Tibor NeumannKing Wladislaus II: weak ruler or victim of circumstances?

The last Jagiellos to sit on the Bohemian and Hungarianthrones, Wladislaus II (1471/1490-1516) and his son Louis II(1516-1526) do not easily fit with the conference motto. Notjust because there was a personal union between Bohemia andHungary during their reign and a close relative sat on thePolish throne, ensuring peace and friendship among the threekingdoms throughout the period.1 Much more important is thatthe two kings, and especially Wladislaus, have been held byboth Hungarian and Bohemian historiography for centuries asutterly incompetent and damaging to their respective countries.This remains true despite the view among Bohemian arthistorians that his reign marked a kind of golden age, althoughhistorians give credit for this to the Bohemian estates whoruled in the absence of the king rather than the king himself.2

So we might adjust the motto to the phrase, “our commonantiheroes”. Accordingly, we will look at Wladislaus’personality and political abilities and the reasons for thedistorted historical view of him, and touch on the grudges thatarose between the Hungarian and Bohemian estates as a result ofthe personal union.

It is interesting to compare the historiographicaltraditions surrounding the two successive kings MatthiasCorvinus and Wladislaus II. The former was regarded as a tyrant

1 The exception was the struggle for the Hungarian throne between 1490 and 1492, when Wladislaus contended with his brother Prince John Albert, later King of Poland (1492–1501). See KUBINYI, András: Két sorsdöntő esztendő [Two fateful years] (1490–1491). In: Történelmi Szemle, Vol. 33, No. 1 (1991) p. 1–54.

2 On this issue see MACEK, Josef: The Monarchy of the Estates. In: TEICH, Mikuláš (ed.): Bohemia in History. Cambridge University Press 1998, p. 98–116. – Most recently on the reign of Wladislaus and Louis II: KUBINYI, András: AJagelló-kori magyar állam [Hungary in the Jagiello Age]. In: Történelmi Szemle, Vol. 48, No. 3–4 (2006) p. 287–307., BUES, Almut: Die Jagiellonen. Herrscher zwischen Ostsee und Adria (Kohlhammer Urban Taschenbücher Band 646.). Stuttgart, Verlag W. Kohlhammer 2010. p. 134–144.

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in his own time, whose seemingly unnecessary wars bled thecountry white and whose death brought tears through wars ofsuccession and civil wars rather than any feelings of loss.3 Bycontrast, Wladislaus’ 26-year reign in Hungary was a period ofpeace long unknown in the country, and by deliberately stayingout of all wars against Christian lands he left to his son aflourishing kingdom, if one living under shadow of the Ottomanthreat.4 Nonetheless, by the middle of the sixteenth century,the national historical consciousness was already looking backin nostalgia to Matthias’ reign and disdaining the allegedlyfeeble Wladislaus. It is not difficult to see the reasons:defeat at the hands of the Ottoman Empire at Mohács in 1526swept away the medieval Kingdom of Hungary, and the death ofthe young king Louis II cast the country into years of civilwar culminating in the division of the kingdom into threeparts, one under Turkish occupation.5 In that desperatesituation, the rising veneration for Matthias, the conqueringking, is understandable, as is the conclusion that the weaknessof the Jagiellos and the constant backbiting among their baronsbore all of the blame for the disaster of Mohács and itsconsequences.6 Habsburg propaganda also gave a boost to thenegative tradition regarding the Jagiellos, happily putting theblame for the Habsburgs’ serious problems on their immediatepredecessors on the throne. Modern historiography reinforcedthis picture in the nineteenth century, raising Matthias toeven greater heights as a national hero, set against the3 Most recently on the character of the king: KUBINYI, András: Matthias Rex. Budapest, Balassi Kiadó 2008., especially p. 175–189.

4 Most recently on the historical tradition of the Jagiello era: TRINGLI, István: Mohács felé [Towards Mohács] 1490–1526. (Magyarország története 8) Budapest, Kossuth Kiadó 2009, p. 109–111.

5 On the revival of the Matthias tradition that had already emerged in the Jagiello age: KRIZA, Ildikó: Rex iustus – rex clarus (Mátyás király a néphagyományban) [Matthias in popular tradition]. In: RÁZSÓ, Gyula–V. MOLNÁR, László (eds.): Hunyadi Mátyás. Emlékkönyv Mátyás király halálának 500. évfordulójára. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó 1990, p. 363–407.

6 TRINGLI, I: Mohács felé op. cit., p. 109.2

“foreign” Jagiellos, whose reign was looked on with increasingdisparagement.7

Hungarian schoolchildren are all familiar with thepusillanimous “László Dobzse” (Vladislav Dobře), who could onlynod and say, “yes, yes” to any question and was so poor he hadto beg his food from the butchers of Buda. This fictionalisedview, if in a somewhat abstracted form, lives on in Hungarianhistoriography. It is difficult to rid ourselves of a traditionthat was transplanted in the second half of the sixteenthcentury from a story published in 1552 by the Bohemian writerDubravius and, nourished by the prevailing attitudes at thetime, put down deep roots in Hungarian popular thought.8 To getan idea of the lifelike but often unrealistic tales of theBohemian bishop-historian, we might mention his comment thatWladislaus only moved to Buda because upon his coronation asHungarian king he got a taste of Hungarian cuisine and liked itmore than Bohemian fare.9 It hardly calls for proof that one ofthe main conditions the Hungarian estates set on Wladislaus’election as king was that he move to Hungary.10 But could therehave been some real basis to the tale of László Dobzse?

Hungarian historiography has undoubtedly made many attackson the Bohemian (sometimes referred to as Polish) Wladislaus onaccount of his origins: he knew nothing of Hungarian customs,and his inability to speak Hungarian prevented him from being a

7 This antipathy is still alive. See e.g. ENGEL, Pál: The Realm of St Stephen. A History of Medieval Hungary 895–1526. London–New York, I. B. Tauris Publishers 2001,p. 347.

8 Iohannis Dubravii Olomuzensis episcopi Historia Bohemica. Francofurti, 1687, p. 831–832. Cf. Gáspár Heltai’s Chronica of 1575: Gáspár Heltai: Krónika az magyaroknak dolgairól. [Chronicle of the deeds of the Hungarians] Adapted for publicationby Margit KULCSÁR, introduction by Péter KULCSÁR. Budapest, Magyar Helikon 1981, p. 447–448.

9 DUBRAVIUS op. cit, p. 809, cf. HELTAI, G: op. cit, p. 413.

10 KUBINYI, András: A királyi tanács az 1490. évi interregnum idején (II. Ulászló választási feltételeinek létrejötte) [The royal council during the 1490 interregnum (The preparation of the terms of Wladislaus II’s election)] In: Levéltári Közlemények, Vol. 48–49 (1978) p. 67.

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fully-fledged king. It is certainly true, indeed self-evident,that Wladislaus came to Hungary without any knowledge of thelanguage. Several contemporary descriptions state that he spoketo the Hungarian Diet in Czech, his words interpreted by hisCzech-speaking confidant Bálint Farkas, Bishop of Várad (nephewof Jan Filipec, Chancellor of Moravia).11 It seems probable,however, that during his long reign he picked up someHungarian, and could at least understand what people weresaying. But he had little need of it. Several contemporarysources confirm that the King had a good grasp of Latin, andcertainly used it for more than receiving foreign envoys. Healso spoke Latin when dealing with his Hungarian subjects, suchas at sessions of the royal council.12 The royal court of Budaat that time was nothing if not international. It wasorganisationally divided between Hungarians and Bohemians, butowing to the Jagiellos’ Polish links, we occasionally find aPolish nobleman among their ranks.13 What interconnected thetwo or three groups was the Latin language. In connection withthe King’s speaking Czech, it is interesting from a Hungarianpoint of view to note, as is known from several sources, thatWladislaus took among his closest (although certainly not mostpowerful) confidants men from Slavonia and the south-easternpart of the Kingdom of Hungary, the lands of today’s Croatiaand Slovakia, people who spoke a Slavic language.14 In orderthat the Hungarian nobles would serve within the orbit of the11 e.g. at the Diet of 1492 and 1496: I[osephus] FÓGEL – B[ela] IVÁNYI – L[adislaus] JUHÁSZ (eds.): Antonius de Bonfinis: Rerum Ungaricarum decades Vol. I–IV. Lipsiae 1936–1941. Vol. IV, p. 228–229., 273.

12 See e.g. BERZEVICZY, Albert (ed.): Aragoniai Beatrix magyar királyné életére vonatkozó okiratok [Documents on the life of Beatrix of Aragon, Queen of Hungary]. Budapest 1914, p. 392. (1496 source) – LAKATOS, Bálint: A tatai országgyűlés és diplomáciai háttere [The Tata Diet and its diplomatic background] (1508–1510). In: LÁSZLÓ, János (ed.): A diplomácia válaszútján. 500 éve volt Tatán országgyűlés (Annales Tataienses VI.), Tata 2010, p. 59. (n. 106) (1510 source).

13 KUBINYI, András: A királyi udvar élete a Jagelló-korban [Life at the royal court in the Jagiello era]. In: KOSZTA, László (ed.): Kelet és Nyugat között. Történeti tanulmányok Kristó Gyula tiszteletére. Szeged 1995, p. 321.

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King, he must have encountered the natural demands of theHungarian estates: they would have taken objection if he hadchosen none but Bohemians as his closest courtiers. Suchlinguistic difficulties are of course not encountered in LouisII’s reign, because Wladislaus II taught his childrenHungarian, as well as Czech, German and Latin.15 The King’smother tongue has been dwelt upon in consequence of prejudiceswritten into the later historical tradition, but is not arelevant criterion for judging his rule.

Perhaps more important for our present subject is to lookat Wladislaus’ abilities as a sovereign. The story that he justnodded at everything and was pulled this way and that by thepoliticians of the day according to their own interests is awild exaggeration, nothing more than a caricature. If we are toseek some truth in the story, then we could mention the lastyear or years of his life, after he had suffered severalstrokes (the first in 150416) and was stricken by severe gout.During his extended periods of sickness, his participation ingovernment was of course limited, but his approval was stillsought for important decisions. By the time he died in 1516 atthe age of sixty, his advanced age (by the standards of thetime) and serious illnesses must indeed have created theimpression of a weary king. This comes through clearly in his

14 His closest confidant in the 1490s was the cubicularius Lőrinc Bradács of Ladomérc, from Zagreb County. See particularly entries into the royal accounts of 1493–1495: ENGEL, Johann Christian: Geschichte des ungarischen Reiches und seiner Nebenländer. I. Band. Halle 1797. passim. It is also possible that Péter Korlátkövi (sometimes Korlátsky), a landowner from near the Moravian border, who appears as a cubicularius from 1502 onwards and later became High Steward, also had an advantage of speaking both Hungarian and Czech. See NEUMANN, Tibor: A Korlátköviek. Egy előkelő család története és politikai szereplése a 15–16. században [The Korlátkövis. History and political significance of a noble family in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries] (A Győri Egyházmegyei Levéltár Kiadványai. Források, feldolgozások 5.) Győr 2007, p. 55, 118–120.

15 BALOGH, István: Velenczei diplomaták Magyarországról [Venetian diplomats on Hungary] (1500–1526). Szeged 1929. xxviii. (Quoted in: TRINGLI, I: Mohács felé [Towards Mohács] op. cit., p. 79.)

16 TRINGLI, I: Mohács felé op. cit., p. 44.5

changing signature: the finely-formed script of his earliercharters degenerated in the final year of his life to a simplemonogram W, written with a trembling hand.17 But let us examinehow he governed before that.

Figures 1–3: Wladislaus II’s signatures from 1490, 1496 and 1516 (Neumann T: Royal signatures op. cit. p. 47–49)

The period is generally seen in both Bohemia and Hungaryas one of steep decline of royal power, but the issue is infact much more complicated. One thing is certain: as Hungarian

17 NEUMANN, Tibor: Királyi aláírás és pecséthasználat a Jagelló-kor elején [Royal signature and seals in the early Jagiello era], In: Turul Vol. 83 No.2 (2010) p. 34, 47–49.

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sources clearly demonstrate, the authority and charisma of theoffice of king were not lacking during Wladislaus’s reign. Weknow only of a few cases when the decisions of the king and theroyal council which supported his government were notfulfilled.18 In addition, the King – unlike his government inBohemia – appointed his baronial office-bearers and prelatesfreely, at his own discretion, and this consolidated hisauthority.19 The foundations of power were thus in place, butthere were indeed several circumstances which restricted theKing’s political scope for action. Chief among these was thedecrease in crown revenues. Few kings had taken over governmentwith so little behind them as did Wladislaus, who haddifficulty even in taking occupation of Buda Castle when hecame to Hungary. A large proportion of the royal castles werein the possession of King Matthias’ illegitimate son JohnCorvinus, and the other royal revenues (such as border customs)had been mortgaged by the royal council during the interregnumto the Szapolyai family (which King Matthias had inexplicablymade extremely rich) and to others.20 It would thus be mistakento think that Wladislaus misdirected a large part of theHungarian crown revenues, because only a fraction of them werein his power when he ascended to the throne. Although thelegacy of Matthias – the Corvinus and Szapolyai questions –caused internal political problems throughout the period to thetwo Jagiello kings, Wladislaus, by the end of the wars ofsuccession in 1492, consolidated his rule with a strong handand recovered some domains and revenues either freely, or by a

18 An exceptional counter-example is the double banate government which formed in the Dalmatian-Croatian-Slavonian Banate in 1507. See PÁLOSFALVI, Tamás: Bajnai Both András és a szlavón bánság. Szlavónia, Európa és a törökök [András Both of Bajna and the Slavonian Banate. Slavonia, Europe and the Turks] 1504–1513. In: NEUMANN, Tibor – RÁCZ, György (eds.): Honoris causa. Tanulmányok Engel Pál tiszteletére (Társadalom- és művelődéstörténeti tanulmányok 40. – Analecta Mediaevalia III.). Budapest–Piliscsaba 2009, p. 251–301.

19 KUBINYI, A.: A Jagelló-kori magyar állam op. cit, p. 295.

20 KUBINYI, András: Két sorsdöntő esztendő op. cit, p. 40–41.7

political deal, or at a greatly reduced price.21 Thecurtailment of revenue was exacerbated by an even moreoppressive phenomenon: alone among European countries, theHungarian-Bohemian king had to maintain a standing army andborder fort system to face the constant Ottoman threat, andthis greatly drained the budget of the royal treasury yearafter year.22 If we want to present the Hungarian Jagiello eraat its simplest, we could say that the Turkish problemafflicted the country with a continual budget deficit, and thisgreatly weakened the king’s negotiating position against thewealthiest prelates and barons – i.e. the treasury’s largestcreditors, such as the Szapolyai family. The king was neverable to break the power of these two groups, and could at mostplace curbs on them, with varying success. Wladislaus was notwanting in decisiveness: in the south of the country, the Kingfought a victorious campaign at the turn of 1494–1495 againstDuke Lőrinc Újlaki – who had defied his orders – and capturedall of the wealthy duke’s castles. And although he soonpardoned Újlaki (graciousness was a prominent component of theKing’s image), he retained his castles for several years, andindeed some of them he never returned.23

Contemporary descriptions reinforce the proposition thatWladislaus’ personality was the diametrically opposite to thatof the autocratic Matthias. An Italian diplomat said of him: hespeaks excellent Latin, is extremely pious and religious, buthis grasp of politics is hampered because, wrote this Italianwitness, used to other ways, he does not put anybody to death,and the kingdom is ruled by his all-powerful chancellors rather

21 NEUMANN, Tibor: A tatai vár és urai a Jagelló-korban [Tata Castle and itslords in the Jagiello era]. In: LÁSZLÓ, János (ed.): A diplomácia válaszútján op.cit., p. 68–69.

22 KUBINYI, András: Magyarország hatalmasai és a török veszély a Jagelló-korban [Power holders in Hungary and the Ottoman peril in the Jagiello era](1490-1526). In: ZOMBORI, István (ed.): Közép-Európa harca a török ellen a 16. század első felében. Budapest, METEM 2004, p. 117–146.

23 For a description of the campaign, see BONFINI op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 258–267.

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then the King himself. He also put the King him down asparsimonious, in stark distinction from the later tradition.24

Domestic sources, however, put a somewhat different tint onthis characterisation. It was certainly not only the King’s ownpropaganda which spread the impression of a peace-loving andbenevolent ruler. As well as meeting the natural demands of acountry longing for peace, it was a characteristic which fittedwith his pious nature. His endeavours for peace and refusal towage war did not, of course, always match the demands of theHungarian nobility, with their predilection for the militaryvirtues. Wladislaus was regarded as sickly, and after hiselection, his younger brother Duke John Albert of Poland,renowned as a warrior, was much more to the nobles’ liking.25

Wladislaus’ greatest strength in the political arena seemsto have been his diplomatic sense. Since had had no extensiveroyal domains to rely on, he had to play the estates offagainst each other at the Diets to achieve his goals, and atthis he proved very skilful. Like other Western Europeanrulers, he did indeed entrust the everyday burdens ofgovernment to his chancellors and treasurers, but if these –like Cardinal Bakóc, later Papal candidate – got hold of toomuch power, then he rallied the nobles and with their supporteasily removed them or at least curtailed their power.26 Atother times he removed baronial ministers with the help of theprelates.27 It is amusing the way Wladislaus managed to put offfor two years his marriage promise to King Matthias’ Italian-

24 From a report by Venetian envoy Sebastian Zustignan in 1503. See BALOGH, I: Velenczei diplomaták [Venetian diplomats], op. cit. vi–vii. Cf. TRINGLI,I: Mohács felé op. cit., p. 31.

25 From a report by Milanese envoy Francesco Tranchedino in 1491. See. Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára, Kézirattár (Budapest), MS. 4936. (1491. aug. 31.)

26 See the trial for embezzlement of the treasurer, Zsigmond Ernuszt (BONFINI op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 273–275), and the seizing of the royal seals from Royal Chancellor Tamás Bakócz in 1497: BÓNIS, György: A jogtudó értelmiség a Mohács előtti Magyarországon [Jurisprudent Elite in Late Medieval Hungary]. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó 1971. p. 312.

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born widow Queen Beatrix, who despite being no stranger tointrigue, took a long time to realise that Wladislaus was usingher for his own purposes. That the King managed to maintain inher the belief that he would marry her publicly after the warsof succession is surely one of the best examples of hispolitical cunning.28

This diplomatic sense is palpable in other areas too.Events of previous decades had ensured that the Bohemian andHungarian estates bore several mutual grudges. Wladislaus hadto hold the balance in these disputes. Hungarian historiographyfrequently puts forward the pejorative view that Wladislauspandered to Bohemian interests throughout his Hungarian reign.This is definitely an exaggeration. The Hungarian estates setout their demands in July 1490, after Wladislaus’ election.These clearly reveal their fears for the consequences of theirelected king also being the ruler of Bohemia.29 Firstly, theyinsisted that the King spend most of his time in Hungary: thiswas fulfilled, because it is well recorded that Wladislaus onlyvisited Bohemia four times after 1490. Elsewhere theystipulated that he could not grant Hungarian estates toforeigners, and could not appoint foreigners to offices inHungary. Wladislaus largely respected this too. He didoccasionally grant or mortgage lands in Hungary to Bohemianbarons, but not to an extent that would have triggered theprotest of the estates.30 (Incidentally, it would be

27 See e.g. the dismissal of István Bátori, Voivode of Transylvania in 1493:NEUMANN, Tibor: Bátori István politikai szerepe II. Ulászló uralkodása alatt [The political role of István Bátori during the reign of Wladislaus II] (1490–1493). In: Szabolcs-szatmár-beregi Szemle Vol. 44 No. 1 (2009) p. 108–113.

28 BERZEVICZY, A. (ed.): Aragoniai Beatrix op. cit. passim. – BERZEVICZY, Albert: Beatrix királyné [Queen Beatrix] (1457–1508). Történelmi élet- és korrajz. Budapest 1908, passim.

29 KUBINYI, A: A királyi tanács op. cit, p. 65–68.

30 In the first six years of his rule, the King mortgaged or granted Hungarian estates only to Jan ze Šelnberka, Royal Chancellor of Bohemia, Captain-General Hanuš Haugvic z Biskupic and cubicularius Burjan z Lichtnburka

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interesting for historians from the two countries to make ajoint presentation of Bohemian nobles who were also active inHungary.) The Hungarians also demanded that Bohemians beexcluded from meetings of the Hungarian royal council. Itseems, however, that Wladislaus relied on his tried and trustedBohemian barons, especially at the start of his reign. Forexample, the King solicited the opinion of the Bohemian HighChancellor Jan ze Šelnberka on the matter of appointing aprelate in 1495.31 The King only refused to satisfy the demandsin respect of the national status of the lands occupied by KingMatthias in Moravia, Silesia and Lužice. The 1479 Treaty ofOlomouc left these in possession of the Hungarian Crown undermortgage, but after Matthias died, they naturally reverted tothe Bohemian Crown. The Hungarian estates several times askedWladislaus to have charters made stating that he possessedthese territories as King of Hungary rather than King ofBohemia. Wladislaus promised to satisfy this request, but neverdid so, and kept silent until the issue dropped off theagenda.32

It is also true that his residence in Buda – on which theBohemian estates several times expressed their displeasure –eventually resulted in him directing foreign and dynasticpolicy involving both Bohemia and Hungary via his Hungariancouncil. After the death of Emperor Maximilian in 1519, theBohemian estates were enraged that Louis II exercised his rightof Elector in the election of the King of the Romans withoutconsulting them.33

a z Bítova. For the data, see NEUMANN, T: Királyi aláírás op. cit., p. 43, NEUMANN, T: Békekötés Pozsonyban – országgyűlés Budán. A Jagelló-Habsburg kapcsolatok egy fejezete [Peace conference in Pressburg – Diet in Buda. A chapter in Jagiello-Habsburg relations] (Második közlemény). In: Századok Vol. 145 No. 2 (2011) p. 304. – We also know of mortgaging to Bohemians indirectly in another two cases.

31 BONFINI op. cit. Vol. IV, p. 271.

32 TRINGLI, I: Mohács felé op. cit., p. 39.

33 Ibid., p. 80.11

To sum up, Wladislaus II comes across from contemporaryHungarian sources as a man of considerable strengths. He was,however, greatly restricted in his choice of action by a verysevere financial crisis, due in part to the damaging acts ofKing Matthias, but most of all to the continual Ottoman threat.It is also important to note that the historical judgement ofthe Jagiello era in Hungary has always drawn on a distortedtradition deriving from the reverberations of the period in thefollowing centuries, rather than on a proper study ofcontemporary sources.

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