Globalization and its Influence on Democratic Development of Post-Communist Societies

Citation: Maldini, Pero (2008): Globalization and its Influence on Democratic Development of Post-Communist Societies, in Milardović,

Anđelko / Pauković, Davor / Vidović, Davorka (eds.): Globalization of Politics, Centar za politološka istraživanja, Zagreb, pp. 193-217

Pero MAldini

Globalization and its Influence on Democratic Development of Post-Communist Societies

Two Faces of Globalization

Globalization is a broad concept and a complex social phenom-

enon which is very difficult to determine precisely. However, it might

be said that it is primarily a process of economic, and then of a general

connectivity of various societies and states, by which, historically, a

new type of their multifold mutual interconnections and interferences

is established. Although it is originally an economic concept (global

economy, world market, economic integrations, international rela-

tions, etc), globalization should be understood primarily as a direct

or indirect influence (not only economic, but also cultural, political

and social) of the most powerful world societies on all of the oth-

ers. Therefore, globalization implies the spreading and interpolation

of the same or similar social structures, forms, values and norms into

other social areas. That also implies mutual influence and mixture of

elements of different cultures. That influence and mixture don‟t go

one way, (although there is dominance of the developed societies over

undeveloped ones).

Although global connectivity runs along with the first forms of

international integrations and cooperation in general, globalization is

still quite different form of connectivity. Namely, the rapid develop-

ment of industrial production, population growth, market expansion

and development of communication paved the way to the high level

of inter-dependence, new relations, tremendous prosperity, but at the

same time it caused many problems, now on the global level. Today,

problems of one country or region are at the same time problems of

the majority of others, if not of the whole world (ex. issues of con-

sumption and renewal of natural resources, issues of environmental

protection and the perspective of sustainable development on global

level, problems of climate changes, international security issues…)

In addition, the world turned to be inter-connected as it has never

been before, owing to the excellent communication and information

technologies. That is how the world became the playground of global

processes which, more or less, directly or indirectly, have influence on

everyone‟s daily life1.

While the previous inter-connections understood, or to some ex-

tent accepted diversities of participants in the connectivity processes,

globalization expresses quite the opposite tendencies. They are mani-

fested in making pressure to uniform the diversities, and in imposing

of unique forms (economic, political, and cultural) for everyone. That

comes, primarily, out of the interest of the most powerful economies,

who are the leaders of global processes and who need the uniform

conditions and general forms in as wide area as possible, in order to

spread their influence.

By establishing new economic and political integrations, and cul-

tural matrices, global processes expel or completely destroy certain

local and national economic structures, political orders and traditional

socio-cultural elements and they, in some way, unify the world. There

is a danger of permanent loss of particular social characteristics (es-

pecially cultural identity) of small nations and undeveloped societies.

1 Globalization is a spatial phenomenon placed in the continuum between the local on one side and the global on the other. Daily activities of one milieu are more and more affected by events that are in progress on the other side of the world. Decisions and activities within one community have increasing impact on the life of other communities, often having global repercussions. Globalization thus points out that political, social and economic activities become inter-regional or inter-continental, and that mutual connectivity, equally among the states and societies become more and more intense (comp. Giddens, 1990).

194 Pero Maldini

That is exactly where significant opposition to global processes comes

from.

It is now difficult to speak about the states (even those most de-

veloped ones that are perceived as carriers and promoters of globali-

zation) as globalization process leaders. Economic and technological

developments have promoted the position of multinational corpora-

tions as leading actors of globalization who serve as trans-national

(trans-state) operators. However, in their activities, they are not sub-

ject to classical forms of political control as those who work within

the frames of national states; and they operate to benefit satisfying

their interests, mostly out of the reach of the democratic public eye.

Regarding their potent economic power, these actors have enormous

influence over (national) political elite and their activities, thus shap-

ing the new structure of the world order.

Problems that are brought by this global system are manifested pri-

marily as governance issues on two basic levels:

• functional level (establishment and coordination of numerous

international and supra-national financial, monetary, techno-

logic and other institutions) and

• political level (issue of legitimacy, i.e. absence of democratic

procedure and democratic procedure of decision making, ab-

sence of monitoring over activities of supra-national corpora-

tions, and the issue of their responsibility).2

Here, the ambivalent nature of globalization in general, and its

main contradiction become clear.

2 That significant democratic deficit is manifested through the absence of democratic legitimacy (the process managers are out of public control, they don‟t have the public consent for their decisions which are made without democratic procedure). Here we speak equally about the management of multinational corporations as well as about super-structures (institutions and administration) of multinational political integrations, and international institutions (institutions of global rule).

Globalization and its Influence on Democratic Development... 195

Neo-liberal concept

Globalization is closely connected with the spread of liberal ideas

(economic and political), that is to say, with neo-liberalism. Neo-libe-

ral definition of globalization is not the only one, but certainly it is the

most common. Same as classical liberalism, neo-liberalism has the

same basic ideas and a doctrine (de-regulation of the state, especially

state social functions that are going through privatization, operation

of free market) but now, under different (global) conditions. Belief in

unquestionable moral justification of the market as the best mecha-

nism of resource allocation is the basic idea of neo-liberalism. That

old liberal idea is now put into the global frame with the goal that

proclaims prosperity for all. It is evident, though, that the neo-libe-

ral concept3, operating through the free market, serves the interest of

those economically most powerful ones. Neo-liberal concept acquire

global dimension, and is the core of globalization (comp. Milardović,

2006, Sundać, 2006).

The fall of communism marked the end of bi-polar world and the

beginning of transition of post-communist societies. Those societies

were determined to quickly enter into the market system, which lead

to the non-selective application of measures (mostly monetary ones)

posted by the world financial power centers4. That diminished the value

of economic transformation, because it undermined the work power,

productivity and creativity which are replaced by import of capital and

3 Neo-liberalism, as an economic and political concept, emerges as a powerful concept in the

seventies of the last ct., first as a reaction to the crisis of a „state of prosperity‟ (economic re- cession, international debt crisis) promoting the market as the main mechanism of allocation and competitive market capitalism, empowerment of the private ownership (privatization of traditionally public or state social services and institutions), free commerce, economic development oriented to export, significant reduction of public consumption, i.e. significant diminishment of the state re-distributive role. Also, neo-liberalism promotes democracy as the most desirable political order and the only appropriate frame of organizing and operating of free market. It seems that this is the point from which the ambivalence of the “democrati- zational” role (which the leaders of the most developed western countries claim to have), as well as the limited democratic achievements in many transitional societies come out.

What is meant here are primarily the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the World Trade Organization (WTO) as global operators and the key pillars of neo-liberalism.

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196 Pero Maldini

goods. The fall of productivity and the decrease in employment are the

most visible consequences of the global neo-liberal doctrine.

Neo-liberal concept has justifiably put in question the function of

a social state in achieving civil egalitarianism and equality. Yet inequa-

lity is the basic obstacle to economic development, both within par-

ticular societies and on the global scale, since the difference between

the developed and undeveloped becomes more and more evident.

Neo-liberal economists are in opposition to social state. Enlargement

of social differences as a consequence of neo-liberal public policies

provokes more pressures by the local community for state interven-

tionism, while globalism tends to suppress its role (comp. Vidović,

2006).

The increasing openness towards world market, firmer interna-

tional integrity and inter-dependence, as well as the revolution in the

economy of knowledge, shape globalization as a process in which na-

tional states have lesser and lesser chance to influence on economic

processes (comp. Petak, 2000: 186). Aggressiveness of globalization,

that is to say aggressiveness of market fundamentalism, significantly

endanger national economies forcing them to adapt laisezz-faire to

global economy, by giving up traditional social values and functions

of a „state of prosperity‟. Neo-liberal globalization has neither estab-

lished equality, nor eliminated poverty; even denser concentration of

wealth occurred, and the dependence of the undeveloped upon the de-

veloped increased (comp. Schwartzman, 2004: 114-116).

Neo-liberalism has not succeeded in bringing prosperity. It didn‟t

solve the crisis of a „state of prosperity‟, since it didn‟t initiate the

production processes where it was the most necessary to be done; on

the contrary. Moreover, on global level, it creates presumptions which

work in favor to discrimination and inequality.

Therefore globalization, based on neo-liberal concept, threatens to

destroy the very core of democracy, even to destroy those historical

compromises between capitalism and democracy that, for example,

the developed European democracies managed to achieve in order

to preserve their legitimacy. Economy-controlled globalization and


market-oriented modernization of current societies express tendency

of low interest for basic human values and rights, as well as for the

very prerequisites for prosperous life in most part of the world (comp.

Meyer, 2004: 30).

Promotion of liberal ideas and of democratic values is thus be-

ing significantly reduced. Neo-liberalism, therefore, doesn‟t promote

liberal democracy; on the contrary, in real relations, it blocks it. That

way, economic and political changes caused by globalization are in

opposition to the proclaimed values which it intends to use as a means

to legitimate itself as a process5.

Globalization and the theory of transition: national state and

international environment

Wider international environment of transitional societies is nowa-

days essentially different from the pre-transitional period, when those

societies pertained to the closed socialist bloc within the frame of the

world divided by cold war. After the fall of communism, new social

potentials were let free, and the free flow of information and ideas on

global level was enabled. Along with the political changes, the world

has gone through rapid technological and economic development.

Since the processes of globalization have enormous impact on trans-

formational processes in transitional societies, this is very important.

Social science was not ready for the fall of communist societies at

the end of the eighties. Namely, in spite of the significant number of

critical studies of the so called real socialism, the fall of communism

could not be predicted, as well as the deep changes, which followed

5 Namely, while liberal democracy presumes fulfillment of basic values (freedom, pluralism, civil rights, political participation, control of power), globalization imposes a democratic form which enables partial democracy (in the form of free market and capitalist relations) by which it significantly reduces, even blocks, a democracy which includes civil rights and control of power through participation in decision making processes and processes of power control.

198 Pero Maldini

within the western society6. Although many phenomena that led to the

big changes derive from the very problem of social (non-) modernism

of post-communist societies, the specific and complex transformation

processes in those societies could not be precisely explained by moder-

nization theories. It had additional influence on researches of politi-

cal orders‟ transformations, as well as of strengthening of democracy,

in other words, on the development of transitional theory which was

based, up to the time, on the experience of democratic transitions of

the third wave7, especially the societies of the South Europe and Latin

America.

While on one side, macro-oriented comparative operations focus on

objective conditions and use the language of causal determination, on

the other side, micro-oriented studies try to stress out political actors‟

strategic attitudes, built in the concrete historical situations. The first

approach implies that the democratic transformation is determined by

various economic, social or political prerequisites, which play a role

in global logic of the world order. Authors who use global connection

in their analyses, before all, provide proof that the current democra-

tic transitions are not isolated, accidental or randomly spread in time

and space. Opposite to their wide-spread beliefs on global nature of

democratic transitions, they differ in characters of global mechanisms

(comp. Schwartzman, 1998).

Essentially, transitional theory has postulated the standpoint that

democracy can be established regardless of structural context. That

way, transitional theory has placed itself in opposition to moderniza-

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7

Comp. Beyme, 1996: 6-7; Nagle, Mahr, 1999: 41-43, 62-63.

Political changes that occurred in various parts of the world in the last quarter of the 20th

ct., stressed out the importance and vitality of democracy. They were taken as components of a wider, global trend of democratization, known as „the third wave of democratization‟. They are marked by: a)the fall of the right-wing authoritarian regimes in the South Europe in mid-seventies; b) replacement of military dictatorships with the elected civil governments throughout Latin America from the end of the 70s till the end of the 80s; c) weakening of authoritarian rules in parts of the East and South Asia from the mid 80s; d) communist crisis and the fall of regimes in East Europe at the end of the 80s, and the breakup of USSR and establishment of post-Soviet republics at the beginning of the 90s; e) weakening of single- party regimes in the countries of sub-Sahara Africa in the first half of the 1990 (comp. Huntington, 1991).


tion approaches8 which stress out structural factors as determinants of

establishment and sustainability of democracy (democracy is an is-

sue of development of socio-economic conditions and other structural

factors9), and in opposition to cultural approaches which stress out

socio-cultural factors (political culture, traditional inheritance) as a

base-power for collective actors to move towards changes.10 However,

transitional theory, in its explanation of democratic processes, implicit-

ly rests on presumption that democratic transitions were achieved on

already established and efficient states. Leaving behind structural and

socio-cultural pre-requisites, it leaves behind also one of the basic

components of democratic processes in many post-communist soci-

eties: overlapping, simultaneity and mutual determination of demo-

cratic processes and processes of national state establishment.

Process of democratization presumes the change of political order,

and political system together with it, that is to say, some particular

reconstruction of state institutions (such as a new election system, par-

liamentary and judiciary reform), but as a modification of the existing

states. However, what was taken for granted here, it should have yet

been established in transition of post-communist societies. What is

8 Traditinal theories of democratization, especially the theory of modernization, referred par- ticularly to understanding of the question why democratization begins. Modernization has taken the long-term perspective of political changes identifying structural pre-requisites of social changes. Contrary to that, transitional studies focus on policy of democratic establishment, taking into account the period following the fall of authoritarian regimes and the political elite‟s behaviour. The starting point of transitional approaches in explaining democratization is Rustow‟s criticism of modernization (Rustow, 1970). He thought that the main shortcoming of the theory of modernization is the fact that it mixes functional characteristics of mature democracies (which have impact on their development) with causes of new democracies (which establish democracy). By criticizing the stressout of structural factors as pre-requisites of democracy, he focused on political factors and put accent on processual approach to democracy. His claim that factors which keep democracy to be stabile are not necessarily the ones that create it (Rustow, 1970: 346), marked the beginning of transitional approaches in describing democratization.

The thesis on modernization as developmental line of historical patterns and democracy as a result of civil class and bourgeoisie (comp. Moore, 1993) and thesis on connection between socio-economic modernization and democracy (comp. Lipset, 1959) determined the theoretical approach, which explains the concept and consolidation of democracy by structural modernization of society.

Comp. Almond, Verba, 2000; Diamond, 1999; Eckstein, 1988; Edvardsen, 1997; Inglehart, Welzel, 2005; Putnam, 2003; Pye, 1965; Welzel, Inglehart, 1999.

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200 Pero Maldini

meant here is the continuity of statehood in the states of the South

Europe and Latin America which reflects in their long-term existence,

and in the status of their states being independent (regardless of dif-

ferent political orders that alternated within time). Opposed to them

stands the explicit discontinuity of the majority of post-communist

states (Eastern Europe) which are in the process of constant change.

Those changes and instability reflect not only in changes of politi-

cal orders, but also in changes of basic state attributes such as a state

status (very often, they were a part of multinational entities, with the

limited sovereignty or without it), territory (change of state borders)

and population (migrations after wars and conflicts). It is essential to

point out in this context that the breakup of the Soviet bloc enabled

the process of national liberalization for many countries (as a conse-

quence of liberation from the Soviet tutorship). Same way, the end of

socialism marked the beginning of the process of state independence

for many nations (as a consequence of the fall of internal rule of the

federal states of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia). Building

up of a state in these societies is in many ways compatible and parallel

with the build-up of democracy itself. In that sense, state, nation, and

identity were and still are in the very center of transitional processes in

many post-communist societies, while they are completely irrelevant

in the countries of the south transition.

Although it seemed that, with the break-up of communism, natio-

nal state will become history, (because the developed western coun-

tries already stepped into the multinational integrations long ago, since

national boundaries are only the obstacle in capital, employment and

goods circulation), the opposite occurred. While the West was inte-

grated, the East started to disintegrate, especially by establishment of

new national states (comp. Blair, 2000: 72-73).

In significant number of these new states, simultaneously with

democratic processes, many retrograde social and political processes

emerged, such as nationalism, xenophobia, and autarchic authoritarian

political aberrations. However, this was, on one side, the result of peo-

ple‟s misunderstanding and wandering in the new situation (that is why


traditional concepts emerged as a shelter), and reaction to insecurity

and loss of identity11. At the same time, it represented an expression of

resistance, not to globalization only, but also to changes in general.

On another side, these concepts were a part of political project of

autocrat and quasi-democratic political elite, who took advantage of

the new circumstances to stay in power, and therefore slowed down

transformational processes toward democracy, and in some cases,

even stopped them. That way, those societies have not protected them-

selves from the influence of globalization process. On the contrary,

due to their inherent interior weakness that derived from structural and

democratic deficits of those orders, they were not prepared to adapt to

globalization processes and they became even easier prey for the big

and powerful in the global market. Yet their interest was not develop-

ment of efficient democracy in those societies, but they only sought

for the formal democratic frame which provides just enough doses of

stability and security to enable free market competition.

Globalization inevitably presumes liberalization of world economy

and development of market and market relations across the bounda-

ries of national states. Beside dissolution of traditional cultural identi-

ties and weakening of national economies of developing societies, the

consequence of liberalization is also the dissolution of the concept of

national state12.

Due to the fact that the process of democratic establishment in

many post-communist societies is not separate from establishment and

strengthening of national state, globalization trends are inevitably in

collision with democracy, limiting it in two ways: by its inherent ac-

tivity out of democratic control, and by blocking the development of

national state as a platform for democratic development. That invokes

11 Emergence of new nationalisms in former socialist countries is a result of economic insecurity, overlapping with globalization processes and individualization, which go in hand with destruction of magic of collective and group identities and entities. (U. Beck, according to: Tomić – Koludrović, 1999: 176).

12 Processes of globalization are accompanied with contradictory effects of occurrence of the new forms of identity, but also with processes of collective and cultural disintegration of the old political identities, especially the ones connected with weakening of national state. (Podunavac, 2004: 80)

202 Pero Maldini

confusion and contradiction, as on the internal, so on the international

level13.

Along with the above mentioned, transitional theory has neglected

the dimension of international environment, i.e. influence of globali-

zation processes as specific and essential factors in democratization

processes of post-communist societies. Namely, by the logic of the

globalization process led by the political elite (the theory of actors14),

transitional theory implicitly doesn‟t give importance to exogenous

factors such as international environment, i.e. globalization. Howe-

ver, in democratization of post-communist societies, international

environment has a double importance: in causes of democratization

and in the context in which it occurs. While the southern transitions

occurred in relatively foreseeable and determined conditions of bipo-

lar division of the world, the breakup of communism marked the end

of such a world, and the shaping of a new, more complex international

constellation started, which incited the post-communist transitions.

Economic and strategic position in international systems of the

Central and East Europe, in relation to the southern countries of Eu-

rope and Latin America, differ significantly. Eastern countries were

not members of western integrations, which had an impact on alterna-

13 This is where contradiction in criticism of globalization comes from, and concurrent advo- cacy for accession to the EU, for example in Croatia (comp. Gligorov, 2004: 60-61).

14 The stress-out of the role of political actors in the process of democratization is one of the basic characteristics of transitional approach, which is, for that reason, very often equated with the theory of actors (although there is a certain reduction). Advocates of the theory of actors claim that the successful transitions depend on arrangements between political elite. In none of their descriptions is democracy occurring as a result of the process of social development or certain structural situation. They claim that a skillful political leadership, in adequate circumstances, is the key to success in establishment of democratic procedures. Also, they assert that there is no transition whose beginning is not a cause or a consequence (direct or indirect) of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself (examples are the majority of southern transitions). Later, the theory of actors will develop a thesis of „pact‟ between elite in the course of transition and the thesis of „balance of power‟ which examines the negotia- tion skill of democrats as opposed to the elite of the old regime, in order to determine the likelihood of democracy. Democracy per se can be an issue of principle, but democratization includes putting principles into action through the specific rules and procedures (O‟Donell, Schmitter, 1986: 10). In that sense, they raise questions of democratization from discussion on pre-requisites to discussion on processes, claiming that democracy began as a result of political actors‟ action. That is where the key role of elite stands in transition to democracy, i.e. the standpoint, that elite have the central and public only peripheral position.


tive transitional ways and forms of democratization.15 Post-commu-

nist and especially East European transitions occurred under the influ-

ence, and within international system which alone was in some kind of

transition activated by the very transition of post-communist societies

(transformation of European democracy in the sense of the EU expan-

sion and mutual adjustment of the old and the new members). What

was included in the East European transitions was not only modifica-

tion of foreign policies, but also a profound re-definition of the role of

a state in the new international system (comp. Bunce 1995: 121), and

this was not the case with the countries of the southern transitions.

Therefore, we can conclude that transitional theory, as the most in-

fluential theory of democratization in the last three decades, meaning,

in the period of the most intense globalization process, expresses its

serious theoretical deficit in explaining the democratization of post-

communist societies. It reflects in paying no respect to international

environment (as an exogenous factor of democratization and its es-

sential influence in launching of democratic changes and an important

influence in the later democratic development of those societies), as

well as in paying no respect to building up of a national state (its role

and importance in democratic development in the most part of post-

communist societies).

Globalization and democratization

Processes of democratization of the originally authoritarian orders

are undoubtedly among the biggest and most important changes that

occur within the global order. Those processes are connected with

establishment of global economy and world market, with emergence

of institutions of global rule and with the network of global connectivi-

15 For ex., countries like Spain, Portugal, and Greece were accepted immediately to the European community of that time (getting enormous economic and military aid from the West and NATO, to which they belonged even before democratic changes) without any conditions, as it is the case with East European countries at joining the EU.

204 Pero Maldini

ty.16 Process of globalization could therefore be seen as a cause, but

also as a consequence of a big turn in national policies caused by glo-

bal movements toward liberalization and global integration.

Post-communist societies, same as other developing societies, are

bundled into a whirl of political relations with the developed socie-

ties which necessarily include the choice of liberal democratic model

of development. However, it becomes more and more obvious that

those societies are, in a way, forced to build a special model of demo-

cracy, where the criterion of formal democracy and open economy is

more important than the need for establishment of efficient democracy

(which, beside the pre-requisites of formal democracy must include

democratic values such as political tolerance, political and legal equi-

ty, respect to human and civil rights, political participation and effi-

cient control of power.

The developed world understands that its prosperity is closely con-

nected with the developing world, the way it has never been connected

before. Namely, economic crises, political instability, ecological and

similar issues in developing countries cause problems that can be ra-

pidly spread and can have influence on economies and societies of the

developed ones.

That is how the development and security of the EU is nowadays

directly connected with the events in the East and Central Europe, as

well as the post-communist Balkan countries, or, for instance, how the

situation in Latin America has the corresponding impact on the US.

Therefore, more than ever, there are reasons why the most developed

countries (Western) try to shape political processes in other countries.

That way, the process of democratization can be viewed as a part of

the broader process of increasing control (almost hegemonic) of the

developed over the developing ones and those that are on the border-

ing lines of the world („westernization‟).

16 There are three ways how globalization shapes democratization processes: economic, through establishment of global capitalist economy (comp. Schwartzman, 2004; Strange, 1992), political, through establishment of institutions of global rule (comp Held, 1998, Scholte, 2000) and cultural, through establishment of global communication network and global culture (comp. Robertson, 1992).


Economic liberalization is usually understood as a kind of a trigger

for democratization, since it happens, as a rule, together with the politi-

cal liberalization by which democratization begins and which is its pre-

requisite. However, for many people in developing countries, economic

liberalization brought poverty and social polarization. It doesn‟t add to

the progress in strengthening of civil society but it backs up the estab-

lishment of hierarchy of the global and the local power. It excludes the

poor, weakens the developing countries through the internationaliza-

tion and deepens the gap between the north and the south (comp. Cox,

1997). Integrations into global markets deepens inequalities within, and

between countries, and makes the developing world vulnerable to po-

litical pressures depending on acceptance or copying of the developing

model from the West. Under these circumstances, democratization, and

especially democracy, can hardly be, or can not be achieved at all.

Institutions of global rule in these processes have a special role.

General characteristic of those institutions is the fact that they inten-

tionally use pressure in imposing particular conditions for distribution

of privileges to the beneficiary countries in multinational institutions.

A classical point of this kind of behaviour in the past (as in presence)

is the International Monetary Fund17. The character of the EU‟s beha-

viour in relation to the newly acceded member countries is very simi-

lar. Thus the EU insists on certain standards of political behaviour as

the minimal pre-requisites for membership (comp. Schmitter, 1996:

30). The European Union is, however, although primarily led by eco-

nomic and security interests, more subtle and thoughtful18. Namely,

17 International Monetary Fund, World Bank, World Trade Organization, even the UN, as the institutions of global rule operate primarily as the instrument for promotion of western interests (capital and power), and less as promoters of real democracy in developing countries. Democracy is promoted in its minimal requests (which come to the formal-institutional constitution, process of election, and regular change of government). It is more about stimu- lation of educational reform programs and movement of flows of distribution of national, economic and social resources toward global market.

Besides, the EU, as itself an integration, (especially the recent process of its expansion), is significantly conditioned by the very need of preserving of the European economic and cultural self-consciousness, as opposed to the pressures of globalization processes. That fact shapes its politics toward the new members which is based primarily on partnership and not on hegemonistic relationship.

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206 Pero Maldini

the support to democratization processes is happening in consensus,

which is, primarily with the consent of the new members, following

the „rules of the game‟ imposed by the EU, which also includes their

concrete application in respective societies. That way, the influence

is not necessarily taken as a pressure, but more as a help in the own

efforts in the process of democratization (comp. Whitehead, 1996).

The achievements on that path are „prized‟ by adequate developmental

programs and finally by the status of an equal member, which then

opens other, better benefits. This consensual form of democratization

(democratization with consensus) can have positive influence on de-

velopment of a stabile and efficient democracy.

For the success of this kind of democratization, exogenous factors

are crucial within particular societies. Beside those necessary structural

pre-requisites, those socio-cultural are even more important. Namely,

it is about the existent (or missing) of strong pro-democratic factors

within the domicile societies. Where the process of democratization

has a strong base in the domestic environment, outside pro-democratic

policies can serve as a welcome support to the strengthening and deep-

ening of democracy. However, it is not realistic to expect a conscious

pro-democratic politics, even less the fulfillment of efficient democ-

racy, if the former is missing. Pro-democratic programs (regardless of

the level of support from the outside) can not produce rapid and big

transformations in a short time; especially where the old and deeply

rooted authoritarian political culture and non-democratic political

power practice is still existent. We have already seen that the institu-

tionalized democratic frame (as a pre-requisite to formal democracy)

is a necessary, but not sufficient pre-requisite for the achievement of

efficient democracy (since under the surface of the formal democratic

system, really non-democratic politic relations can exist). Therefore,

neither those truly pro-democratic outside influences that are not satis-

fied with the achievement of the formal democracy can have full suc-

cess, without achieving socio-cultural pre-requisites which, in the end,

determine the success (or failure) of the process of democratization19.

19 Survival and stability of democracy depend on compatibility of political culture and politi-


As opposed to the time of two decades ago, the speed of cultural

changes is accelerated by global processes and influences on the day

to day lives of most of the people in the world. That‟s the result of

technological advancement, emergence of global communication and

possibility to network (participate) anywhere in the world, any time.

In other words, that means that the cultures are really global and not

just national or local (comp. Giddens, 1990: 55-78; Held, 1998: 12-

13). Many requests for political changes, social justice, environment

protection and similar can be heard and seen thousands of miles away

from the spot of their origin.

That led to the fact that nowadays, changes in various, originally

authoritative societies, and visible as a variety of social demands and

political conflicts, are described as liberalization and democratization,

which is very often not true. Namely, although liberalization is the first

pre-requisite of democracy as a process, it doesn‟t necessarily mean

that it will grow into democratization20. In fact, there is a relatively

small number of societies that successfully completed its democratic

transformation. There is a bigger number of those that took the way

of transition and on that path remained (became) liberalized, but not

democratic societies (various forms of limited, imperfect democracies

or „democratura‟).

cal structure, i.e. on the level of application of the main elements of culture and structure of democracy and the level of general support among citizens. In transitional context, marked by the development discontinuity, the non-matching of political culture and political system (structure) is expressed as a main problem. Dynamics and the content of cultural changes do not correspond to structural changes, and that is why the new political system can not consolidate democratically. Following that fact, political and cultural pre-requisites, upon which democratic consolidation and performance (efficiency) of political systems in transitional societies depend, are marked as the key factors. (comp. Maldini, 2006).

Namely, proclamation of democracy and liberalization of social relations are not sufficient, democratization processes have to be constantly stimulated and actively supported. If there is no political responsibility toward citizens and if there is no tolerance and respect for political opposition and other minorities, then, liberalization is only a cover for non-democratic, political system and authoritarian political power. Democratization processes are directed to provision of rights, liabilities and duties and by that, to the change of political authority‟s behavior, while liberalization refers to conditions in which they occur. Authoritarian leaders can liberalize society without democratization – without the change of the structure of rule, i.e. without the change of regime, and without citizens‟ participation in the rule (Cifrić, 1996: 136).

20

208 Pero Maldini

Nevertheless, the value of judgment by a single person nowadays

is more under the influence of a complex net of meanings produced as

a result of „global cultural exchange‟. That makes us focus on the im-

portance of cultural globalization in shaping democracy. Creation of

elements of global culture acts more and more as a power that shapes

a global civil society, and makes demands for civil right norms that are

internationally supported and also knits trans-national representative

networks.

That is a stimulus to global campaigns for democracy from above.

Creation of something that can be called global civil society21 comes

into being. Namely, globalization processes change conditions by

which national states operate, or better to say, by which their political

orders operate. It is about cultural factors and their influence in shaping

of political community as democratic platforms in the context of global

and local relations („glocalization‟). It is becoming more and more evi-

dent that in globalized world, seen from that point of view, the classical

concept of political community is worn out, and demands the new point

of view if we want to properly examine the process of democratization

in the context of globalized world22. That way, democratization and cul-

tural change will mutually affect on each other more intrinsically.

21 This concept should be taken with reservation, due to its essential limitations. Namely, the development of global civil society directly relies on development of communication and information technologies, since they enable quick transmission and interchange of political approaches and standpoints, which means the possibility of inclusion of wide population into the political decision processes. On the other hand, citizens and societies that have no access to communication (no access to information and their interchange), that means, those who are poor and undeveloped, they are excluded from that process. By that fact, the shaping of global civil society is reduced to the members of the developed societies, while the gap between the poor (in the sense of information) and the rich is deepening. Besides, attempts of trans-national civil networks to keep apart capitalism from democracy, corporations and consumption and relocate them within the discourses of autonomy and population, still has insignificant influence in determination of the meaning of democracy.

That is how, for instance, Held‟s model of cosmopolitan democracy anticipates the possibility of more intensive and more participatory democracy on the local level, being a supple- ment to political relations within the global order (democratic associations among nations, cities, regions). It is based on recognition of nature and quality of democracy within a specific community and the nature of democratic relations among communities that are mutually connected. His argument is based on differentiation of formal (normative, institutional and procedural minimum) and effective (liberal, participatory, efficient) democracy (comp. Held, 1998: 24-25; Held, 1999: 107).

22


The development and changes caused by globalization transform

the known forms of democracy and the perspectives of democratic po-

litical communities. Namely, it is clear that no society can live and act

within the boundaries of one single national state since there are more

and more factors that determine the nature and contents of social rela-

tions outside the reach of single national states. Jurisdiction and range

of political rule activities in the past have belonged to the governments

of national states. However, changes brought by globalization reduce

that scope and a part of these jurisdictions are transferred to supra-

national institutions and regulatory mechanisms outside the national

state boundaries.

The system of national political communities will certainly con-

tinue to exist, but it will be increasingly articulated by complex or-

ganizational, administrative, legal and cultural processes mediated

through institutions of global rule. They are more and more positioned

as structures which mediate, direct, and monitor the activities of glo-

bal society members. However, in order to be accepted and legitimate,

those structures as well as the processes that they lead should not get

around the national states or diminish their importance. Moreover,

institutions of global rule should be incorporated into the internation-

al democratic system by democratic procedure, in decision making

which would develop administrative capability of independent po-

litical resources on global and regional levels, as indispensable sup-

plement to the local and national level policies (comp. Held, 1998).

That, of course, includes control and responsibility of supra-national

institutions. Otherwise, those institutions will continue to be taken as

axes of global neo-liberalism, and their activities will be taken as non-

legitimate.

210 Pero Maldini

Conclusion

The attempt to perceive the influence of globalization on demo-

cratic process in post-communist societies can not be separated from

the influence of globalization on transitional societies in general, i.e.

developing societies, since they share many common aspects of those

inter-relationships. Globalization processes have, more than anything,

added to supremacy and overall presence of democracy both as a dis-

course and an ideal, since they, by their economic and political influ-

ence, managed to penetrate into many authoritarian and closed socie-

ties and have impact on peoples‟ aspirations and on radical political

movements as well as on social changes within them.

Enabled by technology development (information and communi-

cation sciences especially), globalization is, on one side, an objec-

tive world process which leads to the closer and closer connectivity

of diverse societies, their increasing inter-dependence, establishment

of global economy, shaping of global culture and promotion of de-

mocracy. One the other hand, pressures initiated by globalization are

doubtfully pro-democratic. Namely, they count with the spreading of

ideals and beliefs represented by democracy, as being the only legiti-

mate version of the good society. At the same time, globalization pro-

duces and intensifies patterns of non-equality and reduces autonomy

of societies blocking the build-up and strengthening of efficient de-

mocracy. That is how democracy takes the forms that put in question

their basic validity and political postulates, before all, liberal ideas

and democratic validity. The utmost contradictory neo-liberal con-

cept leads to the bigger and bigger differences among societies of the

world, making the gap between the few developed and the majority

of undeveloped societies deeper and deeper. Those undeveloped are

in put in depending position (economically, technologically, politi-

cally and culturally). The shaping of the new world order, built-up on

neo-liberalism and global culture, which should have cosmopolitan

character, is accompanied by serious and troublesome conflicts of

political, ethnical, religious and national groups in various parts of the


world. Impossibility of control and absence of responsibility of global

actors don‟t give optimistic prospect for the development of less de-

veloped and non-developed societies.

However, the alternative to globalization will be provided neither

by anti-global fundamentalism (cultural and political), nor by the iso-

lation from global influences. Adaptation to global changes is inevi-

table, but it has to insist on democratic relations in the processes of

global political decision making, as well as on realization of solidarity

in mutual relations. It is about the democratization of the new global

order which is coming into being. Therefore it is necessary that trans-

national institutions (institutions of global rule) and political processes

(especially processes of decision making) are established on essen-

tially different grounds. Processes and actors of globalization should

be submitted to the political, moreover, to democratic control in order

to achieve the principles of democratic validity, egalitarianism, civil

rights protection and participation in processes of political decision

making, through the politically legitimate procedures.

Definition of what constitutes democracy is nowadays in the hands

of the western governments and institutions of global rule. Yet they

recommend technical recipes for the building up of (minimal) demo-

cracy, the recipes that don‟t correspond to social reality and goals of

societies in which democracy should be applied, but they correspond

to the interests of the developed and powerful ones. This has the ef-

fect that the prevailing project of democratization, as a rule, is taken

as a project of „westernization‟, which, then, leads to various forms of

resistance as a consequence.

We have seen that there is no sense to expect that changes that

were planned from the outside and mechanically (or under pressure),

implemented into particular transitional societies, would work on a

permanent basis. It is very probable that the outside intervention in

the name of democracy will not be successful at areas in which there

is no commitment to democracy by local population. The outside help

can only have a role of support in cases where democratization comes

from social eagerness for success in its realization. Capability of par-

212 Pero Maldini

ticular society to adapt to global processes, as well as its determination

to remain authentic and resistant to negative influence brought by glo-

balization, will also depend on its eagerness for success. It seems the

right way to examine relations of globalization and democratization in

post-communist societies.


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