Khrushchev's 'Second' First Secretaries: Career Trajectories after the Unification of Oblast Party...

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William A. Clark

Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History, Volume 14, Number2, Spring 2013 (New Series), pp. 279-312 (Article)

P bl h d b l v P bl h rDOI: 10.1353/kri.2013.0026

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Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History 14, 2 (Spring 2013): 279–312.

Articles

Khrushchev’s “Second” First Secretaries

Career Trajectories after the Unification of Oblast Party Organizations

William a. Clark

When, on 17 October 1964, Pravda provided an indirect explanation for the removal of Nikita Khrushchev from his positions as first secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, it cited among his weaknesses his “subjectivism and drift in communist construction, harebrained scheming, half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions, and actions divorced from reality, bragging and bluster, attraction to rule by fiat, unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already worked out.”1 An examination of the personnel aspects of the infamous 1962 decision by Khrushchev to bifurcate the apparatus of the CPSU at the regional level into parallel industrial and agricultural organizations, each headed by a different obkom first secretary, certainly lends credence to these assessments of Khrushchev.

The 1962 splitting of the party apparatus emerges in the analysis below as a desperate, ill-conceived effort to regain the administrative initiative in the aftermath of the essentially failed 1957 sovnarkhoz (short for sovety narodnogo khoziaistva, councils of the national economy) reforms designed to devolve economic decision making away from the central all-union ministries. Notwithstanding claims to the contrary by Soviet authorities at the time, the evidence provided by the series of personnel decisions connected with the party bifurcation process between 1962 and Khrushchev’s ouster from power in October 1964 does in fact reveal a 1 “Nezyblemaia leninskaia general´naia liniia KPSS,” Pravda, 17 October 1964, 1. This explanation, while not mentioning Khrushchev by name, followed on the heels of a rather terse statement in Pravda one day earlier to the effect that a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee had granted Khrushchev’s request that, owing to his advanced age and declining health, he be freed from his obligations and be permitted to retire. It was announced that the Central Committee had elected Leonid Brezhnev as the new CPSU first secretary.

280 WILLIAM A. CLARK

haphazard and ill-considered approach to economic management, a lack of planning, and an essentially “rambunctious, shotgun initiative style of leadership.”2 That this bifurcation of the regional party apparatus was the first of Khrushchev’s policies to be reversed in the aftermath of his removal from power lends support to the notion that the conspirators of 1964 viewed this course as especially wrong-headed or, in the words frequently cited to describe Khrushchev’s reforms, a “harebrained scheme” ( prozhekterstvo). It likewise suggests a substantially administrative motive for the conspiracy to remove Khrushchev from power.

Embarking in November 1962 on a plan to restructure the party institutions of the USSR, Nikita Khrushchev pushed through reforms that by early 1963 had bifurcated 75 of the country’s 136 regional communist party committees into separate agricultural and industrial organs, each with its own obkom first secretary.3 Overnight, the number of obkom first secretaries—key “proving ground” positions in the CPSU and Soviet hierarchy—grew from 136 to 211, with 150 of this latter number now confined to sharing power with a “second” first secretary.4 Sixteen incumbent obkom first secretaries were uprooted from their posts altogether, while 59 incumbent obkom first secretaries had their regional political prerogatives and supervisory jurisdictions suddenly and drastically reduced, with the assignment now to focus exclusively either on agricultural or industrial affairs. Many of these 75 incumbents had come to Khrushchev’s rescue as members of the CPSU

2 This is how, in a communiqué to U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 15 October 1964, Thomas L. Hughes, the U.S. State Department’s director of intelligence and research, described the problem of Khrushchev’s leadership that stood at the center of the conspirators’ decision to remove him from power (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/P Files: Lot 71 D 273, USSR). In the light of the analysis that follows, this assessment—at least as it applies to the splitting of the regional party apparatus after 1962—seems accurate. 3 For the purposes of this article, the following units below the level of the 15 union republics are considered “regions”: oblasts, krais, autonomous oblasts (AO), and autonomous soviet socialist republics (ASSR). In 1962, they existed in 6 of the 15 union republics and comprised 136 such units: 105 oblasts, 9 krais, 5 AOs, and 17 ASSRs. Oblasts and krais were strictly administrative units, while AOs and ASSRs were nationality-based. At the time of the 1962 Khrushchev reform, these units existed in only the RSFSR, Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan. It should be noted that the 1962 reform also split the Soviet regional state institutions into agricultural and industrial committees, respectively. Although not the focus of this article, the traditional oblispolkoms and kraiispolkoms—both regional state executive committees attached to soviets—were, like the obkoms and kraikoms attached to the Party, bifurcated. 4 Khrushchev’s 1962 reform bifurcated both party and state hierarchies below the union republic level into parallel agricultural and industrial branches. This article focuses solely on the bifurcation of the regional party organs.

KHRUSHCHEV’S “SECOND” FIRST SECRETARIES 281

Central Committee during the 1957 “anti-party group” challenge, yet this administrative upheaval significantly destabilized their career prospects.5

These worries on the part of Khrushchev’s erstwhile supporters, in combination with the failure of his reforms to produce anything like the enhanced efficiency he was hoping for, go much of the way to explain why he was so easily toppled by his Presidium colleagues in October 1964. Indeed, it is noteworthy that immediately upon Khrushchev’s ouster in late October 1964 his successors set about to eradicate the reform and reconstitute the original pre-reform party structure in the regions.6 By mid-December 1964, the requisite paperwork had been pushed through and the five-week period from 29 December 1964 to 3 February 1965 witnessed the rapid reconstitution of the pre-1963 status quo: 75 obkom first secretaries—1 for each oblast—were named to head the reunified regional party organs,7 and 75 individuals who had served as “tandem” obkom first secretary during the period of bifurcation were assigned other work.8 As part of the modus vivendi reached between the post-Khrushchev leadership in Moscow and newly installed regional party bosses, a period of “stability of cadres” came to mark the political scene. Gone would be the whirlwind “harebrained” schemes of bureaucratic reorganization that marked the 1957–64 period especially, and in its stead would reign a presumption of competence and respect for the nomenklatura. Of course, this post-1965 “trust” or “faith” in the party cadres—part of the implicit contract within the ruling elite in the aftermath of Khrushchev’s frenetic reorganizations—is frequently referred to in identifying the root causes of the “stagnation” that subsequently became the hallmark of the latter Brezhnev era. Be that as it may, the reuniting of the party apparatus and the appointing of single obkom first secretaries in the regions marks at least one area of policy where the Brezhnev leadership acted decisively and 5 As discussed below, Khrushchev’s bifurcation of the Party in 1962 was but a part of a series of organizational changes dating back to the 1957 sovnarkhozy reforms. 6 Its importance is also captured anecdotally by the fact that 20 years after his ouster a meeting of the CPSU CC Politburo lapsed from a discussion of the merits of readmitting Viacheslav Molotov, Georgii Malenkov, and Lazar´ Kaganovich into membership in the Communist Party, into a spirited and undisciplined listing of many Khrushchev sins. In the course of that discussion it was none other than Mikhail Gorbachev who criticized the bifurcating the party apparatus as an error. See Zasedanie Politburo TsK KPSS, 12 iiulia 1984 roda, at www.bukovsky-archives.net/pdfs/ideolog/pb84-1.pdf (accessed 20 March 2013). 7 As shall be shown below, 43 of the original 75 pre-bifurcation obkom first secretaries found themselves back in charge of their original obkom after 1965. 8 To be clear, while there were 75 obkom and kraikom units that were bifurcated, there were 95 individuals who served as “second” first secretaries in those 75 units. Sixteen units saw the incumbent first secretary removed at the moment of bifurcation, necessitating the naming of two new “second” first secretaries, while other units experienced subsequent personnel moves during the 1962–64 period of bifurcation that resulted in multiple “second” first secretaries.


boldly, if only to restore an administrative status quo ante bellum. It is ironic, then, that the Brezhnev leadership team—so noted for its overly conservative and noninterventionist policy toward party cadres—should have launched itself, as it were, with one of the most rapid and thoroughgoing waves of party personnel turnover, as veritable an administrative volte-face as one would see in the post-Stalin period.

This essay analyzes this period of rapid personnel change by focusing on the 95 individuals who found themselves in the position of “second” obkom first secretaries during the period of party bifurcation.9 It was these men, non-obkom first secretaries at the moment of the bifurcation but thereupon quickly elevated to the post in one of the 75 now-split obkom leadership cohorts, who were the human face of Khrushchev’s party reform. In this sense, it was they who were tied personally and professionally to Khrushchev’s reforms. It was likewise they who were seen by many incumbent obkom first secretaries as parvenus who had upset the traditional Russian and Soviet pattern of one-man management over regional political affairs. And it was they, at the end of the day, who would in large numbers suffer immediate career reversals after Khrushchev’s removal from power in October 1964 and the reunification of the party organs. In the game of musical chairs necessitated by the reuniting of the regional party apparatus, it was more often than not these “second” first secretaries who were left without a seat. Whether their careers rebounded after 1965 is accordingly the main concern of the subsequent analysis.

The 1962 Bifurcation of Regional Party Organs in ContextThe 1962 bifurcation of the Party must be seen in the context of Khrushchev’s decision in 1957 to restructure the institutions charged with the administration of Soviet industry. His sovnarkhoz reforms initiated in that year sought to alter the de facto division of labor in Soviet administration: communist party institutions—arranged on a decentralized, territorial basis—

were the overseers of agricultural production in the country, while Soviet state institutions—arranged hierarchically on a unified functional basis—

9 “Second” first secretaries in this paper are defined as such: any official (other than the original pre-bifurcation obkom first secretary) who served during 1962–64 as an obkom first secretary in a bifurcated tandem obkom leadership position. Thus, a “second” first secretary must have served in a bifurcated obkom and be neither (a) the pre-bifurcation incumbent obkom first secretary, or (b) a wholly new, post-reunification obkom first secretary. Biographical data and changes in regional personnel were gathered from the author’s personal data set on regional officials as well as from a variety of additional sources. Particularly valuable was O. V. Khlevniuk et al., Regional´naia politika N. S. Khrushcheva: TsK KPSS i mestnye partiinye komitety, 1953–1964 gg. (Moscow: Rosspen, 2009). For a complete listing of these 95 “second” first secretaries and their positions both prior and subsequent to the bifurcation period, see Appendix 1.


administered Soviet industry and capital construction.10 Khrushchev was determined to eliminate both the bureaucratic barriers that in his view had prevented regional economic ties and the division of labor among nearby industrial and construction enterprises, which were taking orders from separate and oftentimes competing central ministries in Moscow. He was also determined to increase the Party’s influence over industrial management in the country.11 The 1957 reform abolished 10 all-union and 15 union-republic ministries (i.e., all ministries at the SSR level) and, in their stead, created 105 “economic-administrative regions,” each to be directed by one of the separate territorially based sovnarkhozy. In effect, Khrushchev sought to administer Soviet industry in much the same fashion that the party organs had traditionally administered Soviet agriculture: in devolved, decentralized, territorially based administrative organs.12

The role of regional party leaders in this new system of sovnarkhozy increased enormously. Regional party secretaries gained full authority over appointing enterprise directors in their regions and no longer had to coordinate the selection of candidates to these positions with production branch ministries.13 Thus one of the auxiliary effects of the reforms was to emasculate the entrenched power of the central industrial ministries, thereby elevating the position of the CPSU (and Khrushchev as its head) in its ongoing competition with the state apparatus in the politics of the immediate post-

10 The management literature refers to these two styles as “U” and “M” formats. The Unitary Form (U) of management is organized along functional lines and consists of a number of departments implementing complementary tasks on the same territory. This method was characteristic of Soviet industrial management by the central economic ministries of the Soviet state. The Multidimensional Form (M) is marked by a collection of fairly self-contained territorial divisions implementing the same tasks in different locations. This approach was adopted for the management of Soviet agriculture by territorially based party units. The economics literature highlights tradeoffs between M-form’s superior incentive schemes and flexibility, and U-form’s alleged economies of scale. See Andrei Markevich and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, “Career Concerns in a Political Hierarchy: A Case of Regional Leaders in Soviet Russia,” Working Paper no. 134 (Moscow: Center for Economic and Financial Research [CEFIR], New Economics School, 2010), www.cefir.ru/papers/WP134.pdf (accessed 20 March 2013).11 In Khrushchev’s report to the 1962 Central Committee plenum, he stated that only 14 of the 215 questions discussed by regional party committee plenums in the largest industrial oblasts and krais that year had dealt with industrial issues. See Grey Hodnett, “The Obkom First Secretaries,” Slavic Review 24, 4 (1965): 637 n. 1. 12 For the details of the sovnarkhozy reforms, see Oleg Hoeffding, “The Soviet Industrial Reorganization of 1957,” American Economic Review 49, 2 (1959): 65–77; Howard R. Swearer, “Administration of Local Industry after the 1957 Industrial Reorganization,” Soviet Studies 12, 3 (1961): 217–30; Swearer, “Khrushchev’s Revolution in Industrial Management,” World Politics 12, 1 (1959): 45–61; and Swearer, “Decentralization in Recent Soviet Administrative Practice,” Slavic Review 21, 3 (1962): 456–70.13 Markevich and Zhuravskaya, “Career Concerns in a Political Hierarchy,” 12.


Stalin years.14 So threatening to the political prerogatives of the state bodies was Khrushchev’s sovnarkhoz reform that the state’s main representatives in the upper elite (who were, not coincidentally, Khrushchev’s main rivals for leadership after Stalin’s exit from power) opposed the reform proposal at the February 1957 Central Committee Plenum. When the reform was later approved by the USSR Supreme Soviet in May, the opposition in the Politburo determined to remove Khrushchev from power.

Famously, this gambit by this so-called “anti-party group” of Georgii Malenkov (Politburo member and former chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers), Viacheslav Molotov (first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and former foreign minister), Lazar´ Kaganovich (like Molotov, a first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers), Dmitrii Shepilov (party secretary and former foreign minister), and Mikhail Pervukhin (head of the State Planning Committee [Gosplan]) was thwarted by Khrushchev’s strong support in the CPSU Central Committee (many of whose members were regional party first secretaries). In the face of the “anti-party group’s” attempt to relieve Khrushchev, it met in an emergency session to retain him as CPSU first secretary. Defeated in their quest to overthrow Khrushchev, the prominent members of the “anti-party group” found themselves vanquished: Molotov was dispatched to Mongolia as the USSR’s ambassador, Malenkov to Kazakhstan as director of a hydroelectric plant, Kaganovich to the Urals to run a potassium factory, Shepilov to Kyrgyzstan to head the republic’s Academy of Sciences, and Pervukhin to Berlin as Soviet ambassador.15 Thus, Khrushchev’s sovnarkhoz reforms were tied directly to him as leader and were adopted only after considerable opposition had been overcome.16 These 1957 reforms represented the first major example of Khrushchev’s violation of the principle of collective leadership. Their success—or lack thereof—would therefore also be tied to Khrushchev personally.

Unfortunately for Khrushchev, the sovnarkhoz reforms did not go well and thus necessitated a series of seemingly ad hoc adjustments that combined to undermine the decentralizing spirit of the original reforms. In 1959, “state branch committees” were created to coordinate the large

14 Harold Swearer, writing at the time of the bifurcation, argued, “An increase in the authority and responsibility of the entire professional party apparatus from top to bottom bolstered the power position of the Party’s first secretary, Nikita Khrushchev” (“Decentralization in Recent Soviet Administrative Practice,” 466).15 The standard narrative of the 1957 attempted overthrow depicts Pervukhin as a last-minute conspirator who was, after the fact, protected from severe punishment by Andrei Kosygin.16 For the classic exposition of Khrushchev’s confrontation with the “anti-party group,” see Carl A. Linden, Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1966, 1990), esp. chap. 4.


number of sovnarkhozy. In 1960, “republic sovnarkhozy” were created in the larger union republics to coordinate the activities of their regional councils. In the following year, the USSR was divided up administratively into 17 major economic regions. Finally, in 1962, an overarching sovnarkhoz for the entire USSR was created to coordinate the republic-level sovnarkhozy. By 1962, then, the circle had been squared. The original 105 sovnarkhozy had been consolidated into a more manageable 41, and central coordination of industrial activity had been at least partially reestablished. It is in this context that Khrushchev introduced major structural reforms in the party apparatus. The decision to bifurcate the Party into separate agricultural and industrial units was therefore a product of a growing desperation for positive results. Because it involved splitting regional party authority, injecting the Party into direct supervision of industrial activity, the bifurcation ironically raised a direct challenge to the very individuals who had come to Khrushchev’s rescue in 1957: the regional party bosses.17

Khrushchev decided in the end to adopt such a risky strategy—one that undermined both the patronage-based nature of Soviet leadership politics as well as his own potential power base—in large part due to his genuine belief that (a) the Party had been pushed to the sidelines in the area of industrial decision making; and (b) the Soviet system of economic decision making, in both industry and agriculture, was overly centralized. It was these two convictions that linked the sovnarkhoz reforms of 1957 and the bifurcation of the Party in 1962. In Khrushchev’s view, the Party had to reassert itself in industrial affairs, and the Soviet economy had to become more efficient through the devolution of the locus of economic decision making.18 Attaining these goals, however, required the thorough restructuring of the regional elite, which was a risky proposition sure to engender opposition from the sitting Soviet prefects.

When examining the career paths of obkom first secretaries during the Khrushchev years, it is important at the outset to resist the assumption that it was only with the 1962 bifurcation that Khrushchev placed the career

17 Not surprisingly, given the goal of increasing the party’s supervision over industry, 59 of the 95 obkom “second” first secretaries (62 percent) named during the period of split obkoms were given charge of industrial obkoms. As one might also expect, when the Khrushchev bifurcation plan was reversed after his ouster in October 1964, the Party went back to focusing on agricultural management. As shown below, this fact is borne out in the differences in the subsequent career patterns of those obkom “second” first secretaries associated with agriculture, on the one hand, and those associated with industry, on the other. 18 For more on the economic management debates—and their political consequences—see Pekka Sutela, Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 49–73, as well as Barbara Ann Chotiner, Khrushchev’s Party Reform: Coalition Building and Institutional Innovation (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1984).


prospects of these regional party secretaries at risk. In fact, the 1962 reform of the regional party structures represented a further and more serious challenge than even Khrushchev’s more general proclivity to use personnel shakeups as a useful administrative tool. As Grey Hodnett remarked immediately after Khrushchev’s ouster, Khrushchev had always displayed “a readiness to regard personnel changes as a panacea for difficulties in reality stemming from deep structural flaws in the Soviet economy and administrative system.”19 Echoing the Stalinist dictum that “cadres decide everything,” Khrushchev was unafraid of violating what came to be a fetish of his successors: “trust in cadres.”20

Throughout 1960–61, for example, a bloodless purge of the majority of regional party first secretaries revealed that even that group of officials who had salvaged Khrushchev’s career during the 1957 leadership crisis could not count on him for personal job security.21 Indeed, by the early 1960s, almost 70 percent of the RSFSR and Ukrainian obkom first secretaries installed by Khrushchev in the mid-1950s had already been replaced.22 It was on the heels of this more gradual reshuffling of the obkom leadership that Khrushchev ratcheted up the career instability facing the regional first secretaries with his bifurcation plan. Although from the perspective of regional party secretaries the 1962 bifurcation certainly represented a much more drastic measure than had been implemented previously, the fact of the matter is that this measure constituted an “upping of the ante” in a game that had started some time earlier.

At the time of Khrushchev’s 1962 bifurcation of the party apparatus, there were 136 regional units in 6 of the 15 union republics of the USSR. Table 1 shows both the respective number of regional units in each of these republics as well as the number of regional organizations that were split as a result of Khrushchev’s 1962 reform. The vast majority of all Soviet regional units (105 of the 136, or 77.2 percent) were oblasts, and these administrative units were the focus of the 1962 party reform.

19 Hodnett, “The Obkom First Secretaries,” 636. 20 See, for example, the excellent analysis in Yoram Gorlizki, “Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks under Brezhnev,” Slavic Review 69, 3 (2010): 676–700.21 See Jerry F. Hough, “The Generation Gap and the Brezhnev Succession,” Problems of Communism 28, 4 (1979): 2.22 For the RSFSR, 69.2 percent (54 of 78) of the regional party first secretaries named by Khrushchev after he became CPSU first secretary had already been replaced by the time the 1962 bifurcation reform came about. Their tenure in office was, on average, 43 months. An extreme case was the Moscow obkom. When the bifurcation of the obkom was announced and two first secretaries installed, they represented the fifth and sixth different obkom first secretaries in the previous 10 years. For Ukraine, 68.0 percent (17 of 25) original Khrushchev obkom first secretaries were already gone by 1962, after having been in office an average of 46 months.


Fully 75 of the 105 (71.4 percent) oblasts extant in the USSR at the time were bifurcated in 1962, creating two oblast party committees (obkoms) for each region where there had previously been but one: an agricultural obkom and an industrial obkom. In human terms, this change in structure meant that whereas prior to the reform there had been a single individual party official in charge of each region (the obkom first secretary), there would now be two: one party first secretary in charge of the agricultural obkom, and another in charge of the industrial obkom. These tandems, then, would be responsible for their respective sectors and would share power in the region. Seventy-five incumbent first secretaries were thus directly affected at the time of the split: 16 were assigned other duties outside the oblast, and the remaining 59 found themselves sharing power with a new first secretary.23 This change violated a traditional tsarist and Soviet practice of one-man management of regions. The voevoda or guberniia system under the tsars as well as the previous Soviet practice of assigning a party “prefect” to the regions each entailed one individual—be it a voevoda, gubernator, or first secretary—ultimately in charge of, and answerable for, the affairs of the region. Certainly in the Soviet era, obkom first secretaries held vitally important positions in the administrative hierarchy of politics. This fact is reflected in the labels that have been attached to them by Sovietologists: “bosses of the apparatus,” “prefects,” “fast trackers,” regional satraps,” “the influentials,” and so on. Indeed, Stalin himself referred to these regional party first secretaries as the “generals” of the Communist Party.24 As noted above, 49 of these 59 incumbent first secretaries forced to

23 Recall from the discussion above that it is these new, nonincumbent first secretaries that I refer to as “second” first secretaries. There were 95 individuals who served in this capacity during the 1962–65 period. 24 The labels come from, respectively, John A. Armstrong, The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite: A Case Study of the Ukrainian Apparatus (New York: Praeger, 1959), 45; Jerry F. Hough, The

Table 1

Soviet Regional Units at the Time of the Bifurcation of the Party Apparatus in 1962

SSR Units Oblasts Krais AOs ASSRs

RSFSR 78 (42) 51 (42) 6 (0) 5 (0) 16 (0)Belorussian SSR 6 (6) 6 (6) 0 0 0Kazakh SSR 18 (3) 15 (3) 3 (0) 0 0Kirghiz SSR 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 0 0Uzbek SSR 8 (4) 7 (4) 0 0 1 (0)Ukrainian SSR 25 (19) 25 (19) 0 0 0Totals 136 (75) 105 (75) 9 (0) 5 (0) 17 (0)

Units are regional units, and AOs are autonomous oblasts. The number in parentheses repre-sents the number of split units.


share regional power were already full (N=29) or candidate (N=20) members of the CPSU Central Committee. In contrast, only four of the newly appointed “second” first secretaries were at that time members of the Central Committee.25 Shlapentokh, Levita, and Loiberg put it this way: “Regardless of Khrushchev’s genuine intention, it is obvious that this innovation significantly undercut the power of party bosses in a given region, since there were now two, rather than one, regional party secretaries.”26 In a word, Khrushchev’s bifurcation of the party apparatus contradicted long-established patterns of regional management and challenged the political standing of a powerful class of men.27

Entry and Exit as Obkom “Second” First SecretariesAppendix 1 reveals the general outline of the careers of each of the 95 individuals who served as obkom “second” first secretaries during the 1962–64 bifurcation period. An examination of these career paths can tell much about the nature of the reform and may provide clues as to why (or in what ways) the reform was ultimately deemed to be wrong-headed. Not surprisingly, given the explicit rationale of the bifurcation and the new job responsibilities of the new “second” first secretaries, the overwhelming majority of these 95 individuals were promoted to their new positions “from within” (Table 2) Seventy-seven of the 95 men (81.1 percent) held posts within the same oblast when they were elevated to their new posts as “second” obkom first secretary.28

Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organs in Industrial Decision-Making (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1969); Robert E. Blackwell, Jr. and William E. Hulbary, “Political Mobility among Soviet Obkom Elites: The Effects of Regime, Social Backgrounds, and Career Development,” American Journal of Political Science 17, 4 (1973): 735; T. H. Rigby, “How the Obkom Secretary Was Tempered,” Problems of Communism 29, 2 (1980): 57; and Philip D. Stewart, Political Power in the Soviet Union: A Study of Decision-Making in Stalingrad (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968), 194. Stalin is quoted in Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, The Communist Party Apparatus (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1966), 153.25 Two were full voting members (A. V. Kovalenko, who was already an obkom first secretary in a different oblast, and V. V. Shcherbitskii, who was the sitting chairman of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers). Two were candidate members (A. P. Bochkarev, who was the sitting chairman of the Saratov oblispolkom, and N. D. Bubnovskii, who was a secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee). All but Bochkarev were already in position of higher rank than an obkom first secretary at the time they assumed these duties.26 Vladimir Shlapentokh, Roman Levita, and Mikhail Loiberg, From Submission to Rebellion: The Provinces versus the Center in Russia (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1997), 68.27 There had never been a female obkom or kraikom first secretary.28 By any measure, 92 of the 95 “second” first secretaries were elevated to this position from a lower post. Three cases arguably involved demotions (A. Khaidrov left the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the Uzbek Communist Party to become first secretary of the Andizhan agricultural obkom; and P. E. Doroshenko was first secretary of the Chernigov obkom when he was named as first secretary of the Kirovograd agricultural obkom). The final case, characterized by Vladimir Shcherbitskii’s leaving the post as premier of the Ukrainian


In terms of the level of their positions, 75 of the 95 men (78.9 percent) who were named obkom “second” first secretaries by Khrushchev were already in responsible posts at the oblast level at the time of their appointment.29 Finally, it should be noted that quite a sizable number of obkom “second” first secretaries entered that position from nonparty positions. Fully 38 of the 95 “second” first secretaries (40.0 percent) were in responsible state/government positions, most frequently within an oblast soviet executive political committee (oblispolkom), when assigned the position of obkom “second” secretary. These nonparty feeder posts (such as oblispolkom chair or regional sovnarkhoz chair) should not surprise, given that Khrushchev’s aim was to enhance the Party’s supervisory management over industrial matters; expertise on the latter area had traditionally fallen under the jurisdiction of state executive bodies, not those of the Party. If Khrushchev were seeking appointees for party posts to oversee industry, then, the state apparatus would be a logical place to look for talent. Indeed, the fact that this was so constituted an important reason for Khrushchev’s reform in the first place.

Likewise, in the immediate aftermath of the Khrushchev ouster and the reunification of the regional party institutions, 79 of the 90 “second” first secretaries (87.8 percent) about whom we have subsequent career information were named to posts within the same oblast (Table 3). One-quarter (N=24) of the 90 were returned to their original, pre-bifurcation jobs after the

SSR to become (temporarily) first secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk industrial obkom, seems to be an instance of Khrushchev’s demotion of republican premier being reversed once Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev in 1964. Shcherbitskii returned to his post as premier (1965–72) and later became Communist Party boss of Ukraine (1972–89).29 Eleven of the 95 were in municipal-level posts (10 of the 11 were gorkom first secretaries; the 11th was a gorkom secretary). One of the 95 was at the raion level (as a raikom first secretary), and eight individuals held posts at the republic level at the time of being named an obkom “second” first secretary.

Table 2

Feeder Positions of 1962–64 “Second” First Secretaries (N = 95)

Level Number % Republic 8 8.4 Oblast/krai 75 78.9 Gorod 11 11.6 Raion 1 1.1Apparatus State 38 40.0 Party 57 60.0Locale Inside oblast 77 81.1 Outside oblast 18 18.9


reunification of the party apparatus by Brezhnev and his colleagues. Recall that 38 state officials were named to the party “second” first secretary position as a result of the 1962 reform. When the regional party committees were reunified and the “second” first secretaries eliminated, most (21 of the 38, or 55.3 percent) were assigned new jobs in the party (not the state) apparatus. That is, most of the state apparatus cadres who were assigned these party posts in 1962 stayed within the party apparatus after Khrushchev’s reforms were reversed in 1964–65. The vast majority of obkom “second” first secretaries stayed at the oblast/krai level after being removed as obkom first secretaries. Only two individuals dropped back to the municipal level (in both cases to reassume the posts they had left when promoted in 1962), and only six persons took positions at the republic level (and two of these five also returned to their original pre-1962 position).

This rather quick survey of the pre- and post-bifurcation responsibilities of the cohort of “second” first secretaries reveals just how much the introduction and later elimination of the split party structure at the regional level was a local affair. One gets the impression from both the rapidity of the implementation of the bifurcation and the patterns of cadre selection for the new positions that Khrushchev selected “default” officials to fill the newly available “second” first secretary positions—that is, individuals working in the same region at the same level of administration who had had an ongoing close working relationship with the incumbent obkom first secretary. The persons identified by Khrushchev to serve as newly appointed “second” first secretaries were frequently sitting in close proximity as obkom secretary in the same oblast (N=35), chairman of the regional oblispolkom (N=22), chairman of the regional sovnarkhoz (N=4), or their deputies (N=5). Khrushchev rounded up “the usual suspects” when looking to fill these new party first secretary positions.

Table 3

Landing Positions of 1962–64 “Second” First Secretaries (N = 90)

Level Number % Republic 6 6.7 Oblast/krai 82 91.1 Gorod 2 2.2 Raion 0 0.0Apparatus State 20 22.2 Party 70 77.8Locale Inside oblast 79 87.8 Outside oblast 11 12.2


If the personnel moves that constituted Khrushchev’s appointment of obkom “second” first secretaries were predictable, then the post-Khrushchev reunification of the regional party structures seems to reflect an even more hurried correction. Almost 90 percent of the obkom “second” secretaries sacked in December 1964 took up new positions in the very same oblast, 78 percent stayed in party posts (even though 40 percent of them entered the obkom “second” first secretary post from a state job), and those who fell outside these tendencies (N=24) did so to take up the very posts they had had prior to Khrushchev’s reforms. In erasing Khrushchev’s dreaded party bifurcation reform, the ruling dictum seemed to be: if possible, give these men back their original jobs; if not, find something for them in the same region, at the same level, and in the same apparatus. That is, the goal appears to have been to make the return to normalcy as seamless and as painless as possible.

Career Mobility after the Reunification of the Oblast Party OrganizationsAs part of his rationalization for this drastic change in the structure of the regional party, Khrushchev pointed to the infusion of new, younger, and more technically adept cadres into the bloodstream of the Party as the party apparatus took on a greater role in the supervision of industrial activity in the USSR. For example, Armstrong argued:

By 1962 it must have been apparent to Khrushchev that Soviet industrial direction urgently required a better organization and more highly trained and experienced party supervisors. At the same time, the rising age level of the obkom first secretaries and the sovnarkhoz chairmen was a cause for concern. The very vehemence with which Khrushchev’s lieutenants denied the possibility of a “conflict of generations” in the party leads one to suspect that they actually feared such a tendency.30

One might assume, then, that those individuals who were elevated in the winter of 1962–63 were part and parcel of a next generation of rising party officials who had their inevitable metronomic rise through the hierarchy accelerated by Khrushchev’s decision to open up suddenly, as it were, 75 new obkom first secretary positions. If they were selected for these positions in 1962–63 on the basis of their effective performance in other responsible positions, one might expect that their summary sacking in the three months after Khrushchev’s ouster would have presented but a short-term interruption in their immutable rise to ever more responsible positions in the hierarchy. That is, notwithstanding the fact that the reunification of the regional party apparatus by the new Brezhnev leadership entailed, in almost every 30 John A. Armstrong, “Party Bifurcation and Elite Interests,” Soviet Studies 17, 4 (1966): 419.


case, a demotion for these men from the status of obkom first secretary, it is reasonable to assume that this reversal had merely placed them back in their proper career sequence (eliminating the Khrushchev bump) and that they were now to experience “normal” career prospects.

In fact, however, the data on these 95 obkom “second” first secretaries and their subsequent careers do not support these assumptions. First, the newly named obkom “second” first secretaries were not representatives of a “next generation” of Soviet apparatchiks; they were essentially the same age (47.0 years) as the incumbent obkom first secretaries (48.8 years) who were now forced to share power in the oblast. Almost 40 percent of the new appointments as obkom “second” first secretaries were actually older than the pre-bifurcation incumbents whose power and prerogatives they were now eating into.31 As stated above, these men may in fact have been better trained to supervise the industrial activities of the oblast, inasmuch as 40 percent of them came from posts in the state sector, but they were not a markedly younger cohort than those already sitting in the positions of obkom first secretary. This small difference in age disappears altogether if one compares the ages of the two groups at the time of their appointment to their posts (as opposed to their ages at the end of 1962). At bottom, the notion that Khrushchev’s 1962 decision to bifurcate the regional party apparatus had as one of its aims to promote fresh, younger faces into leadership positions is largely a myth.

Moreover—and perhaps not surprisingly once the previous thesis is rejected—after 1965 the men who had been named to bifurcated obkoms in 1962 did not experience career trajectories comparable to either those obkom first secretaries who came before them or those who ran the obkoms after them. Intervening in the process and retarding their future career prospects was the adoption by the new national leadership of the policy “trust in cadres,” with which the Brezhnev team had purchased the support of the Central Committee in its plot to remove Khrushchev. The data analyzed below reveal that as a group these officials, temporarily boosted by Khrushchev’s reorganization scheme of 1962–64, never recovered from the reversal of 1964–65 in terms of their career trajectories. They experienced much lower

31 In 59 of the 75 bifurcated obkoms, the original, pre-split incumbent first secretary was retained. The ages of both first secretaries in a split obkom that includes the previous incumbent are known in 53 of these 59 cases. In 20 of these 53 cases (37.7 percent), the “second” first secretary named in 1962 was older than the incumbent he joined in supervising the oblast. If one includes all incumbents at the time of the bifurcation, a total of 75 men, and all persons who were obkom “second” first secretaries during the period of split units, then the average ages are 48.4 years of age, on average, for pre-split incumbents, while newly appointed “second” first secretaries averaged 46.1 years of age.


career mobility than the incumbent obkom first secretaries with whom they shared regional power for two years.

In an effort to establish a more accurate and systematic record of the career trajectories of the 95 men who served as obkom “second” first secretaries, the career paths of all the obkom first secretaries who served from the bifurcation of 1962 through 1987, a full generation later, were scored on a ranked positional hierarchy established for this purpose.32 That is, to evaluate the subsequent career trajectories of the cohort of obkom “second” first secretaries (1962–64), it is necessary to compare their later careers with those persons who held the equivalent positions in the hierarchy but held those posts in their unified (non-split) form. To discern whether or not the careers of Khrushchev’s class of obkom “second” first secretaries recovered from the abolition of bifurcated obkoms after Khrushchev’s ouster, it is necessary to establish the overall career patterns of those individuals who served as first secretaries in unified obkoms over the next generation. Specifically, my analysis contrasts subsequent careers of the obkom “second” first secretaries with those who (a) emerged as the obkom first secretaries in the newly unified obkoms in 1965, as well as (b) all subsequent obkom first secretaries in the union republics that retained the obkom/kraikom structure after 1965.

The positional hierarchy adopted in this paper (see Appendix 2) is a variation of the hierarchy originally proposed by Philip D. Stewart.33 Modifications made to Stewart’s positional hierarchy herein attempt to overcome his scheme’s automatic equating of different offices at the same level of administration. For example, his original hierarchy would weight the position of obkom first secretary in Moscow oblast identically to the obkom first secretary in Kamchatka oblast, even though the former is a much more important and powerful position than the latter.34 To remedy 32 Both “second” first secretaries, incumbent first secretaries who served in bifurcated obkoms, as well as all obkom first secretaries who served in reunified obkoms from 1965 through 1987 were included in the analysis in this section of the article. 33 See Philip D. Stewart et al., “Political Mobility and the Soviet Political Process: A Partial Test of Two Models,” American Political Science Review 66, 4 (1972): 1269–90. For more on the use of positional hierarchies in the study of Soviet elite mobility, see Mary McAuley, “The Hunting of the Hierarchy: RSFSR Obkom First Secretaries and the Central Committee,” Soviet Studies 26, 4 (1974): 473–501; Peter Frank, “Constructing a Classified Ranking of CPSU Provincial Committees,” British Journal of Political Science 4, 3 (1974): 217–30; William A. Clark, “Toward the Construction of a Political Mobility Ranking of Oblast Communist Party Committees,” Soviet Union/Union soviétique 14, 2 (1987): 197–227; and Michael E. Urban, An Algebra of Soviet Power: Elite Circulation in the Belorussian Republic, 1966–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18–34.34 Peter Frank attempted in his own way to integrate the varying importance of units into his attempt to rank positions in the Soviet system of government. For example, Frank produced a ranking of RSFSR regional party units into seven hierarchical groups based on their


this weakness, the positional hierarchy utilized here takes cognizance of the fact that (a) CPSU Central Committee status in the USSR was tied to posts more than persons, and that (b) the Central Committee status assigned to posts can be used as an indicator of the relative importance of posts. That is, whether a position in the Soviet hierarchy traditionally merited full voting rights representation in the CPSU Central Committee, nonvoting candidate standing in the body, or no representation at all can assist in distinguishing differentially important positions within the same level and branch of Soviet power (the Moscow vs. Kamchatka example). Therefore, Stewart’s positional hierarchy is adjusted so as to accommodate variation in Central Committee status. Subjecting the career paths of all regional party first secretaries in the time period under study to this measure of career mobility permits comparisons between the 95 obkom “second” first secretaries and those individuals who served temporarily as their peers.

Recalling that the primary intent of Khrushchev’s 1962 reform was to enhance the Party’s role in industrial management, 59 of the 95 men elevated to positions as obkom “second” first secretaries (62.1 percent) were named to head industrial obkoms. This reflects the fact that the pre-bifurcation incumbent obkom first secretaries were not very well prepared for the new task of industrial management but had experience in the Party’s traditional bailiwick, agricultural supervision. Khrushchev’s bifurcation thus presented greater upward mobility opportunities for party cadres with industrial management skills in comparison to those with agricultural management experience. However, inasmuch as the Brezhnev team quickly reversed field after October 1964 and reasserted the state’s responsibility over industrial management, it stands to reason that these 59 industrial obkom “second” first secretaries would be the ones to suffer disproportionately.

The data on the subsequent career mobility patters of these men bears out this expectation: once the Party was again relegated primarily to agricultural management concerns, the party cadres with agricultural experience had more opportunities for upward career mobility. When one compares the post-1965 career mobility scores of the two cohorts, we find that the obkom “second” first secretaries who during 1962–64 had headed industrial obkoms (59 individuals with an average mobility score of 9.48) were outpaced by their “second” first secretary peers who had headed

relative importance within the Soviet system. The highest-ranking RSFSR group comprised Leningrad, Moscow, Gor´kii, Voronezh, Kuibyshev, Rostov, Sverdlovsk, Novosibirsk, Irkutsk, and Khabarovsk. At the bottom were Smolensk, Tambov, the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, and Kamchatka. See Frank, “Constructing a Classified Ranking of CPSU Provincial Committees.”


agricultural obkoms (36 men with an average mobility score of 10.29). It should be noted that in the adopted hierarchy of posts used to code responsible positions within the Soviet political system, the post of obkom first secretary is scored as a 10.00. Subsequent upward career mobility patterns for the 95 men in our cohort would therefore generate scores above 10.00 (since their starting point in the hierarchy was in a 10.00 position). Likewise, subsequent downward mobility would be reflected in a mobility score below 10.00. Returning to the two types of “second” first secretaries, those who had headed agricultural obkoms (the traditional domain for the Party) had an average score very slightly above their starting point in 1962, while those who headed industrial obkoms (the traditional domain for the state) had an average score that indicated subsequent downward mobility relative to their starting point in 1962. With the Party’s role in industrial management reduced after 1965, so too were the career opportunities for party officials with industrial management skills.

Switching tack from the within-group comparison, when we compare the subsequent career patterns of Khrushchev’s “second” first secretaries to those who held first secretary positions in unified obkoms (i.e., both the incumbent obkom first secretaries who found themselves running a split obkom during 1962–64 and those obkom first secretaries who were named to their position after the 1965 reunification of the party structures), the structural career mobility deficit of the “second” first secretaries is striking. This deficit appears at three different levels of analysis.

At the level of union republics, the post-1965 careers of Khrushchev’s “second” first secretaries exhibited much lower levels of success than their peers. In not a single union republic did these “second” first secretary cohorts of 1962–64 have higher political mobility scores than those obkom first secretaries who served in the same republic at any time in the 1965–87 period. Table 4 shows that the career deficits experienced by these groups of “second” first secretaries is pronounced. Indeed, career mobility scores generated by Khrushchev’s “second” first secretaries were, at best, 11 percent lower than those produced by their post-1965 peers. In the RSFSR, the gap was the largest: fully 27 percent lower.

Several interesting aspects of these scores are noteworthy. First, when the post-1965 career moves of Khrushchev’s “second” first secretaries are aggregated and grouped by the republic in which they served, only those associated with the Ukrainian obkoms generated a combined score indicative of upward mobility. All other republic cohorts had aggregate scores which indicate that, at least as a group, they failed after 1965 to experience upward


career mobility. The exceptional case of Ukraine might be explicable by the often noted bias in favor of Ukrainian cadres during the Brezhnev years. Joel Moses, for example, tracked the career mobility patterns of regional elites during the first decade of the Brezhnev leadership and noted a pronounced advantage for party and state cadres who worked in Dnepropetrovsk at the time Brezhnev worked in the oblast (1937–41 as obkom secretary; 1947–50 as obkom first secretary).35 Upwardly skewing the average political mobility scores of Khrushchev’s Ukrainian “second” first secretaries, it should be noted, is the post-1965 career of Vladimir Shcherbitskii, who served as Dnepropetrovsk obkom second (1954–55) and first (1955–57) secretary before again serving as the industrial obkom’s first secretary during the 1962–64 bifurcation. Of course, Shcherbitskii, who served both as chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers (1961–63 and 1965–72) and first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party (1972–89), was promoted all the way to the Central Committee Politburo under Brezhnev, serving on the body from 1971 until 1989. Shcherbitskii experienced the highest level of political upward mobility of any “second” first secretary, even though his status as a “second” first secretary is somewhat diluted by the fact that he served during 1962–64 in Dnepropetrovsk as a gap assignment, as it were, from his job as Ukrainian head of government.36

Second, the first secretaries who were associated with obkoms in the RSFSR after 1965 experienced the highest level of upward political mobility of any cohort of obkom first secretaries (average score of 12.96). This is not surprising, inasmuch as the USSR was dominated physically, economically,

35 Joel C. Moses, “Regional Cohorts and Political Mobility in the USSR: The Case of Dnepropetrovsk,” Soviet Union/Union soviétique 8, 1 (1976): 63–89.36 William J. Thompson’s definitive account of the ouster of Khrushchev in 1964 asserts that Shcherbitskii was in fact demoted in 1962 from his post as Ukrainian premier and placed back in Dnepropetrovsk as industrial obkom secretary during the bifurcation period. See “The Fall of Nikita Khrushchev,” Soviet Studies 43, 6 (1991): 1104.

Table 4

Political Mobility Scores for Obkom First Secretaries, by Republic

RepublicAll obkom first secretaries,

1965–87Khrushchev’s “second” first

secretaries, 1962–64 Career deficit

Uzbek SSR 10.45 9.06 –13.3%Kyrgyz SSR 11.74 9.83 –16.3%Kazakh SSR 11.11 9.58 –13.8%Belorussian SSR 11.53 8.96 –24.3%Ukrainian SSR 11.54 10.25 –11.2%RSFSR 12.96 9.44 –27.2%


culturally, and politically by Russia. Perhaps as a result of this high level of upward political mobility, the mobility deficit experienced after 1965 by Khrushchev’s RSFSR “second” first secretaries was the most pronounced. Khrushchev’s 1962–64 cohort achieved only 72 percent of the upward mobility of their post-1965 RSFSR peers.

Dropping down one level from the republics to the regions, the established pattern of lower career prospects for the “second” first secretaries is maintained. When one compares the post-1965 career patterns of Khrushchev’s “second” first secretaries with those individuals who served in the same position in the same region after 1965, the story remains the same. Rather full career data are available on 90 of the 95 men who served as “second” first secretaries between 1962 and 1964. When those careers are coded on the positional hierarchy of posts, only eight of the 90 “second” first secretaries generated an individual mobility score higher than the average score associated with all post-1965 first secretaries from the same oblast. Put differently, 82 of the 90 “second” first secretaries (91.1 percent) experienced lower levels of political mobility than their post-1965 peers from the same obkom. One of these eight over-achievers was Vladimir Shcherbitskii (discussed above), whose status as a bona fide “second” first secretary is open to doubt. Beyond Shcherbitskii, it must be noted that of the remaining seven achievers, six did not lose their positions as obkom first secretary when the party apparatus was reunified in 1965. Their mobility scores did not suffer, since—unlike the rest of their 1962–64 cohort—they were not demoted when Brezhnev restored the pre-1962 status quo ante bellum. At bottom, then, only one man—Baikan Ashimovich Ashimov, first secretary of the Karaganda agricultural obkom in Kazakhstan from 1962–64—lost his first secretary post with the ouster of Khrushchev yet surpassed the average of his post-1965 within-obkom successors on the political mobility rankings.37 Losing one’s obkom first secretaryship at the reunification of the obkom structures in the winter of 1964–65 virtually guaranteed that one’s subsequent career would not match the average of those who were to come later in unified obkoms.

Finally, at the lowest level of analysis comparing the subsequent careers of the individual men who served as obkom first secretaries in the same oblasts during 1962–64 with one another, again the data reveal a political mobility deficit for Khrushchev’s cohort of “second” first secretaries. As stated at the

37 After losing his post, Ashimov was Karaganda oblispolkom chair (1964–68), then first secretary of Taldy-Kurgan obkom (1968–70). He was promoted to chairman of the Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers in 1971. The same year, he was elected to the Politburo of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee and was named a full voting member of the Central Committee of the CPSU.


beginning of this article, when Khrushchev enacted the plan to bifurcate the oblast party structures into an agricultural obkom and an industrial obkom, each headed by a different person, 59 of the 75 split obkoms resulted in dyads where a pre-split incumbent was sharing regional power with a newly named “second” first secretary. When one compares the post-1965 career history of both men in each of the 59 tandems, once again a political mobility deficit exists for the “second” first secretaries. In only 3 of the 59 dyadic cases (i.e., 5.1 percent of cases) did the “second” first secretary’s subsequent career outpace that of his pre-1962 incumbent partner during 1962–64.38 The subsequent careers of the men in these 59 dyads show that the 1962–64 “second” first secretaries were indeed parvenus, men who in 95 percent of the cases were not to have the same level of career success that was achieved by their oblast leadership colleagues.

ConclusionOne of the structural disadvantages of being promoted suddenly to the position of obkom first secretary in late 1962 was that these cadres were entering a pre-existing political cohort manned by individuals with significantly greater power. In most cases, lack of experience alone made the new “second” first secretaries junior partners in the running of the obkoms. Beyond their lower level of experience, however, they also lacked a more institutional qualification: membership in the Central Committee of the CPSU. At the time of the bifurcation of the regional party organs, only four men among those to be newly named as obkom first secretaries had status in the Central Committee of the CPSU, two as candidate members and two as full voting members. In contrast, the incumbent first secretaries who greeted these new partners had in their ranks fully 59 members of the Central Committee—39 full members and 20 candidate members. This initial discrepancy in authority—or, perhaps more accurately, the prospect of its closing—is an important variable in understanding the timing of the October 1964 decision to oust Khrushchev. It can be argued that the lessons of the 1957 “anti-party group’s” failure in its attempt to retire Khrushchev demanded that any attempt after November 1962 to remove Khrushchev would have to take place before the convening of the 23rd Congress of the CPSU, where a new Central Committee would

38 The three “second” first secretaries who experienced greater political mobility than their 1962–64 regional partner (who was a pre-1962 obkom first secretary incumbent) were Afanasii Fedorovich Eshtokin (Kemerovo industrial obkom, RSFSR), Aleksei Semenovich Kolebaev (East Kazakhstan industrial obkom, Kazakh SSR), and Vasilii Vlasovich Rychko (Cherkassy industrial obkom, Ukrainian SSR).


be named. Both those at the top of the Soviet leadership structures who opposed Khrushchev’s continuance in power, on the one hand, and those 59 pre-1962 incumbent obkom first secretaries who were already members of the Central Committee, on the other, had a vested political interest in denying the new cohort of “second” first secretaries a chance to gain membership in the Central Committee. The latter was very likely to happen at the upcoming 23rd Congress for at least two sets of reasons.

First, at the 22nd Congress of October–November 1961 Khrushchev had pushed through both an expansion of the Central Committee membership (raising it from 133 full members elected at the 1956 Congress to 175 full members in 1961) and a rejuvenation/purge of the membership (only 54 percent of the 1959 Central Committee members who were still alive in 1961 were reelected). The 22nd Party Congress of 1961 also witnessed a great expansion in the number of officials who were credentialed to attend and vote at the congress. That congress hosted 4,813 delegates, compared to the 1,367 who attended as delegates in 1959 and the 1,430 who attended in 1956. Khrushchev was also an advocate of frequent party congresses, as the timing of the 20th (February 1956), 21st (January 1959), and 22nd (October 1961) congresses makes clear. If the next party congress portended similar populism, many members of the existing Central Committee—including the 59 members who were now sharing their once exclusive power in the oblasts—were in real jeopardy.

Second, if Khrushchev were to remain seriously committed to his bifurcation scheme, he would be compelled at the 23rd Party Congress to call for an expansion of the Central Committee so as to include a large percentage of the new “second” first secretaries he had appointed in 1962. How could his newly appointed obkom first secretaries be expected to perform on even standing if they had to compete inside the oblast with an official who out-ranked them by virtue of Central Committee membership? Yet how could the incumbent obkom first secretaries who now found themselves in first secretary tandems be expected to maintain their level of regional authority if these parvenus were made members of the Central Committee? Finally, how could Khrushchev’s critics in high office in Moscow be expected to remove him from power if the 23rd Party Congress were allowed to meet and expand the membership of the Central Committee to include more of his allies?

The timing, therefore, of the ouster of Khrushchev on 14 October 1964 was in no small way likely determined by the expectations surrounding the Central Committee status of Khrushchev’s “second” first secretaries and how that status would change if he were permitted to preside over another party


congress. The expansion of the Central Committee at the 23rd Party Congress was, as a result, the expansion that never happened. While Khrushchev was on vacation on the Black Sea at Pitsunda, Georgia, both the party Presidium (13–14 October) and a Central Committee plenum (14 October) met and decided his fate. From the perspective of this analysis, the unanimous vote against Khrushchev in the Central Committee, taken prior to Khrushchev’s return to Moscow, is not surprising. With his removal also came the abolition of his bifurcated obkoms, and the removal of the overwhelming majority of his “second” first secretaries. As shown in this essay, rare indeed was the “second” first secretary who overcame the demotion that followed.

In a broader sense, this article highlights the complex interplay of administrative reform, authority building, patronage, and day-to-day governance in Soviet politics. Without the legitimacy gained by bourgeois politicians through popular elections, and without a set of standardized rules for the circulation of administrative elites, political authority in the post-Stain period was created and sustained in large part through patronage, administrative restructuring, and the ability to capture the initiative. It was on these terms at least that Khrushchev in 1964 lost the right to continue in power.

Dept. of Political ScienceLouisiana State UniversityBaton Rouge, LA 70803-5433 [email protected]


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bko

m,

1962

–64

9.0

0

Kat

sub

aP.

B. (

1914

)Ir

kuts

k (I

)se

ct.,

Irku

tsk

ob

kom

, 196

2–63

2nd

sec

t., Ir

kuts

k o

bko

m, 1

965–

71d

ep. c

hai

r, U

SSR

sta

te c

om

mit

tee,

19

71–

10.5

0

Nes

hko

vK

h. P

. (19

17)

Kal

inin

(I)

2nd

sec

t., K

alin

in o

bko

m, 1

961–

632n

d s

ect.,

Kal

inin

ob

kom

, 196

5–67

sect

., Pr

esid

ium

RSF

SR S

up

rem

e So

viet

, 196

7–87

8

.67

Ost

ash

koV.

I. (1

924)

Kal

uga

(I)

sect

., K

alu

ga o

bko

m, 1

962–

632n

d s

ect.,

Kal

uga

ob

kom

, 196

4–65

dep

. ch

air

of d

ept.,

CC

CPS

U,

1980

–85

8.2

9

Do

bro

rad

nyk

hP.

G. (

1922

–89)

Kir

ov

(I)

1st s

ect.,

Kir

ov

gork

om

, 195

9–63

2nd

sec

t., K

iro

v o

bko

m, 1

965–

681s

t sec

t. (I

), K

iro

v o

bko

m, 1

962–

64 8

.00

Iakh

nit

skii

G. F

. (19

16)

Ko

stro

ma

(I)

2nd

sec

t., K

ost

rom

a o

bko

m,

1961

–63

n.a

.1s

t sec

t. (I

), K

ost

rom

a o

bko

m,

1962

–64

n.a

.

Bry

zin

N. N

. (19

16)

Ku

rgan

(I)

2nd

sec

t., K

urg

an o

bko

m, 1

962–

632n

d s

ect.,

Ku

rgan

ob

kom

, 196

5–70

1st s

ect.

(I),

Ku

rgan

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

8.0

0

Shap

uro

vS.

I. (1

916)

Ku

rsk

(I)

chai

r, K

urs

k so

vnar

kho

z, 1

957–

632n

d s

ect.,

Ku

rsk

ob

kom

, 196

5–65

1st s

ect.

(I),

Ku

rsk

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

8.6

7


Seco

nd

1st

sec

t.R

egio

nPr

ior

po

stSu

bse

qu

ent p

ost

Hig

hes

t or

oth

er p

ost

Mo

bili

ty s

core

Ko

zlo

vG

. I. (

1912

–68)

Len

ingr

ad (A

)ch

air,

Len

ingr

ad o

blis

po

lko

m,

1961

–63

chai

r, Le

nin

grad

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

65–6

81s

t sec

t. (A

), Le

nin

grad

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 9

.50

Serg

eev

N. I

. (19

12)

No

vosi

bir

sk (I

)2n

d s

ect.,

No

vosi

bir

sk o

bko

m,

1961

–63

2nd

sec

t., N

ovo

sib

irsk

ob

kom

, 19

65–6

6d

ep. U

SSR

min

iste

r o

f mac

hin

e to

ol b

uild

ing

for

ind

ust

ry, 1

966–

10.0

0

Go

liko

vK

. N. (

1910

–79)

Om

sk (I

)se

ct.,

Om

sk o

bko

m, 1

957–

632n

d s

ect.,

Om

sk o

bko

m, 1

965–

681s

t sec

t. (I

), O

msk

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

8.6

7

Pote

khin

N. A

. (19

11)

Ore

l (I)

chai

r, O

rel s

ovn

arkh

oz,

196

2–63

2nd

sec

t., O

rel o

bko

m, 1

965

dep

. RSF

SR m

inis

ter

of l

oca

l in

du

stry

, 196

5–75

8.6

7

Mat

kin

B. A

. (19

20)

Pen

za (I

)se

ct.,

Pen

za o

bko

m, 1

961–

632n

d s

ect.,

Pen

za o

bko

m, 1

965;

ch

air,

Pen

za o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

965

USS

R d

ep. m

inis

ter

of

inst

rum

enta

tio

n/c

om

mu

nic

atio

n,

1965

–79

10.5

0

Smir

no

vM

. A. (

1912

)Pe

rm´ (

A)

chai

r, Pe

rm´ o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

962–

632n

d s

ect.,

Per

m´ o

bko

m, 1

965–

1st s

ect.

(A),

Perm

´ ob

kom

, 196

2–64

9.0

0

Bo

rdyl

eno

kN

. A. (

1918

–75)

Ria

zan

´ (I)

sect

., R

iaza

n´ o

bko

m, 1

961–

632n

d s

ect.,

Ria

zan

´ ob

kom

, 196

5–75

1st s

ect.

(I),

Ria

zan

´ o

bko

m,

1962

–64

9.0

0

Bo

chka

rev

A. P

. (19

08)

Sara

tov

(A)

chai

r, Sa

rato

v o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

955–

63ch

air,

Sara

tov

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 196

5–70

1st s

ect.

(A),

Sara

tov

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

410

.00

Bo

riso

vA

. V. (

1913

–77)

Sver

dlo

vsk

(A)

1st d

ep. c

hai

r, Sv

erd

lovs

k o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

961–

63ch

air,

Sver

dlo

vsk

rura

l o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

965–

771s

t sec

t. (A

), Sv

erd

lovs

k o

bko

m,

1962

–64

9.0

0

Zab

avn

iko

vP.

A. (

1915

)Ta

mb

ov

(I)

2nd

sec

t., T

amb

ov

ob

kom

, 196

1–63

2nd

sec

t., T

amb

ov

ob

kom

, 196

5;

chai

r, Ta

mb

ov

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

66–7

5

1st s

ect.

(I),

Tam

bo

v o

bko

m,

1962

–64

8.6

7

Ch

uka

no

vO

. A. (

1914

–200

0)Tu

la (I

)h

ead

of d

ept.,

Tu

la s

ovn

arkh

oz,

19

61–6

3 2n

d s

ect.,

Tu

la o

bko

m, 1

965–

67d

ep. d

ept.

hea

d, C

C C

PSU

, 196

7–86

10.0

0

Pro

toza

no

vA

. K. (

1914

–94)

Tiu

men

´ (I)

chai

r, Ti

um

en´ o

blis

po

lko

m,

1960

–63

2nd

sec

t., T

ium

en´

ob

kom

, 196

5–69

1st s

ect.,

Eas

t Kaz

akh

stan

ob

kom

, 19

69–8

3 9

.25

Vas

ilév

V. P

.U

lían

ovs

k (A

)ch

air,

Ulí

ano

vsk

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

61–6

3ch

air,

U´li

ano

vsk

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

65–7

81s

t sec

t. (A

), U

lían

ovs

k o

bko

m,

1962

–64

9.0

0

Tart

ysh

evN

. N. (

1920

–200

8)C

hit

a (I

)se

ct.,

Ch

ita

ob

kom

, 196

1–63

2nd

sec

t., C

hit

a o

bko

m, 1

964–

712n

d s

ect.,

CC

Kyr

gyz

CP,

197

1–75

10.3

3

Toro

po

vV.

F. (

1918

–200

7)Ia

rosl

avl´

(A)

sect

., Ia

rosl

avl´

ob

kom

, 196

1–63

chai

r, Ia

rosl

avl´

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

65–7

9d

ep. c

hai

r, R

SFSR

sta

te c

om

mit

tee,

19

79–8

9 8

.67


Seco

nd

1st

sec

t.R

egio

nPr

ior

po

stSu

bse

qu

ent p

ost

Hig

hes

t or

oth

er p

ost

Mo

bili

ty s

core

Tru

no

vV.

B (1

918)

Vit

ebsk

(I)

chai

r, V

iteb

sk o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

959–

632n

d s

ect.,

Vit

ebsk

ob

kom

, 196

5–68

Bel

oSS

R m

inis

ter

for

mu

nic

ipal

se

rvic

es, 1

968–

73 8

.67

Iazy

kovi

chV.

F. (

1926

)G

rod

no

(I)

2nd

sec

t., M

insk

ob

kom

, 196

0–63

1st s

ect.,

Go

mel

ob

kom

, 196

5–69

1st s

ect.,

Go

mel

ob

kom

, 196

5–69

10.0

0

Kai

mak

ov

P. V

. (19

17)

Tash

ken

t (I)

1st s

ect.,

Tas

hke

nt g

ork

om

, 196

0–63

dep

. ch

air,

Uzb

ek s

ovn

arkh

oz,

19

65; h

ead

, Mai

n A

dm

in. f

or

Mat

eria

l-Tec

hn

ical

, Uzb

ek S

SR

Co

un

cil o

f Min

iste

rs, 1

965–

73

1st s

ect.

(I),

Tash

ken

t ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 8

.67

Ras

ulo

vS.

R. (

1917

)Fe

rgan

a (I

)se

ct.,

Ferg

ana

ob

kom

, 196

1–63

2nd

sec

t., F

erga

na

ob

kom

, 196

5–65

; 1s

t sec

t., T

ash

ken

t go

rko

m, 1

965–

731s

t sec

t (I)

, Fer

gan

a o

bko

m,

1962

–64

8.5

0

Shev

tso

vIu

. N. (

1913

)V

inn

itsa

(I)

dep

. ch

air,

Vin

nit

sa o

blis

po

lko

m,

?–19

63se

ct.,

Vin

nit

sa o

bko

m, 1

965–

1st s

ect.

(I),

Vin

nit

sa o

bko

m,

1962

–64

9.0

0

Tere

kho

vK

. P. (

1917

)Z

hit

om

ir (I

)in

spec

tor,

CC

Ukr

ain

ian

CP,

19

56–6

32n

d s

ect.,

Zh

ito

mir

ob

kom

, 196

5–68

1st s

ect.,

Zh

ito

mir

ob

kom

, 196

8–78

9.3

3

Mo

kro

us

F. Ia

. (19

15)

Zap

oro

zhe

(A)

chai

r, Z

apo

rozh

e o

blis

po

lko

m,

1958

–63

chai

r, Z

apo

rozh

e o

blis

po

lko

m,

1965

–69

1st s

ect.

(A),

Zh

ito

mir

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 9

.00

Stad

iich

uk

I. I.

(191

2)K

iev

(A)

chai

r, K

iev

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 195

1–63

chai

r, K

iev

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 196

5–67

Ukr

SSR

min

iste

r o

f pro

cure

men

t, 19

69–7

5 8

.50

Surk

inN

. P. (

1910

)C

rim

ea (I

)ch

air,

Cri

mea

so

vnar

kho

z, 1

960–

63se

ct.,

Kir

ovo

grad

ob

kom

, 196

5–1s

t sec

t. (I

), C

rim

ea o

bko

m,

1962

–64

8.6

7

Gu

reev

N. M

. (19

07)

Luga

nsk

(A)

chai

r, Lu

gan

sk o

blis

po

lko

m,

1960

–63

chai

r, Lu

gan

sk o

blis

po

lko

m,

1964

–71

1st s

ect.

(A),

Luga

nsk

ob

kom

, 19

63–6

4 9

.50

Van

den

koL.

S. (

1913

)L´

vov

(A)

sect

., L´

vov

ob

kom

, 196

1–63

sect

., L´

vov

ob

kom

, 196

5–1s

t sec

t. (A

), L´

vov

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

9.0

0

Kh

alap

sin

V. N

.K

her

son

(I)

sect

., K

her

son

ob

kom

, 196

0–63

2nd

sec

t., K

her

son

ob

kom

, 196

5–66

1st s

ect.

(I),

Kh

erso

n o

bko

m,

1962

–64

9.0

0

Esh

toki

nA

. F. (

1913

–74)

Kem

ero

vo (I

)ch

air,

Kem

ero

vo o

blis

po

lko

m,

1962

–63

1st s

ect.,

Kem

ero

vo o

bko

m,

1965

–74

1st s

ect.,

Kem

ero

vo o

bko

m,

1965

–74

12.0

0

Ko

leb

aev

A. S

. (19

14)

East

Kaz

akh

stan

(I

)se

ct.,

East

Kaz

akh

stan

ob

kom

, 19

58–6

31s

t sec

t., E

ast K

azak

hst

an o

bko

m,

1965

; sec

t., C

C C

P K

azak

hst

an,

1965

–75

sect

., C

C K

azak

h C

P, 1

965–

7510

.67

Bo

sen

koN

. V. (

1918

)St

avro

po

l´ (I

)2n

d s

ect.,

Sta

vro

po

l´ kr

aiko

m,

1961

–63

2nd

sec

t., S

tavr

op

ol´

krai

kom

, 19

64–6

8; c

hai

r, St

avro

po

l´ o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

968–

73; c

hai

r R

SFSR

st

ate

com

mit

tee

1st s

ect.

(I),

Stav

rop

ol´

krai

kom

, 19

62–6

4 8

.40


Seco

nd

1st

sec

t.R

egio

nPr

ior

po

stSu

bse

qu

ent p

ost

Hig

hes

t or

oth

er p

ost

Mo

bili

ty s

core

Mo

rozo

vI.

S. (1

920)

Ivan

ovo

(A)

1st d

ep. c

hai

r, Iv

ano

vo

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 196

2–63

chai

r, Iv

ano

no

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

64–6

6 d

ep. R

SFSR

min

iste

r o

f agr

icu

ltu

re,

1966

–81

8.6

7

Ner

on

ov

G. D

. (19

16)

Ro

sto

v (I

)1s

t sec

t., R

ost

ov

gork

om

, 196

1–63

n.a

.1s

t sec

t. (I

), R

ost

ov

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

n.a

.

Liat

och

evsk

iiE.

D. (

1921

)G

om

el (I

)1s

t sec

t., ts

entr

alń

ii ra

iko

m (G

om

el

goro

d),

1962

–63

sect

., G

om

el o

bko

m, 1

965–

751s

t sec

t. (I

), G

om

el o

bko

m, 1

962–

64 9

.00

Ivan

ov

F. M

. (19

18)

Mo

gile

v (A

)2n

d s

ect.,

Mo

gile

v o

bko

m, 1

959–

632n

d s

ect.,

Mo

gile

v o

bko

m, 1

965–

671s

t sec

t. (A

), M

ogi

lev

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 9

.00

Kh

od

zhae

vA

. A. (

1920

)Sa

mar

kan

d (I

)U

zbek

SSR

1st

dep

. min

iste

r o

f m

oto

r tr

ansp

ort

, ?–1

963

chai

r, Sa

mar

kan

d o

blis

po

lko

m,

1965

–67

sect

., C

C U

zbek

CP,

197

8–?;

Po

litb

uro

CC

Uzb

ek C

P 10

.00

Bar

ylń

ikT.

G. (

1909

–87)

Nik

ola

ev (A

)ch

air,

Kh

erso

n o

blis

po

lko

m,

1950

–63

chai

r, N

iko

laev

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 196

5–1s

t sec

t., N

iko

laev

(A),

1962

–64

9.0

0

Fed

ore

nko

V. P

.Su

my

(I)

1st s

ect.,

Su

my

gork

om

, 196

1–63

2nd

sec

t., S

um

y o

bko

m, 1

965–

1st s

ect.

(I),

Sum

y o

bko

m, 1

962–

64 9

.00

Ryc

hko

V. V

. (19

19)

Ch

erka

ssy

(I)

2nd

sec

t., V

oly

n o

bko

m, 1

961–

632n

d s

ect.,

Ch

erka

ssy

ob

kom

, 19

65–7

5ch

air,

Ch

erka

ssy

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

75–

8.5

0

Pop

ov

K. S

. (19

10)

Bel

goro

d (I

)2n

d s

ect.,

Bel

goro

d o

bko

m,

1959

–63

2nd

sec

t., B

elgo

rod

ob

kom

, 19

65–7

61s

t sec

t. (I

), B

elgo

rod

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 9

.00

Petr

ov

B. A

. (19

10–8

9)O

ren

bu

rg (I

)se

ct.,

Ore

nb

urg

ob

kom

, 195

6–63

2nd

sec

t., O

ren

bu

rg o

bko

m, 1

965–

1st s

ect.

(I),

Ore

nb

urg

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 9

.00

Vo

l´to

vski

iB

. I. (

1906

)K

har

´ko

v (A

)ch

air,

Sum

y o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

962–

631s

t sec

t., S

um

y o

bko

m, 1

965–

67ch

air,

Ukr

ain

e St

ate

Co

mm

itte

e fo

r Fo

od

Saf

ety,

196

7–78

9.3

3

Vas

ilév

N. F

. (19

16)

Bel

goro

d (A

)ch

air,

Dn

epro

pet

rovs

k o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

961–

641s

t sec

t., B

elgo

rod

ob

kom

, 196

4–71

USS

R m

inis

ter

of l

and

rec

lam

atio

n,

1979

–13

.33

Ko

vale

nko

A. V

. (19

09–8

7)O

ren

bu

rg (A

)1s

t sec

t., B

elgo

rod

ob

kom

, 196

0–63

; 1s

t sec

t. (A

) Bel

goro

d o

bko

m,

1963

–64

1st s

ect.,

Ore

nb

urg

ob

kom

, 19

65–8

0ch

air,

USS

R S

tate

Co

mm

itte

e fo

r M

ater

ial R

eser

ve, 1

980–

8614

.00

Vas

hch

enko

G. I

. (19

20)

Kh

ar´k

ov

(I)

2nd

sec

t., K

har

´ko

v o

bko

m, 1

959–

631s

t sec

t., K

har

´ko

v o

bko

m, 1

965–

721s

t dep

. ch

air,

Ukr

SSR

Co

un

cil o

f M

inis

ters

, 197

2–83

14.0

0

Pliu

shch

enko

V. V

.K

iro

vogr

ad (I

)se

ct.,

Kir

ovo

grad

ob

kom

, 196

1–63

n.a

.1s

t sec

t. (I

), K

iro

vogr

ad o

bko

m,

1962

–64

n.a

.


Seco

nd

1st

sec

t.R

egio

nPr

ior

po

stSu

bse

qu

ent p

ost

Hig

hes

t or

oth

er p

ost

Mo

bili

ty s

core

Kir

ich

enko

N. K

. (19

23)

Kir

ovo

grad

(A)

chai

r, Po

ltav

a o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

962–

63ch

air,

Kir

ovo

grad

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

65; 1

st s

ect.,

Kir

ovo

grad

ob

kom

, 19

65–6

7

1st s

ect.,

Cri

mea

ob

kom

, 196

7–77

; 1s

t sec

t., O

des

sa o

bko

m, 1

977–

8310

.67

Bal

iasi

nsk

iiI.

G. (

1921

)K

uib

ysh

ev (A

)2n

d s

ect.,

Ku

ibys

hev

ob

kom

, 19

61–6

3ch

air,

Ku

ibys

hev

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

64–6

5U

SSR

1st

dep

. min

iste

r o

f p

rocu

rem

ent

10.8

0

Ch

erka

sov

M. S

. (19

11)

Lip

etsk

(I)

2nd

sec

t., L

ipet

sk o

bko

m, 1

957–

632n

d s

ect.,

Lip

etsk

ob

kom

, 196

5–69

1st s

ect.

(I),

Lip

etsk

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

8.0

0

Dem

chen

koV.

A. (

1920

)M

osc

ow

(I)

sect

., M

osc

ow

ob

kom

, 196

0–63

2nd

sec

t., M

osc

ow

ob

kom

, 196

5–67

dep

uty

ch

air,

RSF

SR C

ou

nci

l of

Min

iste

rs, 1

967–

85 9

.00

Tru

bit

syn

E. G

. (19

11–8

6)Sm

ole

nsk

(I)

1st d

ep. c

hai

r, Sm

ole

nsk

so

vnar

kho

z, 1

961–

632n

d s

ect.,

Sm

ole

nsk

ob

kom

, 196

5R

SFSR

min

iste

r o

f au

to. t

ran

spo

rt,

1967

–83

8.0

0

Kar

dap

ol´t

sev

A. V

. (19

19)

Ch

elia

bin

sk (A

)ch

air,

Ch

elia

bin

sk o

blis

po

lko

m,

1961

–63

chai

r, C

hel

iab

insk

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

64–6

5d

ep. U

SSR

min

iste

r o

f agr

ic.,

1965

–72

9.5

0

Ash

imo

vB

. Sh

. (19

17)

Kar

agan

da

(A)

chai

r, K

arag

and

a o

blis

po

lko

m,

1961

–63

chai

r, K

arag

and

a o

blis

po

lko

m,

1965

–68

1st s

ect.,

Tal

dy-

Ku

rgan

ob

kom

, 19

68–7

0; c

hai

r, K

azak

h S

SR C

ou

nci

l o

f Min

iste

rs, 1

970–

84; c

hai

r, Pr

esid

ium

Su

pre

me

Sovi

et K

azak

h

SSR

12.0

0

Ch

up

rov

F. M

. (19

21)

Osh

(I)

hea

d, d

ept.

of i

nd

ust

ry/t

ran

spo

rt,

CC

Kyr

gyz

CP,

196

0–63

hea

d, d

ept.

of i

nd

ust

ry/r

ansp

ort

, C

C K

yrgy

z C

P, 1

965–

701s

t sec

t. (I

), O

sh o

bko

m, 1

962–

64 8

.67

Kh

od

zhae

vA

. R. (

1927

)A

nd

izh

an (I

)1s

t dep

. ch

air,

sovn

arkh

oz

Uzb

ek

SSR

chai

r, so

vnar

kho

z U

zbek

SSR

, 196

5;

dep

. ch

air,

Uzb

ek S

SR C

ou

nci

l of

Min

iste

rs, 1

965–

84+

dep

. ch

air,

Uzb

ek S

SR C

ou

nci

l of

Min

iste

rs, 1

965–

84+

8.5

0

Vat

chen

koA

. F. (

1914

–84)

Dn

epro

pet

rovs

k (A

)1s

t sec

t., K

hm

el´n

itsk

ii o

bko

m,

1959

–63

1st s

ect.,

Ch

erka

ssy

ob

kom

, 19

64–6

5; 1

st s

ect.,

Dn

epro

pet

rovs

k o

bko

m, 1

965–

76

chai

r, Pr

esid

ium

Ukr

ain

e SS

R

Sup

rem

e So

viet

, 197

6–84

+15

.00

Pop

levk

inT.

T. (

1915

)D

on

etsk

(A)

Ukr

SSR

dep

. min

. of p

rod

uct

ion

an

d p

rocu

rem

ent,

1962

–63

1st s

ect.,

Nik

ola

ev o

bko

m, 1

965–

69U

krSS

R m

inis

ter

of s

tate

farm

s,

1969

–75;

Ukr

SSR

min

iste

r o

f p

rocu

rem

ent,

1975

–77

9.0

0

Do

rosh

enko

P. E

. (19

07)

Od

essa

(A)

1st s

ect.,

Ch

ern

igo

v o

bko

m,

1959

–63

1st s

ect.,

Kir

ovo

grad

ob

kom

, 19

64–6

5U

krSS

R m

inis

ter

of a

gric

ult

ure

, 19

65–7

1 9

.67


Seco

nd

1st

sec

t.R

egio

nPr

ior

po

stSu

bse

qu

ent p

ost

Hig

hes

t or

oth

er p

ost

Mo

bili

ty s

core

Pogr

ebn

iak

Ia. P

. (19

28)

Polt

ava

(I)

2nd

sec

t., D

on

etsk

ob

kom

, 196

2–63

2nd

sec

t., P

olt

ava

ob

kom

, 196

5–66

1st s

ect.,

Ivan

o-F

ran

kovs

k o

bko

m,

1966

–69;

1st

sec

t., N

iko

laev

ob

kom

, 19

69–7

0; s

ect.

CC

Ukr

ain

ian

CP,

19

71–8

7; 1

st s

ect.,

L´v

ov

ob

kom

, 19

87–9

0

11.0

0

Ian

ovi

tski

iK

. F. (

1918

)K

hm

elń

itsk

a (I

)1s

t sec

t., K

amen

ets-

Pod

ol´s

kii

gork

om

(Kh

mel

ńit

ska

ob

last

), 19

62–6

3

sect

., K

hm

elń

itsk

a o

bko

m,

1965

–67+

1st s

ect.

(I),

Kh

mel

ńit

ska

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 9

.00

Iasi

nsk

iiL.

V.

Ch

ern

igo

v (I

)ch

air,

Ind

. Tra

nsp

ort

Dep

t. C

her

nig

ov

ob

kom

, ?–1

963

n.a

.1s

t sec

t. (I

), C

her

nig

ov

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4n

.a.

Met

litsk

iiL.

P. (

1930

)B

rest

(I)

1st s

ect.,

Bar

ano

vich

go

rko

m (B

rest

o

bkl

ast)

, 196

2–63

1st s

ect.,

Min

sk g

ork

om

, 196

5–67

dep

. ch

air,

Go

spla

n B

elo

SSR

, 197

2–77

an

d 1

980–

85 8

.00

Toka

rev

A. M

. (19

21–2

004)

Ku

ibys

hev

(I)

chai

r, K

uib

ysh

ev o

blis

po

lko

m,

1959

–63

1st s

ect.,

Ku

ibys

hev

ob

kom

, 19

65–6

7U

SSR

min

iste

r o

f in

du

stri

al

con

stru

ctio

n, 1

967–

8412

.67

Pavl

ov

G. P

. (19

10–9

1)Li

pet

sk (A

)ch

air,

Lip

etsk

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 196

2–63

1st s

ect.,

Lip

etsk

ob

kom

, 196

5–84

1st s

ect.,

Lip

etsk

ob

kom

, 196

5–84

12.0

0

Ko

no

top

V. I.

(191

6–95

)M

osc

ow

(A)

chai

r, M

osc

ow

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

59–6

31s

t sec

t., M

osc

ow

ob

kom

, 196

5–85

1s

t sec

t., M

osc

ow

ob

kom

, 196

5–85

14.0

0

Kal

myk

N. I

. (19

13–2

000)

Smo

len

sk (A

)2n

d s

ect.,

Sm

ole

nsk

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

31s

t sec

t., S

mo

len

sk o

bko

m, 1

965–

691s

t dep

. RSF

SR m

inis

ter

of

pro

cure

men

t, 19

69–

9.0

0

Ku

ziu

kov

F. F

. (19

15)

Ch

elia

bin

sk (I

)2n

d s

ect.,

Ch

elia

bin

sk o

bko

m,

1960

–63

1st s

ect.,

Ch

elia

bin

sk o

bko

m, 1

965

dep

. USS

R m

inis

ter

of c

oal

in

du

stry

, 196

5–11

.00

Ban

nik

ov

N. V

. (19

14)

Kar

agan

da

(I)

2nd

sec

t., K

arag

and

a o

bko

m,

1959

–63

1st s

ect.,

Kar

agan

da

ob

kom

, 19

65–6

81s

t sec

t., Ir

kuts

k o

bko

m, 1

968–

8311

.00

Suiu

mb

aev

A. S

. (19

20)

Osh

(A)

chai

r, O

sh o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

960–

621s

t sec

t., O

sh o

bko

m, 1

965–

68ch

air,

Kyr

gyz

SSR

Co

un

cil o

f M

inis

ters

, 196

8–78

; Kyr

gyz

SSR

m

inis

ter

of m

un

icip

al s

ervi

ces,

19

78–8

5

11.0

0

Kh

aid

aro

vA

. (19

17)

An

diz

han

(A)

sect

. CC

Uzb

ek C

P, 1

962

1st s

ect.,

An

diz

han

ob

kom

, 196

5–85

1st s

ect.,

An

diz

han

ob

kom

, 196

5–85

10.0

0

Shch

erb

itsk

iiV.

V. (

1918

–90)

Dn

epro

pet

rovs

k (I

)ch

air,

Ukr

SSR

Co

un

cil o

f Min

iste

rs,

1961

–63;

1st

sec

t., D

nep

rop

etro

vsk

ob

kom

, 195

5–57

chai

r, U

krSS

R C

ou

nci

l of M

inis

ters

, 19

65–7

2; 1

st s

ect.,

CC

Ukr

ain

ian

CP,

19

72–8

9

Polit

bu

ro C

C C

PSU

, 197

1–89

; can

d.

Polit

bu

ro, C

C C

PSU

, 196

5–71

; 1st

se

ct.,

CC

Ukr

ain

ian

CP,

197

2–89

15.6

7


Seco

nd

1st

sec

t.R

egio

nPr

ior

po

stSu

bse

qu

ent p

ost

Hig

hes

t or

oth

er p

ost

Mo

bili

ty s

core

Deg

tiar

evV.

I. (1

920–

93)

Do

net

sk (I

)ch

air,

Do

net

sk s

ovn

arkh

oz,

19

62–6

31s

t sec

t., D

on

etsk

ob

kom

, 196

5–75

chai

r, U

krSS

R S

tate

Co

mm

itte

e fo

r Sa

fety

Insp

ecti

on

in In

du

stry

an

d

Min

ing,

197

5–87

11.0

0

Mu

zhit

skii

A. M

. (19

12–7

6)Po

ltav

a (A

)ch

air,

Polt

ava

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 195

9–62

1st s

ect.,

Po

ltav

a o

bko

m, 1

965–

731s

t sec

t., P

olt

ava

ob

kom

, 196

5–73

11.0

0

Bu

bn

ovs

kii

N. D

. (19

07)

Kh

mel

ńit

ska

(A)

sect

., C

C U

krai

nia

n C

P, 1

954–

631s

t sec

t., K

hm

elń

itsk

ii o

bko

m,

1965

–72

1st s

ect.,

Kh

mel

ńit

skii

ob

kom

, 19

65–7

211

.00

Bo

rise

nko

N. M

. (19

18–8

0)C

her

nig

ov

(A)

chai

r, C

her

nig

ov

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

61–6

31s

t sec

t, C

her

nig

ov

ob

kom

, 19

64–7

0se

ct.,

CC

Ukr

ain

ian

CP,

197

0–80

13.5

0

Mik

ulic

hV.

A. (

1920

)B

rest

(A)

2nd

sec

t., B

rest

ob

kom

, 196

2–63

1st s

ect.,

Bre

st o

bko

m, 1

965–

771s

t sec

t., M

insk

ob

kom

, 197

7–85

12

.50

No

silo

vski

iA

. B. (

1917

)M

insk

(I)

1st s

ect.

Min

sk g

ork

om

, 196

0–63

sect

., M

insk

ob

kom

, 196

5–69

2nd

sec

t, M

insk

ob

kom

, 196

9–72

8.6

7

Tiab

ut

D. V

. (19

14)

Min

sk (A

)ch

air,

Min

sk o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

962–

63ch

air,

Min

sk o

blis

po

lko

m, 1

965–

751s

t sec

t. (A

), M

insk

ob

kom

, 196

2–64

9.0

0

Kan

tsel

iari

sto

vP.

S. (

1921

)A

lma-

Ata

(A)

chai

r, A

lma-

Ata

ob

lisp

olk

om

, 19

62–6

3ch

air,

Alm

a-A

ta o

blis

po

lko

m,

1965

–71

chai

r, K

azak

h S

SR P

eop

le´s

Co

ntr

ol

Co

mm

itte

e, 1

971–

81

8.5

0

Dyk

hn

ov

N. V

. (19

19)

Alm

a-A

ta (I

)1s

t sec

t., A

lma-

Ata

go

rko

m, 1

961–

631s

t sec

t., A

lma-

Ata

go

rgo

m,

1964

–65;

var

iou

s p

osi

tio

ns

in

Part

y-St

ate

Co

ntr

ol C

om

mit

tee

CC

C

PSU

, 196

6–69

; cu

ltu

ral a

ttac

hé

USS

R E

mb

assy

in B

ulg

aria

, 196

9–78

; co

nsu

l gen

eral

, USS

R E

mb

assy

in

Pola

nd

, 197

8–79

1st s

ect (

I), A

lma-

Ata

ob

kom

, 19

62–6

4 8

.29

Mob

ility

scor

es fo

r eac

h pe

rson

are

gen

erat

ed b

y co

ding

all

posit

ions

atta

ined

, sta

rtin

g w

ith th

e 19

62–6

4 “s

econ

d” fi

rst s

ecre

tary

pos

t and

con

tinui

ng u

ntil

retir

emen

t, an

d di

vidi

ng th

e su

m o

f the

se sc

ores

by

the

num

ber o

f pos

ition

s atta

ined

/cod

ed. Th

e m

obili

ty sc

ore,

then

, is a

n av

erag

e of

all

the

posit

ions

hel

d fro

m 1

962

until

retir

emen

t.R

athe

r com

plet

e bi

ogra

phic

al d

ata

wer

e co

llect

ed o

n 90

of t

he 9

5 m

en w

ho h

eld

the

posit

ion

of o

bkom

“sec

ond”

firs

t sec

reta

ry b

etw

een

1962

and

196

4.

Thes

e 90

men

com

bine

d to

hol

d 26

2 re

spon

sible

pos

ition

s in

the

Sovi

et p

arty

and

stat

e hi

erar

chy.

The

mea

n av

erag

e of

all

thei

r pos

ition

s and

the

scor

es th

ey

gene

rate

d pr

oduc

ed a

mob

ility

scor

e of

9.5

2 fo

r the

ent

ire c

ohor

t. M

obili

ty S

core

s bel

ow 1

0.00

—th

e sc

ore

assig

ned

by th

e co

ding

sche

me

adop

ted

here

in to

th

eir fi

rst p

ositi

on o

f obk

om fi

rst s

ecre

tary

—co

nstit

ute

net d

ownw

ard

mob

ility

afte

r 196

5. S

core

s abo

ve 1

0.00

repr

esen

t net

upw

ard

mob

ility

afte

r 196

5.


Appendix 2: Hierarchy of Positions in the Soviet Administration

Code = 18• all-union party posts general secretary, CC CPSU full member of Politburo, CC CPSU chairman, Bureau for the RSFSR (CC CPSU)• all-union government posts chairman, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman, USSR Council of Ministers

Code = 16• all-union party posts second secretary/secretaries, CC CPSU candidate member of Politburo, CC CPSU chairman, Party Control Commission, CC CPSU• all-union government posts first deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers

Code = 14• all-union party posts deputy chairman, Party Control Commission, CC CPSU• union republic party posts first secretary, CC republic CP first deputy chairman, Bureau for the RSFSR, republic CP deputy chairman, Bureau for the RSFSR, republic CP• all-union government posts deputy chairman, USSR Council of Ministers minister of the USSR chairman, USSR state committee/commission

Code = 12• all-union party posts head of department, CC CPSU editor, central party press organ• union republic party posts second secretary/secretaries, CC republic CP full member, Bureau for the RSFSR, republic CP full member of Politburo, CC republic CP chairman, Party-State Control Commission, CC republic CP


• all-union government posts USSR ambassador deputy USSR minister deputy chairman, USSR state committee/commission• union republic government posts chairman of the Presidium of republic Supreme Soviet chairman, republic Council of Ministers chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers first deputy chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers chairman, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers first deputy chairman, Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers member, Presidium of the RSFSR Council of Ministers member, Presidium of the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers

“significant” RSFSR minister

Code = 10• regional party posts first secretary oblast party committee (obkom) first secretary krai party committee (kraikom) first secretary ASSR party committee

Code = 8• all-union party posts chairman, Central Auditing Commission, CC CPSU party organizer, CC CPSU instructor, CC CPSU inspector, CC CPSU “official,” CC CPSU “executive party worker,” CC CPSU• union republic party posts candidate member of Politburo, CC republic CP head of department, CC republic CP party organizer, CC republic CP instructor, CC republic CP inspector, CC republic CP “official,” CC republic CP “executive party worker,” CC republic CP deputy chairman, Party-State Control Commission, CC republic CP• lower party organ posts secretary, oblast party committee (obkom)


first secretary, gorod party committee (gorkom) first secretary, autonomous oblast party committee first secretary, autonomous okrug party committee• all-union government posts all those not listed above• union republic government posts chairman, oblast soviet executive committee (oblispolkom) chairman, oblast council of the national economy (sovnarkhoz)

Code = 6• local party posts first secretary, raion party committee (raikom) second secretary, gorod party committee (gorkom) second secretary, autonomous oblast party committee second secretary, autonomous okrug party committee• local government posts other oblast soviet executive committee (oblispolkom) posts chairman, gorod soviet executive committee (gorispolkom) student at higher party school director of enterprise, kombinant, etc. other sovnarkhoz posts not listed above

Code = 4• local party posts first secretary, primary party organization (PPO) other party posts (above PPO level) not listed above• local government posts chairman, raion soviet executive committee (raiispolkom) teacher: elementary through higher education

Code = 2• party/government posts other primary party organization (PPO) posts not listed above other raion soviet executive committee (raiispolkom) posts not listed

above student

Code = 0• position following first secretary of oblast party committee (obkom) is unknown


retired dismissed removed death

Supplemental ScoresCode = 4

• party organ affiliations full member of Politburo, CC CPSU (simultaneous with other post)

Code = 3• party organ affiliation candidate member of Politburo, CC CPSU (simultaneous with other

post)

Code = 2• party organ affiliation full member, Central Committee, CPSU full member of Politburo, CC republic CP (simultaneous with other

post)• government organ affiliation member, Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Code = 1• party organ affiliation candidate member, Central Committee, CPSU candidate member of Politburo, CC republic CP (simultaneous with

other post)• government organ affiliation member, Presidium Republic Supreme Soviet

Notes on Supplemental Scores• Party organ affiliations: these supplemental scores are normally assigned

as such:(1) CC CPSU status is evaluated and assigned twice, once at the end of the

tenure as obkom first secretary and once at the end of the individual’s career. If the individual ends his career as an obkom first secretary, the supplemental score is applied only once; and

(2) Politburo status (CC CPSU and CC republic CP) that occurs simultaneously with another substantive post (e.g., obkom first secretary,


chair of a republic Council of Ministers, or USSR minister) are treated as supplemental. It will be scored only once, as it arises.

• Government organ affiliations: these supplemental scores are applied only once, as they arise.

• These supplemental scores are not to be considered separate posts in any averaging calculations that may be used to determine individual or unit mobility scores. They function to distinguish oblast party committee posts that carry with them varying membership in the above party organs. Thus they reflect the variations of importance among different oblast party committees.

MechanismMobility scores for each person are generated by coding all positions attained, starting with the 1962–64 “second” first secretary post and continuing until retirement, and dividing the sum of these scores by the number of positions attained/coded. The mobility score, then, is an average of all the positions held from 1962 until retirement.

Khrushchev's 'Second' First Secretaries: Career Trajectories after the Unification of Oblast Party...

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