Joséphine Atiéno Ochiel - Université Paris Nanterre

A social identity examination of the

attitudes of Muslim and Christian

students towards terrorism in Kenya:

A case of two public universities

Joséphine Atiéno Ochiel

École doctorale 139 :

Connaissance, langage,

modélisation

Laboratoire Parisienne de

Psychologie sociale

Thèse présentée et soutenue publiquement le 26/01/2021

en vue de l’obtention du doctorat de Psychologie de l’Université Paris Nanterre

sous la direction de M. Jean- François Verlhiac (Université Paris Nanterre)

Jury:

Examinateur.e : M. Marc-Antoine Pérouse de Montclos Directeur

de Recherche, Institut de Recherche pour le

Développement

Rapporteur·e : Mme. Dorra Ben Alaya Maître de conférences,

Université de Tunis

Rapporteur.e: Edith Salès-Wuillemin Professeure, Université de Bourgogne

Président.e: Mme. Constantina Badea Professeure, Université Paris Nanterre

Examinateur: M. Sylvain Delouvée Maître de Conférences, Université de Rennes II

Directeur: M. Verlhiac Jean-François Professeur, Université Paris, Nanterre

Membre de l’université Paris Lumières

pg. i

DEDICATION

To the memory of all the souls that have perished in terrorist attacks in

my country Kenya.

pg. ii

pg. iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work is a culmination of fieldwork done in Kenya in the period October, 2018 to February, 2019.

Many individuals and entities were involved in the process of writing this thesis. First of all, I would like

to acknowledge the invitation of Prof. Andrea to the University of Paris to do my doctoral work without

which this doctoral dream would have remained a mirage. I appreciate the panel of the Parisian

Laboratory of Social Sciences for accepting my candidature, for giving me the opportunity to do this

work under its umbrella and providing all the benefits that came with it. The administration of the

University of Paris, Nanterre is appreciated for the financial sponsorship of the fieldwork in Kenya.

I would like to acknowledge the untiring input of Prof. Jean-François Verlhiac for his intellectual

guidance and expertise in the production of this thesis. I appreciate all the members of the jury for their

acceptance and subsequent participation in the examination of this thesis and the worthy contributions

they made to the publication of the work.

I appreciate the administrations of Garissa University and Masinde Muliro University of Science and

Technology for allowing this fieldwork to be done with their students. I would also like to acknowledge

the assistance of all the patrons who paved the way for the work, Rev. Father Kizito and Dr. Otuya of

Masinde Muliro University. I would like to acknowledge and appreciate the role played by all the student

leaders in laying the groundwork for this research. My special thanks to Mr. Kadison Edison who

travelled all the way to Garissa for the fieldwork and for all the extra work he did in putting together the

report, the data and arranging the completed questionnaires. To all the respondents in this project, without

your participation, this work would not be realized.

I acknowledge all forms of assistance I received from my fellow candidates at the lab, Hassan, Yara and

Sacha for their input in time, expertise and guidance. I acknowledge all others whom I may not mention

here for any assistance or role they played in one way or the other in form of advice, criticisms and words

of encouragement that provided the motivation in putting this work together. Your involvement is

acknowledged and I wish that you do the same for others with similar needs.

Last but not least, I would like to appreciate all those who played a background role in making my stay in

Paris possible, worthwhile and peaceful enough to concentrate on this work. These include the different

French government departments, institutions, companies, and individuals who provided the wherewithal

to ensure that my son‘s and my life went smoothly during our sojourn in France.

May the Almighty God bless you all abundantly.

pg. iv

pg. v

ABSTRACT

The current project aimed to investigate the influence of the terrorism on the perceptions of

Muslim and Christian students at Garissa University and Masinde Muliro University of Science

and Technology in Kenya. These were purposively sampled with the former having a history of a

terrorist attack and being situated in a predominantly Muslim region, classified as a terror

hotspot. The latter was found in a Christian dominated region with lower risk for terrorism. The

research, made up of an experiment and a survey, was guided by the social identity theory

developed by Henri Tajfel and his collaborators.

A sample of 355 participants took part in the experiment where they were categorised into the

experimental and control groups. The independent variables were the university affiliation of

students (Garissa University vs. Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology) and

their religious affiliation (Muslim or Christian) while the dependent variables were the

perception on terrorism, perception on solution factors and the relationship factors. The data was

collected using a questionnaire formulated into four versions combining each of the modalities of

the independent variables. The experimental groups were treated to a primer on terrorism while

the control groups were exposed to a primer on general life and future plans. Analyses of

variance in the data yielded no effect of the experimental treatment on any of the factors under

study. Religion-based terrorism remains a highly salient problematic for all cultural groups,

impacting greatly on their perceptions about terrorism as well as on respondents‘ perceived level

of risk for terrorism, and their preference for counterterrorism measures.

The survey involved 354 Muslim and Christian participants from Garissa University and

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology. The independent variables were the

university affiliation of students (Garissa University vs. Masinde Muliro University of Science

and Technology), their religious affiliation (Muslim or Christian) and their religious

commitment. The dependent variables were perception about terrorism, solutions preference and

self-esteem. The respondents completed a five-section questionnaire. The results showed that

both Muslim and Christian participants were devoted to religion although Muslims in Garissa

were more actively involved in religious activities than Christians at the same institution.

Conversely, Christians in MMUST were more committed to religion than Muslims at this

university. Christian participants were more likely than the Muslims to perceive terrorism as

perpetrated by Muslims and Christians as the targets of terror attacks. Christians were also more

likely than Muslims to prefer more drastic counterterrorism measures. The Christians at

MMUST were more likely to prefer more drastic counterterrorism measures than those at

Garissa University. Garissa university respondents were more likely than MMUST participants

to perceive terrorism as perpetrated by Muslims and Christians as the target. However, the

Garissa Muslim respondents were less likely than their Christian counterparts to prefer drastic

measures against terrorism.

pg. vi

The analysis of data also revealed certain correlations between variables. First of all, it was

observed that the stronger the participants‘ commitment to religion, the lower their tendency to

prefer drastic counterterrorism measures. Additionally, the higher the respondents‘ devotion to

religion, the higher their self-esteem was. It was also observed that the higher the respondents‘

tendency to link terrorism to Muslims and to consider Christians as targeted, the higher their

tendency to prefer drastic counterterrorism measures. Finally, it was observed that the higher the

self-esteem of participants, the lower their tendency to prefer drastic counterterrorism measures.

The project highlights the importance of preventing and reducing Islamophobia through the use

of incentives for the involvement of Muslim communities in countering terrorism. This would

also help in addressing the perceived reticence of Somali communities and the involvement of

communities in security policy-formulation. Suggestions for further research included

investigations into the nature of the perceptions revealed in the current project, the environmental

factors at play, and their link to the observed perceptions. The possible psychological impact of

the Garissa university attack monument and scrupulous security measures at the institution on

the students and locals should be probed. The existence and direction of causation between

correlated variables would be another area of inquiry.

pg. vii

RÉSUMÉ

Le projet doctoral visait à étudier l'influence de l'islamisation du terrorisme sur les perceptions

d‘étudiants musulmans et d‘étudiants chrétiens, soit de l'Université de Garissa soit de l'Université

des sciences et technologies de Masinde Muliro, au Kenya. Ces deux universités ont été

volontairement choisies, la première a des antécédents d'attaque terroriste et se situe dans une

région à prédominance musulmane et identifiée comme un point névralgique du terrorisme. La

seconde se trouve dans une région dominée par les chrétiens avec un risque moindre de

terrorisme. La recherche, composée d'une expérience et d'une enquête de terrains, a été guidée

par la théorie de l‘identité sociale développée par Henri Tajfel et ses collaborateurs.

Un échantillon de 355 participants a participé à une première étude et a été réparti dans un

groupe expérimental et un groupe témoin. Les variables indépendantes étaient l'affiliation

universitaire des étudiants (Université de Garissa vs. Université de Masinde Muliro) et leur

appartenance religieuse (Musulmane Vs. Chrétienne), tandis que les variables dépendantes

étaient la perception du terrorisme, les perceptions de solutions à la lutte contre le terrorisme et

les aspects relationnels entre les communautés musulmanes et chrétiennes. Les données ont été

recueillies à l'aide d'un questionnaire combinant le croisement des modalités des variables

mobilisées dans cette étude. Les groupes expérimentaux ont eu droit à une introduction sur le

terrorisme tandis que les groupes témoins ont été exposés à une introduction sur la vie en général

et les projets futurs des étudiants. Les analyses de variances n'ont révélé aucun effet du

traitement expérimental sur aucun des facteurs étudiés. L‘islamisation du terrorisme reste une

problématique très saillante pour toutes les groupes culturels et a un grand impact sur les

perceptions du terrorisme, sur le niveau de risque perçu, ainsi que sur les préférences des

participants pour la mise en place de contre-mesures luttant contre le terrorisme.

L'enquête quant à elle a impliqué 354 participants soit musulmans, soit chrétiens de l'Université

de Garissa ou de l'Université des sciences et technologies de Masinde Muliro. Les variables

indépendantes étaient l'appartenance à l'université (Université de Garissa vs. Université de

Masinde Muliro), l'appartenance religieuse (Musulmane Vs. Chrétienne) et l'engagement

religieux. Les variables dépendantes étaient la perception du terrorisme, la préférence déclarée

pour des solutions à apporter au terrorisme et l'estime de soi. L‘analyse des résultats permet de

montrer que les participants musulmans, ainsi que ceux chrétiens, étaient dévoués à la religion,

bien que les musulmans de Garissa soient plus activement impliqués dans les activités religieuses

que les chrétiens de la même institution. À l'inverse, les chrétiens de l‘université Masinde Muliro

(MMUST) étaient plus attachés à la religion que les musulmans de la même université. Les

participants chrétiens étaient plus susceptibles que les musulmans de percevoir le terrorisme

comme perpétré par des musulmans et les chrétiens comme les cibles d'attaques terroristes. Les

chrétiens étaient également plus susceptibles que les musulmans de préférer des mesures

antiterroristes drastiques. Les chrétiens de MMUST étaient plus susceptibles de préférer des

mesures antiterroristes drastiques par rapport aux Chrétiens de l'Université de Garissa. Les

pg. viii

étudiants de l'université de Garissa étaient plus susceptibles que ceux de l‘université Masinde

Muliro de se percevoir comme les cibles d‘un terrorisme perpétré par des musulmans.

Cependant, les répondants musulmans de Garissa étaient moins susceptibles que leurs

homologues chrétiens de préférer des mesures drastiques contre le terrorisme.

L'analyse des données a également révélé certaines corrélations entre les variables. Tout d‘abord,

il a été observé que plus l‘engagement des participants envers la religion est fort, moins ils ont

tendance à préférer des mesures antiterroristes drastiques. De plus, plus le dévouement des

répondants à la religion est élevé, plus leur estime de soi est élevée. Il a également été observé

que plus la tendance des personnes interrogées à lier le terrorisme aux musulmans et à considérer

les chrétiens comme ciblés était élevée, plus leur tendance à préférer des mesures antiterroristes

drastiques était importante. Enfin, il a été observé que plus l'estime de soi des participants est

élevée, plus leur tendance à préférer des mesures antiterroristes drastiques est faible.

Le projet souligne l‘importance de mettre en place des mesures de prévention et de réduction de

l'islamophobie, et d‘incitation à l‘implication de la communauté musulmane dans la lutte contre

le terrorisme, et à la prise en compte des réticences perçues envers les communautés somaliennes

et l'implication des communautés dans la formulation des politiques de sécurité. Parmi les

suggestions de recherches supplémentaires, mentionnons des enquêtes sur la nature des

perceptions révélées dans le projet actuel, les facteurs environnementaux en jeu et leur lien avec

les perceptions mesurées dans notre travail. L'impact psychologique que constitue un monument

érigé à la mémoire des victimes de l‘attaque de l'université de Garissa, ainsi que les mesures de

sécurité importantes mises en place par les établissements universitaires devraient être examinés

quant à leurs effets sur les étudiants et les habitants. La question du lien de causalité et de sa

direction entre les variables corrélées entre elles dans notre travail constituent un domaine de

recherche à approfondir.

pg. ix

pg. x

LIST OF TABLES

Table 3.1: Religious distribution of the Kenyan population………………………………………….68

Table 4.1: The global impact of terrorism by regions ................................................................ 129

Table 4.2: Terrorism ranking trend for the top ten African countries in 2019 .......................... 146

Table 4.3: Kenya's terrorism index ranking globally and continentally .................................... 147

Table 4.4: 28 deadliest terror attacks against Kenya ................................................................. 148

Table 5.1: African states' contribution of troops to AMISOM .................................................... 211

Table 6.1: Experiment sampling frame for university affiliation and religious affiliation ........ 247

Table 6.2: Summary of experiment observations on attitude factors ......................................... 271

Table 6.3: Summary of experiment observations on relationship factors .................................. 272

Table 6.4: Summary of experiment observations on proximity factors ...................................... 273

Table 6.5: Summary of experiment observations on terrorism risk attitude factors .................. 274

Table 7.1: Survey sampling frame for university affiliation and religious affiliation ................ 283

Table 7.2: Effects of religious and university affiliations on religious factors .......................... 304

Table 7.3: Effects of religious and university affiliations on attitude factors ............................ 305

Table 7.4: Effects of religious and university affiliations on solution factors ............................ 306

Table 7.5: Summary of observed correlations ............................................................................ 307

pg. xi

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.1: Global position of Kenya ........................................................................................... 11

Figure 1.2: Map of Africa showing the position of Kenya ........................................................... 12

Figure 1.3: Map of Kenya displaying the terrorism hotspots ....................................................... 17

Figure 1.4: The 2015 Garissa University terrorist attack monument .......................................... 25

Figure 1.5: Map of Kenya showing major towns ......................................................................... 28

Figure 2.1: An artist's representation of categorization and image-formation……………………45

Figure 3.1: Pie chart representation of the Kenyan population by religious affiliation ............ 699

Figure 4.1: Map of Africa displaying locations of Islamist militants ......................................... 143

Figure 5.1: The security situation of the coastal and north-eastern regions of Kenya .............. 208

Figure 6.1: Participants' distribution by university ................................................................... 255

Figure 6.2: Religious distribution of participants ...................................................................... 256

Figure 6.3: Distribution of participants by treatment group ...................................................... 257

Figure 6.4: Denominational distribution of respondents ........................................................... 258

Figure 6.5: Gender distribution of participants ......................................................................... 259

Figure 6.6: Respondents' distribution by age ............................................................................. 260

Figure 6.7: Participants' distribution by course level ................................................................ 261

Figure 6.8: Distribution of respondents by year of study ........................................................... 262

Figure 7.1: Distribution of respondents by university ................................................................ 291

Figure 7.2: Religious distribution of respondents ...................................................................... 291

Figure 7.3: Distribution of respondents by denomination.......................................................... 292

Figure 7.4: Gender distribution of respondents ......................................................................... 293

Figure 7.5: Respondents' distribution by age ............................................................................. 294

Figure 7.6: Distribution of participants by course level ............................................................ 295

Figure 7.7: Distribution of respondents by year of study ........................................................... 296

pg. xii

LIST OF ANALYSIS OUTPUTS

Output 6.1: Attitude factors by university, religion and treatment condition ............................. 264

Output 6.2: Relationship factors by university, religion and treatment condition ..................... 266

Output 6.3: Proximity factors by religion and university ........................................................... 268

Output 6.4: Terrorism risk attitude by religion and university .................................................. 269

Output 7.1: Interaction of religion factors, religious affiliation and university affiliation.. ...... 298

Output 7.2: Interaction of attitude factors, religious affiliation and university affiliation.. ...... 299

Output 7.3: Interaction of solution factors, religious affiliation and university affiliation……..301

Output 7.4: Correlations between variables .............................................................................. 302

pg. xiii

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAI – Africa-America Institute

ACSRT – African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

ATPU – Anti-Terrorism Police Unit

AQIM – Al Qaeda in the Maghreb

AU – African Union

AMISOM – African Mission in Somalia

CCG – Christian Control Group

CEG – Christian Experimental Group

CID – Criminal Investigation Department

CT – Counter-Terrorism

DVC – Deputy Vice Chancellor

ETA - Euskadi Ta Askatasuna

GSQ – General Survey Questionnaire

GTI – Global Terrorism Index

GU – Garissa University

GUC – Garissa University Christians

GUM – Garissa University Muslims

HRW – Human Rights Watch

ICU – Islamic Courts Union

IEP – Institute for Economics and Peace

IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development

IGASOM – Inter-Governmental Authority on Somalia

IPOA – Independent Policing Oversight Authority

IRA – Irish Republican Army

pg. xiv

IRIS – Institut de Relation Internationales et Stratégiques

ISIS – Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

ISWA – Islamic State in West Africa

KDF – Kenya Defence Force

KNBS – Kenya National Bureau of Statistics

KNCHR – Kenya National Commission for Human Rights

MCG – Muslim Control Group

MEG – Muslim Experimental Group

MENA – Middle East and North Africa

MMUC – Masinde Muliro University Christians

MMUM – Masinde Muliro University Muslims

MMUST – Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

NCTC – National Counter-Terrorism Centre

OAU – Organisation for African Unity

PTA – Prevention of Terrorism Authority

SDA – Seventh-day Adventist

SLAA – Security Law Amendment Act

UNDP – United Nations Development Program

USAID – United States Agency for International Development

pg. xv

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS

The following terms are defined as they will be used in this project.

i) Attitude factors these are the attributes that constitute the attitudes under study.

ii) Attitude towards solutions stands for respondents‘ preference for counterterrorism

measures.

iii) Attitude towards terrorism means the participants‘ opinions or beliefs about terrorism

in Kenya.

iv) Other religion stands for the opposing religion, i.e. for Muslims it would mean

Christianity and for Christians it would mean Islam.

v) Religion-based terrorism means the linking of terrorism to Islam, or the attitudes that

consistently link Islam to terrorism. It is sometimes interchanged with the word

terrorism.

vi) Terrorism risk attitude is the sensitivity to the likelihood of a terror act taking place in

the immediate environment. It is either strong or weak.

vii) All reference to Muslims and Christians in this work is made to the Kenyan cases

unless otherwise specified.

viii) The words province and district are used to refer to the general area or region and not

necessarily to the units of administration formerly used in Kenya before the creation

of County governments.

ix) All reference to Masinde Muliro University or Masinde Muliro University of Science

and Technology are made to the main campus located in Kakamega unless otherwise

stated.

pg. xvi

pg. xvii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION ........................................................................................................... i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... iii

ABSTRACT ............................................................................................................... v

RÉSUMÉ ................................................................................................................ vii

LIST OF TABLES ...................................................................................................... x

LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................... xi

LIST OF ANALYSIS OUTPUTS ................................................................................ xii

LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................. xiii

OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF TERMS ................................................................ xv

TABLE OF CONTENTS ......................................................................................... xvii

PREAMBLE 1

PRÉAMBULE ............................................................................................................. 1

REFERENCES ............................................................................................................ 6

CHAPTER ONE ........................................................................................................ 7

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT ........................................................................ 7

INTRODUCTION DU PROJET .................................................................................. 7

1.1 Background to the Project .................................................................... 8

1.2 Statement of the Problem ................................................................... 12

1.3 Aim of the Project .............................................................................. 18

1.3.1 Experiment Research Questions ......................................................... 18

1.3.2 Survey Research Questions ................................................................ 19

1.4 Justification of the Project ................................................................. 19

1.5 Significance of the Project ................................................................. 20

1.6 Scope of the Project ........................................................................... 21

1.7 Project Area of Study .......................................................................... 21

1.7.1 Garissa Township ............................................................................... 22

1.7.2 Garissa University .............................................................................. 22

1.7.3 The Garissa University Terrorist Attack ............................................. 23

1.7.4 Kakamega Town ................................................................................. 25

1.7.5 Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology...................... 26

1.8 Project Challenges and Ethical Issues ................................................ 29

pg. xviii

1.8.1 Research Studies Limitations ............................................................. 29

1.8.2 Delimitation Strategies ....................................................................... 29

1.9 Ethical Considerations ....................................................................... 30

CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 32

RÉSUMÉ DU CHAPITRE ......................................................................................... 34

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 36

CHAPTER TWO ..................................................................................................... 39

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL: SOCIAL IDENTITY

THEORY.............................................................................................. 39

CADRE THÉORIQUE ET LE MODÉLE CONCEPTUEL: LA THÉORIE D’IDENTITÉ

SOCIALE ............................................................................................. 39

2.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 40

2.2 Overview ............................................................................................ 40

2.3 Categorisation Theory ........................................................................ 41

2.3.1 Categorisation and In-group Favouritism .......................................... 42

2.3.2 Categorisation and Image-formation.................................................. 44

2.3.3 Intergroup Prejudice and Stereotyping .............................................. 45

2.3.4 Intergroup Emotion ............................................................................ 47

2.3.5 Social Identity and Attitude ............................................................... 49

2.3.6 Group Discrimination ......................................................................... 52

2.3.7 Social Identity and Self-esteem .......................................................... 54

2.3.8 Group Comparisons ........................................................................... 55

2.3.9 Group Identity Threat ........................................................................ 56

2.3.10 Limitations of the Theory................................................................... 57

2.4 The Conceptual Model ........................................................................ 57

CHAPTER SUMMARY ............................................................................................. 60

RÉSUMÉ DU CHAPITRE ......................................................................................... 62

REFERENCES .......................................................................................................... 64

CHAPTER THREE .................................................................................................. 66

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DYNAMICS AND PERCEPTIONS IN KENYA: ......................... 66

LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................ 66

pg. xix

DYNAMIQUES MUSULMANS-CHRÉTIENS ET PERCEPTIONS AU KENYA : ............. 66

UNE REVUE DE LITTÉRATURE .............................................................................. 66

3.1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 67

3.2 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN KENYA ....................................................... 67

3.2.1 Functions of Religion ......................................................................... 70

3.2.2 The Islamic Religious Landscape in Kenya......................................... 71

3.2.3 Christianity in Kenya .......................................................................... 72

3.2.4 Other Religious Identities .................................................................. 73

3.3 THE SPREAD OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY IN KENYA ......................... 74

3.3.1 Muslim-Christian Relations in Kenya ................................................. 75

3.3.2 The Somali Factor ............................................................................... 77

3.3.3 Muslim Fundamentalism in Kenya ..................................................... 78

3.3.3.1 Importation of Islamic Extremism ...................................................... 80

3.3.3.2 Historical Injustices against Muslim Communities ............................ 82

3.3.3.3 The Influence of Immigrants .............................................................. 84

3.3.3.3.1 Encamped Refugees............................................................................ 86

3.3.3.3.2 Urban Refugees .................................................................................. 87

3.3.3.3.3 Refugees on Transit ........................................................................... 89

3.4 INSTITUTIONALISED DIVISIONS BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND

CHRISTIANS ....................................................................................... 90

3.4.1 The Education Sector .......................................................................... 90

3.4.2 The Socio-Cultural Dimension ............................................................ 91

3.4.3 Political Undertones ........................................................................... 92

3.4.4 The Economic Aspect ......................................................................... 93

3.4.5 Enhancement of Muslim-Christian Relations ..................................... 94

3.5 THE IMPACT OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DYNAMICS ON ATTITUDES .. 96

3.5.1 Religious Identity and Attitude .......................................................... 97

3.5.2 Dynamics of Minority Status .............................................................. 98

3.5.3 Islamic Extremism and Christian Objects .......................................... 98

3.5.4 Underlying Grievances as Fertile Ground........................................... 99

3.5.5 Inequity and Improvement of Relations .......................................... 100

3.5.6 Muslim-Christian Emotions and Reactions ....................................... 100

3.6 PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES ...................................... 102

pg. xx

3.6.1 The Effects of Threat ........................................................................ 102

3.6.1.1 Religious Affiliation ......................................................................... 103

3.6.1.2 Geographical Location ...................................................................... 104

3.6.2 Personal Factors ............................................................................... 106

3.6.2.1 Proximity to the Out-Group .............................................................. 106

3.6.2.2 Individual Self-Esteem ...................................................................... 107

3.6.2.3 The Role of Experience ..................................................................... 109

CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 111

RÉSUMÉ DU CHAPITRE ....................................................................................... 113

REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 116

CHAPTER FOUR .................................................................................................. 122

TERRORISM IN KENYA AND OTHER SELECTED REGIONS OF THE WORLD: ..... 122

LITERATURE REVIEW .......................................................................................... 122

LE TERRORISME AU KENYA ET DANS D’AUTRES RÉGIONS ............................... 122

SÉLECTIONNÉES DU MONDE : UNE REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE ..................... 122

4.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 123

4.2 CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM ..................................................... 123

4.2.1 A Brief Historical Perspective ........................................................... 124

4.2.2 Complexity in Terrorism Dimensions .............................................. 125

4.2.3 A Working Definition of Terrorism .................................................. 126

4.3 GLOBAL TERRORISM ....................................................................... 127

4.3.1 The North American Region ............................................................. 129

4.3.2 The Region of Europe ....................................................................... 130

4.3.2.1 The Provisional Irish Republican Army ............................................ 132

4.3.3 The Middle East and North Africa .................................................... 133

4.3.4 Terrorism in the South of the Sahara ............................................... 134

4.3.4.1 The Sahel Region of Africa ............................................................... 138

4.3.4.2 The Lake Chad Basin ........................................................................ 139

4.3.4.3 The Horn of Africa Region ................................................................ 140

4.3.4.4 Terrorism in East Africa ................................................................... 144

4.4 TERRORISM IN KENYA ..................................................................... 145

pg. xxi

4.4.1 Major Terrorist Attacks in Kenya ..................................................... 147

4.4.2 Underlying Factors Linked to Terrorism in Kenya ........................... 149

4.5 THE AL SHABAAB TERRORIST ORGANISATION ............................. 151

4.5.1 Ideology and Structure ..................................................................... 152

4.5.2 Expansion and Support .................................................................... 153

4.5.3 Recruitment Strategies and Propaganda Dissemination .................. 154

4.5.4 Lethalness of Attacks ....................................................................... 156

4.5.5 Presence of al Shabaab in Kenya ...................................................... 157

4.6 RELIGION-BASED TERRORISM IN KENYA ........................................ 159

4.6.1 Muslim Extremism and al Shabaab Assertions ................................. 160

4.6.2 Targeting of Christians and Pro-Christian Agencies ........................ 162

4.6.3 Terrorism News Coverage and Social Media .................................... 164

4.6.4 Counterterrorism Measures targeting Muslims ................................ 165

CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 168


REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 176

CHAPTER FIVE ................................................................................................... 182

COUNTERTERRORISM INTERVENTIONS IN KENYA AND MULISM-CHRISTIAN

PERCEPTIONS: LITERATURE REVIEW .............................................. 182

INTERVENTIONS CONTRE-TERRORISTES AU KENYA ET PERCEPTIONS ENTRE

MUSULSMANS-CHRÉTIENS : UNE REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE ..... 182

5.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 183

5.2 PAST STRATEGIES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM ........................... 183

5.2.1 External Interventions ...................................................................... 184

5.2.2 Internal Factors ................................................................................ 185

5.3 THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM ..................... 185

5.3.1 The Global War on Terror (GWOT) .................................................... 187

5.4 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN AFRICA .............................. 188

5.4.1 The African Union Counterterrorism Initiatives .............................. 189

5.4.2 The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism ......... 189

5.4.3 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) ............................. 191

5.4.4 African Government Responses ....................................................... 192

pg. xxii

5.5 KENYA’S COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY ......................................... 193

5.5.1 The National Counter-Violent Extremism Strategy .......................... 194

5.5.2 The National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) .............................. 195

5.5.3 The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) ............................................. 195

5.5.4 The Modus Operandi of CT Interventions in Kenya ......................... 197

5.5.5 State Secret Surveillance .................................................................. 198

5.6 MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS .................................. 198

5.6.1 Operation Linda Nchi ....................................................................... 198

5.6.2 Usalama Watch ................................................................................. 199

5.6.3 Nyumba Kumi Initiative ................................................................... 200

5.6.4 Operation Linda Boni........................................................................ 201

5.6.5 Successes of the Counterterrorism Operations................................ 203

5.6.6 Flaws in Kenya’s Counterterrorism Frameworks .............................. 204

5.6.7 Challenges arising with Counterterrorism Measures ....................... 206

5.6.8 ATPU-related Challenges .................................................................. 206

5.6.9 Challenges from the Kenyan Incursion ............................................ 209

5.7 CT MEASURES AND MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES .................... 211

5.7.1 Antagonism from Muslim Communities .......................................... 212

5.7.2 Targeting of Somalis and Other Muslims ......................................... 213

5.7.3 Use of Militarised Techniques .......................................................... 214

5.7.4 Violations of Human Rights ............................................................. 216

5.7.5 Retaliatory Attacks on Pro-Christian Interests ................................. 217

5.7.6 Suspicion of Muslims and Government ............................................ 218

5.7.7 Furtherance of Radicalisation .......................................................... 219

5.7.8 Effect on Christian Attitudes ............................................................ 220

5.7.9 Somalis and Muslims as Violent ....................................................... 220

5.7.10 Christian Targets in Retaliatory Attacks .......................................... 221

5.7.11 Violations of Muslims’ Rights .......................................................... 221

5.7.12 Association of Government with Christians..................................... 222

5.7.13 Lack of Trust .................................................................................... 223

5.8 SUGGESTED MEASURES ................................................................... 223

5.8.1 Politico-Structural Measures............................................................. 225

pg. xxiii

5.8.2 Socio-Economic Measures ................................................................ 226

5.8.3 Psycho-Social Measures .................................................................... 227

CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 230


REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 238

CHAPTER SIX ...................................................................................................... 243

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS: THE

EXPERIMENT .................................................................................... 243

MÉTHODOLOGIE DE LA RECHERCHE ET ANALYSES DES RÉSULTATS : L’ÉTUDE

EXPÉRIMENTALE .............................................................................. 243

6.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 244

6.2 Research Design ............................................................................. 245

6.2.1 Target Population ............................................................................. 246

6.2.2 Sample Size ...................................................................................... 247

6.2.3 Sampling Techniques ....................................................................... 247

6.2.4 Study Variables................................................................................. 248

6.2.5 Data Collection Instruments ............................................................ 248

6.2.5.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................... 249

6.2.5.2 Section I: The Primers ...................................................................... 249

6.2.5.3 Section II A: Attitude Factors ............................................................ 250

6.2.5.4 Section II B: Relationship Factors .................................................... 250

6.2.5.5 Section II B Part (ii): Proximity Factors ............................................ 251

6.2.5.6 Section II C: Solution Factors .......................................................... 251

6.2.5.7 Section III: Self-Esteem Factors ........................................................ 252

6.2.5.8 Section IV: Demographic Factors...................................................... 252

6.2.6 Methods of Data collection .............................................................. 253

6.3 Statistical Description of Respondents ........................................ 254

6.3.1 Distribution by University................................................................ 255

6.3.2 Distribution by Religion ................................................................... 255

6.3.3 Summary by Treatment Group ......................................................... 256

6.3.4 Distribution by Denomination ......................................................... 257

6.3.5 Distribution by Gender .................................................................... 259

pg. xxiv

6.3.6 Distribution by Age .......................................................................... 259

6.3.7 Distribution by Course Level............................................................ 260

6.3.8 Distribution by Year of Study........................................................... 261

6.4 Data Analysis .................................................................................. 262

6.4.1 Attitude factors ................................................................................ 262

6.4.2 Relationship Factors ......................................................................... 264

6.4.3 Proximity Factors ............................................................................. 266

6.4.4 Terrorism Risk Attitudes .................................................................. 268

6.5 Summary of Findings ..................................................................... 270

6.5.1 Summary of Effects on Attitude Factors .......................................... 270

6.5.2 Summary of Effects on Relationship Factors ................................... 271

6.5.3 Summary of Proximity Factor Effects ............................................... 272

6.5.4 Summary of Effects on Terrorism Risk Attitude .............................. 273

CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 275


REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 280

CHAPTER SEVEN ................................................................................................ 281

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS: THE SURVEY .... 281

MÉTHODOLOGIE DE LA RECHERCHE ET RÉSULTATS DES ANALYSES DES

DONNEES : L’ENQUÊTE .................................................................... 281

7.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 282

7.2 Research Design ............................................................................. 282

7.2.1 Target Population ............................................................................. 283

7.2.2 Sample Size ...................................................................................... 283

7.2.3 Sampling Techniques ....................................................................... 283

7.2.4 Study Variables................................................................................. 284

7.2.5 Data Collection Instruments ............................................................ 284

7.2.5.1 Introductory Remarks ...................................................................... 285

7.2.5.2 Section I: Religious Commitment ..................................................... 285

7.2.5.3 Preliminary Segment ........................................................................ 285

7.2.5.4 Major Segment .................................................................................. 286

7.2.5.5 Section II: Attitude Factors ............................................................... 287

pg. xxv

7.2.5.6 Section III: Solution Factors .............................................................. 287

7.2.5.7 Section IV: Self-Esteem Factors ........................................................ 288

7.2.5.8 Section V: Demographic Factors ....................................................... 288

7.2.6 Methods of Data collection .............................................................. 289

7.3 STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENTS ............................. 290

7.3.1 Descriptive Summary ....................................................................... 290

7.3.1.1 Distribution by University................................................................ 290

7.3.1.2 Distribution by Religion ................................................................... 291

7.3.1.3 Distribution by Denomination ......................................................... 292

7.3.1.4 Distribution by Gender .................................................................... 293

7.3.1.5 Distribution by Age .......................................................................... 293

7.3.1.6 Distribution by Course Level............................................................ 294

7.3.1.7 Distribution by Year of Study........................................................... 295

7.4 Data Analysis .................................................................................. 296

7.4.1 Religion Factors ................................................................................ 296

7.4.2 Attitude Factors ................................................................................ 298

7.4.3 Solution Factors................................................................................ 300

7.4.4 Correlations between Variables ........................................................ 301

7.5 Summary of Findings ..................................................................... 303

7.5.1 Summary of Effects on Religion Factors .......................................... 303

7.5.2 Summary of Effects on Attitude Factors .......................................... 304

7.5.3 Summary of Effects on Solution Factors .......................................... 305

7.5.4 Summary of Correlations Results ..................................................... 306

CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 308


CHAPTER EIGHT ................................................................................................ 314

INTERPRETATION OF EXPERIMENT AND SURVEY RESULTS ............................. 314

INTERPRÉTATION DES RÉSULTATS DE L’ÉTUDE EXPÉRIMENTALE ET DE

L’ENQUÊTE ....................................................................................... 314

8.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 315

8.2 THE EXPERIMENT ............................................................................ 315

8.2.1 Effect of Religion-based Terrorism on Attitudes ............................. 316

pg. xxvi

8.2.2 Influence of Terrorism on Relationship with Members of the Other

Religion ............................................................................................ 317

8.2.3 Impact on Terrorism Risk Attitude .................................................. 318

8.2.4 Effect of Religion-based Terrorism on Solutions Preference ........... 318

8.2.5 Religion-based Terrorism versus Religious Affiliation .................... 319

8.2.6 Religion-based Terrorism versus University Affiliation ................... 319

8.2.7 Interpretation of Observations ......................................................... 320

8.3 THE SURVEY ..................................................................................... 321

8.3.1 Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Religious

Commitment……………………...………………………………………………321

8.3.2 Relationship between University Affiliation and Religious

Commitment..................................................................................... 323

8.3.3 Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Attitude towards

Terrorism ......................................................................................... 324

8.3.4 Relationship between University Affiliation and Attitude towards

Terrorism ......................................................................................... 329

8.3.5 Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Solutions Preference

......................................................................................................... 333

8.3.6 Relationship between University Affiliation and Solutions Preference

......................................................................................................... 335

8.3.7 Correlation between Religious Commitment and Solutions Preference

......................................................................................................... 338

8.3.8 Correlation between Religious Commitment and Self-esteem ......... 339

8.3.9 Correlation between Attitude towards Terrorism and Solutions

Preference ........................................................................................ 340

8.3.10 Correlation between Self-Esteem and Solutions Preference ............. 340

8.4 Summary of Conclusions and Interpretations ............................. 342

8.4.1 Experiment Conclusions ................................................................... 343

8.4.2 Interpretation of Experiment Conclusions ....................................... 343

8.4.3 Survey Conclusions .......................................................................... 344

8.4.4 Interpretation of Survey Conclusions .............................................. 345


pg. xxvii

CHAPTER NINE ................................................................................................... 358

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER

RESEARCH ........................................................................................ 358

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS ET SUGGESTIONS POUR DE PLUS AMPLES

RECHERCHES ................................................................................... 358

9.1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 359

9.2 PROJECT CONCLUSIONS .................................................................. 359

9.2.1 Conclusions from the Experiment ................................................ 360

9.2.1.1 Does terrorism shape the attitudes of university students in Kenya?

......................................................................................................... 360

9.2.1.2 How does religion-based terrorism affect students’ of terrorism risk

attitude? ........................................................................................... 362

9.2.1.3 Does terrorism influence the relations between Muslim and Christian

students at the two universities? ..................................................... 362

9.2.1.4 What is the influence of terrorism on preference for counterterrorism

measures? ......................................................................................... 363

9.2.2 Conclusions from the Survey ........................................................ 363

9.2.2.1 What is the relationship between religious affiliation and religious

commitment? ................................................................................... 364

9.2.2.2 Does religious affiliation affect attitudes towards terrorism? ......... 365

9.2.2.3 What relationship exists between religious affiliation and preference

for counterterrorism measures? ...................................................... 365

9.2.2.4 Does university affiliation have any influence on religious

commitment? ................................................................................... 366

9.2.2.5 How does university affiliation affect attitudes towards terrorism?

......................................................................................................... 366

9.2.2.6 Is university affiliation related to preference for counterterrorism

measures? ......................................................................................... 367

9.2.3 Supplementary Conclusions .......................................................... 367

9.2.3.1 Relationship between Religious Commitment and Solutions

Preference ........................................................................................ 368

9.2.3.2 Relationship between Religious Commitment and Self-esteem ....... 368

9.2.3.3 Relationship between Attitudes towards Terrorism and Solutions

Preference ........................................................................................ 368

9.2.3.4 Relationship between Self-Esteem and Solutions Preference ........... 369

9.2.4 Link between the Experiment and the Survey Findings ................... 369

pg. xxviii

9.3 PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................... 370

9.3.1 Interventions against Islamophobia ................................................. 370

9.3.2 The Role of the Muslim Community................................................. 371

9.3.3 The Somali Factor in Kenya .............................................................. 373

9.3.4 Community Involvement in Policy-Formulation .............................. 374

9.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH ....................................... 376

9.4.1 Stability of Attitudes ........................................................................ 376

9.4.2 Attitudes towards Terrorism and the Environment ......................... 376

9.4.3 Preferences for Counterterrorism Measures and the Environment.. 377

9.4.4 The Commemorative Monument at Garissa University .................... 377

9.4.5 The Garissa University Attack Footprints ........................................ 378

9.4.6 Conversion Issues ............................................................................ 378

9.4.7 Correlations and Causations between Variables .............................. 379

9.4.8 Religion and Self-Esteem .................................................................. 380

CHAPTER SUMMARY ........................................................................................... 382


REFERENCES ........................................................................................................ 391

APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRES ........................................................ 407

A. Muslim Experimental Group ............................................................. 407

B. Muslim Control Group ...................................................................... 414

C. Christian Experimental Group .......................................................... 421

D. Christian Control Group ................................................................... 427

E. General Survey Questionnaire .......................................................... 433

APPENDIX II: Fieldwork Authorizations ............................................................ 440

A. NACOSTI Research Licence ……………………………………………………………..441

B. NACOSTI Research Authorization Letter……………..……………………………...442

C. Introduction Letter for Research Assistant………………………………………….443

D. Authorization by Garissa County Commission………………...………………….444

E. Authorization by Garissa County Directorate of Education…………………….445

pg. xxix

pg. 1

PREAMBLE

PRÉAMBULE

pg. 2

On the dawn of 2nd

April, 2015, armed militants stormed the Garissa University College in

Garissa County in Kenya, killing the guards at the gate before forcing their way into the campus.

They went on to ransack all the buildings including classrooms, offices and dormitories and took

hostage all students identified as Christians whom they assembled outside and shot dead. Some

were murdered in their dormitory rooms. Survivors narrated that the militants asked each student

whether they were Christian or Muslim and went on to massacre the Christians. This siege that

began at around 5.00 a.m. local time lasted about 16 hours and left 148 people dead. 142 of them

were students and three were soldiers who responded to the siege while three were staff at the

college. The timing of the attack coincided with the preparations for morning prayers among a

group of Christian students on this eve of Good Friday, thus the high number of casualties. The

al Shabaab terrorist organisation claimed responsibility for the attack, boasting the killings and

threatening to launch more attacks in what it termed as Kenya‘s war with Somalia. The incident

sent shockwaves throughout the country and sparked local and international reactions to the

security challenge that al Shabaab had become and the international terrorist menace. The

university was closed indefinitely and surviving students transferred to the Moi University main

campus in Eldoret whose constituent college Garissa University was.

This would be the climax of a series of attacks staged by the militant group on Kenyan soil in

especially Muslim-dominated regions of the north east and the coast where helpless Christians

had been targeted and massacred for no other reason but their religion. For instance, in a Nairobi-

bound bus carrying 60 passengers, the terrorists separated Christians from Muslims and went on

to kill 28 of them. All the casualties were teachers from other parts of the country who were

pg. 3

travelling home for Christmas festivities. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility again with its

spokesman Sheikh Ali Mohammed Rage1 stating:

―The Mujahedeen intercepted a bus, which had on board a group of Christians that enjoyed the killing

and the maiming of Muslims.‖ (World Watch Monitor, 2014 paragraph, 4).

It seemed as if Muslims and Christians were at war with each other. Earlier, on Tuesday, 2nd

December, 2014 night at 1.00 am, heavily armed gunmen had stormed a quarry at Koromey,

about 20 kilometres from Mandera town and 9 miles from the Somalia border (Mutiga, 2014).

They had separated the quarry workers whom they found sleeping into Muslims and non-

Muslims and killed the non-Muslims. Eyewitnesses said that the 36 victims may have been

forced to lie on the ground outside their tents before being murdered in cold blood, while four of

them were beheaded in their tents (Business Standard, 2014).

This scenario was replicated in other parts of the country in al Shabaab attacks which had been

launched against Christians and pro-Christian establishments. On 15th

June, 2014, armed men

had arrived in Mpeketoni town in Lamu County in the coastal region in several vehicles chanting

Islamist slogans and burning buildings. The local police station was not spared with the militia

overrunning it and scaring the police officers into flight. The latter left behind their weapons

which the militia collected, and continued the raids for ten hours without any interruption from

security organs. It was alleged that the latter were watching a FIFA World Cup match

(Jamestown Foundation, 2017). During the raids, the militia picked out non-Muslim males,

whom they stabbed or shot at close range (Human Rights Watch, 2015); leaving 47 people dead

1 Also known as Sheikh Ali Dhere, [was the then] media spokesperson for al-Shabaab.

pg. 4

by morning. The following night, armed militia raided a neighbouring village where they

slaughtered 15 people and on 23rd

June, 2014, yet another village was attacked (Nyagah, Mwangi

& Attree (2016). In fact, the Human Rights Watch (2015) asserts that, a total of 8 villages were

attacked in Lamu and Tana River counties during this period where 30 buildings and 50 vehicles

were also destroyed by the militia. Four security officers were among those killed. On 19th

July,

2014, a bus plying the Malindi-Lamu highway was attacked and 30 passengers killed. In one

month alone, the coastal region had witnessed more than 100 killings of non-Muslims (Nyagah

et al, 2016). The Human Rights Watch (2015) states that the militia who operated in groups of 15

to 300 men and were armed with guns, knives, machetes, bazookas and grenade launchers

targeted non-Muslims and persons of different ethnicities.

The attackers who identified themselves as al Shabaab fighters in all of the incidences except one

gave reasons for these atrocities as the persecution of Muslims. The militants claimed that they

killed Christians because they had invaded and occupied Muslim lands, probably referring to the

significant proportion of residents and settlers in the region from ethnic communities that were

not native to the coast (Abdullahi Boru Halakhe, 2014, as cited in Anderson, 2014). They

demanded the withdrawal of Kenyan troops from Somalia and stated that they were avenging the

killing of Muslim clerics by Kenyan security forces. They told the women who were forced to

watch the killings of men to pass these grievances and demands to the president of the republic.

Kenyan security forces were caught flat-footed by this series of events, with the villages

remaining unprotected in the aftermath. When they eventually intervened, the officers used force

on those they identified as Muslims and ethnic Somalis, often beating them, stealing their

property and detaining some of them arbitrarily (HRW, 2015).

pg. 5

These happenings and others in the capital Nairobi and other towns in north-eastern and the coast

continued to reveal a religious streak to them. They had an impact on public opinions, raising

concern among Kenyans about the trend of terrorists targeting Christians and using them as a

scapegoat to fight against the government. On the other hand, the Islamic religious identity was

in danger of being associated with terror as the anti-terrorism interventions seemed to be directed

at Muslims and lauded by non-Muslims.

pg. 6

REFERENCES

Anderson, D.M. (2014, September). ‗Why Mpeketoni Matters: Al Shabaab and Violence in

Kenya‘, Policy Brief, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre. Retrieved from

https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/183993/cc2dacde481e24ca3ca5eaf60e974ee9.pdf on 11th

July 2018 at 10.00 am.

Business Standard (2014, December 2). 36 Massacred in Kenya, al Shabaab Claims Hand

(Roundup). Retrieved from https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/

36-massacred-in-kenya-al-shabaab-claims-hand-roundup-114120201191_1.html

on 29/05/2020 at 00.25am .

Human Rights Watch (2015, June 15). Insult to Injury. The 2014 Lamu and Tana River Attacks

and Kenya‘s Abusive Response. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/15/

insult-injury/2014-lamu-and-tana-river-attacks-and-kenyas-abusive-response#1573

on 29/05.2020 at 00.20 am.

Jamestown Foundation. (2017, October 27). How Kenya's Failure to Contain an Islamist

Insurgency is Threatening Regional Prosperity. Terrorism Monitor, Vol. 15, Issue 20.

Retrieved from https://www.refworld.org/docid/5a0d6cac4.html.

Mutiga, M. (2014). Al-Shabaab Militants Kill 36 Christian Quarry Workers in Kenya. The

Guardian. 2nd

December, 2014. Retrieved from https://www.theguardian.com/world/

2014/dec/02/kenya-quarry-massacre-leaves-36-dead-says-red-cross on 29/05/2020 at

2.00pm.

Nyagah, T., Mwangi, J. & Attree, L. (2016). Inside Kenya‘s War on Terror: The Case of Lamu.

Safeworld Publication. Retrieved from https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/inside-

kenyaas-war-on-terror-the-case-of-lamu on 29/05/2020 at 00.45am.

World Watch Monitor. (2014). 28 Kenyan Christians killed by Al-Shabaab. Retrieved from

https://www.worldwatchmonitor.org/coe/28-kenyan-christians-killed-by-al-shabaab/

on 29/05/2020 at 1.00 am.

https://www.files.ethz/

https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ians/36-massacred-in-kenya-al-shabaab-claims-hand-roundup-114120201191_1.html


https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/06/15/insult-injury/2014-lamu-and-tana-river-attacks-and-kenyas-abusive-response#1573

https://www.theguardian.com/world/%202014/dec/02/kenya-quarry-massacre-leaves-36-dead-says-red-cross


https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/inside-kenyaas-war-on-terror-the-case-of-lamu



pg. 7

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION TO THE PROJECT

INTRODUCTION DU PROJET

pg. 8

1.1 Background to the Project

Terrorism is a problem of global importance given the rising number of terrorist attacks in recent

years. In 2017 alone, close to 26,445 lives were lost to terrorism worldwide with an average

annual death of 21,000 in the previous decade. The lowest death toll was in 2010 when terrorism

resulted in 7,827 deaths while the highest figure was recorded in 2014 when there were 44,490

terror-related deaths (Ritchie, Hasell, Appel & Roser, 2020).

Prior to the 1990s, incidences of terrorism were mostly common in Middle Eastern countries and

other parts of the world may not have paid much attention to it. However, the rise in terrorist

activities globally to areas that were hitherto ‗safe‘ has drawn global attention. Kenya has had

her own share of these unfortunate events, ranking continually among the top countries in Africa

on the Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017). Over the years, Kenya

remained a potentially prime target for terrorists in its own right. This is because it was host to a

substantial pool of Western interests such as a booming tourism industry, a large number of

Western embassies and several international organisations and businesses. Kenya was also host

to the headquarters of the United Nations Environment Program and the United Nations Habitat

Program (Lyman, n.d). It was a signatory and active participant in the US-led Global War on

Terror and had received massive financial and technical support to this end from the international

community. These western interests are targeted by terrorists.

The first modern terrorist attack on the country took place in December, 1980, just before the

New Year, when a Palestinian group detonated a bomb that flattened the Norfolk Hotel in

Nairobi, killing 20 people and injuring 85 others. This was in protest against Kenya‘s role in

assisting to refuel an Israeli aircraft that had been hijacked at Entebbe Airport in Uganda. After

that, there was a period of near peace and quiet during which terrorism was not considered an

pg. 9

important issue in the country. Then on 7th

August, 1998, there was a bomb blast at the US

embassy in Nairobi, an incident that left 218 people dead, and close to 5,000 injured (Sanders,

2008). The last ten years had been the worst with terrorist activities becoming common in the

country especially after the Kenya government sent military troops from the Kenya Defence

Forces2 into neighbouring Somalia. This was in an attempt to counter rising hostility and

criminal activities by the al Qaeda-linked extremist Islamist militia group, al Shabaab3 that were

interfering with Kenya‘s interests along the coastal region. The interference included piracy on

the high seas and foreign tourist kidnappings perpetrated along the border with the Federal

Republic of Somalia. In retaliation to the now infamous Somalia invasion, the al Shabaab group

intensified attacks on Kenya in order to put pressure on the government and other African Union

members who later joined in the fight, to withdraw their troops from Somalia (Tharoor, 2013).

According to Tharoor (ibid), the militia group had launched a series of major and minor

coordinated attacks mostly in the capital, Nairobi, the coastal and the north-eastern regions of

Kenya. Bremmer (2015) reports that the country suffered more than 600 deaths as a result of

terror-related activities between 2012 and 2015. Wafula (2014) and the US Department of State

(2018) affirm that nine of the country‘s forty seven counties had witnessed terror-related attacks

where hand grenades, improvised explosive devices, landmines, bombs and guns as well as

machetes had been the terrorists‘ weapons of choice. Mwambingu and Mutiga (2020) mention

that the militia had also carried out horrific throat-slitting episodes.

2 A wing of the Kenya military sent to Somalia in 2011 to fight the al Shabaab in their backyard.

3 The Somali-based terrorist group that has claimed responsibility for a series of terrorist attacks in Kenya.

pg. 10

The al Shabaab had targeted a variety of locations for attacks including a shopping mall mostly

patronized by foreign residents, visitors and tourists; a hotel, buses, a bus-stop, churches, a

quarry and a university. It goes without saying that these terrorist actions had resulted in far-

reaching consequences such as the loss of lives, property and disruptions of society. The

challenge of terrorism had left it its wake traumatized families, friends and a citizenry living in

the fear of the unknown. Moreover, it had led to strained relations across religious, ethnic and

political lines, threatening social cohesion. Wafula (2014) describes the aftermath of terrorist

attacks as characterised by immense pain and anguish of survivors who had had to face an

uncertain future of dismay. Some had suffered bodily damage while others had lost their bread

winners, yet there was no government relief to help them cope with the resultant burden of

medical bills and post-traumatic stress.

Terrorism in Kenya had resulted in not only the loss of lives, personal suffering and pain, but

also in growing instability and a heightened sense of insecurity. The latter had harmed the

country‘s economy, particularly the tourism sector, coupled with widespread doubt about the

government‘s will and ability to deal with the situation. The country‘s biggest and best-known

international hotels were so heavily guarded and protected that entering them felt more like

visiting a prison. Security measures had been stepped up in public buildings, universities and

shopping malls. Newly re-opened Westgate Mall, which experienced a terror attack in 2013, had

invested in entry checks comparable to those at international airports (Hellsten, 2016). The

insecurity caused by terrorism had also led to foreign investor-apprehension.

Yet, al Shabaab and even ISIS were known to conduct active recruitment of boys and young men

living in the slums regardless of their religious affiliation. Youngsters with little hope of

pg. 11

education and good jobs were particularly easy prey. Similarly, in the country‘s border regions,

recruitment was reportedly active. Girls, children from wealthy families and university students

had not been left out of the terrorist recruitment drive. This was witnessed during the Garissa

terror incident of 2015 (Hellsten, ibid) in which one of the gunmen was highly educated and had

a degree in Banking.

Below is a figure showing the position of Kenya globally.

Figure 1.1: Global position of Kenya

SOURCE: https://www.google.com/search?rl

https://www.google.com/search?rl

pg. 12

The figure below shows the position of Kenya in Africa.

Figure 1.2: Map of Africa showing the position of Kenya

SOURCE: https://www.dreamstime.com/

1.2 Statement of the Problem

While religion may not have been the primary motivation for terrorist attacks, it served as a

justification. Sometimes there were political reasons behind the attacks, for example in the case

of the global Salafist Jihad that advocates the defeat of western powers preventing the

https://www.dreamstime.com/

pg. 13

establishment of a true Islamist state stretching from Morocco to the Philippines. However, the

present wave of terrorism had been dominated by Islamist concerns especially. Islam had been

singled out as a religion that bred violence (Morgan [2004]; & Weinber, Pedalizus & Hirsch-

Hoefler [2004] as cited in Willem & van der Joop [2016]).

In the Kenyan case, most counterterrorism interventions had revealed a religious streak to them

where most suspects had been Muslims of Somali origin with a few non-Muslims who allegedly

had been recruited into the al Shabaab outfit. The mere fact that counterterrorism measures

targeted certain sections of the public pointed to the perception of who the suspects were. For

instance, the Usalama Watch4 initiative was criticized by Amnesty International as a pretext for

the blanket punishment of the Somali community in Kenya (Magogo, 2017). Elsewhere, in the

coastal city of Mombasa, certain Islamic groups and clergy had claimed responsibility for terror

activities, vowing not to relent until their demands were met. This augmented the terrorism-Islam

link.

Brislen (2013) states that a person of Somali ethnicity was often considered a foreigner until

proven otherwise. In one incident, a non-Somali was one day questioned by the police following

an attack in Nairobi because he bore physical features similar to those of the Somali. In addition,

following increased cases of terrorist attacks that climaxed with the infamous Westgate Siege5,

the Kenyan government launched the Usalama Watch6. This operation seemed to have

4 A security measure implemented by the government of Kenya on 2

nd April, 2014 in which over 4,000 Muslim

―suspects‖ were detained (Anderson, 2014) for screening and possible repatriation to Somalia. 5 A terror attack on the Westgate Shopping Mall in Nairobi on 21

st September, 2013 which claimed 70 lives and

caused several injuries. 6 A counterterrorism operation mostly centred in Nairobi. Usalama is Kiswahili for security.

pg. 14

antagonized a segment of the local community in Nairobi‘s Eastleigh7 neighbourhood where it

was concentrated. Members of the said community would flee and lock themselves up in houses

whenever they sighted the Police (Muhumed, 2014). Consequently, there was an outcry by a

section of the public (mostly Somali-Muslim) against supposed discrimination and stereotyping

of persons from certain ethnic and religious groups (read Islam) as terrorists. It should be noted

that Kenya had local ethnics of Somali origin, who originated in the north-eastern frontiers,

bordering the Republic of Somalia to the east, some of whom had moved into the Eastleigh area

too. It had become difficult to actually distinguish authentic Kenyan Somalis whose population

was about 2.3 million (Zirulnick, 2016 as cited in Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2019) from non-

Kenyan Somalis. In fact, Brislen (2013) reports that in 2007 several people of Somali ethnic

origin were deported ‗back‘ to Somalia as the government of Kenya claimed that they were

Somali nationals, and that they were linked to terrorism in some fashion. According to him, it

was very possible that Kenyan citizens of Somali ethnicity had been deported along with those of

Somali nationality.

Accordingly, tensions between Christians and Muslims and persons of Somali origin because of

the suspicion, stereotyped attitudes and discrimination that emanated from such actions may be

evident. The repercussions were likely to affect social relations between the two religious groups

and by extension strain ethnic relations. As a matter of fact, some Muslims had reported feeling

threatened to the extent of being called ‗terrorist‘ or ‗al Shabaab‘ by non-Muslims as they

walked along the road. One of them even alluded to toying with the idea of joining a terror group

7 A bustling business hub in Nairobi largely inhabited by Somali refugees.

pg. 15

to fulfil these allegations. In the lakeside city of Kisumu, a group of locals accosted worshippers

in a number of mosques and threatened them with dire consequences should a terrorist attack be

staged in the city. This was evidence of the suspicion with which Muslims were held, one of the

accusations levelled against them being the allegation that they shielded terrorist elements from

authorities. In addition, Wesonga (2017) states that there had been reports of pastors asking to be

given guns during church services in anticipation of attacks. He continues to explain that it was

also common to find many big churches throughout the country conducting services under armed

police guard. He cited Islamophobia as the cause of radicalisation and the high rate of insecurity

in parts of Majengo, Kisauni and Old Town in the city of Mombasa, where gangs of youths

attacked people in broad daylight. These and many other unreported incidences could be a

pointer to problematic relations between Muslims and Christians in the wake of terrorism.

It is against this backdrop that this project was designed, to investigate the attitudes of Christian

university students towards their Muslim counterparts and vice versa. Wandusim (2015) notes

that the rise of extremist groups under the umbrella of Islam in the Middle East, Asia, and Africa

and the atrocities unleashed on humanity in the name of Islam and ‗Jihad‘ calls for the

relationship between the two faiths to be taken seriously. Wesonga (2017) states that despite

efforts to restore faith and trust between Christians and Muslims, there was still suspicion in

some areas. For instance, in the Mpeketoni8 area of Lamu where over 70 people were killed in

June 2014, the number of Christian students attending the Mkunumbi Secondary School had

reduced sharply. Mpeketoni is located in the Coastal region of Kenya in Lamu County. It was

8 A district of the Lamu County along the coast of Kenya that has witnessed a number of terrorist attacks.

pg. 16

inhabited by a majority local Arab-Swahili-Muslim population although there was a high

population of other ethnic Africans who settled there after independence. The scenario described

above was replicated at Garissa University when only 23 students selected to enrol there out of

the 710 places offered in the September 2016 (The Nation, 2016). The following year, only 277

places were filled out of the 470 slots provided by the government (Hajir, 2017). This may have

been occasioned by the infamous Garissa University terrorist attack9 that took place in 2015.

According to Wandusim (2015), the activities of extremist groups all over the world under the

name of Islam propagated mistrust and suspicion between Islam and Christianity. The map

below shows the geographical locations of Mpeketoni and Garissa among the major terrorism

hotspots in the country.

9 Terrorists attacked the university on the dawn of 2

nd April, 2015 and gunned down close to 148 Christian students

and staff.

pg. 17

Figure 1.3: Map of Kenya displaying the terrorism hotspots

SOURCE: The Economist

Second, the project aimed to investigate the effect of threat on student‘s attitudes. A review of

the government‘s counter-terrorism interventions was done with the aim of eliciting the opinions

of respondents on these strategies. The project specifically targeted university students in Kenya

because reports had it that a number of them had joined the terror group or that they were

sympathizers, aiding in their activities. In addition, university students were considered the

pg. 18

academic elite of the society, constituting a pool of the next generation of experts and leaders.

Their opinions on sensitive societal issues such as terrorism was worthy of examination. Besides,

they came from the larger Kenyan community whose attitudes they were likely to reflect and

shape. Because they were pursuing higher education, they held positions of authority among

their peers and families, rendering their views and attitudes important among other groups of

people within their social networks. That they had the potential to influence others and to impact

the communities could not be overemphasized.

1.3 Aim of the Project

The goal of this research project was to investigate the differences in the attitudes between

Muslim and Christian students at two universities in Kenya in the light of growing terrorism in

the country. This goal was broken down into ten more specific aims and allocated to the two

studies that made up the project. The two studies were an experiment which was guided by four

goals and a survey which was guided by six goals. The specific goals of the experiment and

survey are presented in form of research questions in the next section.

1.3.1 Experiment Research Questions

The experiment aimed to answer the following four questions.

i) Does religion-based terrorism shape the attitudes of Muslim and Christian university

students towards terrorism in Kenya?

ii) How does religion-based terrorism affect students‘ terrorism risk attitude?

iii) Does terrorism influence the relations between Muslim and Christian students at the two

universities?

pg. 19

iv) What is the influence of religion-based terrorism on participants‘ preference for

counterterrorism measures?

1.3.2 Survey Research Questions

The survey was guided by the following six research questions.

i) What is the relationship between religious affiliation and religious commitment?

ii) Does religious affiliation affect attitudes towards terrorism?

iii) What relationship exists between religious affiliation and preference for counterterrorism

measures?

iv) Does university affiliation have any influence on religious commitment?

v) How does university affiliation affect attitudes towards terrorism?

vi) Is university affiliation related to preference for counterterrorism measures?

1.4 Justification of the Project

The research project aimed to contribute to the world of knowledge by an engaging discourse of

intergroup relations, social interaction and creation and treatment of ‗other‘ from what people

perceived as the truth, from media reports and from experience. The project highlights the

students‘ attitudes about the issue of terrorism, the role of religion in these attitudes and their

preferences for counterterrorism interventions. While a lot of research had been done in the area

of violent extremism and terrorism, and given the fact that it was only emerging in the past

fifteen years or so as a problem in Kenya, more research needed to be done on it. There are an

increasing number of studies on terrorism especially in this part of Africa. One of the rarer areas

tackled by these however, was the effect of terrorism on social relations especially because of the

link between religious fundamentalism and violent extremism with Islam. Another reason why

pg. 20

this research was justified was that it targeted youth who were the main recruits into terrorist

groups. The project studies elicited this group‘s attitudes towards matters terrorism and helped to

voice their views on the same.

1.5 Significance of the Project

The UNDP (2017) reported that violent extremism in Africa was setting in motion a dramatic

reversal of gains and it threatened to stunt development prospects for decades to come. In fact, as

Lyman (n.d) put it, Africa as any other part of the world can only ignore the threat of terrorism at

its peril. As such, it is hoped that the findings of this project will be useful for countering rising

violent extremism in Kenya and elsewhere. This region of Africa was reporting the second

highest number of deaths from this vice after the Middle East and North Africa (UNDP, 2017).

Secondly, the findings of the project are important for Muslim-Christian relations as these groups

interact at various levels of society. The negative impact of terrorism on these relations is

examined alongside suggestions of how these can be neutralized. The results of the project are

applicable to other conflict situations such as inter-racial, inter-ethnic and gender relations, the

work place and the society in general. It informs future research in the areas of human relations,

causes of conflict, peace work, and media ethics, among others while being valuable for experts

working on terrorism and religious groups. The results of the project may be helpful for those

working in the fields of religion, Peace and Conflict Resolution.

pg. 21

1.6 Scope of the Project

The project was carried out in two Kenyan universities with two groups of participants being

distinguished, namely Muslims and Christians. The target was undergraduate and graduate

students in the two universities and no distinction was made in the area of specialization. There

was provision for categorization within each religious group but the Muslim respondents did not

categorize themselves into any sub-sects. Christians categorized themselves into roughly four

distinct denominational groups namely the Catholic, Christian Union, Seventh-day Adventists

and Repentance and Holiness among others. The project focused on participants‘ attitudes

towards terrorism with regard to members of the other group (Muslim versus Christian and vice

versa). It also investigated the linking of Islam and terrorism and the effect of targeting

Christians by terrorists. The respondents‘ level of risk for terrorism was also probed. Other

questions inquired about their preferences for counterterrorism measures.

1.7 Project Area of Study

The two studies were conducted at two universities situated in different towns in Kenya chosen

for their unique characteristics as far as terrorism was concerned. Garissa town is in the extreme

eastern region bordering Somalia while Kakamega is to the west of the country some kilometres

from the Kenya-Uganda boundary. The universities included in the study were Garissa in Garissa

town and Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology main campus in Kakamega

town, henceforth referred to as MMUST. Garissa University was chosen because of its location

in a terror hotspot region bordering Somalia, the home of al Shabaab. The university itself

suffered a deadly terrorist attack in 2015. MMUST is situated in a low terror-risk region and has

no history of terror attack.

pg. 22

1.7.1 Garissa Township

Garissa town is found in the recently created Garissa County which has a total population of

841,353 according to census results released by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics on 4th

November, 2019 (KNBS, 2019). Situated in the north-eastern region of the country, it lies a few

kilometres from the Somali border. According to Brislen (2013), the population of this region is

predominantly ethnic Somali and almost completely Muslim. The region is hot, arid,

geographically large, sparsely populated and underdeveloped with few roads. Many of the

Kenyan Somalis who live in the province continue to herd camels in a nomadic lifestyle. The

Kenya-Somalia border which lies around Garissa is porous and ethnic Somalis of the same clans,

sub-clans and families live on both sides of the border. This means that people here regularly live

and travel irrespective of national boundaries. The collapse of the Somali state and the ensuing

violence brought a large influx of ethnic Somalis from Somalia into the north-eastern province,

making it difficult to know who were truly Kenyan citizens and who were not. Despite hosting a

Kenya Defence Forces military camp for soldiers involved in fighting the al Shabaab, Garissa

had borne the brunt of terrorist attacks and at one point, Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) data

showed that 39% of the assaults on Kenya occurred there.

1.7.2 Garissa University

Garissa University was founded in 2011 as a constituent college of Moi University, in the

facilities of the former Garissa Teachers Training College. This was part of the response to

grievances over marginalization of the northern frontiers by the colonial and independent

Kenyan governments. Hitherto, the residents of this county and the larger north-eastern region

who wished to further their education had to register at universities in Nairobi or other parts of

the country. The university has a library which was established in 1996 in the former teacher

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moi_University

pg. 23

training college. It remained the only public higher education institution offering degree courses

in the north eastern region. These courses were in the areas of Arts and Social Sciences; Business

Studies; Education; and Information Science. These were organised into three schools namely

Education, Arts and Social Sciences; Pure and Applied Sciences; and Business and Economics

(Garissa University, 2020). The college was chartered as a full-fledged university on 23rd

October, 2017 by the president of the Republic of Kenya (Kenya Broadcasting Corporation,

2017) and ranked 52 in the country and 11,353 in the world rankings of universities by uniRank

(4icu.org, 2020).

1.7.3 The Garissa University Terrorist Attack

On the dawn of 2nd

April, 2015, gunmen stormed the then Garissa University

College in Garissa, and killed 148 people, and injured about 79 others. They took over 700

students hostage, freeing the Muslims among them and killing those they identified as non-

Muslims. Majority of those who were killed were Christian students and a few members of staff.

The siege ended the same day, when all four of the attackers were killed. Five men were later

arrested in connection with the attack, and a bounty placed for the arrest of a suspected

organizer. The attack was the deadliest in Kenya since the 1998 US embassy bombings, and is

the second deadliest overall. There were more casualties than the 2002 Mombasa attacks, the

2013 Westgate shopping mall attack, the 2014 Nairobi bus bombings, the 2014 Gikomba Market

bombings, the 2014 Mpeketoni attacks and the 2014 Lamu attacks (Wikipedia, 2019).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garissa_University_College

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garissa_University_College

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Garissa

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1998_United_States_embassy_bombings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Terrorism_in_Kenya

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2002_Mombasa_attacks

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Westgate_shopping_mall_attack

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Nairobi_bus_bombings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Gikomba_bombings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Gikomba_bombings

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Mpeketoni_attacks

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2014_Lamu_attacks

pg. 24

A student survivor of the attack said that the gunmen spoke in Kiswahili10

, and asserted that they

were associated with the al Shabaab group which later claimed responsibility for the assault. A

spokesman for the group, Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage11

, in referring to the situation stated thus:

"When our men arrived, they released the Muslims…mission is to kill those who are against the

Shabab…Kenya is at war with Somalia" (Mail & Guardian, 2015).

Another spokesman affirmed that al Shabaab attacked the institution because it was

"…on Muslim land colonized by non-Muslims".

The university reopened on 4th

Januray, 2016 (Kuo, 2016) with beefed up security, although

many students refused to return. Approximately 650 students who survived the ordeal were

absorbed at the institution‘s main campus at Moi University in Eldoret town. A commemorative

monument was built at the institution and the names of those who perished in the incident

engraved on it. Every year, a memorial service attended by thousands of people, students, staff

and clergy in honour of the 148 departed souls is conducted at the institution. This attack remains

the worst by al Shabaab in Kenyan history and it occasioned the implementation of tighter

security measures at the campus. These included a perimeter fence, CCTV cameras at strategic

points and a biometric identification register at the main gate for vetting students before they

entered the campus on a daily basis. A police post was also set up within the compound with

armed officers permanently stationed within the institution (The Star, 2020). Furthermore, there

was a designated drop-off point for all visitors arriving by public transportation and they had to

10 The national language, spoken in all areas of the country and in the Eastern Africa region comprising Tanzania,

Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and in parts of Somalia. 11

aka Sheikh Ali Dhere, [was the then] media spokesperson for al-Shabaab (Hines, 2010).

pg. 25

walk the rest of the way to the gate which was manned by armed soldiers and regular security

personnel.

Below is a picture of the monument in memory of the students who were slain in the attack.

Figure 1.4: The 2015 Garissa University terrorist attack monument

1.7.4 Kakamega Town

Kakamega town is situated in Kakamega County which was densely populated at 1,867,579,

ranking fourth out of the forty seven counties in terms of population (KNBS, 2019). It lies in the

western part of the country and is the capital and commercial hub of the County (Ondiba &

Matsui, 2019). It is only 30km north of the Equator and is 52 km north of the Kisumu port city

on Lake Victoria, the largest fresh water lake in Africa. At an altitude of 1,535 metres above sea

level (―Kakamega County,‖ 2020); Kakamega County is highly agricultural, receiving a

pg. 26

relatively higher rainfall per annum as compared to her neighbours. Dotting the hilly landscape

are farming activities that ranged from food production to animal husbandry with products such

as maize, millet, sugarcane, beans, vegetables, potatoes, tomatoes, arrow-roots among others.

Livestock included cattle, sheep, goats, poultry, pigs, etc. Other commercial activities were

pottery and carving. It is homeland to the only indigenous rainforest, the Kakamega forest which

was a tourist attraction alongside the Weeping Stone. Bull-fighting was a major traditional

sporting event in the county which was also home to major factories in the Sugar Industry such

as Mumias Sugar Company and West Kenya Sugar Company. The establishment of MMUST

spurred the economic growth of the town (Ludeki & Yatundu, 2016) which had lain dormant for

years after independence despite hosting the headquarters of the now defunct Western Province.

1.7.5 Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

Popularly known as MMUST, the university was established in the facilities of the former

Western College (WECO) in December, 2002. It remained a constituent college of the Moi

University till the year 2007 when it was chartered. With a current enrolment of 17,000 students,

its 400 academic programs are run under several faculties organized into eleven schools. These

are Agriculture, Veterinary Science and Technology; Arts and Social Sciences; Business and

Economics; Computing and Informatics; Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance;

Education; Engineering and the Built Environment; Medicine; Natural Sciences; Nursing and

Midwifery; and Public Health. It is situated along the Kakamega-Webuye highway in Kakamega

town (MMUST, 2020) which has a population range of 50,000 to 249,999 inhabitants. It is a

non-profit-making institution with satellite campuses in Nairobi and the neighbouring districts of

Bungoma, Kaimosi, Kisumu and Webuye. With an enrolment of between 4,000 and 4,999 local

and international students, it was officially ranked as a small coeducational higher education

pg. 27

institution by the uniRank. The courses at this institution led to state-recognized qualifications in

higher education at all levels ranging from certificate, diploma, bachelor, masters up to doctorate

degrees in numerous areas of study. The uniRank classified it as a selective institution given its

admission policy that was based on students‘ past academic record and grades. It was ranked 22

in the country and 9,014 worldwide by uniRank (4icu.org, 2019).

Below is a map of Kenya showing the positions of Eldoret, Garissa, Kakamega, Kisumu, Lamu

and Nairobi, the towns mentioned in this chapter among others.

pg. 28

Figure 1.5: Map of Kenya showing major towns

SOURCE: https://www.shadepro.co.ke/wp-content/themes/understrap-child-master/img/kenya.gif

https://www.shadepro.co.ke/wp-content/themes/understrap-child-master/img/kenya.gif

pg. 29

1.8 Project Challenges and Ethical Issues

Certain challenges and ethical issues arose with the implementation of the research studies in this

project. These were the limitations inherent in the project itself and the ethical considerations

that had to be made. The next section describes these areas of limitation and how they were

tackled.

1.8.1 Research Studies Limitations

Three limitations were encountered in carrying out the research studies. First, a major limitation

of this project was the sensitive nature of the subject under research which affected participants‘

willingness to freely participate. A section of Muslim respondents was uncomfortable with the

research topic and they opted out of the exercise. It is still reiterated here that terrorism was a

sensitive topic among certain groups of people in Kenya. Second, there was no categorization for

Muslim participants although a provision was made for them to indicate their denominational

groups. This probably had an effect on the results. Budgetary and timeline constraints limited the

inclusion of other Christian groups which existed and were active at the two universities.

Finally, there were time constrictions and the fieldwork had to be rushed at MMUST as the

students were preparing for examinations in the months of November and December after which

they were to proceed for holidays. In fact some of the questionnaires from the survey were

returned after the holiday. The distances between Garissa and Kakamega were also such that the

two fieldworks could not be carried out simultaneously. Sometime was therefore lost in between.

Furthermore, Garissa was situated in a hotspot for terror and it was in unfamiliar terrain for the

researchers.

1.8.2 Delimitation Strategies

To minimize the effects of the limitations, respondents were assured of anonymity; as they were

not required to write their names on the questionnaires. In addition, Muslim research assistants

pg. 30

were engaged in collecting data from Muslim respondents while Christian research assistants

helped to collect data from Christian participants. This helped to minimize suspicion while

increasing freedom of expression and rapport during the exercise. Some of the research

assistants were trained on how to uphold ethical standards during fieldwork. All the assistants

had a relative amount of rapport with the respondents prior to the fieldwork as they were the

regular leaders of these groups. Second, the financial constraints were reduced by using the same

research assistants in the two studies to help reduce the costs of engaging other personnel who

would have needed training and briefing. The collection of data had to be staggered before and

after university examinations and the Christmas break because of the long distances between

Garissa and Kakamega and the security situation in the former. An experienced research assistant

who was familiar and comfortable with the Garissa terrain was involved in conducting fieldwork

in the area.

1.9 Ethical Considerations

Before embarking on fieldwork, all the research questionnaires (experiment and survey)

underwent scrutiny by an expert at the Parisian Laboratory of Social Psychology. Permission was

granted by the laboratory to proceed for fieldwork. In addition, the researcher sought clearance

and permission from the National Council for Science and Technology in Kenya and a license

authorizing the fieldwork was issued. It should be mentioned here that the platform for filling out

the name of the research area did not make provision for multiple sites and so the license only

reads Garissa County and not Kakamega County although it covered both sites. Furthermore, a

letter of clearance to collect data at Garissa University was issued by the Garissa County

government. The researcher was able to proceed for data collection at Masinde Muliro

pg. 31

University without need for further clearance apart from the license mentioned above. All the

written permissions are attached at the appendices section of this report. At the data collection

phase, the purposes of the study were clearly explained to the respondents and anyone who did

not wish to continue in the exercise was allowed to drop out. Nobody was compelled to

participate as even some of those who had accepted to take part opted out along the way and/or

did not return the questionnaires.

Since Garissa county was generally a terror hotspot area, wide consultation was made before

embarking on the fieldwork. A government official from the region assured the researchers of

the possibility of conducting the fieldwork and he recommended the research assistant who was

familiar with the terrain and had experience in conducting studies in the region. Moreover, the

researcher interrogated this research assistant to establish how comfortable and secure he would

be travelling from Nairobi to Garissa and staying there for the duration of the fieldwork. He

assured the researcher that he was used to it and that that was what he did to earn a living. He

explained that he knew the secure neighbourhoods of the town where he could stay and which

areas to avoid during his sojourn in Garissa. He and the government officer cited examples of

fieldworks that he had engaged in in the larger Garissa County.

The results of this study will be shared with the relevant stakeholders.

pg. 32

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the background to the project, giving an overview of the history of terror

attacks in Kenya, a country in East Africa. The rise in terror activities by the Somalia-based al

Shabaab group was examined along with the incursion of the Kenya Defence Forces into

Somalia, which further triggered hostility from the militia. The problem arising from these

continued attacks and that led to the designing of this project was explained as the insecurity

arising from the continued threat of terrorism and its associated consequences in deaths and

human suffering. The glaring targeting of Christian faithful during attacks was examined

alongside its probable impact on Christian-Muslim attitudes and relations.

The project was designed with the broad aim of investigating the differences in the attitudes and

relations between Muslim and Christian students at the two universities. The goal was broken

down into several more specific objectives for better exploration. The project was justified as

investigating the effect of rising religious fundamentalism which had the potential of impacting

inter-group relations in the country. It targeted youth who were the main recruits into terrorist

groups and the elite of the next generation. The significance of the project included but was not

limited to its relevance for the Kenyan context where the UNDP reported in 2017 that the threat

of terrorism was likely to reverse the gains made in development. The project is also useful for

other group relations contexts and is valuable for those working in the fields of Terrorism,

Religion; and Peace and Conflict Resolution.

Two studies were undertaken in the project, an experiment and a survey which were conducted at

the two public Kenyan universities of Garissa and Masinde Muliro, situated in Garissa County

and Kakamega County respectively.

pg. 33

The chapter discussed the challenges and limitations that were faced in implementing the

research project. The subject of terrorism was inherently sensitive and it resulted in some

participants dropping out. There were also financial, time and security constraints. However, the

effects of these limitations were lessened by making use of the same research assistants in the

two studies and by limiting the time of the field work, which was also staggered. The research

project took care of all the required ethical considerations in terms of authorisations from the

Parisian Laboratory of Social Psychology, the research permits from the relevant bodies in

Kenya and the institutions‘ administrations. The research assistant who did the fieldwork in

Garissa was experienced in doing research in the region and was therefore more familiar with the

terrain and security precautions to take than the researchers themselves.

The next chapter describes the theoretical framework that was used to guide the project.

pg. 34

RÉSUMÉ DU CHAPITRE

Ce chapitre a abordé le contexte de l‘étude, donnant un aperçu de l‘histoire des attaques

terroristes au Kenya, un pays d‘Afrique de l‘Est. L‘augmentation des activités terroristes du

groupe somalien al-Shabaab est examinée avec l‘incursion des Forces de défense du Kenya en

Somalie, ce qui a suscité une nouvelle hostilité de la part d‘al-Shabaab. Le problème découlant

de ces attaques continues et qui ont conduit à la conception de ce projet s‘explique par

l‘insécurité découlant de la menace continue du terrorisme, des cas de morts et de souffrances

humaines qui en résultent et du ciblage flagrant des chrétiens lors d‘attaques. L‘impact de ce

ciblage, qui a conduit à l‘islamisation du terrorisme et à son effet sur les relations entre chrétiens

et musulmans, est discuté.

Le projet tente de répondre à quatre questions de recherche dans le but général d‘étudier les

différences dans les perceptions, les opinions et les relations entre les étudiants musulmans et les

étudiants chrétiens dans deux universités au Kenya. L‘objectif a été divisé en plusieurs objectifs

plus spécifiques pour une meilleure synthèse. L‘étude était justifiée comme étudiant l‘effet de

l‘augmentation du fondamentalisme religieux et des relations intergroupes dans le pays. Il ciblait

les jeunes qui étaient les principales recrues dans les groupes terroristes. L‘importance du projet

incluait mais ne se limite pas à sa pertinence dans le contexte kenyan où le PNUD a signalé en

2017 que la menace terroriste est susceptible d‘inverser les gains réalisés dans le développement.

Le projet est également utile pour d‘autres contextes de relations de groupe, tout en pouvant

fournir des informations à ceux qui travaillent dans les domaines du terrorisme, de la religion et

de la paix et de la résolution des conflits.

Le projet a été entrepris dans deux universités publiques au Kenya, à savoir l‘Université de

Garissa et l‘Université des sciences et de la technologie de Masinde Muliro situées

pg. 35

respectivement dans le comté de Garissa et le comté de Kakamega. Il ne ciblait que les étudiants

musulmans et chrétiens de ces institutions. Il a été guidé par la théorie de l‘identité sociales de

Henri Tajfel et un modèle conceptuel élaboré pour représenter l‘interaction des principaux

aspects du projet, c‘est-à-dire les musulmans, les chrétiens et l‘islamisation du terrorisme.

Ce chapitre nous a permis de discuter des défis et des limites auxquels on a dû faire face dans la

mise en œuvre du projet de recherche. Le sujet du terrorisme était intrinsèquement sensible et il a

entraîné l‘abandon de certains participants. Il y avait aussi des contraintes financières, de temps

et de sécurité. Cependant, les effets de ces limitations ont été atténués en faisant appel aux

mêmes assistants de recherche dans les deux études et en limitant le temps des travaux sur le

terrain. Le projet de recherche a pris en charge toutes les considérations éthiques requises en

termes d‘autorisations du Laboratoire parisien de psychologie sociale, les permis de recherche

des organes concernés au Kenya et les administrations des institutions. L‘assistant de recherche

qui a fait le travail sur le terrain à Garissa était expérimenté dans la recherche, connaissait la

région et était donc familier avec le terrain et les précautions de sécurité à prendre.

Le chapitre suivant décrit le cadre théorique qui a été utilisé pour guider le projet.

pg. 36

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pg. 39

CHAPTER TWO

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND THE CONCEPTUAL MODEL:

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

CADRE THÉORIQUE ET LE MODÉLE CONCEPTUEL: LA THÉORIE

D’IDENTITÉ SOCIALE

pg. 40

2.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter discusses the theoretical framework that guided the project. In includes the

definition of the theory, its concepts and functions. The present project employed the social

identity theory to investigate and explain the attitudes of Muslim and Christian university

students towards terrorism and whether this affected their relationship with one other. It sought

to compare these attributes along religious lines at and across the two universities. The chapter

discusses the theory of social identity that was defined by Henri Tajfel and a few collaborators

along with its effect on intergroup relations. It culminates in the formulation of the conceptual

model that guided the research project.

2.2 Overview

The Social identity theory was developed by Henri Tajfel and his colleagues in the early 1970‘s

(Ellemers, 2010). After losing his whole family during the Jewish holocaust, he set out to inquire

into group identities and what drives intergroup prejudice and hostilities. Tajfel defined social

identity as an individual‘s awareness of their group membership along with the accompanying

emotional and value significance of this membership (Tajfel, 1972 in Vaughan, 2020). Group

membership comes with a shared identity denoting who members are, their beliefs and

appropriate behaviour. It highlights the distinctions from out-groups in relevant social contexts

(Vaughan, ibid). Mcleod (2019) describes social identity as a person‘s sense of who they are

based on their group membership(s).

According to Ellemers (2020), the theory proposes that both personal and social identities have

consequences for individual perceptions and group behaviour. Tajfel (1979) himself intimated

that groups provide a sense of belonging to the social world and that they can be a source of

pg. 41

pride and self-esteem. Such groups could include clubs, family, social class, football team, etc. It

is a way that people put themselves into social groups (Mcleod, 2019).

2.3 Categorisation Theory

Further development of the theory in the 80s to more precisely define the social cognitive bases

of social identity phenomena saw the emergence of the self-categorization theory (Turner et al.,

1987 in Hogg, 2016). This theory suggests that human groups are general categories that people

adopt to mentally represent divisions with interrelated attributes such as attitudes, behaviours,

customs, dress, etc. generally capturing intra-group similarities and inter-group differences.

Research has also shown that humans have a tendency to divide the world into ―us‖ and ―them‖

due to certain ties that bind them to affective associations. These ties may include shared

understandings, common goals and the perception of a shared fate (Staub, 1989). It may lead to

people lumping themselves into definitive or indefinitive groups, a process that social

psychologists referred to as categorization. Staub (ibid) describes this process as a basis of

stereotypes that culminates in exaggerated negative beliefs about groups. Just by defining people

as ―them‖ results in devaluating them. The main sources of in-group-out-group differentiations

are distinctions in race, religion, status, wealth, power and political views.

Hogg (2016) states that categorization has consequences for inter-group relations. Instead of

seeing a categorized person as an individual, they are seen through the lens of the prototype of

the category they have been placed in. This is referred to as depersonalization, whereby

individuals are matched to the prototype and assigned its attributes to varying degrees. It can also

happen when one self-categorizes oneself with the effect that one‘s behavior tends to conform to

in-group norms. The self-categorization transforms one‘s self-conception and produces

normative behavior among group members.

pg. 42

Self-categorization also impacts intergroup emotions. If two groups are in rivalry with each

other, it gives rise to prejudice as the two compete to maintain their self-esteem. The outcome is

intergroup hostility which arises not only due to competition over resources but also over

identities.

2.3.1 Categorisation and In-group Favouritism

Tajfel and his colleagues designed the first research on minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, 1970 in

Ellemers, 2010) opening the way for other similar experiments across the globe using a variety

of participants. All of these have yielded the robust finding that a mere categorization of a person

into a group is enough to produce ethnocentric feelings and competitive intergroup behaviour

(Diehl, 1990 in Vaughan, 2020). Additional studies have revealed a pattern of in-group

favouritism rather than out-group discrimination. However, when there was a feeling that the in-

group was under threat, there was full-blown out-group discrimination (Mummendey & Otten,

1998 in Vaughan, ibid). Identification with a group is likely related to the tendency to favor

that group. Low identification or commitment to groups may have negative effects on

individuals‘ reactions and evaluations (Brown, 2000 in Verkuyten, 2007). Minimal intergroup

categorization had the potential to generate in-group bias at the implicit level with culprits barely

being conscious of it (Otten & Wentura, 1999, in Vaughan, 2020).

According to Mcleod (2019), Tajfel and Turner (1979) proposed three mental processes involved

in grouping others as in-group or out-group members. These are described below.

pg. 43

i) Social categorization

Human beings categorize objects and people in order to make sense of their environment. Social

categories may include black, white, Australian, Christian, Muslim, student, bus driver, etc.

These are useful because they give us more information about those things or people. Categories

also tell us about ourselves and help to define the norms to which members are expected to

adhere. Sometimes this is difficult as individuals may belong to multiple groups at the same

time.

ii) Social identification

The second stage of grouping people where individuals adopt the identity of the group they have

categorized themselves as belonging to is social identification. For instance, if one categorizes

oneself as a student, they will most likely adopt the identity of a student and begin to behave in

ways they believe that students should act. This helps them to conform to the group‘s norms, and

it is usually accompanied by significant emotions. This has implications for self-esteem.

iii) Social comparison

The third and final stage of grouping is social comparison. At this stage, individuals tend to

compare the groups they have identified with to other groups. For members to maintain a high

self-esteem, their group needs to compare favorably with other groups (Vaughan, 2020). Thus,

they may use mechanisms that demean out-groups and depict their in-groups as better and more

acceptable. This helps to enhance their self-esteem and to reduce the status of the out-group.

Additionally, when group identity is threatened, members will try to maintain or restore a

positive and distinct collective identity such as by in-group favouritism. Verkuyten (2007)

pg. 44

indicates for instance, that the public condemnation of Islam and the calls to assimilation and

tolerance have such implications for Islamic groups and their religious identity.

2.3.2 Categorisation and Image-formation

Boulding (1959) cited in Parkinson, Fischer and Manstead (2005) explains that an ―image‖ is a

cognitive, affective and evaluative structure. Images form as a consequence of strategic

relationships between nations and serve corresponding functions (Herrmann, 1985 as cited in

Parkinson et al, ibid). The image theory provides useful pointers to the sorts of appraisals that are

relevant to the formation of out-group images and the emotions that correspond to these

appraisals. For instance there has been a constant linking of Islam with terrorism, described by

Sarwar and Raj (2016) as the West tarnishing of the name of Islam by insinuating that terrorist

outfits equal Islam. This may result in the image of the Muslim as terrorist, accompanied by

certain attitudes, negative emotional reactions and tense intergroup.

The artist‘s representation below probably best captures the effects of the image-formation

phenomenon.

pg. 45

Figure 2.1: An artist's representation of categorization and image-formation

2.3.3 Intergroup Prejudice and Stereotyping

Tajfel and his collaborators also believed that basic human motivations and cognitive processes

were the drivers behind prejudice and intergroup conflict. These drivers were influenced by

individual beliefs about self, about society, the social context and the immediate situations

surrounding people and the groups to which they belong (Abrams & Hogg, 2004 and Billig,

1976 both in Vaughan, 2020). According to Biernat & Dovidio (2000), individual members of

out-groups are usually judged in terms of group-based expectations or standards, prejudice and

discrimination. This may lead to stereotyping with generalized beliefs about a person based on

his/her membership in a group (Schultz & Hollenbeck, 2008).

pg. 46

Attributes that define the extent to which a group seems to be a distinct and clearly defined entity

are known as prototypes. For instance, what comes to mind the moment one hears ―French‖,

―terrorist‖, ―cowboy‖, or ―Buddhist‖ represents the prototype. However, if many people have the

same prototype of their own or another group, this prototype then becomes a stereotype. This

means for instance that if only one person believes that engineers are not good at the arts, it is a

prototype, but if many more people hold this same belief, then it is also a stereotype (Hogg,

2016). Biernat and Dovidio (2000) define stereotypes as descriptions of groups which may be

faulty, incomplete, overly rigid; and extending to group members. Generally speaking,

stereotypes may be unfounded, lack basis and be excessively generalized to group members.

Stereotyping can lead to stigmatization of members of an out-group.

In-group prototypes tend to be biased towards the similarities within the in-group and to

emphasize differences with a specific out-group. These prototypes can vary significantly around

a stable core, depending on the out-group in question. This means that the in-group prototypes

are determined by the context in which the comparison is taking place. Furthermore, Dovidio,

Major, and Crocker (2000) clarify that stigmatizing others can lead to differential treatment,

systematic avoidance, segregation and marginalization of those considered as threatening the

well-being and values of the stigmatiser. It can give way to prejudice which is an unjustified

attitude towards a person based on their membership in a group.

pg. 47

2.3.4 Intergroup Emotion

Intergroup emotion has to do with feelings that emanate from belonging to a certain group and is

not necessarily individual level emotions (Parkinson et al (2005). For instance, racists despise

members of other racial groups not because they believe that any individual member of these

groups has negative attributes. Rather, they believe that all of them have these negative

attributes. People who feel guilty about their group‘s behaviour do so not because of harm that

they personally have inflicted on another group, but because they see members of their own

group as having collective responsibility for the harm done. For example, Germans may feel

guilty about what their compatriots did to Jews in the 20th

century although none of them partook

of these atrocities. Such feelings may be evident among Muslims and Christians when they

evaluate members of the out-group on the basis of their religious affiliation. Discriminated

Muslims may harbour negative feelings towards anyone associated with Christianity although

the latter may not be directly responsible for the discrimination. On the other hand, Christians

may perceive a Muslim as violent without necessary proof , only because of the constant linking

of Islam with violence.

Dijker (1987) cited in Parkinson et al (ibid) demonstrated a definite link between intergroup

attitudes and emotions. He examined the emotions of indigenous Dutch people towards members

of two ethnic minorities, Surinamese and Turks-Moroccans using factor analysis, and he came

up with four categories of these emotions:

i) Anxiety: this included fear, uncertainty, distrust, antipathy and action tendency

involving keeping distance from the out-group.

ii) Irritation: annoyance, aversion, anger, contempt and having unfriendly thoughts about

the out-group.

pg. 48

iii) Concern: worry and wishing the out-group would move further away.

iv) ―Positive mood‖: a range of pleasant emotions and feelings, e.g. happiness,

admiration, sympathy, liking and an action tendency of seeking contact.

Greenwood (1994) states that certain emotions are aroused when the social identity of groups is

at stake. For instance, when group goals are thwarted or threatened, feelings of anger may arise.

If the group loses something important to its goals, it may lead to sadness and when group goals

are achieved as a result of group members‘ efforts; it may lead to feelings of pride. Members

tend to feel shame when the respect of their group is diminished because of members‘ actions.

Parkinson et al (2005) explains that the angry feelings of members of one social group toward

members of another social group can be done through an appraisal of goal compatibility, relative

power and relative status.

In quoting Kramer and Jost‘s (2002) analysis, Parkinson et al (ibid) identify three factors as

playing a central role in an in-group feeling fear and anxiety towards an out-group. These are

out-group paranoia involving high distrust and suspicion, perception of threat; and perception of

in-group vulnerabilities. This project investigated the attitudes which according to this literature,

is influenced by threat and vulnerability. In essence, how threatened and vulnerable individuals

felt affected their attitude.

According to Greenwood (1994), relative deprivation is the sense of injustice and the associated

feelings of resentment and anger arising from the perception that one has less than one deserves,

relative to others. It can be at both the individual and group levels. People can also feel anger on

behalf of other group members. When individuals feel that their group has been unfair to an out-

pg. 49

group, it gives rise to inter-group guilt, which is greater when the individuals strongly identify

themselves as members of the group (Parkinson et al, 2005). This is congruent with the findings

reported by Obaidi et al (2018) that individuals with strong religious identity felt the highest

level of threat. This project investigated religious commitment, a component of religious identity

and its relationship with attitudes.

2.3.5 Social Identity and Attitude

Relations within and across groups are also influenced by attitudes. This was investigated in this

project to try to detect any differences between the groups under study, i.e. Muslim, Christian,

Garissa and MMUST. Eagly & Chaiken (1993) in Mcleod (2018a) and Eagly & Chaiken (1998)

in Abun, Magallanes and Incarnacio (2019) define attitude as ―a psychological tendency that is

expressed by evaluating a particular entity with some degree of favour or disfavour.‖ According

to Main (2014) in Abun et al (2019), Jung defined attitude as a readiness of the psyche to act or

react in a certain way. Hogg & Vaughan (2005) in Mcleod (2018a) define attitude as ―a

relatively enduring organization of beliefs, feelings and behavioural tendencies towards socially

significant objects, groups, events or symbols‖. Cherry (2019) cited in Abun et al (2019) declare

that human attitude are the thoughts, beliefs, feelings and behavior of individuals toward a

particular subject, person, object, institution or event. It makes individuals to evaluate things

according to their own perception, ideas or feelings meaning that their opinion or feeling toward

the object can be favorable or unfavorable. It then becomes the individual‘s disposition to react

favorably or unfavorably towards the object, subject, institution or event Ajzen (1993) cited in

Abun et al (ibid).

pg. 50

Macleod (2018a) describes three elements as being important in the structure of attitudes and

refers to them as the ABC model of attitudes.

i) The individual‘s feelings and emotions about the attitude object is the affective

component.

ii) The influence of the attitude on the individual behaviour and/or action is the

behavioural component and it is also known as the conative component.

iii) The individual‘s knowledge about the attitude is the cognitive component.

According to Abun et al (2019), the affective component is the individual‘s emotional reaction or

feeling toward the object of the attitude, which may be positive or negative. The behavioural

component refers to their manifest reaction toward the object of the attitude while the cognitive

element has to do with the thought, perception or ideas of the person toward the object of the

attitude. According to Abun et al (ibid) the emotion or belief toward an object can range from

extremely negative to extremely positive as it represents the individual mental disposition

accompanied by a response or reaction toward the object of the attitude which in turn influence

the person‘s action.

Attitudes are not static but they are dynamic as they are ever changing. In fact, Mcleod (2018a)

indicates that attitudes emanating from direct experience are held more strongly and are more

likely to influence behaviour than those that are formed indirectly such as those coming from

hear-say, reading or watching television. Exposure to the object of the attitude has implications

for the attitude. Repeated exposure to the attitude object is thought to enhance the attitude itself

(Zajonc, 1998 cited in Abun et al, 2019). Thus, attitudes do not just appear but are linked to past

and present experience as confirmed by Allport (1935) cited in Abun, ibid).

pg. 51

The principle of consistency asserts that there is a link between the attitude of a person and their

behaviour. The strength of this link is a good predictor of the behaviour of the individual, i.e. the

stronger the attitude, the more likely it will be to affect behaviour. On the other hand, the

strength of the attitudes is linked to its relevance to the person and is related to self-interest and

social identification. If it is of high interest to the group the person belongs to, then it is

extremely important and it will have a bearing on their behaviour. However, if it is not related to

their life, then it will not be important to them (Mcleod, 2018a). Finally, a person‘s knowledge

about the attitude influences their interest in the object of the attitude. It is documented that

people tend to be more knowledgeable and hold strong attitudes about topics that interest them.

Katz (1960) cited in Mcleod (ibid) states that attitudes have functional value. These functions are

summarized as follows.

i) The knowledge function implies that human beings are in the business of making

sense of the world. Having knowledge about life helps them to predict outcomes and

gives them a sense of control. Thus they will be able to organise and structure their

experiences. Knowing each other‘s attitude helps to predict their behaviour too.

ii) The self-expressive function affirms that our attitudes help us communicate who we

are and they may make us feel good because we have asserted our identity. This self-

expression of attitudes can also be non-verbal and is part of our identity, representing

our feelings, beliefs and values.

iii) The adaptive function represents the expression of socially acceptable attitudes and it

attracts rewards through approval and social acceptance. This expression can also be

non-verbal. This means that attitudes are part of belonging to a social group and they

help us fit in with the group. Individuals are usually on the outlook for others with

pg. 52

similar attitudes and also develop attitudes similar to those of people they like. Thus

attitudes are social phenomena.

iv) The ego-defensive function means holding attitudes that are protective of individual

self-esteem or those that justify actions that arouse feelings of guilt. For example

when children develop negative attitudes towards all kinds of sports once they are

humiliated at physical education lessons. Positive attitudes towards ourselves thus

serve the function of reserving our self-image.

This functional approach to understanding attitudes stipulates that the latter help the individual to

bridge the gap between their own internal needs and the external world.

2.3.6 Group Discrimination

According to Dovidio et al (2000), an unjustified attitude (stereotype) may result in

discrimination, which may be defined as unequal or unfair treatment of a person based on his/her

group membership. Staub and Bar-Tal (2003) cited in Kaakinen, Oksanen and Rasanen (2017)

state that societal conditions can threaten one‘s control and satisfaction of security or human

needs. These may comprise the predictability of environment control and security which may

result in increasing hostilities towards the out-groups perceived as responsible. Historical

evidence shows a rise in intergroup conflicts following fear, economic hardship, social/political

segregation and perceived in-group threats (Baumeister, 1997; Staub, 1989; Staub & Bar-Tal,

2003 as cited in Kaakinen et al, ibid) leading to out-group discrimination. Also, Das, Bushman,

Bezemer, Kerkhof, & Vermeulen (2009) assert that news about terrorism threatens one‘s group

and reactions to out-group members.

pg. 53

According to the social identity theory, discrimination is motivated by a need to uphold a

positive and outstanding social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) and it leads to the acts of

favouring members of the in-group, which acts eventually enhance their value and

distinctiveness. This results in a positive social identity (Oldmeadow & Fiske, 2010).

Stereotypes can be considered as cognitive elements, while attitudes are affective and

discrimination is behavioural (Schultz & Hollenbeck, 2008). This means that before a person

acts, there should be a thought or cognitive activity that plays as attitudes which culminate into

action. This transformation of cognitive structures into behaviours is illustrated in the diagram

below.

According to the 821 project (2017), hate crimes, negative attitudes and violent aggression

against certain religious groups like the Jewish, Sikh and Muslim citizens of North America and

Europe have increased in the last couple of years. This has been affected by political voices that

have ranged from condemnation, to indifference and to support, sometimes to the extent that

some have gained political mileage from it. In fact, counter-terrorism efforts and discourses on

Discrimination

(Behavioural)

Ejecting a Muslim

from a public bus

OR

Avoid living in

Christian

neighbourhoods

Attitudes

(Affective)

Discomfort around

Muslims

OR

Fear of interacting with

Christians

Stereotypes

(Cognitive)

Muslims are violent

OR

Christians have low

moral standards

pg. 54

the Syrian refugee crisis and immigration have increased religious intolerance in North America

and Europe.

2.3.7 Social Identity and Self-esteem

Tajfel & Turner (1979) in Hogg (2016) indicated that social identity processes and phenomena

were somehow tied to promotion of positive intergroup distinctiveness and self-enhancement.

Group members strive to protect and promote their belief that ―we‖ are better than ―them‖,

implying that groups are important in self-definition. This means that one‘s status, prestige, and

social valence of the group attaches to oneself. As a result, individuals‘ pursuit of positive social

identity is a major motivation for self-enhancement and self-esteem according to Sedikides &

Strube (1997) in Hogg (ibid). Rubin & Hestone (1998) explain that when groups seek to

establish a positive distinctiveness for their group members, in-group members are establishing a

positive social identity for themselves and eventually, a positive self-esteem. The self-esteem

hypothesis indicates that the dynamics of group and intergroup behaviour imply that low self-

esteem motivates group identification and intergroup behaviour while identification elevates self-

esteem (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998 in Hogg, 2019). Rubin & Hewstone

(1998) further distinguish social self-esteem from personal self-esteem by describing it as the

esteem in which individuals hold a shared self-image that constitutes their social-psychological

in-group. Research has suggested certain findings on social self-esteem.

i) Group-based self-esteem is more closely associated with social identity processes

than individual self-esteem.

pg. 55

ii) Self-esteem can be raised through identification with the group but low self-esteem

does not necessarily lead to identification as people with high self-esteem tend to

identify more strongly (Leary & Baumeister, 2000 in Hogg, 2016).

iii) Individuals are highly skilled at safeguarding themselves against the consequences of

low status or stigmatized group membership (Crocker, Major & Steele, 1998 in Hogg,

ibid).

2.3.8 Group Comparisons

Social identity helps to evaluate the self-concept and how one will be treated and thought of by

others. Consequently, when comparing own groups and out-groups, members tend to favorably

evaluate and to promote a positive distinction of their in-groups that is clearly different from

relevant out-groups. In many different contexts, individuals act more warmly towards members

of their own group as compared to members of their out-groups. This phenomenon is known as

in-group favoritism or parochial altruism (Everett, Faber and Crockett, 2015). Intergroup

comparisons are usually characterized by in-group favoritism and ethnocentrism (Brewer &

Campbell, 1976 in Hogg, 2016). Thus, intergroup behavior is essentially a struggle over the

relative status of one‘s in-group. This struggle lies at the root of all intergroup conflict as

advantaged groups struggle to maintain their privileged position and disadvantaged groups

strive for improvement of their predicament and social standing (Vaughan, 2020). In this

struggle, higher status groups aim to protect their evaluative superiority while lower status

groups fight to shrug off the social stigma attached to them and to increase their positivity

(Hogg, 2016).

pg. 56

Groups adopt various strategies to cope with their identity. These are dependent upon a number

of beliefs held by the members, called subjective belief structures. According to Ellemers,

1993 in Hogg (ibid), these beliefs focus on the following factors.

i) The group‘s social standing in relation to the out-group (status).

ii) How stable the status relationship is (stability).

iii) How legitimate the status relationship is (legitimacy).

iv) How easy it is for members to change their social identity by ―passing‖ into the out-

group (permeability).

v) Whether it is possible to have a different intergroup relationship (cognitive

alternatives)?

2.3.9 Group Identity Threat

According to Ellemers (2010) groups can experience threats to their collective identity and it

may affect their behavior and attitudes. This can be in the form of group status threat or social

identity threat. Group status threat occurs when the perceived competence of the group is

devalued or when their moral behavior is questioned. Questioning the morality of a group can

threaten even members who may in no way be held accountable for the behavior of the group,

e.g. when group members exhibit shame and guilt at atrocities committed by their group long

before they were born. Acceptance threat happens when members are not identified with

groups they wish to be identified with, e.g. when a Russian immigrant is not invited to join a

local Russian residents‘ association.

pg. 57

Social identity threat on its part happens when members feel that their group is not

acknowledged as a separate and distinct entity with unique characteristics. This happens for

instance when members of a group are considered to be part of a larger more inclusive group

without giving distinctiveness to them. An example is when ethnic minorities are treated as

belonging to larger tribal groups. It also occurs when members are treated as belonging to a

group when they prefer not to, for example when a female lawyer is treated in a court of law on

the basis of their gender and not the preferred profession.

2.3.10 Limitations of the Theory

Certain limitations are inherent in the measurement of attitudes the most common of which is the

tendency for respondents to respond in a socially desirable way to questionnaire items. This is in

an attempt to appear well-adjusted, unprejudiced, open-minded and democratic. Religion, a

major attribute under study in this project falls in the category of characteristics that are often

victim to social desirability bias, alongside race and sex (Mcleod, 2018b). Mcleod (ibid) asserts

that participants with negative attitude towards a specific group under study may not want to

admit it to the researcher nor to themselves. Thus their responses are never completely valid.

2.4 The Conceptual Model

Below is the conceptual model that guided this project.

pg. 58

TERRORISM

Muslims Christians

Effect

Figure 2.2: The conceptual model Figure 2.2: The Conceptual model

pg. 59

The above conceptual model illustrates how each group visualized the other in the wake of

increasing terrorism in Kenya. In this model, Muslims had a view of Christians on one hand and

a view of terrorism on the other hand. Christians also had a view of Muslims on the one hand and

terrorism on the other. Terrorism played a part in influencing their views of each other and their

relations as shown in the model. It had an influence on the attitudes of the two religious groups

towards each other. To be precise, Muslims in this study may have seen Christians as their

accusers and terrorism as an excuse for being victimised. Christians on the other hand may have

viewed Muslims as terrorist and terrorism as a weapon targeting them and a threat to their

security. Each of the terms was fully determined by the other two in a triadic model of

knowledge construction which had implications for the attitudes investigated.

pg. 60

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter described the theoretical background of the study. The social identity theory

developed by Henri Tajfel in the 70‘s is explained in detail including certain theories that

emanated from it, which were relevant for the study. These include the categorization theory, the

image-formation theory along with relevant principles of intergroup relations. These were used

to explain the relations between Muslims and Christians. A few relevant literatures are also

mentioned.

Categorization was defined as the tendency for humans to group themselves and others into ―us‖

and ―them‖ along with the implications of these groupings and it is characterised by in-group

favouritism. The three stages of the process of categorization were described, i.e. social

categorization, social identification and social comparison. This self and other categorization

leads to in-group favouritism, image-formation, intergroup prejudice and stereotyping. Image-

formation happens when group members form images about the out-group and they were subject

to prejudice, and stereotypical beliefs. The difference between prototypes and stereotypes are

explained and how these may affect attitudes and intergroup behaviour.

The combination of various intergroup dynamics resulted in intergroup emotions; anger and

animosity on the one side and shame and guilt on the other. These were summarised into four

major categories as anxiety, irritation, concern and positive mood. Social identity also has

implications for attitude formation with the latter serving several functions. These are the

knowledge, self-expressive, adaptive and ego-defensive functions. Social identity results in

group competition and discrimination. Identification and commitment to groups affects

members‘ self-esteem either positively or negatively as does group comparisons.

pg. 61

The chapter ended with the conceptual model that was used to guide the study and a description

of the limitations of the social identity theory.

pg. 62


Ce chapitre décrit le contexte théorique de l‘étude. La théorie de l‘identité sociale développée par

Henri Tajfel en 70‘s est expliquée en détail, y compris certaines théories qui en émanaient, qui

étaient pertinentes pour l‘étude. Il s‘agit notamment de la théorie de la catégorisation, la théorie

de la formation de l‘image ainsi que les principes pertinents des relations intergroupes. Ceux-ci

ont été utilisés pour expliquer les relations entre musulmans et chrétiens. Quelques références

pertinentes sont également mentionnées.

La catégorisation a été définie comme la tendance des humains à se regrouper eux-mêmes et les

autres en « nous » et « eux » ainsi que les implications de ces groupements et il se caractérise par

le favoritisme envers son groupe. Les trois étapes du processus de catégorisation ont été décrites,

c‘est-à-dire la catégorisation sociale, l‘identification sociale et la comparaison sociale. Cette

catégorisation de soi et d‘autres conduit au favoritisme envers son groupe, à la formation

d‘images, aux préjugés intergroupes et aux stéréotypes. La formation d‘images se produit lorsque

les membres du groupe forment des images sur le hors-groupe et qu‘ils sont sujets à des préjugés

et à des croyances stéréotypées. La différence entre les prototypes et les stéréotypes est expliquée

et comment ceux-ci peuvent affecter les attitudes et le comportement intergroupe.

La combinaison de diverses dynamiques intergroupes a donné lieu à des émotions intergroupes ;

la colère et l‘animosité d‘un côté et la honte et la culpabilité de l‘autre. Ceux-ci ont été résumés

en quatre grandes catégories comme l‘anxiété, l‘irritation, l‘inquiétude et l‘humeur positive.

L‘identité sociale a également des implications pour la formation de l‘attitude avec ce dernier

servant plusieurs fonctions. Ce sont les fonctions de connaissance, d‘auto-expressivité,

d‘adaptation et de défense de l‘ego. L‘identité sociale entraîne la concurrence entre les groupes

pg. 63

et la discrimination. L‘identification et l‘engagement envers les groupes ont une incidence

positive ou négative sur l‘estime de soi des membres, tout comme les comparaisons de groupe.

Le chapitre s‘est ensuite penché sur le modèle conceptuel qui a été utilisé pour guider l‘étude et

une description des limites de la théorie de l‘identité sociale.

pg. 64

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pg. 66

CHAPTER THREE

MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DYNAMICS AND PERCEPTIONS IN KENYA:

LITERATURE REVIEW

DYNAMIQUES MUSULMANS-CHRÉTIENS ET PERCEPTIONS AU

KENYA :

UNE REVUE DE LITTÉRATURE

pg. 67

3.1 INTRODUCTION

The previous chapter gave a background of the project and mentioned that the research inquired

into the attitudes of Muslims and Christians on the subject of violent extremism and the problem

of terrorism in Kenya. This second chapter will delve into religious identity in Kenya with

specific focus on Islam and Christianity, the two religions under study. It details the nature of

relations between the two religious groups with a view to tracing the dimensions that lend

credence to the Islam-terrorism narrative. It analyses the ambivalence in relations between

Muslims and Christians and the challenges faced in the quest for better integration. The growth

of Islamic extremism is analysed along with the factors that aggravate it. Principles of intergroup

relations and dynamics are applied to these interreligious relations. These culminate in the final

section of the chapter which discusses individual factors that may have a bearing on the attitudes

of Muslims and Christians.

3.2 RELIGIOUS IDENTITY IN KENYA

The people of Kenya practice a number of religions with majority being Christians followed by

Muslims and others. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics results of the Kenya Housing and

Population Census released in December, 2019 put the Kenyan population at 47,213,282.

According to the statistics, Christianity remains the predominant religion, accounting for 85.5%

of the population while Islam followed at 11%. Majority of the Christians were Protestants who

accounted for 33.4% of the Kenyan population while Catholics and Evangelical Christians

accounted for 20.6% and 20.4% respectively. Other religious affiliations were Orthodox,

Hinduism, Traditionists and other unspecified religions. Some Kenyans were atheists, not

ascribing to any religious beliefs while others either did not know what their religion was or they

pg. 68

did not state their affiliation (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, 2019). Below is the population

distribution according to the religious groups as captured by the statistics bureau.

No. Religious group Population Proportion of

population

1. Protestant 15,777,473 33.4%

2. Catholic 9,726,169 20.6%

3. Evangelical 9,648,690 20.4%

4. Africanists 3,292,573 6.97%

5. Orthodox 201,263 0.43%

6. Other Christian 1,732,911 3.67%

7. Islam 5,152,194 10.9%

8. Hinduism 60,287 0.13%

9. Traditionists 318,727 0.68%

10. Other religions 467,083 0.99%

11. Atheists 755,750 1.6%

12. Don't know 73,253 0.16%

13. Not stated 6,909 0.01%

Total 47,213,282 100%

Table 3.1: Religious distribution of the Kenyan population

SOURCE: Kenyan National Bureau of Statistics (2019)

pg. 69

The pie chart below gives an illustration of these representations.

Figure 3.1: Pie chart representation of the Kenyan population by religious affiliation

Because Muslims and Christians in Kenya tend to be predominant in different ethnic groups,

religious difference may often imply ethnic difference (Brislen, 2015). There also tend to be

small Muslim populations within most of the major ethnicities, and one can occasionally find

Muslims and Christians in the same family. Other native Kenyan communities tend to be largely

Christian. Towns close to the Somali border have more persons of Somali origin, most of whom

also share blood, clan and religious ties with families living across the frontier in Somalia. The

coastal strip of Kenya has high populations of Muslims most especially with Arab origin. The

general Somali and Arab populations are principally Muslim. More inland towns which are

inhabited by other ethnic groups have large Christian or traditionist populations and Muslims are

usually the minority. Generally, religious orientation is upheld in the larger Kenyan society. The

next section will therefore discuss the importance of religion in the lives of individuals.

Catholic

Protestant

Evangelical Churches

African Instituted Churches3,292,573Orthodox

Other Christian

Islam

Hindu

Traditionists

Other Religion

pg. 70

3.2.1 Functions of Religion

Religion is defined as a system of beliefs and practices by which a group of people struggles

with the ultimate problems of life. It provides answers to the questions of life, meaning, purpose

and the understanding of suffering and death. It acts as a source of fulfilment, transformation into

a better being and a force for social cohesiveness (―Studying Religion‖, n.d). According to

Willem & van der Joop (2016), religion serves several functions in the lives of human beings.

Below is a synthesis of the role of religion from various sources.

i) Religion signifies a distinct worldview and eternal group membership unmatched by

identification with other social groups. According to Brislen (2015), religion assists in the

formation of a healthy community that enhances the lives of those who participate in it. A

community may be defined as people living peacefully and united so that they are able to

work together for the common good. This may include socio-economic progress at a

personal, community and even a national level. Religion can serve as a powerful

expression of individual and group identity (UNDP, 2017).

ii) Religion can facilitate a clear and stark dichotomy between right and wrong while serving

as a framework for understanding the world people live in. It is also a basis for rewarding

the ‗righteous‘ and punishing the ‗immoral‘ as it provides justification for what is

acceptable and allowed or what is forbidden and denigrated.

iii) Wandusim (2015) offers that religion constitutes a framework for interpreting prevailing

conditions and realities. Religious groups serve a powerful function in shaping the

processes of interpreting the world and reactions to different circumstances. [This] can

lead to extreme behaviours such as intolerance, domination and violence (Willem & van

der Joop, 2016). Indeed, the United Nations Development Program (2017) confirms that

pg. 71

religious ideology was significant in determining one‘s decision to join a terrorist group.

As Obaidi, Kunst, Kteily, Thomsen and Sidanius (2018) were able to demonstrate in their

research, individuals with strong religious identity felt the highest level of threat. They

observed more levels of threat among strong Muslims and Christians who both

demonstrated more out-group hostility. This is a good example of the power of religion

over individuals.

3.2.2 The Islamic Religious Landscape in Kenya

The history of Islam in Kenya dates back to the emergence of the Swahili people along the East

coast of Africa and the presence of the Somali people in north-eastern Kenya. Other factors that

led to the growth of Islam in Kenya include the immigration of south Asians, and the settlement

of colonial-era African soldiers, often called Nubians, in Kenyan urban areas. According to

Brislen‘s (2015) review of writings ―the Kenyan who has gone through a European education has

been trained to equate Muslims with non-Africans.‖ That current popular and academic writing

about Islam in Kenya tends to portray Islam and Muslims as somehow foreign to Kenya.

Muslims are concentrated mainly in the Coastal and north-eastern regions of the country

although Nairobi has several mosques and a significant Muslim population. The establishment of

the Eastleigh12

area as a haven for Somali refugees brings into sharp focus the high concentration

of Somali-Muslims in that area too. There are large and historically significant populations of

Swahili Muslims on the coast (most notably in Mombasa, Lamu and Malindi). Inland areas

where there are significant Muslim populations despite the dominance of Christianity are

12 A bustling Somali business hub in the suburbs of Nairobi predominantly populated by Somali refugees.

pg. 72

Mumias area in Kakamega County and Kendu Bay region in Homa Bay County. With the

growth and expansion of Somali trade, certain urban areas have seen a growing number of

Somali-Muslims in trading outlets popularly known as Garissa Lodge. Smaller numbers of Arab

and South Asian Muslims are scattered throughout the country too.

3.2.3 Christianity in Kenya

The arrival of Johann Ludwig Krapf13

, a German Lutheran serving with the British Church

Missionary Society, marked the beginning of continuous Christian presence in the territory of

Kenya, and by extension an interaction between Muslims and Christians that continues to this

day (Brislen, ibid). Other denominations of the Christian faith that were introduced through

missionary work in Kenya include Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, Seventh-Day Adventism,

Presbyterianism, Methodism, Baptism, Reformed, the Apostolic Church, Jehovah‘s Witnesses,

Branhamism and a host of other sects under Protestantism and Evangelicalism. Some of these

arrived in the territory during the pre-colonial era while others are a recent development. In fact,

it is difficult to give an exhaustive list of all the Christian denominations and churches in the

country.

The modern Christian landscape in Kenya has seen a major growth and mushrooming of various

smaller cults, some of which are a marriage of Christian doctrine and Africanism. This

Africanisation of the church in Africa has been spearheaded by a number of charismatic founders

13 Dr. Krapf was trained by the Basel Missionary Institute in the early nineteenth century. He moved to the East

Coast of Africa and set up a mission at Rabai in Mombasa where he stayed from 1844 to 1855. In 1846, he was

joined by another German, Johannes Rebmann with whom they worked on translating the Bible into the local

language (Dictionary of African Christianity, 2020).

pg. 73

across the country. The sects are sometimes referred to as the white-garment churches for their

practice of donning long white attire and are guided by a blend of Christian beliefs and

traditional African practices. Examples include the Akorino sect in central Kenya and the Roho

Israel, Dini ya Msambwa and Legio Maria in western Kenya.

3.2.4 Other Religious Identities

Apart from Islam and Christianity, other religions in Kenya include the purely African

Traditionists who do not subscribe to Monotheism as is the case with Islam and Christianity.

These believe in the power of ancestral spirits and traditions. Baha‘ism is also present in addition

to Hinduism, Buddhism and Sikhism which are chiefly practiced by Kenyans of Asian descent

and are mostly to be found in urban areas.

Some 1.6% of the Kenyan population declared that they were atheists (Kenya National Bureau of

Statistics, 2019), not subscribing to any form of religious belief. As this research project was

focused on Muslims and Christians with regard to terrorism in Kenya, this chapter and the rest of

the thesis will be dedicated to discussing these two religions. In addition, any reference to

Muslims and Christians in the remaining section of this work concerns those in Kenya unless

otherwise stated.

The following section gives an analysis of the link between Islamic identity and radicalisation in

Kenya.

pg. 74

3.3 THE SPREAD OF EXTREMIST IDEOLOGY IN KENYA

Historically, there have been long-standing overt and covert conflicts between Islam and

Christianity worldwide. The last two decades have seen relations between Muslims and Non-

Muslims become more and more hostile (Obaidi et al, 2018). These relations are further

complicated by spontaneous happenings that lead to the oscillation between peace and suspicion.

For instance, to many Muslims, the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan are an attack on Islam by

Christianity (Lia, 2008 and Roy, 2004 as cited in Obaidi et al, ibid) while the latter may see them

as justified actions to curb insecurity. A research in Pakistan revealed that in the wake of the US-

led war on terror, there had emerged widespread anti-American and anti-Western sentiments

among Muslims who dehumanised the Christian minority as western agents (Ahmed & Zahoor,

2020). A study with Muslims in Europe and the Middle East predicted that hostility towards non-

Muslims and the West would result from symbolic threats due to the perceived incompatibility of

culture, criticism of Islamic culture and pressures arising from the need to assimilate (Kunst &

Sam, 2013; Kunst & Thomsen, 2015 as cited in Obaidi et al ibid).

Muslim-Christian relations in Africa in colonial days mirrored some aspect of the picture of the

global relations as ―...conflict and rivalry rather than cooperation” (Migliore, 2014 as cited in

Wandusim, 2015). According to Jaji (2014), the recent decades have seen terrorism increasingly

associated with Muslims. However, Mbillah (2010) as cited in Wandusim (2015) & Brislen

(2015) state that in Africa south of the Sahara, Muslims and Christians are known to live as close

family members despite their religious differences. Yet, there have been post-colonial revivalist

movements especially in Islam that produced tensions and rivalry in Nigeria and Sudan (Brislen,

ibid).

pg. 75

This segment that discusses the link between Islamic identity and radicalisation is divided into

three sub-sections that correspond to certain factors that make Islamic identity be linked to

terrorism in Kenya. These are suspicious Muslim-Christian relations, the Somali factor and the

growth of Islamic fundamentalism.

3.3.1 Muslim-Christian Relations in Kenya

The global scenario of contention between Islam and Christianity is replicated in Kenya where

rivalries have been particularly witnessed in areas of the country where Islam is predominant and

the adherents perceived as foreign. These include the north-eastern frontiers with large

populations of Somali ethnics, the coastal region with a large Swahili-Arab populace and some

inland provinces with Arabic, Asian and Nubian communities. Most Christians are

predominantly native Africans although there are pockets of native Muslims in parts of the

country.

In deliberating Muslim-Christian relations in Africa, one must be cognizant of which groups one

is considering as attitudes vary accordingly. For instance, a religiously mixed marriage would

not be completely unusual for a Luhya family in Mumias, Kenya which has a significant Muslim

population, although as a whole the Luhya ethnic group may not be predominantly Muslim. Yet,

as Wesonga (2017) alludes, interfaith marriage always evokes emotions. According to Islamic

teachings, a Muslim woman cannot marry a non-Muslim man, regardless of his religion, while a

Muslim man can marry a non-Muslim woman.

On the other hand Christians are forbidden to be yoked with non-believers. These sentiments

emerged in an interfaith seminar held in Mombasa, where both Muslim and Christian

participants strongly opposed the idea of interfaith marriage. One Muslim participant said his

pg. 76

daughter could only marry a Christian over his dead body while a Christian participant said he

had skipped his daughter‘s wedding (Nikah) as she was marrying a Muslim against his wish.

This may represent the view of majority Muslims and Christians who despite embracing

interfaith dialogue could not tolerate marriage outside their religious boundaries. Muslims felt

labelled by Christians as not belonging or as violent persons. For instance, one Somali-Muslim

commented that he was worried about the growing trend in which Christians linked terrorism to

Islam. No wonder Hellsten (2016) listed historical discrimination against Muslims, Arabs and

Somalis as among the factors that threatened security in Kenya. Furthermore, security forces

responses to increased terrorist attacks deepened the attention of other Kenyan public‘s on the

Somali-speaking communities. This aggravated feelings of mistrust against Somalis who had

historically been subjected to suspicion and doubts about their authenticity as Kenyans (Institut

de Relation Internationales et Strategiques, 2015).

Wesonga (2017) observes that Islamophobia, the fear of ethnic communities perceived to be

Muslims, namely the Somali, Swahili and Arabs, was on the rise. Kiswii (2013) agrees that

Somali ethnics were generally viewed with suspicion regardless of whether they were Kenyan or

not. This had led to prejudice against Muslims who were considered extremists and had resulted

in discrimination and a heightened fear of interaction with them even in public spaces.

Sometimes, just visibly belonging to the Muslim community could earn one a place in al

Shabaab in the minds of other Kenyans. There was an informal rule in some parts of the country

that Christians could not be neighbours with Muslims and that Christian landlords could not give

tenancy to Muslims. In Jaji‘s (2014) study, a male respondent claimed that he would be

uncomfortable living in the same neighbourhood with Muslims whom he accused of

aggressiveness and violence.

pg. 77

On the contrary, Christians did not consider any Christian denomination violent and they

attributed terrorism to the Somali. That several Kenyan towns like Eldoret, Kisumu and Nakuru

had growing numbers of Somali refugee populations (Campbell et al, 2011 as cited in Lindley &

Haslie, 2011) was likely to spread deeper tensions with Somalis and Muslims (Anderson, 2014).

Both Kenyan Somalis and Somali refugees had reported cases of discrimination (Botha, 2013)

falling victim to arbitrary arrests for no other reason but their ethnicity (Khalil & Zeuthen, 2014).

In any case, it was often difficult to distinguish Kenyan Somalis from Somali refugees. This

difficulty was confirmed when a planned registration exercise for refugees in Mandera was

cancelled due to the difficulty in distinguishing refugees holding Kenyan national identity cards

from locals with refugee identification cards. It was said that many Kenyan Somalis turned up

because they were attracted by the aid provided by the Red Cross (Lindley & Haslie, 2011).

3.3.2 The Somali Factor

The Somali factor was of paramount importance in issues of Islam and terrorism in Kenya. Two

elements were particularly significant in this regard. One was the vital proportion of Kenyan

ethnics of Somali origin and second was the fact that Kenya played host to Somali refugees who

incidentally also shared clan ties across the border with the Kenyan Somali. In fact, the

government had attributed al Shabaab attacks in Kenya to its Somali citizens and Somali

refugees (Mwangi, 2017) that incidentally were predominantly Muslim. In addition, the al

Shabaab terror outfit itself was based in Somalia.

Besides, some terrorist attacks that took place before al Shabaab became a force to reckon with

had a Somali dimension to them. For instance, some al Qaeda operatives who had executed

attacks in Kenya had met in Mogadishu, Somalia for ideological and weapons training. It is

pg. 78

believed that their leader may have made numerous back and forth trips between Mombasa and

Mogadishu for secret meetings (Rosenau, 2015) in the planning phase. Furthermore, the group

was able to smuggle weapons from Somalia into Kenya (Mogire & Agade, 2011 as cited in

Bryden, 2003) and finally escaping to Mogadishu by boat after executing the attacks (Rosenau,

2015). As a result of such revelations, it was not uncommon for the ordinary Kenyan to link

terrorism with Somalia, the Somali, and to extend it to other predominantly Islamic groups and

Muslims in general.

Non-Muslim Kenyans frequently referred to persons of Somali origin as ‗Somalis‘ or Warria‘

(depicting their foreignness) while not necessarily doing the same for other ethnic groups. Even

when challenged that two million Somali people were native to Kenya, majority were often

reluctant to identify them as such (Brislen, 2015). On their part, Somali refugees accused Kenyan

non-Muslims of being Islamophobic, ignorant, immoral and violent criminals who threatened

Somali cultural and religious values. Some of them asserted that they avoided living outside the

Somali-dominated Eastleigh area because they did not want to be exposed to Kenyans‘ criminal

ways as witnessed in the media. Other descriptive terms used by Somalis for the Kenyan out-

group were ‗thieves‘, ‗drunkards‘, ‗dangerous‘ and ‗westernized‘ because they engaged in drug

abuse, prostitution and homosexuality. Furthermore, extremists had justified jihad against Kenya

for waging war ‗against Muslims‘ in the pretext of fighting terrorism.

3.3.3 Muslim Fundamentalism in Kenya

Most terrorist networks were organized and oriented at international level where actions were

planned in one country and executed in another (Ball & Webster, 2005 as cited in Chumba,

pg. 79

Okoth, & Were, 2016). This kind of terrorism thrived from wide recruitment (Thuranira, 2017)

into the global jihadi movement which recruitment depended on the process of radicalization

(Rosenau, 2005). Radicalisation is defined as the social process by which people are brought to

condone, legitimize, support, or carry out violence for political or religious objectives (Ladbury,

2009 as cited in International Interactions 2013). Mair (2003) as cited in Rosenau (2005) lists

three essential elements for the achievement of a substantial pool of extremists. These were

inadequate police intelligence and law enforcement capacity; a ―mobilising belief‖ such as

Salafist/jihadist extremism; and ―appropriate agitators‖ to propagate the extremist ideas. All

three conditions were present in Kenya with the third one being reinforced by radicalised al

Shabaab elements that justified the ‗holy‘ war against Kenya; and had succeeded in recruiting

many Kenyan Muslims (Amble & Hitchens, 2014). In addition, the USAID classified what it

termed the drivers of terror into three main categories. These were drivers linked to recruitment,

community support or tolerance and thirdly, an enabling environment for the thriving of terror

activities (Gatuiku, 2016).

This brings to the fore the reality that radicalisation was actually foreign to Kenya. In fact, the

US government mentioned years back that foreign elements were present in Kenya and that they

were radicalising the traditionally tolerant Kenyan Muslims (Rosenau, 2005). Herbst and Mills

(2003) cited in Rosenau (ibid) confirm that communities that had been tolerant could become

radicalised. A review of literature reveals three areas that were particularly important in the

spread of Islamic extremism in Kenya. These were the importation of Islamic fundamentalism;

the presence of underlying grievances; and the refugee factor.

pg. 80

3.3.3.1 Importation of Islamic Extremism

Radicalization in Kenya had been linked with migration from and to jihadist warzones. It posed a

big danger to Kenya‘s safety and stability (Mohamed, 2013 as cited in Chumba et al, 2016).

Islamic extremism in Kenya did not come with al Shabaab as evidence of radicalisation on the

coastal strip could be traced to the 1990s when security forces were slow to deal with it (Botha,

2013 as cited in Anderson, 2014). Wahhabi Islam in this region filtered in in the 1980s with the

return of Muslim students who had become radicalised while undergoing religious training in

Saudi Arabia. On coming back, they influenced the youth to antagonize the local imams‘

ideology. A typical example was Khalid Balala14

, a Kenyan born into a family with roots in

Yemen. These returnees used a ‗takeover‘ strategy in which regular visitors at local mosques and

other smaller religious groups were recruited and taken through indoctrination lectures delivered

by various Salafist scholars (Botha, 2014). Some of these scholars and imams came from Saudi

Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries under the sponsorship of the Middle East. According

to Rosenau (2005), locals knew who these extremists were and the mosques they controlled

adding that government officials had asserted that Muslims in Kenya were undergoing

radicalisation by extremists from the Gulf States, South Asia and the Middle East.

Moreover, many local Muslims joined the al Qaeda network in the 1990s while some Kenyans

were enticed to carry out logistical and other tasks. Officials of the US government claimed that

14 A charismatic Kenyan sheikh, who went on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, studied at Medina University and

visited a number of Far East and European countries. He also studied in England and in India. He came back

radicalized and joined the Islamic Party of Kenya in which he led demonstrations against the government. He helped

the party become much more radicalised with financial backing from Iran, Sudan and other Islamic extremist

organisations (Oded, 1996).

pg. 81

some Kenyans had even been recruited to support the insurgency in Iraq (New York Daily News,

2003 as cited in Rosenau, ibid). Evidence that foreign extremists from the Middle East were

present in the country emerged with the identification of suspects linked with the 1998 United

States Embassy bombing in Nairobi. These included two Saudi suicide bombers (Bergen, 2002

as cited in Kimunguyi, 2010) recruited by Fazul Abdallah Mohamed15

, Osama bin Laden16

; and a

former Egyptian policeman (Vittori et al, 2009 as cited in Aronson, 2013). Although the

operation was almost entirely a foreign affair, it had some support from a number of Kenyan

citizens (Aronson, ibid). Fazul went on to plan and execute the November 2002 suicide bombing

of the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Kikambala, Mombasa and the failed surface-to-air missile

attack on an Israeli-owned charter plane at Mombasa airport, simultaneously (Mwaura, 2017).

It‘s highly unlikely that attacks of such high magnitude and precision, whose planning is

described by Aronson (2013) as protracted and meticulous could be accomplished without the

involvement of locals. Speckhard and Shajkovci (2019) agree that al Shabaab activities inside of

Kenya had been supported by locals who participated in the organisation‘s activities.

Additionally, the marginalized Muslim communities who included Kenyans of Arab and South

Asian ancestry, were generally closed to non-Muslim outsiders, remaining largely obscure

(Rosenau, 2005). This may have buffered them from would-be whistle blowers while bolstering

the continuation of dubious activities among them. In fact, Fazul was even bold enough to plan

yet another attack on the then newly built US embassy in 2003; an attack that was foiled yet he

15 An al Qaeda operative from the Comoros Island.

16 A Palestinian member of al Qaeda from Jordan.

pg. 82

was never located (Aronson, 2013). Local coastal residents agreed that it was pretty easy for

terrorist outsiders to blend into the Muslim community as the only requirement for acceptance

was the profession of the Islamic faith (Rosenau, 2005). As a matter of fact, Fazul and his

company are known to have established a small lobster-fishing business as a cover-up for the

group‘s activities (UN 2003 as cited in Rosenau, ibid) enabling them to interact freely in the

community.

3.3.3.2 Historical Injustices against Muslim Communities

Immigrants had established a cross-border presence and a clandestine support network among

Muslim populations in the north-eastern region, Nairobi and on the coast. They were said to be

involved in the radicalization and recruitment of young people from these communities by

capitalizing on long-standing grievances against the central government (Chumba et al, 2016).

Such attitudes may have been considered by other Kenyans as abetting violent extremism and an

indifference to the terrorism problem on their part. This was played out in the public‘s wide

support for militarized measures to flush out suspected terrorists and illegal immigrants in ethnic

Somali neighbourhoods. In fact, the public uproar that met the results of the 2009 census in

which more than half of the Muslim population of Kenya was reported to be of Somali origin

(Brislen, 2015) led to the rejection of the statistics. That security in most urban centres in the

country had been strengthened, often to the inconvenience of the innocent (Hellsten, 2016)

worsened matters.

However, most of the grievances levelled against successive governments by Muslim

communities were not unfounded. Some of the historical injustices include the Wagalla

pg. 83

Massacre in which the Kenyan army murdered a yet-to-be-confirmed number of people from the

Degodia clan in February, 1984. Official statements claimed that only 57 people died in this

operation which the government referred to as an effort to disarm this sub-group of Somali

ethnics. However, locals insisted that about 5,000 people were massacred. The Truth, Justice and

Reconciliation Commission put the number at an estimated 1,000, but went on to state that this

may not be completely accurate (Dahir, 2014). Other grievances from the northern frontiers and

the coastal region were the lag in infrastructural development evident in the fewer amenities such

as schools, tarmacked road networks, electricity, water provision and health care. This

marginalisation can be traced to the colonial period with the post-colonial regimes continuing

military occupation and administration in the former north-eastern Province. There was a

struggle for secession in the period following Kenyan‘s independence from British rule in 1963

although this did not succeed (―Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques‖, 2015).

This led to decades of further marginalisation and isolation of the region.

Residents of these areas had also been long underrepresented in government while their youth

had to undergo additional scrutiny unlike other Kenyan youth before they could obtain national

identity cards. The general requisite was for applicants to produce their parents‘ documents and

to be issued with a temporary waiting card until their national identity card was ready. However,

Kenyan Somalis had to face a vetting committee composed of elders, the local chief, and often,

members of the security services (Kenya National Commission for Human Rights, 2007 as cited

in Lochery, 2012). According to the Equal Rights Trust (2011) cited in Odero (2015) they were

required to produce their grandparents‘ identification credentials in addition to their parents‘

documents before they could be issued with a national identification card or passport.

pg. 84

Furthermore, those with a Somali- or Arab-like appearance had to undergo a National Security

Intelligence screening interview in Nairobi. According to ―Institut des Relations Internationales

et Strategiques‖ (2015), residents of the north-eastern counties of Mandera and Wajir considered

themselves minorities, not belonging with other Kenyan ethnics and as second-class citizens.

3.3.3.3 The Influence of Immigrants

Radicalisation in Kenya was also linked to the large numbers of refugees hosted in the country.

The 1980s and 1990s saw a large influx of refugees into Kenya from her then troubled

neighbours (Mwaura, 2017) namely Ethiopia, Somalia, Uganda and Sudan. Initially, the

government maintained an open-door policy and was responsive to refugee protection. However,

things changed when Somalis became increasingly associated with arms-smuggling, trafficking,

forgery of documents, and illicit radio and telecommunications networks (Bryden, 2003). Yet,

challenges arose in the practicality of screening procedures (Mwaura, 2017) around the mid-

1980s due to the increased entry from Somalia and the spill-over of conflict. The passage of time

did not ease this influx owing to protracted conflict in the country. The United National High

Commissioner for Refugees (2011) cited in Lindley & Haslie (2011) reported that it had

registered nearly 800,000 Somali refugees in the Eastern African region with 423,164 of them

hosted in Kenya. A staff of the UNHCR mentioned that the Garissa-based Dadaab refugee camp

where most Somali refugees were hosted was way overwhelmed. The camp had a capacity of

8,000 yearly but the organisation was receiving some 9,000 refugees monthly (Lindley & Haslie,

ibid).

pg. 85

A section of literature presents Somali refugees as a source of insecurity and conflict (Betss &

Loechsher, 2011 as cited in Kiswii, 2013). For example, Aronson (2013) warned that although

refugees were seeking a better life in Kenya, the number of terrorists should not be

underestimated. There was an obvious Kenyan state suspicion of radical Islamic doctrine among

them which contributed to reduced refugee protection (Kathina, 2002 as cited in Wakahiu, 2007).

Odero (2015) mentions massive security intelligence and evidence indicating that al Shabaab

elements camouflaged among refugees and gained access into Kenyan camps and urban areas.

The government‘s apprehension also stemmed from memories of the Shifta War that lasted for

decades leading to suspicion of Somali ethnics from Kenya and Somalia (Kiswii, 2013).

Successive governments often treated them with suspicion especially after the protracted war that

followed Kenya‘s independence (Danish Demining Group, 2014 as cited in ―Institut des

Relations Internationales et Strategiques‖, 2015).

Jaji‘s (2014) research revealed that Kenyan participants and Kenyan and Somali politicians

particularly singled out Somali refugees‘ religious affiliation and linked it to terrorism. Yet, it

was imperative to remember that refugees had fled their insecure countries and left behind their

belongings and safe social networks, thereby being vulnerable to psychological reactions.

The following section will analyse the intersection between radicalisation and three categories of

refugees in Kenya. Ochiel (2018) identified three groups of Somali refugees in Kenya. These

were refugees hosted in camps, those in urban areas and those who stayed temporarily while on

transit to other countries.

pg. 86

3.3.3.3.1 Encamped Refugees

Kenya is home to the largest refugee camp in the world, hosting about 400,000 refugees

(Rawlence, 2014 as cited in Mwangi, 2017) and located at Dadaab in Garissa County, bordering

Somalia. Camps were considered important for the security of countries as they were potential

grounds for terrorist activity. Two factors were identified as playing an important role in the

growth of radicalisation at this camp.

Generally, conditions in camps are characterised by poor facilities, inadequate sanitation, shelter,

resources and healthcare infrastructure. Yet, the camp‘s capacity was overwhelmed, and suffered

from the impact of dwindling international assistance. With refugees overflowing its capacity,

Dadaab facilities could have been worse, leading to hopelessness and poor treatment, a fact

lamented by International Interactions (2013). In addition, the hot and arid climate in the region

limited refugees‘ involvement in income-generating activities. Terrorists were likely to capitalize

on these poor conditions in the camps by filling needs gaps, thereby appealing to the refugee

community (International Interactions, ibid). In any case, al Shabaab were known to have done

this in the regions they controlled back home in Somalia where they gained support from local

communities by exploiting the government‘s failure to provide citizens with basic necessities. A

comment by a guard at the al Hawl camp for Syrian refugees says it all when he asserted that

they watched the fence while the Islamic State was in charge within the camp (Newshub, 2019).

Second, the location of the camp reduced chances of reliable surveillance, making it an ideal

environment for the continuation of or the onset of new conflicts. Crisp (2003) cited in

International Interactions (2013) agrees that most camps were located just inside the borders of

the host country. Rebel groups, exiles and terrorists could easily gain access, hide and recruit

pg. 87

sympathizers from within the camps (Salehyan, 2007 as cited in International Interactions, ibid).

Newshub (2019) reports that propaganda videos made at the Syrian refugee camp in al Hawl

reveal radicalised elements claiming that the camp was a ‗ticking time bomb‘. According to

International Interactions (2013), those engaged in conflict could find refuge in the camps and go

on a potential terrorist recruitment and training spree while being shielded from detection. In

addition, even if the camp was far from the border, there was the likelihood that it would be

isolated, making it easy to hide on-going activities from authorities. This could increase chances

of undetected terrorist cell development, and weapons laundering and distribution. Dadaab Camp

was considered by Kenyan state authorities as a breeding place for terrorism and source of

insecurity for the country (Rawlence, 2014 as cited in Mwangi, 2017). No wonder Ladbury

(2009) cited in International Interactions (2013) asserted that refugee camps were fertile grounds

for radicalisation.

To the Kenyan government, Garissa County, home of Dadaab was a haven of bandits, smugglers

and terrorists hiding in the immigrant community. Dadaab was also depicted by the media as an

entry point for small arms and contributing to the deterioration of security in Kenya. In fact, the

Garissa County commissioner Rashid Harun Khator asserted that the Kenyan-Somali border had

been the main entrance of small weapons into Kenya. This had had devastating effects on the

security of the country (Al-Jazeera, 2013 as cited in Odero, 2015).

3.3.3.3.2 Urban Refugees

Certain loopholes in the Kenyan state departments of Immigration and of Home Affairs emerged

at the height of the Somali refugee influx. This was exploited by criminals who disguised as

pg. 88

migrants, managing to escape arrests by police and immigration officials. Subsequently, there

was a bulge in the urban refugee population (Kiswii, 2013 & Mwaura, 2017) in the rest of the

country with most of them integrating into the vibrant Somali business community (Lindley &

Haslie, 2011). For instance, 43% of refugees in Nairobi were estimated to be self-employed in

petty trade, import and export businesses, shops and malls, real estate, hotels, the miraa or khat

trade, long-distance transport and trucking companies, livestock trade, foreign exchange and

money transfer services. Their businesses ranged in scale from street hawking to large

multinational conglomerates. Some were officially registered while others operated within

Kenya‘s large informal sector (Lindley & Haslie, ibid).

One time police spokesman, Erick Kiraithe confirmed the security threat posed by the urban

refugee population when he indicated that criminals shielded by refugees had been smoked out

of areas like Eastleigh. Many traders in small arms were of Somali origin (Kiswii, 2013) while

some Somali refugees had obtained Kenyan identity cards through unscrupulous means. In fact,

there was a securitisation of the Somali presence in Kenya due to concerns about al Shabaab

becoming a ‗pan-East African entity‘ (Onyango-Obbo, 2011 as cited in Lindley & Haslie, 2011).

This had occasioned the use of militarised action and heavy-handedness against them by the

Kenyan police (Lochery, 2011 as cited in Lindley & Haslie, ibid). While addressing parliament,

a Kenyan minister once likened the predominant Somali community in Eastleigh to an al-

Shabaab enclave and the extremist organisation to a snake that had its tail in Somalia and its

head in Eastleigh (NPR, 2011as cited in Odero, 2015).

pg. 89

3.3.3.3.3 Refugees on Transit

Documented or undocumented refugees (Lindley & Haslie, 2011) on transit to other lands also

posed a radicalisation threat within Kenyan borders. The International Organisation for

Migration was involved in facilitating the resettlement of thousands of refugees in USA, Canada,

Australia, New Zealand and some ten European countries (IOM, 2011 as cited in Odero, 2015).

However, the process was lengthy and relocation was not assured as onward transit could be

denied. When dreams of a ‗better life‘ abroad did not come true, it had the potential of resulting

in feelings of disappointment and disillusionment. This rendered the migrants vulnerable to

radicalisation as the prospect of staying longer and perhaps permanently in Kenya became a

depressing reality. In some cases, a lack of complete integration, led immigrants to becoming

radicalised (Kacou, 2015). This was confirmed by experiences in France and Belgium where

terror attacks were linked to descendants of immigrant families. In the USA, radicalisation was

linked to the frustration resulting from racial segregation (Mwaura, 2017). In addition, such

segregation was sometimes accompanied by other negative representations resulting from the

causes of displacement, such as violence and war (Augustinos, Hanson-Easey & Due, 2015).

Immigrants into Kenya could become disenchanted if they were met with hostility and anger

from Kenyan nationals who treated them with suspicion. They were also likely to lead a life of

stigma, poverty and hardship (Mwaura, ibid) yet they had fled the security of their homes and

probably even lost or could not trace their loved ones. Those born into the next generation faced

numerous obstacles because they were unable to find good employment while prospects for

better placements remained illusionary because of terrorist-related fear and stigma (Odero,

2015). The subsequent socio-economic conflicts with host communities, fear-mongering and

pg. 90

anti-immigrant political undertones predisposed them to radicalisation and recruitment into

terrorist networks (Mwaura, 2017).

All in all, the high influx of Somali refugees had been largely to blame for the rise in terrorist

activities in the country. The al Shabaab had taken advantage of this and managed to blend into

the thriving Somali business enterprises and the local Somali populace. From this vantage point,

they had established their presence and planned, coordinated terrorist cells and attacked high

value targets in the country and in the East African region at large (Muhwezi, 2014).

3.4 INSTITUTIONALISED DIVISIONS BETWEEN MUSLIMS AND

CHRISTIANS

The distinction between Muslims and Christians may have been evident in the state institutions.

In fact, the government itself was identified with Christianity and had been accused of systematic

discrimination of Muslim populations in the northern frontiers and the coastal regions of the

country.

The following section discusses four problematic areas identified by Brislen (2015) as creating

divisions and differentiations in Christian interaction with Islam since early Western Christian

missionary engagement in Kenya to date though often in altered forms.

3.4.1 The Education Sector

According to Brislen (ibid), the history textbooks used in secondary schools often referred to the

Swahili people as Swahili-Arabs, where the addition of the word, Arab, communicated the

‗foreign‘ nature of these indigenous people.‘ No wonder, Hellsten (2016) mentioned ethnicity as

pg. 91

one of the areas that posed a threat to Kenyan security. Also, there were ways in which the

education system undermined integration by separating students into Christian Religious

Education and Islamic Religious Education classes. This may have stemmed from the

government‘s effort to provide for the fundamental freedom of worship without making

provision for the neutralisation of the resultant negative impact. In fact, Brislen (2015) confirmed

that tensions had arisen in Christian-sponsored schools as administrations had restricted the

religious practices of Muslim students. In the worst cases some church-sponsored schools had

sent away Muslim girls who refused to attend worship services (Wesonga, 2017).

3.4.2 The Socio-Cultural Dimension

According to Brislen (2015), there was a lot of influence of the African cultural and/or religious

heritage on Muslim-Christian relations, the latter being more plural and tolerant while the former

had introduced religious intolerance. Wesonga (2017) suggests that Christian leaders had openly

expressed their fears for their people, quoting Father Willybard Lagho, Vicar General of the

Catholic Diocese of Mombasa. In an interview with the Christian Science Monitor, the latter

stated that tolerance levels between the two religious groups had been challenged in the last 20

years (Zirulnick, 2015). Wesonga (2017) also implies that a lack of knowledge and

understanding among the adherents of each faith had led to suspicions. For instance, the

statement by some Muslim leaders during the Abuja Declaration in 1989 that they wanted to

make ‗Islam the Religion of Africa‘ was misconstrued and used to convince Christians that

Muslim intentions were dubious. The Global Terrorism Index report on its part refers to a study

in which 97% of Muslim respondents claimed that their religion was threatened physically and

/or ideologically (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017).

pg. 92

According to Brislen (2015), publicly, Christian leaders had been careful not to associate

terrorism with Islam although ordinary Christians had been heard to imply that Islam and

violence were synonymous. Many Christians wished to identify with the gentleness and

forgiveness of Jesus Christ while Muslims were ‗perceived‘ as perpetrators of violence. Indeed

Chitwood‘s (2017) case study of evangelical Christians on the relations between Muslims and

Christians in Kenya revealed evidence of other-ing of Somali Muslims when they were portrayed

as Samaritans, who needed to be reached with the gospel of Christianity. In addition, when a

Kenyan Christian imagined a Kenyan Muslim, she/he was likely to visualise someone of an

ethnicity different from her/his own. This means that interreligious relations in Kenya often

implied interethnic relations, along with the dynamics insinuated in them (Brislen, 2015).

Odero (2015) writes that Somali refugees had faced harassment in their daily lives. Some of

them had reported difficulty using public service vehicles due to their ethnicity. Their journeys

had been cut short for lack of identification documents or scepticism from other passengers. One

participant explained how he was heckled and thrown out of a public bus by passengers who

accused him of intending to kill them. Many a Somali refugee had had to part with bribes to buy

their freedom or risk detention by police officers who took advantage of their predicament.

3.4.3 Political Undertones

Several Muslim groups were perceived to be at least partially or even fully foreign and they may

have had difficulty receiving full rights as citizens. These included the Nubian who were

considered ‗Sudanese‘, the Borana who were deemed to have migrated from Ethiopia; and

people of Asian background (Brislen, 2015). Wesonga (2017) postulates that the Abuja

pg. 93

Declaration evoked erroneous thinking among Christians who perceived it as a pedestal for the

reintroduction of sharia law. This stemmed from the statement that Muslims in Africa had been

deprived of their rights to be governed under those laws. The argument above was used to

convince Christians to vote against the new constitution in 2010 as fears emerged that Muslims

intended to Islamize Kenya by ‗sneaking‘ some of the declarations into the constitution. The

issue remained controversial and it constantly emerged in Muslim-Christian dialogues.

That Muslims now occupy some top positions in government had not gone down well with some

Christians who cited it as evidence that the Abuja Declaration was coming into force. Brislen

(2015) reports that the conflict between Muslims and the government had often resulted in the

destruction of churches as the latter was identified with Christianity. A number of churches and

at least one mosque had been burned down as a result of clashes between Muslims and

Christians. However, only 24% of Muslim respondents in the GTI report considered other

religions as problematic (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017). The report further states that

reformed perpetrators repeatedly expressed mistrust of government institutions and high levels of

animosity towards government personnel like the police, politicians and the military. 71% of the

respondents blamed some form of ‗government action‘ as their trigger for joining a terrorist

organisation while 49% identified the government as the ‗enemy‘.

3.4.4 The Economic Aspect

The north-eastern regions of Kenya which were occupied by Somali ethnics and the coastal

region with high populations of Arabs had suffered decades of neglect by successive

governments. These populations were also predominantly Muslim. The areas in question were

pg. 94

reported by the United Nations Development Program (2017) as being characterised by youth

unemployment of between 40% and 50% more than the national average. The regions also had

higher levels of multidimensional poverty as compared to Nairobi and the Central region.

Poverty levels in this region were reported as 49% in Garissa County and 89% in Mandera

(Danish Demining Group, 2014 as cited in ―Institut des Relations Internationales et

Stratégiques‖, 2015).

However, a good proportion of Muslims controlled large portions of the economy as business

people. These were to be found in the famous Garissa Lodges situated in a number of urban

areas including a large shopping complex in Nairobi‘s Eastleigh. Furthermore, most Asian

Muslims were successful business entrepreneurs while a number of Somali refugees, who were

Muslim were benefitting from humanitarian aid. In the coastal region, Christians could not

march the financial muscle of many Muslims as most large-scale businesses there were

controlled by Muslim-Arabs. These included public transport, real estate, long-distance trucking

and haulage, and the import-export businesses among others.

3.4.5 Enhancement of Muslim-Christian Relations

Despite intermittent tensions amplified by terrorists who used the name of religion, relations

between Muslims and Christians had continued to improve. Muslims had stood with Christians

in the midst of terror attacks to express what Islam stood for (Wesonga, 2017). For example,

during an attack on Christians, a group of Muslim passengers shocked al Shabaab fighters who

had ambushed a bus shuttling from Nairobi to Mandera in December 2015. When the fighters

asked Muslims to separate from Christians, the Muslim passengers told the militia to kill all the

pg. 95

passengers including Muslims or spare all of them. This incident made headlines for its failure

because the Muslims protected the Christians (Hellsten, 2016). One of the Muslim passengers,

teacher Salah Farah was awarded one of Kenya‘s top honours posthumously after succumbing to

gunshot wounds sustained in the incident (Condez, 2016). Three years later in July 2019, armed

militia marched into a quarry site ready to slaughter more than 20 non-Muslim workers.

However, their plans were scuttled when they found no one there as local residents had warned

the targeted workers to vacate the premises (Editorial Note, 2019). In another occurrence,

Muslim leaders from the Bishaaro Mandera area, while condoling with bereaved families,

strongly condemned the attacks on the Bishaaro hotel, terming the killings ‗bizarre, heinous and

barbaric‘ (Wesonga, 2017).

The government on its part had made some improvements in the treatment of Muslim suspects of

terrorism. Previously, Muslim youths would disappear without trace while in police custody; but

today terror suspects have equal rights and they appear in court like other accused persons.

Several interfaith initiatives had been implemented with the aim of quelling tensions, suspicions

and conflict; and to enhance better understanding and relations between Muslims and Christians.

These included initiatives such as the Programme for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa

(PROCMURA) and the Centre for Christian-Muslim Relations in Eastleigh (CCMRE). Some

organisations had brought Muslims, Christians and others together with the aim of improving

interreligious relations and enhancing cooperation to resolve socio-economic challenges.

Examples were the Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics (CICC) and the Interreligious Council of

Kenya (IRCK). Elsewhere, all over the country, Muslims and Christians living in the same

pg. 96

neighbourhoods continued to face the same challenges like drought, violence, crime, poverty,

underdevelopment, etc. which they cooperated with each other to surmount.

3.5 THE IMPACT OF MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN DYNAMICS ON ATTITUDES

The following section traces the nexus between the Muslim-Christian relations discussed above

and perceptions regarding terrorism, giving relevance to this research project. This exposition of

relations between the two groups plays a number of roles. One, it is the backbone of the research

on Muslim-Christian attitudes towards terrorism as it reveals the sources of Islamic extremism in

the country. In other words, it answers the questions as to why the project was designed, why the

distinction of respondents as Muslims and Christians and why the phenomenon of terrorism.

Furthermore, it paints a general picture of the relations between Muslims and Christians from

documentary and research evidence. This provides the reader with a reliable background to the

problem of terrorism in Kenya. It also gives essence to the research project; acting as a prologue

to the next two chapters that examine terrorism and counterterrorism measures in Kenya in

greater detail.

The aim of the project was to investigate the attitudes of Muslims and Christians towards

terrorism. The rationale for the choice of these two religious groups was given in chapter one.

The discourse in this second chapter brings to the fore five dimensions of Muslim-Christian

dynamics that have a bearing on the attributes interrogated in this project. These are listed below.

i) Religious identity shapes the attitudes of Muslims and Christians who use it to

devaluate out-group members.

ii) The Kenyan religious landscape is characterised by minority issues which have

implications for the two groups both at national and regional level.

pg. 97

iii) Islamic extremism is rife in Muslim communities and it is targeted at non-Muslims

majority of who are Christians.

iv) Long-standing discrimination of Muslim populations by the government provides

fertile ground for violent extremism to thrive and it is used to justify attacks.

v) There are attempts by various stakeholders to improve relations between Muslims and

Christians.

3.5.1 Religious Identity and Attitude

Religion is important in people‘s lives as it gives them a sense of belonging and an eternal group

identity. Those who adhere strongly to religious beliefs tend to identify more with religion and

this influences their attitudes. As the literature has revealed, just by people grouping themselves

into ―us‖ and ―them‖, there is a devaluation mark put on out-groups. This has a bearing on

attitudes.

Members of the two groups categorised themselves into ‗us‘ and ‗them‘ leading to the

devaluation of out-group members. This was evident in Muslims labelling Christians as

‗immoral‘, ‗drunkards‘, ‗thieves‘, etc. Christians too had labels for Muslims whom they

described as violent, extremist, radical, warriah17

, etc. This kind of behaviour emanated from

attitudes towards each other. The members of the two religious groups had mental images of

each other when they used such labels. The insinuation of foreignness in reference to Somali and

Arab Muslims was a pointer to an image of a people who did not belong, a lack of acceptance

and rejection. On the other hand, discriminated Muslim communities may have harboured mental

17 A Kenyan label used to refer to persons of Somali ethnicity regardless of their nationality as Kenyan or Somali.

pg. 98

images of unfair Christians whom they identified with oppressive governments. This could have

given rise to animosity and justification of terrorist attacks against them even if the latter did not

act unfairly or oppressively. The latter may have been used as an easy target used to get at the

government.

3.5.2 Dynamics of Minority Status

The religious landscape in Kenya was characterised by a sharply skewed distribution of religious

affiliation. In any case, Kenya as a whole was largely Christian, making Islam a minority

religion. Secondly, Christians were the minority in certain regions of the country with large

populations of ethnic communities that were predominantly Muslim. The attitudes of dominant

groups and minority groups largely depend on the dynamics of intergroup interactions and

relationships. The status of minorities in societies has implications for psychological attributes,

whereby, discrimination is likely to give rise to negative attitudes while acceptance can boost

confidence and self-esteem.

3.5.3 Islamic Extremism and Christian Objects

The spread of Islamic extremist ideology in Kenya likely impacted the attitudes of traditionally

tolerant Muslims and Christians alike. Otherwise it would not be possible to have local Kenyans

engage in terrorist activities as had been witnessed in the past. Once the attitudes were

manipulated, Muslim extremists and their sympathisers were likely to abet the crime of terrorism

and to justify their actions. Although a majority of Muslims may not support terrorism, they may

identify with certain ideological positions held by extremists, and this had implications for their

attitudes too.

pg. 99

3.5.4 Underlying Grievances as Fertile Ground

The historical injustices from successive governments were another factor that impacted people‘s

attitudes. Individuals from discriminated communities were likely to be affected differently from

those who were not. However, it should be noted that although these attitudes could be negative,

some of these individuals may not be in support of terrorism as a solution. On the other hand,

Kenyans from other ethnic communities had argued that some non-Muslim communities had

also been side-lined and continued to face the same challenges as those put forth by extremists.

Other regions of the country that had faced decades of neglect by previous governments included

parts of Western Kenya and Nyanza; and the north-western frontiers which incidentally shared

the same climatic and arid conditions as north-eastern Kenya.

The argument was that poverty and unemployment continued to plague the country yet youth

from other regions had not resorted to violent extremism. This was after it emerged that these

were among the grievances used to justify acts of violent extremism against the government and

the public. This could have a bearing on the attitudes of Christians who dismissed these

arguments as not holding water and expressed concern that there must have been religious

motives behind the use of terrorism. In any case, many attacks had targeted innocent citizens and

Christians who had nothing to do with the challenges mentioned above. Lastly, it is noteworthy

that terrorist elements from non-Muslim backgrounds had first converted to Islam before they

engaged in these acts. For example, Juma Ayub Otit Were, Suleiman Irungu Mwangi ―Karongo‖

aka Habib, Mohamed Murithi and Ramadan Osao (UNSEC, 2010 as cited in Botha, 2014). This

gives weight to the case for religious motives behind the spread of Muslim fundamentalism. For

instance, Gatuiku (2016) argues that most populations that were affected by identified drivers of

pg. 100

terrorism did not resort to violence. Furthermore, for the few who did, it could not be proven

beyond doubt that the drivers were their only motivation.

3.5.5 Inequity and Improvement of Relations

The systematic divisions resulting from institutionalised discrimination discussed in this chapter

had the potential of contributing to grievances from the Muslim community and to impact

Christians‘ attitudes. It could have triggered angry emotions and reactions from Muslim groups

while furthering the entrenchment of negative attitudes and discriminatory practices among

Christians. It also had the potential to ignite group sympathy and guilt among Christians.

Although there had been attempts at enhancing relations between the two religious groups, these

were yet to bear tangible fruit. Nevertheless, the effects of these efforts on attitudes however

small cannot be overlooked.

3.5.6 Muslim-Christian Emotions and Reactions

Prejudice, which may emanate from personal or group experience guides human behaviour.

Discrimination may give rise to prejudice against perceived discriminators. Muslims may have

harboured negative feelings and attitudes against Christians whom they considered haters of their

religion. Christians on the other hand may have pre-judged Muslims and assumed that all of

them were terrorists or that they were linked to the vice in some way. This is confirmed by

Parkinson et al (2005) whose study revealed that prejudice and discrimination tends to manifest

in a blanket judgement of the whole out-group. The outcome may include intergroup emotions

that manifest as hostilities, avoidance, and negative attitudes.

pg. 101

Group discrimination is likely to lead to heightened anger and reactions from in-group members

and to cause further hostility and suspicion from out-groups as groups are capable of feeling

anger on behalf of their group members. The discrimination against Muslims may give rise to

anger in the larger Islamic community due to feelings of vulnerability and threats to their

wellbeing. The strength of the shared religious ties could cause discomfort because of the

atrocities and partial treatment their brethren were exposed to. On the other hand, Christians who

perceived that their religion was under attack from Islam could feel anger because of the

vulnerability arising from group membership. This anger could have been expressed on behalf of

in-group members who came under direct attack manifesting as outbursts of hostility and

animosity towards perceived perpetrators. For instance, the Usalama Watch operation in which

thousands of Somali Muslims were rounded up and confined in a stadium for screening and

repatriation of illegals to Somalia provoked anger from the Muslim community. However, some

Christians supported the government-led operation and cited dishonesty among the Somali

community whom they accused of harbouring terrorists.

Inter-group anger may also manifest as calls for revenge such as when some Christian leaders

demanded to be armed with guns during church services in readiness for combat. In another

example, an article by the Nation Media Group Managing Editor read in part:

―…every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter our

children . . . We are at war. Let‘s start shooting‖ (Bruzzone, 2014 as cited in Anderson, 2014).

Secondly, intergroup guilt is important for attitudes as Muslims who did not condone attacks on

Christians could be ashamed of their group‘s actions. Some Christians could also feel guilty

pg. 102

because of the discriminatory measures against Muslim communities by a government they

identified with.

3.6 PERSONAL EXPERIENCE AND ATTITUDES

Attitude is important for guiding human behaviour. If a Christian considered a Muslim a

potential terrorist, they were likely to treat them differently. On the other hand, if a Muslim knew

that a Christian was making a judgment about them, whether accurate or inaccurate, it could

influence their reaction towards them. Though necessarily based on incomplete and unverified

(or unreliable) information, attitudes influence the reality for most practical purposes and it

guides human behaviour in general. Perhaps the power of attitude is summed in the report of the

2017 GTI which mentions an analysis of 500 former members of extremist organisations. Over

50% of them said that they decided to join the organisations because they considered their

religion to be under attack; yet, up to 57% reported having only a limited understanding of

religious texts (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017).

The following section details more individual factors that were considered to be relevant to this

project as far as attitudes and intergroup relations were concerned. These were categorised into

two broad groups namely, the effects of threat (external factors) and personal (internal) factors.

3.6.1 The Effects of Threat

A threat is an implication that something unlikeable or aggressive will happen if a particular

action is not taken or a certain order is not followed (Cambridge University Press, 2020). Threats

may involve other individuals or groups of individuals and it may lead to a disintegration of

pg. 103

cohesion. It may also give rise to inter-group and intra-group suspicion and a sense of insecurity.

Threats can emanate from two fundamental components of an individual‘s life. These are the

individual‘s religious affiliation and their geographical location.

3.6.1.1 Religious Affiliation

The threat linked to religious affiliation has to do with participants‘ subscription to Islam or

Christianity and how this may affect their attitudes towards terrorism. Perceived and actual

threats can play a significant role in shaping attitudes about an issue. When individuals feel that

they are under threat from another group, whether this threat is tangible or not, it may influence

their attitudes and reactions to the out-group. After conducting five studies with a variety of

groups and contexts, Obaidi et al (2018) were able to demonstrate a link between intergroup

threats and out-group hostility and violence among non-Muslims in Europe and the USA, and

Muslims in Europe, Afghanistan and Turkey.

A variety of literature also supports the proposition that perceived threat is important for

intergroup bias and attitudes (Sherif, 1961; Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004; as cited in

Obaidi et al, ibid). Sarwar and Raj (2016) state that Islam is seen as a religion that threatens

civilisation and is constantly linked with terrorism via all channels of society such as through

mass media reportage that presents the religion as no more than a terrorist institution. This

symbolic threat (Kumar, 2012 as cited in Obaidi et al, 2018) may lead the persons to act in

certain ways to protect themselves or to reduce the level of perceived threat. There have been

claims of significant degrees of prejudice based on well-established historical notions among

immigrant communities (Feldman, 2012 as cited in Sarwar & Raj, 2016). Indeed, many

European governments had expressed concern about the influx of Muslim refugees who were

pg. 104

considered a threat to Christian identity, values and norms (Machey, 2015 as cited in Obaidi et

al, 2018). This reluctance in embracing refugees from Muslim backgrounds stems from the

attitude of threat and is meant to safeguard security. For instance, Klung (2012) cited in Sarwar

and Raj (2016) mentions that France no longer tolerates the wearing of headscarves and that

there was a significant level of anti-Arab racism in America.

Das and colleagues (2009) conducted a study in the Netherlands which showed a link between

terror-induced prejudice and stereotype generalization. It revealed that Westerners‘ prejudice

against Arabs increased after exposure to Muslim terrorist threats news. Thus the stereotype that

―Arab = bad‖ was generalized to all individuals thought to fit into that category. In this case, just

belonging to a group constituted a threat and the individual had no control over it. Yet some

group memberships were ascribed at birth. Majority of Muslims and Christians are born into

families with these religious affiliations. Many of them did not choose their religious affiliations

and they mostly remain comfortable in those groups for the rest of their lives. In the face of

threats that are linked to such ascribed group memberships, Muslims and Christians were forced

to develop coping mechanisms which in turn impact their attitudes.

3.6.1.2 Geographical Location

The geographical location where one lived constituted another kind of threat. Certain towns and

regions in Kenya had reported high incidences of terrorism and were classified as terrorism

hotspots while others were not displays the terrorism hotspots in Kenya. For purposes of this

research, the place where the participants‘ university was located constituted the threat as this

was the place where they spent the school year. These were Garissa University and MMUST,

which were respectively classified as terror-threat high and low. Also, Garissa University had

pg. 105

been targeted by terrorists in the past and several Christians killed while MMUST had no such

history. Because the level of perceived threat is important in determining people‘s ways of

thinking, their preparedness for eventuality and their reactions towards the threat, it was

important to look at these two locations.

Unlike religious affiliation, University affiliation is not ascribed at birth and is characterised by a

certain degree of choice as students were given the opportunity to select their preferred courses

and universities. This means that the two affiliations differed in the manner in which they

impacted individuals‘ attitudes. Anyhow, the threat arising from geographical location and its

impact on attitudes was an essential part of this study. Obaidi‘s et al (2018) study yielded a link

between threat attitude and hostility to Muslims. Students at Garissa University were more

exposed to terrorist incidences because of the rampant terror attacks in the Garissa region.

Furthermore, there was a monument in the university campus in memory of the 2015 terror

attack at the institution in which 148 students were killed, most of whom were Christians.

Exposure to repeated attacks and the presence of this monument was a stark reminder of terror in

the region and had the likelihood of affecting attitudes. Other stringent security measures that

were put in place following the attack included a perimeter fence, part of which was walled, a

police post within the campus with armed police officers in the compound throughout, and a

biometric register at the gate for all students. CCTV cameras had been mounted at strategic

places while visitors arriving by public transportation were not allowed beyond a certain point

and had to alight and walk the rest of the way to the main entrance. These had a potential impact

on the respondents from this institution.

pg. 106

3.6.2 Personal Factors

The way in which people experience events and situations is influenced by individual

differences. While the same event may happen to two individuals, differences in their personal

traits affect their interpretations of those events and their reactions. In this project, the personal

factors that were considered as having an influence on individual attitudes towards terrorism

were broken down into three specific traits. These were the individual‘s proximity to the out-

group, their self-esteem and their experience.

3.6.2.1 Proximity to the Out-Group

The role of proximity to members of the out-group was considered as important in attitude

formation. Repeated interactions with members of out-groups increase individuals‘

understanding of those groups, their cultural beliefs and norms; and possibly influence their

attitudes towards them. On the other hand, these interactions could increase negative attitudes

towards members of the out-group depending on the experiences and outcomes of those

interactions. Negative interactions may not yield the same effects as positive ones. Proximity

may be in the form of blood relationships, family ties, friendships and other associations. The

intergroup contact theory (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Pettigrew, 1998) states that people who

engage in intergroup contact are less likely to be prejudiced towards out-group members than

those who do not.

Proposed by Gordon Allport as an effective way to reduce prejudice and inter-group conflict

between majority and minority groups, the theory stipulates four conditions that could yield

positive intergroup effects. These are status; cooperation across the groups; having common

goals; and support by institutional authorities (Everett, 2013). In designing the project, it was

pg. 107

assumed that these conditions were met in the two locations under study with one site being

predominantly Muslim populated while the other one was majorly Christian populated. It was

also assumed that the minority Christians, at Garissa University interacted with the majority

Muslim populations within and without the university premises. The same applied for the

minority Muslim students at MMUST where similar interactions with the majority Christians

within and without the campus were assumed to be taking place. The two were state-owned

institutions which operated with equality as their core value devoid of discrimination in the daily

academic and social lives of students. In addition, proximity to the out-group also existed in

terms of relations, family ties and friendships and this were considered to have implications for

attitudes.

3.6.2.2 Individual Self-Esteem

Self-esteem is a person‘s sense of self-worth. It is a major predictor of psychological well- or ill-

being and therefore of human behaviour. In the study by Das et al (2009) terrorism news was

found to affect collective and personal self-esteem. The study showed that low self-esteem had

an effect on individuals‘ attitudes towards members of out-groups. Specifically, the death-related

thoughts resulting from watching a clip on terrorism perpetrated by an Arab increased negative

attitudes towards Arabs, especially in individuals with low self-esteem. These findings also

supported a proposition that self-esteem cushions the individual against the effects of terrorism

news. This is because the increase in prejudice was more likely to be observed among viewers

with low self-esteem than those with high self-esteem.

pg. 108

However, Das and colleagues offer that in situations where individuals are threatened, high self-

esteem may increase rather than reduce prejudice especially when the threat was perceived as

psychologically and physically close to the individual. Badea, Bender and Korda (2019) also

found that self-affirmation, an attribute of self-esteem was important in reducing the effects of

threats and the favouring of discriminatory counterterrorism interventions. This was especially so

in participants high in individualism. They found that self-affirmation helped cushion individuals

against immigrant threats leading them to be less supportive of extreme measures against

terrorism.

Every and Perry (2014) mention research in the USA that linked discrimination with lower self-

esteem. This was more especially for acts of discrimination that were interpersonal in nature,

such as insults or physical distance. Their study with Muslim minority immigrants in Australia

showed that interpersonal and systemic discrimination had an effect on self-esteem especially

with participants living in situations that devalue Muslims. A two-year research project by

Mousavimoghadam, Nourmohammadi, Ranjbarian, and Rashidahal (2014) yielded a positive

correlation between religious orientation and self-esteem. Other studies had linked religious

orientation to improvement of mental health, a reduction in mental disorders and an increase in

self-esteem (Bahrami, 2002 as cited in Mousavimoghadam et al, ibid).

It is evident from the above studies that self-esteem plays an important role in individual attitude.

Yet, self-esteem is affected by acts of discrimination which Muslims and Christians had been

exposed to.

pg. 109

3.6.2.3 The Role of Experience

As the English adage goes, experience is the best teacher; the role of experience in attitude-

formation cannot be overlooked. It is in view of this fact that the research sought to interrogate

respondents from a university that had a history of terror attacks and one that did not. According

to Parvez (2014), the experiences that people go through in life may entrench certain ways of

thinking and traits in them that were hitherto not present. S/he refers to a study that revealed that

most gym addicts were either victims of bullying or they had been involved in at least one fight.

This may have stemmed from their desire to protect self from future aggression. Likewise, a

history of terror attacks may cause a person to develop certain attitudes and to behave a certain

way unlike another person under similar circumstances but with no such history.

A dramatic event such as a terrorist attack may trigger antagonistic reactions towards perceived

perpetrators. This is supported by a study that revealed that online hostility increased

immediately after the November 13, 2015 terror attack in Paris in which 130 people were killed;

triggering major societal reactions throughout Europe. Moreover, after the attack on satirical

magazine Charlie Hebdo on 7th

January, 2015 that left twelve people dead and 11 others injured,

concern was raised that refugees were potential terrorists (Kaakinen et al, 2017). It is probable

therefore that those who had experienced terrorist attacks in their communities had different

attitudes and opinions from those who had not.

The literature in this chapter has highlighted the prejudice and negative attitudes displayed by

members of the Muslim and Christian communities against each other in Kenya. For instance,

that Somali refugees are generally avoided and treated differently points to the existence of

discrimination against their group, who are judged on the basis of some stereotypes. The

harassment of Somali immigrants by law-enforcement officers points to prejudice and

pg. 110

discrimination as opposed to other groups of immigrants who did not experience such treatment.

On the other hand, Somali refugees‘ comments that they could not live in areas inhabited by

Christians was a pointer to stereotypical beliefs and a lack of complete integration into the

society. Muslims who held those beliefs may have avoided Christians and were probably closed

to other communities. It is no wonder then that the attribute of opaqueness among Muslim

communities had been linked to Islamic extremism and it forms part of the recommendations

made in chapter nine.

pg. 111

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter explored the background information on relations between Muslims and Christians

in Kenya, the proportions of the religions in the population and their nationwide distribution. The

link between Islam and radicalisation was drawn. Muslim-Christian relations were characterised

by suspicion, rivalry and animosity on the one hand and positive peace and cooperation on the

other, especially where the two groups shared the same fate. The relationships of suspicion were

attributed to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism imported from the Middle East, the Gulf

States and Somalia. The extremist ideologies had resulted in numerous terrorist attacks in the

country, many of which were targeted at Christians.

The growth of radicalisation was linked to the ability of foreign radical elements to blend into the

Kenyan Muslim communities where they spread their ideology unabated. The presence of

underlying grievances among Muslim populations was considered as fertile ground for the

spread of Islamic extremism. Immigrants were also linked to the growth of violent extremism

and terror activities in the country. Immigrants were categorised into three groups of refugees,

i.e. those in the Dadaab camps, refugees in urban areas especially Nairobi and refugees on

transit. The last group included those who did not manage to relocate to western countries where

they expected to live a better life. It was noted that urban refugee populations were growing in

other towns too other than the capital, Nairobi and the Garissa frontier.

Discrimination of Muslims was institutionalised in various Kenyan sectors; the education, socio-

culturally, politically and economically where it had the potential of affecting the attitudes of

Muslims and Christians. Initiatives focused on improving the relations between Muslims and

Christians had been implemented by the government, religious leaders and organisations, non-

governmental authorities and even private individuals. Although some Muslim populations had

pg. 112

been under-represented in government and their regions side-lined by successive governments,

not all of them lived in poverty. There were Muslim business moguls who controlled a great deal

of wealth, unmatched by their Christian counterparts in certain parts of the country. Most of

these were of Arab, Asian and some African descent especially at the Coast and to some extent

in Nairobi and other towns. Besides, the Eastleigh economic hub was bustling thanks to Somali

business acumen.

The chapter also discussed certain individual traits that were considered important in attitudes

towards the out-group and terrorism. These were categorised into two groups, specifically

external factors and internal factors. External factors were also described as the effects of threat

and they constituted individual‘s religious affiliation and their geographical location. Because

these factors exposed individuals to certain threats; they influenced their attitudes. Internal

factors were referred to as personal factors and they were composed of three traits; the

individual‘s proximity to members of the out-group, their self-esteem and their personal

experiences.

The next chapter provides a review of literature on the phenomenon of violent extremism and

terrorism globally, regionally and in Kenya.

pg. 113


Ce chapitre a exploré les informations de fond sur les relations entre musulmans et chrétiens au

Kenya, les proportions des religions dans la population et leur répartition nationale. Le lien entre

l‘islam et la radicalisation a été établi. Les relations entre musulmans et chrétiens se sont

caractérisées par la suspicion, la rivalité et l‘animosité d‘une part et la paix et la coopération

positives d‘autre part, en particulier lorsque les deux groupes ont partagé le même sort. Les

relations de suspicion ont été attribuées à la propagation du fondamentalisme islamique importé

du Moyen-Orient, des États du Golfe et de la Somalie. Les idéologies extrémistes avaient donné

lieu à de nombreuses attaques terroristes dans le pays, dont beaucoup visaient des chrétiens.

La croissance de la radicalisation a été liée à la capacité des éléments radicaux étrangers à se

fondre dans les communautés musulmanes kényanes où ils répandent leur idéologie sans relâche.

La présence de griefs sous-jacents parmi les musulmans a été considérée comme un terrain fertile

pour la propagation de l‘extrémisme islamique. Les immigrants étaient également liés à la

croissance de l‘extrémisme violent et des activités terroristes dans le pays. Celles-ci ont été

classées en trois groupes de réfugiés ; dans les camps de Dadaab, les réfugiés urbains, en

particulier à Nairobi, les réfugiés en transit ou ceux qui n‘ont pas réussi à s‘installer dans les pays

occidentaux où ils s‘attendaient à vivre une vie meilleure. Il a été noté que les populations de

réfugiés urbains augmentaient dans d‘autres villes que la capitale, Nairobi et la frontière de

Garissa.

La discrimination à l‘égard des musulmans a été institutionnalisée dans divers secteurs kenyans ;

l‘éducation, socio-culturellement, politiquement et économiquement où elle avait le potentiel

d‘affecter les perceptions des musulmans et des chrétiens. Des initiatives visant à améliorer les

relations entre musulmans et chrétiens ont été mises en œuvre par le gouvernement, les chefs

pg. 114

religieux et les organisations, les autorités non gouvernementales et même les particuliers. Tous

les musulmans ne vivaient pas dans la pauvreté, et il y avait des magnats des affaires musulmans

qui contrôlaient beaucoup de richesses, inégalées par leurs homologues chrétiens. La plupart

d‘entre eux étaient d‘origine arabe, asiatique et africaine, en particulier à la côte et dans une

certaine mesure à Nairobi et dans d‘autres villes. Le centre économique d‘Eastleigh était animé

grâce au sens des affaires somalienne.

Certains principes de relations intergroupes ont été mobilisés pour expliquer les relations entre

musulmans et chrétiens. Par exemple, les membres du groupe se sont regroupés en « nous » et «

eux » et ont dévalué les membres du groupe extérieur à propos desquels ils utilisaient des

étiquettes descriptives négatives. Celles-ci émanaient d‘images qu‘ils formaient au sujet de l‘out-

group et étaient sujettes à des préjugés et à des croyances stéréotypées. Les extrémistes violents

justifiaient des actes terroristes visant des chrétiens qu‘ils identifiaient à des gouvernements

oppressifs. La combinaison de ces dynamiques intergroupes a donné lieu à des émotions

intergroupes ; colère et l‘animosité d‘un côté et la honte et la culpabilité de l‘autre.

Le chapitre a également discuté de certains traits individuels qui étaient considérés comme

importants dans les perceptions au sujet du groupe extérieur et du terrorisme. Ceux-ci ont été

classés en deux groupes, en particulier des facteurs externes et des facteurs internes. Des facteurs

externes ont également été décrits comme les effets de la menace et ils constituaient

l‘appartenance religieuse de l‘individu et sa situation géographique. Parce que ces facteurs

exposaient les individus à certaines menaces ; ils ont influencé leurs perceptions. Les facteurs

internes étaient appelés facteurs personnels et ils étaient composés de trois caractéristiques, c‘est-

à-dire la proximité de l‘individu avec les membres de l‘extérieur du groupe, son estime de soi et

ses expériences personnelles.

pg. 115

Le chapitre suivant fournit un examen détaillé de la littérature sur le phénomène de l‘extrémisme

violent et du terrorisme à l‘échelle mondiale, régionale et au Kenya.

pg. 116

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pg. 122

CHAPTER FOUR

TERRORISM IN KENYA AND OTHER SELECTED REGIONS OF THE

WORLD:

LITERATURE REVIEW

LE TERRORISME AU KENYA ET DANS D’AUTRES RÉGIONS

SÉLECTIONNÉES DU MONDE : UNE REVUE DE LA LITTÉRATURE

pg. 123

4.1 INTRODUCTION

In the previous chapter, the frictions between Muslims and Christians were examined and

established to be partly originating from Islamic extremism imported into the country. They

found ground to thrive among Muslim communities who had grievances against the government

and resulted in terror acts targeted at Christians. This chapter therefore reviews some existing

literature related to the subject of terrorism, which is a manifestation of violent extremism and

how it had affected Christians. The first section presents an overview of the concept of terrorism

that ends with a working definition adopted in this project. A discussion of global terrorism

broken down into regional specifics follows beginning with North America, then Europe, the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and then sub-Saharan Africa. Terrorism in sub-Saharan

Africa is split into sub-sections corresponding with three major regions of the continent that had

witnessed significant violent activities related to religious fundamentalism. These are the Sahel,

the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa. The chapter narrows down to discuss the

phenomenon of terrorism in the East African region and climaxes in a discourse on the dynamics

of terror activities in Kenya and how these informed the research project. The presence of al

Shabaab in the country and religion-based terrorism that formed the backbone of this project

conclude the review.

4.2 CONCEPTUALIZING TERRORISM

The main aim of terrorist organisations is to cause psychological effects by attracting public

attention and undermining the authority of the state in ensuring the safety of citizens rather than

causing physical harm. Terrorism fits the description of aggression in three specific ways the

first of which is that the intention to harm is never accidental. There is usually a presence of the

pg. 124

expectancy that it will result in harm to the target and the willingness of the target person to

avoid the harm done (Krahe, 1996).

According to Shuggart II cited in Rosdiawan (2014) and Krahe (1996), the characteristics that

define terrorism can be summarised into the following elements:

i) Terrorist acts are used as a means for achieving political aims and as instruments for

creating a terrifying atmosphere in order to get public attention, and to cause

intimidation.

ii) The acts are directed at harming people other than the direct opponents in the political

conflict.

iii) Terrorism has always been linked to anti status-quo movements opposing the

legitimate power.

iv) The trend of world political discourse is instrumental in determining the realm where

terrorism issues are centralized.

4.2.1 A Brief Historical Perspective

Rosdiawan (2014) avers that which actions are regarded as terrorism and which are not is a big

problem as these have political consequences and implications for moral rhetoric. According to

William F. Shuggart II cited in Rosdiawan (ibid), three major categories of violent actions have

been labelled terrorist since the end of the Second World War.

i) At the end of the World War II, the violent actions that were grounded by separatism

with the goal of forming the new Sovereign state were regarded as terrorism.

ii) From the 1960s until the fall of the Berlin Wall, into the period during the cold war

between the Western bloc and the Eastern bloc, terrorism was seen as the Soviet-led

pg. 125

Eastern bloc attacking US-led western interests in different parts of the world. This

period is often considered the start of ‗globalization‘ of terrorism.

iii) The more recent emergence of religion-based violence, in particular Islam is regarded

as more brutal and terrifying.

4.2.2 Complexity in Terrorism Dimensions

Some terrorist acts are committed within wider geo-political and military agenda, with the

perpetrators legitimizing their actions (United Nations Development Program, 2017). Karlsonn

(2015) adds that terrorism is a complicated and multipart occurrence that appears in different

forms and in many parts of the world; in democracies, autocracies and transnational states, in

developed, underdeveloped and developing countries.

Furthermore, the complexity of terrorism deserves mention. Multivariate factors interact in each

terrorist act, bringing to the fore, the various dimensions of the issue. For example, according to

Africa-America Institute (2006), although the 1998 US embassy bombing in Dar es-Salaam was

externally sponsored, the terrorists, weapons and victims were all Tanzanian. This illustrates the

complexity of the issue at hand, raising concerns about domestic and criminal law. It also

combines aspects of the political, international and domestic domains. Richardson (2006) cited in

Karlsonn (2015) offers that terrorism varies in ideology, in its relationship to religion and to the

communities in which it has a hold. What started out domestically, with groups acting out in

their local areas turns out to be a global conflict which unfortunately, inspires and draws local

groups into it.

pg. 126

4.2.3 A Working Definition of Terrorism

There is generally no universally accepted definition of terrorism as there have been difficulties

agreeing on what actions and/or intentions actually characterize the phenomenon. Fiseha (2016)

reports that there are more than 200 definitions of terrorism with at least 90 of them being used

by governments and other institutions. Busher (2014) states that despite there being a myriad

arguments about definitions of terrorism, the African context would be interesting to examine in

view of empirical evidence and conceptual issues, which would yield further definitions of the

phenomenon. There is a clear lack of the examination of phenomena like ‗state terrorism‘ and the

reasons behind labelling certain groups as terrorist and not others. With this in mind, it is

necessary to explore a variety of definitions for the phenomenon of terrorism from different

sources.

Krahe (1996) defines terrorism as any act of violence aimed at making an impact on the power

holders within a particular country. The Institute for Economics and Peace defines terrorism as

"the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,

economic, religious or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation" (Vicencio, Clarke, &

Humphrey, 2016). The United Nations describes terrorism as: ‗Criminal acts intended or

calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public‘ (United Nations Development

Program, 2017).

A synthesis of the three definitions brings to the fore the use of violence and force with the aim

of causing harm to the public by a non-state actor target in need of making a statement to the

‗world‘ and to the authorities involved in particular. Certain tactics used by terrorists have been

outlawed by states and therefore have a bearing on its definition. These include hijacking of

aeroplanes and ships, attacks on ships and ports, targeting of diplomatic personnel, hostage-

pg. 127

taking, bombings, financing of terror organisations, handling of dangerous nuclear materials and

indiscriminate attacks on civilians (Ganor, 2005 as cited in Kamya, 2018).

According to Kamya (ibid), the Kenya Prevention of Terrorism Act offers no clear definition of

terrorism but rather only lists acts that may constitute the vice. It states that a terrorist act is any

act or threat of action involving violence against others, the use of firearms and explosives,

dangerous, hazardous, toxic or radioactive substances; or other acts that may amount to

intimidation of the government or destabilisation of the country. It also stipulates the penalties to

be enforced on those found guilty of terrorism-related activities along with the boundaries

governing the investigation of terrorist acts (Biegon & Songa, 2018). It defines a terrorist group

as any entity whose purposes or activities are aimed at committing or facilitating any act that

constitutes terror (Kamya, ibid).

Acts of terrorism researched for purposes of this dissertation were those defined by ordinary

Kenyans as hostile attacks by especially the Somalia based al Shabaab, who had claimed

responsibility for them. Other forms of excesses that could fit the definition of terrorism by the

state, organisations or other non-state actors were not taken into consideration. Consequently, all

reference to terrorism in this study was guided by the government‘s framework.

4.3 GLOBAL TERRORISM

Terrorism can take place locally, regionally or internationally across continents leading to the

internationalisation of terrorism. Globalization of terrorism is the spread of terror acts beyond

certain borders designed to harm a third party such as another nation or state. The primary goal is

never to injure the country where the terrorist attack takes place (Shinn, 2003). However, the

pg. 128

third party is usually a close ally to the country suffering the terrorist acts. For example, a terror

attack staged in Africa south of the Sahara may be aimed at harming the United States, Egypt, or

Israel as happened during the simultaneous bomb attacks on the US embassies in Nairobi, Kenya

and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania on 7th

August, 1998.

Acts of terrorism in the global north have taken various forms and have been witnessed in

France, Germany, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the USA (Obaidi et al, 2018) and

Australia. However, the spread of terrorism has been skewed with certain regions of the world

bearing the brunt of attacks. According to the Global Terrorism Database (Institute for

Economics & Peace, 2017) by the University of Maryland, nine in every ten terror attacks

happened in Asia, Middle East and North Africa (MENA) or Africa south of the Sahara. Ritchie

et al (2020) adds that 95% of the 26,445 terrorism-related deaths in the world in 2017 occurred in

the Middle East, Africa or South Asia. Majority of countries in these regions also constitute the

global south. In the same period, terror-related deaths in Europe, the Americas and Oceania were

comparatively low at less than 2%.

Africa and the Middle East were fertile grounds for terrorist groups (National Academy of

Sciences, Engineering & Medicine, 2019). Moreover, even in these regions, terrorist events and

deaths were concentrated in only a few of the countries which accounted for most victims of

terror in the world (Ritchie, et al, 2020). According to the UNDP (2017), Africa lost some

33,000 people to violent extremism between 2011 and early 2016. Lyman (n.d) asserts that

Africa was no more immune to the threats from terrorism than any other continent. According to

Worcester (n.d), Saudi Arabia was investing millions of dollars in wiping away more tolerant

pg. 129

Sufi mosques dominant in much of Africa and building Salafist mosques. In the table below, the

impact of terrorism by regions of the world is indicated revealing that the Middle East, Asia and

Africa were the most affected by these acts whose economic impact was estimated in billions of

US dollars.

No. Region Economic Impact

of Terrorism

(Billion dollars)

Regional Impact

(Percentage of

Global Total)

1 Sub-Saharan Africa 12.7 37%

2 Middle East and North Africa 11.9 36%

3 South Asia 5.87 18%

4 Asia-Pacific 1.22 4%

5 Europe 0.6 2%

6 South America 0.59 2%

7 North America 0.49 1%

8 Russia and Eurasia 0.23 0.7%

9 Central America and the Caribbean 0.12 0.4% Table 4.1: The global impact of terrorism by regions

The following section presents synopses of the terrorism situation in certain regions of the world.

Although all the regions of the world had experienced terror-related activity, not all of them were

included. Those that are discussed below were identified for information and comparison

purposes or because of their role in the spread of violent extremism in Africa south of the Sahara.

4.3.1 The North American Region

This region is composed of the United States of America and Canada. With the exception of the

death toll arising from the September 11th

bomb attacks, terrorist attacks on the United States of

America are dimmed in comparison with other regions of the world. In the 9/11 attacks alone,

close to 3000 people lost their lives, a figure much higher than all terrorist attacks in the country

pg. 130

over the years since 1970. These events remain the most fatal terrorist attack in the world.

However, there was a rise in terror events in the USA although the resultant deaths were fewer

than 50 annually. This accounted for less than 0.01% of all deaths yearly from 1970 with road

accidents in the USA claiming about 120 lives daily according to Ritchie et al (2020). The

number of terrorist attacks on American soil had also declined in recent years.

According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2019), the year 2018 saw a 32% reduction

in terrorism-related deaths in the USA although the number of incidents increased from 49 to 57

from the previous year. Most of these were committed by far-right extremists while others were

attributed to unknown people and jihadi extremists. The techniques used were shootings with

firearms such as the mass shooting by an anti-Semitic extremist at a synagogue in Pittsburgh,

Pennsylvania in which 11 people died and 7 were injured. Terrorists in the region also carried

out arson or incendiary attacks which thankfully had not led to any fatalities. Canada recorded an

increase in terror activities in 2018 to 10, up from only 6 in 2017. This was caused by an Incel

perpetrator who drove into a crowd of civilians in Toronto. The group is considered the third

deadliest and was responsible for staging 5 attacks in the region since 2002 and leading to 9.5%

of the total fatalities. Since 2002, the USA had experienced 382 attacks and Canada had seen 49

incidences.

4.3.2 The Region of Europe

The Institute for Economics and Peace (2019) reports that Europe as a whole recorded

improvement in 25 of its 36 countries in 2018. It was the second best performing region after

Central America and the Caribbean in terms of reduction in terrorist incidences. There were 62

pg. 131

terror-related deaths with majority occurring in Turkey, the most affected country which

witnessed 95 incidences and 40 deaths. In 2017, there were 119 attacks in which 123 lives were

lost. Other countries that witnessed terror attacks were Montenegro, Lithuania, Netherlands, Italy

and Denmark. Terrorists here carried out shootings; and suicide and petrol bombings. Some of

the incidents in England openly targeted Jews, Muslims or Sikhs while one of the attacks in

Montenegro targeted the US Embassy in the capital, Podgorica. Although some attackers were

unknown, others were identified as unaffiliated persons, the PKK (what is believed to be the

Kurdistan Workers‘ Party), Muslim extremists, anarchists, anti-fascist activists and anti-Semitic

extremists.

The United Kingdom continued to witness attacks staged in Northern Ireland where terror

activities were related to the conflict between republicans and unionists. There were a total of 95

terror attacks in 2018 but only 2 deaths, with 80 of the attacks and the 2 deaths occurring in

Northern Ireland (Institute for Economics & Peace, ibid). According to Ritchie et al (2020), the

United Kingdom [also] topped the list of terrorism-related deaths in Western Europe in much of

the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, thanks to the long-standing conflict in Northern Ireland. The region

accounted for 70% to 80% deaths from terrorism globally although this changed at the turn of the

century. For instance, in 2017, only 0.3% of deaths from terrorism occurred there.

Between the year 2000 and 2017, there were just fewer than 1000 terrorism-related deaths in

Western Europe, a figure that equals two to three years‘ death toll in the 1970s. In an average

year, terrorism killed less than fifty people in this region while road accidents claimed seventy

lives daily. However, Ritchie et al (ibid) state that year to year changes had been volatile with

pg. 132

headline-grabbing attacks happening occasionally. These had included the Madrid train

bombings of 2004, the London bombings in 2005, the 2011 Norway attacks, the 2015 Paris and

Nice attacks, the 2015 Berlin Christmas market attack and the 2017 Manchester and Barcelona

attacks. Terrorist deaths in Western Europe dimmed in the global context. However, an

examination of the group responsible for protracted terror activities in the region, the Irish

Republican Army would be informative.

4.3.2.1 The Provisional Irish Republican Army

Staging arguably the longest-standing conflict in modern Europe, the Irish Republican Army was

established in 1919 (Faith, 2019) with the aim of wresting control of Northern Ireland from

British rule (Wikipedia). Its initial founders can be traced to the 1840s (Bell, 1987 as cited in

Faith, 2019). On 28th

December, 1969, the faction that later came to be known as the

Provisionals split in favour of more violent means of achieving their aim. They were more

concerned with protecting the Catholic minority from diehard loyalists and the protestant-

majority British police force. The other faction, the officials, preferred peaceful means of

seeking independence from the British (Faith, 2019). They staged protests that could pass for

terrorism in Ireland and parts of England for close to 30 years (Wikipedia), a period that came to

be known as the ‗Troubles‘. It dominated the 1970s and 1980s, recording hundreds of deaths

from terrorism annually with certain years witnessing more than 400 deaths (Ritchie et al, 2020).

The IRA emulated the ideology of the French Revolution. Some of the tactics used by the group

included guerrilla war campaigns, hunger strikes, and bombings. With the British government

resolute on remaining in Ireland, the IRA reorganised itself into smaller cells that were more

pg. 133

difficult to penetrate. What followed were more sustained campaigns named the ‗Long War‘

whose aim was to weaken British occupation. This period was named the ‗terrorist phase‘ of the

IRA who escalated the conflict with weapons imported from Libya (Wikipedia). On 30th

January,

1972, British paratroopers killed 13 Catholic demonstrators, wounding 15 others in Derry,

accusing them falsely of carrying guns and bombs. This event led to hundreds of people joining

the IRA with the day earning the name Bloody Sunday. One extraordinary tactic used by the IRA

was a 1981 months-long hunger strike lasting from March to October that left 10 IRA members

dead and led to several riots in Belfast. Months of secret talks culminated in an agreement on 31st

August, 1994 when the IRA announced ceasefire and complete cessation of military operations.

Their activities accounted for close to 1,800 deaths, nearly 600 of which were civilian (Faith,

2019).

4.3.3 The Middle East and North Africa

The Middle East is the region of Asia next to Africa which is often classified with the countries

of North Africa that form the Maghreb composed of Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and

Egypt (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2018). The latter were often taken for granted in matters

concerning terrorism. However, the African Maghreb was home to more Arabs than the Middle

East (Africa-America Institute, 2006) to which it was geographically proximate. It had suffered

its own share of terror impact with Libya and Egypt often ranking highly after Nigeria and

Somalia on the Global Terrorism Index.

The presence of the Islamic al Qaeda in the region was a cause for concern as they continued to

be a menace spreading into the Sahel region. They are said to have formed two administrative

pg. 134

units via south-western Algeria into Mauritania and northern Mali; and north-eastern Mali,

northern Niger and western Chad (Boserup & Martinez, 2018). Since 2002, the MENA region

had accounted for 42% of terrorism-related deaths globally. In 2018, there was a remarkable

drop with just 15% of global deaths happening in the region. This was attributed to the defeat of

ISIL in Iraq. Nevertheless, this improvement was neutralised by the deterioration observed in the

rise in terrorist group and ISIL activities in Syria and Morocco. The latter experienced its first

terror attack since 2015 in which ISIL-affiliated jihadi extremists killed two tourists, signalling

the presence of ISIL in the country. According to the Institute for Economics and Peace (2019),

although attacks were fewer in this region, fatalities increased. Other countries that witnessed

terror attacks were Lebanon and Bahrain (Institute for Economics & Peace, ibid).

4.3.4 Terrorism in the South of the Sahara

Africa south of the Sahara had seen terror incidences rise to high proportions both in frequency

of occurrence and seriousness of attacks. A number of countries in this region had witnessed acts

of terrorism right from the western coast of Dakar to Mogadishu in the east. Central and

Southern Africa had not been spared either. The rise in terrorist activities in this region could be

attributed to a number of cross-cutting factors which were enumerated by the Africa-America

Institute (2006). Some of these were a presence of ―root causes‖ or ―context‖ for terrorism, poor

or weak governance and institution-building and a lack of proper development. There were high

levels of vulnerability stemming from economic displacement, issues of conflict resolution, with

conflict itself being a major driving force for much terrorist activity.

pg. 135

Worcester (n.d) and Lyman (n.d) also agree that certain conditions in sub-Saharan Africa were

conducive for the thriving of the growing Islamic terrorist threat. These were as follows.

i) The expansion of Islamic networks in East and Southern Africa.

ii) The strong presence of radical Islamic groups in Somalia.

iii) The growing presence of Iranian-backed groups tied to Hezbollah, at times

cooperating with al Qaeda in West Africa.

iv) A combination of relatively weak states.

v) Ethnic and religious diversity (and conflict thereof).

vi) Discrimination, poverty and some ―ungoverned spaces‖.

It is important to note however that the masterminds of terrorist organizations are rarely poor

themselves (Africa-America Institute, 2016). For example, several members of Boko Haram18

came from wealthy and influential backgrounds (Karlsonn, 2015).

The al Qaeda had expressed their interest in expanding to sub-Saharan Africa due to the general

weakness of central governments and high levels of corruption, making it easier to operate there

than in other parts of the world where governance structures were more efficient (Worcester,

n.d). It is no wonder then that as early as 2008; he predicted that the region south of the Sahara

would feel the ripple effects of the militant form of Islam being imported from the Middle East

in place of the more tolerant one that was widely practiced on the continent. To make matters

worse, groups tied to Lebanon and Hezbollah were expanding their economic reach to Africa

with an estimated $200m collected yearly from the Lebanese Diaspora in Africa to sponsor it.

18 Terrorist organisation in the Sahelian region of Nigeria and Burkina Faso.

pg. 136

Worcester‘s prediction had seen the light of day as the UNDP (2017) reported that Africa south

of the Sahara was now reporting the second highest number of deaths from terrorism after the

Middle East and North Africa.

The regions of Africa which were most affected by violent extremism were characterized by

stark levels of unemployment and economic need often well below national averages. Examples

included Nigeria‘s north-eastern region, Kenya‘s north-eastern and coastal counties (UNDP,

ibid) and Burkina Faso‘s northern region (Benedikter & Ouedraogo, 2018). Poverty and social

injustice were also rampant (Shinn, 2003). Terrorism in Africa south of the Sahara had huge

international dimensions according to Busher (2014). These are specified below.

i) The perpetration of attacks often took place outside the countries in which terrorists

were based.

ii) There was a definite targeting of foreign (and specifically European or North

American) citizens (and interests).

iii) The ability of groups like al Shabaab to recruit among diaspora communities

occasioned by the widespread online presence of terrorist groups in this part of

Africa.

iv) International support in the form of huge financial flows that had sustained the

terrorist groups.

v) Processes of international ‗contagion‘ and ‗diffusion‘ which had led to the spread of

violence in the Sahel region.

pg. 137

That sub-Saharan Africa was home to two of the four deadliest terrorist outfits in the world was a

matter of great concern. These were al Shabaab and Boko Haram which together with ISIL and

Taliban were responsible for 10,632 deaths representing 56.5% of total deaths in 2017. The four

were also responsible for 44% of terror-related deaths in the last decade (IEP, 2018). Boko

Haram, renamed ISWA19

after merging with ISIS20

, operated in northern Nigeria, and was one of

the most implacable terrorist organizations in the world. After Osama bin Laden‘s death, ISWA

and al Qaeda became two of the most lethal terrorist organizations.

The latest information from the IEP (2019) shows that only five countries in this region were free

of terrorist activities. These were Angola, Republic of the Congo, Cote d‘Ivoire, Madagascar and

Gabon. Contrariwise, Guinea, Rwanda, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and Ghana experienced

increased activity. Mozambique was particularly hit hard with terrorist activities increasing from

10 in 2017 to 62 in 2018. These were attributed to the Ansar al-Sunna, an Islamist militant group

that was previously operating in Kenya; and now aims to establish an Islamic state in

Mozambique‘s Cabo Delgado province.

In 2018, terrorist activities were more prevalent in Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic Republic of the

Congo (DRC), Mali, and Central African Republic (CAR). These countries had also experienced

armed conflict and political instability in the past decade. In Mali, five terror organisations and

three extremist groups were active with Islamist extremism and ethnic conflict topping their

19 Islamic State in West Africa, also known as Islamic State‘s West African Province.

20 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.

pg. 138

narratives. One of them was the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (IEP, ibid). The worst-hit

was Nigeria which had maintained third position on the Global Terrorism Index for several years

in a row. Despite the decrease in Boko Haram‘s activities, the rise in Fulani extremism involving

terror tactics had seen the country remain in the red. Other active violent extremist groups in sub-

Saharan Africa were the al Shabaab in Somalia, the Lord‘s Resistance Army in DRC and

Uganda, and the Allied Democratic Forces.

4.3.4.1 The Sahel Region of Africa

The Sahel is the region of Africa directly below the Sahara Desert where lie Burkina Faso, Mali

and Niger. The common frontiers between the African Maghreb region and the Sahel were a

cause for concern in the fight against terrorism as it was emerging as a hotspot (IEP, 2018). The

region was mostly inhabited by the Fulani people whose livelihood stemmed majorly from

centuries of a nomadic or semi-nomadic lifestyle. The Fulani people numbered almost 20 million

(IEP, 2019) and were found in several West and Central African countries most especially

Nigeria. There was a great likelihood that they could capitalize on grievances of their kinsmen in

Nigeria and recruit susceptible Fulani ethnics using ethno-religious narratives.

The Front de Libération du Macina (FLM) of Mali had aims and modes of operation similar to

those of the al Qaeda in the Maghreb (AQIM). The organization had been linked with 12% of

terror attacks in Mali in 2015 and 2016 which attacks accounted for 10% terror-related deaths in

the two years (IEP, ibid). A stone‘s throw away from Mali is Burkina Faso which had been

living under the threat of terrorism since 2015. Poverty remained a major challenge especially in

the northern region which had been largely left out of economic and social development.

pg. 139

Benedikter & Ouedraogo (2018) envisage that if not addressed adequately, poverty, inequality

and their causal origins in lack of education, could lead to increased ideological and religious

fundamentalism, further escalating the precariousness of the region and the nation at large.

4.3.4.2 The Lake Chad Basin

This region is composed of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, the countries that directly

contain a part of Lake Chad and its wetlands (Wikipedia, 2019) and is home to millions of

Muslim Fulani ethnics. The region had experienced sporadic tensions prompted by economic

reasons and suspicion that had escalated to incidences of violence between the Fulani in Nigeria

who were predominantly Muslim, and farmers, majority of whom were Christian. This had been

aggravated by worsening droughts, unreliable rainfall and land degeneration that caused

numerous deaths. Despite marked government interventions, the Global Terrorism Database

revealed the increasing use of terrorism tactics by Fulani extremist elements. However, there was

still no evidence of any organised terrorist group (IEP, 2019).

Of special note however, was the existence of the Islamist group, Boko Haram whose official

name was Jama‟tu Ahlis Sunna Lidda‟awati wal-Jihad. The organisation ranked 4th

worldwide in

lethality in 2018 and was the deadliest in sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2011, it had been

responsible for 35,000 combat-related deaths and 18,000 terror-related deaths in the Lake Chad

Basin, mainly in Nigeria where it was based in the Borno State. It had also carried out attacks in

Burkina Faso and Cameroon. That Boko Haram had infiltrated both the government and the

military was unsettling (Karlsonn, 2015).

pg. 140

A unique factor of this organisation was its high proportion of women and children who were

sometimes recruited forcibly and constituting two-thirds of its suicide bombers. This strategy

was based on the premise that women were less likely than men to be searched especially in

countries where the police forces were male-dominated and gender segregation was practiced.

Equally seemingly innocent were children who were rarely suspected. The organisation had

recently split into several factions the largest of which was the ISIL-aligned ISWAP which

controlled the Lake Chad shores and collected taxes in north-east Nigeria. It had largely targeted

the military and government agents (IEP, 2019). The child suicide bombers had detonated at bus

stops and markets where they had succeeded in causing more casualties than their adult

counterparts (IEP, ibid). The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (2019)

adds kidnappings as a method favoured by terrorists in this region.

4.3.4.3 The Horn of Africa Region

Composed of Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Sudan (Shinn, 2003), the Horn of Africa

has been termed Africa‘s bridge to the Middle East (Lyman, n.d). Because of this alone the

region posed concerns on matters terrorism, acting as a conduit for interaction of Islamic culture

across the regions. In any case, all of the countries in this region had either a predominantly

Islamic population or a significant Muslim minority coupled with a number of Islamic non-

governmental organizations. It had been the most conflicted part of Africa during the previous 50

years, outdoing long-standing disputes in Angola, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, and

the Congo (Shinn, 2003). The territory particularly complicated Africa‘s counterterrorism efforts

as it was ripe for terrorism infiltration (Lyman, n.d).

pg. 141

Shinn (2003) describes three levels of terrorist acts that were committed in the Horn region. First

is international terrorism which involved acts perpetrated by organizations based outside the

region. Examples were the assassination of American Ambassador and Deputy Chief of Mission

and a Belgian diplomat in Khartoum by the Palestinian terrorist group Black September in 1973

and the attempted assassination of Egyptian President Hosny Mubarak in Addis Ababa by the

Egyptian terrorist group Gama'at al-Islamiyya in 1995.

The second level involves terrorist acts planned by organizations within the region but aimed at

neighbouring countries. Two examples that fit into this category were the Somalia-based al-

Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) who targeted civilians in Ethiopia in the 1990s and the Sudan-based

Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ) which conducted attacks inside Eritrea killing civilians although the

intended targets may have been military.

The third level of terrorism in the horn consisted of acts instigated by an internal insurgent group

against authority in a single country. The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Oromo

Liberation Front (OLF) that had used terrorist tactics in Uganda and Ethiopia respectively fit into

this category. According to IEP (2019), civil conflict against the LRA by the Allied Democratic

Forces had resulted in 3,077 deaths in northern Uganda.

The AAI (2006) reports that the prevalence of bad relations between states—characterized by the

mindset that ―the enemy of my enemy is my friend‖—was a strong enabling factor for terrorism

in the Horn of Africa. Porous borders were typical of the region, the gravity of which was

described by Shinn (2003) as ―…a border which is nothing more than a line drawn in the sand

and stretching for hundreds of miles.‖ Shinn (ibid) affirms that borders in this region were

pg. 142

porous even by African standards. In addition, Eritrea, Somalia, Kenya and Tanzania had long

and poorly patrolled coasts on the Red Sea or Indian Ocean.

Furthermore, the political failure of Somalia combined with the isolation and withdrawal that

followed created a vacuum that made the country vulnerable to use as a terrorist pedestal (AAI,

2006). Because there lacked apparent state power, radical Islamic organizations took the

initiative to respond to basic needs such as education, small financial credit and other assistance

to the majority of the population who had no alternative. Consequently, they made inroads into

the community where they received widespread support while gaining legitimacy and

occupancy. Moreover, the lawlessness that followed the collapse of the Somali state gave way to

the infiltration of small arms and weapons.

There was a severe shortage of financial resources and trained personnel to counter terrorist

activities in the Horn region yet corruption was prevalent there. Shinn (2003) avers that

corruption combined with low pay for security personnel was a recipe for chaos as officers were

vulnerable to being compromised by terrorist elements in exchange for favours. The external

terrorist organizations operating in the Horn region were all linked to radical Islamic

fundamentalism and they targeted Western, pro-Western, and Israeli interests. The most

threatening external group was al Qaeda. Experience shows that these external terrorist

organizations could function with only a small number of local supporters. Some of them, with

funding from persons or governments in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, wittingly or otherwise

offered cover for terrorists (Shinn, ibid).

pg. 143

Al Shabaab remained a security threat in the region because of its free movement in parts of

Somalia such as Middle and Lower Juba, Hiraan, the capital Mogadishu and Middle Shabelle

from where they could extend attacks into neighbouring countries (ACSRT, 2019). Other groups

in the region were the ISS, al Hijra, al Muhajiroun and Jahba East Africa.

The figure below presents a map of Africa indicating the major Islamist militant and extremist

groups in Africa and their areas of operation.

Figure 4.1: Map of Africa displaying locations of Islamist militants

pg. 144

4.3.4.4 Terrorism in East Africa

In the East African region comprising Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and by extension Rwanda and

Burundi, external terrorist activities were dimmed by the recent rise in al Shabaab operations.

The group was responsible for a number of attacks within this region with Kenya bearing the

brunt of its wrath followed by Uganda and Tanzania. It may well be the case that the al Shabaab

was a clear present and growing danger in the [region] and beyond (Tase, 2013). The three East

African countries of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania were constrained by scarce resources and lack

of skilled personnel. They were therefore soft targets who unfortunately were host to a variety of

Western interests (Shinn, 2003).

Shinn (ibid) mentions two characteristics that increased the vulnerability of both Kenya and

Tanzania to terrorism. These were their easy accessibility via sea and the presence of a small,

radicalized Islamic element that assisted external terrorist groups. A case in point was the Islamic

Party of Kenya which was strong at the Swahili coast. There was also a suspected support

network for terrorists along the coast where people from the Comoros Islands, the Gulf States,

Pakistan and Somalia could easily intermingle with locals. In fact, Nderitu (2015) agrees that the

geographical positioning of East Africa next to the Arabian Peninsula contributed to its highest

vulnerability to terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa.

Persistent corruption among Kenyan immigration officials enabled these individuals to obtain

citizenship and to engage in valid cover-up businesses (Shinn, 2003). A case in point was the al

pg. 145

Qaeda operatives led by Fazul Abdallah Mohammed21

(Bryden, 2003) who were able to

meticulously plan two simultaneous attacks in Mombasa in November of 2002. According to a

draft United Nations report, Fazul assembled a team along the coast, and established a small-

scale lobster fishing business to provide cover for the group‘s activities (UN 2003 as cited in

Rosenau, 2005). It is believed that he made several back and forth trips without hindrance

between Mogadishu and Mombasa during this time as the planning involved secret meetings in

Mogadishu and in Kenya (Rosenau, ibid). They were also able to smuggle weapons from

Somalia into Kenya undetected (Mogire & Agade, 2011 as cited in Bryden, 2003). They kept

standby boats which they used for escaping to Mogadishu after executing the attacks (Rosenau,

2005).

4.4 TERRORISM IN KENYA

Kenya ranked among the top countries in sub-Saharan Africa on the Global Terrorism Index. It

came after Nigeria and Somalia at some point and had remained consistently among the top ten

countries in this region of Africa in terrorism ranking for a number of years (IEP, 2017). The

Global Terrorism Index was published after observation and data collection on four indicators

weighted over a five-year period. These factors were the number of terrorist incidents per year,

the number of fatalities resulting from terror activities per year, the number of injuries caused by

terrorists per year and the total value of property damaged during terror attacks per year. The

score ranged from 0 to 10 whereby a score of 0 meant that there was no terror incident (IEP,

21 An al Qaeda man from the Comoros Island, believed to have masterminded the 1998 Nairobi US Embassy

bombing, the 2002 simultaneous Mombasa attacks and a foiled attack on the newly-built US Embassy in 2003.

pg. 146

2019). There was no cap on the number of fatalities expected as this was not predictable. The

table below shows the top ten sub-Saharan African countries on the 2019 GTI22

and Kenya‘s

trend of remaining in the top ten since 2014.

No. Country GTI Ranking in the region

2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

1 Nigeria 1 1 1 1 1 1

2 Somalia 2 2 2 2 2 2

3 Kenya 3 6 7 9 8 9

4 Democratic Republic of Congo 4 7 5 3 3 3

5 Mali 6 9 9 11 9 4

6 Central African Republic 7 3 8 7 5 5

7 Cameroon 20 8 3 5 6 6

8 South Sudan 5 4 4 4 7

9 Sudan 4 5 6 6 7 8

10 Niger 17 24 4 8 10 10 Table 4.2: Terrorism ranking trend for the top ten African countries in 2019

(SOURCE: Institute for Economics and Peace (2019)

It is notable that the other countries with this trend namely Nigeria, Somalia, Democratic

Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and South Sudan had had protracted civil wars in

the past. Kenya stood out as a country that enjoyed relative peace from the 1970s to the 1990s

while her neighbours were in turmoil. However, it now ranks first on the GTI in East Africa.

22 Four factors important in determining each country score on the index were the number of incidents, the fatalities,

the injuries and the damage to property. The incidents were weighted at 1; fatalities were weighted at 3, injuries at

0.5 and damage to property at 0-3 depending on the severity. The casualties caused by terrorist attacks per year were

then multiplied by the weightings. Next, the effects of trauma from the previous four years were factored in with

decreasing weight on each year as these had lingering effects on the population. The current year had a weight of 16,

contributing 52% of the final score while the previous year had a weight of 8 and contributed 29%. Incidences that

occurred two years in the past were weighted at 4, contributing 13%, those of the past three years were factored at 2,

contributing 6% while four-year-old incidences were factored at 1 and they contributed 3%.

pg. 147

The table below displays Kenya‘s ranking on the latest GTI released in November, 2019

alongside Afghanistan, top in the world, Nigeria which had repeatedly topped Africa among

other selected countries of the world. Somalia was included for its proximity to and importance

in the spread of violent extremism in Kenya. It was home to the al Shabaab militia group which

had claimed responsibility for most terror attacks in the country. In fact, it had become

impossible to talk about terrorism in Kenya without mentioning Somalia and the al Shabaab. The

other countries included were selected from the major regions of the world discussed above and

were considered important for this project as a point of reference for the Kenyan situation. The

table shows period-specific changes in terror-related activities from 2002 to 2018 and from 2017

to 2018.

NO. COUNTRY TERRORISM

INDEX SCORE

GLOBAL

RANK

CHANGE

2002-2018

CHANGE

2017 - 2018

1 Afghanistan 9.603 1 +4.058 +0.212

2 Iraq 9.241 2 +5.535 -0.505

3 Nigeria 8.597 3 +5.089 -0.063

4 Somalia 7.8 6 +4.727 -0.220

5 Egypt 6.794 11 +6.417 -0.551

6 Libya 6.766 12 +6.766 -0.221

7 Kenya 5.756 21 +1.124 -0.358

8 USA 5.691 22 -2.358 -0.375

9 UK 5.405 28 +1.102 -0.205

10 France 5.008 36 +1.269 -0.467 Table 4.3: Kenya's terrorism index ranking globally and continentally

SOURCE: Institute for Economics and Peace (2019)

4.4.1 Major Terrorist Attacks in Kenya

There had been close to 350 terrorist attacks on Kenyan soil since 1975. Of these, about 321 took

place between 2011 and 2019 evidencing the upsurge of violent extremism in the country. In

2016, al Shabaab attacked Kenya 48 times and was suspected in many other incidences. In fact,

pg. 148

during the fieldwork for this project, the terror group attacked Nairobi‘s Dusit D2 Hotel and

caused the death of 21 people (Speckhard & Shajkovci, 2019). Below is a list of the 28 deadliest

attacks that had taken place in Kenya and one in Somalia, involving Kenyan military targets.

No. Date Scene Fatalities

1. 1st March, 1975 OTC Bust stop attack, Nairobi 27

2. 31st December, 1980 The Norfolk Hotel, Nairobi 20

3. 7th

August, 1998 American Embassy, Nairobi 212

4. 22nd

November, 2002 Paradise Hotel, Mombasa 13

5. 15th

August, 2008 Nagwanga, Turkana 71

6. 21st October, 2010 Mandera East, Mandera 30

7. 16th

November, 2011 Dujis, Garissa 12

8. 1st July, 2012 Dujis, Garissa 17

9. 18th

November, 2012 Eastleigh, Nairobi 10

10. 21st September, 2013 Westgate Mall, Nairobi 67

11. 23rd

November, 2013 Mandera East, Mandera 28

12. 2nd

December, 2013 Mandera East, Mandera 38

13. 14th

June, 2014 Mpeketoni, Lamu 57

14. 23rd

June, 2014 Witu, Lamu 11

15. 5th

July, 2014 Hindi, Lamu 21

16. 21st November, 2014 Bula Mpya, Mandera 28

17. 3rd

December, 2012 Mado Gashi, Isiolo 15

18. 1st December, 2014 Bula Mpya, Mandera 36

19. 2nd

April, 2015 Garissa University College 148

20. 7th

July, 2015 Township, Mandera 14

21. 15th

January, 2016 El Adde, Somalia 180

22. 3rd

June, 2016 Liboi, Garissa 10

23. 25th

October, 2016 Mandera East, Mandera 12

24. 16th

July, 2017 Liboi, Dadaab 10

25. 6th

November, 2017 Daba Siti, Mandera 12

26. 13th

August, 2018 El Wak, Mandera 10

27. 21st September, 2018 Witu, Lamu 10

28. 15th

January, 2019 DusitD2 Hotel, Nairobi 21 Table 4.4: 28 deadliest terror attacks against Kenya

Source: The Elephant Data (Atellah, 2019)

pg. 149

4.4.2 Underlying Factors Linked to Terrorism in Kenya

A review of literature brings to the fore a myriad causal factors for the spread of violent

extremism. Different groups and individuals joined terrorist organizations and perpetrated acts of

terror for varied reasons. As the AAI (2006) has pointed out, terrorism had many aspects in the

international and domestic spheres, having legal and criminal aspects; and military and political

features. No study can show concretely what the causes of terrorism were and a conclusive

agreement in this direction is often difficult to arrive at. However, it is possible to identify

conditions favourable to the spread of terrorism (AAI, ibid). Karlsonn (2015) proffers four

factors that give rise to terrorism as psychological, political, economic, and religious. On its part,

the Institute for Economics and Peace (Vicencio et al, 2016) gives the causes of terrorism as

follows.

i) Lack of intergroup unity, mounting group grievances and large social hostilities

between groups whether ethnic, religious or linguistic.

ii) State-sponsored violence, extrajudicial killings, political terror and blatant abuses of

human rights.

iii) High levels of other forms of violence such as organized conflict, probability of

violent demonstrations, violent crime and perception of criminality.

A study by Vicencio et al (ibid) revealed that certain factors existing in Kenya did indeed play a

role in creating conditions in which the al Shabaab agenda thrived. These factors also facilitated

the crafting of effective propaganda narratives that appealed to disenfranchised populations. One

such issue was the difficulty that Kenyan Somali-Muslims faced in obtaining official

documentation like identity cards and passports. In the absence of such documentation, a simple

pg. 150

job application could not go through; and this resulted in their disenchantment towards

government.

Certain voices cited poverty, inefficient borders, incompetent law enforcement, failed

governments and rising disillusionment among young Islamists and a few non-Muslims as

reasons for escalating cases of terrorism in the country. For instance, Brislen (2015) alluded to

structural alienation of the Muslim population in Kenya as a model being used by terrorists to

justify their cause. Other reasons that had been mentioned included poor governance that led

young people to cross over into the world of crime. A case in point is mentioned in a news

report by Chimbi (2017) where a mother explained that her son decided to join the al Shabaab

after making ten unsuccessful attempts at joining the Kenya Police Service. She said that he

could not afford the bribes demanded at the recruitment stage. Stories abounded of young people

insinuating that joining the terror group was a welcome alternative after they failed to meet the

demands of recruitment into the Kenyan Defence Forces. They had reasoned that they would still

be doing the job they wanted, and getting paid anyway, with equal risk of getting killed. Since

the KDF were involved in fighting al Shabaab in Somalia, they would only be fighting on the

opposite side.

Certain characteristics continued to provide a vacuum for the spread of terrorism in the country.

For instance, the US government lamented about weaknesses that characterised its development

partners of whom Kenya was one. These included insufficient sharing of information about

known and suspected terrorists, the use of fraudulent travel documents and corruption and lack

of security in passport issuance among other issues (US Government, 2011). Other security

challenges in the country were as a result of both internal and international factors, poverty,

pg. 151

unemployment, food insecurity, cross-border conflict and instability in neighbouring countries

(Ombati, 2013).

4.5 THE AL SHABAAB TERRORIST ORGANISATION

The Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Mwangi, 2012) or simply al Shabaab, which is Arabic

for ―the youth‖ (Agbiboa, 2014, BBC News, 2017) was founded in 2004. It was long considered

a terrorist organization by many countries, including Australia, Canada, Norway, Sweden and the

UK (Tase, 2013). It gained prominence around 2006 (Mwangi, 2012) and was officially declared

a terrorist organisation by the U.S. Government on 29th

February, 2008 (Tase, 2013, Mwangi,

2012). The group is banned by both the US and the UK and is believed to have between 7,000

and 9,000 fighters (BBC, 2017) although Tase (2013) puts its membership at 14,500. Classified

as an Islamic insurgent group alongside Boko Haram and al Qaeda (Fiseha, 2016), al Shabaab

enjoys wide support. It is considered a prospective means of achieving long-term elusive peace

for Somalia, along with the hope that the organisation will finally root out tribalism and

perceived foreign influence tolerated by the UN-backed Somali government (Sipus, 2010).

According to Tase (2013), al Shabaab is one of the splinter extremist organizations that came

into being after the breakdown of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) that was occasioned by the

intervention of Ethiopian forces between 2006 and 2009. An Islamist militant group, the al

Shabaab was battling the UN-backed government in Somalia. It had emerged in 2006 as a radical

youth wing of Somalia's now-defunct Union of Islamic Courts that had controlled Mogadishu

(BBC News, 2017). At its founding, one of the ICU leaders, Hassan Dahir Aweys appointed al

Shabaab‘s first leader, Aden Hashi Farah ―Ayro‖. When ―Ayro‖ died, Sheikh Mukhtar Robow

pg. 152

aka Abu Mansur assumed leadership and he was later succeeded by Moktar Ali Zubeyr

―Godane‖ who controlled food reserves during the 2010-2011 drought in Somalia. The

organization had undergone a lot of challenges and changes due to severe drought and the

assassination of its top leadership. Its chief at the time of this project was Ibrahim Haji Jama

Mee‘aad, aka Ibrahim ―al-Afghani‖. All al Shabaab leaders praised Osama bin Laden (Tase,

2013) and officially announced integration into the al Qaeda network in 2008 (Busher, 2014).

However, it was not until 9th

February, 2012 that the two groups formally joined ranks (Mwangi,

2012).

4.5.1 Ideology and Structure

According to Agbiboa (2014) al Shabaab had deep ties with al Qaeda whose global campaign

was jihadist with an ideological, religious and political agenda. Al Qaeda‘s goals which were

Muslim enforcing were two-pronged.

i) To unify the Islamic world under Sunni Islam.

ii) To liberate Muslim territories from foreign occupation…use of holy war to bind

Muslims together…[and to] rid the Muslim world of non-Muslim cultural and

political influence, (Piazza, 2009 as cited in Agbiboa, ibid).

Tase (2013) describes the al Shabaab group as a much decentralized organization in terms of the

establishment of its agenda and goals, with members from a number of distinct clans. This made

it highly susceptible to clan politics, internal wrangles and shifting alliances. Mwangi (2012)

writes that the organisation was structured in a three-layered pyramidal composition that

consisted of the Qiyadah or the top leadership, the Muhaajiruun or foreign fighters and Somalis

with foreign passports; and the Ansar or local Somali fighters.

pg. 153

4.5.2 Expansion and Support

Tase (2013) affirms that the hostilities of al Shabaab towards foreign assistance organizations

working in the country forced the latter to call it a day and exit Somalia unceremoniously. This

worked to the advantage of the militant organisation which moved fast to spread its influence.

They took complete control of the central and southern regions of the country including some sea

ports that were vital for Somalia‘s economy. Mwangi (2012) mentions that different factions of

the group controlled various parts of the country. Though the group had been pushed out of most

of the main towns it once controlled, it remained a potent threat to Somalia and Eastern Africa

where it had carried out a string of attacks (BBC News [2017]; Tase [2013]).

The group also assumed the role of liberating the country from what it termed as ‗occupying

forces‘. Besides, in the absence of basic goods and services from a functional state government,

the group took up this responsibility (Mwangi, 2012), further legitimizing its operations and

gaining local support. It also ran preparation camps for specialized training such as suicide

bombings (Mwangi, ibid). Its sources of funding ranged from the Somali Diaspora (Tase, 2013)

to local revenue levied at airports and seaports, taxes on goods, services, domestic produce,

checkpoints and ‗jihad contributions‘. Other forms of extortion were presented as a religious

obligation or zakat23

to international sources in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf States (Mwangi,

2012).

23 This is a form of giving in Islamic religious practice that is highly regarded and placed second only to prayer.

pg. 154

Al Shabaab leaders continuously called upon their fighters, who were known to apply guerrilla

asymmetric warfare to fight against the African Union troops based in Mogadishu and

throughout Somalia. They had also succeeded in convincing Somalis abroad to return and fight

in their ranks of jihad. Two well-known indoctrination cases in point are the ―Minneapolis 8‖

and the ―Toronto 6‖ which were successful in converting several youths of Somali-American

origin into fighters. Minneapolis 8 was also involved in planning an attack during President

Obama‘s inauguration ceremony (Tase, 2013). The BBC (2017) confirms that there were

numerous reports of foreign jihadists going to Somalia to help al Shabaab from neighbouring

countries, as well as the USA and Europe.

4.5.3 Recruitment Strategies and Propaganda Dissemination

Like other aspects of the group‘s operations, al Shabaab‘s recruitment strategies had evolved

over time (Vicencio et al, 2016). Mwangi (2012) indicates that prior to 2007, the movement used

to produce rudimentary online statements but that this had changed with time. Al Shabaab had a

media wing, the al-Kataib Foundation for Media Productions which did more professional work

producing edited lengthy movies that glorified martyrdom and pointed toward future attacks.

These videos were distributed with the help of the more effective technical expertise of al

Qaeda‘s Global Islamic Media Foundation. The organization was able to achieve three major

goals while disseminating its propaganda via Internet.

i) The organisation was able to express their distrust of other media outlets in

Western and certain Muslim countries.

pg. 155

ii) Al Shabaab used the media to boast the movement‘s sophistication as compared

to other factions in Somalia which still lacked in the area of communication

technology.

iii) Through these media, the terror organisation was able to communicate with the

Somali Diaspora and the global jihadi movement.

The organisation also used the internet to communicate with the public and to terrorise the public

during attacks such as happened during the Westgate Mall siege. That al Shabaab had numerous

radio stations confirmed the seriousness and sophistication with which the organisation was

conducting its business. These were Quran Karim Radio FM, Somali Wayen Radio FM, Horn

Afrik Radio and Radio al-Andalus. These stations were used to spread al Shabaab‘s jihadist

rhetoric and to portray the movement as a provider of basic economic and political goods and

services, hence capable of governing Somalia effectively (Mwangi, ibid).

Apart from that, there was a strong belief that refugee camps in the northern region of Kenya

acted as points of transit for illegal arms smuggling and terrorist recruitment (Thurarina, 2017).

The Garissa University attack (Cannon, 2016) and the Westgate attack are believed to have been

planned there (Mazou, 2017). One of the Westgate Mall attack suspects was a refugee from the

Kakuma camp while another may have made a call to someone in Dadaab camp (Sude et al,

2015 as cited in Schmid, 2016). This may have prompted the government‘s announcement of

plans to close down Dadaab although this was met with international resistance.

pg. 156

Al Shabaab militants had posed as refugees and had been admitted into the Dadaab camps from

where they planned and executed a number of land mine and grenade attacks, threatening the

security of the north-eastern province and Kenya in general. Reports indicated that armed gangs

easily sneaked into the camps undetected and it was often difficult to distinguish genuine

refugees from militants. Furthermore, differentiating between Kenyan Somalis and Somali

Somalis remained a challenge (Kiswii, 2013). Terrorist recruitment was also believed to be rife

in the north-eastern borderlands (Hellsten, 2016). For example, the al-Haramain Islamic

Foundation and al –Itihaad were involved in humanitarian work in Somali refugee camps where

they established links with the refugees. They smuggled dangerous weapons into Kenya and it

was later discovered that they had links with al Qaeda (Loechsher & Milner, 2008 as cited in

Kiswii, 2013).

Al Shabaab had issued threats to the Kenya government around the Dadaab region. They had

executed deadly attacks in Kenya accusing the government of meddling in Somalia‘s affairs.

They are said to have even imposed sharia law in the north-eastern region of the country (Daily

Nation, 2011 as cited in Kiswii, 2013). The continued influx of refugees from Somalia did not

help matters as the extremist militias were likely to pose as innocent civilians with a

displacement problem (Daily Nation, 2010 as cited in Kiswii, ibid).

4.5.4 Lethalness of Attacks

In 2017, al Shabaab overtook Boko Haram as the deadliest terror organisation in sub-Saharan

Africa since 2010 while the deaths it caused in Kenya increased by 100 from the previous year.

This was a result of terror attacks launched in Lamu, Garissa and Mandera counties half of which

pg. 157

took place in Lamu. The terror group was also responsible for 256 deaths in 2014. They had

capitalised on the instability of the Somali state and its political and security machinery to mount

deadly attacks. In 2017, the organisation mounted two of the twenty largest terror attacks in the

world and managed to carry out seventeen attacks that resulted into ten or more deaths. The

deadliness of al Shabaab was evidenced by the lethality of its bomb and explosive attacks which

ranked highest among the four most dangerous terrorist outfits that year. Their main targets had

been government and business agencies, private citizens, and a suicide bombing that claimed 588

lives. The latter took place in Mogadishu and went into the record as the deadliest attack of the

year 2017 globally (IEP, 2018). Nearly all terrorist attacks in Kenya in the recent past had been

claimed by the Somali-based militia group (Agbiboa, 2014). They had targeted schools, a

university, churches, Christian crusades, police stations, refugee camps, and bus stations, moving

vehicles, hotels, nightclubs and a shopping mall (Wafula, 2014).

4.5.5 Presence of al Shabaab in Kenya

According to Mwangi (2012), Kenya was a primary target for al Shabaab rhetoric for a number

of reasons. Some of these include Kenya‘s political and military support for the Transitional

Federal Government of Somalia and for the US-backed counterterrorism efforts in the region.

Sipus (2010) states that al Shabaab had a strong presence in the Eastleigh Area, a thriving

economic hub in the suburbs of Nairobi‘s Central Business District mostly inhabited by Somali

refugees. ―Small Mogadishu‖ as it was sometimes called was a major hub for Somali informal

trade with its inadequate infrastructure and high crime rates (Lindley & Haslie, 2014). It was also

believed to be a violent extremism hotspot, along with the Kenyan coastal region (Khalil &

Zeuthen, 2014).

pg. 158

The lawlessness in Somalia enabled the duty-free importation of goods constituting majorly

electronics and clothes, making the goods cheap and popular in the Kenyan market. This money

was then shipped back to Somalia to finance the organisation (Thuranira, 2017). This was a well-

known fact in Eastleigh circles where majority of businesses were believed to be owned by al

Shabaab operatives or their affiliates. Many of the shops sold propaganda videos produced

locally. This helped to advertise the Shabaab agenda and to provide revenue to local businesses

while reinforcing the organisation‘s position within the community. The extremist group was

also involved in sponsoring the construction and operation of mosques around the area,

endearing them to religious clerics whose messages to the Ummah24

they manipulated.

Furthermore, school programs that promoted Shabaab messages in the curriculum received

financial or material support with some going as far as providing students with school uniforms

modelled on the al Shabaab theme. Lack of opportunity, poverty and indoctrination made young

men in Eastleigh [and by extension other Kenyan regions] vulnerable to joining the militant

group (Sipus, 2010). No wonder a Kenyan minister once likened the predominant Somali

community in Eastleigh to an al Shabaab enclave equating the extremist organisation to a snake

that had its tail in Somalia and its head in Eastleigh (NPR, 2011 as cited in Odero, 2015).

The organisation had support from the Islamist fundamentalist group, al Hijra, which was born

out of the Muslim Youth Centre (Aronson, ibid) in Nairobi. It had been linked to a number of

terror events in Kenya such as the Westgate Mall attack that claimed 67 lives and left hundreds

24 Members of the Muslim Community.

pg. 159

of people with injuries. It had been established that al Shabaab received financial and operational

support from al Qaeda in Pakistan for this attack in the form of foreign fighters from Africa, the

Middle East, Europe and even USA (Aronson, ibid).

4.6 RELIGION-BASED TERRORISM IN KENYA

The following extract from El-Mesawi and Khriji (2006) probably summarizes the whole

essence of this research and particularly this section on religion-based terrorism.

After the collapse of the Berlin wall and the end of the Cold War, there emerged a spirited campaign to paint

the Muslim as the terrorist, the emerging threat to civilization and the collective worth of democracy and

freedom. A campaign that was carried by powerful TV cables like CNN, intelligence analysts and ―experts

on Muslim affairs.‖ Western news media, many governments, academic and corporate experts present Islam

as a dangerous religion that is inherently violent and Muslim culture intrinsically prone to

violence…Muslims have problems living with their neighbours.

A large part of American and European society believed that Islam played a big part in the

problem of terrorism and that it was a violent religion. This led to a certain amount of

Islamophobia which was evident in public conversations (Karlsonn, 2015). Unfortunately, many

misinterpreted Jihad and believed that the whole of Islam supported acts of terrorism

(Juergensmeyer, [2006] as cited in Karlsonn [ibid]). Rosdiawan (2014) adds that conventional

media tended to use aggression-related labels such as violence, threats, extremism, fanaticism

and terrorism when referring to Muslims. Furthermore, the use of constructed concepts after the

events of September 11, 2001 tended to advance the stereotype of the Muslim as a terrorist

(Karlsonn [2015] & Rosdiawan [ibid]) lending credence to religion-based terrorism. These

included concepts such as ‗Islamic world‘, ‗the West‘, ‗the rise of Islam‘, ‗political Islam‘,

‗Islamism‘, ‗extremism‘, ‗radicalism‘, ‗fundamentalism‘, ‗religious terrorism‘, ‗Jihad‘,

‗Wahhabi‘, ‗Salafi‘, ‗militant‘, ‗moderate‘, ‗global Jihad movement‘, ‗al Qaeda‘, and ‗Islamic

terrorism‘.

pg. 160

Wandusim (2015) notes that there was a rise of extremist groups under the umbrella of Islam in

the Middle East, Asia, and Africa unleashing atrocities on humanity all in the name of Islam and

‗Jihad‘ (holy war). Some of these extremist groups included ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and

Syria), al Qaeda, Taliban, Boko Haram (now Islamic State in West African Province) and al

Shabaab, etc. The atrocities had included the killing or ‗slaughtering‘ of Christians and non-

Muslims by ISIS in Libya, Syria, Iraq etc.; the merciless gunning of 147 Kenyan Christian

students early in 2015 by al Shabaab militants, and other atrocities in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan,

Pakistan, Nigeria, etc., by Islamic extremists. The Daily Nation (2015) reported that religion was

used to provide ideological ground for justifying terror acts and binding members to a common

cause. Some youth had been indoctrinated into believing that they would be rewarded with 72

virgins in ―heaven‖ for committing dastardly acts against unbelievers or ―infidels.‖

Four areas were identified as reinforcing terrorism in Kenya. These were al Shabaab assertions

and the exposure to radical teachings; the targeting of Christians and associated agencies,

terrorism news coverage and social media; and counterterrorism interventions targeting Muslims.

4.6.1 Muslim Extremism and al Shabaab Assertions

Lyman (n.d) states that terrorist cells in Kenya had taken root in the Muslim community tracing

their origins to the Middle East. Wahhabi Islam at the coast of Kenya could be tracked to the

1980s with the return of Muslim students who had attended religious training in Saudi Arabia

where they had become radicalized. The returnees would influence the youth to antagonize the

local imams‘ ideology. The Middle East also sponsored imams and scholars from Saudi Arabia

and other Middle Eastern countries in a ‗takeover‘ strategy that recruited regular visitors at local

pg. 161

mosques and smaller religious groups. The recruits would then attend indoctrination lectures

delivered by various Salafist scholars (Botha, 2014). A typical example of these returnees was

Khalid Balala25

, a Kenyan born into a family with roots in Yemen. In addition, reports of

respected Muslim clerics promoting extremist messages had been documented. For example,

Aboud Rogo was accused of preaching such messages and inciting youth to fight to defend Islam

in Somalia (Vicencio et al, 2016).

The UNDP (2017) reports that perspectives on violent extremism were frequently conflated with

negative perceptions about Islam itself, often expressed through a commonly accepted

perspective on madrassa26

-based radicalization. This is confirmed by Omwega, Role & Ndiku,

2016) who reveal that the contents of madrassa and mosque school curriculums were a major

contributor to extremist ideology and an incubator for terrorism. These were believed to have

given rise to violent radicals and aggressive militants like the Afghan Taliban (Hogan &

Braddlock, 2012 as cited in Omwega et al, ibid).

The assertions of the al Shabaab reinforced perceptions that linked Islam to terrorism. Al

Shabaab described itself as an organisation waging Jihad against the enemies of Islam (Tase,

2013). The organization advocated the Saudi-inspired Wahhabi version of Islam, while most

Somalis were Sufis. It had imposed a strict version of Sharia law in areas under its control,

including stoning to death women accused of adultery and amputating the hands of those found

25 A charismatic Kenyan sheikh, who went on a pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia, studied at Medina University and

visited a number of Far East and European countries. He also studied in England and in India. He came back

radicalized and joined the Islamic Party of Kenya in which he led demonstrations against the government. He helped

the party become much more radicalised with financial backing from Iran, Sudan and other Islamic extremist

organisations (Oded, 1996). 26

The religious instruction given to children under the leadership of an Islamic teacher or leader.

pg. 162

guilty of theft (BBC, 2017). Although it described itself as a Salafist movement, many scholars

and its detractors labelled it Wahhabist due to the extreme Islamism that it advocated. One of its

core goals was to create an Islamic State of the Somalis in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and

Ethiopia (Mwangi, 2012).

Furthermore, al Shabaab spokesmen had often expressed intolerance for non-Muslims in their

narratives. For instance, after an attack at Mpeketoni they gave three justifications. First, that it

was retaliation for Kenyan government oppression of Muslims. Second, it was a resistance

against the Kenya Defence Forces‘ invasion, occupation and massacre of the innocent in Muslim

lands [read Somalia]. Third, that Mpeketoni and the larger Lamu town originally belonged to

Muslims but that it was invaded and taken over by Christian settlers (Abdullahi Boru Halakhe,

2014 as cited in Anderson, 2014).

4.6.2 Targeting of Christians and Pro-Christian Agencies

The religious kick to the violent extremist messages and terrorist attacks in Kenya was glaring.

Christians had been the direct object of the use of derogatory terms and attacks by terrorists.

According to Wesonga (2017), frequent attacks by terrorists on Christian establishments had

given rise to Islamophobia and hatred. Furthermore, numerous attacks had targeted worshippers

in churches while in other places Christians had been singled out and massacred. The June 2014

raids in Mpeketoni were an overt demonstration of this targeting. During the Garissa University

dawn siege where at least 148 people died, the terrorists are said to have separated Christians and

Muslims and gone ahead to kill all the Christians. The use of such phrases as ―operation against

infidels‖ bolstered the religious agenda to terrorist activities in Kenya. In fact, Brislen (2013)

claims that Islam was a ―threat to the Christian identity…‖ and found resurgent Islam to be at

pg. 163

fault for interreligious violence in Nigeria and certain incidents in Kenya. This pitted the two

groups against each other.

According to Wesonga (2017), for the lay Christian in Kenya, it became hard to distinguish

between ‗terrorism‘ and Islam. The attack on Bishaaro hotel in Mandera, Northern Eastern

region of Kenya, in which over 12 people were killed, contributed to an impression that Islam

was fighting Christianity. According to a survivor, the attackers were shouting „Allah Akbar,

Allah Akbar‟. Furthermore, Rosdiawan (2014) describes discourses of terrorism that were more

driven by religious motives or sacred reasons than by considerations of political or ideological

motivations. To make matters worse, some Christian televangelists had argued that the Prophet

Mohammed himself was a kind of terrorist (Juergensmeyer, [2006] as cited in Karlsonn [2015]).

Another instance where Christians were targeted for terror was in a 31st January, 2016 attack in

Kenya‘s coastal Lamu County, where four people were killed. The al Shabaab claimed

responsibility for the incident and told Al Jazeera Television thus:

‗Our fighters attacked non-believers in the occupied Muslim land of Lamu. Our Mujahideen killed several

non-believers in the attack‘ (World Watch Monitor, 2016 & Wesonga, 2017).

Hellsten (2016) agrees that such terrorist attacks targeting non-Muslims in Kenya had increased

tensions along religious lines.

That Kenya identified itself as a Christian country made the government seem religiously

inclined to Christianity. This was used by terrorists to justify attacks against government

agencies and civil servants. That the Muslim community in Kenya had been discriminated in the

past by governments headed by self-proclaimed Christian executives opened the gap for criticism

pg. 164

to take on a religious tone. Majority of top government officials including all former and sitting

presidents and their deputies had a Christian identity. Therefore the targeting of government

officials and agencies by terrorists may have been perceived as a war against Christianity.

4.6.3 Terrorism News Coverage and Social Media

Local and international media outlets had been accused of a lack of professionalism in terrorism

news reporting that led to exaggeration of facts and the spread of fear, terror and prejudice

between Muslims and Christians in Kenya. Das et al (2009) agree that terrorism news reports

elicited fear and could unintentionally increase prejudice against out-groups and support for

one‘s country and government. Whenever a terrorist attack occurred, the news was broken and

disseminated with speed especially in this present age of advanced information technology.

In addition, terrorism news tended to spread like wildfire through the various media and witness

accounts. Yet, Das and colleagues (ibid) were able to link terror-induced prejudice to stereotype

generalization because of the unconscious fear of death. The resulting prejudice was such that

participants became more terrified after watching the terrorism news. Notably, they were able to

demonstrate that this prejudice was not only directed towards the perceived group of the

perpetrators but also against other out-groups, regardless of their link to the news content.

Specifically, apart from the increase in prejudice against Arabs (due to the negative image

created), they observed an increase in prejudice against Europeans among Muslim participants.

This suggested that terror-related news potentially increased prejudice against members of any

out-group because viewers were confronted with their own mortality.

pg. 165

In certain instances, there wasn‘t enough time for the filtration of information before it reached

the public thanks to social media. Moreover, in some cases, the perpetrators themselves had

released terrorism-related material into the public, sometimes with updates on the progress of

attacks as happened during the Westgate siege in Nairobi. These reports could have had the

effect of strengthening the Islam-terrorism link in the language of use or the reporting of the

accounts. Furthermore, discrimination could have taken place on social media platforms which

were widely used by Kenyans to react to terror. Wesonga (2017) confirms that in the aftermath

of any terror attack, Islamophobic messages were circulated over the social media, increasing

levels of prejudice, hatred and discrimination. He claims that this had resulted in the growth of a

new breed of Christian fundamentalism in the country. Social media could have been used to

spread hate messages further aggravating the problem of religion-based terrorism, intergroup

tensions and suspicion. Kaakinen et al (2017) cite Keipi et al (2017), Nasi et al (2015), Tynes

(2006) and Ybarra et al (2006) in asserting that hostile online behaviour could have hurtful

consequences to its victims. This is confirmed by Awan and Zempi (2016) and Douglas (2007)

who agree that hateful or hostile online behaviour could be a threat to social inclusiveness and

that it had the potential of motivating hateful acts offline. That social media was used by the

public in the dissemination of news, clips and graphic materials and pictures did not help

matters.

4.6.4 Counterterrorism Measures targeting Muslims

Another factor that could have contributed to Islam and terrorism narrative is the fact that

Kenya‘s Counter Violent Extremism initiatives had almost exclusively targeted Muslims

(Vicencio et al, 2016). A people‘s government was considered an authority entity and its action

pg. 166

and policies had great implications for the attitudes of the populace. The targeting of Muslims by

state machinery to root out terrorists sent messages to the public that Muslims or Somali =

terrorists. In fact, at one point, the government had decided to close down Dadaab, the largest

refugee camp in the world that had played host to Somali refugees over the decades as a measure

against violent extremism in the country. The addition of other voices of authority and opinion

leaders to this narrative may have had the effect of further linking Islam with terrorism in Kenya.

For example, an article written by the Nation Media Group Managing Editor made a call to arms

in these words:

―Every little, two-bit Somali has a big dream to blow us up, knock down our buildings and slaughter

our children . . . We are at war. Let‘s start shooting‖ (Bruzzone, 2014 as cited in Anderson

2014).

In fact, a flurry of public condemnation of the disloyalty of Kenya‘s Somali population in the

local press prompted the government to launch the Operation Usalama Watch on 2nd

April, 2014.

It began with the round-up and arrest of 650 Somalis in Nairobi‘s Eastleigh neighbourhood. At

its peak, more than 6,000 security personnel were deployed. They detained and interrogated

more than 4,000 Muslim ―suspects‖ (Anderson, ibid). Many Kenyan nationals supported this

exercise, almost breathing a sigh of relief at what they considered as a long overdue seriousness

by the government in its security obligation to the citizenry (Botha, 2014). This was in spite of

the operation appearing to target ethnic Somalis and alienating Muslims (Bruzzone, 2014 as cited

in Anderson 2014).

On the other hand, although refugees from other countries were equally not assisted to integrate,

they were able to live uninterrupted by raids, profiling, arbitrary arrests and forced repatriation

that constantly characterised the lives of their Somali counterparts (Jaji, 2014). Other

pg. 167

nationalities of refugees in Kenya were Burundian, Congolese, Ethiopian, Rwandan, South

Sudanese, and Ugandan (Mwaura, 2017).

A deeper examination of the counterterrorism responses targeting the Somali and Muslims in

Kenya is done in the next chapter.

pg. 168

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discussed the concept of terrorism, itself a difficult phenomenon to define as there

were varying definitions from different actors. The history of the term and concept dates back to

the end of the Second World War. There were a complexity of dimensions surrounding violent

extremism as each definition included and excluded certain factors and actors. The project

adopted a definition corresponding to that brought forth by the government of Kenya. Global

terrorism was discussed in regional specifics beginning with the North American region

comprising the USA and Canada where terrorism-deaths were dimmed in comparison with other

regions. Terrorist attacks however, increased in the recent past. Led by Turkey as the most

affected country, the European region was the second best performing after South America and

the Caribbean in terms of improvements in 2017. The annual terror-related deaths were less than

the annual deaths resulting from road accidents. However, the long-standing conflict with the

Irish Republican Army was noted. Although terror-related activity in the Middle East and North

Africa had decreased in the recent past, the region continued to contribute significantly to global

terrorism-related deaths. It was noted that although ISIL had been defeated in Iraq, this victory

was negated by increased terror group and ISIL activities in Syria. Other countries like Morocco

which had not witnessed terror attacks experienced a surge in activity.

Africa south of the Sahara was divided into three major regions that had experienced significant

terrorism events. This region bore the brunt of terrorist attacks in the world although many of the

targets of the attacks were in other regions of the world. The three regions of sub-Saharan Africa

were the Sahel, the Lake Chad Basin and the Horn of Africa. It was noted with concern that the

borders separating the countries of the Sahel and Maghreb Africa posed a terrorism challenge

due to the presence of an active al Qaeda element in North Africa. These were responsible for

pg. 169

exporting extremist ideology into the Sahel and this had resulted in terrorism activity in Burkina

Faso and Mali. The Lake Chad Basin, comprising Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, was

home to the ISIS-linked Boko Haram which was the most lethal terrorist organisation in the

world. Boko was based in Borno State of Nigeria and had employed extraordinary strategies not

common with many terror groups. These included kidnappings and the recruitment of women

and children who made up two-thirds of its suicide bombers. The Lake Chad Basin was also

problematic because of radicalising Muslim Fulani ethnics who had used terrorist tactics in

conflicts with farmers most of whom were Christians, over pastureland for their livestock. It is

feared that this radicalism could spread to other West and Central African countries where the

Fulani were also found. A disturbing fact was that Boko had infiltrated the Nigerian government

and military.

The Horn of Africa region was dogged with challenges such as conspiracy and lack of trust

among neighbouring nations which had aided in the spread of violent extremism. The region was

also characterised by porous borders, poorly paid immigration personnel, and corruption, among

others. Apart from al Shabaab, other terror groups in this region were the Lord‘s Resistance

Army and the Oromo Liberation Front. The chapter narrowed down to a discourse on terrorism

in the East African sub-region comprised of Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania and the challenges

they faced in countering terrorism. These were enumerated as poorly patrolled seacoasts, and the

lack of resources and skilled personnel. These factors were of special concern to Kenya and

Tanzania which had significant populations of Swahili Muslims at the coastal strip. The region

was also proximate to the Comoros Island, Pakistan and other countries via the Indian Ocean

from where Islamic fundamentalism was being imported. This discourse narrowed further to

focus on Kenya, the study area for the project.

pg. 170

Terrorism activities in Kenya were largely perpetrated by the Somalia-based al Shabaab whose

activities seemed to overshadow other terror outfits. The al Shabaab was discussed in detail

giving its Islamist fundamentalism ideology and goal of establishing a Somali state in the region

encompassing Kenya, Somalia and Djibouti. Its leadership structure was described alongside its

expansion strategies in Somalia through provision of services to the public. Its campaign for

local and international/diaspora support and extortion were mentioned as part of the methods it

had used to finance itself. Its recruitment and propaganda strategies were accomplished via

sophisticated use of information technology such as the internet and radio. The lethality of al

Shabaab attacks was noted and attributed to their preferred means of using improvised explosive

devices. The organisation‘s presence in Kenya was important and it was thriving on propaganda

centred on long-standing grievances by the Kenyan Muslim community. They had used these

narratives to advance their agenda and to recruit Kenyan youth. The presence of a robust Somali

neighbourhood in Nairobi‘s Eastleigh area was a factor in the spread of violent extremism in the

country.

Finally, the chapter discussed four main factors strengthening religion-based terrorism in Kenya.

These were the presence of an Islamic extremist population and terrorist cells in the country and

allegations of radicalisation in madrassa. Besides, al Shabaab proclamations depicting Christians

as the enemy had pitted the two religious groups against each other. Additionally, the targeting

of Christians and their interests in attacks was considered as propagating the Islam-terrorism

narrative. The government, which was associated with Christianity, had been targeted too.

Thirdly, the exposure of the public to news and social media content that portrayed Muslims as

perpetrators of terrorism increased religion-based terrorism. Finally, counterterrorism measures

pg. 171

targeting Muslims such as happened during the Usalama Watch also increased the association of

Islam with terrorism.

Chapter five presents literature on some counterterrorism measures that had been implemented

globally and in Kenya; and how these likely shaped the perceptions of Muslims and Christians in

the country.

pg. 172


Ce chapitre a abordé le concept de terrorisme, lui-même un phénomène difficile à définir car il y

a des définitions variables données par différents acteurs. L‘histoire du terme et du concept

remonte à la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Il y avait une complexité des dimensions

entourant l‘extrémisme violent, car chaque définition incluait et excluait certains facteurs et

acteurs. Le projet a adopté une définition correspondant à celle présentée par le gouvernement du

Kenya. Le terrorisme mondial a été discuté dans des régions spécifiques à partir de la région

nord-américaine comprenant les États-Unis et le Canada où les décès dus au terrorisme ont été

atténués par rapport à d‘autres régions. Les attaques terroristes ont toutefois augmenté dans un

passé récent. Dirigée par la Turquie comme le pays le plus touché, la région européenne a été la

deuxième plus performante après l‘Amérique du Sud et les Caraïbes en termes d‘améliorations

en 2017. Les décès annuels liés au terrorisme étaient inférieurs aux décès annuels dus à des

accidents de la route. Cependant, le conflit de longue date avec l‘Armée républicaine irlandaise a

été noté. Bien que les activités liées au terrorisme au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique du Nord aient

diminué dans un passé récent, la région a continué de contribuer de manière significative aux

décès liés au terrorisme dans le monde. Il a été noté que bien que l‘EIIL ait été vaincu en Irak,

cette victoire a été annulée par l‘intensification des activités des groupes terroristes et de l‘EIIL

en Syrie. D‘autres pays comme le Maroc qui n‘avaient pas été témoins d‘attaques terroristes ont

connu une recrudescence de l‘activité.

L‘Afrique au sud du Sahara a été divisée en trois grandes régions qui ont connu d‘importants

événements terroristes. Cette région a été la plus touchée par les attaques terroristes dans le

monde, bien que de nombreuses cibles des attaques aient eu lieu dans d‘autres régions du monde.

Les trois régions d‘Afrique subsaharienne étaient le Sahel, le bassin du lac Tchad et la Corne de

pg. 173

l‘Afrique. Il a été noté avec inquiétude que les frontières séparant les pays du Sahel et de

l‘Afrique du Maghreb posaient un défi terroriste en raison de la présence d‘un élément actif

d‘Al-Qaïda en Afrique du Nord. Ceux-ci étaient responsables de l‘exportation de l‘idéologie

extrémiste au Sahel, ce qui a donné lieu à des activités terroristes au Burkina Faso et au Mali. Le

bassin du lac Tchad, qui comprend le Cameroun, le Tchad, le Niger et le Nigeria, abritait Boko

Haram, lié à l‘Etat islamique, qui était l‘organisation terroriste la plus meurtrière au monde.

Boko était basé dans l‘État de Borno au Nigeria et avait utilisé des stratégies hors du commun et

peu usitées par de nombreux groupes terroristes. Il s‘agissait notamment d‘enlèvements et de

recrutement de femmes et d‘enfants qui représentaient les deux tiers de ses kamikazes. Le bassin

du lac Tchad a également été problématique en raison de la radicalisation des ethnies

musulmanes peuls qui avaient utilisé des tactiques terroristes dans des conflits avec des

agriculteurs dont la plupart étaient chrétiens, au-dessus des pâturages pour leur bétail. On craint

que ce radicalisme ne se propage à d‘autres pays d‘Afrique de l‘Ouest et d‘Afrique centrale où

l‘on trouve également des Peuls. Un fait troublant était que Boko avait infiltré le gouvernement

nigérian et l‘armée.

La région de la Corne de l‘Afrique était en proie à des défis tels que la conspiration et le manque

de confiance entre les nations voisines avaient contribué à la propagation de l‘extrémisme

violent. La région a également été caractérisée par des frontières poreuses, du personnel

d‘immigration mal rémunéré et de la corruption, entre autres. Outre al Shabaab, d‘autres groupes

terroristes dans cette région étaient l‘Armée de résistance du Seigneur et le Front de libération

des Oromos. Le chapitre s‘est réduit à un discours sur le terrorisme dans la sous-région d‘Afrique

de l‘Est composé du Kenya, de l‘Ouganda et de la Tanzanie et aux défis auxquels ils ont dû faire

face dans les interventions antiterroristes. Il s‘agissait de côtes maritimes mal surveillées et du

pg. 174

manque de ressources et de personnel qualifié. Ceci était particulièrement préoccupant pour le

Kenya et la Tanzanie, qui comptaient d‘importantes populations de musulmans swahili à la

bande côtière. La région était également proche de l‘île des Comores, du Pakistan et d‘autres

pays via l‘océan Indien desquels le fondamentalisme islamique avait été importé. L‘analyse s‘est

ensuite recentrée sur le Kenya, domaine d‘étude de notre projet.

Les activités terroristes au Kenya ont été en grande partie perpétrées par al Shabaab, basé en

Somalie, dont les activités semblaient éclipser d‘autres groupes terroristes. Le shebab a été

discuté en détail donnant à son idéologie du fondamentalisme islamiste et à son objectif d‘établir

un État somalien dans la région englobant le Kenya, la Somalie et Djibouti. Sa structure de

leadership a été décrite parallèlement à ses stratégies d‘expansion en Somalie par la fourniture de

services au public. Sa campagne pour le soutien et l‘extorsion locaux et internationaux/diasporas

a été mentionnée dans le cadre des méthodes qu‘elle avait utilisées pour se financer. Ses

stratégies de recrutement et de propagande ont été réalisées grâce à une utilisation sophistiquée

des technologies de l‘information telles que l‘Internet et la radio. La létalité des attaques d‘al

Shabaab a été constatée et attribuée à leur moyen préféré d‘utiliser des engins explosifs

improvisés. La présence de l‘organisation au Kenya était importante et elle était en plein essor

sur la propagande centrée sur les griefs de longue date de la communauté musulmane kényane.

Ils avaient utilisé ces récits pour faire avancer leur programme et recruter des jeunes Kenyans. La

présence d‘un quartier somalien important dans la région d‘Eastleigh à Nairobi a été un facteur

dans la propagation de l‘extrémisme violent dans le pays.

Enfin, ce chapitre nous a permis de discuter de quatre facteurs principaux renforçant

l‘islamisation du terrorisme au Kenya. Il s‘agissait de la présence d‘une population extrémiste

islamique et de cellules terroristes dans le pays et d‘allégations de radicalisation dans la

pg. 175

madrassa. En outre, les proclamations d‘al Shabaab dépeignant les chrétiens comme l‘ennemi

avaient opposé les deux groupes religieux l‘un contre l‘autre. Le deuxième facteur a été le

ciblage des chrétiens et leurs intérêts dans les attaques et cela a été considéré comme la

propagation du récit de l‘islamisation. Le gouvernement, qui était associé au christianisme, avait

également été pris pour cible. Troisièmement, l‘exposition du public aux nouvelles et au contenu

des médias sociaux qui dépeignaient les musulmans comme des auteurs du terrorisme a accru

l‘islamisation du terrorisme. Enfin, les mesures antiterroristes visant les musulmans comme cela

s‘est produit pendant l‘Usalama Watch ont également renforcé l‘association de l‘islam avec le

terrorisme.

Le chapitre cinq présente des éléments relatifs à certaines mesures antiterroristes mises en œuvre

à l‘échelle mondiale et au Kenya ; et décrit comment ces mesures ont probablement façonné les

perceptions des musulmans et des chrétiens dans le pays.

pg. 176

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pg. 182

CHAPTER FIVE

COUNTERTERRORISM INTERVENTIONS IN KENYA AND MULISM-

CHRISTIAN PERCEPTIONS: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTERVENTIONS CONTRE-TERRORISTES AU KENYA ET

PERCEPTIONS ENTRE MUSULSMANS-CHRÉTIENS : UNE REVUE DE LA

LITTÉRATURE

pg. 183

5.1 INTRODUCTION

Chapter four discussed the phenomenon of global terrorism and its implications for Muslim-

Christian relations where it was broken down into certain regional and local perspectives.

However, that discussion is not complete without a discourse on the probable impact of

counterterrorism measures on Muslim-Christian relations and attitudes which also formed a

section of this project. This chapter is designed to do just that. It mentions past examples of

terrorist groups that disbanded followed by a discussion of the Global War on Terror. The

Counterterrorism initiatives of the African Union are discussed along with the responses of some

African countries in this war. A detailed account of measures implemented in Kenya is given

alongside the flaws arising from them. The intention is not to be exhaustive as to be generally

informative. A section of the chapter is dedicated to tracing the influence of CT measures on the

attitudes of Muslims and Christians in Kenya. A final section gives an overview of suggested CT

interventions for the Kenyan situation and these are divided into politico-structural, socio-

economic and psycho-social measures.

5.2 PAST STRATEGIES IN COUNTERING TERRORISM

Since the existence of man, societies have lived with challenges that could be classified as

terrorist for which response mechanisms were employed. Since terrorism is not a recent addition

to the challenges of the modern world, so too are the methods to counter it. The fight against

terrorism is not a long shot in the dark and it bears credibility as historically, efforts to disband

terrorist organisations had been enforced with success. Some terrorist outfits had also faded into

oblivion due to external and/or internal factors. Cronin (2006; 2009) cited in Willem & Joop

(2016) asserts that one way to combat terrorism is to put an end or decline to terrorist groups by

pg. 184

creating scenarios that may weaken them or remove their motivations. The scenarios could be

classified into external interventions and internal factors.

5.2.1 External Interventions

External interventions had to do with actions outside the terror organisations that led to their

disintegration or to a decline in their activities. For instance, the capture of the leaders of such

organisations led to the disbanding of the groups when members had no leadership structure.

This helped in the disbandment of Peru‘s Shining Path in 1992 when its leaders like Guzman

were captured and killed. The Red Brigade of Italy failed to transition to the next generation

probably due to external factors. Also, a group could disband when its objectives were fulfilled

as was the case with the Africa National Congress with the election of its leader Nelson Mandela

as president. Finally, transition to a legitimate political process can end the activities of groups

that employ terrorist mechanisms. For instance, the opening of negotiations between the British

and Irish governments led to the breaking down of the Provisional Irish Republican Army.

Structural elements could also lead to disbanding of terror outfits as happened with the political

and social changes that weakened the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) (Reinares, 2011 cited in

Willem & Joop, 2016). The German Police are known to have employed retribution as a method

to disintegrate the Red Army Faction (RAF) around 1972 when they punished perpetrators

(Moghadam, 2012 as cited in Willem & Joop, 2016). Decreased public support and reduced

recruitment had also been helpful in this direction as stated by Willem and Joop (2016).

pg. 185

5.2.2 Internal Factors

According to Willem and Joop (2016), terrorist groups could disband due to individual factors

such as tensions and disagreements on how to achieve their goals, feelings of guilt and

interpersonal dynamics. Terror outfits could also stop believing in the mission or they may

undergo pressures and fears of a terrorist life. When members no longer supported the goals of

the group, they disengaged by leaving the terrorist group and becoming de-radicalized. Groups

could disband due to organizational factors such as the ETA which had issues with the modes of

leadership and resented the strict rules to which they were required to adhere. Another group of

factors had to do with personal issues such as feelings of having done enough for the

organization and wanting others to take over. However, disbandment did not necessarily mean

de-radicalization (Reinares, 2011 as cited in Willem & Joop, 2016).

5.3 THE INTERNATIONAL FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

The challenge of terrorism gained widespread global attention especially after the September 11th

2001 attacks on the Twin Towers in America. This event led to the realization that it was

possible for terror to be exported and that what was eating one‘s neighbour could come for one

too. The renewed interest of the north in funding and building the capacity of the global south in

the fight against terrorism was quite telling. Busher (2014) sums it up by stating that as terrorist

activity had internationalized, the counterterrorism response had done so too. This response was

made possible through responsive government behaviours towards countering the vice. The role

played by the government in terrorism is a wide topic that could range from how the government

was contributing to the rise in violent extremism and what citizens expected of it. It could also

include the measures put in place to fight the menace and whether these were successful or not,

and how improvements could be made.

pg. 186

The UN counter-terrorism strategy had five elements (AAI, 2006) which were summed up as

stipulated below.

i) To dissuade disaffected groups from choosing terrorism as a tactic to achieve their

goals.

ii) To deny terrorists the means to carry out attacks.

iii) To deter states from supporting terrorists.

iv) To develop state capacity to prevent terrorism.

v) To defend human rights in the struggle to counter terrorism.

All in all, counterterrorism interventions had two aims. First, was to deal with conditions that

aided the spread of terrorism. The second goal was to prevent and combat terrorism (UN, 2006 &

Paulussen, 2012 as cited in Mwangi, 2017). Another way to categorise anti-terrorism measures

was to use two broad classifications which were not necessarily mutually exclusive. These were

preventative measures and combative measures. Preventative measures sought to stop or thwart

terrorist activities before they took place while combative measures were geared towards

confronting and responding to terror-related activities. It could include the use of force and the

apprehension of perpetrators. It is important to note that a wide array of activities could be

classified under violent extremism provided they in any way aided the perpetration of terrorism.

These included the development of extremist ideologies, dissemination of these ideologies,

recruitment into terrorist organisations, radicalization, terror funding mechanisms; and

organisation and launching of attacks among others.

Ngugi (n.d) classifies counterterrorism policies into two, namely the defensive or reactive

policies and the proactive or offensive policies. The former involved interventions that

strengthened targets against attacks such as those that aimed to reduce the extent of damage

pg. 187

caused by such acts. An example of such a mechanism was the frisking of the body before being

allowed entry into certain premises. The latter included the infiltration of terrorist groups, the

search for intelligence, interfering with their funding mechanisms and destruction of their camps

(Sandler, 2011 as cited in Ngugi, n.d). These could also be focussed on the terrorists and their

sympathisers in order to reduce their operational capacities (Sandler 2005 as cited in Mwangi,

2017).

5.3.1 The Global War on Terror (GWOT)

The US-led CT interventions were collectively referred to as the Global war against Terrorism. It

had as its intention the elimination of international terrorism which referred to all terror-related

activities carried out by citizens of more than one country or territory (Kayani, 2011). It

employed the 4-D strategy which had four major goals. These were to defeat terror outfits that

had global reach, to deny them havens from where they operated and organised attacks, to

diminish factors that encouraged their operations; and to defend the US against attacks from

terrorists (Thrall & Goepner, 2017). The global war on terror redefined the concept of terrorism

and incorporated various dimensions that were considered to be related to violent extremism.

These came to include political, legal, ideological and military efforts to thwart outfits labelled

terrorist and all governments or states that supported them. The most prominent of these

organisations was al Qaeda [which had organised the 9/11 attacks] and all outfits and individuals

with an Islamic extremist agenda (Kayani, 2011). The efforts took on both combat and non-

combat techniques and included a variety of initiatives. They included the gathering of

intelligence, law enforcement, countering narcotics trafficking, fighting terrorist financing,

economic sanctions, fighting insurgencies and scattering terrorist cells and their training camps.

Thrall and Goepner (2017) offer that military intervention by the US involved both direct and

pg. 188

indirect measures. Direct methods aimed to kill terrorists and to destroy their organisations or

their ability to operate. Indirect approaches involved varied forms of assistance to build the

capacity of third-party military regimes in their anti-terrorism responses. These were in the form

of intelligence, advising, training, military equipment and money. Kayani (2011) adds that local

military and police forces were the focus of US war on terrorism assistance. Other endeavours

included reconstruction efforts, strengthening of infrastructure, support of fledgling

governments, protection of human rights, and giving of humanitarian aid.

5.4 COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES IN AFRICA

Kamya (2018) asserts that efforts to fight violent extremism and terrorism in Africa date back to

1992 with the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Resolution on the Strengthening of

Cooperation and Coordination among African states. It called on member states to avoid

supporting terrorism and to cooperate in combating extremism and terrorism. According to

Mwangi (2017), member states committed to fighting the vice. The Declaration in a Code of

Conduct for Inter-African Relations was adopted in 1994. It declared all terrorist attacks and

activities ‗criminal‘ (Kamya, 2018). It rejected all forms of extremism and terrorism, their

methods and practices while committing to improving cooperation in fighting it (Mwangi, 2017).

Expanded campaigns in the fight against terrorism in Africa culminated in the 1977 OAU

Convention for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa and the 1999 OAU Convention on the

Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. Others were the 2001 Dakar Declaration against

Terrorism and the 2002 Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (Kamya,

2018). According to Mwangi (2017), the 1999 Convention was enacted in December, 2002.

Furthermore, the AU Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and Combating of

pg. 189

Terrorism in Africa which took place in Algiers in September, 2002 adopted the AU Plan of

Action on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. The subsequent section discusses

initiatives by the African Union in combating terrorism.

5.4.1 The African Union Counterterrorism Initiatives

Major counterterrorism efforts in Africa were spearheaded by the African Union (AU). Busher

(2014) states that apart from scaling up domestic efforts against terrorism, the African Union had

continued to support the fight through the various plans and protocols associated with its

Counterterrorism Framework. There had also been substantial bilateral and multilateral support

for such efforts in Africa south of the Sahara by the wider international community. For instance,

during the 2017-2018 financial year, the Trump Administration followed in the Obama legacy of

heavy support in countering terrorism in sub-Saharan Africa and approved a total of $244 million

to countries in the region. The top ten beneficiaries of this aid were Burkina Faso, Cameroon,

Chad, Kenya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Niger, Senegal and Uganda (US Press Release, 2018).

Some initiatives that were implemented by the AU are described below.

5.4.2 The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism

The African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) was set up in 2004

following the decision of the AU High-Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on the Prevention and

Combating of Terrorism in Africa, held in Algiers in September 2002. The centre provided a

forum for interaction and cooperation among Member States and Regional Mechanisms. It also

played an important role in guiding the AU‘s CT efforts and implementing the AU CT

framework. It worked in collaboration with a number of regional and international partners to

pg. 190

ensure coherent and coordinated CT efforts on the continent. The following were among its

functions.

i) Provision of leadership to appropriate organs of the AU on matters concerning the

prevention and combating of terrorism in Africa.

ii) Promotion and sensitization on the implementation of the global and continental

counterterrorism framework.

iii) Strengthening of the capacity of member states by providing operational and

technical advice and support and trainings to enable them carry out their obligations

under the global and continental regime.

iv) Promotion and strengthening of inter-state collaboration and cooperation in

counterterrorism operations.

v) Mobilization of international support for counterterrorism action in Africa and the

strengthening of relations between AU and its member states and relevant

international bodies.

vi) Conducting research and studies on terrorism matters in the different countries and

regions of the continent and to develop strategies and recommendations to address

them.

vii) Production of regular information on terrorist threats in Africa and raising awareness

on relevant issues.

viii) Enhancement of early warning and early response and the integration of the concept

of Preventive Management of Crisis.

pg. 191

The regional and international partners with whom ACRST worked closely included the

European Union (EU), the UN Counter Terrorism Committee and the Executive Directorate and

the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF). They collaborated with the

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and the relevant committees established

pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions. Other organisations with which they worked were

the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Global Counter Terrorism Forum

(GCTF).

5.4.3 The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was an active, regional peacekeeping

mission operated by the AU with the approval of the United Nations. It was created by the

African Union‘s Peace and Security Council on 19th

January 2007. AMISOM replaced and

subsumed the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Peace Support Mission to

Somalia or IGASOM. The latter had been opposed by the Islamic Courts union who saw it as an

initiative by western powers to curb the growth of the Islamic movement (AMISOM, 2020). On

20th

February 2007, the United Nations Security Council authorized the AU to deploy a

peacekeeping mission with a mandate of six months, under resolution 1744(2007)13. The aim

was to support a national reconciliation congress. In October, 2014, the Security Council

(Resolution 2182 (2014) gave a green light to the AU to continue its mission in Somalia until

30th

November 2015.

Furthermore, the council authorized the mission to take all measures possible to support dialogue

and reconciliation. This would be done by assisting with free movement, safe passage and

protection of all those involved in the national reconciliation congress. In August 2017, the UN

pg. 192

Security Council issued resolution 2372 enabling the gradual handing over of security

responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. This was subject to the latter‘s

ability; and political and security progress in Somalia. According to BBC News (2017), the AU

force was made up of troops from Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda.

5.4.4 African Government Responses

Although capacity needs were most acute in Africa, African countries accepted the dual role in

combating terrorism, both as active contributors and as beneficiaries of various strategies. These

capacity needs were identified in the areas of judicial training and specialized law enforcement

skills. This was because terrorists were able to hide behind a lack of jurisdiction or of requisite

speed in the judicial process. Various African governments were able to launch a number of

counterterrorism initiatives (AAI, 2006) with those in the Sahel embracing help from America in

getting control of ungoverned spaces. For instance, the Burkinabe government committed

millions of dollars, precisely $835 to the Emergency Program for the Sahel which was designed

to support socio-economic development, public security and defence, and local governance and

infrastructure. The focus was on improving communication and interaction with the National

Plan for Economic and Social Development (Benedikter & Ouedraogo, 2018).

In response to Boko Haram, the Nigerian military was working in conjunction with the

Multinational Joint Task Forces (MNJTF) (IEP, 2018). They had managed to weaken the

organisation and to reclaim some territory in 2015 and 2016. However, the government was

having a hard time finding resources to increase the capabilities of gathering the intelligence

needed to monitor the terrorist organization (Nkechi, 2013 as cited in Karlsonn, 2015).

http://www.pndes2020.com/pdf/06-en.pdf

http://www.pndes2020.com/pdf/06-en.pdf

pg. 193

Ethiopia and Mauritania were rooting for increased U.S. support for their anti-terrorist policies

although they had been accused of solidifying policies of suppression and antidemocratic

practices in the process. Tanzania passed the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 2002 (Mbogo, 2002

as cited in Ngugi, n.d) and established a National Counterterrorism Centre whose goal was to

coordinate information from different agencies and responses to attacks. Some of the initiatives

had received funding from the USA for capacity-building in criminal investigation, response, and

proliferation of small arms among others (Ploch, 2010 as cited in Ngugi, n.d). In Zimbabwe,

domestic opponents had been labelled ―terrorists‖ while Kenya and South Africa needed to

balance between new security legislation and the preservation of civil rights (AAI, 2006).

All in all, there was a need to coordinate the various responses of African nations as lack of it

increased vulnerability to terrorism. It had also been noted that some countries used the idea of

counterterrorism to justify their own corrupt and oppressive regimes (AAI, 2006). For example,

it was reported that 95% of the [Nigerian] population believed that the government was corrupt

(Nkechi, 2013 as cited in Karlsonn, 2015). Yet these officials were responsible for enacting the

counterterrorism initiatives adopted in their countries. As indicated by Benedikter and

Ouedraogo (2018) the reality…[requires] a more comprehensive approach as

underlying..…problems at the roots of fundamentalism remained insufficiently addressed.

5.5 KENYA’S COUNTERTERRORISM POLICY

Kenya started considering stepping up its counterterrorism engagements after the 1998 US

embassy bombing. Immediately after this attack, two coordinated assaults in Mombasa were

staged against Israeli interests. It had become apparent that the country was a soft target for

international terrorists aiming at western establishments (Kagwanja, 2006 as cited in Biegon &

pg. 194

Songa, 2018). This led to the formation of the anti-terrorism police unit in 2003 at the

Directorate of Criminal Investigations (Directorate of Criminal Investigations, 2015). However,

mounting pressure from the US and other international actors forced the government to

formulate a more comprehensive counterterrorism strategy (Biegon & Songa, 2018).

Kenya‘s counterterrorism efforts were largely external donor-funded by especially the USA, the

UK and Denmark (Mwangi, 2017) making her a key ally in the USA and UK-led War on Terror.

Kenya has received international assistance relevant to this fight especially after the Westgate

attack (Hellsten, 2016). Three priority areas of donor focus characterised the Kenyan CT

response and these can be summarised as follows.

i) Targeting of sections of the population for prevention of radicalisation.

ii) Provision of military assistance and strengthening of security forces.

iii) Legal advice on anti-terrorism legislation.

The deployment of the Kenya Defence Forces to pursue al Shabaab in their Somali backyard in

October, 2011 was a major step in Kenya‘s counterterrorism policy (Biegon & Songa, 2018). It

marked a new era in the government‘s reaction to what it termed as foreign aggression after the

terror group was consistently linked with violent crimes within its territorial boundaries.

5.5.1 The National Counter-Violent Extremism Strategy

Kenya had a National Counter-Violent Extremism Strategy which was developed through a

consultative process involving government agencies and county governments, religious leaders,

civil society, the private sector, researchers, and regional and international partners. It was

launched by the President of the republic in September, 2016 at which time he said that the fight

pg. 195

against terrorism in the country would use several approaches. These would incorporate the

disengagement and rehabilitation of returning foreign terrorist fighters (Daily Nation, 2016).

5.5.2 The National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC)

Domiciled at the Office of the President, the National Counter-Terrorism Centre coordinated the

National Counter-Violent Extremism Strategy and also acted as its focal point (Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, 2018). It was a multi-security agency mandated with the task of managing CT

efforts. It was established by the Security Law Amendment Act (SLAA) 2014, a decade after it

became operational in 2004 when it was created by cabinet decision (Biegon & Songa, 2018). Its

constitution was managed by the National Security Council which appointed its director and

decided which institutions were incorporated into it. It also oversaw engagement with foreign

partners and state stakeholders such as the Kenya Armed Forces, National Security Intelligence

Service, Kenya Police, Provincial Administration, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Immigration

Department, Kenya Revenue Authority, Kenya Ports Authority, Kenya Airports Authority and

the Office of the Attorney General (NCTC, 2016).

5.5.3 The Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU)

The Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) was implemented primarily by the National Police

Service. Within it was the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU) which spearheaded the combating

of terror (OSJI & MUHURI, 2013 as cited in Biegon & Songa, 2018). The CID (2015) listed the

functions of the unit thus.

i) To prevent, disrupt and interdict terrorist activities within the country.

pg. 196

ii) To investigate all terrorism related cases.

iii) To lead other agencies at all scenes of terrorist related incidents.

iv) To create profiles of suspected terrorists and keep an updated databank.

v) To share intelligence with other stakeholders.

vi) To review and monitor security of vital installations and soft targets.

vii) To sensitize the public on terrorism awareness on needs basis.

Headquartered in Nairobi, the ATPU had a branch in Mombasa, where it was most active,

although its operations were not confined to these two regions (Biegon & Songa, 2018). It had

been credited with foiling several terrorist attempts, and arresting and killing a number of terror

suspects in various CT responses. ATPU‘s mode of operation had come under criticism for

lacking in transparency and therefore being prone to abuse due to its use of arbitrary methods

that amounted to harassment. That the unit operated without a legally-binding framework raised

concerns about its legitimacy especially among Muslim populations (Mwangi, 2017).

ATPU operations were generally viewed as religiously and ethnically discriminative, having

targeted ethnic Somali Kenyans and Somali refugees most of whom were Muslim (Margon 2014

as cited in Mwangi, ibid). For instance during the now infamous operation Usalama27

Watch,

thousands of Somalis were rounded up, harassed, extorted from and ill-treated in early April,

2014. The police unit also came under accusation for being connected with the extrajudicial

killings of terror suspects and their promoters. The Human Rights Watch (2014) reported that the

anti-terrorism unit was killing and ‗disappearing‘ people right under the noses of top government

27 Kiswahili for security. Further discussion on this operation is given in the section on major CT operations

implemented in the country.

pg. 197

officials, major embassies and the United Nations. ATPU had however absolved itself from any

involvement in these incidences and the disappearance of suspects. It instead attributed them to

internal wrangles and disputes within the terror organisation. Nonetheless, the unit acknowledges

that some terror suspects had died in its line of duty, depicting these as unintentional and

inevitable deaths. It also asserted that the untraceable suspects of terrorism had fled the country

for fear of persecution (Open Society Foundations, 2013 as cited in Mwangi, 2017).

5.5.4 The Modus Operandi of CT Interventions in Kenya

The Kenyan CT instruments had been criticised for containing broad definitions of terrorism

which gave security agencies the leeway to interpret and enforce mechanisms beyond certain

legal boundaries (OSJI & MUHURI, 2013 as cited in Biegon & Songa, 2018). Officers‘ applied

their own tact in the discharge of duty while fighting terrorism and had ended up violating the

fundamental rights and freedoms of certain populations. For example, there had been reports of

discriminatory handling of the Somali people (Lochery, 2012). In addition, some CT measures

were conducted under great amounts of discretion that was prone to exploitation by agencies

(Biegon & Songa, 2018). Some of these violations are listed by Mwangi (2017), Biegon & Songa

(2018) and Kamya (2018) as follows:

i) Constant profiling of Somali ethnics.

ii) Torture, killing and disappearance of suspects.

iii) Suppression of minority rights such as the illegal and excessive use of force during

house raids.

iv) Kidnappings, illegal detentions and executions.

v) Suspects being detained in sub-standard facilities and beyond the requisite 48 hours.

pg. 198

vi) Victimisation for speaking out against human rights violations during

counterterrorism operations. For instance, Haki Africa and MUHURI, two

organisations that had voiced concerns about such violations were blacklisted as

terror outfits and their bank accounts frozen.

5.5.5 State Secret Surveillance

The Kenyan state made use of secret state surveillance as a strategy in CT. This was based on the

SLAA amendment of the security law which was declared constitutional by the High Court. It

increased state discretion in undertaking secret surveillance for investigative purposes related to

the fight against terrorism. Under this law, security agents could intercept communications in an

attempt to detect, deter and disrupt terrorism (Biegon & Songa, 2018), a sanction that was

considered by many as being prone to abuse and misuse. This is because there were no control or

confirmation structures to guard against such abuse.

5.6 MAJOR COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS

A number of CT measures had been implemented in Kenya. This section will discuss a few of

them for a general understanding of the CT picture.

5.6.1 Operation Linda Nchi28

In October 2011, the Government of the Republic of Kenya launched the Operation Linda Nchi,

which literally means an Operation to Protect the Country in which it sent its military troops into

28 Kiswahili for protect the country.

pg. 199

Somalia to thwart the al- Shabaab terrorist group. The latter were believed to be behind a spate of

terror attacks and kidnappings of several foreign tourists and aid workers within Kenyan

territorial boundaries. The operation was coordinated jointly with the fragile Somalia

government which had been fighting the terror group for a while without success (Agbiboa,

2014). The al Shabaab had on several occasions vowed to continue staging attacks in Kenya until

the government withdrew those troops. The latter on its part sought to downplay the threat posed

by its continued stay in enemy land. For instance, on a visit to the USA, the Kenyan president

told journalists that even before the incursion; Kenya had already been exposed to numerous

terror attacks from the militant group (Wafula, 2014).

Kenyan troops had also come under retaliatory attacks by the Shabaab in Somalia. For example,

on the dawn of 15th

January, 2016, the militants ambushed a Kenyan military camp at El Adde

and slaughtered between 141 and 185 soldiers (Vidja & Agutu, 2020) in what has come to be

known as the Battle of El Adde. A year later, another ambush at Kulbiyow would leave

approximately 68 Kenyan troopers dead (Michira, 2017). These and many other casualties on the

Somali frontlines had resulted in the public voicing their concerns about the occupation of

Somalia by the Kenyan forces and the need to explore other avenues of dealing with terrorism.

5.6.2 Usalama Watch

As already mentioned above, Linda Nchi resulted in the al Shabaab intensifying attacks on

Kenyan soil in order to put pressure on the government to withdraw the troops from Somalia. A

number of terrorist attacks subsequently rocked various parts of the country, including the cities

of Nairobi [especially the Eastleigh area], Mombasa and the north-eastern region (Momanyi,

2015 & Mwambingu & Mutiga, 2020). This informed the launch of the Operation Sanitization of

Eastleigh, commonly known as Usalama Watch, in April 2014. Usalama was implemented after

pg. 200

a 23rd

March attack in Mombasa and other explosions in Eastleigh, Nairobi on 31st March that

left at least 10 people dead and scores of others injured (Mwangi, 2017). The aim of this

operation was to flush out al-Shabaab elements and/or aliens (Magogo, 2017) and to search for

weapons, improvised explosive devices and other arms. It was hoped that the operation would

also detect, disrupt and deter terrorism and other organized criminal activities with the overall

aim of ensuring the safety of Kenya (Wafula, 2014). Over 1,000 individuals were forcibly

relocated to overcrowded refugee camps in north-eastern Kenya and hundreds others deported

back to Somalia (Mwangi, 2017). The exercise generated more than 4,000 arrests characterised

by arbitrary arrests based on ethnicity (Torbjornsson & Jonsson, 2016).

5.6.3 Nyumba Kumi29

Initiative

Nyumba Kumi is a community policing concept in which villages and residential areas were

structured into ten household units, with a clear leadership structure which was responsible for

the security of the relevant households (Ombati, 2013). The government launched this initiative

to improve community policing. The concept was aimed at bringing the local community

together in pursuit of common ideals like a sustainable and prosperous neighbourhood while

anchoring community policing at household level or any other generic cluster (Andhoga &

Mavole, 2017). The concept was adopted from Tanzania where it had been in use for a long time

with a significant positive impact on security (Andhoga & Mavole, 2017 & Ombati, 2013).

29 A Kiswahili term for ten houses or households.

pg. 201

In Tanzania, because of the strategy, the police and immigration officials knew exactly who was

staying at which hotel, who rented and lived where, who owned which property and who was

moving in and out of the villages. No aliens were allowed to rent a house or to stay at a hotel or

village without seeking permission from the security personnel within 24 hours, with the latter

expected to keep records of such visitors (Andhoga & Mavole, 2017). The government of Kenya

was keen on rolling out this policing structure in rural and urban areas in order to encourage

Kenyans to ‗know‘ their neighbours (Ombati, 2013). It was proposed as a solution for curbing

crime and rising terrorism. It encouraged locals to interact and share information about each

other while also monitoring security threats with the aim of providing this information to the

local administration and security organs (Andhoga & Mavole, 2017). The policy was derived

from the need to be one‘s brother‘s keeper as valued in the African traditional context. This need

is summarised by Ndono, Muthama and Muigua (2019) in the African saying that goes, ‗I am

because we are, and because we are so I am ‘. However, according to them, the initiative has not

been successful due to the lack of inclusivity of players, criminal gangs‘ infiltration into the

control mechanisms and the misuse of the policy by unscrupulous elements with personal

interests.

5.6.4 Operation Linda Boni30

Nine months after the Westgate attack, several villages in Mpeketoni area of Lamu were raided

in a series of nocturnal attacks by armed militia believed to be affiliated to the al Shabaab

terrorist group. The Human Rights Watch (2015) indicates that the marauding gangs of between

30 Boni is the name of a thick forest in Lamu County where al Shabaab militia are believed to be holed up. The word

linda is Kiswahili for secure, thus linda Boni means to secure Boni forest.

pg. 202

15 and 300 men used all manner of weapons to kill non-Muslim males in 8 villages in the coastal

counties of Lamu and Tana River. They also destroyed a number of buildings, vehicles and other

property. Nyagah et al (2016) reports that a passenger bus was also attacked along the main

Lamu highway and 30 passengers killed, asserting that close to 100 people lost their lives in the

month-long spate of attacks. This prompted the government to launch the operation Linda Boni,

a counterterrorism intervention involving the military, the police and the local administration

focused on flushing out al Shabaab operatives believed to be hiding deep inside the Boni forest

in Lamu. The operation which started in September 2015 was expected to last only 90

days (Daily Nation, 2015 as cited in Jamestown Foundation, 2017). According to Mwambingu &

Mutiga (2020), the operation (which was still on at the time of the current project) covered

approximately 10 villages straddling the north-eastern part of Lamu all the way to the southern

region of Garissa County. It involved various security departments such as the KDF, the National

Police Service, the Administration Police and the National Intelligence Service (NIS) with the

latter infiltrating the villages in search of terrorist allies (Jamestown Foundation, 2017). In the

initial days, the operation was typified by heavy security presence and roadblocks where

passengers travelling into and out of Lamu underwent thorough screening. However, the Kenyan

security machinery had not managed to flush out the militia from the forest as the latter was

characterised by a thick canopy that rendered aerial surveillance ineffective. In addition, the

militia had planted land mines all over the place, further curtailing penetration into the forest area

which was already plagued by a poor road network. In fact, security analysts voiced concern

about the high rates of fatalities of security department personnel (Mwambingu & Mutiga, 2020)

as the terrorists had not relented in their attacks against them.

http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Troops-to-pitch-tent-in-Boni-Forest-until-2017/1056-2958132-o2swyq/index.html

pg. 203

That the forest was home to the local Awer community, whose major livelihood relied heavily on

foraging, complicated matters as all operations needed to take them into account. For instance,

some security leaders had considered throwing bombs into the terrorist hideouts at whatever cost

(Jamestown Foundation, 2017). Still, locals had been scared into abandoning their homes by

frequent militia raids on the villages and the use of explosive devices on roads. All in all, the

operation had been dogged by many setbacks such as the lack of cooperation from local

communities in sharing information and their colluding with the militia (Mwambingu & Mutiga,

2020). The security departments involved were beset by internal wrangles and lack of expertise

(Jamestown Foundation, 2017) while generally, suspicions, and political, religious and ethnic

undertones abound.

5.6.5 Successes of the Counterterrorism Operations

The responsibility of citizen protection from outside aggression was largely considered a duty of

the government of the day. In his first public appearance following a terrorist attack in Mandera

that saw up to 28 non-Muslim teachers killed, the Kenyan president, implied that the

responsibility for security lay on each citizen. Many of his critics interpreted this as an indication

of the state‘s defeatist attitude and inability to carry out its protective duty towards its citizens.

Nevertheless, despite weaknesses in the counterterrorism policy and capacity challenges that the

government had faced, certain inroads had been made in the war on terror on Kenyan soil. Linda

Nchi was reportedly successful with the capture of the port of Kismayu which was a key element

in this operation. The port had acted as a source of funding for the organisation because of the

business activity it handled (Lind, Mutahi & Oosterom, 2015). According to Speckhard &

Shajkovci (2019), the KDF had managed to push al Shabaab out of their strangleholds. The

wresting of the control of Kismayu port from them sparked government jubilation and

pg. 204

celebration from sections of the public. At the time of this project fieldwork, the Kenyan army

was still fighting the al Shabaab in Somalia.

Back home, government reports indicated that more than 2,000 terrorist suspects had been

arrested (Wafula, 2014). According to the Daily Nation (2016), the president also stated that

disengagement from al Shabaab accelerated sharply following the 2014 government amnesty that

came alongside the Nyumba Kumi initiative. As part of the anti-terrorism campaign, the

government gazetted Dadaab and Kakuma as the only legally-recognized refugee camps in

Kenya (Wafula, 2014).

5.6.6 Flaws in Kenya’s Counterterrorism Frameworks

Despite successes in the implementation of CT initiatives in Kenya, certain loopholes emerged.

First, the wide definition of the terrorism phenomenon rendered it vulnerable to misinterpretation

and abuse by security forces. Indeed, the lack of a standard definition of terrorism itself rendered

counterterrorism measures problematic. For example, Kenya‘s PTA did not define terrorism

specifically, making it prone to misuse and abuse by state agencies bent on netting in anti-

government elements. In fact, the East African Law Society in criticizing the Act described it as

too wide and vulnerable to misuse by possible victimisation of opponents or political enemies

(Mwazighe, 2012 as cited in Kamya, 2018).

Second, several of Kenya‘s CT efforts were implemented without proper legal frameworks. For

example, the legitimacy of ATPU had been questioned as it was created before the CT law came

into force. Besides, the PTA of 2012 did not do justice to the definition of terrorism and created

terrorist blacklists without proper mechanisms for due process. It gave the police too much

pg. 205

power (Mwangi, 2017) which was subject to abuse and exploitation of suspects. It could also be

used to repress and discriminate groups on religious, ethnic, minority and political grounds

(Open Society Foundations, 2013 as cited in Mwangi, ibid).

Third, Kenya, like other countries in this region of Africa, suffered from resource and capacity

challenges. Kamya (2018) gives these as:

i) Lack of investigative capabilities.

ii) Lack of professionalism in terror-related inquiries.

iii) Inter-security agency interference in operations and investigations.

iv) Inhuman detention facilities.

v) Poor equipment and resources.

Fourth, the secrecy of surveillance rendered it subject to abuse and misuse. The extrajudicial

killings of Muslim clerics and suspected al Shabaab members especially in the coastal region had

been linked to it. The killing of Abubakar Shariff Ahmed, a.k.a ‗Makaburi‘31

, a radical Muslim

cleric in Mombasa by a death squad sanctioned by the state was linked to unregulated

surveillance (INCLO, 2016 in Biegon & Songa, 2018). Two other leading Islamists had been

killed in the two years preceding the assassination of ‗Makaburi‘ (Akwiri, 2014). OSJI and

MUHURI (2013) cited in Biegon and Songa (2018) mention the inability of ATPU to gather

31 Abubakar Shariff was killed as he waited to be picked by a vehicle in the premises of a court where he had

attended hearings 15km from Mombasa city. A vehicle carrying the assassins approached him while he was in the

company of another person and they were sprayed with bullets (Akwiri, 2014).

pg. 206

enough evidence for conviction of terror suspects. They argue that this resulted in the police unit

committing the executions and enforced disappearances they were accused of.

Finally, the implementation of CT policies had been subjected to interference from the executive

in the form of ‗roadside declarations‘. The Kenyan President in announcing an anti-terrorism

operation after yet another deadly attack in Lamu County asserted that al Shabaab would be

wiped out and not only be jailed but buried (Daily Nation, 2017 July 18, as cited in Ngugi,

undated). This implied the resolve to kill suspects without necessarily subjecting them to due

legal processes. Mwahanga (2014) cited in Biegon and Songa (2018) also documents that at least

one county commissioner had issued a shoot-to-kill order against suspected terrorists. Such

pronouncements may be misconstrued as intrusion into the functions of the agencies tasked with

the implementation of CT policies who may be tempted to use excessive force to please their

bosses.

5.6.7 Challenges arising with Counterterrorism Measures

The above policy flaws had resulted in challenges being encountered with CT initiatives in

Kenya. These challenges arose from the CT activities of the KDF and the ATPU, the two

security organs that were at the frontline of the war on terrorism in Kenya.

5.6.8 ATPU-related Challenges

The ATPU measures were known to employ the use of excessive force and harassment. Statistics

suggested that at least 81 extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of suspects had been

linked with CT measures implemented by ATPU between 2012 and November 2016 (BBC

News, 2016). 22 people were believed to have been killed in police operations while 4 died in

pg. 207

custody. 31 deaths occurred in cold blood murders whereas 24 persons disappeared forcefully

(Haki Africa, 2016 as cited in Biegon & Songa, 2018). In the north-eastern region, at least 34

terror suspects went missing between December 2013 and December 2015 (HRW 2016 as cited

in Biegon & Songa, ibid). A 2015 report by Juma (2015) indicated that 60 Muslims aged

between 17 and 40 had been documented as ‗missing‘ with the most affected areas being the

Muslim dominated regions of Mandera, Wajir, Garissa, Nairobi and Mombasa. They were

allegedly abducted by officers attached to ATPU, KDF or the Kenya Wildlife Services.

According to a 2015 Kenyan National Commission on Human Rights report, there were 120

extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances of persons suspected of terrorism in Nairobi,

the Coastal and north-eastern regions (Freedom House, 2018).

Below is a map of Kenya showing these regions as high-risk areas as far as terrorism was

concerned.

pg. 208

Figure 5.1: The security situation of the coastal and north-eastern regions of Kenya

SOURCE: Travelscams.org

In addition, the ATPU was said to have blacklisted Muslim youth whom the security agencies

believed were radicalised. These included some high school students some of whom had fled

pg. 209

into exile for fear of consequences of being wanted. In fact, many Muslims stated that the police

themselves had become terrorists (Juma, 2015).

5.6.9 Challenges from the Kenyan Incursion

The Kenyan incursion into Somalia was entirely a KDF affair which had rubbed al Shabaab the

wrong way and resulted in more frequent, widespread and lethal attacks from the group. Two

major successful attacks on Kenyan military camps in Somalia sent shock waves in the country

after hundreds of Kenyan soldiers were massacred by al-Shabaab militia. On the dawn of 15th

January, 2016, the militia ambushed a Kenyan military camp situated at El Adde and slaughtered

approximately 180 Kenyan soldiers. This sparked angry reactions from families of the fallen

heroes and other members of the public who called on the government to withdraw these troops

from Somalia.

The Standard Newspaper reported on 29th

January, 2017 that al Shabaab had laid another ambush

on a Kenyan-Somali forces camp at Kulbiyow, where they shot dead at least 68 Kenyan soldiers.

This happened on a Friday dawn in January, 2017 although the government put the figure at only

9. This was however disputed by accounts of eyewitnesses who claimed to have seen the arrival

by night of several aircraft believed to be flying in the bodies of the victims into a Nairobi-based

military barracks. The bodies were allegedly transported the following morning to the Forces

Memorial Hospital mortuary in vans bearing civilian number plates (Michira, 2017) in order to

conceal the extent of damage from the attack. In fact, the terror group had put the number of

casualties at 57 probably because they did not have time to assess the actual damage they had

caused on the camp. In that attack, the militia took off with vehicles and arms in their

characteristic manner before Nairobi backup arrived to take back the overrun and burnt camp.

pg. 210

News of other al Shabaab ambushes and attacks on Kenyan military targets both at home and

abroad in Somalia were not uncommon.

In Kenya, things continued to worsen with the government reporting that about 100 terrorist

plots had been detected or intercepted in just four months, meaning that the police were

neutralizing at least a terrorist attack every two days. Official data released to The Standard on

Sunday newspaper showed that between the start of Operation Linda Nchi in October, 2011 and

[September] 2014, Kenya had been attacked 133 times (Wafula, 2014), suffering 264 deaths and

923 injuries (Biegon & Songa, 2018). This meant that on average, there had been a terror attack

on Kenyan soil every eight days. The Government officially announced that the number of foiled

attacks was higher than those that had been launched. Al Shabaab continued to carry out many

more attacks from September, 2014 especially in Garissa, Kilifi, Kwale, Lamu, Mandera, Tana

River and Wajir Counties (Beigon & Songa, ibid).

However, it should be noted that although al Shabaab had blamed the Kenyan military operations

in Somalia, bearing the brunt of the militant group‘s wrath, troops from other African countries

were also involved in peace-keeping and other missions in Somalia. In fact, some of these

countries had sent in more soldiers than Kenya. There were also police forces from other African

countries engaged in building the capacity of the Somali police force. The table below illustrates

these figures as reported by AMISOM.

pg. 211

NO. Country Troops Police Officers

1. Burundi 5,432 __

2. Djibouti 960 __

3. Ethiopia 4,395 __

4. Ghana __ 56

5. Kenya 3,664 48

6. Nigeria __ 200

7. Uganda 6,223 201

8. Sierra Leone 850 47

Table 5.1: African states' contribution of troops to AMISOM

SOURCE: AMISOM Website (2020).

The challenges discussed above had implications for the attitudes of Muslims and Christians in

the country. The next section will therefore delve into some of these implications.

5.7 CT MEASURES AND MUSLIM-CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES

Vicencio et al (2016) argue that the exclusive targeting of the Muslim population in

counterterrorism initiatives; and the subsequent profiling and scapegoating of Muslim Kenyans

had resulted in unintended consequences. This was because other factors that contributed to

violent extremism had been overshadowed. There were widespread negative attitudes by

especially Somali-Muslim youth who felt discriminated by the police on the basis of their

religion and ethnicity. For instance, there were reports of certain excesses in the aftermath of the

Westgate attacks (Busher, 2014 & Torbjornsson & Jonsson, 2016).

pg. 212

Hellsten (2016) agrees that security measures carried out in the Muslim and Somali-dominated

areas of Nairobi and the Coast had increased prejudice against the two groups of people

regardless of their status as nationals, refugees or migrants. These responses had entrenched

divisions and mistrust (Danish Demining Group, 2014 as cited in IRIS, 2015) and what the IRIS

(ibid) terms as the ―we-versus-them culture‖. A statement from the Daily Nation (2015) which

called on the government to stem the tide towards polarizing Kenyans along ethnic, religious and

regional lines says it all.

The government on its part refused to relent on its Somalia incursion and had instead engaged a

more militarised gear against the Islamic militant group in Kenya and in Somalia. This resulted

in more regular raids in Eastleigh and other Somali neighbourhoods in the capital Nairobi and

Mombasa (Lochery, 2012). Operations and crackdowns were a common feature in areas believed

to harbour terrorists (Biegon & Songa, 2018), with varied results and impact on Muslim and

Christian communities. The following section attempts to discuss some of these effects.

5.7.1 Antagonism from Muslim Communities

The declaration of the ―War on Terror‖ by the Bush administration had far-reaching

consequences for Muslims in East Africa who became the object of legislation that had been

described as rather intrusive (Ngugi, n.d). That most counterterrorism operations in the world

had targeted Muslims was evidence to the Muslim communities that they were under threat. In

fact, Biegon and Songa (2018) state that like other parts of the world, Kenyan CT measures had

been overly focussed on Muslims with obvious consequences. According to IPOA (2014) cited

in Biegon and Songa (ibid), the result had been the antagonism of the local community.

pg. 213

Six dimensions in which CT measures were likely to impact Muslims are identified and

examined in this section. These are related to the targeting of Somalis and Muslims, the methods

employed in the measures, human rights issues, revenge attacks on Christians, the presence of

suspicion and the increase in radicalisation.

5.7.2 Targeting of Somalis and Other Muslims

Hellsten (2016) agrees that security measures carried out in Muslim and Somali-dominated areas

of Nairobi and the Coast had increased prejudice against the two groups of people. This was

regardless of their status as nationals, refugees or migrants and it was likely to lead to feelings of

alienation and sympathy for terrorist organizations. The reaction of Muslims in other parts of the

world to CT measures was a factor to consider in the Kenyan case. For example, CT laws in

Nigeria were met with stiff opposition and rejection by the predominantly Islamic northern states

where they were perceived as targeting Muslims (Harsch, 2009 as cited in Ngugi, n.d). Such

cases had the likelihood of strengthening attitudes in Kenya that support the presence of an anti-

Islam agenda. This may result in more antipathy towards government measures. In any case,

Boko Harm had ties with the al Shabaab organisation whose attitudes they were likely to

influence. These could be used to manipulate local Muslim communities to the unfortunate

advantage of the terrorist agenda.

The effect of CT measures targeting Muslims of Somali background was multi-faceted and they

were related to two dimensions, namely the religion and the ethnic identity. For each of these

attributes, CT measures were likely to be two-pronged. First, it led to the attitude that the Islamic

religion was targeted, an attribute that was likely to spread to other Muslims who had been

tolerant. Secondly, the targeting of Muslims could lead to adherents feeling victimised and

pg. 214

mistaken as terrorists. The other dimension of CT measures was their impact on the ethnic

background of suspects. The average Somali was likely to feel targeted because of their ethnic

identity and that terrorism was used to justify this targeting. For long the Somali had been

subjected to discrimination by successive regimes in their local north-eastern frontiers. As a

result of this collective memory, the targeting of Somali ethnics was likely to be considered a

continuation of state discrimination. Besides, it led to emotional reactions that came with the

‗terrorist‘ label which in turn interfered with their interactions with other ethnic groups.

5.7.3 Use of Militarised Techniques

ATPU activities in Mombasa had led to disaffection by the community because of allegations of

the application of excessive force and sanctioned killings. There had been riots and protests

believed to be linked to these CT operations. The local Awer community in Lamu for instance

had fallen victim to both the al Shabaab and the security officers carrying out operations (Kiser

2017 cited in Biegon & Songa, 2018). Because of this use of excessive force, the terror militia

had launched retaliatory attacks on police stations during which many officers had died (Biegon

& Songa, ibid).

The Human Rights Watch (2014) lamented that the use of abusive CT measures did not protect

Kenyans from terrorists but rather it undermined the rule of law. Other reactions to ATPU‘s CT

operations had included the gunning down in 2014 of at least two members of community

policing committees who were suspected to be state informers. State security agents had also

been targeted (Ndungu, 2014 as cited in Biegon & Songa, 2018). The use of excessive force by

this unit threatened Muslim communities and led to resentment against state police who

ironically were supposed to protect them. Counter-attacks on the police also had the potential to

pg. 215

portray the state agents as the enemy especially among and of Muslim communities. Moreover,

the police had been known to counter-react to attacks by local communities by using brutal force,

after-all they had state machinery at their disposal and could act under state cover. Reactive

police crackdowns had been linked with attacks by locals or by criminal elements.

The incursion into Somalia had resulted in increased revenge attacks by al Shabaab in a bid to

push the government to withdraw its troops. According to Speckhard and Shajkovci (2019),

these attacks had become speedier and more frequent. Al Shabaab had staged some of the most

dramatic and lethal attacks with this aim including Westgate and the Garissa University attack.

During the Westgate attack, the organisation used social media to publicise the incident to the

world in a fashion reminiscent of action movies. They used platforms like Twitter and Facebook

to update the public on the siege at Westgate, in a manner never witnessed before with any other

terrorist organisation. This elevated the al Shabaab to another level among its contemporaries

and it became more widely known after this. During the Garissa University dawn siege, the

terrorists were said to have separated Christians and Muslims and gone ahead to kill all the

Christians while using such phrases as ―operation against infidels‖. A spokesman for the group,

Sheikh Ali Mohamud Rage32

, in referring to the incident stated thus:

"When our men arrived, they released the Muslims…mission is to kill those who are against the

Shabab…Kenya is at war with Somalia" ((Mail & Guardian, 2015).

32 Also known as Sheikh Ali Dhere, [he was then] media spokesperson for al-Shabaab (Hines, 2010).

pg. 216

Another spokesman affirmed that al Shabaab attacked the institution because it was "on Muslim

land colonized by non-Muslims". The clear religious message behind these revenge attacks had

the potential to portray Muslims as supportive of the terror outfit‘s jihadist agenda, methods and

killing sprees. The two remain some of the worst attacks since al Shabaab launched offensives on

Kenyan targets.

The direct targeting of Christians and the use of dehumanising and demeaning terminology on

them also spoke volumes. The use of Islamic (Arabic) religious language communicated the

universality of al Shabaab agenda with the potential of polarising Muslims and Christians whom

they identified with the government they were fighting. This also had the likelihood of affecting

the attitudes of tolerant Muslims for fear of being identified with terrorists. Revenge attacks on

innocent Christians in reaction to militarised CT measures strengthened the government-

Christian link.

5.7.4 Violations of Human Rights

The manner in which terror suspects were treated was problematic as the system had no

provisions for their protection. The youth felt helpless as they were not able to defend themselves

against a system that was ―against‖ them (Mwangi, 2017). In addition, the accusation that

suspects had been involved in terrorism drew little sympathy and concern for their predicament.

It exposed them to abuse of their procedural and substantive rights in contravention of the

UNSEC Resolution 1456 (2003) (6). This resolution required states to continue upholding the

provisions of international law, stipulated in the International refugee, human rights and

humanitarian law (Kamya, 2018). Botha (2013) as cited in Mwangi (2017) agrees that CT

measures that employed mass arrests and racial profiling were often counterproductive. The

pg. 217

violation of human rights came with lots of emotional reactions as Muslim communities were

likely to feel mistreated, dehumanised, trampled and without recourse except to fight back.

5.7.5 Retaliatory Attacks on Pro-Christian Interests

The targeting of Christian establishments in retaliation against state CT measures by al Shabaab

strengthened the linking of the government to Christianity. It had the potential of portraying

Christians as the enemy of Islam and therefore at war with Muslims, further polarising the two

groups. In addition, it could affect the attitudes of Muslims towards Christians as a result of al

Shabaab justification narratives which portrayed the Christians as fighting Islam. On the other

hand it could breed feelings of shame and guilt among tolerant Muslims who considered it an

attack on innocent people. These scenarios had further implications for the interactions between

them and Christians.

That the government was continually associated with Christianity faded the line between its

secular/traditional provisions and Christian tenets. For example, the government had been known

to provide for secular rights that promoted homosexuality, alcohol sale and consumption,

polygamy and abortion. These were against Islamic and/or Christian teachings and values. The

continued association of government and Christianity was likely to promote the attitude that

Christians were prone to moral decay, thereby allowing for such provisions in the constitution. It

could have contributed to the labelling of Christians as immoral by Muslims as mentioned

elsewhere in this work. Furthermore, many of these secular provisions were pro-western, leading

Muslims to perceive Christians as being ―westernised‖ and lacking the moral muscle to protect

their religious or African heritage. It led to the perception of lack of standard principles among

Christians, leading Muslims to have negative attitudes towards them. The fact that the

pg. 218

government was an ally to a western-sponsored war on terror did not help matters, further

augmenting resentment from al Shabaab, Islamic extremists and their sympathisers.

5.7.6 Suspicion of Muslims and Government

The dynamics of CT measures revealed the suspicion that Muslims had about government

motives. For instance, the KNCHR and CHRP (2015) cited in Biegon and Songa (2018)

explained that Muslims were not ready to cooperate with the government in community policing

programs. The government had particularly singled them out for not wanting to share

intelligence on criminals. This was likely to increase the thinking that Muslims were shielding

criminal and terrorist elements and therefore lacked transparency. This resulted in increased

security machinery focus on their neighbourhoods and their youth. The lack of cooperation could

have been informed by past experiences of police brutality against Muslim suspects. It may also

have been occasioned by the vulnerability of the anti-terrorism legal frameworks to abuse by

state agencies. It reeked of lack of trust of state agencies and the justice system.

Second, the seeming scapegoating of the Somali community during Usalama (AI, 2014 as cited

in Mwangi, 2017) led to an erosion of trust between the Muslim community and the government,

which was identified with Christians. Each side pointed accusing fingers at the other with many

Christians hailing the operation while the media was awash with accounts of harassment of

Somali Muslims. This had the potential of leading to negative emotions by Muslims and the

attitude that Christians were supportive of oppressive government measures against them.

Third, there was hesitancy among Muslims to seek legal redress for their relatives who had been

tortured, killed or disappeared in police custody. This could have stemmed from their fear of

pg. 219

falling victim too or being targeted in future operations (HRW, 2016 as cited in Biegon & Songa,

2018). Consequently, it could result in resentment of state security machinery and apathy

towards the rest of the Kenyan publics.

5.7.7 Furtherance of Radicalisation

Kenya‘s CT efforts had had a negative impact as far as radicalisation was concerned. In a study

of former members of al Shabaab, 65% of respondents indicated that they had joined the terror

group as a result of the CT strategy (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2017). Some of these

methods had employed violence as a method to subdue extremism, the execution or extrajudicial

killings of radical Muslim scholars and other repressive techniques which were not effective in

fighting terrorism (Botha, 2014 as cited in Mwangi, 2017). In fact, the violent methods employed

in CT measures in Kenya were likely to be counterproductive in the war against terror. For

example, the al Shabaab justified an attack in Mpeketoni (Anderson, 2014) as revenge against

what they described as government oppression of Muslims. In fact, in retaliation to the Kenyan

incursion into Somalia, al Shabaab claimed that the Kenyan soldiers had subjected Muslim

innocents to suffering and that they illegally occupied Muslim lands. They affirmed that the

Kenya Defense Forces had invaded, occupied and massacred the innocent in Muslim lands

(Abdullahi Boru Halakhe, 2014 as cited in Anderson, ibid). This was likely to be used as a

recruitment strategy that portrayed the Kenyan state as being at loggerheads with Muslims. It

was a call to Muslim faithful to rise up and defend their brethren through radicalisation.

The methods of ATPU were considered discriminatory and had been linked to the increase in

radicalisation rather than its decrease (Mwangi, 2017). Some youth had joined terror groups

because of marginalisation and the belief that there was no justice for them in a system that

pg. 220

declared them ‗guilty of terrorism until proven otherwise‘. Joining a terrorist group was therefore

acceptable and expected.

The blanket arrests of Somali Muslims in certain operations like Usalama added to radicalization

as it was likely to be considered as ‗collective punishment‘ driven by an erroneous global

attitude that Muslims were terrorists or potential terrorists (Mwangi, ibid). With similar measures

targeting Muslims used across the globe, the average Muslim could be easily convinced that the

war on terror was actually a war on the Islamic religion. This could be treated as a call for the

need to arise and defend a religion under siege.

5.7.8 Effect on Christian Attitudes

The targeting of Muslims in CT strategies posed challenges for their Christian counterparts

because of three basic elements. First, the two groups continued to interact in the same society;

second, Christians were constantly identified with the government and state machinery; and third

they had been the direct target of terrorists. As CT measures had inherent problems, they had the

potential to influence the attitudes of Christians in the country. Below is an overview of how the

fight against terrorism could have affected this religious group. These are linked to the targeting

of Somalis and Muslims, al Shabaab revenge attacks, violation of Muslim rights, constant linking

of government to Christians and trust issues.

5.7.9 Somalis and Muslims as Violent

The constant targeting of Somali Muslims in CT measures was likely to increase the attitude

among Christians that Muslims were violent with the resultant effect of increasing their apathy

towards them. In addition, they were likely to consider the Somali as a security threat, further

pg. 221

affecting their relations. In general, this targeting led to Christians increasingly associating Islam

and ethnic communities that were predominantly Muslim with terrorism. These attitudes came

with several dynamics inherent in them in a society that was already knee-deep in widespread

ethnic discrimination. Blanket measures were also likely to confirm to Christian communities

who looked up to the government for protection that communities where the measures were

being implemented harboured terrorist elements.

5.7.10 Christian Targets in Retaliatory Attacks

Retaliatory attacks by al Shabaab and other Muslims who were offended by the government

measures had the potential of influencing the attitudes of government-aligned Christians who

considered the latter‘s measures justified. It was also likely to increase animosity as majority of

security agents injured or killed in pursuit of al Shabaab were from Christian communities.

The use of Islamic (Arabic) religious language portrayed the universality of al Shabaab agenda

and the view that terrorism was a religious war. This had the potential to polarise Muslims and

Christians, who were identified with the government, and therefore lumped together with it as

the collective enemy of Islam. The result could put Christians in an awkward position especially

because of the belief that they were the target of Islamic extremists. The use of religious

language to demean Christians had the possibility of making the latter believe that there were

religious motives and undertones in the al Shabaab and by extension, the Muslim agenda.

5.7.11 Violations of Muslims’ Rights

The violation of human rights came with lots of emotional reactions as Muslim communities

were likely to feel mistreated, dehumanised, trampled and without recourse except to fight back.

pg. 222

It had the potential of making Christians stigmatise Muslims and to consider them as deserving

of the measures used in apprehending them. The result of this was the danger of hardening the

Muslim stand against Christians with implications for intergroup interactions. It could also lead

to feelings of shame and guilt among Christians especially if they identified with security organs

and concurred that the rights of Muslims had been violated.

5.7.12 Association of Government with Christians

To most Christians, the government was an independent entity which according to them, was led

by secular officials, laws and constitutions. For example the provisions of gay rights, polygamy,

free alcohol consumption, and the debate on abortion had Christians shift in their seats as these

tenets and many other constitutional provisions went against the biblical grain. Therefore, the

consistent linking of Christianity to a government that promoted secular values had the

likelihood of affecting their attitude towards Muslims and consequently, their relationship. This

begs the question of whether Kenya was truly a Christian state or a secular one. Did a non-

Muslim identity automatically qualify one to be Christian? There should have been a clear

distinction between Christianity and government especially in public education and formulation

of CT policies and measures.

Besides, Christians were likely to feel scapegoated by Muslim extremists who could not get back

at a government against whom they had grievances. Third, it increased negative attitudes towards

Muslims, whose accusations of Christians were in tandem with al Shabaab justifications.

Because of the similarity of al Shabaab narratives and Muslim claims, it became difficult to

divorce the two. Finally, Christians were likely to consider the Islamist extremist claims and

attacks on government as an excuse to push a religious agenda.

pg. 223

5.7.13 Lack of Trust

The reluctance on the part of Muslims to participate fully in community policing programs was

likely to lead to the belief that they were covering up suspicious activities and that they could not

be trusted. Christian communities were likely to read mischief in this while questioning

Muslims‘ segregation and unwillingness to yield to equal treatment with other publics. This had

already resulted in trust issues as attested to by some individuals who indicated that they would

not be comfortable living near Somalis.

The fear that Muslims harboured towards government and complaints about injustices committed

against them were likely to breed resentment by Christians who doubted those narratives. These

narratives could be used by Christians to strengthen their suspicion and lack of trust of the

Muslim community. For instance, despite the outcry by Somali Muslim communities during

Usalama, many Christians hailed the operation and remarked that it had been long overdue, to

the chagrin of many Muslims. The result was the strengthening of the government-Christian tie

as the latter acquiesced with the government, further aggravating attitudes of mistrust and

animosity between the two groups. Still, this blame game had the potential of giving rise to

feelings of guilt and shame among tolerant Christians.

5.8 SUGGESTED MEASURES

The presence of myriad internal factors in Africa called for holistic and comprehensive

mechanisms in its governments‘ War on Terror. Dagne (2004) as cited in Ngugi (n.d) lists some

of these as abject poverty, corruption, political, ethnic and religious tensions. Cronin (2006;

2009) as cited in Willem and Joop (2016) lament the haphazard manner in which

counterterrorism policies were implemented as there lacked a befitting analysis of the

pg. 224

assumptions underlying them. This translated to formulation and implementation of

counterterrorism policies that were not water-tight. It is important to note that since there were

myriad factors underlying the spread of terrorism, the solutions also needed to take multi-

pronged approaches. Most CT practices in Kenya had been reactive and therefore prone to abuse

and victimisation of suspects and innocent persons. The use of soft CT measures to curb the

spread of extremism and to prevent occurrence of terrorist attacks needed to be explored more

extensively.

Governments needed to fight corruption in order to seal any loopholes that could be exploited by

terrorist elements. It had been alleged for instance that Somali criminals wishing to bring illegal

arms into Kenya knew that they needed to factor in the costs of bribing security and immigration

officers at borders before they attempted to cross over. This is confirmed by Mwangi (2017) who

states that corruption hindered CT efforts as it facilitated the entry of illegal arms that could be

used for terror activities. Secondly, corruption had hindered the employment of many youth

some of whom had resorted to radicalism. An example is mentioned by Chimbi (2017) where a

young man from Kilifi County joined the al Shabaab because of frustration occasioned by the

inability to raise money for bribes demanded by recruitment officers. Stories abounded of young

people insinuating that joining the terror group would be a welcome alternative after their

attempts at being recruited into the Kenyan Defence Forces were frustrated due to inability to

afford the hefty bribes demanded. Ngugi (n.d) agrees that if corruption was wiped out, more

employment opportunities could be made available for the youth who were generally vulnerable

to being radicalised.

Literature on past, present and suggested anti-terror strategies reveals three clusters of

interventions namely politico-structural measures, socio-economic strategies and psycho-social

pg. 225

interventions. Below are certain measures that had been proposed in addition to the existing

strategies aimed at curbing terrorism in the country. Some of these could have been in place by

the time of the project implementation while others could have been at various stages of planning

or they may have been discarded altogether.

5.8.1 Politico-Structural Measures

Following the Westgate Mall attack, the government resolved to enhance border control

management through various security initiatives that would include passenger profiling and

screening of persons entering and exiting the country. This would see the implementation of

Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System at the country‘s international

airports. There would also be a move to curtail the acquisition of fake Kenyan identification

documents. Efforts to identify and to intercept known criminals and terrorists and the tracking of

suspicious travellers would be intensified (Ombati, 2013).

Other recommendations were to step up the fight against corruption in government, withdrawal

of Kenyan troops from Somalia, ‗flushing‘ out of illegal immigrants, stricter legal measures

against perpetrators, and capacity building of security personnel (Ochiel, 2018). Brislen (2015)

suggests the building of a physical wall between Kenya and Somalia; addressing historical

injustices; rethinking the country‘s security strategy; and a new military policy plan informed by

the new threat of religion-based terrorism. Willem and Joop (2016) propose that isolation by

tracking and monitoring social support for radical, violent solutions could have been helpful too.

Ngugi (n.d) argues for the use of public dialogue as a tool for fighting violent extremism as it

was valuable for dealing with uncooperative actors. However, the principle should not be to bend

to the demands of the terror organisations or to legitimize their actions but to skilfully negotiate

pg. 226

more moderate policies and behaviours (Store, 2011 as cited in Ngugi). Tyner and the European

Institute for Peace (n.d) also argue that dialogue could be important in handling terrorists as the

conflict with them tended to be asymmetric. However, it was not to be confused with

concessions to their demands, nor should it be used to legitimise their methods. It should not also

be seen as a show of weakness. He offers that dialogue should be employed when the terrorist

movement threatens to evolve into an insurgency and as a complementary tool to other

counterterrorism strategies rather than as a stand-alone measure. Good practices through

implementation of laws and proper policy frameworks could have been adopted at national level.

Such a dialogue could have been done online as this was likely to assist states to obtain

important information from the terrorists about their availability, accessibility and terrorist

content online. Such information could then provide good evidence for prosecution (UN Security

Council as cited in Ngugi, n.d).

5.8.2 Socio-Economic Measures

Willem and Joop (2016) propose another dimension of measures that could have proved useful in

preventing the occurrence of terrorist activities. These included general interventions that were

applicable to other contexts other than radicalism and terrorism; such as the increase of equity on

the education front and forestalling deprivation. Conscious efforts to correct misconceptions

about values and to clarify the positions of various groups on issues were important too. More

focus needed to be placed on practical and economic assistance. In any case, Wesonga (2017)

affirms that both Muslims and Christians in Kenya had the common challenges of corruption,

lack of clean drinking water, lack of access to medical facilities, unemployment, and insecurity.

Formulation of superordinate goals geared towards resolving these challenges were likely to give

them more opportunities for cooperation and networking.

pg. 227

These could emulate the formats of the interfaith peace groups that had engaged young people in

empowerment programs that provided entrepreneurship skills in the past. The result could be the

integration of the two groups as they worked towards achieving common goals. Benedikter and

Ouedraogo (2018) recommend for governmental institutions to tackle the politics of individual

and collective memory, demography policies and the problems of urbanization. They

recommend initiatives to replace failed companies and to seek ways to increase financial support

for the benefit of water quality, sanitation, and healthcare. The easing of procurement procedures

for the affected areas, lower taxes, and strengthening of civilian-military collaboration were also

likely to result in positive impacts.

5.8.3 Psycho-Social Measures

Brislen‘s (2015) research mentions that some religious scholars had advocated for interreligious

dialogue between Muslims and Christians with a view to building a better Kenyan community.

Wandusim (2015) recommends that during such dialogue, the unique contribution of the youth as

the future leaders needed to be appreciated in three fundamental areas.

i) How did both faiths read their sacred texts i.e. the Bible and the Qur‘an?

ii) How did they perceive the character of the one God who commands love for God and

for one‘s neighbours?

iii) What was the nature of the source of the love command, i.e., was it from God or was

it from man?

However, Wesonga (2017) warns that extremists on both sides needed to avoid confusing the

goal of such dialogue with conversion. Rather, Muslims and Christians could hold on to their

pg. 228

faith while respecting each other‘s points of view. Other measures that were proffered to foster

peace between Muslims and Christians included the concept of Colour in Faith. According to

Wesonga (ibid), this concept was developed by Yazmany Arboleda as a way of demonstrating

shared humanity irrespective of different faiths. It had resulted in Mosques and Churches in parts

of Nairobi being painted yellow by Muslims and Christians working together as an expression of

love and the recognition of one Creator.

In addition, Willem and Joop (2016) enumerate a few elements that may be essential in

preventing radicalism and terrorism. These are anger management; dispelling of stereotypes or

the representation of victims‘ positions in a sympathetic manner that reduces prejudice; and the

building of better interpersonal relationships through cooperative learning and greater

helpfulness. Increase in intergroup contact was suggested as a useful tool in reducing prejudice

and hostility towards members of out-groups. Psychological counselling and the formation of

new social networks with out-group members could also help in combating radicalism and

terrorism (Paluck & Green, 2009 & Horgan & Braddock, 2010 as cited in Willem & Joop, ibid).

Mentorship to prevent radicalization or to help de-radicalize individuals was essential too.

Benedikter and Ouedraogo (2018) root for the promotion of organized remembrance of

traditional values and habits alongside the appreciation of racial, ethnic and religious differences

to lessen the political impacts of radicalization. They also advocate for the creation of trauma and

resilience support groups to reduce the influence of jihadist propaganda while focusing on

historical knowledge and evidence, raising awareness of space, time and place among citizens.

Finally, Chellaney (2019) suggests that a successful anti-terrorism campaign needed to focus on

disputing pernicious radicalising ideology as was done during the Cold War when communism

pg. 229

was discredited and capitalism promoted to gain international appeal. Beliefs that inspired terror

attacks around the world should be run down, for instance, the very concept of jihad could be

attacked as negating the obvious benefits and gains of contemporary civilisation. Specific beliefs

such as the supposed reward composed of 72 virgins awaiting any young man who died for the

jihadi course could be easily brought to disrepute as it was not recorded in the Qur‘an. The

weaknesses of sharia law or Islamic law could be exposed as an assault on modernity and

societal progress. These included the promotion of gender inequality such as discrimination

against women and girl child marriage to adult men; and the dehumanisation of non-Muslims.

pg. 230

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter discussed counterterrorism interventions in Kenya and their likely impact on

perceptions of Muslims and Christians in Kenya. It began with a description of past successes in

disbanding of terrorist groups that dated back to the 1970s. The global War on Terror which was

the mainstay of most CT interventions in Africa was discussed along with the strategies that

underlay it. These strategies included the use of direct and indirect capacity building of military

and state security machinery which also informed the African Union‘s strategy that had several

functions. Two major AU initiatives were discussed, i.e. the African Centre for the Study and

Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The aim of

the former was to guide member states in their CT strategies while the latter was made up of

forces from a number of Eastern and Central African countries. The latter were involved in

fighting alongside Somali military forces against the al Shabaab terrorist militants.

Kenya‘s CT policy was discussed specifically with regard to its National Counter-Terrorism

Centre (NCTC) which was tasked with coordinating state agencies in implementing the National

Counter-violent Extremism Strategy. Here, the activities of the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit and

the Kenya Defence Forces are discussed. The former had come under criticism from especially

Muslim populations for lacking a legal framework to guide its activities, which were described

as militarised and arbitrary. The government‘s use of secret surveillance had also been linked to

the extrajudicial killings of radical Islamic leaders in the country although it had denied

involvement in these. The Kenyan military were involved in the incursion into Somalia where

they were taking on al Shabaab and had managed to wrestle control of the port of Kismayu from

them. Three operations that had been carried out in a bid to fight terrorism in the country are

discussed. One of these was the Operation Linda Nchi by KDF which began in October, 2011 in

pg. 231

Somalia and was still on-going at the time of data collection for this project. The second was the

Usalama Watch which was carried out by the ATPU in early April, 2014. A third intervention

was the Nyumba Kumi Initiative which was a community policing concept that was yet to be

fully accepted by especially Muslim populations and other publics. The final intervention was

the six-year-old operation Linda Boni forest in Lamu County which was facing a myriad

challenges.

The probable impact of these and other CT measures on the attitudes of Muslims and Christians

was discussed alongside their likelihood to lead to suspicion of Muslims by the government and

vice versa. Besides, there was the probability of increasing antagonism from the Muslim

community in six dimensions linked to the constant targeting of Somalis and Muslims. These

were likely to result in the Muslims‘ view of victimisation and the continuation of discrimination

by the government. The excessive use of force led to antipathy towards the government and

hesitancy in seeking justice for families of individuals mishandled by the police. Human rights

violations of Muslims had increased their animosity because of the resultant feelings of

helplessness. Retaliatory attacks instigated by CT measures had targeted Christians and their

establishments, further strengthening the association of government with Christians and the

perception of the latter as the enemy of Islam. Muslims were suspicious of government motives

behind the Nyumba Kumi initiative and they were unwilling to participate fully in it, leading to

further suspicion from the government. The use of force in CT measures had led to some youth

becoming radicalised and joining terrorist organisations. Moderate Muslims were likely to

harbour feelings of shame and guilt because of their group‘s behaviour.

The CT measures were likely to have adverse influences on Christians in five perspectives. The

targeting of Somalis and Muslims had the potential of strengthening the link between these

pg. 232

attributes with terrorism. The targeting of Christian interests in revenge attacks could strengthen

the attitude that terrorism was a religious weapon especially due to the use of religious (Arabic)

language during attacks. The violation of Muslim rights had the potential of triggering animosity

among Christians who did not believe the former‘s allegations of innocence. The constant

association of the government with Christians was likely to lead to the belief that they were

being used as a scapegoat, further breeding animosity against Muslims. The lack of Muslim

cooperation in community policing programs could lead to issues of trust between the two

groups. Finally, moderate and sympathetic Christians were likely to feel shame and guilt on

behalf of the government and Christians.

The chapter ended with a discourse on the suggestions about CT measures that could be more

efficacious. These were categorised into three groups; namely politico-structural measures,

socio-economic measures and psycho-social interventions. Politico-structural measures had to do

with strengthening border control, fighting corruption and the use of dialogue. Socio-economic

measures focussed on equity on the education front, resolution of underlying injustices,

economic empowerment programs and the correction of misconceptions. Psycho-social

interventions were related to interreligious dialogue, anger management, increasing group

cooperation between Muslims and Christians, de-radicalisation, psychological counselling and

the thrashing of radicalising ideology.

This chapter marks the third and last of literature review for this project. The review began in

chapter two which was an analysis of the dynamics of the relations between Muslims and

Christians in Kenya and their implications for attitudes. Chapter three examined the subject of

terrorism and ushered in this chapter on counterterrorism measures and their potential influence

on the attitudes of Muslims and Christians. The discourse now changes dimension to the

pg. 233

practical aspects of the research which will be the focus of the next four chapters. Chapter five

marks the beginning of this dimension and it provides a description of the methodological

aspects of the project.

pg. 234


Ce chapitre a abordé les interventions antiterroristes au Kenya et leur impact probable sur les

perceptions des musulmans et des chrétiens au Kenya. Il a commencé par une description des

succès passés dans la dissolution des groupes terroristes qui dataient des années 1970. La guerre

mondiale contre le terrorisme, qui a été le pilier de la plupart des interventions de CT en Afrique,

a été discutée avec les stratégies qui la sous-tendent. Ces stratégies comprenaient l‘utilisation de

renforcement direct et indirect des capacités des mécanismes de sécurité militaire et étatique qui

ont également influencé la stratégie de l‘Union africaine qui avait plusieurs fonctions. Deux

grandes initiatives de l‘UA ont été discutées, à savoir le Centre africain d‘étude et de recherche

sur le terrorisme (ACSRT) et la Mission africaine en Somalie (AMISOM). L‘objectif de la

première était de guider les États membres dans leurs stratégies de lutte contreterroriste (CT),

tandis que le second était composé de forces provenant de plusieurs pays d‘Afrique de l‘Est et

d‘Afrique centrale. Ces derniers ont été impliqués dans des combats aux côtés des forces

militaires somaliennes contre les militants terroristes d‘al Shabaab.

La politique de la lutte CT du Kenya a été discutée spécifiquement en ce qui concerne son Centre

national de lutte contre le terrorisme (NCTC), qui a été chargé de coordonner les organismes

d‘État dans la mise en œuvre de la Stratégie nationale de lutte contre l‘extrémisme violent. Ici,

les activités de l‘Unité de police antiterroriste et des Forces de défense du Kenya sont discutées.

Le premier avait fait l‘objet de critiques de la part des populations en particulier musulmanes

pour ne pas avoir un cadre juridique pour orienter ses activités, qui ont été décrites comme

militarisées et arbitraires. Son recours à la surveillance secrète avait également été lié aux

exécutions extrajudiciaires de dirigeants islamiques radicaux dans le pays, bien qu‘elle ait nié

toute implication dans ces affaires. Ce dernier a été impliqué dans l‘incursion en Somalie où il

pg. 235

s‘en prenait à al Shabaab et avait réussi à lutter contre le contrôle du port de Kismayu. Trois

opérations qui avaient été menées dans le but de lutter contre le terrorisme dans le pays sont

discutées. L‘une d‘elles était l‘opération Linda Nchi de KDF qui a débuté en octobre 2011 en

Somalie et était toujours en cours au moment de la collecte de données pour ce projet. La

seconde était l‘Usalama Watch qui a été réalisée par l‘ATPU au début d‘avril 2014. Une

troisième intervention a été l‘Initiative Nyumba Kumi qui était un concept de police

communautaire qui n‘était pas encore pleinement accepté par les populations musulmanes et

d‘autres publics.

L‘impact de ces mesures et d‘autres mesures de CT sur les perceptions des musulmans et des

chrétiens a été discuté et les mesures ont été décrites comme susceptibles de conduire à la

suspicion des musulmans par le gouvernement et vice versa. En outre, il y avait la probabilité

d‘accroître l‘antagonisme de la communauté musulmane en six dimensions liées au ciblage

constant des Somaliens et des Musulmans. Cela pourrait donner lieu à la perception de

victimisation par les musulmans et à la poursuite de la discrimination de la part du

gouvernement. Le recours excessif à la force a conduit à l‘antipathie envers le gouvernement et à

l‘hésitation à demander justice aux familles d‘individus malmenés par la police. Les violations

des droits de l‘homme commises par les musulmans avaient accru leur animosité en raison des

sentiments d‘impuissance qui en ont résulté. Les attaques en tant que représailles lancées par les

mesures de la CT avaient visé les chrétiens et leurs établissements, renforçant encore

l‘association du gouvernement avec les chrétiens et la perception de ce dernier comme l‘ennemi

de l‘Islam. Les musulmans se méfiaient des motivations du gouvernement à l‘origine de

l‘initiative Nyumba Kumi et ils n‘étaient pas disposés à y participer pleinement, ce qui a conduit

à d‘autres soupçons de la part du gouvernement. Le recours à la force dans les mesures de la

pg. 236

TCC a conduit certains jeunes à se radicaliser et à rejoindre des organisations terroristes. Les

musulmans modérés étaient susceptibles d‘abriter des sentiments de honte et de culpabilité en

raison du comportement de leur groupe.

Les mesures de CT étaient susceptibles d‘avoir des influences négatives sur les chrétiens sur cinq

points. Le ciblage des Somaliens et des musulmans avait le potentiel de renforcer le lien entre

ces attributs et le terrorisme. Le ciblage des intérêts chrétiens dans les attaques fondées sur la

vengeance a augmenté la perception que le terrorisme était une arme religieuse en particulier en

raison de l‘utilisation de la langue religieuse (arabe) pendant les attaques. La violation des droits

des musulmans avait le potentiel de conduire à l‘animosité parmi les chrétiens qui ne croyaient

pas les allégations d‘innocence de la première. L‘association constante du gouvernement avec les

chrétiens était susceptible de conduire à la perception d‘être utilisé comme bouc émissaire, une

animosité supplémentaire se reproduisant contre les musulmans. Le manque de coopération

musulmane dans les programmes de police communautaire pourrait conduire à des questions de

confiance entre les deux groupes. Enfin, les chrétiens modérés et sympathiques étaient

susceptibles de ressentir de la honte et de la culpabilité vis-à-vis du positionnement du

gouvernement et de l‘attitude des chrétiens.

Le chapitre s‘est terminé par un discours sur les mesures proposées de la TC qui pourraient être

plus efficaces. Celles-ci ont été classées en trois groupes, à savoir des mesures politico-

structurelles, des mesures socio-économiques et des interventions psychosociales. Les mesures

politico-structurelles ont trait au renforcement du contrôle des frontières, à la lutte contre la

corruption et au dialogue. Les mesures socio-économiques ont mis l‘accent sur l‘équité sur le

front de l‘éducation, la résolution des injustices sous-jacentes, les programmes d‘autonomisation

économique et la correction des idées fausses. Les interventions psychosociales étaient liées au

pg. 237

dialogue interreligieux, à la gestion de la colère, à la coopération croissante entre les groupes

entre musulmans et chrétiens, à la déradicalisation, au conseil psychologique et à la lutte contre

l‘idéologie radicalisante.

Ce chapitre marque le troisième et dernier examen de la littérature pour ce projet. L‘examen a

commencé dans le chapitre deux qui était une analyse de la dynamique des relations entre les

musulmans et les chrétiens au Kenya et leurs implications au niveau des perceptions. Le chapitre

trois a examiné la question du terrorisme et a introduit ce chapitre sur les mesures antiterroristes

et leur influence potentielle sur les perceptions des musulmans et des chrétiens. Le travail porte

désormais un regard sur les aspects pratiques de la recherche qui seront au centre des quatre

prochains chapitres. Le chapitre cinq marque le début de cette approche empirique en fournissant

une description des aspects méthodologiques du projet.

pg. 238

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pg. 243

CHAPTER SIX

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS OF DATA ANALYSIS: THE

EXPERIMENT

MÉTHODOLOGIE DE LA RECHERCHE ET ANALYSES DES RÉSULTATS :

L’ÉTUDE EXPÉRIMENTALE

pg. 244

6.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this research project was to investigate the attitudes of Kenyan Muslims and

Christians on religion-based terrorism. In chapter three, an in-depth synthesis of the dynamics of

the relations between these two religious groups was given. It exposed the inclination towards

rivalry and competition rather than cooperation between them. The entrance of terrorism into the

scene complicated matters as the attacks had been perpetrated by culprits who were associated

with Islam and targeted at Christians, further aggravating the ambivalent relations between the

two groups. Chapter four gave an in-depth analysis of the problem of global terrorism and how it

was reflected in the Kenyan case where most attacks had been attributed to the al Shabaab. This

was a terror group based in neighbouring Somalia but it was actively present in Kenya where

they were on an aggressive recruitment drive. They had managed to organise and to carry out

attacks on Christian and associated interests. Chapter five delved into the counterterrorism

measures that had been launched by the government. These were informed by the US and UK-

led Global War on Terror policies and heavily financed by their and other donor funds. The

mechanisms used in fighting terrorism in Kenya made matters worse in the way in which

Muslims were targeted with excessive use of force and their rights violated. This had resulted in

further radicalisation of traditionally moderate Kenyan Muslims some of whom had joined terror

organisations. This had led to increased attacks and the linking of the government to Christians.

As a result of these observations, the project was designed to investigate the attitudes of Muslim

and Christian youth about terrorism in the country. First, the target population was youth

members of the two religious groups who were prone to radicalisation. The research enquired

into how the two groups related with each other in daily life as described in chapter two. There

was an investigation into the belief that terrorism was linked to Islam and that terrorists targeted

pg. 245

Christians as explained in chapter three. Finally, the project also examined the attitudes of

respondents on the counterterrorism measures in the country as discussed in chapter four. This

project was composed of two research studies, an experiment and a survey.

The current chapter presents the research techniques and methodology that were employed in the

experiment which constituted the first study of the project. The experiment aimed at

investigating the attitudes of Muslims and Christian students in Garissa University and MMUST

on terrorism in Kenya. The chapter examines the methodology that was used for the study, the

descriptive analysis of participants, methods of data analysis and the findings of this analysis.

6.2 Research Design

The study made use of quantitative techniques in an experimental design. Participants were

classified according to religion. Muslim participants were only categorised into one homogenous

group as there were no self-reported distinctions along denominational lines among them. Even

the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (2019) did not categorise Muslims further into

denominations. However, this did not mean that there were no differences in the Muslim

respondents‘ forms of religious expression. However, in this study, Christian participants were

categorized into denominations namely Catholic33

, the Christian Union34

, Seventh-day

Adventist35

, and the Repentance and Holiness36

. This was to ensure a relatively wider spread of

33 Those who subscribed to Roman Catholicism and they account for 20.6% of the Kenyan population.

34 Also known as CU, the Christian Union is an association of Christian students usually from an evangelical

background. Evangelical Christians account for 20.4% of the population of Kenya. 35

It is also known in short as SDA. A unique characteristic of this group is their observance of Saturday as the day

of worship as opposed to majority of Christians who observe Sunday. They are classified as Protestants, who

account for 33.4% of the Kenyan population.

pg. 246

Christians as they were not a homogenous group. The Muslims and Christians were then

classified into two groups namely the control and experimental groups for purposes of the

experiment. These groups were subjected to different treatments in the form of primers at the

beginning of the questionnaire. Further details on this and other aspects of the questionnaire are

given under the relevant sections below.

The questionnaires were administered to them without telling them whether they were in the

control or experimental group as they responded to the questionnaires in the same setting. Where

the researcher was present in MMUST, even the research assistants were blind to the hypotheses

to ensure that they did not influence participants‘ responses in any way. Participants were

required to complete the questionnaires there and then during their regular prayer or other

meetings.

6.2.1 Target Population

Since the study was focussed on Muslim and Christian participants, all the Muslim and Christian

students at these institutions became the target population from which the sample was picked to

provide observations for the study. The experiment targeted Muslim and Christian students of

Garissa University and the MMUST main campus. These were regular registered students who

identified themselves with either of the two religions. As it was not possible to make

observations on whole target populations, representative samples were used to provide

information about the whole group. Below is a description of the sample that was used.

36 A new religious movement based on the prophetic calling that emerged in Kenya around 2004 (Ndeda, 2013). It is

classified as an evangelical Christian ministry. Evangelical Christians account for 20.4% of Kenya‘s population.

pg. 247

6.2.2 Sample Size

The whole Muslim group was targeted while the Christian groups were chosen purposively.

Three of the largest Christian groups in the universities and Kenya as a whole were chosen,

namely the Catholic, the Christian Union, and the Seventh-day Adventists along with the

Repentance and Holiness ministry. As mentioned in Chapter two, the Catholic, Protestants and

Evangelicals constituted the major Christian denominations in Kenya. The Seventh-day

Adventists was a Protestant outfit while the Christian Union was an evangelical group. The

Repentance and Holiness Ministry combines both protestant and evangelical Christian principles.

The sample was made up of 355 respondents, with 164 respondents from Garissa University and

191 respondents from MMUST. Of the Garissa respondents, 49 were Muslims while 115 were

Christians. MMUST respondents consisted of 34 Muslims and 157 Christians. This translated to

83 Muslims and 272 Christians. The table below illustrates this distribution.

University Muslims Christians TOTAL

Garissa 49 115 164

MMUST 34 157 191

TOTAL 83 272 355 Table 6.1: Experiment sampling frame for university affiliation and religious affiliation

6.2.3 Sampling Techniques

The two institutions were sampled purposively for their unique characteristics. As mentioned in

chapter 1, Garissa University was situated in a terror hotspot and had been targeted by terrorists

in the past while MMUST main campus was in a relatively low-risk region for terror and it had

no past history of attack. Islam and Christianity were sampled purposively because of the aim of

this study which was to inquire into their attitudes; therefore it was automatic to pick Muslim

students. However, as Christians in Kenya‘s institutions of higher learning were not a

pg. 248

homogenous group, it became necessary to sample the denominations to be observed. Four

denominations were chosen to participate in the study. These were Catholic, Christian Union,

Seventh-day Adventist, and Repentance and Holiness. Thus, the Christian religious

denominations were selected and the four sub-groups chosen from them. These four were also

major denominations with large followings in Kenya. Other denominations with equally or

relatively large membership were the Anglican Church, Church of God, the Methodist,

Apostolic, Jehovah‘s Witnesses, Pentecostal Assemblies of God, Salvation Army, among others.

It is because of these divisions of the Christians that a sampling of denominations had to be done.

6.2.4 Study Variables

There were two groups of variables in this study, namely the independent variables and the

dependent variables. The independent variables comprised of the University of Affiliation and

religious affiliation while the dependent variables constituted the attitudes about terrorism,

attitudes about solutions, relationship factors, and self-esteem factors. The dependent variables

were each correlated with the independent variables.

6.2.5 Data Collection Instruments

Data was collected from respondents by use of questionnaires which were divided into six

sections on seven printed pages, and they were all identical. It took the respondents an average of

twenty minutes to complete the questionnaires. There were a total of four sets of questionnaires

specifically for the Muslim Experimental Group (MEG), Muslim Control Group (MCG), the

Christian Experimental Group (CEG) and the Christian Control Group (CCG). The

questionnaires were marked as such at the pagination area for ease of identification by the

pg. 249

researcher yet not to attract the attention of the respondents. These questionnaires are included in

the appendix I section (A, B, C and D respectively) at the end of this thesis for further reference.

Below is a breakdown of the different sections of the questionnaires.

6.2.5.1 Introductory Remarks

The first part of the questionnaire introduced the study to the participants and explained the

purposes of the inquiry. The respondents were requested to participate in the study in order to

contribute to the generation of knowledge. They were also encouraged to respond as truthfully as

possible as there was no right or wrong answer. This was to motivate them further and to

minimize the chances of inaccurate responses intended to impress. They were also assured of

confidentiality. The length of the questionnaire was indicated and the approximate time it would

take them to complete it. This section mentioned the presence and titles of the different sections

of the questionnaire and ended with the instructions to participants on how they were expected to

indicate their responses. Respondents were instructed not to write their names or registration

numbers.

6.2.5.2 Section I: The Primers

There was a primer at the beginning of each questionnaire depending on the group of

respondents. The primer on the control group questionnaire was meant to help respondents think

of their general life in and after university. It did not mention anything about terrorism and it

read as follows.

Think about your life in university, your studies, your failures and your successes. Consider your future

goals and life in general. When you think about the plans you have for your future, do you feel anxious,

optimistic or resigned to fate? How about life in general? Is it good, wonderful, unpredictable?

pg. 250

On the other hand, the primer on the experimental questionnaire was related to terrorism and was

intended to make respondents think about the problem of terrorism in Kenya. It read thus.

Think about the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Kenya in the recent past and who the perpetrators

are. Consider the manner in which Christians have been targeted in these events. Reflect on the effects of

these acts on your life, your future and the feelings and emotions they evoke. Does it make you feel

anxious, pessimistic?

6.2.5.3 Section II A: Attitude Factors

This section was divided into three sub-sections focusing on the attitudes and relationship factors

of respondents. The first sub-section was titled Perception Factors and it contained 12 items in a

Likert scale. The respondents were required to indicate how strongly they agreed or disagreed

with each statement on a continuum with 6 responses. These were designated as -3 for strongly

disagree, -2 for disagree, -1 for somehow disagree, 1 for somehow agree, 2 for agree and 3 for

strongly agree. Reliability was measured using Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability for Likert

Scales and it yielded an alpha of .74. This meant that the items had a high internal consistency.

An example of an item in this section was:

Somali refugees are behind terrorist acts in Kenya.

6.2.5.4 Section II B: Relationship Factors

The second sub-section was titled Relationship Factors and it contained items about participants‘

relationships with members of the opposite religion. It was further divided into two parts with

part (i) containing 12 items on a 6-response Likert scale. The responses on the scale were

designated as -3 for strongly disagree, -2 for disagree, -1 for somehow disagree, 1 for somehow

agree, 2 for agree and 3 for strongly agree. Seven out of the twelve items in this section were

modified to correspond to the religious group of the respondent by swapping the words

Christian(s) and Muslim(s) with each other accordingly. Reliability was measured using

pg. 251

Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability for Likert Scales and it yielded an alpha of .56 thus the items

had a moderate internal consistency. An example of an item from this section in the Muslims‘

questionnaire is given below.

I have no problem sharing a room with a Christian at any point during my stay at the university.

The equivalent item in the Christians‘ questionnaire read as follows.

I have no problem sharing a room with a Muslim at any point during my stay at the university.

6.2.5.5 Section II B Part (ii): Proximity Factors

This sub-section of relationship factors focused on the proximity of respondents to persons of the

opposite religion. The difference with the previous section is that it focussed more on proximity

by family ties and interaction such as in living arrangements. The participants were only required

to indicate Yes or No depending on their situation for the 6 items contained in this part. Here too,

the words Muslim(s) and Christian(s) were swapped for all the items depending on the

questionnaire. One example of an item in this section of the Muslims‘ questionnaire read as

follows:

I have immediate family members who are Christians (Father/Mother/Sister/Brother).

The equivalent of the above item in the Christians‘ questionnaire read as indicated below.

I have immediate family members who are Muslims (Father/Mother/Sister/Brother).

6.2.5.6 Section II C: Solution Factors

This section had items interrogating participants on their attitudes towards the counterterrorism

measures applied in Kenya. It was titled Solution Factors and it contained 10 items in a Likert

pg. 252

scale with 6 responses on a continuum, which were designated as -3 for strongly disagree, -2 for

disagree, -1 for somehow disagree, 1 for somehow agree, 2 for agree and 3 for strongly agree.

The reliability of these items was measured using Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability for Likert

Scales and it yielded an alpha of .67 thus the items had a strong internal consistency. An example

of an item in this section read thus.

Kenya should withdraw its KDF soldiers from Somalia.

6.2.5.7 Section III: Self-Esteem Factors

This section asked respondents to reply to questions about their sense of self-worth. It was titled

Self-Esteem Scale and it contained 10 items on Likert scale with 6 responses on the continuum.

These were designated as -3 for strongly disagree, -2 for disagree, -1 for somehow disagree, 1 for

somehow agree, 2 for agree and 3 for strongly agree. The items were a mixture of items

indicative of high and low self-esteem. Their reliability was measured using Cronbach‘s Alpha

test of reliability for Likert Scales and it yielded an alpha of .48. Two examples of items

indicative of participants‘ levels of self-esteem are given below with the first one signifying high

self-esteem and the second one representative of low self-esteem.

1. I feel that I have a number of good qualities.

2. Sometimes I think I am no good at all.

6.2.5.8 Section IV: Demographic Factors

This section comprised 7 items asking the respondents about their personal information in the

areas of their sex, religion, denomination, age, the course level, their year of study and the area

of specialization at the current university. There were only two obvious options for sex, either

male or female and only two options for religion, either Islam or Christianity. The ages were

pg. 253

categorized into four spans of 3 years each with the fifth and final age category having no upper

limit. The spans began with 18, the minimum college entry age in Kenya and were as follows: 18

to 20; 21 to 23; 24 to 26; 27 to 29; and over 30. The course level had to do with the qualification

they were seeking and these could have varied from certificate, diploma, bachelor, Masters to

doctorate level. Generally, certificate courses lasted up to six months, diploma courses lasted up

to one year while bachelors training could last from four to six years depending on the area of

specialization. The year of study represented the stage they were at in their studies such as first

year, second year, third year, fourth year, fifth year and so on. The area of specialization was the

major they were studying at university and it could have varied accordingly, e.g. Education,

Agriculture, Engineering, etc.

6.2.6 Methods of Data collection

Collection of data at Garissa University was done by a qualified researcher who worked as a

research assistant in this project. He first sought authorisation from the County Commissioner‘s

office which was granted in written form. This was used to access the Deputy Vice Chancellor of

the university, who handed him over to the respective student leaders. The leaders then

mobilized their members, informed them of the research exercise and then they completed the

questionnaires. During the sessions, the respondents were all mixed up and they did not know

that there was any difference in the questionnaires they were responding to.

At MMUST, there was an attempt to contact the patrons of various religious groups for

introduction to the student leaders. The Christian Union patron and the Catholic chaplain, who

also doubled as the chaplain for the Muslim students‘ association, were able to initiate contact

with the respective student leaders. It was not possible to make contact with the patrons of the

pg. 254

Seventh-day Adventist and the Repentance and Holiness groups. It was not clear at the time

whether these offices even existed and who held them. However, the student leaders were willing

to work directly with the researcher to assist in mobilizing the respondents. All group leaders

were taken through a briefing of the research purposes and data collection techniques before

being allowed to start working. They helped to mobilize the members especially before and

during worship services and to prepare them psychologically for the exercise. The Christian

groups completed the questionnaires immediately after worship services. The Muslims did not

hold any worship services on campus, but they had a weekly meeting during which these

exercises (mobilization and questionnaire completion) were done on two different occasions.

The following section presents the descriptive statistics of the respondents who participated in

the studies alongside explanations of how the data collected from them was treated, in that order.

Illustrative histograms and/or pie-charts are provided alongside the explanations. Next is a

description of how the data was analysed with outputs that were generated used to illuminate the

observations. These results are also contained in tabular form for ease of reference with

summaries at the end of each table.

6.3 Statistical Description of Respondents

The statistical description of the participants in this study is summarised in this sub-section.

There were a total of 356 respondents who were categorised by religious affiliation, university

affiliation, treatment groups, denominations, sex, age, course level and year of study. The

distributions are illustrated in histograms and pie charts.

pg. 255

6.3.1 Distribution by University

There were 164 participants from Garissa University and 191 respondents from the MMUST

main campus. This means that participants from the former made up 46% while those from the

latter constituted 54% of the total number of respondents. A pie chart of this distribution is given

below.

Figure 6.1: Participants' distribution by university

6.3.2 Distribution by Religion

Of the 356 respondents, 272 were Christians accounting for 76.6% of participants. 83 were

Muslims who accounted for 23.3%. The pie chart below shows this distribution.

164 (46%) 191 (54%)

University

Garissa

Masinde Muliro

pg. 256

Figure 6.2 Religious distribution of participants

6.3.3 Summary by Treatment Group

There were two treatment groups namely the Experimental group and the Control group. The

respondents from the two religions were allocated to these groups yielding a total of four groups.

These were the Muslim Experimental Group denoted by MEG and Muslim Control Group

denoted by MCG; Christian Experimental Group denoted by the abbreviation CEG and the

Christian Control Group denoted by CCG. There were 42 participants in each of the Muslim

groups. The Christian Experimental Group and the Christian Control Group had 130 respondents

and 142 participants respectively. Below is a histogram of this distribution.

272 (77%)

83 (23%)

Religion

Christianity

Islam

pg. 257

Figure 6.3: Distribution of participants by treatment group

6.3.4 Distribution by Denomination

The Muslims‘ denominational categories were not available as none of them indicated this in

their questionnaires. There were a total of 84 Muslim respondents. Four Christian denominations

were represented in this experiment. They were Catholic with 78 respondents, the Christian

Union with 97 respondents, the Seventh-day Adventist with 54 participants and Repentance and

Holiness with 43 respondents. Below is the histogram that represents this distribution.

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Christians Muslims

Experimental group

Control group

pg. 258

Figure 6.4: Denominational distribution of respondents

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

ChristianUnion

Catholic Advenstist Repentance Islamic

Denomination

Denomination

pg. 259

6.3.5 Distribution by Gender

There were 197 males and 158 females with males accounting for 55% of the respondents and

females accounting for 45%. The histogram below shows this distribution.

Figure 6.5: Gender distribution of participants

6.3.6 Distribution by Age

The respondents were categorized into five age groups ranging from 18 years of age to over 30.

There were 100 respondents aged 18 to 20 years of age, 207 respondents were aged 21 to 23

years, 43 were aged 24 to 26 years, 5 were aged 27 to 29 years and none was aged 30 and above.

The histogram below illustrates this distribution.

197 (55%) 158 (45%)

Gender

Male

Female

pg. 260

Figure 6.6: Respondents' distribution by age

6.3.7 Distribution by Course Level

The course level had to do with the level of training the respondents were undertaking at the

university at the time of data collection. There were 3 respondents taking certificate level

training, 21 were undertaking diploma level courses, 329 respondents were studying for

Bachelor‘s degrees and 2 participants were pursuing their Master‘s degree(s). There was no

respondent training at doctoral level. The histogram below illustrates this distribution.

0

50

100

150

200

250

18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29

Age

Age

pg. 261

Figure 6.7: Participants' distribution by course level

6.3.8 Distribution by Year of Study

The year of study represented the academic year the respondents were at in their training at

university as at the time of data collection. There were 49 respondents in their first year, 150 in

their second year, 89 in their third year and 57 in the fourth year of study. There were 6 fifth

years and 4 sixth years. This distribution is captured in the histogram below.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Certificate Diploma Bachelor's Master's

Course level

Course level

pg. 262

Figure 6.8: Distribution of respondents by year of study

6.4 Data Analysis

The following section describes how the data was manipulated and the results that were arrived

at. Analysis of variance was done to determine whether there was any difference between the

experimental group and the control group in the variables under study. The results are presented

below under respective variable names as the headings.

6.4.1 Attitude factors

The analysis of variance showed that there was a main effect of religious affiliation, F(1, 347) =

86,52, p < .001, η²p = .19 with Christian students considering that Christians were the main

targets of terrorist activities as compared with Muslim students (respectively M = 3.7; M = 2.9).

There is also a main effect of university affiliation F(1, 347) = 31.22, p < .001, η²p = .17 ; with

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year

Year of Study

Year of Study

pg. 263

students from ―Masinde Muliro‖ university considering that they were under less threat from

terrorist attacks than students from ―Garissa‖ university (respectively M = 2.9; M = 3.7).

At university level, Christian students at ―Garissa‖ considered Christians as targeted by terrorists

more than their Muslim counterparts given that M Christians = 4.2; M Muslims = 3.3 respectively.

Christian students at “Masinde Muliro” university regarded themselves rather targeted by

terrorists than their Muslim colleagues with M Christians = 3.3; M Muslims = 2.6 respectively.

However, there was no major effect of experimental group, F(1, 347) <1, neither were there any

significant interactions between any of the factors under study.

The output below shows the main effects discussed above revealing the influences of university

affiliation and religious affiliation on attitudes towards terrorism as an additive level effect.

pg. 264

Output 6.1: Attitudes factors by university, religion and treatment condition

6.4.2 Relationship Factors


24.11, p < .001, η²p = 0.06. There was a higher likelihood of Christian respondents relating with

Muslims than of Muslim respondents relating with Christians (respectively M = 3.0; M = 2.7).

There was a significant effect of university affiliation F(1, 347) = 5.26, p < .001, η²p = 0.01; as

the means for ―Masinde Muliro‖ university and ―Garissa‖ university were M = 2.7; M = 2.9

respectively. This means that Garissa respondents were more likely to relate with members of

opposite religion than those of Masinde Muliro University. When considering the religious X

university affiliations interaction F(1, 347) = 2,41, p =.12, η²p = 0.001, at ―Masinde Muliro‖

Experiment*Religion*university; Moy. Moindres Carrés

Effet courant : F(1, 347)=.07390, p=.78590

Décomposition efficace de l'hypothèse

Les barres verticales représentent les intervalles de confiance à 0.95

Experiment

EG

Experiment

CGuniversity: GU

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

Mean

pf

university: MMUST

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM

pg. 265

university, there was no significant difference in the relationship factors between the two groups

of respondents as M Christians = 2.8 and M Muslims = 2.7.

However, ―Garissa‖ university Christian students (M = 3.3) were more likely to relate with

members of the Muslim religion, while their Muslim counterparts (M=2.6) were less likely to

relate with members of the Christian religion. This means that at Garissa University, the

likelihood of Christian students relating with Muslims was higher than that of Muslim students

relating with Christians. The Muslim students at Garissa were also the least likely of all the

groups to relate with members of the opposite religion. There was no major effect of

experimental group, F(1, 347) <1.

Below is the output that illustrates these results which reveal differences in the likelihood of

relating with the out-group for Garissa University students only.

pg. 266

Output 6.2: Relationship factors by university, religion and treatment condition

6.4.3 Proximity Factors

The analysis of variance showed that there was an effect of religious affiliation, F(1, 347) =

83.49, p < .001, η²p = 0.19 with Christian students having closer associations with Muslims as

opposed to Muslim students (respectively M = 2.9; M = 2.6). There was no main effect of

university affiliation F(1, 347) <1; with the means for ―Masinde Muliro‖ university and

―Garissa‖ university being M = 2.7; M = 2.7 respectively.

At ―Masinde Muliro” university there was some difference in the proximity factors between the

two groups of respondents: M Christians =2.9 and M Muslims =2.5. The Christian students at this

Experiment*Religion*university ; Moy. Moindres Carrés

Effet courant : F(1, 347)=2.4070, p=.12170



Experiment

EG

Experiment

CGuniversity: GU

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM2.0

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3.0

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

Mean

re

university: MMUST

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM

pg. 267

institution related more with Muslims than the Muslim students related with Christians. This was

in contrast with the observations made about the Garissa University respondents where there was

no significant difference in the relations with the out-group between Muslim and Christian

respondents. At ―Garissa‖ university, the means were M Christians = 2.8; M Muslims = 2.7. There was

no major effect of experimental group, F(1, 347) <1, neither were there any significant

interactions between any of the factors.

The output below illustrates these results which reveal that differences in the proximity of

respondents to out-groups was evident at MMUST only.

pg. 268

Output 6.3: Proximity factors by religion and university

6.4.4 Terrorism Risk Attitudes


22.63, p < .001, η²p = 0.06 with Christian students being more likely to feel at risk of being

targeted by terrorists than Muslim students (respectively M = 3.9; M = 3.3). There was a major

significant effect of university affiliation F(1, 347) = 100.32, p < .001, η²p = 0.22; with the

means for ―Garissa‖ university and ―Masinde Muliro‖ university being M = 4.2; M = 3.0

respectively. This signified that students of ―Garissa‖ sensed a higher risk of terrorism in their

environment than those of ―Masinde Muliro‖.


Effet courant : F(1, 347)=.01525, p=.90178



Experiment

EG

Experiment

CGuniversity: GU

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

3.0

3.1

3.2

university: MMUST

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM

pg. 269

At university level, ―Garissa‖ university Christian students felt more at risk of terrorism than

their Muslim counterparts (M = 4.4; M = 3.9) while at ―Masinde Muliro‖ university Christian

respondents felt more at risk of terrorism than their Muslim counterparts (M Christians = 3.4 and M

Muslims = 2.7).

There was no major effect of experimental group, F(1, 347) <1, neither were there any

significant interactions between any of the factors. These results are represented in the graphical

output below. However, there were main effects of the university affiliation and religious

affiliation on terrorism risk attitude. This signifies an additive level effect of an attitude of

vulnerability to terrorism.

Output 6.4: Terrorism risk attitude by religion and university


Effet courant : F(1, 347)=.21619, p=.64225



Experiment

EG

Experiment

CGuniversity: GU

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM2.0

2.5

3.0

3.5

4.0

4.5

5.0

Ris

k p

erc

p

university: MMUST

Religion:CHRISTIAN

MUSLIM

pg. 270

6.5 Summary of Findings

This section below summarises the results discussed above after analysing the data on the

variables in question. The variables were attitude factors, relationship factors, proximity factors

and terrorism risk attitude factors. Tables are provided for reference at a glance.

6.5.1 Summary of Effects on Attitude Factors

It is important to note that there was no experimental effect on attitude factors. This was the main

goal of this study. However, certain observations were made that are important too. For instance,

it was observed that Christian respondents were more likely than their Muslim counterparts to

attribute terrorism to Muslims and to consider Christians as targeted by terrorists. Garissa

university students were also more likely than Masinde Muliro students to link terrorism with

Muslims and to regard Christians as the target of such acts. At university level, Garissa

University Muslim respondents were less likely than Garissa University Christians to have these

attitudes. This was replicated at Masinde Muliro University where the Muslim students were less

likely to consider terrorism as perpetrated by Muslims and Christians as the target.

Following is a table with a summary of results on the analysis of data on attitude factors.

No. Effects Values Observations

1.

Experimental

effect

There was no effect of the treatment on the

attitude towards terrorism.

2.

Religious affiliation

η²p= 0.19

Religious affiliation had an effect on attitude

factors.

Muslims ; Christians

2.9 ; 3.7

Christian respondents were more likely than

Muslim respondents to consider terrorism as

targeting Christians

pg. 271

University affiliation

η²p=0.17

University affiliation had an effect on attitude

factors.

GU37

; MMUST38

4.4; 4.1

Garissa university students were more likely to

than MMUST students to consider Christians as

targeted by terrorists.

3.

Post Hoc Interactions

GUM39

; GUC40

3.3; 4.2

Garissa university Muslims were less likely than

Garissa university Christians to consider terrorism

as targeting Christians.

MMUM41

; MMUC42

2.6; 3.3

MMUST Muslims were less likely than MMUST

Christians to regard Christians as targeted by

terrorists. Table 6.2: Summary of experiment observations on attitude factors

6.5.2 Summary of Effects on Relationship Factors

The results show that there was no significant effect of the experimental treatment on the

relationship factors. However, other observations showed that Muslim respondents were less

likely to relate with Christians while Christian participants were comparatively more likely to

relate with Muslims. At university level, Garissa University Muslims were less likely to

associate with Christians as compared to Garissa University Christians who were more likely to

relate with Muslims.

37 Garissa University

38 Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

39 Garissa University Muslim respondents

40 Garissa University Christian respondents

41 Masinde Muliro University Muslim respondents

42 Masinde Muliro University Christian respondents

pg. 272

No. Major Effects Values Observations

1. Experimental Effect There was no effect of the experimental treatment

on the relationship factors.

2.


η²p=0.06

Religious affiliation had an effect on relationship

factors.

Muslims ; Christians 2.7 ; 3.0 Muslim respondents were less likely than

Christian respondents to relate with members of

the opposite religion.

3.


η²p = 0.01

University affiliation has an effect on relationship

factors.

GU ; MMUST

2.9 ; 2.7

There was no significant difference in relationship

factors at university level.

2.


GUM ; GUC

2.6; 3.3


Garissa university Christians to relate with

members of the other religion.

MMUM ; MMUC

2.7 ; 2.8

There was no significant difference between

MMUST Muslim and MMUST Christian

respondents‘ relations with the other religion. Table 6.3: Summary of experiment observations on relationship factors

6.5.3 Summary of Proximity Factor Effects

The analysis of data revealed that Muslim students were less proximal to Christians than

Christian respondents were to Muslims. It also revealed that Masinde Muliro Muslim students

were less likely to be proximal to Christians than Christian respondents at the university were to

Muslims. They were also the least likely of all the four groups to be proximal to persons of the

opposite religion.

pg. 273


1.


η²p=0.19

Religious affiliation had an effect on relationship

factors.

Muslims ; Christians 2.6 ; 2.9 Muslim respondents were less proximal than

Christian respondents to members of the opposite

religion.

3.


η²p = 1

University affiliation had no effect on proximity

factors.

GU ; MMUST

2.7 ; 2.7

There was no difference in proximity factors at

university level.

2.


GUM ; GUC

2.7; 2.8

There was no significant difference in the

proximity factors between Garissa university

Muslims and Garissa university Christians.

MMUM ; MMUC

2.5 ; 2.9

MMUST Muslim students were less likely than

MMUST Christians to be proximate to persons of

the other religion. Table 6.4: Summary of experiment observations on proximity factors

6.5.4 Summary of Effects on Terrorism Risk Attitude

The major goal of this analysis was to investigate the effect of the experiment on the terrorism

risk attitude. The analysis of data did not reveal any such effect and it was concluded that the

treatment did not influence the terrorism risk attitude. Other observations were made to the

effect that Muslim respondents were less likely than Christian respondents to consider

themselves at risk of being attacked by terrorists. In addition, Garissa university students were

more likely than Masinde Muliro students to consider themselves at risk of being attacked by

terrorists. At university level, Garissa University Muslim respondents were less likely than their

Christian counterparts at the same institution to consider themselves at risk of terrorist attacks.

The same was observed at Masinde Muliro where the Muslim participants considered themselves

less likely than their Christian counterparts to be at risk of terror attacks.

pg. 274


1. Experimental Effect Less than 1 There was no effect of the experimental treatment

on the terrorism risk attitude.

2.


η²p=0.06

Religious affiliation had an effect on the terrorism

risk attitude.

Muslims ; Christians 3.3 ; 3.9 Muslim respondents were less likely than

Christian respondents to consider themselves at

risk of being attacked by terrorists.

3.


η²p = 0.22

University affiliation had an effect on the

terrorism risk attitude.

GU ; MMUST

4.2 ; 3.0

Garissa university students considered themselves

at higher risk of being attacked by terrorists than

MMUST students.

2.


GUM ; GUC

3.9; 4.4


Garissa university Christians to consider

themselves at risk of being attacked by terrorists.

MMUM ; MMUC

2.7 ; 3.4

MMUST Muslim students considered themselves

at lower risk of being attacked by terrorists than

MMUST Christian students. Table 6.5: Summary of experiment observations on terrorism risk attitude factors

pg. 275

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter described the methodology that was employed in the experiment alongside a

description of the participants, data analysis techniques and the findings arrived at. The

participants constituted the Muslim and Christian students at Garissa University and at MMUST.

The independent variables were the university affiliation and the religious affiliation while the

dependent variables were the respondents‘ attitudes towards terrorism, attitudes towards

solutions, relationship factors, and self-esteem factors. The study targeted Muslims and

Christians with the latter being categorised into denominational divisions as applied in Kenya.

All the Muslim students enrolled in universities were contacted for participation in the study.

Four Christian denominations were selected for observation in order to reduce chances of

skewedness. These were Catholic, the Christian Union, Seventh-day Adventists and the

Repentance and Holiness ministry. The leaders of these groups acted as the research assistants

and they helped in the fieldwork with sensitizing and mobilising members for questionnaire

completion. The respondents were designated the treatment groups with half being in the control

group and the other in the experimental group. The questionnaires for the two groups were

identical except that the control group was exposed to a primer about their general life while the

experimental group was manipulated using a primer on terrorism. The questionnaire consisted of

six sections which were the introductory part, followed by the sections on relationship factors,

solution factors and self-esteem factors. The final section had items on the demographic

characteristics of respondents. Most of the sections had a reliable level of internal consistency

measured using the Cronbach‘s alpha. Field-work at Garissa University was done entirely by a

research assistant while at MMUST it was done by the researcher. The respondents were

required to complete the questionnaires on the spot without carrying them home.

pg. 276

This chapter begun with a descriptive analysis of the 356 participants who took part in the

experiment giving their distribution by university affiliation, religious affiliation, treatment

groups, denominations, sex, age, course level and year of study. Data was analysed by doing

analyses of variance. The variables consisted of attitudes towards terrorism, relationship factors,

proximity factors and terrorism risk attitude.

The results showed that the experimental treatment had no effect on any of the variables.

However, there were supplementary observations that were made to the effect that Christian

students were more likely than Muslim students to link terrorism to Muslims and to consider

Christians as targeted by terrorists. This was replicated at university level in both institutions.

Garissa University students were more likely than Masinde Muliro university respondents to

consider terrorism as perpetrated by Muslims and targeted at Christians. It also revealed that

Muslim participants were less likely to relate to Christians as compared to Christian participants

who were more likely to relate with Muslims. Muslim students were also less proximal to

Christians as compared to Christian students who related more with Muslims comparatively. Of

all the groups, Masinde Muliro Muslim students were the least likely to be proximal to the out-

group. Muslim respondents generally viewed themselves as less likely to be at risk of terror

attacks than their Christian counterparts, both overall and at university level. Garissa university

students had a stronger attitude of risk for terrorism than Masinde Muliro students.

The next chapter discusses the methodology that was employed in conducting the second study

of the project, i.e. the survey, the descriptive statistics of the participants, the methods and

techniques of data collection and analysis and the results that were arrived at.

pg. 277


Ce chapitre décrit la méthodologie utilisée pour acquérir les données des deux études de ce

projet. Il est divisé en deux sections majeures correspondant à l‘expérience et à l‘enquête. La

première partie a discuté de la méthodologie utilisée dans la réalisation de l‘expérience avec des

étudiants musulmans et chrétiens à l‘Université de Garissa et au MMUST. Les variables

indépendantes invoquées étaient l‘affiliation universitaire et l‘appartenance religieuse, tandis que

les variables dépendantes étaient la perception des participants à l‘égard du terrorisme, de la

perception des solutions, des facteurs relationnels et des facteurs d‘estime de soi. L‘étude ciblait

les musulmans et les chrétiens. Ces derniers étaient catégorisés suivant les critères appliqués au

Kenya.

Tous les étudiants musulmans inscrits dans les universités ont été contactés pour participer à

l‘étude. Quatre dénominations chrétiennes ont été sélectionnées pour l‘observation afin de

réduire les risques de biais de représentativité. Il s‘agissait de catholiques, de l‘Union chrétienne,

d‘adventistes du septième jour et du ministère de la Repentance et de la Sainteté. Les dirigeants

de ces groupes ont agi en tant qu‘assistants de recherche et ils ont aidé dans le travail sur le

terrain à sensibiliser et à mobiliser les membres pour l‘achèvement du questionnaire. Les

répondants ont été répartis aléatoirement entre les groupes de traitement, la moitié faisant l‘objet

du groupe témoin et l‘autre dans le groupe expérimental. Les questionnaires pour les deux

groupes étaient identiques, sauf que le groupe témoin a été exposé à une amorce sur la vie

générale tandis que le groupe expérimental a été exposé à une amorce sur le terrorisme. Le

questionnaire se composait de six sections qui étaient la partie d‘introduction, suivies par les

sections sur les facteurs relationnels, les facteurs de solution et les facteurs d‘estime de soi. La

dernière section avait des éléments sur les caractéristiques démographiques des répondants. La

pg. 278

plupart des sections avaient un niveau fiable de cohérence interne mesurée à l‘aide de l‘alpha du

Cronbach. Le travail sur le terrain à l‘Université de Garissa a été entièrement effectué par un

assistant de recherche alors qu‘au MMUST, ce travail de recueil a été fait par un chercheur. Les

participants devaient remplir les questionnaires sur place sans les emporter avec eux.

Ce chapitre a commencé par une analyse descriptive des 356 participants qui ont participé à

l'expérience en donnant leur répartition par affiliation universitaire, appartenance religieuse,

groupes de traitement, dénominations, sexe, âge, niveau de cours et année d'études. Les données

ont été analysées en effectuant des analyses de variance à l'aide du logiciel de traitements de

données STATISTICA pour les sciences sociales. Les variables comprenaient les perceptions du

terrorisme, les facteurs relationnels, les facteurs de proximité et la perception du risque

d'attentats terroristes.

Les analyses ont montré que le traitement expérimental n'avait aucun effet sur aucune des

variables. Cependant, des observations supplémentaires ont été faites selon lesquelles les

étudiants chrétiens étaient plus susceptibles que les étudiants musulmans de lier le terrorisme aux

musulmans et de percevoir les chrétiens comme les cibles des terroristes. Cela a été reproduit au

niveau universitaire entre les deux institutions. Les étudiants de l'université de Garissa étaient

plus susceptibles que les répondants de l'université de Masinde Muliro de considérer le

terrorisme comme perpétré par des musulmans et visant des chrétiens. Au niveau des aspects

relationnels, les participants musulmans étaient moins susceptibles d'avoir des relations avec les

chrétiens que les participants chrétiens qui étaient plus susceptibles d'avoir des relations avec les

musulmans. Les étudiants musulmans étaient également moins proches des chrétiens que les

étudiants chrétiens qui avaient davantage de relations avec les musulmans. De tous les groupes,

les étudiants musulmans de Masinde Muliro étaient les moins susceptibles d'être proches du hors

pg. 279

groupe. Les répondants musulmans se considéraient généralement comme moins susceptibles de

vivre le risque d‘être les cibles d'attentats terroristes comparativement à leurs homologues

chrétiens, tant au niveau global qu'au niveau universitaire. Les étudiants de l'université de

Garissa avaient une perception plus élevée du risque de terrorisme que les étudiants de Masinde

Muliro.

Le chapitre suivant traite de la méthodologie utilisée pour mener la deuxième étude du projet,

c‘est-à-dire de l‘enquête, ainsi que des statistiques descriptives des participants, ainsi que des

méthodes et des résultats de l‘analyse des données.

pg. 280

REFERENCES





Ndeda, M.A.J. (2013). The struggles of new religious movements in the Kenyan religious space:

the case of Repentance and Holiness Movement. The East African Review, (pp. 33-56).

Retrieved from https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/404.



https://journals.openedition.org/eastafrica/404.

pg. 281

CHAPTER SEVEN

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS: THE

SURVEY

MÉTHODOLOGIE DE LA RECHERCHE ET RÉSULTATS DES ANALYSES

DES DONNEES : L’ENQUÊTE

pg. 282

7.1 INTRODUCTION

The aim of this study was to interrogate the attitudes towards terrorism among the Muslim and

Christian students at Garissa University and Masinde Muliro University. This was done by

designing two studies, an experiment and a survey. The previous chapter examined the design,

methodology, the treatment of data and the findings of the experiment. The current chapter is

dedicated to discussing the second study in the project, which was the survey. This survey was

guided by six goals. First was to inquire into the relationship between religious affiliation and

religious commitment. The second was to find out if religious affiliation had any influence on

attitudes towards terrorism. Third, the study sought to investigate the link between religious

affiliation and preference for counterterrorism measures. The fourth goal of the survey was to

examine the influence of university affiliation on religious commitment. The study also

investigated the impact of university affiliation on attitudes towards terrorism. Finally, the survey

aimed to inquire into the relationship between university affiliation and preference for

counterterrorism measures. This chapter will examine the methodology, descriptive analysis of

the participants, methods of data analysis and the findings of the study.

7.2 Research Design

The study was designed as a descriptive survey in which questionnaires were distributed to

participants to obtain their responses to the items. This method was favoured because it enabled

the observation of a large number of respondents within a short period of time. The correlational

nature of the study also enabled the depiction of responses vis-à-vis the independent variables.

pg. 283

7.2.1 Target Population

Since the study was focussed on Muslim and Christian participants, all the Muslim and Christian

students at these institutions constituted the target population who provided the pool from which

the sample was picked for observation. Thus the survey targeted Muslim and Christian students

of Garissa University and the MMUST main campus. These were regular registered students

who identified themselves with either of the two religions. As it was not possible to make

observations on the whole target population, a representative sample was determined and used to

provide information about the whole group. Below is a description of the various dimensions of

the sample.

7.2.2 Sample Size

The sample in this survey consisted of 354 respondents with 90 respondents from Garissa

University and 264 respondents from MMUST. Of the Garissa respondents, 30 were Muslims

while 60 were Christians. MMUST respondents consisted of 26 Muslims and 238 Christians.

This translated to a total of 56 Muslims and 298 Christians as illustrated in the sampling frame

below.

University Muslims Christians TOTAL

Garissa 30 60 90

MMUST 26 238 264

TOTAL 56 298 354 Table 7.1: Survey sampling frame for university affiliation and religious affiliation

7.2.3 Sampling Techniques

The two institutions were sampled purposively given their unique characteristics. Garissa

University being in the terror hotspot region of north-eastern Kenya and having fallen victim to a

terror attack in the past was an interesting site to be included. On the other hand, MMUST was

pg. 284

located in the relatively terror low-risk western region of the country and it had no history of

terror attacks. Any Muslim or Christian student wishing to participate in the study was given a

questionnaire although most of the Christians who participated were drawn from four major

denominations whose leaders had assisted in the experiment fieldwork. They had also been

briefed on the data collection techniques. These were the Catholic, Christian Union, Seventh-day

Adventist and Repentance and Holiness.

7.2.4 Study Variables

There were two groups of variables in this study, namely the independent variables and the

dependent variables. The independent variables were the University affiliation, religious

affiliation and religious adherence while the dependent variables were attitudes towards

terrorism, attitudes towards solutions to terrorism, and self-esteem. The dependent variables were

each correlated with the independent variables.

7.2.5 Data Collection Instruments

Data was collected from respondents by use of questionnaires that were on seven printed pages

and divided into six sections that took the respondents an average of twenty minutes to complete.

The sections were the introductory portion, section I on religious adherence, section II on attitude

factors, section III on solution factors and section IV on self-esteem factors. The final part was

Section V which had questions on the demographic characteristics. Below is a detailed

breakdown of the different sections.

pg. 285

7.2.5.1 Introductory Remarks

The first part of the questionnaire introduced the study to the participants and explained that it

was in partial fulfilment of the requirements for a doctorate degree. The respondents were

requested to participate in the study in order to contribute to the generation of knowledge. They

were also encouraged to respond as truthfully as possible as there was no right or wrong answer.

This was done to motivate them and to mitigate against the temptation to be politically correct.

The length of the questionnaire was also indicated and the approximate time it would take them

to complete it. It mentioned the presence of different sections of the questionnaire under various

titles and ended with the instructions to participants on how they were expected to indicate their

responses. Participants were instructed not to write their names or registration numbers and were

assured of confidentiality. The details of the specific sections are discussed next.

7.2.5.2 Section I: Religious Commitment

This section consisted of questions about commitment to religion. It was titled Religion Factors

and was divided into two smaller parts distinguished by the nature of the questions. The first part

which had four questions functioned as a preliminary segment that ushered the respondent into

the second and major part that contained 20 questions.

7.2.5.3 Preliminary Segment

This part consisted of four questions specifically asking for details of membership in a religious

and denominational group. The first item required an indication of the respondents‘ religion with

only two possible options, i.e. Islam and Christianity. The second item asked the respondents to

pg. 286

indicate their denominations with choices provided for them. These choices were Catholic,

SDA43

, Pentecostal/Evangelical, Repentance, Sunni, Shi‘a and others. The ‗others‘ had a blank

space on which respondents whose denominations did not fall among the choices provided were

to indicate the name of theirs. The third question required the indication of membership in any

religious club on campus which was then to be indicated in the blank space in the fourth item.

7.2.5.4 Major Segment

This section consisted of 20 items on a Likert scale with a 6-response continuum on which

respondents were expected to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with given statements.

These were designated as -3 for strongly disagree, -2 for disagree, -1 for somehow disagree, 1 for

somehow agree, 2 for agree and 3 for strongly agree. The reliability of the items was measured

using Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability for Likert Scales and it yielded an alpha of .79 which

means that the items had a relatively high internal consistency. The items indicated how strongly

individuals were committed to their religions. Two examples of items from this section that

indicated strong adherence and weak adherence are given below. The first one indicated strong

commitment while the second one signified weak adherence to religion.

1. I study the Bible/Quran regularly.

2. I don’t attend worship services at all.

43 Seventh-day Adventist in full.

pg. 287

7.2.5.5 Section II: Attitude Factors

This section consisted of 16 items on a Likert-type scale with a continuum of six responses on

which participants were expected to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with given

statements. Titled Perception Factors, it consisted of items inquiring about respondents‘ attitudes

towards terrorist activities in the country. The responses were designated as -3 for strongly


strongly agree. The reliability of items was measured using Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability

for Likert Scales. It yielded an alpha of .82 meaning that the items had a high internal

consistency. Two examples of items from this section were:

1. Terrorism in Kenya is carried out by Muslims.

2. I sometimes get worried that terrorists will attack my university.

7.2.5.6 Section III: Solution Factors

This 10-item section titled Solution Factors focused on the counterterrorism measures that should

be used in Kenya. Respondents were required to indicate how much they agreed with or

disagreed with the statements presented in 6-response Likert scales. There was a mix of items

with some proposing drastic measures, some proposed moderate ones while others suggested

conservative measures against terrorism. The responses were designated as -3 for strongly


strongly agree. Their reliability was measured using Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability for

Likert Scales and it yielded an alpha of .67 thus the items had a moderate internal consistency.

Two examples of items suggesting drastic and conservative measures respectively are given

below.

1. All refugees should be repatriated back to their homeland.

2. The government should pay attention to marginalized parts of the country.

pg. 288

7.2.5.7 Section IV: Self-Esteem Factors

This section which was titled Self-Esteem Scale contained 10 items in Likert-scale format with 6

responses on the continuum. These were designated as -3 for strongly disagree, -2 for disagree, -

1 for somehow disagree, 1 for somehow agree, 2 for agree and 3 for strongly agree. It inquired

into the level of self-worth that respondents had of themselves by requiring them to respond to a

mixture of items representative of high and low levels of self -esteem. The reliability of the items

was measured using Cronbach‘s Alpha test of reliability for Likert Scales and it yielded an alpha

of .59 meaning that the items had a moderate level of internal consistency. Below are two

examples of items from the questionnaire indicating high self-esteem and low levels of self-

esteem respectively.

1. Generally, I am satisfied with myself.

2. Overall, I tend to feel that I am a failure.

7.2.5.8 Section V: Demographic Factors

The final section of the questionnaire comprised 7 items asking respondents to put down their

personal information. This had to do with their sex, age, the course level, their year of study and

the area of specialization at the current university. There were only two obvious options for sex,

either male or female. The ages were categorized into four spans of 3 years each with the fifth

and final age category having no upper limit. The spans began with 18, the minimum college

entry age in Kenya and were as follows: 18 to 20; 21 to 23; 24 to 26; 27 to 29; and over 30. The

course level had to do with the level of training the students were undergoing at university at the

time of data collection. These could have ranged from certificate, diploma, bachelor, Masters to

doctorate level. Generally, certificate courses lasted up to six months, diploma courses lasted up

to one year while bachelors training could last from four to six years depending on the area of

specialization. Master‘s degrees took approximately two years to complete while doctoral

pg. 289

degrees could take up to four years or more. The year of study represented the stage at which

respondents were in their studies such as first year, second year, third year, fourth year, and fifth

year and so on. The area of specialization was the major they were taking at university and it

varied accordingly, e.g. Education, Agriculture, Engineering, etc.

7.2.6 Methods of Data collection

At Garissa University, data was collected exclusively by a research assistant who first sought

permission from the County Commissioner‘s office. The latter granted this by way of a letter of

authorisation which was used to access the Deputy Vice Chancellor in charge of academics at the

institution. The DVC referred him to the relevant student leaders who were then briefed on the

purposes of the research and trained in the techniques to use in the exercise. The leaders helped

to mobilize the members who were also briefed by the lead research assistant before being

involved in completing the questionnaires. This final exercise took approximately one week to

complete. At MMUST, the patrons of Catholic students who also doubled as the patron for the

Muslim society, and the Christian Union patron were contacted to provide initial contact with the

students. Respondents from other denominations were approached by the various research

assistants. Most respondents, both Muslim and Christian, managed to complete the

questionnaires during their regular meetings on campus. Others asked to complete them at home

and to hand those in at a later date and it took close to three weeks to have some questionnaires

back.

pg. 290

In total, the period between acquisition of the research permit from the National Council for

Science, Technology and Innovation (NACOSTI) to the final compilation and summary drafting

was approximately four months.

7.3 STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF RESPONDENTS

Most of the survey questionnaires were completed after the first study. The section below gives a

statistical overview of the respondents who took part in the study beginning with the descriptive

summary. A discussion of how the data was analysed follows with a presentation of the results

that were arrived at.

7.3.1 Descriptive Summary

In this study, 363 observations were made and their characteristics are described here

statistically. However, 9 of the questionnaires were not valid and they were therefore discarded,

leaving 354 valid cases. These are presented in distributions of religious affiliation, university

affiliation, denomination, sex, age, course level and year of study. They are also presented in

histograms and pie charts for better illustration.

7.3.1.1 Distribution by University

There were 90 participants from Garissa University and 273 respondents from Masinde Muliro

University. This means that respondents from Garissa University accounted for 25% of

respondents while those from MMUST constituted 75% of participants. The histogram below

illustrates this distribution.

pg. 291

Figure 7.1: Distribution of respondents by university

7.3.1.2 Distribution by Religion

The respondents comprised of 56 Muslims and 307 Christians as illustrated in the figure below.

Figure 7.2: Religious distribution of respondents

90 (25%)

273 (75%)

University

Garissa

Masinde Muliro

56 (15%)

307 (85%)

Religion

Islam

Christianity

pg. 292

7.3.1.3 Distribution by Denomination

The 51 Muslim respondents did not categorize themselves into any denominational subgroups.

The Christian participants were from four denominations namely Catholic with 164 respondents,

Pentecostal with 94 participants, Seventh-day Adventist which had 36 respondents and

Repentance and Holiness where 16 observations were made. 2 participants indicated their

denominations as others. The figure below best illustrates this distribution.

Figure 7.3: Distribution of respondents by denomination

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

180

Denomination

Denomination

pg. 293

7.3.1.4 Distribution by Gender

There were 126 female and 228 male participants in this study as shown in the figure below.

Figure 7.4: Gender distribution of respondents

7.3.1.5 Distribution by Age

The participants‘ ages ranged from 18 to over 30. There were 79 respondents aged 18 to 20 years

of age, 212 participants were aged 21 to 23 years and 50 respondents were aged 24 to 26 years.

12 participants were aged 27 to 29 and 1 was over 30 years old. This age distribution is

illustrated in the histogram below.

228 (64%)

126 (36%)

Gender

Male

Female

pg. 294

Figure 7.5: Respondents' distribution by age

7.3.1.6 Distribution by Course Level

Course level ranged from certificate, diploma, Bachelor‘s degree, Master‘s degree and doctoral

degree. There were 2 participants undertaking certificate courses, 19 were taking diploma

courses, and 331 respondents were pursuing their Bachelor‘s degrees. 1 participant was pursuing

Master‘s degree and another was in doctoral training. The illustration below represents this

distribution.

0

50

100

150

200

250

18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29 Above 30

Age

Age

pg. 295

Figure 7.6: Distribution of participants by course level

7.3.1.7 Distribution by Year of Study

The courses undertaken by students ranged anywhere from six months to six years. 66

participants were in their first year, 112 were in their second year, 90 were in their third year, 73

were in their fourth year, 11 were fifth years and 2 were sixth years. Below is the histogram

showing the distribution of participants by year of study.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

Certificate Diploma Bachelor's Master's Doctoral

Course level

Course level

pg. 296

Figure 7.7: Distribution of respondents by year of study

7.4 Data Analysis

Analysis of variance was done to find the differences in the means of the variables under study.

These variables were religion factors, attitudes towards terrorism, solution factors and self-

esteem factors. The following results were arrived at.

7.4.1 Religion Factors

The analysis of variance showed no major effect of religious affiliation between Christian

students and Muslim students (M = 4.3; M =4.2). F (1, 359) = 0.41, p = 0.51, η²p = .001. There

was a major effect of university affiliation F (1, 359) = 8.34, p =< .001, η²p = .02; as the means

for ―Garissa‖ university and ―Masinde Muliro‖ university were M = 4.4; M = 4.1 respectively.

The interaction effects between religious affiliation (Christians and Muslims) and university

affiliation (―Garissa‖ and ―Masinde Muliro‖) were significant, F (1, 359) = 19.513, p =< .001,

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 6th Year

Year of Study

Year of Study

pg. 297

η²p = .05. The Post Hoc tests showed that there were also some means differences between

Muslims in ―Garissa‖ university and Muslims in ―Masinde Muliro‖ university (p = 0.001) with

(M Garissa =4.6; M Masinde=3.9). This signified that Garissa Muslims tended to be more religious

than Masinde Muliro Muslims.

In addition, ―Garissa‖ university Muslim respondents had a higher mean than the ―Garissa‖

university Christian respondents (M Muslims=4.6; M Christians=4.3 ; p = 0.001) signifying that they

were more religious than their Christian colleagues.

Some significant means differences were observed between Muslims and Christians in ―Masinde

Muliro‖ university too (p = 0.02), indicating that the Christians were more religious than the

Muslims (M Christians=4.4; M Muslims=3.9) at this institution.

Also, there was a big internal variance within the two Muslim groups at ―Garissa‖ and at

―Masinde Muliro‖ universities as compared to the Christians.

The output below illustrates the mutual moderation between religious affiliation and university

affiliation on religious implication.

pg. 298

University*Religion; Moy. Moindres Carrés

Effet courant : F(1, 359)=19.513, p=.00001



University GU University MMUST

1 2

Religion

3.4

3.6

3.8

4.0

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.0

Me

an

rf

Output 7.1: Interaction of religion factors, religious affiliation and university affiliation

*1 = Muslim and 2 = Christians

7.4.2 Attitude Factors

The analysis of variance showed that there was a main effect of religious affiliation, F (1, 359) =

52.07, p =< .001, η²p = .12 with Christian students being more likely to regard Christians as

targeted by terrorists than Muslim students (M = 3.7; M = 3.0 respectively).

There was an effect of university affiliation F (1, 359) = 26.14, p =< .001, η²p = .06; with

respondents from ―Garissa‖ university being more likely than those from ―Masinde Muliro‖

university to attribute terrorism to Muslims and to perceive Christians as targeted by terrorists

(M = 3.6; M = 3.1 respectively). Interaction effects was not significant, F (1, 353) < 1.

As main effects show us, ―Garissa‖ university Christian respondents were more likely to

attribute terrorism to Muslims and to consider Christians as targeted by terrorists than the

Muslim respondents (M = 4.0; M = 3.2). They were also the most likely of all the groups to hold

pg. 299

this view. This same scenario was replicated at ―Masinde Muliro‖ university where the Christian

students were more likely to attribute terrorism to Muslims and to consider Christians as the

target of terrorists as compared to the Muslim respondents at the same institution (M Christians =3.4

and M Muslims =2.8).

The output below shows the main effects discussed above. The main effects of university

affiliation and religious affiliation on attitudes towards terrorism represent an additive level

effect.

Univ ersity *Religion; Moy . Moindres Carrés

Ef f et courant : F(1, 353)=.63175, p=.42725

Décomposition ef f icace de l'hy pothèse

Les barres v erticales représentent les interv alles de conf iance à 0.95

Univ ersity

GU

Univ ersity

MMUST

1 2

Religion

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

3.0

3.2

3.4

3.6

3.8

4.0

4.2

4.4

Me

an

pf

Output 7.2: Interaction of attitude factors, religious affiliation and university affiliation

*1 = Muslim and 2 = Christian

pg. 300

7.4.3 Solution Factors

The analysis of variance showed that there was a significant effect of religious affiliation on

solution factors, F (1, 359) = 1.55, p =< .001, η²p = .00, although it was of minor importance.

Muslim students had a lower tendency to favor drastic measures against terrorism as compared to

Christian students (respectively M = 2.5; M = 2.7).

There was a significant effect of university affiliation too, although of minor importance, F (1,

359) = 12.71, p =< .001, η²p = .03; as the means for ―Garissa‖ university and ―Masinde Muliro‖

university were M = 2.6; M = 2.6 respectively.

The interaction effects between religious affiliation and university affiliation were significant, F

(1, 352) = 12.717, p =< .00041, η²p = .03. Post Hoc tests showed significant means differences

between ―Garissa‖ university Muslims and ―Garissa‖ university Christians (p=0.02) with

(M=2.4; M=2.9). This signified that the Muslim students in this university had a lower

preference for drastic measures against terrorism as compared to the Christian students.

There was a significant difference between ―Garissa‖ university Christians and ―Masinde

Muliro‖ university Christians (p=0.004), with (M Garissa = 2.9; M Masinde = 2.5) indicating that the

―Garissa‖ Christian students had a higher preference for drastic measures against terrorism than

their counterparts at ―Masinde Muliro‖. At ―Masinde Muliro‖ university the Muslim respondents

did not necessarily have a higher tendency to favour drastic solutions to terrorism than Christians

at the same institution (M Muslims =2.7; M Christians =2.5. However, the variance scores were of

importance for Muslims participants given their sample size.

pg. 301

The output below illustrates these reversed preferences for drastic measures against terrorism

with regard to the religious affiliation and university affiliation of participants.

Univ ersity *Religion; Moy . Moindres Carrés

Ef f et courant : F(1, 352)=12.717, p=.00041

Décomposition ef f icace de l'hy pothèse

Les barres v erticales représentent les interv alles de conf iance à 0.95

Univ ersity

GU

Univ ersity

MMUST

1 2

Religion

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

2.5

2.6

2.7

2.8

2.9

3.0

3.1

3.2

Mean

sf

Output 7.3: Interaction of solution factors, religious affiliation and university affiliation

*1 = Muslim, 2 = Christian

7.4.4 Correlations between Variables

Correlational analyses were done to find out relationships between the factors under study. The

following correlations were detected.

i) There was a negative correlation between religious factors and solution factors with a

correlation coefficient (alpha) of -.28; p = 0.001. Thus, the more religious the

individuals were, the less radical the solutions they preferred.

pg. 302

ii) There was a positive correlation between religious factors and self-esteem. The

correlation coefficient (alpha) was .27; p = 0.001. This meant that the more religious

the individuals, the higher their self-esteem.

iii) There was a positive correlation between attitude factors and solution factors yielding

a correlation coefficient (alpha) of .37; p = 0.001. This implied that the stronger the

attitude that Islam was to blame for terrorism, the more conservative the preferred

solutions.

iv) There was a negative correlation between self-esteem and solution factors with a

correlation coefficient (alpha) of -.26; p = 0.001. This meant that the higher the self-

esteem, the less radical the solutions favored.

The output below illustrates these results. We note that self-esteem is related to religious factors

and solution Factors.

Variables

Corrélations N=356

Mean rf Mean af Mean sf

Mean af .0047 p=.930

Mean sf -.2877 .3784 p=.000 p=.000

Mean Esteem .2705 -.0482 -.2671 p=.000 p=.365 p=.000

Output 7.4: Correlations between variables

*rf = Relation Factors, pa = Attitude Factors, sf = Solution Factors

Further analyses of self-esteem differences at religious and university level were inconclusive.44

44 There were no specific hypotheses for self-esteem differences with regard to religious and university affiliation.

The approach used in the study was exploratory in nature therefore this does not affect the work. Normally,

pg. 303

7.5 Summary of Findings

The following sub-section summarises the major effects observed and described above. These

are in the same order as in the discussion: religion factors, attitude factors, solution factors and

correlations between factors.

7.5.1 Summary of Effects on Religion Factors

As a whole, Garissa university students were more religious than their Masinde Muliro

counterparts. Secondly, the interaction effects indicated that Garissa university Muslim

respondents were more religious than the Masinde Muliro University Muslim respondents. At

institution level, Garissa University Muslim respondents were more religious than the Christian

respondents at the same university. Finally, the Masinde Muliro University Muslim respondents

were less religious than the Masinde Muliro Christian respondents.

The table below illustrates the effects of university affiliation on religion factors.


1.


η²p = 0.02

University affiliation has an effect on religion

factors.

GU45

; MMUST46

4.4; 4.1

Garissa university students were more religious

than MMUST students.

2.


vulnerable or minority groups tend to score lower on self-esteem especially when they are faced with discriminatory

practices, but this was not observed here. 45

Garissa University 46

Masinde Muliro University of Science and Technology

pg. 304

GUM47

; GUC48

4.6; 4.3

Garissa university Muslims were more religious

than Garissa university Christians.

GUM ; MMUM49

p=0.001

4.6; 3.9

Garissa university Muslims were more religious

than MMUST Muslims.

MMUM ; MMUC50

p=0.02

3.9; 4.4

MMUST Muslims were less religious than

MMUST Christians. Table 7.2: Effects of religious and university affiliations on religious factors

7.5.2 Summary of Effects on Attitude Factors

The results showed that Muslim participants were less likely than their Christian counterparts to

attribute terrorism to Muslims and to consider Christians as the target of terrorism. There were

some interaction effects that revealed that Garissa university respondents were more likely than

Masinde Muliro university students to regard Christians as targeted by terrorists. Masinde Muliro

Muslim students were less likely than their Christian counterparts at the same university to

attribute terror acts to Muslims and to consider Christians as the target of terrorists. The table

below illustrates these findings on the influence of the religious affiliation of respondents on

their attitudes towards terrorism.

47 Garissa University Muslim respondents

48 Garissa University Christian respondents

49 Masinde Muliro University Muslim respondents

50 Masinde Muliro University Christian respondents

pg. 305


1.


η²p=0.12

Religious affiliation had an effect on

attitudes.


3.0; 3.7

Muslim students were less likely than

Christian students to attribute terrorism to

Muslims.

2.


η²p=0.06

University affiliation had an effect on

attitudes.

GU ; MMUST

3.6; 3.1

Garissa respondents were more likely than

MMUST respondents to consider Muslims as

the perpetrators of terrorism.

MMUM ; MMUC

2.8; 3.4

MMUST Muslim students were less likely

than MMUST Christian students to attribute

terrorism to Muslims. Table 7.3: Effects of religious and university affiliations on attitude factors

7.5.3 Summary of Effects on Solution Factors

The data analysis revealed a significant effect of religious affiliation on the preference for

solutions for terrorism. Muslim respondents preferred less drastic measures as compared to their

Christian counterparts. Interaction effects revealed that Garissa university Muslim respondents

preferred less drastic measures than the Garissa University Christian respondents. Garissa

University Christian respondents preferred more drastic measures than the Masinde Muliro

University Christian participants. Masinde Muliro University Muslim students preferred more

drastic solutions than their Christian counterparts at the same institution. The table below

contains a summary of the significant observations made on the effects of the independent

variables on solution factors.

pg. 306


1.


η²p=0.00

Religious affiliation had a marginal effect on

respondents‘ solutions preference.


2.5; 2.7

Muslim respondents preferred less drastic

measures than Christian respondents.

2.

Post Hoc Results

GUM ; GUC

p=0.02

2.4; 2.9

Garissa Muslim students preferred less

drastic measures than Garissa Christian

students.

GUC ; MMUC

p=0.004

2.9; 2.5

Garissa Christian students preferred more

drastic measures than MMUST Christians.

MMUM ; MMUC

2.7; 2.5

MMUST Muslim students preferred more

drastic measures than MMUST Christian

students. Table 7.4: Effects of religious and university affiliations on solution factors

7.5.4 Summary of Correlations Results

The observations contained in the table above indicate that there were correlations between

certain variables. First, there was a negative correlation between religion factors and solution

factors. This means that the more religious the respondents, the less drastic the measures they

preferred against terrorism. The second correlation was between attitude factors and solution

factors which suggested that the stronger the attitude that Muslims were to blame for terrorism

and that Christians were targeted by terrorists, the more drastic the solutions preferred. The third

relationship was observed between self-esteem and solution factors which indicated that the

higher the self-esteem of respondents, the lower their preference for drastic measures. Finally,

the positive correlation between religion and self-esteem suggested that the higher the religion

factors, the higher the self-esteem. These observations are summarized in the table below.

pg. 307

Variables Observed Effects (alpha)

Solution Factors Comments

Religion Factors

-0.28

There was a negative correlation between religion

factors and solution factors.

Perception Factors

0.37

There was a positive correlation between attitude

factors and solution factors.

Self-Esteem

-0.26

There was a negative correlation between self-

esteem and solution factors.

Religion Factors

Self-Esteem

0.27

There was a positive correlation between self-

esteem and religion factors. Table 7.5: Summary of observed correlations

pg. 308

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter presented the methodology that was employed in the survey part of the project. The

discussion centred on the techniques of data collection, the descriptive statistics of the

respondents, the analysis of data and the results that were arrived at. The study aimed to inquire

into the attitudes of Muslim and Christian students at Garissa University and at MMUST who

therefore were the target population. The independent variables were the University affiliation,

religious affiliation and religious adherence while the dependent variables were attitude towards

terrorism, attitude towards solutions, and self-esteem. All the Muslims at the two institutions

were informed of the research and given a chance to participate. However, due to the large

numbers of Christians, attempts were made to incorporate multiple groups of Christians to give

more groups more chances at participation. Thus the leaders of the denominations involved in

the experiment also doubled as assistants in this study. They helped with the mobilisation of

members of their denominational groups for questionnaire completion during the fieldwork.

Some respondents were not able to complete the questionnaires during their regular meetings and

so they were allowed to take them home and to bring them back later. The questionnaire

consisted of six sections beginning with the introductory part and section two on relationship

factors. This was followed by section three on religious commitment, section four on attitudes

towards terrorism and section five on self-esteem. The sixth and final section required

respondents to indicate their demographic characteristics. Field-work at Garissa University was

done entirely by a research assistant while at MMUST it was done by the researcher.

The second section of the chapter presented the analysis of data collected in the survey. There

was a descriptive overview of the 359 participants in the study by university affiliation; religious

affiliation, denominations, sex, age, course level and year of study. The variables consisted of

pg. 309

religion factors, attitudes towards terrorism, and solution factors. The results showed that Garissa

university students were more religious than Masinde Muliro university students. Interaction

effects revealed that Garissa university Muslim students were more religious than Garissa

University Christian students and Masinde Muliro Muslim students. Masinde Muliro Christian

students were more religious than Masinde Muliro Muslim students.

Data analysis also indicated that the religious affiliation of respondents had an effect on their

attitudes. Muslim participants were less likely than Christian participants to link terrorism to

Muslims and to consider Christians as targeted. Interaction effects revealed that Garissa

university respondents held this view more than their Masinde Muliro counterparts. Masinde

Muliro University Muslim students were less likely than Christian respondents at the same

institution to deem terrorism as carried out by Muslims. They were also less likely to regard

Christians as the targets of these acts. Religious affiliation had an effect on preference for

solutions against terrorism with Muslim respondents preferring less drastic measures than

Christian respondents. Interaction effects indicated that Garissa university Muslim respondents

preferred less drastic measures compared to their Christian counterparts at the same institution.

However, the latter preferred more drastic measures against terrorism than Masinde Muliro

University Christians. But, Masinde Muliro Muslim students preferred more drastic measures

against terrorism than the Christians at the same university.

Correlational analysis of data revealed relationships between variables. Religion factors were

negatively correlated with solution factors as were self-esteem and preference for solutions to

terrorism. This means that the higher the score on religion factors, the less the preference for

drastic solutions to terrorism. It also suggested that the higher the self-esteem of respondents, the

lower their preference for drastic measures against terrorism. There were positive correlations

pg. 310

between attitude factors and solution factors; and also between religion factors and self-esteem.

This meant that the higher the attitude that Muslims were responsible for terrorism and that

Christians were targeted by terrorists, the higher the preference for more drastic measures against

terrorism. This was particularly true of Christian respondents as Muslim respondents from

Garissa University preferred less drastic measures despite holding the same view. The

correlational analyses also yielded the observation that the stronger the religious activity of

respondents, the higher their self-esteem.

Chapter eight will discuss the interpretation of the results obtained from analysing the data

accrued from the experiment and the survey.

pg. 311


Ce chapitre présentait la méthodologie utilisée lors de la réalisation de l‘enquête. La discussion a

porté sur les techniques de collecte de données, les statistiques descriptives des répondants,

l‘analyse des données et les résultats obtenus. L‘étude visait à enquêter sur les perceptions des

étudiants musulmans et chrétiens de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST qui étaient donc la

population cible. Les variables indépendantes invoquées étaient l‘appartenance à l‘Université,

l‘appartenance religieuse et l‘adhésion religieuse, tandis que les variables dépendantes étaient la

perception du terrorisme, la perception des solutions et l‘estime de soi. Tous les musulmans des

deux institutions ont été informés de la recherche et tous avaient la possibilité de participer.

Cependant, en raison du grand nombre de chrétiens, nous avons tenté de tenir compte des

spécificités d‘obédiences religieuses afin d‘assurer une représentation des différents groupes de

chrétiens.

Ainsi, les dirigeants des dénominations impliquées dans l‘expérience ont également doublé le

nombre d‘assistants dans cette étude. Ils ont contribué à la mobilisation des membres pour

l‘achèvement du questionnaire pendant le travail sur le terrain. Certains répondants n‘ont pas été

en mesure de remplir les questionnaires au cours de leurs réunions régulières et ils ont donc été

autorisés à les apporter à leur domicile et à les ramener plus tard. Le questionnaire comprenait

six sections commençant par la partie d‘introduction et la deuxième section sur les facteurs

relationnels. Elle a été suivie de la section trois sur l‘engagement religieux, de la quatrième

section sur les perceptions au sujet du terrorisme et de la partie 5 sur l‘estime de soi. La sixième

et dernière section invitait les répondants à indiquer leurs caractéristiques démographiques. Le

travail sur le terrain à l‘Université de Garissa a été entièrement effectué par un assistant de

recherche tandis qu‘au MMUST, il a été fait par la chercheure elle-même.

pg. 312

La deuxième section du chapitre présentait l‘analyse des données recueillies dans le sondage. Il y

avait un aperçu descriptif des 359 participants à l‘étude selon leur affiliation universitaire ; leur

appartenance religieuse, leur confession, le sexe, l‘âge, le niveau de cours et l‘année d‘études.

Les variables se composaient de facteurs religieux, de perceptions sur le terrorisme et de facteurs

de solution. Nous observons que les étudiants de l‘université de Garissa étaient plus religieux

que les étudiants de l‘université masinde Muliro. Les effets d‘interaction ont révélé que les

étudiants musulmans de l‘université de Garissa étaient plus religieux que les étudiants chrétiens

de l‘Université de Garissa et les étudiants musulmans de Masinde Muliro. Les étudiants chrétiens

de Masinde Muliro étaient plus religieux que les étudiants musulmans de Masinde Muliro.

L‘analyse des données a également révélé que l‘appartenance religieuse des répondants avait un

effet sur leurs perceptions. Les participants musulmans étaient moins susceptibles que les

participants chrétiens de lier le terrorisme aux musulmans et de percevoir les chrétiens comme

des cibles. Les effets d‘interaction ont révélé que les répondants de l‘université de Garissa étaient

plus en phase avec ces observations que leurs homologues de Masinde Muliro. Les étudiants

musulmans de l‘Université Masinde Muliro étaient moins susceptibles que les répondants

chrétiens de la même institution de lier le terrorisme aux musulmans. Ils étaient également moins

susceptibles de percevoir les chrétiens comme des cibles d‘actes terroristes. L‘appartenance

religieuse a eu un effet sur la préférence pour des solutions contre le terrorisme, les répondants

musulmans préférant des mesures moins drastiques que les répondants chrétiens. Les effets

d‘interaction ont permis de voir que les répondants musulmans de l‘université de Garissa

préféraient des mesures moins drastiques que leurs homologues chrétiens de la même institution.

Cependant, ces derniers préféraient des mesures plus drastiques contre le terrorisme que les

chrétiens de l‘Université Masinde Muliro. Mais les étudiants musulmans de Masinde Muliro

pg. 313

préféraient des mesures plus drastiques contre le terrorisme que les chrétiens de la même

université.

L‘analyse des corrélations a révélé certaines relations entre les variables. Les facteurs religieux

sont négativement corrélés avec les facteurs de solution, tout comme l‘estime de soi et la

préférence pour les solutions au terrorisme. Cela signifie que plus les participants ont une

implication religieuse, moins ils adhèrent à l‘idée de développer des solutions drastiques pour

résoudre le terrorisme. Ceci suggère également que plus l‘estime de soi des répondants est

élevée, moins ils retiennent l‘idée de mettre en place des dispositifs drastiques de lutte contre le

terrorisme. Il y avait des corrélations positives entre les facteurs de perception et les facteurs de

solution ; et aussi entre les facteurs religieux et l‘estime de soi. Cela signifiait que d‘un côté plus

la perception les musulmans étaient jugés responsables du terrorisme et les chrétiens considérés

comme les cibles principales du terrorisme, plus les mesures les plus drastiques contre le

terrorisme étaient privilégiées. C‘était particulièrement vrai pour les répondants chrétiens alors

que les répondants musulmans de l‘Université de Garissa étaient plutôt modérés et penchaient

pour des mesures moins drastiques. Les analyses de corrélation ont également permis de

constater que plus l‘implication religieuse des répondants était forte, plus leur estime de soi

l‘était également. Le chapitre huit concentrera l‘interprétation des résultats obtenus pour l‘étude

expérimentale et pour l‘enquête.

pg. 314

CHAPTER EIGHT

INTERPRETATION OF EXPERIMENT AND SURVEY RESULTS

INTERPRÉTATION DES RÉSULTATS DE L’ÉTUDE EXPÉRIMENTALE ET

DE L’ENQUÊTE

pg. 315

8.1 INTRODUCTION

This chapter presents a discussion of the results that were arrived at after the analysis of the data

collected in the experiment and the survey. The project aimed at comparing the attitudes of

Muslim and Christian respondents at Garissa University and MMUST main campus towards

terrorism. The experiment investigated the effect of religion-based terrorism51

on attitudes

towards terrorism52

, relationship with other religion53

, level of terrorism risk54

and solutions

preference55

. These variables were compared between the experimental group56

and the control

group57

. The survey was designed to investigate the influence of religious affiliation58

and

university affiliation59

on religious commitment60

, attitude towards terrorism and solutions

preference. Correlational analyses were done to find the relationships between these dependent

variables. All the results, both from the experiment and from the survey are interpreted and

discussed in this chapter.

8.2 THE EXPERIMENT

The main objective of this study was to find out whether terrorism had any effect on participants‘

attitude towards terrorism and their relationship with members of the opposite religion. It also

sought to investigate their levels of terrorism risk attitude and their preferences for

51 A deliberate attempt at linking terrorist activities in Kenya with Islam.

52 Opinions, beliefs or views about terrorists and whether they targeted Christians or not.

53 Willingness of Muslims to interact with Christians and willingness of Christians to relate with Muslims.

54 How much respondents felt threatened by terrorism.

55 Severity of counterterrorism measures favoured by respondents.

56 The group that was exposed to a statement linking terrorism to Muslims.

57 The group that was exposed to a general statement about life at the university and plans for the future.

58 The religion to which one subscribed, either Islam or Christianity.

59 The university where respondents were enrolled at the time of data collection.

60 The level of devotion to religious programs and rituals.

pg. 316

counterterrorism measures. A total of 356 respondents participated in the experiment. As

mentioned earlier, the respondents were divided into two groups namely the experimental groups

and the control groups. The experimental groups received the treatment composed of a primer

linking terrorism to Islam at the beginning of the questionnaire. The control groups had to read a

general statement about life at the university at the beginning of their questionnaire. The

following observations were made from the results of the data analysis. A further examination of

the differences in attitude according to religious affiliation and university affiliation will be done.

8.2.1 Effect of Religion-based Terrorism on Attitudes

The study sought to find out whether religion-based terrorism had any effect on the attitudes of

respondents. This had to do with the opinions of respondents on whether Christians were the

targets of terrorists in Kenya, whether Muslims were responsible for carrying out terrorist acts in

the country, and whether Islam was to blame for terrorism. The results indicated no difference in

this attitude between the experimental group and the control group. This meant that manipulation

did not affect the attitudes of respondents towards terrorism suggesting the likelihood of a high

level of religion-based terrorism in the mind. This points to a high floor effect on the

measurement scale.

However, the results revealed that the religious affiliation of respondents influenced their

attitudes towards terrorism. Christian students had a higher tendency to view terrorism as

perpetrated by Muslims and to regard Christians as targeted in terrorist acts. An additional

observation was made at Garissa University where Christian students were more likely to

consider terrorism as perpetrated by Muslims and Christians as targeted by these acts than their

Muslim counterparts at the same institution.

pg. 317

8.2.2 Influence of Terrorism on Relationship with Members of the

Other Religion

The study investigated whether terrorism influenced the relationships between Muslim and

Christian respondents at the two universities. Relationship with other religion had to do with

whether respondents would be willing to relate with members of the opposite religion after being

exposed to the primer linking terrorism to Islam. The same followed for whether they would

assist a member of that religion if they needed help. The Muslim respondents indicated how

closely they were willing to relate to Christians and Christian respondents indicated how closely

they were willing to relate to Muslims. The results revealed no difference in the relationship

factors between the experimental group and the control group leading to the observation that our

manipulation of saliency of conflictual terrorism did not increase the latent effect of terrorism

expected to impact on respondents‘ willingness to relate with members of the other religion.

The results showed nonetheless, that the religious affiliation of respondents had an effect on the

likelihood of respondents relating with members of the other religion. It was observed that

Christian respondents were more likely to relate with Muslims as compared to Muslim

respondents. The university affiliation also had an influence on the relationship of respondents

with members of the other religion. The results showed that respondents from Garissa University

were more likely to relate with members of the other religion than those from MMUST.

Furthermore, at Garissa University, it was observed that the likelihood of Christian respondents

to relate with Muslims was higher as compared to their Muslim counterparts at the same

institution. It was also noted that Garissa University Muslim respondents were the least likely of

all the four groups of respondents to relate with members of the opposite religion.

pg. 318

8.2.3 Impact on Terrorism Risk Attitude

The study also sought to investigate any differences in the respondents‘ level of terrorism risk.

The level of terrorism risk had to do with how much the respondents felt at risk for or threatened

by terrorism after being exposed to the suggestion that it was linked to Islam. The results yielded

no differences in the level of terrorism risk between the experimental group and the control

group. It led to the observation that our manipulation of saliency of conflictual terrorism did not

increase the latent effect of religion-based terrorism expected to impact on respondents‘ level of

terrorism risk.

Despite the lack of effect observed above, the results showed that participants‘ religious

affiliation impacted their terrorism risk attitude. Christian respondents were more likely to feel at

risk of being targeted by terrorists than their Muslim counterparts. This was observed at

university level too whereby there was a higher likelihood for both Christian groups of

respondents to consider themselves at risk for terrorism than the Muslim groups. The university

affiliation also had an effect on respondents‘ terrorism risk attitude. There was more likelihood

among the Garissa University respondents to consider themselves at risk for terror attacks than

among the MMUST respondents.

8.2.4 Effect of Religion-based Terrorism on Solutions Preference

One objective of this study was to investigate whether religion-based terrorism had any effect on

the severity of counterterrorism measures favoured by respondents. The measures suggested

ranged from conservative, to moderate and to drastic solutions. Conservative measures were

designated as cautious interventions whose effects would be lenient, tolerant and liberal. Drastic

measures were defined as those whose effect would be radical, strong or extreme with far-

pg. 319

reaching consequences. Some measures were considered moderate in effect. An example of a

conservative measure was that ‗the government should pay attention to marginalized parts of the

country‘. One example of moderate solutions was ‗Kenya should continue with its role in the

international war on terrorism‘. A drastic measure read ‗Kenya should erect a wall at the border

to separate it from Somalia‟. There was no significant difference between the experimental

group and the control group in the severity of solutions favoured. Our manipulation of saliency

of conflictual terrorism did not increase the latent effect of religion-based terrorism expected to

influence respondents‘ preference for measures against terrorism.

8.2.5 Religion-based Terrorism versus Religious Affiliation

The analyses of data showed no interaction effects between the treatment (experimental vs.

control group) and the groups of Muslim and Christian respondents‘ attitudes towards terrorism

for any of the dependent measures (influence attitudes, relationships with members of the other

religion, terrorism risk attitude, solutions factors).

The experiment concluded therefore that manipulation of saliency of conflictual terrorism did not

increase the latent effect of religion-based terrorism, expected to influence attitudes among

Muslim and Christian students of Garissa and Masinde Muliro Universities.

8.2.6 Religion-based Terrorism versus University Affiliation

There was no evidence of interactions effects between the treatment (experimental vs. control

group) and university affiliation of respondents‘ (Garissa vs. Masinde Muliro) on attitudes

towards terrorism for any of the dependent measures (influence attitudes, relationships with

members of the other religion, terrorism risk attitude, and preferences for solutions). The

pg. 320

experiment concluded therefore that manipulation of saliency of conflictual terrorism did not

increase the latent influence of religion-based terrorism on the attitudes towards terrorism among

students of Garissa university and Masinde Muliro university.

8.2.7 Interpretation of Observations

It is important to note that the experimental condition had no effect on any of the dependent

variables. It is the opinion of the researchers that matters surrounding the terrorism phenomenon

in Kenya were so ingrained in the minds of the participants that the treatment could not yield any

effect. The two groups had so much information about terrorism probably with already formed

opinions that the manipulation could not affect them in any way. However, this part of the

research could be improved by having smaller groups and retesting severally. Qualitative

methods with intense interviewing techniques could also help to unearth the reasons behind the

observations and the stability of attitudes against manipulation. The researchers came to the

conclusion that the two groups had so much in mind about the conflicted world in which they

lived courtesy of the dynamics surrounding terrorism.

Further explanation of these observations will be given later in this chapter where the theoretical

approach is used to examine them.

pg. 321

8.3 THE SURVEY

A total of 363 respondents took part in this study. The analysis of variance was carried out to

investigate the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variables. The

independent variables were religious affiliation61

and university of affiliation62

. The dependent

variables were religious commitment, attitudes towards terrorism and solutions preference.

Correlational analyses were carried out to investigate the relationship between the dependent

variables namely religious commitment and solutions preference, religious commitment and self-

esteem63

, attitude towards terrorism and solutions preference, and finally between self-esteem

and solutions preference.

8.3.1 Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Religious

Commitment

Religious commitment was measured by requiring respondents to indicate their level of

dedication or faithfulness in participating in religious events and programs. Such activities

included attendance at worship services, studying of the central texts, i.e. the Qur‘an for Muslims

and the Bible for Christians, participation in religious meetings and involvement in religious

exercises like fastings and prayer. The results showed that there was no difference in the

religious commitment of Muslims and Christians. Both groups were found to be equally

observing their religious practices.

61 The religious group with which the respondents identified themselves, in this case, Islam or Christianity.

62

The university at which the respondents were studying at the time of data collection. 63

The image that people have of themselves resulting from others‘ feedback about them (Pagaduan-Apostol,

2017).

pg. 322

However, the results revealed a tendency for a wide variance among Muslim respondents

regardless of their university. This meant that religious commitment among these respondents

varied widely from strict, to moderate commitment behaviour and to laxity. This could be a

reflection of the reality of the Muslim community in Kenya, whose commitment to their

religious faith may have been varied. On the other hand, it could be a reflection of the

characteristics of Muslim adherents in the two universities under study. Third, it could have been

occasioned by the way in which they were identified. At both universities, the Muslim

participants were all approached and requested to be part of the study regardless of whether they

were strong adherents or not. On the other hand, identification of Christian respondents was done

at religious meetings, which means that those who were not as committed to religious practice

had minimal chances of participating. That they frequented religious meetings may be a pointer

to their stronger commitment to religion than the Muslim students who were specifically sought

out. It should be noted that due to the latter‘s relatively smaller proportion in the population, they

had to be sought for regardless of whether they attended religious meetings or not.

The United Nations Development Program (2017) attested to the power of religion as an avenue

for individuals and groups to express their identity. Religion provides justification for what is

acceptable or what is forbidden and denigrated (Willem & van der Joop, 2016). These results

showed that the respondents in this study were actually active participants in their respective

religions.

pg. 323

8.3.2 Relationship between University Affiliation and Religious

Commitment

Some difference in religious commitment was observed at university level. Muslim participants

from Garissa University adhered more to their religious practices than Christian respondents

from the same university. It can be recalled that the environs of Garissa University were

predominantly Muslim populated while those of MMMUST were predominantly Christian.

These results may be a reflection of environmental influence. It was expected that Islam was

thriving in the Garissa region resulting in more incentives, motivations and support for Muslims

to participate in religious exercises. The region may have been characterised by a richer selection

of Islamic religious resources like clergy, teachers, mosques, and schools that were equipped

with books and other materials, etc. These were essential for the growth and establishment of the

religion as opposed to Christianity whose adherents may not have enjoyed similar assets. Also,

the Christian respondents at this institution may not have been as committed to religion as their

Muslim counterparts for other reasons such as a past terror attack that affected Christians at the

university. However, further research was required to prove this point and to investigate the

presence of any other factors. It could be that the history of terror attacks or the presence of a

majority Muslim population had a negative impact on Christians‘ religious identification. There

could also be a social influence of majority Muslims on Christians‘ beliefs and religious

commitment challenging their beliefs with the goal of conversion. There was a symmetrical

phenomenon at the two universities where Muslims were the majority in one and a minority in

the other with Christians being the majority in one and a minority in the other. This was linked to

a similar trend in the two institutions where the majority and minority groups tended to report

consistently similar characteristics leading to a form of parallelism.

pg. 324

At MMUST, Christian respondents were found to adhere more to religious practices than their

Muslim counterparts. The university was situated in a predominantly Christian area; with a wide

range of Christian religious assets such as churches, mission centres, religious leaders and

teachers, schools and a similar community of members. This was considered to be likely to

facilitate and to promote the commitment to religion among them. The Muslims at this institution

did not have the same wealth of religious resources and this may have had a negative impact on

their level of religious commitment. In fact, that the Muslim students here had a Christian

chaplain was quite telling. This was confirmed by the significant difference observed between

the two Muslim groups revealing that those in Garissa were more committed to religion than the

ones in MMUST. The parallelism described above resulting from the characteristics observed

among majority and minority groups at the two universities was replicated in this trait. It is

noteworthy however, that the difference between Christians in Garissa and Christians in

MMUST was only marginal. This meant that the level of religious commitment among the two

Christian groups was comparable.

8.3.3 Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Attitude

towards Terrorism

This section deals with the religious differences observed in attitude towards terrorism. The

results of this study revealed that Christian respondents tended to consider Christians as the

targets of terrorist activities and to blame terrorism on Muslims. Many factors may have been

responsible for this observation. First, humans tended to divide the world into ―us‖ and ―them‖,

lumping themselves into definitive or indefinitive groups with shared understandings, goals and

perception of a shared fate in a process known as categorisation. Staub (1989) describes this

pg. 325

process of categorisation as the basis upon which stereotypes were built leading to exaggerated

beliefs about groups that were often negative. Just by defining people as ―them‖ resulted in

devaluating them with religion being a major source of in-group-out-group differentiations.

Others were race, status, wealth, power and political opinions.

Second, the recent history of terrorist attacks in Kenya revealed a tendency of targeting

Christians. During or immediately following such attacks, media was awash with the news

reports sometimes with gory details of Muslim terrorists targeting, threatening and even killing

Christian targets. The ordinary sensitive Christian could not help but notice this religious vein.

All perpetrators had been linked with Islam and even when they had been born and brought up in

Christian or non-Muslim families, they had converted to Islam before participating in terror

activities. It was informative that the UN Monitoring Group for Somalia noted with concern that

al Shabaab had begun expanding its influence to non-Somali Kenyans since 2009. Examples of

persons who had converted to Islam before getting involved in terrorist activities included Juma

Ayub Otit Were, Suleiman Irungu Mwangi ―Karongo‖ aka Habib, Mohamed Murithi and

Ramadan Osao (UNSEC, 2010 as cited in Botha, 2014). Such reports went a long way in shaping

people‘s attitudes.

Jaji (2014) agrees that the increasing association of terrorism with Muslims in Kenya in recent

times was a cause for concern. To make matters worse, Das et al (2009) proved in a study that

those who watched a clip on terrorism perpetrated by an Arab had increased negative attitudes

towards Arabs. Such negative attitudes had the potential to lead to stereotyping. Stereotypes are

defined by Biernat and Dovidio (2000) as descriptions of groups that may be faulty, incomplete

pg. 326

and rigid. They were overgeneralised to group members even if they were unfounded and lacked

a basis. They led to stigmatisation of out-group members and gave way to an unjustifiable

prejudice (Dovidio et al, 2000). If this was the case, then this linking of Islam with terrorism was

congruent with the observation made in this study.

Third, since colonial days, Muslim-Christian relations in Africa had tended to lean towards

conflict and rivalry rather than cooperation (Migliore, 2014 as cited in Wandusim, 2015) further

strengthening suspicions and negative attitudes between the two groups. Yet, attitude was

important in guiding human behaviour. For instance, if a Christian considered a Muslim a

potential terrorist, it could affect their behaviour towards them. A case study by Chitwood (2017)

revealed the other-ing of Somali Muslims by evangelical Christians in Kenya who portrayed

them as Samaritans in need of the gospel of Christianity. This was confirmed by Brislen (2015)

who asserted that the picture of a Kenyan Muslim in the mind of a Kenyan Christian was that of

someone of different ethnicity from their own. This meant that interreligious relations in Kenya

also often implied interethnic relations complete with the dynamics that came with them.

Besides, Hellsten (2016) confirms that there had been historical discrimination against Muslims,

Arabs and Somalis in Kenya due to ethnicity and religion.

Fourth, the Somali factor in Kenya was of paramount importance since they were associated with

Islam and al Shabaab. In many parts of Kenya, Somalis were considered aggressive and violent

and this could unfortunately be generalized to the whole Muslim population. This was in spite of

the fact that certain Kenyan non-Somalis had also participated in terrorist activities. Jaji‘s (2014)

research revealed that Kenyan participants and Kenyan and Somali politicians particularly

pg. 327

singled out Somali refugees‘ religious affiliation and linked them to terrorism. For instance,

while addressing parliament, a Kenyan minister once likened the predominant Somali

community in Eastleigh, a Somali-dominated neighbourhood in Nairobi to an al Shabaab

enclave. He described the extremist organisation as a snake that had its tail in Somalia and its

head in Eastleigh (NPR, 2011 as cited in Odero, 2015). That some of the terrorists had converted

to Islam before participating in terrorist activities only strengthened this link between Islam and

terrorism. Consequently, the ordinary Christian, who had seen other Christians come under

terrorist attacks by militia who identified with Islam, found it difficult to delink terrorism from it.

Fifth, although Muslims and Christians in sub-Saharan Africa lived closely as family members in

spite of their religious differences, post-colonial revivalist movements in Islam were known to

have produced tensions and rivalry in Nigeria and Sudan (Brislen, 2015). These were probably

replicated in other parts of Africa as Botha (2014) reports that actually there was evidence of

Islamic religious fundamentalism along the coast of Kenya from the 1980s. This radicalisation

was imported by Kenyan Muslims returning from further studies in the Middle East. Therefore,

the observation of the attitude that linked terrorism to Islam could have developed from long-

standing Islamophobia (Wesonga, 2017 & Jaji, 2014) and the belief that the Muslim was violent.

Nderitu (2015) states that al Qaeda, its affiliates and al Shabaab had been present in the region

for close to 20 years.

According to the image-formation theory, group members could be prejudiced against relevant

out-groups to enhance their social identity and self-esteem. It was observed that Christian

respondents were more likely to consider terrorism as linked to Islam and to see their in-group as

targeted. On the other hand, Muslim respondents did not link terrorism with Islam nor did they

pg. 328

consider Christians as the targets of terrorism in Kenya. Greenwood (1994) indicates that group

members tended to feel shame when the respect of their group was diminished because of

members‘ actions. Terrorism aroused feelings of shame among family members who had the

tendency to dissociate themselves from perpetrators. For example, a Kenya government chief

distanced himself from his son, Abdirahim Abdullahi, a gunman at the Garissa university attack

whom he had reported missing before the attack. In another incident, the family of Ali Gichunge

‗Farouk‘ who was killed by commandos responding to a terrorist siege at Nairobi‘s Dusit D2

Hotel Complex in January 2019 described him as a truant on whom they had long given up

(Nation Team, 2019). These acts of detachment could have been prompted by fear of the stigma

that likely haunted families that were linked with perpetrators. Therefore, it was probable that

Muslim participants did not agree that terrorism was linked to Islam because they did not want to

lose respect or to identify with terrorists and their activities.

Moreover, many Muslims in Kenya had argued that terrorists used the name of Islam to justify

their actions yet theirs was a religion of peace. Majority of Muslims denied either partaking in or

supporting terrorism. Muslim clerics in Kenya had come out in public to denounce and estrange

themselves and the religion from acts of terror. This attitude may have trickled down to the

faithful as they followed in the footsteps of their leaders and in solidarity with the rest of the

Muslim brotherhood. It may also be that the general Muslim community were not party to

terrorism. Parkinson et al (2005) explain that people who felt guilty about their group‘s

behaviour did so not because of harm that they personally had inflicted on another group. Rather,

it was a result of them seeing members of their own group as having collective responsibility for

the harm done. This assertion could help explain the collective responsibility for terrorism

pg. 329

demonstrated by the Muslim respondents in this study. They may have suffered guilt because of

the victimisation of Christians by terrorists affiliated to Islam. Inter-group guilt arises when

individuals feel that their group had been unfair to an out-group. The guilt could have manifested

itself in this observation as the Muslim respondents sought to distance themselves from terror

acts either consciously or unconsciously.

8.3.4 Relationship between University Affiliation and Attitude

towards Terrorism

Garissa University students were more likely than MMUST respondents to attribute terrorist

activities to Muslims and to regard Christians as the targets of terrorists. Environmental factors

seemed to be at play here. Garissa itself was a terrorism hotspot area and these respondents

seemed to have experienced terrorism differently from their MMUST counterparts. A discussion

of the effect of environmental characteristics will be given shortly. In the meantime, it was also

worth noting that Garissa University Christians were more likely than MMUST Christians to

attribute terrorism to Islam and to consider Christians as the targets of terrorist activities. They

were also the most likely of all the four groups of respondents to attribute terrorist activities to

Islam and to deem Christians as the targets of terrorists in Kenya.

These observations may have been a consequence of the environmental characteristics of the

locations of the two universities. Garissa University, the larger Garissa and its environs had

witnessed repeated terrorist activities in which Christians had been adversely affected. Some of

these attacks had been carried out against churches during Sunday worship (Sambu, 2016). The

university itself suffered a terror attack in which close to 148 Christians were killed in 2015,

making international headlines. Hence, the experience of these respondents with terrorism was

pg. 330

distinctive as they had experienced terrorism differently, being more in touch with terrorist acts

and its details because of their terrorism hotspot neighbourhood. They were more exposed to

news about terrorism and actual terrorist incidences which were more frequent in the larger

Garissa area. The resultant cumulative sensitisation effect may have had a bearing on their

attitudes. Indeed, Das et al (2009) affirm that news about terrorism threatened one‘s group and

reactions to out-group members. Likewise, a history of terror attacks had the potential to

influence the attitudes of individuals differently from those without such an experience.

Exposure to multiple terror attacks in the locality of the university could have triggered

antagonistic reactions and behaviours towards those considered to be responsible. For instance,

Kaakinen et al (2017) discovered that online hostility increased immediately after the Paris terror

attacks on 13th

November, 2015. This may not have been replicated in other places which were

outside the scope of the attack area. The public anger aroused by such attacks could stimulate

negative attitudes towards perpetrators. The experiences of those coming directly and close to

terror attacks likely played a role in shaping their opinions and attitudes.

The terrorist attack on the university may have left footprints in its wake. First of all, in response

to the attack, several measures were put in place to tighten security at the university. A drop-off

point a distance away from the main entrance was designated at which all visitors arriving by

public transportation had to alight. At the gate which was manned by armed soldiers and regular

security personnel was a biometric register for vetting all students entering the compound on a

daily basis. A perimeter wall and barbed wire fence was built around the university and CCTV

cameras mounted at certain places. A police post with armed security personnel was stationed

permanently within the premises (The Star, 2020). These coupled with the presence of a

pg. 331

commemorative monument at the campus on which the names of the Christian students

massacred in the episode were engraved served as a constant reminder of the incident.

All these phenomena raised students‘ awareness of terrorism as a major challenge the country

was grappling with and the reality of this challenge in the Garissa area. Additionally, the naming

system in Kenya was such that one‘s religious affiliation could easily be identified. Assuming

that the respondents had had an opportunity to read through the names on the monument, they

were well aware of the religious affiliation of the slain victims. This had the potential to

influence their attitudes about Christians being targets of terror acts. In any case, Christian

respondents in Garissa were also a little bit more likely than the Christian respondents at

MMUST to attribute terrorism to Islam and to regard Christians as the targets of terrorists. This

suggested that an environmental factor was at play. The social category of Christians in Garissa

and their experience with terrorism could have been responsible for the differences observed in

their attitude compared to Christians in MMUST.

Geographical location may pose a threat to one‘s security as shown in terror incidents. Certain

towns and regions in Kenya had reported higher incidences of terrorism and were classified as

terrorism hotspots while others were not. Because of living under a higher threat of terrorism,

Christian respondents at Garissa could have exhibited what Baumeister (1997), Staub (1989) and

Staub and Bar-Tal (2003) cited in Kaakinen et al (2017) termed as out-group discrimination as a

result of fear and in-group threat. They could have been more sympathetic to and identified with

the victims of the 2015 terrorist attack at the institution. Furthermore, the threats from out-groups

influenced the attitudes and reactions of individuals. This was evidenced by Obaidi et al (2018)

who after conducting five studies were able to link intergroup threats and out-group hostility and

violence among non-Muslims in Europe and the USA, and Muslims in Europe, Afghanistan and

pg. 332

Turkey. They also observed a link between threat perceptions and hostility to Muslims.

Literature supports the idea that perceived threat was important for intergroup bias and attitudes

(Sherif, 1961 & Sniderman, Hagendoorn & Prior, 2004 as cited in Obaidi et al, 2018). A study

by Das and colleagues (2009) in the Netherlands was able to link terror-induced prejudice to

stereotype generalization. They demonstrated an increase in prejudice among Westerners against

Arabs after they were exposed to Muslim terrorist threats news. It gave rise to a generalization of

the stereotype that ―Arab = bad‖. This could happen in cases where individuals were exposed to

terrorism news as was the case with rampant terror attacks in Garissa town and its environs.

Constant interaction with members of other groups had the potential to increase individual

understanding of those groups‘ cultures and to reduce stereotypical beliefs about them. However,

the specific dynamics of such interactions had the potential to increase negative attitudes towards

members of out-groups too. In fact, Zajonc (1998) cited in Abun et al (2019) confirms that

repeated exposure to the attitude object may strengthen the attitude itself. This could have been a

factor in these observations as such constant interactions were likely to give rise to or to

strengthen attitudes linked to religion-based terrorism. It was the assumption of this study that

Christians in Garissa had more interaction with the Muslim community because of their

environment. Apart from producing positive attitudes about the Muslim community, such

interactions had the potential to generate negative attitudes which further shaped their attitudes.

Although Masinde Muliro respondents (both Muslim and Christian) were less likely to attribute

terrorist activities to Muslims, the Christian respondents at this institution were more likely to

attribute terrorist activities to Islam than their Muslims counterparts. They were also more likely

pg. 333

than their Muslim colleagues to consider Christians as the targets of terrorism. This could have

been a factor of the stigmatisation and prejudice already discussed in the section above where

Christian respondents seemed to be more likely to link terrorism to Islam.

Of all the groups, MMUST Muslims were the least likely to attribute terror-related activities in

Kenya to Islam. They were also the least likely to consider Christians as the targets of terror acts.

This could have been brought about by their different experiences with terrorism from their

Garissa counterparts with whom they shared a religion. Another reason could have been their

minority status in the Kakamega area playing out as a resistance to the proposition that Islam was

to blame for terrorism. In any case, they were less likely to have witnessed a terror attack.

According to social identity theory, identities were not static and they were constantly changing

due to experience. Accordingly, this Muslim group could have been in the process of defining

their relationship with Christians in the Christian-dominated area of Kakamega and its environs.

For instance, Andreouli and Chryssochoou (2015) argue that identity was a system of knowledge

about oneself, about others and about the social context constructed and negotiated within the

social relations. The term negotiation had the connotation of continuity meaning that this group

of respondents were in the process of negotiating their social identity and social self-esteem. One

way they did this was by resisting the suggestion that terrorism was perpetrated by Muslims, a

minority group with which they identified in a predominantly Christian environment.

8.3.5 Relationship between Religious Affiliation and Solutions

Preference

Christian respondents were more likely to favour drastic measures against terrorism than their

Muslim counterparts who preferred more conservative measures. This was in line with their

pg. 334

attitude that tended to link Islam with terrorist attacks, an attribute that was widespread among

Christian respondents. This probably played a role in their preference for drastic

counterterrorism measures which could have been motivated by their need for self-protection

with the hope of deterring would-be culprits. Parkinson et al (2005) state that intergroup emotion

had to do with feelings that emanated from belonging to a certain group. Christians who

considered terrorists as targeting Christians may have seen their group as being under attack and

therefore the need to safeguard it. Although feelings at personal level could have differed,

Parkinson et al (ibid) assert that these emotions were not necessarily projected to individual

members of out-groups but rather to the Muslim group as a whole. He cites the example that

racists despised members of other racial groups not because they believed that any individual

member of these groups had negative attributes. Rather, they believed that all of them had these

negative attributes. Thus, although Christian respondents may not have personally identified any

Muslim terrorist, they passed a blanket judgement on the whole Muslim group as terrorist

because of the intergroup emotion that the phenomenon aroused in them.

In line with their attitude that Muslims were not to blame for terrorism in Kenya and that

Christians were not the target of terrorists, Muslim respondents favoured conservative

counterterrorism measures. This may have been occasioned by Muslim respondents‘ sympathy

towards the terrorists‘ cause, and therefore the favouring of more conservative measures.

Terrorists did not just strike without reason and some of the grievances put forth by al Shabaab

constituted genuine complaints. It should be noted that this terror group had managed to recruit

Kenyan ethnics by capitalising on long-standing injustices committed against the latter. They had

also used some of the grievances of Kenyan Muslims as justification for attacks. If the Muslim

pg. 335

respondents in this study identified with those grievances, they had reason to commiserate with

the terrorists whom they deemed as warranted in fighting for what they saw as a ‗just‘ cause. It

should be recalled that literature detailed systematic discrimination of Muslim populations in

Kenya especially in the north-eastern and coastal regions. In addition, Amble and Hitchens

(2014) document the justification of jihad in Kenya by extremists in response to the

government‘s war ‗against Muslims‘ disguised as the fight against terrorism. According to them,

some Kenyan Muslims had joined the jihad probably due to these convictions.

Second, the preference for conservative interventions against terrorism may have resulted from

Muslim respondents‘ religious, family or blood ties with recruits into terror organisations and

confirmed perpetrators of terrorist acts. In any case, they had religion as a common factor with

them.

8.3.6 Relationship between University Affiliation and Solutions

Preference

In general, there was no relationship between University Affiliation and solutions preference.

However, at university level, Christian respondents at MMUST favoured more drastic measures

to terrorism than Muslim respondents at the same institution. This scenario was replicated at

Garissa University where Christian respondents tended to favour drastic counterterrorism

measures in comparison to the Muslim participants. Parvez (2014) writes that people‘s life

experiences could embed new ways of thinking and traits in them. With more and more

Christians affected in terror attacks, this observation among Christian respondents was not

surprising.

pg. 336

The responses of Muslims at the two universities were more varied, spread across the continuum

from conservative, to moderate and to drastic measures against terrorism. This was also the case

with the Christian participants from Garissa University who although favoured drastic measures,

were more heterogeneous in their preference for solutions. This may have been caused by the

effects of their greater interaction with the local Muslim populace in Garissa area. Brown and

Hewstone (2005) and Pettigrew (1998) confirm that people with intergroup contact were less

likely to be prejudiced towards out-group members than those without this form of contact. This

may have accounted for the variance observed in this group. The intergroup contact theory was

advanced by Gordon Allport as a means of reducing prejudice and intergroup conflict between

majority and minority groups (Everett, 2013). Thus, although Christians at Garissa attributed

terrorism to Muslims and considered Christians as the target of terrorists, the variation in their

preference for solutions may have been influenced by the dynamics arising from their increased

contact with Muslims in Garissa. However, another factor could have been responsible for this

observation. It was notable that this group of students chose to enrol at the university when it

reopened after months of closure and removal from the Universities Joint Admissions Board64

selection pool following the 2015 terror attack. It is important to note that Garissa University

suffered low enrolment rates in the aftermath of the 2015 attack (Zirulnick, 2016). This history

of a terror attack did not deter them from registering at the institution, meaning that the presence

of such attitudes before their decision to study there could not be completely ruled out.

Only MMUST Christian respondents displayed little variation in their preference for severity of

64 The panel previously tasked with allocating students to state-owned universities in Kenya.

pg. 337

solutions to terrorism; there was more homogeneity in their preferences. This relative uniformity

may have been due to a lack of interaction effects observed in their Christian counterparts at

Garissa. The intergroup contact theory proposes four channels for reducing intergroup prejudice

and conflict between minorities and majorities. These were equal status for both groups,

cooperation across the groups, setting of common goals and providing support through

institutional authorities (Everett, 2013). Since both Garissa University and MMUST were state

educational institutions that admitted students from all walks of life, the study assumed that these

four conditions were at play and that any stereotypes had been neutralised. This then hinted at

environmental characteristics of the participants as a plausible explanation to the little difference

observed between the two Christian groups at Garissa and at MMUST.

That Muslim respondents in both universities tended to favour more conservative measures

against terrorism compared to their Christian counterparts was congruent with their attitudes. It

was notable that the university affiliation had no effect on the preference for solutions despite

their differences in other areas. This may have ensued from the effects of previous experience or

solidarity with their Muslim brethren who may have faced harsh counterterrorism measures from

Kenyan state machinery. For example, Busher (2014) reports widespread negative perceptions

by Somali-Muslim youth complaining about religious and ethnic discrimination by the police

and the use of excessive force in the aftermath of the Westgate attacks.

Moreover, counterterrorism security measures targeting Muslim-dominated areas of Nairobi and

the coastal region had led to escalation of prejudice against Muslims (Hellsten, 2016). This may

have had a two-pronged effect on Christians and Muslims. While having the likelihood of

pg. 338

increasing Christians‘ prejudice against Muslims, it had the potential of propagating feelings of

alienation among Muslims and fostering sympathy for terrorist organisations. One Muslim stated

that after a terrorist attack that happened in Nairobi, she was harassed by certain publics as she

walked in Kakamega town. This made her feel like joining a terrorist group to retaliate. Indeed,

the Daily Nation (2015) wrote asking the government to curb the spread of polarization of

Kenyans along ethnic, religious and regional lines even as it fought rising terrorism in the

country. In fact, Cronin (2006) cited in Willem and van der Joop (2016) lament the haphazard

manner in which the implementation of counterterrorism policies was carried out without

examination or confirmation of underlying assumptions. Such aspects had the capacity to

neutralise the effect of environmental characteristics and to make Muslims more protective of

their own.

8.3.7 Correlation between Religious Commitment and Solutions

Preference

The observations revealed a negative correlation between religious commitment and solutions

preference. This meant that the more participants were dedicated to religion, the more they

preferred conservative and less radical counterterrorism measures. Stronger commitment to

religion was observed among the Muslim participants in Garissa and the Christian participants in

MMUST. This negative correlation could be traced to these two groups of respondents who both

favoured conservative solutions to terrorism as discussed in the section on university affiliation.

Anyhow, commitment to religion seemed to play a role in the preference for solutions. Other

factors that may have played a role in this observation for the Garissa Muslim group was their

experience with terrorism and counterterrorism measures in the region where they lived. Being

Muslim in a terror-prone area, there was the likelihood that they had been affected negatively

pg. 339

either directly or indirectly during anti-terrorism security operations. A second factor may have

been their religious ties to Muslim suspects owing to the feeling of a shared fate with them.

Furthermore, Obaidi et al (2018) demonstrated that those with strong religious identity felt the

highest level of threat. This had the capacity to influence their solutions preferences as

implementation of drastic Muslim-focused measures was likely to affect them adversely. Recall

that Christian respondents at MMUST also exhibited stronger commitment to religion, yet they

favoured relatively conservative measures. This was in spite of their attitude that terrorists

targeted Christians and that Islam was to blame for terrorism. It was probable that their different

experience with terrorist-related activities from that of the Christians at Garissa influenced this

observation. The type of experience with terrorism may have been responsible for influencing

this attitude, as the Garissa Christians had more tangible experience with the phenomenon than

those at MMUST.

8.3.8 Correlation between Religious Commitment and Self-esteem

The results of this section of the study indicated that there was a positive correlation between

religious commitment and self-esteem. This meant that the more a person was devoted to

religion, the higher their self-esteem was. Their commitment to religion may have been

responsible for this observation. Religion served certain functions in the respondents‘ lives,

providing them with a community of like-minded people and a lens through which to interpret

the events of life. According to Willem and van de Joop (2016), one function of religion was that

it shaped the processes by which individuals interpreted the world and their reactions to different

circumstances.

pg. 340

It is worth mentioning that stronger religious commitment was observed among Muslims at

Garissa and Christians at MMUST. These may have accounted for the correlation with self-

esteem observed here; pointing to the role of religion in the self-esteem of respondents. Another

explanation was that these individuals dwelt in regions where their religion was predominant

offering them more space for religious expression. This could have resulted in the boosting of

their confidence and self-esteem. Conversely, it could also be that their self-esteem motivated

their commitment to religion.

8.3.9 Correlation between Attitude towards Terrorism and

Solutions Preference

This study revealed a positive correlation between attitude towards terrorism and preference for

solutions. It was observed that the stronger the attitude that Islam was to blame for terrorism, the

more extreme the preferred solutions. The attitude that Muslims were to blame for terrorism was

observed among the two Christian groups at Garissa University and at MMUST as was the

preference for more drastic measures against terrorism. This may have resulted from the attitude

towards terrorism which could have been driven by factors such as suspicion, discrimination and

long-standing prejudice against Muslim populations. If this was the case, then its influence in the

preference for drastic interventions against terrorism was not totally surprising. Another probable

reason could have been the respondents‘ feeling that if the culprits were known then there was a

need to deal with them.

8.3.10 Correlation between Self-Esteem and Solutions

Preference

The study showed that there was a negative correlation between self-esteem and the preference

for solutions. This meant that the higher the self-esteem of an individual, the more conservative

pg. 341

or mild the measures they preferred against terrorism. This could have been on account of higher

self-esteem observed in respondents with stronger commitment to religion. These individuals

were also likely to prefer more conservative measures against terrorism probably because they

were less threatened by terrorism than their counterparts with lower self-esteem. Their stronger

commitment to religion could have been a factor at play here too. Das et al (2009) confirmed the

role of self-esteem in cushioning individuals against the effects of terrorism news. They observed

that increase in prejudice against perpetrators of terrorism was higher in viewers with low self-

esteem than in those with high self-esteem. Prejudice was defined by Dovidio et al (2000) as an

attitude towards a person based on their belonging to a given group. Prejudice could lead to

harsh judgments against people, as observed in the study by Das et al (2009). Thus, the more

individuals blamed Islam for terrorism (prejudice), the more drastic the counterterrorism

measures they preferred (harsh judgement). Probably, the higher self-esteem observed in

religiously devoted persons shielded them against this kind of prejudice. And because of lower

prejudice against Muslims, they favoured conservative measures. Besides, Badea et al (2019)

observed that self-affirmation, a factor of self-esteem helped to reduce the influence of threats

and the preference for discriminatory counterterrorism measures. It helped cushion individuals

against threats from immigrants and the inclination towards supporting radical measures against

terrorism. The reverse was probably true as well because Das et al (2009) likewise discovered

that low self-esteem affected individuals‘ attitudes towards out-group members. Therefore, lower

commitment to religion was present along with lower self-esteem which culminated in the

preference for drastic measures. Nonetheless, this was an area for further research.

Interestingly, it was observed that although Muslims in Garissa and Christians in MMUST both

showed high commitment to religion, they parted ways in their preferences for solutions. While

pg. 342

the Garissa Muslims preferred conservative measures against terrorism, MMUST Christians

preferred strict, drastic measures. The expectation would be that because strict religious

commitment was associated with high self-esteem and less threats, it should have been

automatically associated with preference for less drastic measures. This was not the case

however with MMUST respondents, leading to the implication that higher commitment to

religion did not necessarily culminate in preference for conservative counterterrorism measures.

It could also be that high self-esteem did not lead to preference for less drastic counterterrorism

interventions after all. Parkinson et al (2005) state that it was possible for people to feel anger on

behalf of other group members while Obaidi et al (2018) ascertained that people with strong

religious identity felt high levels of threat. If this was the case, then such feelings of threat could

justify the observations made on these two groups of respondents. For the Garissa Muslims, the

fear of being affected (directly or indirectly) may have driven them to favour conservative

measures. For MMUST Christians, the fear of falling victim to terrorism could have been the

driving force towards the preference for drastic measures. In both cases, the goal was that of self-

preservation. Still, this observation may have resulted from certain other factors at play in the

Muslim respondents at Garissa. Finally, it could have resulted from having a higher proportion of

MMUST Christians to Garissa Muslims in the sample.

8.4 Summary of Conclusions and Interpretations

The conclusions that were made in this study are listed here under each study respectively. An

illustrative table is also provided for ease of reference.

pg. 343

8.4.1 Experiment Conclusions

1. The experiment concluded that manipulating the saliency of terrorism activity in Kenya

did not increase its latent role on respondents‘ attitudes towards terrorism.

2. It was concluded that terrorism had a high permanent influence on respondents in a

number of dimensions.

i) It impacted participants‘ readiness to relate with members of the opposite religion.

ii) It was responsible for respondents‘ maintenance of a strong terrorism risk attitude.

iii) It influenced their preference for counterterrorism measures.

iv) It was responsible for the maintenance of a status quo on the attitudes towards

terrorism among the Muslim and Christian students of the two universities.

v) The continuance of a status quo on the intent to relate with members of the other

religion among Muslim and Christian students of Garissa and Masinde Muliro

universities was attributed to it.

vi) It affected the level of terrorism risk attitude for Garissa University and Masinde

Muliro University Muslim and Christian students.

vii) The preference for counterterrorism solutions among the Muslim and Christian

students of Garissa University and Masinde Muliro University was linked to it.

8.4.2 Interpretation of Experiment Conclusions

The above conclusions led to the following interpretations.

1. Issues of terrorism in Kenya were already entrenched in the minds of the participants that

they could not be manipulated further. This points to the strength of the attitudes towards

terrorism.

pg. 344

2. The two groups had taken their positions due to the abundance of information about

terrorism and the conflicted world in which they lived that the manipulation could not

affect them in any way.

3. The attitudes of participants were considered to be relatively stable.

8.4.3 Survey Conclusions

1. These results of the survey led to the conclusion that the respondents in this study were

dedicated to their respective religions.

2. It was concluded that Muslim participants from Garissa University were more devoted to

their religious practices than Christian respondents at the same institution.

3. The Christian participants from MMUST were more committed to their religion than the

Muslim respondents at the same university.

4. The results of this study revealed that Christian respondents were more likely than the

Muslim respondents to see terrorist activities as perpetrated by Muslims and to view

Christians as targeted in these acts.

5. Respondents from Garissa University were more likely than those from MMUST to link

terrorist activities to Muslims and to regard Christians as the targets of terrorists.

6. Of all the groups, Muslim respondents from MMUST were the least likely to attribute

terrorist acts to Muslims and also least likely to consider Christians as targeted.

7. Muslim participants at both universities were less likely than Christian respondents in the

two institutions to prefer drastic counterterrorism measures.

8. The study revealed that the more committed participants were to religion, the less likely

they were to prefer drastic counterterrorism measures.

pg. 345

9. It was also discovered that the higher the participants‘ dedication to religion, the higher

their self-esteem was. This confirms the thesis that stronger group attachment or

commitment was linked with higher self-esteem.

10. It was observed that the stronger the attitude that Islam was to blame for terrorism and

that Christians were targeted by terrorists, the higher the preference for drastic

counterterrorism measures was.

11. The study revealed that the higher the self-esteem of participants, the lower their

preference for drastic measures against terrorism.

8.4.4 Interpretation of Survey Conclusions

The above observations were linked to several reasons as stipulated in this sub-section.

1. The identification of participants was accurate as they were relatively strong adherents to

their faiths.

2. Environmental factors were considered to play a big role especially in the differences

observed between the two universities.

3. The abundance of information about terrorism was also considered important and it was

linked to the media presentation of news related to terrorism.

4. The categorization phenomenon was considered to play a role in influencing attitudes

especially due to the lumping of groups into ―us‖ and ―them‖.

5. The Somali factor was important in the linking of terrorism to Muslims and it may have

resulted from certain longstanding attitudes.

6. The attitudes that linked terrorism to Muslims and that viewed Christians as targeted

were considered to be stable.

pg. 346

7. Because the attitudes were already stable, they could not be easily manipulated and they

were used to interpret all other information concerning violent extremism.

8. Muslims were less likely to link terrorism to Islam because of self-preservation, the need

to protect themselves from guilt, shame, accusation and possible victimization of self or

fellow Muslims.

9. Christian respondents had a higher preference for drastic measures because of the need

for self-preservation.

pg. 347

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter dealt with the interpretation of the results arrived at after analysis of data. It was

divided into two major sections corresponding to the two investigations that made up the

research project.

First was the experiment which sought to investigate the influence of terrorism on the dependent

variables. The results showed that priming religion-based terrorism had no effect on the attitudes

of respondents towards terrorism in comparison with the control condition. The same primer had

no effect on how closely respondents were willing to relate with persons of the other religion.

The terrorism primer also had no effect on the level of terrorism risk attitude of respondents.

Finally, it had no influence on the severity of respondents‘ choice of counterterrorism measures.

This certainly could have been related to previously formed opinions that resulted from the

availability and exposure to information on the subject of terrorism. These attitudes could not

yield to manipulation by the primer.

The second section dealt with the survey whose main objective was to investigate the influence

of religious affiliation and university affiliation on the commitment of respondents to their

religion, attitudes of respondents on terrorism, and the severity of the counterterrorism

interventions they preferred. The results showed that there was no difference in the level of

commitment to religion between Muslims and Christians. This was attributed to the role of

religion in the lives of respondents because it served a social function and a protective function,

providing them with a system of beliefs and the interpretation of life events. Second, Christians

tended to attribute terrorist activities in Kenya to Muslims and they were more likely to consider

Christians as the targets of terrorists. This was linked to historical stigmatisation of the Muslim

community as violent, systematic discrimination by government and Muslim-focused

pg. 348

counterterrorism measures. Muslim respondents were less likely to attribute terrorism to

Muslims as they were also less likely to consider Christians as targets of terrorists. This was

attributed to their sense of guilt and shame for previous atrocities committed against Christians

by terrorists identifying with Islam, a sense of responsibility, and fear of being stigmatised.

Third, Christian respondents had a higher preference for drastic measures against terrorism as

compared to their Muslim counterparts who preferred more conservative measures. This was

linked to discrimination, stereotyping and self-preservation on the part of Christians. For

Muslims, it was linked to the fear of victimisation, solidarity with would-be culprits and self-

preservation interests.

There was a relationship between university affiliation and religious commitment. Garissa

University Muslims and MMUST Christians were more devoted to religion than the other groups

of respondents. This was attributed to enabling environments that facilitated religious expression.

Second, University of affiliation was found to influence attitudes towards terrorism. Garissa

University respondents were more likely to attribute terrorism to Muslims and to consider

Christians as targeted by terrorists than their MMUST counterparts. This was partly attributed to

the different ways in which the two groups experienced terrorism. Garissa was a terror hotspot,

where respondents experienced terrorist incidences differently from Kakamega where MMUST

is situated. The impact and footprints of the 2015 Garissa university terror attack were also taken

into consideration as possibly contributing to differences observed between Garissa and

MMUST respondents. Third, there was a relationship between university affiliation and choice

of counterterrorism measures. Although Garissa University Muslims attributed terrorism to

Islam, they preferred more conservative counterterrorism measures. This was considered to be a

pg. 349

result of the need for self-preservation, fear of victimization and the possible presence of family

or blood and the apparent religious ties with some of the perpetrators.

The chapter also discussed correlations observed between certain variables. There was a negative

correlation between religious commitment and the choice of counterterrorism measures. The

more devoted the respondents were to religion, the more conservative the counterterrorism

measures they preferred. This was considered to be a factor of religion and the environmental

characteristics of the respondents. Second, there was a positive correlation between religious

commitment and self-esteem, i.e. the more devoted the respondents were to religion, the higher

their self-esteem. This was attributed to the role of religion in the lives of the respondents and the

supportiveness of the religious environments where they lived. Third, there was a negative

correlation between attitude and solutions preferred against terrorism. The stronger the attitude

that terrorism was perpetrated by Muslims and that Christians were the targets of such acts, the

higher the preference for drastic counterterrorism measures. Finally, there was a negative

correlation between self-esteem and preference for counterterrorism interventions. The higher

the self-esteem of respondents, the more conservative the measures they preferred against

terrorism. This was probably due to the religious commitment which was positively correlated

with self-esteem.

The findings above were discussed under the umbrella of the conceptual model that guided this

research project. The different groups of respondents discussed fitted into the model at the

relevant points. However, the presence of these attitudes should not be misconstrued to mean that

people had the same opinion but that the organization of individual knowledge was influenced by

common principles shared by people in the same culture or community (Andreouli &

Chryssochoou, 2015). It gave meaning to the people‘s environments and how they positioned

pg. 350

themselves in it. In short, the attitudes investigated in this project guided people‘s practices

(Andreouli & Chryssochoou, ibid). Thus, the group differences observed in this study were

explained in the context of social identity despite the similarity of certain elements and

environmental characteristics.

The next and final chapter of this work presents the conclusions that were drawn in this research

project along with the recommendations we made. Suggestions will be given for areas of further

research to illuminate certain aspects that could not be handled conclusively in this project.

pg. 351


Ce chapitre portait sur l‘interprétation des résultats obtenus après l‘analyse des données. Il est

organisé en deux parties principales correspondant aux deux études ayant constitué ce projet. La

première étude cherchait à étudier l‘influence de l‘islamisation du terrorisme, via une tâche de

rappel du contexte conflictuel et menaçant de la vie au Kenya, sur les variables dépendantes.

Nous n‘avons pas observé d‘effets de notre manipulation du contexte, rappelant l‘islamisation du

terrorisme, sur la perception des participants, par rapport au groupe contrôle, vraisemblablement

ce contexte étant encore trop présent dans leur esprit pour produire une différence significative

de leur façon d‘envisager leur environnement social. Il n‘y a eu aucun effet de la cristallisation

de l‘islamisation du terrorisme sur la façon dont les participants étaient prêts à se rapprocher des

personnes de l‘autre religion, ni même sur le niveau de risque perçu de terrorisme perçu ; celui-ci

étant perçu comme très élevé. Les choix des contre-mesures antiterroristes s‘est également révélé

très important dans tous les cas.

La deuxième partie de la discussion portait sur l‘enquête dont l‘objectif principal était d‘étudier

l‘influence de l‘appartenance religieuse et de l‘affiliation universitaire à l‘engagement des

répondants dans leur pratique religieuse, leur perception du terrorisme et la sévérité des contre-

mesures antiterroristes qu‘ils privilégieraient.

Premièrement, nous n‘avons pas observé de différences au niveau de l‘engagement religieux

parmi les musulmans et les chrétiens. Nous avons attribué cela au rôle de la religion dans la vie

des répondants, dans la mesure où elle sert des fonctions sociales et protectrices. La religion leur

fournit un système de croyances et d‘interprétation des événements de vie.

Deuxièmement, les chrétiens avaient non seulement tendance à imputer aux musulmans, la

responsabilité des activités terroristes au Kenya, mais également à estimer que les chrétiens

pg. 352

étaient plus susceptibles d‘être cibles des terroristes. Cela était lié à la stigmatisation historique

de la communauté musulmane, cible d‘une discrimination violente et systématique par le

gouvernement à laquelle est associée des contre-mesures antiterroristes qui leur sont

préjudiciables. Les répondants musulmans, quant à eux, étaient moins susceptibles d‘attribuer le

terrorisme aux musulmans car ils étaient également moins susceptibles de considérer les

chrétiens comme des cibles de terroristes. Cela a été attribué à leur sentiment de culpabilité et de

honte pour les atrocités commises précédemment contre les chrétiens par des terroristes qui

s‘identifiaient à l‘islam et qui par ce biais suscitait un sens des responsabilités, et la peur d‘être

stigmatisé.

Troisièmement, les répondants chrétiens avaient une préférence plus élevée pour les mesures

drastiques contre le terrorisme par rapport à leurs homologues musulmans qui préféraient des

mesures plus protectrices. Cela était lié à la discrimination et aux stéréotypes de la part des

chrétiens d‘un côté et au besoin d‘auto-préservation, de peur de la victimisation et de solidarité

avec les coupables en soi de l‘autre côté.

Nous avons observé une relation entre l‘affiliation universitaire et l‘engagement religieux. Les

musulmans de l‘Université de Garissa et les chrétiens du MMUST étaient plus dévoués à la

religion que les autres groupes de répondants. Cela a été attribué à des environnements

favorables à l‘expression de la dévotion et de l‘expression religieuse. Par ailleurs, l‘université

d‘affiliation a eu une influence sur la perception du terrorisme. Les répondants de l‘Université de

Garissa étaient plus susceptibles d‘attribuer le terrorisme aux musulmans et de considérer les

chrétiens comme ciblés par les terroristes en comparaison de leurs homologues du MMUST.

Cela a été attribué en partie aux différentes façons dont les deux groupes ont été victimes du

terrorisme. Garissa était un point névralgique de la manifestation de la terreur, où les répondants

pg. 353

ont connu des incidents terroristes à la différence de la région de Kakamega où se trouve le

MMUST. Les effets de l‘attentat terroriste de l‘université de Garissa en 2015 ont également été

pris en considération. Nous avons également observé qu‘il y avait une relation entre l‘affiliation

à l‘université et le choix des mesures antiterroristes. Bien que les musulmans de l‘Université de

Garissa aient perçu le terrorisme comme étant perpétré par des musulmans, ils ont opté pour des

mesures antiterroristes plus protectrices. Cela a été considéré comme le résultat de la nécessité de

l‘auto-préservation, la peur que des mesures plus sévères entrainent une victimisation et la

présence de liens religieux, familiaux ou de sang avec certains des auteurs des actes terroristes.

Dans ce chapitre, nous avons également discuté des corrélations observées entre certaines

variables. Il y avait une corrélation négative entre l‘engagement religieux et le choix des mesures

antiterroristes. Plus les répondants étaient dévoués à la religion, plus les mesures antiterroristes

qu‘ils préféraient étaient conservatrices. Cela a été considéré comme un facteur de religion et les

caractéristiques de l‘environnement dans lequel vivait les participants à l‘étude.

Nous avons également observé qu‘il y avait une corrélation positive entre l‘engagement religieux

et l‘estime de soi, c‘est-à-dire que plus les répondants étaient dévoués à la religion, plus leur

estime de soi était élevée. Cela a été attribué au rôle de la religion dans la vie des fidèles et au

soutien des milieux religieux dans lesquels ils vivaient. Nous avons constaté une corrélation

négative entre la perception du terrorisme et le choix pour des solutions anti-terroristes. Plus

émerge le sentiment que le terrorisme a été perpétré par des musulmans et que les chrétiens en

ont été la cible, plus les participants ont préféré des mesures antiterroristes drastiques. Enfin, il y

avait une corrélation négative entre l‘estime de soi et la préférence pour les interventions

antiterroristes. Plus l‘estime de soi des répondants est élevée, plus les mesures qu‘ils préféraient

pg. 354

contre le terrorisme se sont avérées plutôt protectrices. Cela était probablement dû à

l‘engagement religieux, positivement corrélé avec l‘estime de soi.

Les résultats ci-dessus ont été discutés sous l‘égide du modèle conceptuel qui nous a guidé dans

la réalisation de cette étude. Les différents groupes de répondants interrogés nous ont permis, par

leurs réponses, d‘investiguer la pertinence du modèle d‘analyse. Un fait de principe est que les

attitudes ne signifient pas que les gens ont la même opinion, mais que l‘organisation des

connaissances individuelles est influencée par des principes communs partagés par des personnes

de la même culture ou communauté (Andreuli et Chryssochoou, 2015).

Le prochain et dernier chapitre de ce travail présente les conclusions qui ont été tirées dans ce

projet de recherche ainsi que les recommandations que nous avons faites. Des suggestions seront

faites pour les domaines de recherche supplémentaires afin d‘éclairer certains aspects qui n‘ont

pas pu être traités de façon concluante dans le cadre de ce projet.

pg. 355

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pg. 358

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR

FURTHER RESEARCH

CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS ET SUGGESTIONS POUR DE

PLUS AMPLES RECHERCHES

pg. 359

9.1 INTRODUCTION

This is the final chapter of this research project report. It discusses the conclusions that were

arrived at after interpretation of results in chapter eight. This interpretation was done on the

outcomes of data analysis derived from the experiment and the survey with the guidance of the

social identity theory. Reference is made to relevant literature and published studies on

intergroup conflicts and attitudes toward counterterrorism measures.

The experiment yielded no evidence of relationships between priming the salience of religion-

based terrorism and attitudes towards terrorism; or with the relationship with members of the

opposite religion. The terrorism primer also had no impact on the terrorism risk attitude; nor with

preference for counterterrorism measures. The discussion of the results from the survey centred

on the relationships between religious affiliation and university affiliation as the independent

variables. The religious commitment, attitude towards terrorism and solutions preference

comprised the dependent variables. Correlations that were detected between some of the

dependent variables are also discussed. The second section of the chapter discusses the

recommendations made in this project based on the observations and conclusions arrived at. The

third section is the culmination of the study that gives suggestions of areas that may require

further or deeper examination to help resolve questions raised by the study or those that it was

not able to answer.

9.2 PROJECT CONCLUSIONS

The main goal of this research project was to investigate the differences in the attitudes towards

terrorism between Muslim and Christian students at two universities in Kenya. These universities

were Garissa and MMUST. The goal was broken down into more specific objectives which were

pg. 360

formulated in question format. The answers to these questions comprised the findings discussed

in the previous chapter which findings led to the inferences that were made here. The section

below presents the conclusions that were made from the results of the two studies in the project.

9.2.1 Conclusions from the Experiment

The experiment aimed at answering four specific questions enumerated below.

i) Does terrorism shape the attitudes of Muslim and Christian university students in

Kenya?

ii) How does religion-based terrorism affect students‘ terrorism risk attitude?

iii) Does terrorism influence the relations between Muslim and Christian students at the

two universities?

iv) What is the influence of terrorism on participants‘ preference for counterterrorism

measures?

The findings on the questions above led to the making of the conclusions discussed below under

each question heading.

9.2.1.1 Does terrorism shape the attitudes of university

students in Kenya?

The interpretation of results revealed high levels of relationships between religion-based

terrorism and the attitudes of respondents towards terrorism in Kenya. This negates the effect of

our priming strategy for the terrorist conflict in Kenya. A priming strategy focusing on the

opposite dimension could probably have yielded different results. This could have been in the

pg. 361

form of a primer aimed at minimizing the terrorist conflict in the country and probably

downplaying the place of religion in matters of terrorism. These could constitute the delinking of

Islam with terrorism and the focusing on descriptions of Christian targets without necessarily

mentioning their religion. This could have led to either a reaction effect or a rebound effect

crystallizing the conflictual of the situation in Kenya and exacerbating the dynamics of us vs.

them.

These attitudes had to do with whether respondents viewed terrorism in Kenya as perpetrated by

Muslims or not and whether Christians were targeted by terrorists in the country or not. There

was no effect of our contextual primer on the influence of religion-based terrorism on attitudes

about terrorism among Muslim and Christian students. There was also no interaction effect

between our primer of religion-based terrorism and attitudes towards terrorism among students

of Garissa University and MMUST. Having demonstrated no such relationship this experiment

concluded that there was a latent role of religion-based terrorism on attitudes towards terrorism

among Muslim and Christian students at the two universities. The absence of such a prime effect

did not mean that attitudes about terrorism were not influenced by the way in which terrorism

impacted the minds of respondents. It may have resulted from the failure of the primer to elicit

these differences. In addition, we assume the fact that it was considered as a threat to the

respondents‘ wellbeing. In any case, the study also showed that the level of threat for terrorism

was high and this may have already shaped the attitudes before the study, rendering them

insusceptible to manipulation. It also means that terrorism is a latent threat. In any case the level

of terrorism threat in the country and especially in the Garissa area remains high. The

conclusions from the survey discussed later in this section illuminate this issue further.

pg. 362

9.2.1.2 How does religion-based terrorism affect students’ of

terrorism risk attitude?

The study aimed to inquire into the influence of priming religion-based terrorism on how much

threatened with terrorism the students‘ were. There was no evidence of such an influence of our

primer from the interpretation of results arrived at for both the groups in the universities. This

study therefore concluded that priming religion-based terrorism did not increase the level of risk

for terrorism among Muslim and Christian students at Garissa and Masinde Muliro universities.

We assume that there was a high level of threat. The fact that Garissa University was situated in

a terror-hotspot region cannot be overemphasized. These results could have been a pointer to the

high levels of this awareness and the inability of the primer to elicit any further influences. It

may therefore be an indicator of hitherto tense relations between the two groups with each of

them holding their positions without yielding to the primer.

9.2.1.3 Does terrorism influence the relations between Muslim

and Christian students at the two universities?

The experiment investigated the relationship that existed between priming terrorism and the

relations between Muslim and Christian students at Garissa University and at MMMUST. The

results showed no evidence that priming terrorism decreased the interactions between Muslims

and Christians at Garissa university and at MMUST. The study therefore concluded that priming

terrorism did not worsen relations between Muslim and Christian students at the two institutions.

This may be a pointer to already degraded relations such that the status quo was maintained

without submission to the primer.

pg. 363

9.2.1.4 What is the influence of terrorism on preference for


Another aim of the experiment was to investigate the influence of priming terrorism on

respondents‘ inclination for counterterrorism measures. This influence was sort for at religious

affiliation level and at university level. The results yielded no evidence pointing to any influence

of priming terrorism on preference for counterterrorism measures among Muslim and Christian

students. It also showed no effect of contextualising terrorism on counterterrorism measures

preference among students of Garissa University and MMUST. It was thus concluded that

priming terrorism did not increase the preferences for counterterrorism measures among Muslim

and Christian students at Garissa University and at MMUST. This may have been a consequence

of previously formed opinions that could not yield to the manipulation.

9.2.2 Conclusions from the Survey

The survey was guided by six research questions specified below.

i) What is the relationship between religious affiliation and religious commitment?

ii) Does religious affiliation affect attitudes towards terrorism?

iii) What relationship exists between religious affiliation and preference for


iv) Does university affiliation have any influence on religious commitment?

v) How does university affiliation affect attitudes towards terrorism?

vi) Is university affiliation related to preference for counterterrorism measures?

The observations made in an attempt at answering these research questions led to the

conclusions discussed below under the respective questions as headings.

pg. 364

9.2.2.1 What is the relationship between religious affiliation

and religious commitment?

One goal of the survey was to investigate the relationship between the religious affiliation of

respondents and their level of dedication to religion. This was important because religion

affected the way individuals coped with threats. The religious affiliations in this project were

either Islam or Christianity. The level of religious commitment was measured by requiring the

respondents to give an indication of their staunchness in religious practice as evidenced by

attendance at worship services. Other determinants were participation in religious meetings, the

consistent study of the central religious texts, and the performance of religious rituals such as

fastings and prayers among others. No difference was observed in the level of dedication to

religion between Muslims and Christians. The study therefore concluded that there was no

relationship between the religious affiliation of Muslim and Christian students at Garissa

University and at MMUST and their level of commitment to religion.

However, certain differences were observed at university level. Garissa University Muslim

students tended to be more dedicated to religion than the Christian students at the campus.

Contrariwise, MMUST Muslim students were less committed to religion than Christian students

at the institution. This led to the conclusion that the religious affiliation of Garissa University

Muslim and Christian students influenced their level of religious commitment. It was also

concluded that the religious affiliation of MMUST Muslim and Christian students affected their

level of dedication to religion.

pg. 365

9.2.2.2 Does religious affiliation affect attitudes towards

terrorism?

The survey sought to inquire into the relationship between religious affiliation and the attitudes

of respondents towards terrorism. These attitudes were about the link between terrorism and

Islam and opinions that suggested that Christians were the targets of terrorists. The results

revealed a relationship between religious affiliation and attitudes of respondents towards

terrorism. It was found that Muslim students were less likely to attribute acts of terrorism to

Muslims. They were also less likely to consider Christians as targets of terrorist activities. The

Christian students were however more likely to link terror acts in Kenya to Muslims and to

believe that terrorists targeted Christians in attacks. Consequently, the study concluded that the

religious affiliation of Muslims and Christians at Garissa University and at MMUST had a

bearing on their attitudes towards terrorism.

9.2.2.3 What relationship exists between religious affiliation

and preference for counterterrorism measures?

The survey investigated the relationship between religious affiliation and the preferences of

respondents for counterterrorism measures. These preferences were categorized as conservative,

moderate and drastic in accordance with the severity of their projected impact. The results

yielded evidence of such a relationship to the effect that the Muslim respondents were inclined to

favour less drastic measures against terrorism. Their Christian contemporaries nonetheless had a

preference for more drastic measures regardless of their university of affiliation. It was also

observed that the Muslim respondents were more heterogeneous in their preferences for

counterterrorism measures than the Christian respondents. It was therefore the conclusion of this

pg. 366

study that the religious affiliation of the Muslim and Christian students of Garissa University and

MMUST influenced their preference for counterterrorism measures.

9.2.2.4 Does university affiliation have any influence on

religious commitment?

The research sought to answer the question as to whether there was any relationship between the

university affiliation of respondents and their level of religious commitment. The results revealed

that Garissa Muslim respondents were more devoted to religion than the MMUST Muslim

students. MMUST Christians also exhibited a higher devotion to religion than the Garissa

Christians. It was the conclusion of this survey that the university affiliation of Muslim and

Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST influenced their level of commitment to

religion.

9.2.2.5 How does university affiliation affect attitudes towards

terrorism?

The survey sought to inquire into whether there was any relationship between the university

affiliation of respondents and their attitudes towards terrorism. These attitudes were linked to the

view that terrorism was perpetrated by Muslims and the opinion that Christians were the target of

terrorists. The results revealed that the university affiliation of respondents had a bearing on their

attitude towards terrorism. There was a higher inclination among Garissa university respondents,

regardless of their religious affiliation, to attribute terrorism to Muslims and to consider

Christians as pursued by terrorists. MMUST students however, were less likely to attribute

terrorism to Islam and to view Christians as the targets of terrorists. This led to the conclusion

pg. 367

that the university affiliation of Garissa University and MMUST students affected their attitudes

towards terrorism.

9.2.2.6 Is university affiliation related to preference for


The study aimed at inquiring into whether there was any relationship between the university

affiliation of respondents and their preference for counterterrorism measures. There was no

significant relationship between the university affiliation of respondents and their preference for

counterterrorism measures. However, some preferences aligned to the religious affiliation of

respondents were observed. In this dimension, it was observed that Muslims tended to prefer less

drastic measures while Christians tended to favour more drastic solutions to terrorism.

Nevertheless, although the Christian respondents from Garissa University were more inclined to

favour more drastic measures against terrorism, they were less homogeneous in this choice than

the Christian students at MMUST. Since this was attributed to environmental characteristics, the

study concluded that the University Affiliation of Christian students at Garissa University and at

MMUST had an effect on their preferences for counterterrorism measures.

9.2.3 Supplementary Conclusions

Further results from the survey were interpreted from analyses that detected correlations between

certain variables. The study revealed consistent relationships between these variables leading to

the making of several conclusions. Although they were not interpreted as indications of causal

relationships, the correlations provided a hint as to the probable existence of such relationships.

The correlations are discussed below under respective sub-topics.

pg. 368

9.2.3.1 Relationship between Religious Commitment and


The interpretation of results gave rise to the observation that there was a correlation between

dedication to religion and preference for counterterrorism measures. The more dedicated to

religion the respondents were, the less drastic their preferred measures against terrorism. The

study therefore concluded that there was a relationship between religious commitment and the

preference for counterterrorism measures among the Muslim and Christian students of Garissa

University and MMUST.

9.2.3.2 Relationship between Religious Commitment and Self-

esteem

The results of this study revealed a correlation between respondents‘ level of commitment to

religion and their self-esteem. It was realised that the more devoted the respondents were to

religion, the higher their self-esteem. The study therefore concluded that the religious

commitment of the Muslim and Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST had a

bearing on their self-esteem.

9.2.3.3 Relationship between Attitudes towards Terrorism and


The results of this study demonstrated a correlation between the Christian respondents‘ attitudes

towards terrorism and their preference for solutions. The more they viewed terrorism as

perpetrated by Muslims, and Christians as the targets of terrorists, the more they were inclined to

recommend drastic counterterrorism measures. However, it was remarkable that although the

pg. 369

Garissa Muslim respondents had the same attitudes, their preference for counterterrorism

measures differed. Therefore, the study concluded that there was a relationship between the

attitude towards terrorism and preference for counterterrorism measures among Christian

students at Garissa University and at MMUST.

9.2.3.4 Relationship between Self-Esteem and Solutions

Preference

The interpretation of results in this section revealed a correlation between the self-esteem of

respondents and their preference for solutions against terrorism. The results indicated that the

higher the self-esteem of respondents, the more conservative their preferred measures against

terrorism. The study therefore concluded that the self-esteem of Muslim and Christian students at

Garissa University and at MMUST was related to their preference for counterterrorism measures.

9.2.4 Link between the Experiment and the Survey Findings

The results of the survey indicated the presence of Islamized terrorism attitudes in Kenya

especially among Christian students at the two institutions yet the experiment demonstrated no

such evidence. This was an interesting observation and it raised further queries that were

interpreted in two ways. First was that the opinions and attitudes of the respondents were already

formed and could not be manipulated further by the primer in the experiment. It was the opinion

of the researchers that attitudes about this kind of terrorism had reached a ‗point of saturation‘

and could not be influenced by manipulation. The observations from the Garissa experiment

reflected those of MMUST notwithstanding the fact that fieldwork in the former was carried out

just a week after a dramatic terror attack on a Nairobi Hotel. This was used as evidence to back

pg. 370

up the ‗saturation‘ supposition mentioned above, which was considered as a contributing factor

to the stability of the attitudes. Second, it could be a pointer to the tolerant nature of relationships

among Muslim and Christian students at the two institutions. The use of a more intense

intervention rather than a primer would probably yield different results.

9.3 PROJECT RECOMMENDATIONS

The following section discusses the recommendations that ensued from the findings and

conclusions of this project.

9.3.1 Interventions against Islamophobia

The study concluded that the religious affiliation of Muslims and Christians at Garissa

University and at MMUST had a bearing on their attitudes towards terrorism. This was linked to

the role of history and media, and the historical discrimination of Muslim populations in Kenya.

The conclusion stated further that some attitudes seemed to have taken root and had remained

stable over the years. The project made mention of literature that documents this discrimination

and long-standing suspicion of Muslims. There was also information on rising Islamophobia

among Christian and other communities in Africa and Kenya in particular. It was recommended

that deliberate strategies be implemented with a view to shifting such tendencies. The research

reiterated suggestions already made in this direction such as cooperative projects involving

Muslims and Christians to help build trust. This was imperative because the inquiry detected less

Islamophobic tendencies among Christians in Garissa than among those at MMUST. The

contribution of the respective environments to this observation was important because Garissa

was predominantly Muslim-peopled while Kakamega was predominantly Christian-populated.

The proposal is to recreate more cooperative environments in regions with either minority

pg. 371

populations with programs targeted at building trust across the two religious groups. Such

programs could emulate the natural environment of Garissa where Christians could be involved

with Muslims in less threatening circumstances. In any case trust was of paramount importance

if the fight against Islamophobia and terrorism was to be won.

Further, media could play a significant role in dispelling phobic attitudes and myths about the

Muslim as terrorist since they played a major role in the coverage of terror activities. The

authority of media in matters of social group relationships cannot be overstated. One way the

media could intervene is to hold debriefing sessions after pertinent terrorist news coverage to

dispel misconceptions that Islam condones or even supports terrorism. Because of the influence

they wield, local media houses could make use of Muslim clerics and adherents during such

times to analyse news reports in order to restore trust and to pacify affected populations.

However, they need to guard against falling into the trap of defending terrorists as this could

have boomerang effects.

9.3.2 The Role of the Muslim Community

In the same vein of reduction of Islamophobia, the Muslim community needed to adopt a key

task in dissipating attitudes that associated their religion with terrorism. It was worthy of mention

that Muslim clerics had denounced terrorism acts in the past and echoed peace as a central tenet

of their doctrine. However, there was always room for improvement in this course. Muslim elite

in Kenya could be more proactive in reproving terror acts perpetrated by Muslims. They could

cooperate with state machinery in formulating more effective counterterrorism measures devoid

of suspicion from all stakeholders. Besides, they needed to get involved in the assistance of

pg. 372

affected persons in cash and/or kind in order to show their solidarity with the affected and to

express their disapproval of terrorism.

On the other hand, members of the Muslim community needed to be more proactive in standing

up to their religious precepts and to not leave this responsibility to the clergy alone. They needed

to take a lead role in denouncing terror acts that seemed to target Christians or certain sections of

the society. After-all, it was also in their interest as terrorist acts affected whole communes

including members of the Muslim fraternity. For instance, the closure of Garissa University

following the 2015 attack did not only affect Christians, but all who were at the institution and its

environs. Langat (2015) reports that numerous small shops and restaurants along the road leading

to the university, grocery shops, second-hand clothing kiosks, supermarkets in the larger Garissa

town and the transport sector were among those that took a nosedive following the attack.

Several students among them Muslims who could not transfer to other universities were also

affected by the prolonged disruption of learning.

Muslim publics could make deliberate attempts at rebuilding trust and confidence across

religious boundaries as happened in two incidences in Mandera. First was when Muslim

travellers stood with and protected their Christian counterparts during an attack on a public

transport bus although on this occasion, these Muslims lost their lives. In the second incident,

Muslim locals tipped off Christian workers at a quarry about a planned attack. The latter escaped

for their dear lives and the militia were disappointed on their arrival at the site that night. The

principle remains that of standing up against victimisation of certain groups by terrorists.

Cooperative programs could be implemented in neighbourhoods where Christians were the

minority in order to increase levels of cooperative engagements. Muslim communities in Kenya

had been largely faulted for being closed to outsiders. These cliquish tendencies had been linked

pg. 373

to secrecy which may have resulted in the concealment of and advancement of terror activities

within their communities in the past; either deliberately or otherwise.

Also, Muslims who were privy to information that could lead to the arrest and apprehension of

terrorists and the prevention of terror acts could volunteer that information to relevant

authorities. Emphasis should be given to this area as most of those who had perpetrated acts of

terror in the country had been identified with Islam. These culprits may have interacted with

other Muslims who may have been privy to their intentions and engagements in violent

extremism. After the Westgate attack in 2013, there was public outcry from Kenyan publics who

accused the Muslim community of dishonesty and of harbouring terrorist elements among them.

On the other hand, if the volunteering of information is to be successful, it should be done in

secure environments without the threat of repercussions. Channels through which this

information could be relayed to the relevant government departments should be set up to protect

the identities of those concerned. In the past, many Kenyan citizens had expressed distrust of

state security machinery that they accused of victimising those who had tipped off the police.

The public should be able to participate in community policing and to respond to government

calls for public cooperation against terrorist and other criminal activities without feeling

threatened. Similarly, the government should assure protection of such persons from backlash by

terrorists and their sympathisers.

9.3.3 The Somali Factor in Kenya

The Somali-factor in Kenya could not be overlooked in matters terrorism. Most terror attacks on

Kenyan soil had been linked to the Somali-based al Shabaab. Yet, Kenya had a significant

proportion of Somali ethnics who lived close to the border next to Somalia where they even had

pg. 374

clan ties with locals. Consequently, many foreign Somali nationals were believed to have entered

into the country through the porous border and obtained Kenyan identification documents

fraudulently (Bryden, 2003). Some of them were hosted by their Kenyan relatives. That both

groups of Somalis straddling the frontier bore similar physical features and spoke similar dialects

complicated matters on the Kenyan side with regard to the fight against terrorism. Some Kenyan-

Somalis were believed to host and/or to hide suspicious Somali Somalis leading to the link

between the Kenyan Muslim to terrorism. The Somali community was also criticised for a

reticence that raised suspicion among other Kenyan ethnic groups, leading to the attitude of a

people shrouded in mystery and high secrecy. This covertness could be regarded by the rest of

the Kenyan publics as a trait that aided the cover-up of vital information related to terrorism.

9.3.4 Community Involvement in Policy-Formulation

Both Muslim and Christian communities should be involved in the process of formulating

counterterrorism policies so that they can own and be a part of these strategies. This was because

many of these policies were implemented without proper examination of the underlying

assumptions. Community involvement can help to dispel suspicions and feelings of victimization

of Muslims while enhancing objectivity on the part of the government and other stakeholders.

Counterterrorism measures should be well examined and their short- and long-term impact

weighed before implementation. In deed literature has lamented the haphazard execution of some

counterterrorism policies (Cronin, 2006 as cited in Willem & van der Joop, 2016) which may be

faulted for causing undesirable outcomes.

That the Garissa area was a hotspot for terrorism should not be ignored. This state of affairs

continued to augment the already problematic sidelining of the region from the rest of the

pg. 375

country. It led to insecurity, and the prolonged developmental lag of the region behind other

provinces in Kenya. Of course, the recent years had seen government make steps to reduce this

marginalization. For example, there was a relatively wider inclusion of members of the Kenyan-

Somali and Muslim community in government alongside affirmative action to promote

educational opportunities for children from this frontier. The establishment of the Garissa

University itself was a step in this direction. However, much more needed to be done as the

region had suffered decades of marginalisation, which in effect enhanced the activities and

operations of terrorists in the province. The high number of terror activities witnessed in this

region was likely to have a retrogressive effect on the rate of human, social and infrastructure

development already achieved. For example, the closure of the university for close to a year

following the attack affected its enrolment and the neighbouring community that depended on it.

For instance, many businesses that depended on the university community had to slow or shut

down completely during that period (Langat, 2015). That the study detected the role played by

environmental characteristics on attitudes towards terrorism was important too. This conclusion

ensued from the observation that both the Muslim and Christian respondents from Garissa

University tended to link terrorism to Muslims and to consider Christians as their targets. The

study linked this observation with the frequent incidences of terrorism in the Garissa locality.

Thus, environmental adjustments are recommended with a view to neutralizing the effects of

these incidences and other terrorism-related activities on the attitudes of the students at Garissa

University. Additionally, the inclusion of local communities in hotspot regions such as Garissa in

the formulation of counterterrorism policies is highly recommended.

pg. 376

9.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Because of the scope of this project, certain aspects were not thoroughly explored leaving some

questions that still needed to be answered. In addition, a number of areas arose from the findings

of the project that require further investigation. The final section of this chapter therefore gives

these areas as suggestions for further research.

9.4.1 Stability of Attitudes

The fact that Muslim and Christian respondents at both universities were not influenced by

priming terrorism was a pointer to the stability of their opinions. It was believed that

respondents‘ attitudes towards terrorism had gained stability over time rendering the primer

inadequate in effecting any influence. However, deeper research into these attitudes should be

done to determine the exact nature of their attributes. More social identity research needs to be

done to find out how other attributes of the attitudes impacted respondents and intergroup

exchanges. It would also be essential to investigate what components of these attitudes could be

subjected to manipulation.

9.4.2 Attitudes towards Terrorism and the Environment

Environmental factors were also used to explain the observation that Garissa University Muslim

respondents were more likely than MMUST Muslim respondents to link terrorism with Islam

and to consider Christians as targeted by terrorists. This is another environmental factor that

needs deeper scrutiny to determine the exact nexus of the environmental factors and these

attitudes. The exact aspects of the environment that were responsible for these links is an area for

pg. 377

further exploration along with the possibility of their yielding to manipulation and interventions

where necessary.

9.4.3 Preferences for Counterterrorism Measures and the

Environment

The differences in observations made between Christians in Garissa and Christians in MMUST

were mostly attributed to environmental factors. One such difference was the lesser homogeneity

in the preferences for counterterrorism measures among the Garissa group of Christians. This

was considered to be a function of their higher interactions with the local Muslim populace.

However, the study was not able to explain exactly how this happened. It is therefore

recommended that further research be done to trace such a link and to explain how these

interactions affected respondents‘ choices. The exact environmental components influencing this

group‘s preferences should be explored with a view to investigating exactly what factors in the

environment were at play, how participants interacted with the environments and how the

environment influenced/impacted them in turn.

9.4.4 The Commemorative Monument at Garissa University

The study linked the presence of a monument commemorating the attack by terrorists at Garissa

University to some observations made in this study. The monument stood out as a major

terrorism-related environmental characteristic distinguishing the two institutions where the study

took place. For instance, it was observed that although religious commitment was the same

between the two religious groups, Christian respondents at Garissa were slightly less committed

to religion than their MMUST colleagues. One explanation given for this was the presence of the

monument which served as a stark reminder to the incident that saw Christians massacred at the

pg. 378

campus. It would be enlightening to have a more detailed understanding of the effects of this

monument on the Christians at the University given that the names of the victims of the attack

were engraved on it. An examination of the effects of the monument on the rest of the student

body and the university community at large would also be illuminating.

9.4.5 The Garissa University Attack Footprints

Along with the effects of the monument, the heavy security presence and precautions taken on

the Garissa University campus could be explored as this was different from the situation at

MMUST. It should be mentioned that after the Garissa University attack, security was tightened

at all public universities in Kenya. However, the security precautions at the Garissa campus were

more rigorous than those at MMUST. For example, there were armed security personnel at the

entrance to the former but not at the latter where only regular security guards manned the gates.

Other security features at Garissa that were not at MMUST were the on-campus police post,

CCTV cameras, the perimeter wall, the biometric system check, and the designated drop-off

point for public transport vehicles. In fact, the MMMUST main gate is directly adjacent to a

major regional highway. The effects of these measures on residents‘ attitudes towards terrorism

should be investigated.

9.4.6 Conversion Issues

It was observed that participants were less dedicated to religion in the Universities where their

religion was the minority. This means that Muslims at MMUST were less dedicated than

Christians at the same institution and Muslims in Garissa University. The opposite was also true

whereby Christians at Garissa University were less committed to religion than Muslims at the

pg. 379

same institution and Christians at MMUST. As this was attributed to environmental factors, it

would be important to investigate the exact factors at play. For example, it is a well-known fact

that the two religions under study thrived on expansion and conversion of more converts through

evangelism. Thus, the role of evangelism and other environmental factors on religious

commitment should be investigated. Such relative laxity in religious conformation could have

arisen from the need for self-protection against criticism from the majority, the need to resist

being perceived as a religious "fundamentalist" or from a sense of proselytism.

9.4.7 Correlations and Causations between Variables

The correlational observations and conclusions made in this study do not amount to causal

relationships. Nonetheless, it is important to explore the nature of those relationships and to

investigate the direction of any causation if there be. The study concluded that there was a

correlation between religious commitment and preference for counterterrorism measures among

Muslim and Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST. The study could not however

establish whether this dedication to religion was responsible for influencing preference for

conservative measures or whether another factor was at play. Second, it was concluded that there

was a correlation between religious commitment and self-esteem. It was not clear whether

stronger religious practice led to higher self-esteem or the presence of high self-esteem caused

respondents to be more devoted to religious practice. Third, it was concluded that there was a

correlation between self-esteem and preference for counterterrorism measures. The higher the

self-esteem of participants, the lower their preference for drastic counterterrorism measures was.

It was not clear whether their high self-esteem led to this preference or not, and if it did, what

elements of self-esteem were responsible for this inclination. Probably too, higher self-esteem

pg. 380

was present alongside another factor that was responsible for this observation. Finally, it was

noted that both higher levels of religious commitment and higher levels of self-esteem were

correlated with lower preference for drastic measures against terrorism. This compound

relationship is an area for further exploration.

The study concluded that there was a correlation between attitudes towards terrorism and

preference for measures against terrorism among Christian respondents. The stronger the linking

of terrorism to Islam, the higher the preference for drastic measures against it. This was not

observed among Garissa Muslim respondents who although considered Christians as targeted by

terrorists and tended to link terrorism to Islam, favoured more conservative measures against

terror. The study concluded that there was a relationship between the attitude towards terrorism

and preference for counterterrorism measures among Christian students at Garissa University

and at MMUST. Since this conclusion concerned only Christian respondents, it is necessary to

explore exactly what factors shaped the Christians‘ traits to cause the relationship. It would also

be informative to investigate the reasons behind the lower preference for drastic counterterrorism

measures among Muslim students of Garissa University. This is because they shared the same

attitude with the two Christian groups that linked terrorism with Muslims and saw Christians as

targeted by terrorists.

9.4.8 Religion and Self-Esteem

One of the conclusions of the study was that the religious commitment of Muslim and Christian

students at Garissa University and at MMUST had a bearing on their self-esteem. The converse,

linking lower dedication to religion with lower levels of self-esteem was also assumed to be true.

This meant that religion played a role in the self-esteem of individuals, but this link needs to be

pg. 381

probed. In addition, an inquiry into the aspects of religion that may be linked to self-esteem

should be undertaken. This may be important for professionals working in the fields of

psychology, self-esteem and religion.

pg. 382

CHAPTER SUMMARY

This chapter consisted of a discussion of the project conclusions alongside some

recommendations and suggestions for further research. The conclusions made here were derived

from the interpretation of results from the two studies as discussed in chapter seven. The current

chapter dealt with the conclusions drawn from the results of the experiment which was guided by

a set of four research questions corresponding with the four areas representing the variables. The

experiment concluded that priming terrorism had no effect the attitudes of respondents on it. It

also had no effect on the relationship factors between Muslims and Christians and on the

respondents‘ attitudes on risk for terrorism. It was also concluded that priming terrorism had no

effect on the respondents‘ preference for counterterrorism measures. A major conclusion was

that priming terrorism had no effect on the attitudes towards terrorism and relationships among

Muslim and Christian students at the two universities. Additionally, it had no effect on the

attitudes towards terrorism and relationships among students of Garissa University and MMUST

from the two faiths. However, it was important to mention that the absence of treatment effect on

the different variables did not mean that terrorism did not have any influence on the respondents‘

attitudes. This is because terrorism was actively carried out in Kenya and the two religious

groups were still affected by it. The absence of any effect could probably be linked to the

stability of the attributes of respondents which were observed to not yield to manipulation. It

could also be that the respondents had learned to be tolerant of each other.

The second study in this project was a survey that was guided by a set of six questions. The

conclusions drawn from the results of this survey were discussed under respective research

questions as sub-headings. The study concluded that there was no relationship between the

religious affiliation and commitment to religion of Muslim and Christian respondents from

pg. 383

Garissa University and MMUST. The second conclusion from the survey was that the religious

affiliation of Muslims and Christians at Garissa University and at MMUST had an effect on their

attitudes towards terrorism. A third conclusion was that the religious affiliation of Muslim and

Christian respondents from Garissa University and MMUST influenced their preference for

counterterrorism measures. It was also a conclusion of the study that the university affiliation of

Muslim and Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST had a bearing on their level of

dedication to religious practice. Furthermore, the survey concluded that the university affiliation

of the Muslim and Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST had an impact on their

attitudes towards terrorism. Finally, the survey concluded that the university affiliation of

Christian students at both universities affected their preferences for counterterrorism measures.

Of note was the link between the experiment and the survey whereby the former demonstrated

no effect of priming terrorism on attitudes, yet the latter did confirm the latent aspect of this

phenomenon. This pointed to the insusceptibility of the attitudes to manipulation, at least in this

form.

The survey made further conclusions based on correlational relationships observed in the results.

First, it was concluded that there was a relationship between the religious commitment of

Muslim and Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST and their preference for

counterterrorism measures. A second conclusion was that the self-esteem of Muslim and

Christian students of Garissa University and MMUST was related to their devotion to religion.

The study also concluded that there was a relationship between the attitude towards terrorism and

preference for counterterrorism measures among Christian students at Garissa University and at

MMUST. It was also concluded that the self-esteem of Muslim and Christian students at Garissa

pg. 384

University and at MMUST was related to their preference for counterterrorism measures.

However, it was noted that these correlations did not amount to causal relationships.

The chapter gave recommendations based on the conclusions summarised above. The

recommendations were that there should be deliberate efforts to deal with deep-seated

Islamophobia fostered in part by history, discrimination of Muslim populations and the media.

The role of the Muslim clergy and the faithful was important in this regard through the building

of trust via cooperative programs and media debriefing. It was suggested that the Muslim

community adopt a key role in dissipating negative attitudes about their religion among

Christians. This could be done by engaging in the support of victims of terror and the creation of

more interaction opportunities with Christians to counter suspicions. On the other hand,

awareness creation and sensitisation of Christian communities could be done with the aim of

reducing stereotypical beliefs and increasing acceptance of Muslims. The Somali factor was

discussed as complicating the war against terrorism and the picture of the Muslim as violent in

many Kenyans‘ minds. The buck was passed on to the Kenyan-Somali community to prove their

goodwill by cooperating with state machinery in identification of culprits and apprehension of

perpetrators of terrorism. It was also recommended that all sections of the community, Christian,

and Muslim be involved in the formulation of counterterrorism strategies to improve the

ownership process of such interventions and to neutralise any misgivings and partiality.

The chapter culminated in a discourse on ideas for further research. It was proposed that

investigation be done with social identity theory to deepen understanding of the attitudes that

respondents had towards terrorism. This is projected to prospectively help determine how

deeply-seated such attitudes were, and how they could be influenced for the good. Another

proposal was to inquire into attributes of the respondents‘ attitudes towards terrorism, whether

pg. 385

these could be manipulated and how the environment helped to shape them. The project

recommended a deeper investigation into the exact environmental features and their

interconnection with individual traits. This is important because certain observations were

associated with respondents‘ environments, e.g. the higher levels of religious commitment of

Garissa University Muslims and MMUST Christians in comparison with their respective

contemporaries; the differences in the attitudes of the two Muslim groups on terrorism; and the

heterogeneity of Garissa Christians on their preferences for more drastic counterterrorism

measures. The study suggested an inquiry into the exact components of the environment at play,

how they were linked to these observations and whether they could be manipulated. Another

proposition was to investigate the impact of the Garissa University terrorist attack monument on

the different groups of students, staff and the university community. Another area of possible

investigation is the influence of the heavy security presence, scrupulous measures and other

footprints of the 2015 terror attack at Garissa University campus on attitudes towards terrorism.

Lastly, it was suggested that the relationships between variables that were correlated be explored

further. Correlations were observed between religious commitment and preference for

counterterrorism measures; between religious commitment and self-esteem; between attitude

towards terrorism and preference for measures against terrorism; and between self-esteem and

preference for counterterrorism measures. It would be informative to determine the nature of

these relationships and to explore causalities and their directions if any. Also, an inquiry would

be in order to determine whether there was a third factor at play in the manifold relationship

observed between religious commitment, self-esteem and preference for counterterrorism

measures. A final proposal was to probe the connection between religion and self-esteem.

pg. 386


Ce chapitre discutait des conclusions du projet ainsi qu‘il proposait quelques recommandations et

suggestions pour d‘autres recherches. Les conclusions ont été tirées de l‘interprétation des

résultats des deux études telles qu‘elles ont été discutées au chapitre sept. Nous avons discuté des

conclusions tirées des résultats de l‘expérience, guidées par quatre ensembles de questions de

recherche correspondant aux quatre variables principales de notre étude. L‘expérience a permis

de conclure que la contextualisation de l‘islamisation du terrorisme n‘avait aucun effet sur

l‘attitude des répondants sur ce thème. Le priming n‘a pas non plus eu d‘effet sur les facteurs

relationnels entre musulmans et chrétiens et sur leurs attitudes du risque de terrorisme. Il a

également été conclu que la contextualisation de l‘islamisation du terrorisme n‘avait aucun effet

sur leurs préférences pour les différentes mesures antiterroristes. Une conclusion principale était

qu‘une mise en scène de l‘islamisation du terrorisme n‘avait aucun effet sur les attitudes sur le

terrorisme et les relations entre les étudiants musulmans et chrétiens des deux universités. En

outre, elle n‘a eu aucun effet sur les attitudes du terrorisme et des relations entre les étudiants de

l‘Université de Garissa et MMUST des deux groupes religieux. Toutefois, il est important de

mentionner que l‘absence d‘effet de traitement sur les différentes variables ne signifie pas que

l‘islamisation du terrorisme n‘a pas d‘influence sur les attitudes des intimés, car non seulement le

terrorisme est présent de façon latente et très actif au Kenya mais également il affecte encore à

l‘heure actuelle les deux groupes religieux. L‘absence de tout effet a été reliée à la stabilité des

attitudes et à leur robustesse face à la manipulation.

La deuxième étude de ce projet était un sondage guidé par une série de six questions. Les

conclusions tirées de l‘analyse des résultats de cette enquête ont été décrites. L‘étude a conclu

qu‘il n‘y avait aucun lien entre l‘appartenance religieuse et l‘engagement à la religion des

pg. 387

répondants musulmans et chrétiens de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST. La deuxième

conclusion de l‘enquête est que l‘appartenance religieuse des musulmans et des chrétiens à

l‘Université de Garissa et au MMUST a eu un effet sur leurs attitudes du terrorisme. Une

troisième conclusion est que l‘appartenance religieuse des répondants musulmans et chrétiens de

l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST a influencé leur préférence pour les mesures

antiterroristes. De façon analogue l‘affiliation universitaire des étudiants musulmans et chrétiens

de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST a eu une incidence sur leur niveau de dévouement à la

pratique religieuse. En outre, l‘enquête a permis de conclure que l‘affiliation universitaire des

étudiants musulmans et chrétiens de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST jouait sur leurs

attitudes du terrorisme. Enfin, l‘enquête a conclu que l‘affiliation universitaire des étudiants

chrétiens dans les deux universités jouait sur leurs préférences en matière de mesures

antiterroristes. Il convient de noter le lien entre l‘étude expérimentale et l‘enquête selon laquelle

la première n‘a pas réussi à mettre en évidence le rôle de la contextualisation de l‘islamisation du

conflit sur les attitudes, mais la seconde a confirmé l‘aspect latent de ce phénomène. Cela a mis

en évidence le peu de susceptibilité des attitudes à la manipulation, tout au moins suivant cette

forme.

L‘enquête a permis de tirer d‘autres conclusions en fonction des liens de corrélation entre les

variables. Tout d‘abord, il a été conclu qu‘il y avait un lien entre l‘engagement religieux des

étudiants musulmans et chrétiens de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST et leur préférence

pour les mesures antiterroristes. Une deuxième conclusion était que l‘estime de soi des étudiants

musulmans et chrétiens de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST était liée à leur dévouement à

la religion. L‘étude a également conclu qu‘il existe un lien entre la attitudes du terrorisme et la

préférence pour les mesures de lutte contre le terrorisme parmi les étudiants chrétiens de

pg. 388

l‘Université de Garissa et au MMUST. Il a également été conclu que l‘estime de soi des

étudiants musulmans et chrétiens de l‘Université de Garissa et du MMUST était liée à leur

préférence pour les mesures antiterroristes. Bien entendu, ces corrélations n‘équivalent pas à des

relations causales.

Le chapitre a permis de proposer des recommandations fondées sur les conclusions résumées ci-

dessus. Les recommandations étaient le renforcement de mesures pour faire face à

l‘islamophobie, qui est profondément ancrée et favorisée en partie par l‘histoire, la

discrimination des populations musulmanes et par les médias. Le rôle du clergé musulman et des

fidèles est important à cet égard pour renforcer la confiance en l‘autre par le biais de programmes

coopératifs et de débriefing médiatique. Il a été suggéré que la communauté musulmane adopte

un rôle clé dans la dissipation des attitudes négatives sur leur religion en soutenant les victimes

de la terreur et en créant plus d‘occasions d‘interactions avec les chrétiens pour dissiper les

soupçons. D‘autre part, la prise de conscience et la sensibilisation des communautés chrétiennes

pourraient se faire dans le but de réduire les croyances stéréotypées et d‘accroître l‘acceptation

des musulmans. Le facteur somalien a été discuté comme compliquant la guerre contre le

terrorisme et l‘image du musulman violent dans l‘esprit de nombreux Kenyans. L‘argent a été

transmis à la communauté kenyane-somalienne pour prouver sa bonne volonté en coopérant avec

l‘appareil de l‘État dans l‘identification des coupables et l‘arrestation des auteurs du terrorisme.

Il a également été recommandé que toutes les sections de la communauté, chrétienne et

musulmane participent à la formulation de stratégies antiterroristes visant à améliorer la capacité

de telles interventions à neutraliser toute appréhension et toute partialité.

pg. 389

Le chapitre a abouti à une discussion sur les idées pour d‘autres recherches. Il a été proposé que

l‘on fasse une enquête avec la théorie de l‘identité sociales afin d‘approfondir la compréhension

du noyau et de la périphérie des attitudes du terrorisme parmi les répondants. On prévoit que cela

aidera à déterminer à quel point ces attitudes sont profondément ancrées et comment elles

pourraient être influencées dans le sens d‘une amélioration des représentations entre les groupes.

Une autre proposition consiste à s‘enquérir de la périphérie des représentations des répondants

sur leurs attitudes du terrorisme, de leur manipulation et de la façon dont l‘environnement a

contribué à les façonner. Le projet recommande une étude plus approfondie des caractéristiques

environnementales exactes et de leur interconnexion avec les caractéristiques des individus.

Cela est important parce que certaines observations ont été associées à l‘environnement des

répondants, par exemple les niveaux plus élevés d‘engagement religieux des musulmans de

l‘Université de Garissa et de celui des chrétiens du MMUST par rapport à leurs contemporains

respectifs ; mais également les différences de attitudes des deux groupes musulmans à propos du

terrorisme ; mais encore l‘hétérogénéité des chrétiens de Garissa quant à leurs préférences

exprimées pour des mesures antiterroristes plus drastiques. Nous suggérons de mener une

enquête sur les composantes exactes de l‘environnement en jeu, comment elles sont liées aux

observations et si elles peuvent être manipulées. Une autre proposition a été d‘enquêter sur

l‘impact du monument d‘attaque terroriste de l‘Université de Garissa sur les différents groupes

d‘étudiants, du personnel et de la communauté universitaire. La présence de mesures sécuritaires

importantes et strictes sur le campus de l‘Université de Garissa agit fortement sur les attitudes du

terrorisme et nous conduit à proposer des éléments d‘enquêtes supplémentaires.

Pour finir, il a été suggéré d‘explorer davantage les relations entre les variables quant à leur

nature causale. Des corrélations ont été observées entre l‘engagement religieux et la préférence

pg. 390

pour les mesures antiterroristes ; entre l‘engagement religieux et l‘estime de soi ; entre la attitude

du terrorisme et la préférence pour les mesures contre le terrorisme ; et entre l‘estime de soi et la

préférence pour les mesures antiterroristes. Il serait instructif de déterminer l‘orientation de telles

relations entre les variables, le cas échéant. De plus, une enquête pourrait être menée afin de

déterminer l‘influence d‘un troisième facteur en jeu dans les multiples relations observée entre

l‘engagement religieux, l‘estime de soi et la préférence pour les mesures antiterroristes. Une

dernière proposition a été d‘examiner le lien entre la religion et l‘estime de soi.

Une conclusion majeure a porté sur l‘échec de notre contextualisation de l‘islamisation du

terrorisme sur l‘extrêmisation des attitudes autour du terrorisme, des relations entre les étudiants

musulmans et chrétiens des deux universités. En outre, elle n‘a eu aucun effet contrastant les

attitudes sur le terrorisme et les relations entre les étudiants de l‘Université de Garissa et

MMUST des deux religions. Toutefois, il est important de mentionner que l‘absence d‘effet de

traitement sur les différentes variables ne signifie pas que l‘islamisation du terrorisme n‘a pas

d‘influence sur les attitudes, car le terrorisme est toujours actif au Kenya et affecte encore les

deux groupes religieux.

Nous proposons de mener une enquête sur les composantes exactes de l‘environnement en jeu

dans notre étude, d‘explorer leurs liens, voire leur possibilité d‘être manipulées

expérimentalement, avec les différentes mesures investiguées dans notre travail.

pg. 391

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Langat, A. (2015, November 20). Businesses and university students continue to suffer months

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https://www.4icu.org/reviews/12290.%20htm


pg. 407

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I: RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRES

A. Muslim Experimental Group

RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE

INSTRUCTIONS: This questionnaire is a data collection instrument for a PhD project carried

out among university students in Kenya. You are hereby invited to participate in the study and to

have a chance to contribute to the world of knowledge and enhancement of research in Kenya. It

takes about 20 minutes to complete the form. Kindly take your time to carefully and most

truthfully fill it out. There is no right or wrong answer, your view is what is important here. All

the information you provide will be treated with uttermost confidentiality.

The questionnaire is divided into 4 sections on 7 printed pages.

Section I: To read and to reflect upon

Section II: A. Perception Factors

B. Relationship Factors

C. Solution Factors

Section III: Self-Esteem Scale

Section IV: Demographic Factors

INSTRUCTIONS: Indicate your most preferred choice by putting a tick or an X next to the

response that best describes your answer or opinion. Please DO NOT write your name nor your

registration number anywhere in the questionnaire. Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

SECTION I: READ AND REFLECT ON THESE STATEMENTS FOR ABOUT ONE

MINUTE

Think about the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Kenya in the recent past and who the

perpetrators are. Consider the manner in which Christians have been targeted in these events.

Reflect on the effects of these acts on your life, your future and the feelings and emotions they

evoke. Does it make you feel anxious, pessimistic?

SECTION II: A. PERCEPTION FACTORS

Indicate the response that best describes your opinion about the question posed on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -

3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.


Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree

Agree Strongly agree

2. Al-Shabaab militia are responsible for terror attacks in Kenya.

pg. 408



3. Somali refugees are behind terrorist attacks in Kenya.



4. Terrorism affects both Muslims and Christians in the same way.



5. Terrorists use the name of Islam to justify their actions.



6. Terrorists in Kenya target Christians.






8. I often fear that I will be caught up in a terrorist attack in this town.



9. I have a feeling that there are some terrorists in my university.



10. I suspect that there are some terrorists in this town.



11. I am always on the look-out for any suspicious characters that could be terrorists.



12. I am always ready to report suspicious activity that could result in terrorism.



pg. 409

B: RELATIONSHIP FACTORS

i) Respond to these items on your relationship with Christians on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -

3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3=

strongly agree.

1. Islam is to blame for terrorism in Kenya.

Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow

agree Agree Strongly agree

2. I don‘t trust Christians.



3. I avoid Christians as much as possible.



4. I don‘t feel threatened whenever I encounter a Christian.



5. I get uncomfortable whenever I am around Christians.



6. I have no problem sharing a room with a Christian at any point during my stay at the university.



7. I would be uncomfortable being in the same discussion group with a Christian.



8. If I come across a Christian with a problem, I can assist them.



9. There are tensions between Muslims and Christians in Kenya because of terrorism.



10. Christians don‘t like Muslims because of terrorism.



pg. 410

11. Muslims don‘t like Christians because of terrorism.



12. The government has played a role in the increase in cases of terrorism.



ii) How closely do you relate to Christians with respect to the following statements?

1. I have immediate family members who are Christians (Father/Mother/Sister/Brother). Yes

No

2. I have second line relatives who are Christians (Uncle/Aunt/Cousin/Grandparents). Yes

No

3. I live close to Christians (roommate/neighbor). Yes No

4. I have very many Christian friends. Yes No

5. I have a few Christian friends. Yes No

6. I have no Christian friends. Yes No

C. SOLUTION FACTORS

Indicate the solutions you would suggest for implementation by the government in view of the challenge of terrorism

in the country. The same scale of -3 to +3 applies whereby -3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -1=somehow

disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.

1. Kenya should continue with its role in the international war on terrorism.



2. A wall should be built along the Kenya-Somalia border.



3. Dadaab Refugee Camp should be closed.



4. Reformed terrorists should be empowered financially.

pg. 411



5. Kenya should withdraw its KDF soldiers from Somalia.






7. Corruption should be dealt with firmly.



8. There should be enhanced capacity building of security machinery.



9. All refugees in Kenya should be repatriated back to their countries.



10. The Nyumba Kumi initiative should be implemented.



SECTION III: SELF ESTEEM SCALE

Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate how strongly you

agree or disagree with each statement on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -

1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.








pg. 412



4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.



5. I don‘t really have much to be proud of.



6. I certainly feel useless at times.



7. I feel that I am a person of worth, just like everyone else.



8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.






10. I take a positive attitude toward myself.



SECTION IV: DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

Tell us a little bit about yourself

1. Sex: Male Female

2. Religion: Christianity Islam

3. Denomination: Catholic SDA Pentecostal/Evangelical Repentance Other

(Specify__________________)

4. Age: 18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29

Over 30

pg. 413

5. Course Level: Certificate Diploma Bachelors Masters

Doctoral

6. Year of Study: First Second Third Fourth Fifth

Above fifth

7. Field of Study at current university, e.g. Education, Agriculture, Engineering, etc.

_____________________________________________________________________________________________

pg. 414

B. Muslim Control Group












C. Solution Factors






SECTION I: READ AND REFLECT ON THESE STATEMENTS FOR ABOUT ONE

MINUTE

Think about your life in university, your studies, your failures and your successes. Consider your

future goals and life in general. When you think about the plans you have for your future, do you

feel anxious, optimistic or resigned to fate? How about life in general? Is it good, wonderful,

unpredictable?



3=strongly disagree,

-2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.







pg. 415

3. Somali refugees are behind terrorist attacks in Kenya.






















Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree

Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree

pg. 416

B. RELATIONSHIP FACTORS

i) Respond to these items on your relationship with Christians on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree,





2. I don‘t trust Christians.



3. I avoid Christians as much as possible.



4. I don‘t feel threatened whenever I encounter a Christian.



5. I get uncomfortable whenever I am around Christians.



6. I have no problem sharing a room with a Christian at any point during my stay at the university.



7. I would be uncomfortable being in the same discussion group with a Christian.



8. If I come across a Christian with a problem, I would assist them.










pg. 417






ii) How closely do you relate to Christians with respect to the following statements?

1. I have immediate family members who are Christians (Father/Mother/Sister/Brother). Yes

No

2. I have second line relatives who are Christians (Uncle/Aunt/Cousin/Grandparents). Yes

No

3. I live close to Christians (roommate/neighbor). Yes No

4. I have very many Christian friends. Yes No

5. I have a few Christian friends. Yes No

6. I have no Christian friends. Yes No

C. SOLUTION FACTORS














pg. 418












8. There should be enhanced capacity building of security machinery.










Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -

1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.










pg. 419

4. I am able to do things as well as most other people.



5. I don’t really have much to be proud of.



6. I certainly feel useless at times.



7. I feel that I am a person of worth, just like everyone else.



8. I wish I could have more respect for myself.






10. I have a positive attitude towards myself.





1. Sex: Male Female


3. Denomination: Catholic SDA Pentecostal/Evangelical Repentance

Other (Specify__________________)

4. Age: 18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29

Over 30

pg. 420

5. Course Level: Certificate Diploma Bachelors

Masters Doctoral


Above fifth


_______________________________________________________________________________

pg. 421

C. Christian Experimental Group












C. Solution Factors






SECTION I: READ AND REFLECT ON THESE STATEMENTS FOR ABOUT

ONE MINUTE

Think about the terrorist attacks that have taken place in Kenya in the recent past and who the

perpetrators are. Consider the manner in which Christians have been targeted in these events.

Reflect on the effects of these acts on your life, your future and the feelings and emotions they

evoke. Does it make you feel anxious, pessimistic?



3=strongly disagree,




Strongly agree



Strongly agree

pg. 422

3. Somali refugees are behind terrorist acts in Kenya.


Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree

10. I suspect that there are some terrorists in this town


Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree


i) Respond to these items on your relationship with Muslims on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree, -

2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.



Strongly agree

2. I don‘t trust Muslims.


Strongly agree

3. I avoid Muslims as much as possible.

pg. 423


Strongly agree

4. I don‘t feel threatened whenever I encounter a Muslim.


Strongly agree

5. I get uncomfortable whenever I am around Muslims.


Strongly agree

6. I have no problem sharing a room with a Muslim at any point during my stay at the university.


Strongly agree

7. I would be uncomfortable being in the same discussion group with a Muslim.


Strongly agree

8. If I come across a Muslim with a problem, I would assist them.


Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree

ii) How closely do you relate to Muslims with respect to the following statements?

1. I have immediate family members who are Muslims (Father/Mother/Sister/Brother). Yes

No

2. I have second line relatives who are Muslims (Uncle/Aunt/Cousin/Grandparents). Yes

No

3. I live close to Muslims (roommate/neighbor). Yes No

4. I have very many Muslim friends. Yes No

5. I have a few Muslim friends. Yes No

6. I have no Muslim friends. Yes No

pg. 424

C. SOLUTION FACTORS

























8. There should be enhanced capacity-building of security machinery.










Below is a list of statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with each statement on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree,

-1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.


pg. 425

Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

2. Sometimes I think I am no good at all. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


5. I don’t really have much to be proud of. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


6. I certainly feel useless at times. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


7. I feel that I am a person of worth, just like everyone else. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


9. Overall, I tend to feel that I am a failure. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


10. I have a positive attitude towards myself. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree




1. Sex: Male Female



Other (Specify____________________)

pg. 426

4. Age: 18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29

Over 30


Doctoral


Above fifth


________________________________________________________________________

pg. 427

D. Christian Control Group












C. Solution Factors






SECTION I: READ AND REFLECT ON THESE STATEMENTS FOR ABOUT

ONE MINUTE

Think about your life in university, your studies, your failures and your successes. Consider your

future goals and life in general. When you think about the plans you have for your future, do you

feel anxious, optimistic or resigned to fate? How about life in general? Is it good, wonderful,

unpredictable?

pg. 428


Indicate in the circles the response that best describes your opinion about the question posed on a scale of -3 to +3

whereby -3=strongly disagree,




Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree

pg. 429



Strongly agree


i) Respond to these items on your relationship with Muslims on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree, -




Strongly agree

2. I don‘t trust Muslims.


Strongly agree

3. I avoid Muslims as much as possible.


Strongly agree

4. I don‘t feel threatened whenever I encounter a Muslim.


Strongly agree

5. I get uncomfortable whenever I am around Muslims.


Strongly agree

6. I have no problem sharing a room with a Muslim at any point during my stay at the university.


Strongly agree

7. I would be uncomfortable being in the same discussion group with a Muslim.


Strongly agree

8. If I come across a Muslim with a problem, I would assist them.


Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree


pg. 430


Strongly agree

ii) How closely do you relate to Muslims with respect to the following statements?

1. I have immediate family members who are Muslims (Father/Mother/Sister/Brother). Yes No

2. I have second line relatives who are Muslims (Uncle/Aunt/Cousin/Grandparents). Yes No

3. I live close to Muslims (roommate/neighbor). Yes No

4. I have very many Muslim friends. Yes No

5. I have a few Muslim friends. Yes No

6. I have no Muslim friends. Yes No

C. SOLUTION FACTORS






Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree


pg. 431


Strongly agree



Strongly agree



Strongly agree



-1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.



2. Sometimes I think I am no good at all. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

5. I don’t really have much to be proud of. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

6. I certainly feel useless at times. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

7. I feel that I am a person of worth, just like everyone else. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

9. Overall, I tend to feel that I am a failure. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

pg. 432

10. I have a positive attitude towards myself. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree



1. Sex: Male Female



Other (Specify__________________)

4. Age: 18-20 21-23 24-26

27-29 Over 30


Doctoral


Above fifth


______________________________________________________________________________________

pg. 433

E. General Survey Questionnaire


INSTRUCTIONS: This questionnaire is a data collection instrument for a PhD

project carried out among university students in Kenya. You are hereby invited to

participate in the study and to have a chance to contribute to the world of

knowledge and enhancement of research in Kenya. It takes about 20 minutes to

complete the form. Kindly take your time to carefully and most truthfully fill it out.

There is no right or wrong answer, your view is what is important here. All the

information you provide will be treated with uttermost confidentiality.


Section I: Religion Factors

Section II: Perception Factors

Section III: Solution Factors

Section IV: Self-Esteem Scale

Section V: Demographic Factors

INSTRUCTIONS: Indicate your most preferred choice by putting a tick or an X

next to the response that best describes your answer or opinion. Please DO NOT

write your name nor your registration number anywhere in the questionnaire.

Thank you in advance for your cooperation.

SECTION I: RELIGION FACTORS

Indicate your religious information in the table below.

1. What religion do you belong to? Islam Christianity

2. What is your denomination or religious group? Catholic SDA

Pentecostal/Evangelical Repentance Sunni Shi‘iya Other

(Specify_____________________)

3. Are you registered as a member of that religious club or group on campus? Yes No

4. Specify the name of the religious club ______________________________

Below is a list of statements about your religious life. Please indicate how strongly you agree or disagree with

each statement concerning your situation as truthfully as possible on a scale of -3 to +3 and do not feel obliged

to impress. -3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3=

strongly agree.

pg. 434

3. I don’t attend worship services at all.



4. I attend worship services once in a while. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


5. I have never missed worship services. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


6. Apart from worship services, I participate actively in other activities organized by my church/mosque. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


7. I consider religion an important part of my life. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


8. Apart from regular worship and prayer services, I also participate in other activities organized by my religious group. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


9. I do not subscribe to any religious ideology. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


10. I listen to the preaching of my spiritual leader(s) at least every week. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


11. I consider myself very strong spiritually.



12. I don’t think I am spiritual. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


13. I am an atheist, I don’t believe in God. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


14. I spend time in prayer at least once a day. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


15. I pray several times a day.

pg. 435



16. I own a copy of the Bible/Quran. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


17. I only pray during worship services. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


18. I regularly do fasting. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


19. Apart from worshipping, I serve during worship services, e.g. leading worship, singing, ushering, cleaning, etc. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


20. I study the Bible/Quran regularly. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


21. Although I believe in God, I am not a prayerful person. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


22. I remain well informed about my local religious group and I have influence on its decisions. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


SECTION II: PERCEPTION FACTORS

i) Indicate the response that best describes your opinion about the question posed on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -

3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.











pg. 436





















ii) Respond to these items on your relationship with Muslims on a scale of -3 to +3 whereby -3=strongly disagree, -








13. Muslims don‘t like Christians because they blame them for terrorism.






15. The government of Kenya has succeeded in fighting terrorism.



16. There is nothing the government can do about terrorism.

pg. 437



SECTION III: SOLUTION FACTORS

Indicate the solutions you would suggest for implementation by the government in the war against terrorism in

Kenya. The same scale of -3 to +3 applies whereby -3=strongly disagree, -2=disagree, -1=somehow disagree,

+1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree.










6. KDF soldiers should be withdrawn from Somalia.












10. All refugees should be repatriated back to their homeland.



11. Kenya‘s borders should be secured.






SECTION IV: SELF ESTEEM SCALE

pg. 438


-1=somehow disagree, +1=somehow agree, +2=agree, +3= strongly agree. 1. Generally, I am satisfied with myself.


2. Sometimes I think I am no good at all. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


3. I feel that I have a number of good qualities. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


4. I am able to do things as well as most other people. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


5. I feel I do not have much to be proud of.


6. I certainly feel useless at times. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


7. I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on an equal basis with others. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


8. I wish I could have more respect for myself. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


9. Overall, I tend to feel that I am a failure. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree


10. I take a positive attitude toward myself. Strongly disagree Disagree Somehow disagree Somehow agree Agree Strongly agree

SECTION V: DEMOGRAPHIC FACTORS

8. Sex: Male Female

9. Age: 18-20 21-23 24-26 27-29 Over 30

pg. 439


Doctoral


Sixth

12. Field of Study: e.g. Education, Agriculture, Engineering, etc.

pg. 440

APPENDIX II: Fieldwork Authorizations

pg. 441

pg. 442

pg. 443

pg. 444

pg. 445

Joséphine Atiéno Ochiel - Université Paris Nanterre

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