Zaire/DR Congo 1980 - 2001(Oct 29, 2010 at 09:45 PM) - Contributed by Tom Cooper & Pit Weinert, with additional details from Jonathan Kyzer and Albert Grandolini - LastUpdated (Feb 17, 2011 at 07:31 PM)

The last 15 years of the civil war in Congo have seen quite some use of air power as well - frequently at an unexpectedly(and largely unknown) high level. Considering the size of the country and the number of involved fractions, as well as thecomplexity of this conflict however, this is not surprising. This exclusive report was prepared on the basis of years ofintensive research, which enabled the authors to privde very in-depth information about composition and operations ofinvolved air forces, but also about the general conduct of this war. The article below has been vastly updated in November 2010, with the help of information sourced from the book AfricanMiGs Volume 1, which can be ordered HERE

Complex Backgrounds

Congo is the second largest state in Africa. The population is made of some 50 million of people from 200 separateethnic groups, each of which is speaking a distinctly different language: nevertheless, only four have official status, whileFrench is the government language. There is no majority ethnic group: there are only few larger ones, like Luba, Kongo,or Anamongo. Nevertheless, there is a major conflict between the Tutsi and Hutu ethnicity, raging in eastern Congoalready since several centuries.

The newest wars in Congo are extremely complex and brutal conflicts, the latest of which – fought with fewinterruptions ever since 1996 – is often named the “I African War”, and not seldom compared withthe World War I. Its backgrounds can be tracked back for centuries, but in summary it can be said that it directly involvedno less but nine African countries (including Angola, Burundi, Chad, Libya, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe),various fractions in Congo, and several non-African nations too. There are several reasons for such a massiveinternational involvement, with each involved country having its own objectives. Another part of this conflict is connectedwith the fate of ethnic Banyarwandas, or – as called locally and in French – Banyamulenges. The history ofBanyamulenges dates back in the 1920s, when the Belgian colonial authorities began importing labour force –consisting of Hutus and Tutsis – from Rwanda to Kivu area in Congo, and the mines in Katanga. Eventually,Banyamulenges became an important ethnic group in Belgian Congo: upon independence they were all given theCongolese nationality, yet during the civil war of 1960-1965 they found themselves in a conflict with local tribes. This theyconcluded successfully then they sided with the dictator Mobutu. Of course, the native Congolese could never forgetwhat the Banyamulenges have done to them, and disputed their nationality. This dispute was never completely solved:eventually, in 1991 Mobutu changed his mind, created a new law about citizenship and over the night theBanyamulenges lost the Congolese nationality and all their rights. Clearly, they were not pleased about this situation.

French Intervention

During the 1980s - in what was then known as Zaïre under dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko - there were a number ofrebellions regarding which very little documentation has surfaced. Clearly, most of these rebellions had degrees ofsuccess commensurate with their renown abroad: almost none at all.

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Nevertheless, it is known that in February 1988 rebels infiltrated from Uganda attacked the garrison of the 41st ZairianBrigade, in Kisingani, and that ever since Mobutu started losing control over eastern parts of his realm.

Two years later numerous ethnic Tutsi troops of the Ugandan Army defected to Zaïre, from where they launched arebellion against the regime in Kampala. This uprising was supported by Mobutu and eventually turned Uganda againstZaïre. Mobutu then aggravated the situation by interfering into the civil war in Rwanda, where he supported the Huturebels: this was something the Zairian Tutsis were not the least pleased about, and thus they started an insurgencyagainst the Zairian dictator. However, Mobutu was not overly concerned: as long as he was supported by the USA(through CIA) and France, nothing really serious could happen to his regime.

With the end of the Cold War the equilibrium of the forces in whole Africa shifted, with France, Belgium and the USAreducing their support for the Mobutu regime. The early 1990s had seen a wave of democratization in Africa, and therewas substantial internal and external pressure for democratization in Zaïre, and Mobutu promised reform. Aside from this,the inept handling of the economy had brought Zaïre to the verge of social chaos, with state-employees and the militarynot receiving their salary for months.

Mobutu officially ended the one-party system he had maintained since 1967, but ultimately was unwilling to implementbroad reform, alienating allies both at home and internationally. The USA disengaged from supporting Mobutu, whileseveral smaller groups of dissidents from eastern Zaïre – all having grandiose names like “Front Nationalpour la Liberation du Congo” (National Front for the Liberation of he Congo - FNLC), the Parti de la revolutionPopulaire (Popular Revolutionary Party – PRP, led by Laurent Desiré Kabila - a small-time Marxist revolutionarywho had excellent connections in Rwanda and Uganda, and enriched himself selling Congolese gold and was fightingagainst Mobutu already since 1963), and the Mouvement National Congolais-Lumumba (Congolse NationalGovement/Lumumba – MNCL, led by Nathaniel Bumba and Delphin Mulanda, veterans of Shaba I and IIuprisings, from 1970s) – under influence of similar developments in Sudan, Uganda, and Rwanda, joined into analliance that was to present a solid political opposition against Mobutu. This new organization, the “Alliance ofDemocratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo” (ADFL), was led by Laurent Désiré Kabila and relatively slow togrow due to poor infrastructure and problematic terrain in this part of the country.

The Zairian Army - Forces Armées Zaïroises - undertook nothing against the rebels, partially because of not being paidfor months, but also because of rampant corruption within its chain of commands, as well as because mechanized units– which have had most of their equipment in inoperational condition due to lack of maintenance and spares -could hardly operate in the local terrain, and partially because the rebels were more usually concerned with their ownsurvival than with fighting the official authorities. In fact, the poor condition of the military led to open revolt in somegarrisons: on 22 September 1991, the troops of the 31st Airborne Brigade, stationed near N’Djili airfield, mutiniedand occupied local installations. Other units of the joined them, together with inhabitants of several major towns. Lootingand destruction spread, aimed mainly at the government offices and houses and enterprises belonging to the foreignersin Kinshasa, Lumumbashi, Kolwesi and Kisingani. In the last town, the mutineers were well-organized troops of the elite41st Commando Brigade, trained by the Chinese.

Mobutu immediately requested help from France and Belgium, and on 23 September 1991, Paris launched“Operation Baumier”, with the aim of restoring order and evacuating foreign citizens from Kinshasa. Seme450 troops from the 21st RIMA (Marine Infantry Regiment) were immediately deployed to N’Djili, which wasmeanwhile secured by loyal troops of the Service d’Action et de Renseignement Militaire of FAZ, the fearedMilitary Intelligence Bureau, run by Gen. Mahale, fanatically loyal to the Mobutu family. The French troops arrived fromBangui, in Central African Republic, and were flown in by a dozen C.160 Transal transports of the ET.61 (61st TransportWing). Another wave of French troops brought in a company of the 2nd REI (2nd Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment) fromN’Djamena, in Chad. The Legionaires immediately moved into Kinshasa and secured the French embassy.Meanwhile, the loyal Zairian SARM forces and troops from the Division Special Présidentielle (DSP) – thepraetorian palace guard – had cleared most of the rebels out of city centre.

Two days later, on 24 September 1991, Belgium launched Operation “Blue Beam”, deploying some 450http://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

paras of the Régiment Para-Commando”, from Zaventem to Kinshasa. The troops were flown in on boardchartered airliners from the national carrier SABENA, while vehicles and other heavy equipment followed in Belgian AirForce Lockheed C-130H Hercules transports of the 205 Squadron (15th Transport Wing). Given that the N’Djiliairfield was not considered safe enough, Belgians reached an agreement with the government of Congo-Brazzaville, toland their troops there. This was the first time that the local government granted such permission to a Western nationever since the removal of the Marxist pro-Soviet regime in Brazzaville.

More heavy equipment for Belgian troops followed on board USAF Lockheed C-141 StarLifter transports. The Frenchthen deployed two C-130Hs to Brazzaville as well, in addition to two Army Eurocopter SA.330 Puma helicopters. With alogistic base firmly in place, the Belgians began reinforcing their troops inside Zaïre. On 25 September, Belgian troopslaunched the Operation “Kir”, deploying additional paratroops directly to N’Dolo, the smaller airfieldnear Kinshasa.

In the meantime, the French continued deploying additional troops as well, notably elements from the 8th RPIMA and the1st RIMA. A sizeable detachment of these was landed by French C.160s at the Kolwezi airport, taken in face of relativelylight and sporadic resistance. On the same day, the French paras retook Kisingani, while Belgian C-130Hs and Boeing727s brought another 600 troops into the country, followed by 250 soldiers that arrived on 26 September. On the laterdate, Belgian C-130Hs were used to deploy 250 troops and their equipment to Lumumbashi.

With this, the Belgians have had a total of 1.100 troops in the country, and the French some 1.000. With the main airportfirmly secured, a decision was taken to evacuate foreign citizens. For this purpose the Belgian Air Force deployed half adozen C-130Hs, while the French used at least ten C.160s, two C-130Hs, and a single Douglas DC-8. This sizeableforce was augmented by four C-130 Hercules of the Portuguese Air Force.

 

The War of 1996-2001

Conglomerate of Enemies

Except in Mobutu’s decision to deny the Congolese citizenship to all the Banyamulenges', and the ADFLrebellion, the origin of the subsequent “I African War” was the civil war that raged through neighbouringRwanda in 1994. Shortly after concluding peace negotiations that called for UN-peacekeeping force to be stationed in thecountry, the aircraft carrying (Hutu) President Habyarimana and Burundi’s President Ntaryamira (also Hutu) washttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

shot down near Kigali, capital of Rwanda. Hutu and Tutsi extremists accused each other for this act and eventually thesituation escalated so far that within the next few weeks between 500.000 and 1 million of Rwandan Tutsis weremassacred. In response Tutsi rebels launched an offensive that culminated in the capture of Kigali, in June 1994, andresulted in an exodus of almost 1 million of Hutus into Zaïre.

The new Rwandese regime under Paul Kagame decided to retaliate against the extremists between the Hutu refugees inZaïre. In collaboration with Zairian Hutus, namely, the Rwandan Hutus were swift to establish what was actually an ownnation in the area, from where they – in cooperation with Zairian Army – mounted raids against the nowTutsi-ruled Rwanda, in September 1996. Barely a month later the Rwandan regime repulsed the Hutus and Zairianswhile providing militias organized by Banyamulenge dissidents with weapons and training.

The huge number of Hutu refugees continued creating problems in Zaïre: their camps were under control of differentmilitias, which were aided by the Zairian government and repeatedly clashed not only with Rwandan troops, but also withdifferent eastern Zairian rebels around Lake Kivu. It did not last long before there were open hostilities between Zaïre andRwanda, escalating into cross-border shelling in Gisenyi area, by late October 1996.

To Rwandan’s regime it was clear that the Hutus in Zaïre had to be brought under control. Consequently, it begansupporting the ADFL with training and weapons: the Zairian rebels were to become a military organization superior to theZairian Army Units deployed in the area. Eventually, Paul Kagame brought the decision the organize an all-out revoltagainst Mobutu, then it was clear that without a change of the ruler in Kinshasa there would also be no end of support forthe Hutus in Zaïre.

The Rwandans therefore started working on preparing an all-out revolt: the ADFL alliance was an ideal partner for suchan enterprise. During the following two years the Banyamulenge militias joined the coalition, which – except forPRP, FNLC, and MNL - by 1998 included also the Alliance Democratique du Peuples (ADP, led by Deogratia Bugera),Movement Revolutionaire pour la Liberation de Zaïre (MLRZ, of Masasu Nindanga), Conseil National de Resistance pourla Democratique (CNRD, of Abdre Kisase Ngadu), and Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democratie (RCD, of ErnestWamba de Wamba). Additionally, except by Rwanda, the ADFL was backed by governments of four other countries,including Uganda, Burundi, Angola, and Zambia, all of which were hostile to Mobutu because of his support for variousrebel groups (for example, UNITA-rebels in Angola were supported by Mobutu already since the 1960s).

The stage was now set for the ultimate confrontation between all these parties.

Involved Air Forces

Zairian AF

The Force Aérienne Zairoise (Zairian Air Force – FAZA) was a relatively powerful, COIN-capable arm in the1970s, but by the mid-1980s it started to suffer from the same problems like the rest of the Zairian military, including lackof funding and widespread corruption. Eventually, the FAZ was not maintained as a coherent fighting force any more:what was left was the nominal chain of command, with corrupt officers collecting all the pays for their units and not takingcare about NCOs and troops. In fact, the extreme corruption between officers meant that Zairian airplanes were by farmore frequently used for private “business” than for any other purposes. Under such circumstances notmuch was left of the FAZ by the late 1980s. Out of 14 originally delivered Mirage 5Ms, only seven were still intact by1988: no less but five were reported as being lost in different accidents (including M401, lost in 1978; and M402, lost in1983 in Chad). By the mid-1990s the last three examples were sold, together with the two surviving Mirage 5DMs (M201and M203) – which were last seen in France, in 1996. There were also eight survivors out of 12 Aermacchihttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

MB.326GBs and six MB.326Ks supplied by Italy in the mid-1970s: at earlier times they were operated by the 21st Wingof the 2nd Ground-Attack Group (2eme Groupement Aérien Tactique), from Kamina AB, but all became unserviceableby 1997. Similar was also the condition of the 1er Groupement Aérien, the FAZ division responsible for support, trainingand transport. Out of 12 SIAI-Marchetti SF.260MC trainers of the 131. Escadra at least eight were sold to the USA in theperiod 1985-1987: the four others appeared to have been stored inside hangars at Kinshasa.

Worst yet, by 1995 the FAZ could not even keep C-130s of the 19th Wing in operational condition. The last twoexamples, "9T-TCC" and "9T-TCF" were apparently sent to France for overhaul in 1996, but never returned and wereever since taken by the French Air Force. Only a pair of Buffalos from 22nd Wing, as well as a handful of AérospatialeAS.332L Puma and Alouette III helicopters (the later were survivors of four purchased by the CIA for support of FMLNrebels in Angola, in 1975) of the 12ème Wing remained airworthy, and these were mainly used for VIP-transportationpurposes.

Instead of working on improving the condition of his military, when Mobutu realized that he was about to face immenseproblems, in 1996, he – once again – attempted to recruit foreign mercenaries. For this purpose, twodistinct military missions were sent abroad: one was led by the Office of the Prime Minister, while the other attempt wasrun through the Defence Ministry. Such an uncoordinated effort resulted later in big problems. Most of the hiredmercenaries did not speak the same language and were armed with very different weapons. Paris therefore decided tooffer help and better coordinate this effort. Having to keep a low profile, the French handed over this job to the GeolinkCompany, a private enterprise with strong relations to the French intelligence apparatus. Geolink hired a group of mainlyFrench and Serbian mercenaries, including a group of Serbian pilots that were to operate aircraft and helicopters.Namely, Serbia agreed to deliver three SOKO J-21 Jastreb and one SOKO NJ-21 Jastreb light strikers, as well as fourMiG-21PFMs and a MiG-21 two seater, while five Mil Mi-24 (ASCC-Code “Hind”) were purchased in theUkraine. All these aircraft were to be based at Gbadolite.

In autumn 1996 France financed the acquisition of five Mi-24s and contracts for a number of Serbian pilots andtechnicians on behalf of Mobutu's regime. Two of them were never assembled after delivery and remain ever since inderelict condition at Gbadolite; one of the Hinds was a Mi-24 P coded "9T-HM1", while the other - depicted here - was aMi-24V coded "9T-HM2". The third example, "9T-HM3" crashed a few months after arrival. (Artwork by Tom Cooper;Photo: via ACIG.org forum)

In late 1996 these aircraft were delivered at Gbadolite. A group of Russian or Ukrainian technicians was tasked toassemble the MiG-21s arrived in kit form – whatever the reason this work was never completed, tail sections werenot installed and they were abandoned on the spot, remaining in this condition and slowly deteriorating to this day.

The Jastrebs were successfully assembled and flown, but no clear details of their use have emerged. What little is knownabout subsequent operations involving Serbian mercenaries in Congo is by no means a pleasant story. From fewhttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

available reports it is obvious that there were immense problems with the Serbs, who would not listen to anybody, wereextremely undisciplined, and always operated at their own discretion. Although some of them were flying frequently, onlya very small number of operational sorties was undertaken: obviously, they were not especially motivated to risk theirskin for Mobutu’s diamonds and gold – and after all they were supposed to train and advise the Zairian AirForce, not to fly combat sorties in their place.

Sometimes in 1997 one of the Serbian mercenaries, a former colonel called Turcinovic, was killed while flying a foolishultra-low-level pass over Gbadolite and clipping a lamp post with his wing. The wreckage of his aircraft fell directly into acolumn of Mobutu's guards on a parade, killing around 30 of them. Turcinovic apparently fell victim to a massive liquorproblem all the Serbian mercenaries in Zaïre have had: their pilots are known to have flown drunk on a number ofoccasions, and he still had a hangover from the night before... Apparently the Serbians were kicked out after thisunfortunate stunt. The operational condition of the three remaining Jastrebs deteriorated and it is likely they were notflown at all after the Serbians left; recent photos show them disassembled on the ground at Gbadolite, besides the 5derelict MiG-21s.

Included in the French-Serbian contract for supply of weapons and "contract personnel" on behalf of Mobutu, from 1996,were also three SOKO J-21 Jastreb and one SOKO NJ-21 Jasterb two seater light strike aircraft. They were flown andserviced by Serbian mercenaries and nothing is known about their possible deployment in combat. The few availablepictures usually show a formation of 3: two single seat and the two seat Jastreb; it appears that they wore no nationalmarkings, and that their camouflage pattern consisted of the standard colours of dark grey and dark green over, lightblue under - applied already in Yugoslavia of the 1980s. Markings of the former Yugoslav Air Force (JRViPVO) appear tohave been hastily overpainted. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

In the case of Mi-24s it is known that two were never assembled and shared the fate of the MiG-21s. The other threewere sporadically flown by an unknown pilot all trough late 1996 and early 1997, but it is said that most sorties wereinterrupted by technical failures. This pilot, on board Mi-24 coded 9T-HM3 hit a power line and crashed on 27 March1997, the crew of three plus four passengers died.

Meanwhile, the South African company Stabilco recurited several pilots for the Hinds, including David Atkinson and NeilEllis, who arrived in Kinshasa in December 1996. Three other pilots followed later: Roelf van Heerden, Ryan Hogan, andJuba Joubert (who already flew Mi-24s for EO in Sierra Leone), together with technicians Grant Williams and Phil Scott.Later on also a French pilot Jean-Jacques Fuentes arrived. They were promised hefty monthly salaries, but got onlysomething like half of this. Also, they found out that none of the Mi-24s was left in operational condition.

Ellis and the others were left waiting in a hotel in Kinsahsa until mid-May 1997. That's when Gen Likunia, the last PMunder Mobutu, told them that there are still two Jastrebs, four Mi-24s and five MiG-21s at Gbadolite. Likunia told themthat all would be "fully serviceable", and all they would need to do would be to "slow down" the rebel advance (Kabila andhttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

Kagame’s forces were meanwhile marching directly on Kinshasa). The last CO of FAZA, Gen. Baruti, correctedLikunia, and said that two Jastrebs and two Mi-24s would actually be operational, so Ellis and two other pilots (Joubertand Fuentes) decided to go to Gbadolite.

Upon arrival there, on 15 May, they found out that two Mi-24s could be flown, in theory, but couldn't because there wereno batteries to start their engines. Besides, there was only one intact J-21 and one NJ-21, but they couldn't be started forthe same reasons. All MiGs were still days if not weeks away from becoming operational (and there were no technicainsto do the job). Later in the day, few technicians arrived, and Joubert did a test-flight, but only to find out that there waswater in one of the main rotor blade drag dampers, causing vibration.

On the following day, Mobutu arrived in Gbadolite too, together with his entire entourage - but only to catch an Il-76chartered from Victor Bout, that flew them out of Zaire, on 17 May, as rebels were entering the town. Of course, they leftNellis, Joubert and Fuentes back, forcing them to swim over the border to the Central African Republic.

The rest of the FAZA was to remain inactive: for all practical purposes it can therefore be said that this service wasdestined not to fight its last war, but to go down together with the rest of Mobutu’s empire.

Four MiG-21PFMs and a two seater were supplied to Mobutu's regime from Serbia. These aircraft were left in variousstages of re-assembly at Gbadolite AB, where they remained ever since. These MiGs did not receive FAZA markingsand were never flown. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Ugandan AF

To which degree were any other air forces involved in the following conflict, in 1997, remains unknown. According toavailable information, only the Ugandan Army Air Force (UAAF) might have taken part in support of the rebels, even ifthere is evidence that several countries were in the process of improving their military at the time. When taking a closerlook at the UAAF’s condition of the time even this is questionable. Namely, the UAAF was still in the process of re-construction after a complete disbandment resulting from defeat in the war against Tanzania, in the late 1970s. By 1996the UAAF operated only a handful of light aircraft, including a few survivors out of eight Swiss FFA AS.202-18A-1 Bravos(in service with the Central Flying School), two ex-Libyan SF.260ML trainers (for which there is no pictorial evidence yet)and six ex-Italian SF.260s, as well as a single SAAB MFI-17 Supporter. Sometimes in the late 1980s or early 1990s theLibyans should have donated at least three Aero L-39 ZO Albatrosses to Uganda: these were reported as wearing exLibyan markings and UAAF serials “AF-701”, “AF-702”, and “AF-703”.

The helicopter arm was in a slightly better condition, and is known to have seen some combat service against Ugandanrebels in Congo. Some sources claimed that in the late 1980s the Libyans donated three Mi-24s and between four andseven Mi-17s to Uganda. Such claims, however, were never confirmed: the only known Mi-24s that ever reachedhttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

Uganda were supplied from Belarus (see further bellow), while most of the seven UAAF Mi-17s (at least two of which areMi-172 saloon-helicopters) wear a green and grey camouflage pattern and were all purchased directly from KazanHelicopters Company. Nevertheless, Uganda did receive three Agusta-Bell AB.206 helicopters from Libya. These wereoperated together with six AB.412s purchased from Italy. Although the AB.206s and AB.412s were almost all in-operational by 1997, at least the Mi-17s were all in reasonably good condition when - in the same year - Uganda orderedfour Mi-24s from Belarus, via the Consolidated Sales Corporation (CSC), a company registered on the British VirginIslands. Two of these arrived in 1998, and were later to become the reason for a major scandal, when the Ugandansfound out that the helicopters were not refurbished before delivery and were incapable of flying – even if this wasspecified in the contract. The UAAF had two smaller airfields in proximity of the Zairian border: Arua in the north, and FortRoyal in the south. Of course, Entebbe IAP (runways 12/30, 2.400m long, and 17/35, 3.658m long) remained the mainair force base.

UAAF Aircraft and Helicopters in 1997

- AF-103, AS.202, last surviving Bravo regularly flown - AF-104, AS.202, written off sometimes in 1996 - AF-201, MFI.17, stored in Entebbe due to lack of spares - AF-302, AB.206, not in flying condition - AF-303, AB.206, not in flying condition - AF-305, AB.412, not in flying condition - AF-306, AB.412, not in flying condition - AF-309, AB.206, not in flying condition (ex-LARAF) - AF-401, AB.412, not in flying condition - AF-402, AB.412, not in flying condition - AF-406, AB.412, in flying condition - AF-50?, SF.260, the only operational example - AF-504, SF.260, written off sometimes in 1996 - AF-506, SF.260, stored in Entebbe - AF-001, Mi-172, white overall, cheat line in Ugandan colours from front fuselage over the whole boom, remainingoperational - AF-601, Mi-8MTV-2, green & green camouflage, exhaust difusers, remaining operational - AF-602, Mi-17, fate unknown - AF-603, Mi-8MTV-2, light earth & grey camouflage, exhaust difusers, remaining operational - AF-604, Mi-8/17, remaining operational - AF-605, Mi-8MTV-2, green & grey camouflage, exhaust difusers, remaining operational - AF-606, Mi-17, fate unknown - AF-607, Mi-17, green & earth brown camouflage, remaining operational - AF-615, Mi-172, green & green camouflage, black serial, remaining operational, crashed on 30 July 2005 http://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

- AF-701, L-39ZO, stored, reportedly never flown (ex-LARAF) - AF-702, L-39ZO, stored, reportedly never flown (ex-LARAF) - AF-703, L-39ZO, stored, reportedly never flown (ex-LARAF)

Uganda is known to have purchased a total of six Mi-8s, Mi-17s and two Mi-172 saloon helicopters from Russia alreadyin 1997. One of the saloon helicopters is painted white, and has a cheat line in Ugandan national colors, as well as thetitle "REPUBLIC OF UGANDA" and serial ("AF-001") applied in yellow. The second Mi-171 wears a camouflage patternin mid-grey and light olive green, and the new UAAF marking directly over the door on the port side, but no serial. Theremaining six Mi-8/17s are also painted in different colors: the first Mi-8MTV-2 is serialled "AF-601" and painted in samecolors like the second Mi-172 example. Mi-8MTV-2 "AF-603" wears a camouflage consisting of light grey and light earth.Both, AF-601 and AF-603 also have exhaust difusers of older form. However, "AF-607", shown here, is a Mi-17 (evenaccording to official Kazan publications), and wears not only no exhaust difusers but was also camouflaged in acompletely different colors as well. The origins of these helicopters are all the same, nevertheless: they were allpurchased directly from the Kazan Helicopters Company. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

In addition to what is mentioned above about Ugandan Mi-17s, it is certain that the UAAF has obtained additionalhelicopters of this type in the time-frame between 1998 and 2006. Namely, at least two UAAF Mi-17s (AF-603 and AF-605) and one Mi-172 (AF-615) are known to have been lost in various accidents since 1998, while a couple of Mi-17MTV-5s were observed in service carrying serials known to have been worn by other Mi-8MTV-2s at earlier times.

The situation as of early 2006 was as follows:

- AF-601, Mi-8MTV-2, green&green camouflage, exhaust difusers, remaining operational - AF-602, Mi-17, fate unknown - AF-603 (reused serial), Mi-8MTV-5, green & green camouflage, serial in yellow - AF-604, Mi-8/17, remaining operational - AF-605 (reused serial), Mi-8MTV-5, green & green camouflage, exhaust difusers, serial in yellow - AF-606, Mi-17, fate unknown - AF-607, Mi-17, green & earth brown camouflage, remaining operational - AF-611, Mi-8MTV-5, green & green camouflage, exhaust difusers, serial in yellow

The two inoperational Mi-24 delivered in 1998 were sent back to Belarus for overhaul in 2002. Before that, an additionalMi-24P was purchased and painted in a flashy green & green camo, with no serial or national insignia. Two Mi-24Vserials are known: AF-802 and AF-803. Finally, in 2004, press reports appeared about the delivery of 6 Mi-24PN fromhttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

Russia, a single example of which was sighted in 2006 at Entebbe.

Uganda also bought 6 MiG-21bis (serials 9211, 9307, 9799, 9801, 9811, 9818) and a MiG-21UM (serial 9307) fromPoland in 1999. One of the single seaters was lost shortly after delivery. Four bis and one UM were sent to Israel forupgrades done by the IAI company, which finished work in early 2004. Other documented crashes took place in 2003,2006 and in December 2008.

The "no-appearance": all available indications point at the fact that Ugandan MiG-21s became operational much too lateto become involved in the Congo War of 1998-2001. This ex-Polish MiG-21bis is depicted in the appealing camouflagescheme it received after overhaul and upgrade by the Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI). When delivered from Poland, it wasin natural metal overall, sporting a large red serial typical to the Warsaw Pact and had the Ugandan flag on the tailinstead of the current roundel. Apart from the paintscheme, the most visible part of the upgrade is the addition of achaff&flare dispenser on the lower back fuselage, just above the ventral fin. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

 Rwandan AF

For almost 30 years the Force Aérienne Rwandaise (“RwAF” – Rwandan Air Force) was a smalltransport and liaison arm, equipped with small helicopters and light transports. Established in 1962, when Rwandagained independence from Belgium, the Force Aérienne Rwandese (RwAF) was originally equipped with two Douglas C-47s and six Aérospatiale SA.316 Alouette IIIs. In 1974 three Aermacchi AM-3C utility light planes were purchased and aCaravelle (reg. 9XR-CH) donated by the French for VIP flights. There was the intention to establish a small jet force ofattack trainers but such plans were abandoned very soon for lack of funds, and in the late 1970s the RwAF wasequipped and trained on French helicopters, with only two STOL piston-engined Socata R.235 Guerrier armed trainerand general purpose airplanes, seven Aérospatiale SA.316 Alouette III, six Aérospatiale SA.342L Gazelles, and at leastone AS.365 Dauphin. Other aircraft in use during 1980s were two Britten-Norman Islanders, two Nord 2501 Noratlas, andtwo Aérospatiale AS.350B Ecureuils.

During the civil war that raged from 1990 until 1994, the RwAF fell apart, having lost most of its transport- and trainingaircraft in crashes, shot down or destroyed on the ground. The helicopter force and Rwandan personnel suffered somelosses as well and were subsequently scattered. The sole surviving Noratlas (reg. 9XR-GY) was flown out to Dar-Es-Salam shortly before the outbreak of rebellion in Rwanda, and apparently abandoned there (last seen in 1996 and againin 1998). Only three Gazelles seem to have survived and they were seen – together with two Mi-24s – atKigali IAP, in 1997, all painted in the – for RwAF – standard camouflage pattern. Two were then noticed atGoma, in Zaire, in August 1997, already with provisional Congolese codes – 9T-HG3 and 9T-HG5(“G” in their serial stood for “Gazelle”, “H” for Helicopter), which indicated that itis possible that up to five Gazelles were given to Kabila. A number of other Rwandan helicopters were seen in SouthAfrica and Swaziland, indicating the involvement of South African companies and mercenaries in the Rwandan civil war.For example, the Gazelle coded “10K12” was seen in green camouflage pattern after being overhauled inLanseria, South Africa. At the same place also a Dauphin was sighted – full of holes from small arms fire.

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least three Mi-24s were purchased, of which two – RAF-0102 and RAF-0110 – were camouflaged in sandand dark earth, while the third example – sighted in 2000 in Kigali – was camouflaged “green ongreen”. How far were Rwandan Mi-24s ready to take part in the war in 1997, however, remains unknown: certainis only that at least the two earth & sand painted examples survived long enough to be photographed in Kigali after thewar, in 2001. Sometime after the war, two additional Mi-24 were purchased, serials RAF-2102 and RAF-2308, firstsighted in Kigali in 2005.

Finally, the RwAF should have acquired a number of Mi-8s and Mi-17s from different sources by 1997, of which one wasidentified as Mi-17MTV “RAF-0403”, without the landing ramp of the MTV-5. Another example was sightedabandoned in 2003 at Lungi; additional Mi-17s were to follow.

Sometimes in 1997 Rwanda received its first two (or three) Mi-24s from an unknown source. The existence of twoexamples - serialled "RAF-0102" and "RAF-0110" - was confirmed so far. A third example, reportedly camouflaged in"Green on Green" - was sighted in Kigali in 2000. It remains unknown to which extension were they deployed in the warin Congo. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

The following list compiles all Rwandan Mi-8/17 sighted between 1996 and 2006; thus some of the airframes listed belowmight have been delivered after the war.

- RAF-0110, Mi-17MTV-5 sand & dark earth, Kazan-built - RAF-0210, Mi-17MTV-5 sand & dark earth, Kazan-built - RAF-0402, Mi-17MTV-2 sand & dark earth, other details unknown - RAF-0403, Mi-17MTV other details unknown - RAF-0407, Mi-17MTV-2 sand & dark earth, other details unknown - RAF-1101, Mi-8MTV-2 Kazan-built - RAF-1705, Mi-17MTV-5 sand & dark earth, other details unknown - RAF-1707, Mi-17MTV-5 sand & dark earth, Kazan-built - RAF-1905, Mi-172 sand / dark earth / dark green, Saloon helicopter, Kazan-built - RAF-1907, Mi-172 sand & dark earth, Saloon helicopter, Kazan-built - RAF-0???, Mi-17MTV seen abandoned at Lungi IAP, Sierra Leone, 2003; other details unknown

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 All-Out Revolt

The first ADFL attacks against Hutus in Zaïre occurred already in October and November 1996 near the LakeTanganyika. In January 1997 the Zairian Army launched a counteroffensive against the rebels, but this was swiftly foughtdown and Kabila’s forces then advanced on Kisingani. Nevertheless, more than 9.000 civilians died in battles thatraged from Goma and Bukavu, via Kisingani to Mbandaka, most were Hutu refugees from neighbouring Rwanda, gunneddown by rebel troops.

In the following weeks Rwanda deployed several battalions into Zaïre: these were put under nominal command of theADFL leader, Laurent Kabila, who was less a military commander than a leadership figure. It is believed that the actualmastermind of the following campaign was Gen. Nindaga Masasu, top commander of Kabila’s troops, togetherwith James Kabari, a Tutsi of uncertain nationality who speaks fluent Swahili and broken English (languages used inUganda) – but no French or any of languages used in Congo. There are reports that some of rebel militaryleaders were trained by US military personnel in Rwanda, but it remains unknown how far is this truth. Certain is that intotal Masasu and Kabari had a core of some 2.500 lightly armed but well-trained fighters, reinforced by some 4.000foreign troops.

Against them Mobutu should have been able to put up 59.000 soldiers and police officers, equipped with 40 tanks, someartillery and multiple rocket launchers, few transport aircraft and two Mi-24s. Nevertheless, most of Zairian Army’sequipment was not in working condition, morale was bellow all acceptable levels, and discipline non-existing. Under suchconditions it was actually impossible for the FAZ to cooperate with the rest of the Zairian military.

The joint force of rebels, Rwandan and Ugandan troops therefore had little problems and in preparing and launching aswift campaign that remains poorly documented because the rebel leaders did not permit any reporters to accompanythem. In exchange for supporting the ADFL, Rwandan troops and their Congolese Tutsi allies were given a free hand togo after the Hutu refugees so long as they also contributed to toppling Mobutu. Rebel officers who opposed this policywere removed: Andre Kisase Ngandu was gunned down by Rwandan Tutsi troops near Goma on 6 January 1998, forexample.

The offensive was launched on 4 October 1997, with rebels crossing the Ruzizi River from Rwanda and attacking ahospital and a Congolese Army base near Lemera, a village between Lake Kivu and Lake Tanganyika. The assaultdeveloped along a simple formula: the rebels would first infiltrate their troops inside the targeted town or village, and thenattack from several directions simultaneously, supported by mortar fire, confusing Mobutu’s troops and leavingthem one escape route. The resistance in Lemera collapsed within few hours and the government troops – mostof whom had not been paid since over a year – fled into the Fizi region, inhabited by the Bembe tribe, where manywere killed by the locals in revenge for previous atrocities. On 24 October Uvira fell: the rebels treated residents well, butseparated Hutu refuges from the crowd and subsequently massacred over 1.600 of them. http://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

Only six days later the rebels advanced on Bukavu, almost 180km away, on the shore of Lake Kivu. Underway theyattacked one UN-protected refugee camp after the other, Meanwhile, 700 rebels opened another front, sneaking intoCongo near Goma and attacking Kibumba refugee camp, in which some 200.000 Hutus lived, and which was defendedby Mobutu’s Presidential Guard and Hutu militia. During a short but sharp clash the Guards and Hutus sufferedheavy casualties, and then left the battlefield, causing the refugees to flee towards Goma where they found shelter innext massive camp, Mugunga. However, Goma was captured by rebels already on 1 November, then meanwhileRwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian regulars entered Zaïre near Ruzizi, south of Bukavu, commanded by a RwandanColonel, and supported by Rwandan gunboats. The subsequent attack on Mugunga camp resulted in one of the largest“spontaneous repatriations” in recent history, as 600.000 Hutus fled back into Rwanda, and also ended thetalks about possible deployment of a UN-peacekeeping force to Congo.

Further 400km down the road towards west, in Bunia, the Zairian Army concentrated several units – including the31st Para Brigade, one of the few remaining functioning Army units. The Rwandan troops reached the area by mid-December, followed by Ugandans and rebels. The paras checked the rebel attack, but then run out of ammunition:without them the defence of the city collapsed within only a few days: Bunia fell on 24 December 1997. There was somebickering about future operations at this point: Rwanda was only interested in establishing a buffer zone along the borderand stop the advance. But, Angolans were interested in toppling Mobutu and pushed for a capture of Kinshasa. By midFebruary, a new agreement was reached and the advance continued towards West from Bunia, and northwest fromBukavu. For this purpose the ADFL’s force was reinforced by a number of Katangese troops led by Angolanofficers, deployed to Bukavu aboard transport aircraft of the Angolan Air Force. Additional Angolan troops entered Zaïrefrom the south.

Mobutu’s Army was meanwhile concentrating at Kisingani, 600km down the road from Bunia, where a“great lightning offensive” was to be launched. Instead of organizing supplies for their forces, however, theleading officers were competing who would lead the counterattack. So it happened that when reinforcements arrived fromKinshasa there was insufficient food for them. A planeload of fish that was to be used as food for troops sent to Kisinganiaboard a FAZA Caribou was sold by the crew of the transport. From that moment every Zaïrian soldier in the area had totake care about himself. Serb mercenaries, already infamous for their brutality in the Bosnian war, terrorized the localpopulation to get food, looting stores through the city. Without surprise, when the rebels launched their attack onKisingani, on 13 March 1998, the locals led them through the forest around the Army positions: the city was encircledand fell two days later.

With the northern Congo firmly in rebel hands the battlefield shifted towards the south: within barely three months thecoalition of rebels and foreign troops captured one third of Congo. The pace of advance was now even increased: anadvance guard of 300 Rwandan and Banyamulenge troops was sent ahead to seize one town after the other along theroad to Kinshasa. The mop-up of the areas behind them was left to the rebels. The tactics was risky but the results wereexcellent: on 9 April the key mining town of Lumumbashi was captured after the neighbouring Zambia granted the rebelsfree passage so they could attack from an unexpected direction. By 30 April Kikwit fell as well – more than1.000km through thick jungle from where the rebels started on 1 March 1998.

The Zairian Army’s last stand – a bridge over the Bombo River, 100km east of Kinshasa – fell on 15May. Although the Army C-in-C, Gen. Marc Mahele Lieko Bokungu, promised to defend it at all cost, a group of 600rebels sneaked across the river and attacked from the rear, causing a complete collapse of the position. Weakened byillness, and concluding that the negotiations with Kabila – held in Pointe Noire, in Congo-Brazzaville –made his shaky position clear to his opponents, the next day Mobutu flew out of Kinshasa after Mahele informed him hewould fight no more: General was shot by Mobutu’s loyalists on the same day. In the early morning of 17 May1998 rebel patrols entered the capital. Due to the support of the African Great Lakes states, and given no sign of externalaid for Mobutu, the Zairian Army joined Kabila, who formally took power on May 20, 1997, simultaneously renaming Zaïreinto the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The New “Strong Man”

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The country that Kabila took over was in a terrible state. The debt was estimated at around $16 billion. Lacking a solidpolitical base but being a new leader in a state that knew nothing but terror from the top political leadership ever sinceexisting, the new president had little choice but to play the “strong man”. He quickly alienated potentialforeign investors by breaking agreements with major mining companies; then there was a dispute between Kabila andEtienne Tshisekedi – leader of the UDP – who demanded the position of Prime Minister, and soon enoughalso massive accusations for continuing corruption and incompetence of Mobutu’s regime appeared as well. It didnot take long before the US State Department officially refused to continue support for the Kabila’s regime.

Understandably, Kabila had problems with former functionaries of Mobutu’s regime (so-called“Mobutuists”), foremost the former Zairian security police chief Gen. Baramoto, former special forcescommander Gen. Nzimbi and former minister of defence Admiral Mavua. All three escaped to South Africa, from wherethey were organizing armed resistance against Kabila regime. Under supervision of Baramoto, the Mobutuistsestablished connections to Congolese Tutsis, Rwandese and Ugandans. Later on Baramoto played a key role in thecapture of Kitona AB, with some support from former Zairian troops stationed there.

Increasing his problems, however, Kabila refused to take any steps against Hutu rebels, which alienated Rwanda andUganda: they were financing and backing the whole war against Mobutu (largely by Congo-Zairian diamonds), but nowthe Congolese President was demanding their troops to leave the country. In fact, Kabila went so far to issue officialcomplaints when in July 1998 the Rwandans lost patience with Hutus in Congo and launched a deadly operation ofethnic cleansing over the border. Within a month more than half of the remaining Hutu refugees were forced out of theircamps and herded back into Rwanda; over 200.000 died during this “operation”. On the other side,Kabila’s over-reliance on the Rwandans for political and military control was a major reason for other members ofthe ADFL-alliance accusing him of being a puppet of Kigali. Never being in control of all the forces officially undercommand of the ADFL, Kabila eventually felt so insecure, that on 14 July 1998 he removed his top military commander,James Kabari, and replaced him by his own son, Joseph Kabila.

Opposing the presence of foreign troops on Congolese soil on 27 July Kabila finally ordered all Rwandan and Ugandanmilitary personnel to leave the country immediately. The Rwandan objectives and reasons for their presence in Congowere clear, and the aggressive regime in Kigali was not to ignore such an act. The Ugandan government could not actaccordingly either: Kampala considered it as ultimately important to have military bases in Congo, then from there it wassending support for the Sudanese People’s Liberation Army involved in a civil war with the Islamic regime– and action that saw some US and British support.

What was left of the ADFL alliance now began to fall apart: the decision that was to be used as the main reason for theoutbreak of a new war was Kabila’s order issued on 1 August 1998, with which all the Tutsi (i.e. Banyamulenge)officials were removed from his government. Two of Kabila’s closest aides were Tutsis, however: the foreignminister Bizima Karaha and the Presidential Affairs Minister, Deogratias Bugera. Both were forced to leave Congo– thus increasing the number of exiled former VIPs. In their place Kabila put his personal aides and tribal followersfrom Katanga Province. Gaean Kakudji and Mwenze Kongolo, two of Kabila’s cousins, became ministers ofinterior and justice, respectively. The head of the national police, the governor of the central bank, his ambassador-at-large and all the new members of the presidential guard were from Katanga. Clearly, most of Kabila’s aides sawthis effort of centralizing the control over Congo as evidence for president’s corruption: they saw no other solutionbut to launch a new rebellion.

Struggle for Survival

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The reaction of what was now opposition to Kabila’s regime was immediate. On 2 August 1998 some 16.000Banyamulenge soldiers of the 10 Brigade of the Congolese Army (FAC), based in Kisingani, mutinied. Their uprising wasdirectly supported by Rwanda and Uganda: in fact, the Congolese Tutsis depended on Rwandan military presence forprotection against hostile armed groups. On 4 August Rwandan officers responsible for training of former Mobutu troopsstaged an uprising in Kitona. The fighting in that part of the country spread within hours to the towns of Muanda andBanana, near Cabinda, where the US oil company Chevron operated one of the most lucrative oil concessions in theworld. By 6 August the uprising spread into other parts of Congo as the Rwandan Tutsi officers started mobilizingBanyamulenges to establish the main fighting force against Mobutu. Goma and Bukavu in the Kivu Province fell almostimmediately under rebel control, and fierce fighting broke out in Uvira and Kisingani. In the west, there was an uprising inthe Congo’s outlet to the Atlantic Ocean and along the border to the oil-rich Angolan enclave of Cabinda.

In Kinshasa there were bitter battles around two military bases on the outskirts of the city, which erupted after Kabilaissued shoot-to-kill orders against all Rwandans. More than 1.000 Rwandan and ethnic Tutsi troops based theredisappeared in the surrounding jungle: they were to cause immense problems to Kabila’s regime. Due to thewidespread basing of Rwandan troops and immense concerns of Banyamulenges for their own safety, the uprisingspread very fast within only a few days into eastern Congo, where 5.000 additional troops mutinied, captured and lootedseveral towns, river ports, and airfields. Simultaneously, Rwanda claimed a substantial part of eastern Congo, withBurundi – the troops of which were deployed in Congo as well – following the suit.

Rebels against (Former) Rebels

The new war in Congo was so far the most complex of any armed conflicts ever fought there. In fact, it became socomplex that there is certainly a need to explain in some detail at least the most important participants.

- Congolese Army (FAC) The FAC was by August 1998 largely consisting of former Mobutu’s troops. They were definitely the most unusualamong all of the Congolese fighters involved in this war solely due to the fact that all of them received proper militarytraining. The discipline in the whole FAC was non-existing, and especially in August 1998 most of the Army was on averge of collapse. Nevertheless, several times during the following fighting they were to prove that – if properly ledand regularly paid - they could constitute a force to be reckoned with.

- Katangan Tigers Tigers were originally formed by Moise Tschombe’s former Katangan gendarmes who went into exile with theirfamilies in Angola, in the 1960s. There they received military training within the MPLA, but were demobilized after aceasefire with UNITA was signed in 1992. Tigers were supporting Kabila already during the war 1996-1997, and - mostof them - continued doing so during the new war as well.

However, their military leadership was divided: the wing led by Henri Mukatshung Mwambu and Gen. Vindicien“Mufu” Kiyana, members of the “Front de Libération National du Congo” (FNLC), whichfought in two Shaba uprisings; and the wing led by Dr. Emila Ilunga, former PRP-representative in the EU who regardedhimself as political leader of the FNLC. Ilunga cooperated with Gen. Jean Delphin Muland (or Mulanda), the nominalhead of the Katangan Tigers, imprisoned by Kabila after a disagreement in 1997.

Eventually, both wings of the Tigers were to side with Kabila.

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- People’s Militia (Different Groups) Known as the “Défense civile et populaire (“People’s Civil Defence”), this militia was createdby Kabila during 1998, and became foremost present in Kinshasa area. Their participation in the war afterwards remainsof unknown quality. Considering how fierce this war became it is not very likely that any of People's Militia groups wasever especially effective or successful.

- Driven Out: Banyamulenge Although frequently claimed to the be initiators of the uprising from August 1998, the Banyamulenge were actually aninstrument. With their right to Congolese nationality being contested and their strained relations with other ethnic groupsthey generated a deep feeling of insecurity, which was confirmed when Kabila requested Rwandan troops to leave thecountry. They mutinied actually already in the early 1998, when Kabila’s regime attempted to disperse themthroughout the Congolese Army to serve alongside former soldiers of Mobutu’s army. However, almostsimultaneously also the relations between Banyamulenge and Rwandans deteriorated so that the Banyamulengeeventually allied with Burundi. Those of them stationed in Kinshasa were to suffer extremely heavy losses early duringthe new war. The others were fighting with almost every fraction involved in this war.

- Rebels: RCD (or “ADFL-bis”) Most of the rebels that were to fight against Kabila formed under the aegis of the “Rassemblement congolais pourla démocratie” (Congolese Assembly for Democracy - RCD). In August 1998 the RCD was a lose organisation ofdisparate persons and their followers, a core of which could be called “the disillusioned of the firstliberation”. The leadership of the RCD in 1998 included the “politicians”, most of which had noserious political base in Congolese society: - Bizima Karaha (a Tutsi from South Kivu), former Minister of Foreign Affairs under Kabila - Shambuyi Kalala (Kasai), formerly in charge of propaganda for the ADFL under Kabila - Emile Ilunga (Katanga), a wanna-be president of the political wing of the Katangan Tigers, removed from power byKabila in spring of 1997, later RCD “Minister” of health and social affairs - Moise Nyarugabo (a Tutsi from South Kivu), former Secretary-General of ADFL, sidelined in June 1998.

It cannot be said that the RCD had a coherent fighting force during this war: there was a large number of very differentlocal militias and different bands fighting for it. Some of these, however, were led by excellent officers and proved verydangerous even for - correspondingly - well-trained professional Angolan and Zimbabwean troops.

Kabila was also confronted by many members of former Mobutu’s regime, foremost Arthur Zahidi Ngoma, alawyer known for his work in the field of human rights and a staunch opponent of Mobutu and Kabila, and Wamba diaWamba, a professor of history living in Tanzania. Like many other Mubutuists they both eventually sided with the RCD.This mixture of different militias and armed groups they led was to deliver some exceptionally heavy blows againstKabila's regime early during the new war.

- Rebels: MLC The "Mouvement de libération Congolais" was actually a private army, established and trained in 1998 by Ugandans,and led by millionaire businessman Jean-Pierre Bemba as well as Col. Amur. Based in NE Congo (HQ in Gemena), itincluded some of the best-trained and disciplined fighters that were to participate in the war on the side opposing Kabila.Not of special importance early during the war, with some Libyan support the MLC developed into a powerful force of20.000, that was to fight bitter battles in the Gbadolite area in 2000 and 2001.

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- Rebels: UDI Alexis Tambwé and Kengo wa Dondo (later was the former Director of Customs) founded and presided the“Union des democrats independents” (Union of Independent Democrats – UDI) that eventuallysided with RCD-rebellion.

- Rebels: UPDS & PDSC The “Union pour la démocratie et le progress social” (Union for Democracy and Social Progress –UPDS), and the “Parti démocrate-social Chrétien” (Christian Social-Democratic Party – PDSC),favoured political negotiations instead of an armed rebellion. Over the time, however, some of them joined the rebellion(those that did not were either concerned with their own security or did not want to be associated with the Rwandans).

- Foreign Rebels: Ugandan Guerrilla Movements Time and again also other, foreign rebel organisations became involved in the war in Congo between them threeUgandan guerrilla movements: “Allied Democratic Forces” (ADF, active in the Ruwenzori mountains),“West Nile Bank Front” (followers of former dictator Idi Amin Dada), and “Lord’s ResistanceArmy” (LRA, mainly members of the Acholi ethnic group, frustrated by the loss of power since Museveni’svictory in 1986, foremost known for their extreme cruelty).

 Collapse of Kabila’s Regime

The new rebellion initially appeared to be a re-run of the one from 1997, with the difference that this time the rebels hadnot only the advantage of knowing their enemy very well, but also of being well deployed around the country. Once againunder Rwandan supervision, the rebels deployed the same tactics like against Mobutu’s forces the year before:they would send a weak spearhead to attack the actual objective of their interest in a bold and – frequently– shockingly swift move, and then follow-up by the main force that was to mop-up the conquered area. Gome,Bukavu, Uvira and Kisingani were almost immediately under their control; other towns fell in rapid succession, and thenthey prepared a master plan to take Kabila by surprise: the rebels hijacked a passenger aircraft, put over 100 fighters onit and flew it to Kitona, in SW Congo, to spread the mutiny. The airfield was swiftly secured in cooperation with localMobutuists in a terrible battle that shocked the government in Kinshasa.

The situation for Kabila worsened significantly by 13 August, when the western corridor to Atlantic was cut off by rebels,threatening a catastrophic food crisis in Kinshasa. The port of Matadi and the hydro-electric power station Inga –which supplies electricity to Kinshasa – were captured with little fighting, cutting off all connections betweenKinshasa and Atlantic. Condition of forces loyal to the government in the eastern Congo was even poorer, the rebelsclaiming to have “liberated” Shabunda (100km west of Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu) and Aru (100kmsouth of the Sudanese border) by mid-August. With his military falling apart and uncertain about the loyalty of remaininghttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

troops under his control, Kabila could do little but abandon Kinshasa, and withdraw to his power-base in the province ofKatanga - and request help from his remaining foreign friends, attempting to secure domestic support by whipping upnationalist feelings while simultaneously requesting military assistance from other African countries against Rwandan andUgandan aggression.

The rebellion thus swiftly exploded into a new war, with the fate of the new Congolese president apparently being alreadysealed. As they were now well-positioned east and west of Kinshasa, the situation of Kabila became so critical that on 17August he left the capital aboard a Mi-8 helicopter of unknown origin, together with most of his government, retreatinginto Katanga Province, in southern Congo.

Zimbabwean “MiGs”

Zimbabwe and Angola were swift to offer their aid to Kabila, then both countries were interested in his survival –for their own reasons. Angola mainly because Kabila cut off UNITA’s supply-lines from Congo when he came topower; Zimbabwe because Kabila regime owed it $93 million for weapons and equipment bought between 1996 and1998. Other countries were to follow.

By 1998 the AFZ was actually not in the best position to fight a war, then it was flying relatively old aircraft andhelicopters and experiencing quite some problems with spares acquisition due to lack of funding. No less but 85% ofcontemporary Zimbabwean defence budget of barely $250 million was spent for pays of the professional army. What wasleft was simply insufficient for taking proper care about equipment, not to talk about purchasing new. Nevertheless, theAFZ has meanwhile survived the lengthy period when there was a considerable lack of qualified pilots and technicalpersonnel and the AFZ depended on foreign support for remaining operational. In fact, by 1998 the AFZ commander, AirMarshal Perence Shiri, and his deputy, Air-Vice Marshal Henry Muchena, were in command of probably the mostcompetent flying service in sub-Saharan Africa, staffed with well-trained, experienced, disciplined, and courageouspersonnel. Consequently, the AFZ entered this war as the best-equipped and trained of all involved flying services.

Until 1997 the No.1 Squadron AFZ was flying Hunters: five ex-Kenyan Hawker Hunter FGA.Mk.9s (out of 12 delivered), asingle Hunter FGA.Mk.9 left behind from the former Rhodesian Air Force, and one (out of three delivered) ex-KenyanHunter T.Mk.81s. The Hunters were retired from service sometimes in 1997 and replaced by four or five ex-Libyan MiG-23 MS and a MiG-23 UB.

The No.2 AFZ Squadron was flying 12 BAe Hawk T.Mk.60/60As (out of 13 supplied in two batches – one of eight,in 1980, and one of five in 1992), which are used as strike-fighters – equipped with AIM-9B Sidewinder and PL-7AAMs, Mk.82-series bombs, and Hunting BL.755 cluster-bomber units (CBUs), as well as launchers for unguided rockets– but also for advanced training. The same unit comprised also the Jet Flying Training School that was trainingnew pilots for flying not only Hunters, but also eleven Chengdu F-7II/IINs and two Guizhou FT-7BZs operated by theNo.5 Squadron. The aircraft were originally delivered in two batches after being test-flown and inspected at the CATICfactory in China. A group of 15 Chinese experts – including two test-pilots – arrived in Zimbabwe to re-assemble and test-fly them. The Chinese issued a warranty for 12 months or 150 flying hours for them: a seven-membertechnical team was attached to the AFZ during this period. By 1998 only six or seven F-7s remained fully mission-capable, and the No.5 Squadron had approximately a dozen of qualified pilots. Besides, at the time the war in Congowas to break out Zimbabwe was in the middle of negotiations with China for an additional batch of 12 F-7s, which nevermaterialized.

The AFZ furthermore consisted of the No.3 Squadron, flying 12 CASA C.212-200 and six Britten-Norman BN-2A Islanderlight transports: these simple and robust aircraft have already seen heavy service, and were to see even more in Congo.Transport and liaison were also duties of the No.7 Squadron, equipped with Aérospatiale SA.316B Alouette IIIshttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

(including ex-Portuguese Air Force- and Romanian IAR-built examples), as well as of the No.8 Squadron, equipped withAgusta-Bell 412SPs. However, the later unit was soon to play a significant role in the war in Congo, as it was to beequipped with the most recent addition to the AFZ: six Mi-35 helicopters (including two Mi-35Ps). Paid for byKabila’s supporters these were bought from Russia for a reported $26.35 million. The first AFZ Mi-35-crews weretrained at Thornhill AB, in Gweru, by Russian instructors. CO of this unit was Sqn.Ldr. Mukotekwa.

The final two AFZ units, the No.4 and No.6 Squadrons were equipped with Cessna FTB.337Gs and SF.260 of differentsub-variants, including SF.260C/W/TP/F, respectively.

The AFZ is proud to draw back upon traditions of the former Rhodesian Air Force (RhAF), and it still operates SA.316BAlouettes equipped as "G-Car" and "K-Cars", like the RhAF did in the 1970s. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Despite many attempts to find out precise details about the AFZ deployment in Congo, from 1998 until 2001, it largelyremains unclear to which degree was which unit involved. The main reason for this is that the reporting about exact typesused in this war is very poor, but also that the exact details about condition of Zimbabwean and Congolese aircraftremain unclear. What appears to be certain is that in mid-August 1998 the AFZ deployed between five and six Hawks,most of C.212s, and something like a dozen of helicopters – including Alouettes, Bell 412s and Mi-35s – toCongo. All were flown by Zimbabwean pilots. It was therefore so that the AFZ contingent in Congo in August andSeptember 1998 consisted of flights from No.2, No.3, No.4, No.7 and No.8 Squadrons, The involvement of other unitscannot be definitely confirmed, but it is sure that Zimbabwe chartered also a number of civilian transport aircraft for swiftdeployment of its troops into the war area.

With financial help from Kabila (i.e. Zairean/Congolese diamonds and gold) Zimbabwe purchased between six Mi-35s, atleast two of which are Mi-35Ps - including the example shown here, armed with two 30mm cannons. Zimbabwean Mi-35swere intensively involved in the war in Congo since late August or early September 1998. They were used for close-air-support and interdiction operations, but also for escorting lighter AFZ helicopters. After the experiences from the war inCongo showed the importance of night-fighting capability, in the spring of 2000 four of AFZ Mi-35s were sent to Russiafor upgrade at Rostvertol Helicopter Plant. These helicopters now have Russian-made NVGs, a new countermeasuressystem, Garmin GPS 115 with VPS-200 interface, and a turret-mounted IRTV-445MGH thermal imaging system. Theturret with the later is mounted underneath the left outboard pylon and enabling the crew to operate in any weather andby night, as well as to detect objects out to ranges of four kilometres. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

In addition to Zimbabwe, Angola also deployed a part of its air force. In fact, numerically, the Fuerza Aérea Nacional(“FAN” – as the Angolan Air Force was renamed in 1993) was the largest service to becomehttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

involved in this war. Technically, and when it comes to quality of personnel, however, its situation was far from ideal.Although operating a total of no less than six Air Regiments with 16 squadrons, by 1998 the FAN was left with barely 15MiG-23s, nine Su-22s, six Su-25s, around a dozen MiG-21s, six L-39s, and around a dozen Mi-25s and Mi-35s inoperational condition. There was a large number of derelict airframes, many of which were used as sources of spares. Itwas therefore not surprising when the FAN failed to deploy anything more but elements from three of its units to fight inCongo.

The first of these were eight MiG-21MFs of the 25th Air-Combat Fighter Regiment (ACFR). Split into two Flights, simplyknown as “Flight One” and “Flight Two”, these fighters were deployed to Negage AB innorthern Angola. Furthermore, the FAN also had a flight of six Su-25Ks of the 26th ACFR – plus six L-39s - basedin Cabinda, and a mixed flight of Mi-24s and Mi-25/35s of the 22nd Helicopter Combat Attack Regiment (HCAR) and fewMi-8/17s of the 22nd HCAR deployed to Congo. For the most part they were flown in combat by Angolan pilots, but the26th ACFR brought with it also ten “foreign advisors” – foreign mercenary pilots, including anAmerican and a former pilot of the JRViPVO (Yugoslav Air Force) – the latter known to have remained with FANin Congo until the year 2000. Of course, the Angolans have also used a considerable number of transport aircraft duringthis war, most of which belonged to TAP, a semi-military national carrier.

Finally, the Congolese Air Force (DRCAF) – or what was left of the former FAZA – was brought back to lifeduring the war as well. Initially it had only the two surviving Mi-24s (one Mi-24P and one Mi-24V), and some Mi-17s aswell as other helicopters. The Mi-24V 9T-HM2 was flown in combat during the batlle for N’Djili by a South Africanpilot. At least as important was the fact that – with Zimbabwean and South African support – the DRCAFwas able to make three MB.326s of the former 2° GAT/21st Wing FAZ found at Kinshasa operational again and that therewere used. Later on the Angolans reportedly found at least three stored SF.260s of the former 131 Escadra FAZ atKitona AB. These were overhauled with help of AFZ technicians and the stocks of spares found at this airfield and thenrushed into service with the Zimbabwean Air Force.

According to some reports the Zimbabweans found several stored SIAI-Marchetti SF.260s of the former Force AérienneZairoise at Kamina AB. These were hurriedly refurbished and put into service, flying combat sorties against eastern-Congolese rebels, Rwandan and Ugandan troops. (Photo: SIAI-Marchetti, via Tom Cooper)

In late 1998 a number of MiG-23s in rather poor condition arrived from Libya: two UB two seaters and (reportedly) 2 or 3MiG-23MS – for the latter there is no pictorial evidence yet. A Zimababwean company called “AvientLtd” was contracted to operate them; after repair and assembly work one of the UBs was test flown once byUkrainian or Russian pilots but then all work was abandoned, the contract with Avient was interrupted and the MiGsgrounded for good.

The next effort to get jets paid off: 4 Su-25s were acquired from Georgia and delivered to N’Djili IAP in November1999. Flown by Ukrainian pilots, they performed strikes during the year 2000. While contemporary reports alwaysmentioned 8 or 10 Sukhois, it is meanwhile clear that only four were delivered. All survived the war, but two crashed in2006 and 2007 respectively, both with the loss of the pilot. Also, additional Mi-24s were purchased in several batches– details are scant, but the highest known serial is 9T-HM15, this apparently being the last from a batch of 2 or 3purchased in sometimes in 2001.

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Contrary to earlier reports, the DRC received only four Su-25s from Georgia. These aircraft – serialled FG-500trough FG-503 saw sporadic combat deployments, mostly in 2000. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Talking about mercenaries, it should be mentioned that – overall – the number of foreign pilots involved inthis war remained low. Except for ten MiG-21-pilots that served with FAN, there was a larger group of Russian instructorspresent in Zimbabwe at the time: nevertheless, only few of them went to Congo with Mi-35s of the No.8 Squadron, in theyear 2000, and then flew only very few combat sorties.

Regardless what the Angolan, Congolese and Zimbabwean air forces were flying during this war, it is important to notethat the rebels, Rwandans and Ugandans soon became well-known for reporting of being attacked from the air by almosteverything, from “Zimbabwean MiGs”, via “Mi-17 jet fighters”, “Mil-3” or“M-135 gunships”, “helicopters equipped with flame-throwers”, not to talk about“South African Mirage F.1s” or “USAF B-52” bombers, or whatever else. Especially the term“Zimbabwean MiG” became very widespread and well-known in the public – in fact so much so thateven Angolan or Namibian helicopters were designated as such! While such reporting might appear laughable on the firstview, it is actually not surprising – considering the significant number of different aircraft and helicopter typesdeployed during the following war, but also the general lack of knowledge about aircraft identification by the locals. Afterall, one should not forget that even professional US-troops deployed in Iraq tend to call any type of Iraqi aircraft theycaptured a “MiG”.

 An African Intervention

While Kabila was leaving Kinshasa, the Zimbabweans were already streaming in, launching the operation“Sovereign Legitimacy”. Starting on 2 August, and using Il-76 transports chartered in Russia and theUkraine, but also some Air Zaire passenger aircraft. Within two days they deployed 900 troops to the Congolese capital.Also involved in this “air bridge” were CASA C.212 transports of the No.3 Squadron AFZ. In days-longbrutal battles with some 1.000 Rwandan troops and rebel fighters stationed in Kinshasa, the Zimbabweans established asecure perimeter around the Kinshasa-N’Dolo airport (runway 08/26, 1.680m long). Subsequently they alsobrought under control Kinshasa-N’Djili IAP (runway 06/24, 4.700m long), some 15km outside the city. Workingfeverishly, they then organized deployment of their helicopters – including Alouettes of No.7 and AB.412s of No.8http://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

Squadron – there as well. The first “African” intervention of this size thus had a good basis to startwith.

Zimbabwean Defence Forces troops seen on arrival on Kinshasa IAP, in August 1998. ZDF is considered for one of thebest-trained and disciplinned Armies in Sub-Saharan Africa. (via Tom Cooper)

Over 1.000km on the other side of Congo, and far away from Kinshasa, the second prong of the Zimbabweanintervention was meanwhile in organization. With official permission from Zambia the Zimbabweans rushed their troopsalong the only good road in that part of Africa, from Harare to Lusaka, via Kabwe and Chingola to Lumumbashi, insouthern Katanga. Entering Congo in a fighting march the Zimbabwean Army troops swiftly established several basesalong this communication. The road was to become the main supply route for their troops in eastern Congo: as the rebelsadvanced on Mbuji-Mayi, the so-called “Diamond Capital” of Congo, and already established their controlover the surrounding area, the road became immensely important for Zimbabwe. In fact, the Zimbabweans stampededtowards Mbuji-Mayi, eventually deploying so many of their troops along this route that many Zambian citizenscomplained the road would now be “owned” by Zimbabwean military.

Together with Zimbabwean troops, additional Alouette and AB.412 helicopters were deployed to the Lumumbashi IAP(runway 07/25, 3.200m long), and then on a similar installation near Mbuji-Mayi (runway 17/35, 2.000m long). The AFZalso operated from the small airfield near Manono, some 350km to the east, which was used as the main supply hub forZimbabwean troops deployed in Maniema and Sud-Kivu Provinces, opposite to the border with Rwanda. The Angolanswere also in action inside Congo by the time, as on 20 August there were the first reports about a long column –including some 2.000 Angolan troops from 5th and 18th Regiment, supported by tanks and APCs, and 150 NambianDefence Forces troops – entering Congo from SW, along the road from Cabinda to Kinshasa.

Just two days later, on 24 August, a British tourist reported sighting a column of at least 500 Ugandan troops, two tanksand several self-propelled anti-aircraft pieces (probably ZSU-23-4s) no less but 180 kilometres inside Congo.Zimbabwean and Angolan intelligence reported also vivid deployment of Ugandan Army Air Force helicopters alongborders to Congo, and AFZ-units deployed in the country were warned that confrontations were possible. Obviously,Uganda was now responding to Angolan and Zimbabwean interventions by a major troop commitment and support of therebel assault on Kisingani as well. In total, there were now five African countries fighting on Kabila’s side in Congo.

Meanwhile, a number of mercenary outfits appeared on the surface as well – mainly South African and British-based companies, like Branch Energy, Diamond Works, Heritage Oil and Gas, and Sandline International – mostof which were frequently misidentified as “EO”, or brought in connection with it, without any valid reason(the fact was that this company stopped operating already earlier that year; of course, this did not mean that all of itsformer employees returned home: quite a number of them took care to get new contracts from local companies and thegovernment). The South Africans were contracted by Kabila to recapture and defend the strategic Inga Dam, provide VIP-protection, electronic surveillance and air combat support. Few South African pilots appear to have been flying some ofCongolese and Angolan aircraft and helicopters, used for “offensive air reconnaissance operations”– also against UNITA’s bases inside Congo. Another group of around 100 mercenaries was taking careabout the security in Lumumbashi, Katangese capital, while an – unnamed – South African consortium wascontracted by Kabila for providing “non-lethal” support, including air- and sea-transport of cargo andmilitary supplies. This company was connecting foremost Namibia, Angola, and Zambia with Congo. The deployment offoreign mercenaries was eventually highly effective: without any special problems the South Africans secured thewestern road and rail corridor – including the oil pipeline and electricity distribution lines to the Atlantic coasthttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

– and thanks to them by mid-September 1998 Kabila was able to claim that these were now safe for normalfunction.

The Battle for N'Djili

At the same time the Zimbabweans were deploying to the Congolese capital, the Rwandans advanced over the mutualborder and occupied Goma, together with the local airfield. Rwandan special troops commandeered several passengerairliners - among these were two Boeing 727 (9Q-CDM from Blue Air Lines and EL-GPX from GomAir) and a Boeing 707- which in the following days were used to transport an entire brigade of the Rwandan Army, followed by a Ugandanbrigade, over 1500 km to Kitona AB, in the western DRC. Gen James Kabari, C-in-C of the Rwandan forces in westernCongo, found there plenty of heavy equipment plus lots of Congolese troops that mutined against Kabila, and decided -in agreement with the then MoD of Rwanda, Paul Kagame (nowadays President of Rwanda) - to strike directly atKinshasa, before the Zimbabweans could deploy properly. They moved out on 10 August and captured the port of Matadion the 13th, thus cutting off the corridor between Kinshasa and the Atlantic. As next, they bypassed Kasangulu (some45km SW of Kinshasa) already on the 18th, intent on taking N'Djili IAP already the next morning. However, nearKasangulu, their advance party surprisingly run into a squad of Zimbabwean SAS and a company of loyal Congolesetroops and suffered a loss of 18 KIA.

The Zimbabwean SAS troops called for air support, but there was none available at the moment. The first AFZ planes todeploy to Congo were four FB.337 Lynxes. They arrived only on 20 August, moving out first because they were theslowest of all the AFZ planes planned to deploy. And, they flew the entire way (over 3.500km) on their own, withrefuelling stops in Tanzania, and then Kamina AB, in southern Congo. Hawks followed only on the next day.

The brief clash at Kasangulu did not really stop Kabari, but it did cost his advance party two good days. Then, his mainforce was still two days behind it - it reached Mbanza Ngungu, some 120km SW of Kinshasa on 20 August - and had tocatch up. What was important, from Kabila's and Zimbabwean’s point of view, was the fact that the vanguardforce was prevented from accomplishing its task: infiltrating Kinshasa and launching a surprise attack on N'Djili. So, itwas only 22 August, that Kabari outmaneuvered the front SAS parties and advanced on Celo and then Kisantu, some100km SW of Kinshasa. That's where they were detected by another SAS party and this time their call for help did notremain unanswered. Four Hawks - which had arrived in N'Djili barely two hours before - flew their first combat sortie inCongo on that afternoon, striking two columns with BL.755 cluster bombs, producing a real carnage.

Kabari regrouped and launched a new advance already on the next day. By 24 August, his main force - including roughlya squadron/company of Congolese T-54/55 tanks - approached Kasangulu again. This time they were detected by apatrolling Lynx. The column included around a dozen tanks and plenty of trucks (some towing ZPUs, others carryingmortars, ammo and fuel). After reporting about their appearance, the enterprising Lynx-pilot decided to attack anddestroyed the lead tank with unguided rockets from his Matra F2 pod. This column was then left to run into an SASambush (swiftly set up with the help of Alouette III helicopters), and then finished by additional Lynx and Hawk strikes.This second ambush at Kasangulu destroyed all the armor in Kabari's hands. His force continued its advance onKinshasa, but without any armored support and only a few mortars in their posession. On the same day the secondcontingent of Zimbabwean troops was deployed to N’Djili, including 1000 paratroopers.

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The AFZ deployed at least four Cessna FTB.337G Lynxes to Congo, and they flew hundreds of sorties, particularlyduring the battle for N'Djili IAP. Their usual load consisted of two Matra F2 rocket pods under the wings (each with six 68mmunguided rockets) and two machine guns installed in a fairing above the fuselage. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

Although the Zimbabweans deployed first only elite troops such as SAS, paras and commandos, these were too few tostop the Rwandan and rebel advance, especially since these were using highly successful infiltration techniques. Thisway, on the morning of 26 August Rwandan advance parties entered Kinshasa spearheaded by a mutinied CongoleseArmy unit, cleverly posing as loyalist troops retreating. Their cover was blown very late, when being only 100 metersaway from the main terminal at N’Djili. Zimbabwean troops repulsed the first attack, but the second assaultoccupied the S-W part of the runway, the tower and other facilities. But due to the lenth of the runway (4,7 km) AFZplanes could operate from the N-E section of the runway: Hawks and Lynxes flew each dozens of sorties per day.Ammunition ressuply was done sometimes with the engines running. After three days of intense fighting, on theafternoon of 29 August, the Zimbabweans finally managed to push the tired and low on ammo enemy away from theairport, into the slums of southern Kinshasa, where fighting continued for another week.

AFZ technicians in the process of re-arming Hawk 610 at N'Djili IAP, in August 1998. The aircraft has a centerlinemounted ADEN 30 mm gunpod with 120 rounds and two Matra 155 rocket pods under the wings, each holding 18 SNEBunguided rockets caliber 68 mm. (via Tom Cooper)

In late August Libyan Arab Republic Air Force (LARAF) Ilushin Il-76 transports were used to bring 1.500 Chadian fightersto Congo. Their deployment enabled Zimbabweans to free part of their units and start an mopping-up operations aroundthe capital while the Angolans marched on Kitona. Effectively, what was then left of the original rebel units in westernCongo was destroyed in a multi-prong offensive.

Map showing the situation in Congo during the second half of 1998, displaying the most notable opposing forces, thedirections of their main offensives, as well as airfields and airbases used. (Map by Tom Cooper, based on Encarta 2003software)

Zimbabweans under Pressure http://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

In order to better coordinate their efforts, the Angolans, Namibians and Zimbabweans agreed to put all their troops undera unitary command. The overall command of these contingents was given to AFZ Air Marshall Shiri, who delivered asimple plan: the Zimbabweans were to hold out at Kinshasa and in Katanga, while the Angolans would advance onKitona and then push towards Kinshasa.

Soon after deployment of larger Zimbabwean units in the Kinshasa area, the rebels started suffering setbacks. Aftercapturing Kitona the Angolans found themselves in a pursuit of their opponents and then deep inside the rear areas heldby the rebels. In the process of this advance they completely destroyed the chain of supply of Rwandan and rebel forcesin western Congo. The Zimbabwean push towards south from Kinshasa run out of steam pretty soon – and therewas a number of reasons for this. The Angolans were not yet ready for their advance and could therefore not decreasethe rebel pressure towards west. Meanwhile, the RCD and MLC have recruited well over 100.000 fighters in easternCongo and more of these were appearing on the battlefield as the main rebel effort was an advance towards RCD-headquarters in Kisingani. Besides, by mid-September the war was fought on no less but three different fronts, in Kindu,Kalemie and Kisingani, and heavily equipped foreign troops were unable to be everywhere at the same time. Theremainder of Rwandan led forces which had attacked N’Djili was pushed into Northern Angola by theZimbabwean offensive. There, with help from UNITA, they regrouped around an airstrip from which they were evacuatedto Kisingani by chartered transports. Thus, their offensive ended the same way it began: with a huge airlift.

The problem was, however, that during the Non-Aligned Summit in South Africa, in early September, the situationsuddenly changed again. The South African President Nelson Mandela announced without any explanation that SouthAfrican was now backing the intervention in support of Kabila. At least as astonishing was reaction of ZimbabweanPresident Robert Mugabe, who – in belief that Kabila’s government was already safe – suggestedthat there was no need to continue the war, and peace should be negotiated. Kabila, however, was not the least ready tonegotiate with rebels, while Rwanda and Uganda misunderstood Mugabe’s suggestion as a sign of weakness.The eventual result was that the rebels reinforced their efforts: the Rwandans and Ugandans were also rushing better-equipped units into the battle as well. Indeed, the garrisons in eastern Congo that remained loyal to Kabila were fallingone after the other. Kisingani fell on 27 August and 400 pro-Kabila fighters – including some 100 troops of theAllied Democratic Forces and 100 Rwandese Interahamwe – were captured. Besides, the rebels simultaneouslyattacked also the Ndigili airport, in Kibanseke Province, held by Zimbabwean troops, as well as Kitona. In both cases theFAN and AFZ responded with fierce air strikes, offering rebels the opportunity to claim that up to 100 civilians were killedby their bombs.

Consequently, after initial successes of both sides, and the successful defences of Kabila’s supporters, the laterexperienced a number of setbacks. What happened was that while the Zimbabweans and Angolans were bringing goodequipment, experience and discipline, the rebels were present in numbers their opponents could not tackle, while theRwandans and the Ugandans added heavy weapons and fire-support. With foreign troops in his back Kabila returned toKinshasa predicting victory over the rebels and urging a genocidal campaign against members of the Tutsi tribe. Inresponse, Uganda and Rwanda launched a joint airlift, moving additional heavy weapons and own troops into central andsouthern Congo.

Eventually, the two sides clashed in a series of fierce battles fought between 4 and 13 September 1998, during whichfinally also the Angolan mechanised forces were able to deploy their full firepower. The Chadian contingent wasmeanwhile deployed in NE Congo, where it participated in re-capture of Lubutu. The AFZ and FAC were active in thisarea for several days, flying a number of strikes during which also cluster-bomb units (CBUs) were used. According togovernment reports 45 rebels were killed and 19 captured in this battle.

The fighting in what can only be described as the “manoeuvre phase” of this war culminated on 13September, when the Angolans advanced from Kikwit towards north-east, in cooperation with the Namibians, while theZimbabweans found themselves under fierce attacks by thousands of rebels in the Manono area. It was in this area thathttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

the AFZ suffered its first documented loss of this war: on 4 September the SF.260MC flown by Sqn.Ldr. Sharungacrashed in bad weather, killing the pilot. Nine days later also an Alouette III helicopter carrying several high officers– including Col. Kufa and Sqn.Ldr. Vundla – was shot down by rebels in eastern central Congo. Kufa andVundla were killed, while Flt.Sgt. Sande was captured by RCD.

Than followed a relatively quiet period used by both sides for replenishing their stocks of ammunition and equipment,reorganizing and reinforcing the units in the field. In late September the AFZ redeployed its Hawks and troops fromN’Djili to Kamina, taking advantage of the large stocks of bombs and unguided rockets found there, stockpiled bythe former Zairian AF. Rwandans, Ugandans and rebels did not sit idle either: in early October they launched a majoroffensive against Kindu, deploying some 9.000 troops in the area. The Congolese Army had barely 5.000 fighters fromseveral scattered units in the city. The Zimbabweans reacted by deploying two additional battalions via Zambia, andincreasing their troop presence in Congo to meanwhile some 5.000 troops, but the rebels then launched new offensives– towards Lumumbashi and Mbuji-Mayi, threatening both of the airfields used by the AFZ. Zimbabwean troopswere also supplied from the air, mainly by chartered transport planes. One of these, an Il-76, was shot down by rebels orRwandans, on 11 October, while attempting to land, killing 40 troops. The weapon used was probably an SA-14MANPADS, a number of which were acquired from Eastern Europe and reached the battlefields in those days.

Despite strong resistance, the Rwandans captured Kindu by 15 October. As soon as the city fell the local airfield wascleared and used for the transport of supplies and ammunition. According to reports of the foreign press, at least threemedium-sized transport aircraft were observed flying in shuttle traffic between Kindu and Kigali. The origin of theseaircraft remains unknown, as neither Rwanda nor Uganda are known to have had any larger transport aircraft in serviceat the time. Nevertheless, considering the number of surplus airframes available in the former USSR at the time it wascertainly not especially problematic for either of the two countries to charter foreign aircraft – foremost from anumber of companies run by Russians or Ukrainians, and based in Sharjah, in the UAE.

The Zimbabweans subsequently found themselves under additional pressure, then even if in the north the Congoleseand Chadian troops re-captured Bunia – with some support from FAN MiG-21s and Mi-24s – on 23October 1998, the situation of their troops in eastern central Congo was swiftly worsening. Few days later theZimbabweans launched an offensive – to a degree possible due to deployment of additional foreign troops inCongo, including some 2.000 Namibians – in SE Congo. This began with a series of air strikes, flown by BAeHawk T.Mk.60s of the No.2 Squadron from Kamina. These first targeted airfields in Gbadolite, Dongo and Gmena, andthen rebel and Rwandan communications and depots in Kisingani area, on 21 November. On the following day the No.2Squadron prepared a special mission, launching a strike package of six aircraft, armed with Mk.82 bombs and Matra 155rocket pods for unguided rockets calibre 68mm: reaching out far over central Congo they appeared over the LakeTanganyka and attacked ferries used to transport Burundi troops and supplies into the war in Congo. According toZimbabwean reports their strike came as a complete surprise: with no other means of air defence but machine-guns andlight infantry weapons, six ferries were sunk and 600 Burundian and Rwandan troops killed.

Seen on one of Congolese airfields held by Zimbabweans in the summer of 1998, this Hawk T.Mk.60 was carrying ahefty load of two Hunting BL.755 cluster-bombs on inner underwing pylons, and an ADEN 30mm cannon under thecentreline. The BL.755 are deadly weapons, extremely effective against infantry and lightly armoured vehicles, and haveproven their worth beyond any doubt in already several completely different conflicts. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

There were only very few reports about the fighting in the next few days, probably because the Congolese, Zimbabweanhttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

and Angolan governments found themselves under heavy pressure from Western powers because of this offensive. Thefew reports released from sources close to the rebels indicated Zimbabwean and Congolese attacks on Nuyuzu, Kasingeand towards Manono, supported even by T-62 tanks and heavy artillery. According to Zimbabwean reports the Hawkscontinued their operations by additional attacks against Kalemie, on 23 November, during which the pilots destroyed aLockheed Electra transport on the ground with 30 mm gunfire.

However, fighting picked up again around Kagalo, a strategically placed town overlooking a road and rail bridge over theCongo River. Kagalo was finally captured by the Zimbabwean Army in March 1999, Hawks providing close supportduring their advance. But they also suffered setbacks in other areas: in late November 1998 a Zimbabwean companywas encircled near Ikela, in northern Congo. They cleared a small airstrip in the middle of the defensive perimeter andwere supplied by AFZ helicopters. Later, several CASA C.212 transports were converted into makeshift bombers insupport of the besieged troops, which miraculously managed to resist for two years, until being relieved in 2001.

Zimbabwean C.212s saw extensive service during the war in Congo, and often flew very dangerous nocturnal attacksagainst selected enemy strongholds, dropping Zimbabwean “Arigona” bombs out of the cargo hold.(Artwork by Tom Cooper)

In March 1999 the fighting once again picked up considerably, with a Rwandan Army offensive pushing through Kakuyuand Kongolo in the north and towards Ankoro in the south. Again a Zimbabwean unit was encircled – this time abattalion, near Manono. They also built a small landing strip in the middle of their perimeter, for SA.316 Alouette III andAgusta-Bell AB.412 to fly in supplies and evacuate the casualties. But, contrary to the company surrounded at Ikelamentioned above, their location was well within range of AFZ Hawks and Mi-35s which flew intensive CAS sorties. It washere that on 23 March 1999, AFZ suffered the first and only Hawk loss of the war. One of two Mistrals launched hit theplane piloted by Flt Lt Michael Enslin, who had to eject behind enemy lines. Although injured, he managed to avoidcapture and joined the encircled battalion – which broke trough and reached friendly lines after three weeks offighting with the Rwandans.

After his recovery from injuries sustained during the Congo War, Flt Lt Michael Enslin (left) went on to win the AFZ'sprestigious “Jungle Dustbin” gunnery trophy, with a record score. This photo shows Enslin together with theprevious record-holder, Flt Lt Sam Sigauke. (AFZ Magazine, 2001)

Meanwhile, negotiations for a peace agreement were going on, and started to yield results. The first ceasefire to belargely respected was signed between DRC and Uganda in mid April 1999. This lead to infighting among the various anti-http://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

government groups, and especially between the Ugandans and Rwandans. The latter continued fighting, and by earlyJuly 1999 reached the Katanga and Kasai provinces; but the main Congolese anti-government factions signed aceasefire on 1 August, so the successful Rwandan advance had to stop barely 50 km away from Mbuji Mayi,Congo’s “diamond capital”.

With the frontlines stabilized, lengthy negotiations took place which finally led to a withdrawal of all foreign forces fromCongo in 2001. However, fighting continued at a smaller scale and the AFZ continued flying strikes against targets deepbehind enemy lines. Due to persistent reports about the possible deployment of Ugandan MiG-21s, these miniature strikepackages were escorted by at least one Hawk armed with two PL-7 AAMs and the ADEN cannon pod. Congolese Su-25s also became operational and flew their first strikes strikes against enemy bases in April, May and June 2000,reportedly flown by Ukrainian pilots. Their last last known combat sorties were reportedly flown in December 2000, duringthe battle for Pepa.

AFZ Hawk T.Mk.60 with the typical CAP / escort load: two Chinese Made PL-7 short range IR guided AAMs and anADEN 30 mm gun pod on the centerline. hawks flew these missions in response to the reports about Ugandansdeploying their MiG-21s to Congo, but also in a vain attempt to intercept transport aircraft and helicopters which weredelivering supplies to the opposing forces. (Artwork by Tom Cooper)

What can be concluded with regards to the aerial side of this conflict is that airpower played a significant – and incertain places, like the battle for N’Djili – a decisive role, also due to the usually huge distances involved,almost no ground radar coverage and a very poor road and rail infrastructure. The first two factors mentioned beforewere also the main reason for which there were no air to air combats, as well as the absence of on-board aerial interceptradars.

Contrary to the dozens of “MiGs” claimed as shot down by the various rebel forces, Rwandans , Ugandans,etc. - only one Zimbabwean jet, a Hawk, has been confirmed as lost in combat. Some sources indicate the loss of asecond, but there are no details available. If the Angolan MiG-21 emergency landed just inside Congo is also added, thetotal jet loses in the Congo war of 1998-2001 rank up to 2, possibly 3 airframes written off.

Aerial activities of military Ugandan, Rwandan and possibly Burundian helicopters are hazy at best. It is very likely theyperformed transport or even reconnaissance tasks, especially in eastern Congo, but there is no clear evidence abouttheir involvement in combat, in spite of claims by loyal Congolese units of being attacked or overflown by enemyhelicopter gunships and jets.

It is certain that Zimbabwean F-7s were not involved in the fighting and were not deployed to either the DRC or Zambia,as it has been usually reported. When five were finally sent to Congo in January 2001, their mission was to perform aflypast at Laurent Kabila’s funeral. It was an ill-fated mission which would lead to an attrition worse than than theone during the whole war. Due to the F-7’s short range they had to perform 5 refueling stops along the way toKinshasa, thus prolonging the flight well into the night. One pilot, a Wing Commander without recent night flyingexperience, became disoriented and ejected safely before the arrival in Kinshasa. After performing the flypast, the thirdof the remaining four jets was slammed into the ground at landing, as the group commander flying it misjudged hisapproach. With the runway closed, the fourth F-7 still airborne had to divert to an airport 30 minutes away, while havinghttp://www.acig.info/CMS - www.acig.org Powered by Mambo Generated:20 June, 2015, 21:09

fuel for only 20 minutes of flying left. The pilot chose to land on an airstrip in Lubumbashi; the plane skidded off the wetrunway and ploughed into a tree receiving extensive damage. Both pilots of the latter two mishaps escaped unhurt. Itwas an unglamorous and unnecessary end to an otherwise remarkable performance of Zimbabwean aircrews during thiswar.

Notes & Bibliography

Except for own research and materials kindly supplied by contributors on ACIG.org forum, especially Mr. Tom N., thefollowing sources of reference were used:

- "AFRICAN MiGs Volume 1 / Angola to Ivory Coast" by Tom Cooper and Peter Weinert, with Fabian Hinz and MarkLepko, Harpia Publishing 2010 (ISBN: 978-0-9825539-5-4)

- "CONTINENT ABLAZE; The Insurgency Wars in Africa, 1960 to the Present" by John W. Turner, Arms and Armour1998 (ISBN: 1-85409-128-X)

- "Congo At War", ICG Report No.2, Briefing on the Internal and External Players in the Central African Conflict, byInternational Crisis Group (ICG), issued 17 November 1998

- “Ugandan Notes” by Winston Brent, AFM volume 12/1996, p.26/27.

- "The Almanac of World Military Power" by Dupuy

- New Vision, Kampala (newspaper, different issues)

- The Monitor, Kampala (newspaper, different issues)

- La Réference Plus, Kinshasa (newspaper, different issues)

- Zimbabwe Standard, Harare (newspaper, different issues)

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- The Air Force of Zimbabwe Magazine (magazine, different issues)

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