ISLAM IN EGYPTIAN POLITICS 1978-1981

SAIFUL UMAM

A THESIS

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY

OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

IN CANDIDACY OF THE DEGREE

OF MASTER OF ARTS

RECOMMENDED FOR THE ACCEPTANCE

BY THE PROGRAM IN NEAR EASTERN STUDIES

JUNE 1996

© Copyright by Saiful Umam, 1996. All rights reserved

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

There are many who have helped and supported me in completing this paper and

my study at Princeton. It is my pleasure now to acknowledge and thank them all. First, I

would like to thank my parents, Munawar and Sa‘idah, who raised me and taught me the

value of honesty and the importance of knowledge. They are always my inspiration in my

life. Then, I would like to thank the Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of

Indonesia, in particular the State Institute of Islamic Studies in Jakarta, in which I am

working. It has supported me to pursue a study abroad. I also would like to thank the

Education and Training Agency for Development Planning (which was formerly the

Overseas Training Office) of the National Development Planning Agency of the

Government of Indonesia, which has funded me during my entire study at Princeton.

Without its fellowship, I would have never had this great experience.

In Princeton, I would like to thank Professor Heath Lowry, Professor Abdellah

Hammoudi, Professor Hossein Modarressi and Professor Sukru Hanioglu, without whom

my hard life in Princeton would have been even harder. I am most indebted to Professor

Khaled Fahmy with whom I worked on this paper. His advice, guidance and patience in

reading and rereading my thesis were invaluable and my thanks know no bounds. I am

also indebted to Marc Moebius who carefully read my work and gave significant input to

improve my writing skills.

My greatest thanks go to my beloved wife Zubaidah who always stands by me in

the ups and downs of life. Her patience, understanding and encouragement have been and

will forever be my key success.

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................... 1

CHAPTER ONE: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND ............................................. 7

A. Social and Political Situation of Egypt 1970-1977 ........................................... 7

B. Sadat’s Visit to Jerusalem ............................................................................... 24

CHAPTER TWO: THE LEGITIMACY OF SADAT’S PEACE POLICY ........... 28

A. The Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty .............................................. 28

B. Criticism of Sadat’s Peace Policy .................................................................... 32

C. The Sadat Regime’s Reaction to the Criticism ................................................. 41

CHAPTER THREE: AL-JIHAD AND THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT ..... 50

A. Egyptian Politics in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s ........................................ 50

B. The Importance of al-Jihad .............................................................................. 62

C. The Assassination of Sadat .............................................................................. 73

C.1. The Assassination in the View of the Assassins ......................................... 73

C.2. The Assassination in the View of al-Jihad’s Leaders ................................. 79

D. Interpreting the Assassination .......................................................................... 84

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................... 87

BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................ 91

1

INTRODUCTION

The relation between Islam and politics is always a hot issue of discussion. This issue can

be vast, ranging from the Shari‘ah (Islamic law) to local tradition and from Qur’anic

verses to personal opinion. It also covers a long period of time, since it can be traced back

to the early period of Islam. As it is known, the first disintegration of the Muslim society

was caused by a political question, namely who was to succeed the Prophet as leader of

the new umma (community). The political dispute followed by the ideological and legal

ones have established the two main poles of Islam: Sunnism and Shi‘ism.

An endless disputed question of Islam and politics is whether or not Islam and

politics are two separate things. In a broader term, the question is if Islam is a religion

only or both a religion and a state. Some people, especially the Islamists, argue that Islam

is both “a religion and a state” (dîn wa-dawlah), thus Islam can not be separated from

politics. Others argue that Islam is a religion and not a political system. Thus, Islam is

separated from politics.

In the recent decades in which the wave of Islamic resurgence in the Muslim

world is taking place, the issue of the relation between Islam and politics has gained even

more currency. A lot of literature has been written dealing with this issue. Two books

worth mentioning are Nazih Ayubi’s Political Islam and John Esposito’s Islam and

Politics.1 The two works deal mainly with the recent political movements in the Muslim

1Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York: Routledge, 1991), John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 3rd ed. (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1984).

2

world preceded by the discussion of theoretical terms of politics in Islam. Ayubi argues

that “political Islam” is not something inherent in Islam, because no reference to this is

found in the original sources of Islam, i.e., the Qur‘an and Prophetic traditions. However,

Islam always existed in Islamic states by the way that the states appropriated religion. For

example, religion had been used by the states to legitimize their presence, especially

when they were threatened by various protest groups, or to legitimize new regulations

which were needed in order to preserve the states but would possibly result in social

discontent. The recent Muslim “neofundamentalist” movements, according to Ayubi, are

trying to reverse this relation so that politics and state would be subservient to religion.

Esposito, on the other hand, shows how diverse the Islamic teachings are, so that

different parties, especially between the state and religious groups, can use Islam at the

same time for different purposes. This means that there is a competition between the

government and the political opposition in utilizing Islam.

Realizing that the discussion of Islam and politics can be very broad, in this paper

I will focus on how this complicated question has been manifest in one country, Egypt. I

will not discuss whether or not Islam and politics are separate things. Yet I prefer to take

Ayubi’s argument that although politics is not inherently part of Islamic principles, it

always exists in the history of Islamic states. In other words, Islam and politics are

different things but in practice they can not be separated since the one influences the

other. In Esposito’s term, the relation between Islam and politics in contemporary

Muslim world is formulated in a competition between governments and opposition

movements in declaring their devotion to Islam and their promise of a more Islamic way

3

of life. This thesis will discuss such a competition in Egypt. However, there is little doubt

that the contested issue is not about sincere allegiance nor sincere commitment, because

behind all of their efforts in utilizing Islam are political purposes. Accordingly what had

happened was not just a competition in order to attract more supporters but a challenge

from one side to the other in an attempt to destroy the other’s legitimacy.

Some of the questions posed in this work are: What was general pattern of using

Islam in Egyptian politics? How did each group of the government and the opposition try

to utilize Islam to realize their goals? How did the constellation of Islam in Egyptian

politics change from one time to the other? Why did it change? What were the causes that

brought about the changes? The period of 1978-1981 has been chosen to analyze and

study these questions because there were two climatic events during this time. The first

was the signing of the Camp David accords in 1978 and the second was the assassination

of President Sadat. These two events certainly had extraordinary effects and influence on

the use of Islam in the Egyptian politics.

Related to those two events, a more specific question will be discussed, namely

whether or not there was any relation between Sadat’s peace initiative and his

assassination. Due to the short interval of time separating the two events, some people

indeed argue that there was a direct relation between the two, i.e., Sadat was assassinated

because he had signed peace agreement with Israel.2 It will be assessed if there are

2Some sources arguing that the assassination of Sadat was closely related with his signing of peace treaties with Israel are Derek Hopwood, “al-Sadat, Anwar,” Encyclopedia of Islam, 1995 ed.; Time, 19 October 1981; The Economist, 10 October 1981; Desmond Meiring, Fire of Islam (London: Wildwood House, 1982).

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historical bases for this opinion. If the answer for this question is negative, then why was

Sadat assassinated in 1981 not long after the signing of the peace treaty?

In Muslim Extremism in Egypt, Kepel’s explanation for this question is widely

accepted by many scholars.3 According to him there were two main factors behind

Sadat’s assassination. First, there was no mediator between the ruler and the ruled. Egypt

was in need of a group of people who, on the one hand, legitimized the rule of the regime

and, on the other, imposed recognition of the legitimacy on the ruled. Those who played

this role should maintain the balance between the ruler and the ruled. The ulama who

were supposed to play this role were evidently too dependent to the ruler and even

became part of the bureaucracy. Therefore, they lost their credibility and then the ruled

turned instead to independent religious groups. Second, the assassination was the highest

expression of people’s disappointment in the deteriorating economic situation. Kepel

seems to undermine the religious belief of the assassins, in particular, and the Islamists,

in general, by arguing that religious expression was only a veil of economic problems.

While accepting some of Kepel’s ideas, this thesis will try to argue, the religious belief

was not less important than economic difficulties as a factor causing the assassination of

Sadat as well as the spread of radicalism among the Islamists.

To address all of the questions, I will begin, in the following chapter, with a

discussion of Egyptian politics from 1970 to 1977, which will serve as a historical

background to the events of 1978-1981. This period, which starts from Sadat’s ascension

to the presidency and concludes with his controversial visit to Jerusalem, shows how the 3Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh, trans. John Rothschil (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986).

5

state effectively dominated the use of Islam in the political sphere. Sadat’s decision to

ally with the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1970s and his 1973 war against Israel were

decisive factors that made his claim of Islam go unchallenged. Following the war Sadat

introduced an open-door economic policy for foreign investment. Infitah, as this policy

was known, was meant to improve the Egyptian economy, by inviting foreign capital.

After it became obvious that the policy was not successful as was hoped, the regime’s

domination in using Islam started to be contested, as the case of the Jama‘at al-Takfir

wa-al-Hijrah in mid 1977 demonstrated. The challenge continued to increase following

Sadat’s journey to Jerusalem.

Sadat’s peace initiative made the regime lose its domination in using Islam in the

political sphere. As will be discussed in chapter two, the Islamists, mainly the Muslim

Brotherhood, articulated Islamic symbols to challenge Sadat’s peace policy. The peace

policy had resulted in an intensive competition between the regime and the Islamists in

the use of Islamic symbols in Egyptian politics. Each side tried to challenge and refute

the symbols employed by the other. Interestingly, as a part of the Islamists, al-Jihad,

whose members assassinated Sadat, was not interested in the discussion of the separate

Egyptian peace with Israel. This group was concerned with Egypt’s internal problems,

and specifically, the ruler, who was charged as being un-Islamic and tyrannical. It was

the group’s priority to overthrow the regime and to replace it with an Islamic one.

The emergence of al-Jihad marked the end of the regime’s preference to use Islam

for its political purposes. Since the regime, for al-Jihad, had already been seen as un-

Islamic, it had no right to employ Islamic symbols. This will be discussed in chapter

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three. In this chapter also, it will be assessed why Sadat was assassinated. The opinion

from both the assassins and the leaders of al-Jihad will be reviewed to answer this

question. Mahmud Salah’s booklet entitled Hakadha Qatalna al-Sadat (Thus We

Assassinated Sadat) will be the main source for their confession. This booklet contains

their confessions to the investigators during the investigation conducted soon after the

assassination. The short interval between the assassination and the interrogation would

give a closer version of what they really perceived about the assassination. By the end of

this chapter it will become clear that the assassination was motivated by religious zeal as

well as the politico-economic problems.

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CHAPTER ONE

THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This chapter will overview mainly the important policies of the Sadat regime from his

ascension to the presidency in 1970 until 1977, when he visited Jerusalem. In this period,

Islam had already been used by the regime to cast legitimacy on its politics. This will

give a background of how Islam was subsequently used, not only by the government, but

also by the opposition to legitimize its activities. In addition, this section will also assess

the radical decision of Sadat to visit Jerusalem and the factors that forced him to reverse

his position vis-à-vis Israel.

A. Social and Political Situation of Egypt 1970-1977

In 1970 Egypt saw a significant political shift. Gamal Abdel Nasser died and Anwar

Sadat, as the Vice President, succeeded him as the head of the state. Although he was a

close ally of Nasser and was committed to continue in Nasser’s footsteps, Sadat’s

policies soon appeared very different from those of his predecessor. The campaign of de-

Nasserization in the political and economic spheres, the alliance with the West, and the

peace initiative with Israel were among the significant differences. In addition, Sadat also

utilized Islamic symbols in order to legitimize his policies.

Sadat’s first year of presidency was spent struggling to secure his position. His

assumption of the presidency was confirmed by the Arab Socialist Union (ASU)1, the

1The Arab Socialist Union was the only party politics which was allowed in the 1960s and continued to exist during Sadat until it was abolished and replaced by the National Democratic Party in 1978 following the introduction of multi-party system.

8

National Assembly as well as a public referendum. However, he was still challenged by

the left-wing Free Officers,2 led by Vice President Ali Sabri, in the matter of who would

have decisive political power to determine the future of Egypt. The conflict was stern

because the two factions were equally strong. Sabri’s group had been dominant during

the Nasser era, while Sadat, as the formal President, was backed by those who did not

like Sabri holding political power.

The two most disputed issues were the distribution of power and the political and

economic system. Considering Sadat a weak man, Sabri’s group demanded a collective

leadership in which Sadat was supposed to always consult with the party in making

important political decisions. Sadat refused these constraints. He did not want to be

controlled by Sabri’s group who then dominated the executive committee of the ASU.

Sadat’s appointment of Mahmud Fawzi3 as the Prime Minister was the first watershed in

this dispute. Sadat did not consult the ASU about this decision; and Fawzi was not

favorable to the party. This matter resulted in pro-and anti-Fawzi factions in the cabinet,

since there were ministers who were Sabri’s allies.

Regarding the second issue, Sabri’s group, as the heirs of Nasserism, wanted to

continue Nasser’s policies such as state-socialism, single party system, and making the

party superior over the military and the bureaucracy. In addition, they also sought to

continue an alliance with the Soviet Union and harsh enmity against Israel. Sadat’s allies,

on the contrary, argued that socialism had already been practiced during Nasser and it

2The Free Officers were a coalition of army officers which, led by Gamal Abdel Nasser, successfully overthrew the Egyptian monarchy in 1952, and bore the modern Egyptian state in which Nasser became the president.

9

failed, therefore it was time to apply state capitalism and make an alliance with the

West.4

The conflict became irreconcilable when Sadat got committed to the idea of

federation between Egypt, Syria and Libya. The federation was intended to form a strong

alliance in order to face Israel, but this idea was opposed by Sabri’s group simply

because Sadat did not consult the party. The ASU executive committee, which was

dominated by Sabri’s allies, rejected the project. Sadat then brought the idea to

Parliament, where it was endorsed. By this time, both decided that they could no longer

co-exist and, henceforth, each faction tried to eliminate the other. Sabri’s group was

actually in the stronger position, since Sabri was the Vice President and some critical

ministries, such as the Ministry of Interior, War and Information were held by his allies.

His group also dominated the elite party. However, Sadat, having formal legitimacy and

backed by the presidential guard and individuals who opposed Sabri, cleverly forged an

alliance with the second ranking officials of the ministries held by Sabri’s group. With

this position, Sadat felt strong enough to dismiss Ali Sabri as Vice President and six more

ministers, through the ‘corrective revolution’ in May 1971.5 All of this process was a

3This man should not be confused with Muhammad Fawzi, who was Sabri’s ally and the Minister of War in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 4Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr., Egyptian Politics under Sadat (Bolder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985) 40-46. 5Sabri was dismissed by Sadat on May 2, 1971. Although there was no formal reason for this removal, it was believed that Sabri’s criticism on the federation of Egypt, Syria and Libya was the main reason. As the protest for dismissing Sabri, six ministries and three members of the Executive Committee of the ASU —all of whom were Sabri’s allies— resigned, and Sadat accepted their resignation. Those who resigned were Sharawi Guma (Interior), Muhammad Fawzi (War), Sami Sharaf (Presidential Affairs), Muhammad Faiq (Information), Hilmi al-Said (Electricity), and Saad Zayd (Housing), and the three of the executive committee were Labib Shukair, who was also Speaker of Parliament, Abd al-

10

decisive part of what observers defined as de-Nasserization —a policy to eradicate

Nasserism.

Sadat also attempted to remove the influence Nasserism from the masses. He did

this by effectively using Islamic symbols. First, he relaxed the political repression of the

Islamists by releasing most of them from prisons. Then, he encouraged them, especially

in university campuses, to counter the Nasserists and other leftists. Islam, which

inherently contradicts communism, was used to attack the leftists. The Ikhwan al-

Muslimin which was politically suppressed under Nasser, was given a free hand by

Sadat. The leader of the Ikhwan al-Muslimin, Hasan al-Hudaybi, and the man who

followed him as leader of the group, Umar al-Tilmisani, were among those who were

released from jail. Although the Ikhwan was never officially legalized and there was no

formal agreement between it and the regime, it was widely known that the former was

committed to support the latter in neutralizing Nasserists and the radical Islamists. This

cooperation was symbolized by the visit of Hudaybi and Tilmisani to Sadat soon after

they were released from prison and the publication of the important journals of the

Ikhwan, al-Da‘wah and al-I‘tisam.6 In these two journals, articles condemning

Nasserism, socialism and communism appeared.

Muhsin Abu al-Nur —Secretary General of the party— and Dia al-Din Dawud. On May 14, the Sadat regime announced the attempted coup and accused Sabri’s group of being behind it. Therefore those people in addition to more than a hundred suspected conspirators were arrested. Sadat then formed a new cabinet which fully consisted of his allies. This whole incident was declared by Sadat as the ‘corrective revolution.’ See Dan Hofstadter, ed., Egypt and Nasser, 3 vols. (New York: Facts on File, 1973) 3: 266-273. 6Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt, trans. Jon Rothschild (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986) 103-107. This good relation broke when Sadat initiated to make peace with Israel. Both al-Da‘wah and al-I‘tisam then became very critical following Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, as I will discuss later.

11

One pro-Sadat article in al-I‘tisam, for example, denounced socialism because it

had failed to increase production and employment opportunity. “When socialism failed

once in raising production, it failed ten times in creating jobs... After 25 years, there is no

socialism around us except its name, nor social justice but its sketch.”7 The writer who

was a former propagator of socialism admitted that

I called for socialism when it appeared that it was a cure for our misery. Today after we applied socialism, we still suffer and our condition is worse. It is my duty to declare that socialism has come to an end. Let us highly raise Islam, not socialism nor communism.8

The use of Islamic symbols was also apparent from the fact that Sadat always

represented himself as a pious man. Al-Rais al-Mu’min, “the Believer President,” was his

title and he was called by his first name “Muhammad”. He always began his speeches

with “In the name of God” and ended them with quoting Qur’anic verses. He was shown

in the mass media going to or coming out of the mosque, wearing his white jallabiya, a

traditional Egyptian garment. He was portrayed as a devout man when in prayer he

murmured, closed his eyes, and showed fear of God.9

When Sadat launched the 1973 war, he did not intend to eliminate Israel, or even

to recapture the whole of Sinai. Rather, he only made a limited target, crossing the Suez

Canal, and utilized it as a tool for his political strategies, both internally and externally.

Internally and on the Arab scene, he used it for enhancing his legitimacy as the leader of

Arab people. In this context, Islamic symbols were, again, important. The war, for

7Al-I’tisam, February 1977, 23. 8Al-I’tisam, February 1977, 26. The writer was Ahmad Husayn, one of the founders of the Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat). 9Hassan Hanafi, “The Relevance of the Islamic Alternative in Egypt,” Arab Studies Quarterly 4 (1982): 63.

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example, which incidentally took place during Ramadan, the holiest month in Islam, was

subsequently declared as the glory of Ramadan.10 The name of the operation was Badr,

one of the important battles during the Prophet’s time, and the cry of the soldiers was

“God is Great” (Allahu Akbar). Therefore when the Egyptian army successfully crossed

the Suez Canal and overrun the Israelis on the Bar Lev line —though not totally defeated

them— Sadat’s popularity increased sharply and he became the “hero of the crossing.”

The war was subsequently perceived as a big “victory” over Israel, brought money inflow

from Arab states, and made Sadat’s position stronger. In short, the war not only secured

Sadat’s position as president but also gave him full authority to determine the future of

Egypt.

Externally, the war was used to push the US to sponsor a peace process in the

Middle East. Sadat thought that the US held the key position in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

“Ninety-nine percent of the cards in this game” were believed by him to be in the hand of

the US.11 It was the US supply of recent military equipment, for example, that allowed

Israel to keep fighting. Therefore, it was assumed that had the US promoted peace, Israel

would have had no choice. Consequently, Sadat’s regime tried to convince the US to play

this role. When diplomacy did not succeed, then a limited war against Israel was an

10There is no doubt that the reason for carrying out the war in October 1973 was not because of Ramadan, but because of military strategy. This was admitted by Sadat himself. He said that the option for launching the war was May, August-September, and October. The last was the most suitable due to two considerations. First, an attack would “coincide with Yom Kippur—the Day of Atonement—on October 6 when all public services in Israel would be suspended.” Second, after October the Syrians “would not be favorable for military action... because of the climatic and physical conditions.” See Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York: Harper & Row, 1978) 241. 11Derek Hopwood, Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-1984 (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1985) 108.

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option. The initial victory did pave the way for an American-sponsored peace. The direct

result was two disengagement agreements, in January 1974 and September 1975, by

which Israel agreed to withdraw partially from Sinai and the oil-fields in return for an

Egyptian promise not to use force again.12

Sadat’s reliance on the US took place not only on the Arab-Israeli issue, but also

on who would be the Egypt’s ally in the future. There is little doubt that Sadat preferred

to make allies with the US rather than the Soviet Union, which had already been Egypt’s

close ally during Nasser’s presidency. This was apparent when Sadat dismissed Sabri’s

group which was very close to the Soviet elite. Then, in 1972 Sadat expelled the Soviet

military advisers from Egypt, after the Soviets did not send arms that he ordered. Sadat

also supported Ja‘far Numayri, the Sudanese president, in crashing an aborted coup

which was reportedly staged by the Soviets. The treaty of friendship with the Soviet,

which was signed in 1971, therefore, should be understood as a temporary agreement,

when the West had not been convinced yet. After the West accepted Egypt’s proposal,

the Soviets was kicked out.13

Parallel to this turn, Sadat launched a new economic policy, known as infitah

(open-door policy for foreign investment), to reconstruct the Egyptian economy.

Although the way for this policy had already been prepared since early 1970’s through,

for example, the adoption of the Law number 65 (1971) which governed Arab investment

and free-trade zones, the decisive step was taken in 1974 through what is known as the

12Hopwood 107-108. 13Without reasonable explanation, in 1976, for example, Sadat abrogated the treaty of friendship which was supposed to be in effect for fifteen years.

14

“October working paper.” In this paper, Sadat used the “glorious victory” of the 1973

war as the legitimate reason for starting a new Egypt.

The great Ramadan (October) should be a springboard for a new phase of national action with which we can push forward to progress along the same lines and with the same rates we achieved in the magnificent battle.14

Dealing with the economic development, as a main factor of “the comprehensive

civilisational strategy,” Sadat noted a significant shift of the policy by giving more space

for private sectors and foreign investment. He said, for example, that the private sector

had an important role in development, but “we should admit that we have not always met

its requirements nor created conditions to promote its productive activity.”15 Then, he

said that Egypt still needed great foreign sources to mobilize economic progress.16

With infitah, Sadat wanted to combine Egyptian human resources, Arab capital

and Western advanced technology to increase Egypt’s prosperity. Arab “surplus funds,”

mainly the result of the rise of oil prices, were “invited” to Egypt because “we are in need

of such investment.”17 Western investment was also encouraged because it would bring

“advanced technological knowledge” which was needed to speed up economic

development.18 To make all this work, Sadat created free-trade zones.

The policy of establishing free-trade zones will not only introduce new industries, contribute to manpower employment, and provide us with world storing and distribution centers on account of our outstanding geographical position, it will

14Anwar Sadat, The October Working Paper (Egypt: Ministry of Information, 1974) 26. 15Sadat 60. 16Sadat 61. 17Sadat 62. 18Sadat 64.

15

also serve to speed up the industrialisation policy as well as develop and modernise out local industries.19

Sadat did not forget to insert Islamic symbols in his infitah. He said that infitah

was a starting point of the era of “faith and knowledge” (iman wa-‘ilm).20 This terms

were taken by referring to Qur’anic verse, ”God will raise those of you who believe, and

those who have knowledge, in position.”21

The October paper, as a political statement, was followed by legal regulation.

Law no. 43 dealing with investment of Arab and foreign capital and the Free Zones was

promulgated in 1974. This was regarded as the most important law in relation to infitah,

since it made all fields, including those formerly prohibited, legal for foreign capital.22

This law was enhanced by others, such as Law no. 63 (1974), which allowed Egyptians

to represent foreign companies; Law no. 137 (1974), which permitted Egyptian

individuals and companies possessing foreign currency; and Law no. 118 (1975), which

concerned import and export of goods, in addition to numerous ministerial decrees.23

From the beginning Sadat was aware that he lacked Nasser’s charisma. He could

not play a uniting role for different groups and classes. Therefore Sadat needed a

cohesive, though limited, constituency which would consistently support him.24 They

were the bourgeoisie; and the new economic policy was just strategic in building this

19Sadat 65. 20Sadat 91-93. 21Qur’an 58:11. 22Nazih Ayubi, The State and Public Policies in Egypt Since Sadat (UK: Ithaca Press, 1991) 20. 23A study of laws relating with infitah was carried out by Khaled Fahmy, Legislating Infitah: Investment, Currency and Foreign Trade Laws (Egypt: AUC Press, 1989).

16

class. A small number of Egyptians subsequently benefited much of infitah and quickly

ammassed considerable wealth.

A typical example of this new bourgeoisie was the commercial agent. According

to the decree of the Ministry of Commerce no. 249 (1976), the public sector was not

permitted to make a direct transaction with a foreign company; therefore a commercial

agent that represented a foreign company was needed. By simply having an agency

contract and a formal registration at the Ministry of Trade, an agent was lawful to operate

like a broker. When the public sector, for example, wanted to buy certain commodities, it

made public announcement, and several agents interested in the project would submit

their offer. Officially, the decision to choose the agent was based on the best offer;

however, due to rampant corruption and the lack of fair competition, the decision was

often made on the basis of close relation between the agent and the decision maker in the

given public sector company. Consequently, the price of the commodities could be

doubled or tripled, and in turn the agent received a great deal of benefits when it was

granted commission from its foreign partner as certain percentage of the payment.25

In this context, it can be understood that the social origins of the majority of

people who engaged in the commercial agency were traditional trading and industrial

bourgeois families (50%) and state sector technocrats, managers, and senior civil servants

(30%).26 The first group of people were those who had already been rich and had special

24Hinnebusch 50. 25Malak Zaalouk, Power, Class and Foreign Capital in Egypt (London and New Jersey: Zed Books, 1989) 118-126. 26Zaalouk 132-133.

17

relation with high-rank bureaucrats. The second, due to their interaction with the first,

subsequently also entered into the business. Both were the real beneficiaries of infitah

from the fact that most of them were the first generation to be in their business.

Combined these two figures showed that majority of the beneficiaries of infitah were

those who had access to the decision makers. The next important category that made up

the commercial agents were liberal professions, such as accountants, lawyers, doctors and

engineers, (10%); and military officers (6%). These figures, again, added the conclusion

that only those who had access to the ruling elite could take advantage of infitah. In

contrast, small-scale merchants and wholesale traders, who almost had no such

privileges, made up only two percent.27 Therefore, infitah, which was originally intended

to increase the overall Egyptian economy, in practice, only favored those who were

already privileged economically, socially and politically.

Let us now examine the foreign investment as a main target of infitah. Until the

end of 1978, the total investment in approved projects was £E1,664 million. Arab

countries were significant investors. They shared £E270m (16%), followed by the US

(10%), European countries (6%) and others like Japan and Greece (13%). In total, foreign

investment was not more than 45%. The bigger part, therefore, still came from the

Egyptians (55% or £E905m). Public sector reportedly contributed £E445m while the

private £E460m.28 This is ironic, of course, because the promulgation of the law no. 43

(1974) was meant to attract foreign investment; but in reality more than half capital came

from the Egyptians. It became more ironic when considering the fact that about half of

27Zaalouk 132-133. 28Ayubi The State 39-40.

18

the local capital —equal to almost 27 percent of the total investment— was from public

sector. This means that the government’s money was still a major part in the overall

investment. Until 1978, therefore, the foreign investment was unsuccessfully brought by

infitah policy.

The utilization of the capital also showed that infitah ran far from it was hoped.

Lacking a regulation of what sectors should be more prioritized than others, a big part of

the investment went to distribution and services sectors (65%). Tourism, housing,

banking and investment companies were among those that absorbed much of the capital;

all together they were responsible for as much as 55% of the total investment. On the

other hand, commodity sectors only got 35%.29 This indicates that a significant amount of

the capital inflow was used not for productive sectors which were supposed to be the

important base for “real” prosperity in the long term, but for services and luxurious

things.

There were benefits, of course, that came to Egypt as a result of infitah. Egypt’s

GDP, for example, increased sharply from £E4,197 million in 1974 to £E7,341 million in

1977 and then again to £E20,727 million in 1981. Moreover, the rate of economic growth

since the initiation of the open-door policy was about 9% per annum. The GNP per capita

also increased promptly from $260 in 1975 to $580 in 1980, though this was

accompanied with the aggravating inflation which reached 20%-30% annually.30 The

other benefit was a certain degree of political liberalization which accompanied the

inflow of investment. Although the liberalization was taken half-heartedly, because the

29Ayubi The State 36-38.

19

intention was to smash Nasserism as well as to give impression to the West that

democracy existed in Egypt, Sadat at least introduced a multi-party system and lifted a

‘police state’ in which naked oppression was used to force the regime policies. The

infrastructure, especially roads and telephone, also significantly improved.31

However, there is no doubt that Egyptians, on the mass level, were unsatisfied

with all these improvements. This is because a big part of the “cake” of the development

was consumed by a small number of people and was not evenly distributed. As indicated

above, the majority of people who benefited from infitah were high level state employees

in addition to the bourgeoisie. Then, corruption became more widespread and acute,

especially, among those two classes, referred to as “fat cats”. In addition, the mounting

inflation and the rise of “commercialism” hurt the Egyptians after infitah was introduced.

The high rate inflation was very apparent in the apartment rents, the price of land and

housing, all of which tripled or even quadrupled in just few years. On the other hand, the

imported consumer goods and the luxury buildings were pouring into Egyptian cities. All

of this gave rise to discontent situation among the poor and low middle class.

If the state budget and external trade are analyzed, the Egyptian economy in

reality was deteriorating during these years. This is obvious from the fact that the deficits

of both increased significantly. It was true that the budget revenue increased, from

£E1,524 million in 1975 to £E3,306 million in 1978; yet the expenditure almost doubled

from £2,626m to £E5,013m in the same periods. Added by the emergency fund deficit,

30Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Egypt’s Troubled Economy: Mubarak’s Inheritance,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 6 (1981-1982): 401-431.

20

which was £E284m and £E370m respectively, the budget deficit rose from £E1,386m in

1975 to £E2,077m in 1978. The deficit in the trade balance also increased from

US$1,242m in 1974 to US$2,842m in 1978. The latter was based on exchange control

records. If custom records are used, then the increase in the trade deficit was much

sharper, because in 1974, it was only US$835m and in 1978 it became US$4,990m.32 In

order to finance the deficit, Egypt needed more money from foreign countries and

international institutions, such as World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF),

but to get loans, some adjustment in economic policies had to be made, based on the

lender’s suggestion. In 1977, for example, following the recommendation of the IMF, the

government decided to cut the budget expenditure. There were four areas to be cut—

defense, public sector investment, debt service or subsidies— and the government chose

the last one. The reason seemed that while the first three had powerful international or

elite constituencies, the last did not. However, the people’s reaction to the decision was

underestimated. The reduction of food subsidies added by social discontent resulted in

mass riots, which were known also as the “food riots.”

The ‘food riots’ broke out in January 1977. There was little doubt that the

uprising was a spontaneous reaction to the price rises and unorganized expression of

mass dissatisfaction to the state economic policy in general, although the regime blamed

that it was instigated by the leftists.33 As discussed earlier, infitah had resulted in a

31Ayubi, The State 53-58. 32Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Egypt Economy Under Sadat: Will the Peace Agreement be Followed by Prosperity?” Middle East Contemporary Survey 3 (1978-1979): 354-378. 33Joel Beinin, “Will the Real Egyptian Working Class Please Stand Up?” in Zachary Lockman, ed., Workers and Working Classes in the Middle East (New York: SUNY Press, 1994) 247-268.

21

decrease in their standard of living. When the regime on 17 January announced a

reduction in subsidies for 25 essential foodstuffs, and the price of those commodities

consequently increased, the masses responded by taking to the streets on the following

day. The unrest took place first in Alexandria and then in Cairo and later spread to other

major cities. “Tens of thousands of men and women poured into the streets, people for

whom life had long been almost unbearably hard but who knew that now they were going

to find it impossible.”34 This was the first nation-wide protest which needed massive

military intervention to regain control. According to an official report, this riots brought

about 77 people died, 566 wounded (around 200 of whom were military people) and

1063 arrested, in addition to the damages valued at hundreds of million dollar.35 The size

and scale of the uprising really shocked Sadat.

In the same year, Sadat was also shaken by Islamic radicalism. Sadat’s effort in

removing Nasserism from the Egyptian public life by using Islam was quite successful.

Yet, when he could not offer an ideological substitute, the ideology vacuum was soon

filled by Islamic fundamentalism.36 Islamic radicalism then emerged in the case of the

Jama‘at al-Takfir wa-al-Hijrah, as will be discussed below. The radicalization had

already been noticed as early as 1974, when a group known as the Munazzamat al-Tahrir

34Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (New York: Random House, 1983) 90-92. 35Al-Ahram 22 January 1977. 36R. Hrair Dekmejian, “Fundamentalist Islam: Theories, Typologies, and Trends,” Middle East Review 17.4 (1985): 30.

22

al-Islam (Islamic Liberation Organization) attempted to assassinate Sadat while giving a

speech in the Military Academy in Cairo.37

The Jama‘at al-Takfir wa-al-Hijrah (the Repentance and Holy Flight group) was

a group founded by Shukri Mustafa, soon after he was released from jail by Sadat in the

early 1970s. Mustafa was imprisoned by Nasser due to his activities in the Ikhwan al-

Muslimin. The most important ideology of this group was that all Egyptians were

jahiliyah (ignorant), therefore the members of this group lived together in a remote area

and separated themselves from the rest of community. They imitated what the Prophet

did when he migrated from Mecca to Medina in order to develop a strong Muslim

community. They believed that they would come again to the jahiliyah community only

when the group was strong enough to defeat them, as when the Prophet conquered

Mecca.38

Deterioration of the Egyptian economy on the mass level was also responsible for

the radicalization of this group. The economic difficulties faced by the Egyptians in

getting foods and housing, for example, were answered by this group. As part of the

implementation of hijrah principle, the accommodation were prepared for members, so

they did not have to think about renting an apartment. This group also prepared food for

37Thus the name of this organization was known also as the Jama’at al-Fanniyyah al-Askariyyah (the Technical Military Academy group). This group was led by Salih Siriyya. See Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Anatomy of Egypt’s Militant Islamic Groups: Methodological Note and Preliminary Findings,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980). 38Originally, the name of this group was the Jamaat al-Muslimin (Community of Muslims) but was then referred to by the mass media as Jamaat al-Takfir wa-al-Hijrah, a

23

the members, thus they were not worried about hunger. In addition, marriage was made

easy and cheap by the leader of the Jama‘a, hence they did not have to delay it by

working abroad and accumulating money first. All of these measures were attracting

factors that brought about, especially, young Egyptians to join the group.39 Among this

youth who composed the majority of the members the radicalization inseminated by

Mustafa grew rapidly, as testified by the case of kidnapping and killing Shaykh al-

Dhahabi.

The Jama‘a abducted the former Minister of Religious Affairs, Muhammad

Husayn al-Dhahabi, in July 1977. They demanded the release of 60 of their members who

had been arrested by the authorities, in addition to a ransom of £E200,000, for freeing

Dhahabi. When the government failed to fulfill their demands by the deadline they set,

Dhahabi was killed. The security forces responded by rounding up members of this

groups. Six people were killed and 57 others wounded during the operation and the

authorities arrested 620 leaders and members, 465 of whom subsequently stood trial

before military courts, including Shukri Mustafa.40

Sadat was really shocked by these two important incidents. The large-scale unrest

in January made Sadat realize that the open-door policy was not as successful as he had

hoped. On the other hand, his use of Islam for political purposes had brought the

radicalization of Islam. Therefore, he needed a new policy that could cope with the recent

name which was initially used by the Egyptian authority. See Ibrahim, “Anatomy” 433-453. 39Kepel 70-102. 40Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “Islamic Militancy as a Social Movements: The Case of Two Groups in Egypt,” in Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982) 118.

24

problems of Egypt. What he needed was “something radical, revolutionary, that would

provide both a real breakthrough in some direction other than the open-door policy, and a

means to hold the people’s attention until that breakthrough was accomplished.”41 From

this point, it can be concluded it was these problems that pushed Sadat to visit Jerusalem

in November 1977.42

B. Sadat’s Visit To Jerusalem

The idea of peace with Israel had been in Sadat’s mind soon after the end of the 1973

war,43 but the first decisive step was taken in November 1977 by his visit to Jerusalem. In

addition to the mounting internal problems mentioned earlier, there were some factors

that brought him to undertake this controversial journey. They were the suggestion from

his advisor, political gestures of the Israeli Prime Minister Begin, as well as Sadat’s own

opinion on the peace process.

In September 1977, Hasan al-Tuhamy, Egypt’s Deputy Prime Minister and

advisor to the President, had a secret meeting with the Israeli Foreign Minister, Moshe

Dayan, in Morocco. According to Tuhamy, in this meeting Israelis had agreed to

withdraw their forces from all the occupied territories in return for peace.44 This report

was totally different from Dayan’s version. According to Dayan, what he agreed was to

report to Begin Egypt’s request that Israel make a clear commitment to withdraw from

41Raphael Israeli, Man of Defiance: a Political Biography on Anwar Sadat (New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985) 217. 42Ibrahim, “Anatomy” 424. 43This can be seen the two disengagement agreements discussed earlier.

25

the occupied territories.45 Based on his perception of the result of the meeting, Tuhamy

reportedly suggested to Sadat to visit Jerusalem.

Go to Jerusalem... Let us go to Jerusalem—our land, our holy place, center of the world and center of the problem...From there we will declare our demands and let the world hear and know in a last attempt for true peace. We shall see if they have courage to go along with us in the same way.46

The idea of visiting Jerusalem, therefore, might have been in Sadat’s mind by September

1977.47

By the end of October Sadat had decided to go in person to Israel. This decision

was taken after he visited Bucharest in which he was convinced by the Romanian

President Ceausescu that Israeli Prime Minister Begin really wanted peace. It was on the

plane on the way back from Bucharest that Sadat decided to visit Jerusalem, because

when he stopped in Tehran on 31 October, Sadat had already told the Shah about this

idea.48 Then, when he gave a speech in the Egyptian Parliament on 9 November 1977 —

in the presence of Yasser Arafat— he announced that he was prepared to go ‘to the end

of the earth’ for the sake of peace.49

For Sadat himself, the visit would resolve ‘70 per cent of the conflict’ and smash

the ‘psychological barrier’ which had separated Israel and the Arab countries over the

past century. Two elements of the psychological barrier, according to Sadat, were the

44Zahid Mahmood, “Sadat and Camp David Reappraised,” Journal of Palestine Studies 15.1 (1985): 65 45Moshe Dayan, Breakthrough: a Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981) 38-54. 46As quoted in Mahmood 66. 47Mahmood 66. See also Israeli 228. 48Heikal 96-97.

26

Arab-Muslim conception of Israel as a ‘foreign body’ transplanted into the Arab world,

hence it had to be eliminated, and the feeling of Israelis as under constant threat from

their neighbors.50

All of the above reasons had brought Sadat to visit Jerusalem on 19 November

1977. In Israel Sadat gave a speech in the Knesset, the Israeli parliament, explaining his

willingness to build a just and permanent peace between the Arab world and Israel, and

not a separate peace between Egypt and Israel, nor another disengagement agreement.

Sadat also demanded that Israel should withdraw from all Arab territories occupied in

1967. “There are Arab territories which Israel has occupied and still occupies by armed

forces. We insist on complete withdrawal from these territories, including Arab

Jerusalem.” In addition Sadat also insisted on the necessity of solving Palestinian

problems.

The Palestinian problem is the core and essence of the conflict, and that so long as it continues to be unresolved, the conflict will continue to aggravate, reaching new dimension... There can be no peace without the Palestinians. It is a grave error of unpredictable consequences to overlook or brush aside this cause.51

Sadat did not forget to use his visit for religious gestures also. He visited the al-

Aqsa mosque (the third holiest place in Islam, after Mecca and Madina) and prayed there

on ’Id al-Adha (one of the two most important holidays in Islam). This symbolized that

what he did by visiting Jerusalem was not only for economic and political reasons but

also religious ones.

***

49Israeli 228. 50Israeli 230.

27

To sum up, there are two points which are worth mentioning. First, two cases that took

place in 1977 —the ”food riots” in January and the abduction of Dhahabi in July—

pushed Sadat to take more a decisive step of peace. Though peace initiative had already

been in his mind by the early 1970s, these two incidents can be regarded as direct causes

of his visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. As I will discuss in the next chapter, this

controversial journey had paved the way to the peace agreement with Israel.

Second, between 1970 and 1977, the use of Islamic symbols in the Egyptian

politics was totally dominated by the regime and those who supported it. Started by

releasing the Islamists from prisons and followed by the 1973 war, the domination of the

regime in using Islamic symbols was unchallenged until 1977, when the Jama‘at al-

Takfir wa-al-Hijrah started to contest it by asserting the concept of jahiliyah and hijrah.

This case was a starting point for the change of using Islamic symbols in Egyptian

politics. As I will discuss in next chapter, Sadat’s peace agreement which followed his

controversial journey to Jerusalem, had indeed changed the regime’s monopoly in using

Islam. Henceforth, Sadat’s regime was no longer the dominant actor in using Islam in the

political sphere.

51For complete text of Sadat speech in the Knesset, see Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) 2 (1977-78): 134-139.

28

CHAPTER TWO

THE LEGITIMACY OF SADAT’S PEACE POLICY

As discussed in the earlier chapter, the Sadat regime’s monopoly of using Islam in the

political sphere started to be contested openly in mid 1977 with the case of the Jama‘at

al-Takfir wa-al-Hijrah. The challenge continued to increase following the Egyptian-

Israeli peace treaty. Sadat’s peace initiative indeed succeeded in shifting the Egyptian

attention from the economic distress to the peace process. However, at the same time, his

peace policy was also giving chance for the Islamists to challenge him by employing

Islamic symbols. This chapter will assess manner in which Islam was used by the

Islamists in Egyptian politics as a result of the signing of the Camp David accords and

the peace treaty. Before discussing this, I will elaborate on the content of the two

agreements first.

A. The Camp David Accords and the Peace Treaty

Following Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, peace talks between Egypt and

Israel intensified with the United States acting as the mediator. Two important

agreements were reached in the two subsequent years. The first was the Camp David

accords which were signed in September 1978, and the second was the Egyptian-Israeli

peace treaty, signed in March 1979. What points were agreed upon in these documents?

To what extent was the agreement in accordance with Sadat’s demands?

29

Camp David produced two agreements. The first dealt with the so-called

framework for a self-governing authority of the West Bank and Gaza, and the second was

an outline for the withdrawal of the Israeli armed forces from Sinai. According to the first

agreement, the future of the West Bank and Gaza would be determined through three

stages.1 First, there would be transitional arrangements for the two areas for a period of

no more than five years. Second, during that period, a self-governing authority would be

elected by the residents of both lands. Egypt, Israel and Jordan would agree on the

modalities for establishing a self-governing authority in both the West Bank and Gaza.

Third, after a self-governing authority was established, another five-year-transitional

period would begin, during which the final status of Gaza and the West Bank would be

determined. Egypt, Israel, Jordan and representatives of the two regions would be parties

taking part in this process. This document also stated that Egypt and Israel would

recognize each other, abrogate the economic boycott, and guarantee the safety of each

other’s citizens in their own territory. In addition, it affirmed that Egypt and Israel would

not use force to settle disputes.

There were some principles which the accords did not mention. For example, the

agreement did not give the assurance that Israel would return the territories it had

occupied in 1967. It did not mention the prospect for the emergence of a Palestinian state,

nor did it refer to the role of the PLO. The “self-governing authority” stated in the accord

was meant as only an Administrative Council which would have no significant political

power. The accord assured a full autonomy to the inhabitants of both areas, but not to the

land. It promised that the Palestinians would take part in negotiations to determine the

1For the full text of the Camp David accords, see Middle East Contemporary Survey

30

future of the West Bank and Gaza, yet their representatives had to be mutually agreed

upon. In other words, the Palestinians could not freely choose people whom they wanted

to be their representative. Furthermore, the influence of the Palestinians in discussing the

final status of the West Bank and Gaza was not strong, because there were other parties

—Israel, Egypt, and Jordan— all of which would have an equal position. The

requirement that the final status of the West Bank and Gaza had to be agreed upon by all

factions raised doubts that this stage could ever be reached.

The second document dealt with a proposed peace agreement between Israel and

Egypt. Among important points agreed upon by the two states were the sovereignty of

Egypt over lands up to the international border between Egypt and mandate Palestine; the

withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from Sinai; and the right of Israel to use the Gulf of

Suez, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. However, there was no

clear linkage between the question of Sinai and solving the Palestinian problem. The

absence of that link made it possible to deal with both questions separately. This

conclusion, of course, was different from what Sadat demanded with the peace, for he did

not seek a separate peace nor another engagement agreement. Yet he accepted the

accords and signed them.2

(MECS) 2 (1977-78): 149-153. 2Some accounts were made to explain why Sadat signed the Camp David accords, though they did not fulfill his objective. Mahmood, for example, says that Sadat was assured by President Carter of many things. First, there would be no more new settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Second, Sadat was assured that Carter was on his side in this matter, and the American interpretation of the accords was not different from his own. Third, Sadat was also convinced that Carter would hold a second period of his presidency, thus by the time the first five-year-transitional-period was over, Carter would be able to exercise pressure on Israel to reach an agreement acceptable to the Palestinians. Fourth, Sadat was also convinced that he would get full support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Fifth, Carter promised that he would arrange a deal between Israel

31

The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty can be seen as a more detailed version of the

second document of the Camp David accords. Some significant points of the treaty were

the end of the state of war between Egypt and Israel; the withdrawal of both the Israeli

armed forces and civilians from Sinai, followed by the establishment of normal relations

between the two countries; and the free passage for Israeli ships through the Suez Canal,

the Gulf of Suez, the Mediterranean Sea, the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran. Both

states also committed not to threaten one other, and not to allow their territory to become

the base of threats toward the other. Thus Egypt would not help Arab states, should they

launch war against Israel. Another point of the agreement was the schedule of the

withdrawal of the Israelis, and the number of the Egyptian armed forces which would be

subsequently stationed in the area. As the name for the agreement was the Egyptian-

Israeli peace treaty, it did not mention the question of the West Bank and Gaza.3

Sadat had now effectively agreed to a separate peace between Egypt and Israel

and not a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace, as he had previously demanded. Although

one of Camp David accords dealt with the question of the West Bank and Gaza, the steps

to solve the problem were not convincing. The requirement that the final status of the

West Bank and Gaza be agreed by Egypt, Israel, Jordan and a representative of the

inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza, made reaching a final settlement technically

difficult, if not impossible. Moreover, the Palestinians and Jordan refused to join this

process. In the subsequent meetings between Egypt and Israel, differences of opinion

were found on almost every single issue that was raised, such as the status of Jerusalem,

and Syria over the Golan Heights, immediately after Camp David. See Zahid Mahmood, “Sadat and Camp David Reappraised,” Journal of Palestine Studies, 15.1 (1985): 78-79.

32

the settlements on the West Bank and in Gaza, water resources, and security.4 The only

result coming out clearly from the peace agreement was the return of Sinai; therefore it

was a separate peace.

B. Criticism of Sadat’s Peace Policy

Following the peace treaty, harsh reaction was directed toward Sadat by many elements

from both inside and outside Egypt. They rejected the peace agreement between Egypt

and Israel, though they differed on the reasons for doing so. Some used the separate

nature of the peace for their criticism, while others, specifically the Islamists, utilized

intensely religious symbols. The latter means that Sadat’s peace policy had resulted in the

change of the use of Islam in Egyptian politics, because his monopoly had been balanced

by the Islamists.

Reaction from outside Egypt came mainly from Arab countries. The majority of

the Arab states rejected the peace agreement, because Sadat was regarded as violating the

charter of the Arab League and resolutions of the Arab summit, which were expected to

solve comprehensively the Palestinian question. The peace agreement was considered as

a separate peace, thus it did not serve the aspirations of the Arabs. Arab states then

appealed to Sadat to renounce the agreement, but Sadat refused to do so. The result was

the Baghdad conferences in November 1978 and March 1979, during which Egypt was

3The full version of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, including its annexes, can be seen in MECS 3 (1978-79): 119-131. 4Raphael Israeli, Man of Defiance: a Political Biography on Anwar Sadat (New Jersey: Barnes & Noble Books, 1985) 250.

33

not only alienated from her Arab neighbors but was also expelled from the Arab League.5

The headquarters of the League were also transferred from Cairo to Tunis. Arab countries

were ordered to cut political and diplomatic ties with Egypt, and also to suspend their

economic relations. By April 1979, most Arab states broke formal diplomatic relations

with Egypt and their ambassadors left Cairo. The only members of the Arab League

which retained relations with Egypt at the time were Sudan, Somalia, and Oman. This

political alienation was accompanied by economic sanctions. Inter-Arab economic and

financial institutions decided to suspend Egypt’s membership and to cut off investments,

credit and aid. The Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries also took

similar action. The sanctions also included aviation; in May 1979, the Arab Civil

Aviation Organization closed all Arab airports to Egyptian airliners. The offices of Arab

airlines in Cairo were also shut down. The Arab Military Industrialization Organization

—a consortium of arms production located in Egypt and financed by Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates— was dissolved following the withdrawal

of the financiers. The distribution of Egyptian newspapers, magazines, and books was

5The Arab League was an expression of pan-Arabism. It was formed in 1944 by Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and North Yemen. Then other countries joined. They were Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Kuwait, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, the PLO, Qatar, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, and the United Arab Emirates. The charter which was formally signed in 1945 called for a collective protection of the sovereign independence of the members. After the creation of Israel as a state, the League declared war against her and since then this issue became one of the most important ones. See Tawfiq Y. Hasou, “Arab League,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World 4 vol. John L. Esposito, ed., (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) vol. 1: 111-112.

34

also banned by several Arab governments. Egyptian television and radio productions

were not excepted. Egypt was totally boycotted by the Arab world.6

The only two areas which were not affected by the Arab boycott were the deposits

of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states in Egyptian banks which was estimated at $1.9

billion; and the annual $2 billion in remittances from the Egyptian workers in the Arab

world.7 These two factors, especially the latter, were very significant in forestalling the

collapse of the Egyptian economy. Had the Gulf states sent home Egyptians working

there, the case would have been totally different for the regime.

The criticism from within Egypt was voiced by the party opposition as well as the

Islamists. The National Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP),8 for example, had criticized

Sadat’s peace initiative since he visited Jerusalem. This party also condemned the Camp

David accords as being against the national interest, as jeopardizing Egypt’s economy —

due to the economic sanctions from the Arab states— and as a separate peace.9

6Daniel Dishon, “Inter-Arab Relations,” MECS 3 (1978-1979): 213-258. 7Israel Altman, “The Arab Republic of Egypt,” MECS 3 (1978-1979): 414. Actually it is hard to measure how severe the impact of the Arab sanction to the Egyptian economy. Victor Lavy, for example, argues that the sanction had only temporary effect on the Egyptian economy. See Victor Lavy, “The Economic Embargo of Egypt by Arab States: Myth and Reality,” The Middle East Journal 38.3 (1984): 419-432. 8This party was small. Under the leadership of Khalid Muhi al-Din, it got only 4 seats (out of 350) in Parliament as a result of the 1976 elections. However its criticism seemed to have worried Sadat, and in May 1978, he cracked down on it, with the accusation that it was Communist, thus unbeliever, and the agent of the Soviet Union. To replace it, a more loyal opposition party, the Socialist Labor Party, was established. In this new party Sadat’s son-in-law, Mahmud Abu Wafia, was one of the party leaders. See Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Jr., Egyptian Politics under Sadat (Bolder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1985) 187-198. 9Altman 395-397.

35

The Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Umar al-Tilmisani was the

group most critical of Sadat’s peace policy with Israel. It was also the most intense group

using Islam for criticizing the peace initiative. Initially, in the early 1970s the

Brotherhood had good relations with Sadat by supporting him vis-à-vis the leftists and

Muslim radicals, but the support was broken by his visit to Jerusalem. As the first

organization paying attention to the danger of Zionist intentions in Palestine in the 1930s

and sending paramilitary volunteer and assistance to Palestinians in the 1948 war, the

Brotherhood remained committed to this cause.10 Therefore, as early as December 1977,

after Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem, the Brotherhood had condemned Sadat’s peace initiative

through its publications, al-Da‘wah and al-I‘tisam. Since then, the notion of opposition

toward the peace policy always appeared in almost every single edition of the periodicals.

According to Ibrahim, it was the Brotherhood’s open attack which encouraged other

opposition parties to gradually come out against Sadat’s peace policy.11

The main argument of the Muslim Brotherhood in opposing the peace policy was

centered on the impossibility of having peaceful coexistence with the Jewish state. Israel

was perceived as an aggressor on the Islamic abode (dar al-Islam), and it was the enemy

of Islam. Therefore, no matter what Sadat demanded of the Israelis in return for peace,

the Brotherhood totally opposed the idea.12 The Brotherhood did not specify distinction

whether it opposed the peace treaty because Israel was perceived as an aggressor or

10Walid Mahmoud Abdelnasser, The Islamic Movement in Egypt: Perceptions of International Relations 1967-81 (London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1994) 128-130. See also Saad Eddin Ibrahim, “An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat,” Arab Studies Quarterly 4 (1982): 85. 11Ibrahim, “An Islamic Alternative” 86. 12Ibrahim, “An Islamic Alternative” 86.

36

because it was a Jewish state. Both notions were used interchangeably by the

Brotherhood. One article in al-I‘tisam, written by Jabir Rizq, for example, clearly shows

this.

We fear no one but God. Prison and hanging do not frighten us. Dying for the sake of God is our dearest aspiration. From this vantage point we consider the shameful peace produced at Camp David and the Treaty with the enemy of God, the Prophet, the believers, humanity and justice to be an illusion. We believe from the depth of our hearts that it is a false peace. The Zionist existence on the land of Islamic Palestine at the expense of the Palestinian people is totally illegitimate. It is based on usurpation and pillage. Any treaty with a usurper, therefore, is itself false. Any outcome based on falsity is itself false and must be done away with sooner or later. As the treaty [with Israel] is false, so all its consequences. Normalization, therefore, is not only religiously condemned but it also entails rampant dangers to Muslim Egypt. It is a disguised Jewish invasion of the Egyptian society which hitherto was the fortress of Islam. Egypt has been the last line of defense against the three enemies of Islam: Western crusaders, Communists, and Jewish Zionists.13

This excerpt shows that the Brotherhood perceived Israel not only as the

aggressor on Palestinian lands, but also as a Jewish state and the enemy of Islam. By

stressing the last, the Brotherhood could easily use Islamic symbols to support its

refutation to the peace treaty. For example, Qur’anic verses 2:120, “the Jews and

Christians will never be pleased with you until you follow their way,” and 5:51, “O

believers, do not hold Jews and Christians as your allies,” were repeatedly quoted in

many articles. This shows how the Brotherhood used Islamic symbols in refusing Sadat’s

peace policy.

Other articles of the Brotherhood argued that Israelis lacked good character.

Israelis were accused as being untrustworthy because “they never fulfilled the accords

13Al-I‘tisam, April-May 1981, 28-29.

37

nor their promises.”14 The fact that Israel continued to build new settlements in the West

Bank after the Camp David accords had been signed was used by the Brotherhood as

proof of its untrustworthy character. According to the Brotherhood, Israelis would never

give up their dream of establishing a Jewish home land extending from the Nile to the

Euphrates. The treaty was regarded as a step to fulfill that dream, because with the treaty

Egypt committed not to attack Israel anymore.15

The only way to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict, according to the Brotherhood,

was jihad, a holy war against Israel. By using the term jihad which was, again, referred to

the Qur’an, the Brotherhood employed another Islamic symbol for its rejection to the

peace policy. This is cited in another article in al-Da‘wah.

War is the authentic means stipulated by God in his Holy Book for those whose rights, honor, or wealth have been encroached upon by an aggressor. God addressed the faithful “fighting is your lot despite its hardship.” Muslims do not seek fighting if they can protect or restore their rights through other means... The Arabs have tried the West to see if it would help them restore their rights but to no avail... There is no hope for the Arabs out of this predicament except through fighting (jihad).16

Apart from the Brotherhood’s critical stand-point toward Sadat’s peace policy,

Umar al-Tilmisani, as the leader, refused to join the National Coalition (al-I‘tilaf al-

Watani) founded by the independent Assembly deputy, Mumtaz Nassar, in February

1980. This coalition tried to unite all political oppositions, from Left to Right, in order to

create a strong anti-Sadat front. The main concern of the coalition was to demand

14Al-I‘tisam, November 1978, 4-5. 15Al-I‘tisam, February 1979, 36-37. 16Al-Da‘wah, May 1981, 62-64.

38

restriction of the President’s authorities, as well as more political freedom for people.17 It

is unclear why Tilmisani refused to join this coalition. It might be due to the differences

of concern between Tilmisani and the coalition. The concern of the coalition was clearly

to challenge Sadat’s political power and was not confined to opposing the peace treaty. It

was only in the fourth statement of the coalition, issued in February 1981, that it dealt

with Egypt’s relation with Israel and Arab countries. On the other hand, Tilmisani’s

concern was Sadat’s peace policy, and not his power. Tilmisani seemed to avoid a frontal

confrontation with Sadat by refusing to join the coalition. At the same time, Tilmisani

wanted to preserve the legitimacy of the Brotherhood’s struggle against Israel. As it is

known, the Brotherhood had sent volunteers to the Palestine during the 1940s. Those

who died were claimed as the martyrs (shuhada’) because they fought against the enemy

of Islam. Sadat’s peace policy, therefore, would question the martyrdom of those people.

Furthermore, the peace policy could make the Brotherhood’s sacrifice for the Palestinians

useless.

Criticism by using Islamic symbols also came from the Jama‘at Islamiyah.

Similar to the Brotherhood, in criticizing Sadat’s peace policy, the Jama‘at did not

specify whether its criticism was because of Israel being a Jewish state or a Zionist one.

Both were employed interchangeably. In its official statement, entitled “Our Stand with

Regard to Israel” and “About the Relation with Jews,” for example, the Jama‘at rejected

any kind of peace with Israel.18 These statements were started by a quotation of Qur’anic

verse, “The Jews and Christians will never be pleased with you until you follow their

17Altman 341-342 and also Ami Ayalon, “Egypt,” MECS 5 (1980-81): 420-421.

39

way.”19 Then they listed some of Israel’s transgression. Israel, for example, was regarded

as an occupying force; it was founded on Palestinian land and occupied Sinai, the West

Bank, and the Golan Heights. Since Islam did not discriminate one Islamic land from the

other, “all Islamic lands have to be defended with honor.”20 Then, they argued that Israel

was a state based on Zionist ideology which believes that Israel’s land should spread

between Nile and Euphrates. According to this group, the Israelis would never give up

that ideology. In addition, this group also argued that Israelis were people who could not

be trusted. Therefore, “we declare that any kind of peace agreement (sulh) with or

recognition of Israel was religiously illegitimate.”21 The statements concluded with

another verse, “O believers, do not hold Jews and Christians as your allies. They are

allies of one another; and anyone who makes them his friends is surely one of them.”22

Again, this shows how Islam was used to challenge Sadat’s policies.

Al-Jihad was not very vocal about the peace treaty. The little it said was about the

nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict; for it regarded the conflict as a conflict between

Muslims and Jews or Islam and Judaism, and not an Arab-Israeli conflict. With this

perception, Israel would not only be the enemy of the Palestinians and Arabs, but the

enemy of Islam. However, for al-Jihad, the war should be first carried out against an

inside enemy, which is the government, in order to establish an Islamic state. After the

real Islamic state has been established, then war against the outside enemy, Israel, would

18Badr Muhammad Badr, al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyyah fi Jami‘at Misr [al-Jama‘ah al-Islamiyah in Egyptian Universities] (n.p.: n.p., 1989) 58-68. 19Qur’an 2:120. 20Badr 60. 21Badr 62.

40

be waged under the banner and leadership of genuine Islam.23 For al-Jihad, therefore,

Sadat’s peace policy was not the urgent issue to be concerned with.

Criticism of Sadat’s peace policy also came from independent preachers such as

Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, al-Mahallawi Sha’rawi, and Hafiz Salama. All of them

used Islamic symbols for their criticism by arguing that Israel was an enemy of Islam and

Muslim countries; thus there was no possibility to make peace with her. Shaykh Kishk,

for example, said that Israel was created in the region to divide Muslims, while Sha’rawi

explained that Israel was a bridge for satanic powers whose enemies were Islam and

Muslims. Moreover, Sha’rawi said that the Palestinian question is the central problem

and not just one of the problems of the region, the solution to which should be the

disappearance of Israel. Therefore, the only choice was a holy war against Zionism.24

The criticism toward Sadat’s peace policy, as discussed before, showed that the

Islamists based their criticism on the religious belief that Israel was an illegitimate entity

and thus there was no legality to make peace with her. None of the critics considered the

contents of the agreement as their main argument, except the party opposition and the

Arab League. It seemed that whatever concession that Sadat got from the agreement, it

would not change their criticism, because the problem was not the content of the

agreement but with whom the peace was sought. Sadat’s intention that his visit to

Jerusalem would smash the “psychological barrier” was, therefore, unsuccessful. Israel

was still perceived as an enemy of Arabs and Muslims. Sadat might not have taken

enough actions to socialize the idea of peace and prepare the Egyptians for accepting

22Qur’an 5:51. 23Abdelnasser 134-138.

41

Israel. Or it might be that the five-year interval between the October war and the Camp

David accords was too short to change the image of Israel from the “enemy” to the

“ally.”

C. The Sadat Regime’s Reaction to the Criticism

Having been criticized by many factions, the Sadat regime tried to counter-attack the

criticism and at the same time to defend the peace agreement. These efforts included

belittling the position of Arab states, eradicating parliamentary opposition, and using

religious symbols.

In responding to the criticism of the Arab-states, Sadat stressed two important

issues. First, he refused the Arab argument that the treaty was a separate peace. Second,

he refused the legality of the Baghdad conferences in 1978 and 1979. The first refutation

was based on one clause in the Camp David accords saying that “this framework as

appropriate is intended by them [Egypt and Israel] to constitute a basis for peace not only

between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other neighbors which

is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis.” By this condition, besides the

fact that the solution for the West Bank and Gaza was mentioned in the accords, Sadat

argued that Egypt did not make a separate peace. What Egypt did by making peace with

Israel was a first step which should be followed by other Arab states in order to achieve a

just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East. Sadat’s argument was totally

formalistic, for in essence, the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement was indeed a separate

one.

24Abdelnasser 138-139.

42

Sadat also denied the formal legality of both Baghdad conferences as the ninth

Arab summit. Sadat based on the fact that the invitation was not handled by the Arab

League secretariat located in Cairo, as required by the League’s charter. As a founding

country, Egypt was also not invited. Since the meeting, according to Sadat, was illegal,

all resolutions were then illegal, especially the suspension of Egypt from the League and

the transfer of the League’s headquarters to Tunis. For the last two issues, he had other

arguments. The League’s charter named Cairo as the seat of the League and it did not

mention any way to suspend a member. Therefore if the Arab League wanted to take this

decision, it would have to change the charter first —but the League did not do that.25

With that argument Sadat convinced his people that the Arab League’s stand-

point was wrong. He also assured that the economic boycott by the Arab states would not

endanger the Egyptian economy. On the contrary, the peace agreement would result in

prosperity since the money that had been used for war would be funneled to a

development. In order to replace the lost Arab aid, the regime approached Western

countries. The visit of Vice President Mubarak to some European countries and the

United States in June 1979, for example, was intended for this purpose. One important

result from Mubarak’s trip was that Egypt could preserve its arms industry, the AMIO,

despite the withdrawal of its Arab partners. The lost Arab aid was, therefore, substituted

by Western countries. The US aid alone, for example, reached $1 billion per annum in

1878, $1.3 bn in 1979 and almost $2 bn in 1980.26

25Al-Ahram, 5 November 1978 and 2 April 1979. See Dishon 225-232. 26Al-Ahram, 18 June 1979. See also Altman 415-416.

43

Within Egypt, Sadat tried to show that what he did was supported by the

Egyptians. First, the agreement was brought to the People’s Assembly to be ratified.

There was debate in Parliament between members of the government party, the National

Democratic Party, on the one hand, and a small number of the National Progressive

Unionist Party (NPUP) and independents affiliated with the Islamists, on the other.

However the result was almost predictable. On 10 April 1979, Parliament, which was

dominated by the NDP, accepted the peace agreement with an overwhelming majority:

out of all votes cast 327 approved and only 15 rejected the agreement, which meant that

only 4.5% refused it.27 Then, the following day, Sadat surprisingly announced a

Presidential decree calling for a referendum on 19 April 1979. In this referendum, two

issues were brought up. The first was the peace agreement and the second was the so-

called program to reorganize the state. What was meant by the latter was a pretext for the

dissolution of Parliament and new elections for it. The result of the referendum was,

again, devoid of surprises. According to official sources, the referendum was attended by

90.2% of those who had the right to vote. Of those who participated, 99.95% voted for

the peace agreement, while 99.90% voted in favor of the dissolution of Parliament.28 The

referendum was used by Sadat to prove that almost all Egyptians supported him.

Moreover, with this referendum, Sadat had justification to reorganize the Egyptian

political structure.

The idea to dissolve Parliament showed Sadat’s worry of the growing

independence of the opposition parties. A half-hearted political liberalization which was

27Al-Ahram, 11 and 12 April 1979. 28Al-Ahram, 13 April 1979.

44

introduced in the mid 1970s accompanying the infitah policy was apparently taken

seriously by the opposition parties. Hence, they became courageous to oppose and

challenge Sadat’s policies. This was something unacceptable for Sadat. The existence of

the opposition parties for Sadat was not to challenge him but to have claim that there was

democracy in Egypt.

On 21 April 1979, based on the referendum Sadat issued decrees dissolving

Parliament and calling for new elections on 7 June 1979.29 The elections resulted in the

NDP as a single majority party accompanied by two small-loyal-opposition parties, the

Socialist Labor Party30 and the Liberal Party.31 After the elections the NDP got 302 seats,

the SLP 29, the Liberal Party 3, and independents, 9. None of the NPUP candidates nor

Sadat’s outspoken critics who ran as independents were elected to Parliament.32 Once

again, Sadat showed to the world that he had a national mandate. With the new

29Al-Ahram, 13 April 1979. 30The Socialist Labor Party was said to be the center-left loyal opposition. When it was founded in 1978, the party was intended to remove the constituency of the NPUP and absorb liberal and democratic people who did not want to joint the government party. The leader of the party was Ibrahim Shukri, a former leader of the Misr al-Fatat; and Sadat’s son-in-law, Mahmud Abu Wafia, was the number-two man. During its first year, this party was not different from the NDP in its attitude toward the regime. Yet after the 1979 elections, the differences between the party and the government grew and the conflict rose. When the party became detrimental toward the regime, Abu Wafia resigned. See Hinnebusch 167-170 31The Liberal (Ahrar) Party was the right-liberal loyal opposition. When it was founded, this party was expected to function as a loyal opposition and at the same time to attract the secular-liberal right (such as the former Wafdists) and the religious right (such as the Brotherhood and its offshoots). Led by Mustafa Kamil Murad, a former army officer, this party was also not different from the government party in its relation with the regime. The desire of the party to bring in both secular liberal and religious people was never a success, and it remained a small party. However it refused to merge into the NDP. See Hinnebusch 165-167. 32Al-Ahram, 17 June 1979.

45

composition of the People’s Assembly, the parliamentary opposition was practically

eliminated.

The result of the referendum and the election should be read cautiously, for many

reasons. First, the elections were constrained with many restrictions, such as the

stipulation that an individual candidate should spend no more than £E500 for publicity

and, more importantly, that the peace agreement could not be used as an issue for the

campaign. Second, serious disruptions were reported during polling. For example, it was

alleged that ballot boxes, stuffed full of completed voting slips, were discovered before

polling started. Likewise, representatives of the opposition were not allowed to attend the

counting of the ballots. The state bureaucracy was also reportedly using its power to

pressure voters.33

In addition to parliamentary measures, Sadat also employed Islamic symbols to

defend his peace policy. This action was mainly to respond the criticism from the

Islamists who had used massively Islamic terms. In this means the role of the established

ulama (the religious scholars) of al-Azhar University and the mufti (the scholar who

holds a formal position to issue a religious edict) of the Dar al-Ifta was very critical. In

1977, Shaykh al-Azhar, Abd al-Halim Mahmud, for example, supported Sadat’s visit to

Jerusalem. He argued that the visit was a step toward the return of the Palestinians to

their country.34Azharite ulama also supported the Camp David accords and the Peace

Treaty. They argued that God commands Muslims to make peace with their enemy if

there were benefits for Muslims. This referred to a verse in the Qur’an, “If they are

33Altman, MECS 3 (1978-1979): 406-407. 34Abdelnasser 139-142.

46

inclined to peace, make peace with them, and have trust in God.”35 According to the

Azharites, this verse was a specification (takhsis), and was not abrogated by, verses

urging war. In other words, “fighting the enemy is an obligation in order to protect

Muslims, except if the enemy was inclined to peace and there were benefits for Muslims

in that peace.”36 Therefore making peace with the enemy, for the Azharites, was

religiously lawful if it benefited Muslims, as the case of the treaty of Hudaybiyah —a

treaty between the Prophet and Meccan people. This treaty was taken when Muslims

were strong and the Prophet saw that it was in the interest of Muslims. The Egyptian-

Israeli peace agreement, for the Azharites, was not essentially different from the treaty of

Hudaybiyah, because it was taken also from position of strength following the “victory”

of the 1973 war, and the ruler saw it benefiting Muslims. Peace with non-Muslims was

prohibited if Muslims were under threat.37

In June 1979, Jad al-Haq Ali Jad al-Haq, the Grand Mufti of Egypt, supported the

Azharite position. He issued a fatwa that the peace agreement was not something which

contradicted Qur’anic law and the hadith (the Prophetic tradition), because “it does not

forfeit truth nor acknowledge [an act of] occupying land.”38 To support the opinion that

the peace accord was not illegitimate, Jad al-Haq referred to the Qur’anic verse which

was quoted by the Azharite, and also the treaty of Hudaybiyah. He insisted that peace

was the basis for human relations, and peace was also an essence of Islam, therefore the

peace with Israel was religiously legal. At the end he appealed to Egyptian Muslims to

35Qur’an 8:61. 36Al-Ahram, 10 May 1979. 37Al-Ahram, 10 May 1979.

47

unite together and cease their disagreement as suggested by the verse in the Qur’an,

“Hold on firmly together to the rope of God, and be not divided among

yourselves.”39With the last point, Jad al-Haq seemed to be aware that Egyptians were

dispersed, especially following Sadat’s peace initiative. Unity was even more important

when facing the boycott of the Arab states.

In fact, there had been some Egyptians who had defended Sadat’s peace initiative

by using Islamic reason before those two institutions did. Minbar al-Islam in January

1978, for example, published many articles supporting Sadat’s peace efforts. One article

in this edition said that “Islam is a religion of peace. Islam always raises olive branches

until people feel safe and secure. Peace is the most expectative thing... When there is no

place to escape from war in order to glorify Islam and Muslims, then jihad becomes

necessary.”40This article implied that peace should be the first priority, and jihad was the

last choice. Another article stressed the importance of Muslims’ obedience to the ruler. It

quoted a Qur’anic verse, “O you who believe, obey God and the Prophet and those in

authority among you.”41This was supported by a hadith, where the Prophet reportedly

said that “When man obeys me, he obeys God, and when he disobeys me, he disobeys

God. When man obeys the ruler, he obeys me, and when he disobeys the ruler, he

disobeys me.” With these bases, the article called for Muslims to support the regime,

because obedience to the ruler was a part of obedience to God. As long as the ruler did

not instruct an evil, to obey the ruler was a religious duty.

38Al-Ahram, 14 June 1979. 39Qur’an 3:103. 40Minbar al-Islam January 1978: 154-156.

48

Sadat used many means to secure the peace agreement. Not only political

institutions but also religious ones were called upon to support his peace policy, hence

they were “victims” of the peace initiative. Al-Azhar was a typical example. During

Nasser’s time until the mid 1970s, the Azharite Ulama believed that any peace with Jews

was religiously unlawful. Until Jews left Palestine and the right of the Palestinians to

their land was restored, no peace with Israel could be sought.42 When Sadat signed the

peace accords with Israel, al-Azhar was torn between supporting the regime and

upholding its former fatwa. As a part of the state bureaucracy, al-Azhar had no other

option than to support the regime. Yet it had to be well argued. This might be a reason

why al-Azhar expressed its opinion concerning the peace agreement somewhat later, after

the agreement had already been accepted by Parliament and even the Egyptian people

through a referendum. Al-Azhar needed time to find a convincing religious reason to

support its turning position. Eventually al-Azhar found the treaty of Hudaybiyah as an

acceptable precedent to legitimize the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement.

***

The Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty had backfired for

the Sadat regime. Those who opposed the regime easily used the agreement as a tool to

attack it. On paper, the peace agreement was accepted by the Egyptians, as shown in a

referendum. Yet many prominent and highly educated Egyptians refused the peace. The

41Qur’an 4:59. 42In 1956 al-Azhar issued a fatwa that any kind of peace with Israel was religiously illegitimate. See Majallat al-Azhar 27.6 (January 1956): 682-686.

49

peace had almost brought about Sadat’s demise due to the Arab world’s sanctions,

though ironically by the peace he got world recognition and international acclaim.43

The peace agreement also changed the constellation of using Islamic symbols in

the Egyptian politics. Before the agreement, the regime was the dominant user, but after

it, the Islamists competed with the regime in using Islam. The Islamists increasingly used

Islamic symbols for attacking the state policies, especially the peace policy. However, the

regime was still able to contain the criticism from the Islamists by successfully “forcing”

the establishment ulama, especially al-Azhar, to defend the policies. Had Egypt had no

al-Azhar, or had al-Azhar not supported the regime, the result would have been totally

different; the peace agreement would have brought about the collapse of the Sadat’s

regime.

43This can be seen that in the end of 1978, together with Israeli Prime Minister Begin, Sadat was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

50

CHAPTER THREE

AL-JIHAD AND THE ASSASSINATION OF SADAT

As discussed in the earlier chapter, Sadat’s peace policy had changed the constellation of

using Islam in Egyptian politics. The domination of the regime had been challenged, and

in the early 1980s the regime had even lost its legitimacy in using Islam for political

purposes. This is true at least from the case when al-Jihad accused the regime as being

kafir (unbeliever), thus had no right to employ Islam. Al-Jihad was a small but radical

group whose members assassinated Sadat in October 1981. As an organization, al-Jihad

was quite young when its leader, Abd al-Salam Faraj, decided to kill the President. It was

only about two years old. But the militancy of its members was a special feature of this

group. This militancy was apparently derived from its manifesto, al-Farîdah al-Ghâibah

(the Missing Duty), as well as from the severe socio-political condition at the time. This

chapter will discuss al-Jihad and the assassination of Sadat. To begin with, I will start

with the sociopolitical situation of Egypt in the late 1970s and early 1980s during which

al-Jihad emerged, grew and killed Sadat.

A. Egyptian Politics in the Late 1970s and Early 1980s

In the late 1970s and early 1980s the Egyptian economy deteriorated. Sadat’s promise

that “peace” would bring prosperity had not materialized. At the same time political

conflicts between the government, on the one hand, and political oppositions,

professional associations, and religious groups, on the other hand, increased. In addition,

51

a sectarian conflict between radical Muslims and Copts was becoming more intense. In

September 1981, all of this tension culminated with a dramatic decree by Sadat to arrest

more than 1,500 people who were allegedly involved in the sectarian conflict as well as

those who opposed his policies.

Sadat had promised that peace would soon bring prosperity for the Egyptians, but

what happened in reality was the opposite. The Gross Domestic Product continued to

grow at more than 8% per annum, but it was accompanied by the high growth of the

population, 2.9% per year, and the mounting inflation which was as high as 30% a year.

The high growth of GDP then did nothing to improve the economic condition of the

majority of Egyptians. Parallel to the high growth of the population, unemployment

increased constantly and the problem of housing was never solved. The increase of

housing was not enough to fulfill the rising population, and what was available was not

affordable. The food problem still existed. The memory of the 1977 food riots was still

fresh, thus the state continued to subsidize basic commodities heavily in order to

compensate low- income people. In 1980-1981, direct subsidies were about 20% of all

government expenditure, or more than 13% of GDP. Almost half of them went on bread

alone. This indirectly showed how bad the economic life of Egyptians in general was. In

the same year, the fiscal deficit went up to £E2.3 billion, while the deficit in the balance

of payments mounted to US $2.1 billion, according to formal sources, and almost US

$3.4 billion according to other authoritative sources.1 The peace, therefore, did not lessen

Egypt’s economic burden, as what Sadat had promised.

1Eliyahu Kanovsky, “Egypt’s Troubled Economy: Mubarak’s Inheritance,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 6 (1981-1982): 401-431.

52

In the political sphere, peace with Israel was still a hot political issue. Although

the Sadat regime had decided that the peace agreement must not be open to public debate

after it had been accepted by the Assembly and approved in a the public referendum,

opposition parties still brought up this issue in a different way. They did not question the

peace agreement per se, but the normalization of relations with Israel. Arguing that Israel

did not fulfill the agreement from the fact that she continued building new settlements in

the West Bank, the opposition appealed to the government to delay the normalization of

relations until Israel completely withdrew from the occupied territories and the

Palestinian problem was solved.2 This demand was shared by professional associations—

such as the Syndicates of Lawyers, Journalists, and Doctors— as well as the Islamists.

Protesting the normalization of relations with Israel, which was began on 26 February

1980, the Syndicate of Lawyers, for example, organized a demonstration against Israel

and normalization of relation with it by burning Israeli flags and raising Palestinian ones.3

The other issues brought up by the opposition were democracy and freedom of

expression. The Socialist Labor Party (SLP), which changed gradually from a tame

opposition to a more independent and critical one, accused the regime of dismissing the

principles of democracy. As the biggest party opposition, with 28 deputies in Parliament,

the Party argued that the regime never consulted with the People’s Assembly in making

decisions on national issues. The Party claimed that Sadat always made individual

decisions, then brought them to the Assembly only to be ratified and not discussed. Since

2Raymond Hinnebusch, Egyptian Politics under Sadat (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner, 1988) 168. 3Hinnebusch 151-152.

53

the Assembly was dominated by the government’s party, the National Democratic Party,

none of Sadat’s policies was ever turned down. The Party also accused the authorities of

always rejecting the views proposed by the opposition, both parliamentary and extra

parliamentary. Therefore, the leader of the Party, Ibrahim Shukri, said that the

contemporary situation was not different from that of the single-party system, and

democracy in Egypt was in serious danger. This opinion was shared by the National

Progressive Unionist Party (NPUP) which had no deputies in the Assembly since the

1979 elections. In sum, they claimed that democracy had disappeared from Egypt and the

state had become autocratic, fascist and totalitarian.4

The opposition also complained that since the regime enacted the Law for the

Protection of Ethics (qânûn himâyat al-qiyam), known also as the “Law of Shame”

(qânûn al-‘aib), and the Press Law, the freedom of expression had become much more

limited. When the draft of the Law of Shame was introduced in January 1980, it

immediately created a public controversy.5 Egyptians, especially the Syndicate of

Journalists and that of Lawyers as well as politicians, intellectuals and the Islamists,

openly rejected the law. The reason was the belief that with this law, people could be

tried simply because of their opposing position vis-à-vis the regime. A heated debate

about the law also took place in Parliament. Yet the parliamentary opposition, due to its

small size, could not prevent the law from being approved. Parliament, dominated by the

4Israel Altman, “The Arab Republic of Egypt,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 4 (1979-1980): 339-343. 5For the draft of the law, see al-Ahram, 29 January 1980.

54

NDP, eventually accepted the law in April 1980 with some changes.6 The changes did not

make big differences since there were still points which could be easily used to try those

who opposed the government. For example, propagating an anti-religious ideology,

encouraging others to deviate from religious and patriotic values, and endangering

Egypt’s national interest, were among the actions which were against this law. The

Socialist Prosecutor, therefore, could bring those who opposed the government to the

Court of Ethics and accuse them of endangering national interest or encouraging others to

deviate from patriotic values. The penalties for those “found” guilty ranged from

suspension from membership in unions, fines, to house arrest and imprisonment.7

The Press Law which was approved by the Assembly in July 1980 had an

idealistic concept, i.e., to make the Press into a “Fourth Power” alongside the legislature,

executive and judiciary. But in essence this law was meant to control anti-Sadat

journalists. As everywhere, the press in Egypt had a strong potential power to shape

public opinion. Sadat wanted to make sure that his policies would not be challenged by

journalists’ writings. Therefore a new law was drafted.8 According to this law, journalists

would have to adhere to “society’s fundamental principles, stipulated in the Constitution,

and to the values mentioned in the Press Honor Code.” The law also introduced the

formation of a Supreme Press Council which would take disciplinary action toward

journalists who infringed the Press Honor Code. The other duty of the Council was to

make sure that journalists would always preserve the basic elements of society, ensure the

6Al-Ahram, 29 April 1980. 7Mohamed Heikal, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat (New York: Random House, 1983) 110. 8Al-Ahram, 7 July 1980.

55

safety of national unity and social peace, and adhere to religious and spiritual values, to

the democratic-socialist system and to the gains of the Egyptian people.9 As in the Law of

Shame, the regulations in the Press Law could be interpreted in many ways and with

political power, the authorities could interpret parts of the law to snare those who

criticized the regime. A journalist, therefore, could be sanctioned if his or her article was

regarded as against national unity. It made sense that the opposition regarded this law as

on the same line with the Law of Shame. Altogether, they gave nothing but more

limitation of freedom of expression.

While these two laws harmed the opposition, they perfectly benefited the

authorities. On the one hand, with the existence of the two laws people were pushed to

think about the risk when they challenged the regime. In turn, this would reduce their

bravery to oppose the government. That was what exactly the regime hoped. On the other

hand, the regime’s imprisonment of those who attacked it would also become legal

according to these laws. It was true that before these laws existed the regime could jail

anyone by force; yet with both laws, its actions would become legal. These two were

among the formal-legal actions taken by Sadat to curb the opposition’s attacks which

increased in the late 1970s and early 1980s. The other action was an attempt to strengthen

its image as an Islamic regime.

A typical measure to enhance the image of an Islamic regime was the change of

Article 2 of the Egypt’s Constitution. Formerly, Article 2 stated that “the principles of the

Islamic sharî‘ah are a principle source of legislation.” Then it became “...are the

9Altman 347-348. See also Ami Ayalon, “Egypt,” Middle East Contemporary Survey 5 (1980-1981): 421-423.

56

principle source of legislation.” The change of this article was only part of many changes

all of which were intended to amend the Constitution to the political innovation that had

already been or would be made by the regime, such as the abolition of the Arab Socialist

Union. The most important change was probably that of Article 77 which then enabled

Sadat to be reelected for a third term. Formerly this article read: “The term of presidency

is six years ... and the President of the Republic may be re-elected for a second successive

term.” This changed to be “...and the President of the Republic may be re-elected for

other successive terms.”10 The word “second” was omitted and “term” became plural,

“terms.” The change of Article 77, enabled Sadat, who had held the second term of

presidency, to be re-elected for the third term. Since the changes were all put on one

ballot that the electorate was asked to vote on, there was no doubt that the change of

Article 2 was to guarantee that the revision would be accepted, because with highlighting

the change of Article 2, the others were not too visible, thus resulting in no objection. The

change of Article 2, therefore, had two folds. First, it would preserve Sadat’s position,

and second, it would give Sadat the right to claim that the regime had adopted the

Islamists’ aspirations, and in return, the Islamists were hoped to reduce their criticism to

the state.

Another measure to enhance the Islamic image of the regime was the introduction

of two Islamic publications, al-Liwâ al-Islâmî and al-‘Urwa al-Wuthqâ. These two

10Altman 344.

57

periodicals were intended to counter-balance the influence of al-Da‘wah and al-I‘tisâm,

which always criticized the regime’s policies.11

At the same time, Sadat also took measures to cut the sources of religious

radicalism in universities. Through a Presidential decree, the government canceled the

elected councils of student unions which, in some universities, were dominated by

members of the Jama‘at Islamiyah. A nationwide association of students, which was

regulated in contemporary bylaws, was dissolved by this decree. New bylaws for student

unions were introduced in November 1979, according to which every student union

would be a local organization and headed by a dean or a faculty member.12 With the new

rules, university authorities were also able to control election of new councils. The result

was that the Jama’at Islamiyah was hindered from dominating the councils.13 Along with

these bylaws, the regime also prohibited religious and political activities from being

conducted inside universities. In 1980, the government closed down the Islamic “cultural

camps” which were conducted by the Jama’at Islamiyah every summer.14

The regime’s efforts to strengthen its image as an Islamic regime were criticized

by the Islamists. The Muslim Brotherhood, for example, argued that the change of Article

2 was only a first step in order to establish an Islamic state; it had to be followed by

others, such as implementation of the sharî‘ah in real life. Moreover, the Brotherhood

argued that the Article should not read “the principles of the Islamic sharî‘ah are the

principle source of legislation,” but the Islamic sharî‘ah itself —not its principles— 11Ayalon 425-426. 12Al-Ahram, 18 September, 14 October, and 9 November 1979. 13Al-Da‘wah, January 1980, 59. 14Al-Da‘wah, August 1980, 61 and September 1980, 60-61.

58

should become the only source of the legislation.15 The Brotherhood also criticized the

regime’s refusal to allow the emergence of an Islamic party, while on the other hand it

granted the leftists a political party.16 The decree to dissolve student unions and the

introduction of new bylaws of student unions were protested by students. They argued

that the decree was unconstitutional and a way to forbid Islamic activities in

universities.17 The protest was followed by an increase of radicalism among students. In

November 1980, for example, a riot organized by a group of university students in Asyut

broke out. Although the direct cause was reportedly new arrangements of their

dormitories, the riot represented their dissatisfaction with the regime’s regulation of

student life in general. This was apparent from the fact that they clashed with the campus

security unit which was set up following the dismissing of the student unions in order to

guard campuses from such unrest.18 In early 1981, similar unrest broke out again in

Asyut; at this time the students clashed with the police.19 The Islamists who were

encouraged by Sadat in the early 1970s in order to silence the leftists and Nesserists, as

discussed in chapter two, now became powerful and turned against him.

The increase in Islamist radicalism, especially in universities, was not only

directed against the authorities but also against the Copts. In January 1980, for example,

there was an attempt to bomb churches in Alexandria, which left one dead and eight

15Al-Da‘wah, June 1980, 14-15. 16Al-Da‘wah, September 1979, 4-5 and 12-13; October 1979, 52-53 and 63. 17Al-Da‘wah, November 1979, 58-59. 18Al-Ahram, 22, 23 November 1980. 19Al-Ahram, 26 January 1981.

59

wounded.20 In March 1980, there was a demonstration of the Islamist students at Asyut

University opposing the Shah of Iran who was given asylum by Sadat following the

Iranian Islamic revolution in 1979. Yet the demonstration suddenly turned into an anti-

Coptic one. In April, an anti-Coptic rally took place again in Asyut and Alexandria,

leaving several students wounded. A Muslim-Coptic clash erupted also in Minya and

killed two people and wounded 35 others.21 The Islamist activities in university campuses

which were encouraged by the regime in the early 1970s, turned to be uncontrollable.

The government responded to these cases by rounding up the Islamists involved

in the anti-Coptic activities, arresting hundreds of the Islamists, and localizing the

conflict by prohibiting the press from reporting the actions. However, the Copts still

protested to the government. They claimed that they had already experienced harassment,

physical attacks and discrimination in job opportunities. They also argued that they were

not properly represented in Parliament. The change of Article 2, on the one hand, and

their rights that had never been defined in the Constitution, on the other, increased their

fear of their future presence in Egypt. They accused the authorities of taking no proper

measures against those involved in anti-Coptic activities. Therefore, Pope Shenuda III,

the head of the Holy Synod of the Coptic Orthodox Church, announced the cancellation

of all Easter celebrations on 30 March 1980, as a protest to the government about all that

20Altman 329. 21Altman 329-330. See also Gilles Kepel, Muslim Extremism in Egypt: The Prophet and Pharaoh (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985) 156-164.

60

had stricken the Copts in general.22 About the same time, the Copts in the US launched a

campaign against Sadat who was attending a summit meeting in Washington.23

Sadat was reportedly very annoyed by the Copts’ protest, especially the campaign

in Washington. Sadat urged the Pope to content himself with being a priest and not to

turn into a political leader. On 14 May 1980, Sadat spent almost half of his speech in

Parliament describing the Coptic challenge. He accused the Copts of having tried to block

the revision of Article 2, by their campaign at home and abroad. He insisted that Egypt

was an Islamic state and its President was an Islamic ruler, yet the rights of religious

minorities were fully guaranteed. Therefore, the Copts needed not worry of their

existence in Egypt. Sadat also asserted that no political organization based on religion

would be allowed; and the religious leaders must not try to become political leaders.

There could be “no politics in religion and no religion in politics.” Then Sadat promised

to end all activities spreading religious fanaticism.24

Following Sadat’s speech, the sectarian tension subsided to some degree and

Coptic religious festivals and celebrations were resumed. But this lasted for only about a

year. In June 1981, a sectarian conflict broke up again in Zawiya al-Hamra, a suburb of

Cairo. This time the conflict was much more severe than before, in terms of casualties. It

was started by a dispute between Muslims and Copts over whether to build a mosque or a

church on an empty lot. Once provoked, fighting spread rapidly to other parts of

neighborhood, followed by looting and the burning of houses and some churches.

22New York Times, 31 March 1980. 23John Waterbury, The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) 361. 24For the text of Sadat speech see Al-Ahram, 15 May 1980.

61

According to the official report, the clash resulted in 10 people dead, 54 wounded and

113 arrested,25 while the real casualties were estimated higher.26 The authorities

reportedly sent thousands of security forces to regain control of the city and ordered them

to open fire on law-breakers. This reaction showed how severe the tension was and how

worried the government was.

After examining intelligence reports concerning the situation, especially about the

Zawiya al-Hamra incident, Sadat’s patience seemed to run out. On 5 September 1981,

during a speech in Parliament, Sadat attacked those who opposed him, both the religious

and political oppositions, and accused them of fomenting enmity and agitating conflict. In

Sadat’s terms, the situation called for “a radical solution” which was mass arrests.

Accordingly, 1,536 people were jailed, the majority of whom were religious leaders and

activists, especially Muslims. Among them were the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood,

Umar al-Tilmisani and Salih Ashmawi; and the famous Muslim preachers, Shaykh Abd

al-Hamid Kishk and Hafiz Salama. Tens of prominent figures in the political parties, who

were very critical to Sadat and his policies, were also detained. Sadat also withdrew the

government recognition of Pope Shenuda III as Pope of the Copts and put him under

house arrest. Some publications, including al-Da‘wah and al-I‘tisam, were banned and 13

religious societies, 10 Islamic and 3 Christian, were dissolved. The government also

25Al-Ahram 21 June 1981. 26Hamied Ansari, for example, mentions that 17 people died and 112 injured while 266 arrested. See Hamied Ansari, “Sectarian Conflict in Egypt and the Political Expediency of Religion,” Middle East Journal 38.3 (1984): 411.

62

tightened its control over thousands of ahli (privately-owned) mosques, by announcing

that only approved preachers would be allowed to deliver sermons in them.27

This dramatic action showed that Islamic symbols used by Sadat had not been

useful to steer Egyptian politics. The legitimacy of the regime in using Islam had been

unacceptable for the Islamists. The change of Article 2 of the Constitution and Sadat’s

statement on 14 May 1980 that Egypt was an Islamic state and the President was a

Muslim ruler, for example, did not reduce the Islamists’ criticism of the regime nor

change the Islamists’ attitudes in opposing the state. Since the early 1980s, then, the use

of Islamic symbols in Egyptian politics was dominated by the Islamists. This was much

more clear in the case of al-Jihad and the assassination of Sadat.

B. The Importance of al-Jihad

In the heated political situation as discussed above, al-Jihad emerged, developed and

decided to kill Sadat. Al-Jihad was formed in 1979 by Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj.28

Formerly, Faraj joined a ‘Jihad’ group in Alexandria, headed by Ali Ibrahim Salama, but

when this group was uncovered by the government, he severed all ties and moved to

Cairo where he built his own group. In 1980, Faraj met Abbud al-Zumur,29 through the

latter’s brother-in-law, Tariq al-Zumur.30 This meeting was significant because Abbud,

who shared Faraj’s idea of the necessity of establishing an Islamic state, was 27Al-Ahram 6-7 September 1981. 28Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, when arrested, was 27. He was an engineer and worked in the Cairo University administrative in the post of electrical engineer. All figures mentioned below refer to the members’ ages at time of arrest, i.e., 1981. 29Abbud al-Zumur was 30 and a colonel in the military intelligence of the Egyptian army. 30Tariq al-Zumur was 21 and a student of agriculture, Cairo University.

63

subsequently responsible for the organizational strategies. Abbud then devised the

organizational plan and steps in order to achieve the main objective of the group which

was to overthrow the regime and establish an Islamic state.31 To discuss al-Jihad

movement, I will start with its ideology, organizational structures, then the membership’s

recruitment and distribution, and finally the steps that had been carried out prior to the

assassination.

The main ideology of this group, as its name indicated, was the necessity of jihad

(religious war) in order to overthrow the unbelieving ruler, and to establish the rule of

God (al-hâkimiyyah). This idea was clearly found in al-Farîdah al-Ghâibah (the Missing

Duty), a pamphlet written by Faraj and becoming the handbook for the organizational

thought.32 What was meant by the title, the missing duty, was exactly the jihad that,

according to Faraj, had already been neglected. In the introduction, Faraj reminded the

readers about this.

Jihad for God’s cause, in spite of its extreme importance and its great significance for the future of this religion, has been neglected by the ulama of this age. They have feigned ignorance of it, but they know that it is the only way to the return and the establishment of the glory of Islam anew... There is no doubt that the idols of this world can only be made to disappear through the power of the sword.33

The jihad had to be revitalized against the present government because the latter

had become unbeliever (kâfir). The infidelity of the government was due to its negligence

31Nemat Guenena, The Jihad: an ‘Islamic Alternative’ in Egypt (Cairo: American University in Cairo Press, 1986)52-53. 32The complete translation of al-Farîdah al-Ghâibah can be found in Johannes Jansen, The Neglected Duty (New York and London: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986) 160-230. 33Jansen 160-161.

64

of applying the sharî‘ah (Islamic law) and instead utilizing a man-made legislation. Faraj

said that “the State (of Egypt in which we live today) is ruled by the laws of unbelief

although the majority of its inhabitants are Muslims. The laws by which the Muslims are

ruled today are the laws of unbelief; they are actually codes of law that were made by

infidels.”34 Faraj used a very strong symbol to denounce the regime. Being kâfir was not

only un-Islamic but also anti-Islamic and had to be fought.

Then, Faraj compared the present government with the Tartars, the descendants of

Genghis Khan, who converted to Islam and headed a Mongolian kingdom. Faraj referred

to Ibn Taymiyyah (1263-1328), a prominent Islamic jurist during the time of the Tartars,

who declared that the Tartars, in spite of their conversion, were not Islamic rulers,

because they did not apply the sharî‘ah but applied a constitution called Yasiq which was

a mixture of Islamic, Jews and Christian laws. Although they declared that they were

Muslim rulers, actually they were not, for a Qur’anic verse states that “those who do not

judge by God’s revelations are infidels indeed.”35 Ibn Taymiyyah, therefore, issued a

fatwa (religious edict) calling for jihad in order to destroy the Tartars. Because today’s

Egypt resembles the Tartars in the way that both are Muslims only nominally, Faraj

appealed to Muslims to launch jihad against the government.

By accusing the Sadat regime of being kafir and calling for jihad to destroy the

regime, Faraj denounced the competence of the regime in using Islam for its political

purposes. For Faraj and also for al-Jihad’s members, as I will discuss in their confession,

34Jansen 167. 35Qur’an 5:44.

65

the regime no longer had the right to employ Islamic symbols since the regime itself was

not Islamic.

Faraj took a step further by criticizing other Islamic groups for their negligence of

jihad. Without naming them, Faraj denounced those who used means other than jihad as

a way of their struggle, such as those who stressed the importance of da‘wah, education,

political party, and hijrah—this apparently referred to, respectively, the individual

preachers, Azharite ulama, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Jama‘at al-Takfir wa-al-

Hijrah. All of their methods, he believed, would not cause the collapse of the pagan ruler

and the establishment of an Islamic state. The only way was jihad. There was no excuse

to avoid this duty because of lack of knowledge. “Jihad can easily and simply be studied,

and in a very short time. The matter then has no need for much study.”36 Faraj refused the

opinion saying that jihad in Islam was defensive. It was both offensive and defensive.

Faraj also disagreed with those who argued that jihad should be waged against Israel,

because fighting an inside enemy was more urgent than struggling against an outside

enemy.

We must concentrate on our own Islamic situation; we have to establish the Rule of God’s Religion in out own county first, and to make the Word of God supreme... There is no doubt that the first battlefield for jihad is the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by a complete Islamic order. From here we should start.37

In sum, Faraj insisted the importance of jihad as the only way to bring the

government to an end and to replace it with an Islamic government. In the situation of

36Jansen 189. 37Jansen 193.

66

Egypt at the time, jihad then became an individual duty, similar to prayer and fasting.38

Faraj’s ideas which centered on jihad seemed to be very influential to the members. As I

will discuss later, the confession of the Sadat’s assassins showed how central the logic of

Faraj’s ideas was in their mind. All of them, for example, used the same Qur’anic verse

to charge the ruler with unbelief, compared Sadat with the Tartars, and referred to Ibn

Taymiyyah’s fatwa.

Now let us discuss the organizational structure of al-Jihad. Although according to

Ansari there is little evidence that this group was a formal organization,39 there is no

doubt that it had an organizational structure. The highest structure was the Consultative

Council (Majlis al-Shûrâ) whose function was both legislative and administrative. This

council was headed by Abd al-Salam Faraj, and had Abbud al-Zumur, Karam Zuhdi40

and Fuad al-Dawalibi,41 as the members. The other important figure was Nabil al-

Maghrabi42 who was responsible for military training —the main program of the

committee of preparation (lajnat al-i’dâd). This committee was one out of three

committees branched out of the council. The other two were the propaganda and

economic committees (lajnat al-da‘wah and lajnat al-iqtisâd). In addition to the

committees, there were also units (majmu‘ât) which were headed by amir. Based on

geographical formations, there existed six units: Cairo and Giza; Minya; Asyut; Sohag;

38Jansen 199-200. 39Hamied N. Ansari, “The Islamic Militants in Egyptian Politics,” IJMES 16 (1984): 125. 40Karam al-Zuhdi was 27 and a student of the Institute of Cooperative Study in Asyut. 41Fuad al-Dawalibi was 27 and a shopkeeper in Minya. 42Nabil al-Maghrabi was 29 and an employee of the Ministry of Culture. Although he was not part of the Majlis Shura, he was reportedly the third man in the organization after Faraj and Abbud.

67

Naga Hamadi; and Kena.43 It is unclear what the relation between the Majlis Shûrâ, the

committee, and the unit was. However, it can be assumed that the relation was flexible

and far from formality, as the case in recruiting members.

The recruitment of new members was carried out anywhere and by any

responsible member. In other words, there was no certain committee which was solely

responsible for recruitment. The main channel through which most members were

recruited was through the local private mosques. This was understandable because these

mosques were the only places in which people could express their disappointment with

the government. While other institutions might be banned by the government, especially

after the promulgation of the Law of Shame, the Friday sermon could never be banned

for it is a part of prayer. In the private mosques, independent preachers could express

their criticism to the regime as well as religious teachings during their sermons. These

places, in turn, became more popular than those controlled by the Awqaf (Religious

Endowment) Ministry. Khalid al-Islambuli, one of the Sadat’s assassins, said that he

always went to private mosques, and it was through this channel that he joined al-Jihad.

This also happened with Abd al-Hamid, another Sadat’s assassin. The other channels for

the recruitment of new members were kinship and friendship. Husayn, one of the

assassins, was Faraj’s friend since in college, and Ata, also one of the assassins, knew

Faraj through his brother in law.44

43Guenena 53-55. 44Ansari, “Islamic Militant” 125-130. See also Halah Mustafa, al-Islâm al-Siyâsî fi Misr [The Political Islam in Egypt] (Qahirah: Markaz al-Dirâsât al-Siyâsiyah wa-al-Istirâtijiyyah, 1992)151-153.

68

There were no special requirements to be a member of al-Jihad. Unlike the

Jama‘at al-Takfir which required the members to live together in a remote place, al-Jihad

allowed its members to live as common people. The most important thing was to hold the

idea that jihad was necessary and to be ready to wage it whenever it was needed. This

strategy was evidently beneficial, so the organization was not suspected and none of its

members was arrested during the September crackdown. The secrecy of membership was

another principle strategy of this group. Thus a member did not have to know the other;

only the leaders of al-Jihad knew the names and numbers of their members. That was

why Sadat’s assassins knew each other just a few days before the assassination through

their leaders, especially Faraj.

The profile of members was not very different from other radical Islamic groups,

in which the majority was young people. Seventy per cent (196) of the 280 members who

were subsequently tried were between the ages of 21-30, and those less than 21 made up

17.5 per cent (49). Those who were 31-40 were 10.7 per cent (30), while the 40 year-and-

older members were only 1.8 per cent (5). These figures showed how high the percentage

of the youth was; those who were less than 30 year old constituted 87.5 per cent. By

occupation, most were students (43.9%), followed by workers (14.6%), professionals

(12.5), shopkeepers (5.7%), government officials (5.4%), police and military (5%) and

farmers (2.2%), in addition to unemployed (10.7%). By region, the majority came from

Upper Egypt (65.4%) then Greater Cairo (26.1%) and Lower Egypt (8.6%).45 Some

inferences can be drawn from these figures. Those who joined al-Jihad were from middle

and lower middle classes who had high rate of literacy, mobility, and political

45Ansari, “Islamic Militant” 130-133

69

consciousness. They joined al-Jihad partly because of the regime’s mishandling of

Egyptian political and economic problems. They represented young generation who

highly expected that higher education would made their economic lives better. Yet when

they faced the real situation in which the rate of educated unemployment always

increased and those who had positions were not well paid, they became disappointed, if

not frustrated. That the economic hardship was a factor bringing them to join al-Jihad

was also apparent form the fact that most members lived in Upper Egypt, in which living

conditions were very hard. Similarly, living conditions in peripheral areas of Cairo, in

which some other members lived, were equally harsh. They were also aware with the

authoritarian nature of the regime in political sphere. Yet they could not do anything to

change these deteriorating conditions. Then, they met al-Jihad which offered a simple

massage: overthrowing the regime and establishing an Islamic state would solve all the

problems.46

That massage seemed to be the main promise for recruiting new members. No

organizational programs that would solve the problems were offered to attract new

members. What they offered was a claim that Islam was the answer for all of the

predicament.47 The main massage of al-Jihad, therefore, would not solve Egyptian socio-

economic and political problems. However, this massage was attractive to some people

because, according to Ayubi, it would give them at least two important things: a refuge

46Nazih Ayubi, Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World (London and New York: Routledge, 1991) 82-84 also 162-174. 47Ayubi, Political Islam 230-238.

70

that provides emotional peace and comfort; and a spearhead for socio-political resistance

against the corrupt and unjust ruler.48 The latter then turned into radicalism.

Radicalism of al-Jihad can also be understood from the profile of members as

mentioned earlier. It was young people who dominated al-Jihad, and it was young people

also who are usually idealists and anti-establishment. They are easily fascinated by ideas

which would bring revolutionary changes of the contemporary situation. In the case of al-

Jihad, the main massage of jihad against the regime offered this outlook; it would change

the Egyptian regime from pagan to Islamic. In addition, the members’ educational

backgrounds also explained this easy spread of militancy and radicalism. Most of its

members had scientific backgrounds, such as engineering, agriculture, and technology, so

they were not well informed about many doctrinal matters in Islam. Among 45 students

and 8 new graduates, out of 110 who were sentenced, only two of them were students of

al-Azhar University of the branch of Giza.49 Thus, the lack of a wider perspective of

Islamic teachings caused them to be misled to strict and narrow understanding of the

Islamic principles.

Since the organization had no official programs, the organization’s steps which

had been carried out are worth noting to discuss how potentially dangerous the group

was. Two decisive steps were to collect guns and ammunition and to conduct military

training. Both were in exact accordance with the main principle of the group, jihad. It

was reported that the organization’s money, which mainly came from the sale of stolen

48Nazih Ayubi, “The Political Revival of Islam: The Case of Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 12 (1980): 486. 49Guenena 94-99.

71

gold and the remittances from members in the Gulf states, was spent to buy guns and

ammunition.50 Therefore when Khalid al-Islambuli needed ammunition in order to

assassinate Sadat, the group did not find difficulty procuring it. The military training

program, which was headed by Nabil al-Maghrabi, taught members the military arts,

from topography to first aid measure, the methods of firing arms and explosives, as well

as how to take over and control strategic locations.51 However, it was hardly known how

far this training had gone.

Another important, although unsuccessful, step was to ask Shaykh Umar Abd al-

Rahman, a blind professor at al-Azhar University in Asyut, to be the spiritual leader of al-

Jihad. Abbud and Faraj might have been thinking to position Umar as the Egyptian

“Khomeini”. As an Azharite professor, Umar was more suitable to be the religious leader

than Faraj who was an electrical engineer. Moreover, he had been well known as the

spiritual leader of the Jama’at al-Islamiyah. Unfortunately, Umar refused this offer with

the reason of his blindness and his ignorance of people in al-Jihad organization. Had

Umar accepted the offer, the ability of al-Jihad to attract new members would have been

much effective.

There were also other important strategies, but these were not agreed upon by the

leaders, especially between Faraj and Abbud. When Faraj wrote, printed, and distributed

his book, for example, Abbud objected to this step. Faraj might have thought that

publishing and distributing the book was a good way to spread his ideas, but Abbud

thought that this could easily lead the authorities to uncover the group which was still in

50Ansari, “Islamic Militant” 126-7. 51Guenena 70-72.

72

its embryo. Therefore, the number of copies of the book that had been distributed was

only about 50, while as much as 500 had been printed. The rest were subsequently

burned.52

The other step which was also disputed was the target of recruitment. With the

consideration that military people had been trained in using firearms and they had access

to weapons and ammunition, Faraj tried to recruit these people. Doubting the logic of

such a move, Abbud, who himself was a military officer and knew exactly that armies

were always under surveillance, thought that it was better and safer to recruit civilians. 53

This explains why members of the police and the army were still few when this group

was uncovered.

The most important action which was disputed was the assassination of Sadat.

When Faraj decided to take this action after the idea was proposed by Khalid al-

Islambuli, Abbud totally disagreed with it, not because of ideological reasons but for

tactical ones. Abbud thought that the assassination itself would not lead to toppling the

regime. There had to be ‘popular revolution’ following the assassination, and Abbud

knew for sure that the organization had not been strong enough to instigate that. He said

that the group needed two or three more years before it could successfully carry out the

action.54 Unlike the two cases above in which Faraj accepted Abbud’s opinion, here Faraj

did not take Abbud’s conception into account. Supported by his close associates, like

Karam Zuhdi and Fuad al-Dawalibi, Faraj was convinced that the popular revolution

52Mahmud Salah, Hakadhâ Qatalnâ al-Sâdât [In this Way We Assassinated Sadat] (Egypt: Maktabah Madbuli al-Saghir, 1995) 155. 53Ansari, “Islamic Militant” 127-128. 54Salah 103-107.

73

would follow the assassination, and they would succeed, including taking over radio and

TV stations, army headquarters, and the ministries of the interior and defense.55

C. The Assassination of Sadat

The assassination of Sadat was carried out on 6 October 1981 during the commemoration

of the 1973 war. Four military men, Khalid Ahmad Shawqi al-Islambuli,56 Abd al-Hamid

Abd al-Salam,57 Ata Tayil Humaidah,58 and Husayn Abbas Muhammad,59 went out from

one of the military trucks which passed the presidential tribune. Suddenly, they opened

fire on the President and people around him with automatic weapons. After that, the

leader of the assassins, Khalid al-Islambuli, reportedly shouted sentences: “I am Khalid. I

have killed Pharaoh and I do not fear death.”60 What did these sentences meant? This

section will discuss the assassination in the view of the assassins and the leaders of the

organization, as revealed during the investigation. Why Sadat was killed and what they

hoped from the assassination were among important questions of this section.

C.1. The Assassination in the View of the Assassins

55Salah 152-7. 56Khalid al-Islambuli was 24 and a First Lieutenant. 57Abd al-Hamid was 28 and a former Lieutenant in the army. 58Ata Tayil was 26 and a First Lieutenant. 59Husayn Abbas was 28 and an army draftee. 60Kepel 191-192.

74

It is admitted by all who carried out the assassination that the action was not long

in preparation. Surprisingly, they even knew each other just a few days before the action.

This incident was started when Khalid was told that he would take part in the parade

commemorating the October 1973 war.61 The following day, after rehearsal, by which he

knew that his position during the parade would be close enough to the tribune in which

Sadat would view the parade, he visited Faraj. They discussed the current situation in

which the authorities were acting more harshly toward Muslims. This discussion touched

Khalid and led to the emergence of the idea of assassinating Sadat. Due to the fact that

Khalid would take part in the parade and his position was not far from the tribune, it was

not impossible to carry out this action. This idea was fully supported by Faraj; moreover

Faraj was also ready not only to prepare the ammunition and grenade but also to find

three other officers whom Khalid needed.62

The main reason upon which was shared by all four assassins was their judgment

that Sadat was an infidel ruler (kâfir) because he had neglected the sharî‘ah and applied a

man-made law. This opinion was based of the Qur’anic verses, 5:44-49. Since all of them

quoted these verses, it is worth quoting in full.

Those who do not judge by God’s revelations are infidels indeed. And there (in the Torah) We had ordained for them a life for a life, and an eye for an eye, and a nose for a nose, and an ear for an ear, and a tooth for a tooth, and for wounds retribution, though he who forgoes it out of charity, atones for his sins. And those who do not judge by God’s revelation are unjust... Let the people of the Gospel judge by what has been revealed in it by God. And those who do not judge in accordance with what God has sent down are disobedient. And to you We have

61There are many version when exactly Khalid was told about his participation in the parade. Heikal, for example, says 23 October, while Khalid in the investigation said 29 October. For the latter, see Salah 44. 62Salah 44-50.

75

revealed the Book containing the truth, confirming the earlier revelations, and preserving them (from change and corruption). So judge between them by what has been revealed by God, and do not follow their whims, side-stepping the truth that has reached you. To each of you We have given a law and a way and a pattern of life... Judge between them in the light of what has been revealed by God. 63

Here it can be seen how influential Faraj’s ideas were in their mind. All of them

quoted the same verses which had been referred by Faraj in his book, in order to charge

the contemporary ruler with unbelief. Then, they made a comparison between Sadat and

the Tartar rulers —a comparison which had been made by Faraj.64 They also mentioned

some Islamic jurists whose opinion was referred by Faraj, especially Ibn Taymiyyah.65 It

can be assumed, therefore, that Faraj’s main idea had already been well absorbed by these

army officers.

Other reasons were mentioned. The arrest of the ulama during the September

1981 crackdown, for example, was cited by all of them. This was regarded as a big

mistake of the regime because, according to them, the ulama committed no crimes except

that they said the truth.66 They also raised issues about women and the veil. According to

them, the government had already destroyed the role of women in Islam by encouraging

them to work outside the house. In addition, the ruler had also laughed at the importance

of the veil for women, by regarding it as a tent.67 The spread of alcohol consumption,

dance, films, and usury were also among the ruler’s ‘sins’, because all of them were

63Emphasis added. 64Salah 12, 41, 52. 65Salah 16, 27-28, 52 66Salah 12, 23, 39, 44. 67Salah 23, 39, 156.

76

prohibited in Islam. One of the defendants, Ata Tayil, even criticized democracy as an

un-Islamic system because it means governing people by people. By this system

Parliament could issue such regulations that contradict the sharî‘ah, and that was what

existed at the time.68 What the People’s Assembly had done by deciding the principles of

the sharî‘ah as the main source of the Egyptian legislation was regarded as lip service

only, because in reality it was never applied.69 “All of these causes made me think to

change this abomination by killing the president,” said Abd al-Hamid.70 Ata Tayil, on the

other hand, argued that “the unbeliever who doubts God and the Prophet was lawful to be

killed.”71 The similar notion was expressed by Husayn: “the apostate who leaves his

religion should be killed,”72 and Khalid commented that “it is obligatory to fight the ruler

who does not rule with the God’s book.”73

From the reasons mentioned above, it can be inferred that the assassination, in

their view, was more a religious act than a political one. They believed that the jihad was

a part of Islamic duties, thus to assassinate Sadat was a religious duty. It is debatable

whether this view was truly Islamic or not. But there is little doubt that Khalid and his

friends believed in the rightness of this belief. This means also that Faraj had shaped their

perception of Islam, especially about jihad. Khalid indirectly confirmed this when he

admitted that had Faraj disagreed with the idea of the assassination, he would not have

68Salah 23. 69Salah 11, 156,7 70Salah 13. 71Salah 29. 72Salah 39. 73Salah 53.

77

carried it out. “He (Faraj) was afqah (more knowledgeable of Islamic jurisprudence) than

me,” said Khalid.74

The fact that they knew each other a few days before the assassination was also

another indication that they perceived the assassination as a religious duty. It was Faraj

who introduced them to each other, after a plan of the assassination had been set up. They

admitted that it was the same ideology —Islam in the way they believed in— that made

them willing to carry out the very high risk action with people whom they had met only

recently. It was also that ideology which caused none of them to regret their involvement

in the assassination, though they faced execution. 75 “I have sold my body to God,” said

Husayn,76 while Ata said “I do not fear the military tribunal, but I fear the God’s law.”77

The religious perception of the assassination was also clear from their target of

the assassination. All of them confessed that it was only Sadat whom they really intended

to assassinate.78 The other ten people who were killed and 27 wounded were

unintentionally shot. All of them also said that the aim of the assassination was simply to

“warn his (Sadat’s) successor.”79 No one mentioned clearly overthrowing the regime and

establishing an Islamic one. When asked whether assassinating the president was enough

to establish an Islamic state, Ata merely answered that “I did that in order to carry out

74Salah 85-86. 75Salah 19, 30, 43, 83, 76Salah 37. 77Salah 26. 78Salah 83, 89. 79Salah 13, 28, 58.

78

God’s command. And God alone knows when the establishment of an Islamic state will

take place.”80

In addition to religious tendency, as discussed above, social discontent was also

another factor which led to the assassination. Although it was not mentioned clearly, the

assassins’ pronouncement that the September crackdown was as an important cause of

the assassination was a clue for that. Sadat’s imprisonment of more than 1,500 people in

September 1981 meant that he not only violated Islam, because many of them were

Muslim preachers and the Islamists, but also strengthened his attribute as tyrannical ruler.

Sadat’s tyrannical character had been obvious when he attempted to silence those who

opposed him by instigating the Law of Shame and the Press Law. This authoritarian

character became intolerable when Sadat undertook mass arrest. They could not accept

the fact that people they respected, such as Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Kishk, al-Mahallawi

Sha‘rawi, and Hafiz Salama, were arrested to prevent them from delivering Friday

sermons. This social discontent was not less important than that of deep religious

feelings, especially in the case of Khalid. Khalid’s brother, Muhammad al-Islambuli, was

one of those arrested in September 1981 due to his activities as a leader of the Jama’at

Islamiyah. Khalid was very upset when he learned of this. When he subsequently plotted

the assassination, there might be a direct link with what had just stricken his family, as he

told his mother that he would seek revenge and that “every tyrant has his end.”81

Therefore, the term Pharaoh which was said by Khalid to point out Sadat, could mean

80Salah 29. 81Kepel 205 and 210

79

that Sadat was both a tyrant as well as an unbeliever. To sum up, the assassination of

Sadat in the view of the assassins was more a socio-religious incident than a political one.

One interesting thing that should be kept in mind was the fact that none of the

assassins mentioned Sadat’s peace agreement with Israel as one of his failures that led to

the assassination. Although at that time, the peace with Israel was still a hot political

issue in Egypt, they did not mention it at all. Does this mean that the assassination had

nothing to do with Sadat’s peace policy?

C.2. The Assassination in the View of al-Jihad’s Leaders

There were no big differences between what was admitted by the assassins and al-Jihad’s

leaders when they talked about the reason for assassinating Sadat. Yet when they

mentioned the aim of the assassination, there was significant difference between both

sides, because the group’s leaders saw the assassination as a part of a bigger plan which

was to overthrow the regime and to establish an Islamic state. Hence the assassination

for al-Jihad leaders was very political.

According to the confession of Abd al-Salam Faraj, the number-one man in al-

Jihad, Sadat was killed because he had fought against Islam. “Sadat had prevented the

application of the sharî‘ah in this Muslim country. He suppressed Muslims, preachers

and ulama by jailing them. Sadat had also laughed at the Islamic law by regarding the

hijab as a tent and encouraging women to work outside their houses.”82 Although Sadat

had changed Article 2 of the Egypt’s Constitution, so the principle of Islamic sharî‘ah

became the source of legislation, this did not change anything in Faraj’s view, because in

82Salah 156.

80

reality, the shari‘ah was never applied.83 Faraj’s confession represented both his religious

sentiment and social discontent.

The two reasons were clearer in Abbud al-Zumur’s confession. According to this

number-two man, there were two main reasons behind the assassination. First, Sadat had

been an unbeliever (kâfir), for he had replaced the sharî‘ah with the man-made law,

laughed at the verdict of hijâb for women, made peace with Jews, and allied with

Christians. Second, Sadat had been a tyrant and unjust ruler due to his imprisonment of

the Islamists and ulama, and even death sentence for some of them, such as Salih

Siriyya.84

The reasons for assassinating Sadat for these two leaders were thus not very

different from those mentioned by the assassins. Both of them also employed Islam for

justifying the assassination. However, their perception on the objective of the

assassination was totally different from that of the assassins. Faraj, for example, admitted

that the assassination was “the way that would bring me to apply the sharî‘ah and to

dismiss the unbelieving ruler.”85 This means that by assassinating Sadat, Faraj hoped he

would be able to realize his desire to establish an Islamic state, and, more significantly,

he would be a new Islamic ruler. The single subject that he used —“me” instead of

“us”— showed what he personally aimed to achieve with the assassination, i.e., political

83Salah 157. 84Ahmad Rajab, Abbûd al-Zumur: Hiwârât wa-Wathâiq [Abbud al-Zumur: Dialogues and Documents] (Jizah [Egypt]: Markaz al-Hadârah al-‘Arabiyah, 1990) 27-28. Salih Siriyya, as I mentioned in the Chapter I, was the leader of the Military Academy group which attempted to kill Sadat in 1974. 85Salah 150.

81

power. As the leader of the organization, Faraj would be a central person had his group

succeeded in overthrowing Sadat’s regime.

Abbud admitted that assassinating Sadat was a final stage of the organization’s

steps in order to establish an Islamic state. He argued that the Egyptian ruler would never

accept any attempt to apply Islamic principles. The only way to apply the sharî‘ah in

Egypt was through jihad, which meant to kill the President and dismiss other strategic

ministers. Then Abbud referred to two Qur’anic verses: “Fight them on until there is no

more persecution and religion become God’s in its entirety,”86 and “Fight these

specimens of faithlessness, for surely their oaths have no sanctity: They may haply

desist.”87 For Abbud, killing Sadat and overthrowing the regime were in compliance with

these verses. Again, Abbud used Islam for justifying his opinion. The confession of both

leaders of al-Jihad showed how political the assassination in their views was.

The political nuance of the assassination was clear also from two cases revealed

during the investigation. The first was disagreement between Abbud and Faraj when the

latter decided to kill Sadat. Although both of them agreed that the assassination of Sadat

was an organizational aim, they differed in the matter of its timing. According to Abbud,

the moment was not suitable to carry out this operation. He wanted to make sure that the

assassination would not only result in the death of Sadat but also the collapse of the

regime; and for Abbud the organization was not ready yet to bring the regime to an end.

The group still needed two or three more years before waging jihad against the state.

86Qur’an 8:39. 87Qur’an 9:12. These two verses use the term qatal which means also “to kill” in addition to “to fight”.

82

Faraj might have thought that it was a perfect time, because Khalid was participating in

the parade and he would be able to execute the operation; or Faraj might not be patient

enough after the mass arrest in September 1981, as he confessed during the

investigation.88 This difference seemed to be very critical, for Abbud was not invited to a

meeting in which Faraj and others discussed a detailed plan of the assassination. “He

(Faraj) did not wish my presence,” said Abbud.89 As a person responsible for the

organization’s struggles and strategies and as army officers who knew military operation,

his absence showed how critical the difference was. However, Abbud eventually agreed

to the attempt after Faraj convinced him through a letter that the assassination would be

an individual action, and not an organizational one. Had something happened with

Khalid and his friends, it would not have affected the organization, because they would

act personally.90 Abbud’s attitudes showed clearly his political awareness of the

assassination. He knew what would happen with the group and himself after the

assassination. Only after he was assured that the operation would not endanger the

organization did he endorse the attempt.

The second was Faraj’s denial of any involvement in the assassination. Faraj was

caught by the authorities on 13 October 1981 and interrogated on the same day. At this

moment, he totally rejected the accusation of having any relation with the assassination.

He denied that the assassination was his plan. He even said that he did not know Khalid

al-Islambuli and the others who killed Sadat. He also regarded the assassination as

88Salah 159. 89Salah 105. 90Salah 103-104.

83

religiously unlawful. But he refused to affirm a question whether Khalid and his friends

were not telling the truth, when they mentioned Faraj as their leader. Faraj simply

answered that “God knows everything,” for the question. He denied all accusation by

saying “everything did not happen.”91 It was in the second interrogation —after his wife

admitted his involvement in the plan and urged him to acknowledge it— that Faraj

affirmed his involvement with the assassination. This case is interesting because, it was

only Faraj who ever refused the accusation of being involved in the attempt. While other

defendants who were questioned about the assassination admitted their involvement

during their first investigation, Faraj, who was the top leader of al-Jihad, denied the

accusation. There is no clear clue why he did that. There might have existed an

agreement between Faraj and the assassins that the assassination was an individual action

and not an organizational one, as Faraj then told Abbud in a letter. With this agreement,

Faraj tried to avoid his responsibility as the leader of the group. He might have thought

that he would succeed in doing this by persistently denying the accusation. This

uncovered Faraj’s personal political aim, because had he had sincere beliefs in what he

himself wrote about jihad, he would have never denied the accusation.

For the leaders of al-Jihad, therefore, the assassination was a very political action.

Although they mentioned religious reasons to justify the assassination, the main objective

of the action was clearly political, namely to establish what they called an Islamic state,

in which they would become new rulers. For the al-Jihad’s leaders, the assassination was

not only meant to kill Sadat per se and to give warning to the next ruler, as what had been

admitted by the assassins. It was also meant as a decisive step to bring the regime to an

91Salah 60-69.

84

end. Nevertheless, this aim had never been accomplished. The assassination of the

President only resulted in the death of Sadat and some other people, but the regime did

not collapse and the so-called an Islamic state was never established.

D. Interpreting the Assassination

Now let us return to the question I proposed in the introduction, namely, if the

assassination of Sadat had a relation with the peace treaties. When al-Jihad’s point of

views were examined, the assassination of Sadat certainly had no relation with the

signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. As an organization whose members

assassinated Sadat, al-Jihad was not interested in Egypt’s foreign affairs. Al-Farîdah al-

Ghâibah, written by Faraj after the peace accords had been signed, did not mention the

peace treaties as among Sadat’s failures. None of the defendants cited the peace treaties

during their confession. It was later in the prison that Abbud made a statement

mentioning the peace agreement, not as the main reason of the assassination, but as one

of many conditions causing Sadat to be charged as an unbelieving ruler. The latter, for

Abbud, was one of two main reasons for the assassination of Sadat.

The discussion of the peace treaties in the earlier chapter showed that the

Islamists who were eager to criticize peace policies were the Muslim Brotherhood, which

had long historical links with the Palestinian struggle, and to some extent the Jama‘at

Islamiyah. Al-Jihad, in the other hand, did not pay much attention to this matter.

85

Following the ideology of al-Jihad, as written in al-Farîdah al-Ghâibah, and its

organizational strategies as drawn by Abbud, as well as the steps that had already been

carried out prior to the assassination, there is little doubt that an attempt on Sadat’s life

would have been done, regardless of whether he signed a treaty with Israel or not. The

difference between Abbud and Faraj concerning the assassination was only about time.

Had Faraj accepted Abbud’s idea not to assassinate Sadat in October 1981, the matter

might have been worse. If the operation were carried out after the group was strong, not

only would Sadat have been killed, but also the regime would have been overthrown.

Nevertheless, there might be another possibility that al-Jihad would have never succeeded

in assassinating Sadat if Abbud’s opinion was taken by Faraj because the group might

have been uncovered before it had a chance to carry out the assassination.

According to Kepel two important factors that caused the increase of Islamic

radicalism that culminated in the assassination of Sadat were the absence of the

independent ulama who could mediate between the ruler and the ruled, and the economic

difficulties.92 As Kepel talks about the general trend of the growth of radicalism in Egypt,

both are perfectly true. Economic discontent, on the one hand, and the disappearance of

the ulama’s credibility, for their closeness to the regime, in the eye of people, on the

other, forced the people turn to independent and clandestine Islamic groups. These groups

were attractive for dissatisfied people because they could offer them a refuge. However,

after joining the groups, the members’ knowledge of religious principles was shaped in

specific ways by their leaders. This process is crucial to be kept in mind, because when

they acted violently, this religious knowledge was a very powerful activator. Of course, it

92Kepel 226-235.

86

was a religious belief that had been manipulated. In the case of al-Jihad, it is clear how

Abd al-Salam Faraj had reduced the vast Islamic teachings to a single principle, that of

the armed struggle, jihad, against the ruler. As far as al-Jihad was concerned, this

religious understanding was not a mere “mask” of the economic problems, but it really

existed in their mind as they genuinely believed in.

87

CONCLUSION

As far as the “competition” between the Sadat regime and the Islamists in using Islam in

Egyptian politics is concerned, it shows that a crucial shift occurred in the late 1970s.

While in the early 1970s, Sadat’s regime dominated the use of Islam, during the late

1970s and the early 1980s, the regime lost this domination. This change was caused by

many factors. First, it was partly due to Sadat’s policy to cooperate with the Islamists and

to employ Islamic symbols in politics during the early 1970s. Although this policy was

meant by Sadat to strengthen his position against his political rivals, namely the

Nasserists and leftists, it resulted in the re-emergence of the Islamist groups. These

groups which had been politically suppressed under Nasser were given a free hand by

Sadat to emerge and develop again, even to be strong enough to challenge himself. Sadat

was formerly convinced that the Islamists would always support him because he released

them from jail and he encouraged them to be involved in political activities, especially

those on university campuses. Sadat also portrayed himself as a good Muslim and

covered his policies with Islam —such as the “Ramadan victory” for the 1973 war and

the era of “faith and knowledge” (iman wa ‘ilm) for the open-door economic program.

These efforts indeed helped Sadat secure his position, yet at the same time these also

made the Islamists grow stronger and more independent. This was apparently not realized

by Sadat until the case of the Jama‘at al-Takfir wa-al-Hijrah erupted in mid 1977. This

case showed that one Islamist group had been powerful and dared to challenge the

regime’s domination in using Islam in politics.

88

The second factor was Egypt’s economic problems. Sadat’s program in opening

Egypt’s economy for foreign investment, known as infitah, was aimed at improving the

Egyptian economy. Infitah indeed improved the Egyptian economy in general. Yet the

economic development was not evenly distributed. Only a small number of people

benefited while the vast majority were still in trouble. The “food riots” in early 1977 were

an expression of this economic discontent. The Islamists as part of the majority argued

that the economic troubles resulted from the regime’s applying a capitalist economic

system instead of the Islamic one.

The third was Sadat’s breakthrough in coping with the economic difficulties by

engaging in peace with Israel. Unable to solve the economic problems in a short time,

Sadat tried to affect domestic public opinion by shifting its interest from the economy to

the peace process. It indeed shifted the attention of the nation. But it also caused the

change of using Islam in Egyptian politics. Islamist groups which had regained their

strength but were still economically dissatisfied started to use Islamic symbols massively

in order to oppose Sadat’ peace policy. They used Qur’anic verses, the Prophetic tradition

as well as the opinion of the Islamic jurists to oppose the peace agreement and to refute

the opinion of the establishment ulama of al-Azhar who defended the agreement. Sadat’s

peace initiative, therefore, was the turning point for the regime’s loss of domination in

using Islam for political purposes.

Losing his domination in using Islamic symbols, Sadat increased the use of

political power. Sadat made use of the parliament which was dominated by the

government’s party to ratify the peace agreement as well as to introduce new regulations

such as the Law of Shame and the Press Law which would silence the voices of the

89

opposition. With these regulations, Sadat tightened the control on those who opposed his

policies. Economic dissatisfaction that had existed among the Egyptians was then

accompanied by political discontent. In this situation there was no institution able to

voice their grievances except private mosques.

It was in these mosques that the Egyptians found a place to express their

disappointment to the recent political and economic problems. The Friday sermon in

private mosques was a free place to criticize the government policies. The government

would never ban it because it was part of Islamic ritual. The preachers in these mosques

were usually not government employees so the government could not impose direct

control on them. In return, they dared to criticize the state’s policies during their sermons.

In the mosques, independent preachers such as Shaikh Abd al-Hamid Kishk and Hafiz

Salama criticized the government’s policies during their sermons, and these mosques

were always attended by large crowds. Although the preachers’ criticism did not affect

the government policies nor make the current situation better, it did not matter. The

sermon which expressed social discontent shared by many Egyptians was enough to

make it very attractive, so people from different cities came to these places in order to

listen to the sermon of these independent preachers.

Nonetheless, a few people felt that it was not enough to deliver sermons only.

They tried to establish an organization with a simple but abstract massage that Islam was

the solution for all problems. Abd al-Salam Faraj was one of them. With al-Jihad he tried

to offer dissatisfied people a dream that recent economic and political distress would

disappear if the rule of Islam was applied in Egypt. Sadat’s regime was un-Islamic, thus,

it should be toppled and replaced by an Islamic state. To carry this out, armed struggle,

90

jihad, was a necessity. This was a wishful thinking, of course. Yet for some people

Faraj’s idea was fascinating because it offered a simple solution; it was convincing also

because it was supported by Qur’anic verses, the Prophetic tradition as well as the

opinion of Islamic scholars. Hence, the majority of those who joined al-Jihad were young

people who tried to surmount economic and political distress, and had limited knowledge

of Islamic principles. Once they joined this group, they believed in the truth of what had

been taught by Faraj. They believed that jihad was a part of Islamic duties which had

been neglected. When they were involved in a struggle, therefore, they held a fervent

belief that it was part of their religious duty and they were ready to pay it with their lives.

In short, economic and political problems were very significant in bringing people

to join certain militant groups. But once they were involved in radical movements, the

more decisive factor was their religious belief —the belief that had been shaped in certain

ways by their leaders. This, I think, is valid not only to al-Jihad’s case which I have

discussed, but also to other radical Islamic movements in the Middle East.

91

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