Lessons from community based management of floodplain fisheries in Bangladesh

Lessons from community based management of floodplain

fisheries in Bangladeshq

Paul M. Thompsona,*, Parvin Sultanab, Nurul Islama

aWorldFish Center, House 22B, Road 7 Block F, Banani, Dhaka 1213, BangladeshbWorldFish Center, Jalan Batu Maung, Batu Maung, Penang 11690, Penang, Malaysia

Abstract

Inland (floodplain) fisheries remain the most important contributor to fish production in Bangladesh. They have in the past been

administered to generate government revenue without due concern for sustainability or equity. Community Based Fisheries Management

(CBFM) is a possible solution and was tested in 19 waterbodies (rivers and beels) during 1996–2000. The outcomes so far are assessed with

respect to social, institutional, and physical context, and the interactions that arose in establishing CBFM. The lessons drawn are that: it was

essential that communities obtained rights over the fisheries, strong facilitation was necessary, taking up visible resource management

actions greatly helped, success was more likely in homogeneous communities, external threats were a strong limiting factor, clear boundaries

and small fisheries were not so critical, and new institutions could be built with as much ease (or difficulty) as modifying existing ones.

Effective well-defined partnerships of NGOs and government were not easy to establish but were sufficiently beneficial that in several

locations new community institutions for fisheries management were established. This is a slow process, the sustainability of local

management institutions is not yet established, although they continued during an interim period without funding, further phased support is

planned to strengthen these organizations and to generate evidence of impacts and momentum to influence wider fisheries policy in and

beyond Bangladesh.

q 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Community-based management; Co-management; Access; Equity; Food security

1. Introduction

Over half of Bangladesh comprises floodplains, and the

remaining area of about four million hectares of floodplain

wetlands form a major capture fishery (Ali, 1997) and source

of livelihoods for rural people—these wetlands contribute

about 46% of all fish consumed (Department of Fisheries,

2000). Over 70% of households in the floodplains catch fish

either for income or food (Minkin et al., 1997; Thompson

et al., 1999). These floodplains support a dense human

population (over 800 people per km2) and are intensively

used for agriculture, fishing and other aquatic resources.

This paper focuses on lessons for community manage-

ment of these fisheries. The importance of these fisheries has

been neglected in the past, consequently development

policies have favoured agriculture and there has been

widespread flood control and drainage, this has increased

areas and intensities of rice cultivation to the detriment offish

(total catches and diversity). Institutional arrangements for

better fishery management and for stakeholder participation

have also received limited attention in the past. From the

1980s this has changed, at least on a pilot scale, and initiatives

to empower fishing communities and enable them to take

management decisions themselves for sustainable use of

these fisheries have moved forward through community-

based projects including the experience reported here.

Property rights in these floodplains are complex and are

critical to an understanding of poverty among fishers and

approaches to community empowerment and fishery co-

management in Bangladesh. Seasonally flooded land is

mostly privately owned and cultivated, but during the

monsoon in the moderate-to-deeply flooded lands anyone

from the surrounding villages (including the poor) can

usually fish provided this does not damage crops. In the dry

season water and fish left stranded in ditches become the

property of the ditch owner. However, larger permanent

waterbodies including rivers and beels (depressions in the

deeper parts of the floodplain) form the more valuable

components of the overall fisheries and are government

property divided up into about 12,000 jalmohals or fishery

estates. The fishing rights in jalmohals have historically been

managed by the Ministry of Land for revenue generation.

0301-4797/$ - see front matter q 2003 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.jenvman.2003.09.014

Journal of Environmental Management 69 (2003) 307–321

www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvman

q WorldFish Center contribution no. 1693.* Corresponding author. Tel.: þ880-2-881-3250; fax: þ880-2-881-1151.

E-mail address: [email protected] (P.M. Thompson).

http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jenvman

They have been leased out to the highest bidder for three

years, usually this means they are controlled by wealthy and

influential lessees who then hire traditional professional

fishers to catch fish for them or charge tolls from those fishers.

The government of Bangladesh has attempted to reverse

this pattern. In the 1970s a preference for leasing jalmohals to

fisher cooperatives was established, and from 1986 the New

Fisheries Management Policy (NFMP) piloted licensing of

individual fishers in about 270 jalmohals. However, these

policy changes had little impact since fisher cooperatives

tend to be under the patronage of moneylenders and de facto

lessees who pay for the lease, while the decision on who

received licenses was also controlled by the cooperatives and

therefore indirectly their patrons (Ahmed et al., 1997).

In parallel with these changes in fisheries management,

development in related rural sectors has been undergoing

similar changes in emphasis, although this has not

necessarily been translated yet into actions. For example,

the maintenance of remaining wetland areas is now part of

the National Water Policy (Habib, 1999), although there is a

risk of continued small-scale projects draining smaller

wetlands. Moreover, participatory planning of water

management projects has been part of government policy

and practice for several years (FPCO, 1993; MWR, 2001)

and local user committees are supposed to be established

within water management projects (although farming tends

to dominate over other interests). In the environment

sector there are also pilot projects for community manage-

ment of wetlands. More generally there is increasing

emphasis, mainly from donors, on improved governance,

decentralisation and devolution of power, but reforms have

been slow to come. The union parishad—a local council

covering about 10 villages—remains the only locally

elected form of government.

2. The CBFM project

This paper draws lessons from the experience of a pilot

project—the Community Based Fisheries Management

(CBFM) project—funded by the Ford Foundation from

1996 to 1999. From early 2000, CBFM activities continued

with limited external support until a second phase

project started in late 2001. The project was based on a

partnership of a government agency—the Department of

Fisheries (DOF), five non-governmental organisations

(NGOs)—BRAC, Banchte Sheka, CARITAS, CRED and

PROSHIKA, and an international research center

(WorldFish Center1). The partnership approaches are

discussed in Hossain et al. (1998) and are an important

area for lessons in NGO – community relations,

NGO–government relations and the involvement of an

international research center.

Through this project, arrangements for devolving

responsibilities for managing fisheries to the user commu-

nities were developed and tested in 19 wetlands and

waterbodies: ten rivers, three seasonal wetlands (‘open

beels’) and six permanent lakes (‘closed beels’ for example

oxbow lakes). The CBFM project aimed to develop a

framework for community-based fisheries management,

and to ensure more sustainable exploitation of openwater

fish resources for future generations (Hossain et al., 1999).

In doing this it would promote an equitable distribution of

fisheries benefits within communities; develop additional

sources of income to compensate poor people for reducing

fishing effort and to enhance incomes during the lean

season; enhance fishers’ human capital through training

and adult literacy courses; and build on local institutions,

traditional practices and ecological knowledge to regulate

access to, and patterns of exploitation of, the fisheries. It

was also expected to generate and disseminate policy-

relevant information to foster debate and advocate policy

change.

The key features of this action research project included

capacity building and empowerment for fishing commu-

nities through:

† Involvement of both a government agency and NGOs as

partners with facilitation by WorldFish Center

† An attempt led by DOF to secure access rights for fishing

communities to waterbodies

† Provision of training and credit for the fishing commu-

nities by the NGOs

† Establishment of local fishery management bodies

(committees) which prepared plans and undertook

actions to better manage their fisheries and

† Monitoring and research by DOF and WorldFish to

document and assess the impacts of these changes.

In the beels, management committees have been

established, either representing only the groups of fishers

organised by the partner NGO or also representing other

fishers and other wetland resource users such as farmers.

Access to the beel jalmohals was reserved by government

for these organised fishing communities by transferring

responsibility from the land administration to Department of

Fisheries, but some of these fisheries extend beyond the

public jalmohal and also include seasonal floodplain

fisheries on private land.

However, in September 1995, most rivers, which until

that time had been subdivided into jalmohals each leased

out in the same way as the beels, were made lease free and

hence de facto open access. This change in policy meant

that fisher groups organised under the CBFM project had

no specific or exclusive rights to the river fisheries. Hence

the river management committees that were initiated by

the project had no legitimacy to establish or enforce

1 Formerly the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources

Management (ICLARM), one of the Consultative Group of International

Agricultural Research centers.

P.M. Thompson et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 69 (2003) 307–321308

the restrictions on fishing that they attempted to introduce.

The policy vacuum resulted in a lack of incentives for DOF

and NGOs to place much emphasis on these committees or

to promote responsible local fisheries management in

rivers.

In planning the project, attention was paid to partnerships

and roles of the implementing organisations, expecting that

NGOs might act as intermediaries between DOF and

communities, or that both DOF and NGOs would give

separate support to the communities, or that a form of three-

way co-management might evolve (Fig. 1). To some extent

all of these interactions occurred, but in hindsight the more

important institutional developments were in the local

fishery management committees, which were formed

largely by NGO initiatives but also provided a forum that

DOF staff could interact with. Two types of user committee

developed, that reflected the nature of the resource and

diversity in its use, communities and the nature of access to

the resource, and the preferences of the NGO concerned.

Table 1 summarises key features of the waterbodies,

communities and institutional arrangements according to

the three categories of waterbody covered by the project.

The NGOs provided poorer fishing households from the

communities with training, credit and support to organise

themselves.

Fig. 2 shows the locations of the waterbodies and the

NGO partners involved. In the beels the communities have

agreed on and then taken up fishery management actions

such as: local fish sanctuaries, stocking carps (in more

closed beels), observing closed seasons and more equal and

transparent sharing of their costs and benefits

Key to waterbody names in Fig. 1 and Tables 2 to 6

No Waterbody Code Year management

committee formed

1 Kali Nodi Kal 1998

2 Titas River (Ka) TitK 1998

3 Titas River

(Gokon–Goshaipur)

TitG 1998

4 Boyral River Boy None

5 Moisherkandi

Bornpur River

Moi 1998

6 Dhaleswari River Dha 1999

7 Jari Jamuna–

Bachamora River

Jar 1998

8 Tetulia River Tet 1998

9 Ashurar Beel Ash 1997

10 Hamil Beel Ham 1996

11 Ubdakhali River Ubd 1997

12 Rajdhola Beel Raj 1997

13 Digshi Beel Dig 1998

14 Goakhola-Hatiara Beel Goa 1997

15 Arial Kha River Ari 1997

16 Dum Nadi Beel Dum 1998

17 Ruhia Baisa Beel Ruh 1998

18 Krishnochandrapur Baor Kri 1997

19 Shemulia Baor She None

Fig. 1. Partnership and institutional arrangements for Community Based Fisheries Management under CBFM.

P.M. Thompson et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 69 (2003) 307–321 309

.3. Methods and indicators

CBFM has been achieved by establishing local user

management committees with fisher executives answer-

able to the community through the participant groups that

they represent and in some cases through regular

elections.

Research involved formal household interview sur-

veys, regular monitoring of fish catches and fish

consumption, process documentation, and participatory

assessments. Much of this forms a long term monitoring

program designed to reveal trends in these fisheries and

communities. Trends are difficult to determine reliably

because of considerable between year fluctuations—for

example de Graaf et al. (2001) reported about a 10-fold

difference in total estimated fish catch in a floodplain

area during an eight-year monitoring period, with the

wide range largely associated with variations in flooding

pattern.

In assessing these examples of CBFM, which may be

termed community based co-management, the insti-

tutional analysis framework developed by the then

International Center for Living Aquatic Resources

Management and Institute for Fisheries Management

(ICLARM and IFM, 1998) forms a starting point. This

builds from the context of the resource base (biological,

physical, and technological characteristics), user commu-

nity or stakeholder attributes, market attributes, and

external factors; to examine local co-management

processes and institutional arrangements. The interactions

and conflicts between stakeholders determine the out-

comes of co-management in terms of resource use and

sustainability and the efficiency, equity and sustainability

or resilience of the co-management or CBFM institutions.

In drawing lessons from the CBFM project we have

simplified and modified this framework to allow for

common features of inland fisheries in Bangladesh and try

to identify key factors and practical lessons from this

experience. Thus fish related market attributes are not

considered in the analysis since they are not significantly

different between inland wetlands in Bangladesh. There is a

ready market for freshwater fish locally and a complex

marketing network that ensures that higher production or

catches are bought by traders and reach both local

consumers and urban markets. Local fish markets were

monitored by the project but no notable changes that might

be associated with changes in production were apparent.

However, in the stocked closed beels the fish caught through

organised fishing are usually auctioned at the beel-side and

local people are often given preferential prices for small

quantities for home use.

Based on project experience, facilitation and the levels of

NGO support to communities have been added to the analysis

as distinct factors which, as will be seen, have an important

bearing on outcomes. Institutional support for co-management

and the community organisations (management committees)

Table 1

Scale and institutional arrangements in the CBFM Project by waterbody type

Attribute Closed beel/baor (6) Open beel (3) River (10)

Maximum size (ha) 36.5 (16–58) 300 (250–400) 482 (40–1620 þ )

Number of villages 4.8 (2–7) 8.7 (3–14) 11.8 (5–17)

Total householdsa 1267 (250–3560) 1142 (355–2100) 1322 (530–2220)

NGO participants 96 (60–135) 325 (215–509) 324 (37–1155)

Property rights Public jalmohals, in each

the NGO participant fishers pay

revenue for exclusive fishing rights

Two are public jalmohals where NGO

participants pay revenue for fishing rights.

One is private land—a seasonal

common fishery in the monsoon

All public jalmohals: 2 under

NFMP—licensed fishers have exclusive

access; 1 leased by a fisher cooperative

as a ‘fish sanctuary’; 7 open access

Management committees

(BMC or RMC)

4 BMCs, BMC never established

in one site, one BMC lost lease

and broke up in 1999

3 BMCs 9 RMCs on paper but only 4 made

any rules for fishing

Membership Only leader(s) of each NGO group Only leader(s) of each NGO group (2).

Group leaders (female), male fishers,

landowners, NGO staff

and local council member (1)

NGO group leaders, other fishers,

local elites, FAD owners, DOF

and local administration, NGO staff

and local council members

Executive posts Elected by general members Elected in one, decided by NGO in 2 Decided by DOF and NGO, but

non-functional in all but one

Fishery management

decisions and rules by MC

(numbers of sites adopting)

In 5 fingerling purchase, closed

season, guarding, rotational harvesting,

sharing of income, taking loan

to meet collective costs

Sanctuary delineation and protection (2),

habitat re-excavation (1), closed

season (2), gear restrictions (2)

Sanctuary (1), fish culture in pen (1),

limit fishing grounds and try to

rotate fishing (3), several committed

not to use ‘harmful’ gear

but not enforced

Figures are means with range in parenthesis. BMC ¼ Beel Management Committee; RMC ¼ River Management Committee; jalmohal ¼ a water estate or

fishery that is state property usually leased out for revenue; FAD ¼ Fish Aggregating Device.a Approximate figure from household census, note that some additional villages make use of some waterbodies.


is treated as being part of the process rather than an underlying

factor, since locally this could and did evolve through

interaction of the community organisations, project partners

and local government.

4. Outcomes and determining factors

Case studies of the co-management arrangements that

have evolved, plus monitoring of households, fish catches

Fig. 2. Locations of CBFM Project Waterbodies.


and fish consumption, reveal the impacts of community

management and illustrate both co-operation and conflicts

arising during the process. There is evidence of increased

participation in decision-making, greater cooperation

among fishing communities and in some cases the wider

communities, and support from local government. In the

beels where communities have enhanced fisheries, com-

pliance with local community-set rules has been good and

monitoring data indicate that catches have increased,

and that local sanctuaries have helped restore some species

and stocks. On the other hand, a combination of factors

means that effective co-management models have yet to be

developed for the rivers. To illustrate the CBFM arrange-

ments and findings we give two examples to illustrate

the type of participatory arrangements that can be

recommended for adaptation elsewhere.

4.1. Example 1: group management of a closed beel

A group management approach has been adopted in

Bangladesh both by the CBFM Project and in the Oxbow

Lakes Project II (Apu et al., 1999). Dhum Nadi Beel is a

permanent lake of 60 ha, code ‘Dum’ in Tables 2 and 3. It is

one of five such beels under the CBFM project that may be

termed ‘closed’ as they have few connections to the wider

floodplain. Previously, it was managed by a few individuals

who led a fisher cooperative which held the lease through

DOF under the NFMP licensing system. Since 1997, the 115

households fishing for an income have been organised by an

NGO (BRAC) into six groups each represented in a

management committee, they:

† share equal payments to the government for fishing

rights,

† elect a management committee as an executive body,

† buy carp fingerlings to stock the beel each year,

† can take credit from the NGO partner to finance

operations,

† observe a closed season and restrictions on access and

gear use,

† share equally in guarding, team fishing, and income, and

† have higher incomes from fishing since recorded

production increased by about 70% from 280 kg/ha in

the early 1990s to 480 kg/ha in the first 2 years of fisher

community management.

However, the NGO was not so far able to achieve

transparency in the management committee’s accounting

Table 2

Context and institutions for fisheries co-management in CBFM beels

Indicator Closed beels Open beels

Ham Raj Dum Ruh Kri She Ash Dig Goa

Waterbody size S M S S S S L L L

Clear boundary Y Y Y Y Y Y P N Y

Access rights Lease Lease Lease Lease Lease Lease Leasep Lease Private

Govt. recognition

of fisher rights

Y Y-late Y Y Y Y Informal Y Informal

Participant households M S M S S M L L M

Participant fishers/ha 8.43 1.77 1.98 2.07 2.50 1.67 1.27 1.00 0.86

% Households

participate

12% 15% 7% 15% 28% 29% 52% 12% 61%

Homogeneity H H H H M H M H H

Facilitator Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

Fulltime

NGO

NGO partner Caritas Caritas BRAC BRAC BRAC BRAC Caritas Caritas BS

Training no/

household

4.3 5.1 2.0 2.0 2.6 0 3.2 2.0 1.6

Credit Tk/

household/year

750 2930 1330 1000 500 0 670 510 860

Management

committee type

NGO

fisher

NGO

fisher

NGO

fisher

NGO

fisher

NGO

fisher

None NGO

fisher

NGO

fisher

Multi

stakeholder

Active Y Y Y Y Y N Y part Y

Election Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N

Financial

responsibility

Y Y Y Y Y N N Y N

Meetings R R R R R N R I R

External threats/

influences

Farmers

Town council

Powerful

lessee

Some part-

time fishers

Muslim

mass poach

None, internal

factions

Mastan

control

None Power-ful

lessee

None

Agreement: Y ¼ yes, N ¼ no, P ¼ partly, Na ¼ not available. Waterbody size (maximum 2 monsoon season 2 area): S ¼ up to 50 ha, M ¼ 50–200 ha,

L ¼ 200 þ ha. Access rights: Leasep: Ashurar Beel is under DOF control for use by fishers, no revenue collected during CBFM. Participant households:

S ¼ up to 100, M ¼ 101–300, L ¼ 301 þ . Homogeneity: H ¼ homogeneous (90% plus from one religious group), M ¼ mixed. NGO training and credit data

cover only three years—1996–1998. Meetings: R ¼ regular, I ¼ infrequent, N ¼ no.


and leadership. Also rules have been rather inflexible, for

example some poor participants have better income earning

opportunities if they migrate to towns as labourers or

rickshaw pullers in the non-fishing period but are required to

perform guard duty or they would lose access.

4.2. Example 2: community-based conservation of an open

floodplain beel fishery

Goakhola-Hatiara Beel is one of three larger wetlands

under the CBFM project, code ‘Goa’ in Tables 2 and 3. In

the monsoon it covers about 250 ha. In the dry season there

is virtually no water except for a small canal which connects

to a river and 86 privately owned kuas or ditches which are

used as fish aggregating devices and are drained out to catch

fish. The whole area is private crop land, in the wet season

much of the area is cultivated with deepwater paddy but in

this season it also forms a common property fishery with

open access for inhabitants of the neighbouring villages. All

355 households living in four villages around the beel are

Hindu and women from 205 have been organized in groups

by an NGO (Banchte Sheka). Key features and outcomes of

this example are:

† The NGO groups only comprise women, but all of these

women catch fish for food from the beel.

† The Beel Management Committee (BMC) comprises

eight female group members and 19 men (fishers,

landowners, and local council representatives).

† The BMC agreed a strategy and management plan.

Table 3

Outcomes and impacts of fisheries co-management in CBFM beels

Indicator Closed beels Open beels

Ham Raj Dum Ruh Kri She Ash Dig Goa

Immediate outcomes

Institutional support DOF,

local admin

DOF,

local admin

DOF Local admin No No UP Some from DOF UP

Conflicts over fishery

management

M—internal H—lease L—internal M—external M—internal H—external None H—lease L—farmers

Fishery actions

Closed season Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y

Stocking Y Y Y Y Y N N N N

Sanctuary N N N N N N Y Y/part Y

FAD restriction Na Na Na Na Na Na Y N N

Gear restriction Y Y Y Y Y N Y N N

Guard rotation Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y

Rotational fishing Y Y Y Y Y N N N N

Co-management

indicators

Participation H H M H M/end 1999 None H L H/M

Equity H H H H H L H M H

Catch trend

(1997–2000)

Inc/ ¼ ¼ Inc Inc ¼ Na Inc DK Inc

CPUE trend

(1997–2000)

Na Na Na Na Na Na ¼ ¼ Inc

Incomes and assets ¼ ¼ ¼ Inc ¼ Na Inc ¼ ¼

Legitimacy H M H H H N M M M

Rule compliance H H H H H Na H M H

Retention of rights Y Y Y Y N N Y Y Y

Overall rating G G G G F F G Av G

Institutional

sustainability

G G G G Abandon Never started G Av G

Institutional support: DOF ¼ Department of Fisheries, Local admin ¼ local sub-district civil administration including police, UP ¼ union parishad (local

elected councils covering on average 10 or more villages). FAD ¼ Fish Aggregating Device—typically a brushpile or ditch where fish shelter in the dry season.

Equity, Legitimacy and Rule compliance: H ¼ high, M ¼ medium, L ¼ low. Catch trend: based on estimated total production/catch from waterbody from

catch monitoring: Inc, increase; ¼ , no trend, Dec, decrease; DK, do not know—due to inconsistencies in data or changes in survey coverage. CPUE (Catch

per unit effort) trend: on average significant differences in catch per unit effort (kg/person h) for main gears used—Inc, increase; ¼ , no trend; Dec, decrease.

For closed stocked beels insufficient data to estimate CPUE for fishing for non-stocked species and CPUE not relevant for organised harvesting of stocked fish.

Incomes and assets: Inc, increase; ¼ , no change; Dec, decrease (subjective assessments by participants of changes in early part of project). Overall rating:

G ¼ good, Av ¼ average, P ¼ poor, F ¼ failed (research team’s assessment). Institutional sustainability prospect: G ¼ good, Av ¼ average, P ¼ poor

(research team’s assessment). P þ indicates sites that will be included in a second phase of CBFM and where it is hoped to establish sustainable institutions.

The other ratings indicate the perceived sustainability with no further project support.


† The key decision was to rent several kuas each dry

season and keep them as refuges for floodplain resident

fish, thereby ensuring more brood fish for the next

monsoon, this has continued from winter 1997/98

onwards, women and men share duty guarding the

sanctuaries.

† All households in these four villages observe a 2–3

month closed season on fishing in the beel in the early

monsoon when fish are breeding.

† Compliance with the rules has been high.

† The BMC attempted fish-friendly operation of the sluice

gate on the canal (to allow in migrating fish) but this was

not possible as farmers wanted to protect crops from

flood damage.

† Catches in 1999 were 41% higher than in 1997 and

increase to double the 1997 level in 2001, with the gains

evenly divided between fish aggregating devices and

other gears, and benefiting all members of the

community.

† Some fish species which had not been recorded for many

years returned.

† Although fish catch per gear-day (catch per unit effort)

varies between years and gears, for most of the main

gears it was higher in 2000 and 2001 compared to

1997.

However, grants for testing a new fish conservation

measure have not encouraged a sustainable local system and

with no past experience of paying for the right to fish, a way

of mobilising local contributions to the costs of conserving

fish has not yet been found in this site.

4.3. Overall findings

Tables 2–5 summarise some of the evidence from all 19

waterbodies. However, floodplain fisheries are very variable

between years according to flood levels, and the achieve-

ments so far depended on significant facilitation from NGOs

and on the individuals concerned. The assessments at the

foot of Table 3 indicate that these experiments in CBFM in

closed beels have either been good (four) or a failure (two),

and in open beels experience has generally been good.

However, Table 5 indicates that the performance of

community management organisations in rivers has been

much poorer. That there is not a uniform pattern reflects the

many complex combinations of factors at play. The

management committees that represent only groups sup-

ported by the NGO partners (for example in seven out of

nine beels—Table 2) tended to be more active—holding

regular meetings, having elected executives, and in the

closed beels managing finances. Associated with this are the

fishery management activities undertaken. The two

examples illustrate the types of arrangement typical of the

two types of beels. In the rivers the only management

actions that could be agreed on were a sanctuary in one river

which was promoted by local leaders, and limiting

the number of fish aggregating devices in two rivers

where licensing continued (Table 5).

4.4. Poverty

One of the rationales for the project was that fishers in

Bangladesh are poor in terms of their incomes and

livelihood assets (including access to fishing grounds,

education, finance), and lack a role in decisions about the

future of the resources that they depend on. The community

based approach acknowledged the diversity among fishers,

from full time traditional fishers, to seasonal/part time

fishers and subsistence fishers (who only catch fish for

food). It focused on strengthening the role of full time

fishers while maintaining access for subsistence fishing and

limiting the power of the rich with fishery interests such as

moneylenders.

The NGO partners targeted poorer fishing households in

forming groups. Baseline household surveys in 1996 just

after group formation confirmed that the NGO participants

were more dependent on fishing than other households in the

same area, and relatively more were landless. Most had low

incomes of under US$ 85 per person in a year, but this was

similar for random samples of non-participants. Any

increases in incomes and landholdings by 2001 were similar

for participants and non-participants (Table 6). Poverty is

more complex than this and the initial expectation that rapid

measurable impacts would occur was not borne out. For

example, in Goakhola-Hatiara Beel the NGO participants

have improved their standard of living: 62% had tin-roofed

houses in 1996 and this rose to 93% in 2001, but the pattern

was similar for non-participants (increasing from 70 to 93%

in the same period), and this was repeated on average in all

the sites. Reported household income rose on average by

37% for participants, who caught up in the same period with

non-participants who remained static, but this was due more

to improved incomes from agriculture and small businesses

(supported by NGO training and credit) than from fishing.

There was also some reduction in fishing dependence linked

with two trends: diversification of income sources by NGO

participants and reduction in fishing for food by non-

participants.

In Goakhola-Hatiara, for example, self-assessments

using anchored scales indicated statistically significant

increases between 1997 and 2001 in perceived levels of

participation, influence, decision-making, fishery access,

and benefits for both NGO participants and other members

of the community. The gains for NGO participants in

fisheries influence, decision-making and control over

resources were also significantly higher than for non-

participants. Combined with the high level of confidence in

the beel management committee (on average over 70% of

all households in the community believe it is capable) and

continued activity after the project funding (admittedly with

some continued NGO support), this indicates that CBFM

has in some sites had a wider benefit of empowering poorer


fishing households within local fishery management

institutions.

5. Lessons

The 19 sites represent a major effort in establishing

CBFM, but are too few for statistical analysis relating

institutional and fishery management performance to the

factors identified. Nevertheless seven lessons have been

identified from comparative analysis of the case studies and

from project experience. We believe these are relevant to

the wider debate on co-management and common property

institutions.

5.1. Boundaries, scale and type of fishery

Although it is commonly cited that key factors

contributing to successful co-management and common

property institutions are smaller well defined (bounded)

fisheries and bounded user communities (Pomeroy and

Williams, 1994; Agrawal, 2001), the CBFM evidence in

support of this is ambiguous. The more open and unbounded

rivers (which also averaged larger numbers of villagers and

users, Table 4) were generally unsuccessful, and their

character had a role in this, but we consider changing

property rights and other factors were more important in

this. CBFM was unsuccessful in two closed beels (Krish-

nochandrapur and Shemulia Baors) despite the user

communities being well defined and limited, and the beels

being clearly bounded. Moreover CBFM was relatively

successful in two out of three open and unbounded

floodplain beels exploited in the case of Ashurar Beel by a

large and heterogeneous user community.

5.2. Property rights

The history of leasing inland fisheries in Bangladesh has

left the most important legacy for undertaking CBFM.

Payment of government revenue (the lease) bestows on the

lessee the right to set local rules on exploitation of the

fishery. This is a major reason why in the rivers when

revenue collection ended there was no legitimacy for local

management committees to set rules limiting fishing, even

when they included local officials. In the closed beels there

had been a history of leaseholders controlling access and

stocking carps prior to the project, and the fishers organised

under the project were able to continue this practice.

However, the open floodplain beel of Goakhola-Hatiara is

an exception—there is no jalmohal in this seasonal beel and

so no lease to pay, yet the community was able to agree on,

implement and comply with conservation measures (dry

season fish sanctuaries and a closed season) that have helped

to protect fish and improve returns from fishing.

5.3. Homogeneity and community characteristics

The exception mentioned in lesson 2 supports the

conclusion that communities that are homogeneous are

more likely to establish effective community fishery

management. In Goakhola-Hatiara the entire user commu-

nity is Hindu and has no major factions, unusually women in

these villages fish for food and the NGO organised groups of

women to take a lead in conserving fish. In none of the other

sites were women even represented in the management

committees. It is not an exception in terms of community

characteristics—the more successful CBFM sites tend to

have homogeneous user communities. For example, in four

closed beels where CBFM has been relatively successful the

users are either all Muslim part-time fishers (two sites) or all

Hindu traditional fishers (two sites), and in all four of these

the members of the groups organised to manage the fishery

have average landholdings of under 0.2 ha. However, some

traditional Hindu fishing communities using the rivers have

been unable to cooperate effectively for fishery manage-

ment, but this is partly because more powerful outsiders use

influence to compete for the resource. Also CBFM has been

relatively successful in Ashurar Beel, a large open beel

where a diverse community including immigrants and

ethnic minorities spread across several villages have

cooperated to conserve fish stocks.

5.4. Building on existing institutions

The four closed beels where CBFM institutions have

continued (Table 3) show that it is just as possible to build

new effective institutions and community organisations as it

is to build on existing ones. In Hamil Beel and Dhum Nadi

there were already fisher cooperatives that had controlled

the beels for many years. The two NGOs involved based

CBFM on these organisations but then worked to add poorer

fishers who had been excluded and to push out members

who were not actively fishing. The participants in both cases

were more-or-less homogeneous and the cooperatives were

not dependent on a single moneylender or de facto lessee.

However, they have been prone to new problems of internal

factions that arise when NGOs promote more transparent

and accountable leadership including elections to executive

posts. This results in a set of new leaders who see the NGO

as their source of help and power, and a set of old leaders

who see the NGO as a threat and look towards DOF for

support (since they had built good connections in the past

with government officers in order to retain the lease and

later to manage licensing). Experience indicates that it is

important for the sustainability of such organisations either

that the leadership is fixed (which tends to concentrate

power and give an inequitable distribution of benefits) or

that leadership has the possibility to rotate sufficiently

frequently through a democratic and transparent process.

This may be achieved, for example, by elections every 1–2


Table 4

Context and institutions for fisheries co-management in CBFM rivers

Indicator Ubd Moi TitK TitG Dha Kal Ari Boy Jar Tet

Waterbody size S M L L L L M S L L

Clear boundary P P P P N P Y P N N

Access rights License Lease Open Open Open Open Open Open Leasep Open

Govt. recognition

of fisher rights

Y Y N N N N Informal Partial N N

Participant households M L L M L L L S M L

Participant fishers/ha 2.61 1.27 0.64 1.51 2.05 0.36 8.13 1.00 0.18 ,0.1

% Households participate 10% 13% 18% 30% 47% 29% 15% 3% 20% 28%

Homogeneity M M M H M M H H M H

Facilitator Fulltime NGO DOF Occasional Occasional Occasional Occasional Fulltime NGO Occasional Occasional Occasional

NGO partner Caritas Proshika Proshika Proshika Proshika Proshika CRED Proshika Proshika Proshika

Training no/household 2.1 0.8 3.3 0.8 3.4 2.6 1.2 3.5 0.9 1.1

Credit Tk/ household/year 530 1470 2380 3380 12,290 7160 1390 5310 1350 2410

Management committee type License

fishers

Fisher

cooperative

Multi

stakeholder

Multi

stakeholder

Multi

stakeholder

Multi

stakeholder

Multi

stakeholder

None Multi

stakeholder

Multi

stakeholder

Active N Y N N N N Y N N N

Election N N N N N N N N N N

Financial responsibility N Y N N N N N N N N

Meetings I R I I I I R N N N

External threats/influences Money lenders,

attempt to lease

Minor—

irrigation, boats

Kata increase

other fishers

Kata increase

and tolls

Border dispute,

kata increase

Kata increase None Attempt to lease,

irrigate

‘Coop’

leased sanctuary

Increasing effort

Agreement: Y ¼ yes, N ¼ no, P ¼ partly, Na ¼ not available. Waterbody size (maximum 2 monsoon season 2 area): S ¼ up to 50 ha, M ¼ 50–200 ha, L ¼ 200 þ ha. Access rights: Leasep: Jari Jamuna

was leased to a so-called cooperative for a fee for use as a ‘sanctuary’, the cooperative collects tolls from fishers including those in the NGO groups. Participant households: S ¼ up to 100, M ¼ 101–300,

L ¼ 301 þ . Homogeneity: H ¼ homogeneous (90% plus from one religious group), M ¼ mixed. NGO training and credit data cover only three years—1996–1998. Meetings: R ¼ regular, I ¼ infrequent,

N ¼ no.

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Table 5

Outcomes and indicators of fisheries co-management in CBFM rivers

Indicator Ubd Moi TitK TitG Dha Kal Ari Boy Jar Tet

Immediate outcomes

Institutional support Local admin DOF UP None (DOF

non-coop)

None (DOF

non coop)

None UP, elites Local admin None—admin

support coop

None, general

restrict

Conflicts over fishery

management

H—external

and internal

L—internal M—gears M—gears H—external

and internal

M—gears None H—external

and gear

H—lessee L—gears

Fishery actions

Closed season N N N N N N N N N N

Stocking N N N N N N N N N N

Sanctuary N N N N N N Y N N N

FAD restriction Y Y N N N N N N Na Na

Gear restriction N Y N N N N N N N N

Guard rotation N N N N N N N N N N

Rotational fishing Y Y N Y N N N N N N

Co-management indicators

Participation L M L L L L M/L None None L

Equity M H L L L L M L L M

Catch trend (1997–2000) Dec Inc ¼ Inc ¼ Inc Inc Na Na Dec

CPUE trend (1997–2000) ¼ Inc ¼ Inc ¼ /Dec ¼ Dec Na Na ¼

Incomes and assets Dec ¼ ¼ Inc Dec Inc ¼ ¼ ¼ ¼

Legitimacy L/M M/H N N N N M N N N

Rule compliance L H L L L L M Na Na Na

Retention of rights Y Y N N N N N N N N

Overall rating Av G/Av P P P P Av F F P

Institutional sustainability Av/P Av P þ P þ P þ P þ P þ Abandon Abandon P

Institutional support: DOF ¼ Department of Fisheries, Local admin ¼ local sub-district civil administration including police, UP ¼ union parishad (local elected councils covering on average 10 or more

villages). FAD ¼ Fish Aggregating Device—typically a brushpile or ditch where fish shelter in the dry season. Equity, Legitimacy and Rule compliance: H ¼ high, M ¼ medium, L ¼ low. Catch trend: based on

estimated total production/catch from waterbody from catch monitoring: Inc, increase; ¼ , no trend; Dec, decrease; DK, do not know—due to inconsistencies in data or changes in survey coverage. CPUE (Catch

per unit effort) trend: on average significant differences in catch per unit effort (kg/person h) for main gears used—Inc, increase; ¼ , no trend; Dec, decrease. Incomes and assets: Inc, increase; ¼ , no change;

Dec, decrease (subjective assessments by participants of changes in early part of project). Overall rating: G ¼ good, Av ¼ average, P ¼ poor, F ¼ failed (research team’s assessment). Institutional sustainability

prospect: G ¼ good, Av ¼ average, P ¼ poor (research team’s assessment). P þ indicates sites that will be included in a second phase of CBFM and where it is hoped to establish sustainable institutions. The

other ratings indicate the perceived sustainability with no further project support.

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years, so that power does not become polarised with one

faction.

The other two closed beels—Rajdhala and Ruhia

Baisha—counteract these two case studies. In these cases

the traditional Hindu fishing communities before were

unable to lease the waterbodies in the face of lessees who

were financially and politically more powerful. New

organisations representing all of the members of these

fishing communities have been formed, and the same

principles are applied as in the reformed cooperatives. But

similar leadership problems emerged and are probably

inevitable when there are relatively large costs and returns

from stocking fish that are handled by a few people on

behalf of all users.

5.5. Facilitation

The important role of experienced or dedicated facil-

itators in establishing local co-management has been

stressed, for example by Ostrom (1992). The CBFM

experience suggests that this is necessary but not sufficient

at least in Bangladesh fisheries. All of the beels had full time

NGO facilitators, only two river sites had full-time

facilitators but this was not associated with better perform-

ance. Progress was better in developing local organisations

and undertaking fishery management actions in one river

where DOF staff took the initiative. One NGO (Proshika)

did not post full time local organisers for CBFM and in

general made little progress in helping fishers to organise

committees that could coordinate to develop management

plans and actions at the waterbody level. However, despite

an NGO posting full time facilitators to organise the

concerned communities, CBFM failed in two of the beels (in

one the combination of NGO and DOF was unable to

overcome the control of local interest groups over the

fishery). It had also not been expected that individual NGOs

would be as rigid as was found with each adopting its own

approach and making limited modifications to fit with local

circumstances, and even being unable to coordinate between

offices for adjacent administrative areas.

The level of NGO support, as measured in training

courses provided per household and average amount of credit

disbursed per household per year (Tables 2 and 4), did not

appear to be associated with progress of CBFM. Although

participants in the more successful sites on average received

more training, fisher households in several rivers received

relatively large amounts of credit—often to support purchase

of gear or to support fish processing. We conclude that skilled

staffs dedicated to helping communities organise and who

have as their main target building the capacity of local

management committees for resource management are vital.

NGOs appear to have a comparative advantage in commu-

nity organisational skills. They have some flexibility

compared with technical government agencies, but more

emphasis on feedback and learning is needed and they should

not rely on staff with already high workloads organising

resource management groups as an additional task, nor

should they place a strong emphasis on micro-credit.

Table 6

Changes in household fishing, income and assets in CBFM waterbodies

Indicator Closed Beel (4) Open Beel (3) River (8)

NGO Non-NGO NGO Non-NGO NGO Non-NGO

1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001

Household sample 230 227 240 240 180 150 180 150 480 384 480 389

% Household with tin roof 48 87 67 84 46 83 57 85 77 96 74 91

Household landholding

,0.2 ha 77 80 60 51 51 46 41 41 72 66 64 62

0.2–0.4 ha 10 13 12 13 15 19 14 15 12 11 13 12

.0.4 ha 12 8 28 36 34 35 44 43 16 23 23 26

Household income in previous 12 months

,20,000 Tk. 78 62 60 50 58 49 58 50 58 31 63 38

20,000–29,999 Tk. 11 20 16 18 16 23 14 21 16 18 18 18

30,000–39,999 Tk. 4 7 7 13 13 9 10 11 9 16 6 12

40,000 Tk. and above 7 10 18 20 13 19 18 17 17 35 14 32

Gear value (Tk/household) 1861 2233 394 271 1840 1868 727 825 10,922 8870 3738 5540

Reported fishing status

Fish for income 96 92 25 11 77 67 22 19 88 63 64 48

Fish for food 3 1 55 49 23 27 77 59 10 22 35 34

Not fish 0 7 20 40 1 5 1 22 2 15 2 17

Note: Tk 20,000 was equivalent to approximately US$ 465 in 1996, which amounted to about US$ 85 per person.


5.6. Resource management activities

Although actions such as stocking fish, closed seasons

and fish sanctuaries might be termed outcomes of CBFM,

they are also important in helping to establish viable

institutions. Without any agreement or ability to initiate a

visible action to improve their fishery, and without an

activity to see, fishery communities may become disinter-

ested in the investment of time needed in the form of

meetings and elections to make organisations work. In Arial

Khan River a sanctuary was established through support

from the local leaders and a local management committee.

However, there was less participation from fishers in this

local management committee and it did not continue after

the project. Also it is unclear if this was an appropriate

management action since catch per unit effort has been

falling in this site and overfishing is probably continuing. In

this case the physical intervention was a focus for local

influential people but not for fisher participation. By

contrast where the majority of the fishing community took

part in actions and were actively involved in decision-

making, the activities have persisted and formed a focus for

fishery management and helped to strengthen the insti-

tutional arrangements. They also resulted in voluntary

compliance by most households, even non-participants.

5.7. External forces

An important limiting factor on establishing CBFM is

external forces and threats, for example from powerful

individuals or groups who try to obtain the rights to a

fishery, or conflicting uses of a wetland, or non-traditional

fishers starting to fish. These external forces do not promote

CBFM, but to the extent that some communities are able to

overcome these forces by themselves or in partnership with

other organisations this process can be part of empower-

ment. Conversely the lack of any concerted external efforts

to capture the resource in two of the open beels (which are

complex fisheries with a large number of users and required

some effort to establish consensus on management among

communities) doubtless contributed to the success of

CBFM.

6. Conclusions

6.1. Partnership

Perhaps the most important lessons concern partnerships

at a number of levels. NGO–research institute partnerships

can bring complementarities and mutual benefits (IIRR,

1999). This is the main justification for investing in any

partnership, but the inherent differences between partners

which make partnership desirable are also a basis for

inequalities and tensions. Lewis (1998) raised issues

concerning partnerships involving WorldFish Center

(then ICLARM) and other agencies in research on

aquaculture in Bangladesh, in particular the temporary

funding-driven nature of partnership and its use in

competing for resources, top-down government agencies,

limits to partnership, lack of empowerment of farmers in the

process, and gaps between large and small NGOs. These

issues are also relevant to the CBFM partnership, but some

differences are of note.

Each partner had different but related expectations. For

some NGOs this offered a new venture moving from

aquaculture into openwater fisheries management, for

others it offered an opportunity to improve the resource

base, knowledge and capabilities of their existing groups of

fishers: the partnership offered access to knowledge and

waterbodies. The Department of Fisheries probably

expected to gain power through access and a greater say

in fisheries, which were transferred from land adminis-

tration to it for CBFM, and to demonstrate that these

fisheries could be managed more productively through its

support. As most development activities were actually done

by NGOs it could minimise its risks in this new venture.

WorldFish Center expected the research on the partner

approaches and outcomes to support a wider strategic

objective to determine which co-management models are

viable in terms of equity, efficiency and sustainability, and

how they empower fishing communities; and to influence

government and NGO activities. The fisher communities

needed their right to establish local management rules,

which of course limit exploitation of resources, to be

recognised and legitimised by government. All partners of

course also gained funding to expand their activities.

At the project inception workshop there was heated

public argument between DOF staff and NGOs over past

experience. Government staff emphasized the uncertain

and fund related role of NGOs compared with themselves,

while also criticising NGOs that plan for long-term

relations with their clients based on credit. Meanwhile

NGOs criticised top-down approaches of government and

attempts to control their activities. Establishing trust is a

slow process. While these remain issues, a general

acceptance of the complementary roles of DOF and

NGOs has emerged. One important factor in working as

a partnership was that each organisation received a

separate grant thus maintaining financial independence,

yet accepted mutual dependence and a division of

responsibilities through a set of memoranda of agreement

between the government, each NGO and WorldFish. This

leads to another factor—that in each site only one NGO

was active, avoiding any direct conflicts over working

methods, and placing smaller NGOs on an equal footing in

meetings. Coordination was addressed through central

monthly coordination meetings rotated among partners,

and approximately every 4 months field meetings at each

site where the formal partners and the community

organisation discussed progress and plans. The scope for

communities to be full partners in the project as a whole


was limited, but annual workshops where the management

committee chairpersons along with local NGO and DOF

staff each presented their progress and participated in

working groups to address issues and propose solutions

resulted in some role for the fishers in the project direction.

We also believe that the research center had a role beyond

providing independent advice, as a catalyst and inter-

mediary or buffer between the government and NGOs. This

helped avoid conflicts and instead promoted shared

dissemination activities such as newsletters and workshops.

On the other hand, the NGO partners individually did not

show flexibility in their approaches and community

organisation to the extent expected.

6.2. Sustainability

The sustainability of the institutional arrangements and

the local fisheries under CBFM in Bangladesh are yet to be

determined. In fact the partners did not have a clear strategy

for the project end and how to ensure that people’s

organisations would be sustainable. It is now clear that

establishing sustainable CBFM is much more than a 3-year

program, at least in Bangladesh. To address this continued

monitoring and a phased withdrawal of external support are

planned. A second phase project started in 2001 which will

continue to support CBFM and assess its impacts in 15 of

the first phase sites to determine sustainability during the

phase-out period, and which has considerably expanded the

number of pilot sites with an emphasis on open beels and

floodplains. Design of the new project has built on the

lessons from the first phase. It will develop co-management

arrangements to co-ordinate local management in clusters of

waterbodies that form larger linked wetland systems, and

inform and influence a wide range of stakeholders in the

formulation of fisheries policy. For example, networking

among local CBFM organisations, as recommended by

Ostrom (1994), is planned to help develop a movement of

community organisations which it is hoped will continue

after the project.

We conclude that for the lessons from pilot activities in

the field of common property resource management and

community-based management to have maximum impact

clear linkages from pilot intervention, through research and

impact assessment, to support for uptake and influence for

supportive policy change are needed. This should be based

on complementary support from a range of organisations in

a phased approach that allows sufficient time to establish

sustainable community organisations.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank the 5000 households who have

participated in the CBFM project for their active interest

and tolerance of monitoring in this action research. We

thank the many staff of WorldFish Center, Bangladesh

Department of Fisheries, Banchte Sheka, BRAC, CAR-

ITAS, Center for Rural and Environment Development, and

PROSHIKA who worked in partnership to initiate CBFM

and to assess its progress. Particular thanks go to Md.

Mokammel Hossain, Fikret Berkes and Bob Pomeroy for

advice at different stages of the project. We thank David

Lewis for his helpful comments on an earlier draft. The

project was supported by the Ford Foundation through a

series of grants to each of the partners mentioned, and we

thank Doris Capistrano for designing the project and

partnership. This paper is also an output of the interim

period and second phase of the project funded by the UK

Department for International Development (DFID) for the

benefit of developing countries. The views expressed are

those of the authors and are not necessarily those of DFID or

Ford Foundation.

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Lessons from community based management of floodplain fisheries in Bangladesh

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