Is The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) being Globalized by China?

Quarterly Journal of Chinese Studies

Editor-in-ChiefTongtao ZhengXiamen University

Executive EditorYu ZhuXiamen University

Editorial AssistantAmy Sung & Han ZhangXiamen University

Editorial BoardLianghuo Fan, University of Southampton, U.K. Huanhai Fang, Xiamen UniversityShengli Feng, Chinese University of Hong KongShui-Lung Fung, BNU-HKBU United International CollegeWei Hong, Purdue University, U.S.A.Rulong Li, Xiamen UniversityKing-Long Ling, National Taichung University of Science and TechnologyHong Liu, Nanyang Technological University, SingaporeJinghui Liu, California State University, U.S.A.Colin Mackerras, Griffith University, AustraliaShiu-Kee Shum, University of Hong KongChung-Mou Si, University of Hong KongShek-Kam Tse, University of Hong KongLing Wang, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.Jie Xu, University of MacauNora Yao, University of Auckland, New ZealandLinsheng Zhang, Osaka Prefecture University, JapanTongtao Zheng, Xiamen UinversityZhen Zou, University of Minnesota, U.S.A.

Jianchuan Zhou, Albany State University, U.S.A.

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS

Volume 2 • Number 1 • Autumn 2013

QJCS Articles

Promotion Mix and Consumer Engagement on Social Networking Sites: A Cross-cultural Case Study of Starbucks Posts on Facebook (USA) and Kaixin (China)JUSHENg YU 1

Framing H1N1 Influenza in Chinese TV NewsJINGFeI LIU & GANG KeVIN HAN 18

Hey, ‘Red China’ is Brand New: A Case Study of China’s Self-depicted National Identity on its Promotional Video ‘experience China’RUOJIE WANg 33

Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese Language Classroom: A Qualitative StudyKA F. WONg 67

Is the Democratic Republic of Congo being Globalized by China?The Case of Small Commerce at Kinshasa Central MarketNuah M. Makungu M. 89

Sovereignty and Identity in EU-China-Japan Political dialogue. A Theoretical AnalysisOLIVIeRO FRATTOLILLO 102

The Word “Macao” and its Special Meaning in the British Colonial Records of Nine-teenth-Century MalayaWEI CHIN WONg 119

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 1-17ISSN: 2224-2716Copyright © 2012 Overseas education College of Xiamen university

Promotion Mix and Consumer Engagement on Social Net-working Sites: A Cross-cultural Case Study of Starbucks

Posts on Facebook (USA) and Kaixin (China)1

Jusheng YuSouthern Illinois University at Edwardsville, U.S.A.

This cross-cultural case study of Starbucks’ fan pages on Facebook (USA) and Kaixin (China) ex-amined how the brand coordinates and controls the various promotion mix elements in its social media communication and the cultural differences in the impact of such message manipulation on consumer engagement with brand posts on these two SNSs. A total of 267 Starbucks posts, 190 on Kaixin and 77 on Facebook, were collected and content analyzed to investigate the brand’s manipulation of the promotion mix elements. Two types of consumer engagement, self-expression and relationship-involvement, were measured by the number of “Likes” and by the number of “Comments” and “Shares” respectively. The results showed that 1) building consumer relation-ship is a major part of the brand’s message strategy on SNSs; 2) consumers engage more with relationship-type posts than with promotion-type ones; and 3) compared to their counterparts of Kaixin, Facebook users are more likely to engage in brand posts with in a self-expression manner, whereas Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts in a relationship-involvement man-ner than their Facebook counterparts.

Keywords: SNS, promotion mix, cultural orientation, consumer engagement

INTROdUCTION

The landscape of marketing communication has significantly changed in recent years due to the advent of social media. Social media marketing has become a global phenomenon as myriad social media platforms attract and connect millions of consumers worldwide. Among many social media applications, social networking sites (SNSs) might be the most prominent with their connection and interaction power, and have entered the public con-sciousness and permeated many people’s daily lives (Spiegler, Hildebrand, & Michahelles, 2011). Facebook, for example, hosts the largest online community in the world, with 901 million monthly active users and more than 125 billion friend connections across the globe at the end of March 2012, according to the statistics released by Facebook (2012).

Although approximately 80 percent of Facebook’s monthly active users are outside the United States and Canada (Facebook, 2012), this globally popular social networking site is not accessible in China, which has the largest number of Internet users ironically. But the marginal usage of Facebook does not cloud the popularity of SNSs in China. Rather, according to a report by Synthesio (2011), a Paris France based global multi-lingual social

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Jusheng Yu. E-mail: [email protected]

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 1-17yu 2

media monitoring and research company, in 2011, about half of Chinese Internet users, or 600 million Chinese, use more than one social networking sites, and one-third connect at least once a day. The two most promising SNSs in China are Renren (renren.com) with 120 million members and Kaixin (kaixin001.com) with 75 million, targeting different segments of the population though. While the majority of Renren’s members are students, Kaixin’s membership mainly consists of young employees (Synthesio, 2011).

Such rapid growth of SNSs in popularity across the globe has promoted many corpora-tions to invest in marketing communications on SNSs (Boyd & Ellison, 2008). With their social exchange and engagement functions supported by the Web 2.0 technology, SNSs present marketers unprecedented media opportunities for customer relationship building, not only peer to peer among consumers but also between marketers and their customers (Harridge-March & Quinton, 2009). Therefore, SNSs provide brand marketers new plat-forms to build their online brand communities through integrating a variety of communi-cation tools, or promotion mix elements. For example, Starbucks has accumulated more than 30 million fans on Facebook since it created its fan page in 2008 (Starbucks, 2012). As Mangold and Faulds (2009) argued, social media is a hybrid element of the promotion mix. In other words, SNSs offer marketers opportunities to manage and run integrated marketing communications (IMC) programs all in one medium.

However, there is a lack of empirical studies of how brand marketers coordinate and control the various elements of the promotion mix on social network sites in literature. Marketers might be more interested in knowing and predicting the effectiveness of their IMC programs on SNSs. The judgment of whether a marketing communication works is directly related to the communication and media objective(s). By the same token, identify-ing the measurement of the effectiveness of IMC on SNSs depends on what marketers want to achieve. However, the objectives of using SNSs might be different from those of using traditional media for IMC. Whereas traditional media is all about reach, in social media en-vironment, the focus of marketing communications should be on capturing and continuing attention via engagement (Hanna, Rohm, & Crittenden, 2011). Hoffman and Fodor (2010) emphasized three objectives that take advantage of the distinctive characteristics of social media: brand awareness, brand engagement, and word of mouth. The latter two that involve a user’s behavior and experience within the online brand community especially reflect the unique connection and interaction features of social network sites. Thus, one of the purpos-es of this study is to examine a possible relationship between the employment of the pro-motion mix elements on social networking sites and brand engagement.

Another factor this study takes into account that might influence consumer engagement on SNSs is culture. A number of previous cross-cultural studies of consumer engagement behavior in social media have also found the influence of cultural difference on consum-er motives for participation in online brand communities (Madupu & Cooley, 2010) and on electronic word of mouth (Chu & Choi, 2011). So another research problem this study seeks to solve is how brands manipulate the promotion mix elements on SNSs in different cultures, and consequentially, how brand engagement is influenced by the cultural differ-ences. Starbucks posts on its public pages on Facebook in USA and Kaixin in China were selected for this case study because of the opposite cultural orientations, the immense popu-larity of SNSs, the similarity of SNS outlets, and the identicalness of the brand in these two countries.

Promotion mix and Consumer engagement on soCial networking sites 3

LITeRATURe ReVIeW

Consumer Engagement on SNSs

As marketing managers become more comfortable with including social media as part of their IMC, measuring the effectiveness or the return of investment (ROI) of social media marketing has become the common interest of marketers across brands and product cate-gories. Hoffman and Fodor’s (2010) article mentions that a quick google search for “ROI social media” returned over 2.5 million hits, many seemingly relevant (p.41). But the ques-tion is how to measure the effectiveness of communication on SNSs.

It seems that audience engagement has become the major criterion for judging the effectiveness of advertising campaigns in digital media (Russell, 2011). Because of new technologies, consumer control, media fragmentation, and business pressures, the con-cept of earned engagement, in which the audience engages with the message in a real or imagined way because the message is perceived to merit interaction, is increasingly part of advertising planning (Russell, 2011). Audience engagement especially matters in social media marketing communications, because the major goal of using social media is to de-velop long-term meaningful relationships that involve interactive conversations (Hoffman & Fodor, 2010). delahaye Paine (2011) gave three reasons why engagement is crucial to brand managers: engagement is the first step in building a relationship between a brand and its customers; customer engagement helps promote and protect the brand; and customer engagement can make the products better. In other words, for social media, “engagement is king” (Shih, 2011, p. 126).

Social media researchers have suggested some devices for measuring consumer en-gagement on social networking sites. In their relevant metrics for social media applications, Hoffman and Fodor (2010) suggested that engagement be measured by the number of ac-tive users, number of “likes”, number of comments, number of user-generated items, etc. On both Facebook and Kaixin, three consumer responses to the brand posts are recorded: Likes, comments, and shares. Following this suggestion, a recent study used the number of likes to measure consumer engagement with a brand’s posts on Facebook and used the number of comments and the number of shares to measure eWOM (Yu, 2012).

However, eWOM behaviors such as comment giving and brand post sharing may be considered as certain types of consumer engagement and the types of consumer engage-ment behavior on SNSs are different in terms of response objects, motivation, and cogni-tive effort. When clicking on the button “Like” under a brand post on Facebook or Kaixin, the SNS user is expressing his or her positive attitude toward the post while the response behaviors of giving comments on and sharing the post are toward the visitor’s friends in the same SNS community. Motivations of these different response behaviors may also be dif-ferent. Clicking the “Like” button is more about the user’s self-expression. That is, by do-ing so, the person expresses his or her preference toward the post without expecting his or her attitude to be seen by other users. In fact, whereas Facebook and Kaixin show the most recent comments on each post on their public pages, people who “liked” the post cannot be seen by the user unless the user clicks the “Likes” button. Also, most users are not ex-pected to check who “liked” the post since there is no meaningful content. However, users’ comment giving and post sharing might be motivated by their needs to interact with other


people in the SNS community and maintain the relationships with their Facebook or Kaixin friends. Also, clicking the button of “Like” should require less cognitive effort than writing comments or sharing the post.

Promotion Mix and Consumer Engagement on SNSs

The concept of integrated marketing communications (IMC) has been used by both market-ing scholars and professionals for decades. Simply speaking, IMC strategically employs a host of different marketing communication tools, or elements of promotion mix, including advertising, sales promotion, public relations, direct marketing, interactive marketing, and personal selling, to produce customer-focused messages and, therefore, achieve various or-ganizational objectives (Smith, Gopalakrishna, & Chatterjee, 2006).

Traditionally, to develop an IMC strategy, the coordination of these promotion mix elements is typically implemented by the company’s paid agents, such as advertising agen-cies, marketing research firms, and public relations consultants (Mangold & Faulds, 2009). These elements require the paid agents to make strategic decisions on target audience, geo-graphic budget allocation, message content, frequency, scheduling, and media mix for vari-ous forms of communications. Basically, Shannon’s (1948) communication model can still be applied to the traditional IMC process, which begins with the message sender and ends with the message receiver. That is, the information is “pushed” from the marketer through transmitting channels to consumers. The goal to reach a certain level of audience exposure to the message largely depends on the selection of the right media that reach the target audience, because audiences consume media primarily for information and entertainment, not for advertisements. On the other hand, the information flow outside this traditional IMC process “has generally been confined to face-to-face, word-of-mouth communications among individual consumers, which has had minimal impact on the dynamics of the mar-ketplace due to its limited dissemination (see Mangold & Faulds, 2009; Mayzlin, 2006).

However, the advent of social media has significantly changed the media environment of IMC. Among the many social media applications, social network sites (SNSs) such as Facebook in the United States and other English-speaking countries and Kaixin (aka “hap-piness” in Chinese) in China have become part of many people’s daily life and attracted millions of consumers across the globe. Boyd and ellison (2008) defined social network sites as “web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within the system (p. 211).”

With such unique media characteristics from promotion mix perspective, on one hand, SNSs still have the function of traditional advertising media, i.e., promoting the brand and the company to the target audience. Through social media, advertisers have carried out their promotions to take consumer’s high attention and participation to maximize their brand exposure (Kirtiş & Karahan, 2011). On the other hand, more importantly, the way of the interaction between brand marketers and their target audience has changed. First, audiences are no longer passive information receivers. Instead, in the social media envi-ronment, they become active participants. On a social network site, marketing messages are consumed by audiences who visit the SNS rather than being “pushed” by the marketer


to its target audience. So it is more like “pulling” audiences to the messages. Second, mar-keters and consumers have become more equal in status in online brand communities. For example, in Starbucks’ brand community on Facebook, both Starbucks and its fans have their own Facebook profiles and their communication opportunities are equal. The differ-ence may just lie in the degree of the publicity of their profiles and the size of their fans or friend networks on the SNS. Third, as some researchers argued earlier, “markets are not about messages, but about conversations” (see Hanna et al., 2011, p. 267; Levine, Locke, Searls, & Weinberger, 2001) and social network sites are about experiences (see Hanna et al., 2011, p. 268; Wyshynski, 2009), which “arise when marketers are able to incorporate reach, intimacy, and engagement into the company’s overall IMC strategy” (Hanna et al., 2011, p. 268). Fourth, in the communication process of SNSs, audiences are not only active participants but also content generators and information disseminators. Taking Starbucks on Facebook for example, again, a visitor can leave comments on its fan page, share the posts by the page with his or her friends, and discuss the brand in his or her own friend network on Facebook.

Thus, building and maintaining intimate relationships with current and potential cus-tomers rather than merely delivering promotional information is crucial to the success of IMC on SNSs. From marketers’ perspective, SNSs give them abundant opportunities they have never had before in traditional media environment to communicate with their custom-ers because there is no medium cost for delivering messages on SNSs. This change makes the marketer be able to afford to communicate a proportionately larger amount of non-prod-uct-related or non-promotional information in their IMC effort, although strictly speaking, any type of posts by the brand on a social network site is promotional because the ultimate goal of social media marketing is still to sell the brand. Also, from the perspective of con-sumer motivation, the literature of Uses and gratifications suggests that individuals use media to gratify their needs and wants (see Gangadharbatla, 2011, p. 265; Katz, Blumer, & gurevitch, 1973; Rubin, 1983). Indeed, consumers visit a brand’s fan page not for directly promotional ads but for enjoyable experiences. The present study sought for answers to a research question about marketers’ use of promotion mix elements in social media market-ing followed by an examination of a hypothesis regarding the relationship between the use of promotion mix elements and consumer engagement:

RQ: How consumer brands strategically use promotion mix elements in their social me-dia marketing communication?

H1: Individuals who visit a brand’s fan page on a social networking site engage more in relationship-type posts than promotion-type ones

Cultural Orientations and Consumer Engagement on SNSs

Culture is an important factor that affects how people think and behave. Having provided a conceptual and theoretical foundation for many subsequent cross-cultural research en-deavors in the past decades, Hofstede’s (1980) study is one of the most influential research efforts with regard to the impact of national culture on the values of the members in that nation and the interpersonal relationship within them. His paradigm of national cultures consists of five dimensions: individualism versus collectivism, small versus large power distance, weak versus strong uncertainty avoidance, femininity versus masculinity, and


long-term versus short-term orientation. The sixth and new dimension, indulgence versus restraint, was added in the 2010 book written by Hofstede and his colleagues (geert Hofst-ede, Hofstede, & Minkov, 2010).

Among these cultural dimensions, the individualism versus collectivism dimension has been most widely used in cross-cultural research (e.g., g Hofstede, 2001; Jackson & Wang, 2013; U. Kim, Trandis, Kagitcibase, Choi, & Yoon, 1994; Oyserman, Coon, & Kem-melmeier, 2000; Trandis, 1995, 2001, 2008; Trandis & Trafimow, 2001). There is extensive research on how this cultural dimension influences people’s communication behavior both directly and indirectly in different societies (see gudykunst et al., 1996). According to Hof-stede (2011), “Individualism on the one side versus its opposite, as a societal, not an indi-vidual characteristics, is the degree to which people in a society are integrated into groups (p.11).” In general, at a society level, people in individualistic cultures emphasize the goals of the individual over group goals, whereas people in collectivistic cultures consider more groups goals than individual goals (Triandis, 1988). On the continuum with individualism and collectivism at two opposite ends, nations are identified as being either more individu-alistic or more collectivistic in their cultural orientation (Trandis, 1994). Although People’s Republic of China or Mainland China was not among the 40 countries in Hofstede’s 1980 study, the country was added to the national cultures in the study by Fernandez, et al. (1997). As a result, the United States had the highest score (13.41) on the individualism-collec-tivism dimension, making it the most individualistic nation while China was classified as a collectivist country. Belonging to the same East Asian culture, China scored even lower (10.38) than Japan (10.91), making it more collectivistic than Japan.

Cultural orientations in terms of individualism versus collectivism can impact individu-als’ self-expression. As Kim and Sherman (2007) discussed, in Western individualistic cul-tures such as the United States, the most prevalent view of the self is the independent self. That is, “the individual is understood and practices as a separate or distinct entity whose behavior is determined by some amalgam of internal attributes (p.2).” In contrast, in East Asian collectivistic cultures, the individual exists not as an independent entity but primarily as a relational entity. In other words, the self is defined by relationships and the person is viewed as connected with others (see H. S. Kim & Sherman, 2007; Markus & Kitayama, 1991; Shweder & Bourne, 1984; Trandis, 1989). Thus, in individualistic cultures, individ-uals come to know their own internal traits through self-expression. For example, Higgins and Rholes (1978) found that verbal expression of attitudes makes people believe in those attitudes more. However, self-expression may not have the same implications for the self in collectivistic cultures because the meaningful aspects of the self is social and external and is defined in relationships and expressing internal traits is relatively insignificant in defining the self (H. S. Kim & Sherman, 2007). Thus, the person in collectivistic cultures may not be motivated to express him- or herself if self-expression is not viewed as part of the per-son’s interaction with other people and not recognized in relationships.

Applying this concept to understanding the consumer behavior on SNSs, it is assumed that consumers in individualistic and collectivistic cultures may respond to the brand posts on Facebook and Kaixin differently, depending on whether the responding behaviors are viewed and understood in relationships or as self-expression. Having argued earlier that the behavior of clicking the “Like” button on Facebook and Kaixin is more about self-expres-sion, the author proposes the following hypothesis:


H2: Facebook (USA) users are more likely to engage in brand posts with self-expres-sion type of response behavior than Kaixin (China) users.

On the other hand, in collectivistic cultures, people stress group goals and activities so that they may be more motivated to take actions if the actions contribute to group interac-tion and relationships. Therefore, they tend to be willing to give information to or share in-formation with their in-group (Chow, deng, & Ho, 2000). This idea has been supported by a number of empirical studies. For example, in their investigation of the influence of culture differences on the motives for consumer participation in online brand communities, Madu-pu and Cooley (2010) found that giving information is a stronger motivation for members in collectivistic cultures (Indian participants) than for members in individualistic cultures (American participants). Another latter cross-cultural study (Chu & Choi, 2012) comparing consumer engagement in eWOM between Chinese and American participants found that, compared to their counterparts, Chinese SNS users were more likely to offer opinions, to seek opinions, and to pass along opinion on SNSs. Based on this notion, two hypotheses are posited as below:

H3: Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts with relationship-involve-ment type of response behavior than their Facebook counterparts.

METHOd

Promotion Mix data Collection

A content analysis of Starbucks posts on Facebook and Kaixin was conducted to investi-gate how the brand used the promotion mix elements on these two SNSs. Facebook is the most popular SNS in the United States while Kaixin is one of the top SNSs in China. These two SNSs have similar marketing communication features such as offering platforms for a brand to set a public page to build up its online brand community and providing consumer response mechanisms for visitors to respond to brand messages including “Like”, “Com-ment” and “Share”. Starbucks is a popular consumer brand in both countries and has a public page on both Facebook and Kaixin. Such characteristics of Facebook, Kaixin, and Starbucks make the brand’s promotion mix strategy on its public pages and consumer en-gagement on these two SNSs a good case for a cross-cultural study of social media market-ing communication.

A total of 267 posts on Starbucks’ public pages, 190 on Kaixin and 77 on Facebook, were collected and content analyzed. These are all the posts posted by the brand in four months from the beginning of december 2011 until the end of March 2012. To investigate Starbucks’ promotion mix strategy in its social media marketing communication, all these posts were categorized to discover how the brand manipulates the messages on Facebook and Kaixin. In a recent study of a Swiss consumer goods brand’s posts on its public page on Facebook, the brand’s social media manager created 7 post categories to categorize the sample brand posts, including: product(s) announcement, information, designed question, questioner, competition, advertisement, and statement (Cvijikj & Michahelles, 2011). de-parting from this categorization, the present study identified 9 post categories: product advertising, sales promotion, corporate information focusing on its own business, customer service, corporate information focusing on good will, greetings/wishes, designed ques-


tion, advocacy statement, and life experience sharing. Table 1 shows the post categories, working definitions and examples. The 77 Facebook posts were categorized by two trained American college senior students enrolled in a Midwest university. Two Chinese graduate students from another Midwestern university were recruited and trained for the task of cod-ing the 190 Kaixin posts.

Table 1Post Categories, Operational definitions, and examples

Post category Operational definition example

Product Advertising

Announcement of a certain new product or advertisement of a certain existing product

Facebook: 100% Kona is back. Reminds me of being on vacation! (sorry, flower not included) http://sbux.co/y7ZnBj. (A product picture is below the copy)Kaixin (translated): Tiramisu is a cake with stories. The name means “pick me up” in Italian. The traditional Italian recipe perfectly mixed with Mascarpone cheese and rich syrup made from Frappuccino powder, makes this new classic Tiramisu among the unique tasty Starbucks choices. (A product picture is below the copy)

Sales Promotion Posts that offer an extra incentive such as a price deal to promote a certain product

Facebook: Yes, it’s true. A free 12 oz drink when you buy a pound of tribute Blend (or Tribute Blend VIA). Ends today! – US and Canada only.Kaixin (translated): Dear friends: Do you have afternoon-tea complexity? From today until Apr. 4, buy a cumulative sum of two afternoon tea combos, each including 2 newly introduced drinks and 1 piece of cake, for a free Grande brewed coffee.

Corporate Information/Business

Information about business growth, new store opening, website update, etc.

Facebook: We’re humbled to be on Fast Company’s list of most Innovative companies.Kainxin (headline translated): At the end of March, we just opened the fourth store in Fushan – Nanhan W. Guiping St.

Customer Service

Information regarding customer service, customer courtesy, and online service programs such as mobile apps

Facebook: Don’t worry your mom. Wait until the car is stopped to use your phone. Starbucks drive-thru now accepting mobile payments, idea #200 launched. Keep the ideas coming!Kaixin (translated): The New Year is around the corner. Let’s warm every our customer with our coffee and touch every our fan with our hearts. A cup of fragrant coffee, courteous words, a smile from heart, beautiful memories of everyday…All because we have you!


Corporate Information/Good Will

Good will and philanthropy of the company

Facebook: Here’s a Create Jobs For USA update - in the first 3 months we’ve distributed half a million wristbands and raised over $7 million in donations thanks to you! These donations will directly support $50 million in new financing to help create 2,300 new jobs in America!Kaixin (headline translated): Giving back to community: Startucks will donate the first day turnover of a store to help improve the facilities of the local Hope elementary school.

Greetings/Wishes

Posts in form of greetings or wishes from the personalized brand

Facebook: Happy Valentine’s Day!Kaixin (translated): There is only 1 thing 2 do 3 words 4 you. I love you! Happy Valentine’s Day.

Designed Question

Posts in form of questions or polls with a goal to engage users in a dialog

Facebook: Coffee and snow go together like _________ and ___________.Kaixin (translated): If you have a cup of Mocha, Cappuccino, Latte, Vanilla Spice Latte, Caramel Macchiato, and Hazelnut latte. Which ones are for your friends and which one is for you?

Advocacy Statement

Posts in form of statement, stating opinion on a certain topic or social issue

Facebook: We are proud to support Marriage Equality legislation in the Washington State Legislature.Kaixin (headline translated): Love earth! Let’s start with ourselves!

Life Experience Sharing

Posts showing that the personalized brand is sharing his life experiences such as stories, fun, understanding of something, feelings, mood, sentiments, etc.

Facebook: Hey look, coffee cherries!Kaixin (translatied): Everyday, right here, we share our feelings with our customers and gain life experiences together. Coffee connects you and me, who used to be strangers. So we all are creating stories at every moment.

Consumer Engagement data Collection

Both Facebook and Kaixin provide platforms for consumers who visit the brand pages to engage in the posts. Specifically, on these two SNSs, a visitor can click the “Like” button to express his or her preference toward the brand posts, comment on the posts and share the comments with his or her peers in the same brand community through clicking the “Com-ment” button, and/or share the posts with other users on his or her friend list on that SNS. Facebook and Kaixin record the number of likes, comments, and shares. The present study uses these numbers to measure consumer engagement. More specifically, the number of likes is used to measure self-expression type of engagement while the number of comments and the number of shares serve as the measure of relationship type of engagement. Thus, the number of consumer responses rather than the number of visitors who responded to the


posts serves as the unit of analysis. Although at an individual level single individuals might have multiple types of responses to the same post such as doing both “like” button clicking and giving comments, the aggregate data should give a picture of the relative popularity of like, comment, and share.

RESULTS

Two coders whose native language is english were asked to categorize the 77 Starbucks posts on Facebook and two other coders whose native language is Chinese completed the task of categorizing the 190 Starbucks posts on Kaixin. To determine the inter-coder reliability, a Cohen’s kappa was calculated for each coding, κ = .82 for Facebook posts and κ = .73 for Kaixin, which are considered satisfactory.

Post distribution across the Promotion Mix Categories

A total of 267 Starbucks posts, 77 on Facebook and 190 on Kaixin, were categorized into 9 categories: product advertising, sales promotion, corporate information focusing on its own business, customer service, corporate information focusing on good will, greetings/wishes, designed question, advocacy statement, and life experience sharing. The proportions of these 9 categories were calculated and then were rank-ordered for a comparison of these two SNSs in terms of their post distributions across the categories. The result presented in Table 2 shows the difference between the brand post distributions on Facebook and Kaixin. For example, On Facebook, the number one category, sales promotion, has about 21 percent of the posts, whereas on Kaixin it ranks as the 6th among the 9 promotion mix categories with only 6.3 percent of all the Kaixin sample posts. A Spearman rank-order correlation analysis was conducted in order to determine if the brand manipulated these 9 promotion mix categories in a similar manner on these two SNSs. The test indicated that there was no significant correlation between the brand’s category uses on these two SNSs, rs = .49, p = .19.

TABLE 2Profortions of the Promotion Mix Elements Used by Starbucks on Face-Book and Kaixin

Facebook Kaixin TogetherPost Category (Promotion Mix Elements)

Product Promotion

Product advertising 14.3% 31.6% 26.6%

Sales Promotion 20.8% 6.3% 10.5%

Corporate Information

Corporate information/Business 13% 5.3% 7.5%

Corporate information/Customer service

3.9% 7.4% 6.4%

Corporate information/Good will 1.3% 1.6% 1.5%

Community Relationship

Greetings/Wishes 18.2% 12.1% 13.9%

Design question 7.8% 14.2% 12.4%

Advocacy statement 3.9% 1.1% 1.9%

Life experience sharing 16.9% 20.5% 19.5%


To test the first hypothesis that the non-promotional relationship-type of communication is more prominent than the promotional communication in firms’ social media marketing on SNSs, these 9 categories were integrated into 3 broader categories, the categories of prod-uct advertising and sales promotion into a new category “product promotion”, corporate information/business, corporate information/customer service, and corporate information/good wills into the second new category “corporate information”, and the rest 4 categories, greetings/wishes, designed question, advocacy statement, and life experience sharing, into the third category “community relationship”. After category integration, the aggregated data indicate that the brand used the promotion mix elements in its SNS marketing com-munication on Facebook and Kaixin in a similar pattern. That is, in term of the number of posts, the category of community relationship sits on top, with 46.8 percent of all the sample posts on Facebook and 53.7 percent on Kaxin, product promotion ranked as second, with 35.1 percent on Facebook and 36.3 percent on Kaixin, and corporate information was at the bottom, with 18.2 percent on Facebook and 10.0 percent on Kaixin.

Two one-sample chi-square tests were conducted to assess if Starbucks relatively put more effort into building community relationship, promoting its products, or delivering company information. The results of the test for Facebook posts were significant, χ2(2, N = 77) = 9.53, p < .01. A follow-up test indicated that the brand posted significantly more community-relationship (P = 46.8) than corporate-information posts (P = 18.2), χ2(1, N = 50) = 9.68, p < .01, whereas the difference between community relationship and product promotion (P = 35.1) was not significant, χ2(1, N = 63) = 1.29, p = .26. The results from the test for Kaixin posts were significant, χ2(2, N = 190) = 55.15, p < .001. A follow-up test was also conducted and the results indicated that on the Chinese SNS, the brand did produced more community-relationship posts (P = 53.7) than both product-promotion posts (P = 36.3), χ2(1, N = 171) = 6.37, p < .05, and corporate-information posts (P = 10.0), χ2(1, N = 121) = 56.93, p < .001.

Consumer Responses to Brand Posts Carrying Promotion Mix Elements

The numbers of total responses to each sample post including likes, comments and shares were used to measure consumer engagement with the three types of brand posts respectively. The descriptive response data are presented in Table 3. Two separate one-way ANOVAs were conducted to evaluate the relationship between the promotion mix elements used in the brand posts and consumer engagement. The ANOVA for the responses to the Facebook posts was significant, F(2, 74) = 9.98, p < .001, η2 = .21, which indicated that the levels on which Facebook users engaged in Starbucks’ posts were significantly different. Post hoc tests were then conducted to evaluate pairwise differences among the three means. A dunnett’s C test, which does not assume equal variances among the three categories, was chosen because the homogeneity test of variance was significant, p < .05. The results indicated that the mean of the number of responses to the community-relationship posts (M = 23419.83) is significantly larger than the mean of the number of responses to the product-promotion posts (M = 11643.07) and the mean of the number of responses to the corporate-information posts (M = 7781.29), while there was no significant difference between the latter two non-relationship categories.


TABLE 3Means & Standard Deviations for the Numbers of Fesponses to the Brand Posts on Face-Book

and Kaixin

Facebook Posts Kaixin Posts

M SD M SD

Product Promotion 11643.07 2521.18 23.23 2.41

Corporate Information 7781.29 3501.24 13.37 4.58

Community Relationship 23419.83 2183.41 26.55 1.98

The ANOVA for the responses to Kaixin posts was also significant, F(2, 187) = 3.57, p < .05, η2 = .04. The results of a Dunnett’s C test for unequal variances indicated that the dif-ference between the mean of community relationship (M = 26.55) and that of corporate in-formation (M = 13.37) was significant, whereas there was no significant difference between the mean of community relationship and that of product advertising (M = 23.23).

These three categories were further integrated into two new categories, “promotion” and “relationship”, by combining “product promotion” and “corporate information” to-gether as corporate information was considered as corporate advertising, which is just another type of promotion. Two separate independent-samples t tests were conducted to test the first research hypothesis that individuals who visit a brand’s fan page on a social network site engage more in relationship-type posts than promotion-type ones. The test for the responses to Facebook posts was significant, t(62.94) = -4.29, p < .001. On the av-erage, visitors responded more to relationship-type posts (M = 23419.83, SD = 15147.82) than promotion-type post (M = 10324.41, SD = 10961.85). The result of the other t test for Kaixin posts revealed that there was a difference between the average number of responses to relationship-type posts (M = 26.55, SD = 23.01) and the average number of responses to promotion-type posts (M = 21.10, SD = 16.12), and the difference was marginally signifi-cant, t(180.72) = -1.91, p = .06. As a result, the first hypothesis was supported.

Cultural differences in Types of Consumer Responses

To determine whether users, when responding to the post, are more likely to click the “Like” button, give comments, or share it with their friends on SNSs, the relative popularity of these three response behaviors on Facebook and Kaixin was quantified by converting the raw numbers to percentage by dividing the number of each type of responses by the total number of responses (i.e., the sum of the numbers of likes, comments, and shares) to the post. For example, on March 30 2012, because there were 12540 likes, 596 comments, and 692 shares for the Starbucks post posted by the brand on its public page on Facebook, the relative popularity score is .91 for like, .04 for comment, and .05 for share.

The present study examined the cultural difference in two types of consumer respons-es to brand posts, self-expression responses and relationship-involvement responses. The self-expression engagement was measured by the quantified popularity of “like” while the relationship-involvement engagement was measured by the relative popularity of “com-ment” and “share”. Table 4 presents the means and standard deviations for the relative pop-ularity scores of the three types of responses. An independent-samples t test was conducted


to test the second research hypothesis that Facebook users are more likely to engage in brand posts with self-expression type of response behavior than Kaixin users. The test re-sult was significant, t(260.02) = 54.04, p < .001. The average popularity score for “like” on Facebook (M = .88, SD = .07) is significantly larger than the average popularity score for “like” on Kaixin (M = .16, SD = .15). Thus, the second hypothesis was supported.

To evaluate the third research hypothesis that Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts with relationship-involvement type of response behavior than their Facebook counterparts, two separate independent-samples t tests for unequal variances were conduct-ed, one for “comments” and the other for “shares”. The result of the t test for “comments” indicated that Kaixin users (M = .51, SD = .20) are significantly more likely to give com-ments on the brand posts than their Facebook counterparts (M = .06, SD = .06), t(247.37) = -28.73, p < .001. The other t test for “shares” was also significant, t(237.18) = -20.18, p < .001. The “share” responses are significantly more popular among Kaixin users (M = .33, SD = .17) than among Facebook users (M = .06, SD = .04). The third hypothesis was sup-ported.

TABLE 4Means & Standard Deviations for the Popularity Scores of 3 Response Types on Face-Book and

Kaixin

Facebook Posts Kaixin Posts

M SD M SD

Popularity of Likes .88 .07 .16 .15

Popularity of Comments .06 .06 .51 .20

Popularity of Shares .06 .04 .33 .17

dISCUSSION ANd CONCLUSION

The present case study investigated how the global coffee brand Starbucks uses the promotion mix elements in its social media communication to engage consumers on its public pages on Facebook and Kaixin, a popular Chinese SNS. It was found that the brand posted significantly more community-relationship posts than both product-promotion and corporate-information posts on Facebook, whereas on the Chinese SNS, in proportion, the number of community-relationship posts was significantly larger than that of corporate-information posts but the difference between the number of community-relationship posts and the number of product-promotion posts was not significant. These research findings indicated that building consumer relationship is a major part of the brand’s message strategy on SNSs if the use of this promotion mix element does not overwhelm the use of product promotion and corporate advertising.

Managers may reap the harvest of using this social media communication strategy. The research findings in this study supported the second hypothesis that those who visit a brand’s fan page on a social networking site engage more with relationship-type posts than with promotion-type ones. The results of the statistical tests showed that the average num-ber of visitor responses to the relationship-type posts was significantly larger than the av-erage number of the promotion-type posts on both Facebook and Kaixin. The confirmation


of the second hypothesis with empirical data is consistent with the theoretical notions in literature and may shed a little light on social media marketing practices.

The present study also examined the cultural influence on consumer engagement on SNSs. Social media users respond to the same message in different ways and the amount of cognitive effort they make in their responses are also different. Cross-cultural scholars and behavioral psychologists believe that members of individualistic cultures highly value self-expression. One important aspect of individualism is even called “expressive individ-ualism” (Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1985), in which members express their feelings and inner thoughts in order to realize their individuality. However, in more collectivistic cultures, self-expression may be neither viewed positively nor particularly encouraged because meaningful aspects of the self are social and external such as rela-tionships (H. S. Kim & Sherman, 2007). This notion about cultural difference in term of self-expression behavior was conceptualized in the third research hypothesis in this case study that, compared to their counterparts on Kaixin (China), Facebook (USA) visitors are more likely to engage in brand posts with self-expression type of response behavior, which was operationalized as the number of “Likes”. The hypothesis was supported. From the perspective of Chinese SNS users, they may be reluctant to respond to a brand post if their responses are perceived as mere self-expression.

On the other hand, individuals in collectivistic cultures emphasize social connectedness, interdependence, value harmony, and in-group memberships (Singelis, 1994), and in turn, they may see SNSs as a venue for them to maintain their social relationships (Chu & Choi, 2012). Previous studies found that Chinese and Indian SNS users are more likely to give information than their American counterparts (e.g., Chu & Choi, 2012; Madupu & Cooley, 2010). In the present study, this view was examined through testing a research hypothesis that Kaixin users are more likely to engage in brand posts with relationship-involvement type of response behavior than their Facebook counterparts. Supporting the hypothesis, the results indicated that Kaixin users gave significantly more “comments” and “shares” than Facebook users.

To sum up, through answering the research question, the present case study implies that social media has become a hybrid of various promotion mix elements (Mangold & Faulds, 2009). Unlike traditional media advertising in which promotional messages dominate the communication, on social networking sites, much of companies’ marketing communication effort goes to building and maintaining customer relationships. The evidence supporting the research hypotheses indicates that, on the user side, SNS users engage in a greater level of responding to the messages that are more about social relationships in the online communi-ty than about product and corporate promotion and the way of such user engagement may be influenced by cultural differences.

The empirical findings in this study may offer both theoretical and managerial impli-cations, although the consumer engagement data are aggregate data provided by Facebook and Kaixin. The use of such aggregate data sacrifices control over some key variables when measuring them. For example, the assumption behind the comparison of Facebook and Kaixin users was that the majority of Facebook users are members of an individualis-tic culture, mainly Americans, while Kaixin users are of a collectivistic culture, and they are Chinese since the SNS is China-based and the language is Chinese. However, if the research goal is to establish theoretical relationships among variables such as the relation-


ship between consumer engagement and cultural orientation, this assumption can be easily violated because many Facebook users who can communicate in English are not members of individualistic cultures. Thus, designing a survey study or an experimental examination wherein the key variables are measured by using valid and reliable measurement scales may provide a more precise picture of cultural orientation’s impact on consumer engage-ment on social networking sites in the future.

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Author’s Biodata:dr. Jusheng Yu is an assistant professor in the department of Mass Communications at Southern Illinois University Edwardsville, USA. He received his Ph.d. in Mass Communi-cation from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA, his M.A. in Journalism from the University of Texas at Austin, USA, and his B.A. in Advertising and Journalism from Zhejiang University, China. His primary research interests are in the areas of agenda setting theory, consumer cognitive process of marketing information, and the effects of marketing communication on consumer attitude and behavior.

First Author’s Address:[email protected]


Framing H1N1 Influenza in Chinese TV News1

Jingfei Liu & gang Kevin HanUniversity of Missouri at Columbia, U.S.A.

This study examines news frames, source use, and the correlation between frames and sources, concerning the coverage of H1N1 influenza in CCTV News Broadcast in China from April 2009 to October 2010. Attribution of responsibility is the dominant frame in CCTV. The most cited source in CCTV is the domestic government, followed by foreign governments and international organi-zations. Positive correlations are found between attribution of responsibility frame and domestic government source. In addition, human interest frame and both the domestic government and cit-izens, as well as conflict frame and scientists, are positively correlated in CCTV. The influence of Chinese media system on TV news frames and source use is also discussed.

Keywords: Chinese media, News framing, TV news, Health risk communication, H1N1

The outbreak of H1N1 influenza (hereafter, H1N1 or H1N1 flu), the global pandemic in Spring 2009 and spread globally through Summer 2010, has illustrated that different parts of the international community may have to face and deal with the same health threat in the increasingly interconnected global village. Originally termed “swine flu,” H1N1 first broke out in Mexico in March 2009. In the middle of April, the first case was reported in the Unit-ed States. Since late April, H1N1 had caused global concern, and incidences of H1N1 flu had been reported in many countries. By the end of May 2010, 214 countries and territories had reported laboratory-confirmed H1N1 cases, with at least 18,138 deaths (WHO, 2010a). On August 10, 2010, WHO declared that the global pandemic was over, and nevertheless warned that H1N1 virus would continue to spread for years like a regular seasonal influenza virus (WHO, 2010b). Facing the challenges from the global pandemic, China is among the countries that were hit hard by H1N1 (Han, Zhang, Chu & Shen, 2013). The total estimated 128,033 hospitalizations and 805 deaths were reported by August 2010 (Ministry of Health of the People’s Republic of China, 2010).

When a health risk broke out, the general public usually relies on mass media for relat-ed information (Hayes & grossman, 2006), as mass media are able to obtain accurate infor-mation, relieve uncertainty and calm the audience (graber, 1980). The large scale and the significant consequences of H1N1 have likewise drawn much attention from Chinese news media. This pandemic offers an appropriate opportunity to examine the latent attributes of media coverage on certain health risk for a better understanding of the role the media play in a “risk society” (Beck, see Ritter, 1993).

The notion of news framing arguably serves as a proper theoretical framework in this endeavor. Mostly of previous framing analyses on media coverage of H1N1 outbreak (Chang, 2010; Ibrabim, Mustaffa & Kee, 2010; Wang, Smith & Worawongs, 2010), nev-

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Gang Han. E-mail: [email protected]

Framing H1n1 inFluenza in CHinese TV news 19

ertheless, focus on print media and do not include television news coverage. The current study thus aims to fill the gap by examining how the leading evening news show, China Central Television’s xinwen lianbo2 (hereafter, CCTV News Broadcast), frame H1N1 over its life span from April 2009 through October 2010, as well as how it uses a variety of news sources when covering H1N1. This study also evaluates the possible correlations between news frames and news sources in CCTV, as a partial reflection of the influence of the media system on health-related TV news frame in China.

LITeRATURe ReVIeW

Mass Media in China

As the agency of interest groups, mass media reflect the ideology of their owners that control their financial or personnel resources or both. generally speaking, major outlets of Chinese mass media are still tightly controlled by the propaganda system of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP, hereafter the Party). According to Lee (1990), through this “command” system, the Party exerts rigorous ideological control on mass media at all levels, from content to page layout. Politics and politicians are deeply involved in the running and daily operation of Chinese media. As a result, mass media help maintain the status quo either actively or passively (see also Han, 2007).

Market-driven economic reforms since the end of the 1970s have loosened, to some extent, the Party’s censorship on non-political media content. Mass-appeal contents are produced to please the audience so as to maximize market share. Zhao (1998) argues that contemporary Chinese mass media are suffering simultaneously from the pressure of ideol-ogy and the pressure of market competition. His (2000) metaphor of “tug-of-war” describes the dilemma of the “Party Press,” which is converting itself into a “Party Publicity Inc.” (p. 112). Pan (2000) uses “improvising activities” to explain the sporadic or occasional reforms generated in the routine journalistic practice in China, as which are carried out under con-tinual ideological control.

With regards to a health risk issue, the Party always faces a challenge between dis-closure of disease information and avoidance of public panic. In some cases, government restriction of media coverage alleviates public fear as assumed; in other cases, however, blocking disease information leads to public anxiety (ding & Liu, 2004) with severe con-sequences (Fang, 2003). CCTV News Broadcast in this case must meet the needs of both the Party and changing taste of Chinese news consumers, in order to survive the tension between the ideological control and market force.

Although the focus of this study is to establish news frames presented in TV coverage of H1N1, not the “framing setting” process, the characteristics of Chinese media system may suggest a plausible prediction and explanation on the presence of news frames as well as the pattern of source use in Chinese television news.

News Frames

The concept of framing has become an important theoretic approach in communication

2　《新闻联播》in Chinese.

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 18-32lIu & HaN20

scholarship since goffman (1974) and Bateson introduced the concept to social science in the 1970’s (Han, 2007). According to Entman (1993), “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communication text in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (p. 52). News frames provide a template that guides journalists in assembling facts, quotations, and other story elements into a news story, as well as orient the interpretations of the audience (Han, 2007, p. 41).

Entman (1993) states that frames can exist in every phase in the communication pro-cess—news production, content, and reception of news. One line of research in framing focuses on news frames or media frames, which examines how frames are present in media coverage, and how such various factors as “social-structural or organizational variables and…individual or ideological variables” affect “the creation or modification of frames” at the media level (Scheufele, 1999, p. 107).

There are a growing number of studies that have assessed news frames. For example, Neuman, Just and Crigler (1992) find four dominant frames, economic, human impact, con-flict and morality frames, in news coverage in U.S. media. Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) summarize five mostly used news frames, namely “generic” frames—attribution of respon-sibility, conflict, human interest, economic consequences and morality—and apply them to the examination of news stories on European politics. They further propose a deductive approach to framing analysis of news, which “involves predefining certain frames as con-tent analytic variables to verify the extent to which these frames occur in the news ” (p. 94). This approach with the five generic frames have been replicated in many subsequent stud-ies that aim to detect differences in framing between media outlets or within certain media (e.g., Han, 2007). For example, Kamhawi’s study (2002) establishes the conflict frame and the blame/responsibility frame in the coverage of the Israel-Palestine conflict. Li, Lindsay and Mogensen (2002) and Aiken (2003) use a couple of or all of the five generic frames to analyze the coverage of September 11. dimitrova, Kaid, Williams & Trammell (2005) adopt the military conflict, the human interest, and the responsibility frame in their study on online news coverage of the Iraq War.

When it comes to topics about diseases, Luther and Zhou (2005) detect four of the generic frames from SARS related coverage in both Chinese and U.S. newspapers, where the former are less likely than the latter to present the responsibility, the conflict and the economic consequences frames. Meanwhile, there is no difference on the visibility of the human interest frame in both countries. A following study by Beaudoin (2007) compare frames in SARS news coverage from China’s Xinhua News Agency and the Associated Press (AP), which illustrates that the attribution of responsibility frame and the economic consequences frames are more visible in AP’s news items.

A few framing studies are found specifically related to H1N1, most of which focus on the news coverage in either print or online media. For instance, Ibrabim, Mustaffa & Kee (2010) suggest all the five generic frames exist in the H1N1 coverage in four Malaysian mainstream newspapers, where the responsibility frame is most visible, followed by the morality, the human interest, the conflict and the economic consequences frames. No prior literature, however, have been found analyzing generic frames in broadcasting coverage of H1N1-related issues.

Along with this research line, the current study takes a deductive approach in identify-


ing the five generic frames in the Chinese leading evening TV news program concerning H1N1 flu.

The attribution of responsibility frame refers to “the manner in which news portrays a problematic event or issue by focusing on blame and responsibility” (Beaudoin, 2007, p. 511). It involves those considered to be responsible, such as government department, non-government organizations or other institutions, for protection of the public and preven-tion of certain diseases in a public health crisis.

The human interest frame “brings a human face or emotional angle to a reported news event or issue” (Beaudoin, 2007, p. 512). It is embedded in the news stories that portray people’s emotions, living conditions, and touching aspect of everyday lives.

The conflict frame emphasizes the discrepancy between people or organizations (Sem-etko & Valkenburg, 2000; Han, 2007). In this study, this frame concerns the argument about some policies made by government officials and the current prevention situation.

The economic consequences frame focuses on the impact of the risk event on the econ-omy (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). In the current study, this frame addresses the financial and economic implications of H1N1.

Another original generic frame, morality, “puts the event, problem, or issue in the con-text of religious tenets or moral prescriptions” (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000, p.95). This frame is slightly revised and renamed as “humanity” frame, which is supposed to be more fit for the current study, considering the topic discussed is better related to humanity aid and sympathies (Ibrahim, Mustaffa & Kee, 2010).

News Sources

The news sources, i.e., “a person or document that provides information for a story,” (Harrigan, 1993, p. 422) exercise great influence on media content (Beder, 2004; gitlin, 1980; Tuchman, 1978). Scholars (e.g., Fishman, 1980; Paletz & etman, 1993) find that news media heavily depend on official sources for information, since which can add prestige to the story and increase the efficiency of news production (McLeod & Hertog, 1998). Sigal’s research (1973) reports that three quarters of the news sources in Washington Post and The New York Times are American and foreign government officials. Han, Shoemaker, Lee, Zhang and Wang (2011) compare newspaper coverage of terrorism in China and the U.S. and find domestic government officials are the dominant news sources in both countries. This pattern is also visible under certain risk situations. greenberg, Sachsman, Sandman and Salomone (1989) find, for example, that high-quality risk news is heavily related to reliable sources, which are considered the scientists and representatives from government and industry.

Scholars maintain that examining news source helps better understand the formation of news frames. Aiken’s comparison (2003) between The News York Times and Le Monde on newspaper coverage of the September 11 attack finds, the human interest frame did not, but the economic consequence frame indeed, require elite sources, such as corporate executives, experts and professionals. In their study about the U.S. television coverage of September 11 attack, Li, Lindsay and Mogensen (2002) find the political frame is associat-ed most with government sources, the disaster frame is associated mainly with witnesses, and the criminal and terrorism frames are related to government officials and experts cited


as news sources. dimitrova and Strömbäck (2005) also try to connect source use and news frames in their study of framing the Iraq War in newspapers. They notice that the articles with the human interest frame are less likely to use government officials, whereas the arti-cles with the military conflict frame cite military sources more frequently. It is worth noting that no sophisticated measures have been used in previous studies to test the relationship between frame visibility and source use in health risk coverage.

Hypotheses and Research Questions

Based on above literature review, due to the explorative nature of the study, a research question is first asked about the visibility of these predefined generic frames.

RQ1: Which of the generic frames, i.e., attribution of responsibility, human interest, conflict, economic consequences and morality, will be visible in Chinese TV news?

Assuming all frames are detectable in the selected Chinese TV news program, this study predicts that the attribution of responsibility frame will be the most visible frame through which the accountability is assigned to non-government sectors or individuals involved in risky situations, as creating positive publicity of the government is always the focus of the coverage on risk events (Chen & Zhang, 2008).

H1: The attribution of responsibility frame will be used more frequently in Chinese TV news than other frames.

In addition, this study discusses whether the frames changed over the 19 months period, if yes, how. Two research questions are thus developed.

rQ2: How did the news frames vary from April 2009 through October 2010 in Chinese TV news?

RQ3: What is the pattern of source use by Chinese TV news in H1N1 coverage?One more research question is then asked to discuss the relationship between news

frames and news sources. RQ4: How do the sources cited and the frames correlate in Chinese TV news?

METHOd

data source

To establish TV news frames concerning H1N1 in China, the current study chooses News Broadcast of China Central Television (CCTV), which is considered the most influential TV news show in the nation and can be regarded as the representative examples of typical TV news programs from China. The half-hour news show airs in two main channels of CCTV and all news channels of regional and local TV stations across the country at 7:00 through 7:30 every evening.

The transcripts for 203 items of CCTV News Broadcast with H1N1 as the main top-ic were collected from CCTV’s official Website (China Central Television, 2012). These items cover the news episodes broadcasted between April 25, 2009 (WTO confirmed and declared H1N1 flu as a health emergency) and August 10, 2010 (WTO declared the end of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic globally) in China.

Coding of Frame Visibility


The unit of analysis is the whole news story with a news lead introduced by anchors. Adopted from Semetko and Valkenburg’s (2000), each of the five predefined frames was measured by five corresponding questions. During the coding process, the coders were not aware of the correspondence between the questions and the frames. The questions were given to coders in broken sequence. They evaluated each news item by giving a “yes” (1) or “no” (0) to each question. For example, for the story entitled “The scientists of our country have already developed a specific and sensitive diagnosis method of H1N1 flu” (CCTV News Broadcast, April, 30, 2009), the coders answered “yes” to two questions corresponding with attribution of responsibility frame, two questions corresponding with human interest frame, and one question corresponding with humanity frame, whereas they gave “no” to the rest of questions.

Coding of News Source

The information sources cited in news stories refer to individuals, groups and organizations that provided data and interpretation to help the public understand the unfolding strip of events. Based on previous studies (e.g., Aiken, 2003; Chen & Zhang, 2008; Guzman, 2008) and the particular topic, the numbers for each of the following nine types of sources were coded in the current project: (1) domestic government officials: domestic government officials departments, offices, and bureaus, at the central, provincial, and local levels; (2) foreign government officials: government officials, departments, offices, and bureaus, at the central, provincial, and local levels of the foreign countries; (3) international official organizations; (4) media: media organizations and people who work in the media; (5) scientists: scientists, researchers and experts from universities, research institutions, and health administration agencies; (6) non-governmental organizations: including the Red Cross or other global and local organizations that focus on lending assistance during crisis situations; (7) victims: victims of the H1N1 flu, including the patients, their families or friends; (8) citizens: ordinary people who were not victims of H1N1 flu, and (9) other: other sources not listed above.

All sources were coded for each story. The frequency with which the sources were used in each news program was counted.

Coding of frames and sources was conducted by one of the authors and a graduate stu-dent who was trained per the coding protocols. Ten percent of all news stories from CCTV News Broadcast were coded to check the intercoder reliability. For framing visibility and news source, the intercoder reliability (Cohen’s kappa) is .90 and .95 respectively. Both are acceptable for the content analysis (Wimmer & dominick, 2004).

data Analysis

To examine whether each of the 25 framing questions can cluster into five distinguishable frames, a principal component analysis with varimax-rotated factor solution was conducted. Ten questions, including all five questions for the humanity frame, were omitted, since they cannot be clustered into any of the predefined frame due to low loading values (lower than .40). Table 1 shows the final factor solution for the remaining 15 questions. By summing up the score of each corresponding question and averaging it by the number of questions,


a multi-item scales was constructed to indicate the visibility for each established frame (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000).

Independent samples t-test was used to compare frame visibilities as well as sources cit-ed in the news program. general Linear Model (repeated measures) with Bonferroni adjust-ment was used to examine the difference among visible frames within the program. Pearson Correlation was used to assess the relationship between news frames and news sources.

Table 1Varimax-rotated Factor Solution for Framing questions

FramesAttribution of responsibility

Human Interest

Conflict economic Consequence

Does the story suggest that some level of government has the ability to alleviate the problem?

.520 -.066 .008 -.025

Does the story suggest that some level of the government is responsible for the issue/problem?

.484 .122 .266 .010

Does the story suggest solution(s) to the problem/issue?

.512 .228 -.055 .199

Does the story suggest the problem requires urgent action?

.591 .213 -.071 .031

Does the story employ the relationship between two or more individuals?

.158 .638 .132 .028

Does the story employ adjectives or personal vignettes that generate feelings of outrage, empathy-caring, sympathy, or compassion?

.171 .442 .290 .113

Does the story go into the personal or private lives of the actors?

.026 .767 .081 .110

Does the story provide a human example or ―human voice on the issue?

.140 .838 .087 .005

Does one party-individual-group-country criticize another?

.157 -.037 .711 -.017

Does the story refer to two sides or to more than two sides of the problem or issue?

.026 .078 .515 -.003


Does the story reflect disagreement between parties/individuals-groups-countries?

-.098 .243 .463 -.058

Does the story mention the reason of the conflict/disagreement?

-.059 .172 .939 -.042

Is there a mention of financial losses now or in the future?

.007 -.039 .012 .956

Is there a reference to economic consequences of not pursuing a course of action?

.019 .007 -.008 .400

Is there a mention of the cost/degree of expense involved?

.065 .150 -.051 .424

RESULTS

To answer the first research question about whether the five predefined frames actually exist in H1N1 coverage in Chinese evening news program, the factor analysis reports establishes four of them as expected, except for the humanity frame, as aforementioned. Table 2 reports the frequencies and percentages of the presence of news frames in CCTV News Broadcast.

TABLE 2Frequencies and Percentages of the Presence of News Frames in CCTV News Broadcast

Frames

CCTV News Broadcast

N % within the program

Attribution of Responsibility 121 59.6

Human interest 43 21.2

Economic consequences 7 3.5

Conflict 1 .5

H1 predicts the most visible frame within CCTV News Broadcast will be the attribution of responsibility frame. Table 3 reports the gLM results. Within CCTV News Broadcast, Bonferroni method demonstrates that, the score of the responsibility frame is significantly higher than those of other three frames (p< .01). The value of the human interest frame is significantly higher than the economic consequence frame and the conflict frames, although there is no significant difference between the scores of the last two frames. H1 is supported.

TABLE 3 Visibility of News Frames and Bonferroni Test within CCTV News Broadcast


CCTV News Braodcast

Frames Mean Grouping

Attribution of Responsibility .27 (.29) a

Human interest .10 (.21) b

Conflict .01 (.02) C

economic .01 (.07) C

Total .39 (.40)

N=203; p <0.01Note: The high to low means are marked with alphabetical order. Means with the same letter are

not significantly different

With regard to RQ2, Figure 1 illustrates that the visibility of the attribution of respon-sibility frame was always kept in top over the time period under this study. The visibility of human interest frame was relatively high in May and december 2009. The visibility of the economic consequence frame was high in October, while the visibility of the conflict frame reached its highest point in November 2009. Then all the frames tended to be invisible after January 2010.

FIGURE 1 Frames Over Time in CCTV News Broadcast

RQ3 asks about the pattern of source use in CCTV News Broadcast. According to Table 4, domestic government officials are cited more than other sources. Foreign governments is listed as the second most frequently used source, followed by international organizations, scientists, non-government organizations, media and citizens. No victims were quoted in CCTV News Broadcast when H1N1 being covered.


TABLE 4Means and SDs for Sources Use in and Bonferroni Test within CCTV News Broadcast

CCTV News Broadcast

Mean (SD) Grouping

Domestic government officials, departments, offices, and bureaus, at the central, provincial, and local levels

.60 (.81) a

Government officials, departments, offices, and bureaus, at the central, provincial, and local levels of the foreign countries

.56 (1.61) a

International official organizations .26 (.53) b

Scientists, researchers and experts from universities, research institutions, and health administration agencies

.08 (.28) b C

Non-governmental organizations, including the Red Cross or other global and local organizations that focus on lending assistance during crisis situations

.04 (.23) b C

Media organizations and people who work in the media .02 (.16) b C

Ordinary citizens who were not victims of H1N1 flu .00 (.07) C

Victims of the H1N1 flu (including the patients and the families or friends of the patient, and the people whose lives are negatively affected by the flu)

.00 (.00)

N=203; p <0.01

Note: The high to low means are marked with alphabetical order. Means with the same letter are not significantly different.

RQ4 asks whether certain sources and the news frames will be correlated with each oth-er. In CCTV News Broadcast, there are significant positive correlations between the source of domestic government officials and the attribution of responsibility frame (r= .24, p< .001), and the human interest frame (r= .24, p< .001). In addition, while the conflict frame and the source of scientists is positively associated (r= .23, p< .001), the human interest frame is also positively related to the citizens used as a news source (r= .21, p< .01),

dISCUSSION

This study establishes predefined news frames embedded in the H1N1 coverage in the Chinese premier television news program, CCTV News Broadcast. Findings reveal the frame visibility and source use within the program, as well as the correlation between frames and source use. This study partially supports the theoretical notions that the nature and editorial stance of mass media, mainly derived from a particular media system, can affect risk-related coverage. The state-owned media in China adopts a descriptive and straight-line style to report the health-related risk, with low level of frame visibility and


small numbers of sources cited in its coverage. Specifically, the attribution of responsibility is the most visible frame. This frame is

mainly concerned about the positive aspects of government’s responses to the public health crisis. There were a number of items approving the measures taken by the Chinese govern-ment for dealing with H1H1 crisis. For example, “The Ministry of Health’s Mechanism of Treatment of H1N1 Came Out” (April 30, 2009) and “Our efficient Mechanism of Flu Pre-vention and Control Was Highly Praised by Other Countries” (August 21, 2009). This is not surprising though, since by nature, Chinese media serve as the publicity channel controlled by the Party’s propaganda system.

The human interest frame also has the highest visibility next to the attribution of re-sponsibility frame in CCTV News Broadcast, compared with other detectable frames. While the propaganda function works as the media’s main duty and TV news focuses on the gov-ernment, CCTV indeed paid attention, more or less, to the ordinary people. In addition, although it is also established in CCTV news, the conflict frame’ visibility is relatively low. government’s censorship may restrict the ability of the media to dig into risk issues or topics that may concern the public. On the other hand, journalists’ self-censorship may play a vital role in news production (e.g., Beaudion, 2007, p.521). In many cases, they tend to avoid covering risk-related issues if that could reveal potential conflicts among the gov-ernment, social sectors and the public. This “rule of game” helps them bypass the punish-ment from their ideological or administrative superiors, doing no harm to their job security. Meanwhile, the visibility of the economic consequence frame is not highly visible in CCTV News Broadcast. The routine news stories on H1N1 did not focus much on financial or eco-nomic concerns relevant to this particular public health crisis.

generally speaking, CCTV News Broadcast presented “government-granted” coverage of H1N1 pandemic that turned a crisis situation into a positive publicity opportunity for the government and its agencies. Covering H1N1 news in Chinese TV, in this sense, was based on a “play-by-play” daily journalistic routine. The news stories about the pandemic pro-vided by CCTV mainly included such general information as the number of suspected and confirmed cases, full of promises made by the government to ease public fear toward the unknown disease.

When shifting the light to source used in H1N1 coverage, we notice that domestic government officials are the dominant information source in this program, who are usually regarded by the media and the public as the most important and reliable source in risky or crisis situations. On the contrary, CCTV News Broadcast cited information from ordinary people only once, making it the least used source.

In addition, CCTV News Broadcast adopted more institutional sources with rare alterna-tive information sources. The top three sources included domestic government, foreign gov-ernment officials and international official organizations. Learning a lesson from public’s criticism and complains over media coverage of SARS in 2003 (Zheng, 2009), Chinese media have recognized the importance of releasing disease information from authorized sources to the public as much as they can at the early stage of a health crisis. Media select-ed the official information from both home and abroad and made the message disseminated as soon as possible, even before the first case emerged in Mainland China.

As for the correlation between news frames and news sources in H1N1 coverage in CCTV, data analysis partially confirms previous findings that source use, especially of


the government or officials, is able to shape the presence of news frames. For example, in CCTV News Broadcast, the use of government or official sources is positively correlated with both the attribution of responsibility frame and the human interest frame. On one hand, when covering a personally relevant story in a health risk situation, the state-owned media are still inclined to include officials, instead of individual victims or witnesses, as the primary source. On the other hand, as already discussed, government and its agencies may take advantage of being quoted in news to strategically respond to the public’s call for government accountability in public health crisis. In this respect, official sources have dom-inated the tones of Chinese news stories about H1N1, to a certain extent.

Limitations and Future Studies

While this study reports intriguing findings about broadcasting news frames and the pattern of source use, the limitations should be noted here and be addressed in future studies.

First, this study focuses on “generic” frames proposed and repeatedly tested in previous studies. The “issue-specific” frames (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000), particularly relevant to health issues, should be considered in next study. Likewise, in addition to those universally applicable news frames, more literature reviews and theoretical elaborations are needed to discuss the possible existence of unique frames only visible in Chinese news.

Moreover, this study chooses the state-level media outlet, and does not include more market-oriented channels at regional or local level. Future studies must select more outlets or news shows for a comparison. Similarly, TV news programs in other countries, such as the U.S., whose people were also severely affected by H1N1, should be incorporated in next project to update or verify the findings of the current study.

Methodologically, while this study confirms the necessity of employing a factor analy-sis in framing analysis using a deductive approach, one frame, humanity, revised from the moral frame, was not identified as expected. This result may imply that the validity of the new questions specifically prepared as the indicators for this study can be optimized.

Finally, since a considerate part of the video footages for the program under study were not available, this study examines transcripts instead. The information concerning news frames that may be only available in visual materials cannot be reported for this study. The next project should include an analysis based on both textual and visual materials to achieve a more comprehensive picture on TV news frames regarding health risks.

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Author’s Biodata:Jingfei Liu is a current doctoral student in educational psychology at the University of Missouri, Columbia. Liu received her bachelor’s degree in broadcasting news from Com-


munication University of China in 2008. She worked with China Central Television before joining Iowa State University’s master program in journalism and mass communication in 2009, where she received her master’s degree in 2012. Email: [email protected]

gang Han is Assistant Professor in greenlee School of Journalism and Communication at Iowa State University. Han previously was Assistant Professor at the department of Com-munication, SUNY at Fredonia. He studied mass communication in S. I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University, where he received his doctorate in 2007. Before coming to the U.S., Han taught in Journalism School at Fudan University from 2000 through 2004. Email: [email protected]

Corresponding Author’s Address:[email protected]


Hey, ‘Red China’ is Brand New:A Case Study of China’s Self-depicted National Identity on

its Promotional Video ‘experience China’1

Roujie WangXiamen University

The Western representation of the others and the self-representation of the others have received varying degree of scholarly interest, with the former being extensively explored and the latter being largely ignored. Based on the social semiotic interpretation of Chinese visual showcase ‘Experience China’, this project attempts to contribute to the study of the self-representation of non-Western countries. This dissertation intends to answer the question how China depicts its national identity to both its internal and external audience. The exploration of the video is situ-ated in the cross examination of nationalism and self-Orientalism. As demonstrated throughout this research, nationalism, as the layered meaning of the video, is invoked by the government to cement the national identity of its internal audience and brand itself to the global audience. By stimulating the resonance of the global audience, awakening the national pride and highlighting its soft power, China has depicted its national identity as a powerful and influential nation posing no threat to others. However, the further probe into the representation of Chinese women and Chinese course of modernisation reveals a contrastive expression of Chinese national identity. On one hand, by superimposing various traditional elements appealing to Western sensibility, women in the showcase have been utilised to satisfy the rosy imagination of the West and display a fixed image of China. On the other hand, the video portrays a modern China capable of alleviating pov-erty and boosting technology. However, the representation of modern China is largely restricted to the material dimension. The reification and reductionistic perception of modernity chiefly result from Chinese immense yearning for achieving modernity and the Chinese Communist Party’s concern of Western ideological threats. China, though with certain degree of resistance, slides into self-Orientalism in depicting its national identity.

Keywords: National Identity, Nationalism, Self-Orientalism, Nation Branding

INTROdUCTION

‘Soft power’ coined by Joseph Nye (2004) refers to a country’s capability of achieving the goals through attraction. differing from hard power which closely ties to the military and economic strength of a country, soft power emerges from the country’s attractiveness of culture, political ideology, and policies. Soft power is often waived in the self-representation of a country in the form of nation branding. In the era of information expansion, the global spotlight is invariably on those who are capable of capturing global attention (ding, 2011;

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Roujie Wang. E-mail: [email protected]

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 33-66waNg34

Kunczik, 1997). Recognizing the significance of soft power, countries in the present era have actively participated in the new game of politics-a game ‘not about oil and trading routes but about image and reputation’ (Van Ham, 2008: 147). This is particularly relevant to those non-Western countries which are eager to represent themselves and keep their national image at the same pace with their fast changing reality (Anholt, 2006; gertner, 2007). However, compared to the investigations into the Western-produced representations of others, the examination of how others represent themselves has largely been overlooked (Yan, 2009).

With the acceleration of globalisation, a couple of scholars have been celebrating for the reducing of colonizing binaries such as First/Third World and colonist/the colonized. They believe that countries in the process of self-branding have casted aside the colonial dis-course in perceiving self and others (Roy, 2007). With keen interest in testifying this state-ment, I would like to probe into one particular branding case of China and critically look into its self-representation. Self-representation is often entangled with the self-depiction of national identity. Hence, ‘national identity’ will be the key term leading our investigation. Specifically, we will locate the examination of ‘national identity’ in the broad context of na-tion branding and specific theoretical framework of nationalism and Orientalism.

Nation branding is often endowed with multi-layered goals. Consolidating nationalism is the most prominent one (Huang, 2011). To fulfil this aim, countries often utilise the fe-tishized visual codes and specific image-signs to deliver the ideology and construct official national identity (Roy, 2007). To interpret the visual signs released, we are able to evalu-ate whether nationalism has been incorporated into the branding narrative. However, my research interest goes far beyond that. Inspired by Said’s (2003) Orientalism, the deeper concern of this project is to unfold whether China, as one of the others, has portrayed itself conforming to the self-Orientalistic discourse—seeing itself from the Occidental-centric point of view. In particular, the end of the Cold War has rendered the First World as ‘the apparently undisputed model of progress’ (Lee, 1997). Struggling for modernity, the Orient thus viewed the achievement of the First World as the standard for prosperity and yielded to the Western representation (Pletsch, 1981; Worsley, 1984; Yan, 2009). Hence, a probe into Chinese self-representation might contribute to the unresolved debate upon the relationship between Western postmodernity and the ongoing modernization of the Orient (Lee, 1994).

China has long been associated with negative impressions such as ‘a guarded image, troubled by reports of human rights violations and environmental issues’ (Berkowitz, P. et al., 2007). This stereotyped impression is resented by China since the backward image is believed to be the ‘integral part of the colonial discourse that justified foreign dominance of China’ (Xiao, 2002: 285). To redress the stereotype, China has devoted to displaying a new national identity. Produced by the Information Office of the State Council of China and to coincide with President Hu Jintao’s visit to the United States, the national promotional video named ‘Experience China’ was launched in the ‘World Crossroads’- Times Square of New York on January 17th of 2011. With red as theme colour and emotive music as back-ground, the 60-second video clip attempts to unfold a new image of China through the vi-sual presentation of 59 celebrities from its various sectors.

Observation of the publicity video demands an approach that is sensitive to the multi-layered meanings of images and signs. Hence, visual analysis particularly social se-miotic approach is adopted in unveiling the visual representation of China. The following

Hey, ‘Red CHina’ is BRand new 35

section starts with a critical review of the pertinent literature. A brief overview of the cur-rent researches related to the relationship between nation branding and national identity first sets the scene. I then address the dynamics of national identity in the contexts of nation-alism and Orientalism respectively, followed by a sketch of debates over nationalism and national identity in socialist China. drawing upon the literature, a conceptual framework is established based on the perspectives of nationalism as enhancement of national identity, self-Orientalism as consequences of Orient-Occident interaction and modernity-pursuing, as well as an eye-catching strategy. The section ends by outlining the research objectives and generating a general research question concerning the self-representation of China. To operationalize the research question, the general question has been further developed into a set of sub-questions looking specifically to visual representation pertinent to nationalism and self-Orientalism. The subsequent section then justifies the application of social semiotic approach and reflects on its limitations, followed by a detailed description of methodologi-cal design. An intensive interpretation of selected scenes and a comprehensive appreciation of the video as a whole will be invited in the critical discussion of how China represents it-self. This project then concludes with implications generated by the answers to the research question as well as an outline of future study on the self-representation of the others.

THEORETICAL CHAPTER

Literature Review

Nation Branding and National Identity

Nation branding is an effort to adopt commercial strategies to manage or wield the soft power of a country (Van Ham, 2008). Some scholars believed that there was a correlation between national branding and the construction of national identity. On one hand, nation branding is a part of foreign policy to distinguish us from others (Van Ham, 2001, 2008; Aronczyk, 2008). It is also a discourse, specifically, one of self-reflective efforts of national identity (Kim & dittmer 1993; Widler, 2007; Roy, 2007; de Chernatony, 2008; Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). Hence, the narrative of nation branding is a reflection of ‘the particular choices of elites as they re-imagine national identity’ (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011). On the other hand, political scientists nowadays are inclined to study identity as a political resource which can be exploited in branding nations (Kim & dittmer, 1993). However, some tended to be sceptical of the effects of nation branding since the government-inspired communications consisted of only ‘a tiny fraction of the information received by people’ about the branded nations (Blechman, 2005). Additionally, nation branding embraces several limitations such as insufficiency in mobilizing democratic dialogues and uncertainty in exercising centralised control over communications (Kaneva & Popescu, 2011; Wang, 2008). Nonetheless, nation branding is still a common practice for countries especially developing countries to deliver their new national identity (Gaither, 2007; Volcic, 2008; Pasquinelli, 2010; Lee, 2010; Bolin & Per, 2010).

Nationalism and National Identity

Opinions on the correlation between nationalism and national identity are contested.


Some state that national identity is an overarching emotion towards the nation and thus nationalism is one of the consequences of national identity (Blank & Schmidt, 2003). This sort of national identity approximates the discursive identity held by individuals. To the contrary, some believe that an ideology of nationalism is the precondition, rather than the consequence of national identity. And thus, national identity is not given and can be ‘created, nurtured, and carefully promoted by state authorities’ (Watson, 1993). Some have resonance with this idea delineating that nationalism is able to assist governmental activities in polishing national images and sustaining the state by psychologically uniting the people (Bolin & Per, 2010; Ng-Quinn, 1998). By instilling strong feelings of loyalty, nationalism serves as the binding force between people and its territory and will reinforce the national identity (Brinton, 1953; Kohn, 1955). The declination of nationalism would result in people’s insecurity of national identity (Billig, 1995). This is particularly relevant to the ‘official’ national identity presented in the publicity video.

In addition to the disagreement on the relation between nationalism and national identi-ty, doctrinal dispute over the construction of national identity remains unsettled. Berger and Luckmann (1966) admitted that there was individual identity but refused to recognize the collective identity, for instance, national identity. For them, imposing ‘identity’ on imper-sonal entities such as nations is hypostatization. However, for a group of scholars, national identity does exist in the reciprocal relations between individual and the nations (Oriol & Igonet-Fastinger, 1984). Individual is inevitably influenced by its surrounding context in a reflexive or unreflexive way, and thus, the dichotomy of separating individual and national identity as two distinctive identities is unhelpful (Edensor, 2002). National identity will not be generated without the constant interaction between individual and society. Similar-ly, Melucci (1982) regarded national identity as a byproduct of collective actions, during which individual have been granted opportunities to fulfill their ‘self-recognition and het-ero-recognition’. Sciolla (1983) further argued that the interaction between individual and the nation might not only result in the fulfillment of self-identity but also the modification of the national identity. Schlesinger (1991a) instead situated national identity in the tem-poral and spatial dimension. For him (1991a), identity construction is not a static process, rather a dynamic and complex process of inclusion and exclusion. The process of inclusion assists in identifying ‘us’ from ‘them’ while the process of exclusion sets boundaries be-tween ‘us’ and ‘them’. Lastly, Anderson (1991) stressed media’s role in cultivating individ-uals’ national consciousness by connecting people in a common discourse and facilitating the creation of imagined community.

Orientalism, Self-Orientalism and National Identity

The legacies of colonization and the accompanying efforts of decolonization have together shaped the nationalism and national identity of the previous colonies (gellner, 1983; Frankenberg & Mani, 1993). The end of colonial occupation does not signal the end of colonization, which is also the main theme of post-colonialism (Drew, 1999). For those used to be colonised, national identity is not merely the country’s static and monotonic self-perception of ‘who I am’ and inevitably includes a constant self-struggle of ‘who I was’, and is finally presented in the form of ‘who I want you to think I am’. Identity, in fact, is a totalisation of “heterogeneous ‘selves’ and ‘subjectivities’ ” (Radhakrishnan, 1993).


Orientalism is one of the most influential postcolonial theories concerning how the West constructs the identity of the Orient. Said’s Orientalism is the milestone of this school of thoughts. Mainly based on the works of Jacque derrida, Antonio gramsci and Michel Foucault, Said has redefined the concept of Orientalism as ‘hegemony’, ‘a sign of europe-an-Atlantic power over the Orient’ and ‘a political doctrine willed over the Orient’ (Said, 2003: 6, 7). It is ‘a style of thought, based on an ontological and epistemological distinction between Orient and Occident’ and an ideology to justify the subjugation of the deprived groups (Macfie, 2002: 4). In the framework of Orientalism, the West is in the perpetual ‘po-sitional supremacy’ (Said, 2003). Concentrating on the ‘texuality and the body of writing and representing, Orientalism in the eyes of Said is a Foucauldian discourse and a represen-tation system able to construct an unchangeable Orient (Yan, 2009: 296).

Said’s Orientalism has nonetheless received wide-ranging criticism. Lewis (1982) and Colley (1992) disprove Said’s ahistorical approach of viewing Orientalism as a mere dis-course of power relationship. They challenged Said’s views by pointing out that Britain’s largest others was not the Orient but France in the eighteen and nineteen century. Similar-ly, Kopf (1980) contended that Said’s work was inadequate of historical precision. By the same token, MacKenzie (1994) accused that Said has paid insufficient attention to the in-stability of imperial culture. Siding with this idea, Bhabha (1994) disagreed on Said’s view of colonial power as ‘signifiers of stability’ and suggested that the colonial system was constantly challenged by ‘diachronic forms of history and narrative’ (p. 102). He further pointed out that the asymmetric Foucauldian discourse also embraced logic of resistance, and thus ‘can be subverted by being inverted’ (Bhabha, 1994:103). However, chiefly rely-ing on post-structuralism, Bhabha only attended to subaltern’s ‘rhetorical acts of resistance’ leaving the material level of colonialism untouched (Hassan, 2002: 49). Orientalism is also challenged by Chinese intellectual Chen Xiaomei (2002) who put forward ‘Occiden-talism’ as counterpart of ‘Orientalism’. Occidentalism refers to the Orient’s reification of the Occident. Occidentalism in China, from her perspective, aims primarily at serving for the domestic politics. It can be further divided into official Occidentalism and anti-official Occidentalism. The former is utilised by the government to support the nationalism while the latter regards Western others ‘as a metaphor for a political liberation against ideological oppression within a totalitarian society’ (2002: 5). Although differing from Orientalism in aims, Chen further admitted that Occidentalism is the product of Western Orientalism.

In response to some criticism especially those concerning the potential anti-Westernism emanating from overemphasis upon Orientalism , Said (2003) clarified that highlighting the competing alter ego was a ‘mere academic wool-gathering’ aiming at unveiling the devel-opment and maintenance of every culture (p. 332). Examining Orientalism as a discourse, he stated, has enabled European culture to acquire a more clear understanding of the Orient.

Orientalism deals with Western construction of Orient’s identity and places the Orient in a relatively passive position. On the other hand, self-Orientalism, as an extension of Ori-entalism, suggested that the Orient itself has participated in the ‘construction, reinforcement and circulation’ of its national identity (Yan, 2009: 297). Self-Orientalism looks at how the Western representation of the Orient has been incorporated into the self-image of the East (Dirlik, 1996). Yan further (2009) classified Self-Orientalism into three categories. Firstly, self-Orientalism is the self-representation of the Orient to cater for the Western conception. Orientalism discourse is produced and reinforced in the interaction with Western ideology.


Secondly, self-Orientalism results from the Orient’s quest for modernity. The West is dei-fied by the Orient as the representation of modernity and the Orient is reflexively posited to the opposite. Thirdly, self-Orientalism is utilised as a strategy to display a unique identity and manipulated to reinforce the differences, hence, renders the Orient visible in the mod-ern world. To illustrate strategic self-Orientalism, Mitchell (2004) took the music of a Sin-gapore singer dick Lee as an example. He pointed out that self-Orientalism was a ‘playful form of identity politics’ allowing a self-representation of ‘exotic fetishisations and fasci-nations’, and bypassing the previous stereotypes (p. 110). Lee’s attempts of Asian-Western syncretic music was commented as a good balance between ‘the notion of a pan-Asian identity with the use of clever parodying and inversion of Western imagery and musical idi-oms’ (Iwabuchi & Muecke & Thomas, 2004: 5) Similarly, Asian director Ang Lee’s movies was also closely scrutinized for his possible contribution to the perpetuation of Orientalist discourses (Chan, 2004).2 Chow (1995) further mentioned that the attitudes towards strate-gic Orientalism in Chinese films were in fact ambiguous and self-contradictory. On the one hand, a great number of Chinese had contempt for the films’ postcolonial expression-catch-ing foreign gaze with shallow and inappropriate means. On the other hand, the contempt it-self contained the acts and constant imagination of foreign gaze. Strategic self-Orientalism is not only manifest in film industry. Umbach and Wishnoff (2008) proposed that by con-structing an exotic identity, merchant elites in New York City’s Chinatown have invoked self-Orientalism to fulfil their financial interests. Self-Orientalism discourse, whether as an inevitable consequence in the process of the Orient-Occident interaction or consequence of modernisation or even as an intentional strategy is nonetheless relevant to our study.

National Identity, Nationalism and Socialist China

National identity in China has a twofold meaning: the self-identification as ‘Zhongguoren’ embracing connotation of modern nationalism, and the self-categorizing as members of Chinese race (Zhonghuaminzu) (Wu, 1991). Although there is significant overlapping between these two identities, the chief focus of our discussion will be on the former. In post-Tiananmen of 1989, literature on how Chinese Communist Party (CCP) utilizes nationalism to construct China’s national identity is burgeoning. A great number of scholars believed that the role of CCP in constructing national identity has been largely weakened due to wider recognition of distinction between government and the state (Fitzgerald, 1995). With communist ideology losing its global popularity, CCP found it even more difficult to rally nationalism to consolidate its political legitimacy and to fulfill its national interests (Huang, 1995; Zhao, 1997; Zheng, 1999). Thus some held that CCP has resorted to Chinese culture and tradition to ground the national identity (Scalapino, 1993). Hence, cultural meaning was constantly utilized and reformed by CCP to reshape the discursive identity (Wilson, 1998). However, some further argued that the primary focus of the state-led cultural nationalism is rarely on identity but rather on a party ideology which prioritized the economic modernisation (Clausen, 1998; He, & guo, 2000). Cultural nationalism

2　 Lee' s movie based on the traditional Chinese ‘Wuxia’ (Chinese Sword-Fighting movie) Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) was a great success. Inspired by Lee, a group of Chinese directors has begun to explore Wuxia films for Western audience waiving a global return of Wuxia films. Subsequently, academic debate has been triggered over the possible self-Orientalism of Chinese Wuxia films.


which is confined within limited group of people is in fact a ‘resurgent elitism’ (He, & Guo, 2000). gries (1999) disagreed with the reductionist view of regarding Chinese cultural nationalism as elitism and the overlook of the popular sentiment stemming from Chinese ‘face nationalism’. Zheng (1999) challenged that the deep root of ‘face nationalism’ is not about national dignity but anti-foreignism accompanied by the anti-invasion in Chinese history. The highlight of foreigners especially the ‘superior’ others, Suzuki (2007) argued, was instrumental for Chinese fulfilment of its national identity as a ‘victim’. Callahan (2004) on the other hand, questioned the effects of relying external others on portraying self since humiliation politics was not peculiar to China. Although scholars disagreed on the relationship between CCP-sponsored nationalism and the construction of Chinese national identity, most of them have reached a consensus that Chinese ‘official nationalism’ possesses particular focus on patriotism which addresses ‘the loyalty to the existing State’(Wu, 1991; Pye, 1993; Zhao, 1998; He, & guo, 2000). It is true that national identity of China at such complexity interwoven into its particular history and culture does not lend to the simplified approach based on communist system (BØckman, 1998). Nonetheless, the state-led construction of national identity is our focus of study.

Conceptual Framework

The research project primarily addresses the national identity depicted by Chinese government in its publicity video during its nation branding. Nation branding, as the background of this project, takes two forms: beautifying a nation from top to bottom and branding the nation from the grassroots (Lee, 2010). Our project only looks into the first form -the governmental effort of constructing national identity. The analysis of the video will be situated in the conceptual framework of nationalism and self-Orientalism.

Nationalism embraces two meanings. First it refers to the process of establishing an in-dependent state based on share identity (Billig, 1995; Harris, 1997). Secondly, it describes the authorities’ efforts in creating an assertive national self-awareness (Harris, 1997). In this project, we only examine its second meaning. By drawing individuals’ attention to ‘the flaggings of nationhood’, nationalism allows people to look at both themselves and others (Billig, 1995). In the process of self-examination and recognition of others, individual’s national identity is constructed and solidified gradually. However, the national identity of individuals is not absolute and unshakable and it is subject to the external influence. A self-representation of the nation by state elites will shape both the internal and external perception of that particular country. Hence, nationalism is often utilised by the elites as a tool to cement the identity of its people and ensure that national identity held by people and the authority remains congruent. Furthermore, once nationalism has been invoked, it has a tendency to ‘project [projecting] itself back in time to some mythical origin to erase the dif-ferent temporalities of the past, so that all history becomes a history of national emergence’ (dirlik, 1996: 106). during this course, nationalism tends to be akin to Orientalism: trapped in the ‘metonymic reductionism’ highlighting some particular traits but sweeping aside oth-ers inconsistent with its self-image (Ibid.).

Especially for China, its nationalism and the construction of national identity has been tied closely to its history of semi-colonisation (gellner, 1983). The colonial power penetrat-ing into colonies cannot easily be erased even after the end of colonial occupation. Hence,


China, like other nation-states previously colonised, might be subject to a postcolonial discourse, specifically, Orientalism. In Orientalistic discourse, the image of the Orient has been produced and represented by the West based on its Orientalistic imagination (Said, 2003). However, not only the West but also the Orient has engaged in the representation of themselves. As an integral part of Orientalism, self-Orientalism has offered a critical perspective for this project to examine how China represents itself. The previous literature review reveals that a self-Orientalistic discourse results from the long-standing interaction between the Orient and the West, as well as the Orient’s assumption of Westernisation as precondition of modernity (Yan, 2009). Furthermore, self-Orientalism was sometimes ad-opted intentionally by the Orient as a strategy to highlight the exotic identity and attract global attention (Ibid.; Iwabuchi, Muecke, & Thomas, 2004). By interweaving Chinese cul-ture and history into interpretation, this project attempts to critically examine the self-rep-resentation of China and see nationalism and self-Orientalism, if any, are embedded in the visual presentation of national identity.

Research Objectives and Research Questions

The purpose of this research is to better understand the self-representation of the others by examining the visual representation of Chinese national identity in its branding video. Positioning Chinese self-representation in the theoretical examination of nationalism and self-Orientalism, this project hopes to contribute to the understanding of how non-Western displayed its national identity. This, in turn, will lead to a further study of how non-Western overcomes the Orientalistic hurdles to construct their national identity ‘in full complexity, heterogeneity, and dynamism’ (Hung, 2003: 276). This will not only be an attempt of the Orient to transcend the colonial power and cultural hegemony, but also a beneficial step forward for both the Orient and the West to look at diverse civilisations in full respect. Additionally, with the rise of China, a revisit of Orientalism will shed some light on the debate over the relationship between Western postmodernity and Asian modernisation (Lee, 1994). This project alone certainly cannot fulfil the goals but only serve as a point of departure. However, this research distinguishes itself by taking a social semiotic approach to uncover those impalpable behind the images, by both looking at the national identity construction in nationalism and self-Orientalism, and by inviting Chinese culture and history into the overarching interpretation.

The preceding background presentation and theoretical discussion have generated the following research question:

In the campaign of nation branding, how does Chinese government depict its national identity to the internal and external audience through its publicity video ‘Experience Chi-na’?

This question can be further dismantled into two sub-questions: 1: Is nationalism penetrated into the self-representation of China? If so, how?(1) Are there any image/sign/music/texts waving the flag of nationhood and provoking

the national pride? If so, how?2: Is self-Orientalism invoked in Chinese self-representation? If so, how is it embedded

in the narrative of the video?(1) How does this video portray Chinese women? Are there any image/sign/texts being


utilised to highlight the exotic differences?(2) How does China depict its course of modernisation?

RESEARCH dESIgN ANd METHOdOLOgY

Visual Analysis

Representation, especially visual representation, both in its presentation and reception plays a pivotal role in constructing identities (Woodward, 2002). Ferdinand de Saussure, the founder of structural linguistics articulated that it is through language, a symbolic system encompassing both words and images, that identity is constructed (Ibid.). The specific semiotic characteristic of visual representation such as images and music allows a ‘particularly affective and direct ways’ of identity forming and expressing (Turino, 1999: 221). Hence, a close examination of visual resources would open up possibilities to perceive how a particular country constructs its national identity through visual narrative. However, the quantitative approach of visual analysis is inadequate in interpreting meaning of a domain of representation (Bell, 2001) and thus, I take a qualitative approach, namely social semiotic analysis, to unfold how China is represented. By studying the image subjects, we are able to have a clear perspective about the idea of image makers (Bank, 2001).

Social Semiotic Analysis

Semiotic was defined as ‘the science of the life of signs in society’ (Saussure, 1974). 3Hence, akin to verbal language, semiotic resource such as images, texts and music can also be viewed as a form of communications operated within the meaning system (Hodge & Kress, 1988). To exploit the semiotic resource, one is able to unearth the meanings hidden beneath. Involving both description and interpretation of semiotic resources, social semiotic approach is one of the most useful tools to facilitate this kind of exploitation. (Jewitt, & Oyama, 2001).

differing from the Paris school semiotics whose key word is ‘code’ rather than ‘re-source’, social semiotic analysis allows meanings of visual language being examined with-in a broader social and cultural contexts, and thus, renders meanings much more open-end-ed (Ibid., & Silverman, 1983). To adopt social semiotic analysis, our investigation into the promotional video will not necessarily conform to a thematic coding framework or a rigid system of inter-textual references.4 Instead, this approach invites a multi-dimensional description and interpretation of the video. By weaving Chinese history and culture into in-terpretation, this method will dig out the representational meaning, interactive meaning and

3　‘The only difference between them being that semiology is preferred by Europeans, out of deference to Saussure’s coinage of the term, and semiotics tends to be preferred by English speakers, out of deference to the American Peirce’. See Hawkes, T. (1977).4　 For how codes are used in semiotic, See Eco, U. (1976). For the application and explanation of self-referential intertextuality See Goldman, R., & Papson, S. (1996).


compositional meaning of the images and signs in the video.5 The examination of representational meaning will draw upon Barthes’ (1984) classifi-

cation of visual meanings as denotation and connotation. For Barthes (1993), denotation refers to the application of language to refer to what it says while connotation means the application of language to refer to something other than what is said. By investigating the denotation of the video, we are able to observe how the video producers depict China through image and signs (photographic analogue). On the other hand, connotation encrypt-ed in the visual language can be decrypted when presented under specific social and cultur-al contexts. Hence, we might interpret the visual representation of Chinese national identity within our theoretical framework of nationalism and self-Orientalism and in the peculiar historical and cultural contexts of China.

The probe into the interactive meanings of the video is particular useful in this project whose main content is the group presentation of Chinese celebrities. Studying the interac-tive meanings of semiotic resource will facilitate the description of the ‘complex and subtle relations between the represented and the viewer’ (Jewitt, & Oyama, 2001:145). In the pub-licity video, Chinese national identity is chiefly presented by the images of its celebrities. Hence, by looking at the factors of ‘contact’, ‘distance’ and ‘point of view’, we are able to uncover the relevant messages coded in the presenters in the video.

The compositional interpretation or ‘the good eye’ termed by gillian Rose (2007) fo-cuses primarily on the image itself and its compositional modality. By carefully analysing the components of compositional interpretation such as mise-en-scene, montage and sound, this research would unfold the real intention of the video producers (Monaco, 1981). In this way, we are able to see whether nationhood or exotic differences are intentionally made sa-lient by filming techniques.

Limitations of Social Semiotic Approach

However, this approach is not perfect and inevitably encompasses a slice of distinct limitations. Firstly, the representativeness and replicability of the research results are often questioned due to this method’s ‘preference for detailed readings of individual images’ (Rose, 2001: 103). Nonetheless the findings of this research only serve as one illustration of Chinese self-representation rather than an empirical generalisation of how the Orient represents itself.

The second drawback of this approach also stems from its subjectivity. The selection of samples being closely examined often cannot be well-justified. In terms of this project, the selection of the scenes is guided by the research interest of nationalism and self-Oriental-ism. Hence, special attention will be poured into images containing manifest signs relevant to these two themes. I acknowledge that the selection process can hardly be free of my sub-jectivity and assumption. However, as I previously put forward, the research results are not meant to be a generalisation.

The third shortcoming concerns the balance between over-interpretation and under-in-terpretation of the visuals. As Berger (2005: 27) stated ‘all texts are related to other texts,

5　 The three meanings mentioned can also be called as ‘representation’, ‘orientation’ and ‘organization’. See Lemke (1989) and Lemke (1992) .


to varying degrees’, the connotation meanings of the images might vary with different in-terpreters due to their diverse interest and backgrounds. It is arduous to define the scope of reasonable interpretation and locate the precise middle point between over-interpretation and under-interpretation. This is where the most painful, as well as the most beautiful, part of social semiotic-there is always academic potential waiting to be tapped.

The fourth limitation lies in the gap between interpreters’ idealized analytic readings and the viewers’ actual reading practice (McHoul, 1991; Iedema, 2001). differing from ac-tual readings, our project follows a set of strict rules in unfolding the layered meanings and involves some degree of technical interpretation. The seemingly sophisticated way of visual reading is endowed with the specific objective to excavate those ‘at the level of vague sus-picion and intuitive response’ (Iedema, 2001: 200).

The final limitation rests in the incapability of fully involving the actual creating pro-cess of the video into our analysis. Due to the constraints of information, the specific cir-cumstance of the video making often falls beyond our investigation. Without the limitation of time, I would welcome further interpretation taking full consideration of the video creat-ing process.

Research design

Selection of Scenes

The 60-second video clip involves fourteen distinct themes with respective captions of ‘Stunning Chinese Beauty’, ‘Leading-Edge Chinese Agriculture’, ‘Influential Chinese Wealth’, ‘Extraordinary Chinese People’, ‘Aesthetic Chinese design’, ‘Trend-Setting Chinese Supermodels’, ‘Chinese Space Travel’, ‘Thriving Chinese Athletes’, ‘Thought-provoking Chinese Scholarship’, ‘Enchanting Chinese art’, ‘Captivating Chinese dialogue’, ‘Inspiring Chinese Bravery’, ‘ Award-Winning Chinese Talent’ and ‘Chinese Friendship/China’. These themes have been further elaborated in 15 scenes and 23 shots.6 due to time constraints and the length of the dissertation, examining all the scenes in full details is virtually impossible.

Hence, my primary focus is on those scenes most pertinent to my research interest, namely nationalism and self-Orientalism. guided by this principle, I develop my two main focuses into three sub-themes to facilitate the selection (See Table 1). In terms of national-ism, scenes explicitly embracing the message of ‘China in the world’ will be first selected. I acknowledge that nationalism is a broad theme and the selection criteria vary from diverse understanding of the concept. Our selection criteria are mainly based on Billig’s (1995) articulation of nationalism as relationship between nation and the world. Hence, scenes concerning international performance of China, and communication between China and the world have been chosen. To investigate whether China’s self-representation has conformed to the self-Orientalistic discourse, I picked scenes chiefly portraying Chinese women and scenes depicting the past and/or present of China. The representation of Chinese women is particularly pertinent to this project since Chinese women are the discursive representa-tion of China (Yan, 2009). Chinese showcase of its modernisation is also worth significant

6　 The 60 second video is the combination of two 30-second version clips.


readings because Orientalism can be an integral expression of modernity (dirlik, 1996).

Table 1 Scenes Selection

Research Interest Relevant Themes Scenes Selected

Nationalism China in the World Thriving Chinese Athletes(international activity)Captivating Chinese Dialogue(communication between China and the world)Award-Winning Chinese Talent (global recognition)

Self-Orientalism Chinese Women Stunning Chinese beauty (2 different scenes)

Past/PresentTradition/Modernity

Leading-Edge Chinese Agriculture (past/present)Chinese Space Travel (present/modernity)

Methodological Procedures

As previously mentioned, our analysis aims at answering the research questions by unfolding the threefold meaning of selected scenes. The analysis starts with the identification of the presenters’ social roles. This will be followed by examining the representational meanings of the scenes. denotation meanings of the scenes are acquired by a general description of the visuals and background images. Special attention has been poured into the dressing and makeup of the presenters and the selection of background images since they usually contain symbolic meanings (Barthes, 1983; Emmison, 2000). The analysis of connotation is contextualised in the vast background of Chinese culture and history. In terms of interactive meanings, three facets namely ‘contact’, ‘distance’ and ‘point of view’ are emphasized. These three categories depict the intangible relationship between the presenters and the viewers.7 Body language of the presenters and filming techniques, especially shots and angles, are closely examined. With regards toward the compositional meanings, the analysis only attends to the use of montage (cuts) and sounds omitting the overlapping part with interactive interpretation (shots, angles, point of view). Since all the selected scenes contains only one shot respectively and the background sounds do not vary with diverse scenes, the exploration of compositional meanings only tailors to the interpretation of the video as a whole. The final reading of the video from an overarching perspective is rewarding for grasping the correlation between various scenes/themes and impartially answering our research questions (Hawkes, 1977).

7　No repetition of interpretation will be addressed to the similar interactive meanings since same ‘distance’ and ‘point of view’ are applied to most of scenes in this video.


TABLE 2 Design of Research Tools

Scene (C

aption)

Social Identity of the P

representationalMeanings

denotation Visuals: dressing, furnishings, decorations

Background ImageConnotation

Interactive MeaningsBody Language: pose/gesture/facial expression

Contact distance Point of View

Body Language: pose/gesture/facial expression

Shots:e.g. long shot, medium shot, close shot, zoom shot

e.g. low angleeye-levelhigh anglefrontalityprofilereverse angle

Compositional Meanings

Montage(Cuts) Sounds

TypeRhythmEffects

TypeRelation to the imagesEffects

Note: the methodological procedures are inspired and developed upon the works of Jewitt and Oyama (2001), Iedema (2001), Rose (2007) and Monaco (1981).

RESULTS ANd INTERPRETATION

Nationalism: A Sense of National Pride and a Posture of Confidence and Independence

Nationalism is visibly manifested in the selected three scenes in the way of evoking the internal audience’s sense of national pride and displaying a confident and independent image of China to the global audience. In Scene 1(see Figure 1 in Appendices), sport has been utilised to awaken nationalism, which is a common practice across continents (Tudor, 1992; O’donnell, 1994). The powerful intersections of media have facilitated sports as a binding force and identity enforcement in nation-making (Rowe, McKay, & Miller, 1998). Five world-famous Chinese athletes are placed in front of the superimposed background of the National Stadium of China and the Parthenon. The Birds’ Nest stadium is one of the embodiments of the glorious present of China- a host of Olympics and a nation of strong soft power. On the other hand, Parthenon is the enduring symbol of Western civilization and athletics. The manipulation of background images intentionally connecting China with the world carries the connotation of ‘harmonization of western and non-western civilizations in an age of globalization’ (Xu, 2006: 104). Caption of ‘Thriving Chinese Athletes’ clearly reveals the presenters’ social identity and the use of descriptive adjective ‘thriving’ demonstrates a sense of national pride. The sport suits of outstanding volleyball player Lang Ping and prominent diver guo Jingjing further reinforce their social role. Moreover, the sharp contrast of height between former NBA player Yao Ming (2.29/7’6’’) and the Chinese professional snooker player ding Junhui (1.76/ 5’9’’) has created a strong visual impact. All of them are holding a confident posture and wearing a warm smile. For


instance, with arms hidden behind, legs slightly apart and chests thrown out, Lang and guo are in a quintessential posture of ‘presentation’. By zooming in and out, the camera has unfolded the scene and guided the viewers into the group presentation. Furthermore, the application of eye-level and frontal point of view has constructed an equal and interactive relationship between the presenters and the viewers (Jewitt & Oyama, 2001). In this way, the confident presentation of sports celebrities have enabled the cultivation of collective identity and the dissemination of officially endorsed Chinese national identity (Schlesinger, 1991b).

FIGURE 1 One Frame of Scene 1

In Scene 2 (see Figure 2 in Appendices), four Chinese TV anchors are standing in front of a 3 dimensional world map with prominent caption of ‘Captivating Chinese dialogue’. Dressed in professional wear, posing and smiling with confidence, four anchors represent the power and charm of Chinese communications. Similar filming techniques are employed to maintain a benign interaction with the viewers. The selection of the world map as a back-ground image highlights the link between China and the world: Chinese voice can be heard and China has a say in the world affairs. The demonstration of Chinese voice is closely as-sociated with its long history of ‘voiceless’. Although the People’s Republic of China was found in 1949, its political rights of representing itself have long been denied by a couple of Western countries (Schick, 1968). China did not official make itself heard until 1971 when admitted into the United Nations. In this scene, the video reshapes China’s national identi-ty from a voiceless and politically insignificant country into a confident and open-minded power. Nationalism is embedded in the intangible contrast between the present China and the past China (gries, 2001).


TABLE 3 Interpretation of Scene 1

Scene(Caption)

Social Identity of the Presenter(s)

representational M

eanings

Subjects/LayeredMeanings

Visuals Background Image

Thriving C

hinese Athletes (S

ee right column for caption indicating the nam

e of the presenters)

(Left to Right)

Lang Ping: former Chinese volleyball player and former head coach of the U.S. women’s national volleyball team

Guo Jingjing: Chinese female diver, consecutive champion at Olympics

Ding Junhui: Chinese most successful professional snooker player

Yao Ming: Chinese famous professional basketball player used to play in the NBA

deng Yaping: Chinese table tennis player who won six world championships and four Olympic championships

denotation

Five Chinese athletes stand together. Lang, Guo, deng are in sport suit. Ding and Yao in black and white shirts respectively.

Superimposition of National Stadium of China and Parthenon plus some watermarks of Chinese ‘lucky cloud’

Connotation

Chinese sport achievement in the world;Collective moment of national pride

Chinese sports spirit is in consistence with that of the WestHarmonization between Western civilization and non-Western civilisation

Interactive Meanings

Contact distance Point of View

Lang and Guo have their palms rest on the hips with their elbows bowed outward. Ding folds his hands on the chest. Yao has one hand on ding’s shoulder and the other in the pocket. deng lowers her arms with hands crossed. All of them are wearing smiles.

Type: Zoom-out shot/medium to long shotEffect: attract attention of the viewers, and guide the viewing

Type: eye-level, frontalityEffect: equality and engagement




Scene(Caption)


representational

Meanings


VisualsBackground Image

Captivating C

hinese Dialogu

(Left to Right)

Chen Luyu: famous Chinese anchor and host, known as ‘China’s Oprah’

Shui Junyi: prominent Chinese news anchor affiliated with China Central Television.

Jing Yidan: ibis.bai Yansong: ibis.

denotation

Four famous Chinese anchors stand together. Two of them are female.Jing is in informal attire. Chen is in Business Casual. Two male anchors are in smart casual.

A 3-dimensional map of the world

Connotationthe voice of Chinathe confident image of present China

Communication between China and the world;China has a say in world affairs.

InteractiveM

eanings

Contact

Chen folds her arms over the upper abdomen. Jing lowers her arms with her hands crossed. Shui thrusts one hand in his pocket and relax the other. Bai stands with his arms folded.


Scene 3 (See Figure 3 in Appendices) is the presentation of two world-class Chinese film directors. The visual narrative makes no effort to hide the strong national pride. The caption ‘Award-Winning Chinese Talent’ stresses on the global recognition of their works. Moreover, to appeals to Western sensibility, the video has applied the English name ‘John Woo’ instead of Chinese name ‘Wu Yusen’ to label of the director’s identity. The combined group presentation of one Hollywood Chinese director and one leading figure of Chinese film not only reveal the achievement of the Chinese film industry but also the dynamic of Chinese culture to cater for the diverse. Moreover, the computer-generated background of cinema has further reinforced the presenters’ identities as bankable film directors. The entire scene implies the international attractiveness of Chinese culture and its potential to contribute to the world diversity. Since national culture and national power is closely connected, China is demonstrating its national power when addressing its cultural strength (Morgenthau, 1985; Huntington, 1993). In this way, China portrays itself as a cultural at-tractive entity throughout the narrative of cultural nationalism.


China depicts its national identity in the selected scenes by waiving nationalism in var-ious ways. In Scene 1, ‘sport’ has been employed as the embodiment of collective glorious moments as well as the connecting point between China and the world. Sports serve as the binding force of the ‘imagined community’ and the global communication channel for nation-states (Anderson, 1991). Hence, China obtains the resonance of the global audience by displaying itself as a sport super power. In Scene 2, the national identity of China is re-shaped in the intangible contrast between its backward past and confident present. By pre-senting a politic active and world influential China, the video attempts to erase the Chinese past as a voiceless Third Country. Nationalism in this scene takes its effects by recalling the past (Bolin & Per, 2010). In Scene 3, nationalism is entangled with the presentation of soft power. In particular, culture is utilised as a manifestation of national strength and thus, to


evoke the national pride of Chinese. On the other hand, culture provides possibility to be shared and appreciated by a broader base of people. Hence, China is depicted as a cultural-ly appealing country.


Scene(Caption)


representational M

eanings



Aw

ard-Winning C

hinese Talent

(Left to Right)

John Woo (Wu Yusen): a famous Hong Kong-based film director with widely known Hollywood films such as Face/Off and Mission: Impossible 2.

Chen Kaike: a leading figure of the fifth generation of Chinese cinema

denotation

Two film directors stand side by side. Both of them are in suits.

inside the cinema

ConnotationChinese art is of global recognition.

Chinese films are successful at the box office.Chinese culture and art appeals to the global audience. Strong soft power

Interactive M

eanings

Contact

Woo smiles and stands with his arms folded. Wearing a serious look, Chen thrusts one hand in his pocket and relaxes the other.

Self-Orientalistic Representation of China?

Chinese Women: Exotic Beauty of China

Version one of the video starts with a group presentation of Chinese female stars. Behind them, there is a large traditional Chinese painting of flowers with Chinese calligraphy (See Figure 4 in Appendices). The painting appears to be yellow with age. All the presenters are in graceful poses wearing attractive smiles. Zhang Zilin, the first Miss World of east Asian origin, is serene in a black strapless gown with little pink flowers on her drape. The simple design of her dress reveals a beauty of mystery. Sitting in refined manner, Chinese famous actress Zhou Xun is in a white short Qipao.8 Although Qipao is Chinese national costume for women, it is ‘today neither commonly worn nor very highly regarded’ (Finnane, 1996). Women wearing this gender-distinctive garment have been regarded as a signifier of the nation (Ibid.). Yang Liping, famous for her peacock dance, follows a style of Chinese ethnic minority wearing a red garment and a dark blue dudou inside.9 dudou

8　 better known in the West as ‘cheongsam’.9　 Dudou is literally known as ‘belly cover’.


is a one-piece underwear with ‘cups and straps drawn over the shoulder and tied to the girth seam at the lower back’ (Shanner, 1996). It used to be an ancient vogue but has been out of fashion today.10 Moreover, Yang is also wearing a pair of very long white nails. Originating in ancient China, nail decoration was developed in accordance with Chinese idea of women’s nails as symbols of status, good manners and temperament (Nail Art). Long white and slender fingers were regarded as beautiful. Fan Bingbing, a Chinese actress recently active in various international fashion shows, is wearing a full-length blue and white porcelain style skirt. Chinese Blue and white porcelain is the embodiment of delicate Chinese craftsmanship. When the blue and white porcelain ware was exported to Europe in 17th and 18th centuries, it was exceedingly popular among aristocrats and its technique was even imitated by the Europeans (McCabe, 2008). Zhang Ziyi, widely known by the West after starring in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), is in a green dress with peacock-feather-like bodice and layered drape. Ancient Chinese believed that peacock is the manifestation of the phoenix on earth (Wei, 2006). 11As the counterpart of Chinese dragon (Chinese pinyin: long), phoenix is widely employed to represent the queen and females. It is also closely associated to Chinese feudal society. For instance, peacock feathers were used to decorate the trappings of officers in Qing Dynasty.


10 Dudou was popular among rich Chinese women in Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and become common in Qing Dynasty (1644-1912). See also Shanner (1996).11　The phoenix which Zhao people (BC 403-BC 222) worshipped stemmed from the large peacock and swan.



Scene(Caption)


representational M

eanings



Stunning C

hinese Beauty

(Left to Right)

Zhang Zilin: a beauty queen and fashion model, the first Miss World of East Asian origin (Miss World 2007)

Zhou Xun: Chinese actress and singer, one of the ‘Four Young Dan Actresses’ in China

Yang liping: a Chinese director, choreographer, famous for her ‘peacock dance’

Fan bingbing: a Chinese actress

Zhang Ziyi: a renowned Chinese film actress. She achieved wider fame in the West after starring in Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000)

denotation

Four Chinese stars gather together. Zhou and Yang are sitting while the other three are standing. Zhang Zilin is in a long black dress decorated with little pink flowers. Zhou wears a short white piece of Qipao. Yang is in a red ethnic dress with dark blue dudou inside and wears a pair of well-decorated long nails. Fan is in a long dress decorated with Chinese elements of ‘blue-white porcelain’. Zhang ziyi is in a peacock style green dress.

A traditional Chinese Painting of flowers with Chinese calligraphy

ConnotationDiverse and exotic Chinese beauty

representation of Chinese history, culture and arts, and Chinese taste of beauty


Contact

Zhang Zilin stands crossing her arms on the chest. Zhou sits crossing her legs. Yang sits with her hands crossing on her knees. Fan stands holding one hand at her side and the other relaxed. Zhang Ziyi slightly crosses her arms on the upper abdomen. All of them are wearing beautiful smiles.

In the following scene (See Figure 5), deaf and mute Chinese dancers are performing the stunning dance of guanyin (bodhisattva)12 of the Thousand Hands in front of a mural of flying Asparases. This iconographic depiction of Guanyin represents a grace under feminin-ity and compassion: in each hand of guanyin, an eye is watching over the suffering of the

12　known in the West as ‘Goddess of Mercy’.


world (King, 2011). The flying and immortal Apsarases are symbols of beautiful maidens of India’s heaven in Hindu and Buddhist culture (Priest, 1949). In China, Apsaras has ex-tended its religious meaning to the representation of femininity and good luck (Wang, Fan, & Li, 2009). dressing in shining golden costumes with exquisite ornaments on both hands and heads, dancers appear to follow the style of Chinese Ancient Western Regions. Their performance of guanyin and the background mural of dunhuang Fresco unfold the mem-ories of glorious Chinese past. dunhuang, a crucial junction of the Silk Road (BC 202-Ad 8), was then a highway for the trade and culture between the east and the West (Whitfield, 1996). Apart from the crucial role in world history, the Silk Road is also the embodiment of the prosperous Chinese past. In Sui and Tang dynasty (Ad 589-Ad 896), the Silk Road was further developed and flourishing, which facilitated the expansion of East-West ex-change (Wood, 2002). A great deal of foreign merchants then gathered and even settled down in Chinese east capital Luoyang and west capital Chang’an. In this scene, an image of powerful, prosperous, joyful, and religiously mysterious ancient China has been portrayed and presented in the visual spectacle of guanyin dance.


The selected scenes have depicted China as a feminine and ancient Oriental country catering for the Western imagination. In Scene 4, Chinese women are dressed and pos-ing like a collection of highly wrought articles expecting for the foreign gaze. Traditional Chinese elements such as qipao, dudou, blue and white porcelain and phoenix have been manipulated to intensify the exotic identity. As the camera zooms in and out, women in this scene remain smiling and wordless. They are presented by their social identity as beauty queen or actress, and by the exoticism woven into their dressing and makeup, rather than by themselves, as individual embodiment of truly diverse beauty. Saturated in a deep nos-talgic emotion, Scene 5 reproduces a changeless China in its heyday. By invoking the reli-


gious icons and highlighting the femininity, this scene has displayed China as a prosperous and dreamy country. Making Chinese women as the epitome of China, Scene 4 and 5 have constructed a Chinese identity as old and unchanged Oriental country with exotic feminine attractiveness. This has conformed to the self-Orientalistic discourse or in Said’s definition, a radical realism attempting to identify the east as fixed and unchangeable (Macfie, 2002).


Scene(Caption)


representational M

eaning



Stunning C

hinese Beauty

Dancers (Principal dancer: Tai Lihua): deaf-mute dancers famous for their dance of Guanyin of the Thousand Hands.

denotation

A group of dancers are playing the dance of Guanyin of the Thousand Hands (but we can only see their hands except for the principal dancer Tai). They are in the shining golden costume. Tai is also wearing a gorgeous decoration on her head.

A mural of Dunhuang Fresco depicting flying apsaras

Connotation

stunning Chinese art;exotic and diverse Chinese beauty;femininity and compassion

Delicate Chinese craftsmanship; Buddhist art from the Silk Road; glorious ancient China;Charming and mysterious Chinese culture


Contact

Dancers are playing the dance of Guanyin of the Thousand Hands with their hands making the rounds across the net.

The Past and the Present: A Material Representation of Chinese Modernisation

When the camera switches to Scene 6 (see Figure 6 in Appendices) and slowly zooms out, Chinese agricultural scientist Yuan Longping seems to greet the viewers with a slight inclination of his head. Sitting on a mahogany chair, Yuan conveys no distinct


facial expression. A wooden container filled with paddy rice is placed beside him. A large background image portraying dropping ears of rice along with the caption ‘Leading-Edge Chinese Agriculture’ reinforces his widely-known identity as ‘Father of Hybrid Rice’. Yuan does not speak a single word just like other presenters in this video. However, as a crucial figure in the development of Chinese agriculture, Yuan himself is a signifier of Chinese modernisation. The scene is an entanglement of Chinese past and present. It demonstrates an official shift of Chinese national identity from a poor agriculture country to an emerging and influential power. It also serves as a self-evident response to the query on China’s capability of satisfying its future grain needs. For instance, Brown (1995) used to question China’s ability to feed itself due to the dramatic reduce of croplands accompanying by its ongoing industrialisation. The breakthrough of agricultural technology and the rapid advancement of modernisation represented by this scene have provided the official explanation to this doubt. The interpretation is furthered supported by the fact that although a late comer in modernisation, China has achieved remarkable success in its course of modernisation. Specifically, due to a series of successful reforms in the last two decades of the 20th century, the number of Chinese people living in absolute poverty has been substantially reduced from over 250 million to about 50 million (Qian, 2003). Hence, the message conveyed by the scene can be interpreted as the official Chinese claim of the end to famine and its proud presentation of its achievement in modernisation.


As another manifest representation of Chinese modernisation, Scene 7 (see Figure 7 in Appendices) depicts a group of Chinese astronauts. differing from Scene 6 focusing on the past and present of China, Scene 7 unfolds both the present and the future of China. dress-ing in the dark blue uniform with national flags on the chests, six astronauts are standing in the pose of soldiers and displaying Chinese military bearing. Wearing a serious look, Yang


Liwei, the first man sent into space by China, is positioned in the middle and made salient. Yang is utilised in the scene as the signifier of the historically moment when China became the third country to independently send people into space. The group presentation of astro-nauts is indicative of the current development of Chinese space industry and the rising of its military strength. Behind the astronauts, the background picture portraying the flying aerospace vehicles and space-walking astronauts is suggestive of a field full of potential and waiting to be explored. The visual presentation of Chinese space achievement echoes Chinese government’s belief that ‘science and technology are capable of pushing society ever forward in a desired direction’ (Woei, 1993: 144).


Although the proud claim of resolving the poverty conveyed by Scene 6 or the gratify-ing achievement of Chinese science and technology presented in Scene 7 are miniatures of Chinese modernisation, they only reveal its material dimension. Apart from the reification of Western modernity, the video evades the presentation of modernity in the dimensions of ideology and culture. This in fact is the reflection of Chinese government’s long-time am-bivalence about modernity: an entanglement with eagerness and fear. On one hand, the tre-mendous growth under Western pattern is a lure for developing China. On the other hand, the incompatibility between socialist China and capitalist West generates concerns over the possible political instability imposed by the indiscriminate acceptance of Western moder-nity. As Leo Ou-fan Lee (2000) reveals in his exploration of Shanghai modernity, Chinese modernity have more concerns about the utility rather than the rationality of science and technology (Yeh, 2000). Shanghai model of modernity is further labelled as ‘colonial mo-dernity’ by dirlik (2002). Chinese emphasis on material modernity largely results from Western Enlightenment ideology and social darwinism (Yan, 2009). The West has been placed on the higher and superior level of the linear scale of social development. To the contrary, non-Western countries have been positioned as passive and inferior. Consequent-


ly, clinging to the next stage of development, the Oriental countries have to be subject to the material representation of the West and thus, conform to self-Orientalism.


Scene(Caption)


representational M

eanings



Leading-Edge C

hinese Agriculture

Yuan Longping: a Chinese agricultural scientist and educator, also known as ‘The Father of Hybrid rice’

denotation

Yuan sits on a mahogany chair. A wooden containers filled with paddy rice is placed on the mahogany table beside him. He is wearing a short-sleeves shirt of blue white checks.

An image of super hybrid rice

ConnotationChinese agriculture development is ahead of the world.

China has successfully solved the problem of food and has made contribution to the resolution of world food problem. Achievement of Chinese modernisation


Contact

Yuan is sitting on the chair with no distinct facial expression.



Scene(Caption)


representational M

eanings



Chinese S

pace Trave

Chinese AstronautsFrom left to right:

Zhai Zhigang: crew member of Shenzhou 7, the first Chinese citizen to carry out a spacewalk

Nie Haisheng: crew member of Shenzhou 6

Yang Liwei: the first man sent into space by the Chinese space program. Yang’s mission Shenzhou 5 made China the third country to independently send people into space.

Fei Junlong: crew member of Shenzhou 6

Jing Haipeng: crew member of Shenzhou 7

Liu Boming: crew member of Shenzhou 7

denotation

6 Chinese astronauts stand side by side. All of them are in dark blue uniforms and boots. There is a clear red national flag on each of their uniforms.

An image of space portraying several aerospace vehicles and astronauts in space suits

Connotation

A highly disciplined image of Chinese Military;The rapid development of Chinese space industry and technology;

The achievement of Chinese modernization.The potential of technology developmentThe bright future of Chinese modernisation


Contact

Six astronauts stand at attention with Yang in the middle. Their facial expression tends to be serious.


Discussions: Reading the Video as a Whole

With various scenes conveying diverse themes flashing by, the 60-second visual showcase displays an updated China through the group presentation of Chinese celebrities. A piece of exuberant music has run through the entire video parallel to each scene. The variations of rhythms, beats and tones and the application of embellishments are indicative of traditional China while the majestic symphonic music is suggestive of the modernity. The cross-practice of traditional Chinese elements and the Western music factors have recreated a sense of past and present crisscross. Furthermore, the application of red colour is utilised to intensify the ancientness of China since red is the auspicious symbol for harvest and passion long favoured by Chinese people across different classes (Yan, 2009). The jumping rhythm of the background music and a series of dissolve cut in connecting different shots are employed to draw the viewers’ attention. All the presenters in the video remain silent. Thus, a ‘new’ China is presented by the smiling and silent celebrities in the visual and auditory interlacing of past and present.

Nationalism is the surface current of the video, which can easily be identified in the first three scenes selected. Making use of collective activities and memories like sport, awaken-ing national pride in presenting a contrastively current image, demonstrating the attractive and adaptable Chinese culture, nationalism is penetrated in depicting an open-minded, po-litical influential, cultural appealing and domestic united new China.

However, nationalism is only the literal meaning of the video. Self-Orientalism instead is the sub-surface current, which reflects the long-term painful and contradictory construc-tion of Chinese national identity. In early 20th century, China has fumbled for its national identity by viewing ‘Chinese tradition and Western modernity as oppositional dichotomies’ (Shih, 2001). China was associated with cultural terms such as ‘traditional’ and ‘agricul-tural’ while accordingly the West was linked to phrases like ‘modern’ and ‘industrial’. On one hand, intoxicated with the glorious past and attempting to capture global attention, China has again romanticised itself as the opposite to the West by inventing the traditional elements appealing to Western imagination. By portraying China in this way, China has brought an unchanged Orient to the Western learning, Western consciousness, and later, Western empire (Said, 2003). This can be seen from the reification of Chinese women as embodiment of exotic beauty. On the other hand, China has depicted itself as a modern nation. However, it only attends to the material representation of its modernisation. This largely results from its dual feelings of intense longing for modernity and fear about the undesirable political consequences generated by Western modernity. This ambivalence of self-representation is closely tied to Chinese history. In the last century, the tangled warfare among feudal warlords and the invasion of fascist Japanese has imposed miseries on China. Lagging far behind the West, China is in desperate need for development. This is mani-fested in its great Leap Forward Movement (1958-1961), which aimed at transforming the agrarian country into a modern communist society through rapid industrialisation. The socialist attempts resulted in catastrophe and the economic regression. Moreover, the sub-sequent Cultural Revolution launched by Mao Zedong to safeguard the socialist economic system and communist ideology has exerted further detrimental impacts upon Chinese so-ciety (Lu, 2004). To speed up modernisation, China has adopted a reform and opening-up policy since late 1978. Losing the ideological reference point for modernisation after the


disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991, China finds no available pattern of moder-nity other than the Western paradigm to draw upon. However, China still hesitates to fully follow the Western path. The Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989 has rendered Chinese government more cautious of the unfavourable consequences triggered by Western ideol-ogy, for instance, the call for political liberalisation in this particular case. The desire for growth and the fear for political instability have placed Chinese construction of its national identity in torment. Though with ideological resistance, China still slips into the self-Orien-talism in its quest for modernity.

CONCLUSION REMARKS

Aiming at adding insights to the self-representation of others and intrigued by the hypothesis that the rising of nationalism in the non-Western countries is inclined to invoke self-Orientalism, this dissertation employed a social semiotic approach to examine how China displays its national identity in its visual showcase (dirlik, 1996). The interpretation of the representational, interactive and compositional meanings of the video is situated in the broad context of Chinese culture and history and confined in the theoretical framework of nationalism and Orientalism.

This project reveals a struggling self-representation of China. Firstly, nationalism which penetrates through the entire video is invoked by Chinese government to consolidate the national identity of its internal audience and re-brand itself to the global viewers. By arous-ing the collective memories, evoking national pride and demonstrating soft power, China displays itself as a confident, attractive and peace-loving nation. This coincides with Chi-nese claim of ‘peaceful rising’ and gives a response to the concern about ‘China Threat’. Secondly, exploring beyond nationalism, the project identifies an Orientalistic narrative in Chinese self-representation. Intensifying the exotic beauty of Chinese women and making them as symbols of its glorious past, China presents an unchanged Oriental country full of fascinations and miracles. However, the seemingly intentional shaping of a China catering for Western imagination may be a branding strategy of China to make itself salient. Further-more, China provides a reified representation of Western modernity when it portrays itself as a modern country. This largely results from the Chinese persistent quest for modernity and its perception of development as a liner process where the Western model appears to be superior. However, China does not conform to the self-Orientalistic discourse without resis-tance. With incompatible ideology with the West, Chinese authority is reluctant to refer to the West in terms of non-material dimensions.

While non-Western countries seem to fall prey to Orientalistic representation, Chinese ideological resistance of Western modernity opens up a possibility for the others to search for a proper paradigm pertinent to their own conditions. As a number of scholars believed, the eventual fate of non-Western countries would not be submissive and they are able to make an original contribution (Radtke, 1993). The recent global revival of Confucianism has reinforced this point by implying a new paradigm of modernisation transcending the seemingly only available model of Western modernity (Lee, 1997). The question that lies in extricating from Orientalistic representation of self is not if, but when. Thus, future research might concentrate on the resistance of non-Western countries in reshaping the stereotyped representation of the others as well as the appropriate paradigms of non-Western moderni-


sation other than colonial modernity. Aside from the limitation of subjectivity, the social semiotic methodology also implies more than one interpretation of the video and allows the video being examined in various contexts. Without constrains of dissertation length, a comprehensive and in-depth investigation of each scene will surely generate more useful insights.

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Author’s Biodata:Roujie Wang, currently an English teacher in International College, Xiamen University, holds the MSc. in Media and Communication governance in London School of Economics and Political Science (2011) as well as the double bachelor’s degree in diplomacy and English in Beijing Foreign Studies University (2010). Her research interest lies in the self-representation and national identity establishment of China.



Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese Language Classroom: A Qualitative Study1

Ka F. WongSt Olaf College, U.S.A.

The notion of integrating culture into the foreign and second language curriculum, with the aim of enhancing linguistic competence as well as cross-cultural understanding, has become increas-ingly important for Chinese language educators. However, such an undertaking is easier said than done. The realization of teaching and learning culture proves to be a daunting task. Through sixty in-depth interviews with members of the Chinese pedagogical community in the United States, this study explores the perspectives of both teachers and students on incorporating culture into the Chinese classroom. The grounded theory-based analysis identifies seven theoretical sample categories regarding the subject—complexity in defining culture, importance of cultural pedago-gy, interests in cultural teaching and learning, limitations on cultural pedagogy, complications in integrating culture, timeliness of cultural pedagogy, as well as training and background of the in-dividuals. These categories enrich our understanding of the role of culture in the actual classroom. Thus, this study hopes to initiate further discussion and development of cultural pedagogy in Chi-nese language instruction.

Keywords: Chinese, culture, cultural pedagogy, second language acquisition

INTROdUCTION

Although Chinese pedagogues have widely acknowledged the call for an integrated curriculum of language and culture, few agree on what constitutes, or ought to constitute, the category of culture in the classroom. Everything in daily life somehow relates to culture, of which language is an essential part. The inexhaustible array of materials offers as many promises as problems for teachers. The dilemma is not about whether to teach culture or not “but rather one of degree,” and “the challenge lies in teaching language in a more culture-centered environment” (Allen, 1985, p.145). How culture and language are linked in the classroom depends largely on how the notion of culture is interpreted. despite the growing appreciation and demand for teaching culture, it is still very difficult to pin down its definition. This is partly because language and culture are such complex concepts, and partly, because the various academic views on these issues are so numerous and diffuse. While some scholars highlight the so-called “Big C Culture”—such as philosophy, art, and literature—to enhance instruction, others favor “small c culture” that focuses on the communicative aspects of daily lives.

As the importance of culture in foreign and second language acquisition becomes an

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Ka F. Wong. E-mail: [email protected]

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 67-88wONg68

increasingly studied subject, this study endeavors to further shed light into Chinese cultural pedagogy through sixty in-depth interviews with members of the Chinese educational com-munity. While many researchers are interested in theorizing the role of culture in language acquisition, the perspectives of both teachers and students often remain unexplored. Sapir (1994) maintains that the “individual is the bearer of culture”; where researchers should start is the individual and his or her behavior (p.140). Accordingly, the actual classroom experiences of teachers and students form the central thread of this article. The ground-ed-theory based analysis produces seven categories of Chinese cultural pedagogy, which can enrich our understanding and enhance the development of the field. Before presenting the interview analysis, a brief overview of the extant literature about culture in the language classroom is germane to the discussion.

CULTURE ANd LANgUAgE IN THE CLASSROOM: A BRIEF LITERATURE RE-VIeW

The cultural nature of language pedagogy is nothing new. Yet the consensus that foreign language students can fully “achieve communicative competence only if they learn to understand the target culture at the same time” is a fairly recent development (Singerman 1988, p.9). The second half of the twentieth century saw an amplified attempt to integrate culture into the language curriculum. The seminal works of Brooks (1960), Hall (1959), and Seelye (1981), to name a few, are pioneering examples. Many scholars since have compellingly promoted the cause. Byram (1989) lays the groundwork for cultural pedagogy, which he refers to as “cultural studies,” to claim a “rightful place” in language classrooms. As a guide to teaching culture, Valdés (1986) brings together conceptual and practical resources from a variety of disciplines that pay special attention to the perspective of the language instructor. Robinson (1985) extends the meaning of “cross-cultural understanding” from the “behaviorist and functionalist” school to “cognitive and symbolic” approaches. Damen (1987) sees culture as “the fifth dimension” in the language classroom. Her discussion on teaching culture from the “intercultural communication perspective” merits special attention. Believing that “language expresses and embodies cultural reality,” Kramsch (1998a) argues that “cultural awareness must be viewed both as enabling language proficiency and as being the outcome of reflection on language proficiency” (pp.3-8). Teaching culture thus not only makes students aware of speech acts, cultural facts, connotations and etiquette but also grants them with the opportunity to think and act as members of the target society.

Setting cultural teaching on the same track as cognitive and symbolic anthropology, many experts further suggest that cultural pedagogy should expand beyond “national her-itage” and conceive culture as a communal system of “thinking about and interpreting reality” (Campbell & Pfister 2002, p.6). This interest is best manifested in The National Standards for Foreign Language Learning: Preparing for the 21st Century (1996, 1999). Culture, along with Communication, Communities, Connections, and Comparisons, are the five principles in foreign language learning. Specifically, teaching “Culture” entails the dissemination of the products, practices, and perspectives of the target-language society. Meanwhile, cultural knowledge is considered crucial to all three modes of communica-tion—interpersonal, interpretive, and presentational. It is important to instill in students a

Cultural Pedagogy in the Chinese language Classroom 69

sense of cross-cultural awareness by providing them not merely with the facts of the for-eign culture but also with the tools to formulate proper attitudes and empathic worldviews towards the “others,” eventually leading to a critical reflection on their own cultures.

Encouraged by advances in its Western counterparts, Chinese scholarship has, too, re-cast language acquisition in the mode of cultural and communicative competence. Walker (2000) puts forward a “performed culture approach,” in which the chief concern is the cul-ture of everyday life, the socio-behavioral realm. Shepherd (2005) underscores aspects of “performed culture,” especially culturally coded intentions in the second language, through the studies of “banquet.” Another concerted effort is Tseng’s (2007) AP Chinese Language and Culture Teacher’s Guide that develops a high-school Chinese curriculum within an en-riched cultural framework. On the other hand, Wong (2008) proposes “4P’s of cultural ped-agogy,” a new paradigm for incorporating the cultural dimension into the Chinese language classroom.

emphasis on culture in the field of “teaching Chinese as a second language” (Duiwai Hanyu jiaoxue 对外汉语教学 ) has also been advocated by scholars such as Xu Jialu 许嘉璐 (2008), Zhang Zhanyi 张占一 (1992), and Zhao Xianzhou 赵贤州 (1992). The Office of Chinese Language Council International ( 中国国家汉语国际推广领导小组 ), also known as “Hanban” ( 汉办 ), has made culture one of the basic tenets in Chinese language ped-agogy. Book compilations on teaching culture in the language context have emerged as a result. Xiaoqi Li’s (2006) Duiwai Hanyu wenhua jiaoxue yanjiu (对外汉语文化教学研究 ) is one of the noteworthy editions.

METHOdOLOgY

To better comprehend the issues facing cultural teaching and learning in the Chinese classroom, sixty interviews were conducted in total with twenty teachers and forty students in the United States. The participants came from diverse demographics and with various experiences, including teachers from different age groups and ethnic origins, as well as both heritage and non-heritage students who learned Chinese in college, high-school, weekend-heritage school, intensive summer program, study-abroad and exchange program in a wide range of Chinese communities. Their demographic information is provided in Appendices 1 and 2. All student interviews were conducted in English, and excerpts were presented as such. Fifteen teacher interviews were in Mandarin (five of which were in a combination of English and Mandarin), and the translations by the author are provided along with their original Chinese transcriptions in the excerpts.

The transcripts were examined to extract a full range of responses and to identity all the central ideas expressed by the participants. The initial coding of the data generated a set of labels—either identified by the participants themselves or emerging during the process of analysis—from which broader categories were derived. These labels were not identified a priori and were allowed to develop from the participant’s responses rather than the re-searcher’s preconceived notions on the matter. Once a category was identified, it was re-ex-amined in order to confirm whether or not it was supported by other examples and further evidence to enrich its description until the category was “saturated” (Richards, 2003, p.17). The “axial coding” procedure—organizing related categories into subcategories and mak-ing connections among them—was then performed. Finally, seven “theoretical sample” cat-


egories were identified—1) complexity in defining culture; 2) importance of cultural peda-gogy; 3) interests in cultural teaching and learning; 4) limitations on cultural pedagogy; 5) complications in integrating culture; 6) timeliness of cultural pedagogy; and 7) training and background of the individuals.

As each category is supported by many similar opinions, only selected quotes are pre-sented here to illustrate the point. Although some citations are abbreviated with ellipses and personal names are omitted, the quotes are reproduced as they were spoken, with their idio-syncrasies and at times grammatical errors intact. To keep the identities of the interviewees anonymous, the excerpts only mention their assigned codes with “T” for teacher and “S” for student, followed by their session number as listed in the Appendices.

Complexity in Defining Culture

As the inquiry centers on cultural pedagogy, the first and foremost question seeks to understand how the teacher and student participants interpret the meaning of culture in the Chinese classroom. The interviewees all render their notions of cultural teaching and learning rather differently. Still, they generally feel that culture, as a concept, covers a broad scope of ideas, issues, and representations that often eludes simple definition. A teacher states that “culture is a complicated phenomenon, but from a language teaching point of view, we ought to simultaneously explain how that language turns out to be like this, or why conversations are spoken in certain ways. And here within lies culture [ 文化是一个很复杂的现象。但是要是从语言教学来看的话 , 我们要解释语言为什么是这样子的 , 对话为什么要这样子的说 , 其中就是文化 ]” (T#6).

Like this teacher above, most of the respondents relate culture to the collective behav-ioral and cognitive pattern of a community. One teacher defines culture as “the habits and practices of language, of living, and of customs [ 文化就是语言的习惯 , 生活习惯 , 风俗习惯 ]” (T#4). In giving more specific definitions of culture, many teachers resort to “text-book” explanations, that is, the division of the “Big C” and “small c” cultures. One teacher elucidates his idea:

Big C culture mainly includes… history, literature, art, and architecture, etc. This i s probably easier to see through the accumulated products in history and through historical records. Also, there are the small c cultures. Those are the principles for people’s daily be-haviors, and then their customs and habits. This is related to the principles of our language use, which is invisible and hard to grasp, but yet an important part of cultural pedagogy.

大文化主要包括那种 … 历史 , 文学 , 艺术 , 建筑 , 等等的。这个可能比较容易通过历史的沉淀 , 记载下来的东西。还有一些小文化 , 就是说人们日常的行为规范 , 然后是他们的习俗 , 这是跟咱们语言使用的一些规范性的东西 , 隐形的 , 不好把握的 , 但是文化教学中的一个重要的部分。(T#7)

The reason why the teachers base their definitions on theories is perhaps not too diffi-cult to conjecture. These cultural concepts are included in the common readings of language pedagogy, and thus, would be a familiar part of their education and teaching guidelines. Of course, the more traditional understanding of culture makes up many teachers’ conception as well. When the participants were asked to name a few things that instantly come to their minds regarding Chinese culture, the most typical answers were expectedly food, festival, Confucianism, the language, and the color red.


The student interviewees also describe culture as a mixture of material and cognitive el-ements. Indeed, they lean even more towards the conventional definitions, such as tradition, family, and history. It is interesting to point out that a number of non-heritage students (as well as a Caucasian teacher) identify “money” as one of their strongest perceptions of Chi-nese culture, yet none of the ethnic Chinese teachers or heritage students do so. A Cauca-sian student who has studied Mandarin in Taiwan mentions “saving money, being frugal… always cares about money” when she thinks of Chinese culture (S#2). Another Caucasian student agrees that “everyone talks about money, real estate, all the time” in China (S#9). Whether Chinese culture overtly concerns money is a topic more appropriate for a sociol-ogist. Nevertheless, the different observations among the so-called insiders and outsiders suggest that culture is above all subjective, and the two groups often hold dissimilar Chi-nese cultural images.

The precarious nature of understanding culture, together with the potential issues that may result from it, is best summed up by this teacher. “In reality, seldom can teachers really practice what these theories entail; in term of cultural pedagogy, it’s generally more about “discussing military strategies on paper [ 实际上很少老师能够真正地实践这些理论上的东西。对文化教学来说 , 大概一般都是 “ 纸上谈兵 ” 比较多 ]” (T#8). The varied comments by the participants highlight the difficulty in defining culture and the even more challenging task of integrating it into the Chinese classroom. In spite of the disparate views, there is little disagreement on the importance of culture in Chinese language acquisition, which forms the second category of the discussion.

Importance of Cultural Pedagogy

All interviewees share the premise that culture is intricately linked to language learning. It is, hence, vital for teachers to bring cultural elements into the classroom. A teacher believes that “culture is absolutely a part of the language class,” and “language and culture cannot be separated” [ 文化绝对是语言课的一部分 ... 因为语言跟文化不能脱离 ] (T#16). A different teacher affirms the necessity of incorporating culture into language courses, especially when one aims to take the student-centered and communicative approach. She maintains: “Culture must be included in language teaching exactly because we emphasize student-centered pedagogy, situational dialogue, and communication. Culture is surely embedded within [ 文化是肯定要包含在语言教学中的。因为我们就是强调学生为主的这种方式 , 强调情景对话 , 强调这个 communication。那就肯定有文化在里面 ]”. (T#6)

Other teachers support the idea of cultural pedagogy because cross-cultural awareness may not come automatically to most foreign and second language learners. Thus, additional cultural explanations are needed.

For example, we Chinese people like to repeat certain words when expressing polite-ness, like nǎli nǎli and such. If we don’t explain them, the students would have no idea what they mean and also wouldn’t know how to use them.

比如说像我们中国人喜欢表示客气的时候就会 repeat 一些 words, 哪里哪里什么的。如果不跟他们讲 , 他们就不知道是什么意思 , 他们也不会用。 (T#3)

Likewise, learners see culture as an integral part of their language acquisition experi-ence. All student interviewees believe that cultural knowledge should be taught along with linguistic skills in the classroom. Culture is important, as one of the students argues; “be-


cause you can’t really get a good sense of what the Chinese language is without knowing what’s behind it” (S#30). Another student notes” “If you just learn a language just to learn the language, it’s not useless, but I think… you don’t embody the experience to the full-est… The point of learning another language is to be able to connect with people of differ-ent cultures” (S#24). While a lot of the values are the same between Chinese and Western cultures, a student realizes that they are often expressed differently.

Every time you go to your house [in China] you had to take off your shoes... Westerners don’t do that… Westerners really value keeping the house clean, we do; we just don’t take off our shoes. So like the core principle of the issue is really the same… but just the way they put them into practice can be a little different… what else… I think polite, sometimes [Chinese act] in ridiculous ways, like rejecting things before accepting them. It’s also very different (S#9).

Similarly, a student acknowledges the importance of cultural learning since “people who take [Chinese classes] probably want to use the language to go to China, so they don’t want to offend people when they’re there” (S#13). Like this student, many participants voice that the Chinese that they learned in the classroom would inevitably be applied to real life situations; therefore, appropriate language use and adequate background knowledge, which are by all means culturally specific, make culture a fundamental element in language education.

Interests in Cultural Teaching and Learning

That culture is imperative to second language learning is not the sole reason for its importance. Culture is essential to the language classroom because it can also generate students’ interest. Almost all students mention that culture makes their classes more “interesting” and “feel more connected to the language.” Answering the question whether culture should be taught in the Chinese classroom, one student replies: “The grammar and sentence structures and all of that are interesting in an academic sense, but what really makes people excited about language learning is culture” (S#9). Learning the purely linguistic aspects of the language can be “monotonous”; adding cultural discussion can make the lessons livelier and enhance the language learning experience (S#17).

Not surprisingly, many teachers have the same view. A teacher opines that “when talking about culture, the class would become more interesting because it incites students’ interests [ 我觉得讲文化的时候会让课堂比较有意思 , 因为他们的兴趣就上来了嘛 ]” (T#3). Another teacher remarks how cultural discussion can stimulate her classes: “Student’s reactions are generally very enthusiastic. Basically, when we start talking about [culture], there will be no end to it. They become extremely excited [ 学生的反应一般都很热烈 , 基本上一讨论起来就没完没了 , 他们非常兴奋 ]” (T#5). To boost the learners’ interest, many teachers have incorporated cultural elements into their instructional agenda with warm appreciation from the students. Furthermore, some teachers have turned the class-room into a Chinese “cultural island,” making culture an explicit element of the learning experience. A teacher remarks:

Our department chair is very keen on the decoration inside the classroom. For example, we will hang red lanterns, dragons, decorate for the Chinese festivals, letting the students experience Chinese culture. In terms of color, red is the main palette… In fact, students are


very interested. 我们的系主任非常重视在教室里面的布置。比方说我们会挂上大红灯呀 , 龙呀 ,

中国的节日呀 , 让他们感受到中国的文化。颜色上就是以红色为主色调 … 其实学生很感兴趣。 (T#9)

From cultural differences to appropriate etiquette, the students are keen on knowing a wide variety of topics offered by their Chinese teachers. A heritage student wants to find out more about the traditions behind the cultural topics that she learned in class. “Not just with what happens but why is it, what started this tradition,” she says (S#1). Apart from tradition and history, most participants believe popular cultures and contemporary lifestyles in Chinese communities are the most intriguing aspects for learners. A student maintains:

Most students are very interested in the daily life in China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong... what it’s like to buy things, take a taxi cab, bargaining, food in the markets, order food in the restaurant, those kind of things (S#4).

In addition, a teacher discovers that the more spontaneous the cultural discussion, the more interested the students become.

Every time I talk about culture, they are pretty interested... But if the teacher intention-ally talks about a lesson-related topic that is not accidental, but a specially designed unit, then they would lose their interest. For example, we teach a special… story from an idiom, like “Jingwei filling the Ocean,” they don’t have much interest. I find it very strange... If it is accidental, something like naturally emerged conversation, this is how we Chinese are; the students are particularly interested and listen with great delight.

每次讲到文化他们都挺有兴趣的 ... 可是老师故意地跟课堂内容有关的 , 不是 ac-cidental 的 ... 而是有特定的一个 cultural unit , 他们反而就没有兴趣。比如说我们今天特意教…一个成语的故事“精卫填海”什么的 , 他们就没有什么兴趣。我觉得很奇怪 ... 如果是 accidental, 好像是 naturally emerged 的 conversation, 我们是这样子的 , 他们就特别有兴趣 , 听得津津有味的。(T#6)

Teaching and learning culture in the Chinese classroom, according to the interviewees, is both important and interesting. However, it may not be an easy undertaking. The suc-cessful outcome of cultural pedagogy depends on numerous institutional, situational, and personal factors. The following categories present some of the major concerns put forward by the participants.

Limitations on Cultural Pedagogy

Although the interviewees value the role of culture in successful language acquisition, they, too, voice reservations about its implementation. A teacher expresses her concern:

The direction of including culture is surely not wrong. It’s because, putting it in con-crete terms, language is a form of vehicle for culture... But even the direction is right, how to actually realize its operation, I feel that is still a rather difficult issue.

要包括文化这个方向肯定是没有错的。因为具体来讲 , 就是说语言是文化的一种载体 ... 但是就是说方向对 , 具体要怎样操作 , 我觉得是比较难的一个东西。(T#15)

There are a few complications in cultural pedagogy that most teachers find challenging, including the language of instruction, the constraints on time and other resources, as well as the integration of cultural materials.

The language of instruction is one of the obvious problems, especially for elementary


level classes. Since the class is above all a “language” class, the instructional language should be in the target language. However, beginners have very limited linguistic skills. They can barely command the basic language itself, needless to say, comprehend or discuss complex cultural issues in Chinese. As the employment of English seems unavoidable in teaching culture, how to strike a balance becomes an issue. different teachers ostensibly have different positions, depending in part on the age group and proficiency level of the learners. A teacher mentions:

For the lower level students, it is probably not appropriate to discuss too much because of their limited language ability. When we introduce the material culture, there will be a lot of special terms, which they won’t be able to take them all in.

对低年级的学生可能还是不适合过多 , 因为他们的语言能力有限 , 因为在介绍到物质文化的时候 , 你会碰到很多很多的专有名词 , 他们可能一下子就接受不了。(T#20)

While the students’ lack of language skill poses a challenge, limited class time generates another problem. Comparing her Chinese teaching experiences in high school with college, one teacher finds the latter was far more pressed for time, and hence, a less accommodating environment to cultural teaching.

I felt the biggest problem is that we have this time constraint. Chinese classes, espe-cially elementary classes, have embedded such a packed target within the curriculum. Then culture, because you have to really explain it, and explanation is only secondary, the key is action, for example, to do some small presentations, or a song, look at some calligraphy and paintings, this kind of activities. I always feel that there is no time.

我觉得最大的问题就是我们有这个 time constraint。中文课 , 尤其是基础中文课 , 就有这么一个繁密 target 在里面。然后因为文化 , 你真的要解释 , 而且解释是次要的 , 关键的是要做 , 譬如说让他们去做一个小小的 presentation, 或者学一首歌呀 , 看一些书画呀 , appreciation 这一类东西 , 就经常的觉得没有时间做。(T#6)

Although many students wish to seek a deeper understanding of the culture behind the language, the lack of class time often discourages their pursuits. “As far as learning culture my biggest question is always why,” one student asserts; “the why question takes a lot lon-ger than what you have time for in class” (S#23). Many other students have comparable re-sponses. “We don’t even have enough time to learn the language,” another student claims; “there’s not really time to learn culture” (S#10).

Time is not the only resource that is lacking. The preset teaching materials may also limit the ways in which teachers can bring culture into the classroom. A teacher laments the lack of “freedom” (T#19) and regrets that most schools only pay lip-service to cultural pedagogy with little effort to actually promote it. He says: “There is no curriculum that said you did not need to teach culture. But almost all curriculums require you to teach so much stuff in so little time that when it comes to making a choice, very regrettably, teachers would neglect the cultural part [ 没有一个课程说你不用教文化 , 但是几乎所有的课程都要你在极少的时间内教太多的东西 , 在取择之间 , 很遗憾都会把文化舍弃掉 ] (T#19).

All the restraints have reduced cultural teaching and learning to a secondary footnote in the instructional agenda. Even if teachers aspire to engage in culture, in whatever form it may take in the Chinese classroom, they often fall short in securing the much needed re-sources or support from their schools. To successfully create and conduct cultural friendly activities that compliment the language instruction, from organizing festival parties to field trips, for instance, requires resources that exceed the grasp of the teachers alone.


Almost all participants—both teachers and students—believe that “going abroad to China or Taiwan” is the best way to learn Chinese language and culture. While the effect of such programs is widely recognized, the dilemma of cultural pedagogy in the language classroom remains unresolved. Many language students do not have the opportunity to visit or live in a Chinese-speaking community for a substantial period of time, and the re-cre-ation of the authentic culture in the school setting is extremely difficult, if not impossible. A student from the Midwest states: “It’ll be nice to have hand on experience to actually see China, or Peking Opera... but you can’t do things like that when you’re in the middle of Minnesota” (S#38).

Some teachers, accordingly, opine that culture should be excluded in the language classes. Ideally, Chinese language students should also take a variety of Chinese content classes, which can both deepen their specific knowledge on Chinese culture and benefit their language learning. A teacher notes; “I think students should be encouraged to take Chinese culture classes in addition to the language they learn in the classroom” (T#13). Whether college language learners take extra cultural classes is out of any teacher’s control, however. Not many schools can demand that language students take other Chinese-related classes. In many cases, the language class is the students’ only source of Chinese cultural knowledge. It is, hence, important for teachers to incorporate at least some cultural aspects into their instructional agenda. The problem eventually boils down to how cultural elements can be successfully integrated into the classroom. Both teachers and students have their opinions about the complications involved, which is the subject for the next section.

Complications in Integrating Culture

Culture is one of the five standards in foreign language education. Yet, less standardized is how teachers should fulfill their cultural teaching responsibility. As one teacher points out, cultural teaching in the Chinese classroom lacks consistency, and at most, touches only on superficial and factual tidbits provided by the textbooks.

Culture, sometimes it is a component, but other times, it isn’t that consistent… You dis-cuss whatever you can think of, but it lacks consistency like sentence structure, from simple to difficult... When you teach culture to students, you only teach… some factual or super-ficial materials. The deeper level, that is, how to integrate culture into language pedagogy, this is quite difficult.

那文化呢 , 有的时候作为一个 component, 有的时候就不是那么 consistent… 你是想到什么就讲 , 不是给学生一个 consistent 像句型一样 , 从简到难 ... 就是说你教学生文化你只教给他 … 一些属于 factual 的 , 或者是一种表象的东西。更深层次的就是说怎样给他融进语言的教学 , 这个挺难的。(T#5)

To extend the cultural materials from the textbooks and to stimulate the students’ inter-est, many teachers incorporate films, music, food, or field trips into their repertoire. Still, cultural activities do not always yield desirable pedagogical results. A teacher reflects upon her experiences with museum excursion and film:

Last week we went to the museum… and the topic is popular religion in China. The dif-ficulty is… this is such a broad topic… and because of the limited time, we only introduced some definitions of Daoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism. After the field trip, the students were kind of confused, because there was so much stuff to look at (T#11).


As culturally rich in information as museum pieces or renowned films can be, the teach-ers who utilize them also tread a thin line between enlightening students with Chinese cul-tural knowledge and reinforcing cultural stereotypes. To avoid the adverse outcomes of the latter requires extensive explanations on the teacher’s part, especially for elementary level students with little or no background. Assessing a cultural activity in which his teacher brought in traditional Chinese food, a student comments:

I don’t know how useful [making dumplings] was... I was there, and that’s great. But in terms of interacting with my teachers and other students, there wasn’t any emphasis placed, there was no kind of end goal (S#19) .

The introduction of the cultural dimension must have a clear objective, careful plan-ning, and corresponding links to language instruction. Only then would it become a reward-ing experience for both teachers and learners; otherwise, the excitement and exotica wear off quickly, and the students end up learning little.

The question of how to teach culture and to what extent it can purposefully advance language acquisition is a complicated one. Speaking from a sociolinguistic perspective, a teacher acknowledges the difficulty in bringing culture and communication together in the classroom setting. “The main problem is how to effectively combine language form with other aspects such as the function and context of language use; this is the first issue [ 最主要的问题就是说 , 语言的形式如何跟语言应用的功能 , 场景 , 等等有效地结合起来 , 这是第一个原因 ]” (T#7). He continues with his view on the “lack of variety” in the teaching materials:

The second one is that our teaching materials... their character designs are rather sim-ple. They are always classmates... or, they are Chinese friends, or with their own teachers. These three types are the most frequently appearing characters... But one often runs into other characters in daily life. If the characters lack variety, it will lead students to fixed patterns in language use.

第二个就是说咱们的教材 ... 人物角色的设计比较单一 , 往往就是同学 ... 要嘛就是中国朋友 , 要嘛就是跟自己的老师。这三种可能是最常见的 ... 但是日常生活中还是会遇到其他的 , 如果人物角色没有这种丰富性的话 , 就会使学生使用语言产生一种定型。 (T#7)

The concern of this teacher is shared by many students, who seek more than just lin-guistic skills in their Chinese class but also cultural insights that can prepare them for real-life encounters. A student, who has study-aboard experiences in China, observes that “aspects of the culture like interpersonal relationships are much harder to get across.” He offers an example:

Restaurants in China are not like restaurants in the United States... service usually goes to the loudest and most aggressive customers… students who have never been to China be-fore, and whose only experience has been Chinese language classes go to China, they have a hard time getting service in a normal Chinese restaurant. They usually gravitate to the Western orientated kinds of restaurants... because there, they understand how to be served (S#4).

The “invisible” culture in everyday interaction is difficult to explain in the classroom. One teacher recites a story that even explicit teaching of the communicative and cultural patterns may not necessarily warrant the students’ complete understanding and correct use of the language.


If you know a Chinese person well enough, you would probably ask the obvious ques-tions in greeting. Knowing what they are going to do and then ask exactly that. This is greeting. Then one day, a student who just learned that ran into the teacher at the bottom of the stairs and asked: “Teacher, you are going up the stairs?” So, sometimes it’s very hard to teach this kind of culture. You told them to ask the obvious, and that is not wrong. But when he student saw the teacher going up the stairs and asked “you are going up the stairs,” it sounded very strange.

你要跟中国人熟的话 , 你可能在打招呼的时候就明知故问 , 知道他要干什么你就问什么 , 这个就是打招呼。然后有一天学生学了以后 , 在上楼梯的时候碰到老师就说 : 「老师 , 您上楼梯呢 ? 」所以有时候这种文化 , 就是说不好教就是在这里 … 非常难去把握这个度 , 你告诉他们明知故问这个没有错 , 可是他看到他上楼梯他就问「您上楼梯呢」, 听来就觉得很奇怪。(T#2)

The search for better paradigms and practices to incorporate various cultural factors into Chinese language instruction has become a pressing issue for educators. One particular issue that constantly appears in many participants’ accounts is the timeliness of cultural ma-terials, which is presented in the next section.

Timeliness of Cultural Pedagogy

All teacher and student interviewees are aware of how culture is connected to the contemporary context where Chinese language is used. According to the participants, language pedagogy needs to catch up with the ever-changing and dynamic nature of culture. For language instructors, China’s time-honored history and cultural achievements can be both a blessing and a burden. There is an enormous amount of cultural sources, perhaps too much and too rich for the purpose of the language class. At the same time, the long history of China often makes a large portion of its culture seem antiquated in comparison with relatively young societies such as the American one.

“Regarding the so-called Chinese culture,” a teacher stresses, “you need not immediate-ly think of ancient things whenever it was brought up, such as the great Wall, the Imperial Palace, or such things. Contemporary China is also very Chinese, [ 所谓的中国文化 , 你不需要一提到中国文化 , 你就想到是古代的东西 , 一想到文化就是中国的长城故宫这些东西。现代中国也是很中国 ]” (T#15). Another teacher concurs: “learning culture is not about studying historical or geographical knowledge in rigid ways; in fact, greeting is also an example of cultural pedagogy [ 学习文化不是读一些很古板的历史知识 , 地理知识 , 比如说你在问候 , 实际上也是说文化教学 ]” (T#4) .

To be pedagogically forwarding-looking does not mean to abandon the traditional as-pects of culture. As long as the contents are helpful to the students’ understanding of lan-guage use and social behavior, even if they are historical topics, they should be incorporat-ed into the language module. Relevance is the key. Traditional culture, for example, often finds ways to transcend time and be transferred into modern society; more importantly, it is demonstrated through language and communication. A teacher attests:

The most important thing is to let students know how history and culture manifest in language and language use. For example, Chinese tradition emphasized the male but not the female. That is indeed also a major problem in contemporary Chinese society, as everybody wants to have male children, right? This tradition may also show in language, for instance,


Chinese only say nánnǚ [male-female] as a term and not the other way around, then fùmǔ [father-mother], bàba māma [dad-mom], fūqī [husband-wife], always the male goes before the female.

最重要的是让学生知道那些历史文化如何在语言和语用上呈现出来。比方说中国传统是重男轻女的。那这个其实也是现在中国社会的一个大问题 , 大家都要男孩子 , 对不对 ? 这种传统也可能会表现在语言上 , 譬如说 , 中国人只说男女 , 不说女男 , 然后父母 , 爸爸妈妈 , 夫妻 , 往往是男的先女的后。(T#8)

To a number of teachers, the concern for timeliness in cultural presentation leads to the question of whether they should set the pedagogical focus on China or their local communi-ties. While both areas are important in their own right and listed as components of the 5Cs in the National Standards, some teachers believe that one must be distinguished from the other. A teacher summarizes the situation as follows:

I feel that teachers must clearly define how they teach culture, whether you want to teach this native, target culture, or you want to use Chinese as a medium… Or, simply put, whether to use Chinese to understand Chinese culture, putting your emphasis on the far away realm, your heritage and cultural origins. Or you use language as a tool… to apply to the current living situation, to express and describe things in your life.

教文化我觉得老师一定要分清楚你是想要教这个 native 的 , 这个 target culture, 还是你想用 Chinese 做一个 medium 的 …. 或者就是说用中文了解中国的文化 … 看你的重点是这个遥远的国度 , 你的 heritage, 你的文化的起源。还是你用语言 … 作一个tool, 用在现在的生活中 , 表达描述你自己的生活中的东西。(T#6)

Although many students appreciate the historical aspects of culture, the most pressing issue for them is to learn how to understand contemporary Chinese culture, and eventually, to communicate effectively with native Chinese people in daily situations. This aspect of communicative culture is closely tied to sociolinguistics. Many teachers have shared their stories about the shifting nuances of the Chinese language and their pedagogical implica-tions. The meanings of “xiǎojie” (Miss) or “tóngzhì” (comrade), for example, have changed over time; the understanding of these words in contemporary cultural setting can help stu-dents to avoid awkward or embarrassing situations.

Whether the cultural topics or materials used in the classroom are kept up to date de-pends greatly on the people involved in the process. As many teachers attest, it is often a personal choice. The individual instructors and learners usually make significant imprints on the contents, methods, and directions of cultural pedagogy. The final category, hence, sums up how the different backgrounds of the participants may have an impact on the cul-tural experiences in the Chinese classroom.

Cultural Background and Training of the Individuals

Any discussion of cultural pedagogy ultimately comes down to the individual actors—the teachers and students themselves. Their beliefs, presuppositions, and experiences affect the dynamics of the class. “I think every teacher’s style is different [ 我觉得每一个老师的风格不一样 ],” a teacher says; “In fact, you can use the same pedagogical method, but as each teacher brings to class his or her own personality and accent, the whole atmosphere wouldn’t be the same [ 其实说你用同一个教学法 , 可是每个人的个性呀 , 他的口音呀, 带进去的时候 , 整个气氛就不一样 ]” (T#20). Hence, “the ideal way is to base [cultural


pedagogy] on the teachers themselves, talk about what they know, because it is not about the materials accounted for in the textbooks [ 最理想的方式就是按这个老师本身来说 , 就是说就他的所知来讲 , 因为教文化不是课文里交代的东西 ]” (T#20) .

The background of the teachers, for better or for worse, influences how cultural teach-ing is carried out in the classroom. The individual differences are noticed on the student’s side. A student asserts: “it really varies from teacher to teacher and what they think is important” (S#4). Cultural pedagogy is, to a great degree, subject to regional differences. As the Chinese-speaking community comprises vast and varied regions with significantly diverse dialects, customs, and practices, the locales where the teachers come from may lead to different understandings of Chinese culture. A teacher in Hawaii recalls the experience in teaching heritage Chinese students whose ethnic origins are from Southern China.

When I first taught Chinese New Year, I asked the students what kind of foods we eat during Chinese New Year. I expected people to say niángāo [New Year Cake], jiǎozi [dumplings], yú [fish], etc, but I only got zhāi (jai) [vegetarian dish]. At the time, I didn’t know what the students were talking about… I think it’s important to understand that there are many types of Chinese culture, like the difference between Taiwan, Hong Kong, Main-land China... and overseas Chinese cultures (T#18).

Evaluating her take on Mainland Chinese culture, a teacher from Taiwan states: I guess a problem is that since I... have never been to China, sometimes students ask

me things about China, I really have to say I don’t know, or I get it from my friends [from mainland China] (T#12).

Likewise, many teacher interviewees originally from Mainland China had never visited Taiwan. One of the teachers explains:

Sometimes the textbook mentions something about Taiwan, I have no way to know whether they were authentically Taiwan or not, since I have never been there... My under-standing of Taiwan mostly comes from TV program, music, also some Taiwanese friends... these kinds of indirect sources, so I wouldn’t say much in class.

有时候课本会提到有关台湾的东西 , 我真的不知道台湾到底是不是这样的。我没有去过 ... 我对台湾的理解大概也就是一些电视节目 , 音乐呀 , 也有一些台湾朋友 … 也就是这么一些 … 比较间接的东西 , 所以在课堂上也不会多说。 (T#16)

Of course, the ethnic and cultural identities of the Chinese teachers extend beyond the border of Mainland China and Taiwan. A teacher from Singapore offers this opinion:

Our living experiences are probably quite different from most Chinese people. Singa-pore, in term of ancestral worship, has preserved better than China. Then there are those so-called cultural factors, how to celebrate the New Year, the dragon Boat Festival. But these follow a different set of rules in Mainland Chinese culture.

我们的生活经验可能跟一般的中国人可能不太一样。星加坡 , 在这个祖先崇拜这一环比中国保留得好。然后可能一些所谓的文化因素 , 新年要怎么样呀 , 端午节要怎么样呀 , 但是这些在中国的文化又是另外一套了。(T#19)

A Caucasian teacher concurs that being a non-ethnic Chinese has given him a rather different outlook on Chinese culture, which can be put to good use in cultural teaching. He reckons: “Since I’m outside of Chinese culture, I might be more objective about what Chi-nese culture might be… that a native speaker might just not think about” (T#13).

It is perhaps not too difficult to imagine that students would react differently to cultural materials presented by a native Chinese teacher and a non-native one. Some learners weigh


the native status as a valuable and necessary credential for teaching culture. A student shows her preference for “a teacher from China instead of someone who is Caucasian” because “they can explain things within context whereas the Caucasian teacher would just have to read from history books” (S#32).

In contrast, not everyone sees having an ethnic Chinese background as an advantage. The argument that native speakers possess uncontested authority over their language and culture has become increasingly debatable in the field (Kramsch, 1998b). Some students prize the cultural neutrality of non-native teachers.

It’s nice to have someone who has looked at the culture from the outside in a similar way like us, he obviously [is] someone who had the experiences and could kind of tell without necessarily having an emotional reaction… without being biased for one way or another (S#21).

Many participants believe that the ethnic backgrounds of the students also make a dif-ference in their cultural learning. All heritage students reveal that they have access to a variety of authentic resources and personal contacts with Chinese culture. Their family and friends are said to be the two most important ties in keeping them close to Chinese cultural practices and tradition. Many of them regularly watch film and television, listen to music, read magazines and visit Internet websites in the Chinese language.

On the other hand, non-heritage students often regret that they have no or little face-to-face interaction with Chinese people. Especially for the elementary-level students, they feel their language skills are too limited to understand and enjoy Chinese films or music on their own; the Chinese classroom is their sole opportunity for exposure to Chinese culture. For example, a Caucasian student remarks: “I think that the teachers might have taken other [heritage] students’ cultural knowledge for granted, and I at the time didn’t realize that, it was okay that I didn’t know these things” (S#27).

The different ethnic background and cultural experiences of the students may create certain problems for teachers. A teacher states:

Sometimes when you talk about the twenty-four Chinese stories of filial piety, like “Ly-ing on the ice to fish a carp” or “drilling a hole to steal light”… the students would laugh and say, “Teacher, if it happened in the United States, [they] would have been caught and put in prison long ago!” They are all ancient tales of filial piety that make us feel so touched and emotional. But upon hearing these stories, those American students don’t think like that.

有的时候你讲到中国的二十四孝 , 什么「卧冰求鲤」, 什么「凿壁偷光」... 学生也笑。他们说 : 「老师 , 凿壁偷光 , 如果在美国的话 , [ 他们 ] 早就被抓到监狱去了 ! 」... 就是我们讲的都是一些古老的我们自己觉得很感动的一些孝顺的故事 , 可是那些老美的学生听起来 , 他们不这么认为。(T#4)

Whether the biographic profile of the teachers and students has a consequential effect on cultural pedagogy remains a matter of opinion. Still, background alone is inadequate to explain all the differences. Culture is intricately woven into the cognitive and social fabric of a community. Hence, most teachers agree that their upbringing and training are far more prominent factors in gearing their practice than ethnic origins. describing her own back-ground, a teacher notices how these personal elements have shaped her perspective on cul-tural teaching:

I did not originally come from the field of Chinese pedagogy; I’m from ESL. I had


some students who had studied Chinese in high schools. They would say: “our previous teachers taught us to sing this song; some students who had studied abroad in China could sing “dropping the handkerchief.” I couldn’t teach such things because they are too distant from my background and teaching style. I am not a very social person either. So, I guess it depends on the individual.

我原来并不是中文教学出身 , 我是 ESL。我以前有学生他们在 high school 上过中文课 , 他们说 : “ 我们以前的老师教过我们唱过这首歌。” 有的学生在 China study abroad 会唱「丢手绢儿」, 我不会教这样的东西 , 因为它跟我的背景 , 跟我的教学差得太远。我个人也是不太容易跟别人打交道 , 所以还是跟个人有关。(T#16)

Some teachers may also be unfamiliar with some of the common sayings or practices that Chinese people take for granted. A teacher (T#14) tells her story about the taboo of “wearing a green hat” [ 戴绿帽子 ] in Chinese culture, but when she is pressed whether she knows the origin of this saying, she admits that she has no idea where, when, or how it came about.

The individual backgrounds and practices of cultural pedagogy usher in the question of uniformity. One teacher argues that “it is necessary to add cultural lessons and cultural methodology into training programs such as certification for Chinese teachers,” so that all Chinese teachers can understand “how different methods can combine with language activ-ities” and “when culture can be brought into the lesson [ 任何中文老师的 certification 之类的 , 我觉得都必须加入文化课呀 , 文化的 methodology, 了解不同的方法能够这么样跟语言的活动结合起来 , culture 什么时候可以进来 ]” (T#6).

Another teacher envisions that “the ideal situation is we all reach a consensus that Chi-nese culture has these components, and they must be taught to students. If we have such a frame, such a format, that probably will work [Ideal 的状态就是大家达成共识 , 中国文化有这些 component 的 , 一定要给学生的。如果有这样一个 frame, 这样一个 format, 那倒是可以的 ]” (T#5). However, she also has some reservations in realizing it on the univer-sity level, which return to the problems created by institutional and individual differences.

CONCLUSION

Whether by a deliberate effort or not, language acquisition comes hand in hand with cultural pedagogy. Like with any other pedagogical endeavors, there is a gap between theory and practice in cultural teaching in the classroom. Teaching culture often fares well as a concept and looks fine on paper. Bringing the idea to life is far more complicated. The multifaceted definition of culture can be a contributing factor. Most participants clearly distinguish communicative culture from informational or material culture and stress that the former should be the focus of instruction. However, their conceptions of the two definitions of culture often muddle in reality. Teachers who define culture in terms of “communicative culture” (jiaoji wenhua 交际文化 ) also at times claim that they do not have much chance of teaching culture—which they refer back to “Big C” cultural items.

Having a consistent and practical definition of culture is just one of the numerous con-cerns raised by the interviewees. The question of “how” to teach culture is equally puzzling as “what” to teach. The complication of integrating cultural elements into the language classroom with an already heavily-loaded curriculum and limited time is an issue. The beginners’ lack of proficiency in Chinese may also prevent them from understanding com-


plex cultural topics and interacting in deeper cultural discussions. Even if the pedagogical community can come up with a list of cultural topics, there is hardly any consensus on how or in what order these topics should be taught. Many teachers also feel that the task of standardizing a sequence in cultural teaching is very difficult at the moment. The current practice leaves the decision to the instructor’s own discretion, that is, if time and resources even allow. The cultural aspects, moreover, need to keep up with the pulse of contempo-rary Chinese society in order to be relevant. At the same time, the “who” question cannot be overlooked. The backgrounds of both teachers and students can steer the direction of cultural pedagogy. every participant is different. Their individual profiles, preferences, and personalities, often make culture an idiosyncratic feature rather than a standardized module in the teaching agenda.

Based on sixty in-depth interviews, this study explores the perspectives of Chinese teachers and learners on cultural pedagogy in the language classroom. Examining their personal and professional experiences opens a window onto the complexity of culture in the postmodern world. With increasing interest in culture, one can expect that many of the current notions and beliefs will be altered, perhaps radically, in years ahead. Not only is the field of teaching Chinese diverse and dynamic, but the definitions of and relationships among Chinese, culture, and pedagogy are, and perhaps always will be, developing, evolv-ing, and changing. The seven categories presented here by no means exhaust the problems faced by the educational community. Rather, they serve merely as referencing anchors for further discussion so as to solidify a better understanding of teaching and learning culture in the Chinese context.

REFERENCES

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Brooks, N. (1960). Language and language learning. New York, NY: Harcourt: Brace Jovanovich. Byram, M. (1989). Cultural studies in foreign language education. Philadelphia, PA: Multilingual Matters. Campbell, J. G., & Pfister, G. (2002). The individual within multi-socio-cultural realities: Cultural analy-

sis as a reading strategy. Lanham, Md: University of America Press. damen, L. (1987). Culture learning: The fifth dimension in the language classroom. Reading, MA: Addi-

son-Wesley.Hall, E. (1959). The silent language. New York, NY: doubleday/Fawcett.Kramsch, C. (1998a). Language and culture. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.Kramsch, C. (1998b). The privilege of the intercultural speaker. In M. Byram and M. Fleming (Eds.), Lan-

guage learning in intercultural perspective: Approaches through drama and ethnography (pp.16-31). Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.

Li, X. 李晓琪 . (Ed.). (2006). Duiwai Hanyu wenhua jiaoxue yanjiu 对外汉语文化教学研究 . Beijing, China: Commercial Press.

National Standards in Foreign Language Education. (1996, 1999). Standards for foreign language learn-ing: Preparing for the 21st century. Alexandria, VA: American Council on the Teaching of Foreign Languages.

Richards, K. (2003). Qualitative inquiry in TESOL. Hampshire, England: Palgrave. Robinson, g. L. (1985). Cross-cultural understanding: Processes and approaches for foreign language,

English as a second language and bilingual educators. New York, NY: Pergamon Press.


Seelye, H. N. (1981, 1984). Teaching culture: Strategies for foreign language educators (3rd ed). Skokie, IL: National Textbook.

Shepherd, E.T. (2005). Eat Shandong: From personal experience to a pedagogy of a second culture. Co-lumbus, OH: National East Asian Languages Resource Center.

Sapir, E. (1994). The psychology of culture: A course of lectures. New York, NY: Mouton de gruyter.Tseng, M.F. (2007). AP Chinese language and culture teacher’s guide. New York, NY: The College Board.Valdés, J. (ed.). (1986). Culture bound: Bridging the cultural gap in language teaching. Cambridge, En-

gland: Cambridge University Press.Walker, g. (2000). Performed culture: Learning to participate in another Culture. In R. d. Lambert & E.

Shohamy (Eds.), Language policy and pedagogy (pp. 221-236). Philadelphia, PA: John Benjamins Publishing.

Wong, K. F. (2008). 4P’s of cultural pedagogy: A new paradigm for the cultural dimension in Chinese Lan-guage Instruction. Journal of the Chinese Language Teachers Association, 43 (3), 1-24.

Xu, J. 许嘉璐 . (2008). Xu Jialu tan Kongzi Xueyuan he Hanyu guoji tuiguang: yixian “hanyu re” 许嘉璐

谈孔子学院和汉语国际推广 : 已现 “ 汉语热 .” Retrieved from www.china.com.cn/book/txt/2008-12/25/content_17003587.htm

Zhang, Z. - Y. 张占一 . (1992). Jiaoji wenhua suotan 交际文化琐谈 . Language Teaching andLingusitics Studies 语言教学与研究 , 4, 96-114.

Zhao, X. - Z. 赵贤州 . (1992). Guanyu wenhua daorude zaisikao 关于文化导入的再思考 . Language Teaching and Lingusitics Studies语言教学与研究 , 3, 31-9.

APPENdIX 1 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THe TeACHeR INTeRVIeWeeS

Gender Ethnic Background

Years of Teaching

Institutions Regions of Teaching

T1 F Chinese (Mainland)

More than 10 years

College, Community College, University, Middle school, High school, Heritage/Weekend school

U.S. Taiwan

T2 M Chinese (Mainland)

1-3 years College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program

U.S., Mainland China


3-6 years College, Community College U.S., Mainland China

T4 F Chinese (Taiwan)

More than 10 years

College, Community College, University, Middle school, High school, Heritage/Weekend school, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring

U.S., Taiwan


3-6 years College, Community College, University

U.S.



U.S.

T7 M Chinese (Mainland)


U.S.



More than 10 years

College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program, Study-aboard program, Private tutoring



1-3 years College, Community College, University, Middle school, High school, Heritage/Weekend school, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring

U.S.


Less than 1 year

College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program

U.S.


between 3-6 years

College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring, Study-abroad program



between 3-6 years

College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring, Study abroad program


T13 M Caucasian between 3-6 years

College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring

U.S.


between 6-9 years

College, Community College, University, Study-aborad program, Professional training



between 3-6 years

College, Community College, University, Professional training program, Private tutoring

U.S.


between 3-6 years

College, Community College, University, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring

U.S.


More than 10 years

College, Community College, High school, Private tutoring

U.S.

T18 M Caucasian between 3-6 years

College, Community College, University

U.S.

T19 M Chinese (Singapore)

between 6-9 years

College, Community College, University, Middle school, High school, Intensive/summer language program, Private tutoring

U.S., Singapore


More than 10 years

College, Community College, Private tutoring

U.S.


APPENdIX 2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THe STUDeNT INTeRVIeWeeS

Gender ageGroup

EthnicBackground

Class Standing

Years of Studying

Chinese Class Level

Institutions

S1 F 18-20 Chinese (Hong Kong)

Sophomore Between 2-3 years

1st Level University, Heritage/Weekend school

S2 F 18-20 Caucasian Junior Between 3-4 years

3rd Level University, High school, Study-aboard program

S3 M 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2 years

2nd Level University, High school, Middle school

S4 M 25 or above

Chinese Graduate More than 4 years

Above 4th level

University, Intensive summer program, Study-aboard program


2nd Level University, elementary school


2nd Level University



S8 M 20-22 Chinese (Taiwan)

Junior Between 2-3 years

3rd Level University, Middle school, elementary school

S9 M 20-22 Caucasian Junior Between 2-3 years

2nd Level University, Study-aboard program

S10 F 20-22 Chinese Sophomore Between 1-2 years


S11 F 20-22 Chinese Junior Between 2-3 years

3rd Level University, High school




S13 F 20-22 Chinese (Vietnam)



S14 M 20-22 Chinese (Hong Kong)




1st Level University

S16 M 25 or above

Caucasian Graduate Less than 1 year

1st Level Intensive summer program

S17 F 20-22 asian (Japanese/Korean)

Unclassified/ other

Less than 1 year


S18 M 20-22 Caucasian Junior Between 2-3 years

3rd Level University, Intensive summer program

S19 M 18 or under

Caucasian Unclassified/ other

Between 2-3 years

3rd Level Intensive summer program, study- abroad program

S20 F 18 or under

Caucasian Freshman Between 2-3 1st Level High school, Intensive summer program

S21 M 25 or above

Caucasian Unclassified/ other

Less than 1 year

1st level Intensive summer program

S22 F 18 or under

African Sophomore Less than 1 year


S23 F 22-25 Caucasian Graduate Less than 1 year


S24 F 20-22 Caucasian Junior Between 2-3 years

3rd Level University, Intensive summer program, Study-abroad program


S25 F 18-20 Asian (Thai/Caucasian)


2nd Level University, Intensive summer program

S26 F 20-22 Caucasian Senior Between 1-2 years

2nd Level University, Intensive summer program, Study-abroad program

S27 F 25 or above

Caucasian Graduate Between 3-4 years

3rd Level University, Intensive summer program, Study-abroad program

S28 M 18 or under

Asian (Thai/Caucasian)

Freshman Less than 1 year

1st Level Intensive Summer Program





S31 M 18-20 Chinese/Caucasian



S32 M 20-22 Caucasian Sophomore Between 1-2 years

1st Level University

S33 F 20-22 Chinese (Taiwan)





S35 F 18-20 Caucasian Sophomore Between 2-3 years

2nd Level University, Summer Intensive program

S36 M 18-20 Chinese (Taiwan)






S38 F 22-24 Caucasian Senior Between 3-4 years

3rd Level University, Summer Intensive program, Study-aboard program

S39 M 20-22 Chinese (Hong Kong)


2nd Level University, elementary school



Author’s Biodata:Ka F. Wong is Assistant Professor of Chinese and Asian Studies at St Olaf College, USA. He received his Phd in Chinese from the University of Hawaii. His research explores the symbiotic ties and tensions between individual identity and cultural discourse across a wide range of topics. Integrating culture and technology into the Chinese classroom is also one of his pedagogical focuses. His publications include Visions of a Nation: Public Monuments in Twentieth-Century Thailand as well as various journal articles and book chapters on Chinese language, film, literature, and cultural anthropology.



Is the Democratic Republic of Congo being Globalized by China?

The Case of Small Commerce at Kinshasa Central Market1

Nuah M. Makungu M. University of Ottawa, Canada

The central market of Kinshasa, also known as Zando, is a site of convergence between flows of Chinese goods and migrants, and citizens of the DRC who generally benefit from the goods and services sold at the market. The rivalries between local shop owners and newly arrived ones who succeed thanks to their insertion in the Chinese diaspora networks, and to their low prices on merchandise and labour force that cannot strike are being exacerbated. However, social tensions and conflicts can also hinder the processes taking place.

Keywords: dRC- China, Kinshasa, Small business, Social Networks, migrants, global-ization.

INTROdUCTION

global flows do not just exist, they have to be set in motion- goods, people, finance and information have to be carried from one end of the globe to the other. Effective globalisation is hard work. In the process of transnational circulation of goods, Chinese people and companies move particular objects from China (Asia) context to dRC (Africa) or from Africa to Asia. According to Hugon (2005:158), the term globalization is embedded with the interdependence among five processes: global finance, organization of global production, free movement of goods, migrations and movement of populations and real time information.

This article aims at providing a better understanding of Chinese migrants in small businesses in the present era of globalisation. Chinese presence in the dRC since 2005 is diversifying in term of diplomatic services, mining groups, forestry groups, fossil fuel groups, telecommunications groups, as well as establishment of small businesses. This presence and establishment of businesses is significant and growing with effects that need to be properly analysed. Chinese immigrants are mostly from Zhejiang, Fujian provinces, etc. (Interviewee n°11). It is common that migrants coming from the same sending areas form communities in the receiving societies, in which members are linked by social and economic networks. These networks usually extend to people who remain in the sending areas. It is also known that Chinese migration is characterised by specific entrepreneurial small family businesses, which are often interconnected (Hugon, 2001; Putnam, 1993). In

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Nuah M. Makungu M. E-mail: [email protected]

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 89-101MakuNgu90

recent decades, marked by increasing globalisation and the rise of China as an economic superpower, the role of Chinese migrants, in particular that of Chinese entrepreneurs (espe-cially transnational entrepreneurs), has changed significantly, with important effects for the economic, social and political contexts of both the sending and receiving areas. despite the significance of these changes, little is known about their processes and consequences (i.e. trends, success and failure).

Small Chinese shop owners (or small entrepreneurs) are opening stores that sell shoes, bedding, and other marketable items. The continuing transformation of the Chinese busi-ness landscape is obvious. Meanwhile, their Congolese counterparts, West Africans, Indi-ans, and Lebanese who were important small commercial actors are now losing grounds due to this Chinese breakthrough. There are growing rivalries between local shop owners and the newly arrived Chinese entrepreneurs. On July 26 2012, local shop owners protested by taking to the streets to claim their exclusive right to small commerce in Kinshasa:

In our memo, we claim that small commerce be secured. It has to come back to the Congolese. We realize it has been invaded by migrants” de-clared one of the protesters (Radio Okapi, 2012).

This paper attempts to find answers to the following questions: how can we explain the success of Chinese shop owners in small businesses, which leads to the decline of local shop owners?

To answer this question, I formulate the following hypothesis: small Chinese entre-preneurs are prospering at Kinshasa central market (i.e. Zando), because they benefit from strong internal and external ethnic networks (associations and other effective family and community structures) of distribution that local shopkeepers (Congolese, West-African and Lebanese) lack. The Chinese shop owners also have low prices on average; their prices are lower by a third when compared to the local prices. Also, they have a docile labour force imported from China that is unable to protest or strike.

The study uses semi-structured interviews (Beau, 1998), participant observation of small business life, as well as the review of literature. I will attempt to analyze the experi-ence of small Chinese shop owners as well as the “Made in China” proliferation of goods in Kinshasa central market. Kinshasa is a city of 6 million and the capital of Congo with estimated population estimated of 69 million (Saint Moulin, L., 2010:274).

As White notes:

Kinshasa is overflowing with automobiles, billboards and neon signs, tall buildings, satellite dishes, and cellular phones. People in Kinshasa show their urban colors through a whole series of cultural markets such as language (Lingala with bits of French is the language of choice), dress (women combine high heels with three-piece traditional dresses made of local or imported wax cloth; men wear dress slacks, dress shirts, and im-ported leather shoes” (White 2008, 21).

I interviewed ten Congolese (male and female, customers coming from the Chinese shops) and one Chinese worker (who speaks French). The interviewees live and work in

Is the DemocratIc republIc of congo (Drc) beIng globalIzeD by chIna 91

Kinshasa, and exhibit characteristics of other people living in this town.First I examined the Congo’s political economy context, and the Sino-dRC cooperation

since 1973. I then examine the accomplishments of small owners of Chinese shops in Kin-shasa and explain how they are succeeding. I take account of the constraints and opportuni-ties of globalisation in shaping Chinese businesses in dRC. I conclude by examining likely outcomes. This study is organized under the following sections: Political and socio-eco-nomic context of dRC; recent history of Sino-dRC relations; visible Chinese advancement in the dRC and small commerce at Kinshasa central market; unrivalled or more competi-tive prices; Chinese ethnic labour force (Chinese); a brief conclusion.

POLITICAL ANd SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF dRC

Since November 1996, the political situation in dRC has become increasingly volatile. After overthrowing Mobutu’ regime and after assuming control of the country, Laurent Désiré Kabila’s relations with his allies (Rwanda and Uganda governments) soured and the eastern provinces of dRC plunged deeper into political insecurity and violence. Beginning in August 1998 the Rwanda-backed rebel movement RCd (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie) and the Uganda-backed MLC (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo) - themselves plagued with factionalism and in-fighting - represented a serious threat in the region. This threat is not for the Congolese government and military only, but for the local populations which in many ways have been held hostage by the conflict (White 2008, xxii). Even with support from several other Africans countries such as, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Angola, Laurent Désiré Kabila’s forces were unable to defeat the various rebellions, leading to a bloody stalemate. The Lusaka Accord, July 1999, resulted in the establishment of an extended United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission (MONUC), and a call by the United Nations for the withdrawal of all foreign troops from Congo. Nonetheless, fighting continued in the region, much of which was fueled by the ongoing threat of Hutu militias based in the DRC. This Hutu militia fled from the 1994 Rwandan genocide, and was also influenced by the competition for access to land and valuable mining resources.

Since hostilities broke out, there have been 3.5 millions deaths and of more than 500,000 refugees and displaced persons (UN 2013). In the meantime, the population has dealt with an outbreak of endemic diseases such as malaria, AIdS (a syndrome caused by HIV), alongside the privatisation of public health services (Ndaywel, 2002; Persyn, et. al., 2004). In addition, there are illnesses caused by natural calamities, such as the volcanic eruption in Goma and floodings in Kisangani, Mbandaka and Kindu.

In this context, Kinshasa and capital cities of provinces experienced a population in-flow. The city, in Southern societies, is the locus of modernity par excellence. It facilitates the flow of money and goods, exchange, the organization and creation of wealth in all its forms. As a breeding-ground for economic life and a final recourse, the city is also char-acterized by exclusion, isolation, violence, distress and malnutrition, a tangible illustration of poverty. Since the 2000’s, malnutrition of young children has reached worrying levels, in the outskirts of Kinshasa, especially during the rainy season when provincial roads and even the rivers are impassable. Consequently, more than a third of the population was ex-posed to food insecurity (PNUd 2009 ; Makungu 2008).

The disastrous effects of malnutrition have already appeared after the 1991 and 1993


riots by the Zairian army in Kinshasa and across the whole country, as a result of non-pay-ment of their wages by the government, hyperinflation, and the loss of purchasing power. Most city dwellers did not earn the equivalent of US$ 1.00 a day (PNUd, 2009 ; Makun-gu, 2008; Trefon, 2004). The few people who were employed were spending the whole income on food (PNUD, 2009). Generalized unemployment was caused by massive lay-offs following the destruction of the country’s industries. Redundancies imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) within the framework of the implementation of structural adjustment policies destroyed the nascent social state: lack of decent jobs with social benefits, multiplication of conflicts, rule of arbitrary treatment and social injustice. The implementation of the neo-liberal model, the economic and state crisis aggravated the misery of the poorest.

In July 2006 and in december 2011, multi-party elections were finally held. Joseph Kabila “won” both elections despite contestations. despite this alleged political break-through, armed conflicts and violence had become so endemic that the U.N. described the conflict in eastern Congo as “the world’s worst humanitarian crisis”. Several reports by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) showed the crisis in the DRC to be the bloodiest conflict in history since the Second World War, with the number of deaths generally esti-mated at six million (CARITAS). The 2013 UN/African Union2 report published in Addis Ababa reveals that over two million people are internally displaced persons and an evi-dence of widespread sexual violence against women and children.

The year 2012 was marked by a series of confrontations in the North Kivu region of dRC between the Congolese national army and the Rwanda-backed rebel movement M23. The dRC government and M23 initiated an agreement which failed on April 14 2013.

As state structures and market mechanisms of the 1990s fell into further decay, Kinsha-sa increasingly came to be known as a place of violence and crisis. People have become accustomed to the state of dirt and dust that resulted from years of political neglect. With a state of generalized unemployment, most people accept the fact that their earning potential is not enough to enable them to pay even for shared private taxis. “People often say, “Mboka ekufi” (the country is dead), and for some time now “Kinshasa la Belle” has been known as “Kinshasa la Poubelle” (Kinshasa the garbage Can) (White 2008, 23-24). A city which used to be a beautiful place is now all dust and noise. Also, people’s needs are not being met.

Although the situation of citizens of Kinshasa is alarming, it is not hopeless. The most current 2013 Human development Report – “The Rise of the South: Human Progress in a Diverse World" states that DRC has succeeded in stabilizing its macro-economic frame-work, mastering hyperinflation and relaunching several of its economic activities. The report further adds that thanks to external support, public investments have almost doubled and its part in the gdP has gone up. As the trends suggest, they should continue to in-crease.

World economic expansion stimulated demand for oil and raw materials from the coun-try and caused the increase of prices. The increase of public development assistance and the stabilization of the macro-economic situation helped to clarify economic perspectives of

2　 United Nations/African Union (2013). Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, Addis Ababa, 24 February.


the country. More aid, fewer debts equal more growth. With a little bit of creativity, Con-golese in particular could transform socio-economic problems into development projects. despite the optimistic tone of the human development report, public development assis-tance remains insufficient and inadequate for funding infrastructure, health and education programs. Unemployment has reached worrying proportions. More and more, thousands of people live on below US $ 1.00 a day per day (PNUd, 2009). The only sign of hope comes from the development of new information and communication technologies. Urban dwellers facing increasing misery are better informed. If they have some money to invest, they can either individually or collectively undertake productive activities. In Kinshasa and elsewhere, the economy is linked to financial under-development. The issue is how poor city dwellers can use this progress of communication to mobilize financial resources for de-velopment ends in an international context where, for two decades, decision-makers tend to privilege the fight against poverty over development.

The following section focuses on recent history of cooperation between the dRC and China.

RECENT HISTORY OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE dRC ANd CHINA

Under the regime of President Mobutu Sese Seko, the Chinese became popular in the dRC by building the presidential domain of N’sele, the presidential palace of Gbadolite, the palace of the people (the parliamentary seat, “palais du people”) and the immense stadium of the Martyrs in Kinshasa. These are the fruits of the Sino-Congolese friendship that began in 1973 after the first official visit of the Congolese president to China under Mao Zedong (Vircoulon, 2007).

By May 17 1997, under the Laurent Désiré Kabila regime, Beijing supplied weapons to Kinshasa which was at war against rebellions instigated by the Kigali and Kampala regime since August 1998.

Ever since 2007, under the regime of President Joseph Kabila, the Chinese have been invested in others sectors of the Congolese economy, such as the Chinese operated Con-go-China Telecom (CCT). The CCT was taken over by France Telecom in 2011). It controls a considerable share of the wireless market with its unrivalled prices. The companies Exim Bank of China, China Railway Engineering Corporation (CREC), etc. are all involved in public works. The small Chinese companies that benefit from mining concessions have kept increasing their numbers. They exploit copper, cobalt, etc. in Katanga. On the basis of the agreement signed on September 17 2008 between Kinshasa and Beijing, the gECAMINES (“Générale des Carrières des Mines”) and the Chinese Consortium of enterprises have cre-ated the Joint Venture (JV) named SICOMINeS (CePAS, 2010: 6). It is one of the ways by which foreign direct investments arrives in this country. Arguably, this is not what we ordinarily call investment to promote local development. Focusing on the elements of glo-balisation, China contributes to the global finance of DRC.

China has been remarkably stepping up its involvement in dRC over the recent years. It does not view its close ties with Congolese government as the donor-recipient relation-ship that characterizes Western development cooperation programs after the Second World War. Rather than aid projects, China focuses on trade and direct investment. This approach provides the Congolese government with greater economic and political room to manoeu-


vre while China pursues a wide range of investments. China does not set any conditions in terms of democracy, good governance or human rights. These three conditions do not play any role in its policy towards dRC (or any country in South).

This South-South cooperation calls into question many aspects of the approach taken by traditional donors and uses economic partnerships to create a counterbalance to the North and reduce dRC’s dependence on northern donors. But, at the same time, new dependen-cies are being created through China’s emerging power. According to Congolese experts, Gizenga’s government has made trade agreements with China to the detriment of his people (CePAS, 2010: 64). What are the consequences of these agreements for the future?

In a country where everything is lacking and where everything must be rebuilt after 32 years of Mobutism (1) and 15 years of Kabilism, the Chinese propositions to rebuild roads and railways or to improve existing ports are taken seriously by ordinary Congolese.

In fact, China has been represented in the dRC by its development aid for about 40 years (davies, 2008) especially through the construction of the projects cited earlier in this paper. Ally to the dRC, China is considered as an opportunity for this country. The typical Congolese thinks that this cooperation will help the country reclaim its tarnished image through economic and social development (Malingumu, 2008).

A Congolese customer who was questioned after leaving a Chinese shop stated that:

The economic propositions from China to rebuild the Congo can help us negotiate a better power relation with regards to our traditional part-ners from Europe and America. Yes, welcome to the Chinese (Inter-viewee n°1).

A romantic view of Chinese is quite common among Congolese imaginations. This Congolese “admiration” for Chinese is based on a vision of China as a model and a source of hope. They do not see Chinese as competitors. Chinese are doing business in a particular way and Congolese are hopeful of the long term benefits. Yet throughout independent his-tory of dRC, it has never had the opportunity to choose and work with multiple partners in order to deliver on its own agenda. The Sino-dRC relationship presents an opportunity for the country to get the most out of international partnership. Whether that partner is a tradi-tional donor (i.e. Belgium, France, the EU, the US) or a so-called emerging partner (China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia, etc.), DRC still needs to compete with all partners. However, China is the largest BRICS country trading partner in dRC. But many critics are quick to point out that China’s assertion of a “strategic partnership” cleverly camouflages its calculated strategic ambition to suck out African natural resources on a long-term basis, cultivate African markets as dumping grounds for its cheap manufactured goods and grad-ually impose its hegemony over the continent. The policy of “non-interference” is said to be an elaborate and shameless ploy used by China to pacify and anesthetize witless African dictators and secure lucrative long-term contracts for raw materials. Therefore, Congolese have to be smart with Chinese small or big business owners.

VISIBLe CHINeSe ADVANCeMeNT IN THe DRC: SMALL-SCALe BUSINeSS IN KINSHASA CENTRAL MARKET


In Kinshasa central market, one can see a long line of Chinese shops, reminiscent of the North American “Chinatowns”. They are installed in cement block buildings and have coloured glass windows. They are permanently guarded by policemen who are paid by the shop owners.

The “Made in China” products are in abundance. In these shops, one can find every-thing China has to offer, to the amazement of impoverished Congolese crowds: bicycles, t-shirts, locks of hair, jewellery, wireless telephones, medicine, electronic watches, video recorders, television sets, belts, kitchen utensils, farming tools, skirts, pants, underwear, shirts printed with the latest trends in African style, etc. It is a real boom in commodities and services, which consumers enjoy.

This trade of manufactured goods demonstrates how the DRC is being globalized by the merchandise made in and imported from China. The free circulation of this merchandise is one of the five processes that characterises globalization (Hugon, 2005:158). One may question, how is this merchandise imported from China?

The only Chinese person who speaks French in Kinshasa central market provides the answer with the following explanation:

The parents stay in China, the cousins and friends living in Singapore and Hong-Kong send them to us by containers as soon as we give them our lists of orders. This allows us to avoid spending money on travelling. The merchandise is sent by containers by sea and it takes three months to arrive to the port of Matadi (Interviewee n°11).

This story illustrates how social networks and the Chinese diaspora fully participate to the success of small Chinese shop owners of Zando, and to their enrichment and flourishing of China in the DRC. The flows of merchandise are never ending. The small Chinese entre-preneurs have become essential partners in the urban landscape of Kinshasa through their low priced merchandise.

UNRIVALLeD OR MORe COMPeTITIVe PRICeS

A Congolese customer was asked about the prices in one of the Chinese shops in the Zando and answered by saying:

At the prices that they sell their products, they do not need to advertise on the television or radio to attract clients! The client who later speaks to his fellow citizens about his errands advertises for the shop for free. The news of unrivalled prices gets around and everyone rushes to the store to benefit from these low prices. The Chinese know that the Congolese have no choice (Interviewee n°6).

The success of small Chinese shop owners can also be explained by a proven method: inferior prices by a third on average when compared to the local competition.

Another client who was interviewed upon leaving a shop declared that:

The low prices of their textile products have almost destroyed the local


industry. The textiles CPA factories and Utexafrica have seen produc-tion slow to a crawl (Interviewee n°7).

Arguably, Chinese merchandise is in competition with merchandise produced in Kin-shasa. The same goes for other building material like cement. Dzaka-Kikouta (2009:136) reports that a 50 kilograms bag of cement imported from China costs US $ 4.00, but the same bag of cement produced in the DRC and in Congo-Brazzaville is US $20.

We can also note that the price of shirts imported from China in a Chinese shop is less than half the price of those manufactured in Congo. due to the low prices, Chinese shops have advantage over the local shop.

Other examples of Chinese successes are as follows. Established and prosperous small Chinese shop owners are now engaging in the small local industry, setting up movable units that do not require complex skills. In Barumbu, a neighborhood of Kinshasa, a small Chi-nese entrepreneur from Zando diversified business by opening a shoe factory. In another neighborhood, another small entrepreneur from Zando invested in the production of bottles and plastic tubs. In Limete, another neighborhood of Kinshasa, another Chinese business-man working in the importation of drug and medical equipment has opened a clinic. All of them continue with their previous business activities and diversify into new activities. Increasingly, Chinese are buying shops and businesses in Kinshasa. The development of small industrial investment is welcome according to the comments heard locally because, it implies the creation of jobs. Success is not always spontaneous. At least 3 out of 10 Chinese trying to start business in Kinshasa fail and go back to China or elsewhere, either because they find that small business is not profitable, or due to a lot of difficulties in the work en-vironment.

The industrial sector is being battered by cheap Chinese imports. The boom in com-modities and consumer spending has coincided with the failure of Congolese manufactur-ing (especially textiles industries). What will the dRC government and policy makers do to move manufacturing of goods consumed in Congo out of China to their country? The answer to this question is a job that someone in the government is paid to do. The govern-ment and policy makers must avoid another form of “neo-colonialism”, which describes the socio-economic and political control exercised by the old colonial countries and others to perpetuate their economic dominance in the former colonies through their multinational corporations and other cultural institutions. “Neo-colonialism” is also the worst form of imperialism. For those who practise it, it means power without responsibility and for those who suffer from it, it means exploitation without redress. In the days of old-fashioned co-lonialism, the imperial power had at least explained and justified the actions it was taking abroad back at home. In the colony, those who served the ruling imperial power could at least look to its protection against any violent move by their opponents. Is there Chinese “neocolonialism” in DRC? Is China exercising “power without responsibility” in DRC “causing exploitation without redress” for Africans?

Chinese are good economic players. China is in Africa in full force with traders, in-vestors, lenders, builders, developers, laborers and others. But there are hidden obstacles, particularly in terms of transferring expertise to the local economy when they bring all their workers and want to just operate in a bunker environment. The dRC can't blame China for its own problems. The dRC needs its own strategy in promoting a healthy and balanced


economy. It should allow Chinese companies and small shop owners to make money while the country and its people benefit from products and services. The DRC can achieve this goal by promoting China and its people as partners as well as competitors. In this way, it will benefit both countries. Are both countries ready?

Sanusi (2013) argued:

Three decades ago, China had a significant advantage over Africa in its cheap labour costs. It is losing that advantage as its economy grows and prosperity spreads. Africa must seize the moment. We must encourage a shift from consuming Chinese-made goods to making and consuming our own. We must add value to our own agricultural products…I cannot rec-ommend a divorce. However, a review of the exploitative elements in this marital contract is long overdue.

Another interesting fact that explains the success of small Chinese entrepreneurs in Kinshasa central market is the Chinese ethnic labour force.

CHINESE ETHNIC LABOUR FORCE

Small Chinese shop owners do not always hire the local Congolese labour force. It is estimated that 10,000 Chinese workers are in the dRC (Michel & Beuret, 2008). The young, legal and illegal Chinese immigrants constitute a very affordable labour force that is also docile for the owners of Zando shops. This labour force works seven days per week, for up to 12 hour shifts, while the locals only work six days per week, and do not work more than eight hours per day. It is also impossible for the imported labour force to strike. This labour force is under a lot of pressure and brings back a considerable amount to the shop owners. Working conditions and forced labour in some Chinese businesses are not known. Are the working conditions of Chinese labour good or bad in Kinshasa? What will dRC government and policy makers do to ensure that Chinese entrepreneurs hire local labour? even if there is an increasing importance of Chinese professionals, highly skilled workers, Chinese entrepreneurs should hire local labour. When they hire them, why do Congolese elites (i.e., African elites) allow the Chinese entrepreneurs to pay local labour the lowest salaries and, eventually, the poorest labour conditions among all others? These are challenges that Congolese can overcome with their own clear principles.

As China works on its immigration policy, it would appear that dRC, as well as several other African nations, are trying to reform their own policies. With the growing complaints in many African countries about Chinese migrants competing to sell “fat cakes” and grocer-ies as well as cheap China-made consumer products, good immigration policies combined with industrial policies – properly implemented – might attract the kinds of Chinese mi-grants who would contribute to job creation and economic growth.

Once again, Congolese can not blame Chinese for their own mistakes. Congolese (as other Africans peoples) need their own strategy to stop this to happen again in the future. However, it is known that “lower standards, lack of “corporate social responsibility” (social and environmental) in business practices, poor labor relations, competition with substitu-


tion industries (especially textiles), and not enough hiring local labor are the downside of China’s increasingly prominent presence in Africa” (Brautigam, 2011).

Both legal and illegal Chinese immigrants working in DRC are also profitable for Chi-na, as it benefits from the remittances sent over by the migrants. These rich Chinese from outside the country constitute a great asset to their country in a globalized context. Howev-er, not all Chinese in Kinshasa are rich.

According to what we observed in Kinshasa, the poor Chinese workers (handy men) from rural area, interact with Congolese daily. They are accustomed to high levels of pov-erty and societal instability. They can not isolate themselves in a Chinese “ghetto” (like the elites, the managers and the entrepreneurs), these immigrants live right alongside Congo-lese in urban communities across the town. Out of sheer necessity, they are often highly assimilated in both language and culture. For the Congolese, this is good news. Frequent interpersonal interactions can help reduce misunderstanding between people. Cultural un-derstanding is something that does go a long way in promoting friendship and peaceful interactions between people. So, globalization has helped blur the boundaries between peo-ple. It has also brought with it challenges in understanding the different communities and finding solutions to their problems. Frequent cultural exchanges will make this task easier.

These Chinese migratory patterns are a proof of the globalisation taking place in the dRC and the rest of Africa by this Asian giant. This migratory dynamic presents one of the most surprising migratory movements of the twenty-first century. While Africans risk their lives to enter Europe, Chinese workers are migrating everywhere in Africa. These migrations and population movements constitute another of the five processes (2) that char-acterise globalisation (Hugon, 2005: 158). We argue that for the Chinese government, this migration of workers is considered to be an outlet for an eventual dissatisfaction resulting from the loss of jobs caused by the 2008 financial crisis that still shows its effects today.

Several young Congolese entrepreneurs, with the help of networks through friends, travel to the city of Guangzhou in China, with a motive of buying cheap consumer com-modities and selling them for a profit back in their town and elsewhere in the country. When they run good business, they make money. In the end, they can afford to feed their families and build a house in the suburbs of Kinshasa. They continue to believe in what they are do-ing and their customers are happy. The free movement of travelling around the world helps few Congolese to pursue their business dream. However, the Congolese government has not clearly enabled Congolese corporate or small entrepreneurs to go into China.

The conclusion analyses the lessons learned from this case study.

CONCLUSION

The findings of this case study on Kinshasa central market reveal that Chinese presence in the urban landscape of Kinshasa contributes to the social progress of the citizens through the sales and distribution of goods and services. In this case study, small Chinese shop owners have gained an unprecedented economic importance in the small urban commerce. Well structured networks of the Chinese Diaspora ensure the flow of cheap and affordable labour compared to the dRC labour. Also, the low prices of merchandise, small Chinese-owned shops are capturing a significant share of the local market, to the detriment of local shop owners. However, social tensions are arising between these groups. Chinese, Lebanese


and Indians, who are migrants, continue to have dominated retail trade. This domination is a violation of dRC rules, which limits them to import and wholesale trade. According to the dRC rule existing for more than 40 years, the retail sector is reserved to the Congolese. Congolese accept Chinese goods. Chinese entrepreneurs do not have to import their labour for market then goods. Congolese can equally market these goods and quite ably do. Considering the population of China, if they continue importing labour, they will crowd out the Congolese labour force.

Since March 15 2013, China’s new political era is characterized by a domestic agenda with a goal of doubling its per capita income for both urban and rural residents, as well as increasing the average income of urban citizens to 7000 USD (Boqing, 2012). Arguably, with China’s new policy agenda, the dRC and others countries will be a source of econom-ic boom for Chinese enterprises. There are no indications that Chinese migration to dRC is slowing. Based on these experiences, as dRC’s economy continues to grow, we should ex-pect even more Chinese migrants to make the long journey across the Indian Ocean. It may be hard to imagine, but a large and growing Chinese population is now a permanent fixture of dRC’s demography. Recent developments in Chinese migration to dRC and its relation to China’s rise on the world stage call for further research and methodological innovation in order to develop a holistic view and an in-depth understanding of the process, trends and impacts of Chinese immigration into dRC in the next decade.

Based on my analysis, dRC must not only be serious about Congolese-Chinese ties, it should also understand the impact of this trade partnership. RDC should define its devel-opment goals more clearly and ensure that they are not obstructed by external influence. The dRC has grown a strong sense of initiative in its development. It has witnessed fast economic development. But, one of the big hurdles for development in dRC has been the rampant external interference. Considering the dRC natural and human resources, if there is less foreign interference and a real commitment to development from Congolese leaders, there is no reason why the country can not out perform in terms of economic growth. The advantage of such approach is that dRC will be able to forge a development path that is independent of others, and will also draw on lessons from successful paths followed by oth-ers. What the dRC really needs are economic agreements and partnerships complementary, not one-sided agreements. If the country gets assistance from others, it must be used for the right purposes to satisfy people’s needs. The country does not have to focus only in food, agriculture, natural resources and manufacturing. It must seize other opportunities like renewable energy. economic diversification is a key to success. Local entrepreneurs, who know better about laws, regulations, investment environment and market channels, have to start setting up joint ventures with BRICS or committed Western partners. With more Chinese consumers getting interested in African products, I believe there will be even more opportunities for Congolese and Chinese businesses to work together. I know that dRC is one of the right places for many entrepreneurs from the BRICS countries to expand their businesses, because of its human and natural resources.

To succeed, this calls for collaboration between policy markers and local entrepreneurs need to ensure they maximise benefits from relations with their leading external trade partners. They must act instead of cloaking their concerns in speeches, to shift them from rhetoric to action. What Congo needs to be doing as a country, is to be ready to engage with China as equal partners. They have the power of freedom in their hands and in their spirit.


Locally-owned shops and other Congolese have to stop complaining about small Chi-nese-owned shops, and rather consider excessive migration of Chinese to take jobs that should have be done by citizens. Congolese elites must ask the immigration department to get accurate on the rising number of Chinese migrants. The Congolese Parliament can ad-dress problems that may arise, but exaggerating of the problem is a worse option. Can the local shop owners learn from the Chinese to structure their social networks based on local cultures in a manner that would allow them to compete with their Chinese counterparts? When are the Congolese going to speed up their investments to make it work for them?

NOTES

(1) The “ism” refers to the ideologies of dictators such as Mobutu and Kabila. (2) Global finance, organization of global production, free movement of goods, migrations and movement of populations and real time information.

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Author’s Biodata:Dr Nuah M. Makungu M. holds a Ph.D in Development Sociology from the Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne (France) and teaches Development Studies courses in the International development Program (School of International development and Globalization) and in the Sociology and Anthropology Department at The University of Ottawa (Canada). From 1993-1997, he served as the ONg supervisor and Policy Adviser’s “Jardins et Elevages de Parcelle (JEEP) in Kinshasa (dRC). His expertise and areas of research are development Sociology; Sociology of cooperation; Agricultural development and Globalization (Chinese in Africa and Africans in China). His present research focuses on Social development and Economic development impacts of dRC-China cooperation (projects and trade).



Sovereignty and Identity in EU-China-Japan Political dia-logue. A Theoretical Analysis1

Oliviero FrattolilloUniversity of Napoli “L’Orientale”, Italy

The “images” which have commonly distinguished Brussels’ relations with Beijing (starting from the 1990s) and Tokyo (since the Cold War years) appear to actually be the result of the concur-rence of events and of structuring factors that denoted trade problems on the surface, or dysfunc-tions generated by the systemic variable. Nonetheless, in this paper I try to explain that these problems are fundamentally based on a much more complex and inherent divergence of two uni-verses of values and different political cultures. Zhao Tingyang’s theory on “relation rationality” and the Japanese ethical notion of “relational coexistence” (linked to Watsuji Tetsurō) may help to inscribe and construct modern historical relations between China and Japan towards Europe into a narrative by bringing - in Carol gluck’s words - “the outside in”. Finally, I analyze the relationship between the three actors in the light of the systemic changes occurred after the end of the bipolar system and especially following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, try-ing to highlight the potential of their political dialogue.

Keywords: China; Japan; Europe; Politics; Identity.

eNDING WeSTPHALIAN ORDeR OR JUST MULTIPLe SOVeReIGNTIeS?

The theme that forms the backdrop to my analysis is the sovereignty. Starting from the historical concept of Westphalian sovereignty, I continue to briefly analyze how this has been changed and re-interpreted over time. It is widely accepted that the same concepts can often be interpreted in different ways by different people: my analysis has focused in particular on some conceptual and interpretative gap that even today generate misunderstandings in their relationships.

Historically, the concept of sovereignty was coined by Western Europe during the six-teenth and then the eighteenth century. The ongoing bloody conflicts and especially the Thirty Years' War certainly promoted the introduction of this concept, and with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 the sovereignty was recognized as the new cardinal principle of interna-tional relations, as the cornerstone for the maintenance of peace and international security.

As it is well known, the concept of sovereignty was based on two dimensions, external and internal. externally was recognized equality between states and was based primarily on the principle of non-interference in internal affairs of the other states, acknowledging the existence of anarchy of the international system. Internally the sovereignty of a state coin-cided with the supreme authority of jurisdiction: the right of a nation to decide its internal

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Oliviero Frattolillo. E-mail: [email protected]

Sovereignty and identity in eU-China-Japan politiCal dialogUe 103

political system and its structure.We could perhaps say that China today still feels the "guardian" of the Westphalian sov-

ereignty. This has, of course, historical roots. The first encounter that China had with this concept dates back to the nineteenth century when the country was penetrated by Western powers. After being defeated in both the First and the Second Opium War, China’s Qing dynasty was forced to sign unfairl treaties and to make further concessions to the Western imperialist powers. After suffering a strong humiliation, China went from being a victim, because it was obliged to accept foreign domination, to the rebuilding of its internal and ex-ternal sovereignty lost because of the “barbarians” (Pan, 2010, p. 239).

Indeed, China went from being an ancient empire, with its own universal order based on the principle Tian Xia, to a nation-state. The Chinese Tian Xia, or “All-under-Heaven”, described the universal Chinese empire from which the neighbors might learn the values of the civilization, and create a harmonious order between the world of man and that of nature.

Conceptually, the Tian Xia preferred the notion of "local" to that of "national", the "fam-ily" to the "nation-state", the "relations" to the "truth and mind", the "communalism" to "in-dividualism". The world is seen as a whole, not a single rational and scientific perspective, but in its complexity and uniqueness, taking into account cultural diversity. The cohesion of peaceful diversity flowed into the concept of Tian Xia: harmony between peoples. Here we find ourselves in front of a first peculiar divergence between Chinese and Western ethics: while the West sees the "other" from a subjective point of view, the Chinese assume that the "other" is part of the 'otherness, that is, as an alternative and as the possibility (Zhao, 2009, p. 9-p. 11).

China was forced, therefore, to adapt itself to the European concept of sovereignty, becoming a nation-state. But this path was abrupt. The encounter between the Chinese im-perial system and the European countries in the second half of the nineteenth century was not painless. The idea of sovereign states equal to each other, having Europe as a model, was spread to China through the gunboat diplomacy, and with the spread of Western con-cepts with an alleged universal character. This naturally led to the creation, by the Chinese, of a distorted notion of the concept of Westphalian sovereignty. In fact, after the establish-ment of the PRC in 1949, China made many efforts to try to regain a sovereignty that was both internal and external. The Western idea of transforming China into a civilized nation brought this to strive for the rights which it incorporated. China wanted to give the concept of sovereignty a strong sense of nationalism, intended as territorial integrity and national dignity: an absolute sovereignty.

Today, then, we see an interpretative reversal: europe has difficulties to live and deal with the Westphalian sovereignty, trying to modify and overcome it, while China defends this concept, preserves and most strongly asserts it.

As argued by some scholars, sovereignty, as a concept, is in a state of flux (Jacobsen, Sampford & Thakur, 2008). Over time, the re-interpretations have been given to this con-cept are many, as numerous are the changes occurred at the international level. Relations between the states are changed, the globalization, the shift from a bipolar to a multipolar system and the new wars have strongly contributed to the need of reinterpreting the classi-cal concept of sovereignty, enriching it with meanings and perspectives which have been renovated. Issues such as human rights and democracy have gained priority, and there is therefore the need to see the states, not only as independent and autonomous, but as actors

Quarterly JOurNal OF CHINeSe StuDIeS, 2(1), 102-118FrattOlIllO104

able to cooperate with each other. The traditional concept of sovereignty is certainly inadequate to express the complex-

ity of international relations today, for which sovereignty is pooled, shared, perforated. The creation of the European Union is just a mirror of this new way of conceiving sov-ereignty: states have voluntarily transferred their rights of sovereign nation-states in a supranational dimension, creating a process of unification and integration (Pan, 2010, p. 234-p. 235).

The post-9/11 also marked a moment of deep change in EU-East Asia relations. As a result, forms of technical and functional cooperation dominated, while the political and strategic dialogue was partly withdrawn at the bilateral level - as evidenced by the growing importance of the EU’s relations with Japan, China and India (ASEM Infoboard, 2002). These changes in inter-regional dialogue highlighted the different realities and strategies that marked the positions of both parts. In an unprecedented moment in history, Asia and Europe committed themselves to the construction of an intensive political dialogue, and these differences gave rise to criticisms and worries throughout the second half of the 1990s (Santander & Ponjaert, 2009, p. 296). The divergences of European and Asian countries rooted in deep differences in terms of backgrounds, beliefs and historical experiences sur-faced when setting the ASEM agenda (Fitriani, 2011, p. 43). On the one hand, the Southeast Asian countries (many of which were former colonies that only gained independence a few years before and were still under economic recovery) were strongly imbued with the notion of national sovereignty, which they believed to be the best guarantee for stability, security and development (Sukma & Nathan, 2009, p. 111). On the other hand, the EU member states opted for an integrated model of institutionalized sharing of sovereignty as a means of achieving effective cooperation and sustainable development. The comments presented in this respect by Busse and Maull (Busse & Maull, 1999, p. 227) are elucidative, as ac-cording to them the history of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in terms of security is, to some extent, “one of the rejecting European role models”.

The explanations given by the two authors focus mainly on issues related to security as well as to geopolitical aspects of the two areas. While many Asian countries were still affected by internal security and economic development problems - frequently as a result of a still incomplete nation-building process – the European states had already become “well consolidated nation-states” (Busse & Maull, 1999, p. 227). In addition to this, from a geo-political point of view, compared to a mainly “land-oriented” Europe, Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific are regions with a strong maritime vocation. Moreover, while the european geo-strategic landscape was markedly bipolar during the Cold War years, the situation in Asia was more complex, punctuated by regional and sub-regional influences that were far removed from European experiences. Today the situation is such as it could be said that the diplomatic games played by both parties show the presence of some “structural limits” within the mutual perceptions. According to Kang, Brussels’ identification of the europe-an political interests in East Asia proved to be a dismissed expectation, while many Asian countries were not able to articulate their vision of the role that the EU could take in their region. different security priorities, divergent sources of terrorism and a thorough heteroge-neity in economic and social development, as well as in sovereignty and jurisdiction issues, seem to be among the main reasons attributed to this by the Asian countries (Kang, 2003, p. 73).


Moreover, an excellent study recently conducted by the European Studies in Asia (ESIA) consortium revealed important aspects related to the perception of the EU in Asia, not re-stricting the analysis at the institutional perspective, but rather exploring the cultural impact on the citizens of the various states involved in the ASeM process (Chaban, Holland & Ryan, 2009). On the basis of results achieved from the empirical research undertaken here, the surprising reality is that “what information did exist tended to be impressionistic, hap-hazard, ill-informed and lacking scientific empirical evidence on how Asian citizens and the media saw the European Union” (Chaban, Holland & Ryan, 2009, p. 2). The phenomenon appears even more pronounced when the EU’s involvement is considered both in terms of inter-regional agreements and of bilateral relations. As stated in an influential 2002 report for the Commission, “Europe does not exist without non-Europe” and “Europe can only be realized in the mirror of Others” (Strath, 2002; Strath, 2010; Bosch Stiftung, 2007).

UNRAVeLING THe TANGLe: THe eU-CHINA-JAPAN TRIANGLe

Although several years elapsed since the enunciation of the European Security Strategy (ESS), the debate on the EU’s international identity is still open. Alongside the notion of ‘civilian power’, the eU has increasingly been recognized as a ‘normative power’. We cannot say, however, that the interest of the analysts in the first connotation of the eU has receded at all, as it is the conceptual framework on which the dominant discourse tending to construct the European international actorness during the 1990s was established (Whitman, 2006, p. 1-p. 20).

In light of the new EU framework that clearly shows its global aspirations, it would be problematic to evaluate how the notion of civilian power can be still feasible. While that image could be now questioned, prominent scholars like Maull (Maull, 2000, p. 56-p. 80), referring to germany’s participation in the Kosovo War in 1999, argue that the recourse to the military instrument did not invalidate, in that case, the notion of Europe as a civilian power. According to him, the ESS clearly stated that this was compatible with the EU’s interests and security priorities, which must be safeguarded in the face of global threats, through the pursuit of strategic goals (including the construction of a safe environment). The main trends found within the debate on the eU’s international profile converge mostly on its potential to exercise power worldwide by promoting democracy and development through trade, foreign aid and peacekeeping operations (Moravcsik, 2002, p. 27). This view goes beyond the traditional dichotomy between civil and military power. While there is wide scientific consensus that the eU’s historical experience as colonial power dissuades it from any hegemonic approaches, it is less clear whether the rejection of the classical models of power politics produce a distinctive vision of international relations. At any rate, the assistance measures and trade conditions at the base of the ESS and the use of military force as a last resort, unambiguously demonstrate the EU’s inclination to soft approaches in the sphere of global politics.

The notion of normative power plays an important role in the debate on the EU’s inter-national identity and on its external perception. The theoretical foundations of the CSdP and of the ESdP, for example, are regulatory as well as constitutive rules as they seek to create a European identity for collective actions. These frameworks provide new institu-tional and normative ground in order to put the EU’s global presence into practice (Cheba-


kova, 2008, p. 2-p. 14). Some authors, however, acknowledged more than a single Europe-an identity as a result of its international projection. They also suggest that the application of the constructivist approach could help to explain how the perception of European iden-tity is socially constructed in East Asia. According to this approach, the reciprocal beliefs and expectations of the states determine the character of the international life. They are the product of social rather than materials structures, largely constructed by the people’s ideas. The existence of social realities depends on the interweaving of the concepts, theories and beliefs expressed by the actors. The sharing of ideas, or the culture of an anarchic system, represents its structure, or at least an important part of it. In his theory of social constructiv-ism, Wendt does not neutralize the importance of power and material interests as explana-tory and constitutive factors of the reality, but he asserts that their meanings and effects de-pend on the system’s social structure. As it is well known, this requires the identification of the ideas and norms that have a constitutive function in determining the means, the purpose and the nature of the game in which the states are involved, which can be conflictive, com-petitive or cooperative. This is exactly what Wendt called the “dominant cultural structure of the international system”, which may be predominantly Hobbesian, Lockean or Kantian. Each of these cultures is included in a context of anarchy, but it does not exhaust all the possible forms that anarchy may take. When the Hobbesian culture is dominant in a system it is considered a kind of “war of all against all”. The central idea, however, is that the state of war is formed on the basis of shared ideas, rather than caused by the state of anarchy, or by human nature in itself. enmity is the consequence of security as a zero-sum game and the resulting security dilemma leads the states to act as if their ultimate goal is to maximize power. The representative type of practice produced by the enemy is the Realpolitik, which tends to build a selfish vision of the Other.

Lockean culture, by contrast, is framed around a rivalry that is tied to the right to sov-ereignty. A weak state may have its own territorial sovereignty if the other states recognize it as a right. The state-actors are not enemies but rivals, according to the Hobbesian princi-ple of “live and let live”. As it is obvious, the subjective beliefs regarding the Self and the Other at the base of Lockean logic are not immutable, and this allows us to presuppose that the rivalry may also change. At the macro level, however, the rivalry forms part of a collec-tive representation of shared knowledge that overcomes the ideas of individual states. By combining these phenomena, we arrive at the idea that the war is, at the same time, accept-ed and contained. While Lockean culture has been dominant over the last three centuries, “Hobbesian disputes”, such as World War II, have undermined the status quo, or at least attempted to.

Kantian culture, lastly, is structured around the role of friendship. It can be composed of rivals and friends, or just that of friends. Two rules of friendship are shared by the states: the refusal of the use of force in the conflicts resolutions and mutual aid between states when a state’s security is threatened by a third actor.

According to Mazzei (Mazzei, 2010, p. 16), a fourth culture can be considered, as pro-posed by Zhao Tingyang, currently the leading figure among Chinese intellectuals, and based on the cardinal Confucian values of “harmony” and “universal cooperation”. Zhao shuns the Western notion of conflict, reputed as ethnocentric, and tries to adopt a win-win approach to maximize the cooperation, minimizing the conflicts. The more a culture is inte-riorized by a set of actors, the greater their identification will be as part of a group that rep-


resents a collective or social identity. This instils in the actors a collective interest towards the preservation of their own culture, which will tend to defend itself in case of external threats.

The discourse on the identity, or rather on the identities, of the EU may offer an expla-nation, in the constructivist sense, for its political weakness in East Asia, and its inability to play a role in the local resolution of hard issues without the support of both Japan and Chi-na.

The EU is integrated into two of the most important political and security networks in Asia, the ASEM and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The Union is also in the privi-leged position of being able to convert its economic influence into soft power, which af-fords it greater power to affect regional political developments. However, despite its coop-eration with East Asian countries in economic and cultural terms, the EU has been excluded from high political discourse in the region, such as the Taiwan issue and the Six Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. In other words, though the Union is formally involved into East Asia’s political structure and security, in reality it has little impact on hard security matters. Thus, the theme of political influence becomes closely related to the constructivist concepts of identity and perception (Pardo, 2009, p. 265-p. 280). The European collective identity is interiorized to such an extent as to be projected in east Asia without taking into consideration the cultural and political implications of its compatibility and understandabil-ity by third actors. Taking into account factors such as identity allows us to gain a better idea of how the conduct of a state is perceived by other states in different ways, depending on the actor with which it interfaces and the manner in which its actions are implemented. As regards the case of Japan, the history of political and diplomatic relations with Europe have been marked since the Cold War years by a clear misevaluation of their respective identities (Frattolillo, 2013). This has impeded a proper understanding of the dynamics which have produced indifference, or which have led to conflicts. emphasizing the impor-tance of the role of identity in the history of Japanese-European political and diplomatic relations certainly does not imply a lack of focus on other equally important factors, such as the nature of the international system, the distribution of power, and interdependence. How-ever, the identity discourse remains an underestimated aspect in this field of study that has undoubtedly contributed to complicating the various attempts aimed at resolving conflicts when they have occurred. As stated by historians such as Akira Iriye (Iriye, 1990, p. 101), “viewing a nation as a culturally defined entity enables diplomatic historians to broaden their inquiries by raising serious questions about one country’s behaviour and attitudes toward others”; thus, “the question of mutual understanding or antagonism among nations cannot be fully examined so long as one focuses exclusively on security or trade issues; one will also have to consider the mind-sets of leaders and peoples”. International relations, as well as international history, take place within a world that is understood not only as geopo-litical interplays or in terms of economics, but also on the basis of normative structures as the most profound cultural expression of the individual states or civilizations, and it would perhaps be parochial to ignore this. According to Iriye, “at certain times and in certain circumstances, ideas and assumptions are crucial”, and then “the study of those times and circumstances may provide a fascinating area of inquiry for diplomatic historians” (Iriye, 1990, p. 101-p. 102).


THE TIAN XIA LEgACY

The term “identity” is inherently multidimensional, since it includes a wide range of elements: civilization, ethics, culture, emotional aspects etc. In this analysis, the identity discourse will be limited, especially in the Japanese case, to the country’s normative beliefs relating to its orientation towards the Other, as it may be clearly explained by some aspects of its own politico-philosophical culture. However, we deemed it appropriate to start with a brief digression about Zhao’s theoretical perspective - which we term here “relational rationality” – that aims, without compromising the overall coherence of our analysis, to serve as introduction to the discourse on the “relational coexistence”, properly concerning Japan. Through a careful reading, in fact, the two dimensions have considerable political and philosophical similarities and they merge into a unique theoretical framework that may relate to some extent both to Japan and East Asia which, in the analysis of EU policies, may sometimes be misleading to consider as fully separated entities.

According to Zhao (Zhao, 2009a; Zhao, 2006, p. 29-p. 41), the US has a Kantian cul-ture when they interact with the Anglophone allies, a Lockean culture towards Europe and a Hobbesian approach with other countries, especially towards the “rogue states” and the “failed nation-states”. The EU would rather show itself to have a Kantian culture within itself and a Lockean approach towards the outside world, and this would result in a great difficulty in asserting itself in cultural contexts which are specular in many respects, as is in the case of Asia. Ontologically, the Lockean approach arises in opposite terms if related to Zhao’s position. Even the Kantian identity fails to converge towards forms of communitar-ianism going beyond the mere cooperation if we consider that this last does not necessarily imply the mutual improvement of the actors involved. As a direct result, the entire West is imbued with a vision that Zhao believes is anchored to principles that have been overcome by the globalized world. In the eyes of the Chinese philosopher, the West is still embedded in the Westphalian model of the international relations, based on the state dimension and without any supranational institution that could ensure stability at the global level. The per-spective in which Zhao’s political philosophy of Tian-xia (“all that is under heaven”) must be framed is indeed placed on a global level (Callahan, 2008, p. 749). It should exceed the nation-state’s threshold, which is by now invalidated by the globalization process, in order to conduct a wide-ranging reflection on the world politics. As stated by Zhao, throughout human history, the various and vain attempts to unify the world have often followed one another through the construction of world empires and state-alliances. Their failure is main-ly due to the absence of a stable model of cooperation, which relied on the Kantian idea of “perpetual peace” or on the notion of “universal harmony” between people of Chinese origin. This implies that the world system should be framed within the Tian-xia theoretical system, which is conceptually open, even if this does not imply its automatic and timeless extensibility (Zhao, 2009a, p. 5). It is an open network focused on a sort of world govern-ment and on a large number of sub-state entities that are extremely divergent in geograph-ical and cultural terms. The world government presides over the universal institutions, the laws and the global order, but it may lose its own legitimacy if it betrays the justice it is supposed to uphold, or if it abuses its powers. In both these cases, it would be reasonable to expect a revolution by the people and the revocation of the “Mandate of Heaven” (gao, 2008, p. 256). Long-term cooperation is ensured by a sort of institutionalized balance,


which relies on the world government’s control over armed forces, which is proportionally increasing compared to the military power of the sub-state entities.

As it has been conceived by Zhao, there are three senses in which the Tian-xia can be understood: the earth and all the lands under heaven; a common choice made by all the peoples of the world, or a universal agreement in the ‘hearts’ of the individuals; and a po-litical world system that includes a universal institution aimed at maintaining the order at every level. The world would therefore consist of three notions: the physical world (the earth), the psychological world (people’s feelings) and the institutional world (global insti-tution) (Zhao, 2009a, p. 9). Political governance must be transferable in a descending order, from “All-under-Heaven” to the nation-states and to the families - and never in the opposite way. However, the political legitimacy of a universal institution must be provided by its ethical justice. Then, unlike the political transposition, the ethical transposition should be developed according to an ascending order that goes from the families to the states, up to “All-under-Heaven”, because it is assumed that the ethics is rooted in the true essence of humanity (Zhao, 2003, p. 4).

Ultimately, the combination of the political transposition - channelled by the Tian-xia’s theory towards the states and the families - and the ethics turns into a relationship of mutual justification. The essence of the harmony, a world without enemies, becomes possible. Yet the concept of harmony is a principle of co-existence that presupposes the existence and, in turn, produces it. This is because, in Zhao’s words, “nothing can be defined if not in terms of ‘relations’” (Zhao, 2009a, p. 10). This philosophical logic is extremely important to un-derstanding the concept of harmony as the principle that substantiates the relations between things. This “fourth culture” results in a win-win approach, which is hard to find out in the Western tradition where the win-lose approach, based on the idea of strenuous opposition, has to prevail. In a first approximation, this could describe the cultural and identity context in order to understand the EU’s disinterest towards East Asian security issues. As stressed by Wendt (Wendt, 2003, p. 337-p. 338), in fact, both these cultures may clash with egoistic type identities.

“In Lockean culture, states identify with each other’s survival, so that “death threats” to one are seen as threats to all, but this does not extend to identification with each other’s security more generally because in many respects it is still a self-help culture. In the Kantian culture, the scope of identification is broader and as such should generate collective action in response to any military threat, not just death threats. [...] even within a relationship and issue covered by a collective identity, it will often be in tension with egoistic identities. [...] the fact that internalizing a culture involves the formation of a collective identity should not blind us to the possibility that egoistic identities may still be important. The picture here is one of “concentric circles” of identification, in which the nature and effects of collective identity vary from case to case, not one of altruism across the board.”

Zhao’s theory of Tian-xia found a sort of further systematization or a gradual deepening in its formulation of the idea of “relational rationality” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 35-p. 49). In the


philosopher’s words, “the Chinese philosophy considers that [...] the variability of the facts is a better premise than the certainty of things” since committing an act involves introduc-ing a form of relation between individuals (Zhao, 2009b, p. 43). In other words, human existence would be continuously reconstituted and redefined through the relationships that people entertain with regard to one another.

A very significant piece of his essay helps to explain the exact terms of this discourse:

“In the world of facts, the formula “x is in relation R to y” (xRy) acquires a meaning quite different from what it has in the world of things. […] In other words, the presence of x and y depends on the relations between them. […] According to this relational point of view, what is the relation that determines the existential situation and the value of the facts that con-stitute the world of life” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 43).

Relational rationality is conceived in dichotomous terms if compared to modern indi-vidualism, which is founded on the assumption of an absolute individuality, and “exalts the personal interests defined and calculated by an individual point of view” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 44). The conceptual framework that underlies the discourse on relationality directly intro-duces the crucial question of “coexistence”, which makes the classic debate on the ontolog-ical existence unnecessary, or even out-dated. This is because “the co-existence precedes the existence” (Zhao, 2009b, p. 45).

Zhao identifies three principles underlying the co-existence aimed at maximizing the cooperation and minimizing conflicts, namely the inclusion of all peoples, the universal benefit and the absence of negative reward. The first insists on the need for a world free of discrimination or of “exclusions of other cultures”, implying a politics that rejects the cat-egory of the “enemy”. According to the second principle, instead, the universally accepted “relations of coexistence” must provide advantages from which all mankind may benefit. The third is based on the assumption that an action or a strategy which entails no negative reward is a “representation of the universal values”. Military competition, trade protection-ism and the war of markets are highly dangerous strategies. Similarly, the individualism is questionable since it is based on selfishness, which produces isolation and hostility (Zhao, 2009b, p. 45-p. 46).

THE NINgEN AIdAgARA PARAdIgM

The relational rationality theory bears a remarkable similarity and a commonality of principles with Japanese relational ethics, the maître-à-penser of which was Watsuji Tetsurō (1889-1960), the pioneer of modern ethics in Japan. It could be argued that, in the Japanese case, Zhao’s theory of Tian-xia is expressed in terms of a “relational coexistence”, which bases its ontological sources on the central concept of ningen aidagara, intended as a “human inter-relationality”, which was analytically presented in a work published in 1935 and entitled Ningengaku toshite no rinrigaku (“The significance of ethics as the study of Man”) (Watsuji, 1997, p. 9).

Western philosophical tradition, which has its roots mainly in Aristotelian, Cartesian, and Christian concepts, had developed social ethics that were hopelessly anthropocentric.


The concept of ningen aidagara aims to offer a “renewed” interpretation of ethics, which seeks to relate the Western concept of the self with the Japanese concept of the self as in-ter-being. In fact, the reasons for this fundamental cultural divergence can be found within the framework of a more profound and complex diversity of cultural context: an anthropo-centric West and a communitarian East. The relational ethics of Watsuji, the idea of a hito to hito to no aidagara is unquestionably the result Confucian universe:

“In ancient China, parent and child, lord and vassal, husband and wife, young and old, friend and friend, and so forth constituted “the grand rin of human beings,” that is to say, the most important kinds of human fel-lowship (Watsuji, 1996, p. 11).”

The Confucian matrix implicit in Watsuji’s ningen is inseparable from the communitar-ian ethics of kazoku seido (Japanese “family system”), and more so from the concept of ie, in its social and spiritual dimension. As is well known, the fundamental importance of the “home/family system” in the Japanese ethics of social relationships was one of the main topics analysed as part of Japanese social studies in recent decades.

As observed by Nakane Chie, who provided one of the most interesting contributions to the system of the ie as a pervasive structural element in Japanese society, group conscious-ness in Japanese society is expressed through this traditional and ubiquitous institution that has come to penetrate, from within, every corner and every aspect of Japanese society. The physical configuration of the traditional Japanese house is a practical expression of a social and affective distinction between the intimacy of the “inside” and the superficiality of the “outside” - which embraces the distinction indicated by Kimura Bin, the space between ex-istential iru-being and the physical spatiality of aru-being. Once again, Nakane shows how the order of the interpersonal relationships in Japan reflects the structure of a tate shakai (vertical society), in which each type of group is organised in a direct, personal and hierar-chical relationship (known in anthropological literature with the dichotomy oyabun-kobun (“parent/child”).

This kind of relationship order was to have permeated the culture of the country, in all its social groups, to embrace the concept of State, in a kazoku kokka sense, which is the level on which the concept of ie relates to the figure of the Tennō and the imperial family system, which is where the highest Confucian cardinal virtues of filial piety and loyalty to their lord converge.

Nakane’s theory is shared and further developed in informative terms that relate to ni-honjinron literature, by the psychiatrist Takeo doi in his famous essay Amae no kōzō (The structure of the amae), in which he analysed Japan’s collective “group consciousness”. From a sociological and psychological standpoint, doi interpreted these relationships as amae expressions, which he called “infantile dependency syndrome”. The amae syndrome helps to understand the psychological underpinning interpersonal communication within the Japanese group. A much deeper and academically pertinent approach is represented by the ponderous study on the ie carried out by Murakami Yasusuke.

With respect to communitarism, in which the meaning of “group awareness” is felt through the ningen aidagara (LaFleur, 1978, p. 237-p. 250), there is the opposite traditional meaning of Western individualism (kojin-hugi); according to this, mankind is the measure


of all things (homo mensura, according to Protagoras’s theory). In Rinrigaku we can read:

“The understanding of the individual is itself, as such, an achievement of the modern spirit and bears an importance that we must never be allowed to forget. However, individualism attempts to consider the notion of the individual that constitutes only one moment of human existence and then substitutes it for the notion of the totality of ningen. This abstraction is the origin of many sorts of misconception. The standpoint of the isolated ego, which constitutes the starting point of modern philosophy, is merely one such example (Watsuji, 1996, p. 9).”

For Watsuji, the kojin-shugi tendency was the consequence of the fact that:

“Such words as anthropos, homo, man, or Mensch cannot denote anything but an individual human being. If we take such a stance, we have no alter-native but to explain such things as the relationships between person and person, communal existence, society, and so forth by appealing to terms somewhat different from that of human being. But if a human being is, basically speaking, a social animal, then social relationships cannot be separated from her (Watsuji, 1996, pp. 13-14).”

The question of ethics is not a matter of individual conscience, but of all the relation-ships between men and reciprocity between them. Any kind of ethical analysis can only succeed if it goes to consider the historical realities of human existence through a proper understanding of its expressions. The final item, which probably led to one of the most heartfelt debates between Heidegger and Watsuji, concerns the “being-for-death” concept. As already mentioned, Watsuji conceived the ningen sonzai as an expression of a “totality”, believing that such a “totality” must be sought “behind the totality of the individual,” and that the totality of the ningen is a totality that goes beyond death, although it includes ‘“being in its death” (Watsuji, 1996, p. 224). In his Ethics we find that:

“The total possibility of ningen sonzai must be found not in “being in its death,” but in the nondual relationship between the self and other as disclosed in the direction of absolute totality. This nondual relationship cannot properly be called into question unless we give heed to subjective spatiality in a basic way. However, Heidegger puts this subjective spread between the self and other entirely outside of his field of vision and keeps his eye focused on the total possibility of the “self” only as comprehended with the aid of the phenomenon of death. This derivation entirely converts his view of the authenticity and inauthenticity of ningen sonzai (Watsuji, 1996, p. 224).”

Spatiality becomes central to the process of understanding the concept of death: if inter-personal relationships are located in the spatial dimension, it is only possible to understand death in relation to that spatiality. On the other hand, Heidegger wrote: “The existential project, in which anticipation has been delimited, has made visible the ontological possibil-


ity of an existential, authentic being-toward-death” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 246).He made it clearer by arguing that “Indubitably, the fact that one da-sein can be rep-

resented by another belongs to the possibilities-of-being of being-with-one-another in the world” (Heidegger, 1996, p. 222). If in this context Heidegger described being as “thrown-projecting being-in-the-world”, and therefore of Being open to emotions (which undoubtedly emphasises the process of self-perception of the Self), he also explained how Being usually dies in a detritus manner, in other words, in its daily relationship with the world. Moreover, although it is in its dimension of ‘“Being-thrown,” Being is always identified with a world in which it is also “Being for” a Being that “takes care”. From the moment that “Being for” inevitably assumes a nature that is both spatial and temporal, the Da-sein, in its most authentic moment of “being-for-death,” is not found to be completely isolated, since dying is merged into Taking Care.

Therefore, for Heidegger, as well as for Watsuji, the experience of death is tied to ‘“be-ing-in-the world”, and thus to the ningen, in a context that is strongly permeated with rela-tionality and inter-subjectivity, or aidagara, in other words of “being-for”.

In this regard the positions taken by some scholars, such as the aforementioned Yuasa Yasuo and Sakai Naoki, who disagreed on some points, are significant. According to Yuasa, the only point in common between the two philosophers lies in the so-called “understand-ing of everyday life” (nichiyō tekina sonzai ryōkai), which consists of the “ways in which human beings achieve an understanding of their relationships, based on the dynamics of cooperation, in the daily existence of the ningen and the spatial dimension of the world”. The basic difference that separates and distances the concept of “human being” formulated by the two philosophers, is to be found in the concepts of Men (mask) and person (character), which Watsuji developed in his Men to perusona (Watsuji, 1963, p. 289-p. 295)2.

Sakai, who had a rather conciliatory position, argued that “many people have tried to distinguish Watsuji thinking from Heidegger’s philosophical ideas, separating the concept of In-der-Welt-sein and that of aidagara. However, as demonstrated by the opinions on the concept of death, both reached the same conclusions” (Sakai, 1999, p. 100).3

If the concept of ningen aidagara distances Watsuji from Scheler’s archetypes, the same cannot be said about the relationship between Watsuji and Heidegger. In some ways the two thinkers appear very close, and the objections raised by Watsuji perhaps end up underesti-mating the ideas of the german philosopher, which, thanks to his friendship with the afore-mentioned Japanese thinker Kuki Shūzō, had come close to eastern thinking and culture several times during his life-time, in particular, Sino-Japanese thinking and culture. The no-tion of yo no naka seems close to that of Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world, and one might be surprised that Watsuji didn’t actually become aware of it. This does not mean Heidegger’s work was wrongly interpreted by Watsuji. Probably, with the notion of yo no naka, the Jap-anese philosopher intended to give a far greater ontological weight to the ‘“Being-between”

2　The notion of perusona would make the role, or function, that each individual plays on the common di-mension of the aidagara ; Men is to indicate, however, the role that the perusona carries out within the group to which it belongs.3　Sakai presented in his contribution also the point of view of Jean-Luc Nancy, who argued in his book, La communauté désœuvrée , that the notions of subjectivism and individualism in Heidegger have led to a complete subjection of the individual to the whole through the logic of communitarian identification.


dimension, convinced that Da-sein was essentially temporal, to the contrary of its ningen, which seems to be centred on the spatial dimension. However, yo no naka makes the idea of “in-the-world’ and not “Being-between” (which would otherwise be called yo no aida), little different from In-der-Welt-sein.

As opposed to Isamu Nagami’s (1981) opinion, Watsuji was not looking for a purely ontological structure (at least not in the Heideggerian sense of the question), but rather a purely ethical system. While Heidegger was carrying out an ontological and phenomeno-logical existenz search, Watsuji was pursuing the sense of aidagara, primarily as a moral element (Bernier, 2001, p. 151). According to Bernier, “the insistence of one of them on ethics and the other on ontology is one of the major differences between the two authors. A difference based, at least in part, on the dominant german philosophical traditions (Hegelian ontology etc.) and the dominant positions in Japan (Confucian morals). However, he soon added that “the difference is, in fact, less strong than it sounds, since Heidegger develops ethical considerations that start from his ontological ideas, while Watsuji starts from meta-physical considerations to end up defining the principles of ethics.

It is clear that, as Wu noted, it is necessary to use a hermeneutical method to obtain ad-equate answers (Wu, 2001, p. 98-p. 99). What is irrational -even in different historical reali-ties - cannot be understood and interpreted by a common and universal logic. It is necessary to use a method that will pursue an understanding of historical reality through the herme-neutic interpretation of the various “human expressions”. The pragmatism stemming from the tendency to adapt itself to current circumstances, giving more importance to the partic-ularities of the specific case, and assessing contingent situations as and when they occur (in Japanese, sono ba sono ba), is a further aspect characterizing the Japanese social, cultural and economic behaviour, and more generally that of East Asian peoples. This leads to the assumption of an attitude that is more intuitive than deductive, more contextual than ratio-nal, and more relativist than absolutist. While in the West, an ethics based on the Kantian categorical imperative prevails, Japanese ethics is atomised, as it is composed of a variety of rules governing how to act at a given time. If, since the distant past, the Western dialectic has continued to be structured on the Cartesian dichotomy of res cogitans/res extensa, in Confucian Asia this was offset by the yin/yang, namely by the dialectic between comple-mentary forces (good/evil; light/dark; day/night), which alternate and counterbalance each other. On this basis, the dialectical efficacy of the Greek logos has no raison d’etre, leaving space for that of relationality. It is exactly within this dialectical relationship that one may find the concept of ontological “monism”: the non-dual dimension between body and mind, the individual and society, or in other words, the overcoming of the Subject/object opposi-tion which is inherent in the ningen aidagara based relational coexistence. Conversely, the EU’s corporate identity is widely shaped around the sharing of individual and political hu-man rights, on democracy and the rule of law. Hence, it appears clear that the EU “strongly identifies with these principles by considering itself their source and by conferring upon them the attribute of universality” (Pardo, 2009, p. 270).

CONCLUdINg REMARKS

In foreign policy, China is going through a transition era: if until recently, Beijing refused politically and ideologically the idea of a global governance, suggested-imposed by


the West, now the country has pragmatically accepted and actively works to carve out a role within the world. But the Chinese leadership is called, in particular, to rethink its attitude to the principle of non-interference, traditional cornerstone of its foreign policy. Until today the defense of this principle had three purposes: to preserve Chinese sovereignty from external interference; to keep the political affinity with the countries in the developing world; to avoid any involvement in international crises that directly touch its own national interests. Since the end of the Cold War, China has started to increase its participation in peacekeeping missions under the UN mandate, and while Beijing has not yet entirely accepted the European idea of the “Responsibility to Protect”, it is gradually sharing this attitude, aiming at a balance between the demands of humanitarian intervention and the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference.

In the Japanese case, it seems that Tokyo’s expectations of the EU are lower than they should be. The problem seems structural and not cyclical, as the expectations deficit cannot be interpreted as a phase of disillusionment preceded by excessive expectations. If Chi-na’s expectations of the EU are actually higher than before, it is above all because Beijing believes that Brussels can counter-balance US unilateralism in order to promote a multi-polar international system (Tsuruoka, 2008, p. 111-p. 113). According to the EU, the set of values that it tries to promote at the global level are also shared by Japan. Nonetheless, the commonality of purposes is not sufficient by itself to increase the effectiveness of their partnership, which can be described as “comprehensive” but still weak. Once again, it is the difference of perceptions and interpretations between the actors involved that makes the difference. In Wetterqvist’s words (2009), “perceptions matter, because they are a basis for understanding and a foundation upon which actors make choices and decisions. Under-standing the perceptions and perspectives of the “other” side can provide a basis for im-proved communication and give guidance on policy adjustments”.

The overcoming, or rather, the management of these conceptual gaps would be today more necessary than ever. The contribution that the two extreme Eurasian peripheries would be able to provide for the creation of a global governance is of the greatest importance. The problems that the international community currently faces are no longer manageable with-in the boundaries of the Westphalian state, since the processes of cultural and economic globalization does not lead to the integration of cultures and economic integration within a unified “global society”. Quite the contrary, they seem to produce a further differentiation and fragmentation of the international arena (Zolo, 2002, p. 180). In other words, the eco-nomic globalization is not accompanying the universalization of Western values , but the revaluation of cultural specificities : a process of indigenization of cultures which implies the radicalization of identity processes on the cultural, ethnic, tribal and especially religious basis (Mazzei, 2010, p. 1617-p. 1630). In the post-Westphalian international system, char-acterized by the emergence of ever new geopolitical fractures, were weak and fragile econ-omies export insecurity, financial crises destabilize entire social and political systems.

Western security is undermined by asymmetric threats produced by transnational terror-ist networks armed by authoritarian regimes. The gap between the North and the South of the world seems to grow dramatically and give way to a planète des naufragés (Latouche, 1991). So, a model of global governance, focusing on the concept of human security, al-though wishful thinking, is obviously the only way to guarantee a comprehensive manage-ment of such problems. The challenges that the process of globalization presents, in fact, to


the individual states make it necessary to rethink the classic political dilemmas of collective action and the logic of costs and benefits. It should also be considered that the choices made today by new actors such as China and other rising powers will affect, in a decisive way, the stability of the international financial and political system.

Europe, China and Japan have, in this sense, a huge potential. Nonetheless, it would be undeniable that the ability to achieve concrete progress in building a ‘global multilateral-ism’ can not do without from the cooperation of the American side. The U.S. should work to create a global system in which international law sets standards of legitimacy for the search of the national interest. In this case, the American soft power will play a major role (Nye, 2003). If, in fact, China, Japan and Europe have become key players on the interna-tional scene, both politically and economically, and their partnership could now potentially be able to handle the issues of the new global agenda, they could continue to deal with the high-profile of their respective bilateral relations with the White House.

From this point of view, the strengthening of the political dialogue of Europe with Chi-na and Japan would be a mostly reactive type, the product of this imbalance of power in an international system that does not seem to be characterized by a balanced multipolarity. The consolidation of Eurasian axis should therefore provide an appropriate contribution to a changing global environment that has never known the “end of history” predicted by Fran-cis Fukuyama or the ‘New International Order’ proclaimed by President Bush Senior. To-day more than ever, key-players such as China, Japan and the EU should actively engage in the construction, which can no longer be postponed, of a more inclusive global governance.

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Author’s BiodataOliviero Frattolillo is an Assistant Professor at the University of Naples “L’Orientale” in the department of Asia, Africa, and the Mediterranean where he teaches Political and diplomatic History of East Asia and History of International Relations of Asia and Africa. Diplomacy in Japan-EU Relations (London-New York: Routledge 2013) is among his most recent works.

First Author’s [email protected]


The Word “Macao” and its Special Meaning in the British Colonial Records of Nineteenth-Century Malaya1’2

Wei Chin Wong University of Macau

Based on a judicious examination of British colonial records and indigenous newspapers, this paper demonstrates that the meaning of the word “Macao” in the nineteenth century colonial Ma-layan context was once known as one of the major Chinese communities besides the “Hokkien”, “Cantonese”, “Teochew”, “Hakka”, and “Hailam”. Interestingly, Chinese that constituted the “Macao” community in British Malaya were not from the Portuguese Macao, but the natives from Canton area. The reason why they were bound together after they arrived in Malaya was because their points of embarkation to British Malaya were similar: Macao. The analysis of the British colonial records also shows the organising principles of the Chinese communities in Malaya be-tween 1810 and 1870 were largely depend on three major factors: (1) common spoken dialect; (2) common native birthplace; and (3) common point of embarkation to British Malaya. In sum, this paper offers fresh insights into the process of how the Chinese migrants adapted themselves to the foreign context of colonial Malaya in the nineteenth century. Moreover, this paper also restores the visibility of the word “Macao” before it became invisible in the British colonial records in the nineteenth century.

Keywords: Chinese, Macao, British Malaya

INTROdUCTION

In contemporary Macau, we know that the word “Macao” indicates a Portuguese spelling of “Macau” since the Portuguese colonial period in the sixteenth century. We do not know, however, the meaning of the word “Macao” used in the nineteenth-century British colonial records. What does the word “Macao” actually mean in the British Malayan context? Does it mean a place name of “Macao” on the Pearl River Delta? Or a particular culture brought originally from Macao to British Malaya in the nineteenth century? These questions are interesting. However, the meaning of the word “Macao” in the colonial Malayan context has not been fully recognised and answered by scholars. For this reason, my paper will explore the meaning of the word “Macao” based on a judicious examination of nineteenth-century British colonial records. The aim in doing so is to restore the visibility of the word “Macao” before it became invisible in the British colonial records in the 1870s.

1　Requests for reprints should be sent to Wei Chin Wong. E-mail: [email protected]　This paper was presented at the 2013 International Graduate Conference on “Asia in a Global Context” in Shanghai University, June 29, 2013. The author is grateful to the College of Liberal Arts, Shanghai University, and the Department Head, Prof. C.X. George Wei at the University of Macau, for giving her the opportunity to present this paper in Shanghai.


“MACAO” IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY BRITISH COLONIAL RECORdS

The earliest British colonial record that tells us about the “Macao” in Malaya was John Leyden’s article in 1811. John Leyden (1775-1811) was a Scottish linguist who joined the British East India Company (hereafter EIC) as a medical staff in Madras in the early nineteenth century. In 1805, Leyden’s visit to Penang had inspired him to study the Chinese and the Malays in the Malay Archipelago. As a result, he published an article, which was entitled “On the Language and Literature of the Indo-Chinese Nations”, in the Asiatick Researches in 1811.

In this article, Leyden (1811, pp. 266-267) pointed out that there were two major Chi-nese communities in Penang: the “Macao” and the “Chin Chew”. He further identified that the spoken Chinese languages of the “Macao” and the “Chin Chew” into six different types, including: Hyong-san ( 香山 ), Sun-tukk ( 順德 ), Nam-hói ( 南海 ), Pún-ngi ( 番禺 ),Tòng-khún (東莞 ) and Fo-khín (福建 ). According to Leyden, the dialects spoken by the “Macao” were the first five languages, Hyong-san, Sun-tukk, Nam-hói, Pún-ngi, Tòng-khún; while the “Chin Chew” commonly spoke Fo-khín in their daily life. This meant that the way that Leyden classified the Chinese inhabitants he encountered in Malaya was according to their spoken languages.

Unfortunately, Leyden did not explain why were the “Chin Chew” and “Macao” spoken different kinds of dialects in Malaya. He also did not discuss, however, that these languages were transcribed from the Cantonese pronunciations of the names of guangdong districts and Fujian province, where Hyong-san was xiangshan ( 香山 ), Sun-tukk was shunde ( 順德 ), Nam-hói was nanhai ( 南海 ), ; vis-à-vis), Pún-ngi was panyu ( 番禺 ), Tòng-khún was dongguan ( 東莞 ), and Fo-khín was fujian ( 福建 ). despite the lack of detailed infor-mation, Leyden’s investigation nevertheless was an important early result that shows about plurality of Chinese languages in British Malaya.

The second British colonial record that tells us about the “Macao” in British Malaya was Siah U Chin’s article, entitled “the Chinese in Singapore” (Siah, 1848, pp. 283-290). This paper was published in 1848 in the Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia. during the nineteenth century, Siah U Chin (1805-1883) was known also as Seah eu Chin, who was one of most influential Chinese merchants in British Malaya due to his language skills and trading knowledge.3 Amongst the respectable Chinese merchants, Siah was the first who discovered the population of “Macao” people in Singapore. In the 1840s, he estimates that the population of “Macao” people, numbering 6,000, was the third larg-est Chinese group in Singapore. At that time, the largest Chinese group in Singapore was the “Teochew”, which constituted nearly 48 percent out of the total Chinese population in Singapore, followed by the “Hokkien” (23%), “Macao” (15%), “Kheh” (10%), the “Mala-ya-born Chinese descendants” (3%), and the “Hailam” (2%). Table 1 below shows the Chi-nese population that Siah estimated in 1848:

Table 1Estimated Population of the Chinese Groups in Singapore, 1848.

3　 The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, “Seah Eu Chin,” 8 October 1935, p. 6. See also: Song, 1967, pp. 19-21.

The Word “Macao” in The BriTish colonial records of Malaya 121

Chinese Groups Population Percentage (%)

Hailam 700 2

Hokkien 9000 23

Kheh 4000 10

Macao 6000 15

Malaya-born Chinese Descendants 1000 3

Teochew 19000 48

Total 39700 100

Source: Siah, 1848, p. 290.

According to Siah, the “Macao” people in Singapore were commonly called as “Macao Chinese” in the Malayan context. These “Macao Chinese” were, however, not originally from the Portuguese Macao, but they were composed almost entirely of the natives from Canton, and the neighbouring villages near Canton. Besides the “Macao”, the other Chinese groups, such as the “Kheh” were men came from the inland areas of guangdong; the “Teo-chew” were predominantly Chinese migrants from Swatow; the “Hokkien” were composed of the natives from the Fujian province (i.e. Amoy, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Yongchun, etc). The “Hailam”, on the other hand, were constituted chiefly by the natives of the Hainan islands (Siah, 1848, p. 283; Vaughan, 1971, p. 6).

In addition, Siah also divides the Chinese occupations in Singapore into six major cat-egories: (1) businessmen, i.e. shopkeepers, petty traders, vendors, opium, pepper and gam-bier dealers, etc.; (2) agricultural workers; (3) craftsmen, i.e. tailors, shoemakers, bakers, barbers, boatmen, fishermen, etc.; (4) coolies or manual labourers; (5) house servants; and (6) the unemployed people. Particularly, according to Siah, the “Macao Chinese” in Singa-pore generally worked as coolies, shopkeepers, gambier and pepper planters, tailors, shoe-makers, boat makers, carpenters, wood cutters, bakers, barbers, and brick makers. Some of the “Macao Chinese” were hired as male domestic servants by the upper class Singapore residents in the 1840s, such as the Europeans and the Malaya-born Chinese (Siah, 1848, p. 290; Logan, 1855, p. 116).

The third British colonial record that tells us about the “Macao” community in nine-teenth-century Malaya was Jonas D. Vaughan’s writings in 1854. Jonas D. Vaughan (1825-1891) was one of the EIC servants who had lived in British Malaya for 45 years, where he had the opportunities to have first-hand contact with the Chinese at Penang.4 Similar to Leyden, Vaughan points out that the Chinese in Penang may be divided into two major Chi-nese categories: the “Macao” and the “Chin Chew”. Nonetheless, unlike Leyden, Vaughan did not focus on the spoken languages, but the native birthplaces of the “Macao” and the “Chin Chew”.

According to Vaughan, the community of “Chin Chew” was distinct from the “Macao” chiefly because their native birthplaces were different. The “Chin Chew” came predomi-nantly from the Fujian province, especially Amoy; while the “Macao” migrated to Malaya mainly from various parts of guangdong, such as: “Sin Neng” ( 新寧 ), “Hiong Shan” ( 香

4　 For the detailed background of Jonas D. Vaughan, refer to: Blythe, 1971, pp. v-vii.


山 ), “Ka Yin Chew” ( 嘉應 ), “Nam Hoi” ( 南海 ), “Sen Tak” ( 順德 ), “Poon Ngwi” ( 番禺 ), “San Wi”( 新會 ), “Howi Peng” ( 開平 ), etc.5 In addition to that, Vaughan also con-siders the “Kheh” people (or the “Hakka”) as part of the “Macao” community in the 1850s (Vaughan, 1854, p. 14).

Vaughan also believed that the organising principle of the “Macao” and the “Chin Chew” was dictated partly by their points of embarkation to Malaya. In the following pas-sage he clearly illustrates that the reason why the “Macao” was called as “Macao” in the Malayan context:

The Chinaman on landing in the Straits is called a “Singké” [ 新客 ; lit-erally new guest or new arrival in Hokkien pronunciation] or new man or new friend, by the Chinchew, and “Sin Hak” [a term 新客 in Cantonese pronunciation] by Macao men. These immigrants are thus obtained. One or more of the Chinese merchants charter a vessel and leave Pinang in April and May for Macao and Amoy. On arriving at the detained port, the charterer, who usually proceeds in the vessel as super-cargo, sets a number of agents to work….The natives of Quang-tung [guangdong] are more robust and hard working than the Fuh-kien [Fujian] or Chin-chew and other tribes (Vaughan, 1854, pp. 2-3).

From the above quote, it is observed that in British Malaya the Chinese migrants em-barked from Portuguese Macao were called as “Macao men”, while those embarked from Fujian, especially Amoy, generally bound themselves as “Chin Chew” after they arrived in Malaya. This statement also demonstrates that the organising principles of the Chinese communities in British Malaya were coinciding not only with the native birthplaces of the Chinese migrants, but closely tied to the migration networks, as well as the points of em-barkation they came to Malaya.

Other nineteenth-century British colonial records also tell us that the port of Macao was the busiest embarkation port for the Chinese migration to Malaya in the late 1840s. Numer-ic figures shown in table 2 below indicate that the majority of Chinese migrants were sailed from Macao to Singapore between 1847 and 1849:

TABLE 2The Number of Chinese Junks, Square-Rigged Vessels, and Chinese Passengers from China to

Singapore, 1847-1849.

China Ports Chinese Junk Square-Rigged Vessel No. of Passengers Percentage (%)amoy 11 11 3369 24Canton 17 0 3098 22Macao 29 0 6374 45Swatow 4 0 830 6Teochew 2 0 505 4Total 63 11 14176 100

Source: Compiled from Siah and TST .6

5　 “Sin Neng” ( 新寧 ) was an old name of today’s Taishan ( 台山 ).6　 Siah, 1848, p. 286; Straits Settlements Original Correspondence, “Chinese Emigrants,” 9 May 1849, p. 6.


This table indicates that between 1847 and 1849 there were 29 Chinese junks, which were carried 6,374 Chinese passengers, had sailed from Macao to Singapore. Compared to the numbers and percentages of the passengers sailed from Amoy, Canton, Swatow and Teochew, it is apparent that the passengers sailed from Macao (45%) was the highest amongst the China ports.

The mechanism of the Chinese migration system from China to Malaya also deserves a notice in this paper. Some doyens have pointed out that the “kinship-based system” was the earliest migration method that brought Chinese to work in Malaya. The sojourning Chinese merchants, who established small shops and businesses throughout Southeast Asia, were the ones who first developed this migration method to hire trustworthy workers amongst their relatives from China in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. This migration movement also became popular when the numbers of Chinese workers grew consistently in Southeast Asia over many generations (Yen, 1986, pp. 4-5; Wang, 1991, pp. 4-6; Song, 1967: 96).

However, according to the nineteenth-century British colonial records, the majority of Chinese migrants in Malaya were brought to Malaya usually by means of “labour bro-kerage system”. The British colonists also called this labour brokerage system the “credit ticket system”. In a practical sense, this system became popular mainly because there were high demands on Chinese labour in British Malaya, which in turn provided a major impetus to the labour brokers in China to make considerable profits by sending Chinese migrants to Malaya in the nineteenth century. At that time, besides the labour brokers, there were also “sub-labour brokers” based in China to help recruited young bachelors from Fujian and guangdong provinces (Yen, 1985, pp. 40-41). In fact, according to the British records, this labour brokerage system was established upon a chartering system from the hong mer-chants in Canton. Labour brokers must pay the hong merchants a certain amount of money before they could send Chinese passengers to British Malaya from Fujian and guangdong provinces.7

In Malaya, these labour brokers were commonly called “kheh-taos” (ketou; 客頭 ), lit-erally “the leading source of labour”, as they were the ones who hires a ship for a voyage to migrant labourers. Meanwhile, the newly arrived Chinese labourers were called as “sink-heh” (xinke, 新客 ; literally new guest or new arrival).8 Because many prospective sinkhehs could not afford to pay for their passage overseas, the passage money provided by sink-hehs were generally transferred to local Chinese secret societies, which known commonly amongst the Chinese as “hoey” ( 會 ; literally gathering or society) in Malaya. The quote below illustrates how the sinkhehs transferred their passage money to local Chinese secret societies in Malaya during the 1850s:

The immigrants are usually over-crowded on shipboard but treated well on the whole. They arrive in the months of January, February and March….The charterer [kheh-tao] gets for a master workman, either tailor, goldsmith or carpenter, 10 to 15 dollars, for a cooly 6 to 10, for a sickly man 3 to 4 or less. The Singké [sinkheh] then agrees to serve for

7　 The Chinese labour brokerage system was discussed in the Legislative Council: CO 273/69, “Legislative Council,” 9 September 1873, p. 7.8　 Newbold, 1839, Vol.1, p. 11-12 and CO 273/69, “Legislative Council,” 9 September 1873, p. 6.


12 months, receiving food, clothes and a few dollars for his services….Their agreements are generally faithfully fulfilled; at the end of the 12 months the Singké [sinkheh] is at liberty to enter his master’s services on a monthly stipend or to seek his livelihood elsewhere….Very few Chinese remain clear of the Hoés [Chinese secret societies], but as few will acknowledge themselves members it is difficult to arrive at the truth (Vaughan, 1854, pp. 2-3).

From the above quote, it shows that the interrelationship of supply-and-demand be-tween the kheh-taos and the local Chinese secret societies quickly bound the sinkhehs to Chinese secret societies after they arrived in British Malaya. The sinkheh needed the local Chinese secret societies not only to help them to pay off their passage money, but they also needed these local organisations for the immediate needs such as food, habitation, clothing, and other basic necessities after they landed in Malaya. At that time, the passage moneys that the sinkhehs owed to secret societies ranged from about 3 to 15 Spanish dollars, based on their manual skills and health conditions upon their arrival. The debts of sinkhehs would then be deducted in the form of labour service for a fixed period of time, usually a year or more, before they were freed from their debts and were able to find other jobs in Malaya.9 By this migration practice, a very cheap source of Chinese labour was introduced to British Malaya throughout the nineteenth century.

According to the Annual Reports of the Straits Settlements, the “Macao” people had formed their own form of Chinese secret society, “Macao ghee Hin”, in Malaya during the nineteenth century. When the British colonists began to control all the Chinese secret soci-eties in Malaya after the 1870s, two “Macao ghee Hin” (one in Singapore, another in Ma-lacca) had been registered to the British colonial supervision (Vaughan, 1971, pp. 112-113). The total members of the “Macao ghee Hin” in Malacca, according to the British colonial records, were 282, 282, 344, 404, and 454 from 1879 up to 1883 (Jarman, 1998, Vol.2, pp. 556-567, 618, 683; Wong, 2010, p. 91).

Interestingly enough, in the 1870s, Chinese migrants who spoke a common language (Cantonese dialect) and came from a common native birthplace (the guangdong area) had been divided into two different communities in British Malaya: the “Cantonese” and the “Macao”.10 According to a British record, the “Macao” was separated from the “Cantonese” because their points of embarkation to Malaya were different. The “Macao” embarked to Malaya mainly from the port of Portuguese Macao, while the “Cantonese” were sent to Malaya mainly in British ships from the Chinese ports of Hong Kong, Canton, Amoy, and Swatow. Because the British policies to the coolie trade in Portuguese Macao changed in 1873, from this year onwards the word “Macao” was no longer could be used as a generic

9　 During the nineteenth century, when the sinkhehs paid off their debts, they would automatically become “laukhehs” (laoke, 老客 ; literally “old guest”). This was a vernacular term of old and experienced settlers in British Malaya, particularly those who entitled to receive a monthly salary from the Chinese secret society they had joined in Malaya.10　 Straits Times Overland Journal, “Friday, 13th April”, 19 April 1877, p. 12.


name for the Chinese community in British colonial records.11 As a result, the “Macao” community in Malaya was merged with the “Cantonese” in the British official records since both groups were similar in their spoken language and their native birthplaces. This was how the “Macao” community became invisible in British Malaya after the 1870s.

CONCLUSION

Summarising the findings above, it is observed that the meaning of the word “Macao” in nineteenth-century British Malaya shows an indication not only as a place name of Macao on the Pearl River delta, but it was known also as one of the major Chinese communities in Malaya besides the “Hokkien”, “Cantonese”, “Teochew”, “Hakka”, and the “Hailam”. Furthermore, the meaning of the word “Macao” was also special in the colonial Malayan context because the people that constituted the “Macao” community were not from Macao but from the Canton area. The reason why they were bound together was primarily because their points of embarkation to British Malaya were identical: Macao.

Putting these findings together enables us to understand the process of how the Chinese bind their people together in the colonial Malayan context. Between the 1810 and 1870, the Chinese migrants in Malaya generally solidified their relationships with one another based on three broad principles: (1) common spoken language; (2) common native birthplace; and (3) common point of embarkation to Malaya. These organising principles also demonstrate that the Chinese settlers in British Malaya were largely dependent on the self-supporting networks after they arrived in Malaya. In other words, without the self-organising Chinese communities that hinged on common spoken language, common native birthplace, and the common point of embarkation, it was hardly possible that the Chinese population could be-come widespread in British Malaya in the nineteenth century.

This paper is a preliminary attempt to outline the organising principles of the Chinese migrant communities after they settled in British Malaya. detailed research is needed to compare and analyse the processes of how the Chinese settlement had arisen in nine-teenth-century British Malaya, as well as the ways the Chinese formed their communities in relation to the colonial development of British Malaya in the nineteenth century.

REFERENCE12

Blythe, W. (1971). Introduction to the manners and customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kua-la Lumpur: Oxford University Press.

Chinese Emigrants. (1849, May 9). The Straits Times (TST), (pp. 6). extracted from the microfilm, Lee Kong Chian Reference Library, National Library Singapore.

Friday, 13th April. (1877, April 19). Straits Times Overland Journal (pp. 12). extracted from the microfilm, Lee Kong Chian Reference Library, National Library Singapore.

Jarman, R. L., (comp.). (1998). Annual reports of the Straits Settlements, 1855-1941 (Vols. 1-12). London:

11　 My recent paper has studied the subject on the formation and the emigration of the “Macao” community in British Malaya, and the subject of how the “Macao” community became invisible in British Malaya. Refer to: Wong, 2013 (January).12　 Abbreviations: CO stands for Colonial Office Records. Straits Settlements Original Correspondence (CO273), EIC for British East India Company, LP is for Lat Pau, SFPMA is for The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, STOJ is Straits Times Overland Journal, and TST represents The Straits Times.


Archive Editions Limited.Legislative council. (1873, September 9). Colonial office records. Straits Settlements original correspon-

dence, (pp. 7). extracted from the microfilm, Central Library of National University of Singapore. Leyden, J. (1811). On the language and literature of the Indo-Chinese nations. Asiatick Researches, 158-

290.Logan, J. R., (ed.) (1855). Notes on the Chinese in the Straits. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and East-

ern Asia, 109-24. More people travelling abroad ( 出洋人眾 ). (1888, April 14). Lat Pau, (pp. 2). Retrieved from http://

www.lib.nus.edu.sg.More people travelling abroad ( 出洋日盛 ). (1888, June 12). Lat Pau, (pp. 2). Retrieved from http://www.

lib.nus.edu.sg.Newbold, T. J. (1839). Political and statistical account of the British settlements in the Straits of Malacca,

viz. Pinang, Malacca, and Singapore; with a history of the Malayan States on the Peninsula of Malac-ca. (Vols. 1-2). London: John Murray.

Seah, E. C. (1935, October 8). The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser, (pp. 6). Extracted from the microfilm, Lee Kong Chian Reference Library, National Library Singapore.

Siah, U. C. (1848). The Chinese in Singapore. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, 283-290.

Song, O. S. (1967). One hundred years’ history of the Chinese in Singapore. Singapore: University Malaya Press. (Original work published in 1923).

Vaughan, J. D. (1854). Notes on the Chinese of Pinang. Journal of the Indian Archipelago and Eastern Asia, 1-27.

Vaughan, J. D. (1971). The manners and customs of the Chinese of the Straits Settlements. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press. (Original work published in 1879).

Wang, g. Wu. (1991). Pattern of Chinese migration in historical perspective. In China and the Chinese overseas (pp. 3-21). Singapore: Times Academic Press.

Wong, W. C. (2010). The connotation of ‘Hakka’ in Southeast Asia: the classification process of Chinese in British Malaya. (Master’s thesis). National Central University, Taiwan.

Wong, W. C. (2013). “Macao” in British Malaya: the emigration and the formation of the Chinese com-munity in Malaya, 1810-1870. Paper presented for the IIM Young Researcher Award 2012 (of which I was the recipient), International Institute of Macau: Macau.

Yen, C. - H. (1985). Coolies and mandarins: China’s protection of overseas Chinese during the late Chʻing period (1851-1911). Singapore: Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore.

Yen, C. - H. (1986). A social history of the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya 1800-1911. Singapore: Ox-ford University Press.

Author’s BiodataWong Wei Chin is currently a doctoral candidate in the department of History at the Uni-versity of Macau. She received her bachelor’s degree in Communication at the University Putra Malaysia, and her Master’s degree in Social Science at the National Central Univer-sity, Taiwan. Her master’s thesis, entitled The Connotation of “Hakka” in Southeast Asia: the Classification Process of Chinese in British Malaya, received two outstanding master’s thesis awards in April and October 2010; one by the Taiwan Association of Southeast Asian Studies, another by the Council for Hakka Affairs, Executive Yuan of Taiwan. Recently, she also received a Young Researcher Prize of 2012 for her research on “Macao” in British Malaya: The Emigration and the Formation of the Chinese Community in Malaya, 1810-1870. This prize was awarded by the International Institute of Macau in January 2013. Her


doctoral thesis, entitled Interrelations between Chinese Secret Societies and the British Co-lonial Government, 1786-1900, will examine how the interrelations between the British co-lonial government and the Chinese secret societies changed from 1786 up to 1900, and how these changes affected the social structure of the Chinese community in British Malaya.

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