M I C H A L B U C H O W S K I

From anti-communist to post-communist ethos : the

case of Poland::- ‘[Tlhe fall of communism did not entail the end of communist cultural reality’

(Kempny 1993: 103)

Historians cannot agree about the precise starting date of the so-called self-limited Polish revolution (cf. Staniszkis 1984; Piekalkiewicz 1991). The round table talks definitely sparked the turmoil and caused the domino effect behind the Iron Curtain in 1989. Most probably, however, the 1989 agreement should be treated as a delayed succession of the events of August 1980. The emergence of the Solidarity trade union, which at that time thrilled public opinion all over the world, is regarded as a landmark in the process of undermining authoritarian political system (Goodwyn 1991). How- ever, it can also be claimed that several other events, like the Poznan workers’ uprising followed by the Polish October in 1956, the Gdansk and Szczecin protests in 1970, and the emergence of several opposition groups in the 1970s were equally significant events on the strenuous Polish path to political freedom after World War 11. If one engages in conjecture about the key features which brought about the disintegration of communism, one cannot either deny the effects of international events such as the Hungarian Uprising of 1956 or the Prague Spring of 1968. What about the importance of other events in the 1980s, such as the declaration of martial law in Poland, Gorbachev’s perestroika, the reform attempts in other communist countries, the Tie- nanmen Square tragedy in Peking, and so on.

The unexpected events of 1989, which really saw the official and spectacular fall of communism in central Europe, can be viewed from various perspectives. The most widely consumed accounts are usually those concocted by political scientists and public relation experts. These kinds of analyses, of necessity quickly devised, try to explain contemporary history by referring, for example, to international events, party alliances, even the personal links of main actors on a political stage. Most such studies suffer from an ignorance of the deeper historical and sociological roots of the events

The first draft of this paper was presented to the 13th International Congress o f Anthropological and Ethnological Science, Mexico City, 30 July-4 August 1993. I am grateful to John Hoopes for his help in editing this text. The Koscius7.ko Foundation supported my research in the Spring semester of 1993 at the University of Kansas, Lawrence.

Socral Anthropology (1994), 2, 2. 133- 148. 0 1994 European Association of Social Anthropologists 133

unfolding in a given area. Gaining an historically and culturally more aware perspec- tive seems to be a natural challenge for anthropological studies.

I would like to offer here an interpretation of recent events in central Europe, particularly in Poland, that respects the importance of the cultural factors so often neglected in narrow economic, political o r even historical studies. By cultural factors, I mean people’s attitudes and patterns of behaviour - in other words, the mentalities and habits shaped by the historical experience of a given social group. I will focus attention particularly on the culturally defined, long duration structures which underpin social developments.

My opening assertion can be put as follows: the unfolding of events, although catalysed and moulded by changing political events, is conditioned at a deeper level by the cultural and historical tradition of a society; the relevance of such events to the shaping of people’s thoughts and actions cannot be denied. Any historical tradition is continuously altered by the pressure of events. However, the response to this type of ‘external’ coercion is conditioned by the ‘internal’ cultural heritage of a given group, and constrained by the norms, values and habits already present in it. We are dealing here with a dialectic of factors both functional and historical.

The above statement is in a sense obvious, almost too general to be worth making. Nonetheless, I put it explicitly since it constitutes both a departure point and a substructure for the present discussion. For me, the answer to the question asked at the beginning about the key landmarks in the Polish revolution should be sought not in dates, individual causes, events or heroes, but in the complexity of the cultural traditions of the Polish people. My tentative answer is that the main reason for the Polish revolution was Polish culture. Stalin was right if he really said ‘it would be easier to saddle a cow than implement communism in Poland’. This remark may reflect an aspect of common wisdom, especially now, when we look back at events. It is a quite different thing, however, to present the same postulate in the form of a convinc- ing argument.

The description of how a combination of culture and socio-economic factors impeded attempts to establish totalitarianism constitute merely part of the story. In order to make the narrative more complete and up to date, I will show how the same cultural traits are present in Polish tradition function today, and how they either foster o r hamper systemic reform in the political and economic order of the country. Many cultural features which made Poles ‘indoctrination-proof‘ work now against political and economic transformation and seriously obstruct structural change. Often, though I hasten to add not always, yesterday’s boons turns out to be today’s handicaps.

As thorough an analysis as outlined would be comparable to Max Weber’s investi- gations of the roots of modern capitalism (Weber 1930). All I can offer here is therefore a delineation of a possible relationships; their more detailed examination will require further meticulous study.

In my presentation I will distinguish several legacies, nationalism, for example, and try to show how they have influenced the social situation at a given time. A specific configuration of different legacies forms a cluster of cultural phenomena which, in turn, spawn syndromes in a people’s behaviour and modes of thought. In other words, specific features of culture such as a combination of nationalistic and religious feelings, may produce a syndrome in which a particular group perceives itself as a fortress besieged by hostile forces. Culturally engendered attributes influence both economic

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and political life. The spheres of economics, politics and culture are closely inter- twined, but they can obviously be distinguished for interpretive purposes. In a sense, I will write about the impetus of tradition in the life of a society, a blend of historical and sociological exegesis. I will not, however, recount the deep historical roots of every legacy or syndrome discussed: some descriptions of these may be found in Davis 1982 and Zamoyski 1987.

The Polish marvel

Poland was the most relucant and rebellious member of the Soviet bloc, and over time <he Poles acquired a degree of freedom unavailable in other countries. It is enough to mention private agriculture, religious freedom, and the strong position of the Catholic church, and the tolerance for dissident groups that culminated in Solidarity, a mass movement with almost ten million members quite independent from the state. O n e should also add to this list such elements as relative but increasing freedom of travel, freedom of cultural expression and freedom of research in the social sciences and humanities. Scholars did not have to declare their ideological commitment to Marxism, and often criticised it, claiming an allegiance to other theoretical orientations.

This relative liberty, instead of functioning as a safety valve, resulted in spiralling aspirations for more licence. Undoubtedly, economic crisis stimulated disobedience to an authoritarian state, but it cannot explain the phenomenon. Living conditions were comparably austere in a number of other communist countries, for example, Albania, Romania, the Soviet republics and Bulgaria, but nowhere did dissent thrive on such a scale o r did the emancipation of citizens from state control became so real and so manifest as in Poland. This is why one should seek the reasons for this unique situation in the cultural realm.

Three notable legacies

In the history of Polish culture one may distinguish the influence of various traditions. I briefly discuss here three legacies which have played a role in the shaping of the convictions of the nation.

Patriotism/nationalism

Internationalism was one of the most prominent slogans of communism, and com- radeship, especially with Big Brother, consistently propagated the idea. In Poland, it collided, however, with the tradition of national independence for which the nation fought, usually against the Russians, for one hundred and fifty years. During the Stalinist period, the Polish traditional heritage was suppressed, but. the authorities soon learned that instead of eradicating it they should exploit it. Nationalism precipi- tated the October thaw of 1956, and Wladyslaw Gomulka came to power. Later, in 1968, he tried to capitalise on nationalistic xenophobia in a loathsome anti-Semitic campaign. Nationalist sentiments were evoked too by Edward Gierek in the 1970s, as expressed in the popular slogan of the time: ‘May Poland grow in power and her people live in prosperity.’ Wojciech Jaruzelski took pains to convince people of his

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patriotism, and his politics demanded frequent allusions to the patriotic and military heritage. Polish communists, unlike the rulers of other Soviet satellites in central Europe, maintained the attributes of national identity almost unchanged: the flag, the anthem, and the seal of a White Eagle, albeit uncrowned. Moscow’s envoys were cheerfully complacent about their rights to use such national tokens, and the political grappling of the 1980s can be understood also as a struggle for control of these symbols, national rituals, heroes, and so on (Mach 1989; Mucha 1992).

Catholicism Generated in the period of the partition of the country (1794-1918) the stereotypical view that Psle equals Catholic become strengthened under communist rule. The reasons for this reinforcement were analogous to the birth of a cliche. The nation, devoid of authentic political autonomy, found partial fulfilment in the realm of cul- ture. Since such domains of public cultural life as official school education and the mass-media were supervised by the state, nationalist feelings were increasingly chan- nelled into religious life - an area increasingly, though only after a protracted tussle, left outside the realm of party control (Weigel 1992). Religious rituals regularly turned into demonstrations of the people’s disagreement with the system forced upon them. The Catholic church at the same time assumed the role of chaperone of national culture: church buildings functioned as shelters for cultural and political activity, and priests assumed the role of guardians of the nation’s mores. In this way, religious and national legacies reinforced each other and merged.

Consumerism ‘ii la communism’ By consumerism I mean a culturally defined human desire to ensure well-being. In the Polish context this generally translates into a yearning to increase one’s family’s standard of living (Buchowski 1993). The substance of the desire, common to many societies, was in Poland inherited from a European middle-class tradition modified in the period of communism. After the years of post-war rebuilding and the denunciation of the bourgeois lifestyle that took place under Gomulka’s leadership (1956-70), Gierek (1970-80) launched the idea of consumer socialism. The people endorsed this appealing proposition eagerly. However, affluence was not supposed to be reached by the classic capitalist route, that is to say through the increased industriousness of the society and the rational economics of the state. Western loans were to spawn this mutation of real socialism. However, the criteria for selecting functionaries of the system still valued loyalty above excellence. The means of acquiring economic and social status which evolved thus involved, for example, nepotism, corruption, and the building up of informal coteries of reciprocal services. These consumer aspirations and the accepted means of their fulfillment were shared across society, starting with the political elites at the top.

The yearning after consumerism blended with communist slogans championing the role of the working class and the unique value of the proletariat’s toil, a view crudely understood to mean the people’s right to an equal distribution of wealth. Some of these aims were actually realised by the state. Consumer dreams were henceforth to

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be fulfilled for everyone, but first of all for the working class that enjoyed the patronage of the communist state.

The communist quandry

The communist rulers of Poland earnestly tried to legitimise their power. However, their attempt to sustain totalitarian rule faced insurmountable obstacles. Totalitarian- ism, after all, means full-scale control not only in politics, but also in economics and culture. Yet the nation ignored this control and sought to claim its own rights (Walicki 1991).

Politically, communist domination could not be justified as the people’s will. At risk of losing power, the rulers were unable to allow free elections. Thus the period of the proletariat’s dictatorship extended endlessly instead of being, as the revolutionary classics had claimed, just an initital stage necessary when introducing a new order. The endorsement of nationalisation and agricultural reform withered as political rigidity became a structural feature of the system. The communists took pains to demonstrate the superiority of socialist democracy over delusive western democracy (Buchowski, Kronenfeld, Peterman and Thomas 1994). This kind of endeavour contrasted mark- edly, however, with wired frontiers, a political secret police, censorship, and official bans on opposition activity.

Economically, the communist system was unable to keep pace with capitalism. In the long run, the dream of a rational and efficient command economy failed: the bastard child of a modernist experiment degenerated into an economic monster. After two decades of healing post-war wounds and growing industrialisation, material, social, and psychological resources were exhausted. Khrushchev’s empty promise that socialism would economically overcome capitalism by 1970 was in reality the swan song of a system already in decline. The supply of even basic needs was always a problem, and shortages increasingly aggravated a people whose appetities as con- sumers had been whetted. Gierek’s promises surpassed the system’s potential to deliver. The tempting well of western loan funds, spent mostly on domestic consump- tion rather than investment in new economic infrastructure, dried up. However, the snake of consumerism had entered the Communist Eden and henceforth never left it; people sought the promised goods, but Santa Claus’s bag was empty.

Meanwhile, the attractions of western consumerism had been rapidly growing in the minds of the Poles. The continuous opening of borders helped to build an idealised image of western affluence. No matter how selective, one-sided, and unrealistic this myth was, its impact on Polish society’s perception of the world was tremendous. In people’s minds, democracy and capitalism quite simply meant affluence.

Spiritually and culturally, the communists meanwhile offered no more than crude slogans. ‘Social justice’ meant politically justified privileges, and ‘a leading role for the working class’ meant the establishment of a nomenklatura and the rule of incom- petents. A materialistic world-view boiled down to a concoction of vulgar, unrealistic, incomprehensible and alien ideas and sentiments. Marxism clashed with traditional values and Christianity. Similarly, the battle waged against the Catholic Church was primitive and contrary to the feelings of the people. Controlling human consciousness turned out to be an unattainable goal. ‘Freedom of cultural expression’ meant ideologi- cally constrained monologue. As time went by, the spirit of cultural values denounced by the communists revived and captured people’s minds; unlicensed and unwelcomed

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by the authorities, culture gradually forced its way through the political and ideologi- cal gridlock.

A cultural tangle

How did these circumstances develop? The combination of cultural legacies and structural problems faced by the communists contributed to the tangle. I propose to show how these reinforced each other, producing a web of insurmountable difficulties.

The authorities were unable to legitimise their power-holding through national tradition. Polish patriotism was imbued with hostility toward Russian imperialism, and native communists were perceived as puppets of the Kremlin established by force in the country. Both folklore and formal education fostered the image of Poles as romantic heroes, perpetually fighting for independence. The inevitably, and visibly, servile relations between the rulers and the Soviets were at odds with the nation’s long struggle for sovereignty. In practice, communist attempts to colonise the country and win public support were repulsed by the patriotic legacy; national sentiment in the people’s Poland worked directly against a vindication of communism. Despite tremen- dous efforts on the part of the communists, the stigma of being no more than spokes- men for an external power was never eradicated. This prevented the communists gaining real patriotic ground.

Because it was imposed by force, communist ideology was perceived similarly as an alien value system forced upon Polish culture. ‘Eastern barbarity’ jeopardised the eastern output of western European culture, and atheism threatened the ‘permanent, stable and immutable principles of the Catholic morality’ (Grad 1993: 77) professed by the Polish nation. Nationalism and Catholicism worked together. No wonder that, during the workers’ strikes of the 1980s, religious and national symbols became so conspicuous: the Black Madonna, the White Eagle, the Pope, national and episcopal flags, religious masses, patriotic and religious songs, and so on. The election of a Polish Pope swelled national pride still further. His visits to the country mobilised millions of pilgrims, uplifted hearts and revealed the latent power of the masses. The role of the Church in transmitting national values independently of the State was central.

Consumer aspirations provided the immediate rationale for protesting against the system. They acted as both functional conditions and as direct ignition for some of the most rebellious events. Demand for a better standard of living enabled Polish society to express in public, political, national and cultural sentiments relegated otherwise to private life. The famous Gdansk 21 postulates, formulated during the shipyard strike of August 1980, thus contained economic, political and religious demand side by side.

Popular opinion of the cultural otherness of the rulers, determined by the histori- cal legacy of the Poles, helps us understand the attitudes and behaviour of the people. First comes the permanent division into ‘us’ and ‘them’. Obviously ‘us’ meant real Poles, the subjects of non-legitimised power exercised by ‘them’ - the communist rulers established in the country by an age-old enemy, the Russians. This black and white split worked as the ultimate identifier within the group. If a person was on the other side of the fence, it meant he or she represented fundamentally different interests; there was no prospect the parties could agree.

In spite of its official name, the communist party was not regarded as belonging to the nation. People alienated from politics at all levels could not identify their interests with those of the state, and the pattern replicated remarkably closely the situation that

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existed during the nineteenth century partition of Poland. State authority and its bureaucratic arm existed to be outsmarted since they represented alien interests, and law-breaking became a norm, often positively approved of. The latter tendency was linked to the communist teaching that Poland was a people’s republic: state property was theoreticaly owned by every citizen and belonged to ‘all working people in the towns and in the country’. This belief, taken literally when necessary, at the moral level conveniently excused the routine of stealing from non-one’s and everyone’s assets. Many felt authorised to take their share immediately - especially since the state was not utterly Polish - and Christian ethics could not stop the practice.

The next syndrome, related to state-ownership, clusters around the idea of state omnipotence. Attempting to control as many aspects of life as possible, the commu- nists ultimately came to be held responsible for almost all life’s problems. The rulers were not aware that this by-product of their totalitarian programme would eventually put them in such a difficult position. The regime automatically became liable for every failure to satisfy both roused expectations and basic needs. The wilful omnipotence of the Party produced in people the conviction that the system itself should be blamed for any and every inconvenience. The scapegoat did not have to be sought far - it was there within arm’s reach. Communist scare stories about imperialistic plots or Jewish perils soon lost their appeal accordingly.

Propelled by socialist ideas and a yearning to control as much as possible, the state also assumed responsibility for the individual’s social security. Basic needs such as medical care, housing, education, full employment, and retirement pensions were to be provided for everyone (Narojek 1991). Difficulties in adequately meeting some of these targets led inevitably to a distrust of the system. The established pattern of nursing individuals from cradle to grave had, moreover, numerous unforeseen conse- quences. The work ethic was badly damaged as employment and payment were secured independent of attitude to work. As the popular saying claimed, ‘Whether you lay or stay, you should receive your pay’. Human activity was suppressed, and the system of rigidly regulated social and economic life effectively promoted inactivity. Changes should come from the top and be authorised. Mediocre but loyal persons were preferred for managing positions, and the provisions of the welfare state served to generate passivity.

Perceived as conflicting with national interests, this culturally alien system was distrusted right from the start. Disbelief was systematically reinforced by a regime that distorted commonly known facts from recent history, and hid or misrepresented political and social events. People eventually became extremely suspicious about any official claim and perfected their shlls at reading between the lines. Even justifiable arguments from the authorities were doomed to be questioned.

This last situation was confirmed in the case of worker protest. The reaction of the authorities soon established a pattern that confirmed popularly held belief. Any re- bellion in the people’s republic was inititally condemned; later on, errors of preceding rulers - but never deficiencies of the system - were admitted. In every case, workers demanded lower prices and/or higher wages, and every time the possibility of such a solution was rejected as economically impossible. However, in the end protesters demands were, at least in a short run, met to buy social peace. This not only strengthened distrust of the authorities. It also reinforced the conviction that there were always financial reserves which could be distributed to the people. Workers, especially in big industrial enterprises, learned that the best way to achieve their

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demands was go on strike. Theroetically, their work was particularly highly regarded in the first place since, according to communist teaching, physical work was the most worthwhile type of labour.

This multi-layered alienation of the power-holders kept most Poles distanced from communist politics. The best way to achieve any goal was to demand but not participate. In fact, the authorities had a vested interest in society’s inertia, particularly at the political level. The support they sought was, after all, essentially symbolic. This may explain the importance the communists attached to such indicators as election turn-outs, meetings, May Day parades, and so on.

However, the totalitarianism of the system and communists’ culpability for every- thing had the result that virtually every act became political. Economically motivated protests struck blows at the core principles of the system. Economic demands strengthened by, and unified with, cultural factors encouraged Polish society to reject the alien implant. Combined and mutually reinforcing, the two factors together con- stituted a deadly weapon when wielded against a structure which, measured by any political yardstick, had seemed established for decades. Mental attitudes in the nation produced a problem which the communist authorities were unable to solve. At the same time, habits bred of years of communist domination made up a large part of the Polish inheritance when things did begin to change.

Liminality and transition

Zygmunt Bauman, describing the current transformation of central Europe, uses the anthropological metaphor of liminality. The primary characteristics of liminality are ambiguity, a ‘betwixt and between’ status, ‘ordeals and humiliation’, and uncertainty about the future. According to Bauman, ‘[all1 post-communist regimes find themselves in a predicament of liminality in which everything may happen but little can be done’ (1992b: 130). The metaphor is very attractive, but as with every caricatured expla- nation of this kind, its most important function is to release our imagination. Several caveats may be entered at once. The characteristics identified by Bauman have anal- ogies with the rites of passage observed in indigenous societies. However, key features are the indeterminacy of today and the tomorrow and the fact that ongoing revolution is ‘a time of mass apathy and the massacre of elites’ (Bauman 1992b: 120).

In traditional contexts, the status novices are to assume is well known and the drama of the rite is strictly defined. Neophytes accept their ordeals eagerly and want to join an already established community of privileged groups. The position of elites is never undermined: the existing social structure is actually strenghtened by the ritual and a spirit of communitas and emotional engagement prevails throughout the period of sacred ceremonial. This could be hardly said to apply in any post-communist country. In all these respects, Bauman’s parallel between Turner’s liminality (1967; 1969) and the current state of social life in central Europe is misleading. The metaphor may be accurate politically and economically, but it is hardly so anthropologically.

The metaphor of liminality, particularly in respect of communitas, accounts more convincingly for the initial stages of the revolution in the autumn of 1989. The world observed massive gatherings in Dresden and at the Berlin Wall, people ringing with their keys in St. Venclaus Square in Prague, the dramatic rallies of the Lithuanian Parliament in Vilnus, the pursuit of Ceausescu in Romania, and so on. Why was there no spectacular Polish example of this kind of ritual in 1989, merely those controlled, if

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nonetheless vehement, semi-free elections that humiliated the communists? One answer is that by 1989 the Poles had already been enduring their rites of passage for several years. People were already assembled in the symbolically intensifed ritual of overthrowing the existing order, united for the duration of a sacred period in which they were able to express long-suppressed feelings. Persecuted dissidents were trans- formed into heroes who were the toast of the nation. As in the Bible, the last really became the first. Bakhtin’s (1967) conception of a world turned upside down was enacted, and the act of establishing the world as a vista was performed and fulfilled. The difference between Bakhtin’s bookish reversal and the real one was that in the real world there could never be a reversion to yesterday’s structure.

When anthropologically understood liminality was over, the revolt should in principle have been complete. However, as Leszek Kolakowski writes ‘[nlo revolution has ever succeeded without bringing bitter disappointment almost in the very moment of victory’ (1990: 198). This is where central Europe seems to be now - a specific post- liminality period in which social dissatisfaction, bitterness, and even hostility prevail. As we have seen, such post-liminality differs from Turner’s. The old political edifice has been melted down for good, not just temporarily, and new forms of social and economic life have not yet evolved. The morning chill prevailing in Poland today will not drive away the hangover of disappointment left by such enthusiastic overindul- gence in heady expectations the night before.

The institutionalisation of new patterns has taken longer than either Poland’s native leaders or international experts expected. Underestimating the length of time the transition would take and putting an optimistic gloss on every occurrence were natural tactics at a time when reformers needed continuing public endorsement for their programme. No social organisation is interested in permanent instability. Yet, regretably, this is what central and eastern European countries actually face: pro- longed turbulence during the transition period.

There are several reasons for this prolongation. Diminishing assistance from west- ern countries troubled by their own social and economic problems is one of them. Despite declarations to the contrary, assuming the twin roles of midwife and rich patron overseeing the passage to democracy and free market enterprise goes beyond the ability and desire of western countries. The doors enabling a free flow of compet- ing products and people are barely kept open, and worldwide recession makes the task no easier; support is often more symbolic than real. Internally, the restructuring of a clumsy old economic system has turned out to be a much more difficult than antici- pated; giant enterprises cannot be shut down or made efficient overnight. Finally, there is the human factor. It was conceived of somehow in political rhetoric but its importance has been either underestimated o r miscalculated. This is the issue which I am going to turn to now.

Vengeance from beyond the grave

The structural deficiencies of communism, as viewed from a modern global perspec- tive, combined with deeply rooted cultural factors led to the regional collapse of the communist system. It is noteworthy that this disintegration took place primarily in a part of the world where the confrontation of both capitalism and real socialism had been a t first hand, and where the cultural heritage was to a large degree latin and

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strongly western European. As we have seen, Polish culture in particular impeded full imposition of the totalitarian regime coveted by the communists.

Free market enterprise and democracy have been officially identified as goals by the international community and societies eager to renounce communism. One might even say that these are mythologised forms of life which the central European nations are pursuing so earnestly because they will help them join the privileged society of the affluent west. Their societies are to be initiated into this elite club by means of dramatic ritual written by the existing possessors of mythical wisdom and power. The established experts act as tribal elders. As novices, post-communist societies do not have real knowledge of the new world they hope to enter; they could, after all, only have learned its secrets by being part of it. Unlike most neophytes in tribal communi- ties, the masses have been left unaware of the torments that will be a necessary part of the initiation process. Moreover, again unlike in traditional groups, there is no cer- tainty that the sacrifice will pay off in the foreseeable future, o r that the exclusive league will ever be joined.

Cultural features play a significant role in events and produce problems which both shape, and are shaped by, politics. Many of these traits were moulded or rein- forced in the era of communism. Thus, does the old regime take its revenge on its own gravediggers, and particularly on the apostles of the new order who are now in charge of the country: the vengeance is mean and hard. Let my now examine a few of the new predicaments.

The post-communist conundrum Poland was inherited from the communists with all its economic and political struc- tures and people. As the 4 June 1989 elections - in which Solidarity gained virtually everything it had hoped - showed, the denunication of the ancien rigime was univer- sal. The country then embarked on unprecedented reforms. However, right from the beginning, support for reconstruction of the country was more symbolic than active (Koralewicz and Ziolkowski 1991 ; Ziolkowski 1993: 11 7). The populace was first and foremost united in condemning what had gone before; while demonstrating respect for what was coming, it responded according to deep-seated habits rather than reformist conviction.

The symbolic succour evaporated as soon as people realised that the state wanted to withdraw from many of the social duties long assigned to it. At the structural level, privatisation has been slower than retreat in the domain of social welfare. The new authorities have wanted to disengage from the burdens of existing provision, while being unable - because of political infighting - to enforce the institutional separation of economic enterprise and state. In this way, the state ‘abandoned responsibility before its subjects ceased to be its clients’ (Bauman 1992b: 120). At the psychological level, Polish society has reacted to the new situation in an old way. In the eyes of the people, the state continues to be omnipotent; it is blamed for every malfunction and remains the scapegoat for all grievances.

The way this dissatisfaction is voiced reflects obsolete fashion. The easiest way to get what you want is to go on strike; and expect, of course, that the state will meet your demands. The belief that the state is always capable of financing more still holds. Sectional interests narrowly concerned with their own gains are inattentive to the needs of their fellow countrymen, and rational economic arguments - in particular the

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fact that enterprises have to be financially self-reliant - are barely comprehended. Very often, the least attuned to the new situation are workers in the giant state plants; though they contributed decisively to the collapse of communism, yesterday’s heroes have turned now into social anachronism. Schooled in protracted conflict with pre- vious regime, such workers are very well organised, do not want to sell their labour cheaply, and fight fervently for their own class interests. This, according to Bauman (1992b), is the core of Polish predicament.

The habit of demanding when seeking to achieve any objective obstructs develop- ment of a Protestant-like work ethic, especially in state-owned companies. Employees want to treat these firms - academic institutions included - as safe havens, but at the same time satisfy consumer aspirations at a level much higher than actual performance allows. Despite a high rate of unemployment (in June 1993 it reached the level of 14.6%) a big part of the workforce remains inactive. Many prefer to subsist on welfare rather than take jobs they regard as underpaid. Marek Ziolkowski (1993: 119) dubs this kind of mentality ‘learned helplessness’; it often mutates into the syndrome of what I call ‘cunning vocation’. Some participate in the grey economy, and involvement that often brings more profits than a regular job. Welfare pay then becomes considered a supplement to illegal earnings, helping to evade taxes and allowing employers to avoid proper social security payments. Unauthorised services and trade are flourish- ing. Law breaking too, can be viewed as a flexible adaptation to the new situation, even if from the point of view of society’s global interests, such behaviour undermines the position of the state and compromises its economic strength.

Although political and economic targets have been identified, this does not mean that the means to achieve these targets have been unanimously agreed upon (Ost 1992). Adopting the metaphor of a rite of passage, it can be said that initiated groups are rebelling against the cruel patterns of ritual now being imposed. Local leaders are trying to manipulate this mutiny of minors to their own advantage. Alternative scripts are being offered and then subjected to fierce political manoeuvring. The rite of passage thus turns into a struggle for real power. In this struggle, as Bauman notes, the process of parricide takes place - and not only parricide. The parents, as I will shortly show, steered by their cultural inheritance and striving for leverage at the individual level, often simultaneously perform acts of fratricide, infanticide, and ultimately suicide. The political elite consumes itself. Certain leaders, many of them veterans of yesterday’s dissent, are unable to see the self-destructive consequences of the insults they cast at their political opponents today. Trust in politicians of all persuasions is undermined, and the direct heirs of the communist party can take advantage of muddy waters stirred up by unyielding fundamentalists. Ironically, the present anti- communist witch-hunt even serves to legitimise the presence of potential outcasts on the political scene. Since everybody is suspected of being involved in the old regime, and many of yesterday’s dissidents actually stand accused of being secret police agents, the victors are hardly distinguishable from the assumed political losers.

Some politicians appear to strive recklessly to undermine their own position, at least in the long run. Bipartisan fights incomprehensible to the public at large are perceived as no more than contests for power and privilege. Mutual accusation, harsh rhetoric, corruption, and other kinds of political scandal help to reinforce this popular image. Inability to reach a compromise is usually caused by the black and white perception of the world which runs deeply through society; in practice it means that ‘[wlhen we disagree on one point we are in disagreement on all issues’ (Cutcher-

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Gershenfeld, Sterniczuk and Chalykoff 1993: 18 1). In practice, social relations among the new political class are extremely icy. Reinforced by markedly different stances on the purpose of the state, they have brought about a lingering division into ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Kempny 1993: 99; Cutcher-Gershenfeld et al. 1993: 177; Ziolkowski 1993: 199). Demanding something from ‘them’ is always justified, so diverting attention from the need for participation in political or economic activity.

Democracy in Poland was expected to bring instant affluence: it was imagined as some sort of cargo cult. Cargoes are now visible but remain inaccessible; heated consumer aspirations have to be postponed indefinitely and the pattern of psychologi- cal malaise, unrelated to economic results, is revived. Complaining has become a Polish national sport. Opinion polls show that the Poles are the most pessimistic nation in central Europe, though living standards hardly justify gloom on this scale. Emigration is seen as an advisable option for the younger generation, and growing social inequality nourishes the uneasiness of groups unable to accustom themselves to the new situation. These are the sources of dissatisfaction which populist politicians exploit.

Champions of democracy and the free market economy are no longer seen as upholders of the nation’s interests: they are amongst those blamed for Poland’s present afflictions. ‘[Tlhose who bring forth the nation out of bondage are called malefactors and are spat upon by the very same nation’ (Michnik 1993: 22) . The old scapegoat, communism, has thus come to be supplemented by new wrongdoers. This time the list is much longer. O n the one hand, the alleged plotting of old regime heirs and their opponents at round table talks is believed to work against the public interest; according to this myth, the new political elite are fraternising with the old nomenkla- tura. Communists, according to the dictates of biblical justice, should now become the last, but they are infiltrating the upper financial echelons of society. Decommunisation should be a panacea for all difficulties, but in practice it revives the spectre of national- ism. Conspiracies of Jews or threats from other nationalities, both inside and outside the country, are explicitly alluded to by right-wing extremists or tacitly assumed by some people. While the Russian syndrome has been partially suspended, intimidation now originates from quite the opposite direction.

Nationalist feeling is fuelled by speculation that international economic and gov- ernmental institutions are developing a scheme to buy Polish assets cheap and oust Polish products from the market; on this view the national economic should be revived using (still insufficient) local capital. No doubt there are negative aspects to western economic assistance to central Europe (Wedel 1992); and protectionism within the European Community has certainly become evident. We are concerned here, however, with the perpetuation of mental attitudes in Polish society. The above case exemplifies the classical dilemma of underdeveloped countries. ‘Should we emu- late those we wish to equal in power (thereby spurning our own tradition), or should we, on the contrary, affirm the values of our own tradition at the price of material weakness?’ (Gellner 1992: 19).

Nationalist opinions are further intensified by the beliefs of religious fundamen- talists. The permissiveness of the west is seen as a threat to traditional Christian values preserved in Poland. Unspoiled by consumerism, the nation of the faithful has been able to avoid the vices of the contemporary. Moral debauchery that runs against the norms of coexistence in any given society is something nobody asks for; selecting from the consumer bliss offered by the west only its beneficial facets seems, however, an

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unattainable dream. The western lifestyle comes as a package deal. Besides, as is usually the case, even if the spirit is willing, the flesh is weak. The administrative means by which some fundamentalists want to secure the country’s moral integrity raise serious questions about the world view the state should adopt. The most proselytising claim that Poland can serve as a paradigm for the re-christianisation of Europe: the outpost of the west surviving in the east comes thus to be seen as a fortress of Christian values expanding afresh into the west. The romantic myth of Poland as the Messiah of nations rises once again.

Nationalistic and religious feelings merge, blending effortlessly with the economic discontent of all those Poles anxious to reach the promised land. This is how populism acquires its muscle. The Solidarity trade union, or rather the remnants of it, needing to retain the support of the workers switched from reformist rhetoric to its earlier role of demanding concessions and undermining the system. The legend of the movement has been smashed, however. Is the earlier drama now going to repeat itself, or we will witness a new - some would say inevitable - phase of the revolutionary process which will lead to a hybrid form of totalitarianism (Bauman 1992a: 171-2)?

Post-communism, postmodernism and menta l i t ies

Those acquainted with current developments in Poland will view this picture as too one-sided, too gloomy. It definitely is! I have deliberately erred in this direction in order to hyperbolise the obstacles the social politics of the country, and possibly the whole region, faces. I do not say that all the features I have mentioned are specifically Polish or even that their impact is more apparent in Poland than elsewhere. One thinks, for example, of nationalism in the former Yugoslavia or East Germany, cor- ruption in Bylorussia or Italy, religious orthodoxy in Ireland, national spiritual messianism in Russia, learned inactivity in Slovakia or Bulgaria, militant working class activity in Komania or Ukraine, the cargo cult and blind trust in western investment in Czechoslavakia, decommunisation in Hungary and so on. I have simply wanted to show how all these factors interact and produce between them an economic, political, social and cultural conundrum of enormous complexity. Weber’s type of analysis of the fall of communism and the rise of a new order, wider and still more complex than the present synopsis, still lies ahead of us.

If the picture were to be made more complete, I would also discuss the positive impact cultural features have had in diverting Poland onto its new course. One may say, for instance, that the capitalist spirit was never abrogated in Poland as it was in neighbouring countries. The private sector survived in agriculture, and private busi- ness in other sections of the economy was never entirely annihiliated. The relative freedom to travel fostered trade skills among thousands of people - even if all those tourist-smugglers did not quite act lawfully! Poland initiated the economic break- through with a class of small entrepreneurs using local capital which long remained unmatched elsewhere in eastern Europe. So supportive a milieu for business-like activity was enormously important. A thirst for capitalism and the capitalist lifestyle soon combined with symbolic support for the new order. Note also that in Poland, despite widespread popular pessimism, the heirs of the communist party have in the semi-free (1989) and first free parliamentary elections (1991) won less support than their comrades from any other post-communist states. Sanctioned initially by society, shock therapy has brought the reforms to the forefront. Economic indicators show

FROM ANTI -COMMUNIST TO POST-COMMUNIST ETHOS 145

that Poland is the first country in the region to begin its recovery from depression; nearly two-thirds of the non-agricultural workforce is now employed in the private sector. Such facts cannot be overlooked.

Nonetheless, as previously noted, the mental attitudes we have discussed have played a central role in creating the conundrum Poland now has to solve. Several patterns of thinking and behaving have been inherited from the past, even if they are obviously undergoing constant change in the present. The post-communist tendency to focus on problems has understandably become pronounced. However, pro- capitalist modes of thought and active adaptation to the emerging situation are also widespread. In fact we encounter in Poland not a one overarching ethos but a plurality of them. The pro-capitalist ethos has travelled far and profoundly influenced Polish economic life. The question is whether the political constituency for reform-oriented parties has managed to grow big enough to outweigh the populist surge before the next political choices need to be made. In other words, the problem is to establish whether, after the excitement of merely symbolic support has died away, the voices of those who can see the advantages of a reborn democracy and a free market will prevail over the voices of discontent; the choice is in the people’s hands.’

The ongoing struggle between various modes of thought and political orientations may also be seen as an implicit confrontation between modernist and postmodernist positions. The societies of central Europe are attracted by the pleasures of western consumerism. However, contemporary consumer satisfaction, at least in its European form, is associated with cultural pluralism, tolerance, the relativity of norms and so on; in short, although recently dented by rightist reactions in some European Community countries, today’s consumer society is closely coupled with the postmodern con- ditions. As I mentioned above, not all central European societies are ready to accept this liberal aspect of western life. Communist nations grew up amidst a black-and- white vision of the world in which one is either right or wrong, and in which bad guys need to be resisted. In a sense, the postmodcrn world in its entirety has invaded the life of those groups which have perpetuated this opinionated view. Social rigidity still persists, sometimes, as in Poland, combined with religious fundamentalism. Such fixed attitudes also provide fertile soil for the growth of nationalist ideology, ‘the escape to the closest, the easiest realm of ideological security’ (Michnik 1993: 35). The key question is therefore in which direction the nations of central Europe will go: liberal or fundamentalist?

Finally, let me comment on the phenomenon observed by Bauman: that the rulers of the old regime and the dissidents have come to seem so closely linked, so engaged in a single dialogue, that now ‘the parents of the Polish Revolution become indistinguish- able from the old establishment’ (1992b: 116). I would push this thesis further. According to Foucault, in political relations those who dominate and those who are dominated exercise particular power at ‘points of resistance’ (1980: 87-92, 198-99). Both sides of the argument are constrained by these relations. The communists and the

1 A postcript is necessary here. As the elections held in Poland on 19 September 1993 showed, the constituency of people supporting radical reforms has not grown big enough to outweigh ‘socialist’ sentiments. A left turn in the Polish elections was evident. However, the reasons for the election outcome are much more complex than the new political configuration of the Polish Parliament suggests. The term ‘left turn’ demands serious qualification in any case. I do not discuss all these questions in this paper.

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dissidents (and/or societies) were integral parts of the same discourse; they not only maintained the existing political dialectic but drew on the same cultural vocaculary. However, this rule applies as much to the post-communist present as it does to the communist past. An analogous and contemporary ‘interpretive community’ has been formed. This time, the principal tension developing in power relations is between liberal and populist schools of thought. The two sides complement each other and together constitute a community which, at the deeper level, shares modes of reasoning and forms of argument. The text of their dialogue is, moreover, limited by long-lasting features of the Polish cultural landscape. Contending historical traditions are being voiced by participants in the conversation independent of individual will and political orientation, precisely demonstrating the way socio-political events are underpinned by deep-seated mentalities. One many condemn the past, but one cannot dismiss it. It is definitely true that the present manipulates the past; yet it is equally true that the past manipulates the present.

Michal Buchowski Department of Ethnology and Cultural Anthropology Adam Mickiewicz University ul. sw. Marcin 78 61-809 Poznan Poland

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