http://jab.sagepub.com/Science

The Journal of Applied Behavioral

http://jab.sagepub.com/content/38/1/78The online version of this article can be found at:

 DOI: 10.1177/0021886302381005

2002 38: 78Journal of Applied Behavioral ScienceRaanan Lipshitz, Micha Popper and Victor J. FriedmanA Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning

  

Published by:

http://www.sagepublications.com

On behalf of: 

  NTL Institute

can be found at:The Journal of Applied Behavioral ScienceAdditional services and information for    

  http://jab.sagepub.com/cgi/alertsEmail Alerts:

 

http://jab.sagepub.com/subscriptionsSubscriptions:  

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.navReprints:  

http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.navPermissions:  

http://jab.sagepub.com/content/38/1/78.refs.htmlCitations:  

What is This? 

- Mar 1, 2002Version of Record >>

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCEMarch 2002Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

A Multifacet Model of Organizational Learning

Raanan LipshitzMicha PopperUniversity of Haifa

Victor J. FriedmanRuppin Institute

Theobjective of this article is tomap themany facets of organizational learning into an inte-grative and parsimonious conceptual framework that can help researchers andpracticioners identify, study, and introduce organizational learning to organizations. Thearticle addresses the gap between theory and practice of organizational learning by provid-ing a working definition of “productive organizational learning” and then describing theconditions under which organizations are likely to learn. The model presented draws onscholarly organizational learning literature, practicioner accounts, and our own experi-ences as researchers and practitioners. It argues that learning by organization, as distinctfrom learning in organizations, requires the existence of organizational learning mecha-nisms. Thesemechanisms,which represent the “structural facet,” are necessary but not suf-ficient for generating productive organizational learning. The quality of organizational learn-ing depends on additional facets of organizational learning (cultural, psychological, policy,and contextual), which facilitate or inhibit learning and are also explored in this article.

The authors of several seminal works on organizational learning have been skepticalabout the ability of organizations to learn.March andOlsen (1976) askedwhat organi-zations actually could learn in the face of barriers such as superstitious learning and the

78

Raanan Lipshitz is an associate professor in the Department of Psychology at the University of Haifa.

Micha Popper is a senior lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the University of Haifa.

Victor J. Friedman is an associate professor at Ruppin Institute.

THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE, Vol. 38 No. 1, March 2002 78-98© 2002 NTL Institute

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

ambiguity of history. Argyris and Schön (1978, p. 8) provided an affirmative answer tothe question, “What is an organization that it may learn?” but devoted most of theirwork to studying and overcoming human reasoning and behavioral patterns that limitlearning. Over a decade later, Huber’s (1991) evaluation of the literature still focusedon the “obstacles to organizational learning from experience” (p. 95). Reflecting onthe state of the literature itself, Huber (1991) concluded that “the landscape of researchon organizational learning”was “sparsely populated”, that therewas a lack of cumula-tive and integrative work, that there was little agreement on what organizational learn-ing is, and that there were few research-based guidelines for managers wishing to pro-mote it.

More recently, however, Barnett (n.d., p. 8) showed that “although the definitions oforganizational learning are somewhat varied, there is also a noticeable convergence ofkey terms and their meanings,” and there seems to be little question that organizationscan learn and that learning is critical for long-term survival:

The companies that are going to be able to become successful, or remain successful, will be the onesthat can learn fast, can assimilate this learning, and develop new insights . . . companies are going tohave to become much more like universities than they have been in the past. Companies tended tothink that they knew a lot, and therefore tried to be efficient in doing what they thought they knew.But now it’s a matter of learning. (Michael Porter, quoted in Starkey, 1998, p. 532)

An important turning point in the study of organizational learning occurred whenSenge (1990a) reframed the issue as the “art and practice of the learning organiza-tion.” Through this reframing, “learning” became a qualifier for those organizationsthat have a capacity for learning and for distinguishing them from organizations with“learning disabilities” (Senge, 1990a). Today, it would be hard to find any organizationthat does not aspire to be a learning organization, and “companies with outstandingreputations—Shell, Mercedes Benz, Rover, Isvor Fiat—baptize themselves as ‘learn-ing organizations’ ” (Gerhardi, 1999, p. 103).

One of the problems with this framing is the implication that an organization eitheris or is not a learning organization. This “either-or” framing does not provide a goodwindow through which to observe and make sense of a complex, multifaceted phe-nomenon such as organizational learning. Furthermore, the proliferation of research,practice, and literature on organizational learning has not necessarily led to a clearerunderstanding of what it means to be a learning organization. As with many issues inthe social sciences, the more closely the phenomenon of organizational learning hasbeen observed and studied, themore complex and ambiguous it has become. Thus, thevery concept of organizational learning remains (notwithstanding helpful clarifica-tions by Barnett, n.d., and Easterby-Smith, 1997) “as elusive as it is popular” (Roth,1996, p. 1), and “in essence, the learning organization has become amanagement Ror-schach Test: whatever one wants to see in the learning organization is seen” (Yeung,Ulrich, Nason, & Von Glinow, 1999, p. 10).

Advocates of organizational learning have tried to create more comprehensivemodels of the knowledge and skills necessary for generating learning practices. Forexample, Willard (1994) surveyed some 30 books and articles relevant to promotingorganizational learning and came up with a list of no fewer than 23 required skills and

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 79

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

attributes. The problem with this work and other works like it is that they offer com-plex, but hardly useful, guides to identifying or developing learning organizations.Many of these skills and attributes seem to be good overall advice for organizationaldevelopment or good management (e.g., Garvin, 1993) rather than aimed specificallyat organizational learning.

The objective of this article is tomap themany facets of organizational learning in away that can help researchers and practitioners identify, study, and build learning orga-nizations. This “map” (Figure 1), which we explicate in the remainder of the article,addresses the question, Under what conditions are organizations more likely to learnproductively?Ourmap aspires to be complete enough to accurately capture the factorsthat influence organizational learning and parsimonious enough to be easily graspedand followed. It draws on organizational learning theory and research, our own find-ings as researchers and consultants, and practitioner accounts of learning by their ownorganizations. Although accounts by or about CEOs and other managers provide use-ful, concrete illustrations of the facets, they should be regarded with skepticism andnot be taken as valid proofs of effectiveness. Indeed, the map itself is intended to pro-vide researchers with a framework for formulating hypotheses about organizationallearning and to guide practitioners in experimentation with promoting it.

The article begins with a brief discussion of the concept of productive organiza-tional learning and then describes five “facets” that make up our model. The structuralfacet addresses the problem of distinguishing between learning by organizations andlearning in organizations. It describes the kinds of organizational arrangements neces-sary for attributing learning to organizations. The cultural facet specifies normativebehaviors that generate productive learning. The psychological facet specifies psycho-logical states that determine the extent towhich individuals enact these behaviors. Thepolicy facet specifies howmanagement can facilitate organizational learning. Finally,the contextual facet specifies features of the organizational or task environment thatpromote or inhibit organizational learning.

PRODUCTIVE LEARNING

The question of what constitutes “productive” learning is entangled in thorny con-ceptual, practical, and ethical questions. Huber (1991) suggested that an organizationlearns if “the range of its potential behaviors changes” and if “any of its units acquiresknowledge that it recognizes as potentially useful to the organization” (p. 89). Thisdefinition, however, raises the question of whether learning requires not only a changein potential or insight but also in actual behavior. Furthermore, in dynamic environ-ments, it is difficult to determine at time t1 what will be the usefulness of knowledge atsome future time. Knowledge that seems worthless eventually may prove critical foran organization’s survival, and lessons that seem worthwhile may turn out to be theseeds of disaster. Finally, it is questionable whether organizations that learn to excel indestructive or unethical practices, such as genocide, manifest productive learning.

Rather than attempt to produce definitive answers to these dilemmas, we adopt apragmatic solution by positing two necessary but not sufficient conditions for produc-

80 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

tive learning. The first condition is that learning generate “valid” knowledge, that is,knowledge that haswithstood critical evaluation and is not based onwillfully distortedinformation or unquestioned interpretations. The second necessary but not sufficientcondition is that knowledge should lead to action, because lessons that are learned butnot implemented are of little consequence, regardless of their validity.

Our approach builds on that of Argyris and Schön (1996), who defined learning as“the detection and correction of error,” but also includes the discovery and exploitation

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 81

ContextualFacet

PolicyFacet

PsychologicalFacet

CulturalFacet

StructuralFacet

ErrorCriticality

Transparency

IntegrityPsychologicalSafety

Tolerance forError

EnvironmentalUncertainty

Commitmentto

Learning

OLMS

IssueOrientation

ProductiveLearning

TaskStructure

Commitmentto

the Workforce

Proximity toCore Mission

OrganizationalCommitment

Inquiry

Accountability

CommittedLeadership

FacilitatesA B RequiresA B

FIGURE 1: Facets of Organizational Learning

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

of opportunity. This definition, which includes both insight and action, views learningas a cyclical process involving the evaluation of past behavior, the discovery of error oropportunity, the invention of newbehaviors, and their implementation. Both errors andopportunities can relate to an organization’s current perception of its environment, itsgoals and standards for performance, and/or its strategies for achieving its goals.According to our definition, productive learning is a process that (a) is conscious andsystematic; (b) yields valid information; and (c) results in actions intended to producenew perceptions, goals, and/or behavioral strategies. Thus, productive organizationallearning is defined as a subset subsumed by Barnett’s (n.d.) overarching definition oforganizational learning as “an experience-based process through which knowledgeabout action-outcome relationships develops, is encoded in routines, is embedded inorganizational memory, and changes collective behavior” (p. 9).

THE STRUCTURAL FACET OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

The structural facet addresses the central question of what conceptually distin-guishes learning in organizations from learning by organizations. The very term orga-nizational learning implicitly attributes a human capacity (i.e., learning) to a nonhu-man entity (i.e., an organization). This problem of anthropomorphism reminds us thatalthough individual and organizational learning both involve information processing,it is not at all clear how organizations perform operations that plausibly can be attrib-uted to organisms because they possess nervous systems.

Treating organizations metaphorically, as if they were human beings, is a helpfulheuristic. In the final analysis, however, it cannot provide clear guidance on how toidentify, introduce, or improve organizational learning. For learning to becomeorgani-zational, there must be roles, functions, and procedures that enable organizationalmembers to systematically collect, analyze, store, disseminate, and use informationrelevant to their own and other members’ performance. We propose that in order tolearn, organizations must have nonmetaphorical analogues to the central nervous sys-tem. These analogues, which we term organizational learning mechanisms (OLMs),are observable organizational subsystems in which organization members interact forthe purpose of learning. Put differently, they are antennas in which individuals can“reflect on behalf of the organization” (Argyris & Schön, 1996). The most frequentlydiscussed OLM in the literature is the after-action or postproject review (Baird,Henderson, & Watts, 1997; Caroll, 1995; DiBella, Nevis, & Gould, 1996; Gulliver,1987; Lipshitz, Popper, &Ron, 1999; Popper&Lipshitz, 1998). However, other typesof mechanisms also can be found in organizations (Cheney, 1998; Dodgson, 1993;Lipshitz & Popper, 2000). By relating individual to organizational learning, OLMswarrant the attribution of a learning capacity to organizations.

Organizational learning mechanisms, which constitute the structural facet of orga-nizational learning, can be categorized according to twomain features: (a)who detectsand corrects errors through information processing and (b) when andwhere this learn-ing occurs relative to the task system. An OLM is “integrated” to the extent that theorganizationalmemberswho process information are the same as thosewho apply this

82 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

newknowledge. It is “nonintegrated” to the extent that learning is carried out by differ-ent individuals. An OLM is “dual purpose” to the extent that learning takes place inconjunction with task performance. It is “designated” to the extent that task perfor-mance and learning are carried out at separate times and in separate places.

Nonintegrated and designated organizational learning mechanisms, such as strate-gic planning, auditing, and quality control departments, are quite common. Thesefunctions study aspects of the organizational environment or task system and pass thatinformation to other units or roles to be acted upon. Some organizations, such asWhirlpool, have developed nonintegrated and designated OLMs specifically for thepurpose of promoting organizational learning (Goeser, 1996, p. 28)

Integrated and designated OLMs are exemplified by formal performance reviewscarried out jointly by relevant members of a task system. After every mission, fighterpilots in Israel’s Air Force carry out “postflight reviews” duringwhich pilots and com-manders jointly debrief the mission, analyze data on their own and one another’s per-formance, and draw lessons for the future (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998). Similarly,Microsoft uses project “postmortems” to improve its operations (Cusumano & Selby,1995, pp. 331-332).

The advantage of integrated OLMs compared to nonintegrated OLMs is that theyavoid the barriers between learners and doers, thereby increasing the likelihood thatlessons learnedwill be implemented and that implementationwill be closer to originalintentions (Schön,Drake,&Miller, 1984). The advantages of nonintegratedOLMs arethat (a) they are relatively easy to install and operate (when they constitute the princi-pal task of their operators), and (b) they can be staffed by people with specializedexpertise. In the final analysis, nonintegrated OLMs become truly effective only whentheir operators learn to respond to their clients’ needs, even at the cost of considerablesimplification of their tradecraft (Wack, 1985). The advantage of dual-purpose OLMsis that learning proceeds practically continuously online. This activity, however, isvery difficult because it requires people to “learn” and “do” simultaneously.

In his work on “reflection-in-action,” Schön (1983) demonstrated how exemplarypractitioners seamlessly intertwine action and reflection. Organizational reflection-in-action requires organizationalmembers to reflect jointly on practice without signif-icantly interrupting task performance. For this reason, integrated and dual-purposeOLMsmay be the hardest to observe and study. Nevertheless, Rayner (1993) provideda vivid description of how an integrated, dual-purposeOLMemerged during a strike atGlobe Metallurgical:

As the union workers left the plant, about 35 salaried workers and 10 company managers stepped into take over operation of two of the five furnaces . . . I [the General Manager, Sims] was assigned towork on the maintenance crew, the dirtiest job in the whole plant. I still don’t know who made theassignments . . . . The strike was a time of great stress but also a time of great progress. We experi-mented with everything . . . . A few weeks after management took over operating the plant, outputactually improved by 20% . . . . We were operating in a very fast, continuous improvement mode.Everyday people would suggest ways to improve the operation of the furnaces or the additive pro-cess or thewaywe transportedmaterial around the plant. I kept a pocket notebook, and if I saw some-thing I’d note it down and discuss it with the team over coffee or during meal. I filled a notebookevery day . . . . As we made more changes and as we settled in to the routine of running the plant wedidn’t need first-line supervisors. We could produce the product more effectively if everyone just

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 83

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

worked together cooperatively—welders, crane operators, furnace operators, forklift drivers, stok-ers, furnace tapers, and taper assistants. (pp. 287-289)

The experience of Globe Metallurgical illustrates how organizational members uti-lized the natural flows and rhythms of task performance to find time for processinginformation. It also suggests that integrated and dual-purposeOLMs tend to emerge insituations such as a crisis, inwhich learning clearly is essential for survival, but there isno slack in the system. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) also described companies in whichknowledge creation occurs all of the time, and “everyone in a knowledge-creatingcompany is a knowledge creator” (p. 151).

Nonintegrated and dual-purpose OLMs exist when organizational membersresponsible for task performance work closely together with people whose role isinformation processing.At the organizational level, this kind ofOLMmaybe exempli-fied by the newly emerging role of the “chief knowledge officer” as an essential orga-nizational function. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 128) saw middle managers as“knowledge engineers,” whose role is to help their subordinates make sense of theirexperiences by turning vast amounts of vague, ambiguous, and scattered informationinto useful knowledge. Program evaluation is a long-standing organizational learningmechanism in social service, health care, and educational organizations. While“summative” program evaluation serves asmeans of judging program outcomes, “for-mative” evaluation provides information for the ongoing design and implementationof programs (Scriven, 1991). In formative evaluation, social scientists closely collabo-rate with program administrators and practitioners in order to help them understandhow their programs work and how they can be improved (e.g., Campbell & Russo,1999; Chen, 1990; Friedman, 2000; Patton, 1997; Schön et al., 1984).

Organizational learningmechanisms represent a necessary but not sufficient condi-tion for productive organizational learning. For example, Dave Moore, Microsoft’sdirector for development, noted that despite the proliferation of project postmortems,errors kept repeating themselves, a problem he attributed to insufficient accountabilityfor following up on the implementation of lessons learned (Cusumano&Selby, 1995).OLMs may be ineffective because the learning may be ritualistic or limited by defen-siveness, impoverished or distorted information, organizational politics, and otherlearning disabilities (Senge, 1990a). Argyris (1991, 1993) has described how talentedand well-intentioned professionals systematically inhibit learning when they experi-ence psychological threats in the process of reflecting on practice. Thus, a usablemodel for guiding organizational learning needs to go beyond the structural element toaddress those factors, which are likely to promote or inhibit organizational learning.

Several authors have noted that effective organizational learning requires a climateor culture that fosters inquiry, openness, and trust (Argyris & Schön, 1978; Beer &Spector, 1993; Davenport, De Long, & Beers, 1998; Davies & Easterby-Smith, 1984;Di Bella et al., 1996;McGill, Slocum,&Lei, 1993). If structures represent the rela-tively tangible “hardware”of organizational learning, culture represents its “software.”

84 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

THE CULTURAL FACET OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

The cultural facet of organizational learning identifies five norms that are likely toproduce valid information and a commitment to corrective action: transparency, integ-rity, issue orientation, inquiry, and accountability. These norms are the observedmani-festations of a set of shared values that constitute an organizational culture conduciveto productive learning.

Transparency is defined as exposing one’s thoughts and actions to others in order toreceive feedback. Transparency is manifested in the invitation issued by British Petro-leum’s (BP) CEO, John Browne, tomembers at all levels of BP to discuss its operationand in the means he adopts to make this possible:

A virtue of [our] organizational structure is that there is a lot of transparency.Not only can the peoplewithin the business unit understandmore clearlywhat they have to do, but I and the other senior exec-utives can understand what they are doing. Then we can have an ongoing dialogue with them andwith ourselves about how to improve performance and build the future. (Prokesch, 1997, p. 164)

Integrity is defined as collecting and providing information regardless of its impli-cations. This means giving others feedback as fully and as accurately as possible andbeing willing to accept full and accurate feedback from others. Integrity not onlyimplies awillingness to be open about and accept one’s errors, it alsomeans encourag-ing others to provide feedback. For example, in describing postflight reviews, an F-16pilot in Israel’sDefense Force told us that “the first principle in debriefing yourself andothers is to be able to say honestly ‘here Imade an error’or ‘here youmade an error’.”

Issue orientation is defined as focusing on the relevance of information to the issuesregardless of the social standing or rank of the recipient or the source. Issue orientationis a cornerstone of after-action reviews in Israeli Air Force flight units. As one full col-onel told us, “Rank does not count; everybody feels free to comment on the pilot’s per-formance. In the debriefing room everyone is equal, irrespective of ‘religion,’ ‘race,’‘sex,’ or ‘rank’.” Another full colonel described this norm as follows: “During theafter-action review I take criticism like a good boy from a captainwhomay debriefme.On some [training] flights I am number one [mission’s leader], on others I am numberfour” (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998, p. 168). Our study of postflight reviews in an F-16fighter squadron showed that these statements are not mere stock phrases (Ron,Lipshitz, & Popper, 2000).

Inquiry is defined as persisting in investigation until full understanding isachieved. It implies a willingness to accept a degree of uncertainty and to suspendjudgment until a satisfactory understanding is achieved and is similar to the value ofintellectual curiosity (questioning the status quo), which Yeung et al. (1999) identi-fied as one of the values of Harley Davidson’s learning culture, and reluctance to sim-plify, which Weick, Sutcliffe, and Obstfeltd (1999) discussed in the context of high-reliability organizations.

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 85

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Accountability is defined as assuming responsibility for both learning and imple-menting lessons learned. Beer and Spector (1993) noted the importance of takingresponsibility for learning in their discussion of “learning diagnosis,” an integratedand dedicated OLM that supports continuous improvement:

A second imperative to support ongoing learning diagnosis is that organizationsmust holdmanagersaccountable for engaging in the process if that process is to become an ongoing, institutionalized partof the organization’s life. Such accountability should occur when a significant part of a manager’sperformance evaluation is based on ability and willingness to undertake diagnosis within her or hisunit and among peers and subordinates. (p. 648)

In our own work in a hospital, we encountered accountability for both learning andimplementation in the head surgeon of one of its surgery wards:

I believe that if a patient dies or fails to heal it is our [i.e., the staff’s] fault. This is a healthy attitude,even if factually it may not be true. One can always rationalize that the patient was 80 years old, thathis heart was weak, that his wife nagged him to death, and so on and so forth. There is an infinitenumber of excuses that one can find to CYA [cover your ass]. Forme, this attitude is unacceptable. Ifthe basic premise is that we are at fault, it follows that we should find out what went wrong so thatnext timewewill avoid this error. Inmyopinion, that’s the key to constantly learning and improving.

As noted above, several authors have noted the importance of culture, organiza-tional aswell as national, to organizational learning. Inquiry, transparency, issue orien-tation, and integrity support understanding, whereas accountability supports bothunderstanding and action.All these norms imply awillingness to incur costs in order toachieve productive learning. Assuming that organizational learning involves tacklingnontrivial, ill-defined problems in complex and dynamic situations (Orasanu & Con-nolly, 1993), understanding requires inquiry, that is, dogged, persistent investigationin spite of difficulties. Inquiry, of course, is also required from a physicist, who mightsingle-handedly solve a problem in advanced quantum mechanics. In social contexts,inquiry requires the collaboration of others and transparency, without which inputfrom others necessarily will be limited or flawed. Transparency is risky because of thepotential exposure of one’s failures and faults. The ensuing anxiety induces defensiveroutines, which can block inquiry or subvert its integrity: “When [sensitive] informa-tion . . . is made public . . . [it is] apt tomake participants uncomfortable . . . . Theymaycall for closure, rarely in the nameof being anxious, but rather in the nameof getting onwith the task” (Argyris & Schön, 1996, p. 57).

Integrity and issue orientation help people proceed with inquiry despite the threatthat it involves. Integrity means that a person prefers the loss of face and other costsincurred by public exposure to the loss of an opportunity to learn and improve. Issueorientation prevents the triggering of defensive behavior by messages that are per-ceived as disrespectful or offensive.

The norms of inquiry, integrity, transparency, and issue orientation are intimatelylinked to psychological safety, one of the two elements of the psychological facet oforganizational learning, to which we turn next.

86 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL FACETOF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

Productive organizational learning is fairly rare because it requires two psychologi-cal states that are difficult to maintain. The first state is psychological safety, withoutwhich people are reluctant to take the risks required for learning. The second state isorganizational commitment, withoutwhich they are reluctant to share information andknowledge with others.

Psychological safety is a state inwhich people feel safe tomake errors and honestlydiscuss what they think and how they feel. As Schein (1993) noted,

For habit and skill learning to take hold, we need opportunities to practice and to make errors. Weneed consistent rewards not only for correct responses but also for detecting errors so that they can becorrected. Rewards for error detection are often lacking. This kind of learning, therefore, is con-strained not only by the difficulty of getting the response in the first place, but by lack of a safe envi-ronment in which to practice and make lots of errors. (p. 87)

A sense of psychological safety makes it easier to face the potentially disturbing orembarrassing outcomes of inquiry, the exposure of transparency, and the risks ofaccountability. This means that issue orientation, which reduces threat, promotes psy-chological safety. In a series of studies, Edmondson (1997, 1999a, 1999b) foundempirical evidence for the relationship between psychological safety (and the trustthat it engenders) and team learning in organizational settings. In particular,Edmondson’s studies show that high- and low-learning teams differ in the extent towhich their members feel psychologically safe (Edmondson, 1999b), that psychologi-cal safety increases nurses’ willingness to report their mistakes (Edmondson, 1996),and that learning behavior mediates between psychological safety and team perfor-mance (Edmondson, 1999a).

Organizational commitment is the extent towhich organizationalmembers identifywith an organization’s goals and values andmake no distinction between promoting itsinterests and their own personal ones. Acknowledging the relationship between orga-nizational commitment and learning, BP’s John Browne observed that “for people tolearn how to deliver performance and growwe had tomake them feel that, individuallyand collectively, they could control the destiny of our business” (Prokesch, 1997,p. 157).Organizational commitment is particularly important for counterbalancing thepolitical considerations that inhibit managers from producing transparency, integrity,or accountability.

The power of organizational commitment is revealed in a study of the career tracksof Ford middle managers before and after undergoing a special training programdesigned to stimulate the initiation of fundamental changes (Spreitzer&Quinn, 1996).While innovation per se was positively correlated with advancement, the mostupwardly mobile managers were the ones who made the most conservative changes,while the managers who made the most radical changes were the least upwardlymobile. In effect, Ford, which has been an industry leader in espousing “trans-formational” change, failed to reward itsmiddlemanagers (or even punished them) for

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 87

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

challenging the status quo. These managers, however, expressed very little bitternessor cynicism at the price they had paid for their initiatives. On the contrary, manyexpressed a deep sense of satisfaction in having done “ ‘the right thing’ rather than the‘political thing’or the ‘easy thing’as in the past” (Spreitzer&Quinn, 1996, p. 255).

Organizational learning is crucially dependent on people’s willingness to care forand share knowledge with others. Davenport and Prusak (1998) hinted at the impor-tance of organizational commitment as an inducement for people to share theirknowledge:

Time, energy, and knowledge are finite. They are very scarce resources in most people’s workdays.In general, we won’t spend scarce resources unless the expenditures brings a meaningful return . . . .In firms structured as partnerships, knowledge sharing that improves profitability will return a bene-fit to the sharer, now and in the future. Whether or not a knowledge seller expects to be paid withequally valuable knowledge from the buyer, hemay believe that his being known for sharing knowl-edge readily will make others in the company more willing to share with him. That is a rationalassumption. (p. 32)

While we agree with Davenport and Prusak that the propensity of people to shareknowledge with others is problematic and that a feeling of partnership is key to over-coming this obstacle, we think that their solutions are couched in an overly narroweconomic framework. The literature on organizational commitment and high-involvementorganizations shows that organizationalmembers do not have to own stocks and sharesor be rewarded only materially or in kind in their “trucking and bartering” with anorganization and with fellow members in order to share valuable scarce resources.They just need to be committed to the organization and to feel that they work for thejoint benefit of themselves, their fellowmembers, and the organization (Lawler, 1988;Popper & Lipshitz, 1992).

As Figure 1 shows, a culture of learning helps promote psychological safety. Inorder to understand how management can promote both psychological safety andorganizational commitment, we turn to the policy facet of organizational learning.

THE POLICY FACET OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

The policy facet of organizational learning denotes the formal and informal stepstaken by management to promote organizational learning. As its name indicates, thisfacet receives concrete expression through an organization’s policies, rules, budgets,procedures, and so forth. Three policies are particularly important for the facilitationof organizational learning: commitment to learning, tolerance for error, and commit-ment to the workforce.

Becoming a true “learning organization” is a strategic decision that is expressed inboth rhetoric and action. The rhetoric expresses the belief that learning is essential forthe success of an organization. Actions that manifest commitment to learning includeinvesting in education and training (Wills, 1993), the installation of OLMs and culturechange (Popper & Lipshitz, 2000b), supporting experimentation and the dissemina-

88 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

tion of information (Goh, 1998), and recognition and reward systems (e.g., skill-basedpay systems) that support rather than frustrate learning (Ford & Field, 1996).

Commitment to learning also may be expressed in more subtle ways, such as theway organizations allocate time. For example, in some elite units of the Israeli AirForce, quarterly training plans include time slots specifically reserved for after-actionreviews. When one of us asked a commander how and when this practice was insti-tuted, he was truly puzzled and said that this was how the unit had operated ever sincehe had joined it many years before. Furthermore, he was not aware that work planscould be drawn in any other way. This reaction indicates that after-action reviews areso deeply ingrained that they virtually constitute a taken-for-granted basic assumption(Schein, 1990).

Tolerance for error is expressed in a message that learning inevitably generateserrors and that errors in the service of learning will not be punished but indeed valuedas opportunities for learning. This attitude is captured in a well-known IBM legend:

At the heart of [learning] . . . is amindset . . . that enables companies to recognize the value of produc-tive failure as opposed to unproductive success . . . . A young manager, after losing $10 million in arisky venture was called into [IBM’s legendary founder] Thomas Watson’s office. The young man,thoroughly intimidated, began by saying, “I guess you want my resignation.” Watson replied “Youcan’t be serious. We just spent $10 million educating you.” (Garvin, 1993, pp. 85-86)

Tolerance for error is management’s principal contribution to psychological safety.Establishing it requires striking a delicate balance between sanctioning errors for thepurpose of learning and holding people accountable for mistakes that either do notserve this purpose or reflect a failure to learn. There are no standard solutions for tack-ling this dilemma. The head surgeon at a hospital ward expressed it to us as follows:“When an intern makes a mistake for the first time I point it out to him and explain tohimwhat he should have done.However, if he repeats thismistake I comedownon himwithout mercy.”

In order to encourage transparency and create opportunities for learning from expe-rience, the chief of theAnti-SabotageDivision of the Israeli Police initiated a policy ofshielding officers who reported “near accidents” from disciplinary action. As a result,the number of near accidents reported in one of the division’s three districts shot updramatically, while those in the other two districts remained stable. Although a highnear accident rate reflects poor performance, the chief summoned all three subordi-nates to his office in order to praise the officer who had the courage to implement thenew policy while the others sought refuge behind false statistics.

Commitment to the workforce is a policy that de-emphasizes status differences,emphasizes fair treatment of subordinates, and guarantees employment security. Thispolicy promotes psychological safety through employment security and generatesorganizational commitment by virtue of the norm of reciprocity. Employment securityis essential for organizational commitment. First, employees will not and cannot beexpected to contribute to productive learning if as a result of higher efficiency andimproved performance, they will lose their jobs. Numerous studies show that layoffs(e.g., as a result of downsizing) increase alienation among survivors (Mishra,Spreitzer, & Mishra, 1998). Clearly, the real test of an organization’s commitment to

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 89

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

the workforce and to learning occurs when the organization must make tough choicesabout where to cut and where to invest scarce resources.

Large-scale layoffs also are detrimental to organizational learning because theyencourage voluntary turnover, particularly among better qualified employees whoalready possess valuable knowledge and who can best contribute to future learning bythe organization (Pfeffer, 1998). Ley and Hitt (1995) concluded that outsourcing,which involves personnel reduction, “can erode the firm’s potential for organizationallearning and development of new technologies” (p. 836). Fisher and White (2000)found that downsizing, another form of restructuring that involves personnel reduc-tion, also damages organizational learning because people who are let go take withthem valuable experience and knowledge and, more so, because their departure dis-rupts the networks of interrelationships among individuals in which organizationallearning is generated.

Reciprocity has been uncovered in every civilization ever studied and even has beenobserved among baboons; it is truly a ubiquitous rule of behavior. The norm of reci-procity means that favors are returned and social obligations are repaid. Commitmentis reciprocal. It is difficult to think of situations, at least in healthy, adult relationships,inwhich one side is committed and the other is not (Pfeffer, 1998, p. 181). Fairness andreciprocity are at the heart of BP’s John Browne’s conception of the type of relation-ships required to promote joint learning with partners, suppliers, and customers. Thisis all themore true in regard to an organization’s relationshipwith its ownmembers:

You can’t expect others to share their knowledge and resources with you fully unless you have astrong relationship with them. You can’t create an enduring business by viewing relationships as abazaar activity—in which I try to get the best of you and you of me—or in which you pass off asmuch risk as you can to the other guy. Rather, we must view relationships as coming together thatallows us to do something no other two parties could do—something thatmakes the pie bigger and isto your advantage and to my advantage. (Prokesch, 1997, p. 154)

THE CONTEXTUAL FACET OF ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING

The contextual facet focuses on exogenous factors that at best are under manage-ment’s indirect control or at worst are not under its control at all. The five componentsof the contextual facet determine the likelihood that organizational learning willevolve or that organizational learningwill be productive in an organization or one of itssubsystems.

Error criticality refers to both the immediacy and the seriousness of the conse-quences of errors aswell as their costs. Extrapolating from findings about the effects ofpast errors on learning to the effects of potential errors on learning, we propose that ahigh perceived likelihood of costly errors facilitates learning. Abundant empirical evi-dence shows that people pay more attention and are more likely to engage in learningafter failure (Wong & Weiner, 1981; Zakay, Ellis & Shevalsky, 1998), particularly iferrors are ofmodest scale (Sitkin, 1992). Consistentwith this proposition, examples oforganizational learning often come from organizations under crisis (e.g., a generalwalkout; Rayner, 1993) or from organizational settings in which people routinely face

90 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

potentially catastrophic (e.g., life-threatening) errors, such as nuclear power plants(Carrol, 1995;DiBella et al., 1996;Weick et al., 1999), hospital surgerywards (Popper& Lipshitz, 1998), and fighter flight units (Popper & Lipshitz, 1998; Ron et al., 2000).In addition, Ellis, Caridi, Lipshitz, and Popper (1998) found that people working inorganizationswith relatively high costs of error (air traffic controllers andmanagers inhigh-tech organizations) produced higher mean scores on a values questionnaire thatmeasures valid information, transparency, accountability, and issue orientation thanpeople working in organizations with relatively low costs of error (psychiatrists andphysicians in mental hospitals and teachers).

Environmental uncertainty is a function of the rate of change (e.g., of new productsor new models) and the extent and intensity of competition in the environment. Bothfactors have been linked repeatedly to the need for and (less frequently) to the exis-tence of organizational learning (Dodgson, 1993; Edmondson & Moingeon, 1997;Ellis & Shpielberg, 1998; Fiol & Lyles, 1985; Garvin, 1993; Goh, 1998). The logicunderlying these relationships is straightforward: Change and competition requireadaptation, which in turn requires learning.

Task structure influences the feasibility of obtaining valid information and people’smotivation to cooperate with colleagues in learning. Adler and Cole (1993) pointedout the relationship between task structure and valid information in their comparisonbetween Toyota-GM NUMMI and Volvo’s Uddevalla auto plants:

Workers at both NUMMI and Uddevalla were encouraged to seek out improvement. And to helpthem, both groups received feedback on their task performance over their respective work cycles.But Toyota’s standardizedwork systemmade this feedback farmore effective in sustaining improve-ment. At NUMMI, the work cycle is about 60 seconds long, and performance of the cycle is verystandardized. Therefore, it is easy to identify problems, define improvement opportunities, andimplement improved processes. Uddevalla workers, too, had detailed information on their workcycle performance, but as this cyclewas some twohours long, they had noway to track their task per-formance at a more detailed level. This problemwas exacerbated by the craft model of work organi-zation, which encouraged Uddevalla workers to believe they should have considerable latitude inhow they performed each cycle. (p. 89)

Its effects on performance-contingent rewardsmoderate the influence of task struc-ture on the motivation to cooperate. For example, in an interview about after-actionreviews, an F-16 pilot told us that he and his fellow pilots were intensely competitive,strove to be “number 1,” and always believed that they could attain this position.Whenasked why this intense competitiveness did not interfere with behaviors that couldreveal failure, such as transparency and integrity, the pilot responded that “sincewe flyin duos and quartets, my chances of survival depend on them. I have as much invest-ment in their improvement as I have in my own.”

Proximity to the organization’s core mission increases the likelihood that learningwill occur in conjunction with a particular task system. Consistent with this proposi-tion, the Israeli Air Force is far more successful in instituting OLMs and values oflearning in its flight units than in its technical and support units. In addition, all of the14 differentOLMs thatwe identified in a university-affiliated hospital were associatedwith its coremissions: the delivery of treatment and the training of interns and students

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 91

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

(Popper & Lipshitz , 1998). The influence of proximity to the core mission can be tiedto error criticality, because errors related to the core mission are likely to be morecostly to an organization than errors in the performance of noncore missions.

Leadership commitment and support are essential for the successful change of pro-grams in general (Huber, Sutcliff,Miller,&Glick, 1993; Rodgers&Hunter, 1991) andfor the success of cultural change in particular (Kanter, 1991; Lundberg, 1985; Schein,1990). Because organizational leaders set policy, it is not surprising that the existenceor absence ofmanagement’s commitment can outweigh the absence or existence of allother contextual factors. However, according toGoeser (1996), leadership plays a spe-cial role in learning because it is “where the exchange of information is launched,becomes systematic, and then is monitored and rewarded” (p. 28). The crucial roleplayed by leaders in the creation and promotion of organizational learning in industrywas recognized by Senge (1990b) and confirmed byLeithwood andLeonard (1998) ina study of organizational learning in schools.

Popper and Lipshitz (2000a) specified four specific roles for managers in the con-text of the multifacet model of organizational learning: making organizational learn-ing a central element in the organization’s strategy, installing and institutionalizingOLMs, instilling the values of a learning culture, and creating conditions that supportpsychological safety and organizational commitment. Edmondson’s (1996) study ofeight units in three hospitals confirmed some of the relationships posited in Figure 1between leadership and the contextual, policy, psychological, and behavioral facets:

Leadership behavior influences theway errors are handled,which in turn leads to shared perceptionsof how consequent it is tomakemistake. These perceptions influencewillingness to reportmistakes,andmay contribute to a climate of fear or of openness which is likely to endure and further influencethe ability to identify and discuss problems. (p. 24)

Lipshitz and Popper (2000) found that in spite of the head surgeon’s indifference, thesurgery ward was able to learn because it was characterized by a well-defined task andan ability to achieve transparency through the use of closed-circuit TV to film opera-tions. By contrast, organizational learning in the internal medicineward, in which taskperformance and outcomesweremuch less easily observable, was primarily attributedto the open, supportive, and trust-generating leadership of its head physician.

CONCLUSION

Despite the explosive growth in publications on organizational learning and learn-ing organizations (Crossan&Guatto, 1996), this literature has yet to add up to a coher-ent body of knowledge (Crossan, Lane, &White, 1997; Gerhardi, 1999; Miller, 1996,p. 485). Huber’s (1991) earlier critique of the organizational learning literature wasechoed by Prange’s (1999)more recent observations that the concept is used in ameta-phorical and/or analogous sense, that it lacks theoretical integration, that research isbeing done in a noncumulative way, and that the literature does not provide “useful”knowledge for practitioners. Considering the diversity of disciplines and perspectives

92 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

from which organizational learning is being studied (Easterby-Smith, 1997), the con-struction of an overarching theory probably is impossible. Nevertheless, a theoreticalsystematization that acknowledges the manifold nature of organizational learning andthat integrates at least some of its diverse literature should help both researchers andpractitioners.

Our multifaceted model of organizational learning has attempted to address thesegaps in the literature. First, the concept of OLMs provides a nonmetaphorical basis fordefining the phenomenon and addresses the difference between individual and organi-zational learning. Organizational-level learning is similar to individual-level learningin that both involve the collection, analysis, storage, and use of information. It differs,however, from individual learning in its basic nature, processing mechanisms, andproducts.While individual learning is primarily a cognitive process that occurs “insidepeople’s heads” and can be fairly well understood through cognitive conceptuallenses, organizational learning is a complex interpersonal process occurring throughstructural mechanisms in a social arena. “Learning by” organizations occurs whenindividual “learning in” occurs within the context of OLMs that ensure that people getthe information they need and that the products of their reflections are stored and dis-seminated throughout an organization. Individual learning produces individualinsights and changes in habits, skills, and action. Organizational learning produceschanges in norms, doctrines, standard operating procedures, structures, and cultures.Consequently, organizational learning cannot be properly understood without usingsocial, political, and cultural lenses in addition to cognitive lenses.

The cultural, psychological, policy, and contextual facetsmapped in Figure 1 repre-sent a step toward an integrative theory of organizational learning. They do not denotea set of necessary conditions for learning; that is, we do not hypothesize that all causallinks in themapmust be realized in order for learning to occur. Rather, we assume thatFigure 1 represents an ideal whereby each positive link in the figure increases the like-lihood of organizational learning. Different organizations, operating under differentcircumstances, canmanage to learn productively while enacting very different config-urations of the facets in the map.

The reference list of this article attests that the multifacet model has attempted tointegrate numerous previous contributions to the study of organizational learning. Itslargest single debt is probably owed to the seminal work of Argyris and Schön (1978,1996). However, in contrast to their approach, our multifacet model addresses theproblem of anthropomorphism by positing directly observable OLMs rather thannonobservable organizational theories of action that can only be attributed to teamsand organizations (Lipshitz, 2000; Popper & Lipshitz, 1998). Both approaches payattention to the influence of cultural values on the feasibility and quality of organiza-tional learning, but the multifacet model neither differentiates between single-loopand double-loop learning nor focuses on defensive routines and their associated theo-ries of action. Our model also expands on the work of Argyris and Schön (1996) byemphasizing the structural, cultural, and contextual conditions that facilitate produc-tive learning.

Themultifacetmodel can be used bymanagers and consultants as a guide for build-ing learning organizations and for estimating the likelihood of success in this

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 93

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

endeavor. Figure 1 provides a means for identifying the key facets of organizationallearning in an organization. It implies that attempts at generating productive learningin a particular organization should take all of the facets into account and attempt tocharacterize the relationships among them. The map indicates that there is no singlepath or best set of arrangements for creating learning organizations and that the meansof productive learning in one organization, or even a subsystem of the same organiza-tion, cannot simply be reproduced somewhere else. Practitioners can use the map asthe basis for identifying alternative configurations and for experimenting with themuntil the suitable configuration for learning in a particular setting is found.

While the map is intended to be a useful guide for both researchers and practitio-ners, it does not represent a blueprint for organizational change. In order to meet thecriteria of comprehensiveness, accuracy, and parsimony, it has been developed at alevel of generalization that does not yield directly “actionable” knowledge (Argyris,1993). Furthermore, the focus of this article has been on describing the conditionsunder which organizational learning is likely to occur, but not the process of creatingthose conditions. Some facets, such as the degree of environmental uncertainty and thecostliness of errors,may be beyond the control ofmanagers.Other facets, such as com-mitment to the workforce, psychological safety, organizational commitment, and cul-tural values, can be created or strengthened. However, specific prescriptions for doingso are beyond the scope of this article but have been discussed elsewhere (e.g. Fried-man, Lipshitz, & Overmeer, 2001; Lipshitz, Popper, & Oz, 1996).

The debate around the feasibility and potential costs and benefits of organizationallearning has largely subsided, and organizational learning now is widely accepted asessential for survival in increasingly volatile and competitive environments (Argyris&Schön, 1996).We join this growing consensus, butwith two caveats. The first caveatis that it is very difficult outside the laboratory to empirically establish direct causalrelations between organizational learning and organizational outcomes. Therefore,wehave constructed our argument by positing necessary but insufficient conditions forproductive organizational learning. The second caveat is simply that productive orga-nizational learning is difficult to achieve. Claims that Organization X is a learningorganization or that a certain n-step recipe is the algorithm for achieving this covetedstatus should never be taken at face value.

Organizational learning is not a single process performed by an entire organizationin a uniform fashion. Rather, it an assemblage of loosely linked subprocesses per-formed by a wide variety of OLMs, in which different organizational units participatein different ways and at different levels of intensity (Lipshitz & Popper, 2000). Theconcept of the learning organization, quite fashionable among consultants andmanag-ers (Argyris & Schön, 1996), probably is more of a visionary rhetorical device than arealizable empirical entity.No organization can truly be classified as a learning organi-zation. Rather, the extent and quality of organizational learning can be determined byassessing the number, variety, and effectiveness of organizational learning mecha-nisms operating in different units and at different levels as well as by identifying thehorizontal and vertical links among OLMs throughout the organization.

94 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

REFERENCES

Adler, P. S., & Cole, R. E. (1993). Designed for learning: A tale of two auto plants. Sloan ManagementReview, 34, 85-94.

Argyris, C. (1991). Teaching smart people how to learn. Harvard Business Review, 69, (3), 99-109.Argyris, C. (1993). Knowledge for action: A guide to overcoming barriers to organizational change. San

Francisco: Jossey-Bass.Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1978).Organizational learning: A theory of action perspective. Reading,MA:

Addison-Wesley.Argyris, C., & Schön, D. A. (1996). Organizational learning II: Theory, methods and practice. Reading,

MA: Addison-Wesley.Baird, L., Henderson, J. C., &Watts, S. (1997). Learning from action: An analysis of the center for army les-

sons learned (CALL). Human Resource Management, 36, 385-395.Barnett, C. (n.d.).Rethinking organizational learning theories: A review and synthesis of the primary litera-

ture. Unpublished manuscript, University of New Hampshire, Whittemore School of Business andEconomics.

Beer, M., & Spector, B. (1993). Organizational diagnosis: Its role in organizational learning. Journal ofCounseling and Development, 71, 642-650.

Campbell, D., & Russo, J. (1999). Social experimentation. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Carrol, J. S. (1995). Incident reviews in high-hazard industries: Sensemaking and learning under ambiguity

and accountability. Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly, 9, 175-197.Chen, H. (1990). Theory-driven evaluations. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.Cheney, S. (1998,March). Evidence of effective learning environments in organizations. Paper presented at

Conference on Organizational Learning: Moving From Theory to Research, Washington, DC.Crossan, M. M., & Guatto, T. (1996). Organizational learning research profile. Journal of Organizational

Change Management, 9, 107-112.Crossan, M. M., Lane, H. W., &White, R. E. (1997). Organizational learning: Toward a theory (Working

Paper No. 98-05). London, Canada: The Richard Ivey School of Business, The University of WesternOntario.

Cusumano,M. A., & Selby, R.W. (1995).Microsoft secrets: How the world’s most powerful software com-pany creates technology, shapes markets, and manages people. New York: Free Press.

Davenport, T. H., De Long, D. W., & Beers, M. C. (1998). Successful knowledge-management projects.Sloan Management Review, 39(2), 43-57.

Davenport, T. H., & Prusak, L. (1998). Working knowledge: How organizations manage what they know.Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Davies, J., & Easterby-Smith, M. (1984). Learning and developing from managerial work experiences.Journal of Management Studies, 21, 169-183.

DiBella, A., Nevis, E. C., &Gould, J. M. (1996). Understanding organizational learning capability. Journalof Management Studies, 33, 361-379.

Dodgson, M. (1993). Organizational learning: A review of some literatures.Organization Studies, 14, 375-394.

Easterby-Smith, M. (1997). Disciplines of the learning organization: Contributions and critiques. HumanRelations, 50, 1085-1113.

Edmondson, A. (1996). Learning from mistakes is easier said than done: Group and organizational influ-ences on the detection and correction of human error. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 5-28.

Edmondson,A. (1997).Learningwhen’s safe: A group-level investigation of antecedents and consequencesof learning behavior (Working Paper 07-069). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School.

Edmondson, A. (1999a). Psychological safety and learning behavior in work teams.Administrative ScienceQuarterly, 44, 350-383.

Edmondson, A. (1999b, June). The view through a different lens: Investigating organizational learning atthe group level of analysis. Paper presented at 3rd International Conference onOrganizational Learning,Lancaster, UK.

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 95

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Edmondson, A., & Moingeon, B. (1997). From organizational learning to the learning organization. Man-agement Learning, 28, 499-517.

Ellis, S., Caridi, O., Lipshitz, R., & Popper, M. (1998). Error criticality and organizational learning: Anempirical investigation. Tel Aviv, Israel: Recanati Graduate School of Business Administration, TelAviv University.

Ellis, S., & Shpielberg, N. (1998, May). Organizational learning mechanisms and managers’ perceiveduncertainty. Paper presented at Conference on Managerial and Organizational Cognition, New York.

Fiol,M.C.,&Lyles,M.A. (1985).Organizational learning.AcademyofManagementReview,10, 803-813.Fisher, S. R., &White, M. A. (2000). Downsizing in a learning organization: Are there hidden costs? Acad-

emy of Management Review, 25, 244-251.Ford, L., & Field, B. (1996).Managing organizational learning: From rhetoric to reality. Melbourne, Aus-

tralia: Longman.Friedman, V. (2000, May). Action evaluation and knowledge creation in social-educational programs.

Paper presented at Conference on Knowledge and Innovation, Helsinki, Finland.Friedman, V., Lipshitz, R., & Overmeer, W. (2001). Creating conditions for organizational learning. In

M. Dierkes, J. Child, I. Nonaka, & A. Berthoin-Antal (Eds.),Handbook of organizational learning andknowledge. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Garvin, D. A. (1993). Building a learning organization. Harvard Business Review, 73(4), 78-91.Gerhardi, S. (1999). Learning as problem-driven or learning in the face of mystery? Organization Studies,

20, 101-124.Goeser, L. (1996). How can David Martin save the company and take it into the future? Harvard Business

Review, 74(3), 27-28.Goh, S. C. (1998). Toward a learning organization: The strategic building blocks. S.A.M. Advanced Man-

agement Journal, 63(2), 15-21.Gulliver, F. R. (1987). Post-project appraisals pay. Harvard Business Review, 65(2), 128-132.Huber, G. P. (1991). Organizational learning: The contributing processes and the literatures.Organizational

Science, 2, 88-115.Huber, G. P., Sutcliff, K. M., Miller, C. C., & Glick, W. H. (1993). Understanding and predicting organiza-

tional change. In G. P. Huber & K. M. Sutcliff (Eds.), Organizational change and redesign: Ideas andinsights for improving performance (pp. 215-265). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Kanter, R. M. (1991). Championing change: An interview with Bell Atlantic’s CEO Raymond Smith.Har-vard Business Review, 69(1), 119-130.

Lawler, E. E., III. (1988). Choosing and involvement strategy. Academy of Management Executive, 2, 197-204.

Leithwood, K., & Leonard, L. (1998). Conditions fostering organizational learning in schools. EducationalAdministration Quarterly, 34, 243-277.

Levitt, B., & March, J. G. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 14, 319-340.Ley, D., & Hitt, M. A. (1995). Strategic restructuring and outsourcing: The effect of mergers and acquisi-

tions on building firm skills and capabilities. Journal of Management, 21, 835-859.Lipshitz, R. (2000). Chic, mystique, and misconception: Argyris and Schön and the rhetoric of organiza-

tional learning. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 36, 456-473.Lipshitz, R., & Popper,M. (2000). Organizational learning in a hospital. The Journal of Applied Behavioral

Science, 36, 345-361.Lipshitz, R., Popper, M., &Oz, S. (1996). Building learning organizations: The design and implementation

of organizational learning mechanisms. Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 292-305.Lipshitz, R., Popper,M., &Ron, N. (1999, June).Post-flight reviews in the Israel Defense Force as an orga-

nizational learning mechanism. Paper presented at 3rd International Conference on OrganizationalLearning, Lancaster, UK.

Lundberg, C. C. (1985). On the feasibility of cultural intervention in organizations. In L. R. Pondy, R. Frost,P. Morgan, & T. Dandridge (Eds.), Organizational symbolism. Greenwich CT: JAI.

March, J. G., &Olsen, J. P. (1976). Organizational learning and the ambiguity of the past. In J. G.March&J. P. Olsen (Eds.), Ambiguity and choice in organizations (pp. 54-68). Bergen, Norway:Universitetsforlaget.

96 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

McGill,M. E., Slocum, J.W., &Lei, D. (1993).Management practices in learning organizations.Organiza-tional Dynamics, 22(1), 5-17.

Miller, D. (1996). A preliminary typology of organizational learning: Synthesizing the literature. Journal ofManagement, 22, 485-505.

Mishra, K. E., Spreitzer, G. M., & Mishra, A. K. (1998). Preserving employee morale during downsizing.Sloan Management Review, 29(2), 83-95.

Nonaka, I.,&Takeuchi,H. (1995).The knowledge-creating company:HowJapanese create the dynamics ofinnovation. New York: Oxford University Press.

Orasanu, J., & Connolly, T. (1993). The reinvention of decision making. In G. A. Klein, J. Orasanu,R. Calderwood, & C. Zsambok (Eds.), Decision making in action: Models and methods (pp. 3-20).Norwood, CT: Ablex.

Patton, M. (1997). Utilization-focused evaluation (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.Pfeffer, J. (1998). The human equation: Building profits by putting people first. Cambridge, MA: Harvard

Business School Press.Popper, M., & Lipshitz, R. (1992). “Ask not what your country can do for you”: Normative vs. instrumental

organizational commitment. Journal of Vocational Behavior, 41, 1-12.Popper,M., & Lipshitz, R. (1998). Organizational learningmechanisms: A cultural and structural approach

to organizational learning. The Journal of Applied Behavioral Science, 34, 161-179.Popper,M., & Lipshitz, R. (2000a). Installingmechanisms and instilling values: The role of leaders in orga-

nizational learning. The Learning Organization: An International Journal, 7, 135-144.Popper,M., & Lipshitz, R. (2000b). Organizational learning:Mechanisms, culture and feasibility.Manage-

ment Learning, 31, 181-196.Prange, C. (1999). Organizational learning—Desperately seeking theory? In M. Easterby-Smith, J. Bur-

goyne, & L. Araujo (Eds.), Organizational learning and the learning organization: Developments intheory and practice (pp. 23-42). London: Sage Ltd.

Prokesch, S. E. (1997). Unleashing the power of learning: An interview with British Petroleum’s JohnBrowne. Harvard Business Review, 75(5), 147-168.

Rayner, B. (1993). Trial by-fire-transformation: An interviewwithGlobeMetallurgical’s ArdenC. Sims. InH. R. Howard & R. D. Haas (Eds.), The learning imperative: Managing people for continuous innova-tion (pp. 277-297). Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Rodgers, R., & Hunter, J. E. (1991). Impact of management by objectives on organizational productivity.Journal of Applied Psychology, 76, 322-336.

Ron, N., Lipshitz, R., & Popper, M. (2000). Post-flight reviews in the Israel Defense Force Air Force as anorganizational learning mechanism: Culture and context. Haifa, Israel: University of Haifa, Depart-ment of Psychology.

Roth, G. L. (1996). Learning histories: Using documentation to assess and facilitate organizational learn-ing. Cambridge, MA: MIT, Sloan School of Management, Center for Organizational Learning.

Schein, E. H. (1990). Organizational culture. American Psychologist, 45, 109-119.Schein, E. H. (1993). How can organizations learn faster? The challenge of entering the green room. Sloan

Management Review, 34(2), 85-92.Schön, D., Drake, W., &Miller, R. (1984). Social experimentation as reflection-in-action. Knowledge Cre-

ation, Diffusion, and Utilization, 6(1), 5-36.Schön,D.A. (1983).The reflective practitioner:Howprofessionals think in action. NewYork:BasicBooks.Scriven, M. (1991). Beyond formative and summative evaluation. In M. W. McLaughlin & D. C. Phillips

(Eds.), Evaluation and education: At quarter century, 90th yearbook of the National Society for theStudy of Education (pp. 18-64). Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Senge, P. (1990a). The fifth discipline: The art and practice of the learning organization. New York:Doubleday.

Senge, P. (1990b). The leader’s new work: Building learning organizations. Sloan Management Review,31(1), 7-23.

Sitkin, S. B. (1992). Learning through failure: The strategy of small losses. Research in OrganizationalBehavior, 14, 231-266.

Spreitzer, G. M., & Quinn, R. E. (1996). Empowering middle managers to be transformational leaders. TheJournal of Applied Behavioral Science, 32, 237-261.

Lipshitz et al. / ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING 97

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from

Starkey, K. (1998). What can we learn from the learning organization? Human Relations, 51, 531-546.Wack, P. (1985). Scenarios: Uncharted waters ahead. Harvard Business Review, 63(5), 73-89.Weick, K. E., Sutcliffe, K. M., & Obstfeltd, D. (1999). Organizing for high reliability: Processes of collec-

tive mindfulness. Research in Organizational Behavior, 21, 81-123.Willard, B. (1994). Ideas on organizational learning: The “what,” “why,” “how,” and “who.” IBMCanada

Annual Leadership Development Workshop Pre-work.Wills, G. (Ed.). (1993). Your enterprise school of management. London: MCB.Wong, P.T.P., & Weiner, B. (1981). When people ask why-questions, and the heuristic of attributional

search. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 40, 650-663.Yeung, A. K., Ulrich, P. O., Nason, S.W., &VonGlinow,M. A.(1999).Organizational learning capability:

Generating and generalizing ideas with impact. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.Zakay, D., Ellis, S., & Shevalsky, M. (1998). Do managers learn from experience? The negative outcome

bias. Tel Aviv, Israel: Tel Aviv University.

98 THE JOURNAL OF APPLIED BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE March 2002

at College of Management on December 16, 2013jab.sagepub.comDownloaded from