Life Courses in the GlobalizationProcess: The Development ofSocial Inequalities in ModernSocietiesSandra Buchholz, Dirk Hofacker, Melinda Mills, Hans-Peter Blossfeld,Karin Kurz and Heather Hofmeister

This article examines the impact of the globalization process on individual life courses and

employment careers in modern societies from an international comparative perspective.

Empirical results are summarized from the GLOBALIFE research project (Life Courses in the

Globalization Process), which studied the effects of globalization on life courses for the

first time. As the results demonstrate, the globalization process has had diverse effects on

different phases of the life course. Qualified men in their mid-careers are broadly

protected from the effects of globalization, while young adults are the losers of the

globalization process. We also find that educational and class characteristics determine the

extent to which an individual faces increasing labour market risks. Under globalization,

these effects have intensified. The results of the GLOBALIFE project thus indicate that

globalization triggers a strengthening of existing social inequality structures. Another

central finding is that globalization has not led to the same outcome across various

modern societies. Globalization appears to be distinctly filtered by deeply embedded

national institutions. These ‘institutional packages’ entail diverse strategies of labour

market flexibilization which themselves differentially shape patterns of social inequality

in modern societies.

Introduction

Over the last two decades, globalization has had a last-ing impact on modern societies, and globalization

research now plays an important role in the social andeconomic science discourse. However, it is notable that,up to now, this research mostly has been limited todescribing and analyzing the effects of the globaliza-tion process on national aggregates with the help ofmacrodata (Panic, 2003). Although there is no denying

that this has made a major contribution to the

understanding of globalization, it can be assumed that

there has been an equally fundamental influence on the

microlevel, particularly on the development of individ-

ual life courses in modern societies, and one aspect that

is particularly unclear is how the patterns of social

inequality in modern societies are changing through

globalization.The GLOBALIFE research project (Life Courses in the

Globalization Process), supported by a 1.7 million euro

European Sociological Review VOLUME 25 NUMBER 1 2009 53–71 53

DOI:10.1093/esr/jcn033, available online at www.esr.oxfordjournals.org

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grant from the Volkswagen Foundation in Germany, wascarried out at the Universities of Bielefeld and Bambergfrom 1999 to 2006. Its goal was to perform a cross-national comparative empirical analysis of the effects ofthe globalization process on the life courses of womenand men in advanced industrial societies. In a sequenceof four project phases, 71 social scientists compared theeffects of the globalization process on selected transitionsin the individual life course in a total of 17 OECDcountries. One major purpose of these analyses was touse current longitudinal datasets and advanced long-itudinal analysis to work out how far national institu-tional structures ‘filter’ the globalization process inspecific ways, thus producing outcomes on the level ofindividual life courses that differ from country tocountry.

This article summarizes the key findings of theGLOBALIFE project. It starts from a theoretical pers-pective by sketching the characteristics of the globaliza-tion process and its effects on individual life courses.These theoretical considerations are then confrontedwith the most important empirical findings of theGLOBALIFE project. We will discuss not only thegeneral changes in central transitions of the life courseresulting from globalization but also the country-specificform that these changes take and the resultingconsequences for the development of social inequalitystructures in various modern societies.

Features and Effects of theGlobalization Process

Basically, globalization is understood as a combinationof processes that have led to growing worldwide inter-connectedness (Robertson, 1992; Alasuutari, 2000).While this is certainly no fundamentally new phenom-enon (Robertson, 1990; Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999;Alasuutari, 2000), nobody would deny that mostindustrial nations have seen an enormous increase inthe intensity and scope of cross-border interactiverelationships over the last two decades—be theyeconomic transactions or processes of informational,cultural, and political exchange (Robertson, 1990;Sutcliffe and Glyn, 1999; Alasuutari, 2000; Held et al.,2000; Castells, 1996; Dreher, 2006; Raab et al., 2008).Particularly through the rapid advances in informationtechnologies in recent years, the fall of the Iron Curtainwith the resulting abrupt opening of new markets, andthe economic boom in Asian countries, there has beena marked intensification of cross-border exchangebetween modern states that has attained a new andpreviously unattained quality.

Nowadays, most social scientists assume that the

globalization process is characterized by the simulta-

neous interaction of four macrostructural trends that

have become increasingly dominant, particularly since

the 1980s (see, also, Figure 1). These are:

(i) the increasing internationalization of markets

and the associated growth in competition

between countries with very different wage

and productivity levels as well as different

social and environmental standards (particu-

larly since the fall of the Iron Curtain and the

integration of East European and Asian

nations into the global market);

(ii) the intensification of competition between

nation states and the resulting tendency for

modern states to reduce business taxes and to

engage in deregulation, privatization, and

liberalization while also strengthening the

market as a co-ordination mechanism;

(iii) the rapid worldwide networking of persons,

companies, and states through new informa-

tion and communication technologies, and, as

a result, the increasing global interdepen-

dence of actors along with the increasing

acceleration of social and economic interaction

processes;

(iv) the fast growth in the importance of globally

networked markets and the accompanying

increase in the interdependence and volatility

of local markets that are ever more vulnerable

to scarcely predictable social, political, and

economic ‘external shocks’ and events

throughout the world (such as wars, economic

crises, sub prime mortgage turbulences, oil

price shocks, consumer fashions, and techno-

logical innovations).

Figure 2 gives a descriptive overview of how

globalization has developed in the last three decades

using the ‘GlobalIndex’. This measure that was recently

developed within the framework of the ESF-funded

Social Research Network ‘TransEurope’ allows to

reconstruct the multidimensional phenomenon of

globalization for 97 countries for the historical period

from 1970 to 2002 (Raab et al., 2008). As can be seen,

globalization has been almost continuously on the rise

since the mid-1970s. However, there are clear signs that

the globalization process accelerated after the fall of

the Iron Curtain and the increasing integration of

Asian countries into the world market. Additionally,

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Figure 2 indicated that the globalization process isclearly more advanced in the OECD countries than inthe less developed regions of the world. In global

comparison, modern countries hence have been exposeddisproportionately to globalization influences in recentdecades.

In the past years, globalization has certainly increasedproductivity and improved the general standard of livingin broad population strata of modern societies. None-theless, it is simultaneously accompanied by a growth inunexpected market trends in an increasingly changingglobal economy, by more rapid processes of social and

economic change, by an ever stronger decline in the pre-dictability of economic and social trends, and, as a resultof this, by a general increase in uncertainty (Figure 1).

As a consequence, globalization has led to asignificant shift in the power relations on the labourmarket. Employers increasingly try to shift their owngreater market risks due to the globalization process andtheir resulting needs for flexibility on to their employ-ees, and so-called asymmetric relationships are assert-ing themselves on the labour market (cf. Breen, 1997).Asymmetric relationships are characterized by thestronger negotiating party—in this case, the

GLOBALIZATION

Internationalization of markets;

competition between countrieswith different

wage/productivity levels andsocial standards

Intensification ofcompetition between

nation states; politics ofderegulation,

privatization andliberalization

Increasing worldwideinterconnectedness

due to the riseof new ICTs

Rising importanceof markets

and their dependenceon random shocks

Rising speed of innovation;accelerated social and economic change

Accelerated marketprocesses

Rise of unpredictablemarket developments

Increasing (market) uncertainty andrising needs for flexibility

INSTITUTIONAL FILTERS

Employment system Education system Welfare regime

channel the rising uncertainty in times of globalization in specific ways

INDIVIDUAL LEVEL

Increasing uncertainty channeled to specific groups within a given society

Figure 1 Globalization and rising uncertainties in modern societies (Source: Own illustration following Mills and

Blossfeld (2005))

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employer—retaining the option of withdrawing fromthe relationship should circumstances require. The

other, weaker party—that is, the employee—has toaccept the decisions of the stronger party without any

sharing of the risk. Examples of asymmetric employ-ment relationships are subcontracts or fixed-term work

contracts. In both cases, employers enter into only ashort-term commitment with their employees and

retain the option of dismissing them again as soon as,for example, markets or orders decline.

So far, there is no consensus in sociological researchwith regard to how these changes in the labour market

and the rise in uncertainty have influenced thedevelopment of social inequalities in modern societies.

Currently, two opposite interpretations of the effects ofglobalization on the development of social inequality

structures can be found (Bernardi, 2000; Mills et al.,2006). The first perspective—for example reflected in

the works of Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990, 1994,1998)—argues that present-day societies can no longer

be characterized as ‘class societies’, but need to beunderstood as ‘risk societies’. In the course of the

globalization process, new forms of risks and uncer-tainty have emerged and have become generalized across

all social strata, thereby breaking down the logic of thetraditional class structure. The second perspective

suggests the opposite, namely the strengthening ofexisting social inequalities in the globalizationprocess. Breen (1997) argues that especially alreadydisadvantaged labour market groups suffer fromincreasing uncertainties in the globalization process.While well qualified employees still enjoy high protec-tion against labour market risks, employers tend toimpose asymmetric relationships especially on the lessqualified and on the outsiders of the labour market.Thus, the increase of risks and uncertainty in theglobalization process is channeled systematically to thedisadvantage of the lower skilled and less qualifiedworkers, thereby amplifying the importance of socialcharacteristics, such as education and class.

Results of the GLOBALIFEProject

The GLOBALIFE project is the first empirical study ofthe effects of the globalization process on individual lifecourses, and thereby on the development of socialinequality in a range of societies in Europe and NorthAmerica. A sequence of four research phases was used toanalyze central transitions in the life course andemployment career of women and men:

(i) the transition from youth to adulthood and

the accompanying process of becoming estab-

lished on the labour market during this period

along with its effects on family formation and

fertility (Blossfeld et al., 2005);

(ii) the transitions during the employment course

of men in mid-career (Blossfeld et al., 2006b);

(iii) the transitions during the employment course

of mid-life women, paying particular attention

to family formation and motherhood

(Blossfeld and Hofmeister, 2006); and

(iv) the changes in late careers and the transition

to retirement (Blossfeld et al., 2006a).

In each of these four single research phases, compar-able country studies were set up for a total of 17 OECDmember states in order to reconstruct the effects of theglobalization process on the respective life-coursetransitions in each national context. A detailed analysisof each country’s institutional and cultural character-istics was used to group countries into five differentwelfare regimes (see, for an overview, Table 2):1 liberal(Canada, Great Britain, and the United States),conservative (Germany, the Netherlands, and France),social-democratic (Norway, Denmark, and Sweden),family-oriented (Italy, Spain, Ireland, and Mexico), and

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000

World Average Tiger/Panther States

OECD Countries Least Developed Countries

Figure 2 The development of globalization since 1970

(GlobalIndex) (Source: Own illustrations; calculations by

Marcel Raab, Michael Ruland and Benno Schonberger

(Otto-Friedrich-University of Bamberg, Germany))

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post-socialist (Estonia, Hungary, the Czech Republic,

and Poland). Hence, the GLOBALIFE project covered

an exceptionally broad spectrum of advanced countries

with highly differing institutional and cultural structures

channeling the effects of the globalization process on

individual life courses in very different ways (see below

and Figure 1). The results of the four project phases

are documented extensively in four volumes (Blossfeld

et al., 2005; Blossfeld et al., 2006a, b; Blossfeld and

Hofmeister, 2006). In this article, we summarize the key

findings of the four project phases and describe the

effects globalization has in terms of the structuring of

social inequality patterns in modern societies.

Changing Life Courses in theGlobalization Process

Youth and Young Adults: The Losers of

Globalization

The first research phase of the GLOBALIFE project took

a cross-national comparative perspective to compare

how adolescents and young adults manage to enter the

labour market under the conditions of globalization, and

how changed labour market entry and early career

patterns in young persons’ lives impact on familial

decisions such as entering marriage or having a baby.

The GLOBALIFE project analyses show that young

persons face a strong increase in uncertainties when

entering the labour market (Blossfeld et al., 2005; Golsch,

2005; Table 1). These uncertainties manifest particularly

in the form of a major increase in precarious, atypical

forms of employment (e.g. short-term jobs, part-time

jobs, precarious forms of self-employment, and, com-

pared with older cohorts, lower income). These devel-

opments tend to make young people the ‘losers’ of the

globalization process. At first glance, this seems to be

contra-intuitive because the young generation is far

more educated than older ones and many of these young

people have spent a longer part of their life abroad.

However, they are affected particularly strongly, because

they frequently lack job experience and strong ties to

business networks, particularly in internal labour

markets. Often they are unable to fall back on established

contacts, and do not possess the negotiating powers to

demand stable and continuous employment. Thus, it is

comparatively easy for employers and unions to adjust

young people’s work contracts and make them more

flexible and less advantageous at their expense.However, the concrete effects of the globalization

process on the labour market positions of young adults

vary according to the specific welfare state and labourmarket regime (Table 1). The strong insider-outsidermarkets of Southern Europe (but, in part, also Germany)reveal increasing phases of unemployment and/or aboveall short-term work contracts (Bernardi and Nazio,2005; Kurz et al., 2005; Simo Noguera et al., 2005).Particularly in Southern Europe, forms of precariousself-employment can be found. In the Netherlands,there is a massive increase in part-time jobs for youngwomen and men (Liefbroer, 2005); and in the openemployment systems of the liberal countries (UnitedStates, Great Britain), the effects of the globalizationprocess are manifesting across generations particularly inincreasing income losses for young persons (BerkowitzKing, 2005; Francesconi and Golsch, 2005).

Independent of the national context, education isclearly becoming more and more important in theglobalization process (Blossfeld et al., 2005; Table 1).Poorly qualified labour market entrants are hit parti-cularly hard by the global changes. This is howglobalization generally reinforces the social inequalitieswithin the young generation, because individual (humancapital) resources gain in importance through thegrowing relevance of the market and individualcompetition.

The increasing experience of employment uncertain-ties in young adulthood has consequences for familialdecision processes. Growing economic and temporaluncertainties lead young people more and more topostpone or even to forgo family formation (Blossfeldet al., 2005; Table 1). On the societal level, this leads toa dilemma, because not only improved conditionsfor labour market flexibility in the sense of greatercompetitiveness but also rising birthrates are viewed asdesirable.

Young adults have developed four behavioral andadaptive strategies as a reaction to growing uncertaintiesin the life course (Mills et al., 2005): (i) Theyincreasingly postpone decisions requiring a long-termcommitment; the youth phase becomes more and moreof a ‘moratorium’, and transitions to gainful employ-ment often take a chaotic course. (ii) They switchincreasingly to alternative roles instead of employment(e.g. they spend longer in the education system insteadof letting themselves be defined as ‘unemployed’).(iii) They are increasingly forming more flexible formsof partnership (e.g. consensual unions) that permit anadaptation to rising uncertainty without having to makelong-term commitments (Nazio and Blossfeld, 2003;Nazio, 2008). (iv) Particularly in the family-orientedwelfare states of Central and Southern Europe, they havedeveloped gender-specific strategies to deal with uncer-tainty: men are increasingly less able to guarantee any

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long-term income security as the ‘breadwinner’ for a

household, often leading to delay in family formation.

In contrast, many unqualified women who ‘have

nothing to lose’ react to the growing uncertainties on

the labour market by turning to the security of the

family and the traditional roles of mother and housewife

(as a strategy to reduce uncertainty). Vice versa, the

tendency for highly qualified women to have children in

increasingly uncertain labour markets depends on

whether they can protect their careers by making

Table 1 Youth and young adults, mid-career men, mid-life women, and late career employees in theglobalization process

Main effect of globalization Regime-specific effect Individual-level effects

Youth and young adultsIncreased employment uncertainty,resulting in postponedfamily formation

� Southern European andconservative countries:marginalization of youth as labourmarket outsiders due to increasingaffectedness by precarious employment;very strong impact on family formationand childbirth

� Post-socialist countries:even stronger employment insecurities;dramatic effects on family formation

� Social-democratic countries:relative shielding of youth and familyfrom employment uncertainty

� Liberal countries:employment uncertainty counterbalancedby open labour market structures;relatively low impact on familyformation due to modest changes insubjectively perceived uncertainty

Increasing importance ofeducation as a key factorto become established inthe labor market

Mid-career menRelatively persistent levels ofemployment stability

� Conservative, Southern European, andsocial-democratic countries:constantly high level of stability

� Post-socialist and liberal countries:modest increases in employmentflexibility among mid-career men

Losses in employmentstability largely concentrateon low(est) qualified menand low occupational classes

Mid-life womenMarginalizationon the labour market

� Conservative andSouthern European countries:increasing integration of women intoemployment, but only as secondaryearners in less stable employment

� Social-democratic countries:relative stability of employment levelsdue to active state supports

� Liberal countries:increasing need to support familyincome pushes women into(flexible) employment

� Post-socialist countries:loss of full employment status afterthe fall of the Iron Curtain

Increasing importance ofemployment experienceand educational attainment

(continued)

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family and career compatible. When childcare facilities

are underdeveloped, as is particularly the case in

Southern Europe, many qualified women decide in

favor of their careers rather than for children (Bernardi

and Nazio, 2005; Simo Noguera et al., 2005).Hence, a paradoxical outcome of the globalization

process is that precisely in traditional family-oriented

societies, the birth rate is declining markedly because of

the growing experience of employment uncertainties for

young men and the incompatibility of family and career

for qualified women. A similar restrained fertility

behavior can also be found in the transformation

countries of Eastern Europe in which uncertainties

have grown enormously since the collapse of socialism

(Katus et al., 2005; Robert and Bukodi, 2005). Whereas

demographic approaches attribute this change merely

to a ‘value shift’ in modern societies (cf. van de Kaa,

1987, 2001; Surkyn and Lesthaeghe, 2002), a globaliza-

tion approach oriented toward increasing structural

uncertainties is in a position to resolve the paradox

between an often marked young people’s desire for

children and the failure to actually realize this desire

in young adulthood: founding a family calls for at least

a minimum of economic and social certainty regarding

the future that, under the global conditions of increasing

labour market uncertainty, can often be achieved only

after a long transition period following the exit from the

education system. Therefore, economically and socially

speaking, young people who forgo having children are

making a rational response to structural trends. In

Scandinavian countries in which the state provides

comparatively generous universal services for youngadults and families along with childcare facilities whileengaging in an active employment policy, the birthrateis comparatively high, though still below the netreproduction rate (Bygren et al., 2005; Nilsen, 2005).2

It is important to point out in this context that it isnot the absolute level of uncertainty that is decisive for

the structuring of decisions on family formation, but the

subjectively perceived relative level of uncertainty in the

specific country’s labour force (Blossfeld et al., 2005). In

each country, young adults compare themselves in daily

life with ‘significant others’ (such as friends, relatives,

and acquaintances) when judging their individual

labour market situation. In the United States, for

example, the absolute level of uncertainty for the

young generation is higher as a whole than in many

European countries. People lose their jobs more

frequently, but the unemployed can rely on soon

finding another job, that is, becoming an ‘insider’

again, because of the low-mobility barriers on the

labour market. This is why labour market uncertainty,

career mobility, and flexibility possess a different social

significance in the United States. Subjectively, they are

perceived differently than in the insider-outsider

markets of Europe in which ‘being an outsider’ often

means an identity-threatening, long-term exclusion

from work in a climate in which flexible work

arrangements are generally viewed as only a stop-gap

solution on the way toward a permanent job. Young

persons in flexibilized forms of employment in the

European insider-outsider markets, therefore,

Table 1 Continued

Main effect of globalization Regime-specific effect Individual-level effects

Late career employeesIncreased risks of forcedemployment withdrawal

� Conservative and SouthernEuropean countries:highest rate of early exit, largelybuffered by generous pension systems

� Social-democratic countries:late career exits and high employmentstability fostered by meansof active labour market policies

� Liberal countries:late career exits, but relativelyhigh employment mobility

� Post-socialist countries:implementation of differentialstrategies (Hungary and CzechRepublic¼ conservativestrategy; Estonia¼ liberal strategy)

Overall inter-individualvariation less pronouncedthan for other life coursetransitions; comparativelyhigher importance ofhuman capital in liberalcountries

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experience their fate as being far more negative than

their peers in the United States.

Men in Mid-career: Are they the Winners

of Globalization?

The second phase of the GLOBALIFE project focused onthe employment trajectories of mid-career men. Resultsshowed that men from younger birth cohorts arecertainly confronted with a somewhat greater labourmarket uncertainty than older birth cohorts (Blossfeldet al., 2006b). Nonetheless, globalization in no way leads,as frequently assumed (cf. Beck 1992), to an increasingerosion of traditional male employment relationships orto the spread of ‘patchwork careers’ and ‘job hopping’.Quite the opposite: the employment careers of well-qualified male employees who are established on thelabour market are still very stable and broadly protectedfrom any flexibilization by employers (Table 1).

Paradoxically, although the globalization processforces companies to respond more flexibly and thereforeto try to reduce their own market risks and pass these onto their employees by imposing more short-term-oriented employment relationships, a completely flex-ibilized workforce is neither desirable nor efficient fromthe company perspective. It would threaten the reliableand permanent co-operation between management andqualified staff. Indeed, studies show that markedflexibilization in companies greatly reduces their staff’swillingness to co-operate, work motivation, and com-pany loyalty (cf. Kohler et al., 2005). In times of greater(international) competition, a secure and long-termco-operation with qualified and experienced staff is stillimportant for employers in order to ensure the flow ofinformation in the company, productivity, and alsoinnovations. The comprehensive introduction of flexibleemployment relationships additionally carries the threatthat a company will be faced with high recruitment costsand qualification losses when hiring new emplboyees(Breen, 1997; Mills et al., 2006). To summarize,employers have no interest in withdrawing from long-term commitments to all the employees on their staff.Therefore, they try not to threaten the trust relationshipto those in qualified positions. These ambivalentcompany goals in the globalization process, namely,flexibility on the one side but stability and continuity onthe other, lead to an increasing segmentation of labourmarkets into core groups and peripheral groups, intoinsiders and outsiders (Blossfeld et al., 2006b). As theresults of the GLOBALIFE project show, the demarca-tion cutoff between those belonging to the insiders andthose belonging to the outsiders is being raisedincreasingly higher. Essentially, this is disadvantaging

the lowly qualified and people who are less establishedon the labour market such as those completingeducation, young adults, and women. Qualified andexperienced male employees, in contrast, are broadly

protected from (labour market) flexibilizations in theglobalization process.

Even if qualified men in mid-career can generally bedescribed as the winners of the globalization process,there are still major differences in the various regimesstudied in the GLOBALIFE project and also within thegroup of men (Mills and Blossfeld, 2006; Table 1). In allthe countries of the GLOBALIFE project, it was possibleto identify a quantitatively significant group of mostlylow-qualified male who are increasingly long-termunemployed and who fail to successfully re-enter thelabour market—in particular in the insider/outsiderlabour market countries. There is a further group of men

in mid-career who ‘oscillate’ between unemploymentand jobs with a low occupational status. Again, these arefairly unskilled men. Therefore, membership in the malegroup of ‘risk employees’ depends decisively on indivi-dual resources, in particular, on the level of education andthe occupational class (Mills and Blossfeld, 2006). It isparticularly qualified and experienced employees in themidst of their career who enjoy comprehensive protec-tion; they may be called the winners of globalization.Male employees with low human capital resources,however, prove to be exceptionally vulnerable onglobalized labour markets (Table 1).

The relative size of this group of ‘male globalizationlosers’ varies from country to country; nonetheless, itis comparatively large particularly in the United States andin some of the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe.In contrast, the majority of mid-career men in countrieswith conservative, family-oriented and social democraticstructures enjoy a high degree of stability in theiremployment careers, because they are comprehensivelyprotected by country-specific labour market and welfarestate regulations (Blossfeld et al., 2006b).

Women in Mid-life: Marginalization in

the Globalization Process

The effects of the globalization process on the middlephase of women’s life courses differ markedly fromthose on men in mid-career. Whereas, as shown above,mid-career male employment courses prove to remaincomparatively stable in the globalization process,women reveal a trend toward marginalization onthe labour market (Blossfeld and Hofmeister, 2006;Table 1). As the GLOBALIFE study has shown, althoughwomen have become increasingly integrated intomodern labour markets as a result of the globalization

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process in a series of countries, this integration has oftenbeen quite precarious.

Several parallel developments since the beginning ofthe 1960s have led middle-aged women to becomeincreasingly active on the labour markets in Europe andNorth America. Due to quantitative and qualitativeimprovements in their access to education, youngwomen show not only a greater interest in their owncareers but also have improved their preconditions forsuccessful labour market participation compared withwomen in earlier generations. Moreover, the increasinginstability of families along with the declining securityin the employment careers of husbands in more recentgenerations in some countries have contributed togreater female participation on the labour market. As aresult of these changes, women’s incomes have becomeincreasingly important for the material security ofwomen and their families. This increasing work supplyof women on the one side has been matched by agrowth in the demand for female labour on the otherside in the expanding (private and public) service sectorbrought about by the globalization process (Blossfeldand Hakim, 1997).

Despite their growing integration into the labourforce, it is almost exclusively women who continue toperform the unpaid familial and care duties in allmodern societies. During the family phase, marriedcouples tend far more to invest in the continuingworking career of the husband rather than that of thewife (Blossfeld and Drobnic, 2001). This practice notonly limits women’s earning capacities but can alsoimpair their continuity of employment and careerchances in the long term, particularly when wives giveup their jobs completely in favor of those of theirhusbands, or adapt them to those of their husbands interms of time or space. Disadvantages in their employ-ment careers are not just experienced by those womenwho actually interrupt their employment careers forfamilial reasons. Even those not planning such a breakare frequently considered to be possibly or probablyplanning to do it—and this argument is used to denythem jobs, promotions, and further training opportu-nities solely because of their gender (the so-called‘statistical discrimination’) (Blossfeld and Hakim,1997). As a result, women are disproportionately over-represented in the flexible forms of work emergingwithin the globalization process (Blossfeld andHofmeister, 2006). Employers legitimize this concentra-tion of flexibilized forms of work on women by pointingrepeatedly to their deficits in work experience comparedwith men and the greater probability of a lateremployment interruption. In contrast to those formsof employment that, although flexibly organized, are

basically secure, the flexibility desired by companies isfrequently tied to insecure, precarious forms of employ-ment that grant employers short-term decision scope(Blossfeld and Hakim, 1997). Jobs with such goalsfrequently do not correspond to the personal flexibilityneeds of women, that is, the option of being able tointerrupt, reduce or plan work flexibly in order to fulfillsimultaneous care duties. However, women often acceptsuch flexible and less secure forms of work so that theycan meet their familial obligations when other measuresto promote the compatibility of career and family arelacking or insufficient.

The results of the GLOBALIFE project have shownthat various forms of disadvantage on the labour marketare accumulating increasingly on women in the global-ization process: precarious, insecure and low-paid jobs;part-time jobs or jobs with variable work shifts; jobswith little autonomy, control, or responsibility; andjobs with only slight possibilities of promotion and highrisks of downward career mobility or unemployment(Hofmeister and Blossfeld, 2006). Hence, globalizationcontributes across all countries to a marginalization ofwomen as ‘outsiders’ of the labour market.

Despite this general tendency toward a margin-alization of women on the labour market, theGLOBALIFE project once again reveals different pat-terns of development in the various regimes (Table 1):in conservative and, to a lesser extent, SouthernEuropean countries, the creation of new, flexible joboptions in the globalization process has contributed to abetter integration of women into national labourmarkets, even though on a precarious basis (Buchholzand Grunow, 2006; Kalmijn and Luijkx, 2006; Pisati andSchizzerotto, 2006; Simo Noguera, 2006). An increasingintegration of women can also be observed in the liberalstates that offer little state support for families andpursue a ‘laissez-faire’ labour market policy. However,in contrast to the conservative and Southern Europeancountries, it is above all low-qualified women who enterthe labour market to support their families financially,and this is frequently in low-income jobs (Hofmeister,2006). The social-democratic and also former socialistcountries, which already possess a long tradition of highfemale employment rates, reveal diverging trends in theglobalization process: Sweden has at least managed tostabilize its exceptionally high proportion of employedwomen while retaining job security in the globalizationprocess (Korpi and Stern, 2006). In contrast, theproportion of working women in Denmark has droppedsince the introduction of leave regulations (Grunow,2006; Grunow and Leth-Sørensen, 2006). In the formersocialist countries, in contrast, integration into the worldeconomy has led to stagnating or even negative

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developments in female employment rates (Bukodi andRobert, 2006; Hamplova, 2006; Helemae and Saar, 2006;Plomien, 2006).

As with men, individual resources, particularly in theform of education qualification, are of central signifi-cance for the course of employment careers in middle-aged women (Hofmeister and Blossfeld, 2006; Table 1).This education effect is also cumulative: well-educatedyoung women in modern, knowledge-based businessfields possess the greatest chances of avoiding unem-ployment and advancing their careers. In contrast, thedisadvantaged in the globalization process are womenwith few qualifications, little work experience and earlierchildrearing breaks in employment along with thosewho have more frequent and longer phases ofunemployment. They face a particularly high risk ofhaving to work in insecure and precarious jobs orof becoming (repeatedly) unemployed (Blossfeld andHofmeister, 2006).

Late-career Employees: Increasingly

Confronted with Accelerating Structural

Change in the Globalization Process

The fourth and final phase of research in theGLOBALIFE project showed that the work careers ofolder employees have also undergone a remarkabletransformation in the globalization process. The causeof this change in later work careers has been anincreasing discrepancy between the growing demandsfor employment flexibility and the limited possibilitiesfor flexibilizing the work conditions and qualificationprofiles of older employees that are becoming evenfurther reinforced through globalization (Buchholzet al., 2006).

As mentioned above, companies facing global marketcompetition have a growing need to be able tocontinuously adapt flexibly to changing economicconditions. However, in light of these new flexibilitydemands through globalization, older employees revealseveral competitive disadvantages compared with theiryounger competitors (Buchholz et al., 2006): theymostly possess only obsolescent technological knowl-edge and vocational qualifications that make it harder toadapt them to the greater technological change in theglobalization process. As a consequence, the decisiveadvantage that older employees used to have, namely,their work experience compared with young labourmarket entrants, is rapidly losing importance. At thesame time, the costs of requalifying older employeesthrough further training programmes and on-the-jobtraining measures are often too high for employersbecause of the poor returns to investments due to the

few years of employment left. Young employees, incontrast, possess more modern qualifications, theirtraining is often to the latest occupational andtechnological standards, and the costs of any necessaryfurther training can be recouped over a longer period oftime. In a number of countries, older employees alsoearn higher ‘seniority wages’ through the logic ofinternal labour markets. This often makes them farmore expensive than their younger competitors, withoutthis difference in pay being linked from the employer’sperspective with higher productivity. In addition, theirjobs often enjoy strong employment protection that isvery hard for companies to overcome. In contrast,young employees have been exposed to a destabilizationand flexibilization in their employment careers withinthe globalization process (Blossfeld et al., 2005). Theirwork contracts are correspondingly less regulated andthey often earn less.

In summary, companies perceive older employees asbeing less flexible, inadequately qualified and cost-intensive in the globalization process. Hence, it is in theinterest of not only companies but also policymakersconcerned with the attractiveness of their nationalbusiness location to find solutions for this discrepancybetween increasing demands for flexibility and thelimited flexibilization potential of older employees(Blossfeld et al., 2006a).

One option for resolving this contradiction is to offerattractive financial incentives for early employment exit.Indeed, comparative labour market data reveal a trendtoward an increasingly early retirement of olderemployees in almost all Western industrial societiessince the 1970s (cf. OECD, 2006). Detailed analyses inthe GLOBALIFE project have shown, however, that themagnitude of this early retirement trend varies markedlybetween different OECD countries (cf. Hofacker andPollnerova, 2006; Hofacker et al., 2006; Table 1). Tocope with the problematic labour market situation ofolder employees in the globalization process, modernsocieties therefore appear to pursue various strategiesthat can be classified according to three different idealtypes (cf. Buchholz et al., 2006).

Particularly, Central and Southern European statespursue a strategy of one-sidedly promoting the employ-ment exit of older employees in order to cope with theglobal competitive pressure and the structural changesin the economy (Blossfeld et al., 2006a). The discre-pancy between growing demands for flexibility in theglobalization process and the flexibilization potential ofolder employees is particularly large in these countries.Due to a highly standardized education system whichlargely restricts vocational training to the early lifecourse and which offers few possibilities of in-service or

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further training, older employees often have majorqualification disadvantages compared with theiryounger labour market competitors. At the same time,extensive protection from dismissal and a well-established system of seniority wages limit the possibi-lities of making their work contracts more flexible. As away out of this dilemma, the Central and SouthernEuropean states have extended existing early retirementoptions and created new early retirement pathways inpart by additional interim welfare state provisions tobridge the gap to full retirement (Beckstette et al., 2006;Henkens and Kalmijn, 2006; Buchholz, 2006, 2008).

This ‘early retirement strategy’ has advantages for allconcerned on the labour market: older employees whoretire early are ensured an adequate standard of livingthrough high (early) pensions; companies gain a‘socially acceptable’ opportunity to implement rationa-lizations and restructurings; governments profit fromsuch strategies by raising the attractiveness of thenational production location for companies whilesimultaneously relieving pressure on the nationallabour market. Nonetheless, despite these clear advan-tages, applying the early retirement strategy to solve theflexibilization dilemma is a cost-intensive option formodern societies. As the results of the GLOBALIFEstudy show, other societies have broadly rejected suchearly retirement measures, and by promoting lifelonglearning and an active employment policy, they havemade it possible for older employees to adapt flexibly tothe challenges of structural and technological change.Empirically, two strategies for the employment main-tenance of older employees can be distinguished(Blossfeld et al., 2006a).

Liberal states (Great Britain, United States) broadlyfollow a model of maintaining older employees throughmarket mechanisms. The policy for adjusting olderworkers to new flexibility demands is to place broadtrust in a flexible labour market and an only mar-ginally standardized education and training system.Low-mobility barriers on the labour market and adecentralized organization for acquiring relevant quali-fications ‘on-the-job’ enable older employees to adaptflexibly to changing demands through labour marketmobility. At the same time, low state pensions and astrong emphasis on private schemes based on capitalinvestments or company pensions limit the possibilitiesof an early exit from employment. Older employees inthe liberal states have correspondingly long employmentcareers and often retire comparatively late. Because ofthe far-reaching non-involvement of the state and thetrust in market mechanisms, the liberal system none-theless tends to strengthen social inequalities on thelabour market beyond retirement age: employees with

meager financial resources sometimes still have to carry

on working after retirement age, or they return to the

labour market because they are unable to survive on

their pensions alone (cf. Warner and Hofmeister, 2006).In contrast, the social-democratic states in

Scandinavia (Sweden, Norway, and Denmark) actively

engage in supporting the ability of older employees to

adapt to the flexibility demands due to globalization (i.e.

by maintaining older employees through state mecha-

nisms). An active labour market policy as well as state

promotion of life-long learning and further vocational

qualification helps to keep them employable so that

their employment careers are more continuous and

stable than in the liberal model oriented toward labour

market mobility. At the same time, pension systems

with lower incentives for early retirement favor a long

work career. Although the social-democratic states

have also introduced some early retirement options in

response to growing unemployment rates, the labour

market participation of older employees remains

markedly higher than the international average

(cf. Aakvik et al., 2006; Hofacker and Leth-Sørensen,

2006; Sjogren Lindquist, 2006).

The Development of SocialInequality Patterns in theGlobalization Process

Hence, the results of the GLOBALIFE project show that

life courses in modern societies have changed pro-

foundly as a result of the globalization process.

The form and extent of these changes vary strongly in

the different regimes studied in the GLOBALIFE project

and are shaped decisively by the given configuration of

country-specific labour market structures, welfare states,

and education systems. Patterns of social inequality in

modern societies have correspondingly also developed

in very different ways in the globalization process (see

also Mills et al., 2008). The article closes with a

systematic sketch of the different patterns in the

development of social inequality for the various

institutional contexts (for an overview, see Table 2).

Regimes with Inflexible Labour Markets:

The Strengthening of Inequality Between

Insiders and Outsiders

In regimes with a low degree of flexibility on their

labour markets (e.g. Germany, Italy, Spain), the

globalization process has led to an increasing division

of society into a strongly protected group of high

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Table 2 Country-specific institutional packages and the development of social inequalities in the globalization process

Country studiesof GLOBALIFEproject

United States,Great Britain,Canada

Sweden, Denmark,Norway, (theNetherlands)

Germany, France,(the Netherlands)

Italy, Spain, Ireland,Mexico

Hungary, Estonia,Poland, CzechRepublic

Employmentrelationships/production regime

Weakly regulated Moderately regulated Strongly regulated Strongly regulated Transition to marketeconomy

Welfare regime Liberal; residualwelfare system

Social-democratic; gener-ous public welfare systemplus active employmentpolicies

Conservative; transfer-oriented; basic welfaresupport for non-employed population

Family-oriented;high-public support for(former) insiders

Post-socialist; undertransformation

Occupation andeducation systems

On-the-job-training;incentives forre-qualification

Vocational qualificationin schools; strongorientation towardsre-qualification andlife-long learning

Dual system; littleincentives forre-qualification

On-the-job-training; littleincentives for re-qualification

Under transformation

Modal employmentflexibility strategy inthe globalizationprocess

Individualizedflexibility as the keyprinciple of the labourmarket

Publicly supportedflexibility as the keyprinciple of the labourmarket

Flexibility at the ‘margins’of the labour market

Flexibility at the ‘margins’of the labour market

Strong differencesbetween countries: liberalstrategy (Estonia) versusContinental Europeanstrategy (Poland, CzechRepublic, Hungary)

Development ofsocial inequalities inthe globalizationprocess

Increasing marketcompetition;inequalities stronglyconnected withindividual resources

Little increase in socialinequalities due tostate-supported securityand re-integration

Increasing socialinequalities betweenlabour market insidersand outsiders; compensa-tion through publictransfers

Increasing socialinequalities betweenlabour market insidersand outsiders; compensa-tion through familialtransfers

Strong differencesbetween countries: liberalstrategy (Estonia) versusContinental Europeanstrategy (Poland, CzechRepublic, Hungary)

Note: The Netherlands make up an intermediate case in the regime classification. With regard to employment policies they show similarities to the social-democratic welfare regime; with regard to

other welfare state arrangements—e.g. pension policies—they come closer to conservative countries.

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earners and an ever larger marginalized group of peoplewho have difficulties in finding stable employment. Inthese systems, well qualified male employees in theirmid-career who are firmly and securely established inthe labour market are strongly protected against thecompetition of job seekers. Whereas in flexible labourmarket regimes, employment risks are cushioned byrelatively rapid (re-) integration chances (see below),this is less possible in systems with well-protectedinsiders. Hence, this means that in countries with lessflexible labour markets, the growing economic competi-tion resulting from the globalization process has led to adrastic increase in labour market risks above all foryoung people starting their careers, women afteremployment breaks and the unemployed and unquali-fied. In these regimes, flexibilization has occurredparticularly at the ‘margins’ of the labour market. InSouthern European regimes, the inequalities betweeninsiders and outsiders in the globalization process areeven stronger than in conservative regimes, becausetheir labour market structures are more rigid and thewelfare state is far more fragmented than in theconservative countries of Central Europe.

Nonetheless, it can be seen that governments andunions in Central and Southern European countrieshave tried to cushion the selective risk distribution onthe labour market and increase the ability of thesesystems to adapt within the globalization process. In thepast, linked to the existing traditions and institutionalconfigurations, most countries with inflexible labourmarkets, an insider-outsider labour market, and rigidoccupational structures have introduced more and morestrategies to take the strain off the labour market and toimprove its ability to adapt. For example, in Germany,the Netherlands, and also in Southern Europe, earlyretirement programmes have been expanded enor-mously in order to channel the greater need forflexibilization in the comparatively regulated labourmarkets and the response to accelerated structural andtechnological change in the globalization process in a‘socially acceptable’ way by pulling older employeesfrom the market.

Nonetheless, it has to be noted that even thesemeasures finally only continue the existing insider-outsider logic of these systems: the generous pensionsystems in these countries provide a strong financialcushion against the flexibilization of older workers. Asa result, this has not yet led to any major strengtheningof social inequalities within the group of older people.It is far more the case that these countries reveal stronginequalities between the generations—that is between(i) older persons (or former insiders) who have acomparatively strong social protection against

employment flexibilization through high pensions, and(ii) young people who have to accept flexibilization onthe labour market with a comparatively low socialsecurity and risk compensation while additionallybearing the burden of financing and securing thehigh-social security of the ‘pensioned generations’.

The unresolved issue in these systems is how far thepublic pension system can continue to be financed inthe future and how long the following generations willbe able to bear the burden of this strategy. Additionally,it has to be asked how the situation of older people willchange in light of more recent reform efforts to reverseearly retirement, especially by reducing pension benefits.It seems likely that with these reforms the financialsituation of future generations of pensioners, especiallyof those with unstable and/or discontinuous workcareers, will become more precarious, too(Ebbinghaus, 2005).

Employment-sustaining Regimes:

Strengthening Market Competition in

Liberal Countries versus State-supported

Security in Social Democratic Regimes

As mentioned above, systems with a greater degree offlexibility on the labour market have adapted moresmoothly to the demands for new economic flexibility aswell as to the technological and structural change in theglobalization process. These have affected larger por-tions of the labour market because employers aregenerally given greater economic leeway for flexibilizingemployment relationships. Nonetheless, major differ-ences can be seen here between the market-orientedliberal countries and social-democratic countriesoriented toward an active involvement of the state.For example, an increasing need for flexibility incompanies in a liberal labour market and welfaresystem that essentially supports market processes canbe met relatively easily through layoffs and wageadjustments (e.g. in the United States and GreatBritain). In line with this, there is comparatively highjob mobility and major wage differences between groupsof individuals who differ in their marketable qualifica-tions. These inequalities are scarcely cushioned bywelfare state programmes and services. The highemployment and wage uncertainty of (potential)employees is accompanied simultaneously by a greaterchance of (re-) employment than in the Central andSouthern European systems, because of high levels ofoverall job turnovers. Hence, as a whole, these countrieshave not developed any insider-outsider problem.Instead, liberal systems have strengthened inequalitiesin general (e.g. the risk of unemployment or precarious

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employment and unequal pay) with increasing flexibi-lizations on the labour market in the globalizationprocess, and employment risks strongly depend onindividual resources.

In contrast to the liberal strategy, the social-democratic countries, in particular Denmark, combinehigh employment flexibility with a comparatively strongset of state promotion measures to make it easier toreintegrate the unemployed into the labour market. In asimilar way, but with a relatively low degree of jobflexibility, Sweden and Norway have also followedthe social-democratic ideology of supporting employeesby publicly promoting their employability. Examplesof this are the active promotion of comprehensivefemale employment through family policy measures orthe support of employment in advanced age throughcontinuous (re-) qualification. At the same time, wagedispersion tends to be low. Hence, although higher jobmobility in response to the globalization process can beobserved in Scandinavian regimes (above all, inDenmark) than in less flexible labour markets, this is,in contrast to liberal regimes, nonetheless linked to highstate-guaranteed security and low wage inequalities.Thus, in social-democratic states, the social inequalitiesthrough the globalization process are markedly lowerboth between older and younger generations and withina single generation, and in recent years, they have alsogrown less than in not only liberal but also conservativeand Southern European systems. Nonetheless, it isnecessary to ask how far this comparatively cost-intensive model of public welfare-state commitmentcan also be retained in times of increasing unemploy-ment to which the Scandinavian states have also becomemore strongly exposed during the last decade.

Post-socialist Regimes: Application of

Different Strategies since the

Transformation to a Market Economy

Finally, former socialist systems reveal that the transi-tion from a strongly regulated (socialist) systemproviding employees with a high degree of security toa market economy system has been accompanied by amajor growth in employment risks. Both, the risk ofunemployment and wage inequalities have grownstrongly since the collapse of the socialist system inthese countries, and there has been a marked increase insocial inequalities between individuals. Nonetheless, theresults of the GLOBALIFE project show that the tran-sition process to a market economy has proceeded verydifferently through the formation of country-specificdominant flexibility strategies that result in distinctnational patterns of social inequality. The post-socialist

countries do not form a homogeneous group but havetaken very different paths toward globalization andflexibilization since the fall of the Iron Curtain.

Estonia, for example, has focused very strongly inrecent years on a comprehensive liberalization of thelabour market. As a result, it has developed a pattern ofinequality that comes close to that in the United Statesand Great Britain. This means that labour market risksare distributed relatively broadly and depend stronglyon individual resources. In contrast, other formerEastern Bloc countries (e.g. Hungary, Poland, and theCzech Republic) have been far more cautious aboutliberalizing their labour markets. Their transformationprocess has tended to follow the strategies of CentralEuropean countries in order to master the shift from aplanned to a market economy. As in the CentralEuropean countries, the degree of market flexibility hasbeen kept comparatively low, and increased flexibiliza-tion demands in the globalization process have beenpassed on systematically to groups with a weakernegotiating position on the labour market. In linewith this, the inequalities have increased drastically inrecent years, particularly between insiders and outsiders.

Summary

This article summarized the results of the GLOBALIFEproject carried out from 1999 to 2006 at the Universitiesof Bielefeld and Bamberg and funded by the VolkswagenFoundation. The goal of the project was to perform anempirically based cross-national comparative analysis ofthe effects of globalization on labour market flexibiliza-tion in different countries that each has their ownspecific institutional contexts. This social scientificproject is the first study which systematically examinedthe effects of the globalization process on individual lifecourses and employment careers and thereby thestructures of social inequality in modern societiesfrom an international comparative perspective.

The research focused on four central phases of the lifecourse:

(i) the transition from youth to adulthood and

the establishment on the labour market that

occurs during this phase along with its effects

on family formation and fertility;

(ii) the employment course of men in mid-career;

(iii) the employment course of women paying

particular attention to family development

and motherhood; as well as

(iv) the late employment career and the transition

to retirement.

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As the results of the GLOBALIFE project show, theglobalization process has impacted very differently onthese different phases of the life course (Table 1):qualified men in mid-career are broadly protected fromthe effects of globalization. Globalization has in no wayled to the frequently assumed increase in the erosion oftraditional male employment relationships or to amassive spread of ‘patchwork careers’. In contrast, theemployment careers of well-qualified (male) personswho have established themselves on the labour marketcontinue to be very stable in modern societies. Incontrast, young adults, women in mid-life, and peopleapproaching retirement have had to accept a clearchange in their life courses as a result of the global-ization process, although the ways in which the lifecourses of these groups have changed vary greatly. In all,it can be seen that it is particularly young adults whocan be described as the losers of the globalizationprocess. Their labour market situation has deterioratedprofoundly in recent years. This group sees itselfas being confronted with fundamental uncertainties inworking life, particularly because it is burdened to avery great extent with flexible and precarious employ-ment conditions without receiving any compensationfor this risk.

However, not only the current phase of life stronglyimpacts the extent to which individuals are affected byglobalization. In addition, educational and occupationalclass characteristics determine in how far an individualhas to face increasing labour market risks. Underglobalization, these effects have become even stronger(Table 1). Thus, the results of the GLOBALIFE projectsupport the argument that globalization triggers astrengthening of existing social inequality structures ashypothesized by Breen (1997) rather than the emergenceof risk societies as proposed by individualizationtheorists (Beck, 1992). Present-day societies hence stillcan be characterized as class societies.

The third central finding of the GLOBALIFE projectis that the globalization process has not led to the sameoutcome in the various modern societies (Table 2).Hence, the results of the GLOBALIFE project explicitlycontradict the frequent assumption in globalizationresearch of a decline in the significance of national stateregulations in the course of the globalization processleading to the same outcomes in different countries(Treiman and Yip, 1989; Ohmae, 1991; Meyer et al.,1992; Beck, 2000). It is far more the case that theglobalization process in different national contexts runsup against various firmly anchored institutional struc-tures such as welfare state institutions, specific ways ofregulating labour markets, or local norms and values(Mills et al., 2008). These national institutions filter the

increasing uncertainty due to globalization in a specific

way, thus leading to special forms of labour marketflexibilization that, in turn, have shaped and changedthe life courses and structures of social inequality in

modern societies in very different ways. Although therecan be no doubt that national institutions change as a

result of the globalization process, they generallycontinue to retain their specific significance withintheir own countries. The results of the GLOBALIFE

project therefore show that globalization must beconceived right from the start as a contingent and

pluralistic process in which the historically developedcountry-specific institutional and social structures haveto be assigned a strong tendency to persist. The

permanence of country-specific differences can bejustified theoretically in that the institutional systems

and social structures of modern societies are interwovenarrangements with a high degree of internal comple-mentarity. They can only be grasped adequately in their

totality as country-specific institutional packages.

Notes

1. This was based on Esping-Andersen’s (1990)

regime classification, which is well established in

comparative social research and distinguishes

between liberal, social-democratic, and conserva-

tive welfare regimes. It was supplemented with the

family-oriented regime covering not only the

South-European countries, which Ferrera (1996)

views as a distinct type of regime, but also

Mexico and Ireland. What these family-oriented

countries studied in the GLOBALIFE project

have in common is that they aim to secure

individual welfare by placing more trust in

familial solidarity and networks than in universal

state services. The post-socialist regime is a

further extension to Esping-Andersen’s classic

welfare state typology. Although this regime is a

relatively heterogeneous cluster (see subse-

quently), all these countries share the abrupt

transition from a comparatively isolated, planned

socialist economy to an open market economy

exposed to the forces of globalization.

2. Ireland is a notable exception regarding the

effects of globalization on the family foundation

process. It is almost a perfect example of how a

country can profit from globalization by embra-

cing competition on the world market, promot-

ing free trade relations, and giving tax incentives

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to foreign investors (Layte et al., 2005). Ireland,

which achieved almost full employment at the

end of the 1990s, is the only country in the

GLOBALIFE project in which globalization has

led to a decline in employment relation uncer-

tainties. Correspondingly, there has also been a

marked upturn in marriage rates and birth rates

since the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, it should be

noted that Ireland’s competitive advantage over

other modern industrial states is due particularly

to the fact that other countries have not yet cut

taxes on corporation so drastically. If all

countries were to follow the same path, the

one country’s advantage over the others would

disappear. There are some developments in this

direction in Eastern Europe at the time being. It

remains therefore open to which extent Ireland

can keep its special position.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank Jonathan Harrow

(Bielefeld, Germany) for his language editing support.

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Authors’ Addresses

Sandra Buchholz (to whom correspondenceshould be addressed), Lehrstuhl fur Soziologie I,Otto-Friedrich-Universitat Bamberg, Postfach1549, D-96045 Bamberg, Germany.Email: sandra.buchholz@uni-bamberg.de

Dirk Hofacker, Staatsinstitut fur Familienforschungan der Universitat Bamberg (ifb), Heinrichsdamm4, D-96047 Bamberg, Germany.Email: dirk.hofaecker@uni-bamberg.de

Melinda Mills, Department of Sociology/ICS, Facultyof Behavioural and Social Sciences, University ofGroningen, Grote Rozenstraat 31, 9712 TG,Groningen, The Netherlands.Email: m.c.mills@rug.nl

Hans-Peter Blossfeld, Lehrstuhl fur Soziologie I,Otto-Friedrich-Universitat Bamberg, Postfach1549, D-96045 Bamberg, Germany.Email: soziologie1@sowi.uni-bamberg.de

Karin Kurz, Universitat Leipzig, Institut fur Soziologie,Beethovenstraße 15, 04107 Leipzig, Germany.Email: kurz@sozio.uni-leipzig.de

Heather Hofmeister, Department of Sociology, RWTHAachen University, Eilfschornsteinstr. 7, 52062Aachen, Germany.Email: heather.hofmeister@rwth-aachen.de

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