and school opportunitiesare particularly serious fostering the entry of youths in urban gangs.Among the social prevention strategies for violence linked to these riskfactors are programs providing incentives for youths to complete theirsecondary studies. Such incentives may be direct economicincentives, increasing the linkage between secondary school and theneeds of the labor markets (computer and accounting certificates),improving the relations of schools with the community and withyouths and improving the school environment. Supplementing schoolefforts, community tutoring programs or special activities for high-riskadolescents may contribute to a reduction of violence within thatgroup (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999, McAlister, 2000).

Another example of social development strategies that can havea significant long term impact are visits to mothers in a situation ofcritical poverty who can be given free pre and postnatal care toprevent injuries in the children that can increase the tendencytowards violent behavior. Such actions may be included withinpublic health programs targeting women, providing greater accessto reproductive health services and information for a healthypregnancy and child rearing (Rosenberg and Mercy, 1991). Civilsociety can support such early violence prevention actions throughnon governmental organizations providing assistance in the earlystages of child development and good quality day care services(public or private) (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinicand Morrison (eds.) 2000).

Another group of preventive structural interventions are thoserelated to the acceptance and promotion of violent behaviors on thepart of a community or society as a whole. Such prevention strategiesuse schools, health centers, religious organizations and the media todisseminate messages against violence and implement programs oftraining and peaceful conflict resolution, including reforms in theschool curricula and mediation programs between school mates. Themedia may instigate violence and can be successfully used to modifycollective attitudes towards violence in the long term. Some specificactions that employ the media are: reducing violent programming

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during children's viewing hours, training journalists in reporting violentcrime, designing peaceful coexistence messages ( soap operas and othercommercial programming can be used besides specific institutionalcampaigns) (Pan American Health Organization, 2000 and Sanjuan,1999). Two examples of programs addressing peaceful conflictresolution are "Mejor Hablemos " in Cali, Colombia, illustrating real lifestories with peaceful resolution and "Justicia para Todos " in Venezuela,in which the function of a peace judge is illustrated by using real lifecases (Sanjuan, 1999 and Primero Justicia, 2000).

In preventing domestic violence structurally it is important toeradicate discrimination against women in the educational system.Discrimination can be reduced by improving the opportunities of girlsat schools and reviewing curricula with gender perspectives(eliminating sex stereotypes from textbooks and including thecontributions of women in the arts and sciences). It is important toincrease equal participation of boys and girls in activities that werepreviously considered single-gender ones such as sports and familyeducation. Another preventive strategy in the educational system iscontrolling violence among school-mates and educating children inconnection with the negative effects of domestic violence (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000).

Media campaigns have also been successfully utilized in thestructural prevention of domestic violence. The campaigns have thefollowing objectives: changing the public's attitudes and values,creating awareness in the population, providing information onavailable support services and disseminating awareness of the law andpenalties connected with domestic violence among the real orpotential victims and aggressors. An example of a comprehensivecampaign against domestic violence in the media is a programimplemented in Argentina (Inter-American Development Bank,Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). Other structural preventionstrategies with good results are the inter-institutional informationcampaigns (health sector, educational sector, local government,community organizations) using local community networks (Heise,Ellsberg and Gottemoeller, 1999).

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Short-term violence risk factors and solutions

Given the magnitude and serious impacts of violence in LatinAmerica, long-term interventions are necessary but clearlyinsufficient for the region, since the results may take one generationor more and are dependent on complex economic, social and culturalfactors. On the other hand, political representatives (specificallyGovernors and Majors) have more incentives to implement actionsagainst violence if the results can be observed during their period inoffice. Consequently, an integrated strategy for the reduction ofviolence should also contain interventions offering short andmedium term results and with an impact on violent events that ismore observable. Such strategies act on risk factors close to theindividual that trigger or instigate violent behavior and on situationalfactors that relate to the opportunity of committing a violent act in anadvantageous manner for the aggressor.

In Latin America, in accordance with the information available,the main risk factors are alcohol consumption, especially duringholidays and weekends and the widespread availability of firearms.There are successful experiences in preventing these risk factors in theregion, taking into account the particular characteristics of the locality,with important impacts in violence reduction. The municipalities ofBogota and Cali, within their programs against violence, have adoptedlegislation limiting the sale of alcohol beverages during certain timesand days as well as health programs to reduce alcohol and drugconsumption (Inter American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) (2000)20.

In connection with gun carrying, important efforts have been madein El Salvador and Nicaragua to establish controls under thepacification agreements (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999). In Panama, themunicipality of Panama created the program Arms for Food with thecooperation of private food companies, where donations are turned

20 In Sao Paulo, there is a Program of Education and Resistance to Drugs in Schoolswith excellent results (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999).

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into food vouchers by the local government and exchanged forweapons without asking too many questions (Arriagada and Godoy,1999). In the case of Colombia, the municipalities of Bogota and Calihave restricted arms carrying. These cities have also implementedprograms for the pacific surrender of weapons with some monetaryincentive or within social works for the community (programs of armsin exchange for baby spoons) (Inter-American Development Bank,Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). However, it is also necessary toconduct efforts at a national and international scale to regulate armstraffic and availability.

The situational risk factors that can be managed through measuresdesigned to reduce opportunities for specific forms of violence(burglary, vandalism and robbery, for example). Such interventionsshould make the use of violence by an aggressor more difficult, costlyand less advantageous by modifying the environment (more lighting,doors and windows with security mechanisms, alarms, mirrors innarrow corridors, among others) (State of Victoria, 2000). Theseinterventions may be public or private, but local governments cancontribute to educating the population on ways of securing their homesand cars, as well as incorporating greater security in housingconstruction programs and neighborhood improvements. A specialcase of actions on situational risk factors is based on Kelling's "brokenwindow theory", according to which the deterioration of the physicalenvironment, lack of appropriate lighting and absence of police in thecommunity incentivate violence (Buvinic, Morrison and Shifter, 1999and PAHO, 1996). This principle was successfully applied in NewYork City (Ibid.). The initiatives of Latin American municipalitiesin connection with improving the condition of parks and streets andincreasing their illumination, as well as expanding police patrols indangerous neighborhoods have had positive results. However,considering urban development projects that include infrastructurefor sports, recreation, and community organizations can ostensiblyexpand the range of actions (Ibid.).

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Violence control and social answers

For an effective control of violence and to enhance the dissuasivepower of control measures, the expected cost of committing a violentcrime plays a fundamental role. This expected cost is a function of theprobability of being caught, the probability of being tried andconvicted and the years in jail. In Latin America, it is common forjustice systems to operate poorly, which does not contribute toviolence control and generates greater violence because the sense ofimpunity causes new violent episodes and justifies taking justice inyour own hands (Arriagada and Godoy, 1999)21. Therefore, incontrolling violence it is necessary to consider the reforms of thejudicial and prison systems as well as the police forces of the region.

Judicial reforms should include instances for the peacefulresolution of conflicts where a court is not required to settle thedispute, such as the "justice houses" in Colombia and the peace judgeprogram in Venezuela (Justicia para Todos, 2002). These programsbring justice closer to the ordinary citizen and in turn reinforce trainingand institutional mechanisms for conflict resolution.

One of the interesting reform experiences of police action in theregion is the application of policing models that work with thecommunity through consultation and also by improving therelationship with community organizations. These models include apolice force that identifies and responds to immediate violence riskfactors, (reporting failures in street lighting, for example). A violencecontrol strategy that has afforded good results has been to modify thestyle of patrolling, from random to focused in zones with a highconcentration of crime and during certain hours of the day. Such policestrategy requires profound reforms of the police forces and even thecreation of new municipal police forces. The necessary reforms in theexisting police forces or the characteristics of the new police forces aresummarized below (see Arriagada and Godoy, 1999):

21 A common case is the lynching of known criminals (neighborhood scourges orrapists) in many poor urban neighborhoods. Another common case is revengebetween gangs and armed bands.

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increase educational requirements and improve police trainingand education;

* create strategic plans for the police to be capable to preventpotential crime scenarios;

* reduce police functions, specially administrative ones;

* increase police pay;

* strengthening State and civil society control over the action ofpolice forces.

Among the community policing experiences in the region are thoseof the municipalities of Cali, Medellin and Bogota in Colombia, SaoPaulo, Rio de Janeiro and Belo Horizonte in Brazil and Villa Nueva inGuatemala (Moreno, 2002, Candina, 2002 and Lunecke, 2002). Mostof these experiences found a first obstacle in the fear of the populationto police forces given the long tradition of mistrust stemming from theabuses committed against the population in Latin America. One of theproblems encountered in Colombia is the coexistence of two policesystems, one national and another municipal, within one same city, withdifferent methods and philosophies (Inter-American DevelopmentBank, Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). However, the threeColombian cities that adopted community policing within integratedviolence reduction plans managed to improve the relationship of thepolice with the community (Ibid. and Moreno, 2000). In the case ofSao Paulo, better communication has been achieved between the policeand the community, but public opinion continues to consider that thepolice is inefficient (Moreno, 2002). In the concrete case of Sao Paulo,the police agency adopted the philosophy of community policing, butthe State has failed to commit sufficient human and financial resourcesfor the project. In Belo Horizonte, a first model of community policingfailed totally in part due to the isolation of the program within the policeorganization itself and the strong dedication of the members of theprogram to activities designed to raise funds for the same (Candina,2002). Recently, Belo Horizonte adopted a performance-based police

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model that incorporated the criticism at the previous communitypolice program and based its strategy in planning police actions, onthe basis of preparing crime maps and decentralizing the responseto community demands. From the review of these experiences itmay be concluded that they have been successful in terms ofmodifying the relationships between the community and the policeand in reducing police abuse. However, given the recentimplementation of some experiences and the lack of appropriateimpact studies, the incidence of community policing on violencereduction is not known with certainty.

As with the control of domestic violence, the first step is to makeit legally punishable, which is not yet the case throughout the region.In controlling domestic violence it is necessary to improve theresponse of health, police and judicial agencies by means of trainingand sensitization on this issue. Some countries like Costa Rica aredriving programs to improve domestic violence diagnosis and care byhealth organizations (Inter-American Development Bank, Buvinic andMorrison (eds.) 2000). Detecting domestic violence and providingspecialized care includes emotional and social support to the victimsthrough emergency telephone lines, safe houses for battered womenand children and care centers for the victims of violence.

A RESEARCH AGENDA FOR STRATEGIES TOREDUCE VIOLENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

In spite of the great strides in the investigation of violence in LatinAmerica during the last decade, there are important gaps both at thelevel of basic information and in the analysis to design strategies tocombat violence through prevention and control. In the coming years,the most relevant research agenda for violence reduction is to identifywhich are the well-performing government and civil societyinterventions in the Latin American context. Below there are a seriesof recommendations for future investigation intended to improve theinformation and analysis available for the design of public policiesagainst violence:

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* Violence indicators and estimates of violence cost

It is necessary to count with more comparable violence indicatorsfor Latin America and with a greater breakdown of the same accordingto the characteristics of the victims, the aggressors, and the place (ruralor urban, neighborhood or street). Most of the information available isbased on homicide rates and robbery frequency at a national scale, frompolice statistics and health care services. Such statistics are subject toconsiderable under-reporting and biases according to the type of violentbehavior. For that reason it is necessary to conduct victimizationsurveys in more countries and more frequently, to supplement theinformation provided by judicial and health agencies. It is equallyimportant to carry out victimization surveys that include excludedethnic and social groups. However, a disadvantage of victimizationsurveys is the high cost involved in generating a representative sampleand conducting periodical surveys. In connection with estimating thecost of violence, most of the studies on this issue in the region use anaccounting methodology since it can produce cost indicators eventhough incomplete information is available (Teruel, Villoro, Morrisonand Hammit, 2001). However, this methodology has severaldisadvantages, among them the possibility of double accounting sincemany times the information is forthcoming from different sources.Another important disadvantage is that it is not a very precise indicatorof what society is willing to pay for less violence (the value thatindividuals place on less violence) since the expenses incurred,especially in the public sector, can be remarkably different to theexpenditure demanded by society. Considering such disadvantages, itis necessary to have more studies using other methodologies to estimatethe population's willingness to pay, such as studies employing hedonicmodels. These models estimate the price of a reduction of violence,based on the variations of housing prices, for example, in different cityzones with different levels of violence (controlling for the othercharacteristics of housing and zones) (Teruel, Villoro, Morrison andHammit, 2001). Among the disadvantages of the hedonic models isthat they require detailed data and that the willingness of the public topay for lower levels of violence may be affected by the various incomelevels since this variable is always measured with a large error

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percentage. Another methodology to investigate the willingness topay is the method of contingent valuation in which individuals aredirectly questioned on their preferences using special instruments.This methodology suffers in a much more evident way of theproblem of sensitivity to valuation connected with income level,since it is very difficult to control for this variable when directlyquestioning a group of people.

* Risk and protection factors at a local level

For prevention and control plans at a national scale to succeed it isimportant to have programs with municipalities as the executingagencies (Pan American Health Organization, 2000 and InterAmerican Development Bank, 2000). Municipal epidemiologicalsurveillance systems require information at a local scale to effectivelyattack violence risk factors in a specific community.

* The impact of violence on development

Although the impact of violence on development is known, giventhe theoretical and empirical evidence from developed countries, thereare few studies of these impacts in the majority of the countries in theregion. More research is required on the impact of violence on healthand the calculation of healthy years of life lost as a result of violence(DALY). It is also necessary to have more estimates of the impact ofviolence in the formation of human capital, both in adults and children.There is a set of studies mostly in the case of Colombia, about theimpact of violence on productivity, savings, income distribution,investment, and economic growth that should be conducted for alarger number of countries (see Cotte Poveda, 2001, Gaviria andVelez, 2001, Morrison and Orlando, 1999).

Relationship between individual traits,social exclusion and violence

Social exclusion prevents a group of individuals from accessinghuman, physical and social capital (Borjas, 1995). The segregation of

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certain groups can produce higher levels of violence by originatingethnic conflicts and social unrest. On the other hand, violence takesa disproportionate toll in lower income groups (Gaviria and V6lez,2001). In Latin America, there are no victimization and aggressionrates available, taking into account variables such as belonging to acertain ethnic group. Studies on the profile of apprehendedcriminals make it possible to conclude that most of the aggressorsare young poor males. However, these studies do not present acomplete picture of the characteristics of aggressors and victimssince only certain aggressors are in prison, so they do not constitutea representative sample of the population. Another area of interest isstudying police abuse and judicial discrimination against individualsof indigenous or African descent (Sutherland, 2001).

Violence against children and the elderlv

There are a small number of studies on domestic and socialviolence against children that need to be replicated in more countriesof the region. There are no comparable cross-country statistics ofviolence against children. Likewise, it is necessary to conduct studieson urban gangs in a larger number of cities and build cross-countrycomparable indicators of this phenomenon. On the other hand, thereare no studies or statistics capturing domestic and social violenceagainst the elderly in Latin America.

Relationship between social capital, human capital andviolence

Moser and Mclllwaine's studies (2000) on poor urbancommunities of Guatemala and Colombia provide evidence of therelationship between the destruction of social capital and violence, aswell as proposals to combat violence on the basis of strengthening thesocial capital existing in the communities2 2. Since each community'ssocial capital has its own characteristics, it would be very useful toconduct this type of studies in other urban and rural communities ofthe region.

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At an aggregate level, the relationship between human capital andviolence presents great complexity, so it has not been easy todetermine empirically whether a higher average educational level inthe population reduces violence (World Bank, Fajnzylber, Ledermanand Loayza (eds.) 2001). In fact, what seems to be relevant is therelationship between inequality of educational opportunities andinequality in income distribution that, in turn, has a direct influence inviolence. Investigations on the relationship between education qualityand income distribution within communities and individuals couldthrow more light on which are the interventions in the educationalsystem that have a greater impact in reducing future income inequalityand, thus, violence.

Institutionalframework for the design and implementationofpolicies for violence prevention and control

It is necessary to count with more research on the institutionalframeworks required for the design and implementation of violenceprevention and control that are suggested in this paper. To implementsome policies connected with violence control, such as replacingimprisonment with alternative penalties, it is necessary to reform thecriminal code in some countries. Another important problem inconnection with violence control and prevention policies iscoordination mechanisms between the local and national agents andthose of different sectors (health, education, justice, etc.). The need forlegal and institutional reforms should be studied by means of specificresearch.

* Impact of interventions on violent attitudes and behaviors

With the purpose of identifying which government interventionsare well performing in the Latin American context, it is necessary toconduct studies of impact and evaluations of the control andprevention programs that have already been implemented. Given thescarce information, the success of some programs is measured byobserving the evolution of homicide rates. Since homicide rates aresensitive to many factors, including the data gathering methodology,

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and in many cases no figures are available at a regional or communitylevel, it is fundamental to use specific instruments to determine theimpact of concrete interventions on violent behaviors and attitudes.There are specific instruments to this end that have been validated andused in other countries. These instruments should become part of theintervention design. Victimization surveys are also a valuable tool tomeasure the impact of reforms or new programs through before andafter comparisons of victimization indexes. Victimization surveysmake it possible to determine the effectiveness of an intervention aftercontrolling for the other factors that may have affected victimizationrates through the period under consideration.

Dissemination of good practices for violenceprevention and control

There is an important gap in the dissemination of good practicesin the region. Experiences such as community policing and integratedprevention and control programs in municipalities of Colombia mayhave much to contribute to the design of policies against violence inother countries and communities (Inter American Development Bank,Buvinic and Morrison (eds.) 2000). In connection with domesticviolence against women and children, there are educational guides andleaflets developed in a friendly and simple language, within thecontext of public health programs, in the United States, Africancountries and in Mexico, that could be very useful (Heise, Ellsberg andGottemoeller, 1999).

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CONCLUSIONS

The high levels of violence, in Latin America, in its variousmanifestations constitute an important barrier to the welfare of itspopulation and the region's economic and social development. Theincidence of the various manifestations of violence has direct costs andnegative impacts on health, productivity, savings and investment. Itmay be concluded from this chapter that a strategy for the region'seconomic and social development needs to include violence reduction,as a fundamental priority.

In connection with diagnosing the problem of violence, thereare homicide rates at a national scale and some victimizationsurveys, but there is still a lack of basic and timely information onthe incidence of violence at a local scale in most countries.Likewise, there are insufficient indicators regarding domestic andsocial violence against women, children and the elderly, so thatspecialized studies and surveys of these issues are required. Withinthe diagnosis of the problem, there is a lack of sufficient data on thepercentage of victims and aggressors within groups that are sociallyexcluded based on ethnic or socio-economic reasons. Systems ofepidemiological surveillance at a national, regional and local scalecan provide significant contributions to the generation anddissemination of information on violence and risk factors forspecific regions and communities.

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In order to prevent and control violence in Latin America it isimportant to design long-term strategies with the aim of combatingstructural and social risk factors (inequality, unemployment, lack ofpostnatal care for mothers at critical poverty levels, etc.) at a national,regional, and local scale. On the other hand, given the magnitude ofviolence, there is a requirement for strategies with observable impacton the short and medium term with the purpose of combating theproximal (alcohol and fire arms) and situational (lighting, policepresence) risk factors. For the implementation of these programs, it isessential for municipalities and local governments to becomeexecuting agencies given the multiplicity of manifestations of violenceacross localities. Municipalities must achieve greater effectiveness inthe intervention on proximal and situational factors. Some successfulexperiences in the region that have used an integrated approach toviolence prevention and control at a local scale include informationsystem at a municipal level, educational programs and informationcampaigns, improvement of public spaces and reforms of the policeforce using community policing and problem solving schemes.

It may be concluded that although there are reports on valuableexperiences in the region, there are still wide gaps in connection withthe knowledge of policies and programs that may operate in each ofthe countries. Additionally, it is necessary to achieve a greaterdissemination of valuable experiences and good practices in thecontinent. The most relevant research agenda for the coming years inconnection with violence is that which identifies which are thegovernment and civil society interventions that have good outcomes inthe Latin American context. With the purpose of identifying suchinterventions, it is necessary to conduct impact studies and evaluationsof the prevention and control programs already implemented, usingspecific instruments to measure directly the incidence of theintervention on violent attitudes and behaviors.

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CHAPTER VI

LATIN AMERICA:CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATICINSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE

THE OBSTACLES AND THE ISSUES

CARLOS STRASSER

CARLOS STRASSER

INTRODUCTION

Always sensible to both theory and experience, Giovanni Sartoriwrote a few years ago the sharp sentence "Institutions andconstitutions cannot perform miracles. But good governments arehardly possible without good government instruments"(1994:8).

On the same subject, the summary chapter of an important book onpolitical reforms in Latin America concludes, in a vein that is alsofound in a score of papers in recent years: "(T)he consideration on howto improve the operation of democracy should not be treated assomething subordinated or subsequent to the processes of economicpolicy changes. Rather, the ultimate success of such efforts is deeplydependent on the development of legitimate democratic institutionsthat adequately represent citizens, hold public officials accountable,reinforce efficiency and uphold the rule of law". And then, in the samesense, "it is increasingly understood that the broader effort ofmodernizing the State and the institutions, which has been identifiedas the key to the region's social and economic development, cannot besuccessful without simultaneous progress in the quality of democraticgovernance. The predictability and soundness of the regulatory andpolicy framework, the guarantees for property rights and theenforcement of contracts, effective and equitable investments in thehealth and education of citizens and in infrastructure are all vital

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LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE

conditions of sustained investment and balanced development. But

creating this environment for growth", the authors insist, requires all of

the above (M. Pyne et al. 2002:xi. My re-translation back to English).

Today there seems to be an extended and growing academic as well

as political consensus on what the two quotations assertl. This is

regularly illustrated both in academic publications and in the

periodical documents of the main international organizations: UNDP,

World Bank, IDB, ECLAC itself, even if they each have their different

nuances (see N. Rabotnikof, 1999). Beneath such differences,

however, there continue to exist some basic approaches that have

currently become broadly extended2. The main one would be that

pointed out by J.Williamson, in the sense that nowadays our attention

should shift to "strengthening a series of key State institutions, the

efficient functioning of which is important for rapid and/or equitable

growth" (1997: 56).But in the above there is one issue that remains in the shadows, and

that is the one we are concerned with. Be it to fight against poverty or,

in our case, with the purpose of effecting political changes or reforms

and institutional engineering or programs in Latin America, the

approaches of more than a few respectable and respected papers look

rather lightly at the concepts, the theories, more generally: at the

frameworks of understanding. Also in part, but stemming from the

same roots, at the experiences in implementing programs (their

outcomes) or the appreciation and learning derived from such

experiences in Latin America, or the consideration of the conditions of

possibility and the possibility of such conditions in the area, i.e. the

"hard" realities existing in the same -political, social economic,

cultural, historical. An example of these: the web of power in definitely

I Several authors go further. For example: "The State reform, a process demanded from multiple

fronts, also has multiple connotations. However, some basic consensus begin to gradually

emerge. One is that, under the new historical conditions, the State needs to renew its own

institutionality to be better able to serve to the uplifting of society, and, ultimately, to social

economic development. Another basic consensus is that, for this purpose, it is necessary for the

State apparatus to become truly public and also that the public space should not be limited to the

State" (Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau, 1998:17). But we will dwell on this below, especially in

chapter 11.2 Korzeniewicz and Smith even note, "Although their precise formulation is quite different, some

close, unsuspected and surprising parallels may be observed between the reconstructed post-

cold war discourse of the left and the issues, strategies and polices advocated by the technocrats

of the multilateral institutions" (2000:409).

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CARLOS STRASSER

class societies with their power relationships, the web of traditions andcultural identities, and so on. There is thus a lot which may be crucial and,more than once, taken for granted when not altogether disregarded.Whence, following the lack of great success of such approaches, it is notcertain that it will suffice to recondition them by incorporating successiveamendments and additions, equivalent to what in the theory of science iscalled "ad hoc clauses", clauses that, in the end, have the purpose ofmaintaining the working hypotheses 3. My assumption is that we have togo deeper, at least intellectually.

At this point in time the observation is particularly relevant, followingso much knowledge and trial & error accumulated in academia and inpractice after (if we count as from the Alliance for Progress) decades ofstudies, proposals and endeavors pro-democracy or pro-equality, withsome good results and some progress, now above all in the political andmacroeconomic order, but progress that is not always homogeneous norsustained and has not even been secured and, even worst, with so manyresounding failures and horrendous poverty, evident to the naked eye 4.To go further, there is even no lack of impressive and highly sophisticatedtechnical studies on the matter which, from a purely scientific point ofview (I mean: beyond the frameworks that every point of view implies inour disciplines) are, however, unacceptable. It is dramatic to observe thatsome come from regional institutions that are powerful and wellendowed in so many senses5.

3 In this sense, one author says: "Both the Washington neoconsensus as the preceding one are stillmarked by the hypothesis of modernization theories (0) The objective of 'second generationreforms' is to deepen, complete and correct the insufficiencies of 'first generation' marketreforms (0) The emphasis continues to be placed on the State's efficiency and the effectivenessof public policies rather than on the legitimacy of the State and the responsiveness of publicpolicies to citizen's demands, in particular to the demands of the disadvantaged (°) It is not analtemative to the preceding one, but rather a continuation°" (C. Santiso, 2001.)

4 For a useful comprehensive critical review of the successive approaches, and their applicationsor developments as well as their results (although mainly centered on social policies, but notonly, and partly on the Argentine experience, but not uniquely), see Cardarelli and Rosenfeld,chapter 1 (1998).

5 1 will venture to mention specifically the 1999 IDB Report "America Latina frente a laDesigualdad", coordinated by Ricardo Hausman, at that time IDB Chief Economist. I made itscritique in Strasser (1999) pages 144-153 (with footnotes in pages 185-187) and pages 29-30.On the subject of international agencies and their reports or studies and policies, it is alsopossible to refer to Carlos M. Vilas (2000), who, in a more general and comprehensive mannerbut likewise and in any case specifically, made a critical analysis of those from the World Bankin the last decade of the 20th Century. Similarly, see D.Tussie's compilations (1997 and 2001),which include the IDB.

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To date, a modicum of precaution already suggests that it would be

convenient to once again situate or, in any case, situate perhaps anew

the major substantive issue that concerns us: a democracy for Latin

America. Capable of providing for its economic and social

development, one that in turn points towards and is shored up by

growth (a sufficiently stable growth) to provide for a greater prosperity

and dignity, greater equality and equity, greater material and spiritual

well-being for its people, uplifting them to levels at least decent or

morally satisfactory. Something which about half of its inhabitants, to

say the least, currently lack. Now, ours is an attempt, an effort in that

sense, an attempt to dive below the surface and see if something is

found that needs to be considered that is not being sufficiently

considered. Or that, when it happens to be, is treated more like a

"problem" to be solved than in terms of a densely interweaved and truly

hard datum of Latin American reality.The enquiry to which we point will in the end hinge on the following:

When in Latin America we face realities that afford lamentations and thus

we say "It is necessary to act in this regard", How far are we ready to go

and, most particularly, how far is it really possible to go?This is a key question. Yet it requires, in turn, previously

deciphering which are exactly the challenges and the threats or, more

generally, the main obstacles to democracy in Latin America; and in

due course it then becomes an inquiry on whether such key issues can

be overcome and, if so, how. Nothing about this will, however, obtain

an answer as required if, again, on the way we fail to revisit as much

as necessary those data and levels which are basic. The ones we will

underline here are essentially political, as seen from political theory;

there we are headed.

The essential concepts

The trouble with the literature that is more widely disseminated

and en vogue nowadays would not so much dwell in the definition of

its concepts, not even the scarce ones that are fundamental here. While

it is too certain that some are not always made explicit, it is also true

that they are quite consolidated and may perhaps be taken for granted.

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CARLOS STRASSER

To start with, I am referring to expressions such as democracy,governability, governance, which despite all the debates alwayspossible -from the very old to the brand new- currently appear tobe quite cutout and pretty well established, even if sometimes silenced.However, for consistency purposes, here it is important to make theseconcepts explicit.

We understand by democracy what is also understood as such,typically, by two renowned and already classical authors such asNorberto Bobbio and Robert A. Dahl6. Said in my own words: as agovernment regime and a system of political procedures ultimatelybased on the principles of popular sovereignty and individualfreedoms, rights and guaranties set by the Constitution; i.e. as a twoheaded body that needs and simultaneously uses its two heads:Majority and Constitution.

Democracy (a liberal democracy) is then, by definition, agovernment regime based on the two above principles, but then, andalso by definition, now of regime, it necessarily is a series offundamental procedures and institutions. As for those that arecharacteristic of it, their best enunciation -so well known- is thatprovided by Dahl, who counts seven. We may briefly summarize themas follows: decisions are made by elected and periodically reelected orreplaced officials / by means of free elections / in which all adults vote/ who, in turn, can all of them stand for public office and attain it. / Allcitizens enjoy freedom of expression / as well as access to diverse andnon monopoly sources of information / and the right to formindependent associations, including those of a political nature (Dahl,1991: 280-281).

A different question, of course, is the previous or concomitantfactors for democracy (thus conceptualized) to be or to become reality.It is on the lack or the presence and the mode of presence or, as the

6 Bobbio (1985), Dahl (1991). In other contexts, for other issues, I would add to their definitionswhat emerges for the liberal-democratic tradition (in which Dahl and Bobbio are inscribed) fromthat which is implied in the republican tradition as may be reconstructed following the studiesby Q. Skinner, H. Baron, D. Waley, J.G.A. Pocock, F Meinecke and others (P. Pettit or H. B&jar,closer to us). with its emphasis on self government, a collective or common good, civic virtue,a committed and active citizenry, equality and patriotism, etc. But at this point I do not wish tocomplicate the discussion to which this paper is devoted.

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case may be, the combination and the balance of such "conditions ofpossibility" (political, social, economic, cultural, historic,international) that in turn depends, country by country, the veryexistence as well as the type or the degree as well as the more specifictraits of existence of democracy, its limits and precariousness. Thisdistinction at three levels amongst a) the concept, b) the actualconditions of possibility of that which is conceptualized, and c) theempirical types and degrees of what is conceptualized: democracy, isfundamental and should be rigorously maintained. Only this canprevent such disputes and confusions of so little use as the eternal onebetween "formal democracy" and "substantive democracy" that, soinappropriately, has regularly taken place at the level of the conceptyet mixing a and b and c -needlessly, to be sure. In concept, at least inthe first and classical understanding, democracy is political and single;what it designates, however, either exists or does not exist in realityaccording to the context, the contexts; and, if it does, it exists invarious subtypes and degrees, be it in one form or another and to agreater or lesser extent (Strasser, 1990/91). If desired, those contextscan also be called "democratic". But, in any case, strictly they are

para-democratic.As for governability, the term simply expresses that a given

political regime is capable (and shows itself capable) of absorbing themajor social conflicts or conflicts of interest present in society, orrather of containing an eventual social indiscipline, while itconfigures, formulates and applies with effect its governmentdecisions through time. Although there are many definitions ofgovernability, ours does violence to none and instead recovers theessence of most, if not all7. Now, democratic governability means that

the government has effective command over society by means of thedemocratic regime itself.

7 Some useful analyses and schematics, in this respect, in A. Camou (2001) and C. Sojo (2001).

For an introduction to the history of the various ideological and theoretical understandings, see

D.H. Corr6chano (2000).

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CARLOS STRASSER

Governance is a term that does not translate easily into Spanish; itis usually written as gobernaci6n, which has previous meanings, orgobernancia or gobernanza, a neologism that has finally beenaccepted by the Spanish Royal Academy. Beyond that and moreimportantly, it is not easy, either, to demarcate its meaning, whichvaries from source to source 8. Essentially, however, we propose thatthe term refers to a form of government complementary of the regimeestablished by the Constitution, in our case the democratic regime. Infact, the complement is just that, perhaps also a refinement in theoperation of the regime, but no substitute. Of course it should notnecessarily be one, as it is sometimes seemingly suggested.

If we follow the drift or the specifications that the concept had overtime, the idea of governance was readjusted. First it was (a) thatthrough it the government leads, and then (b) that through it thegovernment incorporates -now in a less hierarchical, more horizontalas well as more decentralized or less concentrated manner, with voiceand sometimes with vote- various subjects and sectors ororganizations even of a private, or non governmental, nature in thegeneral process and/or in various defined processes of agreeing,formulating and implementing public decisions (R. Maintz: 2000).The reference was particularized on groups or organizations (and thenetworks thereof) such as, for example, the NGOs or otherassociations of the so called "third sector", sometimes in cooperationwith international groups and agencies, or with the same associationsof business or labor as after the Second World War, or even muchbefore (beginnings of the 20th Century), with which this three bandgame baptized as "neocorporatism" by P. C. Schmitter and G.Lehmbruch (1979) was established in parallel to the oficial one.

Precisely. "Neo-corporatism", so extensively considered in theliterature since the 1970's until early in the 1990's, today has perhapsbecome included in the very idea of governance. For "governance"

8 Compare the development of the concept and theory of govemance in R. Maintz (2000). Also,International Social Science Journal, number 155 devoted to "Govemance", especially thearticles by G. Stoker, B. Jessop and C.H. de Alcantara. Stocker's article in particular, breaks outand develops with precision the five major aspects in the ultimate and more refinedconceptualization of govemance (p. 18). See also Cerrnllo (200 1); although slightly confusing,it presents a review of the various senses of the concept in the documents and publications ofdifferent national and intemational organizations.

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too, as a more general mode and a set of mechanisms associated to the

constitutional regime -when not seeped into it-, is already assumedto "follow" or else to cooperate with the government for its (the

goverment's) own ends, e.g in the shaping or the implementing of

public policies, as well as concerning the governability of the social

system itself. In fact, the emergence of it, first empirical and then

conceptual, was subsequent to the increased novelty & complexity and

the multiplication of actors & issues in the agendas over the last

decades. That is, during the period of transition from the social State

to the market State, a shift that already at mid course turned out not to

be precisely linear or lacking learning and corsi e recorsi with regardto processes such as, e.g., the administrative decentralizations and the

so called "devolutions" to civil society.However, it must be noted that, if on the one side governance and

its actors can simultaneously contribute to (i) governability and (ii) the

lightening of some burdens of the State, with the advantage of

favoring a better or more immediate targeting on the objects of the

activity, a greater social participation or control, and a more immediateand increased transparency / effectiveness / efficiency, on the other

hand (iii) they tend towards a lower institutional fixity and a certain

lack of coordination, or to the dilution of ultimate responsibilities, as

well as to a legitimacy which is not always increased but rather and

contradictorily is usually lessened. In this sense, different surveys

indicate that the citizinery, in general, continues widely preferring to

have the State itself as the agent of the public interest and responsiblefor it. Besides, (iv) such an attempt to governance is not infrequentlyshown to be without power precisely when the differences in interestsand the internal disagreements put an end to the degree of self-

regulation that would characterize it (G. Stoker, 1998).To conclude with the concept, let us say, in the end, that from an

additional perspective -more "doctrinarian" in air than denotative-governance or, precisely, good governance would imply "really"legitimate governments that in turn provide room for socialparticipation in terms of an array of public governmental and non-

governmental actors, consensus or agreements between such partiesand their bureaucracies and institutions, effective / efficient

administrations, and transparency. Actors currently so relevant as the

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multilateral lending agencies have adopted this point of view,especially the World Bank; initially as a means towards the greatersuccess of the programs for the development of civil society and,lately, as a value and an end in itself (D. Tussie: 2000). In this sense,good governance can thus be considered to be inscribed withindemocratic governability and intended to assist it.

I repeat, we will later return to these issues, particularly to the thirdone, that of governance9 . In the meantime, let us go back to theIntroduction at the point where we left off. In our criterion, this isrequired to later focus on the issue of this paper's title. If it is a ratherlong sort of detour, we have not managed nor wanted to abridge itmore than we could: mere quotations or references would not suffice,nor would assumptions: the issue is basic and we must clarify it.

RESHAPING (AND ADDING COMPLEXITY TO)THE ISSUE OF OBSTACLES

In order to define the threats and challenges to democracy and alsoto governability and governance in Latin America, we can still refer toManuel Alcantara (1998: 152). He groups these challenges in fourbroad categories. The "first one, of a strictly political nature, wouldcomprise the relationships between the armed forces and thegovernment, terrorism, the poor performance of the Judiciary, people'sdisinterest in politics and the conflicts between the Legislative andExecutive Powers. The second category comprises socio-economicvariables and the foreign debt. The third category has a clear socialexpression and is made up of crime, burglary and robbery and bystrikes, work stoppages and labor conflicts. And, finally, the fourthcategory contemplates a socio-economic component that includesunemployment and extreme poverty."

9 See the section on Government, governability, governance and State, page 443

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Here or for the time being, it is not necessary to dwell more on this

four categories, which are sufficiently understandable. We would

merely add that these threats and challenges are part of a more global

concept, that of the obstacles to democracy -among which one cannot

leave aside the political, social, economic and cultural processes and

structures which are inherently opposed or even at conflict with the

same. Some threats and challenges derive from them, it is obvious, or

are clearly their "function" 10 Just to refer to the first item in

Alcantara's list, in modem Latin America a military coup has never

failed to obtain an essential support by certain civic-economic and

social sectors (or some other notorious, national or foreign associates

& sponsors). By the same token, the "people's lack of interest in

politics", today a universal issue, fails to refer to certain deep

structures and modalities of contemporary politics. Consequently,

such a disinterest is not only, nor maybe even mainly, about what is so

repeatedly mentioned today: an extended corruption, weak political

systems and parties, presidentialism, etc., but also and above all what

lies behind them: the frameworks. Let us then return to them.In effect, let's begin by turning around Sartori's statement quoted at

the beginning so that, without being at all unfaithful to the author, his

sentence becomes "It will be difficult to have good governments

without good government instruments. However, institutions and

constitutions cannot make miracles". We haven't changed the

meaning but we have shifted the emphasis. "Institutions cannot make

miracles", that is the question. Neither can institutional programs. A

democracy or a democratic govemability or a governance (democratic

or not so democratic) successfully addressing the challenges, the

threats and, more generally, the obstacles, not only depend, nor do they

mainly depend, on the institutional programs or the institutions and

what they allow de jure or de facto. Using methodological jargon,

certain other "intervening" or "independent variables" are

fundamental; in any case, an analysis of the issues has to be more

systemic. It is with that purpose that in the following chapters we will

try to introduce or reintroduce into our business some issues that are

10 See J. Prats Catala (1999) throughout the text.

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CARLOS STRASSER

not being considered today or are but little considered, and which weyet find to be of particular relevance.

On the capability of politics

In an early article, at the beginning of the 1970's, Claus Offe (1992,chapter 1) clearly described the conflict of rationales to whichgovernments under a democratic regime are exposed in our times. Onthe one hand, they owe themselves to legal legitimacy; that is, to thatwhich since late modernity constitutes their main source of authority,as Max Weber archetypically presented it. On the other hand, andincreasingly since the emergence of mass societies between the 19thand the 20th Century, they need to respond effectively to the demandsof their constituencies, multiplied and in continuous reproduction indemocratic countries. One and the other rationale, or the legitimacyof origin and the legitimacy of exercise, are usually in tension and,more than a few times, force governments to bend in favor of one tothe detriment of the other. The conflict can only be overcome by anactive search of sufficient social consensus with the purpose ofgetting around the crossroad, something which implies a definitepolitical action (designed to win the coalitional support of someactors or to mobilize citizens or public opinion) in order to cut thisGordian knot with one bias or the other and carry the governmentforward in favor of one line.

The issue is connected with the theme of the capablity of politics.Regarding which we currently have a debate, if not new, one that hasbeen reinstalled with new force in the academic agenda by thecircumstances of the last span of the 20th Century and the turn to the21st. The stands are well summarized in a recent book by Emilio DeIpola (2001). It deals, precisely, with what might be called thecreativity of politics -as opposed to politics being dependent on aglobal or else broader system, an assumption under which politics, theother way round, would operate within already given margins andconditions, in a subordinated way, and without being able to make anybig or specific difference.

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According to our author, these are the polar metaphors to conceive

of politics. It is understood as part of a system -or as a subsystem-

functional to the whole, which makes it weak; an artifact with a

moderate, limited, subsidiary capacity, such as, for example, in the

theoretical perspective of Niklas Luhmann or in Marx's classical one

("superstructure"). Or it is understood to be autonomous and decisive,

which leads to a strong idea of the political possibility, capable even of

modifying an order by itself. De Ipola is sympathetic to those who, in

recent years, wishing to confront the current hegemony of what is

known as neo-liberalism and the proclaimed existence of a "single

thought" (of an ultimately economicist root), have valued the laterl 1. In

any case, what does it mean to say that politics can be "decisive"?

Apparently it would only be so in the occasion of revolutions,

clearly, or else in long term plans, if the urgencies of each moment make

it possible to think of them; the ultimate example being the construction

of the European Union, began in Robert Schuman's time -the Coal and

Steel Community-, four or more decades ago. Or, finally, relating to

isolated, closely determined issues and/or those of immediate effect.

Outside these two extremes, both for other immediate fields or for the

mid-term, political action, particularly that proceeding through the

institutional pathways of contemporary democratic regimes, is in

general lagging behind events and, if not, is limited to accompanying

and con-figuring with its inputs the developments and movements

driven in and by civil society, the market, the international order. Norbert

Lechner appropriately says in this sense (1997:80), speaking of our day

Latin America: "Politics no longer has the mid and long term available

to leam and mature: it becomes exhausted in the here and now. Instead

of formulating and deciding on social goals, political activity runs

behind the facts and barely manages to react to external challenges".

As it is obvious, when efforts are made to vindicate political

possibilities, it is as a reaction to this. And in direct connection with

that, to document and measure what we are saying, it is worthwhile

11 For example, in Europe, Ulrich Beck and Chantal Mouffe. also Zigmunt Bauman, in a more

complex form; or, among the Latin Americans, Isidoro Cheresky. To start with, note the titles of

some of their books: La Invencion de la Politica, El Retorno de lo Politico, La Busqueda de la

Politica, La Innovacion Politica. However, De Ipola himself willingly admits the eventual

complementation or altemance in validity and usefulness of the two approaches. But, in general,

there undoubtedly exist inclinations in favor of one of them. in particular.

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to move on to a comparative study of, precisely, the politicalprocess of State and economic reforms in five Latin Americancountries in the last fifteen years (Torre, 1998)12. In effect, in hisintroduction to the book, the author writes, almost as a profession ofscientism thereon, what we will quote in extenso since everythingincluded is of interest for our purposes.

"Certainly, economic adversity was a powerful driver forstructural adjustment. But although this was a necessarycondition, in and of itself it wasn't enough to define when,how and to what extent the adjustment was to be done. Toexplain the contrasting modalities that structural adjustmenthas undertaken in the various countries, the analysis needs tobe completed by introducing a second order of internalcontextual factors (...) The consideration of political factors(...) brings to the forefront the central role played bygovernment elites (...) in fact their perceptions, politicalinterests, their resources are crucial inputs in the processwhereby the types of reforms to be introduced are decided,when they shall start and how they will be implemented.Being crucial inputs does not mean to say they are the onlyinputs (...) But their gravitation, i.e., their effectiveness, isalways mediated by the behavior of government elites. Inother words, the political preferences both of the internationalcommunity, business, workers and other interest groups donot necessarily enter directly into the reform process; rather,they are screened through the ideological orientations and thepolitical calculations of the government leaders, who, in theend, are the ones who adopt and authorize the continuity orchange ofpublic policies" (pages 14-15, added emphasis) 13.

12 The five countries are Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Colombia. The researches wereconducted by a team, led by Oscar Altimir, which included B. Heredia, L. Sola, E.A. Gamarraand A. L6pez Restrepo.

13 Here, a propos of the expression "government leaders", and also for all of the following. it maybe noted that the author refers to political leadership (or what more repeatedly he callsgovernment elites) without distinguishing them from what might be called leaders or leadershipin a stronger sense (as for example, does J. Prats Catala, op. cit., properly in our criterion).Furthermore, the author does not seem to pay special attention to the non-State public -andeventually political- area; but here we simply note it.

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After noting some "restrictions" to the "active role ofgovernment elites" (the political rules of the game, thebureaucratic and technical capacities of the State's apparatus,the characteristics of sociopolitical alignments, the historicallegacies and circumstances, the negotiations with theinternational agencies and foreign creditors and, finally, theirown "skill to maneuver within them"), the author completeshis point of view as follows:

"In fact, the reform process is substantially a political

operation, i.e. an operation with various outcomes dependingon the contingent results provided by the government elites to

the dilemmas posed by the pressures of economic adversityand by the political restrictions which circumscribe theirfreedom of action" (page 17-18, added emphasis).

To end, the author further supports his approach by criticizing the"absolutely opposite view" which underlines "the limits of politicalwill". Summing up and in synthesis,

"it is necessary to reason from an analytical perspectivecontemplating the reference both to the limits that economiccircumstances place and to the choices made by governmentleaders (0) countries move towards a common repertoire of

market reforms -the effect of the restrictions- but (...) they

cover that road at different speeds and with different scopes -the effect of the political choices made by the governmentleaders in each country-" (page 18-19, added emphasis).

What we can extract at the end of this long quote is preciselysomething that the author recognizes more in fact (thanks to his rigueuror perhaps his professional superego) than what he more manifestlytries to highlight: the importance of politics and politicians. And whathe grants turns out to be that politics is not exactly autonomous,"strong" as in one of De Ipola's metaphors, but rather and in any case-as we said before- a companion and, at the most, con-figurator ofthe processes, conditioned as it is in its possibilities by margins it does

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CARLOS STRASSER

not control and instead has to confront with resources that are limited anduneven. This, in spite of the apparent concentration of political powerthat would have supposedly occurred lately in Latin America (especiallyat the level of the executive powers) and so-called "decisionism" (M.Novaro, 2000; O'Donnell, 1997; Palermo and Novaro, 1996).

Perhaps this was diverse in different periods of the 20th Century, forinstance in the "golden era" Enrc Hobsbawm has referred to, that of theWelfare State (or Social State or, as it was dubbed in Latin America, the"national and popular" State) and in the wake of the fall of theauthoritarian regimes. But it does not seem to be so lately. Finally, thegovernment elites and government leaders, so often mentioned andunderlined in the above examined work, had to, in the end, find theways to move their countries towards "the common repertoire ofmarket reforms" even if each supposedly did it at its own pace andspeed, encountering more or less resistances and overcoming them(or not) with various degrees of skill, etc. The point is that the"intervening variables" which cut across leaderships and theirinitiative or competence, and that Torre himself indicates, do indeedmake for a long list.

Summing up and to close: today, in Latin America "thecentrality of politics as the maximum instance of representation andleadership of society" is diluted (Lechner 1997: 76). For that reason,let us here and in the meantime note that today the very possibilityof democratic governability and governance, as well as,consequently, the capacity of institutions themselves, has to beunderstood to be hindered in the region due to the weakness that wehave just pointed out. And let us leave unsaid how much this is inturn multiplied by the current enormous discredit of politicalactivity and politicians in Latin American public opinion1 4. A resultof all this is the current "representation crisis" (in the terms of B.Manin, 1991 and M. Novaro, 1995) and the emergence of micro andsubpolitics (in the sense of U. Beck, 1999).

14 The above is not new and anticipates what we will deal with below, but it is worthwhile notingsome opinion polls that have measured it, e.g Latinobar6metro 2001. To start with, the onesaying that 68% of the Latin American population does not trust "the people leading thecountry". Leaving the Presidency aside (a point to which we will at some point return inconnection with the typical presidentialism of Latin America and that, even then, as an

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On the ongoing political practices (and ideas)

Continuing with the deeper obstacles to democracy in Latin

America, we now move, precisely, into the terrain of political practice,

in three dimensions: the regime itself, the political class, and the

citizens.

- On Democracy

The political regime prevailing in Latin America is not exactly one

corresponding to our definition above: it includes democracy up to a

point, but is in no way exhausted in it. It is a mixed form of

government combining diverse regimes in the strict sense of the word.

On the other hand, the democratic component of the whole is a subtype

of democracy that from a theoretical-political perspective can be

deciphered as "representative government", though not in the ordinary

positive way but in that of a circumscribed, limited democracy, of a

"representing government" and a "represented democracy".

Lets go step by step. On the one hand, other forms of government

coexist and are interwoven with democracy; what we ordinarily call

democracy; and this is so in variable or alternative ways, depending on

the country, the time, the cycle, each form having a greater or lesser

weight. If the legitimacy that predominates is in any case, normally, the

democratic one, which of course helps to the stability of the

regime, the effective regime is in itself mixed and internally variable.

Now: the other forms of government that coexist and are sometimes

fused with democracy (and confused with it) are, in the strict meaning

of each term, oligarchy -both in the old Aristotelian sense as in the

institution does not merit over 39% of confidence), the population's confidence in the national

Congress and the political parties stands, respectively, at the general average of 24 and 19%. Six

countries out of a total of seventeen rank their confidence in Parliament in the range of 9 to 18%

and another eight countries, from 23 to 25% (the exceptions: Costa Rica with 29, Chile with 33

and Venezuela with 37%. Uruguay tops at 45%). Moreover, I out of every 2 (!) inhabitants of

Latin America believes there can be democracy without Congress and without parties. No

suspicion should be harbored in this sense on the opinions as if stemming from any rampant

populist democratism since, according to other tables, out of these same Latin Americans who,

also one out of every two (!) prefer democracy as a political regime, barely 4% believes that its

most important characteristic is that democracy is "the govemment of the majority" and only

6%, on the other hand, thinks that democracy means "govemment by and for the people" or,

13%, "equality".

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more modem Michelsian one-, bureaucracy, in the way feared byWeber, technocracy, particracy, and neocorporatism 15 .

What we ordinarily and more plainly call democracy is then, infact, a composite of the democratic regime and these other fiveregimes. A composite in which -with greater or lesser stability orvariability- some of them usually predominates, and not necessarilythe one more properly called democratic. The way this worksempirically needs to be considered on a case by case basis, and alsoaccording to periods. But it is usual in Latin America (and not withoutexistence elsewhere).

On the other hand, let's anticipate it, the democratic element of themixed regime is, in turn, more one of a "representing" than a"representative government" (RG). In a sense that -if we look atpolitical theory- was perhaps inaugurated by James Madison whenhe wrote that a representative government is "the first thing thatdistinguishes it from democracy" (The Federalist, x); somethingwhich makes it possible to understand that, in designing thegovernment of his country, the then new United States, based on thepopular election of authorities but successively divided into thefederation and the states, and in each of them into three powers, thisdivision and the whole system of checks and balances was not onlyand not even drawn, perhaps, so much to prevent a concentration ofpolitical power in some of the three branches as intended to impede theformation of majorities capable of confronting in a "factious" mannerthe central federal power or gaining the upper hand on minorities andprivate property. Alexander Hamilton, who in turn considered the RG"a major political invention" (The Federalist, viii) interpreted it andemployed it as the more or less republican mode of creating a powerfulUnion rather than as an instrument of the people's will, under the

15 Forthe definitions, see Strasser ( 1990). Offe and Schmitter (1995) offeran analysis that partiallyfollows the same direction but is more extended and comprehensive, with references tocomparative processes. Their work draws a distinction between intrinsic factors "from the topdown" (including veto powers on democratically elected government officials: oligarchic,technocratic, and others) and "from the bottom up" (that, on my part, I had already includedoutside the mixed regime, e.g. citizens demobilization) and extrinsic ones, fundamentally cutbacks on the sovereignty of the States (also recognized by me in what might be called theentourage of the regime itself).

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assumption that it would be the former, more than the latter, the one

that would provide the population with its greatest welfare and

security in the future (L. Banning, 1978; S.S. Wolin, 1983, 1989; B.

Manin, 1994).Under this scheme "the government is delegated onto a small

number of citizens elected by the rest". They (I am quoting Madison,

idem, now in my own but faithful synthesis) in their wisdom will know,

better than the people, how to establish the true public interest. This is

not too far from the thinking on the RG, a few years later, in France,

according to the famous pens of Madame de Stael and Benjamin

Constant, for whom the precondition for the recovery of the republican

order that had been so rapidly distorted there was making the same

clear distinction between governing and governed and forgetting

"popular sovereignty". Years later, Guizot and the "doctrinarians"

followed in their footsteps. About them it is enough to recall here that

they were appalled by the populace and favored a censitaire voting (F.

Furet, 1993; D. Roldan, 1998). Thus, the RG has its linage.

But in Latin America, what is particularly the case is that the

linage is current, it is not history but a living tradition and, on top of it,

that in the midst of the operating mixed regime, de-democratization

has ways of becoming rampant between election and election. The

political division of work consecrated by the RG, according to which

the representatives do not respond to, but rather lead the people thanks

to their very election to govern it, is compounded with the multiplier

of the other five forms of government; this, since -due to the lack of

an extended democratic consolidation or, the other way round, as a

result of democracy having been suspended so many times and having

only recently been recovered, but with a limited social scope except on

election days- they all cross the regime bare-faced. The ultimate

result is that the existing Latin American political order resides in a

series of connections and commitments that (plus or minor existing

civil liberties and rights) contains citizens politically solely as the

required electorate. And an order lacking the fundamental democratic

ethos that is so extended in advanced countries, a difference that will

never be excessively underlined.

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-On the political class

The Latin American political class (as in general, that of all of theWest, but more specially) finds itself, currently, with a field of actionthat has become strongly restricted, in which it weights perhaps lessthan ever before. And this should not be confused with the fact that itis seen to be very much "in charge" and always obtaining benefits,perhaps more than before.

What happens is that the environment now scarcely allows itself tobe controlled or governed: it escapes rather than follows any decisionsmade. In this regard, and against what sometimes appears to be thecase, maybe never before has been so real what Jean-Paul Sartre wrotefrom Europe decades ago, in the sense that history is produced by manbut also by the rest of men. Or, according to believers, that (in theSpanish saying) "El hombre propone pero Dios dispone", "manproposes but God makes the decision". Beyond their dominions andimmediate times (when not also regarding them), even the mostpowerful leaders or businessmen, with very few exceptions, perhaps,cannot anticipate today with too much certainty or confidence whatwill finally come out of what they intend and consequently order, sayor do. To begin with, there are more than a few strong leaders orbusinessmen, each with his/her own idea, interest, degree of influencebetween determined and undetermined. Neither is there a lack of otheractors and civil societies as numerous as robust as complex, or ofsubjects who are holders of the invoked legitimations, first thedemocratic one and next that of market liberalism; also, those ethnic,cultural, religious, etc. And capitals ranging from the immense to thesmall but uncountable exercising their independence earnestly andthroughout planetary stock exchanges, twenty four hours a day. Theworld itself has today some six billion inhabitants, around twohundred sovereign states, uncountable agencies, organizations,treaties, laws related to them, agreements, and infinite relations.Summing up, it increasingly has become much too plural and out ofpossible control.

In effect, this very competitive and open and not too manageablescenario is further compounded, on one end by the (at least moreapparent) de-ideologization in course, up to the current venal

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corruption; a picture that excites not only the most naked greedy

political ambitions but, in general, simple "self-employed

entrepreneurship". It is that and not precisely the large expansion and

circulation of the media that is responsible for so much scandal of

illicit financing or sale of favors and payoffs that we learn about day

after day, of a born again patrimonialism that merges the public and the

private, or confuses a party with the State or the Nation, which

associates big corporations which those that become their "colonies"

in the public administration, that decreases the number of those living

for politics in contrast to those living from politics (and the fiscal

budget). Corruption itself has become a culture, and few things are so

resistant to change.In the end, too many leaders and politicians not only "do their own

thing" more and more but are increasingly devoid of qualms and any

bad conscience. They can take refuge in the behavior of another one

more or less in sight, and of others, and the successively enlarged,

multiplied, silently admitted, but standard behavior. This explains

why, with parties currently having little ideology and program,

alignments and discipline have become so surprisingly established.

What is at stake is the individual career of each, and that career

depends fundamentally on the peers, the organization16 . A factious

and corporatist alignment and discipline have extended with time.

Thus, in the end, largely impotent, of poor use in the function in

spite of their privileges, the political class does not cease to add causes

for their loss of prestige and credit, a loss that has become

incomparable to date, and makes it difficult or problematic to count

very much with it for that and other purposes or projects, beginning

with the governability and governance of Latin American countries17.

16 There are sufficient empirical studies in this respect. One of the most interesting ones lately and

with a general bibliography is M. P. Jones (1997); see especially pages 197-198.

17 The other effects or projects will be mentioned below, in the following sections. Still, we leave

here aside the periodical popularity polls of leaders that go up and down and more down than

up; in any case, the whole finally fits into the picture. We also leave aside the issue of the

"rebellion of the elites", or their lack of interest about what is collective, that has been reported

by C. Lasch (1995) for the case of the U.S.A. but has its parallel in Latin America.

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-On the Citizenry

While much is said about increasing -above all on the need ofincreasing- citizenship, and beyond current academic debatesconfronting theories of "participatory democracy" and "deliberativedemocracy" 1 8, a defacto reality says on its part, with extreme clarity,how far Latin America (and not just Latin America) is from havingmuch people not simply active in politics or moved by public issues,but simply interested in them. This is one of the harshest data we comeacross and, for the same reason, a great current concern.

For example, Fernando Vallespin (2000:19) writes: "One of thethesis (of the book), which has not been able to avoid a certainunderlying pessimism, is that today the solution to a good share of thepolitical problems necessarily requires a greater involvement ofcitizens in the public field, because of their permanently critical anddemanding attitude and, above all, for being willing to evaluatepolitics as another dimension of their personality and to act inconsequence." Both the need and the objective are clear. But note whatthe author simultaneously asserts: he "has not managed to avoid acertain basic pessimism" in this respect. This is understandable, thereare reasons for it.

In today's world, and especially in Latin America, now in generalunder governments that are between "democratic", "mixed" and"representative"; after the experiences and the tragic ideologicalfailures of the 20th Century, followed in turn by the decomposition ofthe Social State and the offensive of "neo-liberal" reforms andadjustments as well as the subsequently multiplied political skepticismand estrangement already commented together with the discredit ofpoliticians, political parties, politics itself; in that world that, besidesand specially has become "globalized", citizens barely feel andperform as such; we repeat, it is a fact. The multiplication, in the lastdecades, of "social struggles directed at attaining recognition for theethnic, gender, sexual orientation and even the intergenerational rightto a clean environment" (J. E. Castro, 1999) actually means a new and

18 See, in this respect, E. Hauptmann (2001). In passing, let's note that for the author, in any case,deliberative is included in participatory and is actually "less" not "more" than the other.

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valuable way of participation or mobilization of different sectors, but

never -or not yet amongst us, except in definitions elastically

extended from the word's original and basic meaning- a

manifestation of political citizenship properly. In this respect, it may at

the most be a possible bridge towards it and, in the meantime, a sort

of micro-politics and micro-citizenship still at its early stages.

So that citizens barely feel and perform as such. And they can do

so only with difficulty. At the extreme and using Zigmunt Bauman's

words (2001: 12), there seems to be no "space for citizens except as

consumers. Only in this form does the financial and commercial

markets put up with them"1 9. In this sense, and to return to classical

political theory, that explains and anticipates more than is usually

granted, nobody as Adam Ferguson (so long ago and against his two

friends of the Scottish Enlightenment, David Hume and Adam Smith)

foresaw this course of development and, in spite of also sharing a

favorable opinion of the civilizing advantages that the new urban and

commercial society brought about ("the sweetness of trade" that

Montesquieu had envisaged shortly before), warned about the

imperative need of not abandoning but advocating strongly for civic

virtue and a properly political government. Against the civic idleness

resulting from the other discourse, from his republican stand Ferguson

distrusted the government that could be spontaneously derived from

the economy and thus infiltrate politics in a "clandestine" way; he

feared as a consequence a regression, even the return to barbarity2 0.

We are therefore at the verge of democracy without citizens; that

is, non-democracy. And there are many characteristics and

circumstances of contemporary society, let alone those of the last few

decades and not thinking only of Latin America, which conspire from

the start against an active citizenship proper, one politically involved

and participating. What could be thought to be one more reason,

precisely, to foster its existence. But, on the contrary, the work (in the

relatively prosperous or better off countries / areas / social sectors) of

19 Some authors, however, celebrate the shift from citizen's sovereignty" to "consumer

sovereignty". Namely, P. Saunders (1993). In Latin America, in any case, this doesn't go beyond

the high and mid-middle classes.20 For more on this issue, C. Strasser (1999: 60-63). Or, even better, a whole book by A. 0.

Hirschman (1999).

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the trends that were deciphered so precisely and acutely already byTocqueville in Democracy in America, towards becoming engrossedwith the growing production of individual wealth and welfare, or (inthose that are less rich and even poor) the alienation in the struggle forlife and subsistence that is now the subject of so many studies, do notfind and cannot perhaps find anything sufficient to activate orreactivate a citizenship stricto sensui in one or the other scenario.

In the first one the aspiration to conspicuous consumption andhedonism prevails, and the political framework is seen as a fixeddatum, a political framework that -besides been felt to be ratherdistant and hardly modifiable- makes it almost bothersome tobecome informed, discuss or even go and vote 21 . In the second,"social citizenship" is the condition of political citizenship and it iscrudely absent for many and, if not, then it's cracked; other largesectors practically have no time or energy or resources to distract andinvest in this given framework or in political action: both seem remote,one apparently beyond hope of ammendment, the other many timeslittle less than trumped, inoperant, useless. And in the two the issue ofdemand-overload on the State plays a role, for the State is almostalways cornered by finance, so much so that some authors (e.g.Samuel Huntington, always quoted on this point) encourage andrecommend the apathy of citizens, while others, in a more quiet way,breath relief because of their retraction.

Now, in such a context, the question is whether it makes "sense" topretend for these men and women to do and feel what they are and feelso little: true citizens; or to impose such an ideal on ourselves on thebasis of good doctrine, and claim it from them. This context, the realityof Latin American nations and the contemporary world as they appear(such as reality is structured within each as well as betweenthemselves, and moreover leveraged by the common emergence ofglobalization), makes such a demand scarcely feasible and credible.

21 An example may be what happened in Europe at the first round of the French presidentialelections in April 2002, when for this reason Le Pen so unforeseeably won the right to ballotage.This unpleasant "surprise" served as the trigger that we later indicate is necessary (andirreplaceable) to activate the citizenry. In Latin America, consider the electoral abstentionindexes and other data shown in Latinobarometro 2001 as mentioned here in various footnotes.

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There is no doubt -based on a political ethics and theory more

closely adhering to virtue, which is, of course, in abstract the healthiest

one-: it is very well to ask for a real, active citizenship. What remains

to be pondered is up to what point it can be effectively expected and to

what extent it is reasonable to ceaselessly advocate its public

convenience or its very need for a "good political life" today so distant

not only from reality but also, apparently, from what is achievable.

Except for the dangers inherent in renouncing to ideals and hopes.

But, particularly since community-based and industrial-society

identities and memberships began to break apart in ordinary life (the

last decades of the 20th Century), what can be seen everywhere is that

the civic population is commonly unable to weigh in the decision of

anything that is globally important from the social point of view, as

was somehow the case, after the Second World War, for a whole

period. Not even capable (if you think of the majority) of deciding on

anything personal if it s connected with the environment in which

individuals live, only slightly beyond what is intimately private.

Strictly speaking, they now do not hold in their hands the construction

of a life "project" Such a project is fundamentally dependent on the

market -if it is linked to it.Currently, each individual of the large social mass is either

estranged or has been removed from practically any space of effective

power: they are almost all at an unbreachable distance. If the public

scenes they are forced to observe daily irritate individuals, and outrage

them or mortify them, they in fact have almost no ordinary possibility

but to feel impotent, to enter resignation or indifference as a

psychological defense, to dwell on themselves, to become cynical and

individualistic. In this situation, two or three havens remain open to

each (certainly not to all), or two or three ways to perform as people:

to obtain and enjoy strictly individual satisfactions of one type or

another or, more limitedly, to join into consumerism, if they can or

have the wherewithal; and/or practice some sort of "local" or single-

issue kind of citizenships, normally rooted in the neighborhood, the

school, sexuality, environmental pollution, even whale hunting. Most

of the people practice or at least aspire to consumption and have in this

respect an offering ad infinitum. And many, still, to gain some of the

so many goods being offered, do not hesitate to corrupt themselves

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little by little or at a large scale. Why wouldn't they, since from the"top" they get all too many examples.

One way or the other, their degree of personal frustration and theirfrustration as citizens, or their anger, the frequent sensation of beingnothing, are consequently deviated, sucked up, blinded: neutralized.And from discouragement they then shift to conformism, or to the lossor lack of political awareness. The very TV which now forms theirfundamental link to the world reinforces the profile: it bombards themand distracts them and manipulates them ceaselessly, leaving almostnobody with the time or the capacity of knowing or becominginterested in knowing22 .

On some conditions and over determinations of thepolitico-cultural order

If for some the authoritarian threat is currently lurking around thecorner, at least in the meantime, and for some decades already, in LatinAmerica we are living under more or less "democratic" regimes. Inany case, such a fear is precisely related to the fact that they are ratherless than more democratic -and rather less than more successful.

We have seen, however, that right now, in Latin America the fieldof possibilities for politicians, political leaderships, politicalinstitutions (starting with governments), a democratic citizenship, isvery sensibly restricted. On the other hand, let us recall, with regard toglobalization (with its favorable and unfavorable consequences andopportunities), only what it is not redundant here to remember: therelative capitis diminutio suffered by the national states -particularlywhen penrpheral or less developed- within the existing internationalorder and as compared to the G7 or the international agencies and themultinational corporations, with products in excess of the GDP ofseveral of them brought together. Or as compared to the market, by itsown "decision" and implementation, that of the State itself.

22 We are not saying that the public or audiences are merely passive: as well known and alreadyunderlined by so many authors, there is a two-wav street between the two faces of the printedpage or the screen. We only highlight what in any case is undeniable: the manipulation of TVviewers and of general opinion, beyond the degree of success with which it is achieved. See, forexample, J.Curran et. al. (1998).

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But let us now look at other frameworks that need to be taken into

account when thinking of political and social development strategies.

Of the sort that are not usually included to the extent that would

probably be required.

-On genes and crossbreedings

We now enter the field of sociocultural and sociopolitical

conditions. In which different ideological "imports" (I do not mean it

in any derogatory way but rather in a supposedly strict sense) hit one

after another the compact culture deposited in the region over the three

whole centuries of its formation. I say the Iberic culture, specially the

Hispanic one. And that, beginning from the time when Spain "stood in

Europe as a large edifice deja construit" (0. H. Green) and was "the

most modem and developed State of its time" (R. Morse).

Let's underline it: during that very long time, what took root in

Spanish America 2 3 was a solid and self assured culture, one clearly

distinct from those other European cultures that were later constituted

or reconstituted in exchanges with the scientific revolution, the

protestant reform, humanism, thereafter the political revolution, free

trade and industrialization. That culture merged the public and the

private within a vision of the world that reconciliated, much more than

imperium et sacerdotium, community with hierarchy, as well as

power and the reason of State, simultaneously with a deep

social conformity.To be sure, political sociology took it that this most formidable

architecture was laid, on the other hand, on a definite State

patrimonialism, pace Max Weber. Which therefore rested on an

administrative machinery and its concomitant legalism and

bureaucratism, the three of them well developed and connected with

an effective government midway between paternalistic and

authoritarian. It is thus understood that the whole assemblage was

23 For the time being I will leave aside the case of Brazil, the most different one in the region and

the main country in it, which on the other hand belongs to Portuguese-America. As for the

following, I especially refer to the very enlightening essays by R. Morse (1982, 1989). See also

H. Wiarda (1997).

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CARLOS STRASSER

simultaneously a source of intense personalization of political and socialrelations, as well as of clientelism, privileges and sinecures naturallyassociated to the former. And, finally, a source of various subsequentforms of major and lesser chieftains, national, local, and overseas.

Now, what is precisely the case is that such a web came as it stoodto the new world: as a way of life or a cultural nationality rather closedto individual political autonomy. In it, on the contrary, the politicalindividual was by nature a social specimen, a party only within thewhole that signified and assumed it naturaliter Almost the opposite ofthe scene of the other America, the Northern one, so well depicted bySarmiento in a famous paragraph: "...wherever ten Yankees meet,poor, beggarly, stupid, before setting an axe at the foot of the trees tobuild a cabin, they meet to lay out the basis of an association" (1954:Obras Completas, 334). In these other lands to the South, however,like in Spain, society was not "created" by a free and voluntarycontract among the people, it was not subsequent to individuals, it wasalready given. "The difference with the Saxon colonies is radical" (0.Paz 1972: 93).

Then, with Independence, a difficult process of change began.And, likewise, the above mentioned cultural "imports" took place.However, they happened in a succession, with each import overlayingon top of the other, though always within the existing frame. Thus,nothing ever resulted but from a crossing with the established forms oflife or the socially established institutions and the "historical" rights ofthe people (E X. Guerra, 1989 and 1994). And, if different politicalfractions were formed, by more liberal or more conservative yet at thesame time popular elites, the result was nevertheless a continuousnational ideology partly unique, basic, though partly split. Thedifferences are known (see, for example, J. L. Romero, 1967); whatwe recall, however, is that both shared the same foundations.

Let us note it. This common flooring underlying them was and isstill built with the aforementioned Hispanic and then hispano-criollomaterial, a material incorporated into each, even if certainly moresolid in the case of the wide popular sectors and the democratism ofthe popular / populist variant than in the liberal one, for it holds withthe former an evident degree of elective affinity based on the idea ofthe whole preceding the parts, the community and public spirit

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controlling if not submitting the individual and the private

dimension, the allegedly original consent by the people as the

ultimate ratio, the association between the leadership and the

popular mass as a mutual reference of one another, etc. Besides,

from the time there was a "state", also by the exaltation of the figure

and the role of the State itself.That is why, if liberal and demo-liberal forms, concepts and

institutes in a more European or American fashion were received over

time (for example, the modern political party and the general

framework of public law in which it is inscribed: a Constitution in the

manner of the modem Rule of Law, a Parliament and the division of

powers, a representative system, the representation of majority and

minorities through regulated elections, and others), in general they

were received to be used instrumentally or even to be subordinated.

Thus, at this point it will come as no surprise to say that even the more

liberal version turned to lay on the same ground, as it still does. The

most suggestive illustration, not too expected in doctrine, proceeds

from liberalism Latin American style itself, with its marked traits of

centralistic practices and institutions that are both paternalistic and

authoritarian and linked to the privileged estates (i.e., aristocratic or

oligarchic) and even, out of all things, State-dependent. A liberalism,

therefore, that in spite of its rhetoric and even its ideological beliefs in

the abstract, in truth was and still is little prone to pluralism and open

competition, a liberalism preserver of sociopolitical structures that are

only slowly and grudgingly transformed, and therefore not too

inclined to political systems based on parties and operated by parties

and citizens instead of the notables and the corporations.

It is on that foundation, and cutting across the different

variations, then, that the old tradition filtered the concepts received

from liberalism, even demo-liberalism, or else from individualism

and cultural privatism and, finally, the market ideology which is

current today; that is, the various "imports" to which we referred

above. Overlaid one over the other since the 19th century and the

20th. For better or for worse, but if not always disruptively, in fact

mixturing with the local. And crossbreedings are always in tension,

as we shall note below. It thus continued so, until this new turn of

century and millennium.

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At this point in history come the economic and fiscal crisis, thereforms, globalization, and the latest of the "impacts". And withthem a tension between culture / political culture, cultural identitiesand types of citizenship that is not new, as has been said, but thatnow appears to be overcharged. What it reveals more than ever, seenfrom the tradition impacted is that in the Hispanic (I dare hereextend to Ibero or Latin) America, along one lane we see a muteprocess of social cultural dis-integration, simultaneous with anyother processes underway 24 . What I mean to say (going back, bythe way, to an issue previously dealt with), is that in this form theuniversal thesis of the com-position of a society by politics and evenby the State, and the, by axiomatic definition, very unification orintegration goal of political action, appear to be even more severelychallenged in today Latin America.

The culmination of it all has been the last historical tranche. Thepenetration (the impact) of the most recent ideological "import",neoliberalism, has been socially so strong, at least in some urbanmiddle classes that accommodated it, not to mention the upper classes,as, after some years of liberalizations and reforms with social resultsvisibly so little satisfactory and even catastrophic, not only ratherdevastating, but even schizophrenic. All of this followed by the (atleast nostalgic) invocation to a return of the State to its true role.

24 Time and, in particular, space are short to develop it here. We shall merely add, consequently,that the process seems what could in part be fusion and confusion at the national scale butaccording to the social sectors, of the two first (over three: the third one is the "moralist")political cultures that R. D. Putmam (2000) recognizes for various states or series of states in theUS according to all his research and also continuing the studies by Daniel Elazar that he quotes:one, traditionalist, in which politics tends to be dominated by innovation resistant elites, and theother, individualistic, where it is directed by the supporters of economic growth. except that oneand the other feature low or moderate "social capital". However, this is neither the place tooutline the differences simultaneously contained there, nor those between the regions withhigher or greater "civism" thus categorized according to another book by the same Putnam(1993), now with regard to Italy.

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-Political consequences of the same

In the lengthy conformation of these countries, the Spanish

American model and ideology were essentially "incorporators". They

prided themselves of being and continued being such over time and

the historical additions and enmeshments of all sorts. It does not

matter if, in reality, many times they operated in a haphazard or even

savage way, because even then they were seen to be (indirectly)

reaffirming this discourse. By the same token, the State's image and

role, the full and protagonic role corresponding to that model and

ideology consecrated during all the centuries since the Conquest and

until very shortly, were always (more or less far from attaining it)

proposed to be integrators, this in one way or another, below or above

the conformities and unconformities with their lines of action and

specific policies. Besides, as regard the image for the bulk of the

popular sectors and even a large part of the middle sectors, the state

("the State"), below citizenships or above party affiliations, always

meant orientation as well as protection-except, of course, there where

the State did not reach, which is where it now reaches even less.

Let me be clear, that is a discourse, an ideology, although certainly

an extended one. On the other hand, there is nothing to deny that the

current de-structuring / restructuring of the State, the so called reforms

of the State, were in their way necessary and inevitable, even timely.

We are just looking at the counterparts and beyond the appearances.

Greater monetary stability, more efficient (also more expensive)

privatized utilities, reduced state interferences and regulations on

economic activity, sounder fiscal accounts and less deficit ridden

public budgets, the growth (albeit sometimes erratic) of the gross

product and foreign trade or investments, etc., even with all the

differences existing among the various countries, indicate evolutions

that are positive in themselves. Some, such as the drop in inflation, are

even enjoyed by "most everybody".Now, if entire social sectors have simultaneously been separated

-as they have been and still are- from society and the market itself,

the case is that the State, the good old State, comes to be seen by the

majority as the executor of such a "plan" and then as "washing its

hands". Of course, it is not surprising that other actors upward in the

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social scale or abroad may wash them. What does puzzle, in thisAmerica, is for "the State" be washing its hands, while, to makematters worse (and to continue with popular expressions) its topleaders tend to "lick their fingers" shamelessly: among themcorruption and "self employment" are the order of the day and publicand notorious.

Thus, it turns to be also unexpected that "upstairs" so manytraditions, mores, practices and institutions (political and social) areabandoned that, because so deeply rooted and naturally functional,nevertheless do not stop operating. Hence, what the new ideologicalpreaching finally introduces, even when forcing inevitableadaptations, is a good amount of confusion and uncertainty about theframeworks, no less than a variety of legitimations available to variousactors on an opportunistic or arbitrary basis. This, to the same extentas, consequently, a greater fragility or perhaps instability of thedemocratic political regimes in terms of sets of known values/ruleswhich are collectively shared and permanently at play; and also ofcustoms, "acquired rights" and expectations according to what aclassic who is not my greatest favorite but had the most acute sense forthese things called "historic prescriptions"25 .

Once again, I do not want to be misunderstood. I am not adheringto anything nor, insofar as possible, making value judgments, exceptthose that are almost universal. Simply and basically, I try to describe.Besides, and for certain, it is not the Rule of Law that is here at issue.Absolutely not, the Rule of Law is out of the question, there is no otheroption, and Latin America is to date much more aware on the matterof liberties and guarantees. What I am trying to say is, only, thatimplants, when they are such, or impositions, in general, have beenand are of little use. For example, that -beyond its actualinsufficiencies or impotencies- a State that on top of it becomesweak or vaporous engages reality, social need and Latin Americantradition with difficulty. Also, that a "strong" and ubiquitous State

25 1 am referring obviously, to Edmond Burke.

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is not necessarily antidemocratic: here we are far from the remote

contradiction in terms that the expression Democratic State means in

itself (to the extent that "State" is in political science synonymous

with "a system of domination" whereas "democracy" means self

government by the people, something which is opposed to all and any

political domination)2 6 . And so on and so forth. From the

presidentialism that so many competent but also culturally

conditioned political scientists criticize, up to the even more

severely attacked trade union "corporatism", and including the

assistencial policies decided by a welfare state that, it is thought,

should above all and before anything else be concerned with

balancing the budget2 7 .Summing up. On one side, some core old and persistent or

derived elements of the Latin American political culture,

particularly at the level of the broad popular sectors, are not too

much attuned to the ethos of any "inorganic" individualism. Or with a

politics / political practice of the liberal doctrinarian type latent instead

in many proposals and initiatives that end up being imposed from the

top down, even though they pursue or say they pursue the opposite;

that is, the promotion of society, to which end it would first be

necessary to agree with it. On the other, that the State, its presence, its

imprint, its action, are in general so much legitimated in Latin America

26 Certainly, in the last few years there have been reactions -specially from and for the

implementation of so called "second generation reforms"- warning of the need of a State in no

way "minimal" (although, in view of the [still?] prevailing opinion, with great care to prevent

appearing as a straightforward defense of the State). For instance, see L. C. Bresser Pereira

(1997).27 On the so hardly criticized presidentialism literature is very abundant, but so is now becoming

the criticism of it (see, for instance, the recent comments, not less refined for being general, of

J. Lanzaro (2000), who also elaborates on the various types of presidentialism. On this matter,

too, a recent study (Mello Grohmann, 2001) underlines that in most Latin American countries

the Legislative Power has, in the end, a strong weight vis-a-vis the Executive. As for

neocorporatist trade unionism, I hope I do not need to say that I am not protecting the corrupt

bosses and union leaderships that afflict so much the Latin American workers movement.

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CARLOS STRASSER

(notwithstanding the innumerable criticisms it has received andcontinues to receive for all concepts because, precisely, so much isexpected of it in terms of what is due) as they are, consequently,expected by the people and hard to replace2 8.

So far, five fundamental, political and cultural given elements.What is their incidence? We will see in the following section.

THE CIRCLE OF REALITY,POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE

In spite of its relative capitis diminutio mentioned before, today thenation-States continue being the main agents of politics -though notthe only ones- in each country and internationally (see, amongothers, A. Giddens: 1999). And in Latin America's cultural geology,"the State" is still the inescapable center of reference, always expectedto represent, lead and protect or safeguard society.

However, and summarizing, in parallel it is the case that (i) politicsas such has now a weak and subordinated capacity; (ii) democracy is,strictly speaking, more a "representative government" in partconfiscated, hence a rather "representing" government, than a properlydemocratic one; and moreover a government inscribed in a trulymixed regime, within which democracy as a component does notnecessarily prevail; that (iii) the political class seems to be adrift in

28 Paragraph 3 ending here has made no reference, in any of its two parts, to the indigenouspolitical cultures or populations of Latin America (I am particularly thinking of those of Mexico.Guatemala and the Andean countries, where they have been and are patent in their relevance). ARiver Plate nationality or the consequent ignorance of the author on this matter are surelyresponsible for it. But at this point, I want to leave for the record that (as far as I know) whatwas said in the previous section comprises them equally in the rationales and the conclusionsdrawn throughout it. The reason is that based on their origin, and as a result of their forcedincorporation into the Hispanic-criollo order, and even because of their integration withsegregation, also these populations were identified with simultaneous community andhierarchical feelings, as in the case of the Precolombian Aztec or Inca State and a posteriori.Apart from that, naturally the indigenous identity constitutes an added dimension to be takeninto account, so we are in debt in this second aspect.

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events and simultaneously so engrossed in its personal interests or

careers as lacking prestige and certainly credit; (iv) citizenship is

ebbing and skeptical, disinterested, not only as a response to

poverty, which is always inimical to it, but because governments

are perceived to be at a long distance, on the one hand, and given

some -more general- contemporary spirit and trends of

development, on the other2 9.This context is compounded with other given facts. (v) One is -if

not the "end of ideology" or the "end of history"- the sort of

ideological blackout we are going through following that true festival

of ideologies that was most of the 20th century, a festival that

developed so horrendously and ended so badly, as we all know, until

the end of the Cold War and authoritarisms. (vi) Another, that

coincides with the said blackout, is divided into, on one hand, the lack

of actuality and possibility of the consecrated (not naive, and in any

case strong) ideas of both republic and democracy, today barely valid

in terms of norms, or perhaps, even worse, as utopias in the derogatory

sense of the word, and, on the other, the subsequent and quasi

universal narrowing of the party-ideological range, symbolized by

some with the expression the Republic of the center All of which, in

the end, makes it difficult to imagine a broad or sustained mobilization

or political activism of anybody for anything. Moreover, the social

situation does not contribute in this respect; on the contrary, pushing

in general, as it does -leaving aside human rights organizations and

different associations or movements- towards individualism,

isolation, fragmentation, marginality, insecurity, crime, fear30.

(vii) If we further underline the crisis of the State (its diminished

resources, institutional disftinctionality in so many respects, growing

impotency) and the consequent weakening of the political-party

system, action and participation are currently seen to be increasingly

29 An example of one and the other, Latinobarometro 2001 reports (i) that in 15 out of 17 Latin

American countries, "satisfaction with democracy" ranges between 10 and 41%, with an

average of 25 percent, even lower than in Africa, and (ii) for Latin American opinion, economic

development is twice as "important" as democracy (51 versus 25 percent).

30 On the social and individual subjectivity of the current times (partly centered on Chile but more

generally in Latin America) see N. Lechner (2000). Regarding Europe, the polisemic expression

Unsicherheit :uncertainty, insecurity, unprotection by Z. Bauman (2001).

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embodied in non-State actors as those recently set aside, sectoral andthematically limited; even if it is true, however, that several amongthem have at the same time configured networks, given rise to the socalled third sector and also to the issue of governance itself as, in ourdefinition, a form of government complementing the constitutionalpolitical regime, when not a new public mode -or perhaps the theoryof a new public mode- of the government of society by the Stateand/or by itself, at least in some respects. Now, these latest phenomenahave brought about a sort of new "correct" school of thought as wellas high expectations, correlative to the experiences accumulatedduring the 20th century (and already since the final part of the 19th) apropos the insufficiencies of the States and the market to governsociety and its development by themselves. What probably escapesthis school, however, is the extent to which the current "third sector"and governance itself are crossed with the scenario itself and thesituation of the necessary counterparts within it.

But let us set our bearings: this experience went through severalstages before arriving at this point. The first one (the usual narrationstend today to forget it because they focus only on the most recent)made the State the fundamental factor of national consolidation,modernization and integration, for in these countries economic growthwas being strongly sponsored by the market and it was just that state& market then coincided and formed a tandem favored by (as may bethe case) the elites and/or oligarchies in charge at the time, probablythe first to note the need for State support actions in favor of trade andeconomic development. The second advocated, in different ways inthe period between the two world wars and after the Second one, for amore absolute and absorbent role by the State: the state as regulator,planner, director, involved in business and also now factor or bene-factor of the social and political integration of the whole or themajority of society, a society previously consolidated as a nation (tothe extent this had effectively been so)3 1. The third stage came after theprevious model had become fiscally and financially depleted with theeconomic stagnation and social crisis that followed, and gave way

31 Certainly, in some countries such integration remains outstanding specially with regards with theindigenous population.

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to the reign of the market (perhaps with the resigned "acceptance" butalso the decisive cooperation of the State itself) or to the "firstgeneration" neoliberal reforms of the 1980's and early 90's. That is,to the deregulations, privatizations, in general: liberalizations.These in turn had contradictory consequences (economic, speciallymacroeconomic, on one side, and social, on the other) and insufficienteffects or results, eventually -if at all- attainable in excessively"long term" periods from the point of view of the interested parties orthe population as a whole. Something that marks the beginning of thefourth stage and the "second generation" reforms (Naim, 1994; Burkiand Perri, 1998).

In this, the current stage, the givens are 1) that the market provesitself once again insufficient; far from enough, and 2) the Stateaccelerates its most recent degree of institutional powerlessness; ontop of it, it looks not only more co-opted and/or suspected or resistedby various major economic actors but, besides, weakened, when nottaken apart, by the reforms themselves. In fact, then, this (as we saidbefore) core political agent and indispensable center of reference somuch legitimized in Latin America seems to be overcome by thecircumstances. Enter then the third sector and governance.

They effectively enter. Though -note- not in a casual way but asa result of the context: an ever more pluralistic society that includeswhat was recently said plus what was pointed out before, namely, theweakness of politics, the incapacity and lack of prestige of the politicalclass as well as the parties / parliaments / institutions, the ebb ofcitizenship, the condition which tends to spurious of the democraticregime established or reestablished. That is, with the inclination tosubstitute or compensate for their desertion, but also, in fact, to assumetheir role, something which looks artificial and much moreproblematic.

This fourth stage is underway and it is probably too early to passjudgment on how it will develop over time and with what degree ofsuccess. However, it is possible to note some tensions and othercircumstances on the basis of which, in any case, we should notforecast or expect a great success. I repeat, the expectations -whenthey are not already recognized as adequately moderate or else"innocent" from the start- seem to be high, surely too high.

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Multilateral organizations, NGO's or third sector,and democratic politics

One first reason for a certain skepticism is that the third sector assuch is far from being identifiable with civil society, as -inadvertedlyor simplifying the question- seem to believe not a few authors,actors, organizations and agencies. Civil society, notwithstanding allthe discussions, the different discussions, existing about it (N. Bobbio,1987; Arato and Cohen, 1993; N. Rabotnikof, 1999; etc.), isessentially and beyond so many emphasis and understandings simplythe old "society" of sociological or political theory going back one totwo centuries, that is, the other of the State and faced to the State.More politicized, less politicized, more absorbed, less absorbed, withless freedom, more freedom, little or more organized and in more orless autonomous ways. Still, society: individuals, groups, classes. Andsociety, in our case, in the real Latin American way. Things being so,and leaving evolutions aside, not even the whole summation ofNGO's and other organizations and branches of organizations orsocial ensembles that can currently be listed in each country -moreor less formalized, or also informal- are really commensurate withit. In any case, they are substituting it by degrees, for better and/orfor worse, variably.

Therefore, to start with, it is necessary to distinguish between thesevarious and really different subjects of politics and the social action foreach national unit. In this same regard, moreover, it is not possible toleave aside one other subject, i.e. the international credit agencies,precisely because today they are linked so closely to the third sector-no longer only to the State- as "in their own right", given the singularnational relevance that these agencies have lately acquired on acountry by country basis (Casaburi and Tussie, 2000)32. All this hasits consequences for the central theme of this paper.

32 According to the above authors, whose analysis is noted, however, for its moderation, theseagencies "have shifted from being mere sources of financing for infrastructure projects tobecoming designers of society in the borrowing countries" (page 16).

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But before stopping at this point, and in connection with what wewere saying, let us mark the following three other sides of the NGO'scoin, the face of which is undoubtedly positive and a contribution togood governance 33 . One. The NGO's are far from being equivalent inprinciple or even synthetically to civil society in totum and of havingthe a priori right of legitimately pretending to represent the commongood. Actually, besides devoting themselves to projects or issues thatso many times are restricted or local, they tend not to coordinateamong themselves but rather to mistrust and compete for support andresources (starting with the preferences and the funds of the alreadymentioned, large multilateral credit agencies), thus making the aboveequivalence and their own legitimacy even more relative. This,because of some phenomena of a political essence which occur withinand among them which are not exclusive of the state but, simply, alltoo human. Two. The NGO's, for reasons that are finally not thatdifferent, also tend to disregard, compete and even clash with thepolitical parties -the agents or intermediaries in principle morerepresentative and legitimate of the whole of civil society- and alsowith the State, its bureaucracy or technicians 3 4. Their differencesfrequently are not easy ro resolve or capable of being resolved (ormaybe nobody in the organizations, the parties, the government or thepublic administration wishes to resolve them); something which alsofavors the dilution of ultimate responsibilities in terms of design orexecution and control of the given policies or projects, a fact that isalways important, but particularly important at the time of crisis,delays or failures. Three. On their part, the said agencies have in realitya better relationship with one or another NGO, so that the preferedones run the risk of becoming co-opted or "clientelized" by them forthe sake of their agendas or points of view, what makes the generalsocial representativeness of a score of these organizations even more

33 Be it understood, it is far from us to disregard the positive contribution of these organizations.In this sense, it would be sufficient to mention their notable, fundamental contribution in thefield of human rights. Also in others: regarding political or electoral processes, environmentalissues, etc. But we are now speaking of the other side of the coin.

34 "It is evident that the NGO's throughout Latin America have forged multiple and complex linkswith the supranational organizations°(and that) the supremacy of the traditional political partiesand old institutional arrangements centered on the State are challenged" (Korzeniewicz andSmith, 2000: 406).

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partial. One, two and three, without mentioning that, in any case, themultilateral agencies in question usually provide little space for anample participation of the NGO's (much less than to that ofgovernments, for the simple reason of their -in the end- littlepower) in their agendas and blueprints: in general they limit them, inspite of the efforts some have made in an opposite sense, to a share inproject implementations, monitoring and evaluation. (D. Tussie: 2000;Stocker: 1996).

The contribution of NGO's to governability and governance hastherefore two opposite faces; but that is not all. What needs to bereviewed is their representative or democratic and democratizingquality, which to date is excessively taken for granted, probablybecause they and their intervention in the public space entail aparticipatory opening and a certain mobilization, as in effect and intheir measure they do35. But the assumption is not necessarily valid.Opening a certain participation to organizationsfrom and in societycould amount to a kind of corporatism; at least, for sectorialism. Thenatural vehicle of democracy, as we have previously defined it, are, ofcourse, the political parties. Naturally, whether they are at fault orsimply fail to assume their role ex theoria in a full and more correctway is a different matter. But, leaving that aside, the issue at hand iswhether and how much do NGO's inscribe themselves and throughtheir activity in an improved operation of the democratic order, andwhether they make part of good governance understood as a form ofgovernment complementing and perfecting the existing politicalregime; so much as, a fortiori, whether they are really bound to theprinciple of looking after the general interest.

35 One example of this opinion: "On the other hand, the non-state public space is also the space ofparticipatory or direct democracy.. (Non-governmental organizations) are "public" organizationsor forms of control because they tend to the general interest" (Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau,1998:26). Now, from our point of view the first is neither exclusive nor the fundamental case, andthe second is not necessarilv so nor even perhaps the most common. In page 45, the authors speaklikewise of "the advantages" of non-state public property over state ownership for "the expansionof democracy". In the middle of both quotations, however, they seem to change their positon, aswill be seen below. Actually, they are not consistent on this point. A more correct and subtleappreciation is found in E. Jelin (1998: 412), who thinks that the NGO's are very important in theconstruction of more democratic societies, but fail to establish accountability mechanisms, as wellas the sovereigitv of their citizens. "They fundamentally account to those that provide them withfunds and to their own ideology and conscience", so that they are always "at risk of arbitraryaction, manipulation, lack of transparency..."

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LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION, DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS. GOOD GOVERNANCE

In this respect, the problem could be that the NGO's and the thirdsector as well as the multilateral agencies do not come only or not somuch to reinforce a democratic political order in the proper sense, asto keep configuring democracy in terms of a mixed regime (or one thatis even more mixed). Also and in any case, to invigorate a democracythat is more representing than truly representative and more liberal(and broken down into the different subjects of a pluralistic societyand their wills; a society, on the other hand, that is politically withouta center) than an expression of the popular and national collective.Whatever their intentions, it is clear that the multilateral agencies arenot the citizenship, of course, and -let's say it once again- the thirdsector, beyond any services and merits or demerits (or albeit theobvious advantages of a non-state public production of e.g. certainsocial services and more civically inspired attitudes), is in general farfrom representing the society of any country; in particular, not the bulkof the low income sectors, the marginal or excluded. Even less, fromvalidly and effectively substituting for the political institutions simplybecause these are so largely at fault.

Two faces of one process. Now, and in any case, it is not fit tosay that there is underway a transformation of the model or thestructure and the operation of what-we-call-but-is-not-what-it-ideally-was-and-yet-we-keep-calling-democracy; paying for it,moreover, a price that we fail to know whether it is always adequate(there is a scarcity of sufficient evaluations in this respect) norwhether it is convenient in this connection to pay that or any otherprice. This, as it is said, precisely to bring about democracy or tohave it better. To make it more governable and also to endow it withgovernance, even good governance.

What alternatives are there in any case?Possibly positive ventures versus a hard and dense web

The third sector and governance, we said, entered the scenebecause of (a) the limitations and impotencies shown by the marketand the State, a State on the other hand with a blurred role and image.Also, by reason of (b) the relative weakness of politics; (c) the gradual

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but ceaseless conversion of democracy into a mixed regime, onetherefore always somewhat heterogeneous, inconsistent andungoverned; (d) the incapacity and lack of prestige of the politicalclass; and,(e) the ebb of citizenship plus the ideological blackout andthe quasi obsolescence of classical political models. All of that,combined. Their arrival at the scene is not, therefore, accidental; noteven a mere and contingent result of an infinite human creativity. It hasbeen an answer to a need in the national and international order(although the latter -the most systemic- we cannot consider heredue to lack of space).

In the same connection, curiously, it has been written more ingeneral that "the reform of the State, institutional development and thestrengthening of governability are at the crossroads between theeconomic reforms and the consolidation of democracy" (C. Santiso:2001). Because there are "tensions between political reforms andeconomic reforms", "ambiguous and complex relationships betweendemocratization and economic reforms" (ibidem). As it is evident thatthere are, whence the innovations or their programming or theWashington neo-consensus and the "second generation reforms", thirdsector and governance included. Although following on it and on thesame issue, something else has been mentioned too, however: thattherefore it is necessary to reactivate the citizenship and, besides, to"reinvent politics" (ibidem). Regarding which, and leaving anywishful thinking apart, one might say that the first does not seem somuch a matter of convenience than a difficulty, if not improbability,whereas the second seems perhaps to be too imaginative.

The problem is that in all this there is not just a circularity that wecan begin, and only begin, to underline with an indication. One that isalso made by the author we just quoted, in the sense that, as JulianaBambaci (1999) has written, second generation reforms comprise theparadox of having preconditions which at the same time are theirgoals; that is, a dog that even while moving is biting its tail, somethingwhich makes any real progress at least difficult and clumsy. Worst,what actually exists is a circularity which on that side, witharchitectural overtones, precisely has no way out. If in Latin Americansocieties resort is being made (and certainly guided to that -notincidentally but symptomatically- from abroad) to remedies which

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progressively attack difficulty by difficulty, but, of course, onlysome of the most evident at the superficial level, or at least close tothe surface, or to remedies such as dis-articulations and re-articulations which as a rule are of a slow or gradual action, whennot contradictory, that happens because any broader and moresystemic and profound changes are unthinkable, or perhaps -the20th century experiences in sight- because on top of it they areperceived to be undesired and undesirable. The web of establishedpower constitutes a wall of a magnitude and complexity that inpractice cannot be breached but by facts or processes morecyclopean or truly gigantic than those within reach36 .

And yet, it is that web which represents the greatest and mostauthentic challenge if not threat (more generally, obstacle) both topolitical democratization and to less social inequality in the region,as well as to the generation of more fully legitimate, representativeand transparent governments. So that, in any case, we should notdeceive ourselves when the normative option is discarded because itis de facto shown as impossible and/or undesired, to retain thoseoptions that seem more realistic, moderate, accumulative andmedium to long term. They would be what can be done; and, thosethat look as the more appropriate, rapid and successful, the best thatcan be done. Anyway, in parallel let us not be surprised if in themeantime many of them actually provide little in terms ofmitigation or repairs, and results always and only "in works", whennot "backlashes". I mean to say, certain designs -or, going back toSartori, the given institutions themselves- will do their thing, but,at the point at which they are or they get, "cannot performmiracles". The key is in the more general system of things, and inhow each subsystem, institution, etc. connects to it.

This needs to be understood in depth, in the two faces exposed, andto right and left. Regarding which let us mention here the example ofeducation, one of the more correctly noted fields (others are health or,

36 It is not the smaller part of the problem that mentioned by A. Przeworski (1998: 36) "Why wouldthe politicians in command want to voluntarily subject themselves to greater public scrutiny andcontrol?" Only that the question should be extended beyond politicians (and governments) to allthose having power or being part of it. And to everything that constitutes such power. Some imageof that may have began to be perceived before, when we discussed the incapacity of politics.

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at a different level, civil service, the judiciary, etc,) to improvementsupon that in turn are a precondition for social and politicaldevelopment or democratization (in this respect, see the sustainedseries of documents and reports by the World Bank, ECLAC, IDB, inthe last decade). And, in that connection, let us consider the experienceof Argentina throughout the 1990's, the country and the time where,more than in others of the region, concurred (i) the adoption of a sortof universal "awareness" on the decisive importance -both in generaland particularly economic termsof education as a fundamentalfactor of development, (ii) deliberate government policies adjusted tothis newly created awareness, and (iii) an important reordering-streamlining growth of the economy capable of contributing thefinancial resources of the case, specially under the first Menemadministration, 1989/1995 -even if the "new economic model" thatimposed them also brought about at the time, inter alia, a doubling andeven tripling of open unemployment and the foreign debt, and aclearly regressive redistribution of income37 .

The improvements in the field of education during the period(speaking globally and leaving aside nuances and details) can besummarized by saying that between 1991 and 1996 the total percapita spending in education grew a surprising 37.6%, reverting thetrend of the previous decade and surpassing the levels prior to the"foreign debt crisis" of the early 80's. And, at the same time, thatfrom 1991 to 1997 the educational profile (incomplete primary tocomplete tertiary) of those economically active clearly improved3 8.Now, in spite of those improvements, to start with -and as in thewhole of Latin America- the bulk of the drop out rate andschool failures continued being concentrated in the poorersectors, as well as the probability of receiving a minimum of

37 For this and the following, I refer, among others to D. Filmus. "Educaci6n y Desigualdad enAmerica Latina en los noventa" (1999).

38 There were also certainly negative aspects in this respect, such as, for example, maintaining lowteacher salaries, almost half of those of 1980: the reduction of formal requirements in theconditions of teachers' work "in exchange for" the low salaries; the loss of hierarchy of the sameteachers, required and at the same time prevented in fact from training; the contradictionbetween the pedagogical discourse and the policies implemented; the educationaldecentralization conducted in pure terms of bureaucratic-fiscal re-engineering and with thenational State "passing the bucket" of most of the educational expenditure, transferred directlyto the provinces. The "quality" of education decreased during that time too.

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adequate education continued, to a great extent, being conditioned bythe education of the parents and the economic capacity of the givenhousehold. The changes that took place in the economic-occupationalstructure turned into a factor limiting the impact of the educationaltransformations attempted. It is not curious, then, that the advanceswere accompanied by a growing inequality. Alternatively, theeducational expansion in such an occupational context could notcounterbalance the process of said growing inequality. Let us detailthis a bit further.

One, those who had access to more years of schooling evicted fromthe first positions in the "queue to get a job" those sectors with lessformal education. That, even for jobs requiring low skills, given thehigh unemployment rate. The minimum number of years of schoolingdemanded for access to a job increased; even a portion of those whohad completed secondary and tertiary studies had to take lower jobs orjobs with low productivity and less income. In any case, those moreseriously damaged were, obviously, the social groups that did notmanage to attain the minimum (absolute and relative) of schooling. Itis therefore not surprising to note that the additional school yearsprovide a much greater yield of income when they are above a total oftwelve (!) years of schooling. Nothing less.

Two, even in the Greater Buenos Aires (the country's main urbanconcentration, formed by the continuum of the federal capital and thetwenty four adjacent districts) unemployment increased around 250%among the less educated workers and almost five times less or "only"55% among those with complete tertiary studies. So that, if in 1991 thedifference between the unemployment rate of those with completeprimary studies was 30% greater than that of those who had completedtertiary studies, in 1997 the difference reached 200%. The operatingeducational system is thus, in fact, increasing social inequality.Likewise, the greater the education of some (those who better canaccess it) the greater the inequalities of the others (those who do nothave the same access) 39.

39 This is no different among women exclusively, not so much with respect to men as amongthemselves: the percentage of unemployed women (with up to incomplete secondary studies)was in 1991 practically on a par with that of those who had complete "secondary studies andmore" but in 1997 one and the other reached 19.6 and 15%.

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Increasingly, employment and unemployment, higher and lowerincome, relate to "contacts" and they, in turn, are linked to a betteror worse, private-paid or public-free formal education. The"educational credential". In passing, in Latin America as a wholeyears of schooling are no longer enough as a passport to get modernjobs. While between the 40% poorer families, 90% of the childrenand youths attend public schools, in the highest income deciles, thisproportion is reduced to figures ranging between 25 and 40%according to the country (IDB: 1997).

Three: some aspects may have perhaps "improved" in Argentinaduring the same period. For example, the ratio between variouseducation levels and the social benefits received by the employees. Ineffect, workers aged twenty five or over with up to "incompletesecondary studies" which did not receive them and those with"complete secondary and more" in the same situation were in 1991, 30and 12.4% respectively and in 1997 they became 40.7 and 18.9%. Butin absolute terms everybody's situation worsened, (even thoughcuriously Argentina's GDP grew annually at over 5% during all ofthose years) even if by comparison the gap was slightly closed. Butthis is small and insufficient consolation: in 1997 more education is inany case consecrating as much as in 1991 one (another) significantmanifestation of social inequality.

Ultimately, if it is true that to, produce the inequalities werecord, "behind" the education factor there is always the economic-social inequality of origin, in any case it becomes clear that there isa circularity between the two, but the first one operates within thescene to reinforce the "original" direction of the course of things:speaking in methodological jargon it is "the independent variable".Even with the indicated budgetary increase for education, thisvariable operationalizes within its environment effects that are onlypotential in the more material plane, and then it actualizes them inthe educational system itself. In fact, in connection with lowerincome sectors, we have just seen that they do not serve to reducethe inferiority in which they find themselves within thesocioeconomic order, but to galvanize it.

Even if education does indeed improve the intellectual andperhaps even the spiritual condition of a number of individuals, as well

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as their hopes and their mood, and very likely trains them in a morefunctional manner in their capacity as strictly citizens of a republic,those general outcomes cannot be disregarded.

Summarizing, "education" is inscribed within a context broaderthan its own, and not only is a more complex and contradictorysubsystem than usually perceived, but it is also in correspondencewith political, sociological, economic, and other factors orenvironments, that do not fail to impregnate it or traverse it, so that itsdevelopment processes carry within themselves important doses ofinertia, reproduction and impotence. And what has been exemplifiedwith education applies, likewise, mutatis mutandis, to other fields.

To conclude: what I am saying is that we cannot disregard anyof the above, even if we have to choose or do opt for what is foundto be possible, i.e. "what is practical." But there is more to be saidin this regard.

In the picture, what policies?

Ulrich Beck (1999) characterizes current society as one in whichan "and" has replaced the "rather ... or ", let's say the "one out oftwo ". Meaning by this -and I continue in my own words- a societyin which blends or mergers or a mere alternation of elements (ideas,traditions, cultures, values, aesthetical concepts, etc.) are alwaysoccurring and opening up, also when they are heterogeneous and evenopposed to one another. Like a "black hole" that absorbs and absorbs.Globalization has driven this development, particularly so in the more"advanced" areas of each country around the world, although thesituation in Latin America is not too different.

At any rate, it is inconvenient to believe that the discontinuityproposed by Beck is all too clearcut, as -strictly speaking- nodiscontinuity has ever been throughout history. Therefore, theseoverlappings of the old and the new, or the rather closed with thecontemporarily open and mixed, coexist among us too. I.e., whatprevails now, with what no longer prevails as it did in the past.Everything matters. Still, it is necessary to see to what extent and howmuch in each unit: regions, countries, social classes or sectors. In the

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case of Latin America, other differences keep existing (together withmany more that surely remain to be determined) by zones, socialsectors, ethnicity and gender, which are sufficiently manifest.Obviously, any reflection, policy and project need to keep that in mindforemost.

It is at this point that the participation and initiative of the"stakeholders" becomes crucial and should take precedence or-when that is dysfunctional or unfeasible- at least wield auctoritas ormoral authority over the officials or the experts and anything thatcomes "from the top down" (in my view, this should be so from theoutset, with the exception, of course, of the invitation or facilitation to"the stakeholders" to do something regarding a broadly determinedsubject). This approach could be operational, let's mention it inpassing and not so much in passing, against the deactivation of thepopulation qua a democratic citizenship, although without believingthat it will compensate by itself for such estrangement, simply openingthe door to a return to citizenship proper. In fact, such a return wouldprobably require political and ideological triggers of a much moreacute and collective nature than those present (absent) today40 .And atthis time we are just looking at rather limited, specific efforts orreengineerings, even if there are more than a few in the region andsome wished them to become articulated, be these bigger or smaller,or even if the intention were to multiply them in terms of numbers,places, actors and likewise.

Actions and reforms in the field of social policies, specially inthose of "universal coverage" such as health or education (F Repetto,1998), or in fields like the civil service, Justice, social control, accessto information, or even the organization and internal political life andoperation of the parties as such, or the environment, etcetera, areneeded as badly as noted and known; and while important inthemselves and not indifferent for many people, starting with those

40 We mentioned previously the case of France in April 2002. But let's wait and see whether andhow much the currently so healthy and vigorous "Le Pen effect" that buried this candidate in thesecond electoral round lasts. In Latin America, the only current case of a political-ideological"detonation" that can be observed is Venezuela. Also there, it remains to be seen how it evolvesand resolves (or dissolves).

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directly involved, in any case they do not imply or invariablyconstitute their/an interest (their/an involvement) collectively. Now, inany case, it is still true that the initial participation of thoseimmediately concerned in any project is required in its own definitionand scope, both for an eventually greater eventual effectiveness /efficiency and for its strictly democratic character, at least lato sensuor in spirit and to recreate social links, -since the preceding ones,those that were traditional of the 20th Century- are nowdissolving, when they haven't already vanished.

Here we find an obvious problem. In good theory, projects justlike policies must (should) always be defined two ways: for theparticular, individual good, and for the common good; and, usingcertain jargon, their principals & agents (as unum) should inprinciple be respectively the communities of reference, or theneighbors, the women, the workers, even the officials to the extentthey are "affected", etc., etc., on the one hand, and the public powerson the other, much better if decentralized -without losses- as maybe the case of each concrete policy or program. Other parties,namely, the multilateral credit agencies, the NGOs -even if they arestakeholders or sponsors or articulators, but in their capacity of,precisely, a third sector-, the remaining associations, the unionsand even the political parties, summing up: the expressions of civil /civic society (I do not say representations; whether they are such ornot is casuistically open) should instead be understood and serve asagents & brokers, even when they are awarded not only the right toinitiate and successively participate, of course, but also the right tovote and even to veto. In any case, the ultimate actors and sundryroles should be made clear in these terms, conscious and assumed4 1.

But we were saying there is an obvious problem here. Theproblem is precisely that the so-called "public powers" have shownto feature considerable failures in terms of their representativeness,committment, effective capacity and competency, transparency and

41 An assumption for this purpose is the possibility of periodically discriminating and otherwisedetermining who or what constitute the vafious different players (three or four, in total).

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accountability horizontal as well as vertical, and more, aseverybody knows. It is precisely in view of this that the multilateralagencies have taken such a significant role in these matters, both tocooperate with the public powers or to take care (directly orindirectly) of what these have taken care of poorly, if at all.

This is not a problem that has an easy or a forthcomingperhaps not even a remote- solution. Especially in today'sextremely pluralistic societies. In any case, never and nowhere hasthe problem to date been truly solved, although the more developedcountries find themselves at a shorter distance from such a horizonthan the Latin American ones. In such a connection it is not idle torecall what political theory has long and perfectly understood to bethe case: that "the State" is by definition society's other and,whether to establish or to maintain society, it is what interferes with,limits, subjects and dominates society, in de facto better or worseterms. While the State justifies this by invocations to the generalinterest, actually it is not always "telling the truth" in that respect,not quite. What we are indicating is precisely an example of theabove. The history of the 19th and 20th centuries shows that theState, in parallel with its democratization, was no less captured bythe interests (Bobbio, 1985.)

Even so, let's agree that ours is only "the best of all possibleworlds" and, in it, nothing and nobody like the State (thecontemporaneous constitutional State) can in principle betterrepresent or more comprehensively represent the common good.Especially in Latin America, as we saw, according to its tradition orpolitical culture. So that, since there is no escaping this, even withall its deficiencies it is necessary to turn back to the State, not theless when or while attempts are made to bring it closer -throughreforms and controls- to what is its justification in principle, itslegitimate role. Still, what from the democratic point of view is notfeasible is to replace it, as some occasionally wish and even attemptto do, going beyond the need and the will to compensate for itsdeficits. At this point, it "is increasingly evident that not even thedevelopment of the market itself can be assured without ademocratic State, one that among other things, preserves its owncompetence in terms of the public good and provides the protection,

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mediation and redistribution functions needed for socioeconomicdevelopment" (Bresser Pereira and Cunnil Grau, 1998:29)42.

Any argument in favor of its replacement should therefore beunderstood to be an extraordinary hypothesis operating on a differentlevel: that or those already mentioned of necessity, practicality, etc., insum, such reasons as are invoked or can be invoked for theintervention of some other agencies and agents. And, of course,without falling in the naivete of ignoring that ultimately they respondto their own interests, including corporatist ones, or also the intereststhey finally answer to, political and ideological, which of course doexist side by side with the pure commendable ones or underlyingthose, as has always been the case among parties and actors whoseviews are not coincidental and are debatable.

On this point, Bresser Pereira and Cunill Grau point out:"Summarizing, it has to do with opening in society a debate oninstitutionality in favor of satisfying public needs, as well as exertingpressure from it so that the public state sphere does effectively andactually become public; i.e. open to the participation of all, and thusable to adequately regulate the centers of economic and social power,while respecting the spaces of liberty which are increasingly beingdemanded (...) Social control is the way in which society can overseethe State directly, in addition to the classical forms of representativecontrol." (1998: 30, 34, added emphasis).

What policies, therefore? If it had to be said in one line, this wouldbe: policies that are shaped, formulated and implemented in thestrictest democratic-participatory way. Other programs or projects thatfall outside that framework or those public initiatives and policies, inthe narrow sense, remain possible, in fact, and will surely be welcomeand convenient (although not always) for one or another ensemble ofgroups and individuals, agencies and organizations, "thestakeholders"; but democratic and for the common good, in the best ofcases to be eventually determined, because this cannot (not at least

42 The authors continue saying -and by the way correcting other assertions they previously madethat were already quoted in a previous foomote- that "currently the assignment of apredetermined role or an intrinsic virtue to (civil) society is being increasingly questioned itis important to look upon civil society as one organized and weighted in accordance with thepower held by the various groups and individuals", including the NGOs. ..... It is therefore notreasonable to associate a necessarily positive value with civil society as a whole." (Ibidem).

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from the outset) ) be attributed to the same, by definition. From thisperspective, in the democratic political-theoretical perspective, theirrole should be understood as simply complementing the State, andperformed as such.

For public policies, starting with social policies, to succeed notonly in attaining their more declared and immediate objectives, butalso to be properly democratic and democratizing, what the aboveentails is that in parallel it would be necessary to think of additionalpolicies, if not previous, in any case fundamental, and to act goingforward (with a true drive) in the four or five orders that, nowadays,perhaps have the most negative impact in this respect. What orders? 1.In the field of politics, all those connected to recovering an awarenessof politics as the activity that in itself has the objective of serving thecommon good; thus restoring it as a (sub)system that coordinates andintegrates all of the others. 2. The democratic order and regime, in thestrictest sense, purged of the oligarchic, bureaucratic, technocratic,partycratic and neocorporatist forms of government that have beenattached to it over time (and continue being attached to it, even via thephilosophy or the theory of good governance when these are or, insome approaches, become perverted). This is an issue that can alreadybe dealt with from the legal side, that is, through legislation, forexample by regulating or newly regulating republican and democraticconstitutional norms that are clear in themselves and, on that basisforce, for example, the registration of lobbies, etc. 3. The oneconcernig the political class, currently so much diminished andwithout prestige, as is also the case with political parties: both need tobe restored in public opinion (respect) and, of course, in practice, asirreplaceable for a good political order43 . This can also be partly dealtwith using legislation, for example regarding financial or equity and

43 In connection with the parties, the point has been well made by C. Sojo (...): "Political partiesneed to deepen their relations with society, restore their representation and interestintermediation capacity. The expansion of nevvJbrms ofpolitical participation does not supposesubstituting the parties or a radical trans]brmation oj the representative regime. A good shareof the democratic development tasks relates to the capacity of traditional political parties ofadapting to the challenges of the future (..) the challenge lies in finding the means to form partysystems, where the competition and the fight between political and ideological altematives is areal fact and not merely an electoral fiction" (added emphasis). We will return to a couple ofthese points below, to underline them.

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other organizational aspects. 4. The State as the most neutralrepresentative of the common good. That, of course, with itsinstitutions sharpened for this purpose -which is in part what someof the ongoing reforms or reengeneerings are dealing with, only thatin terms of singular, determined policies.

Now, all of this requires activating the related discourse, politicaland ethical, or the very ideas of democracy and republic, today wornso thin and discredited -except in what concerns the obviousadvantages of the Rule of Law, which however needs to be integrated.Driving as a necessity, apart from something legitimate and not at all"politically incorrect" (according to what, for instance, is regularlygleaned from the emphasis on certain unique "state policies"), theshaping and formulation of programs, policies and "ideologies" thatfear not being alternative. Forcefully urging and promoting debates onthese issues44 . And recovering or creating the public spaces and foranecessary for this purpose. This, and only this (outside the activationinstances that may happen of their own accord, only that normally notsubject to forecasts, for they are always beyond anybody's particularwill), would manage to attain the other aspect that is now naturallymissing, but which up to a point can be counterbalanced, namely, 5.the "sense" of citizenship in the population. Today no doctrinarian ortheoretical claim is more sustained or enjoys a broader consensus thanthis. Therefore, it is necessary to act now and immediately regardingcitizenship properly. To be sure, useful projects can be devised in thisregard. After all, it is about creating "sense" in society, a sense todaydoubtlessly performed (even more than by school?) by and throughthe media, starting with TV; but without a plan, by means ofinnumerable (the chemical term) "precipitates" that are broadlyscattered and, in fact, play against the homogeneous creation of agood civic sense.

Also here, and urgently, action and engineering are thereforerequired. Much more and before "inventing" anything. And at least atthe same time as any other designs and developments that the greatlybemoaned social and institutional reality of our countries requires. Of

44 "If the options relating to public policies are effectively restricted to one, democracy is reducedto zero. The political elites can deliberately apply strategies to monopolize and limit the politicaldebate." (Offe & Schmittern 1995: 10).

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CARLOS STRASSER

course, without detracting from what the action of civil societymovements or organizations, NGOs and akin social networks maycontribute in this direction along the way. In this regard, beyond theobservations and reservations we have posed, it should absolutely notbe ruled out that their advocacy in favor of values or interests,collective in different degrees, may help to create or recreate a citizensculture. Specially in Latin America, where previously it was always theState (as opposed to, for example, what was the case in the UnitedStates, this at least until the relatively progressive innovations thatbegan in the 1930's and followed after the second world war, althoughnever to the same extent) that provided the public services and assetsof which, in view of its defection, these organizations and networksnow attempt to address45 .

In the end, it would be about returning to Politics withouthesitation, although neither reducing it per force to the State narrowlyunderstood. And, in this direction, about investing in this relation bymeans of programs, projects, bodies, organizations or agencies andactions, specific while organic, to reintroduce it as a decisive instance,the knot that effectively ties society together as such with the thread ofshared values and interests and purposes. And to the politics that isunderlying the political engineering, i.e. the politics behind thepolicies, that have partially substituted for it and, moreover, have doneso "on a case by case basis", in a rather restricted way.

45 However, in this respect there's the need to take into account the necessarily complex and"multiple" relationship of the so-called "social capital" that includes these organizations, vis-a-vis democratization; see N. Lechner (2000) on this point. But it is still worthwhile to point at therather frequent targets of the NGOs themselves, many times directed in a straightforwardmanner at constructing a public locus for voluntary social relations and interactions withcapacity for the self-determination of the group.

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LATIN AMERICA: CIVIC PARTICIPATION. DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS, GOOD GOVERNANCE

The two faces of the non state public field

Even so, and to put order into things, let us recall that politics is a

system with an environment or (the different theoretical perspective

does not change our target) that is nested within its context. At the

beginning we made a reference to it as the "conditions of possibility"

of democracy, conditions of all types: cultural, historical, social,

economic, starting with its more general patterns or background and

its current web. Therefore, and in connection then with the mutual

reference of politics and context, it is clear that it is essential also to act

in parallel or, even better, in convergence through pathways such as

those of the social policies. From this point of view, these so-called

"social policies" are a core imperative that extends beyond addressing

social needs as such. Attaining a more extended and more properly

democratic practice than the one we have today in Latin America will

also result from the efforts made in the fields/environments of health,

poverty, education, and job training. Another fundamental field, of

course, is women, gender, so that democratization not only reaches the

lowest stratum but also extends beyond man as its subject, thus

reaching women, and also penetrating within the family (which

nowadays, at the bottom, frequently lacks a man).Now, experience and the current state of affairs show that a general

problematic side of all the aforementioned is that, to achieve greater

effectiveness and efficiency, if the supply of goods and services is in

state hands, it is necessary to have the participation and control of the

public, and if it is in the hands of the public, state interventions are

required; both, simply for reasons of differential information, of more

immediate knowledge of each "case", the diverse technical or

administrative expertises required, the differences in commitment and

stimuli or altruism. Also, regarding third-sector volunteers and their

(frequent dis-)organization as such, so that the appropriation of roles

or the emergence of excluding hegemonies do not take place, or in

connection with the funding and the terms in which income collection,

distribution and management thereof occurs, the evaluations and

audits, etc. The two parties have failures or weaknesses that need to be

covered, when not by themselves, then reciprocally.

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CARLOS STRASSER

This required complementation does not imply to refute thatinherently the civil or non-state public associations and NGOseffectively increase the total offering of goods and services, as well asdecrease bureaucracy and rigidity in their management, whileaugmenting the dedication and responsibility of the actors46 . It is forthe same reasons that they are usually declared to be "of publicbenefit" and get tax exemptions. Now, their objectives, structures andworking methods are, however, hugely diverse (M.J. Wyszormirski,1990) to be able to cover them all in detail here. There even exist,according to the English model, quasi non-governmentalorganizations, "acting in the social field, in particular in education andhealth, with resources ensured by the State, and subject to acontractual relationship with the State" (Bresser Pereira & CunillGrau, 1998:48). But another issue continues being their meaning indemocratic terms, as already mentioned more than once. EduardoBustelo points at this aspect in the most forceful, perhaps extrememanner, yet still relevant from our perspective:

If one defining trait were to be pointed out in the current "socialpolicy", it would be causing social dismemberment and havingdisregard for social equality. It is not only that the processes ofmaterial production generate a "fragmented and discontinuous"society, with a plurality and a great diversity of groups andorganizations with very heterogeneous interests, but that, besides,there is a "political operation" to dismember it, to inhibit its innovationpotential and to deactivate the possibility of social actors emerging.Part of this "strategy of social dismemberment" is the "rediscovery" ofcivil society as a way of ignoring the central point of social inequalitiesas well as their centrally public and political character. Also thedecentralization and valorization of the local level as a strategy toweaken the possibility of setting up coalitions with a potential for

46 Their merits are as arguable as varied. For example, one author highlights that their action "tendsto be accompanied by innovation", to overcome the traditional "clientelism" of social policiesand to rebalance the usual protection to "the more strongly organized workers, particularly thoseof the public sector" and urban workers as compared to rural workers, with the "potential ofbringing new stakeholders into the social policy decision-making process" (J.C. Navarro,1998:99, 103 & 104). Another one notes the experience they have in "litigation and surveyingissues in society" (Gonzalez Morales, 1997:44). Etcetera.

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change, the proliferation of NGOs as "captive" social spaces, limitedto programs only, and the assembly of poverty targeted "socialinterventions" could be part of an approach devised as a policy to evictcommon concerns and narrow the democratic spaces..." (1998:13).

The following is connected with this issue and will be our

conclusion. So far we were, in any case, in a "tight spot". The

condition of democracy lies, in principle, on the side of the

constitutional political institutions, beginning with the State, that,

however, is presently wrestling with incapacities, weaknesses and

impotence: listing them would be redundant. A more effective action

and renewal (effective and efficient) in terms of social matters and

political control, usually falls de facto on those of one or other civil

society group or organization; that are, in themselves, however, liable

to awaken legitimate reserves and concerns from the more strictly

democratic point of view, even if here or there they operate

productively at the level of the above mentioned "conditions of

possibility" of democracy.

Government, governability, governance and State

At different points in this work, emphasis has been placed on therole of the State both from the general perspective of political theory(democratic theory very specifically included) and within the traditionof Latin American political culture. Perhaps the ultimate reason for itlays in that a good part, maybe the major part, of the approaches andanalyses of our core subject -such as the institutionalist ones-,come pervaded with another political vision, to use Sheldon Wolin's(1961) suggestive concept. The US-Anglo vision of government,instead of and so different from the German Staat vision, or the FrenchV'Etat's (or, at the extreme of a continumm extending from Hegel toneo-Marxism; for example, that exemplified by N. Poulantzas (1969)once so widely known), which is, understandably, the one more"naturalized" in Latin America according to its tradition. Now, in spiteof being open to both perspectives, the more habitually employedconcepts of governability and governance likewise usually connotate

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CARLOS STRASSER

the difference in approaches. And, aside from the fact that the issuemost seemingly implies a conflict of "paradigms", we apparently havehere another ideological import impacting the political culture of theLatin American region.

At the beginning we dealt with the concepts that were basic for ourpurposes: democracy, governability and governance. We were therealmost at the point of referring to the State, which, undoubtedly, isalso a basic concept, and because we understood that it would benecessary along the way at least "in act"; yet, we decided to postponeit up to this point, where its importance would perhaps become moreevident. For, in effect, this is the point at which, going back to whathas been said so far (partly in passing and between the lines), the ideaof that very dense power web in which social relations are politicallyinterwoven and tied indicates more clearly what kind of challenge,threat and basic obstacle we have before us for the democratization ofthe area. Government says little in this regard: it speaks of theinstitutions or the institutes and policies of the constitutional / legalorder more than about anything else, when not only about them. Italmost does not account for that dense web of power.

However, we have not moved to another terrain when we speakof the weak and subordinated place that politics has today; or whenwe try to show which is the anatomy under the skin of thecontemporary democratic political regime, and the situation towhich the political class has been driven and is now found, on theone hand, or citizenship, on the other; and when we journeyedhistorically and culturally regarding the ideological-political"flooring" that is distinctive of Latin America and is still theminimum-common of its different sectors and currents; at least, themore specific of its large popular majorities. All that relates to theState, is constitutive of it, of its own, difficult, elusive concept. Onthe other hand, and not by chance, it is scarcely attuned with theempiricist vein of the typically American political science, bornprecisely for the object of government.

The idea of governance, however, already seems to extend abridge between "government" and "State". It refers to social actors orsectors together with those of the State, and to different types ofrelations between them, and speaks of institutions more broadly or in

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a different manner, as if in a more sociological and sociological-

political vein, a vein that is closer if not coincidental with that of the

second vision previously mentioned. If this is so, the idea of

governance, as well as that of good governance, is, at least in fact,

understanding that democracy comprises forms or modes of

government that exceed the strict dimension of the "declared" regime

(and that, therefore, can complement it, which is the question; but

likewise, cross in its path and hinder it, as is the case of the oligarchy,

the bureaucracy and other forms that we have recorded inside it). That

is, it penetrates within the realm of the concept of State, of which the

regime is a part that can be analytically broken out -something that

is then related to its capacity and enjoyment of a certain political

"autonomy"-, but in the end both empirically and theoretically not

subject to separation or isolation (Strasser: 1991.)Ultimately, therefore, one could say that the achievement of both

governance and a good governance "involve" (or should "involve", at

least ex hypothesis) the confrontation with the dense web of power that

has held and still holds Latin America in a condition of inequality,

inequity, poverty and inefficiency for which now a more sustained

remedy seems to be sought. It weaves political power, economic

power, media power, international power. Or else it will not involve it,

because that would be so far-fetched or in fact impracticable (and,

besides, with good or bad reasons, undesired by many) as trying to

bring the Andes down; but then one would only be scratching the

problem and there will be little success, except perhaps incrementally

and over the generations. This is what we have been posing all along,

even if there are no alternatives.

But this is the time for conclusions.

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CARLOS STRASSER

CONCLUSIONS THAT ALSO MAKE A SUMMARY

The threats and challenges, or more generally, obstacles todemocracy and democratization in Latin America do not consist only,not even mainly, of the weakness of the institutions or the political andparty systems, or the exacerbated complexity and incompetence of thebureaucracies, the corruption of the legislators or the officials andtheir counterparts, or the blatant inability of the Judiciary to enforcethe effective rule of law. And even less in presidencialism (that is sovaried in structures and performances). There are other factors andbackgrounds to be underlined in this matter -without even speaking ofthe obvious and highly determinant economic and social factors.

One: that politics has diminished, as in other areas of thecontemporary world, the core role it performed since modernity as theintegrator of the various social subsystems, and this to becomeincreasingly -not just a subsystem articulated to the others- but asphere and an activity closer to subordination and to impotence thanthe other way round. Two: that the democratic political regime,victorious in one sense at the fall of communism and the otherauthoritarian orders, in parallel has continued its inclination, nowsecular, to becoming in fact a mixed regime (a variable and variegatedcombination of other several regimes or forms of government strictosensu) and therefore not only more harassed but also more blurred, ill-coordinated and partly disgoverned. Moreover, within thecombination it has already tended to alter its very condition of"representative". Three: that the political classes have, by acombination of history and their own failure, lost their capacity todirect and to be trusted by the people. Four: that citizenship as suchhas visibly gone into a process of deactivation, disbelief and

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individualistic engrossment, due to old and recent trends, the ones and

the others added up. Something that is hardly reversible. Five: that the

very political culture, considered its historical roots and independently

from any value judgment in this regard, appears to be fragmented or

driven to dis-arrangement and dis-concert by successive externalinfiltrations (above all the last one, neoliberalism) only partly

assimilated and/or assimilated by different groups and therefore the

almost haphazard disposition of the players, thus resulting inlegitimacy conflicts and difficulties that are added to the normal ones

resulting from the usual clash between legality and effectiveness that

every government faces.Within this framework, and in connection with all the ongoing

reforms and projects arising from the successively grown complexity

of societies, from the crisis or the deficits of the State, from the

increasing needs, it is necessary not to loose sight of a hard fact: that

they not only each face their specific objective, but also and above all,

an established and dense and partly opaque power web. The very

definition of both reforms and projects actually takes into account this

elementary but solid datum, when it does not, to a good extent,respond or correspond to it. In themselves, therefore, they at the most

and in the best of cases imply improvements or palliatives that are on

one side rather circumscribed and on the other only medium or long

term effects: limited and slow or too parsimonious. Theiraccumulation and integration over time remain to be seen, but

everything suggests the bets made are too high. Over time, many other

things accumulate too.The role of governance as a form of complementary government

that eventually may impove on the constitutional regime (and assist

in democratic governability) should, consequently, not be

exaggerated, good intentions or declarations aside. There are two

dimensions to the issue.Firstly and to begin with, governance is linked by birth and

development to the functioning of neocorporatist guilds and sectorsand, successively, of the "third sector" or the NGOs and multilateralcredit agencies. That not only do not succeed -perhaps will nevermanage to succeed- in coming together and partnering, but,

moreover, cannot be understood a priori as representative of civil

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CARLOS STRASSER

society: this is arguable, specially when speaking of the wide popularsectors. Even less, as expressing political society; or necessarily beingpart of a democratization process. This because their independence -which, for the worse, is sometimes diminished along the way-, theirinnovation capacity, their social altruism, etc., carry with them notonly natural limitations but also natural and surely incorrigibleinclinations to the sectorial, when not to the strictly corporatistinterests. On the other hand and secondly: together with the economicfinancial crisis, the weakness and defection of the State and thepolitical institutions have been the occasion for the emergence of thethird sector and the role of the multilateral credit agencies as well as,likewise, for the growing deployment of both, but besides investingthem with the temptation and illusion of eventually replacing those atfault. Positive actions aside, this is not democratic, by definition or infact. Although it "May" contribute to a subsequent greater civicawareness and a democratizing process.

The defection and weaknesess mentioned are also and on the otherside barriers to the possibility of a governance and good governanceas defined, since the State and its institutions, like the parties, arefundamental and irreplaceable actors in both. In this sense, the role ofone and the others (that of the State, central by definition and tradition,and with an incomparable legitimacy, as in principle also the partieshave) should be repowered, including the reforms that are necessaryand even urgent. However, it is foreseeable that this will mostly nothappen, at least not in the near future; therefore the non-state publicorganizations and NGOs will in all probability continue growing andacting in the terms they already do. They will be welcome. With theirpluses (direct and appreciable) and their minuses (the major onesindirect, and rarely taken into account.)

This does not mean to say that the efforts and reforms of reference,social, political, economic, should not proceed and multiply in themeantime as much as possible. To some degree or another, with moreor less success, they will always make possible some needed andpositive inputs -positive at least for "the stakeholders"-, which inturn may eventually open up roads in directions that appear to beclearly desirable in quite many senses. But it will always be necessaryto incorporate, as from their very design, at least on an equalfooting,

425


the involved players or subjects, together as, essentially, the political

parties (that, even if reluctant or very difficult to deal with, are by

principle the truest and irreplaceable possibility of a collective

representation. In any case -if we consider this resistance or

engrossment and their own precariousness, specially those that have

become so acute of late-, favoring their own internal democratization

as soon as possible, and the education of their "cadres" to this end).

Therefore, a decisive field for investigation and initiatives will be the

relationship between non-state public organizations and NGOs with

political parties.However, the successful achievement of governance and in

particular good governance lies in what its concept perhaps already

implies, beyond certain political "visions" or understandings that, we

suspect, in principle would appear to connotate it as if inherently.

Because its does point, in fact, to the notion and practice of the "State",

and not only to that of "government." That is, because it would imply

articulating but, likewise, confronting the dense web of power

prevailing in Latin America. The true, main obstacle to democracy in

the region. Now, if this can hardly be expected, then, and in the best of

cases, the goals will barely be scratched for a time that will surely be

measured in generations. There is also a whole fundamental political

education task pending; strictly pedagogical, immediately educational,

not indirect and "propedeutic" as the current ones. Our suggestion is

to address it promptly, with imagination and resources, as a policy. As

it is currently done with social issues. This is a necessary investment

that will surely reinforce the others and certainly afford them a greater

success. It would, naturally, be especially important in the civic order

stricto sensu, fundamental in itself.

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CARLOS STRASSER

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OTHER AUTHORS MENTIONED:Hans Baron, Dolores Bejar, Edmond Burke, Isidoro Cheresky, Adam

Ferguson, Otis H. Green, Alexander Hamilton, Eric Hobsbawm, James

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DESARROLLO SOCIAL EN AMERICA LATINA

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Mayra Buvinic, Chief of the Social Development Division and Special Advisor onViolence of the Sustainable Development Department (SDS) of theInter-American Development Bank (IDB). She joined the IDB in 1996as Chief of the Women in Development Unit, SDS. Ms. Buvinic, aChilean citizen, has a Ph.D. and M.A. in Social Psychology, Universityof Wisconsin. Founding member of the Intemational Research Center(ICRW) in Washington, D.C., and its former president from 1978 to1996. In 1990 and 1991, she was associated with the United NationsEconomic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, inSantiago, Chile, as Visiting Researcher of the ICRW. Ms. Buvinic haspublished extensively in the areas of poverty and gender, job promotion,small business development and reproductive health. She has served onthe board of directors of several non-profit institutions, among them theInternational Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) and theIntemational Irrigation Management Institute (IIMI).

Rolando Franco, Director of the Social Development Division of the EconomicCommission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) of theUnited Nations and director of the ECLAC annual publication SocialPanorama of Latin America. Ph.D. in Law and Social Sciences,Universidad de la Republica, Uruguay, and M.A. in Sociology, FacultadLatinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO), Santiago, Chile. Hehas published over 200 articles and 25 books.

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Sara Gordon Rapaport. Full time researcher at the Instituto de Investigaciones

Sociales of the Universidad Nacional Aut6noma de Mexico (UNAM).

She holds a Licenciatura degree in Political and Social Sciences,

UNAM, 1979. M.A. and Ph.D. in Latin American Studies, specializing

in Political Science, Sorbonne, Paris, 1985. She has published numerous

works on poverty, social development and social rights, among them:

Ciudadania y derechos sociales. Una reflexi6n sobre Mexico, Revista

Mexicana de Sociologia, No. 3, July/Sept. 2001. Necesidades y deman-

das ante el nuevo milenio in Mufioz, Humberto (ed), La sociedad mexi-

canafrente al tercer milenio, Vol. II, Miguel Angel Porruia, Coordinaci6n

de Humanidades-UNAM, Mexico, 2001. Nuevas desigualdades y politi-

ca social in R. Cordera and A. Ziccardi (coords.). Las politicas sociales

de Mexico al fin del milenio, Miguel Angel Porrua, Coordinaci6n de

Humanidades, FE, IISUNAM, Mexico, 2000. Poverty and Social

Exclusion in Mexico, International Institute for Labour Studies,

Discussion papers, DP/93/1997, Labour Institutions and Development

Programme, Spanish version in Rafael Menjivar and Dirk Kruijt

(coords.), Pobreza, exclusi6n y politica social. FLACSO-Costa Rica,

UNESCO and Utrecht University, San Jose, Costa Rica, 1997.

Edgar E. Gutierrez-Espeleta, Universidad de Costa Rica graduate in Statistics and

M.Sc. and Ph.D. in Forest Biometry, Iowa State University. At present he

is Director of the Development Observatory and lecturer at the Escuela

de Estadistica of the Universidad de Costa Rica. He is a member of the

panel of experts on indicators of the Sustainable Development

Commission of the United Nations and was recently named member of

the Statistics Commission of the Economic and Social Council of the

United Nations. He is a member of the Scientific Commission on the

project Global Environmental Change and Human Safety of the

International Human Dimension Program (IHDP) and of the Consulting

Group on Indicators of Sustainable Development (CGISD). He has pub-

lished papers in national and international magazines, in books on sus-

tainable development indicators and is the author of a book on statistical

methods. He was Vice President of the Board of Directors of the scien-

tific body of the Convention on Biological Diversity for two years.

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Andrew R. Morrison. Senior Specialist in Social Development, SocialDevelopment Division of the Inter-American Development Bank.Former associate lecturer at the University of Tulane; University of NewMexico and FLACSO/Ecuador. ' Ph.D. in Economy, VanderbiltUniversity. He has published extensively on crime, violence and publicpolicy. Among his most recent contributions we can mention Measuringthe Costs of Crime and Violence as an Input to Public Policy: Evidencefrom Mexico (with Graciela Teruel, Renata Villoro and James Hammitt).Woodrow Wilson Intemational Center for Scholars volume on CitizenSecurity, forthcoming. Living in a Violent World (with Mayra Buvinic),Foreign Policy, 2000. Trade Reform Dynamics and TechnicalEfficiency: The Peruvian Experience (with Ila Alam), World BankEconomic Review, 2000. Notas Tecnicas sobre la Prevenci6n de laViolencia (with Mayra Buvinic), Washington, D.C.: Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, 1999. El Costo del Silencio: Violencia Domestica enlas Americas (with Loreto Biehl). Washington, D.C.: Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank, 1999. Third World Urbanization (with CharlesBecker) in P Cheshire and E. Mills (eds), Handbook of Applied UrbanEconomics. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1999.

Maria Beatriz Orlando. Ph.D. in Economics, University of Tulane (USA) special-izing in Economic Development. Former Lecturer and Researcher atthe Universidad Cat6lica Andres Bello, Caracas, Venezuela. Has donenumerous research projects on Latin American labor markets andsocial matters. Consultant to the World Bank, Inter-AmericanDevelopment Bank and the Office of Economic Consultants to theVenezuelan Congress.

Juan Pablo Perez Siinz. Sociologist. Researcher at FLACSO since 1981. M.A. inSociology, Sorbonne, Paris, and in Development Studies, Institute ofSocial Studies, The Hague. Ph.D. in Economics, Free University,Brussels. He has worked on labor market, poverty and local econom-ic development matters. Noteworthy among his published work are:Respuestas silenciosas. Proletarizaci6n urbana y reproducci6n defuerza de trabajo en America Latina. (Caracas, Nueva Sociedad/UNESCO/FLACSO, 1989); Informalidad urbana en America Latina,

435


Enfoques, problematicas e interrogantes (Caracas, FLACSO/Nueva

Sociedad, 1991); De la finca a la maquila. Modernizaci6n capitalista

y trabajo en Centroamerica (San Jose, FLACSO, 1996) also published

in English as: From the Finca to the Maquila. Labor and Capitalist

Development in Central America (Boulder, Westview Press, 1999;

and, with K. Andrade-Eekhoff, M. Carrera Guerra and E. Olivares

Ferreto): Globalizaci6n y comunidades en Centroamerica (San Jose,

FLACSO, 2001).

Ernesto Rodriguez. Uruguayan sociologist, specializing in Public Youth Policies.

Former Director of the Youth Forum of the Instituto Nacional de la

Juventud (Ministerio de Educaci6n y Cultura), and President of

Organizaci6n Iberoamericana de Juventud (OIJ). Present Director of the

Centro Latinoamericano sobre Juventud (CELAJU); Consultant to the

United Nations (CEPAL, UNESCO, ILO, UNICEF, UNFPA), to the

Intemamerican Development Bank ((IDB), to the OIJ and to the GTZ

German Technical Cooperation Agency, on public youth and social devel-

opment policies. He is the author of a number of papers on his field,

notable among them Primer Informe sobre la Juventud en America Latina

1990" (OIJ, Madrid, 1991), Capacitaci6n y Empleo de J6venes en

America Latina: Experiencias y Desafios (CINTERFOR/ILO,

Montevideo, 1995), and J6venes en America Latina: Actores Estrategicos

del Desarrollo (CIEJUV Mexico, forthcoming).

Carlos Sojo. Costa Rican sociologist, currently Academic Director of FLACSO

Costa Rica, where he has worked as a researcher since 1989. M.A. in

Sociology, Universidad de Costa Rica, and Ph.D. in Social Sciences,

Utrecht University of Holland. He has published extensively on political

sociology and, more recently, on general social development aspects

such as poverty, exclusion and public policy. Noteworthy among his

most recent publications are the book Exclusi6n Social y Reducci6n de

la Pobreza en America Latina y el Caribe published in Spanish in 2000

and in English in 2001 by FLACSO Costa Rica and The World Bank.

With D. Kruijt and R. Grynspan, he co-authored the book Informal

Citizens, Poverty, Informality and Social Exclusion in Latin America

(Rozenberg, Amsterdam, 2002).

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Carlos Strasser. Lawyer (Universidad de Buenos Aires), Ph.D. in Political Science,University of California, Berkeley. Since 1985 he has been chiefresearcher of the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Cientificas ofArgentina. As from 1972, he was, successively, Director of the SocialSciences Department of Fundaci6n Bariloche, Director of the PoliticalScience School at FLACSO, creator and Director of the Masters degreein Social Sciences at FLACSO/Argentina and Director ofFLACSO/Argentina, founder coordinator of the Epistemology andPolicy Group of CLACSO, creator of the Political Science career atUniversidad de Buenos Aires and Director of Humanities Department ofUniversidad de San Andres, among others. He has taught courses andgiven lectures at many universities and academic institutions in LatinAmerica, the United States and Europe. He is the author of numerousarticles and papers published in professional magazines in a number ofcountries and of eight books, the first on Philosophy of the SocialSciences and, thereafter, mainly on Political Theory and, in particular,the Theory of Democracy; among others, La Raz6n Cientifica en

Politica y Sociologia (Amorrortii, Buenos Aires, 1979) and Democracia

y Desigualdad. Sobre la democracia real afines del siglo XX(CLACSO,EUDEBA, Buenos Aires, 1999; second edition, 2000). He is a fellow ofthe Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., and has received the Honor Sashawarded by Sociedad Argentina de Escritores and the 1986-1996 KonexPlatinum Award in Political Science, Argentina.

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