Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines

Running head: KIDNAPPING IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 1

Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines

Sean O'Connor

American Military University

Research Methods

NSEC 500

Dr. William Hanson

September 23, 2014

KIDNAPPING IN THE SOUTHERN PHILIPPINES 2

Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines

Introduction

Kidnapping and slavery have a long history in the Philippines. The Moros in the

Southern Philippines engaged heavily in piracy, slavery, and were known to capture and ransom

Spanish missionaries. By the 1800s there was already an established scale for how much ransom

should be paid for an individual. However, in the 1990s there was a surge of kidnapping

incidents and by the mid-1990s the Philippines had been labelled the “kidnapping capital of

Asia”. In spite of the rise of kidnappings, over the last 24+ years there has only been a limited

study of the event. As of 2009 kidnapping had not been listed among the Philippine National

Police (PNP) list of index crimes “which are serious enough in nature and which occur with

sufficient frequency and regularity such that they can serve as an index to the crime situation” 1.

To put this in perspective; cattle rustling is included as an index crime. Another thing that

happened that contributed to the rise in kidnappings over time was the creation of the Abu

Sayyaf Group (ASG) in 1991. In 1993, they carried out their first kidnapping and eventually

became so successful at executing kidnappings and making a profit that it inspired the creation of

multiple other kidnapping groups.

1. Verzosa, Jesus A., April 22, 2009, Philippine National Police, Letter of

Instruction 02/09, Unit Crime Periodic Report, Camp Crame, Quezon City,

Philippines


To further add to the kidnapping problem is that the Southern Philippines has

become a conflict region with four separate insurgent groups. Because of this, the state is not

able to adequately enforce the rule of law in the region. The proliferation of illegal firearms and

groups of armed men anxious for money provide a steady pool of recruits for kidnapping groups.

Finally, the weak economy and widespread poverty provide motivation for individuals to engage

in the illicit economy and involvement in criminal activities.

Research method

This study examines what determines kidnapping targets, motives, and the outcome of

the kidnapping victim in the Southern Philippines. This was done by doing both content analysis

of documents and collection and analysis of archival data.

Hypothesis:

1. That foreigners are less likely to be subject to kidnapping in the Southern

Philippines than a local national

2. Unlike kidnappings in Iraq and Syria, kidnapping in the Philippines (even if done

by a terrorist group) is done primarily for financial/economic reasons

3. Most kidnapping victims in the Philippines are returned alive after a ransom is

paid.

Dependant variable: The likelihood of being kidnapped

The motive for kidnapping

The result of the kidnapping


Independent variable: The nationality of potential victims

The ideology of kidnap groups

The violence of the group

Review of Literature

There is no shortage of literature discussing kidnappings. However, most of this literature

mentions it in passing when discussing the big picture of terrorism or travel safety and very little

of it focused directly at the problem in the Philippines. If someone is looking for a specific case

or statistics, it is difficult to track these numbers and there seem to be extremes and inconsistency

in reporting. Even the Philippine government has no clear guidelines for counting kidnappings: if

a group is kidnapped together is it 1 case of mass kidnapping, or multiple individual cases? (Lara

and Schoofs, 2013). To add to the inconsistent data, not all kidnapping cases are reported. Many

times the case is resolved privately without police involvement. This skews the results of any

study significantly.

Probably the best look at kidnapping in the Philippines from other than the perspective of

“terrorism” is in a work edited by Fransisco Lara and Steven Schoofs called Out of the Shadows:

Violent Conflict and the Real Economy of Mindanao. This book is a compilation of work from

several researchers regarding the illicit economy of Mindanao; the largest island in the Southern

Philippines. In this book Eric Gutierrez contributed a very thorough chapter about kidnapping in

the Southern Philippines. In his work, Gutierrez breaks kidnappers into three distinct groups:

Bandits, Villain’s, and Bosses. The significance of this is that it looks at kidnapping in Mindanao

as something other than terrorism or conducted by terrorist organizations. Rather, he ties


kidnapping to other factors such as instability caused by conflict that feeds an illicit economy

and the economic and political gains achieved from it.

A fairly good “middle of the road” look at kidnapping in the Philippines is a journal

article by McKenzie O’Brian entitled “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu

Sayyaf's Kidnapping Activities” that describes kidnapping by the Abu Sayyaf Group (an Islamic

separatist group that is the most active kidnapping group in the Philippines) as fluctuating

between crime and terrorism. With the blurring of lines between terrorist groups and

transnational criminal organizations, this is an important look at how these lines blur in regards

to kidnapping in the Southern Philippines. This work is unique because, while others have

written about the broad subject of the crime-terror nexus (Makarenko, 2004), O’Brian applies it

to a specific group. His work reviews the history of the Abu Sayyaf Group from inception to the

time the paper was published in 2012 giving special consideration to the times when the group

transitioned from a terrorist group with a political agenda to a criminal organization seeking

wealth.

When discussing the motivations of kidnappings by terrorist it is important to note

ideological motivations. James J.F. Forest’s work “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970-2010:

Is Ideological Orientation Relevant?” is a study in ideological motivations. He looks at ethnic,

political, and religious motivations. While he does address the Philippines specifically, it is a

small part of the big picture he is trying to achieve. It is important because he notes how

communists, ethnic separatist, and Islamic extremist groups justify the act of kidnapping and

seeks to explore whether or not ideology effects propensity. The report offers some very good

hints at motivations, but finds that the size of the group has a greater effect on whether or not a

group will kidnap that ideology does.


In his work “The Social Organization of Violence Toward Hostages: Does

Violence in Captivity Indicate Which Kidnappers Will Kill?” by Everard M. Phillips operates on

the assumption that how a hostage is treated may indicate the hostage’s likelihood to survive. His

research suggest that the intensity of violence during captivity is more important to whether a

hostage will be killed than the criminal or radical orientation of the kidnappers. Phillips takes his

study a step further in “How Do Kidnappers Kill Hostages? A Comparison of Terrorist and

Criminal Groups”. Here Phillips divides homicides that occur in kidnapping into three

categories: execution, manual, and slaughter. The intent of the study was to determine whether

the criminal or radical orientation of the kidnappers related to the rationality of killing hostages,

and the methods used to commit the murder. At the conclusion of the study it revealed that

kidnappers appear rational in releasing hostages when a ransom is paid, but that a portion of

kidnappers may be emotionally unstable and capable of violent outburst. Both of these findings

could be important in attempting to determine the potential outcomes for a kidnapping victim.

The U.S. State Department releases crime and terror safety warnings through the

embassy of each country. This is a quick guide to let travellers know what risk to be aware of

while visiting a country. For the Philippines, the State Department warns of high risks of

kidnapping by terror groups (notably the Abu Sayyaf Group) in the Southern Philippines.

However, sometimes it appears that there is a hint of political bias when looking at kidnappings

in the Philippines and that both the U.S. government and the Philippine government may have an

interest in reporting kidnappings as a terrorist activity or conducted by a terrorist group.

The primary issue with most literature pertaining to kidnapping in general, and in

the Philippines and other “hot spots “particularly, is that after 9/11, there has been a push to tie

state or regional terror/insurgent groups to kidnapping and other crimes. While there is no doubt


that there are links between terror groups and criminal groups, it sometimes confuses the issue.

Without a clear understanding of contributing factors and motivations, it is difficult to combat

this crime. Further by putting all kidnapping at the foot of radical elements and disregarding the

role of economic kidnapping it prevents awareness and prevention. This paper will attempt to

identify how kidnapping victims are targeted, the motivations of kidnapping groups, and the

potential outcomes for kidnapping victims with a focus on the Southern Philippines.

Findings and Analysis

The Targets

In order to effectively combat kidnapping and ensure the safety and security of the

population we must understand how kidnappers target their victims. With the high levels of

poverty and little chance to move up economically, the illicit economy such as drugs,

kidnapping, and various entrepreneurs of violence is sometimes seen as a favourable option. In

1993, there were reportedly 42 kidnapping groups operating in the country with 23 of those

operating in Mindanao (Shadows). The most notorious terrorist group in the Philippines is the

Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) operating mostly on the islands of Jolo, Basilan, and Mindanao. They

have turned kidnapping into a highly lucrative business conducting 137 documented kidnappings

from 1991 through August 2011 and is believed to have raised over $35 million from kidnapping

activities. (O’Brian, 2012). While they have not been shown to be especially selective on their

choice of victims (they have targeted both foreigners and locals) it would appear that they prefer

to kidnap locals. While members of the state population may not be able to leverage as high of a

ransom as foreigners, they can be ransomed more quickly with less attention from security

forces.


Locals that are kidnapped are usually either wealthy enough to be able to pay the ransom

quickly in cash or ordinary people that government officials can ransom. Among the wealthy, it

has been the successful Chinese-Filipino business owners that have been targeted for kidnapping

the most. The communities of the Southern Philippines that support the kidnapping business

(provide victims) are those that typically possess enough local economic prosperity to support it.

School teachers and nurses tend to be the most commonly targeted of the ordinary population of

Mindanao and Jolo. The other members of the local population that have been occasionally

targeted are those that can be used to influence local elections by causing embarrassment to a

political rival. This is a fairly vague percentage of the population and very difficult to calculate

what percentage of kidnapping victims may fall into this category.

Locals may not bring as much ransom, but the risk involved are significantly less. Only

about 20% of kidnapping victims are foreign (Briggs, 2014). Though no particular foreign

nationality seems to be preferred, the kidnappers have shown that they prefer “soft targets” for

the locations to conduct kidnappings and much of the kidnapping of foreigners has spilled over

across the border to soft targets in Malaysia. An example of this would the 21 kidnapping

victims taken from a resort in Sipadan, Malaysia in 2000 and then moved to an ASG safe area on

the island of Jolo in the Southern Philippines (Briggs, 2014). A review of multiple news sources

indicates that from 2000-2014 there have been approximately 43 kidnappings from the East

Coast of Sabah, Malaysia that have been strongly linked to the Abu Sayyaf Group in Jolo.

The Motivations

There are four separate insurgent groups operating in the Southern Philippines following

three separate ideologies (religious, communist, and ethnic). However, as far as motivations are

concerned, ideology has very little to do with the group’s decision to engage in kidnapping


(Forest, 2012). While the kidnapping itself may not be driven by ideology, the motive for the

kidnapping may be to extort a change in policy related to the group’s ideology. Though the ASG

has become the most significant kidnapping threat in the Southern Philippines, they have not

resorted to kidnapping as an act of terror as seen in recent news regarding Iraq and Syria. In

2007, the ASG was implicated in the beheadings of 10 Philippine Marines on the island of

Basilan. While this was done as an act of terror, it was done following an insurgent combat

operation and not while engaged in the criminal act of kidnapping.

However, there appears to be a grey area between economic kidnappings and those to

influence policy. In the past what has started out as a political motivation has been resolved

economically. In the case of the 2000 kidnapping of 21 hostages from Sipadan, Malaysia, the

ASG originally demanded political concessions and attempted to coerce policy (O’Brian, 2012).

Eventually the case was settled by payment of a ransom. Blurring the border between political

and economic kidnappings even more are the string of kidnappings that may occur around the

time of local elections. These may be conducted to embarrass or intimidate a rival politician in

hopes of influencing the election or as a method of “fund-raising” to support their own

campaigns.

Kidnapping in the Philippines sky rocketed in the 1990s prompting the country to be

named the “kidnapping capital of Asia”. In 1997, it was estimated that approximately 310

million Philippine Pesos in ransom money were paid to various groups (Lara and Schoofs, 2013).

That would amount to billions of Philippine Pesos paid in ransom over the last 24 years since the

kidnapping rate first began to escalate. The ASG has become so adept at profiting from

kidnapping that it has inspired multiple other groups that only engage in the business of kidnap

for ransom. According to Control Risk Group, the median ransom settlement in the Philippines


in 1999 was $78,000 U.S. dollars (Briggs, 2014). In a mostly rural economy based upon

sustenance farming, it is understandable why the illicit economy and kidnapping in particular can

be appealing.

Another way that kidnapping gives an economic reward is by serving as a form of start-

up capital. The conflict and instability along with significant property rights issues has created a

unique market in Mindanao. Armed groups are often hired to guarantee ownership of property by

landowners and by squatters to secure access to land they do not own. The instability, economic

insecurity, and the weak local and central government have created conditions were the ability to

strike back has become the best guarantee of security (Gutierrez & Borras, 2004). In order to

gain a reputation in providing these services someone in the business of violence first has to have

a reputation for violence and the ability to earn fear and respect. Kidnapping and extortion have

often served as start-up capital for such business ventures.

Survival Outcome

There are several factors that affect whether or not a hostage survives the kidnapping

incident. Taking the ransom completely out of the equation, factors that decide a hostage’s

survivability may include the ideology of the group, the size of the organization, how well

organized the organization is, and the intensity of violence displayed during the kidnapping.

Though there has been no information or statistics specific for violence and survival in the

Southern Philippines, an analysis of general available data would suggest that geography and

culture have less to do with survivability than with other factors.

When looking at how different ideological groups view outsiders the term “othering” is

used. This term simply differentiates between “us” and “them”. The more “othering” that occurs


the less human the “them” are in the eyes of the kidnapper and it becomes easier to inflict harm.

Religious and ethnic groups have been found to have strong “othering” components to their

ideology and can become indiscriminately violent. On the other hand, groups like the New

People’s Army (NPA) that have a Marxist ideology tend to display less “othering” (Forest,

2012). The NPA may be less likely to become violent with a local hostage because of fear it

would have a negative impact on their ability recruit and mobilize the masses in pursuit of the

utopian vision. Political insurgents are more likely to consider political implications than a group

that is motivated by religion. Though this is a factor that must be taken into consideration, it does

not appear to be among the prime reasons that a hostage may be killed.

The size of the group seems to play a factor in the outcome of a kidnapping situation. The

larger the group the greater their capabilities and the likelihood that they will have people

capable of great violence and murder. Research has shown that how lethal a terrorist

organization is has more to do with their capability than to how radical their ideology is (Forest,

2012). However, ASG involvement with kidnapping is when there is a peak in membership. Part

of this is because members are drawn by the potential for income that is available through

kidnapping. When the ASG focuses less on criminal activity and more on terrorist activity is

when membership is typically at its lowest and the group has a more radical ideology. Another

reason for this increase in size is because of the infrastructure that needs to exist in order to keep

a hostage for long durations (sometimes over a year) on an island as small as Jolo.

Experience and organization of a kidnapping group appear to be key for a favourable

outcome for a kidnapping victim. Groups that come together to perform a kidnapping suddenly

to take advantage of an opportunity can be very dangerous for the victim. They typically do not

plan on conducting future kidnappings so have little to lose by killing a hostage. Common


criminal groups kill their hostages in 52% of the kidnappings. These common criminals are also

more prone to violence and are more likely to express frustration and anger through violent

outburst. If the ransom is not paid this violence extends to how the hostage is murdered in that

the majority were either strangled or beaten to death (manual) and a small percentage had their

throats cut (slaughter style) (Phillips, 2004). Organized criminal and radical groups, especially

groups that are in the business of kidnapping, are more likely to release a hostage after the

ransom has been paid. Organized groups release their hostages in 69.6% of cases after the

ransom had been paid (Phillips, 2004). Killing a hostage after the ransom is paid makes it more

difficult for their business to continue. When a hostage had been killed, it was usually in an

execution style with the slaughter style of killing seldom used. The level of organization appears

to be tied to the intensity of violence the hostage suffers during captivity, but also in their odds of

release and the method used in their murder.

Conclusion

Local nationals are kidnapped more often than foreigners and the majority of foreigners

are kidnapped from “soft targets”, often from Malaysia. Though foreigners may be able to fetch

a higher ransom it brings unwanted attention from security forces and the group may be forced to

hold the hostages for a long period of time. Though usually the cost of holding hostages can be

passed on to who-ever is paying the ransom, holding a hostage longer increases the risk.

The usual reason for kidnapping in the Southern Philippines is for economic benefit.

Foreigners will typically be kidnapped only for economic reasons while local nationals may also

be kidnapped for various political reasons. The lack of a legal economy, large groups of

unemployed armed men, and the inability of the government to provide security and rule of law

create an environment where economic kidnappings provide the ability for social advancement.


Though it appears that terrorist organization with rumoured Al Qaeda ties is responsible for the

majority of the kidnappings, there have been no cases of kidnapping as a terrorist tactic.

Individuals kidnapped by a professional kidnapping group have a higher chance of

survival than those abducted by common criminal groups or those kidnapped as a crime of

opportunity. It is common for the ASG to conduct kidnapping operations while they have a large

membership to facilitate the infrastructure needed, large groups tend to increase the chances of

harm coming to a hostage. More information would need to be gathered to determine if the ASG

falls victim to this rule as well.

Unfortunately, there is not sufficient information available for a comprehensive

collection and analysis due to the very nature of the crime. In the future, research interviews

should be conducted with kidnap victims after release to determine other aspects of how they

may have been targeted and levels of violence and overall treatment during captivity. An attempt

to account for variables such as environment, culture, leadership, competition, etc. should be

made in future research. It is likely that case studies based upon specific kidnapping groups in

the region would create a better understanding the problem.

References

Briggs, Rachel. The Kidnapping Business. (London, Foreign Policy Center, 2001) Accessed:

September 13, 2014. EBSCO Database

Forest, James J.F., “Kidnapping by Terrorist Groups, 1970-2010: Is Ideological Orientation

Relevant?” Crime & Delinquency 58, no. 5 (2012): 769-797. Accessed: September 13,

2014. DOI: 10.1177/0011128712452962


Gutierrez, E., & Borras, Jr., S. (2004). “The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and Misdirected State

Policies” [Entire issue]. Policy Studies, 8

Lara, Francisco and Steven Schoofs eds. Out of the Shadows:Violent Conflict and the Real

Economy of Mindanao. (n.p: International Alert, 2013). Accessed February 2014.

http://international-alert.org/news/out-shadows

Makarenko, T. (2004, February). The Crime–Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay between

Transnational Organised Crime and Terrorism. Global Crime, 6(1), 129-145. Retrieved

from http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/docs/publications/Makarenko_GlobalCrime.pdf

O’Brian, McKenzie. (2012) Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf's

Kidnapping Activities, Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no.2 (2012): 320-336.

Accessed: August 25, 2014. DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2011.648679

Phillips, Everard M. “The Social Organization of Violence Toward Hostages: Does Violence in

Captivity Indicate Which Kidnappers Will Kill?” Journal of Interpersonal Violence 28,

no. 6 (2012): 1314-1337. Accessed September 14, 2014. DOI:

10.1177/0886260512468249

Phillips, Everard M. “How Do Kidnappers Kill Hostages? A Comparison of Terrorist and

Criminal Groups”, Homicide Studies (February 2014): 1-26. Accessed: September 14,

2014. DOI: 10.1177/1088767914522466

Turner, Mark, “The Kidnapping Crisis in the Philippines 1991--1993: Context and

Management”, Journal of Contingencies & Crisis Management 3, no. 1 (March 1995): 1

– 11. Accessed August 19, 2014.

http://web.b.ebscohost.com.ezproxy1.apus.edu/ehost/detail/detail?vid=4&sid=2f5ddf92-

65a0-48bb-8422-

1ce12fca32c0%40sessionmgr110&hid=123&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZSZzY2

9wZT1zaXRl#db=bth&AN=10478964

United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security. Philippines Crime and Safety

Report 2012. Accessed August 30, 2014.

https://www.osac.gov/Pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=12026




https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=13574



https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15294

Criteria Exemplary 19-20

Accomplished 16-18

Developing 13-15

Beginning 1-12

Unacceptable 0

Total

Synthesis of Knowledge

19

Foundation of Knowledge

20

Application of Knowledge

20

Organization of Ideas/Format

20

Writing and Research Skill

20

Total 99

Sean, this was an extremely good paper, which met all assignment requirements. Your

paper was logical, and well-written. Your writing was strong throughout. Super work.

Dr. Bill

Kidnapping in the Southern Philippines

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