Knowledge, Agency, and Social Engineering: The Case of Smallholder Agriculture in Tanzania

Politics, Development, and Change in Africa – Course Assignment

Knowledge, Agency, and Social Engineering:

The Case of Smallholder Agriculture in Tanzania

- Centre of African Studies -

June 6th, 2014

Submitted by:

Sascha Klocke

Number of characters: 44421

Politics, Development, and Change in Africa

Knowledge, Agency, and Social Engineering: The Case of Smallholder Agriculture in Tanzania

Sascha Klocke

Table of Contents

1.Introduction.......................................................................................................................................1

2.Approaching “Development”............................................................................................................3

3.Agriculture and the Rural in Tanzania...............................................................................................5

3.1.The Importance of Agriculture in Development........................................................................5

3.2.Villagisation and Marketing Boards in Tanzania........................................................................7

3.3.The Period of Neoliberal Adjustment.......................................................................................10

4.The Impact of Knowledge and Agency on Social Engineering.......................................................13

5.Conclusion.......................................................................................................................................17

Appendix A – Social and Economic Indicators for Tanzania.............................................................20

Appendix B – Agricultural Indicators................................................................................................20

Bibliography.......................................................................................................................................21

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1. Introduction

Since colonial times, “Africa”1 has been a target for Northern2 development efforts. Already then,

the colonial powers embarked on programmes to “develop” and “modernise” their respective

colonies. After the African countries started to gain their independence from the 1960s onwards, the

new African governments continued on the colonial course and implemented numerous policies

with a strong focus on state-led development initiatives. Most of these initiatives were unsuccessful,

even detrimental, and left numerous countries on the verge of bankruptcy and their economies

dysfunctional.3 To remedy this situation, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF)

started in the early 1980s to offer conditional loans to African governments, coupled with policy

prescriptions for structural adjustment based on neoliberal theory.4 These programmes, however,

were also largely unable to stimulate accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction. As a

result, the African continent has been lagging behind the rest of the world with regards to economic

and social development, leading to a renewal of state- and donor-led development efforts in the last

decades.

One exemplary case is that of Tanzania. After independence in 1962, the Tanganyika African

National Union (TANU) rose to power and embarked on a path of independent development of the

country. Led by one of Africa's most prominent post-colonial leaders, Julius Nyerere, the

government chose the path of scientific socialism to overcome the colonial legacy and modernise

the country in both economic and social terms. One of the best-known policies was that of

villagisation, the resettlement of a previously dispersed rural population in centrally planned

villages. Yet, as shall be seen, these efforts did not manage to achieve the expected goals. Faced

with high inflation and mounting government debt during the 1970s and 1980s, the Tanzanian

government, after Nyerere was replaced by Ali Hassan Mwinyi in 1985, acknowledged the need for

structural adjustment. In the early 1990s, structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) designed by the

IMF were implemented, aimed at transforming the country into a liberal market economy and

reducing state influence. It soon became clear that, just as was the case with the attempts of

transforming the country based on socialist ideals, the results of these policies seemed not to live up

to the proclaimed goals, and in the new millennium, there have been calls from within and outside

1 In the following paper, Africa shall be used to refer to the countries of Africa south of the Sahara.2 That is to say, the industrialised countries of Western Europe and North America.3 cf. Ng and Yeats (1997), pp. 899ff; Roemer (1982), pp. 125-134.4 That is, a mix of neoclassical economics and liberal democracy.

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of Tanzania to re-expand the role of the state in development again.

Tanzania is still a very poor country by international standards, and like many African

countries, is greatly dependent on agriculture, which contributes in large part to the general

economy and provides the main source of livelihood for the large numbers of rural population.5

Because of this, agricultural development has been regarded as a crucial issue for the general

improvement of the national economy and people's lives in general. While both state- and market-

led approaches have been tried, none have achieved significant success. This state of affairs has left

Tanzanian agriculture, like that of many other African countries, increasingly unproductive when

compared to high-income countries and other developing countries like those of East Asia, resulting

in a failure to improve the livelihoods of a large number of rural poor.

As I shall explain in detail below, major development initiatives in Africa, including

villagisation and structural adjustment in Tanzania, have been attempts at large-scale social

engineering, which aimed at thoroughly transforming both the economy and society of the countries

targeted. Due to this goal, social engineers are confronted with questions of knowledge and the

agency of social actors which influence the drafting and implementation of their plans and policies.

It is in this light that I pose the following research question for this paper:

What happens when top-down modes of social engineering are confronted with local knowledge

and agency in rural Tanzania, and what are the implications for African development?

First, I shall briefly look at the meanings of the terms “development” and “social

engineering” and establish a working definition of these terms for this paper. Next, I shall examine

the role of agriculture in development, with a special focus on smallholder agriculture, in which

most of the rural population in Africa is engaged. I will then look in detail at both Nyerere's state-

led efforts to modernise the Tanzanian agriculture and stimulate development and the effects of

neoliberal structural adjustment which succeeded the development plans of the socialist regime.

Then, I will analyse the outcomes of both state- and market-led approaches, focussing especially on

the role of knowledge and agency, and the implications of this analysis with regards development

policies and social engineering. I shall finish with a concluding section.

The section on development and social engineering will be based on a variety of authors,

with a focus on contemporary debates. The section on agriculture and the development approaches

in Tanzania will feature analyses of Tanzania in particular by James C. Scott (1998), Brian Cooksey

5 cf. Appendix A.

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(2011), and Maia Green (2000), and studies of African agriculture by Jayne et al. (2010) as well as

Diao et al. (2010). While the latter studies are not centred on Tanzania, but a number of other

Eastern and Southern African countries, the broad selection of countries, the geographical closeness

of many of them to Tanzania, and similarities in the structure of the agricultural and the

development policies adapted, suggest that the general conclusions drawn in these papers can also

be applied to Tanzania.6

2. Approaching “Development”

Since the post-World War II period, “development” has been a major concern of international

policy. While focusing mainly on economic growth based on physical investment in the beginning,

the horizon has expanded to include a range of issues from the improvement of “human capital”

(that is, education) to social issues.7 More narrowly defined, contemporary approaches focus on

“improvements in well-being, living standards, and opportunities”8 as well as a “concern about

inequality and poverty.”9 Initial approaches to large-scale development were based on a variety of

theories, including dependencia theory and scientific socialism. However, the economic crises

many developing countries experienced during the 1970s and 1980s led their governments to apply

for financial assistance by the IMF and the World Bank, which offered aid on the condition that

receiving the countries adapt reform programmes based on neoliberal theory. Subsequently,

neoliberalism became, and continues to be, the dominant development paradigm. During the early

period of SAPs in the 1980s, the focus lay squarely on the application of neoclassical economics,10

but it started to expand continuously from the 1990s onwards to include other aspects such as

democratisation, capacity building, and good governance. This shift is still evident today in the

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs), a precondition for debt relief, which gave structural

adjustment a more “human face”11 and now also stress social development and poverty reduction as

major goals.12

6 cf. Cooksey (2011), p. 76; Putterman (1995), p. 311.7 cf. Coyne and Boettke (2006), pp. 49-52; Edelman and Haugerud (2004), p. 86; Lund (2010), p. 29.8 Edelman and Haugerud (2004), p. 86.9 Lund (2010), p. 29.10 That is, on eliminating price and currency controls, reigning in monetary expansion and inflation, and reducing

government interference in the markets through organisations like marketing boards, as well as government spending in general.

11 Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), p. 1395.12 cf. Ellis and Mdoe (2003), pp. 1367f; Harrison (2005), pp. 1303f, 1308ff; Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), pp. 1395f.

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In itself, the term development does not necessarily have to be normative, if, for example, it

is simply used to denote social change, “societal reproduction processes for better or for worse.”13

Yet normative assumptions about “progress” and “improvement” are often implied. This is

especially clear in the dichotomy between “developed” and “developing” (or “underdeveloped”)

countries. Here, the developing countries seem to be “lacking” something which the developed

world already has achieved, and need to embark upon a certain path to follow in the latter's

footsteps. The developed world, in contrast, is assumed to have already reached a peak of sorts,

which, in the currently dominant neoliberal paradigm, is the combination of liberal democracy and a

market-based economy, seen, in Sumich's words, as the “self-proclaimed culmination of human

political experience.”14

The normative tint becomes necessarily even clearer in actual development policy.

Independent of their particular character,15 these policies identify a certain issue that needs to be

overcome in order to reach a better state. This notion is reinforced by the top-down nature of most

development interventions. First, supposed “needs” of the target group, as well as the right goals

which shall be achieved, are assessed from the outside, and then a programme is implemented by

external actors (for example, national governments, international organisations, and non-

governmental organisations (NGOs)).16 This is especially evident in large-scale endeavours of social

engineering, that is, attempts at directing social change and social and economic development

through the top-down implementation of externally conceived plans.17 In the case of Tanzania, both

Nyerere's villagisation policy and later the IMF's structural adjustment programmes exemplify this

normative basis well. Villagisation, the (forced) resettlement of Tanzania's rural population in

centrally-planned villages, accompanied by socialist social and economic policies, aimed not solely

at the modernisation of Tanzanian agriculture and economic development,18 but also at the creation

13 Lund (2010), p. 21.14 Sumich (2010), p. 681. It is worth noting, though, that the global financial crisis in 2008 and the increasing influence

of new economic powers such as the BRICs (Brazil, Russa, India, and China) has strengthened the doubts about these assertions also outside the circles of those critical of capitalism and Northern-driven development in general.

15 That is, independent of the question whether these policies are part of large-scale national development plans aimed at the “modernisation” of a country's economy, whether explicitly political like socialist projects or supposedly “technocratic” like neoliberalism claims, or whether they are more initiatives focussed on the micro-level, like participatory development, and driven by local, national, or international NGOs.

16 cf. Schmidt et al. (2009), p. 275; Green (2000), p. 67.17 cf. Popper (1944), pp. 123f ; Scott and Marshall (2009).18 Although this was an essential part, which will be explained in depth in the following section.

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of “an egalitarian society and a 'new socialist personality.'”19 In the same way, neoliberalism, while

espousing free-market rhetoric, does not solely aim at market liberalisation, but also at having

people “act socially in a market-conforming fashion.”20 It is in this light that neoliberal policy

shifted from simply calling for a reduction in state activity to reforming the state in a way that it can

provide and environment that is seen as conducive for the neoliberal vision of a market-based

economy.21

However, social engineering is not limited to state-level plans and policies. Even on micro-

level, for example in the case of participatory development, there exist attempts of external actors to

try to steer social change into a particular direction. As Maia Green demonstrates in her case study

of participatory development in a Tanzanian rural district, NGOs do not only try to improve certain

development parameters, but explicitly want to “empower” and “transform” the rural population so

it actively participates in the development process.22

As shall become clear below, these external, top-down approaches often face a number of

challenges with regards to both local agency and knowledge, which significantly influence the

prospects and outcomes of social engineering efforts.

3. Agriculture and the Rural in Tanzania

3.1. The Importance of Agriculture in Development

Agriculture has always been crucial in development, both for economic growth and industrialisation

in general, and rural development in particular. It played a significant role in almost every country

in modern history23 with regards to poverty reduction and economic development, either through

supplying surplus labour, raw materials, and food for the growing industrial sector, or by actively

stimulating the other sectors of the industry after being “modernised”, as demonstrated during

Asia's Green Revolution starting in the 1960s.24

In contemporary Africa, agriculture continues to be of major significance. It is the biggest

sector of the economy of many countries, including Tanzania, and the majority of the population

19 Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), p. 1396.20 Harrison (2005), p. 1310.21 cf. Harrison (2005), pp. 1309f.22 cf. Green (2000), pp. 67-75.23 Except for a number of city-states, cf. Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1388.24 cf. Diao et al. (2010), p. 1375; Jayne et al. (2010), pp. 1388, 1394.

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still lives in rural areas, where poverty is highest.25 In contrast to the rest of the world, African

countries did not see major increases in agricultural productivity in the last four decades, and the

increases in output necessary to supply the growing populations with food had to be achieved

through an expansion of the cultivation of arable lands. This process, however, is reaching its limits,

as arable land is becoming increasingly scarce. Subsequently, the increase in cultivated land lags

behind the increase in population, putting considerable pressure on farmers as farm sizes decrease

for a majority of households.26 As a result, African countries now find themselves in a situation of

food insecurity and dependence on food imports in order to satisfy the demand of rural and urban

populations, even though they were self-sufficient in food production at the time of independence.27

Tanzania is no exception to this. In the last decades, the area of cultivated land increased only

slowly, while population growth has continued to be significant. Roughly two-thirds of the

Tanzanian population still lives in rural areas where poverty is a main concern as around 80% of the

population live below the “dollar-a-day” line. The majority of the rural population depends on

agriculture, yet productivity continues to only rise very slowly and the output of staple crops, while

rising gradually, is very unstable over the years.28

Characteristic of African, including Tanzanian, agriculture are “smallholders”,29 households

working on small- to medium-sized farms. While not contributing significantly to the marketed

output of agricultural products, smallholders constitute the largest, and poorest, group of rural

population.30 It is for this reason that development efforts since colonial times have been focussed

on transforming this type of agricultural production.31 Smallholder agriculture is typically

characterised by dispersed settlement patterns, poly-cropping (the planting of different crops in the

same fields), the cultivation of various fields with disparate soil and moisture conditions, and the

predominant use of manual labour.32 Following the evolutionary analogies drawn by many

development theorists, these “traditional” methods of production are seen as “backwards” when

25 cf. Diao et al. (2010), p. 1375.26 cf. Jayne et al. (2010), pp. 1835ff.27 cf. Diao et al. (2010), p. 1381; Mbaku (2000), p. 29.28 cf. Appendix A.29 As Peters (2013, pp. 549f) notes, this term has been criticised due to its obscuring character with regards to

inequalities in land distribution amongst this relatively large group of households, cf. also Jayne et al. (2010), pp. 1385ff.

30 cf. Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1388.31 For example, the PRSP and other Tanzanian strategy documents emphasize an increase in agricultural productivity

as a major development goal, cf. Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1381.32 cf. Peters (2013), p. 550; Putterman (1995), pp. 318f; Scott (1998), pp. 242f.

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compared to the modern agricultural sectors in Northern or East Asian countries, which have seen

large increases in productivity during their transformations.33

It is in this spirit that the colonial powers in many countries, including Tanzania, started their

attempts at a modernisation of African agriculture, based on the permanent settlement of the rural

population, mechanisation, increased use of advanced inputs like fertilisers, and a production of

crops aimed at the (export) market. Early on, the policies met with resistance by the smallholders,

who considered their application as inappropriate for their respective needs and environments, and

resented forceful resettlement away from their lands.34 While the scope of this paper does not allow

for a more detailed analysis of colonial policies in Tanzania, the following sections will shed light

on their core assumptions, as the development policies adapted after independence in Tanzania and

other African countries constituted a continuation of the spirit of modernism that informed the

colonial administrations.35

3.2. Villagisation and Marketing Boards in Tanzania

At the time of independence, the attempts at modernisation of the colonial regime in Tanzania had

not produced any lasting success on a larger scale.36 However, the language of modernism and

progress resonated with Nyerere and the TANU government, as it did with many other well-known

leaders in other countries like Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana or Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, who wanted

to lift their countries, which they perceived as “underdeveloped,” to the standard of the other,

“progressive” countries of the world.37 Thus, the policies of the new government followed those

pursued during the end of the colonial era, albeit with a socialist touch. Two aspects of Nyerere's

push for modernisation shall be highlighted here: villagisation as well as marketing boards and

cooperative unions.

A policy of voluntary villagisation, based on convincing the rural population of the

advantages of village life, was introduced in 1962, shortly after indepenence, and even enjoyed the

initial support of the World Bank at the time.38 Its aim was to settle dispersed smallholders in

centrally planned villages in order to increase service provision, modernise and mechanise

33 cf. Appendix B.34 cf. Peters (2013), p. 550; Scott (1998), pp. 224227.35 Ibid.36 cf. Scott (1998), p. 228.37 cf. Scott; (1998), pp. 229ff; Yergin and Stanislaw (2002), p. 66.38 cf. Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), p. 1396; Scott (1998), p. 242.

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agriculture, and increase control over the population. A notable pillar of these efforts was the

ujamaa ideology, which called for socialist collectivist production on communal farmland. Just like

in the colonial period, the focus was on an increase in farm size, the use of machinery, and,

especially on the collectivist plots, mono-cropping with a focus on cash crops for export.39

Both the settlement patterns of the new villages and the agricultural policies were based on

“scientific” considerations drawn from European experience. However, these “scientific” models

were neither tested nor adapted to local conditions and thus faced strong opposition of the

smallholders early on. The rural population was already wary of progressive policies after their

negative experiences under colonial rule and resisted Nyerere's plans, which were seen as

disregarding the actual needs and desires of the people, just like they resisted during colonial times.

It is important to note that this was not done due to some “inherent backwardness” of the rural

population, but because the smallholders saw the deficits of the centrally planned policies, which

the “scientific” planners did not.40

As a response to this opposition and the stagnation of voluntary villagisation in the first

phase, Nyerere changed his stance and issued an order for compulsory and universal villagisation in

1973, regarding the rural population as not knowing what is “best” for themselves. This went so far

that even previously established and successfully operating independent ujamaa villages saw their

institutions dissolved and integrated into the central bureaucracy, for example in the case of the

Ruvuma Development Association in Songea.41 This shift to coercive villagisation did not, however,

solve the problems of non-cooperation by many smallholders or the issues of the inapropriateness of

centralised plans for the respective local conditions. And while active resistance was subdued due to

the threat of coercion, villagers switched to more passive options like leaving the villages at the first

opportunity or putting a lot less effort into the cultivation of communal lands when compared to

their private plots.42 Eventually, the villagisation project turned out to be highly unsuccessful. It did

not improve the living conditions for the rural population it was supposed to help, and neither did it

create a higher output in export crops or increased state revenues, another goal the planners hoped

to achieve.43

39 cf. Scott (1998), pp. 229ff, 239-243.40 Ibid., pp. 235-243.41 Ibid., pp. 233ff.42 Ibid., pp. 236, 239.43 Ibid., pp. 253f.

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A second aspect of Nyerere's development efforts, also taken from the colonial repertoire,

was the employment of crop marketing boards and cooperative unions,44 both under central state

control. The former were responsible for overseeing the production and purchase of farm products

and re-selling them on export markets, while the latter were in charge of internally marketed crops

and the distribution of subsidised inputs like fertilizer, and provided credits. Their proclaimed goal

was a stabilisation of input and output prices for farmers, as strong swings in those prices on

international markets left farmers, especially poorer smallholders, vulnerable. Furthermore, it was

hoped that the marketing boards would generate revenue for the government by capturing export

surpluses.45 These boards and cooperatives, however, proved inefficient and had problems achieving

their stated goals. While the market for maize, one of the most important staple crops in Tanzania,

grew, the market for export crops contracted. Also, if prices are kept below the market level during

upswings, there exist high incentives for farmers to sell surplus produce on the black market at the

higher market rate.46 Lastly, cooperatives had to trade inputs at prices decreed by the government,

not at market prices, which often left them unable to recover their cost and subsequently to their

increased indebtedness. As a result, marketing boards and cooperative unions did not manage to

create additional government revenue or encourage increased agricultural production. Instead, they

entailed a massive fiscal cost, adding to an increasing debt-burden and fuelling high rates of

inflation.47 Moreover, as Jayne et al. note, the majority of rural households are actually a net buyer

of additional grain and thus directly hurt by artificially inflated prices during downswings.48

Altogether, Nyerere's development plans were a failure that left both the Tanzanian

agricultural sector and general economy worse off than before, while the state had a heavy fiscal

burden to carry. Productivity growth remained minimal as ever and, combined with continued

population growth and a drop in agricultural exports, meant a return to subsistence farming for

numerous households and increasing rural poverty.49 Economic problems were already becoming

apparent in the 1970s, but Nyerere's continued adherence to socialist ideology and policy, and the

44 While farmers and traders established successful cooperative unions for certain products already before independence, they were transformed into village-level cooperatives after the end of the villagisation process in 1976, which in turn sold their products to central government marketing boards, cf. Putterman (1995), pp. 312f.

45 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 59ff; Putterman (1995), pp. 321f; Yergin and Stanislaw (2002), pp. 66f.46 Which helped to boost crop production, especially for maize, cf. Cooskey (2011), p. 61; Putterman (1995), p. 312f.47 cf. Cooksey (2011), p. 60; Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), p. 1396; Putterman (1995), pp. 312ff; Yergin and Stanislaw

(2002), p. 67.48 cf. Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1389.49 cf. Cooksey (2011), p. 60; Green (2000), pp. 77f; Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1390.

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resulting resistance against structural adjustment, prolonged and exacerbated the crisis. By 1984,

real household income had fallen over 50%, leading Hyden and Karlstrom to state that it “may well

be unique in economic history that an already poor country, without suffering from prolonged

drought, war or climatic deterioration, experience[d] such a dramatic reduction in living

standards.”50

It is against this background that the governments of the post-Nyerere era had to apply for

support form the World Bank and the IMF, a move which entailed the necessity to adapt neoliberal

structural adjustment programmes.

3.3. The Period of Neoliberal Adjustment

Struggling with the fallout of the Nyerere's attempts of state-led development under a socialist

vision, the Tanzanian government started to recognise the need for economic reform, especially the

break-up of the state monopoly in agriculture, and instigated first reforms, at first without asking for

IMF support. In 1986, after Nyerere stepped down as president, and because the previous reforms

proved insufficient, the government passed its Economic Recovery Programme and signed an

agreement for financial support with the IMF.51 By the mid-1990s, neoliberal adjustment was

implemented even further, followed by the drafting of a full PRSP by 2000.52 As was usually the

case, this support was conditional and mandated that the Tanzanian economy and political structure

undergo a programme of structural adjustment aimed at cutting back state interference with the

economy, liberalise internal markets, and open the country up to international markets, too.

Assessments of these programmes differ in tone, ranging from “disatrous”53 to generally

positive, though, especially in critical circles, they are regarded overwhelmingly as negative.54

While inroads have been made, a look at available economic and human development indicators

does not indicate a major success of neoliberal adjustment in stimulating rapid economic growth

and poverty reduction.55 Tanzania is no exception to this. While the scope of this paper does not

allow for a detailed analysis of all aspects of neoliberal social engineering, the effects of market

liberalisation on smallholder agriculture provides some useful insights also for the wider

50 Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), p. 1399.51 cf. Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), p. 1400; Putterman (1995), p. 311.52 cf. Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1367f.53 Peters (2013), p. 551.54 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 61, 76; Peters (2013), pp. 551f; Putterman (1995), p. 321.55 cf. Prados de la Escosura (2013), pp. 179f, 190-202; Stein and Nissanke (1999), pp. 399-402.

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programmes.

Structural readjustment of an economy generally takes time, the more so the more thorough

and longer previous policy efforts have moved it into an inefficient and unsustainable direction.

Villagisation,56 the collective production of export crops, and inefficient centralised input-output

management led to a shrinking of the export sector and a return to subsistence agriculture, instead

of an increase in productivity and capital accumulation.57 As has been said above, this lead to a

strong declines in overall agricultural output and living standards. To remedy such severe

maladjustments, even under “perfect” conditions, can be expected not to be instantaneous. Yet, in

reality, conditions are seldom even close to “perfect”, as internal resistance against adjustment by

those set to lose influence or income, and external constraints that lie outside the sphere of influence

of reform by local or national governments58 obstruct a quick and thorough adjustment process.

While superficial structures can be changed with relative ease by passing relevant

legislation, the underlying institutions, which have a more significant impact on the activities of the

people, change more slowly.59 Furthermore, ideologies and resentments against external

intervention might hinder speedy adjustment. In the case of Tanzania, the liberalisation of the

agricultural sector quickly met with opposition from elites, authorities, and former beneficiaries.

The strong socialist and anti-market ideology promoted by Nyerere was shared by many in the

government and bureaucracy and did not vanish after his presidency. These ideological issues were

evident in the reluctant search for solutions to economic and social problems that were already

appearing in the late 1970s, yet only fully addressed by the early 1990s, and continue to exist to the

present day in a state which leans more towards economic control than liberalisation.60

The reforms of marketing boards and cooperative unions provide a case in point. Boards and

unions were some of the earliest targets of reform. However, once implemented, the reforms failed

to revive the market-oriented, voluntary arrangements of pre-socialist Tanzania, and these

56 Which re-settled large parts of the population in surroundings of which they did not necessarily have the necessary knowledge to efficiently continue their agricultural practices.

57 cf. Scott (1998), p. 239.58 Most prominently, in the case of agriculture, obstructions to exports in potential export markets in high-income

countries, which protect their domestic agriculture through subsidies and regulations themselves, cf. Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1393.

59 cf. Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1379; Scott (1998), p. 255. Institutions here means the “customs, rules, regulations, laws, public agencies, and the way these habitually, and from precedence, go about doing what they do.” (Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1379)

60 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 73f; Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1396; Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), pp. 1396, 1399f; Putterman (1995), p. 311.

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institutions continued to be inefficient and heavily influenced by the state.61 Beginning in 1991,

further attempts at liberalisation, aimed at transforming them into purely regulatory authorities, did

not manage to significantly improve the situation, state interference remained high, and a decade

after the dismantling of their powers was started, the process began to be reversed. Regulation,

which supposedly was aimed at liberalising the markets for agricultural products further, instead

handed far-reaching powers to back to the government, placed government officials in the

marketing boards, and returned extensive rights to them to enter the markets as actors again.62

Apart from considering obstacles to its implementation, it is important to take into account

that structural adjustment is usually implemented when governments face severe economic and

fiscal troubles that make it necessary for them to ask for international loans.63 It is then hardly

surprising that, if these structures provided any benefit to at least certain groups, there will be

negative repercussions as the economy adjusts to new structures and new prices.64 However, this

does not necessarily have to be detrimental for the overall population or economy.

Here, the case of fertiliser subsidies in Tanzania proves illustrative: Cooksey notes that the

dominant narrative displays the pre-liberalisation provision of subsidised fertiliser to smallholders

as a success which was cut short when these subsidies were scrapped and market prices proved to

be beyond many smallholders' means. He contrasts this by questioning how widespread the use of

fertiliser among smallholders was in the first place, noting that likely only larger farmers benefited

from its use. And even if smaller farmers had access, the relatively stable output of maize even after

the end of subsidies, which saw fertiliser consumption drop by half, draws into doubt how far the

use of fertiliser did play a significant role. It also questions how far this would justify the high cost

of maintaining the subsidies (which were already subject to financing difficulties before the

liberalisation process) at the cost of the general population (which had to bear the inflationary and

tax burden).65

Even though notable interferences in the markets continued during the liberalisation process

and seem to on the rise again, there has been some success, especially with the production of the

61 cf. Putterman (1995), pp. 312ff.62 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 64-71; Green (2000), p. 81.63 In the case of Tanzania, this includes the drop in agricultural output and real income, high inflation, a high public

debt burden, and shortages of imports, cf. Hyden and Karlstrom (1993), pp. 1397f; Green (2000), p. 77.64 This is, moreover, the case with all major changes which occur time and again in every economy.65 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 62ff.

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important staple maize,66 which not only serves as a major subsistence crop, but also as a cash

crop.67 Though hit by an initial drop, the output of maize managed to keep up with demand. This

success still needs to be considered cautiously. Production did not collapse again, but neither did

productivity improve significantly, thus showing no signs of a strong “development” in terms of

economic progress.68 One reason for this can be found in the ongoing “unwillingness” to invest

surplus income “productively”, as Maia Green describes in her case study of the Ulanga district in

Southwestern Tanzania. Against the backdrop of Nyerere's development policies, which produced

little to negative returns, the rural population still does not regard agriculture as a viable investment.

This notion is exacerbated by the low returns on agricultural investment and production, aggravated

by the continued operation of cooperatives and marketing boards. Hence, rather than investing in

farms or enterprises, people turned to the construction of houses as personal development goals.69

Overall, it seems that, while the liberalisation of agriculture might not have worsened the

situation of Tanzania's rural population further, neoliberal adjustment failed, like the socialist

development approaches before, in stimulating substantial improvement in agricultural production.

Even more generally, when looking at neoliberalism as a social engineering project, it did not

succeed in transforming the state into an institution that strengthens markets and encourages

economic activity. On the contrary, even though the language of strategy papers might be

neoliberal, actual policy and reform actions continue to be driven by anti-market ideas,70 as in the

case of the cooperative unions, and farmers are discouraged from investing and expanding

production. In the following, possible explanation for the failure of stimulating development

through top-down social engineering will be given, and the implications for current and future

development efforts analysed.

4. The Impact of Knowledge and Agency on Social Engineering

In an attempt to explain the subpar, in parts even outright detrimental, results of both the ambitious

development schemes of the socialist government and the neoliberal adjustment process, I want to

66 Which had started, as noted above, its unofficial liberalisation even earlier.67 cf. Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1376.68 cf. Cooksey (2011), p. 61; Putterman (1995), p. 315. As has been mentioned, the lack of productivity growth is a

phenomenon prevalent not only in the cultivation of maize, but generally in the agricultural sector in many African countries.

69 cf. Green (2000), pp. 80-83.70 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 73ff.

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focus on two key issues: knowledge and agency.

For the task of analysing its impact on top-down development efforts, it is useful to

distinguish between different kinds of knowledge: scientific knowledge, “metis”71 (a term used by

James C. Scott) and what F. A. Hayek calls “unorganized knowledge”.72 Scientific knowledge is the

kind of knowledge typically assigned to the term, that is, generic and codified knowledge, often in

possession of, or “discovered” by, experts; the type of knowledge one can learn from books or

lecturers. Metis, on the other hand, is a “wide array of practical skills and acquired intelligence in

responding to a constantly changing natural and human environment.”73 Lastly, unorganised

knowledge can be described as “the knowledge of the particular circumstances of time and place.”74

The latter two defy codification and centralisation, as they are localised and strongly dependent on

the particularities of any given situation.75

Since the first half of the twentieth century, scientific knowledge has been elevated to the

status of the most important knowledge and attempts at generating and applying it have spread

through all fields of science, including the social sciences, and here first and foremost economics.76

This elevation of scientific knowledge, in the field of social science more a “scientistic” than

actually scientific attitude,77 has also been a core tenet in the field of development since its inception

in colonial times, with its striving for progress and modernity, as aptly demonstrated by Nyerere's

policies. The attempts at “modernising” the Tanzanian agriculture paid no heed to metis, the set of

agricultural practices already in place, classifying this knowledge of the rural population as

“traditional” and “backward”. Instead, mechanisation, mono-cropping, and collective production of

export crops were mandated without considering their suitability to different soils, their ecological

impact, and without empirically verifying that the scientific knowledge gathered from European

experience can even be successfully applied in the Tanzanian context.78 This resulted in, as has been

71 Scott (1998), p. 311.72 Hayek (1945), p. 521.73 Scott (1998), p. 313. 74 Hayek (1945), p. 521. While the latter two definitions are similar, I would suggest that metis covers more an array of

different responses to particular circumstances, whereas Hayek's notion corresponds to the actual knowledge of these circumstances at any given point in time.

75 cf. Hayek (1945), pp. 521f; Scott (1998), pp. 315f.76 cf. Hayek (1945), p. 519-522.77 cf. Hayek (1975), pp. 433f. Scientism means the application of the methods of the natural sciences to the social

sciences, “ mechanical and uncritical application of habits of thought to fields different from those in which they have been formed” (Hayek (1942), p. 269), which, in Hayek's view, is inappropriate, as social sciences deal with the relations between individuals and not between things, cf. Hayek (1942).

78 cf. Scott (1998), p. 226.

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noted above, a drastic drop in agricultural output and the impoverishment of the rural population.

Even more broadly, the whole process of villagisation and collectivisation largely ignored the

complexity of social systems, like the interconnections of settlement patterns, agriculture, and social

structures. This was, in a way, inevitable, as scientific modelling is limited to the data that can be

collected. Yet, when dealing with society, the collection of all relevant data is an impossible task, as

its “organised complexity” necessitates that detailed knowledge about each element, that is, each

individual, and not only statistical averages are taken into account. Thus, modelling in the social

field is reduced to utilising rough approximations and the most easily available data, which calls

into question the scientific character of these efforts.79

Moreover, by calling the independent practices of the farmers “traditional” or, more recently,

“local” knowledge, the modernist approach strongly misrepresents the character of metis. Tanzanian

farmers have continuously adapted their practices to a changing environment, shifting between

staple and export crops according to external circumstances, and adapting new crops if they thought

it feasible and profitable.80 The knowledge is also not strictly local, as farmers exchange information

over larger areas and integrate scientific, or external, knowledge into their practices if they make

useful additions.81 Also, the terms “traditional” or “backward” evoke an image of a static nature of

metis, while terms like “progress” and “development” evoke an image of change. Ironically, an

individual in possession of “traditional” and “unorganised” knowledge is much more apt at adapting

quickly to changing conditions, be they environmental or changes in the market, like the demand

for a certain crop.82 Development plans and bureaucracies, on the other hand, are a lot more

cumbersome, as Tanzania has shown. First, government inertia, as well as ideological struggles,

prevented reforms at being enacted in a timely manner after problems started to show, and then

these reforms got bogged down in further ideological and power struggles, as well as government

bureaucracy. In contrast, smallholders quickly adapted to circumstances they deemed unfavourable,

and often switched back to subsistence farming or (illegal) production for the black market.

Nonetheless, it is important to remember that scientific knowledge, and its application, is not

a problem per se. Hence, African metis need not categorically be elevated over scientific research

and insights and protected from their influence. Both can work together, as scientific and external

79 cf. Hayek (1975), pp. 434-438.80 cf. Ellis and Mdoe (2003), p. 1376.81 cf. Green (2000), pp. 73f.82 cf. Hayek (1945), pp. 523f.

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knowledge have the potential “improve” metis, and the modernisation of practices is not necessarily

detrimental to society. However, these types of knowledge need to be adapted to local

circumstances, and modernisation needs to be based on the informal rules in existence by enacting

changes in small steps, following a necessary process of trial and error.83 Conversely, trial-and-error

approaches to large-scale, authoritarian social engineering can have far-reaching, long-term

consequences for the target population.84

The second cause contributing to the failure of modernist development plans, and possibly

even to the absence of “progressive development” in general, is the disregard for agency by

development advocates, policy makers, and social engineers. The top-down scientistic approach

tends to regard human beings not as individuals driven by their own motivations, but as mere

components of the development plans that can be steered in the “right” direction by the planners.

This is evident in the above mentioned notion that the rural population in Tanzania resists the plans

for modernisation out of conservative stubbornness while not knowing what is eventually “best” for

them. The same can also be said for neoliberal social engineering. Based on a specific view of the

market society informed by neoclassical economics, programmes are not designed to fit their

respective target societies, but rather aimed at forming society and individual behaviour so they

better fit the underlying models and assumptions.85

The programmes also side-line the agency of the decision makers in the target countries.

Hence, while African states, including Tanzania, might have adopted the language of neoliberalism,

they seem to not work towards creating an enabling market environment in the way external

advisers of the IMF and World Bank had envisioned. Rather, “local ownership” of these reforms

means that their implementation might stray from the initial goals stated in the strategy papers, as in

the case of the reforms of Tanzanian cooperatives.86 Even more recent approaches like participatory

development seem very patronising, and, while claiming to respect the agency of the people, sees

them not as individuals with their own goals, but constructs them as parts of a collective village

entity which will work together for the collective good.87

83 cf. Scott (1998), pp. 309f, 318, 327, 335f. For a similar approach with regards to “utopian” (that is, large-scale as in the cases of this paper) and “piecemeal” social engineering, cf. Popper (1944).

84 Even under Nyerere's “'softer' version of authoritarian high modernism” (Scott (1999), p. 224), living standards fell significantly, and strongly authoritarian and totalitarian reform programmes like those of Lenin and Mao entailed a drastic cost in human lives.

85 cf. Harrison (2005), pp. 1311-1315.86 cf. Cooksey (2011), pp. 74f; Harrison (2005), pp. 1314ff.87 cf. Green (2000), pp. 74, 80-83.

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This disregard for individual agency can be seen as one of the main causes for the failure of

“development”, as efficient social engineering depends on the positive response and active

cooperation of both the target population and the national decision makers.88 If they resist, it is

much more difficult, or even impossible, to achieve the desired outcomes, even if one assumes that

the respective development initiative itself is at least theoretically sound. Apart from the serious

challenge posed by the inadequate measures taken to improve agricultural output, villagisation

faced the problem of a population unwilling to actively take part in the plan. This resulted in the

very low outputs on collective farms and in villagers abandoning the villages at the first

opportunity. And neoliberalism faces both the challenge of a population that is sometimes unwilling

to act “rationally” in the way the planners would prefer, for example choosing not to invest its

surplus resources productively in agriculture or non-farm enterprises, and the challenge of a

government reluctant to faithfully enact neoliberal policy recommendations.

5. Conclusion

As the analysis has shown, both the importance of metis and unorganised knowledge in the

agricultural sector and individual agency of both the rural population and national decision makers

pose decisive limits to social engineering.

Poverty, and especially rural poverty, is still a crucial issue in Tanzania, which, in the light of

climate change and declining land-to-population ratios, will likely become even more serious in the

future, if current trends of stagnant productivity continue. Though population growth in the

countryside is slower than in urban areas, suggesting a migration from the rural to the urban, this is

not so much driven by a “pull” of surplus workers towards the cities because of better opportunities

and higher incomes, but because of a “push” as the carrying capacity of rural areas is exhausted.

This then does not alleviate the problem of rural poverty, but only spreads it into urban areas

because the surplus population cannot be absorbed by an industrial sector which does not exist in

sufficient size.89 Opportunities for non-farm income in rural areas are very limited, and will likely

only experience serious growth if increased agricultural productivity allows rural households to

invest some time and capital in the establishment of non-farm enterprises. Education as a way out of

poverty is also only a limited option, as it is a long-term investment. Furthermore, it is dependent on

88 cf . Scott (1998), p. 225.89 cf. Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1388; Peters (2013), pp. 548f.

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an increase in non-farm employment opportunities and is, therefore, often not regarded as viable

under current circumstances.90 Thus, the growth of output and productivity in smallholder

agriculture appears to be a necessary step towards economic development and poverty reduction.

While often dismissed as a backward concept that has no place in a future modern Africa by

modernisers with evolutionary views of development,91 smallholder agriculture does hold a

significant potential for poverty reduction and for providing the basis of an expansion of non-farm

employment opportunities. Agricultural-led growth, in the African context, has the potential to

reduce poverty at a faster rate than industrial-led growth, especially when driven by improved

production of staple crops.92 A significant number of smallholders are already able to produce for

the market, and given a rising demand for food in urban areas, which, so far surpasses domestic

supply, future prospects for the sale of surplus seem positive.93 And while food crops have been

relatively volatile in the past, growing demand for bio-fuels and the rising fears over climate-change

and population-growth induced food shortages foreshadow that prices might be on an upward

trajectory in the foreseeable future.

Taking this background into account, it can be expected that a variety of actors, from the

Tanzanian government and international institutions to NGOs, will continue their attempts to

stimulate increased economic and social development. Current approaches include the re-

empowerment of the boards and cooperatives by the Tanzanian government, as well as calls for a

renewed development and modernisation effort by both the state and international donors, both

within and outside of neoliberal frameworks like the PRSP.94 However, the re-empowerment of

marketing boards and cooperatives seems like yet another iteration of the same policies that have

already failed under colonialism and socialism and already prove to be a disincentives for rural

households to invest in agriculture,95 and the calls for more state and donor involvement “assume

prioritisation, co-ordination and implementation capacities on the part of both government and

donors that have never been demonstrated in practice.”96

90 cf. Green (2010), p. 82; Jayne et al. (2010), pp. 1390f.91 cf. Peters (2013), p. 550.92 cf. Diao et al. (2010), pp. 1379ff.93 cf. Diao et al. (2010), p. 1381; Jayne et al. (2010), p. 1390). Jayne et al. note that, while consumer preferences in

urban areas are slowly shifting away from the main staple maize, it is still widely consumed and will potentially be in higher demand as a feed staple as demand for meat rises (ibid.).

94 cf. Diao et al. (2010), pp. 1381f; Jayne et al. (2010), pp. 1391-1395; Peters (2013), pp. 551-555.95 cf. Green (2000), pp. 81f.96 Cooksey (2011), p. 72.

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While an analysis of smallholder agriculture in Tanzania does, of course, only offer a very

specific case. Still, the studies of Diao et al. and Jayne et al. show that the issues facing smallholder

agriculture, as well as the failure to stimulate larger-scale increases in agricultural is not only

limited to Tanzania, but is a major concern for many African countries, and the questions

surrounding metis are significant for agricultural reform in general.97 Even more broadly, the

significance of dispersed knowledge, particular to certain points in time an space, and agency,

driven by individual needs and desires, pose an obstacle to all social engineering. They defy

codification and centralisation, yet social engineers rely on centralised and comprehensive

knowledge for their plans and models. As these informations are not readily available and not easily

gathered, social engineers often rely on “blueprints” with little consideration of the specifics of

particular societies and circumstances, and often achieve little or detrimental results.98

Regardless of the approach to development chosen by the Tanzanian state, the limits that

knowledge and agency pose to social engineering are an important aspect to consider with regards

to future policies. The analysis of previous development efforts has shown that the cost of acting on

beliefs and incomplete knowledge might be very high for those targeted by development

interventions, and that their success will depend on recognising individual agency and

accommodating it in future development efforts. In the words of F. A. Hayek:

“The recognition of the insuperable limits to his knowledge ought indeed to teach the

student of society a lesson of humility which should guard him against becoming an

accomplice in men's fatal striving to control society - a striving which makes him not only a

tyrant over his fellows, but which may well make him the destroyer of a civilization which

no brain has designed but which has grown from the free efforts of millions of

individuals.”99

97 cf. Diao et al. (2010); Jayne et al. (2013); Scott (1998).98 Apart from the case of Tanzania studied here, structural adjustment loans and policies in general are an example of

this. An analysis of the World Bank's structural adjustment loans by Easterly shows that despite receiving upwards of 10 loans, per-capita growth in numerous African countries has been insignificant or negative, cf. Easterly (2005). For general thoughts on the “blueprint” character of structural adjustment, cf. Harrison (2005).

99 Hayek (1975), p. 442.

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Appendix A – Social and Economic Indicators for Tanzania

Year Per-capita GDP (constant 2005 US$)

Population growth rate (average annual %)

Arable land (% of land area)

Cereal yield (kg per ha)

Agriculture value added per worker (constant 2005 US$)

Employment in agricultural sector (% of number employed)

Population living on less than one dollar a day (purchasing power parity adjusted) (%)

Population living on less than two dollars a day (purchasing power parity adjusted) (%)

1980 335.896 - 9.0 1,020.2 - - - -

1985 331.640 - 10.2 1,366.8 - - - -

1990 187.282 - 10.2 1,506.5 224.6 - - -

1995 212.751 - 10.0 1,701.6 226.0 - - -

2000 302.429 - 9.7 1,442.3 240.8 - - -

2005 376.223 - 11.0 1,100.0 274.3 76.5 82.4 95.3

2010 534.662 3.1 (urban: 4.8; rural: 2.4)

13.1 1,646.7 295.3 - - -

Source: IMF (http://www.imf.org/), UN Data (http://data.un.org/), World Bank (http://databank.worldbank.org/).

Appendix B – Agricultural Indicators

Country Fertiliser consumption (kg per ha of arable land), 2010

Agriculture value added per worker (constant 2005 US$), 2010

Cereal yield (kg per ha), 2010

Tanzania 6.6 295.3 1,646.7

Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only)

12.9 699.4 1,375.3

East Asia and Pacific (developing countries)

404.0 726.3 4,906.1

Source: World Bank (http://databank.worldbank.org/).

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Knowledge, Agency, and Social Engineering: The Case of Smallholder Agriculture in Tanzania

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