Paradoxes of Globalization.

PARADOXES OF

GLOBALIZATION

P r e p a r e d f o r t h e 1 s t A n g l o - K o r e a n E c o n o m i c I n s t i t u t e ( A K E I ) C o n f e r e n c e , R o y a l H o l l o w a y ,

U n i v e r s i t y o f L o n d o n ,

J u n e 1 2 , 1 9 9 9

Carlos A. P. Machado University of Minho, School of Economics and Business

4709 Braga Codex, Portugal Phone # 351-53-604567 (direct) or 604100, Fax # 676375 or 679919

email [email protected] homepage www.eeg.uminho.pt

PARADOXES OF GLOBALIZATION CARLOS A. P. MACHADO

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PA R A D OX E S O F G L O BA L I Z AT I O N

SOME PROVOCATIVE THOUGHTS ON A MUCH ABUSED CONCEPT

WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT?

“La mondialisation est un auberge espagnole: chacun y trouve ce qu’il y apporte.” (Monnier 1997, p.145)

“Globalization means different things to different people” (Nayyar 1997, p.13) The quantity of literature being published recently on globalization is overwhelming. A quick

search in the Books in Print data base resulted in 67 titles or subtitles including the G word for 1998, 58 in 1997 and 46 in the year before. UMI Dissertations search results amounted to 512 hits with the word globalization/globalisation in their titles or abstracts.

My relatively modest university library boasted 65 items showing globalization or globalisation in their titles or subtitles, some 15 books with their Portuguese equivalent (globalização), and the same number with their French cousin (mondialisation) on the title. In all three languages they amounted to 23 titles in 1997, 17 published in 1996, and so on.1

The Economist (1997) dedicated to it a series of articles a couple of years ago, and similar publications keep publishing on it all over the world.

As we do not wish to add a lot of words to it, and after a quick review of received definitions, main causes and effects of this process, we proceed to describe some paradoxes, that keep coming up and could provoke some useful thoughts, and hopefully actions, on our way ahead.

Some praise it, others brandish it as the bogeyman of the millennium and talk of a “global disenchantment” (Pintado 1999). As an adjective it excels conveying a strong feeling when qualifying some otherwise common concepts, like in ‘global crime’, ‘global corruption’, etc.

As Hirst & Thompson (1996, p.1) note, “(g)lobalization has become a fashionable concept in the social sciences, a core dictum in the prescriptions of management gurus, and a catch phrase for journalists and politicians of every stripe”. True “pop internationalism”, to use a happy expression coined by Paul Krugman (1996).

However, “(t)he acceptance of the concept of globalization by an increasing number of people is not due to fashion alone. It expresses the need for understanding processes that have lost meaning in terms of the more traditional concepts.” (Petrella 1996, p. 64)

This is one of those concepts everybody uses and abuses, but whose definition is difficult to find. It first appeared in Webster’s Dictionary in 1961, as reported by Kilminster (1997, p.257), who refers to it as “the worldwide connectedness of social events and relationships.” “In contemporary discussions, the extending interdependency chains between nations have been variously referred to as the ‘global human circumstance’, ‘the transnational scene’, ‘the compression of the world’, ‘the global ecumene’ or simply as the world ‘becoming a single place’. (ibidem)

Kilminster (1997) cites Albrow (1992) as offering following “sociological definition”: “This is the process whereby the population of the world is increasingly bonded into a single society.” On a more economic tone the OECD (1996) in a recent report states: “globalisation of industry refers to an evolving pattern of cross-border activities of firms involving international investment, trade and collaboration for purposes of product development, production and sourcing, and marketing. These international activities enable firms to enter new markets, exploit their technological and organisational advantages, and reduce business costs and risks. Underlying the international expansion of firms, and in part driven by it, are technological advances, the liberalisation of markets

1 The 12 books published in 1998 were not mentioned above because a lot of 1998 publications were still coming in.

PARADOXES OF GLOBALIZATION 18-02-05 CARLOS A. P. MACHADO

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and increased mobility of production factors.” Some mention even a “globalization theory”, as Poppi (1997), who introduces it as a correlate of

‘postmodernism theory’, whatever that may be, and who describes the process of globalization as “one of articulation of hitherto unrelated life-worlds.”

“By globalization the political economist means the coincidental effects of three major changes: the accelerated internationalization of production; the sharply increased mobility of capital; and the greater mobility of knowledge or information, from communication of messages to the transfer of technology.” (Strange 1997) For short: “Globalization means a closer international integration of production and markets.” (Gundlach & Nunnenkamp 1998,p.153)

“The critical question is whether globalization defines a change in degree or in kind – an extension

of the modern international world economy into somewhat unfamiliar territory or a systemic transformation which entails both changes in quantity (breadth and depth) and quality, defining new structures and new modes of functioning.”2 “I shall argue…that globalization does have substantive meaning, that we are in the midst of a qualitative transformation of the international world economy. My argument is based on three related propositions. First, dramatic increases in the scale of technology in many industries – in its costs, risk, and complexity – have rendered even the largest national markets too small to be meaningful economic units; they are no longer the ‘principal entities’ of the world economy. National markets are fused transnationally rather than linked across borders. Secondly, the recent explosion of transnational strategic alliances is a manifestation of a fundamental change in the mode of organization of international economic transactions from markets and/or hierarchies (i.e. trade and MNEs) to postmodern global networks. Last, and related to the second point, the emerging global economy is integrated through information systems and information technology rather than hierarchical organizational structures.” (Kobrin 1997)

Globalization is thus defined in terms of scale of technology and geography (world versus nations or states), mode of organization (networks versus hierarchies and markets) and means of integration (information versus hierarchical organizational structures). “I assert that globalization compromises the basic symmetry of political and economic organization, of nation states and national markets, characteristic of the present century.”

The late 19th century experienced also a remarkable process of globalization, which gathered momentum until the outbreak of World War I , with more or less obvious similarities and differences with late 20th century’s one (Nayyar 1997).

According to Kobrin (1997), however, “late-twentieth-century world economy differs significantly from that of a century ago in many respects. First, it is broader in terms of the number of national markets encompassed (albeit to varying degrees) as constituent units. Secondly, it is deeper in terms of the density and velocity of interaction, of flows of trade and investment, than it was prior to 1914. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the dominant mode of organization of international economic transactions has changed…from the market (trade and portfolio investment) to hierarchy or the internationalization of production through the MNE” (Multinational Enterprise).

2 The quantitative differences may also be slightly exagerated and one author states even that “the extent of these changes in international production is not unprecedented; …on a world scale the stock of FDI has not yet passed the high point of 1914”, when measured as % of world output.” (Kozul-Wright 1995, p.157 and Table 6.9, p.158)

Most of us would probably agree on following equation: Globalization = Free markets + Free and increased trade + technological innovation and

increasingly cheap and swift transport/communication of goods, people and information/knowledge + mobility of production factors (except for land?) + standardization of tastes, products and markets


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WHAT KIND OF FORCES DRIVE THIS PROCESS?

Quoting “The Great Transformation” of Karl Polanyi (1944), Altvater & Mahnkopf (1997) describe the industrial revolution as tantamount to a ‘societal monstrosity’, which had become the ‘previously harmless market pattern’, converted by the “labour market, gold standard and free trade.” “For Polanyi, the core truth is that markets can deliver good outcomes when they are restricted to typical products but collapse when their influence is extended to more basic elements of economic life, labour, land and money – that is, when markets are no longer an ‘accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated…by social authority’.” (Boyer & Drache 1996, p.9)

“The tendency of the market to separate from its social bonds and to neglect the nature of planet earth in the course of fierce economic globalization is nothing new. It was already a subject of the analytical part of the Marx and Engels Communist Manifesto.”… “Thus the historical process of ‘disembedding’ is indeed a ‘great transformation’ from traditional to modern relations. In place of the exchange of products, which has a very long history, all areas of human communication are taken over by forms of commodity exchange.” (Altvater & Mahnkopf 1997)

The second most important single cause of globalization was probably technological change, and “two important contributory causes are the dramatical revival of the market economy in erstwhile communist regions, and the changes in the development strategies on the part of most of the developing nations from being inward-looking, import-substituting, foreign-investment-hostile to being outward-looking, export-promoting, foreign-investment-welcoming.” (Lipsey 1997)

Amin & Thrift (1994, p.2-5) point to (1) the “increasing centrality of the financial structure”, and “the resulting increase in the power of finance over production, (2) to the increasing importance of the ‘knowledge structure’ or ‘expert systems’, (3) to the “transnationalization of technology, coupled with an enormous increase in the rapidity of redundancy of given technologies, (4) “the rise of global oligopolies”, (5) “the rise of transnational economic diplomacy and the globalization of state power, (6) “the rise of global cultural flows and ‘deterritorialized’ signs, meanings, and identities”, and (finally) “the results of the processes described above is the rise of new global geographies.”

As more prosaic causes can be singled out economies of scale, scope and experience, both at the firm and the establishment levels.

According to a OECD (1996, p.20-1) study “(g)lobalisation is the result of the innovative response of firms as they exploit opportunities and adapt to changes in their technological and institutional environment, and partly steer these changes. The factors shaping globalisation can be grouped into four general categories, many of which are inter-linked:

• Firm behaviour: − strategic: pre-emptive and imitative behaviour; − exploitation of competitive advantages: use of superior technology, organisation,

production or marketing; − consolidation of competitive advantages: gain access to highly trained and skilled

people, advanced technological and commercial infrastructure, lower labour costs, and to raw materials;

− organizational changes: adoption of ‘lean’ production methods and more horizontal internal and external organisational structures, including greater local and international outsourcing.

• Technology-related factors: − declining computing, communication, co-ordination and transport costs; − increasing importance of R&D, coupled with rising R&D costs; − shortening product lives; − shortening imitation time-lags; − rapid growth of knowledge-intensive industries; − increasing customisation of both intermediate and finished goods; − increasing importance of customer-oriented services.


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• Macroeconomic factors: − availability of key production factors; − productivity differentials; − fluctuations in exchange rates; − differences in the business cycle; − ‘catching-up’ by lagging economies.

• Government policies: − liberalisation of international trade and capital movements; − promotion of regional integration; − inward investment incentives; − R&D, technology, small firms and related industry policies; − intellectual property rights and effective patent life; − competition policies”, which get internationalised and bundled with industrial, trade

and other policies.

WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES?

For some the effects of globalization are terrible, for others they are terrific. Of course, you have a lot to worry about: Hirata & Le Doaré (1998) and Choudhry (1997) worry about women, Rist and coauthors (1997)

ask what is in it for the folks, that are not allowed to migrate3; others would like to know what’s in it for the regions and localities (Amin & Thrift 1994, Rhodes 1996), or for the media industry (Robins & Cornford 1994). What will happen to marxism and socialism/capitalism is what Samir Amin (1996) worries about, while Moran & Wood (1996) stick to health care policy, Humphreys & Simpson (1996) to European telecommunications and Gummett (1996) to European defence industry. Hossein-zadeh (1997) and Adamson & Partridge (1997) care about organized labour.

As it would be impossible to tackle all implications, we will focus on some more interesting to us.

• The costs and benefits of globalization

Main costs and benefits to be expected from globalization are synthesised by Dunning (1997b,

p.20) as the ‘yin’ and ‘yang’ of closer economic interdependence and the liberalisation of markets. On the positive side he includes “undisputedly raising average living standards, offering new job

opportunities, popularizing new technologies and skills, widening consumer choice, and, in a whole variety of ways, improving the lifestyles of large numbers of people”.

On the down-side, “globalization is no less dramatically portrayed in terms of disturbingly high levels of unemployment – particularly among the younger unskilled workers; a personal sense of insecurity and foreboding associated with rapid technological change; the division of societies into new islands of conflicting economic interests; the breakdown of traditional social conventions; the resurgence of ethnic conflicts; and, not least, the easier cross-border movement of tangible or intangible disbenefits e.g. organized crime, drug trafficking, international terrorism and unacceptable patterns of behaviour.”

• Stronger movements of industrial restructuring, including massive layoffs, abrasive

relocations and sudden divestments. • Concentration of industries/firms and other private and non-profit institutions.

3 “Le paradoxe de la mondialisation consiste à célébrer les vertus de la circulation des capitaux, des marchandises et des informations, tout en assignant les gens à résidence et en interdisant la migration des personnes.”


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Firms become ever larger, due not only to internal growth, but also to vertical integration, horizontal expansion and diversification.

European and other securities exchanges are merging. US-style superleague comes to European football (Hoehn & Szymanski 1999). • Globalisation of market segments, homogenisation of tastes and consumer

preferences (Kustin 1994). Some believe this more (Levitt 1983) than others (Buzzel 1968, Douglas & Wind 1995). The

consumer ceases to be king, after a period of intensive customization, where the marketing people catered to the diversified needs of the multitude of consumers or consumer groups. Lower classes get access to same cosmopolitan values, goods and services as upper classes.

• Same democratic (American?) way of life and liberal way of thinking everywhere.

Or else you can be bombed into it and get your political leaders ousted from power.4 La pensée

unique s’installe. However, what was more unifying than the Communist Manifesto? • Information becomes more evenly shared by governments, corporations and

citizens, than ever before. Inter, extra and intra-nets, management information systems and Freedom of Information Act(s) come

to mind. Information overflow is also a problem. • Public policies get internationalized. ‘Internationalization of the state’.

The “prioritization of the interests of globally mobile capital over those of nationally based

economic and social groupings” was in progress. According to Baker (1999), this already happened to HM Treasury and the Bank of England. A former associate of George Soros runs Brazilian central bank.

Dollarisation of some economies is officially considered as a potential problem and/or opportunity by American administration. Europe gets one unified currency. The Federal Reserve has recently (1998) officially decided to include data on the foreign economic situation as criteria for its monetary policy decision making process. Other decisions regarding, for instance, environment protection or pollution control, public health and competition policies have more and more international implications 5.

Some, as social policy, social protection and income policies, acquire perhaps unexpectedly the properties of a prisoner’s dilemma at the international level, as Rayp (1999) pointed out. In order to be effective in all countries, without harming some countries’ competitive position in favour of others’, “it means that constraints may be alleviated by a co-operative policy, consisting of multilateral initiatives in social matters, which recognise and respect the relative positions of the countries and induces them to choose collectively for a higher social protection.” (Rayp 1999, p.23)

• Scientific disciplines get sacked or merged.

Intrafirm trade gains vis-a-vis interfirm trade, with implications in what concerns relevant

theoretical approach, trade theory or theory of the firm. The theory of multinational enterprise, and partly the ‘old’ eclectic paradigm, get updated in

4 In my home country, Portugal, the change of political regime, which took place 25 years ago, was recently “explained” to the kids, as having made possible, what was forbidden before, namely to purchase and drink Coca-Cola!

5Measures against aircraft noise, genetically modified food and hormone fed beef, and on individual data protection have all been contested at the WTO.


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order to take globalisation into consideration. (Dunning 1999) International relations have become so important that they tend to vanish, for lack of specificity. The “end of the nation state” (Ohmae 1995) and the rise of interregional economies, in a

process that could culminate in the rebirth of Interregional/Geography/Location Economics. In terms of scientific approaches we have been watching a trend towards an increasing

interaction and tentative fusion between disciplines. The need for a greater interdisciplinarity is felt across the board.

International and industrial economics tend to merge, while some time ago “in industrial organization theory, we had firms without trade and international trade had the opposite, trade without firms.” (Silber 1983)

“Institutional and technological changes that have taken place in the last thirty years, now require that the analyst replace the theory of international trade6 and conceive of a theory of ‘international economic involvement’. This theory must allow for the fact that trade conducted between independent arm’s-length parties remains important but is no longer the unique identifiable component of international economic interaction. The theory must recognize the existence of MNCs and foreign direct investment (FDI) which amounts, in practice, to a refutation of the essential assumption of the received doctrine - that (all) factors of production are internationally immobile.” (Gray 1999)

• Corporations change their ways, and become the ‘global actor no.1’ (Petrella 1996),

social and even ‘virtual’ (Davidow & Malone 1993) entities. The firm has emerged as the key global actor, mainly for three reasons: 1. “It is the only organization that has transformed itself to become a ‘global’ player. It

operates at the real decision-making level. 2. Our society has given top priority to technology and to the growth of tools. Firms are the

producers of tools. 3. Firms are considered to be key actors that produce wealth, ensure employment and,

therefore, individual and collective well-being.” (Petrella 1996, p.74) “’Going global’ has been far easier for firms than for governments, parliaments, trade unions or

universities, which are not sufficiently flexible institutions ready to adapt easily or quickly to changing conditions.” (Petrella 1996, p.73) “As far as ‘global’ society is concerned, the enterprise lays claim to a kind of historical legitimacy based on the fact that it has become globalized. It makes this claim implicitly in that it presents itself as the only organization able to assure the optimal worldwide management of available material and non-material resources.” (Petrella 1996, p.76)

Unethical behaviour is out; politically correct behaviour is in. No bribes are allowed and never corruption.

Multinational or transnational firms become global corporations (Levitt 1983). These develop a more integrated or centralized management style (Perlmutter 1969, Bartlett & Ghoshal 1989) and now they are even becoming “knowledge creating” (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995) and “knowledge orchestrating” “Metanational” corporations7 (Doz et al 1997). International marketing became “global” and corporate strategy becomes global (Lazar 1996) too, or even “Total Global Strategy” (Yip 1995)

From a Canadian rather interventionist point of view this sounds like Lazar (1996, p.282): “Thus, we must conclude that a global strategy has become essential for competitiveness and success in the contests for achieving a competitive advantage. A global strategy provides more options and greater flexibility than a domestic strategy and so must be more valuable for a firm.” Not considered by this author as a substitute for the three generic Porter strategies (low-cost, differentiation and focus) a global strategy is supposed to be “a crucial complement to each.”

6 I would add international investment. 7 Defined by these authors as corporations that “simultaneously access, meld, and leverage locally-bound and context-dependent knowledge from around the world.” (Doz et al 1997, p.28)


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• Degradation of human (moral) values. ‘Economicism’. “Market fundamentalism”. Pseudo-paradox: market values versus social values.

I believe this consequence to be more apparent than real. If there is in fact a loss of

human/moral values, this is only too often abusively attributed to globalization, defined as above. “Unsure of what they stand for, people increasingly rely on money as the criterion of value.

…The cult of success has replaced a belief in principles. Society has lost its anchor.” (Soros 1997) Free markets threaten family values, as some want us to believe (viz. Kuttner 1999 and Soros

1997) as much or less than any ideology, personality type or state of mind. It is abusive to aver that “capitalism decrees that almost anything goes as long as it sells.”(Ibiden) Capitalism does not justify murder (Coker 1999), as much or as less as it does not justify war, prostitution, drug dealing, bank robbing, and so on, however profitable and widespread any of these activities may be.

• Separation (‘disembedding’) of the economy (market) from the society (Polanyi

1944).

Wood (1997, p.555) states that “the ‘disembedding’ of the ‘economy’ from society is, of course, not – or not only – the separation of the economy from society but also, and above all, the subordination of social relations to the disembedded economy, or the subsumption of society by the economic logic of capitalism.”

Birchfield (1999) even offers a “critique of neoliberal globalization from the vantage point of democratic theory, exposing how this form of market ideology is inherently antithetical to democratic principles.”8

To accept this would be tantamount to denying the right of economic science to exist as an autonomous science; as a matter of fact of any (social) science. Quite to the contrary you could aver that the economy, even today, is subject to all kinds of influences and interventions from the other spheres of human and natural life.

WHAT PARADOXES ARE THERE?

• Wage inequalities increase between developed and developing countries and within developed countries

According to the received international trade theory, it is relatively scarce unskilled labour in

high salary countries that should feel the punch of globalization. And indeed it is, all across the rich countries and not only in the more exposed to international competition mature industries, but also in the high-tech sectors, like aerospace. (Garten 1999)

Wage inequality is apparently also rising within developed countries, mainly in the United States of America and Great Britain. “In 1979, the richest 10% of male Americans in full-time employment earned 3.6 times as much as the poorest 10%. By 1996, they were earning five times as much.” (The Economist 1999, p.5) “Economists offer two main explanations for the growing inequality in American pay. The first, and less convincing, is globalisation. The rise in foreign imports, the argument goes, is forcing some Americans to accept lower pay to remain competitive with, say, Mexican and Chinese workers. The trouble with this story is that foreign trade is a much larger part of Europe’s economies than America’s, so Europe should feel the effect much more. Besides, argues Canice Pendergast, an economist at the University of Chicago graduate business school, of the 13% or so of GNP that America trades, most is with Canada, Japan and Europe. Only about two-fifths of that total is with developing countries - and over 20 years that share has

8 Soros (1998) argues along similar lines.


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risen by only one percentage point of GNP. In Britain, where pay inequality has risen even faster, trade with developing countries has grown more slowly. The second explanation depends on technology, and especially on the way it has increased the demand for skilled, rather than unskilled, workers.” (Ibiden)

This conclusion seems to be shared by Murshed (1997), who states that “(i)t is not trade with the South, per se, which hurts unskilled labor in the North, but the nature of labor market imperfections and the process of technical change.”

Some call our attention to what could be considered specific extreme effects of this rising inequality: “Of all the issues that globalisation raises, none is as tricky as the vast gulf between the pay of most of the world’s chief executives and the stock options of America’s bosses.” (The Economist 1999, p.16)

However, imports into developed nations are reputedly not only displacing labour, but also generating employment in skill intensive downstream handling activities. (Tombazos 1999)

Within developed countries less skilled and paid labour, especially of the immigrant sort, would suffer more than highly skilled and paid people (Wood 1998, Burda & Dluhosch 1998) would. This could be happening not only because of falling barriers to trade, to capital flows, to migration and knowledge spillovers, and because of corporate organisational changes and erosion of trade-union power, but also due to the reduction of what Tang & Wood (1999) call ‘co-operation costs’. This mechanism is described as “the dramatic decline in the cost of international business travel and communication, which has made it much easier for highly-skilled workers who live in developed countries to co-operate in production with less-skilled workers in developing countries, through a mixture of frequent short visits and telecommunication.” (Ibiden)

The wages of highly skilled northern workers would be raising by widening markets for their services. We see here traces of what others called “the winner-take-all society” or “the society of superstars”. “Inequality between Southern and Northern less-skilled workers thus declines, but inequality in the North between highly-skilled and less-skilled workers rises.” (Tang & Wood 1999, p.2)

This “mechanism is also related to direct foreign investment, since transnational companies are suppliers not just of finance but of expertise … : they are channels through which highly-skilled Northern workers contribute to production in the South, and the spread and increasing sophistication of such companies has been both a cause and a consequence of falling co-operation costs. However, much - indeed, probably most – co-operation occurs through channels other than transnational ownership: many Northern importers assist their Southern suppliers with design, production and packaging, as well as marketing; and Southern firms buy the services of Northern experts, either as individuals or through consulting firms.” (Tang & Wood 1999, p.3)

In this context, “it is important to ask why highly-skilled workers do not migrate to the South, where their greater scarcity offers the prospect of higher earnings. The reason appears to be externalities – economies of clustering of highly-skilled workers – of two sorts. One is that frequent contact among such workers, face-to-face as well as by telecommunication, is vital for the acquisition and maintenance of their skills. The other is that many amenities of Northern life valued by highly-skilled workers and their families can be supplied only by clusters of highly-skilled workers.” (Tang & Wood 1999, p.4)

Economic liberalization, in trade and finance, “should normally raise the relative wage of low-skilled workers and reduce wage inequality in low wage countries. However, the more recent experience of a number of developing countries – especially those in Latin America – shows, in addition to rising unemployment (7.4% in 1997), a trend of rising wage inequalities in the aftermath of liberalization. Liberalization appears to have disproportionately benefited skilled workers in several Latin American countries.” (Hansenne 1999, p.8-9)

Among the possible explanations for this unexpected fact, Hansenne (1999, p.9) lists (1) labour market deregulation, (2) the more rapid diffusion of skill-intensive technologies embodied in foreign direct investment and imported capital equipment, that (3) middle-income countries would be comparatively better endowed with skilled labour, and (4) secular decline in the terms of trade of labour-intensive exports from large low-wage countries, indirectly depressing the wages of low-


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skilled workers in all developing countries.9 We get often warned that from this rising gap between those able to ride the wave of

globalization because they are knowledge and communications oriented, and those left behind, could develop a “mounting backlash against globalization”. (Schwab & Smadja 1996, as quoted by Dunning 1997b, p.20)

• International relations become so important that they tend to vanish.

As cross-border barriers fall, so international specificities disappear: currencies, tastes, and immobile factors of production, comparative advantage (chapter xx in introductory economics textbooks).

• Increased, or at least persistent, instability/volatility10 of some economic,

financial11 and other variables, in spite of less segmented more homogenous markets.

Three basic deficiencies appear to underlie the increased instability: (1) Major function of financial markets would have shifted from intermediation to speculation; (2) macroeconomic policies would overemphasise monetary instruments and financial deregulation, in detriment of fiscal/budget and price/income policies; (3) absence of effective multilateral constraints and obligations. (Akyüz 1995)

In this case it appears as if an interaction between technological innovation, in the form of automated computer software, telecommunications, and the like, and financial market integration, with new scope for arbitration between markets, has contributed to increased volatility.

• Convergence, standardization, and homogenisation versus divergence of life

styles, of consumer preferences, differentiation of products and customization, growing heterogeneity, income inequalities, unemployment, social exclusion, ethnical conflict, proliferation of ethnic mass media (Mowlana 1998) and polarisation.

“Market forces and competition work in favor of convergence12, but institutions outside the market work against it.” (Unger 1997, p.99)

• Calls for tax harmonisation and for multinational co-operation in the control of

activities and behaviour by multinationals go hand in hand with a “race to the bottom” for state subsidies/incentives to the firms, reflected also in the erosion of regulatory standards (Lazar 1996) and with the use of transfer prices by those firms.

• “The Paradox of Relationships” (Dunning 1997b).

Cooperation versus Competition (“Co-opetition” Nalebuff & Brandenburger 1996). The ‘yang’ and the ‘yin’ of globalization. Corporate internal transactions versus arms’ length adversarial

9 According to the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, the falling relative wages of unskilled workers in the North would have to imply a decline in the relative price of unskilled labor intensive goods. 10 World output and trade would however show decreasing rates of volatility (Kitson & Michie 1995, Table 1.2, p.8). 11 “For example, volatility of exchange rates, asset prices, and interest rates tends to shorten time horizons for investment decisions, to raise transaction costs, and to increase firms’ incentives to maintain higher mark-ups and greater financial reserves. Moreover volatility blurs the signals which the exchange rate should give for resource allocation." (Akyüz & Cornford 1995, p.172) 12 Convergence has been defined in social sciences as “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes, and performances” (Kerr 1983, p.3, as quoted by Unger 1997, p.101)


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transactions. Neither Markets nor Hierarchies, however flat/horizontal: Networks (Thorelli 1986), Alliance Capitalism (Dunning 1997) or Heterarchies (Hedlund 1986).

Globalization would be “forcing both private and public institutions to reappraise their organizational structures.” … “In its contemporary philosophy, the job of top management is less to control and take decisions, and more to orchestrate strategic vision, set performance standards, nurture organizational values and encourage down-the-line entrepreneurship.” (Dunning 1997b, p.19)

In a recent move Boeing is trying to bring the market inside the firm, in as much as it’s management is going to allow the unions to bid against outside contractors. (Garten 1999)

• Globalization versus regionalization, international economic integration or

formation of regional blocks of countries (supranational public bodies) (LeClair 1997) and of subnational or transnational competitive regional agglomerations (Ohmae 1995, Tanzi 1998).

(G)lobalization is leading to a decentralization of some the traditional tasks of national governments to sub-national, i.e. regional or district authorities; while others, e.g. the management of trade, foreign direct investment and competition policies, and the variety of technical and environmental standardization of harmonization of norms are increasingly becoming the responsibility of regional or supra-national regimes.” (Dunning 1997b, p.20)

Subsidiarity “is gaining widespread acceptance at all levels of governance; and the role of sub-national economic entities is becoming more, rather than less, influential.”(Dunning 1997b, p.13)

• ‘Americanization’ (Guéhenno 1999), ‘Triadization’ (Petrella 1996), and not so

much Globalization.

The American people would be the only one not to feel the contradiction between their nationalism/patriotism and globalization. Globalization would reinforce and confirm American identity and fundamental convictions, as the only “communauté de choix”, also called “communauté de contrat”. All the others, the so called “communautés de mémoire”, would feel aggressed by globalization. (Guéhenno 1999)

“Today’s globalization is a truncated globalization: ‘triadization’ is a more correct definition of the current situation. By ‘triadization’ is meant the fact that the process of technological, economic and socio-cultural integration amongst the three most developed regions of the world (Japan plus the NICs from South-East Asia, Western Europe and North America) is more diffused, intensive and significant than ‘integration’ between these three regions and the less-developed countries, or between the less-developed themselves.” (Petrella 1996, p.77)

“If the target is to win, only a few will be winners. The losers will be excluded and abandoned to their situation. The winners will continues to remain together, and increasingly integrate with one other….De-linking is the process through which some countries and regions are gradually losing their connections with the most economically developed and growing countries and regions of the world.” (Petrella 1996, p.78)

• Concentration of national economies in customs unions and free trade areas versus fragmentation and proliferation of ethnic conflicts.

“The paradox of regional economic integration – albeit it is often market driven – is that it introduces an economic uniformity or universality into people’s lives, which they frequently wish to offset by emphasizing other, and more distinctive, characteristics of their individuality. In some cases – although we would hesitate to suggest this has been caused by the emergence of the global economy, however much it may facilitate it, - it leads to ethnic and ideological schisms and to political disintegration and fragmentation.” (Dunning 1997b, p.13)

• Increased competition in a larger market accompanied by the predominance of

global corporations/monopolies/cartels and the “renaissance of small to


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medium size firms” (Dunning 1997b, p.9).

• Markets become more important, but so does their regulation.

“…disembedded markets which follow an ‘asocial’ and ‘nonnatural’ logic and can conform to economic rationality require social regulation.” (Altvater & Mahnkopf 1997, p.320)

Globalization and economic change would, according to Dunning (1997b, p.17), be “leading to a greater coincidence of interest between governments and the private sector in market economies.” “Hence, the paradox that a free market needs strong and effective government.”

• The paradox of ‘less yet more’, and that of ‘centralization vs. decentralization’ (Dunning 1997b, p.15)

The generalized call for less state and more market since the eighties was not followed by the equivalent drop of public spending as percentage of national product. Dunning (1997b, p.16) describes “a blurring of the boundaries of the role of the private and public sector in capitalist economies…. On the one hand, … the interventionist role of governments has lessened. On the other, as the economic prosperity of firms and nations has become more dependent on the continual upgrading of indigenous created assets – notably intellectual capital and physical and commercial infrastructure -, then, insofar as it has the power to influence, e.g. by its educational and technology policies, the role of the state has become more critical.”

• Decline of the role of the state/government, at the least in what concerns macroeconomic policy (“hollowing out of the state”), but cross-border externalities/spillovers and “global public goods” (Kaul & others 1999) reinforce the case for relevant international agencies and supranational governments (One World, One Government).

Some still believe, with the European Community in mind, however that “in spite of economic internationalization, the nation-state has not only survived but continues to monopolize sovereignty and public power.” While conceding that “it is well possible that the system of international economic governance that is emerging from the defence of the national monopoly on public power will be both: the only one on offer, and far less than what would be needed to make a global economy viable socially as well as, perhaps, economically.” (Streeck 1996, p.314)

Beware: Retrenchment to microeconomic policies could imply large perverse effects, as failures of the state can be larger than market failures. In the words of Dunning (1997b, p.17) “the costs and benefits of non-market intervention are extremely difficult to measure.” Accordingly, the interaction between national government and markets can lead as easily to a virtuous as to a vicious circle.

• Competitive advantage of nations (and firms) remains dependent of local

clusters/agglomerations (Porter 1990) of “national” (Sally 1996) “local embeddedness of transnational corporations” (Dicken, Forsgren & Malmberg 1994), or of industrial districts.

However, according to Mann (1997, p.472) “the expansion of global networks seems to weaken local interaction networks more than national ones.”

• Nations tend to be run like corporations (Hollywood, and the call for managers


12

to run public agencies13) and corporations like nations (social responsibility, ethical behaviour, workers’ participation, etc.).

• A “growing incongruity between the economic and the social space of organization creates a major challenge to economic, political, and social stability.” (Sengenberger & Wilkinson 1995, p. 111)

This mismatch would reflect among others on the contrast between the transnational activities of firms and the national or sub-national level at which labour institutions and labour market regulation remain, where pay, employment rules, working conditions, occupational health and safety, and social security are determined.14 (Sengenberger & Wilkinson 1995, p.111)

• U.S. Federal Reserve included in 1998 the foreign economic situation in the determinants of their decisions, but hesitates to serve as the central bank for non-US dollarised economies.

• The Paradox of Space. (Dunning 1997b)

GO GLOCAL. Think globally, (but) act locally or glocalize (Gustavsson 1994). ‘Subsidiarity’ at the governmental level.

• Irreversible, in spite of never attainable.

“…barring natural or man-made catastrophes or a major reconfiguration of social values, the globalization of economic activity is largely irreversible”(Dunning 1997b), yet “(g)lobalism is never attainable” (Altvater & Mahnkopf 1997).

Mann (1997, p.489) writes of an ‘impure’ globalism, “a combination of both the transnational and the inter-national. The potential universalism of the former is undercut by the particularisms of nation-states – and indeed also by the particularisms of human social practices at large.”

• George Soros (1997 and 1998) complaining about global capitalism.

In his own words: “I contend that an open society may also be threatened from the opposite [in relation to the power of the state] direction – from excessive individualism. Too much competition and too little cooperation can cause intolerable inequities and instability” (Soros 1997)

WHAT ARE THE CONCLUSIONS?

Kemp & Shimomura (1999) offer three alternative definitions of globalization in terms of (i) an enlargement of the set of trading countries, (ii) an enlargement of the set of traded commodities, or (iii) the international sharing of technology. “It is shown that if each country adopts a Paretian scheme of internal compensation then internationalization in each sense leaves at least one country better off, and that if international compensation is admitted then internationalization in each sense makes every country better off.”

The G-word means neither Apocalypse nor Shangri-La; it’s another word to say future, and the future, as they say, is already here, at least in part.

On the other hand, we are dealing here with an exaggerated simplification, but which has the

13 The practice of ministers and other senior officials leaving office to go directly to private enterprise is widespread. Increasingly popular seems to be the recruitment of such officials from the private sector. Latest case in point that has called my attention is the new Brazilian Central Bank president. In my home country the ministry of the economy promotes itself as being the ministry of corporations. 14 See the problem of alleged ‘social dumping’ and the corresponding remedy ‘social clause’. “The purpose of a social clause is to restrict imports of products originating in countries, industries, or firms where labour standards are inferior to certain minimum standards.” (Sengenberger & Wilkinson 1995, p.115)


13

virtue of calling our attention to some paradigm shifts that may be called for.

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