INTERBEHAVIORAL PHILOSOPHY

INTERBEHAVIORALPHILOSOPHY

J. R. Kantor

The Principia Press Chicago • Illinois

1981

ISBN 0911188-56-8

Copyright© 1981 by The Principia Press 5743 South Kimbark Avenue

Chicago, Illinois 60637

All rights reserved.Printed in U.S.A.

D E D I C A T I O N

The debt that intellectual workers owe to their past and present compeers, whether by partial approval or total rejection, can never be fully repaid. However, by token it can be somewhat

acknowledged.Hence to all my companions in research

I dedicate this volume.

C O N T E N T S

Preface ......................................................................................................... xiii

INTRODUCTION: Perennial Problems of PhilosophyChapter 1: Philosophy in search of an Identity ............................................ 3

Variant Aspects of Philosophy. 3: What is Philosophy?. 3: Informal and Technical Philosophyzing. 4; Autistic and Observational Aspects of Philosophy, 4; Authentic or Scientific Aspects of Philosophy. 5: Spiritistic Variants in Conventional Philosophy. 6; Philosophies of Science: Valid and Invalid. 8; Intcrbchavioral Philosophy Identified. 10

SECTION 1: Philosophical Systems in SuccessionChapter 2: Historical Development of Philosophical Systems.................... 15

Informal and Unsystematized Interval. 15; Formal and Systematic Interval. 17.

Chapter 3: The Confrontational Interval.................. .................................19

Philosophical Origins: The Classical Age. 19; I: The Naively ObjectivePostulations of the Early Greek Philosophers. 19; II: The Development of Definite Postulates in the Platonic Doctrine of Knowledge. 23; III: The Statical Function of the Aristotelian Categories. 28; IV: The Influence ofPrimitive Realism on Greek Science. 36.

Chapter 4: The Transcendental Interval............ .........................................41

The Advent of a Dualistic Culture. 41; Characteristics of Transcendentalism. 41.

Chapter 5: Science Intrudes upon F a ith .................................................................46

Confrontation Vs. Beliefs. 46: Spiritism Assimilates Science. 47; The Preeminence of Spirit. 47; Soul as Source of Knowledge. 48; Substances as Associated Psychic Atoms. 48; Substances as Psychic Synthesis. 49;The Reality of Knowledge and Thinking. 50; Knowing and Existence. 51;Science and the Infinite. 53.

Chapter 6: The Materialistic Interval........................................... ......................... 54

The Paradox of Materialism. 54; What is Materialism'?. 54; Materialism as Symbol of Enlightenment. 55; French Materialism in the 18th Century. 55;German Materialism in the 19th Century, 63; Materialism in Psychological Perspective, 64; Significance of the Materialistic Interval. 65; Materialism: Period of Hope and Doubt. 65.

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C O N T E N T S

Positivistic Philosophy, 67; Positivism: Nature and Origin. 68; Positivism in Perspective, 69; Positivism: the Philosophy of Scientists, 69; Positivism — Critical Analysis, 73; Basis of Positivistic Errors, 74; Specimens of Cultural Influences, 76.

Chapter 8; The Interval of Linguistic Analysis............................................ 77Transformation of Philosophical Institutions, 77; Language in the Service of Philosophy, 77; Essentials of Linguistic Philosophy. 78; Linguistic Philosophy: Valid Premises. Invalid Conclusions, 79; Inadequate Attitude toward Philosophy, 79; Inadequate View of Language, 79; The Extensive Range of Language Things and Language Events, 80; The Role of Propositions in Philosophical Situations, 81; Propositions as Behavioral Products. 82; An Interbehavioral Approach to Philosophical Propositions,83: Interbehavioral Implications for Science, 86; Interbehavioral Implications for Philosophy, 89; The Comparison of Propositions with Related Things. 91; Linguistic Philosophy in General, 93.

Chapter 9: Towards Significant Philosophyzing.......................................... 95Guide to Valid Thinking, 95; Specification 1: Freedom from Metaphysical Institutions. 95; Specification II: Freedom from Universalism, 96; Specification III: Freedom from Absolutes, 96; Specification IV: Inhibition of Reifying Constructs, 96; Specification V; Withdrawal from Transcendences, 97; Specification VI: Dissociation from Verbal Puzzles. 97; Specification VII: Valid Linguistics. 98; Specification VIII: Valid Psychology, 98.

Chapter 7: The Positivistic Interval..................................................................... 67

CTION II; The Philosopher and his WorldChapter 10: Nature of Human N ature...................................................... 101

Mankind as Biosocial and Cultural Organisms, 103.

Chapter 11: The Intimacy of Philosophy and Science.............. ............. 106Chapter 12: The Birth of Epistemology and Ontology...... ....................... 120

Knowledge and Existence, 120; Knowledge as Adaptation and Orientation. 120: Fractionation of Adaptations to Events, 121; Epistemology, 121;Ontology and Existence. 123; Mathematics as an Ontological Problem.125; Psychology of Discovery, 126.

Chapter 13: Egocentric Knowing versus Cognitive Fields........................ 127Spiritistic Philosophy Dominates the Science of Knowing, 127; Galileo spiritises Knowing, 127; Newton's Color Experiments support Mentalistic Science, 130; The Newtonian Model of Perceiving, 133; Critical Analysis of Newton's Sensory Model, 134; Historical Career of Newton’s Perceiving Model, 13S; Newton's Baneful Influence on Science and Philosophy,136; Summary, 138.

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C O N T E N T S

SECTION III: Human Events in Philosophical Perspective

Chapter 14: Linguistic Events as Interbehavioral Fields ................................ 141

Ubiquity of Linguistic Behavior. 141; Interbehavioral and Traditional Postulation. 141; Linguistic Fields. 142; Linguistic and Nonlinguistic Events. 144; Speech as the Matrix of Language. 145; The Evolution of Linguistic Things, 146; The Advent of Literacy. 147; The Domination of Linguistics by Words, 147; Interbehavioral Vs, Conventional Linguistics,148; Linguistic Functions in the Anthropic Domain. 153; Linguistic Influences on Philosophyzing. 154; Linguistic Philosophy. 155; Linguistic Philosophy and the World of Events. 156.

Chapter 15: Philosophical Issues in Ethical Situations...............................159

isolation and Identification of Moral Situations. 159; Ethical Events and Ethical Constructs, 160; Morality: Absolute and Relative. 161; Morality Situations Dominated by Infallible Philosophy, 163; Prominent Misconceptions in Ethical Theory, 163; Ethical Problems as Linguistic Analysis.167; Psychological Model of Ethical Behavior. 167; Morals and Values.168; Standards of Morals, 169; Public and Private Morality. 170; Morality and Legality, 171.

Chapter 16: Philosophical Aspects of Politics............................................. 172

Humanity as Colonial Organisms, 172; Hierarchy of Human Groupings.172; Variety in Political Systems, 173; Political Systems and Political Philosophy, 174; Specimens of Political Philosophies. 175; A. Divine and Human Philosophy, 176; B. Philosophy of Social Compacts. 176; C. Philosophy of Political Utility, 178; D. Religious Philosophy and Political Revolution, 180; E. Materialistic Philosophy and Anarchical Society. 185; Individuals versus Political Systems, 186; Specific Political Problems. 186; Psychological Aspects of Political Philosophy, 192.

Chapter 17: Philosophy and Economics ................................................................194

Economics in Philosophical Perspective, 194; Origin and Nature of Economic Events, 195; Crucial Problems in Economic Analysis, 196; Excessive Abstractionism in Economics. 196; Economic Constructions and Economic Events, 197; The Law of Supply and Demand, 197; Specificities in the Economic Complex, 198; The Dogma of Price. 201; Supply and Demand as Dogmas and as Events, 202; Equilibrium in Economics, 202; Capitalism and Socialism as Variant Economic Systems, 203; Business and Public Welfare, 203; Economic Confusions: Causes and Remedies.204; Interrelations of Philosophy and Economics, 206; Psychological Aspects of Economics, 222; Critical Overview of the Philosophy of Economics, 225. ix

C O N T E N T SParlous Conditions of Aesthetics, 232; Art through the Ages, 232; Evolution of Aesthetics, 233; Issues in Art and Aesthetics, 236; Polarities in Artistic and Aesthetic Situations, 244; Range of Aesthetic Qualities, 246;“Beauty": Universal Applique, 249; Aesthetic Beauty Identified and Defined, 250; Paraesthetic Behavior, 252; Interbehavioral Psychology in Aesthetics, 254; Analysis of Aesthetic Fields, 254; A. The Artist, 256;B. The Appreciator or Observer, 257; C. The Interbehavioral Object, 258;D. Setting or Auspice, 258; Recapitulation, 259.

Chapter 19: Education in Philosophical Perspective................................263Education and Human Maturation, 263; Conventional Theories of Education, 263; Education as Personality Evolution, 264; Two Phases of Personality Development, 264; Education Described, 266; Education in Interrelation, 267; Education in the Perspective of Scientific Development,268; Sequential Order in Educational Development, 270; Continuity of Educational Processes, 271; Some Problems in Educational Situations,271; Education Versus Training, 272; Education in Simple and Complex Cultures, 273; Educational Goals and Values, 273; Technology and Engineering in Education, 274; Summary, 276.

Chapter 20: Philosophy of Religion..........................................................278Isolation and Identification of Religion, 278; What is Religion? Various Definitions, 278; Varying Types of Religious Data, 279; Identifying Aspects of Personal Religion, 281; Various Types of Religious Behavior, 282;Religion and Theology, 283; Religion in Anthropological Perspective, 284;Religion and Science, 286; Comparative Philosophies of Religion, 288; Comparative Psychologies of Religion, 289; Dominance of Spiritistic Culture, 291; Religion and Values, 293; Religion and Morals, 295; Religion and Politics, 296.

Chapter 21: Philosophy of Law..................................................................298Laws in Philosophical Perspective, 298; Laws of Nature and of Society,298; Various Philosophies of Laws, 299; A. Nature of Laws in Scientific Contexts, 300; Philosophical Roots of Law Theories, 301; Laws in Scientific Philosophy, 302; B. Laws as Societal Institutions, 304; Legal Philosophy extremely abstractionistic, 304; Nature of Societal Laws, 304; Scientific Philosophy and Societal Laws, 306; Sources of Societal Laws, 306;Laws: Natural or Functional, 308; Semantics and the Law, 308; Psychological Aspects of Societal Laws, 309; Natural Rights and Positive Law,311; Judicial Review and Modification of Law, 311; Paradoxes in Legal Philosophy, 312; Societal Laws not Laws of Nature, 313; National and International Law, 314; Jurisprudence as Interdisciplinary Philosophy,315.

Chapter 18: Philosophy of Art and Aesthetics...............................................232

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C O N T E N T S

Ambiguities concerning the Philosophy of History, 317; Historiography Emended, 317; History as Events and as Constructs, 318; Can History be a Science?, 320; Analysis of Scientific Enterprises, 321; Ontological Aspects of History, 325; Epistemic Issues in Historiography, 331; Range of Historiography, 338.

- V Chapter 23: E p ilogu e........................................................................................ 340

Outstanding Faults of Conventional Philosophy, 340; The Flight from the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, 341; Benefit Claims of Interbehavioral Philosophy, 341; Specialization Problems in Philosophy, 345; Can Cultural Institutions be Changed?, 346.

Subject Index ............................................................................................................... 349

Name Index..................................................................................................................... 353

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

Fig. 1: Evolution of Philosophy Through Intellectual S ta g e s ....................... 75Fig. 2: Newton’s “Experimentum Crucis” ...............................................................131Fig. 3: Conventional Theory o f the Function o f the Brain in Media

ting Between Physical Light and Mental Q ualities........................ 133Fig. 4: D e Saussere’s representation o f the processes o f transforming

psychic states into words and vice v ersa ........................................... 142Fig. 5: Basic Linguistic Behavior................................................................................143Fig. 6: Hearer Becomes S peaker................................................................................143Fig. 7: Comparison o f Linguistic and Sem iotic F ields....................................... 144Fig. 8: The Inverted Pyramid o f L a n g u a g e .......................................................... 145Fig. 9: Ogden-Richards’ Concept o f Symbol-Referent R ela tion .................... 149Fig. 10: Bloomfield’s Concept of Symbol-Referent R elation.............................. 150Fig. 11: Objective Psychology’s Relation Between Linguistic Stimulus and

Response ...................................................................................................... 151Fig. 12: The Behavior Segment as Unit o f Interbehavior............................... 255Fig. 13: Reciprocal Influence o f Culture upon Individuals and Vice

Versa................................................................................................................342

Table 1: Comparison o f Conventional and Interbehavioral Views Concerning Meanings ............................................ 151

Table 2: Samples o f Conventional Ethical Criteria...............................................160

Chapter 22: Philosophical Aspects of H istory ................................................ 317

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C O N T E N T S

ible 3: Keynesian Heresies.......................................................................... 223ible 4: Schema of Economic Development................ 227ible 5: Aesthetic Situations.......................................................... 243ible 6: Schema of Law Construction..........................................................298ible 7: Constitutional Modification.............................. 312

lart 1: Samples of Persons Listed as Anarchists........................................184iart 2: Economic Opinions of the 17th—19th Centuries...................... 228-229

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PREFACE

f Unlike other animals, the hum an species has so evolved as to include unique individuals whose activities extend beyond the behavior necessary for organismic survival and societal adjustments?)Such persons reflect upon and evaluate their ambient cosmic and sociocultural events in order to understand and possibly modify them. In common they construct systems of attitudes or beliefs which when codified and inscribed serve as the intellectual furniture of individuals and the communities in which theylive. Such persons are called philosophers and their systematic products constitute the philosophical institutions depicted in the intellectual histories of the various tribes of mankind.

But this is the idealized description of the philosophical scene. Philosophers as human personalities stray widely from the straight and narrow path. As is the case with their lay companions their professed wisdom is not exclusively involved with objects and events within the range of actual experience. Their formulations are generously interlarded with imaginary ingredients.

Basic to the primary flaws of conventional philosophy is the departure from the things and events actually encountered toward worlds verbally created. Consulting the philosophyzing records o f the Western European tradition we observe without exception the utter domination of philosophers by the delusion that the universe including themselves is dichotom-

. ized into spirit and matter, while persons are composed of body and mind. r Competing and succeeding philosophical systems are simply variations

upon this dualistic theme instead of being founded upon results of contacts with confrontable and observable events. Once the specious dichotomy has been effected numerous variations of epistemologies and ontologies have arisen and succeeded each other. Philosophers continuously struggle with such pseudo-problems as (a) existence and nature of God, (b) the innateness of knowledge, (c) whether minds are imprinted by external forces, (d) the substantiality of “Sense Data,” and (e) the possibility of knowing if other persons have minds. Much of the philosophyzing of Western European thinkers whether categorized as spiritism or its materialistic polarity consists of the verbal means of escaping from the rigors of actually prevailing circumstances. Unfortunately, few philosophers realize that the souls or minds they haggle about have no existence whatever aside

XIII

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mjthe phrases that refer tOi^henyA similar comment can be m ad eab o u t\ 7 : other phase of the mind-bcSdydualism, namely, the metaphysical body. / * Now it is obvious that philosophy is in dire need of complete reforma- n and it is frankly the goal of this book to propose such a reformation.hat is required is a different set o f postulates in order to achieve a more ing means of reflection. Here are some samples of superior postulation.In the first place, it must be assumed that human individuals cannot .nscend the things, objects, conditions, and relations that can be con- »nted and observed. Such is the limit of hum an knowledge and service- V le speculation. No philosophyzing worthy o f the name can roam beyon thentic observation and valid inference. Plainly put, authentic philo- /%. phy has no concern with Absolutes, Infinities, Miracles, Invented Uni- ^ rses, Magical Occurrences, or Imaginary Personalities, Powers, and ocesses.Anothei^a&sumption is that, since philosophers are always members of me rfocietyjir some group within a larger social system, they are flueneejTby this circumstance. This assumption relates to the fact that the story of philosophyzing describes a series of uniquely formulated sys- ms which reflect differences in the political, economic, and general m m unity conditions, prevailing at various times in the circumstances of iman societies. Thus specific differences appear in the construction of lilosophical systems. Granting that philosophyzing represents one of the :ak human preoccupations, criteria and standards are inescapable. Phi- sophical systems are thus subject to evaluation on the basis of origin and ilidity. It is a striking consequencelhat a great hiatus is observable as :tween deliberations derived from contacts with things and events, hether involving human beings or nonhum an occurrences, as compared ith self-indulgent wishes, dreams, and uncontrolled ruminations.A final sample of a basic philosophical assumption is that the erection of

mrious philosophies and ineffective doctrines indicates a lack o f c o n ta c t ith actual events as well as a misuse of language. Metaphorical and tystical propositions are formulated by delusory analogy with authentic ascriptions and in terpretations of observed events and their in- rrelations.Critical students of the conventionally accepted philosophy can only

>nclude that both historical and current thinking is completely riddled ith mythology rather than supported by verifiable propositions concern - g themselves or the events available for observation. This is not to ^erlook the many criticisms that succeeding generations of thinkers make f the errors of their predecessors. Two such apparent monuments of

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P R E F A C E

dissent may be mentioned. FirsU .thc.apparenLgreat revolution when philosophers in the Renaissance period began to turn their thinking away frorrfthe exclusive interest in soul -salvation toward the work and discoveT^

'—ies of sciience. The~dtKer Fsthe monTrecent effort to eschew traditional metaphysics by assuming thaLphifos.ophy is not cohoeVned with content,

"w ith events~but only with the proper use oHangjuage^— While brnTTmovements offer considerable potentiality for the correction of philosophy neither one served to unseat the venerable and powerful dualistic dogma, and so the advocates of scientific philosophy intermixed occurring events with religious interpretations, while.linguistic philosophers failed to match their strictures upon irresponsible references^with an improved appreciation of inorganic, organic, and human events. To achieve significant philosophyzing it is clearly a prime necessity for thinkers to emancipate their discipline from the intolerable fetters of transcendental and other supernatural mythologies that have beclouded the pages of intellectual history.

Since philosophyzing is hum an behavior it is of the utmost importance to break the chains that bind psychology to a mystical dualism, a dualism that perpetuates belief in souls, minds, consciousness, o r other mythical

^ entities. It is a basic prerm seofth is book that a free scientific psychology can greatly advance a naturalistic and valid philosophy. Both philosophy and psychology must be freed from sensations, ideas, thoughts, and every variety of faculty, which items have been historically employed to support the gossamer structures of traditional metaphysics. A naturalistic psychology can o ffer adequate analyses of perceiving, thinking, reasoning, among other important activities, so that the spurious problems of mythical minds with their a prioris and transcendences can be completely abolished, thus making way for reasonable philosophyzing and the valid systemization of observable events. It is only such philosophyzing that justifies the evalua - tion of thinking persons as hom o sapiens sapiens; civilians; and superiorily evolved organisms.

This preface cannot be concluded otherwise than by recording the names of two persons who have aided me greatly in the production of this book. Mr. Greer Allen has not only designed this volume, but also carefully attended to seeing it through the press. 1 appreciate his help very much. Miss Suzanne Howe earned my gratitude for her many effective labors in the development of a satisfactory typescript for the printers. I acknowledge her efforts with thanks.

May 1980 X V J.R .K .

INTRODUCTION

Perennial Problems of Philosophy

C H A P T E R 1

PHILOSOPHYIN SEARCH OF AN IDENTITY

VARIANT ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHY

No reflecting person need question that philosophyzing is a pervasive human preoccupation, nor that philosophical attitudes are among the basic institutions of every complex civilization. Properly envisaged all complex behavior and modes of living are permeated and influenced by structured and unstructured assumptions that reflect the identity, stability, and intellectual direction of individuals and communities. However, philosophyzing possesses many other aspects besides pervasiveness which render it subject to a variety of descriptions, some of which are directly contrary to and irreconcilable with othcrs. At one point in time philosophy is conceived as the “queen of the sciences” in the sense that all intellectual

. occupations are sciences, while at another, it is thought of a /o tio s e in dfutile web-spinning. Again, philosophy has been categorized aslfieTiand- maiden of theology or at least an outgrowth of religion. Despite the great number of varying views concerning philosophy, it is still possible to analyze and identify the traits that mark it as a distinctive attribute of cultivated individuals, and a significant stage in the intellectual evolution of mankind.

WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY?

Basic to all the varieties of philosophyzing and the resulting philosophical products is the construction of systems of assumptions, beliefs, and other intellectual attitudes. Such systems vary with natural and social conditions prevailing in the purview of thinkers. Historically philosophies swing between the creation of literary vehicles to escape from conditions that plague the constructors and their compatriots, to expressions of satisfaction by their inventors with themselves and the world in general. Thus some philosophical products are characterized by the deepest gloom of pessimism while others m irror the peaks of exultation. With this suggestion concerning the identification of philosophy we may explore other aspects of philosophyzing for light on the merits or ranking of the many historical or current systems.

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P E R E N N I A L P R O B L E M S O F P H I L O S O P H YINFO RM AL A N D TECH NICAL PHILOSOPHYZING

ie analysis of philosophyzing enterprises reveals the incessant creator nateur and informal attitudes about the ambient worlds of their ors. Such informal philosophies are definitely related to and precede ->rmal systems that have become crystallized by inscription or general tion throughout generations of thinkers from various communities nations.:chnical philosophies consist of systems of propositions constructed by iduals which through various circumstances become institutionalized codified, as for example the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, St. ustine. St. Thomas, and innumerable modern thinkers; for example :artes, Locke, Hobbes, Kant, Hume, Hegel, Schopenhauer, and so on. the preservation and study of such systems that has givenjise to the ession that philosophy is the history of philosophy.!

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UTISTIC A N D O BSERVATIO NAL ASPECTS O F PHILOSO PH Y

ranting the prevalence and importance of philosophy in all complex an situations and further that philosophy consists of systems of intel- al attitudes, we have to inquire into the nature of the attitudes. The >ry of philosophy show's that for the most part systems of philosophical msitions are autistic. That is, they are not built up on the basis of rvations of things and events but on the contrary are derived from iral traditions. The cultural traditions scarcely touch upon occurring^ >s and events but are founded upon imagined bases concerning reality ell as mythical notions of man and the world.'hy there should be so many variations in philosophical attitudes is litely explained by considering the nature of man as the constructor of ude systems as well as the type of civilization in which he makes his ie. As we shall see in the next chapter, the Greek era of philosophy is acterized by the view of man as a biological organism able to perform >nal behavior. In this period intellectual attitudes were constructed respect to naturalistic surroundings. But this situation did not endure

ong. W ith the change in social and political circumstances, mankind med a biomental d uality so that system constructors were no longer rded as natural beings in a natural world. Thus arose the era of d-body such that thinkers became creators of conversional systems, tan behavior was transformed into soul while biocellular organisms ime bodies. The ambient world, too, traditional thinkers imagined to

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I D E N T I T Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y

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be dichotomized into material on one hand, and spiritual and psychic on the other.

Duaiistic systems continue to prosper down to the present moment. There is no manner of doubt but that this dichotomization o f m an and his world has completely dom inated the entire history of philosophy and infected every branch and specialty of science. The result has been and continues to be that error is rife and philosophy futile. Because philosophy exists alongside and intermixed with mysticism and mythology what should be the most cultivated aspect of hum an living keeps people enmeshed in the most retrogressive intellectual condition despite the high level of technological, political, economic, and social scales o f living. Tradition and ritual rem ain the most effective cultural controls over the otherwise most advanced people.

AUTHENTIC OR SCIENTIFIC ASPECTS OF PHILOSOPHYGenuine philosophical attitudes are essentially those based upon the

responses of persons to confrontable objects and events including the thinker himself. By contrast they stand over against autistic or essentially verbal form ulations. Scientific philosophyzing separates sharply constructions that consist o f such inventions as forces, essences, and powers with their products of universals, absolutes, transcendental * •creations, and so on, from the objects and events with which persons can

' interaet-and'Observe. Interbehavioral Philosophy stands directly opposed ‘ to the puerile verbiages of the orthodox systems reported in the• conventional histories of philosophy.

Authentic philosophy advocates the complete abolition of the nebulous wraith of historical spiritism as cherished by many conventional philosophers whose votaries attem pt to evade or disclaim its mystical and

\ religious source. Although current advanced philosophers claim to be (yotariesfrf science they still argue for a “mind” in addition to a “body” and Jo r a “will” whether free or determined.

An acquaintance with the conventional History of Philosophy convinces that the abiding essence of traditional philosophy is supernatural and transcendental. The entire philosophical scene since the Greco-Roman period is haunted by ghosts of various shapes and sizes. In the days of the Church Fathers and the Scholastics of the Middle Ages, philosophy was frankly centered in the dom ain of theology and consisted of arguments concerning a grand creator and his angel ministers as explanations of everything known or thought of. In those days, thinkers invented a world

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md that of confrontable things and events which shone forth as mate Reality beyond Appearances, as Subsistent rather than Existent, le Perfect and Stable Reality beyond merely contingent events. In sum, osophers verbally created a new environment over and above the ome and wretched ambience of their actual lives. ven in the days of Intellectual Enlightenment the primary concerns of osophers were still God, Freedom, and Immortality. Although there a slight inkling of the superfluity o f cosmic mysteries and of the just ns of natural events, philosophy still remained suffused with age-old itism. Things and events were persistently regarded as creations and ections of spirit named Reason. Self, and ConsciousnessTV^itere ran beings were specifically'under considerationrthey-were-invested 1 spiritistic substances and powers o f mind, self, intelligence, sensations, s, and so on. In consequence thgre arose such insubstantial problems as .hophysical parallelism, interactionism, and identism. From the d point of actual things and events, all this is specious and reducible to ting more than institutional verbiage. r -v -v wlow powerful the spiritistic principle has been since its invention may be ged by the fact that it is not only professional philosophers who ntain this transcendental way of thinking but eminent scientists also, laureate physicist Compton who was himself an excellent example of a

ntist with a penchant for religion has drawn up a list o f great scientists, >ng them Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Kant, and Laplace, who nted_themselves as theists. While he surely could greatly have thened this list and indeed added recent eminent scientists like lington, Schrodinger, Heisenberg, Planck, and Sherrington, to name r a few, he makes the point that while there is some modification of view veen thinkers of different generations they all recognize the importance deas,” “ideals,” and “purpose” in understanding the “meaning” of what pens, and most of the late scientists even introduce the construct of God their world picture.1

SPIRITISTIC VARIANTS IN CONVENTIONAL PHILOSOPHY

tudents of conventional philosophy may ponder the perennial question io w spiritistic ways of thinking persist throughout all the myriads of nges in human experience. An attractive answer is ready to hand. It is the concept and the term “spirit" is polysemous in the extreme. It not

* 1 ] ivLU t A VJ, '*lohiuton, M., The Cosmos o f Arthur Holly Compton. New York,'Knopf, 1967, p. 112.

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only refers to supreme beings but to chemical compounds also, and provides many semantic problems in the literature of philosophy.

The concepts and the terms “meaning” and the “ideal” have become effective tools by means of which thinkers of many persuasions have helped to conserve spiritistic institutions. They have used these tools to pry into many mysteries which they have themselves created. Not realizing that they are simply reifying words, they ask for thejneaninE of “existence”: they ask “who am I?” and “what am I?” and as certain scientists make plain, they believe that the mystery of self is the most pressing of all scientific pursuits.2 Are these authentic questions or mythological answers? The egregious error here is to be dominated by historical spiritism so that things and events are not invariably the starting points for all valid speculation but only surface appearances of a “Reality” that underlies them and gives them their significance. One is tempted to ask whether such scientists have no faith in the world of anatomists, biochemists, geologists, physiologists, or anthropologists. O f course, it is true that many scientists of the types just mentioned also perform sacrifices at the altar of spiritism.

r— Similarly, the translation of the term “spirit” into the “ideal” has served to elevate the nonexistent and the most objectionable things and practices to the ultimate good. Bits of spirit have become ideal building blocks out of which grand systems have been erected, prominent examples from different ages are Schopenhauer’s The World as Will and Idea, and Carnap’s Logical Structure o f the World}

What is_of the greatest .importance here is the wav spiritistic philosophy^ has always influenced scientists to transform things and events into what they are not and could not be.4 Striking examples are the transformation by neurologists of the brain into a nest of “functions” and a storehouse of

, “ideas” and “ijiemories!Land-the rubbing out by physicists from the world 7 of alkcolors, tastes, odors, and soundsT^Scientists, too, join laymen in

transforming all values and v irtuesin to transcendental, that is, verbal abstractions. The ultimately baleful effect of inventing spiritism culminates in creationism. This kind of intellectual behavior amounts to a retreat from things and events actually encountered and results in the loss of

2 Schrodinger, E., Nature and the Greeks, Cambridge, Cambridge Unix’. Press. 1954, and Schrodinger, E„ Science and Humanism, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951.

Schopenhauer, A., Die Welt als Wide unci vorstcllung, 2 vols. Halle, O. Hendel, 1819; and Carnap, R., The Logical Structure o f the World; pseudoproblems in Philosophy (R. A. George, trs.), Berkeley, Univ. of California Press, 1967.

4 Kanlor, J. R., "Scientific Psychology and Specious Philosophy,” Psychological Record. 1969, 19, 15-27.

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I A L P R O B L E M S O F P H I L O S O P H Y

reciation of man’s nature and his relation to those things and events, is in no sense difficult then to account for the origin and perseverance

anscendental ways of thinking..At the bottom of the process lies man’s tcity for manipulating language.' Persons embody in language their ude toward w haf tfiey"dislike, fear, or favor and thus provide jctures” or intellectual institutions. Such institutions achieve their life vigor by virtue of other persons performing similar reactions to the inal stimulating objects and conditions. And as is easily seen, such tutions potentially exert good or evil consequences depending upon icular circumstances. How different all this is from authentic osophy.

PHILOSOPHIES OF SCIENCE: VALID AND INVALID

i recent decades the scientific domains have been rather amply supplied i philosophical analyses and interpretations. Thus have grown up a inct specialization of study called philosophy of science. (What we uld expect of such a discipline is the a nalysis a nd criticism of scientific k and its results by way of comparing and coordinating the interest and ievement of individuals and groups who investigate the confrontable Id of things and events, including the domain of the stars and planets, . varieties of vegetations and animals and their actions, as well as the al and political events of human societvj)But what we find instead is the osition of conventional spiritistic philosophy upon scientists and nee. Thus we may differentiate between a valid and an invalid osophy of science. The former is an aid to both philosophy and science je the latter misrepresents and mystifies scientific works.* W hether a ntist’s philosophical assumptions are valid or invalid depends upon the gruity or incongruity of postulates, hypotheses, protocols, and laws,1 original data: In the following paragraphs we display some examples >uch congruities and incongruities from various sources, including ventional philosophy itself.. Mathematics. The assumption that geometry is a closed and absolute em became established and endured for several thousands of years :>re it was discovered that the Euclidean premises were only one of a ying series and that other geometrical systems were possible and ducible on the basis of very different premises.. Physics. Einstein’s notion that a mysterious capacity of a :hematician enables him to formulate an equational system which later liscovered to fit data is a good example of invalid premises. He

8

developed this notion on the basis that “nature is the realization of the simplest conceivable mathematical ideas” and that “the creative principle resides in mathematics.” 5_It was based on the disregard of the many details involved in the process of choosing the parameters of equations. Einstein

z overlooked the fact that only the mathematician experienced with the data < in question and the expertise to see the relations between constructions and ^ events can succeed in such enterprises. Einstein was unjustified in accepting

vj- the Kantian dictum that philosophers give laws to nature.c. Ethics. The impropriety of assuming fixed and absolute premises is

well illustrated in the domain of morals. Students of ethics adopt either the assumption that there are absolute laws, guides, or descriptions of the good and proper life or they assume a vacuous relativism. In both cases they perform a great leap away from the actual situations of moral behaviorand

^ resort to verbal abstractions, thus failing to present adequate descriptions of proper conduct, justiceTand injustice which initiate their system building in the first place.

d. Education. Because the domain of conventional formal education is so intertwined with social, economic, and political circumstances, it affords a large number of invalid assumptions. These center about the questions of

vocational, cheaply or expensively, and for what purpose. Many of them are theoretical or practical. Striking errors are rooted in the assumptions about the mental capacities of developing persons and affect the learning events and the means of carrying out the learning process in schools. Here, too, we meet with the problems of inequality of races and the specification of social and environing influences.

e. Conventional Philosophy. The reading of historical and current philosophical formulations forces upon us the ineptitude of this intellectual domain. One cannot but be revolted by the aridity and the incongruities between the systems of thinking and the things, events, and conditions with which one is interacting. The ancient beliefs about the supernal and its contrast with the earthy has influenced wrong ideas about man and his nature and indeed about the plenum inevitably surrounding the philosophers.

-M An outstanding symptom of the dichotomizing of the actual universe is the reduction of psychology to the study of words rather than the critical"" description of confrontable things and events. By challenging statements

r

5 Einstein. A., Essays ini Science. New York, Covici-Friede. 1934. pp. 17, 18.

P E R E N N I A L P R O B L E M S O F P H I L O S O P H Y

1 analyzing them it is believed thinkers can be freed from universalism, olutism, and other malefic traits of orthodox philosophy. Linguistic losophv is an improvement but in the final analysis it is negativistic. It" rks a small shift away from transcendental thinking, but it does not aid forward advancement of Philosophy.

1NTERBEHAVIORAL PHILOSO PH Y IDENTIFIED

Barnes aside, since names are only imposed attributes of things, our nmary of the descriptions of an authentic or valid philosophy marks it from all historical and transcendental speculations. There is no place in ;rbehavioral philosophy for ultimate reality, absolutes, eternal truths. versality, totalism, or infinities of any description whatever, erbehavioral philosophy remains forever within the bounds of Fractions of persons with the things and events with which they comeT 3 contact. O nly inferences derived from such contacts have any place in losophical systems.Scientific or valid philosophy is sufficiently identified as a type of human ction to the things and events confronted in their observable form. The il of such behavior is to arrive at the nature of things and events as free as ;sible from the verbal patination laid upon them by generations of nkers from all sorts of periods and places. Philosophical reactions as ihisticated approaches to things and events become increasingly expert h experience, that is the multiplication of critical interactions. Descriptions of confrontations with things and events as well as of the rigs confronted are obviously constructs, but instead of being media for aosing qualities on inorganic objects, biological organisms and their tavior, and psychological and social events, they are records of ;ervations and experiments performed upon the things studied. jreover, there is strict limitation placed on the extrapolation from the dies. Otherwise the evaluations and speculations tend toward vacuous 1 misty verbiage. What no observation or experiment reveals is purely Istic.While constructions are very different from the things observed, >erimented upon, or speculated about, they must in the final analysis be ived from those things. There is a continuity in the behavior of losophers from bare contact with things to the construction of the most ;tract hypotheses and axioms. Notions of hidden qualities, mysterious itions. and theologically based arcana are delusory inventions.

10


Expertness in philosophical matters consists to a considerable extent of being able to distinguish between authentic existence and the autistic constructions presumed to be descriptive and explanatory of such existence. It is in this sense that interbehavioral philosophy is basic to the analysis of intellectual processes and products.

11

SECTION

IPhilosophical Systems

in Succession

C H A P T E R 2

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS

INFORM AL A N D UNSYSTEM ATIZED INTERVAL

Although it is an appealing guess that speculation and reflection are inherent potentialities of human experience, it is daring speculation to attempt to set an interval when humans began to construct philosophical attitudes. The origin of philosophy even of the most primitive sort is lost in the haze of preliterate time. Certainly it must have been eons ago when mankind became somewhat integrated with his surroundings and found the leisure and occasions to construct attitudes about himself, comparisons with others, the cycles of birth and death, and the environment in general.

When one considers the great skill and refinement of taste of the cave hunters and painters we may well assume that the birth of philosophy took place at least as far back as the Neolithic period of human evolution. Of one thing we may be reasonably certain and that is that the ideas the primitives had were simple and perhaps poetic. But no warrant is available to assume that supematurals had already been invented, though of course thinkers may have abstracted and extrapolated farfrom thedimensions of visible objects and relations. All this is not to say that the primitive philosopher is bereft of the process of myth-making. No. As performers of language behavior, primitives could idealize their existences, deplore their

t losses and calamities, and construct fables to ease their grief or assuage their other affections.

Considerable evidence of the capabilities of current primitives for philosophical thinking is available in such works as Radin’s Primitive Man as Philosopher.1 Despite the great differences in time and circumstance between the cave men and the modern primitives there is still good ground to believe that something like the attitudes of modern primitives was cultivated in the early stages of human evolution.

Like all things human, philosophyzing displays numerous changes some of which must be regarded as progressive. Thus, the reflective behavior of particular persons, though they are linked in a chain beginning

' Radin, P., Primitive Stan as Philosopher, New York. Appleton, 1927.i

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P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N

in the most humble and insignificant manner, starts at an elevated point of achievement and value.

The historical development of philosophy must be described and evaluated in terms of the productivity of specialized individuals who have developed competency in observation and delineation of what they observe. In the beginning of philosophyzing such individuals may be singular and unusual members of whatever communities they belong to. What they achieve, however, may be accumulated to form systems and institutional fashions in their societies.

But here we face an im portant problem of specification. It is an established view that the specialized process of philosophyzing is always contaminated with metaphors and mythology. An interesting example is the work of Dodds2 who in his objection to the idea of the utter rationality of the Greeks goes to great lengths to demonstrate that they were, in their religious aspects, highly irrational. Moreover, he carries his notion so far as to discover irrational elements in Greek philosophy even to put in the work of Plato and Aristotle.

His views and that of his cohorts are subject to several objections. In the first place, they assume a universalistic attitude, they ascribe to all Greeks even to philosophers the supematuralism of the herd and the classical poets. Again they reveal an unwitting sympathy with what they call the irrational stance of the general populace. Furthermore, they do not distinguish between supernatural beliefs and psychic powers and processes, and mythical analogies and other inventions.

Probably the most applicable corrective for the study of classical religion and philosophy is the consideration that classicists are unfamiliar with scientific psychology and of recent discoveries. They discuss problems oT~ soul, spirit, and mind as objective entities instead of misused words. They have no compunction to carrying back mind-body doctrine into the past as though it articulated with fact and existence. In general they do not differentiate metaphors, story telling from descriptions of beliefs concerning confrontable things and events. For them literature is no different from philosophy while in general there is absent in their writings any adequate appreciation of the interactions of persons with their ambience, including their own behaviors. Terms like “religion” cover a multitude of activities. Greeks are presumed to wallow in the morass of

: Dodds, E. R., The Greeks and the Irrational, Boston. Beacon Press. 1957.

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S E R I E S O F P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S

spirit though classicists well know the great emphasis Greek philosophers put upon the four exclusive elements of nature — fire, water, air, and earth.

There is a continuity in human affairs, social systems, politics, economics, and all other forms of organization and behavior constitute a unity of many variations. This is true of philosophy. Many specific items have become integrated into abiding institutions of current times. It is the task of current philosophers to analyze the thinking of the times and to differentiate between what has been thought under specific conditions and what can be thought now that events and their stimulations have evolved a new competence. We turn now to a purview of the formal philosophical systems.

FORMAL AND SYSTEMATIC INTERVAL

An important first step in the study of formal and systematic philosophy of the Western European tradition is to observe the involved selectivity. Only some influences of the philosophical systems of the Far East, for example, are taken account of. To illustrate, only the system erected by Schopenhauer is usually included in the philosophy of the occidental tradition, even though Schopenhauer indicates some Eastern sources of his thinking.

Our enumeration of the thinking of Western philosophers begins then with the Greek philosophers since they furnish us for the first time with texts that we can scrutinize, and by the time we reach the fourth century of the pre-Christian era we have the elaborate works of Plato and Aristotle. Now the most fundamental thing about the philosophical attitudes of the Greeks is a strict naturalism. It is traditional to think of Plato as the classical dualist, but actually his dualism is not the culpable dualism of matter and spirit. W hat he was differentiating was construction mainly in the form of mathematical formulae from the objects that were being described or discussed. When we reach Aristotle, who is conventionally regarded as a pupil of Plato, we find that unlike Plato, who was mathematically inclined in his thinking, Aristotle was primarily a biologist and a very competent one, so much so, in fact, as to call out great praise from Darwin.3 In studying Aristotle as a philosopher we find that he is greatly influenced, as is only natural when specialism had not yet developed, by scientific discpvery and observation. He drew his

’“Linnaeus and Cuvier have been my two gods; but they were mere schoolboys compared to old Aristotle.” Letter to W. Ogle in Darwin. F., The Life and Letters o f Charles Darrin, New York, Basic Books. 1959. p. 427.

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inclusions from the observations he made and did not create autistic instructions on the basis of language which is so fertile a potentiality for nythology and superstition.

It is quite remarkable that such an eminent scientist as Schrodinger* ooks down upon the Greeks because they resorted to what he calls Sense Data and did not make great use of the kind of speculation and magi nation which results in all sorts of spiritistic thought and the division sf the world into inner and outer or spirit and matter.

For convenience of exposition the succession of periods or intervals may De divided into six distinct groups as follows:

The Confrontational Interval.The Transcendental Interval.Science Intrudes upon Faith.The Materialistic Interval.The Positivistic Interval.The Interval of Linguistic Analysis.

Each is discussed in the above order.

•Schrodinger, E., Nature and the Creeks. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press. 1954.

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C H A P T E R 3

THE C O NFRO NTATIO NAL INTERVAL

PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS: THE CLASSICAL AGE

We categorize the Greco-Roman objective and naturalistic period as a confrontational age, because the great emphasis of its thinkers was on the description or explanation of observable things, starting with terrestial objects and events, and ascending to the sublimities of the astronomical

__ world.The philosophy of the Greeks and Romans with its culmination in

Aristotle and Lucretius developed through a long series of attitudes pro- ,r- jected against their generating human conditions.(When philosophy first

began, its votaries sought to make an ultimate evaluation of nature exclusively in perceptual and even ethical terms?)This enterprise marked a sharp advance over previous mythological explanation; for the categorization of nature in terms of visible concrete things involved a more sophisticated attitude toward objects and events than had previously been the case. „ With the transition from the early cosmologists to the pre-Sophistics we find a gradual awareness of the evaluation function. This function was sharply focused by Socrates in his attempt to establish standards of ethical conduct, when the Sophists raised the problem of knowledge in the field of practical pursuits. In establishing norms of conduct, Socrates introduced Pythagorean notions, converted into abstract forms which could be utilized in judgments. With Plato these forms became categories, but since he developed only a few, it remained for Aristotle to enlarge the whole categorization field. Prominent throughout this entire development was an attitude of naive objectivity which was the fundamental characteristic of Greek philosophy. This chapter aims to trace out the gradual development of the evaluation process in this objective milieu, and the significance of categorization doctrine.

/The Naively Objective Postulations o f the Early Greek Philosophers

When philosophical attitudes were first recorded, the search for reality carried thinkers to a simple cause for the various objects in the world. It

19


was supposed that an explanation of all the facts of nature could be uimmed up in a simple category which would be at the same time the ,nner essence and the cause of objects. We may well consider this a very naive attitude toward the world of things, but one, however, which resulted directly from the social and intellectual conditions of the time. Although the early Greek philosophers attained a simple, natural science viewpoint and attempted to give a rational explanation of their cont acts with things, they did not understand a nything about the character of the process bv which the nature o^ things was determined.

The pre-Soj)histic philosophers represent merely a transition stage between thtMTiythologists and the more reflective thinkers, since tfieir determination of the world was an immediate expression of uncritical thought. The progress of these thinkers over the previous mythologists lay in a slight inclination toward a more critical attitude toward the objects about them. They gave up telling tales, as Burnet puts it. This is a significant advance, in spite of the fact that the new attitude was not ■deliberately adopted, but was dictated by changes in the immediate social conditions—- --------------------------------------------------------------

The fact that Physis1 was the most fundamental category throughout the entire Milesian period indicates both the changes of that period from the previous cultural age and also its continuity with that age. Thus we can s readily surmise the connection between the water that Thales suggested as the real and the Oceanus and Uranus which the Homeric and Hesiodic poems mention.21J h c lack of a thoroughgoing differentiation between the philosophic and the mythological periods is also indicated by the relation between the Anaximandrialn boundless ancTtfie Hesiodic chaos._ It is characteristic of a mythological era to consider Nature in general to be reality, but the Milesians undertook to give a naturalistic description of its essence. In all the Milesian doctrines some substance which could be observed through direct perceptual means was regarded as the substance of the real.

Instructive evidence of the beginnings of an interest in the process of evaluation is the argument of Anaximenes that the boundless which Anaximander assumed to be reality required more specific determination. To call the essence of nature the boundless seemed to Anaximenes a lapse to the position of the earlier mythologists. He asserted therefore, that the boundless was air, and thus he brought it into closer contact with directly

1 Burnet. J„ Greek Philosophy, London. Macmillan, 1914, p. 27.3 Von Hartmann. E., Geschichie eler Metaphvsik, Ausgewahite Werke, voL II, Leipzig, Haacke,

1899. p. 2.

20

T H E C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I N T E R V A L

perceived objects. He did not find it necessary to think of the infinite as being different from the material which was separated out of it, since diversities were accounted for by a greater or lesser quantity of the substance in a given locus. Anaximenes drew an analogy between the human and the cosmic process. “As our soul is air and we are thereby held 7 together; so the entire world order is encompassed by breath and air."3

That the early Greeks had reached only a beginning toward the realization of the evaluating process is indicated by the fact that they asked no pointed questions as to the nature of scientific description and its relation ^ to actual things, as critical philosophers must do. The categorization of the ' whole of nature in terms of some directly perceived part of it indicates the immaturity o f Ionian philosophy. A more mature conception in which the process of evaluation is a prominent feature would hardly define reality in any but rational terms.

The development of new social conditions with a corresponding modification of orientation in the world of things, brings about new attitudes which reflect the new happenings.JThus the Pythagorean tradition introduces new motives in philosophical thought and leads to the evaluation of nature in terms that are not entirely perceptuaDThc attitude of Pythagoras takes on a mathematical trend, and the Pythagoreans find the reality of things in number. Such a viewpoint represents, however, only a very gradual diversion from the earlier traditions, for in the first place, as Aristotle points out, the numbers of the Pythagoreanscqnstitute the actual content of ordinaryjobjects4 and are not at all what they signify to a modem m athematician. And in the second place the Pythagorean doctrine is clearly very closely related to a religious mysticism. In adopting numbers as the essence of reality, however, more prominence is given to the act of evaluating experience, and incidentally the way is cleared for the problem of thet)n e and the M any.'The Pythagorean tradition, although it is not a substantial rationalistic attitude ,3 stands for philosophical progress above all, in that its fundamental determinations of reality become somewhat more independent of the unreflective categories of religion and mythology. This is true in spite of the fact that the “Physis” of the early Greek philosophers is not actual nature, but is endowed with supernatural qualities.6

3Diels, H., Fragment? der Vorsokratiker, vol. 1, Berlin, Weidmann, 1951, p. 95.‘ Aristotle, Metaphysica, 986a.5 Cf. Herbertz, R. Das Wahrheitsproblem in dgr Griechischen Phitosophie. Berlin, Reimer, 1913. p.

124. ' \ t o f e f e w J /‘■Comford, F. M., From Religion to Philosophy, New York. Harper, 1957, p. 123 ff. 1 V •

.. .,V ' 21) . i.fy t A


The Pythagorean tradition is im portant in that the categories which this chool develops are less directly connected with perceived things and thus illow for a more adequate determination of objects. The concept of the )articipation of things in the forms which described them and the evalua- ion of nature in terms of laws rather than of substances or changes in ;ubstance, initiated a period of emphasis of the categorization function. Phis variation in philosophical attitude culminates in the knowledge doc- rines of Plato and Aristotle, and makes of the Pythagorean movement a ransition between the Ionian and Athenian viewpoints.

In the conflict of the Heracleitan and Parmemdean viewpoints, Greek :hought advances to the stage in which the work of the thinker plays an ncreasingly important role. Both Heracleitus and Parmenides place reliance in reason as a means for the discovery of reality, although in neither can we find a total departure from the naively objective attitude of the Milesians. Parmenides begins a tradition which places distinct emphasis upon the creative aspect of the philosophical attitude. Evaluation as products of reason stands out more prominently than has hitherto been the case; that is, Parmenides stresses the idea that reality is only to be known through reason. By originating the category of Being, he goes farther than any of his predecessors in formulating a non-perceptual evaluation of nature, and at the same time makes philosophy more self-conscious. Based on this viewpoint is the suggestion that Parmenides is the first scientific philosopher,7 who first makes possible the discovery of Being on the basis of definite principles.*

The superiority of the Parmenidean philosophy, however, extends only to the matter of method and not to the actual determination of objects. While Parmenides seeks in a more definite and determined way to understand the significance of interpreting the world, he is not able to formulate a very satisfactory description of the latter. This incapacity is demonstrated in his incUnatiorUQ.denv t he reality of perceptual things which appear to him as delusions.1' As yet Greek thinkers had not attained the personal in- dependeneg which is essential for a constructive attitude toward the world of actjaal_Qbjects. Consequently, they are unable to categorize reaiity in actual knowledge terms. -

’Cohen. H., Logik tier reinen Erkenmniss, Berlin, Cassirer, 1902, p. 27.* Hartmann, E.. Platos Ixjgik des Seins, in H. Cohen and P. Natorp’s Philosophische Arbeiten, vol.

3. Giessen. Topetmann, 1909, p. 44.vWindclhand, W.. History o f Ancient Philosophy (H. E. Cushman, trs.), New York, Scribner’s,

1899. p. 62.

22


A significant m odification in the a ttitu d es o f the ph ilo sophers o f th is period is beg inning to be m anifested in th e lessened en ergy given to the ca tegoriza tio n o f th e u k im a te su b stances o f reality, and in the g reater effort d irec ted tow ard an ex p lan a tio n o f how they o perate, t h e categories describing the w orld begin to include the con tro lling forces o f the changes o f n a tu re ,10 am o n g w hich a re the Love an d S trife o f E m pedocles an d the Nous o f A n ax ag o ras . T h e d e te rm in a tion o f Nous as a fu n d am en ta l cate- g o rv m a rk s a tu rn ing po in t in th e developm ent o,f ph ilosophy. T h e specification o f reason as a force in n a tu re m arks a m ore reflective stage o f philosophical developm ent, since the fo rm ulations o f a ttitudes becom e prob lem s in them selves. T he g radual transition tha t is tak ing p lace in G reek though t at this period is indicated by the fact th a t A naxagoras a ttribu tes to his Nous the pow ers o f setting things in order, d iscrim inating and separa tin g them , and is consequen tly striv ing fo r a m ore scientific view point than his predecessors had a tta in e d ." T h a t the transition is very g rad u a l is indicated by the fact th a t Nous fo r A n ax ag o ras is still h o m o geneous w ith the objective s tu ff o f th e w o r ld .»

T he advance in in tellectual developm ent w hich A n axagoras represen ts parallels a grow ing interest in m an’s circum stances and conditions. T he G reeks o f this g enera tion , ow ing to the ir con tac t w ith th e P ersjans, a re led to find an ab so rb in g in te rest in their o w n personalities. It is in this period th a t A eschylus speaks o f th e G reeks as m en w ho have “never been called th e subjects o r slaves o f anyone ." T his is th e age w hen individualism begins to be the keynote o f G reek civilization, and the advent o f the period w hen A thens assum es the leadersh ip o f the G reeks. T he struggle o f A thens with S p a rta fo r this leadership typ ifies^ the grow th o f individualism and the su p rem acy o f the in te llect, a co n d itio n w hich brings to a focus the problem o f know ledge. F rom this tim e on . Nous becom es a fundam ental ca tegory o f G reek philosophy, fo r A n ax ag o ras is th e first ph ilosopher o f A thens. II

IIThe Development o f Definite Postulates in the Platonic Doctrine o f Knowledge

Practically from the beginning o f th e A then ian period th e o rien ta tio n in the w orld o f things is m ade w ith a fairly critical view to the validity o f the categories function ing in this o rien ta tio n . A fter passing th ro u g h the stages

10 In contrast with the Ionian philosophers who merely quote the changes to support their doctrines of fundamental substance. Cf. in this connection Woodbridge, F. J. E.. Philosophical Review. 10, 359-374.

11 Comford, F. M.. Op. cil. p. 154.

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f inqu iry as to the natu re o f know ledge, th e a tte m p t is m ade by th inkers to eterm ine a list o f logical ca tegories, w hich a re p resum ed to be rep resen ta- ves o f re a lity /F ro m S ocra tes o n m ay be traced a series o f such d eterm ina- ons, resu lting in the A risto telian tab le o f categories, w hich sym bolizes the u lm ination o f the G reek concep tion o f reality^ T h e experience o f the ireeks o f the fo u rth cen tu ry b rin gs out a decidedly different a ttitude from taT o f p revious periods. T he in terests o f th e th in k ers becom e centered lo re in in tim ate h u m an happen ings, a n d th e prob lem s o f h u m an ac tion ver aga inst the b e h a v io ro f cosm ic affairs tak e b h ’g re a te f im p o rtan ce .12 'hus th e A then ian period advances no t on ly the p ro b lem o f know ledge as basis fo r the specula tions concern in g th e reality o f th e w orld , b u t a lso a

,ew series o f evaluations o f life. T hese new descrip tions are form ulated in a tegories o f an ethical so rt, and th e “g o o d " th u s becom es a n expression o f om e fu n d am en ta l changes in p h ilo so p h ic a ttitu d e s . S om e of these hanges are represented by the.S oph ists, w ho tu rn from the considera tion >f n a tu re to an exclusive study o f principles o f co n d u c t.[N a tu ra lly the ih ilosophical fo rm u la tio n s begin to include eth ical an d political p roblem s, ind consequen tly ph ilosophy realizes to a g rea te r ex ten t th a n ever before ha t its function is to in terp re t h u m an cond itions and events.]

T h e a rb itra ry view points w hich th e types o f ph ilo soph ic th o u g h t occasion are successfully d isposed o f by th e g rea t ach ievem ent o f S ocra tes, which consists o f estab lish ing a firm basis as a crite rion fo r m oral co nduc t. fh e p recise result reached by S ocra tes in th is m a tte r is th a t v irtue based o n know ledge is adequately fo u n d ed. H e argues th a t there is a definite m ean- ng o f v irtue w hich can be d iscovered by a n intense search fo r its exact natu re .13 T o ta k e a n exam ple: if we w an t to k now w hat courage is, we m ust seek fo r the essential fac to r o f co u rageous conduct. In the sam e way this establishm ent o f know ledge in th e w orld o f n a tu re involves th e discovery of th e essence o f th ings.U n b o th cases th e result is th e d iscovery o f the form o r un iversa l.14 T h e difficulty in iso la ting these form s in the rea lm o f existence leads S ocrates to the accep tance o f th e m ethod o f overt ju d g m en t o r evaluation . H e states th a t since he has failed in the co n tem pla tion o f tru e existence, he m ust assum e a p rincip le, a descrip tio n w hich is la ter to be tested .15

IJCf. Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 642a, 25.11 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, xiii, 4.14 This was of course an extension of the work of the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, xiii, 4.15 Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 100 ff.; this is the beginning of the doctrine elaborated by Plato. Cf. Adam, J„

The Religious Teachers o f Greece, Edinburgh, Clark, 1908, p. 456.

24


A significant m o dification in the a ttitu d es o f the ph ilosophers o f th is * period is beginning to be m anifested in the lessened .energy g iven to the / ca tegoriza tion o f th e u ltim ate su b stances o f reality, and in the g rem ereffo rt ' d irected tow ard a n e x p la n a tio n o f how they o nerate. T he categories describ ing the w orld begin to include the contro lling forces o f the changes o f n a tu re ,10 am o n g w hich a re th e Love an d S trife o f E m pedocles a n d the Nous o f A nax ag o ras . T h e d e te rm jn a ti onofNoits as a fun d am en ta l category m arks a tu rn ing poin t in th e developm ent o f philosophy. T he specification o f reason as a force in n a tu re m arks a m ore reflective stage o f ph ilosophical developm ent, since the fo rm ulations o f a ttitu d es becom e p roblem s in them selves. T he g rad u al transition tha t is tak ing place in G reek th o u g h t at this period is indicated by the fact th a t A n axagoras a ttrib u tes to his Nous the pow ers o f setting things in order, d iscrim inating an d sep ara tin g them , an d is consequen tly striv ing for a m ore scientific v iew point than his predecessors had a tta in e d .11 T h a t the tran sitio n is very g rad u a l is indicated by the fact th a t Nous fo r A nax ag o ras is still h o m o geneous w ith the objective s tu ff o f th e w o r ld .»

T h e advance in intellectual developm ent which A naxagoras represents parallels a grow ing interest in m an’s circum stances and conditions. T he G re eks o f this g en era tio n , ow ing to the ir con tac t wit h th e Persjans, a re led to find an ab so rb in g in terest in the ir o w n personalities. It is in this period th a t A eschylus speaks o f th e G reeks as m en w ho have "never been called , the subjects o r slaves o f an y o n e .” This is the age w hen individualism begins A-. to be the keynote o f G reek civilization, and the advent o f the period w hen A thens assum es the leadersh ip o f the G reeks. T he struggle o f A thens w ith / S p a rta for this leadership typjfies the g row th o f individualism and the s u p rem acy o f the in tellect, a co n d itio n w hich brings to a focus the problem o f know ledge. F rom this tim e on . Nous becom es a fundam ental ca tegory „ o f G reek philosophy, fo r A n ax ag o ras is th e first ph ilosopher o f A thens.

/ /The Development o f Definite Postulates in the Platonic Doctrine o f Knowledge

Practically from th e beginning o f th e A then ian period th e o rien ta tion in the w orld o f things is m ade w ith a fairly critical view to the validity o f the categories function ing in this o rien ta tion . A fter passing th ro u g h the stages

10 In contrast with the Ionian philosophers who merely quote the changes to support their doctrines of fundamental substance. Cf. in this connection Woodbridge. F. J. E.. Philosophical Review, 10. 359-374.

"Comford, F. M.. Op. cil. p. 154.

23


f inqu iry as to the natu re o f know ledge, th e a ttem p t is m ade by th inkers to eterm ine a list o f logical categories, w hich a re p resum ed to be rep resen ta- ves o f reality^F rom S ocra tes o n m ay be traced a series o f such d eterm ina- ons, resulting in the A risto telian tab le o f categories, w hich sym bolizes the u lm ination o f the G reek concep tion o f rea lity ) T h e experience o f the ireeks o f the fo u rth cen tury b rings o u t a decidedly different a ttitude from la t o f p revious periods. T he in terests o f th e th in k ers becom e centered to re in in tim ate h u m an h ap p en in gs, an d th e problem s"of H um an ac tio n ver against the behav io r o f cosm ic affairs tak ecu T g rea te r im p o rtan ce .11 12 'h u s th e A th en ian period advances n o t on ly th e p ro b lem o f know ledge as basis fo r the speculations co ncern ing th e reality o f th e w orld , b u t also a

,ew series of evaluations o f life. T hese new descrip tions are fo rm ulated in a tegories o f an eth ical so rt, and th e “g o o d ” th u s becom es an expression o f om e fu n d a m e n ta l changes in p h ilo so p h ic a ttitu d es . S o m e of these hanges are represented by the,S oph ists , w ho tu rn fro m the consideration >f na tu re to a n exclusive study o f principles o f co n d u c t.[N a tu ra lly the / . . ih ilosophical fo rm u la tio n s begin to include eth ical an d political p roblem s, / v ind consequen tly ph ilosophy realizes to a g rea te r ex ten t th a n ever b e f o re 'V f ha t its function is to in terp re t h u m an cond itions an d events.]

T h e a rb itra ry v iew points w hich th e types o f ph ilosoph ic th o u g h t occa- iion are successfully d isposed o f by th e g rea t ach ievem ent o f S ocra tes, vh ich consists o f estab lish ing a firm basis as a crite rion fo r m o ra l conduc t. fh e p recise resu lt reached by S ocra tes in th is m a tte r is tha t v irtue based on know ledge is adequately fo u n ded . H e argues th a t there is a definite m ean- ng o f v irtue w hich can be discovered by a n intense search fo r its exact na tu re .13 T o tak e an exam ple: if we w an t to know w ha t courage is, we m ust seek fo r the essential fac to r o f cou rag eo u s conduct. In the sam e w ay this establishm ent o f know ledge in th e w orld o f n a tu re involves th e d iscovery a f th e essence o f th ings.U n b o th cases th e result is th e d iscovery o f the form o r un iversa l.14 T he difficulty in iso la ting these fo rm s in th e rea lm o f existence leads S ocrates to the accep tance o f th e m eth o d o f overt ju d g m en t o r evaluation . H e states th a t since he has failed in the con tem p la tio n o f tru e existence, he m ust assum e a princip le, a d esc rip tio n w hich is la te r to be tested .15

11 Cf. Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 642a, 25.13 Cf. Aristotle, Meiaphvsica, xiii, 4.14 This was of course an extension of the work of the Pythagoreans, cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, xiii, 4.15 Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 100 ft.; this is the beginning of the doctrine elaborated by Plato. Cf. Adam, J„

The Religious Teachers o f Greece, Edinburgh, Clark, 1908. p. 456.

24


T h e discovery o f the universal m arks th e b eg in n in g o f deliberate eva luatio n as a func tion o f k now ledge. F ro m the tim e o f S o cra tes the universal becom es a s tan d a rd an d a crite rio n fo r all de term ina tions o f things.

^K n o w le d g e consists in the iso lation o f th e type o f an object in o rd e r to be certa in o f it, fo r it is assum ed th a t every object has its perfect type. T o insist u p o n iso lating the type o f a th in g m ean s to ap p rec ia te th o ro u g h ly the m ean ing o f th a t th ing , while such a process o f discovering th e precise m eaning o f justice, fo r exam ple , m akes possible fo r the first tim e ac tions w ith a full understand ing o f w hat such ac tions involve.16

A direct developm en t fro m th e S o cra tic theo ry o f universals o r fo rm s is th e P la to n ic d octrine o f ideas. T his d o c trin e in its final results is a fairly com plete so lu tion o f th e p ro b lem co ncern ing the func tion o f ju d g m en ts w ith respect to th e form s. In th e w ork o f Socra tes, and fo r the m ost p a rt in th a t o f P la to , considerable difficulty w as experienced in relating form s with sensible th ings. This difficulty is easily understood w hen we rem em ber that t hglheorv~of p a r tic ip a tio h w as orig inally a P y th ag o rean d o c trin e ,17 w hich S ocra tes ado p ted fo r his p u rposes a n d w hich natu ra lly required m uch m ak ing over.' In the la ter th o u g h t o f P la to the S ocra tic universals tak e on larger and m ore im p o rtan t fu n c tio n s and becom e the co rner-stone o f a com plete logical structure} T h e P la to n ic universals becom e actual catego-ries; th a t is, s tan d ard elem ents o f the p red ica tion o rd e sc rip tio n o f things.

S ince th e S o cra tic d o c tr in e o f fo rm s w as developed on the basis o f a sim ple an d a n a rb itra ry p h ilo sophy o f know ledge, P la to ’s task w as to m ake the universals in to m ore p e rm an en t a n d dependab le know ledge elem ents.' In co n tra s t to the S ocra tic d e te rm in a tio n s w hich arise th ro u g h a process o f exam in ing concrete particu la rs, a jid w hich p erm it va r ia tio n o f op in ion , P la to m eans to establish an assured certa in ty fo r know ledge. This ideal type o f know ledge so clearly sketched in the R ep u b lic indicates th a t the p rob lem o f ideas is definitely epistem ological.CAs a m ethod o f know ledge th e abso lu tely objective ch a rac te r o f th e P la to n ic dialectic is a consequence o f P la to ’s search fo r ce rta in ty , b u t its ob jectiv ity is m ad e possib le by its general func tion and the m ateria l to w hich it is applied.)The fu n c tion o f the dialectic is to b ring o rd e r an d h a rm o n y in to the form s o r pa tterns o f things. T h e significance o f th e en tire P la to n ic dialectic is to bring together anexternal series o f objects w ith a perfectly valid descrip tion o f them.

“ Socrates’ main aim was of course to determine ethical concepts, cf. Windelband, W„ Praludien, Aufsatze und Reden zur Philosophic und ihrer Geschichte, Tubingen, Mohr, 1915, p. 73.

■’Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 987b, 10.“ Plato, Republic, 511.

25


|.-W e m ay distingush several different m otives w hich en ter in to the form u-

u ion o f the d o c trin e o f ideas. P ro m in en t am o n g these are th e m athem ati- al basis o f P la to ’s scientific th in k in g and his in terest in m ediating betw een tie P arm en idean and H eracleitian o p p o sitio n ,19 w ith w hich is connnected he related problem o f the O ne an d the M anjk A no ther im portan t m otive > the a ttem p t to establish the valid ity o f p red ica tio n over against the ceptical con ten tion o f A ntisthenes.20 All these m otives are closely con- lected an d in fo rm us concern ing th e pecu liar developm ent which P la to >oes th ro u g h before he reaches a secure logical position. It is hard ly questionable th a t he is really a ttem p tin g to develop a m ethodology o f (n owledge, bu t he is do ing so u nder the stress o f a m ystical and m etaphysical influence.21 All these different m otives w hich a p p e a r in P la to ’s p h ilo sophical fo rm ulation find their exp lan a tio n in the cu ltu ra l s i tu a tio n o f his period, an d it is only by s tudy ing th e intellectual b ack g ro u n d o f P la to th a t we can get any light as to the apparen tly d irect con trad ic tio n s o f th e doctrine o f ideas.

T h e logical developm ent o f P la to reaches the po in t a t w hich he ex am ines very critically the func tion o f ju d g m en t.22 H e clearly appreciates th e necessity o f rigidly and critically determ ining the natu re o f reality in an effort to orient him self in th e w orld o f things and events. T he critical interest o f his ph ilosophical period em braces the problem o f the validity o f know ledge, fo r th inkers have progressed beyond the naive naturalism o f the Ion ians and are reaching o u t fo r a m ore p ro fo u n d in te rp re ta tio n o f nature.

Because o f th e circum stances u nder w hich P la to ’s though t develops, his w ork does no t result in a m ethod by which the concrete objects o f everyday events are evaluated . Instead , he a r r iv e s ja tth e result th a t th e essence o f things m ust be included in the term s describing them. P la to thus isolates the "com m on” o r general p red icates w hich are logical abstrac tions o f existence.23 His achievem ent lies in carry ing forw ard the w ork o f Socrates w ho m akes the P y thag o rean fo rm s in to descriptive functions. P la to con-

'“'Cf. Aristotle. Metaphvsica. 107Kb. 15.For probable Platonic references to Antisthenes, cf. Natorp, P., Plains Ideenlehre, Leipzig, Durr,

1903, p. 438; Windelband. W,, History o f Ancient Philosophy (H. E. C u s h m a n , trs.). New York, Scribner’s, 1899, p. 142.

Comford. F. M., From Religion to Philosophy, p. 243.11 Cf. Cassirer. E„ Das Frkcnntnissprohlem in der Philosophic und Wissenschaft derneueren Zeit,

vol. I, Berlin, Cassirer. 1906. p. 36.-' These terms are being, nol-bcing. sameness, difference, unity, and others. Cf. Plato, Theaetetus,

185 ff.

)26


. verts th e d escriptive term s w hich he calls th e universals o f all th ings in to predicates o f u ltim ate reality.24

T h e fairly well ro u n d ed o u t m ethodological doctrine o f P la to offers th e tem p ta tio n to read in to his w o rk th e results o f m o d em reflection. T hus, N a to rp an d his fo llow ers in te rp re t th e do c trin e o f ideas as a logical idealism an d consider th a t ob jects fo r P la to consist o f co n stru c tio n s o f th o u g h t.25 N a to rp believes th a t th e P la to n ic th eo ry o f know ledge d em o n stra tes in cu rren t n eo -K an tian fash ion th e genetic developm ent o f objects, th ro u g h th e m ed ium o f ju d g m en ts o r evaluations.26 T h e ideas he considers as p red icates o f scientific ju d g m en ts ,27 an d th e P la to n ic logic as a genuine func tiona l m eth o d fo r th e ev a lu a tio n o f ob jects in all d ep a rtm en ts o f scientific inquiry .28 N a to rp finds the categories enum erated in th e T h ea te - tus, developed in th e P h aed o to fo rm predicates o f fu n d a m e n ta l ju d g m ents.29 T hese fu n d a m e n ta l ju d g m en ts are presum ed to be th e m eans w hereby experience is m ad e possib le . T h e result thus reached indicates to N a to rp th a t we can find as fa r back as P la to th e capacity o f idealism to m ake possible a n em pirical investigation o f scientific law .30

L ittle a rg u m en t is req u ired to estab lish th e fact th a t in P la to ’s do c trin e o f ideas there is a n im p o rta n t m eth o d o lo g ica l aspect, bu t th is does n o t im ply th e conclusion th a t P la to h as developed a m ethod o f scientific investigation in th e m o d ern sen se fA s tu d y o f th e S o p h is t is entirely convincing th a t P la to has reached a very clear u n d ers tan d in g o f th e p rob lem o f p red ication , a lth o u g h th a t p red ica tio n is fo rm al an d inflexible. Ju d g m e n t fo r P la to is a process o f en u m era tio n o f th e a ttribu tes o f th in g sJT h e P la to n ic ju d g m en ts a re n o t ev a lu a tio n s o f o b jec ts in th e sense o f d esc rip tio n s fo r specific purposes, b u t assertions concern ing the im m utab le qualities con- s titu ting a th ing . T his fo llow s fro m th e fu n d a m e n ta la ttk u d e o f P la to , w ho holds th a t all tru e science is tran sc en d en t and deals w ith ob jects w hich lie

^ n t j r e i jn f e y o n d th e ran g e o f a n y possib le experience o f sense. W e find in the en tire ldevelopm ent o f th e P la to n ic th eo ry oflknow ledge the sea rch fo r the essential descrip tive elem ents o f th e type o f a th ing. T his is as well s tated in th e p red ica tion d o c trin e o f the7 S o p h is t o f th e R epublic, as in th e P artic ip a tio n doctrine in th e M en o a n d P haedo .

“ Cf. Plato, Sophist. '“ Natorp, P., Platos Ideenlehre., p. 70 ff., referring to Plato, Phaedrus, 247c. 2bfbid., p. 370.” Ibid., p. 352.Klbid., p. 84 ff., Stewart, J. A., Plato's Doctrine o f Ideas. Oxford, Clarendon, 1909, p. 76. “ Natorp, P., Platos Ideenlehre, p. 111. j

Ibid., pp. 1 2 9 , 1 5 9 . !

L

. s>27

.r*'

A\ P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N

T h e view point tha t P la to is a soph istica ted logician o f th e neo -K an tian ense can be en terta ined only by a n a rb itra ry reconstruction o f his writings, 'his w ould involve tearing P la to ’s th o u g h t com pletely ou t o f its cu ltural o n tex t and trea ting it as an iso lated piece o f in tellectual construc tion . Ja to rp a ttem p ts to do this an d , as a result, he is obliged to assum e in the •resence o f overw helm ing evidence, th a t P la to ’s do c trin e o f ideas is not ntim ately tied up with the theo ry o f the soul o r its im m orta lity .31 P la to as a nan o f science, he believes, cou ld take little in terest in such things. In .no ther instance, in o rd e r to w ork o u t his theo ry , N a to rp is forced to issum e that P la to uses the n o tio n o f p artic ipa tion entirely as a m etaphor.32 \ s a m atte r o f fact, the P la ton ic ph ilosophy, as a p roduc t o f the social :ond itions o f G reece in P la to ’s tim e, is very in tim ate ly related to the /a rio u s religious a ttitudes cu rren t a t th a t period . T h e d ialogues clearly nd icate a philosophical v iew point w hich is g radually developing from an m critical mystical beginning.

P la to succeeds in carry ing o u t the doctrines o f P arm enides and the Pythagoreans until they becom e self-conscious functions tend ing tow ard o rien ta tion in the world o f phenom ena. T he point is reached by P la to in which the problem o f know ledge becom es o f fundam ental im p o rtan ce in form ulating an a ttitude tow ard events. S u ch a hand ling o f the know ledge problem is an explicit recognition o f the necessity fo r a critical exam ina tion o f th e w orld an d its objects, an d fu rth e r im plies th a t a critical m ethod o f determ ining objects o f ph ilosophical in terest has been developed. U ndoub ted ly P la to has reached here th e idea o f the eva lua tion ju d g m en t, b u t in his period , how ever, th e dererm in a tio n d f objects hadliriTved only at iT p re lim in a ry stage in the a ttem p t to find a resem blance betw een an object and the perfect form w hich is th e s ta n d a rd o f reference. As we have already seem this developm ent is peculiarly in term ixed w ith o lder an d m ore m ythical m otives which constitu te th e orig inal m atrix o f P la to n ic though t. It was left to A risto tle to w ork o u t the v iew point to its logical conclusion.

/ / / t y k * 1The Statical Function o f the Aristotelian Categories

T h e consum ation o f the m ethodo log ical achievem ent o f G reek th o u g h t is A risto tle’s logic, w hich is e ssen tia lly ^ process!of su b sum ing a concrete object T inder a perfect form . T his process characterizes th e final developm ent o f Greek science, w hich is a m ethod o f classification an d descrip tion ,

11 N a to r p . P „ Plains Ideenlehre, p p . 12 6 IT.. 144.'■Ibid., p . 2 2 9 .

2 8


h

ra th e r th an a m eans o f ex p erim en ta tio n an d discovery. T h e A risto telian type o f science is designed to d o n o le ss jh an organize the'entire series o f the world ’s objects accord ing to certa in d e finite an d perm anen t principles.T h u s th e A risto telian logic is necessarily deduc tive in natu re , an d represents an infallible rule by w hich to m ak e inflexible judgm ents concern ing things.

Between A risto tle an d P la to no fa r-reach ing difference with respect to fundam en ta l, scientific a ttitu d es exists, yet the fo rm er has developed a ^ tho ro u g h g o in g technique fo r th e hand ling o f objects. As com pared with P la to , A risto tle has a tta ined to a m o re p ro fo u n d app reciation o f th e n a tu re o f scientific m ethod , an d fu rth e rm o re , he in tends to app ly the la tte r to all objects, th e perceptual no t e x c lu d e d .33 A risto te lian science perm eates all the com ers o f nature , as the G reek n a tio n w ith its M acedon ian im petus b ranched o u t over the th ree con tinen ts. ,

A gain , A risto tle’s criticism o f P la to indicates th a t he was a ttem p tin g to ~ \ get c lo ser th an his teacher to ac tu a l experien ta l levels. H is ob jection to the W P la to n ic th eo ry m ay be ta k e n to m ean th a t P la to h ad no ad e q u a te* * Yex p lan a tio n o f ac tual events as they occur. In his M etaphysics34 A risto tle T r asks w hat th e fo rm s co n trib u te to sensible th ings, fo r they neither cause m ovem ent n o r change in things; they d o n o t even aid in the know ledge o f o th e r th ings o r in their being if th e fo rm s a re no t in the individual w hich shares in them . A risto tle en terta in s an ideal o f a closer con tac t with ac tua l th ings, th e p articu la rs, as he calls them , th a n he will adm it P la to h ad . T h a t A risto tle is interested in the s tudy o f th e ac tual, concrete m ateria ls o f . science35 is sufficiently evident from his v arious writings.

T he p hilosophy o f A risto tle m ust be looked u p o n then as a m ethod for the study o f events o f w hatever sort, fo r he considered logic l o b e an o rg a n o n , a n in s tru m en t by w hich the stu d y o f ob jects could go on in the m ost effective way. This m ethod h e very fully w orked out, an d he m ay well be said to h ave developed^*com plete system o f logic,' th a t is, a science o f J * / investigation, cognition , an d p roo f.^JA risto tle’s keen interest in logic as an PV. in strum en t o f investigation influenced him to establish a th o ro u g h g o in g system o f ru les for th e p u rp o se o f d e m o n s tra tio n and p roof. H e also determ ined a series o f categories w hich w ere definitely p resum ed to repre-

33 Cf. Zeller, E„ Aristotle: The Earlier Peripatetics, ‘Philosophy of the Greeks' (B. F. C. Costelloe, and J. H. Muirhead, trs.), vol. I., New York, Longmans, 1897, p. 162 ft.

M Aristotle, Metaphysica, bks. i. xiii, xiv.35 Aristotle, De Partibus Animatium, i, 5.“ Cf. Windetband, W„ History o f Philosophy(i. H. Tufts, trs.). New York. Macmillan. 1910. p. 132.

29


:nt th e en tire ran g e o f ex isting th in g s as revealed in p red ica tio n .37 T hese itegories are n o t arran g ed w ith o u t regard to system as K an t believed,38 ut are definite enum erations o f all th e characteristics o f objects. A ristotle leant to fo rm u la te a series o f all possib le p red icates w hich w ould app ly to .1 possib le th ings, even those th a t have n o ac tu a l existence.39 T h e presence f the te rm “being” m eans th a t th e sta tem en t o f descrip tion is true, while o t-being indicates th a t it is false.40

T he categories o f A ris to tle, h ow ever, a re n o tin .a r ty sense th e c o n d itions >r th e ex istence o f things: they a re ra th e r descrip tions o f th ings as given. u rth e rm o re , they d o n o t refer to an y specific th ings, b u t a re definite types f universals w hich have a v icarious fu n c tio n in general description. It is Dr th is reason th a t substance o r th in g h ead s the list as the m ost universal nd essential elem ent o f determ inations.C T he fact th a t the categories o f tr is to tle are n o t term s o f em pirica l desc rip tion is ind ica ted b y th e exclu- ion fro m th e fo rm u la ted list o f so m e o f th e m ost ch a rac te ris tic an d useful if all th e A risto telian categories. A m ong such p ro m in en t exclusions are lecessity, contingency, pu rpose , end , po ten tia lity , essence, an d develop- nent) These categories, how ever, A risto tle ac tua lly em ployed in scientifically orien ting him self in th e w orld o f things.

A risto tle app aren tly represents tw o types o f though t. O n the o ne h an d , le ap p ears as the m an o f science investigating and in terp re ting th e concrete acts a t his d isposal, p lacing confidence on ly in observ a tio n s a n d theories >ased o n observation .4 O n th e o th e r h an d , he is d isposed to estab lish jerm anen tly th e fun d am en ta l princip les o f the w orld . In the la tte r spirit, \r is to tle stands in the d irect line o f the P la to n ic trad itions: T h is v aria tio n j f view point on th e p a rt o f A risto tle is no t b o rne o u t by a th o ro u g h g o in g »tudy o f his w ork; on th e co n tra ry , his ph ilosophy constitu tes a unified position w hich involves a scientific an d a m etaphysical aspect. H e develops a technique o f observation an d d esc rip tion o f things w hich covers alm ost the en tire range o f availab le in fo rm atio n , b u t th is techn ique is w holly m otivated by an ideal o f m etaphysical perfection.>. T h e A risto telian ph ilo sophy ca n be m o st fru itfu lly in terp re ted as th e highest developm ent o f th e S o c ra tic d o c trin e o f universals. [This d o c trin e o f descrip tion o r defin ition o f a th in g in te rm s o f its ab s tra c ted fo rm o r' ” Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, iv, 2 and v. 7.

'* Kant, I.. Critique o f Pure Reason (F. M. Muller, trs.). New York, Macmillan, 1911, p . 67.w Cf, Apell, O., Beit fane zur Geschichte tier Griechischen Phitosophie, Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1891,

p. 108.*' Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1017a. 31. Also Natorp. P. Platos Ideeniehre, p. 383.41 Aristotle, De Gerwratione Anintalium, 760b, 30.30


universal becom es w ith A risto tle th e e labo ra te conception th a t th ings m ust be described in term s o f a perfect ty p e w hich is in som e degree ap p ro x im ated by ac tua l p articu la rs in th e ir a p p ro a c h to reality . A risto te lian science passes th ro u g h the P la to n ic stage, in w hich the form s develop into a series o f ab s tra c t qualities w ith co rresp o n d in g descriptive categories, and a d o p ts th e ideal o f describ ing a definite concrete object. B ecause o f th e ideal o f a perfect type th e A ris to te lian categories^ how ever, fall fa r sh o rt o f describ ing ac tu a l th ings, in sp ite o f th e fact th a t they represent a system atic e n u m era tion o f the p roperties o f a th ing . T h e specific m anner in w hich A risto tle w orked o u t his concep tion o f the perfect type is o f course the p rob lem o f the developm ent o r co m pletion o f a m ateria l th ing th ro u g h its ac tu a liza tio n by th e fo rm . T h e la tte r fo r A risto tle is th u s a m odel o f perfection w hich a th in g strives to becom e, as is ind icated in the crite rion o f descrip tion .The fittest mode, then of treatm ent is to say, a man has such and such part, because the conception of a man includes their presence and because they arc necessary conditions of existence.42 _____________ _________________________ _____

T h e em pirica l interests o f A risto tle , how ever, fall in to line w ith his concep t o f th e ideal type, in th a t he asse rts th a t th e fo rm realizes itself on ly in thep a jlicu la r. *- _______________ ___ _______________________

T h e concep tion o f types co n d itio n s th e scientific m ethod o f A risto tle an d m akes it consist entirely in classification o f things an d processes accord ing to their fo rm o r final purpose. T husi n dealing with respiration we must show that it makes place for such or such a final object .4>

W e inevitab ly find in G reek th o u g h t th e type o f final p u rp o se as th e co n stan t gu ide in all so rts o f th in k in g and ac tion . So fa r does A risto tle ■/ ca rry this concep tion th a t th e F o rm becom es th e p red o m in an t fa c to r in ' ac tu a l objects o f ev eryday experience. W h at j i th ing is d epends u p o n its • fo rm , a n d th e pu rp o se influenegs e ntire ly w hat a th in g is to becom e. A lthough th e . m ateria l m ust alw ays be presen t, it is n o t th e im p o rtan t [Y ,- elem ent; it is n o t even o f eq u a l im p o rtan ce w ith th e fo rm an d in m ost cases 'yf \ it is p resen t to the d e trim en t o f th e object. S ince th e fo rm is really w hat a th in g is, th e cause o f a n y ob ject no t being w hat it oug h t to be o r w ha t it usually is, is found in th e m ateria l involved.44

A risto tle’s doctrin e o f d evelopm ent th e n is a descrip tion o f th e a ttem p t

42 Aristotle, De Partibus Animalium, 640a. 34.*)*«/., 642a. 30.“ Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 1027a. 13.

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th e form to realize itself. T his a ttem p t is due to an in ternal necessity in i tu re .jv h ic h causes th ings to be w h at they are. T h u s the A risto telian jilosophy o f n a tu re calls for ob jects fully realized and exh ib iting in the st w ay th e purpose ac tua ting the ir presence and condition . All irregular itu ral phenom ena exist because o f th e resistance o f m atter. S o fa r does risto tle carry this idea th a t he considers it a n ab o rtio n o f n a tu re w hen ildren d o not resem ble their paren ts and especially th e father.45 and this ruse is m ade to include m oral qualities. T h e A ristotelian d octrine o f •velop m enLplainly.does n o t describe genuine developm ent, but is m erely device fo r a bsojute classifica tion . It m erely strives to reach a series o f >solute form s to w hich the objects o f experience m ust correspond.T he predom inance o f th e concept o f types in the A risto telian ph ilosophy duces his logic to a process o f su b su m p tio n . T h e p rob lem o f science is to ing o rd e r and h arm ony in to the w orld o f th ings by subsum ing each »jcct u n d er its resem bling form . T h e very a p p a ren t em piricism o f A ri- n le becom es reduced to a d em o n stra tio n o f th e presence o f th e universal

form .46 In duc tion he takes to be th e ascerta in m en t o f in fo rm atio n rough individual perceptual processes,47 bu t it tu rns out th a t w hat he tua lly does is to recognize in th e p a rticu la r object th e type to w hich it longs.4* T his recognition o f the type in the p a rticu la r th ing is the w ork o f ason, w hich functions by m eans o f intellectual insight, a process w hich is tirely n o n -p e rce p tu a l49 A risto telian induction is sim ilar to that o f icrates and P la to described in th e P h aed o and the P haed ru s,50 bu t is irked o u t in greater detail. T h e differr-nor* b e tween A ristotle and the evious th inkers is of course in favor o f the form er, a lthough it is hardly rrect to sav that A ristotle 's doctrine o f in tu ition m akes him in to an tp iric isu51 A risto tle com es m uch closer to the exact m ethod o f know l- gc th an do his predecessors, a lth o u g h he is him self fa r from it.Since it was the cu rren t cu ltu ra l co n d itio n s w hich m ad e it im possib le for ■istotle to d ep art from th e idea o f th e ab so lu te type, he should be given

■'Aristotle. De (jetwraiiane AnimaUum. 767b. 5 ft.■''•'Induction then meant primarily to Aristotle proving a proposition to be true universally by jwing empirically (hat it was true in each particular case." Joseph. H W. B.. An Introduction to xu. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1916. p. J7X.■'Aristotle. Analytiia Ptnteriora. i. IX.■' Aristotle, Analynt a Posteriora. i. 31: Analytiia Prittra, ii. 21."'Aristotle, Analytiia Posteriora. ii. 19.•"Plato. Phaet/rtis. 249; Phttetlo. 74.•' Cf. Altenburg. M .. Die Mcthoi/e tier Hypothesis hei Plato. Aristotle, anti Proktus. Marburg, vert. 1905. p. 156. Also Pranll. C.. Oe.uhithte tier lagik im Aheruiiamie. vol. I. Leipzig. Hirrcl. 1855, 215

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T H E C O N F R O N T A T I O N A L I N T E R V A Lcred it fo r a ttem pting to ad a p t his m ethod to function in co n tac t w ith actual th ings.(Perhaps the shortcom ings o f the en tire A risto telian ph ilosophy are to be accoun ted fo r by the fact th a t A risto tle a ttack ed concrete p rob lem s w ith an inadequa te scientific v iew po in t^H e cou ld no t get beyond P la to b ec au se he w as m erely d e v e lo p in g to th e h ig h est d eg ree a n o n - experim en tal view point o f science, b u t A risto tle was a m ore advanced scientist in tha t he assum ed th a t the existence o f the type w ould have to be d em o n stra ted by finding it in the particu la rs o r concrete things. T h e idealistic critics o f A risto tle w rongly assum e th a t P la to ’s belief th a t the universals form

an idea! system of interconnected concepts which the experiences of sense merely‘imitate' o r make approximation to

is a sign o f his clear intellectual vision.52 S uch a v iew poin t assum es th a t the p h ilo sopher is interested in a possible abso lu te descrip tion o f the w orld in general, w ithou t regard to an y p ractical effects w hich an in te rp re ta tio n o f objects can bring ab o u t in th e w orld o f ac tual happenings. W hile it is true th a t in his final a ttitu d e A risto tle agrees w ith P la to th a t all true science is “tran scen d en t” an d deals w ith objects w hich lie en tire ly beyond the range o f any “possible” experience o f “sense,”53 yet he is eager to m ake his ph ilosophy coun t fo r so m eth in g in the w orld o f actual facts. In decrying th e sh a rp separa tion w hich P la to m akes betw een true know ledge an d

lopinion, A risto tle looks beyond th e ch arac te ristic ab strac tion ism o f his ^ teacher.j F ro m A risto tle’s adh eren ce to the P la to n ic trad ition , it follow s th a t his I m ethod o f science is p reem inently th a t o f p ro o f based upo n know n I principles.54 A risto tle is clearly influenced here by the E uclidean m ethod ,I w hich in itself is an excellent sym ptom o f the G reek A ttitude o f this j period .55 h e cen tral po in t in th is scientific m ethod is inference o r syllo- I gism , w hich, accord ing to its defin ition ,56 aim s a t ab so lu te d em o n stra tio n j a n d n o t a t any d iscovery^T he c rite rion o f certa in ty , o f dem onstra tion , is

the basis o f d istinction betw een the valid and perfect syllogism, the first figure being the on ly perfect one, because it a lone show s the necessity o f the inference from the prem ises.57

5! Taylor, A. E„ Aristotle, New York, Dover, 1955, p. 339. i'lb id , p. 34.“ Aristotle, Analylica Posteriora, i, 2.55 Cf. Allenburg, M„ Op. cil., pp. 135 fT.“ Aristotle, Analylica Priora, i, I.5’Only the first figure proves universal affirmative propositions and by connecting the conclusions

with the rest of our knowledge shows why it is true. Cf. Aristotle, Analylica Posteriora, i. 14.

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In correspondence w ith A risto tle’s general philosophical a ttitu d e his egories are k inds o f existence an d n o t a t all principles o f though t in a idem idealistic sense. T hey are classes o f being, heads under which m ay placed the qualities and cond itions o f being. In consonance with the vely objective concep tion o f G reek th o u g h t, the categories are a t the ne tim e predicates o r expressions o f being. T hus, the categories refer n o t | ly to the m ost general form s o f concrete objective existence, such as I ^stance, quality, and quan tity ,58 b u t also to the m ost abstrac t predica- n o f objects.59 T he tw o m eanings w hich categories have involve A ristotle the difficulties a tten d an t u p o n m aking substance abso lu te individual ng an d a t the sam e tim e a p red icate o f som e being. W hen substance is livid ual being, it is not a category a t all, b u t th a t o f w hich the categories Dress a condition o r quality. S u bstance in this sense is the perm anen t and m utable essence w hich is the cen tral elem ent in all variable objects. Aristotle’s fo rm ula tion o f a com plete an d tho roughgo ing system atic >le o f categories testifies to the stage o f ph ilosoph ic sophistication th a t he ; reached.(H e clearly sees th a t the pu rpose o f ph ilosophy an d science is describe the occurrence an d m o d e o f occurrences o f the facts in the rid o f su rro u n d in g things. H e has no t, how ever, arrived a t the stage o f rstioning the possibility o f describ ing th ings and the cond itions o r the iditv o f those descrip tions. Everything is tak en fo r g ran ted. T hings an d A ir qualities are all given, an d the pu rpose o f th e descrip tion is m erely to 1 im erate them . T he categories o f A risto tle are the b roadest term s, th e \ ■st abstrac t universals und er w hich can be subsum ed an y possible \ ticu lar.The failure o f A risto tle to a tta in to a v iew poin t o f a genuinely descriptive :nce is well ind icated by th e fact th a t he has no t included som e o f the •st essential categories th a t belong in his philosophical system . T his ure to include som e o f th e m ost im p o rta n t term s is n o t m itigated by the t th a t A risto tle p robab ly derives his categories from directly perceived ects.“ A pelt,61 w ho considers th is p rob lem , argues fo r the com pleteness he list o f categories by insisting th a t the la tte r are possible predicates o f gm ents, the function o f w hich is m erely to classify concep ts a n d p ro b - ts in th e ir p ro p e r scientific field, so th a t they can be assigned to the m ostQualities of things for Aristotle are of course resident in the object.Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysica, v, 7.Abstracts them from the content of philosophical judgments as contrasted with Kant, whoderives ategories from the form of judgments, cf. Apelt, O., Beitrage rur Geschichte der Griechischen >sophie, pp. 146 If.Ibid., pp. 159 ft.

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general rules fo r han d lin g them . T h e categories are no t in tended to teach us an y th in g specifically a b o u t n a tu re o r its forces, b u t as predicates o f possible ju d g m en ts , they have th e ir re la tio n o f ac tu a l th ings an d u n d e r these circum stances, A pelt declares th a t every type o f th ing o r qua lity is subsu m ed u n d e r th e fo rm u la te d categories. I t is precisely th is v icarious subsu m p tio n , this fo rm a l, universal reference o f th e categories, w hich invalid a te s th em as ac tu a l fu n c tio n s o f know ledge. B ecause th e ca tegories are so o u t o f re la tion w ith an y concrete occurrence, it is possible to declare th a t th e A risto telian tab le o f categories is sufficient an d com plete beyond any a d d itio n o r sub trac tion .62 *(S ince th e A risto telian categories are above all e lem ents o f descrip tion , th e ir ex trem ely fo rm al ch a rac te r m akes them in g rea t m easu re m erely verbal sym bols o f things. It is this ap p aren tly purely verbal ch a rac te r o f m u ch o f th e A ris to te lian d escrip tion w hich offers us a c lue to th e th eo ry th a t i h e ca tegories are derived from facts o f language^ !

T h a t th e categories o f A risto tle a re n o t functions o f know ledge is well illu stra ted by the fac t th a t they a re m ean t to be applicab le to all possible objects an d cond itions, t o th e suprasensib le w orld as well as to th e w orld o f a c tual perception .64 A s th e m o st ab s trac t universals the categories encom pass all possib le objects.65 T h ey th u s lead d irec tlv lo G od w ho is th e h ighest k in d o f su b stan ce ; in fac t th ey a re m o s t app licab le in th e d o m a in w hich A risto tle calls theo logy o r first science. I t is in m etaphysics th a t th e ca tegories can best fulfill th e ir fu n c tio n , fo r th ey can serve th ere if an y w here as genuine descrip tions; in th e o th e r m o re concrete realm s they can fu n c tio n only as m odes o f classification. M /erssfrnq,

S erv ing as e lem ents o f ju d g m e n t a n d th u s as definite func tions o f d esc rip tio n , the ca tegories o f A risto tle rep resen t a h igh degree o f ph ilosoph ical d evelopm ent, b u t th ey d o n o t com pletely fulfill th e requ irem ents o f genu ine , know ledge e lem en ts, since th ey a re n o t in stru m en ta l in developi n g new fac ts. N evertheless, they rep resen t the highest developm ent o f th e techn ique o f desc rip tio n b ased o n th e ideal o f types an d are th u s fixed an d p e rm an en t objective term s; th a t is, an y descrip tion w hich they com pose is-' p resu m ed to have ex isten tia l im p o rt. T h e A risto telian categories a re ju d g m en t func tions a p p lied to fixed a n d im m edia tely given objects. T h e view-

o in t o f A ris to tle is th u s a highly naive n atu ra lism , w hich has n o t gained uch as a m ethod o f science as a result o f its u ltra ra tio n aliza tion o f the

H Apelt, O., Op. ell., pp. 160-61.w Joseph. H. W. B., An Introduction to Logic, Oxford. Clarendon, 1916, p. 47.M Lask, E., Pie Logik der Philosophic unddie Kaiegorienlehre, Tubingen, Mohr, 1911, pp. 226 ff.M Aristotle, Metaphysica, vii, 7. Cf. Apelt, O., Op. cit., p. 162.

fit "

Mi V

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tical a n d religious elem ents w hich a re p ro m in en t fac to rs in the culturaL caround o f G reek ph ilosophy. T h e en tire co n cep tio n o f categories so is they represent A risto tle’s logic can fu nc tion only in separating an d sifying given objects accord ing to abso lu te types an d insofar as they oduce th e given types.

Influence o f Primitive Realism 3reek Science•ur b rie f resum e o f G reek th o u g h t has conclusively show n th e devel- lent o f definite scientific m ethodo logy th ro u g h a series o f stages. F ro m live eva lu a tio n o f th e w hole o f n a tu re in te rm s o f som e percep tual erial, th e science o f th e G reeks develops to a n elabo ra te o rgan ization descrip tion o f facts in rig id ob jective term s. S ince th e G reek a ttitu d e ard n a tu re w as essentially o ne o f naive objectivity, th e instrum ent th a t ' fash ioned fo r th e p u rp o se o f o rien tin g them selves in th e w orld o f :cts lacked flexibility a n d had definite prefixed lim itations. A s a conse- ace G reek science was m ore im personal a n d seem ingly un re la ted to lan needs th an science h as ever been since. I t is fo r this reason th a t on ly

com paratively late period o f G reek cu ltu re was science seriously ressed w ith th e study o f events.66 S ym bolic o f its im personal and ote ch a rac te r is th e fac t th a t th ro u g h o u t its en tire progress it was >ed an d m oulded by m athem atica l interests and technique.J th o u g h the s tudy o f em pirical facts w as a very v igorous g row th w hen m e to be pu rsu ed in G reece, th e G reeks never developed th e ir science jnd a static objective position . T h e fundam en ta l question in G reekSltlnee has alw ays been ’V /iy floes a th in g happen?" a n d n o t th e precise. I n w hich phenomena occurred. since they considered the ncciirrenra ren ts as given. In G reek biological science the investigation o f w hat ally occurs is noticeab ly su pp lan ted by th e p resupposition o f w hat ild occu r in a fixed anc s tab le w orld . A fu n d am en ta l charac te ristic o f Aristotelian science is t< > exc lude all ac tu a l change. T h e concep tion th a t •articular th ings a re t h : a c tu a liza tio n o f types o r fo rm s p o in ts to th e ilute im m utability o f species,67 o r o f specific functions o r structu res.68

.ristotle finds it necessary on s >us Animaliwn, i, S.'f. Taylor. A. E., Aristotle, p. 41 T. Aristotle's criticism of Demo< i

sveral occasions to defend the study of concrete facts. Cf. De

'ognition, Oxford, Clarendon, |906, pp. 181 f.

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ritus* doctrine of touch, in Beane, J., Greek Theories o f Bemen-


T h e objective and rigid a ttitu d e o f th e G reeks is also evidenced in their general a ttitu d e th a t the fu n d am en ta l psychological processes are those o f vision an d touch. T h e e tern ity o f existing circum stances canno t be better illustrated in G reek tho u g h t th an by A risto tle’s a ttitude to w ard slaves.69

T he ca tegory e te rn a l w as a very im p o rtan t one fo r th e G reek s,70 for th ro u g h it the w ay was clear to the good an d perfect.71 It m ust be constan tly rem em bered th a t G reek th o u g h t is an adm irab le m o n u m en t to th e effort to ra tionalize fu n d am en ta l h u m an actions an d religious desires, a n effort highly successful in its accom plishm ent. It is tru e therefore tha t on ly by placing G reek ph ilosophy in its social an d cu ltu ra l perspective can we hope to understand it.72

T h e form al and detached a ttitu d e to w ard life is excellently expressed in G reek religion and a rt. T h e la tte r is essentially d o m in a ted by the conceptio n o f final perfection, in th a t it strives to get beyond the accidental and concrete particulars w hich are never faultless. T he calculating balance and sym m etry o f m athem atics p u rsue th e G reek even in the realm o f artistic crea tion . Especially no ticeab le is the o rd e r an d sim plicity o f the Hellenic arch itec tu re , the style o f w hose tem ples is very sim ilar in its austere ad h e ren ce to the ideal fo rm . In p rac tica lly none o f the G reek objects o f art can one find individualistic expressions; in every case is exhibited the idealization o f the essential n a tu re o f the w hole o f G reek culture.

G reek a r t is essentially d irec t:73 th a t is, th ings are tak en at their obvious value an d thus the in tim acy a n d appealing affective elem ents o f m odern aesthetic creation a re entirely lack ing . Because the G reek to o k a sim ple and im m edia te a ttitu d e to w ard n a tu re we find in the classic a r t o f H ellas none o f the subjectivistic sen tim en t w hich supplies the essential na tu re o f m ode m lyric an d d ram a tic a rt. L iv ingstone74 poin ts ou t th a t because the G reeks looked u p o n life w ith prim itive frankness an d sincerity, their poetry trea ts love, fo r exam ple, as a n a tu ra l thing, u nadorned w ith artificial sentim entalities.

T h e severe im personal a tt i tu d e o f th e G reeks is clearly expressed in the conflicts o f Hellenic tragedy , in w hich all h u m an relations and actions are

'"Zeller. E.. Aristotle: The Earlier Peripatetics, vol. 2. pp. 216 IT.,0Cf. Aristotle. Metaphvsica. xii. 6.''/hid.. 1051a. 20.’•’No doubt Aristotle's insistence upon the importance of the individual in his political philosophy

and the reality of particulars in his natural philosophy reflects clearly the current political conditions of Greece.

” Cf. Livingstone. R. W.. The Creek Genius and its Meaning to Vs. Oxford. Clarendon. 1912. ch. 3. 74 /hid.

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■whelmed by eternal laws. N o t on ly do we find th a t th e conflicts center ind som e ab strac t m oral o r m ystical princip le, b u t the m ost heart- ling situa tions are accepted in a sp irit o f naive m atte r o f course. T hus, ngstone refers to the Supplicants o f E urip ides, in w hich the m others • have lost th e ir sons in battle d o n o t in th e conven tiona l m anner ;eal th e prim itive fear o f d estitu tio n in o ld age, w hich o b tru d es itself the m isery o f their bereavem ent.75

he religious experience o f the G reeks exem plifies well th e ir prim itive rnality and detachm ent, fo r relig ion was never a deep, personal affair, a fo rm al m a tte r o f na tio n a l conven tiona lity . T h e sta te did n o t inqu ire one’s p riva te beliefs, p rovided on e d id n o t d am age n o r insult sacred

Derty o r sacred sym bols.76 O n th e side o f the individual, G reek religion alw ays a co ld in tellectual affair, capab le o f fo rm in g th e basis fo r

>nal speculation , w hich could becom e ta k e n u p in to philosophy. It is rted th a t the G reeks h ad no real sense o f sin.77 T h ey regarded theirnses as^hartcomings-and called-them-bacLshQts ”_Such things werend to h ap p en an d w hen they h ap p en ed they were best forgo tten .78 :n the G reeks prayed it w as fo r som e definite objective th ing, a victory a r o r freedom from plague, the g o d co m m o n ly being offered a quid p ro.79/ith th e rigidly objective b ack g ro u n d o f th e logic o f science in G reek :s th ere cou ld have been no o th e r th an th e resu lt w hich w e have :ribed. I f we look u p o n the h ighest developm ent o f ca tegory s tudy in ek th o u g h t as an a ttem p t to eva lu a te th e w o rld o f th ings an d events, ind th e categories function ing in a fo rm al w ay th ro u g h a developm ent ;h ranges from a naive n a tu ra lism to a naive rationalism . T hey do n o t my sense rep resen t the in tim ate ind iv idual experiences o f specific ons. W hen w e consider th e ca tegories as deliberately developed factors cientific descrip tion we find th a t th e ir func tion fo r the G reeks was a .c an d non-experim en ta l one.80 T h ey d id n o t lead to an y discovery, b u t er served to perp e tu a te existing cond itions. T hus th e categories o f ek science in th e ir m o st ad vanced s ta tes w ere no t func tions o f experi- ital know ledge; they w ere on ly fac to rs in classification an d static

ivingstone, R. W„ Op. d r , p. 83.■f. Tucker. T. G., Life in Ancient Athens, New York, Macmillan, 1906, pp. 217 IT. ivingstone, R. W„ Op. cit., p. 27. nd., p. 27.’f. Tucker, T. G., Life in Ancient Athens, p. 214.■lead, G. H., “Scientific Method and Individual Thinker," in Creative Intelligence, New York, 1917.

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descrip tion . All the G reek ca tegory doctrines p resupposed a contem plative know ledge and n o t know ledge w hich h ad a p o ten tia l capacity fo r th e con tro l o f phenom ena.

B ut how are w e to reconcile w ith the static m etaphysics described, the expansive interests in specific details o f an em pirical sort, w hich constitu te A risto tle’s scientific developm ent? A s we have seen, A risto tle’s studies o f concrete p h en o m en a w ere influenced m uch m ore by th e m otive o f exh ib iting o r d em o n stra tin g the perfectib ility o f n a tu re th a n by his desire to achieve a hum an istic co n tro l over n a tu re .81 It is therefo re futile fo r the neo -K an tian s to try to belittle th e w ork o f A risto tle by asserting th a t he was a m ere em piricist o r sensualist, since they overlook th e fact th a t he was merely a ttem p tin g to estab lish th e presence o f universals o r perfect types by th e m ost p lausib le m eans. F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f m etaphysics A risto tle has n o t reduced th e P la to n ic ideas in an y w ay, unless it is to the ir d isadvantag e to be em pirically dem o n stra ted . A s we have already seen, th e neo- K an tian s assum e th a t P la to ’s ideas a re n o t universals o f a n objective sort, b u t functions of genetic th o u g h t. T his v iew point takes P la to com pletely o u t o f his cu ltu ra l setting an d ignores the fund am en ta l religious backg round o f philosophy at th is period.82

T h e significance o f G re ek science a n d ph ilo sophy is well disclosed in the considera tion o f th e final resu lts o f A risto tle’s F irs t P h ilosophy. oti on o r th e ac tu a liza tio n p rocess o f th e w orld an d its o b jects m ust have a n ade- q u a te cause, and this m ust finally be an unm oved m over. T h e con tinu ity an d perfectibility o f th e w o rld an d its processes dem and th e assu m p tio n o f an ab so lu te first cause w hose fu n c tio n is m erely to con tinue in perceptual con tem pla tion o f itself. T h isprimum mobile, while itself unm oved, m oves th e rest o f th e w orld w ith o u t an y ac tua l partic ip a tio n in the w orld’s activities. T h is highest developm ent o f the F orm -concept indicates to us the general m o d e o f th in k in g w hich has p ervaded G reece an d w hich has finally com e to b e th e e lab o ra te A risto telian philosophy. M uch as the argum ent o f th e M etaphysics seem s to ind ica te th a t A risto tle deduces from his ph ilosoph ical principles th e idea o f G o d as self-conscious intelligence,81 it is still possible th a t he b o rro w ed it from relig ious sources; practically all G reek w ritings offer convincing evidence th a t philosophical principles reflect religious m otives. In fact, th e en tire developm ent o f G reek though t as an

*■ The concept of the “Good” is probably the most important category in Greek philosophy.,JThe neo-Kantians overtly assert the uselessness of interpreting Plato from the standpoint of his

cultural background. Cf. Hartmann. E.. Plains Leigik ties Seins. p. v.*JZeller, E„ Aristotle: The Earlier Peripatetics, vol. I. p. 399.

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:n tation to the w orld o f objects is influenced th ro u g h o u t by various dam ental religious attitudes, which, however, are no t form alized intel- ual products, bu t ra ther a general naive and w holehearted stand tak en ard nature and society. O f extrem e im portance in shaping this a ttitude the general social conditions, w hich naturally form the m ost intim ate

im m ediate phases o f m an’s surroundings. T he developm ent o f a acityio.evaluate those su rroundings w ithou t an overwhelm ing pressure- n them m arks the developm ent o f a criticaT scienceTTscience w hich s the in terpretation o f natu re ito'be w hat one can verify it to be, and ch perm its thus a m easure o f con tro l over -that n a tu re .-; '— —---------


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C H A P T E R 4

T H E T R A N S C E N D E N T A L I N T E R V A L

THE ADVENT OF A DUALISTIC CULTURE

It is a trite observation th a t cu ltu re like the h u m an race itself is co n tin u ous, an d th a t persons o f th e tw en tie th cen tu ry a re the inherito rs o f the civ ilization o f Greece, R om e, an d Ju d e a , as well as o f th e less definite East. T h e evidence is to be fo u n d in the cu rren t law , m orality , science, and a rch itec tu ra l technology th ey still m ain ta in and cherish. B ut o f course it w as inevitab le th a t th e cu ltu ra l heritage should be m odified in great m easure.

F o r o u r p resen t purposes we are concerned w ith the m etam orphosis in the ph ilosophical a ttitu d es th a t cu rren t th inkers have inherited from their cu ltu ra l ancestors. W e refer to the g rea t shift from the natu ra listic to the transcenden ta l m odes o f th ink ing . T h is shift is well sym bolized bv the difference betw een P la ton ic dualism to the d icho tom ization o f th e w orld by the H ellenistic succession to the H ellenic cu ltu re . W hat P la to only differentia ted as tw o aspects o f the n a tu ra l w orld, nam ely th e co n stru c tio n s o f essence o n the m odel o f m athem atics, and the qualitative asp ec t o f events, becam e in th e tran scen d en ta l period a duality betw een th e n a tu ra l and su p ern a tu ra l worlds. Transcendentalism postulates tw o realities, the m ate-

•% rial an d the spiritual. This d icho tom y ex tends to m an himself. T h o u g h the b o d y ca n n o t be denied there is also the su p erio r half, the im m orta l soul w hich is the opposite o f the b o d y and can n o t be seen, touched , o r otherw ise k n o w n except by abstru se inference. T h is abstru se inference, o f course, m ay be analyzed d ow n to an exaggerated personalism with pow ers to perfo rm p h an tastic feats o f crea tio n by m eans o f au tis tic language u tterances.

CHARACTERISTICS OF TRANSCENDENTALISM

T he transcenden ta l age is the age o f m an , an age o f h u m an is tic p a ran o ia w ith freedom to w allow in th e grossest m ythology a n d m ysticism . By m eans o f th e spiritistic d ich o to m y m an created a p erso n a l god w ho is om nisc ien t an d o m n ip o ten t an d w hom m an no t only resem bles bu t is a p a r t of. T h is is the age o f th e d iv in ity o f m an an d also o f th e h u m an ity o f god, the m an god. 41


■ con trast w ith the naturalistic age o f the G reeks w ho cultivated ce, the transcendental era is the age o f faith. It is characteristic o f this >d o f o u r culture to look dow n on the achievem ent o f Euclid and his enitors and followers in m athem atics, A rchim edes in physics, A ristar- and Eratosthenes in astronom y, and A ristotle in biology. The thinkers lis period despised the w isdom o f the pagan A ristotle until they teed him and m ade him a creature of spiritism , m ong the m ost representative exp lo iters o f the age o f faith is the poken Tertullian (165-220) w ho p roudly paraded his illogicality and tuality. his C redo Quia A bsurdum ..n any of them be so foolish as to believe in God who was born, born moreover of a i. born with a body of tlcsh. God who has wallowed through those reproaches ofc?e Son of God was crucified: I am not ashamed — because it is shameful. The Son of died: it is immediately credible — because it is silly. He was buried, and rose again: it is n — because it is impossible.'

n effective support of the transcendental thinking o f this period was the hasis upon the hidden, the m ysterious charac te r o f spirit. This is clearly ight out in the disquisition of M inucius Felix, which we quote:cannot be seen — he is too bright for sight; nor grasped — he is too pure for touch; nor ured — for he is beyond all sense, infinite, measureless, his dimensions known to elf alone. Too narrow is our breast to take him in. therefore we can only measure him it in calling him immeasurable. As I feel, so will 1 speak; he who thinks he knows the ness of God. makes it less; he who would not lessen it. knows it not. ek not a name for God: God is his name. Terms are needed when individuals have to be iguished from the mass, by proper marks and designations; for God, whoalone is, the "God" sums all. Should I call him "Father", you would think of flesh; or “King”, you d reduce him to this world; or “Lord", you will surely deem him mortal. Away with ;s and appanages, and you will see him in his splendour.2

in excellent statem ent o f the co n trast betw een the natura listic and the iscendental period we lind in the following quo ta tion from M urray.nyone who turns from the great writers of classical Athens, say Sophocles or Aristotle, ose of the Christian era must be conscious of a great difference in tone. There is a change e whole relation of the writer to the world about him. The new quality is not specifically istian: it is just as marked in the Gnostics and Mithras-worshippersas in the Gospels and Apocalypse, in Julian and Plotinus as in Gregory and Jerome. It is hard to describe. It is e of asceticism, of mysticism, in a sense, of pessimism; a loss of self-confidence, of hope ris life and of faith in normal human effort; a despair of patient inquiry, a cry for

c n u l l i a n . On the Flesh of Christ - Dr Carne Christi, E . E v a n s , Tertullian's Treatise on the mutton. L o n d o n . S . I*. C . K ., 1956 . c h . 4 , 41-4 .1 a n d 4 , 2 3 -2 6 .d in u c iu s F e lix . Ottavios, in Tertullian-Minucius Felix ( G . H . R e n d a l l . t r s .) . l . o e b C la s s ic a l a r y . re v . e d . . p p . .114-437 . L o n d o n . H e in e m a n n . 1 9 5 3 . c h . 18, 8 -1 0 .

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infallible revelation; an indifference to the welfare of the stale, a conversion of the soul to God. It is an atmosphere in which the aim of the good man is not so much to live justly, to help the society to which he belongs and enjoy the esteem of his fellow creatures; but rather, by means of a burning faith, by contempt for the world and its standards, by ecstasy, suffering, and martyrdom, to be granted pardon for his unspeakable unworthiness, his immeasurable sin. There is an intensifying of certain spiritual emotions; an increase of sensitiveness, a failure of nerve.

Now this antithesis is often exaggerated by the admirers of one side or the other. A hundred people write as if Sophocles had no mysticism and practically speaking no conscience. Half a dozen retort as if St. Paul had no public spirit and no common sense. I have protested often against this exaggeration; but, stated reasonably, as a change or proportion and not a creation of new hearts, the antithesis is certainly based on fact. The historical reasons for it are suggested above, in the first of these essays.

My description of this complicated change is, of course, inadequate, but not, I hope, one-sided. I do not depreciate the religions that followed on this movement by describing the movement itself as a “failure of nerve". Mankind has not yet decided which of two opposite methods leads to the fuller and deeper knowledge ol the world: the patient and sympathetic study of the good citizen who lives in it, or the ecstatic vision of the saint who

"rejects it. But probably most Christians are inclined to believe that without some failure and sense of failure, without a contrite heart and conviction of sin, man can hardly attain the religious life. 1 can imagine a historian of this temper believing that the period we are about to discuss was a necessary softening of human pride, a P raepara lio E va n g elica l

B ecause transcenden ta l cu ltu re was b o m o u t o f poverty , need, an d the perennial desire o f a -b e tte r life, it is no t surprising th a t the p rim ary intellectual interest o f the tim e was personal salvation. It is typical o f the tim e to be occupied w ith the p rob lem o f “ W hat can 1 d o to be saved?” This is effectively portrayed in the fo llow ing q u o ta tio n from St. A ugustine (354-430).

Wherefore, when it is asked what we ought to believe in matters of religion, the answer is not to be sought in the exploration of the nature of things (reru m n au tra ), after the manner of those whom the Greeks called “physicists.” Nor should we be dismayed if Christians are ignorant about the properties and the number of the basic elements of nature, or about the motion, order, and deviations of the stars, the map of the heavens, the kinds and nature of animals, plants, stones, springs, rivers, and mountains; about the divisions of space and time, about the signs of impending storms, and the myriad other things which these “physicists” have come to understand, or think they have. For even these men. gifted with such superior insight, with their ardor in study and their abundant leisure, exploring some of these matters by human conjecture and others through historical inquiry, have not yet learned everything there is to know. For that matter, many of the things they are so proud to have discovered are more often matters of opinion than of verified knowledge.

For the Christian, it is enough to believe that the cause of all created things, whether in heaven or on earth, whether visible or invisible, is nothing other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and the true God. Further, the Christian believes that nothing exists

' Murray. G.. Five Stages of Greek Religion. New York. Doubleday. Doran. 1955. pp. 119 f.

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jod himself and what comes from him; and he believes that God is triune, i.e. the ;r, and the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same ;r, but one and the same Spirit of the Father and the Son.*

hile in general, cultures m ay be m ain ly hom ogeneous o r m ainly •ogeneous, there are alw ays po ten tialities fo r m ix tu res o f institu tional s. S u ch m ix tu res o f tra its m ay be sym bolized by th e dissim ilarity o f nical th ink ing as co m p ared w ith th e general level o f a ttitu d es w hich be elem entarily m ythological an d m ystical. T h e cond itions in the

>cendental period are charac te ristically hom ogeneous as is easily ible w hen p h an tasy and rem oteness from natu re prevail, hat is no ticeable an d even strik in g a b o u t th is period is th a t a n en tire ire is based u p o n m iracu lous beliefs. T h e g o d -m an idea from the ip o in t o f n a tu ra l happenings is q u ite an im possib le one. B ut n o less t is the accep tance o f m iracles such as h u m an parthenogenesis ,^ ically feeding a m ultitude, w alk ing o n w ater, an d ra ising persons from **

um an cond itions constan tly change a n d w ith the increase ol ila tions dem and ing m ore efficient ad a p ta tio n s to the env ironm ents oi dduals and g ro u p s the presence an d tra its o f n a tu ra l th ings stim ulated ralistic interests w hich resulted in cu ltu ra l alterations. F ro m the ten th ury o nw ards there accum ulated know ledge o f th ings an d events ing tow ard the evolution o f science./ the 13th cen tu ry the tran scen d en ta l civilization was well o n the way .rd the assim ilation o f th e w isdom o f the G reeks and o th er nations. In oentury there a re o u ts tan d in g personages like T h o m as A qu inas and rt the G reat w ho studied the w o rk o f th e G reek P hilosophers bu t o f se w ithou t d eparting from their basic sp iritistic postu lations. A n excel- illustration o f th is fact is th a t w hen A qu in as becam e in terested in the nim a o f A risto tle he traduced it, m ak ing o u t that A risto tle dealt w ith rna tu ra l m ind o r spirits, w hereas the G reek treated psychological ;s as th e ac ts o f o rgan ism s in re la tio n to th ings w ith w hich they w ere ronted.hile a ttem p tin g to accoun t fo r the tran sfo rm atio n o f the natu ra listic objective type o f th ink ing o f th e co n fro n ta tio n a l period to the m ystical m ythical in terval we d o well to co n sid er the societal aspects o f the tw o ids. C o n fro n ta tio n a l th in k in g correlated closely w ith th e social, politi-

igusline. Saint. The Manual on Faith. Hope and Line* Enchiridion de Fide. Speset Camas, in Jhrary o f Christian Classics (Baillie, McNeill, and van Dusen. gen. eds.), vol. 7: Augustine: ssions and Enchiridion (Ouller, irs.J. London. SCM. 1955. ch. 3. 9.

lead.

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cal, and econom ic cond itions o f th e G reek an d R o m an civilizations. W ith th e great destruc tion o f th e glories th a t were G reece and the g ra n d eu r th a t w as R om e there fo llow ed a very d ifferen t k ind o f h u m an existence. T he peop le o f E astern E u ro p e felt hom eless and fo rlo rn . All th e great rocks o f ages and islands o f security w ere gone, an d m an was left w ith o u t the Im peria l s trongho lds th a t he en joyed before. T h en th e th in k ers o f the period , w ho were by th a t tim e clerics invented a transcenden ta l o r an ex tra -sp a tia l w orld , as the g rea t reality. T h a t was the beginning o f w h a t we now k n o w as sp iritism . T h e C h u rch F a th e rs invented heavens fo r the salvation o f the good an d hell fo r th e punishm ent o f the w icked. This o ther-w orld ly a ttitu d e persisted fo r m an y centuries and even now influences greatly the cu ltu re o f th e people o f the m ost advanced nations. In a critical vein, one m ust co n c lu d e th a t the transcenden tal period has played h av o c w ith th e th in k in g o f p h ilo so p h ers and has consistently perverted their trea tm en t o f na tu re an d o f m an’s d irect con tac t w ith it.

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C H A P T E R 5

SCIENCE INTRUDES UPON FAITH

CONFRONTATIONS VS. BELIEFS

)nce th e transcenden ta l v iew poin t becam e estab lished it congealed in to fo u n d a tio n o f the cu ltu ra l edifice o f W este rn civilization. A bove all,

iscenden ta lism em erged as th e basic prem ises a n d postu la tes o f all d lectual enterprises. T h ro u g h o u t all its v aria tio n s it still d o m in a ted the ik in g o f ph ilosophers w ho only differed in som e detailed features o f ir speculations. U p o n the spiritistic fo u n d a tio n th inkers erected system s ich reflected th e ir bew ilderm ent as to the n a tu re o f th e ir im m edia te an d re d is ta n t surroundings. S peculative activ ities a tta in ed g rea t freedom as losophers constructed verbal ab strac tio n s concern ing them selves an d ir place in the w o r ld jjn th is period the ad v an cem en t o f science precipi- id a crisis as betw een th e o b se rv a tio n s o f th ings a n d even ts a n d th e m acies o f their fa ith ipW hile a ttem p tin g to d istinguish betw een ap p ear- :es an d reality they reso rted to som e fo rm o f deity to secure the ir ellectual equilibrium . A t once o n e recalls S p in o za’s D eus Sive N a tu ra , i Berkeley’s G od w ho p ro m p ts ex p lan a tio n s w h e rev er required . A m ong ter illu stra ting incidents th ere a re th e struggles o f D a rw in to achieve a :uralistic view in biology.W ith respect to ph ilosophy 's o w n n a tu re th e dualistic assu m p tio n w as ide th a t aside from the earth ly bod ily p o rtio n m an w as p artly sp irit o r nd ca p ab le o f know ing th e en tire un iverse a n d th u s co u ld deal w ith im ates, abso lu tes, an d e tern ities . I t w as th e basic fu n c tio n o f ph ilos- hers to ach ieve certa in ty am o n g th e acciden ts.S ince philosophyzing is o n ly a m in o r cu ltu ra l o ccupation am o n g all the te r w orks o f people, th e v aria tio n s in ph ilo soph ical system s are p ro - tn d ly influenced by the exigencies inc iden ta l to th e lives o f persons an d :ir com m unities. E conom ics, life styles, a n d techno logy m odify the tguage an d th in k in g o f ph ilo sophers. A n especially in fo rm in g situ a tio n n cem s the varia tions in p h ilo so p h y w ro u g h t b y th e evo lu tion a n d ex pan - >n o f science. T h o u g h scientific w o rk b rings m an y changes in ph ilosoph i- I th ink ing , th e grip o f transcen d en ta l assu m p tio n s is seldom loosened.

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SPIRITISM A SSIM ILA TES SCIENCE

S C I E N C E I N T R U D E S U P O N F A I T H

TH E PREEM INENCE OF SPIRITBy th e 17th cen tu ry scientific ach ievem ents stood o u t w ith acknow l

edged app recia tion . In the registry o f h o n o r there w ere the revolu tion izing o f th e S u n -E a rth relations, h e liocen trism w as well estab lished , th e laws o f G alileo (1564-1642) a n d o f K ep ler (1571-1630) leading to the w ork o f N ew ton’s ( 1642-1727) law o f g rav ita tion . A ccepted too was the hypothesis th a t th e sou l o r m ind w ith the a id o f G o d an d m ath em atics w as cap ab le o f penetrating to th e very basis o f all existence.

In the 17th cen tu ry F ran ce becam e the m odel o f h u m an p rosp erity and achievem ent. Politically , econom ically , an d cu ltu ra lly th a t n a tio n shone w ith so lar brilliance. T h a t success w as reflected in the m irro r o f ph ilosophy. It w as a F renchm an , D escartes (1596-1650), w ho set the pace fo r tha t discipline. H is o u ts tan d in g p rincip le w as the pow er an d conquest o f th in k ing. U p o n his b an n e r w as em b lazo n ed th e m o tto C og ito E rgo S um . T h ink in g guaran teed all ex is ten c ean d all know ledge. W ith th e fu n d am en tal prem ise expressed by his m o tto D escartes filled the pages o f the h isto ry o f ph ilosophy b o th w ith ad h e ren ts an d opponen ts.

D escartes is o ften charac te rized as a leader an d fo re ru n n er o f m o d em th ink ing , an d o f course o n the basis o f co n v en tio n a l m o d em ph ilosophy he richly deserves his acclaim . By all m easures he w as a tru ly em inent and versatile scentist. A p roduc tive m a th em atic ian , physicist, an d physiologist, he achieved greatness in the quest fo r know ledge o f things an d events.

A n d o f course he w as a p rim e d u a list. H e declared the universe is m ade

Since h u m an beings can n o t avoid co n tac ts w ith th ings and events, desp ite th e ir (dichotom izing p ropensities, the accu m u la tio n o f experience forces the cu ltivation o f techno logy a n d science. T he civ ilization o f the W est from a b o u t the ten th ce n tu ry is charac te rized by the ex p an d in g know ledge o f astronom ical, b io logical, m echanical, an d hum an istic lore. B ut the transcenden ta l influence was here an d there am elio ra ted by new er reflection. P rim arily th ro u g h the soul-m ind conversion scientific know ledge was accum ulated to a ph ilo so p h y w hich stressed the pow er o f m ind to k now and validate beliefs a b o u t G od , the freedom and im m orta lity o f the sou l a lo n g w ith descrip tions o f observed th ings an d events. Essentially the d o c trin e becam e cu rren t that n a tu re is the know ledge of nature . By th e 18th cen tu ry , the em in en t K an t fo rm u la te d the n o tio n th a t th e th in k er o r his m ind prescribed the laws o f na tu re .

S & s .

X< ± )

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o f tw o fu ndam en ta l essences o r substances; [they are ex tensionab le itter, an d know ing spirit OTensrationis beside it^T hough the tw o en titie s i so fa r a p a r t as spatiality is from no nspatia lity , they still can in teract. A n :eresting sidelight on D escartes’ dualism is his co n tra s t o f m achines on e hand an d soul o n the o ther. M echan ica l co n tra p tio n s an d in frahum an ; im als possess n o souls, th a t is the cherished a ttr ib u te o f h u m an beings.' ;re is a n illustra tion o f th e m edieval cap tiv ity o f the m aste r w hich raises t questio n w hether D escartes is the last o f th e spiritualists o r the first o f ; m odern philosophers.

T he h isto ry o f ph ilo sophy records the g rea t d eb a te a s to the orig in an d lidity o f know ledge. O n one side speaks L eibniz (1646-1716), the m ath - la tic ian an d theolog ian , a n d on th e o th e r L ocke (1632-1704), a physician id ed ucato r. B oth accept the trad itio n a l postu la tes o f dualistic philos- ihy b u t clash vigorously. Leibniz insists u p o n the soul's innate capacities r intu itive know ledge, w hile L ocke ad o p ts th e view o f the soul as b lank blet u p o n w hich know ledge is im p rin ted th ro u g h ex te rn a l effectors. A n teresting featu re o f the d eb a te is th e d em o n s tra tio n o f how local cu ltu res fluence w ha t appears to the deba te rs as abso lu te su p p o rt fo r b o th the iposing beliefs. Leibniz, a C o n tin en ta l, inclines to w ard s holism an d >mmunistic un ity w hich co n trasts w ith th e in su lar tren d o f individualism . Each o f the views th o u g h based o n co m m o n trad itio n a l fo u n d a tio n s

weloped in to im m ense ep istem ological m ovem ents. T h e Leibnizian sym - ithizers banded together as an im p o rta n t R ationalistic g roup , w hile the llowers o f Locke’s “new w ay o f ideas” issued into the m ovem ent know n Em piricism . E ach o f these opposing views has exerted its influence to the 11 no t on ly in th e d o m a in o f p h ilo so p h y b u t also u p o n the sciences eluding psychology despite its unw ho lesom e origin. I t is one o f the m ost m arkab le facts o f h u m an cu ltu ra l ev o lu tio n th a t the great developm ent ’ science an d techno logy shou ld be ap p a re n tly perm an en tly unab le to /ercom e the b land ishm ents o f re lig ion an d sp irituality the while h istory akes clear the frailty o f th e bound aries o f dualism .

SUBSTANCES AS ASSOCIATED PSYCHIC ATOMS lA lth o u g h philosophy h as never w o n its freed o m fro m sp iritism it has

:en m odified from tim e to tim e by even ts th a t could n o t be ignored . T h u s e un ity o f soul o r m ind w as q u estio n ed th ro u g h vario u s periods o f

SOUL AS SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE

48


ph ilo soph ical h istory . A n o u ts tan d in g illustra tion is the d iversity o f Leibniz’s m o n ad s w ith in the g ran d universa l m o n ad . But even th is c lea rin g o f soul w as o u td o n e by th e successors o f L ocke in the E ng lish b ra n c h of idealistic ph ilosophy . H ere is evidence th a t the developm ents o f science p roduced a pow erful influence u p o n the course o f W estern ph ilosophy.

It is ev iden t th a t th e en tire p h ilo soph ical d eve lopm en t in E ngland beginning w ith Locke w as greatly fash ioned by the co rp u scu la r view o f N ew ton . Science in th e N ew to n ian era w as enm eshed w ith specific th ings b o u n d up in vario u s system s. T h e g rav ita tio n a l p rincip le as the achievem ent to b ring objects o r bodies in to re la tio n p roduced system s o f p h ilo sophy based o n assoc ia tion o f ideas o r m ental particles. F o llow ing u p o n Berkeley’s identification o f th ings w ith assoc ia tion o f idea's, H u m ereach ed the conclusion that the soul o f m an was im possible to capTure!

For my part, when I enter most intimately into what 1 call m yse lf, 1 always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or . pleasure. 1 never can catch m y s e lf at any time without a perception, and never can observe anv thimuhut iheperccDlum. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound 7 sleep; so long am I insensible of m yse lf , and may truly be said not to exist. And were all my perceptions remov’d by death, and could I neither think, nor feel, nor see, nor love, nor hate, after the dissolution of my body, 1 shou’d be entirely annihilated, nor do 1 conceive what is farther requisite to make me a perfect nonentity.1

It is ce rta in ly clear th a t th e ep istem olog ica l period in E ng land lessened the influence o f psychism in p h ilo so p h y b u t in no sense d id th e sp iritism o f anc ien t tim es lose its d o m in an ce over ph ilosoph ical th ink ing . It shifted from one phase to a n o th e r bu t it still constitu tes the m o rta r o f the p h ilo sophical edifice. C o n d itio n s rem a in the sam e as in the day s o f N ew ton w hen he localized the co lo rs o f his spec trum experim en t in the sensorium o r soul.

O f K an t (1728-1804) it is rep o rted th a t he never left his beloved Koriigs- bu rg th o u g h he co m p o sed a trea tise on Physical G eography . It w as this v icarious pereg rin a tio n th a t in d u ced h im to cross th e ch an n e l an d find in sp ira tion in th e w ork o f H um e. S ince he could no t fo rsake the teachings o f Leibnizian in tu ition ism he s tan d s as the great synthesizer o f d iverse cognitive psychism s. S o he declared th a t while all know ledge certain ly

'C begins w ith experience it does n o t arise from experience. N o th in g is m ore certa in fo r h im th an th a t there a re a p rio ri principles o f soul n o t derived

1 Hume, D., A Treatise o f Human Nature (L. A. Sclby-B ed.). Oxford, Clarendon. 1896. p. 252.

SUBSTAN C ES AS PSYCHIC SYNTH ESIS

49


o m experience. In fact, fo r Kan t the ex istence o f a priori principles uaran tees the existence o f the soul.

By an y coun t K ant represen ts the effective assim ila tion by philosophy o f le science o f the tim e, especially as it is sym bolized by the th ink ing o f lew ton. K ant’s transcenden talism like th a t o f o th e r ph ilosophers is o f ourse based on his u n d erstan d in g o f m athem atics. His app recia tion o f the erta in ty o f Euclid and the ph ilosophers w h o built u p o n him m ade his a rioris indestructible. T h e successes o f K epler, Galileo, and the N ew toni- ns in ascerta in ing the secrets o f n a tu re th ro u g h m athem atics proved to im the capabilities o f th inkers to prescribe their laws.

THE REALITY OF KNOW LEDGE A N D THINKING

A n extrem ely in teresting angle o f the epistem ological interval is the ttem p t to justify confidence in th e psychic aspect o f know ledge. T h e •u tstanding exam ple is the w ork o f H erb art, w ho opposed the view o f la n t, w ho denied scientific validity to m ental states because they were no t ubject to m athem atical trea tm en t.

T h e follow ing q u o ta tio n clarifiies the view o f Kant w hich H erb artriticizes.

. . . I maintain that in every special nalural doctrine onlyso much science proper is to be met /ith as mathematics; for. in accordance with the foregoing, science proper, especially science) of nature, requires a pure portion, lying at the foundation of the empirical, and ased upon a priori knowledge of natural things. Now to cognize anything a priori is to ognize it from its mere possibility; but the possibilit.y_.of determinate natural things can not _ ■eTnow-'n from mere conceptions; for from these the possibility of the thought (that it does_ ot contradict itself) can indeed be known, but not of the object, as a natural thing which an be given (as existent) outside the thought. Hence, to the possibility of a determinate ratufarifiing. and therefore io cognise it a p r io r i , it is further requisite that the in tu itio n orresponding a p r io r i to the conception should be given: in other words, that the concep- ion should be constructed. But coEnilion of the reason through construction of conceptions, s mathematical. A pure philosophyof nature in general, namely, one that only investigates vh'afconstitutes a nature in general, may thus be possible without mathematics; but a pure loctrine of nature respecting d e te rm in a te natural things (corporeal doctrine and mental loctrinc). is only possible by means of mathematics; and as in every natural doctrine only so nuch science proper is to be met with therein as there is cognition a p r io r i, a doctrine of tature can only contain so much science proper as there is in it of applied mathematics.

So long, therefore as no conception is discovered for the chemical effects of substances on >ne another, which admits of being constructed, that is, no law of the approach or retreat of he parts can be stated in accordance with which (as, for instance, in proportion to their Icnsitics) their motions, together with the consequences of these, can be intuited a p r io r i (a I cmand that will scarcely ever be fulfilled). chemistry will be nothing more than a systematic irt or experimental doctrine, but never science proper, its principles being merely empirical md not admitting of any presentation a priori-, as a consequence, the principles of chemical

50

phenomena cannot make their possibility in the least degree conceivable, being incapable of the application of mathematics.

But still farther even than chemistry must empirical psychology be removed from the rank of what may be termed a natural science proper; firstly, because mathematics is inapplicable to the phenomena of the internal sense and its laws, unless indeed we consider merely the la w o f p e rm a n e n c e in the flow of its internal changes; but this would be an extension of cognition, bearing much the sime relation to that procured by the mathematics of corporeal knowledge, as the doctrine of the properties of the straight line does to the whole of geometry, forjhc pure internal intuition in which physical.phenomena arc constructed js time^ which has only one dimension. But not even as a systematic art of analysis, or experimental doctrine, can it ever approach chemistry, because in it the manifold of internal observation is only separated in thought, but cannot be kept separate and be connected again at pleasure; still less in another thinking subject amenable to investigations of this kind, and even the observation itself, alters and distorts the state of the object observed. It can never therefore be anything more than an historical, and as such, as far as possible systematic natural doctrine of the internal sense, i.e. a natural description of the soul, but not a science of the soul, nor even a psychological experimental doctrine.2

H e rb a rt analogizes the co rp u scu la r th eo ry o f N ew ton by m ak in g the m ind consist o f idea-particles w ith d y n am ic properties such th a t enabled th em to fo rce th e ir w ay in to th e app ercep tiv e m ass o r soul. H e rb a rt lacked all ap p rec ia tio n o f th e n on -ex istence o f psychic entities o r processes. He sw am w ith th e spiritist cu rren t o f trad itio n a l ph ilosophy. F ro m the s tan d p o in t o f valid science his en tire schem e o f static an d dynam ic a to m s and co m p o u n d s was purely verbal.

^ KNOWING AND EXISTENCE

T h ro u g h o u t the en tire h isto ry o f psychology an d ph ilo sophy including th e p resen t, know ledge a lo n g w ith every o th e r psychological ac t o r process has been a ttrib u ted to th e m ind o f th e know er. L ittle if an y th in g in the know ing process has been cred ited to th e th ings o r events know n. T his circum stance, n o d o u b t, is an inev itab le o u tco m e o f the accep tance o f the

- assu m p tio n th a t psychology is p rim arily concerned w ith the soul. A lth o u g h th is fallacy is m o re flagran tly observab le am o n g ph ilo sophers like th e E m piricists w ho a b so rb k n o w n th ings an d events in to th e m ind o r consciousness, no dualistic o r m en talistic psychology escapes this neglect o f th e field w hich constitu tes know ing , learn ing , an d every o th e r type o f psychological even t.

A consp icu o u s b reak in th is consensus o f view is to be cred ited to T h o m as R eid (1710-1796), a S co ttish p h ilo so p h er w ho a ttack ed the E nglish Em piricists Locke, Berkeley, a n d H um e. By his refusal to accept the

2 Kant. I., The Metaphysical Foundations o f Natural Science (E. B. Bax, trs.), 2nd rev. ed., London, Bell, 1891, pp. 138-142, pref.


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P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S l S' S U C C E S S I O N

ill-inclusive role o f m ind in the know ledge process, he is regarded as a naive ealist an d no t an ide a lis t-N o t th a t R eid was an y the less a spiritistic ihilosopher. A s a m atte r o f fact his p rim ary in terest was to glorify the m ind nd to w ar against the H u m ean a to m iz in g o f the soul. A lso his theism was io w eaker th an th a t o f Berkeley. But his cu ltu ra l background channeled lis th ink ing m ore like the C on tinen ta ls th a n the o th e r Britains. T he entire hrust and quality o f his th ink ing is excellently presented in his doctrine of he diversity betw een sensation an d perception .

When I smell a rose, there is in this operation both sensation and perception. The grceable odour 1 feel, considered by itself, without relation to any external object. is merely sensation. It affects the mind in a certain way; and this affection of the mind may be

onceived. without a thought of the rose, or any other object. This sensation can bejtothing. se than it is felt to be. Its very essence consists in beinufelt: and when it linot felt, it is not. here is no difference between the sensation and thg_feding.of.it — they are one and the ime thing. ItTsfor this reason that we before observed that, in sensation, there"is no object istinct from that act of the mind by which it is felt — and this holds true with regard to all msation.Let us next attend to the perception which we have in smelling a rose. Perception has

ways an external objecL- and the object of my perception, in this case, is that quality in the >se which I discern by the sense of smell. Observing that the agreeable sensation is raised hen the rose is near, and ceases when it is removed. J am led, by my nature, to conclude une quality to be in the rose, wKichls the causcof.lhissensatiQnJrhis quality in the rose is ie object perceived; and that act of mv mind by which,Lhave the conviction and belief of Is quality" is what in this case 1 call perception.But it is here to be observed, that the sensation I feel, and the quality in the rose which I

:rceive, are both called by the same name. The smell of a rose is the name given to both; so at this name hath two meanings; and the distinguishing its different meanings removes all rrplexity, and enables us to give clear and distinct answers to questions about which lilosophers have held much dispute.Thus, if it is asked, w hether the smell be in the rose, or in the mind that feels it, the answer obvious; That there are two different things signified by the smell of a rose; one of which is the mind, and can be in nothing but in a sentient being; the other is truly and properly in e rose. The sensation which I feel is in my mind. The mind is the sentient being; and as the se is insentient, there can be no sensation, nor any thing resembling sensation in it. But this nsation in my mind is occasioned by a certain quality in the rose, which is called bvthe me name with the sensation, not on account of any similitude, but because of their nstant concomitancy.ATTThe names we have for smells, tastes, sounds, and for the various degrees of heat and jd, have a like ambiguity: and what has been said of the smell of a rose may be applied To em. They signify both a sensation, and a quality perceived by means of that sensation. The. st 1s~the sign, the last the thine signified. As both are conjoined by nature, and as the iTposes of common lifedonot require them to be disjoined in our thoughts, they are both pressed by the same name; and this ambiguity is to be found in all languages, because the tson of it extends to all.1

1 Reid, T.. Essays on the A etive Powers o f the Human Mind, in The Works o f Thomas Reid. D. D. '. Hamilton, ed.), 2nd ed.. pp. SI 1-679, Edinburgh. Maclachlan. Stewart. 1849. essay 2. ch. 16.

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D espite all the psychism an d theism o f Reid we m ust ap p lau d his observational capacity in seeing th a t know ing is a n in teractional process. T h a t is one step tow-ard the realization th a t psychological events are field events in w hich reciprocal ac tions o f tw o factors in terbehave on the basis o f un ique sets o f am b ien t c ircum stances. W hat is paradox ical in R eid’s ph ilosophy is th a t he has unw itting ly o p en ^H thp w ay tmvarH a psychology and ph ilosophy w hich goes co n tra ry to all his cherished spiritism .

SCIENCE AND TH E INFINITE

As we have rem arked above institu tional spiritism was little affected by the adven t o f science. In fact th e great scientists interm ixed trad itional a ttitu d es in th e ir descrip tions a n d ex p lan a tio n s o f observed events. We recall Leibniz’s criticism o f New-ton’s cosm ology which required G o d ’s consistent supervision. But Leibniz relied ju st as m uch as N ew ton on divine existence and guidance in m atte rs philosophical an d scientific. T he sam e m ay be said o f all the em inen t scientists o f the present historical interval and m any em inent w orkers th ro u g h o u t the entire history o f philosophy and science.

A n o u ts tan d in g characteristic o f the ph ilosophy an d science o f the 17th and 18th cen tu ries is th e lack o f a basic rea liza tion that ph ilosophy and science are w orks o f individuals unab le to transcend the ac tual world they live in. except by the verbalism o f m etap fio r and general au tistic c rea tion.

—X h e je su lt^ o f such ab s tra c tion istic activity is to m ain ta in in p h ilosophy constructions a b o u t universals, abso lu te and u ltim ate reality, and tru th .

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C H A P T E R 6

THE MATERIALISTIC INTERVAL

THE PARADOX O F M ATERIALISM

Superficially exam ined, the m ateria listic interval appears ' as a g iant a rad o x . It does no t seem to be a subset in th e class o f spiritistic intervals la t have d o m in a ted W estern ph ilo sophy since the G reco -R o m an age. O n le co n tra ry , it appears to be a rev o lu tio n ary w ay o f th ink ing , a tu rn a b o u t 1 philosophyzing. M ateria listic ph ilo sophers ap p ear to be less conten ted ’ilh sp iritistic so lu tions to w orld p rob lem s th an th inkers in the m ain- ream o f trad itio n a l dualism . M ateria lism p resum ably concerns the a tu re o f things and how they becom e know n. H ow ever, a m ore critical pp ro ach to th e subject o f m ateria lism reveals th a t it really is m erely a ir ia n t in the great chain o f sp iritistic system s. It is this indefiniteness ab o u t te m ateria listic interval th a t raises a p h e th o ra o f p roblem s concerning hilosophical doctrine and therefo re invites th o ro u g h analysis.

W HAT IS M ATERIALISM ?

A lth o u g h m ateria listic w ays o f th ink ing sustain resem blances to scien- fic ph ilosophy , o r at least suggest an au ra o f na tu ra lism , it is strictly a letaphysical enterprise. It does n o t to u ch u p o n th e tra its o f concrete lings an d events bu t perta ins to th e abstrac tio n is tic po larity o f sp iritism id m aterialism . Essentially, then, m ateria lism arises and is cu ltivated in tua tions th a t a re social, econom ic , political, and religious ra th e r th a n ientific. In consequence m ateria lism is w rong ly related to the natu ra lis tic lilo so p h y o r th e p re tran sccn d en ta l interval. M ateria lism o f the E nlight- im ent period is in no wise related to the th ink ing o f D em ocritu s, A ris- tle, H ippocrates, o r Lucretius.It is th e considered a ssu m p tio n o f th is w ork th a t the m ateria listic

terval is a period dated in the 18th an d 19th centuries w hen th inkers d iberately questioned the au then tic ity o f the spiritistic trad itions. W e iclude th e m any m ovem ents described by L ange (1828-1875) in his x e llen t w ork entitled , The History of Materialism. L ange includes as pu ted m ateria lists Leibniz, H obbes, Locke, S p inoza , H um e, an d Berke- y w ithou t even sparing K ant, o r o thers o f the idealist’s cam p. N ow it is :re!y no t p ro p er to label as m ateria lism revolts against the teachings o f th e

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T H E M A T E R I A L I S T I C I N T E R V A L

church , th e inequalities o f econom ic life, o r the dem on stra tio n s against political d iscrim ination and oppression.

M ATERIALISM AS SYMBOL O F ENLIGHTENM ENT

N o m ystery attends th e adven t o f m ateria lism in th e 18th and 19th centuries. In fact, m ateria lism is m ore o r less a concrete consequence o f the cu ltu ra l circum stances o f th e day. C onsider th a t E ngland h ad reached rem ark ab le stages o f industria l an d technological advancem ent. T h e F ren ch had experienced the social an d political revolu tion tha t stressed ind iv iduality and h u m an affairs. In ad d itio n G erm any w as d istinguishing itself w ith scientific know ledge ab o u t general o rgan ic nature , an d especially hu m an biology. C u r rent behav io r o f persons in solitary and g roup w o rk situations becam e o f focal in terest. T h e tim e was ripe fo r a m odificatio n o f the trad itional line o f th inking.

FRENCH M ATERIALISM IN THE 18th CENTURY

It is p robab ly no t incorrect to regard th e adven t o f m ateria lism in the 18th cen tury to be a t least a rem ote consequence o f the th ink ing o f J . J . R ousseau (1712-1778), an d th e b o o k o f P . H. T . H o lb ach (1728-1789) System of Nature1 as a m odel o f m ateria listic literature . H o lb ach is n o t so m uch an observer o f n a tu ra l th ings an d events as a m oralist, religionist, an d social an thropologist. H is great em phasis w as to a ttack religion as a m isleading and m ischiefous institu tion . T h is a ttitu d e is well expressed in the preface to his book.

Man is unhappy only because he misunderstands nature. His mind is so infected with prejudices that one would think him condemned to error forever the veil of opinion with which he is covered from infancy is too strongly attached, that it is with the greatest difficulty that he is rid of it. A dangerous leaven mixes with all his knowledge and renders it necessarily wavering, obscure and false: he wanted, for his unhappiness, to surmount the boundaries of his sphere; he attempted to soar up beyond the visible world, and without cease cruel and repeated falls have uselessly warned him of the folly of his enterprise: he wanted to be Metaphysician, before being Physician: he scorned realities, to meditate on chimeras; Keneglected experience, to nourish himself with Systems and conjecture; he did not dare to cultivate reason, against which he was carefully and early cautioned: he claimed to know his lot in the imaginary regions of another life, before thinking to make himself happy in the dwelling where he was living. Inaword man has disdained the study of nature to run after phantoms, which, similar to those false fires encountered by the traveler during the night, terrify him, dazzle him, and cause him to abandon the single path to the true, without which he cannot arrive at happiness.

1 Holbach, P. H. T., Systeme de la Nature, ou les loix du Monde Physique et du Monde Moral. 2 vols., London, Mirabaud, 1774.

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t is. then, important to seek to destroy the influences which are good only to mislead us.; time to draw from nature the remedies for the evils done us by Enthusiasm: reason ded by experience must finally attack at their source the prejudices of which mankind so long been victim. It is time that this reason, unjustly degraded, sloughs off the

.illanimous tone which has made it the accessory of falsehood, and of folly. The truth is it is necessary to man, it can never harm himJtsjnyincible power will make itself felt

nerorTater,Ti must be unveiled' then, to mortals who must be shown its charms with the of arousing their disgust for the shameful worship given to error, which too often

rps their homage under the disguise of truth, whose brilliance can wound only the mies of mankind whose power subsists only by the obscure darkness they spread over ids.t is not at all to these depraved men that reason must speak; its voice is heard only by uous hearts, accustomed to thinking, sensitive enough to lament the calamities without iber with which religious and political Tyranny tries the earth; enlightened enough to :cive the immense chain of evils suffered by disheartened humans in all ages from error.; error which strengthens the crushing chains forged by the Tyrants and the priests •ywhere in the nations. It is error to which is due Slavery, which, in almost all countries, ;t her are the downfall of the people, whom nature destined to strive freely for their own piness. It is error to which is due these religious terrors which everywhere wither men in or ruin them for chimeras. It is error to which is due these inveterate hates, these

barous persecutions, these continual massacres, these revolting tragedies for which, er the pretext of heavenly interests, the earth has so often become the theatre. Finally it i errors consecrated by Religion which are due the ignorance and uncertainty in which 1 finds himself with respect to his most evident duties, his clearest rights, the most tonstrable truths: he is in almost all climes no more than a degraded captive, destitute of grandeur of soul, of reason, of virtue, who is never permitted by the inhuman Jailers to the light of day.

vlaterialism being so p ro tean an en tity co m p reh en d s a great varie ty o f w points so th a t idealists o r sp iritists find th e ir p lace am o n g the m any ikers gathered under the m ateria listic b anner. C onsp icuous am o n g the alists w h o co n trib u te som eth ing to the m ateria listic trad itio n is E tierine nno t de C o n d il la c jC.LZj4= .l780). In o rd e r to es tab lish his sensu- tic an d association istic princip les he invented his w ell-know n m arb le ue w hich becam e a com pletely m entalized personality . A llo tting only sensa tion o f smell to his statue, he proceeds to develop therefrom all the chic pow ers. T h e follow ing ex trac ts fro m his w o rk 2 reveal C ond illac’s ticu lar ideational m aneuvers.

. We imagined a statue internally organized like us, and animated by a mind deprived ty ideas. We supposed, further, that its marble exterior did not permit the use of any of :nscs, and we reserved the liberty of opening them at our convenience to the differentressions of which they are susceptible.

Condillac, E. B. de. Twite ilex ,w‘m otions, in Oeuvresphilosophiques tie Condillac, vol. I (G. Le ed), Corpus general des philosophies framjais (R. Bayer, ed.), Auteurs modemes, vol. 33,.pp.

114, Hans. Presses Univcrsitaires de France, 1947. Cf. also English translation by G. Carr. Los des, Univ. of Southern California, 1930.

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We thought we should begin with smell, because of all the senses it is the one which appears to contribute the least to the awareness. The others were, following that, the objects of our inquiries, and after having considered them separately and together, we saw the statue become an animal capable of guarding its own preservation.

The awareness of our statue limited to the sense of smell can extend only to odors. It can no more have the ideas of extension, form, or of anything outside of itself, or outside of its sensations, than those of color, of sound, of taste.

Ifwe present the statue with a rose, it will be in relation to us a statue smelling a rose; but in relation to itself, it will be the odor itself of this flower.

The statue will be, then the smell of rose, pink, jasmine, violet, according to the objects which act on its organ. In a word, odors are only its own modifications or modes of being; \ and it could not think itself anything else, since these are the only sensations of which it is ) susceptible.

Let those philosophers* to whom it appears so evident that everything is material put themselves fora moment in the statue's place, and let them imagine how they could suspect there exists something that resembles what we call m ailer.

One may, then, already convince himself that it would be sufficient to augment or to diminish the number of the senses to cause us to make completely different judgments from those that are today so natural; and our statue limited to the sense of smell can give us an idea of the class of being whose awareness is the least extended.

/ •

. . . With the first odor, our statue's capacity to sense is entirely directed to the impression being made upon its organ. This is what 1 call attention.

From this moment the statue begins to enjoy or to suffer for if the ability to sense is totally directed to an agreeable odor, this is enjoyment; and is totally directed to a disagreeable odor, suffering. 7 .

But the odor that the statue smells does not escape it entirely as soon as the odoriferous body ceases to act on its organ. The attention that it gave to this color still holds the statue; and there remains of it a more or less strong impression, accordingly as the attention itself had been more or less active. That is memory.^

A judgment is then only the perception of a relation between two ideas that one compares.

/ Thus we can establish that there are two degrees of action in the faculty of memory the 1 weaker is that where the memory can with difficulty cause enjoyment of the past: the more^active is the_one-where-ilcauses enjoyment of the past as if it were present. ------- -

So this faculty is given the name of m e m o ry when it recallsthings only as being past; and it takes the name of im ag in a tion when it retraces them with such strength that they appear present. Imagination occurs, then, in our statue as well as memory, and these two faculties differ only in degree. The mem.ory.is the beginning of an imagination which has as yet little strength; imagination is the memory which has reached the full activity of which it is susceptible.

Having proved that our statue is capable of giving its attention, of remembering, of comparing, of judging, of discerning, of imagining; that it has abstract notions, ideas of number.and duration; that it knows general and specific truths; that it forms desires, has passions, loves, hates, wants; that it is capable of hope, of fear, and of astonishment; and

r.1}57

P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S l I C C E S S I O N

ly. lhai it acquires habits: we must conclude that with a single sense the understanding is many faculties as with the five senses together. We shall see that those which appear to eculiar to us are only these same faculties which being applied to a greater number of cts are more fully developed.

)u r trea tm en t o f F rench m ateria lism so fa r concerns m ainly w hat m a p erm ed the hum anistic and philosophical trend . N ow we tu rn tow ard the re scientific aspect w hich features the p ro n o u n cem en ts o f L aM ettrie 39-1751) and C aban is (1757-1808). O f the tw o. Ju lien O flray De La ttrie is the m ore no tab le figure th o u g h bo th derive their view points from now ledge o f the biology o f th e ir day, an d in general are deeply ccrned to im prove upon the soul trad itio n w hich enthralls them .:or La M ettrie the so lu tion o f the soul p rob lem lies in the organ ization he body.jiasall the faculties of the soul dcpcndso muchontheproper organization of the brain of the whole body, as they are, indeed, visibly nothing but this organization: there is an ihlenetf machine! For. in the end. should man alone have received a share of the natural would he be less a machine for that? Some wheels, a few more springs than the most :ct animals, the brain proportionately nearer the heart and receiving also more blood, hat reason; what do I know in the end? Unknown causes might always produce this live conscience, so easily wounded, this remorse no more foreign to matter than ght. and in a word, all the differences that one supposes here. Could the organization :e. then, for all this? Once again, yes. Since thought develops visibly with the organs, should the matter of which they arc composed not also be susceptible to remorse once it icquired with time the faculty of feeling?’

a M ettrie’s basic idea here is very im p o rtan t. It is the idea o f inheren t ^ ;tion. A certa in structu re , a type o f organ iza tion , form s the basis fo r a esp o n d tn g type o f function , w hether described as biological o r ihological. A m ong the psychological functions is thinking.

ic soul is therefore but an empty term of which no one has any idea, and which an htened mind must not use except to indicate the part in us which thinks. Set down the principle of motion; animated bodies will have everything necessary to move, feel, it. and in a word, to conduct themselves in the physical realm and in the moral realm h depends on it.-1

Ian, like any an im al, is a m echan ism so p u t to g e th er as to be ab le to do t he does. “ E ach tiny fibre, o r p a rt, o f o rganized bodies m oves by a ciple w hich is peculiar to it.” 5 La M ettrie believes th a t his list o f ten

a Mettrie. J. O. de, Stan, a Machine (G. C. Bussey and M. W. Calkins, trs.). French-English text; igo. Open Court, 1912, pp. 128 f. a Mettrie. J. O. de. Man. a Machine, p. 128. itl.. p 130

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experim en ts, as he calls them , shou ld com pletely satisfy any sceptical or hesitan t person.

1. The flesh of all animals palpitates after death. This palpitation continues longer, the more cold blooded the animal is and the less it perspires. Tortoises, lizards, serpents, etc. are evidence of this.

2. Muscles separated from the body contract when they arc stimulated.3. The intestines keep up their peristaltic or vermicular motion for a long time.4. According to Cowper, a simple injection of hot water reanimates the heart and the

muscles.5. A frog's heart moves for an hour or more after it has been removed from the body,

especially when exposed to the sun or better still when placed on a hot table or chair. If this movement seems totally lost one has only to stimulate the heart, and that hollow muscle beats again. Harvey made this same observation on toads.

6 . Bacon of Verulam in his treatise “Sylva Sylvarum” cites the case of a man convicted of treason, who was opened alive, and whose heart thrown into hot water leaped several times, each time less high, to the perpendicular height of two feet.

7. Take a tiny chicken still in the egg, cut out the heart and you will observe the same phenomena as before, under almost the same conditions. The warmth of the breath alone reanimates an animal about to perish in the air pump.

The same experiments, which we owe to Boyle and to Stcnon, are made on pigeons, dogs, and rabbits. Pieces of their hearts beat as their whole hearts would. The same movements can be seen in paws that have been cut off from moles.

8 . The caterpillar, the worm, the spider, the fly, the eel — all exhibit the same phenomena; and in hot water, because of the fire it contains, the movement of the detached parts increases.

9. A drunken soldier cut off with one stroke of his sabre an Indian rooster’s head. The animal remained standing, then walked, and ran: happening to run against a wall, it turned around, beat its wings still running, and finally fell down. As it lay on the ground, all the muscles of this rooster kept on moving. That is what I saw myself, and almost the same phenomena can easily be observed in kittens or puppies with their heads cut off

10. Polyps do more than move after they have been cut in pieces. In a week theyregenerate to form as many animals as there are pieces. I am sorry that these facts speak against the naturalist’s system of generation; or rather 1 am very glad of it, for let this discovery teach us never to reach a general conclusion even on the ground of all known (all most decisive) experiments.6 ______

M a n is a m achine; “th e b o d y is b u t a clock o f w hich the new c h y le s the clockm aker."7

. .. man is but an animal, or an assemblage of springs, all of which wind each other up, without our being able to tell at which point of the human circle nature began. If these springs differ among themselves, it is only in their position and in their degrees of strength, and never in their nature; wherefore the soul is but a principle of motion, ora materia land

.^sensible part of the brain which can be regarded, without fearing error, as a main spring of . the whole machine, having a visible j nfluence on all the oiher.DartS4if.lhft system ancLesen—

appear to have been made first, such that all the others are only an emanation from it---- K

6 La Mettrie, J. O. de, Mart, a Machine, p. 129.''Ibid., p. 135.• Modified quote from La Mettrie, J. O. de, Man, a Machine, p. 135.

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)u ts tan d in g as a F rench m ateria lis t is P ie rre , Je a n , G eorge C aban is 57-1808), a physician like La M ettrie b u t b e tte r equ ipped as a biologist I psychologist w ho u n d erto o k to estab lish the them e that th e soul o r n tality is no th in g m ore th an secre tions o f th e brain . In his fam ous w ork sports duphysique el du moral de I’homme he w rote as an observer and rstigator, o r a t least as one w ho is in terested in a scientific trea tm en t o f i*s n a tu re and action. A ctually, he was a physician w h o was learned in siology an d w ho observed carefully w hat he saw in his p ractice an d it o th e r physicians re p o rted a b o u t th e ir experiences w ith people in Ith and disease.: is a d istinc t m erit o f C ab an is th a t he sp u rn ed w h a t he t o o k j o be a physical d ispu tation , deem ing it u tterly fu tile to speculate ab o u t the Mute origins o f things. O n this g ro u n d it has been denied th a t C aban is a m ateria lis t .9 L ange a n d o th ers agree, b u t ind icate th a t he inclined

ard a stoic-like pantheism . C erta in ly he was n o t free from transcenden- .ssum ptions. H e sim ply ado p ted a view sim ilar to th a t p ro p o u n d ed by 5relate Bossuet (1627-1704) th a t m an sh o uld be looked upo n as a w hole igTincluding th e m ind as weii aT th e b o d y. T o u n d ers tan d th e n a tu re o f i it is necessary to consider him fro m the s tan d p o in t o f his co n stitu tio n his surroundings. T hus we m ust consider the influence o f sex, tem per- nt, disease, d iet, clim ate, an d so on. In read ing C ab an is’ views on these ences o n e is im pressed w ith his general historical a p p ro ach an d w ith act th a t he m ust have ab so rb ed fro m th e G reek physicians a m odicum itu ra lism .o d isagreem ent is possible as to C ab an is’ a ttitu d e to w ard m an. H e lta ined strongly th a t the m edical a p p ro a c h w hich explo its the various litions o f the organism is the p ro p e r one. H e fo rm ula ted this view in the w ing w ords.auld the time be that medicine no longer had in the soothing and healing of disease a practical goal, it would still merit great attention as the base of all sound rational

iophy. It alone, in effect, can make known to us the laws of the living machine, the ir course of the sensibility in the healthy state; it lays bare for jisjhe whole physical of which the moral man himself is but a part, or. ifvou will, another aspect. From the •aTsensibility, the physician sees not only the birth of the ideas and the passions; he further, in some manner, how they are formed; he sees, at least, what favors or irages their formation; and it is always in certain organic states that he finds the >n to each problem.is then, one may consider medicine as furnishing bases equally solid for this philos- vhich traces the source of ideas, and for this other philosophy which traces the source passions. On the one hand, its views must direct every good system of education; onevy-Bruhl, L., History o f Modern Philosophy in France, Chicago, Open Court, 1899, p. 306.

60


the other, it finds in the eternal laws of nature the foundations of the rights and the duties of man. In a word it illuminates the study of the understanding, and delineates the art of guiding and perfecting it, while recognizing in the impressions and needs peculiar to each sensible nature the true causes or the true laws of the relations amongatl the beings deriving from that nature or included in its domain: and from the same principle flow, in the eyes of medicine, the rules of their reciprocal behavior, and the reasoned art of their happiness; that is. morality. 10

Becaus£-of C aban is ' trea tm en t o f various bodily influences u p o n psychological ac tion he has been called the fa th e r o f physiological psychology. C ertain ly he stood fo r th e physio logical m ode o f a tta c k u p o n the m ind- body p ro b lem [C a b an is is the p a ra g o iy o f all those w ho have regarded the m ental as dependen t u p on th e p hysical o r neurological processes. In acco rdance w ith th e princip le o f ex p la in ing psychological activity as the function ing o f specific s truc tu res he p u t g reat stress u p o n th e b ra in as an o rgan ic unity. A lthough C ab an is argued th a t the secretion o f tho u g h t by

■i the b ra in is no g rea ter a m ystery th a n the d igestion o f food by the stom ach , still h e went o n to e labo ra te his belief th a t that is ju s t w hat happens. T hus, by a process o f irrelevant analogy he a ttrib u ted to the b ra in functions of consciousness and though t.

T o develop a correct idea of the operations which result in thought one must consider the brain as a particular organ, specially designed to produce it; as are the stomach and intestines to produce digestion, the liver to filter the bile, the parotids and maxillary and sublingual glands to secrete the salivary juices. The impressions, on arriving at the brain, setit in activity; as food, on falling into the stomach excites it to more abundant secretion oQhe__gastncjmceandtoJhe_moYpments which facilitate its own dissolution. The proper function 7 of the one is to perceive each particular impression, to attach signs to them, draw from that comparison judgments and conclusions; as the function of the other is to act on the nutritive substances whose presence stimulates it, to dissolve them, to assimilate the resultant juices > into our own being.

Will it be said that the organic movements by which the functions of the mind arc carried out are unknown to us? But the action by which the stomach nerves determine the different operations which constitute digestion, the manner in which they mix the gastric juice with the most active dissolving power, are no more revealed to our inquiries. We see the aliments fall into this organ with qualities peculiar to them; we see them leave it with new qualities: and we conclude that the organ has truly caused them to undergo this alteration. We see. likewise, the impressions arrive at the brain through the medium of the nerves: they are, at that time, isolated and without coherence. The organ begins to act on them: and sootLiL sends them back metamorphosed into ideas which facial expression and gesture, or symbols or word and writing manifest externally. We conclude, with the-same certituderthat the

, brain in some way digests the impressions; that it secretes thought organically."10 Cabanis, P. J. G., Du degre de certitude de la medicine, in Oeuvres Philosophiques de Cahanis (C.

Lchccand J. Cazeneuvre, eds.), vol. I.pt. I, Corpus general dcs philosophes frangais(R. Bayer, ed.), Auteurs Modemes. vol. 44, I, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956, pref.

11 Cabanis. P. J. G., Rapports du physique et du moral de I'homme, in Oeuvres Philosophiques de Cahanis (C. Lehec and J. Cazeneuvre, eds.), vol. 1, pt. I, Corpus general des philosophes fracais (R Bayer, ed.). Auteurs Modemes, vol. 44, 1, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1956. Memoire 2, sec. 7.

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V / V i t * - * ' . / ! • , < / ^ > >' ' 4 j' .■ / ' ' ^ r •' . »x

P H I L O S O P I N C A l S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N

C aban is^desp ite the inep titudes o f his psychology, such as the n o tion o f •. ought' as a secretion o r p ro d u c t o f an organ, a n d the obvious m isin terpre- ‘ tion o f th e na tu re o f th e b ra in and its role in the biological econom y, ^ co u raged views o f th e b ra in w hich have becom e co nven tional a n d d u ri ng iyaccep t a bl e. F o r exam ple , w ith his in teg ra tion o f the m ental an d s e physicaThe u ndoub ted ly influenced the phrenological trad ition o f G all • 758-1828), S purzheim (1776-1832), an d th e ir follow ers. If th e bra in is the at o r th e secretor o f m en ta l processes, th en its obviously d ifferentiated .rts cou ld be connected w ith the different kinds o f m ental faculties o r *1ocesses. P hreno logy seem ed to be a d o c trin e th a t cou ld be very reasona- y developed o n th e basis o f th e assum ed secretory' functions o f the brain . ibanis in no way realized th a t his hypothesized “ functions” o r m ental oducts o f the. b ra in w ere as transcen d en ta l as any th ing in th e w hole id ition o f spiritistic psychology, ft/t-S.i" ‘ r ■ - ' L t r . (O'- 'I t is o fco n sid e rab le in terest to no te th a t C aban is was never clear o n his vn ph ilosophy an d could co n ten t h im self w ith incom patib le beliefs and en dow nrigh t con trad ic tions. D espite his em phasis on physical structures clung to ex trem e v italistic views in biology and in his ph ilosophy w as in

• sense averse to v arious types o f m ysticism an d sp iritual cosm ology. A ading o f C aban is leaves n o d o u b t tha t his views o n the relations o f the y s ica l and th e m oral an d on th e influences o f the physical u p o n the ental had not aroused in him any scepticism as to the existence and ieration o f transcen d en ta l events. W hile there is, thus, little w a rran t to 11 C ab an is a scientist in any sense, he d id in the long run influence the rning o f psychology in th e d irec tion o f science by helping greatly to nim ize and m odify the o ld an d s tan d a rd trad itio n o f th e soul as a unified tity. A lth o ugh fro m th e po in t o f view o f scientific psychology he inad- rtentlv illustrated , as o th e rs have done, how the b ra in dogm a was really unded on trad itio n a l a u th ority com bined w ith an ignorance o f biology so at his v lew sfa th ere d a lo ng succession o fb ra in d o c trin es su p p o rted only au tistic beliefs, we m ay co nc jude o u r presen tation o f C aban is ' place in

; h is to ry o f ph ilo so phy by p o in ting o u t th atJ iis im p o rtan ce lies precisely t he fact tha t in his o w n d ay he m ad e p a lpab le the fallacies th a t h ad been ilt up ab o u t bo th the trad itio n a l m ind-body factors. Even his only partia l ift o f em phasis from transcen d en ta l concepts to a t least partly observable gans and behavior m ade fo r progress.

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GERM AN M ATERIALISM IN THE 19th CENTURY

A s we should expect the m ateria listic trad itio n in the 19th cen tu ry p roved to be m ore precise an d detailed than in the p receding period . Scientific know ledge h ad g reatly accum ulated , especially in the biological b ranches. W riters inclined to w ard th e m ateria listic trad itio n could take ad v a n ta g e o f the new er findings in physics and chem istry as in terre lated w ith biological and psychological m atters.

T o be m entioned am o n g the m ost representative o f th e G erm an m aterialists is J . M olescho tt (1822-1893), one o f th e m ost co m peten t and a ttrac tiv e w riters w ho insisted u p o n o b serv a tio n and research , and natu ra l law s as against revelation. In his fam ous volum e entitled , Der Kreisfauf iles Lebens'2 he criticized the em inen t chem ist L iebig (1803-1873) on the g ro u n d th a t the la tte r held th a t events revealed th e w isdom and the m ight

v o f th e creator.B ut M olescho tt like m any scien tists is a m ultip le personality . His em

phasis u p o n events an d th e ir observ a tio n stands out as one o f his m ost favorab le aspects as a ph ilosopher. T h is adm irab le scientific tra it paralleled a d eep spiritistic a ttitu d e w hich was p robab ly a ho ld over from his early S chelling ian and H egelian study a n d his sym path ies w ith F eu rb ach ’s (1804-1872) spiritism .

C o n so n an t w ith his intellectual b ackground and developm ent M ole- sch o tt’s ph ilosophical m ateria lism is clearly evident in his form ulation .

All facts, every observation of a flower, or an insect, the discovery of a world, or the J detection of the characteristics of man, what else are they but relations of objects to our r' senses? • / .

* i f t ‘ .. '• ' .; /. t r j J' "

F u rth erm o re , /> x '. . . because the knowledge of the object resolves itself into the knowledge of their relations, all my knowledge is an objective knowledge. 13 /

K arl C h ris to p h V ogt (1817-1895) as a firm m ateria lis t ap p e a rs as a s tau n ch su p p o rt o f M olescho tt. L ike M olescho tt, Vogt is a na tu ra lis t and geologist so we m ay regard him as a n active p a rtic ip a to r in the cu ltivation o f science. L ike th e o th e r m ateria lis ts , V ogt jo in s battle w ith au th o rity . His b o o k en titled , Lectures on Man, His place in Creation and in the History of the Earth (1864), is a trac t in fav o r o f freeing m an fro m the fetters o f

12 Moleschott, J., tier Kreistaufdes Lebens, Physiotogische antworten auf IJebig's Chemisette Briefe. Mainz, von Zabem, IB52.

IJQuoted from Lange, F. A.. The History o f Materialism and Criticism o f its Present Importance (E. C. Thomas, trs.), 3rd ed.. vol. 2, New York, Humanities Press, 1950. p. 277.


63


litional beliefs. In general, as a n a tu ra lis t and scientist he p roposes rnatives to the undesirab le h isto rical trad itio n s an d is fam o u s fo r his •rtion th a t the b ra in o f m an secretes th o u g h t as gall is secreted by the r and urine by the kidneys.'Ic a rly V o g tis a ttem p tin g to m ake.use oX th e kind o f science fa m ilia rin lay to su p p o rt his belief in th ep o ten c y o f m a tte r to exp lain events in the nal k ingdom including m an and his in tellectual b eh av io r in the general ta in o f science an d religion. It is to be no ticed th a t V ogt is responsible deas w hich have already been sta ted in the previous cen tu ry especially -a M ettrie.he carefu l reader will notice of course, th a t ju s t as is the case w ith all the :r m aterialists, there is no ap p rec ia tio n o f psychological m atters which tld obv iate the necessity o f ta lk ing a b o u t m a tte r and its p reem inencei cosm ically and as p a rt o f the individual. ....he p a rticu la r m ode o f m ateria listic a tta c k o f L udw ig B uchner ( 1824- )) is found in his fam ous book en titled , Kraft und Stojff( 1871). B tichner mes th e a ttitu d e th a t all th ings an d events are reducible to m ovem en t :h is o riginated and intensified as universal force. It is th is universal e th a t m akes up all th ings and th e ir ac tio n s w hich science studies and rds. S ince B uchner like all th e o th e r m ateria lists is identified as a osopher, his views concern ab s trac tio n s from all concrete events. M ind m atter o f all so rts are reducible to the m ovem ents activated by the >. ersal forces. \nee m ateria lism »s_a p h ilo so p hical m ovem ent designed to con tro v ert general ph ilosophical ideas o f preclassica l tim es it em phasizes the ests m ade by B uchner in th e jo llo w in g w ay ; H e declares tha t there is no , no final cause, no im m orta iity o f the soul, and n o freedom . Also, ally, there does not exist fo r him an y soul substance. M ind like light heat, electricity o r m agnetism is m erely a m ovem ent o f m atter.

M ATERIALISM IN PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

ncc dualistic philosophies have alw ays been construc ted on a spiritistic o f psychology, it is im p o rtan t to analyze th e .p sy ch o lo g y o f the rialistic interval. T here are tw o basic assu m p tio n srT irs t there is a shift _the exclusive preoccupation w ith the soul to the activities o f persons, e is an em phasis upon th e value an d im p o rtan ce o f individuals. T here tress o f hum an dignity and the freedom from political d o m in a tio n o f ; and o ther form s o f au th o rity . P sychology has becom e m ore concrete, ever, there is no dep artu re from trad itio n a l dualism . S oul is no t

64

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■&'/'<-!■?/U tl ---ex tru d ed bu t m erely reduced to sensuous states an d ideational consciousness. T here is no lessening o f th e belief in the existence of m ind in its various fo rm s o f know ing, th ink ing , feeling, a n d so on.

— A ssim ilating som e o f the natu ra lis tic developm ents in biology, the m aterialistic ph ilosophers so u g h t a basis in th e psychological view th a t m entality is a fun c tio n o f o rgan ic s truc tu re^C onsciousness in its various fo rm s is

l_ persistently regarded as secretions o f th e b ra in . . ____T h a t th e m ateria lis tic psychology is en tire ly m e n ta lis ts and dualistic is

c lear from th e fact th a t psychological beh av io r is fa r rem ote from the in terac tions o f o rgan ism s w ith o th e r o rgan ism s and objects in concrete situations. Psychological events a re p resum ably processes occurring in the head . T here is n o theore tical ap p rec ia tio n o f psychology as a n objective science sim ilar in a ll respects to th a t o f all the sciences w ith only the differences based on the in terbehav io r o f d ifferent p ro tagon ists and am bien t circum stances.

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SIGNIFICANCE OF T H E M ATERIALISTIC INTERVAL

In draw ing up a balance sheet o f the m ateria listic ph ilosophy there a re to be no ted som e definite m erits to its c red it. T o begin w ith , th o u g h the m ovem ent in general is th o ro u g h ly fan tastic it signalizes a definite u rge to rechannel ph ilosophy aw ay fro m its p u re ly theological d irec tion a n d to w ard a m ore hum anistic an d n a tu ra listic dim ension. A gain , in detail, m ateria listic psychology has m oved in th e d irec tion o f coup ling the psychological discipline to active biological events. T h is is no slight gain.

O n the deb it side the ackno w led g m en t o f th e associa tion o f psychology , w ith biology and o th e r sciences has on ly been em ployed to glorify the j psychic aspects o f their d ualism . T ru e , th e m ateria lists have insisted upo n ’ the prim acy o f m atter, bu t th is on ly accen tu a tes the soul o r m ind-body

c o m p le x jif psycho-physical dualism .O n the w hole the m aterialistic interval is essentially a m etaphysical type

o f ph ilosophy. M aterialistic th in k in g is fa r from actual con fron tab le events. It is essentially a n ab s tra c t dyadic m ode o f ap p ro ach concerned w ith universal, and abso lu tistic a ttitu d es. It h ard ly touches the actual scenes o f inorganic, organic, o r psychological events.

M ATERIALISM : PER IO D O F HOPE AND DOUBT

T h e m aterialistic in terval p resen ts a type o f philosophyzing w hich reflects g reat confidence in in tellectual o rien ta tio n w hich science a n d gen-

65

iltu ra l evo lu tion p rovides. By ca tego riz ing every th ing as m ateria l it is I th a t m an k in d can becom e versed in the n a tu re o f a ll things.1, d o u b ts persist concern ing the com petencies a n d efficacy o f this type losophy. T h a t is evidenced by th e tu rn in g aw ay fro m close co n tac t :hings a n d events w hich science d em an d s , a n d veering to w ard the al aspects o f h u m a n living. M ateria lis tic ph ilo sophy is th u s g re a tly ' m e d w ith th e failings a n d the im p ro v in g o f social living, including alities, civil revolu tions a n d th e p ro sp e rity o f n a tio n a l an d societal s.acco u n t fo r the deficiencies o f m ateria lis tic ph ilosophy , it is suggested it b o tto m these are ow ing to th e co m m o n basic p o s tu la tio n o f n tional th ink ing . L ike m ost p h ilo sophies, m a te ria lism rests u p o n the a tio n o f u n o b ta inable a n d illegitim ate ab so lu tism an d universalism . ever m ateria lism gains by co n d em n in g spiritism it loses by its com - w ith au tistic form ulations.


66

C H A P T E R 7

THE POSITIVISTIC INTERVAL

POSITIVISTIC PHILOSOPHY

f D uring the n ineteen th cen tu ry , ph ilo sophy to o k on a very different com plex ion from the transcenden ta lly dom inated th inking o f earlier in tervals. Essentially there ap p eared a lessening o f the great em phasis u p o n the religiocosm ic speculation th a t prevailed since the G reco -R om an declination . T h ro u g h th e ad v ancem en t o f cu ltu res, the stabiliza tio n o f states, and the increase o f popu la tions an d u rban iza tio n , th inkers focused their intellectual labors m ore an d m ore u p o n th e prob lem s o f people than upo n theological an d transexperien ta l in terests^N ot th a t the o therw orld ly in terests w ere excluded from their th ink ing , bu t the em phasis was different.} S ym p to m atic o f the change o f stress was the dec la ra tion o f C om te (1798- 1857), the presum ed fo u n d er o f sociological science, concerning the th ree stages o f h u m an th o u g h t. F irst w ere theological interests, then m etaphysical, an d finally the positivistic tu rn in g aw ay from first causes, th ings in them selves, and u ltim ate reality, tow ard phenom ena, the findings of science.

In the case o f C o m te him self, his linkage w ith transcendentalism revealed itself in his developm ent o f a religion o f hum anity in w hich the deity o f historical religion becam e displaced by the god hum anity . H ow ever, the grow ing em inence o f science in the n ineteenth cen tu ry led such scientists as G. R. K irchoff (1824-1887), H. H ertz (1857-1894), a n d E. M ach (1838-1916) to enroll u n d e r a b an n e r o f critico-em piricism , w hich represented th e reduction o f scientific d a ta to the delivery o f the senses, o r a type o f m entalism w hich excluded trad itional rationalistic elements.*' T hough the term “positivism ” is no longer in vogue, there is no d im inu tion o f transcenden tal factors am o n g philosophical scientists o r scientific specialists. T his is n o t to overlook the tren d am o n g som e philosophers to tu rn aw ay from m etaphysical a ttitu d es to w ard events to concen trate u p o n the criticism o f philosophical language.1 ,

i. i'

1 Such philosophies are discussed in our next chapter.

67


POSITIVISM: NATU RE AND ORIGIN

ause th e term “ Positiv ism ” is em ployed in so m any different w ays, it sable to identify the p articu la r in terval w ith w hich we are concerned. lly positivism consists o f a m ovem ent designed to am elio ra te -th e . f ph ilo sophy arising fro m its d o m in a tio n by theistic and, a p riori ^ hvsics. W hile the m ovem ent in nam e un d o u b ted ly stem s fr.Qm, -K :’s positivistic ph ilosophy, doctrina lly it has developed from one o f id am en ta l aspects o f B ritish Em piricism ^A m o n g the characteristic o f_ppsitivismj s th a t .a l l valid ph ilosophy is constructed on the

ition o f m entalistic elem ents, nam ely, sensations. etailed^consideration o f C o m te’s th in k in g p rom inen tly reveals the hases th a t m ake u p his essential a ttitudes as a philosopher.vism consists essentially of a Philosophy and a Polity. These can never be dissev- ; former being the basis, and the latter the end of one comprehensive system, in ur intellectual faculties and our social sympathies are brought into close correlation :h other. For in the first place, the science of Society, besides being more important y other, supplies the only logical and scientific link by which all our varied lions of phenomena can be brought into one consistent whole.2

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%\itivism fo r h im signified above all a religious system constructed of s abso lu tes o f a societal an d scientific sort. A lthough C om te was well ed in science, his in tellectual life style was th a t o f a re fo rm er an d irm er o f the n a tu re an d m ode o f living o f peopleJ^Science fo r him lued as po ten tial pow er to im prove the plight o f peo p le ) an u n d ers tan d in g of th e scientific aspects o f C om te’s system we

er th e psychological basis o f his th ink ing . As was only to be ed, psychology in his day an d fo r a long tim e to com e w as fixed ly in th e m ind-body trad itio n , (ft is to the credit o f C o m te th a t he d th a t to concern oneself w ith the m ind as a transpa tia l en tity or s was no t in acco rdance w ith his positivistic tenets. A ccord ingly he lim self fam iliar w ith th e phreno logy o f G all an d accepted the belief le m en ta l consisted o f invisible processes o f the~nervous systen ifj t cV,\ ly,Tiecfiticized Gall because he asserted th a t there were m any m ore es o f m ind th an ap p eared to C o m te as possible. It is o f g reat in terest :rve th a t the positivism o f C om te an d o f the scientists w ho follow ed oo tsteps was really a p a r t o f a tran sp a tia l system w hich co n trasted ■ w ith th e m ain tenets o f the n a tu ra l sciences such as physics,;try, and biology. Yes, C om te rejected m etaphysical philosophye, A., System o f Positive Polity (J. H. Bridges, trs.), vol. I, New York, Burl Franklin, 1875,

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T H E P O S I T I V I S T I C I N T E R V A L

j w hen taken as an abstrac tio n , bu t positiv ism w hether in th e early stages o f I C o m te o r w ith the la ter scientists is o f course purely a m etaphysical l doctrine . This is no t to deny th a t in the critical abstraction istic fo rm

positiv ism w as a step in th e d ev e lo p m en t o f scientific ph ilosophy . B ut as it • ex isted in its ow n tim e it is a ty p e o f d o c trin e w hich scientific psychology

m ust repud ia te in w hole an d in part.

POSITIVISM IN PERSPECTIVE

W hile all the intervals o f m o d ern p h ilo sophy a re in terre lated , positivism reveals a special re la tionsh ip to th e m aterialistic interval. B oth seek w avs to

. avoid m etaphysical m etap h o rs in describ ing th ings and th e ir behav io r. In - th e ir a ttem p t to do so th inkers em phasize an d generalize th e j?sy ch ic fac to rs p resum ed to be th e crucial bases o f all cogn itions.^ In detail,

f how ever, they differ in th a t m ateria lism inclines tow ard onto logical a tti- * tudes while positivism is slan ted to w ard ep istem ology a nd th e processes o f

valid m ethods o f investigation a n d ex p lana tion . - ■ j

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POSITIVISM: TH E PH ILO SO PH Y O F SCIENTISTS

r O ne o f the unique featu res o f th e positivistic view point is the appeal it m ade to practicing scientists. T h o u g h n o t usually recognized, it qualifies as the paren t o f m ost versions o f th e ph ilosophy o f science. Philosophical

lite ra tu re is replete w ith th e w ritings o f scientists m any o f w hom proceeded o n th e basis o f a general sp iritistic ph ilosophy , w hile o th e rs concerned

k them selves w ith the psychic aspects re la tive to specific p rob lem such as 1) cau sa tio n , o r the influence o f investiga to rs on th e ir o p era tions, findings, an d in terp re ta tions. T o the fo rm erly m en tio n ed list o f p ro m in en t scientific p ro p o n e n ts o f positivism m ay be ad d ed K. P earso n (1857-1936), H. H elm holtz (1821-1893), P . W . B ridgm an (1882-1961), H. D ingle (1890- 1978), am o n g m any others.

A s we should expect, th ere a re specific varia tions in views o f scientists g rouped under the b an n er o f positivism . S u ch early m em bers as K irchoff, H ertz, an d M ach sim ply w ished to separa te o u t fro m physics such a b s tra c tion istic construc ts as “forces” an d “pow ers.”6 'h e y m erito riously hoped to build system s o f physics on th e basis o f observable d a ta , and n o t to co n fo u n d co nstruc ts w ith even tsT A dopting th is defensive a ttitu d e signalized a d iscrim inating science wifn a n am b itio n to achieve know ledge o f actually occurring events. T here is no deny ing the po ten tia lity o f such views fo r scientific enterprises even th o u g h their au th o rs m ight som etim es o verlook the co n stan t co rrig ib ilitv o f h y p o theses concern ing the p rocesses

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yed while seeking know ledge a b o u t the n a tu re of th ings and events, ales o f such shifts o f view point include th e denial by E. M ach, W. Id, an d M . P lanck that a to m s exist an d th e ir later conversion, le from their different an tim etaphysica l fo rm ula tions, the positiv- ientists a re united in their reduc tio n o f th ings and events to include tim e, ex tra sp a tia l sensations o r elem ents. A n excellent statem ent by o f the reductionism is the following.he world consists of colors, sounds, temperatures, pressures, spaces, limes, and so hich now we shall not call sensations, nor phenomena, because in either term an y, one-sided theory is embodied, but simply e lem en ts . The fixing of the flux of these s, whether mediately or immediately, is the real object of physical research.5

cists Locke, Berkeley, and H um e. As he says,t my starting-point is not essentially different from Hume’s is of course obvious.4

rs do not produce sensations, but complexes of elements (complexes of sensations) p bodies^ If, to the physicist, bodies appear the real, abiding existences, whilst the its" are regarded merely as their evanescent, transitory appearance, the physicist in the assumption of such a view, that all .bodies are but thought-symbols for

xes of elements (complexes of sensations). Here, too, the elements in question form , immediate, and ultimate foundation, which it is the task of physiologico-physical 1 to investigate. By the recognition of this fact, many points of physiology and assume more distinct and more economical forms, and many spurious problems iosed of.us, therefore, the world does not consist of mysterious entities, which by their ■ ion with another, equally mysterious entity, the ego, produce sensations, which I e accessible. For us, colors, sounds, spaces, times,. . . are provisionally the ultimate; /, s. whose given connexion it is our business to investigate. It is precisely in this that ( > loration of reality consists. !n this investigation we must not allow ourselves to be' d by such abridgments and delimitations as body, ego, matter, spirit, etc., which en formed for special, practical purposes and with wholly provisional and limited view. On the contrary, the fittest forms of thought must be created in and by that n itself, just as is done in every special science. In place of the traditional, instinctive ' thought, a freer, fresher view, conforming to developed experience, and reaching ond the requirements of practical life, must be substituted throughout.6

h. E., Popular Scientific Lectures (T. J. McCormack, irs.), Chicago, Open Court, 1895, pp.

:h, E„ The Analysis o f Sensations and the Relation o f the Physical to the Psychical (C. M. s. trs.). New York, Dover, 1959, p. 46..p. 12.:h, E.. The Analysis o f Sensations and the Relation o f the Physical to the Psychical, pp. 29-31.

• ' '■.i:h ’s view is definitely derived fro m th e sp iritism o f the British

assertion, then, is correct that the world consists only of our sensations^ \ v

tin,

70


Finally,

In the investigation of purely physical processes we generally employ concepts of so abstract a character that as a rule we think only cursorily, or not at all, of the sensations (elements) that lie at their base. For example, when I ascertain the fact that an electric current having the intensity of I ampere develops \0'A cubic centimetres of oxyhydrogen gas at 0°C. and 760 mm. mercury-pressure in a minute, 1 am readily disposed to attribute to the objects defined a reality wholly independent of my sensations. But I am obliged, in order

^to arrive at what I have defined, to conduct the current, for the existence of which my sensations are my only warrant, through a circular wire having a definite radius, so that the current, the intensity of terrestrial magnetism being given, shall turn the magnetic needle a certain angular distance out of the meridian. The determination of the magnetic intensity, of the volume of the oxyhydrogen gas, etc. is no less intricate. The whole statement is based uponan almost unending series of sensations, particularly if we take into consideration the adjustment of the apparatus, which must precede the actual experiment. Now it can easily happen to the physicist who does not study the psychology of his operations, that he does not (to reverse a well-known saying) see the trees for the wood, that he overlooks the sensory elements at the foundation of his work. Now I maintain that every physical concept means nothing but a certain definite kind of connexion of the sensory elements which I havedenoted by A B C . . . These elements — elements in the sense that no further resolution has___as vet been made of them — are the simplest materials out ofwfilch the physical, and also the psychological, world is built up.7

L ater scientists take a m o re aggressive stand . W hile M ach suggested th a t th e basic process in know ledge o r general co gn ition consisted o f m en tal states, th a t is sensations, m ore recent w orkers un d erto o k to analyze e laborately those basic psychic s ta tes as they supposedly o pera te in scientific situations.

<■/: *'> ' ^/T here is no better exercise for the mind than the endeavour to reduce the perception we '

have of “external things” down to the simple sense-impressions by which we feel them. The •*'' arbitrary distinction between outside and inside ourselves is then clearly seen to be one merely of everyday practical convenience.8 * ^ ''

When we find that the mind is entirely limited to the one source, sense-impression, for its contents, that it can classify and analyze, associate and construct but always with this same material, either in its immediate or stored form, then it is not difficult to understand what, and what only, can be the facts of science, the subject-matter of knowledge. Science, we sav at once, deals with conceptions drawn from sense-impressions, and its legitimate field is the whole content of the human mind. Those who assert that science deals with the world of external phenomena are only stating a half-truth. Science only appeals to the world of phenomena — to immediate sense-impressions — with the view of testing and verifying the accuracy of its conceptions and inferences, the ultimate basis of which lies as we have seen in such immediate sense-impressionsj^cience deals with the mental, the “inside” world, and the aim of its processes of classification and inference is precisely that oTinitinctive or mechanicarassociation. namely, to enable the exertion, best calculated to preserve the race

7 Ibid., pp. 4 |, 42.8 Pearson, K„ The Grammar o f Science, London, Walter Scolt, 1892, p. 79.

71

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P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N ^

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: individual, to follow on the sense-impression with the least expenditure of time a nd lectual energy. Science is in this respect an economy of thought — a delicate tuning nterestsoTthe mind of the organs which receive sense-impressions and those whichte activity.’ ~ ^v?Yv •i the problem round and ponder over it as we will, beyond the sense-impression,I the brain .terminals of the sensory nerves we cannot get. Of what is beyond them, of -in-themselves,” as the metaphysicians term them, wexan know but one characteris- ! this we can only describe as a capacity for producing sense-impressions, for sending jes along the sensory nerves to the brain. This is the sole scientific statement which- made with regard to what TiesTieyond sense-impressions. But even in this statement st be careful to analyze our meaning. The methods of classification and inference, hold for sense-impressions and for the-conceptions based upon them, cannot be ed outside our minds, away from the sphere in which we know them to hold, into a which we have recognized as unknown and unknowable. The laws, if we can speak __ ' n f o j i, of this sphere must be as unknown as its contents, and therefore to talk of its / y <'"'c :s as p ro d u c in g sense-impressions is an unwarranted inference, for we are asserting ?I ff le ffe c t— a~law of phenomena or sense-impressions — to hold in a region bevond oerience.10

in teresting to observe how th e basic postu la tes o f the sp iritistic /; 'i ‘‘ ions affected the th in k in g o f scientists w ho follow ed in the H ob b es- J j l ;-B erkeley-H um e E m piristic line o f developm ents. A n o u ts tan d in g pie is B ridgm an w ho fo rm u la te d the o p era tio n a l view w hich culm i- 1 ^ in th e n o tio n th a t science is essentially a so lipsistic psychic process. dgm an) m odels his p a rticu la r ex p o sitio n o f positiv ism u p o n the sT oT m easurem en t. H is a ssu m p tio n is th a t only th ro u g h the opera- o f the scientist can experim en ta l an d valid concepts concern ing the ; o f things be derived. Q uite obliv ious is he t o (the fact th a t h e ’ tingly con founds th ings w ith concepts,'/and concepts w ith psychic sses. His stress o f o p era tio n s to achieve results am o u n ts m erely to 7a lg use o f an evident fact as a base fo r a sp iritistic in terp re ta tio n o f :s an d philosophy.assum ing th a t science m u st tu rn aw ay fro m properties o f th ings to tions, B ridgm an s tresses ac ts o T o p e ra tors, then by converting acts nen tal sta tes a<T processes he lands in to the b ria rs o f m ind -body ism. Physics becom es fo r him a d o m ain in w hich one m ind canno t an o th e r m ind even w hether it exists o r not.

rational analysis is applicable not only to the meaning of terms or concepts, but to matters of meaning, as for example, to the meaning of questions. From this point of lo not know what 1 mean by a question until I can picture to myself what 1 would do k the correctness of an answer which might be presented to me. Analysis of questions

..pp. 80-81.irson, K., The Grammar o f Science, pp. 81-82.

72


from this point of view leads to the recognition that tiueslions-can be formulated which allow no possible procedure for checking the correctness of a hypothetical answer. An example is the celebrated question of W. K. Clifford, “Is it possible that as time goes on the

ij dimensions of the universe may be continually changing, but in such a way that wc can I I never detect it, because all our measuring sticks are shrinking in the same way as everything | * else?""

To start as far back as possible, it is obvious that I can never get outside of myself; direct experience embraces only the things in my consciousness — sense impressions of various sorts and various sorts of cerebrations — and naught else. In the material of direct experience I distinguish features which 1 describe as external to myself and others which I recognize as internal, and possibly there are features where the decision is difficult, as for example whether the pain in my foot is due to a sliver beneath the skin or due to a stone in my shoe. The external features often arouse in me reactions of adjustment of one sort or another, and there are certain conventional devices which I use in making the adjustments. Success in making these adjustments I recognize as desirable, and is something that I strive for, but I do not always attain the success that 1 could desire.1*

This position, which I suppose is the solipsist position, is often felt to be absurd and contrary to common sense. How, it is asked, can there be agreement as to experience unless there are external things which both you and 1 perceive? Part of the hostility to the solipsist position is, Hhink, merely duejo confusion of thinking, and there isa stronjielement of the pseudp-problemTnixjed up here. If 1 say that an externa) thing is merely a part of my direct experience io which I findlHai you react in certain ways, what more is there to be said, or indeed what other operational meaning can be attached to the concept of an external thing?It seems to me that as I have stated it. the solipsist position, if indeed this be the solipsist position, is a simple statement of what direct observation gives me, and we have got to adjust our thinking so that it will not seem repugnant."^ >/>Vi/. X +*

, r■ *£. ' /.'•POSITIVISM — CRITIC A L ANALYSIS & iX,

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E ach interval flushes up its ow n covey o f problem s. T he positivistic in terva l p erhaps m ore definitely th a n o th ers brings to th e surface the fu tility o f a ph ilosophy based u p o n abso lu teness, universality , an d sp iritism . N evertheless, such vacuities a re fea tu red as basic to the ph ilosophy practiced by professional scientists.

A s in the d em o n strab le cases o f the o th e r ph ilosoph ical in tervals o r types o f th ink ing , so here we observe the irresistible pow er o f spiritistic p ostu la tions. Scientists are influenced, how ever unw ittingly , by abso lu tes ? an d universals to the d isad v an tag e o f ac tu a l observation o f th ings and& events. T he result is com plete m isu n d erstan d in g o f experience an d n a tu re . "

"Bridgman. P. W., The Nature o f Physical Theory, Princeton, Princeton Univ. Press, 1936, pp. 11-12.

'-‘Ibid., p . 13."Bridgman, P. W., The Nature o f Physical Theory, pp. 14-15.

73

r ' i tv t i iC '? ' •/ '/ft n- ■ ‘ ■r t s . r •"/'* y '

P H I L O S p ' P II I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N

goes so fa r as the “logical co n stru c tio n o Iih e jw .q rld 3 4) A t b o tto m , the jsal o f positivism by b o th theo re tica l an d ex p erim en ta l scientists is 1 upon the assim ila tion o f a fa llacious psychology, on e erected upon ad itions o f body-m ind dichotom y.n o s t in teresting feature o f the d o m in a tio n o f ph ilosophies by m ental-isychology is th a t w hen criticism is m ad e o f t he p h en o m en o lo gical__ts o f positivism , it takes the form only o f a d issension from th e view ‘sense d a ta ” are basic to all know ledge .15 But th ere is lack ing then iciation th a t “sense” d a ta an d every th ing perta in ing to them are l ^ ic construc tions based on no co n fro n ta tio n w ith th ings an d events onsequently no observations.th ing in science is m ore destructive th a n the im position o f religious -/ ine u p o n the events s tudied , the o b serv a tio n s m ade, an d the in terpre- is o f the entire process o f locating p ro b lem s an d the precise w ays they tacked. T he cen tral issue here is the fallacy o f a ssum ing th a t events no existence except in the m inds o f the scientist, this is no th ing o ther Ringing to a belief in theistic creation . /%(?/«it M /----------------- ~ ------------ 1 • A ? - / S'/

BASIS OF POSITIVISTIC ER R O R S ‘>/V

the e rro rs an d v irtues o f an y philosoph ical system m ay be isolated by m sideration o f the en tire field in w hich it d eveloped in detail; th is field les th e civilizational locus w here it is developed , a lso the capacity o f ig in a to r an d the various co n trib u to rs . T h e accom pany ing d iagram 1) clearly indicates the various facto rs in cu ltu ra l fields, iny o f the erro rs o f the positivistic ph ilo sophy are n o d o u b t ow ing to tct th a t specialized v iew poin ts m ay , w hile m ore o r less correctly ive som e phase o f a m ore general system , still suffer from the erro rs o f neral system . T h u s positivism w hile insisting upo n th e im portance of ience as contac ts with things, m ay w reck itself by the m entalistic lates o f conventional ph ilosophy.the d iag ram indicates a ph ilosoph ical system arises o u t o f a m atrix o f n events o rganized in to a cu ltu ra l com p lex . T h is m atrix consists o f a o r q u an tity o f persons occupying a p artic u la r te rr ito ry sh ared with a e r o f o th er species o f organism s. T h e persons are organized in a m ore s closely b inding relationsh ip . D ep en d in g u p o n th e evo lu tionary

Carnap, R., Die Logische Aufbau der Well; Seheinproblem in der Philosophic, Hamburg, 1966.

Nagel, E„ The Structure of Science; Problems in the Logic o f Scientific Explanation, New arcourt, Brace, 1961.

74


Philosophical Systems

in Multiple

Variations

System

Postulates

Metasystems

Protopostulates

Metapostulates

Cultural Matrix

Type of Civilization

Institutional Equipment

Fig. 1. Evolution of philosophy through intellectual stages.

s ta tu s o f th e individuals there m ay be little o r n o b ehav io r p ro p erly called reflective.

W hen th e life co n d itio n s o f g ro u p s reach levels above th e struggles for, bare organic existence, reflective b ehav io r o f a prim itive o r advanced type will be influenced by th e fac to rs o f th e cu ltu ra l m atrix , language, religion, an d th e trad itio n s o f tr ib a l experience a n d w isdom p erp e tu a ted as cu ltu ra l institu tions. In the m ore ad v an ced societies, o f course, scientific facto rs are included.

75

SPECIM ENS O F CULTURAL INFLUENCES

ommunal Style. Because the essen tials o f h u m an g roups consist o f the in terbehav io r o f ind iv iduals w ith th e institu tions evolved in

o m m o n life a n d in connection w ith the prevailing am b ien t condi- those life styles will influence th e basic prem ises o f the logic and on o f th e ind iv iduals now present. E xam ples are th e intuitive prem - continen tal philosophies as aga inst the em piristic inclinations o f the

Islanders. It is such influences th a t affect the specific styles o f nics. a r t. law, science, and o ther theories.echnology. N o one can fail to be im pressed by the co m parison o f ferences in th e a rch itec tu re , ship form s, jew ellry, house furnishings ips even those w ho occupy territo ries in close proxim ity . W hile care ■e tak en to avoid c ru d e views o f th e causal im pact o f cu ltu ra l details :ach o ther, it m ust still a p p e a r ev ident th a t ce rta in to tal cultures ; pattern ings o f all local entities n o t affected by diffusion from oring cultures.unguage. It is a fairly well estab lished princip le th a t the style o f a ge m ay g reatly influence th e o th e r fac to rs in a societal com plex . A n 'le is the g rea t p reference in scientific circles for m athem atica l sym - vcr w ords. M ore strik ing is the general belief th a t the R om an )n ham pers th e progress o f m athem atica l enterprises. T here is also i m th a t A risto telean logic was eno rm ously ham pered by being based G reek Language.’eligion. A n ap p a ren tly clear-cu t exam ple o f th e influence o f reli- nstitu tions u p o n ph ilosophy an d science is the to ta lita rian psychol- ’ so u th e rn G erm any as over ag a in st a tom istic associa tion ism o f ;rn E urope. T he sam e sort o f in terac tion is noticeable in theories o f al science and econom ics.•ience. T he long struggle betw een C artesian ism an d N ew tonian ism edly exem plifies the influence o f scientific fo rm ula tions over o ther il factors. M any fu rther specific exam ples are availab le from the ice o f science on ph ilosophy an d the p rob lem s o f the superio rity o f ed natu ra l sciences over the social and hum anistic types.

I* n 1 L () S O I* I I I C A l . S V S T E M S I N S ! ' f C F. S S I () N

76

C H A P T E R 8

THE INTERVAL OF LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

TRANSFORM A TION O F PH ILO SO PH ICA L INSTITUTIONS

P hilosophical attitudes m irro r events in the lives o f people. A ccordingly changes in hum an situations find their co u n te rp a rt in the philosophical system s o f particu la r th inkers o f the ages in w hich they live and w ork. P h ilo sophers in the tw entieth cen tu ry a re definitely influenced by the great evolu tion in technology, social o rgan iza tion , rise and decline o f nations, changes in in terna tional re la tionsh ips, an d in local cu ltu re as well a s in o th e r varia tions in levels o f civilization. These changes are reflected in the lessening o f interest in t ra d itio n a l m etaphysics an d in th e developm ent o f a un ique p hilosophical in terval cen tering a b o u t linguistic p rob lem s. T he significance o f linguistic ph ilo sophy w as ap tly characterized by B ertrand

i R ussell w hen he suggested th a t it d eparted from the desire to u n d erstan d ' the w orld in o rder to explore the m ysteries o f w ords and sentences.1

O bservers o f the ph ilosophical scene m ight well report th a t linguistic s tu d y ap p ea red to take over entirely the w ork o f philosophy zing. W hile not all th e m em bers o f the ph ilosophical fra tern ity cu ltivated the new field, the m ost active and creative w riters partic ipa ted in the new w ay o f th ink ing . Incidentally , linguistic ph ilo sophy has developed aces2 w ho like the g rand heros o f philosophical h istory set the stage fo r au th o rita tiv e doctrines and precip ita ted cliques o f ag reem ent an d divergence. In this w ay the linguistic ph ilosophical m ovem ent has been expanded to colossal p roportions, an d ex trem e abstractionism .

LANGUAGE IN THE SERVICE O F PHILOSOPHY

S o in tim ate are speech an d language in the lives o f hum an beings a n d so serviceable th a t it is no t su rp rising th a t w hen philosophers in the tw entie th cen tu ry becam e disillusioned w ith m etaphysical philosophy they tu rn ed to language as the m eans o f avo id in g th e futilities o f transcenden ta l th ink ing ,

t All th e e rro rs in ph ilosophical en terprises they assum ed could be correc ted

1 "The desire lo understand the world, is they think, an outdated folly." Russell. B„ My philosophical Development, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1959. p. 219.

1 An excellent example is Wittgenstein about whom contentions have raged, and whose every word has been the subject of excgetical disputation.

dH tinf 77t., rein-* *HjCy. rL, »

• H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N

analysis o f language. T h e p ro p o n en ts o f the m ovem ent to im prove )phy asserted th a t to avoid m etaphysics it is sufficient to analyze and e th e language used by philosophers.s there aro se th e institu tion o f L inguistic o r S em an tic A nalysis ng a n u m b er o f ph ilosophical sects o p era tin g u n d er v arious nam es s Logical Positivism , Logical E m piricism , A naly tic P h ilosophy , itical C ritic ism , Logical A nalysis, an d so on.CN one o f th em envisage >phy as a ttitu d es o f persons to w ard n a tu ra l o r cu ltu ral events, bu t : a discipline concerned w ith wo rd s and sentences^ By co n trast w ith to rica l n o tio n th a t ph ilo sophy has no subject m a tte r o f its ow n, rs tu rn ed to language as th e p ro p er ob ject o f ph ilosophical investiga- he p resen t ch a p te r is devo ted to the ex am in a tio n o f th is m ovem ent.

ESSENTIALS O F LINGUISTIC PH ILO SO PH Y

piistic ph ilosophy began as a m odest analysis to avo id m etaphysics uistically scru tin izing the language in o rd e r to p reven t transcenden- ions from invading the structu res o r system s o f ph ilosophy. A ppar- how ever, language as a n in s tru m en t o f th in k in g a n d w riting has o u t to be the p rim ary o bject o f study . N o d o u b t th ere is d iscernible

n influence o f m athem atica l p rocedures. H o w closely L inguistic ophy clung to language is clearly ind icated by a d ec la ra tion o f x sor W isdom , a m em ber o f the L inguistic P h ilo so p h y group.

sophy one does not study physics, but the language of physicists; not political' ‘ but the language of political scientists; not history, but the language of historians; j ion or theology, but religious or theological languages.3 I r.

sim ilar vein, P ro fessor A yer declares,rge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding I where it cannot profitably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant4

ain ,✓

ropositions of philosophy are not factual, but linguistic in character — that is, they escribe the behavior of physical, or even mental, objects; they express definitions, or tal consequences of definitions.(Accondingly, we may say that philosophy is a ienl of logicJFor we shall see that the characteristic mark of a purely logical enquiry t is concerned with the formal consequences of our definitions and not with :S of empirical fact.3

h, H. B., Language and Ethics, in Proceedings and Addresses o f the American Philosophical on, 1970-71.A. J., Language, Truth, and Logic, New York, Dover, 1946, p. 35.A. J., Op. cit., p. 57.

78

I N T E R V A L O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY:^ VALID PREM ISES, INVALID CONCLUSIONS

It is u nden iab le that linguistic analysis is a useful p rocedure for checking the language used in any discussion including the philosophical in o rd e r to ascerta in w h a t. if .anything, is being referred to o r w hether the w riter o r • ■ speaker is m erely exercising his pow ers o f p roduc ing w ords. O n the o ther h an d , is it sufficient fo r ph ilosophical purposes fo r th inkers to practice so sim ple an occupation? Is there no t g rea t scope for reflection and intellectual achievem ent in add ition to the p ro p er use o f speech and language? /<**

W e m ay thus regard the ph ilosoph ical in junction to guard language aga inst m isrepresen tation , confusion , an d m isguidance as a valid prem ise.But it is the grossest e rro r to conclude th a t adequate philosophyzing will result from such p recau tionary m easures. Even the m ost guarded and precise references m ay still allow m etaphysical views to in trude in to one's general o rien ta tion and s p e c u la t io n ^ ! oreover, w hat value adheres to the construc tion an d p roc lam atio n o f a system w hich does no t include the considera tion o f the n a tu re and o p era tio n o f things an d events^)r o philosophize significantly a n ind ispensable m in im um is to postu late p roperly concerning language and philosophy. ✓

INADEQUATE ATTITUDE TOW ARD PHILOSOPHY

Linguistic P h ilosophy fails b o th as a ph ilo so p h y and as a co rrec tion fo r philosophy. D espite all th e c laim s o f linguistic philosophers to free th em selves from trad itional m etaphysics, they achieve no such result. P lainly they a re still subject to the cjassical^not ions o f universality and a b so lu te n e ss an d in no way describable as h u m an p ro d u c ts based upon th e e xperiences o f particu la r persons living u nder the auspices o f physiochem ical, biological, and cu ltural conditions. U pon the ph ilosophical basis indicated . L inguistic P hilosophers erect fallible n o tio n s o f hum an natu re and hum an experience. This extends o f course to p roblem s o f language,

INADEQUATE VIEW O F LANGUAGE

A lthough linguistic p h ilo sophers care on ly ab o u t language an d not ab o u t the things and events referred to , still there a re m any flaws in the views they enterta in ab o u t linguistic m atters. A serious fundam ental e rro r o f th e Linguistic Philosophers is the assum ption that language consists o f a rticu la ted o r tex tual w ords b o th w ith independen t status. W riters on speech and language d o no t adequately consider th a t language always

79

Jves persons w ho speak o r w rite a b o u t th ings and events. Basically reduce language to independen t signs o r sym bols th a t p resum ably sen t th ings an d events. W h en we inquire w hat th e linguistic philos- rs u n d erstan d by language w e find th a t they regard language as s o r sym bols, b u t no t an y concre te activ ity o f persons w hen they refer jects o r events.i excellent exam ple o f h o w linguistic p h ilo sophers trea t w ords is ;enstein’s denial th a t “n o t” is the n am e o f a re la tion , such as “righ t” o r nam e relations. He th in k s “ n o t” is n o t a n am e a t all, since if it were

no t-P ” w ould be different fro m “ P ” as nam ing tw o nots w hich “P ” not m en tion .6 L anguage, how ever, can never be d issociated from in activities an d interests basic to ad justm en ts o r ad ap ta tio n s to oning th ings an d circum stances. T h e conven tiona l view o f language :es all the ad justm en ta l featu res o f language with a rcan e “m eanings" :d by w ords o r signs. L anguage in no sense requ ires th e invocation o f scendent m eanings” in o rd e r to fit speech o r language as references o r ols to deal with things an d events.7 ^

THE EXTENSIVE RANGE O F LANGUAGE THINGS AND LANGUAGE EVENTS

jperly to u nderstand the n a tu re an d op era tio n o f language in its us situ a tio n s it is necessary to consider its range o f m ultip le organ iza- and functions. N ot only is language am o n g th e extrem ely im p o rtan t ties o f individuals, covering a w ide range o f perform ances, b u t it also ices m o re o r less lasting p ro d u c ts . D o u b tless th e basic fo rm o f age is speech, th e activities o f referring to things, events, as well as ns. But w hen the activities leave a p ro d u c t in the fo rm o f w ords o r they becom e statisized to serve all so rts o f purposes, fo r exam ple, ds and annals, an d in general supply the m eans o f conveying in fo rm a- cross long stretches o f tim e and space. L inguistic records produced in us w ays as by pictures, sym bols, and w ords conserve and convey -al institu tions o f m any varieties. L inguistic functions serve, too , to d s ta tu s an d deve lopm en t to persons in m an y so rts o f p rivate and : situations. S .o Ja r .a s j j h i l o so phy is concerned , linguistic factors te to c onstruct an d preserve p ro p o sitio n s. In short, lan g u age helps to date the a tt i tu des o f ind iv iduals as p ropositions in the guise o fmore, J. A., Hundred Years o f Philosophy, Harmondswonh, Penguin, 1968, p. 355. a comprehensive study of naturalistic linguistics see Kantor, J. R., Psychological Linguistics,, Principia, 1977.


80

I N T E R V A L O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I Sdescrip tions o r in te rp re ta tio n s o f the ac tiv ities o f persons a n d the objects th a t they con fro n t and rep o rt ab o u t.

S ince L inguistic P h ilo so p h y is in ten d ed as a corrective fo r the tra d itional system s n ow ex tan t, w hether spiritistic o r nonspiritistic, the question arises w hether it can bring a b o u t a U top ian cond ition in the general ph ilosoph ical d om ain? U n fo rtu n a te ly , th e a n swer is no , m ain ly because o f an inad eq u a te no tion o f ph ilo sophy an d language. Basically the th inkers o f the L inguistic in fe rv a rd o no t g o lfeep ly enougfTin their observation th a t ph ilosophyzing consists o f com plex behav io r o f persons w hile developing p ro p o sitio n s a b o u t them selves a n d th e ir env irons a n d are n o t ju s t eva luato rs o f p ro p o sitio n s a lread y fo rm u la ted o n a n a rb itra ry an d insecure basis. P h ilo soph ica l m isin te rp re ta tio n is inev itab le w hen the experiences a n d perfo rm ances o f th inkers are n o t sufficiently tak en in to accoun t. W h a t m u st be sough t after a re th e fac to rs th a t even tua te in the co n stru c tio n o f s ta tem en ts o r p ropositions reflecting the th in k er and his th inking. T h in k in g itself m u st o f cou rse be based o n the results o f observation a n d reasoning.

^ THE ROLE OF PROPOSITIONS IN PHILOSOPHICAL SITUATIONS

P hilosophy constitu tes an accu m u la tio n o f p ropo sitio n s encased in speech a n d tex ts. P ro p o sitio n s a re co n stru c tio n s th a t sum up th e a ttitu d es o r reactions o f individuals to the events w ith w hich they a re in co n tac t d irectly o r indirectly th ro u g h co rrec t o r incorrect in fo rm atio n im parted by o th e r perso n s. In general, the p ro p o sitio n s o f ph ilosophy a re co n tinuous w ith those o f everyday s itua tions b u t subject to the criteria o f expertness an d relevancy fo r o rien ta tional p u rposes a n d subsequent ac tion . *'

- Ind iv idual differences in p ro p o sitio n co n stru c tio n a re obviously fu n ctions o f the in tellectual com petence o f the construc to rs as based on the ir p rio r experiences w ith sim ilar th ings and situations. Also the env iron ing circum stances influencing each.

N ow it follow s th a t the significance o f a p h ilo soph ical system o r m ethod d ep en d ^d efin ite ly u p o n its p ro p o sitio nal constituents, th a t is, the un it

"com ponents. T h e considera tion o f co m p o n en t propositions suggests guide lines foT th e constru c tio n o f ph ilosoph ical system s in w hole o r part. S uch guide lines will serve to recognize an d g u a rd against su p ern a tu ra l prem ises in the ir v arious phases o f m ind -body , m in d -m atte r, a p riori- a posteriori, an d so o n . ^ i t h the e lim ina tion o f all transcenden ta l en tanglem ents, a s tu d en t o f p ropositions can look u p o n th em as definite factors in the events o f hu m an experience .^

*9

81

P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O NPROPOSITIONS AS BEHAVIORAL PRODUCTS

opositions constitu te p roducts o f h u m an ac tion in precisely the sam e as a m usical com position , a p a in tin g o r d raw ing , o r a table. In each

the individual operates u pon specific m ateria ls w ith a m ore o r less itely organized plan. W hile in m aking a table the m an ipu lations ved a re the m ost obvious, the perfo rm ances in the o ther cases m en- d a re no t one w hit different in princip le . S ince this is so, we need n o t ite to include the three kinds o f p ro d u c ts in the sam e class. ie m ateria ls in teracted w ith in the p ro d u c tio n o f p ropositions include • type and variety o f object. T hey range from the m ost crassly m an ipu- ob jects to im agined (created) th ings o r the m ateria ls o f scientific

itions. W henever we have an au th en tic field o f h u m an in terbehav io r ive a po ten tia l location for the process o f p roposition p roduc tion . T he wing tab le suggests the range o f such m ateria ls an d the p ropositions .ructed from them .Materials Proposition Field;y changes The quantity of heat produced by the

transformation of mechanical work is equivalent to work performed.

Physics

•y changes Energy radiation is discontinuous and is measurable in definite quantity. Physics

gical trait The characteristics of organisms arensmission transmitted to their offspring by means

of chromosomal material.Biology

rical Essential incidents in national and in Philosophyternational relations recur in whole of Historyor part.

asitions Logical propositions are basic to all Logicscience.

ties • Spiritual essences are the most real. Philosophy .: numbers If n is any integer whatsoever and if pis

a prime number, then the binomial np — n is a multiple of p.

Mathematics

Philosophy ?lophysics Every psychosis is correlated with aneurosis.

asitions Propositions within a system must be demonstrated by apparatus not comprised in that system.

Logic

1c con- When individual muscle fibres arection stimulated they give a maximal con

traction or none at all.Physiology

8 2

I N T E R V A L O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I SHuman behavior Light rays

Algebraic equations Origin of inventions Great men

Haste makes waste.In an inhomegeneous medium, a light ray travelling between two points fol- lowsa path along which the time taken is a minimum with respect to all paths joining the two points.Any algebraic equation must possess at least one solution real or complex. Necessity is the mother of invention.

Great men are the products of complex historical events.

Folk Wisdom

AppliedMathematics

Mathematics Folk Wisdom

History

(R e fle c tio n as well as o u r ex am p les ind ica tes th a t p ro p o sitio n s a re n o t _only o rgan iza tions o f features derived by ab strac tio n from concrete o r n en tire ly created things, b u t tha t they are construc ted o r p roduced novelties.) £<e**t D ep en d in g u p o n the field in w hich th ey a re co n stru c ted they m ay be variously described as hypotheses, guesses, specula tions, o r ju s t p lain fantasies. F ro m the s tan d p o in t o f objective an d natu ra listic psychology, p ro p o sitio n s belong to the general range o f events in w hich such creations as inventional ideas an d scientific an d artis tic concepts are produced .

AN INTERBEHAVIORAL APPROACH TO „ PHILOSOPHICAL PROPOSITIONS

T h o u g h th e P n ilo so p h iea rIn te rv a l h as failed to co rrec t the w rongs o f ph ilosophy , it m erits th e ap p ro v a l o f a ll w h o a b h o r the en tan g lem en t o f ph ilosophy w ith spiritistic m etaphysics. In a sense, too , th e founders an d follow ers have d em o n stra ted th e necessity fo r a n im proved ap p rec ia tio n o f the ro le o f language in th e reflective d o m a in w ith its re la tio n sh ip to th in k in g an d system m aking. S ince th e w riter assum es th a t such an im proved a ttitu d e tow ard ph ilo sophy is available in the In terbehav io ra l ap p ro a c h , the rem ainder o f th is c h a p te r is devoted to the exposition o f th a t v iew point an d its im pact o n the general ph ilosoph ical trad ition .

j(? T h e basic assu m p tio n o f th e in terb eh av io ra l ap p ro ach is th a t all scientific an d philosoph ical w o rk consists o f in terbehav io r o f ind iv iduals w ith (1) things an d events, an d (2) th e p ro d u c ts o f such in terbehavior.

^ a. Interbehavior with Events. Science an d logic like all o th e r hum an en terp rises a re essentially activ ities o f p erso n s by w ay o f m an ipu la ting , ta lk ing , o r specula ting a b o u t all so rts o f m ateria ls w ith w hich they are

V>

8 3

P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O N;ctly in contac t o r indirectly acq u a in ted th ro u g h speech and sc r ip t E ven en one believes th a t one is endow ed w ith su p ern a tu ra l pow ers one is still ;rbehaving w ith oneself, th o u g h here we m ust distinguish betw een ■per a n d im proper ac tio n . M oreover, w hen persons in teract w ith things t exist only as verbal o r p ictorial c rea tio n (Pegasus, dim ensionless nts, m erm aids, o r the p a ran o iac’s trillion do llars o r iden tity w ith ipoleon), they are sim ilarly dem on stra tin g in terbehavior.n an tic ip a tio n o f later d iscussion th e in te rb eh av io r w ith w ords o r 'guage deserves special m ention . H ere are to be d istinguished (1) referen-

an d sym bolic an d (2) scrip tu ra l an d ep ig ram m atic language. T h e m er belongs to situations in w hich p ersons a re referred to o r o therw ise )t in con tac t w ith sp a tio -tem p o ra l objects an d events.Qn the la tte r case con tac ts do n o t go beyond th e w o rd s , an d are exem plified by th e

grams: “T here exists a n ab so lu te m oral law ," “ I am m aster o f all I

\ t th is po in t it is exped ien t to consider th e question o f novelty. A n m o np lace o f e lem entary psychology is th a t novel crea tions exist only virtue o f various definite in terac tions w ith th ings w hich are transfo rm ed such in terbehav io r as abstrac ting , ex trap o la tin g , in term ix ing , em p h a- ng, analogizing , an d rearrang ing . W h a t is really k now n by everybody is ingely overlooked by s tu d en ts o f logical ded u c tio n a n d scientific m eth- S ure ly th ey.forget th a t they c a o itm a s e n s e transcend th e h u m a n scene

dictate to natu re except by acts o f th e strictest obedience. tfHen we consider the co n tin u ity betw een orig inal th ings and events and

e lab o ra te technological c rea tio n s we find no necessity to construc t c rip tio n s o f events on different levels o f existence o r subsistence. T h e ;rbehav io r o f persons w ith th ings is in princip le like th a t o f th e in terbe- ijor o f anv th in e with anv other, so th a t psychic entities o r pow ers are n in a te d /S ince even all objects constitu te in terbehav io ral system s, for imple, th e in te rb eh av io r o f m olecules o f a m agnet o r o f w ater, we m ay a rd an observationa l even t as in te rb eh av io r w ith in terbehav io r.8) lt m ay a trite b u t nevertheless im p o rtan t suggestion th a t to inject m ind o r p io u s n e s s as n o n -spa tio -tem poral facto rs in to a descrip tion o f an .ervation is a heritage fro m prescientific th o u g h t. It m ay be asserted thw ith th a t th e in terbehav io ral p rincip le in psychology involves no tors different in principle from those o f an y o th e r science. ^

X. Kantor, J. R., “Toward a Scientific Analysis of Motivation," Psychological Record, 1942, 5. 275.

/ _ / / a J>s/,asssjn84

r fU & c to

n t e r v a l o f l i n g u i s t i c a n a l y s i s

Im plied in the in te rb eh av io r w ith events is tha t ac tual individuals com e _into con tac t w ith specific even ts. A t once there is excluded all descrip tions m ade in te rm s o f vague generality . It is such descrip tions w hich lead to m etaphysical theories an d purely verbal statem ents. T he in terbehavioral a p p ro a c h is o p p o sed to hap p en in g s in general, to u ltim ates and totalities. O n th e co n tra ry , it leads to genuine n a tu ra l h isto ry in science a n d to contro llab le system -build ing in logic.

b. Interbehavior with Products. T h e significance o f stressing in terbehav io r w ith p roduc ts is th a t all h u m an enterprises, w hether intellectual, scientific, o r practical, occur u p o n historically successive levels. I f we trace the evo lu tion o f any p a rticu la r science o r discipline we d iscover its beginnings in in terbehav io r w ith th ings on a sim ple, practical, o r com m onsense level. As every h isto rian o f science m ust p o in t o u t, as tro n o m y has its ro o ts first in casual and unsystem atic observations o f prehistoric tim e and la ter in astro logically organized b u t unaccep tab le form ulations. Likewise, w hen scientific chem istry began w ith Lavoisier nine o f his th irty -three elem ents were know n from h o a ry an tiqu ity , w hereas ten tu rned o u t no t to be elem ents a t all.

ji. P recisely here lies th e im p o rtan ce o f th e in terbehavioral a p p ro a c h — nam ely , th e insistence th a t th e w o rk e r an d his w ork rem ain co n stan tly in the fo reground . Especially m ust th e fact be kept alive th a t all later developm en ts in science o r logic, n o m atte r how com plicated , a re definitely based u p o n con tac ts o f persons w ith earlier stages o f the sam e things. T he im portance o f ho ld ing th e w o rk er an d his in terbehav io r in view is evident from th e follow ing considera tions selected from a large num ber.

^ s (1) S ince all com plex en terp rises find individuals im m ersed in e lab o ra te •^ '"cultural accum ulations resu lting from p rio r in terbehavior, the scientific

w orker is not only concerned w ith th ings and events bu t w ith in tellectual trad itio n s. In term ixed in his discipline are innum erable , practical and general h u m an interests. H ence doctrina l trends are engendered in w hich n ational, cu ltu ra l, an d p rac tica l h u m an in terests and m otives a re in term ingled. W h o can say how m u ch the fo rtunes o f science are conditioned

(1 fo r good or evil by such fa c to rs ! C o n sid e r how the deve lopm ent o f m a th e m atics was o b structed by th e persistence o f the B ritish no t to assim ilate the C on tinen ta l calculus. W hy could K an t celebrate the com pletion and perfection o f classical logic? T h a t we a re n o t involved here with developm ents dependen t u p o n abso lu te pow ers o f p articu la r m inds is a ttested by the fact th a t a f te r Boole, S ch roeder, P e a n o , Frege, and o thers did develop m o d em sym bolic logic th e h isto rian w ent back to K ant’s predecessors to piece

• ' I

8 5

eth er th e developm enta l co n tin u ity from the various beginnings, A de- itely to keep before us th e w o rk e r m eans, o f course, including in o u r estigation the conditions under w hich he works.2 ) Because, ce rta in behaviors p rove in teresting o r fru itfu l they set the e o f th o u g h t and investigation. O n a large scale th is fact is illustrated by p en ch an t w hich w orkers develop fo r the exact as over aga inst the

ta c t sciences w ith the result th a t th e social sciences rem ain backw ard pite th e ir im portance . S m aller scale sequelae are exem plified by various ; in scientific investigations; for exam ple , F rauenhofer’s spectroscopic lies w ere unapprecia ted because a t th e tim e scientists were inord inately rested in th e com peting claim s o f the w ave an d em ission theories, lilarly, objective psychology can m ake b u t slow h eadw ay w hen the iistence o f psychical doctrine influences th e p reservation o f psychic ;s bv th e procedure o f in terpre ting them in physical term s. Chr*in I) W h en we concern ourselves w ith a w o rker and his w ork we readily now certa in m ethods tha t p rove useful in science and logic becom e ends lem selves, an d thus perhaps can avoid this ou tcom e. Even statistical experim en ta l p rocedures n o t only becom e bases fo r neglecting events he tim e not am enab le to trea tm en t by such m ethods, b u t also fo r :o n s tru in g th e events they d o treat. W hen the psychologist develops an lligence q u o tien t he is p ro n e to confuse his a rb itra ry m easure an d stical results w ith the ac tua l in terbehav io r w hich originally stim ulated vork. W hen physicists like M ach, D uhem , an d P oincare observe tha t hem atical sym bols constitu te the best w ay to record and represen t its, they risk th e d anger o f regard ing m athem atics as exclusively a form inguage. A gain, the rigor th a t logicians d iscover in d ed u c tio n leads 1 to suggest th a t it is the scientific m ethod par excellence.

INTERBEHAVIORAL IM PLICATIONS FOR SCIENCE

robably the basic im plication o f th e in terbehav io ral a p p ro ach fo r ice a n d p h ilo sophy is th a t the m ateria ls in terac ted w ith a re never luced in the act o f observing them , no m atte r how com plicated the rvation . N o investigation o r experim ent creates th e crude o r p reana- events which originally stim ulate the in terests o f th e scientist. Scientific ngs a re full o f suggestions to the effect th a t things consist o f “sense " w hich a re presum ably processes o f know ing instead o f qualities o f »s k n o w n . A lso “ physical objects” a re alleged to be scientific construc- as well as “ reality ." B oth o f these ideas are sum m ed up in the factitious

lion concern ing the existence o f an ex ternal world.


8 6

N T E R V A L O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I S

-*> H ere we m ust d istinguish betw een crude an d ana ly tic events.9 A s to the fo rm er, we need on ly ind icate th a t these a re the th ings an d events w ith w hich individuals in teract o n an y level. W hile scien tific c ru d e d a ta m ay be c o m plicated tran s fo rm atio n s o f th ings m et w ith in prescientific s itu a tio ns, they m ain ta in the ir con tinu ity w ith those things.

A naly tic d a ta in general consist o f described , recorded , an d in terp re ted events. T hese are co n stru c tio n s developed a fte r the w o rk e r has been in co n tac t w ith cru d e events. S u ch co n stru c tio n s com prise hypo theses, w hich d irec t investigation , an d theo ries a n d laws constitu ting ex p lan a tio n s an d in terp re ta tions o f the p reanaly tic events.

By n o m eans sh o u ld c ru d e an d ana ly tic d a ta be confused . F req u en tly h ighly refined ana ly tic co n stru c tio n s a re trea ted as basic o r c ru d e fac to rs in a scientific situation . F o r exam ple , psychologists and physio logists trea t light rad ia tio n as a th ing in terbehav ing w ith the retina a n d p ro d u c in g a resu lt described as co lo r q u a lity .10 S u ch in term ix tu re o f c ru d e and ana ly tic d a ta leads to unsatisfac tory scientific results.

A n o th e r difficulty arises fro m im posing ana ly tic d a ta o n crude events. N o m atte r how com p lex a n d a b s trac t o u r scientific s tru c tu res they issue fro m basic in terbeh a v io r an d possess n o tran scen d en t va lu e o r reality no t fo u n d in the orig inal observed events. T h is view con trad ic ts sharp ly the idetTnow so p ro m in en t th a t th ere is m o re “ reality” in p o in te r readings o r

I m easu rem en ts th a n th e events m easu red . Im plicit in the la tte r view is th a t the body o f scientific d o c trin e m ay ca rry in it a ssum ptions o r prejudices no t derived fro m orig inal in terbehav io r.(T hat num b ers are m o re basic o r real th a n qualities m ay be traced b ac k to th e kind o f civ ilization th a t gave b irth to P ythagoras.^) (fo/p/

N ow it is obv ious th a t all su ch ideas issue from ac tu a l in te rb e h av io r o f persons w ith th ings.Q t is frequen tly overlooked , how ever, th a t so-called subjectivity , privacy, o r u n ce rta in ty o f know ledge arise fro m such con tac ts w ith crude events as result in m odify ing and d isto rting therm )T o be sure, in te rp o sitio n o f insufficient a n d d is to rtin g too ls o f investigation m ay co n ceal an d m odify th e c ru d e d a ta , b u t th e converse th a t o rig inal d a ta are created by th e m eth o d used is n o t acceptable .

— J> J u s t as im perfect investigative techniques d is to rt an d d is tu rb orig inal d a ta so efficient techn iques obv iously help to increase co n tac t w ith th ings

’ Cf., Article cited in footnote 8.10 Cf., Kantor, J R..A Survey o f the Science o f Psychology, Bloomington, Indiana. Principia. 1933.

pp. 32-33, and Kantor, J. R., and Smith, N. W„ The Science o f Psychology, An Inter behavioral Survey. Chicago, Principia. 1975, pp. 44-45. '

t87


i. •i 'i'.

.1t

i t !I'.'-

an d events. W e d o n o t limit ourselves here to th e observational pow ers engendered by a 200-inch telescope o r an elec tron m icroscope, bu t go fu rth e r to th e ac tu a l in tensification o f n a tu ra l events w hich result in novel facts. T h e p ro d u c tio n o f h igher an d low er tem p era tu res th a n those w ith w hich we a re o rd inarily in co n tac t an d th e p ro d u c tio n o f en o rm o u s p ressu res c o n s titu te events w hich illu s tra te th e ran g e o f h u m an in terbehav io r.

T h is range is fu r th e r indicated by the unexpected discoveries m ade while engaged in o th e r observations. T o keep to th e physics o f light alone, N ew to n ’s d iscovery th a t light consists o f d ifform rays w ith d ifferent refran- gibilities w as m ade while a ttem p tin g to im prove the refracting telescope; a lso F ra u e n h o fe r d iscovered the sod ium line w hile w ork ing o n refrac tion indices o f glass fo r different colors.■jt It is a m erit o f the in terbehav io ral view th a t it need n o t d iscrim inate ag a in st an y so rt o f p reanaly tic even ts. W hen events are ap p ro ach e d as ob jects o f free investigation we are n o t lim ited to n o n -h u m an things and ac tions, b u t m ay include all hum anistic happenings such as social o rgan izatio n an d th e m ateria ls o f civilization w hich definitely arise th ro u g h h u m an agency. M oreo v er, o u r investigative procedures an d theore tical co n stru c tions can he regu la ted bv the kind o f events s tu d ied. D esc rip tio n s an d laws - a re n o t im posed o n one k ind o f m ateria l because o f success in hand ling an o th e r, b u t a re derived from the p articu la r d a ta in terbehaved with. ^-)( A n o th e r basic in terbehavioral im plication fo r science is th a t all the ind iv idua l’s pow ers o f o bservation an d c rea tio n are ou tg ro w th s o f long series o f c o n tac ts w ith th ings in the evo lu tio n o f science. W henever scientific resu lts are pyram ided so th a t new discoveries a re m ade e ither by acciden ta l o b serv a tio n o r p lanned tran sfo rm atio n they im ply a spiralling effect th a t alw ays reaches dow n to the o rig inal co n tac ts w ith things. In o th e r w ords, there are n o m agical pow ers in h eren t in scientists to create realities. W h a t ac tually happens is th a t co n stru c tio n s a re m ade and then regarded as m o re im p o rtan t and fu n d am en ta l th a n the events originally in terbehaved w ith. But, after all, in terbehav io r is p rio r to everything.

T h u s, from co n tac ts o f individuals w ith co lo red objects have arisen theories o f co lo r, th e d istinction betw een co lo r an d w ave frequencies, etc. O u t o f observ a tio n o f m echanical w ork an d various changes resulting from w ork have developed the capacities to p roduce such p ro d u c ts as theories o f energy, law s o f m echanics and therm odynam ics. F ro m in terbehav io r w ith rad ia tio n , electrical phenom ena, and light has evolved th e ability to m ake

8 8

I N T E R V A L O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I Sall so rts o f scientific tran sfo rm atio n s an d ap p lica tio n s a n d to achieve laws o f electricity.

N o tio n s o f tran scen d en t pow ers a re certa in ly n o t derived fro m the stu d y o f m an in in te rb eh av io r w ith th ings. Q u ite th e reverse, su ch views are in te rm ix ed w ith beliefs b red by m an ’s w ishes a n d a sp ira tio n s an d the trad itio n a l cult system s w hich feed u p o n such asp ira tio n s. T h e a sp ira tio n s

ersons_with lack 3 u n sa tisfac to ry id o p p re ssio n o f

states o r classes.c o n tac ts w ith o th e r persons as well as w ith th e ty ra n n y a r

/ IN TERBEH A V IO R A L IM PLICATIONS FOR PH IL O SO PH Y

T h o u g h ph ilo sophy as a h u m an en terprise is in essential respects like all o th e r m em b ers o f the g ro u p , no one wisely o verlooks th e d e ta iled differences. P h ilo so p h ica l w orkers o pera te w ith definite m ateria ls and co n stru c t p ro d u c ts u n d er specific cu ltu ra l ausp ices: in consequence , like scientists, they a re subject to v ario u s tem p o ra ry an d h isto rical ideo logical influences.

T h e first im p o rtan t in terbehav io ral im plica tion , th en , concerns the p h ilo so p h er’s o p era tio n a l field. I t is im p o rta n t to m a rk o u t w hat the p h ilo so p h er w orks a t, th e lim its o f his w ork a n d p ro d u c ts , an d th e in terrela tion o f h is w ork w ith th a t o f o th e r w orkers,

i A ll th ese p o in ts c a n be readily a n d briefly ind ica ted by co nsidering one o u ts tan d in g characteristic o f ph ilosophers, nam ely , th e ir general expan siveness o f a t t i tu d e. Instead o f regard ing th e ir w o rk as specific an d specialized they th in k o f them selves as general law givers o r n o rm p rov iders fo r all o th e r w orkers. T h is is a consequence, o f course, o f th e trad itio n a l n o tion th a t p h ilo sophy is concerned w ith reason , w ith th e ra tio n a l basis o f theo logy, o f science, an d o f every o th e r discipline. T h o u g h in th e h isto ry o f ph ilo so p h y the n o tio n o f com prehensiveness a n d u ltim acy takes o n various fo rm s, a t n o p o in t does th e p h ilo sopher realize th a t even w hen he is co n ce rn ed w ith th e m ost ab s tru se an d generalized m ate ria ls h e is still in terbehav ing w itlTa p a rticu la r type o f sub ject-m atter.

D ia lec tic a n d deduc tive logicians since th e S cho lastic era regarded e them selves as ab le to transcend n a tu re ; they th o u g h t they cou ld prove I p ro p o s itio n s a b o u t heavenly as well as e a rth ly m a tte rs . T o achieve their \ p u rp o se th ey sim ply crea ted (verbally) pow ers fo r m an w hich w ere exag- 5 g era ted m agn ifica tions o f w h a t they observed h im to be ab le to d o . F ro m

a n in terbehav io ra l s tan d p o in t it is c lear th a t the ir am b itio n stem m ed from

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II

a d issatisfaction w ith general h u m an cond itions, w hereas the ir m eans o f carry ing it o u t they derivetW rom observ ing local ac ts o f inference an d argum en t. /¥■ T h o u g h the so-calleji inductive p h ilo sophers regarded them selves as sim ply concerned w iy the m ethods o f science, they presum ed to prescribe

tgeneralized p ro c ed u re s jior dealing w ith th ings. In th e m eantim e they were ob liv ious to th e actual p rocedures o f scientists in d ea ling w ith concrete things a n d even ts.(F u rtherm ore , inductive p h ilo sophy as a technical and universal d iscipline lost con tac t w ith ph ilosophy’s h istorical concern w ith linguistic system s^

Is it n o t c lear, then, th a t w hatever transcendence is achieved by a p h ilo so p h er is verbal co n stru c tio n an d th ere fo re a fa c to r in a definite in terb eh av io ra l field as we have indicated . T h e n o tio n o f a priori philosoph y in th e sense th a t the h u m an m ind can tran scen d concre te in terbehav ioral d o m ain s is sim ply th e acceptance o f ce rta in trad itio n s evolved in

✓ w estern E u ro p ean culture since th e tim e o f th e Greeks.—> T h e m ore recent fo rm al o r deductive p h ilo so p h ers w ho a re n o longer

in terested in transcend ing things directly , have tu rn ed to u ltim ate processes o f inference a n d reaso n . T h e m ateria ls they w o rk w ith are p rim arily re la tions, a s in th e case o f d iscovering th e system atic basis o f m athem atics.

✓ T h e ir p ro d u c ts consist o f system s o f re la tio n s. All these they handle by m eans o f p ropositions som etim es regarded as sentences, b u t a t o th e r tim es as th a t w hich the sentences rep resen t o r sym bolize. H ere there is an o p p o rtu n ity o f ad o p tin g an in terbehav io ra l view, so th a t ph ilosophy becom es concerned w ith the fo rm atio n an d tra n s fo rm a tio n o f system s o f propositions.

C ould such a view o f ph ilosophy prevail, p h ilo so p h ers w ould look up o n them selves as engaged in a specialized e n te rp r is e j jn s te a d they regard

S them selves as concerned w ith processes m uch m ore fun d am en ta l and m ore 3 pow erful th a n th e construc tion o f p ropo sitio n a l system s, nam ely, w ith <. ep istem ological an d o th e r ph ilosophical issues. T h e co n tra s t betw een the

tw o views is illustrated by th e follow ing q uestions ph ilosophers ask co n cern ing p ropositions, (a) A re p ropositions identical w ith o r d ifferent from

' a' \ (1) expressions o r fo rm u la tio n o f ju d g m en ts , o p in ions, an d inferences, o r\ v a re they (2) sta tem ents o f re la tions betw een objects? (b) A re p ropositions

(true) identical w ith facts o r are they fo rm u la tio n s o r construc tions con - cem ing facts? (c) D o sentences o r p ro p o sitio n s as a w hole refer to o r represen t things and events o r d o only th e ir te rm o r w ord constituen ts d o so?

P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T^E^M S I N S U C C E S S I O N

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N T E R V A L O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I STH E C O M PARISO N OF PROPOSITIONS W ITH RELATED TH ING S

W e now proceed to relate an d com pare p ropo sitio n s w ith fac to rs with w hich they a re identified o r from w hich they are separated .

a. Propositions and sentences, [p ro b a b ly m ost w riters o n logic differentia te p ro p o sitio n s an d sentences o n th e g ro u n d th a t sentences express p ro p ositions]jT h is is b o th an accep tab le an d a n unaccep tab le view. It is accep tab le in the sense th a t we m ay distinguish betw een a p rop o sitio n as a co n stru c ted referen t a n d the sentence em b ody ing it o r sym bolizing o r referring to it. F o r exam ple , th e p ro p o sitio n th a t th e a rea o f no sq u are can be exactly eq u a l to th a t o f a circle is sep a ra ted from th e d iscussion o f th a t m athem atica l p roduct.(T h is d iscrim ination is based u p o n the o bservation o f tw o in terbehav io ra l fields. O n the one han d , there is a com plex in terbeh av io r w ith po in ts, lines, surfaces, an d relations, as the un its o f geom etric figures (squares , circles) w ith in th e d o m a in o f E uclidean geom etry . O n the o th er, th e re a re m any fields, including th e linguistic, in w hich the p ropositional p ro d u c t is the th ing in teracted w ith. G ran ted th a t the w ork o f constru c tin g th is p ro p o sitio n involves besides th in k in g an d im ag ination ac tio n a lso th e use o f pencil an d paper, an d th a t there fo re w ords and sym bols co n stitu te processes an d too ls w ith w hich w e co n stru c t a p ro p o sition , th ere is still n o occasion to overlook the differences in th e facto rs

✓ 'involved . F ro m an analytical s tan d p o in t the use o f such too ls is accidental an d n o t abso lu te ly essential fo r the p ro d u c tio n o f such a p ro d u c t. O n theo th er h an d , once we have developed this p ro d u c t we refer to it an d record it. In b o th these instances it is m etaphorically co rrec t to say th a t the linguistic activities o r the sym bols record ing them co n stitu te expressions o f the p roposition .

T h o se w h o w ish to ignore th e w ork o f c rea tin g the p ro p o sitio n an d deal on ly w ith th e reference to o r reco rd ing o f it as a p ro d u c t need no t d istinguish betw een p ropositions and sentences. It is im p o rtan t, how ever, to be c lea r concern ing the tw o situa tions involved, in o th e r w ords, to recogn izeJw o opera tional fields. hMul? /ntfiAes M t* tJp &

b. Propositions and meaning content of sentences. W rite rs frequently ^ describe a p ro p o sitio n as th e significance o r m ean ing co n ten t o f a sentence.11 T h is descrip tion is subject to tw o in terp re ta tions, one o f w hich we reject com pletely , w hereas the o ther m ight be ad ap ted to o u r ow n exposi-

11 Passmore, J., A Hundred Years o f Philosophy. Harmondsworth, Penguin. 1968. p. 369.

91

P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O Ntion. T h e rejected in te rp re ta tio n is th a t the signification o r m eaning con ten t con stitu tes som e so rt o f psychic elem ent o r process. N o t on ly d o we object to the in tro d u c tio n o f psychic facto rs b u t a lso to overlook ing tha t the p ro p o sitio n is a definite object, a re la tion o r func tion developed in concrete creative in terbehavior.

v ' If by th e te rm meaning content one u n d erstan d s a p roposition -referen t w hich is sym bolized o r expressed by a sentence we can accept the description . It is d o u b tfu l, how ever, w hether this objective in te rp re ta tio n o f the term s meaning content an d expression is widely recognized.

It is no t difficult to acco u n t for the prevalence o f th e psychic in terp re tatio n o f m ean ing con ten t. W riters u n d o u b ted ly a re m isled by th e fact th a t th e p ro d u c t is no t ap p a ren t and independently existing until it is em bodied in a set o f w ords o r sym bols. Let us assum e th a t a m a th em atic ian does no t really have a th eo rem un til he has w ritten it ou t. In fact h e m ay n o t be ab le to satisfy h im self th a t he h as construc ted a th eo rem u n til he sees it in black a n d w hite before him . N evertheless, the p ro d u c t m ade from observed o r contrived relations need no t be confused w ith any so rt o f psychic factor.

s A gain , it m ay be strongly argued th a t a p ro p o sitio n unem bodied in (w o rd s o r sym bols is no t a com plete p ro d u c t b u t p e rh ap s only a process. In r o th er w ords, it m ay be difficult to separate th e nascent p roposition from the ( a c t io n o f fo rm ing it. T h is fact in n o w ay, how ever, suggests th a t the activity

is no t a com pletely objective in terbehav io ra l process o r th a t th e process by stages does no t lead to a thorough ly objective creation .

A t this p o in t we face th e prob lem o f “ logical” 12 existence. It is obvious th a t p ro p o sitio n s only exist in in terbehav io ral fields an d by virtue o f

n in terbehav io ral events. A s form ulations o f observed relations o r construc- II t ions co ncern ing events they exist only as ab s tra c tio n s. T hey a re stim ulus

objects o r referents dealt w ith th ro u g h substitu te stim uli (th ings o r events) a t the tim e o f p ro d u c tio n an d the sam e things o r events p lus so u n d o r script w hen they are otherw ise in teracted with (referred to , stud ied , etc.). A s facto rs (stim u lus objects) in in terbehavioral fields they a re spatio -tem p o ra l an d objective.13 11

11 We emphasize Ihc term logical lo indicate that it is here used in the conventional sense of something non-existing. In other words, it does not exist as lahlesand planelsexist. An example frequently given of such non-exislenls is a hippogriff.

11 Wclirmly oppose Dewey's assertions (Log/V. The Theory o f Inquiry. New York. Holt. 1938, pp. 45. 117, 271, el pawimi concerning the non-temporality of propositional terms and relations. Such assertions certainly imply an objectionable view concerning the non-naturalistic character of logical things and events.

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I N T E R V A l , ' O F L I N G U I S T I C A N A L Y S I SA n exam ple of th e evo lu tion o f a m athem atica l p ro p o sitio n m ay be used

to c lear up th e po in ts involved here. A m ath em atic ian w ork in g w ith p rim e n u m b ers m igh t create the n o tio n (theorem ) th a t fo r an y value n to w hich 22 can be ra ised a p rim e n u m b er is o b ta in ed by the a d d itio n o f 1. T h is p ro p o sitio n m ay be created by ac tually try ing o u t such values fo r n a s 0 , 1, 2 ,3 , an d 4, o r the try ing o u t process m ay follow by w ay o f d em o n stra tin g the tru th o f th e p roposition . In the fo rm er case the p roposition is created by in terac ting w ith p rim e an d co m p o u n d num b ers w hich a re han d led by v erbal-ac tion substitu tes o r by w ritten ou t integers. In bo th cases it is possib le th a t the th eo rem -p ro p o sitio n has on ly been referred to verbally e ith e r in the constru c tio n a l procedure o r a fte r the no tion was crea ted . T he w hole set o f o p era tio n s need only be described as com pletely objective events.

O nly w hen the m ath em atic ian is satisfied th a t he h as crea ted a valid th eo rem d o es he w rite it d o w n , p erh ap s only in a le tte r to be sent to som eone fo r analysis. S u ch sentences in w hich th e p ro p o sitio n is referred to o r rep resen ted as in th e fo rm u la 22" + 1 = p co nstitu te definite th ings added to th e p ro p o sitio n o r theorem .

LINGUISTIC PH ILO SO PH Y A N D PHILOSO PH Y IN G ENER AL

A su m m ariz in g eva lu a tio n o f L inguistic P h ilo so p h y brings to light a n u m b er o f ad v an tag es fo r the evo lu tion o f th e ph ilosoph ical en terprise. T h e in ten tio n to exclude m etaphysical no tions a lo n e ap p e a rs as a m ark ed advance in p h ilo soph ical th ink ing . T h en there is the s tirring u p o f p rob lem s concern ing th e p lan an d m ethods of philosophyzing.

B ut w hen th e q u estio n o f p erm anen t achievem ent is in o rd e r, th e final results o f th e m any partic ip an ts o f the m ovem ent offer little encouragem ent. T h e L inguistic P h ilo sophy interval fails to d ep a rt fro m m etaphysica l p u rsu its. T h e in terval does n o t b reak co n n ec tio n w ith th e general ph ilo sophical tra d itio n w hich is ensh ro u d ed in dualistic ra im en t. P h ilo so p h y rem ains still only verbally opposed to th e m etaphysical trad itio n .

As to th e developm ent o f linguistic resources fo r use in ph ilosophical d iscussion, th e L inguistic P h ilosophy interval scores d istinc t d isap p o in tm ent. T h e n a tu re a n d fun c tio n , o f language is g rea tly m isin te rp re ted . A ccord ingly , language as an in strum en t fo r im prov ing p h ilo so p h y is a frail reed to rely upon .

A p rim ary fa ilu re o f th e L inguistic P h ilo so p h y lies in th e m isconcep tion o f th e n a tu re o f psychology. It is true th a t som e m em bers o f th e L inguistic P h ilo so p h y g ro u p urge the ab a n d o n m e n t o f th e dualistic o r tw o-w orld

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P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O Nd o g m a 14, bu t this tu rns ou t to be only verbal. W h a t is essential is to describe psychological events as in terbehaviors w ith specific objects (stim uli) un d e r p articu la r circum stances. O rganocen tric descrip tions o f psychological events are no t only incom plete, bu t b lank fo rm s calling fo r psychic filling in.

I “ For example Ryle, in his book. The Concept o f Mind (London, Hutchinson House. 1949). but I the notion of mind is retained though renamed dispositions and organizations.

C H A P T E R 9

TOWARDS SIGNIFICANT PHILOSOPHYZING

G U ID E TO VALID TH INKING

T h e p rim ary value o f passing in review th e v ario u s in tervals in th e h isto ry o f ph ilo sophy is th e in tim atio n it p rovides o f im prov ing th e goal a n d scope o f ph ilosophyzing. T h e p ro b lem is w h a t to avo id , an d w h a t to accept. A b ove all, o n e m ay be encouraged by th e g ra d u a l m in im iza tion o f th e transcenden ta lism w hich keeps ph ilo sophy in bondage . T o get rid o f o tio se p rob lem s opens up th e w ay to w ard be tte r ph ilosophyzing . In th e follow ing pages I p ro p o se som e specifications fo r w h a t to avoid and w hat to receive w hile fo rm ula ting a system o f philosophical p ropositions.

SPECIFICATION I.

FREEDO M FROM M ETAPH YSICAL INSTITUTIO NS

W h at is plainly ind icated is th a t th inkers m ust free them selves from the anc ien t a n d pow erfu l dualistic influences th a t s tan d betw een th em an d co n fro n tab le things a n d events. N o valid ph ilosoph ical th in k in g ca n to lera te com m erce w ith sp irits w hether gods, angels, dem ons, o r pow ers o f such verbal creations.

B ut can th is be accom plished? Yes, th e re is n o th in g to p reven t this from happen ing . W e m u st assum e th a t it is on ly necessary to acqu ire a n in tim acy w ith ongo ing events. F o r one th ing , one m ust realize th a t ph iloso p h ers are persons a n d not com prised o f bodies, souls, o r m inds th a t can only d is to rt things in teracted w ith o r create them .

W e are rem inded here o f th e perennial a rg u m en t th a t if one can n o t p rove th e ex istence o f G od , ne ither can one d isp ro v e it. T h e g rea t fallacy Here is th a t th e a rgum en t is bu ilt o n th e assu m p tio n th a t th ere is a G od p ro b lem to prove o r d isp rove. O n th e o th e r h an d , th ere is a lso overlooked th a t a rg u m en ts are th e assertions o f persons an d n o th in g is easier th an to trace o u t th e origin a n d basis o f such assum ptions. H ence it is possible to analyze th e cu ltu ra l background th a t m akes possib le a n d encourages theistic assum ptions. A s we have seen, su p e rn a tu ra l trad itio n s grow up in p a rticu la r k in d s o f social, political, an d econom ic circum stances and becom e diffused to o th e r localities th a t a re receptive to them .

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P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O NW hen w e a re called u p o n to analyze an d eva lua te th e n a tu re an d th e

failings o f ph ilo so p h y th ro u g h o u t its co n tin u ity since th e beginnings o f th e tran scen d en ta l e ra , we can p o in t w ith assu ran ce to th e false ideas th en engendered concern ing ph ilosophers an d th e ir basic postu la tion . F ro m th a t period o n to th is d a te , persons as well a s th e w orld have been d ich o to m ized in to sou ls an d flesh, m inds an d bodies, egos a n d b ra ins, m ind an d m atter, a n d sim ilar dualities.

In tra in w ith these dualism s com e such puzzles as th e existence o r know ledge o f o th e r m inds, w hether th e m ind creates reality o r th e existence o f a n o u te r w orld , an d so on.

SPECIFICATION II. FREEDOM FROM UNIVERSALISM

T rad itio n a l ph ilosophers have presum ed to fo rm ula te p ropositions a b o u t th e en tire universe b o th cu ltu ra l a n d cosm ic. T h a t is a so rt o f p a ran o ic a ssu m p tio n th a t needs to be changed rad ically i f ph ilo sophy is to be o f any significance a t all. S u ch to talities bespeak a residual heritage stem m ing from so m e religious type o f th ink ing . T o ta lk a n d explain every th ing a t once is to p lu n g e in to a m aze o f m eaningless beliefs and au tistic verbal inventions.

SPECIFICATION III. FREEDOM FROM ABSOLUTES

T h e records o f philosophyzing are strew n w ith concern fo r absolutes o f various types, fo r exam ple, abso lu te certainty, abso lu te existence, abso lu te tru th . All su ch abso lu tes w hether o f th in k in g o r o f objects, a re to be banished from th e realm o f serious reflectioa

A w o rk ab le and consequential philosophy clearly m ust rid itself o f such alienation , from events and reflective behavior. O nly confusion an d ignorance can com e from false know ledge an d im aginary o rien ta tio n w hich is encouraged by th e fallacious ideas concern ing m an an d his w orld. N ow here in th e d o m a in o f ph ilosophy is there ro o m fo r such categories as th e abso lu te , th e infinite, and sim ilar inventions. A u th en tic ph ilosophy is different fro m the search fo r ultim ates, th e sp iritual, th e m ateria l, th e quest fo r certain ty , th e pathw ay to reality, an d o th e r such ab e rra tio n s concerning actual p roblem s, and so on.

SPECIFICATION IV. INHIBITION O F REIFYING CONSTRUCTS

It is an u n fo rtu n a te aspect o f trad itional ph ilosophyzing th a t constructs bo th o f a com pletely im aginative kind o r based o n som e partia lly observed96

T O W A R D S S I G N I F I C A N T F H I L O S O P H Y Z I N Gevent are m ad e in to a n independently existing th ing o r event. P h ilosoph ical lite ratu re is full o f discussions ab o u t w hat is real a n d w hat is illusion, a b o u t crea to rs , a b o u t abso lu te om niscent an d o m n ip o ten t personalities an d so on.

SPECIFICATIO N V. W ITH DRAW AL FROM TR A N SC EN D EN C ES

Even scientifically inclined philosophers d o n o t hesitate to exh ib it great know ledge a b o u t th e unknow able. T h is sim ply is a h angover from th e tim e w hen ph ilo so p h ers im bued w ith religious ideas p laced great s to re by invisible persons an d pow ers. T hey could ta lk an d w rite ab o u t th e h idden an d th e unknow n . T h e ir argum ents w ere centered a b o u t schem es fo r p rov ing th e value an d im p o rtan ce o f th e tran scen d en ta l w orld. T h e m o re \ they su pposed know ledge o f tra n s c e n d e n ta l w as im possib le th e m o re they J cou ld discuss and a rg u e ab o u t them .

E vidence fo r the persistence o f the transcenden ta l m otives in th e ph ilo soph ical trad itio n s is th e m odification o f these goals fo r th e u ltim a te a n d ab so lu te in to th e personalistic triune o f G od, F reed o m , a n d Im m o rta lity . S ince th e ep istem olog ical e ra o f the e igh teen th cen tu ry , it is th e m a tte r o f belief in th e d iv ine, th e m o ra l, an d th e perso n a l survival th a t in terested th e th inkers o f th a t p hase o f th e intellectual con tinuum .

SPECIFICATIO N VI. DISSOCIATION FROM VERBAL PUZZLES

A u n iq u e m ark o f significance fo r psychological p ro p o sitio n s is w hether th e p h ilo so p h er has d issociated h im self from verbal puzzles. In ancien t tim es Z e n o con stru c ted sta tem ents to th e effect th a t m o tio n w as n o t possib le o n th e g ro u n d th a t bodies h ad to b e som ew here alw ays. T h is puzzle d e p a rts w idely from m o d ern th in k in g w hen bod ies a re m ainly ch a rac te rized a s m ov ing a n d a c tin g ^ T is really needless to p o in t o u t th a t ad v an tag e is tak en o f th e p articu la r ways w ords ca n be in terpreted .

M o re m o d e m verbal puzzles cen ter a ro u n d m entalistic entities. Q uestions a re asked ab o u t how o ne can know w hether o th e r persons have m inds, w h e th e r th e w orld is one o r m any, th e reality o f space an d tim e. F am o u s a re th e puzzles o f w he the r th e to rto ise ca n w in a race fro m a hare. O th e r sam ples o f such pseudoquestions are: A re there a n y gaps in th e series o f n a tu ra l num bers? Is it possib le fo r 2 + 2 ?M ? C an w e be certa in th a t there is an ex ternal w orld beyond ones ow n consciousness?

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P H I L O S O P H I C A L S Y S T E M S I N S U C C E S S I O NSPECIFICATION VII. VALID LINGUISTICS

O nly those w ho observe th e p roper na tu re an d functions o f speech and o th e r fo rm s o f language can hope to avoid th e erro rs o f h istorical philosophy, and to a tta in a valid natu ra listic a ttitu d e tow ards th e th ings and events o f an actual am bience.

T o develop p ro p er a ttitudes tow ard oneself a n d th e su rro u n d in g circum stances o f one’s actual w orld is to be alert to th e developm ent o f speech an d its p roduc ts. In this w ay one can ab ju re triv ial a n d nonsensical questions an d s ta tem en ts. N o significant o r useful p u rp o se can be served by such questions as: “H ow do.you know I have tw o eyes?” H ow w ould things be if they w ere different?

A ccurate and useful language theory in ph ilosophical th ink ing serves ad m irab ly to check th e construc tion o f fables a n d fa iry tales w hen descriptions an d judgm en ts are required.

SPECIFICATION VIII. VALID PSYCHOLOGY

Significant ph ilosophyzing can only be based u p o n valid no tions o f psychology. T his requirem ent perta ins to every p hase o f th e ph ilosophyzing enterprise. T o begin w ith, the th inker o r the bu ilder o f a philosophical system m ust be keenly aw are o f the actual na tu re o f psychological perform ances, especially th ink ing . In general valid th ink ing depends u p o n p ro p er basic p ro to p o stu la tes and succeeding specific postu la tion . O bjective o r natu ra listic psychology precludes all so rts o f pow ers beyond observations o r inferences from observances. P ropositions th u s fo rm ula ted will no t overstep beyond th e limits o f possible con fron ta tions o f th e th in k er w ith things and events. A lso, valid psychology will serve as criteria fo r the seriousness o r originality o f th e th ink ing products.

Specifically valid psychology will d ictate a strict d ifferentiation betw een stim uli, th a t is, objects and events con fron ted w ith, a n d the responses tow ard th o se things. F u rtherm ore , the a ttem p t to describe psychological ac tions o r processes w ith accuracy will serve to keep p ropositions w ithin the b o unds o f ac tu a l observations an d serve to co n tro l th e influences upon th e th in k er w ith respect to the sources o f his p ropositional structures.

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S E C T IO N

IIThe Philosopher and His World

C H A PT E R 10

NATURE OF HUMAN NATURE

Philosopher as Human Being. T o be liberated from trad itional institutions is to be free from the erroneous n o tion th a t th e ph ilosopher is a un ique creatu re w ith innate pow ers th a t differentiate him from the rest o f his fellow creatures.[N o, the philosopher is a person w ho has evolved w ithin a d istinctive milieu to be observant, understand ing , and expressive^ Being a ph ilosopher is no different from being an artist, a craftsm an, a scientist, o r a physician. H ow and w hat the p h ilosopher believes o r thinks is a function o f th e experiences passed th rough in th e course o f his o r her developm ent. T o be a philosopher is only to be an instance o r exam ple o f the invariable law o f individual differences o r varia tions in psychological traits. T h e fact o f ind iv idual differences is itself only a feature o f the constan t variability in all events, w hether organ ic o r inorganic. N o t to appreciate this is to miss one o f the m ost im portan t prem ises o f au thentic philosophy. Im plied in this assum ption is th e con tinu ity w hich begins in the p rim ary origin o f o rganic things and events, an d w hich culm inates in the activities o f thinkers. T his basic assum ption reinforces the naturalistic view point th a t characterizes the conten t of this volum e.

In su p p o rt o f the naturalistic assum ptions o f this treatise I consider briefly the general natu re o f the th inker o r ph ilosopher as an observer and interpreter. T his excursion in to the dom ain o f psychology throw s light on the natu re o f know ledge and thinking, showing the pow er and lim itations o f th e p h ilosopher as he proceeds to adap t to and describe his w orld, th a t is, the ob jects and cond itions no t only o f his su rround ings bu t also o f him self in relation to th a t world.

Human Being as Philosopher. Since the process o f philosophyzing is the activity o f h u m an beings, it is essential to be fully cognizant o f the kind o f activities the ph ilosopher is capable o f and lim ited to . T h e philosopher is a p rim ate o f the h u m an species, living w ithin the b o unds o f a particu lar env ironm ent w ith all its advantages and disadvantages. W hat this signifies

11 is th a t the ph ilosopher’s situa tion is com pletely devoid o f all supernatural ' aspects. W h a t the organism called a philosopher can d o is lim ited by his

evo lu tion and the co rrelated things and events w hich m ar or m ake th a t evolution.

*)T O ne o f the fundam ental tra its that the hum an organism has developed is

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N A T U R E O F H U M A N N A T U R Ep articu la r tra its o r talen ts range from incom peten t o r re ta rd ed persons to those generally regarded as greatly com peten t geniuses.

Evolution of Psychological Competency. S ince h u m an o rgan ism s are social beings, the peaks reached by individuals are in tegrated an d com po u n d ed in great m easure o n the basis o f p ro duc ts accru ing from the in teractions o f all so rts w ith things an d events. T h u s hu m an organism s achieve great pow ers and effectiveness in innum erab le ways. T hey becom e efficient as too lm akers, physicians, craftsm en, th inkers, social organizers, an d artists o f various types.

M A N K IN D AS BIOSOCIAL A N D C U LTURAL O R G A N ISM S

1i

W hile h u m an organism s belong to the an im al co n tin u u m as descend- ents o f apes o r o th er evolutional antecedents, they are a lso creatu res o f cu ltu re . T h u s they a re im m ersed in tw o series o f th ings a n d events. F requen tly speech is regarded as a d istinctive m ark o f difference betw een h u m an an d n o n h u m an organism s. H ow ever, o th e r an im als in the evolutionary scale also perfo rm referential ac tions though o f an extrem ely sim ple sort. W h a t does co u n t as a c rite rion o f difference is th e tra it o f bu ild ing up a com plex an d perm anen t civil society w ith a p le th o ra o f objects, social b ehav io r (rituals, custom s, styles o f living), an d institu tions o f n u m ero u s varieties. H u m an beings are no t on ly b iological o rganism s bu t civil o r social beings also.

T h e psychological aspects o f civil life o r cu ltu ra l existence a re o f course extrem ely com plex. T h e various institu tions an d practices exert influences u p o n all th e vario u s behaviors o f persons including language, beliefs, m odes o f th ink ing , an d conventional practices. A lth o u g h all such behaviors a re concrete na tu ra l events, it has been a serious and d isto rting postu re to regard h u m an individuals as mystical beings. A strik ing exam ple is H am let’s evocation.

What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving, how express and admirable! in action.how like an angel! in apprehension, how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals!

a. Homo Sapiens in Cultural Evolution. F ro m a biological s tandpo in t, h u m an an im als are sim ply organism s tha t have reached a ce rta in stage o f developm ent very sim ilar to th a t o f o th e r prim ates. In fact, s tructu ra lly the h o m o organ ism is very close to the apes. But m an k in d a lso has underg o n e a n o th e r an d a different evolution so th a t h u m an organism s are capab le o f perfo rm ing behav io r no t possible for their biological cousins. In brief.

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N A T U R E O F H U M A N N A T U R Ec. Scientific Psychology and Scientific Philosophy. G ra n tin g th a t the

study o f th e origin an d developm ent o f psychological personalities reveals the n a tu ra lis tic cha rac te r o f h u m an psychology, there follow num ero u s inferences a b o u t the re la tio n sh ip o f psychology' to ph ilosophy. T h e n atu re an d evo lu tion o f psychological personalities b ea r a u th en tic evidence concern ing th e orig in an d developm ent o f the a ttitu d es w hich con stitu te the subject m a tte r o f ph ilosophy. It is evident th a t au th en tic o r scientific p h ilo sophy ca n n o t ab id e th e trad itio n a l generalities, an d abso lu teness that h istory unro lls th ro u g h the ages. A scientific psychology enables us to d istinguish clearly an d effectively betw een ideas based o n co n fro n ta tio n w ith events and correc t inferences derived from the observation o f events, an d th e fantasies an d verb igerations created by pseudo philosophers.

In this conn ec tio n it is suggested th a t we co n tra s t ideas concern ing , for exam ple , th e u n reachab le infinities o f space o n the basis o f local observations w ith purely invented tales. A gain , a scientific psychology calls an em p h atic halt to th e in jection o f such ideas as m atter, spirit, divinity, vitalism , abso lu te pow ers, supernatu ralism , in to philosophical system s.

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C H A PT E R II

THE INTIMACY OF PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE1

G ra n tin g th a t p h ilosophy consists o f th e in tellectual reactions o f persons to the th ings an d events they encoun ter, a n d w hich aid an d su p p o rt them , there is im m ediately im plied a re la tion betw een philosophy a n d science. Science is a n ex tension o f th e o rd in ary in te rb eh av io r w ith th ings and rests u p o n th e fac t th a t it constitu tes the m ost m eticulous a n d exp ert aw areness o n h F a m b ie n t^ cond itions o f th ink ing , individuals. O f course, scientists requ ire "checking fo r conform ity w ith th e p rim ary functions o f scientific w ork. O f a su re ty scientists are constan tly runn ing in to “philosophical issues.”

O n th e o th e r h and , it m ust be recognized th a t p h ilosophy is a n inevitable b ack g ro u n d fo r all intellectual en te rp rises. F o r it is a well fou n d ed oenel th a t n o reflective aspect o f m an’s w o rk rests u p o n a m ore supportive" fo u n d a tio n th an a p ro p er ph ilosophy. O nly a glance a t th e scientific scene convinces u s th a t scientists a re constan tly ru n n in g in to m etascientific p roblem s. A ccordingly , m any recent experim en ta l a n d theore tical scientists such as Jean s, E ddington , H eisenberg, B ohr, S ch rod inger, B om , a n d B ridgm an, to nam e a few, have occupied them selves w ith ph ilosophical p roblem s.

*£■ W e c a n n o t, th en b u t ap p lau d scientists fo r developing a n in terest in p h ilo sophy , an d fo r im plem enting this interest. In th is w ay th ey show their ap p rec ia tio n o f th e perennial corrigjbility o f sciencefN ature a n d cu ltu re are

^ ' co n stan tly chang ing , so science m ust period ically reconsider its prem ises if it is to register p rogres£]C ertain ly this has been th e h is to ry o f science. W ith th e adv en t o f relativity an d q u an tu m m echanics, physicists, fo r exam ple, have ag a in been forced to po n d er the n a tu re o f know ledge, a n d its re la tion to existence. T h u s they have becom e ab so rb ed in o pera tion ism , com plem entarity , a n d th e question w hether n a tu re is th e sam e as the know ledge o f n a tu re . A t an y ra te , by s tudy ing th e fo u n d a tio n s a n d th e significance o f their science, scientists reveal the ir aw areness o f th e need to test, to im prove, a n d som etim es to replace established ax iom s.

B ut ho ld , a re w e n o t ru n n in g here in to a serious p arad o x ? M ay scientists

1 The material of this chapter is a modified version of an article entitled, “Scientific Psychology and Specious Philosophy.' first published in the Psychological Record, 1969, 19, 15-27.

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I N T I M A C Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C E

f

repud ia te th e p roposition th a t only afte r their discipline freed itself from th e fetters o f ph ilosophy could it becom e a science? Is it n o t th e case tha t, only after scientists ceased to occupy them selves w ith th e vacuous speculations o f trad itio n a l ph ilosophy and began to follow in the footsteps o f the dissecting physiologists, the quantizing chem ists, an d the m an ipu lating physicists, did they a tta in a solid basis fo r th e ir dom ain? F ro m the h istory o f psychology we learn th a t it was a great revolu tion in th ink ing when s tuden ts o f psychological events hit upo n the d istinc tion betw een ra tional

j-^^Jlia t is speculative — and em pirical o r observational psychology. \ X 'G rea t indeed is the p a rad o x we face here. Science w ith o u t ph ilo sophy is without ru d d e r o r com pass, b u t philosophy itself m ay be inconsequential,

\ m isleading, an d even fallacious. W e canno t h ope to solve th is p a rad o x / W ith o u t a th o ro u g h analysis o f philosophy. S uch a study soon reveals th a t/ jthere are various types o f philosophy, o f w hich only som e are beneficial for /science. M oreover, we learn that an au then tic ph ilosophy is available, /th o u g h the prevailing philosophy is specious. _____

It is obviously im possib le to m ake th e k ind o f analysis o u r p rob lem dem ands in a lim ited space; still, I hope to suggest th e lines a lo n g which such a study should proceed.

A t the very th reshold o f o u r analysis we m ust o rien t ourselves in the ph ilosophical field. O bviously, we a re prim arily interested in the philosoph y o f science, b u t im m ediately we discover th a t th ere is ac tually no difference betw een general trad itional philosophy an d th e conventional ph ilosophy o f science. T h e basis an d core o f conven tiona l ph ilosophy o f science is ju s t trad itio n a l philosophy. P ick up a n y boo k o n the subject and you will find th e fam iliar ontological and epistem ological m aterials; the descrip tion o f ra tionalism , em piricism , positivism , an d sim ilar ism s dow n to logical positivism a n d linguistic analysis. Y ou will be regaled w ith the th ink ing o f D escartes, L ocke, Leibniz, Berkeley, an d H um e, as well a s o f m an y o thers w ho have historically expounded the difference betw een th o u g h t an d ex tension , reality and appearance, m onism an d p luralism , n o u m en a an d phenom ena , an d tru th a n d e rro r. M oreover, th e trea tm en t o f these top ics hard ly differs from the theological h an d lin g o f th e cognate p rob lem s o f the existence a n d tire na tu re o f G o d , th e freedom o f the will, an d the im m orality o f th e soul.'iThe difference betw een th e sacred a n d the p ro fan e types o f ph ilosophy lies only in the questionable belief th a t som ehow the la tte r can be associated with scientific m a t te r s ^

If th e reader concludes from w hat I have ju s t said th a t scientists shou ld be w ary o f plunging in to the stream o f philosophy, his inference is correct.

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T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L DB ut o n th e o th e r h an d , he is w rong to th ink th a t I am re trea ting o ne inch from th e position th a t ph ilosophy is o f g reat use to all th e sciences. But alw ays th e em phasis is, it m ust be a valid philosophy.

I ven tu re th e in terp re ta tion th a t w hen scientists declared their independence from ph ilo sophy they w ere referring to a p artic u la r k ind o f philosophy, one th a t w as inim ical to th e pu rsu it o f scientific studies. But this is q u ite a different th in g from rejecting ph ilosophy . As in all h u m an situations, no d ep artm en t o f though t, n o in tellectual in stitu tion is single and invariab le . W e m ust ab ide by the ru le o f specificity. T h ere is no abstract

V ph ilo sophy , only p a rticu la r kinds. T h o se w ho reject a spurious ph ilosophy „ . m ay hope to discover a genuine one!

A t th is p o in t we m ust be rem inded th a t th ere is a n inseverable connectio n betw een ph ilosophy and psychology. A side from th e fact th a t philoso p h y is a p rocess a n d a p roduc t o f h u m an behavior, th ere never has been a tim e w hen psychology has n o t been suffused w ith m etaphysical philosophy. C o n sid e r only th e fam ous persons in th e q u an tiza tio n and experim ental trad ition . H erbart, W undt, K iilpe, E bbinghaus, an d H elm holtz were all ph ilosophers o r u n d er th e direct influence o f p a rticu la r philosophies. It is well know n how cap tiva ted H elm holtz w as by K an t, despite his occasional disagreem ents with him. Indeed, if we acco rd F ech n er th e h o n o r o f being th e g ra n d fa th e r o f experim en ta l psychology, we m u st tak e acco u n t o f th e in terre lation o f experim ental psychology w ith religious m ysticism . F u rth erm o re , an analy tic exam ina tion o f the cu rren tly accepted m odel o f sensory an d percep tual behavior reveals the epistem ological influence o f

' Locke, Berkeley, H um e, and K ant u p o n its fo rm u la tio n . Even if it is true ■ th a t m uch o f th e psychology o f learning superficially escapes th e influence o f trad itio n a l philosophy, this is certainly n o t tru e o f th e psychology o f personality , o f perception, o f m otivation , o f m em ory , an d o f th inking. -

In the light o f the h istory of science, it shou ld be clear w hy th e relation betw-een ph ilosophy and science is th o ro u g h ly reciprocal. E ach is influenced by th e o ther. [A bad philosophy invariab ly co m p o rts w ith bad science an d vice-versa7]In general, too , it is fa ta l fo r an y science to be unilaterally d o m inated by an y autistically fo rm ulated ph ilosophy . A philoso p h y can only be suitable fo r and useful to the sciences if it is roo ted in scientific soil an d reciprocally, o f course, the p ro p rie ty o f an y philosophy depends u p o n the valid ity o f its confederated sciences, a nd this includes a veracious psychology. W e are ready now to consider the natu re an d value o f ph ilo sophy an d o u r first step is a sem antic one. W e m ust identify o u r

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p articu la r referent w hen we use the term “ ph ilosophy” since there are so m any different usages.2

Basically, ph ilosophy consists o f intellectual a ttitu d es assum ed by p ersons w ith respect to things an d events w hich in terest them . W e stress the ro le o f persons because ph ilosophyzing is alw ays the behav io r o f p articu la r ind iv iduals w ho in teract w ith specific cu ltu ra l an d n o n cu ltu ra l th ings an d events. T h ere are n o supernal env ironm ents n o r su p ern a tu ra l pow ers fo r access to them . (T hough such a ttitu d es m u st begin as reactions to ac tual things, th e ir developm ent m ay involve indefinite ex trapo la tions, w ith the result th a t philosophical a ttitudes a re stretched w ay beyond an y actually occurring events. S trik ing exam ples are the fan tastic transfo rm ations o f organism s in to souls and flesh, th e ac ts o f being aw are o f objects in to psychic “processes” called consciousness, and th e m agnification o f the acts o f persons in to th e behav io r o f deities, angels, an d d em o ns. T h e m etam o rphosing process is. oTcourse. facilitated by th e verbal ag ilitv o f th e philos- o p hers, an d by th e h u m an circum stances a t tend ing th e ir specula tions.

(P h ilo soph ical a ttitudes m ay be engendered either by the m otives o f describing an d in terp re ting th ings an d events observed, o r by needs an d desires based on h u m an adjustm ents to ac tual o r im agined situations. )

W h a t is to be specifically no ted here is th a t ph ilosophy is n o t to be identified w ith a n y varie ty o f trad itio n a l m etaphysics. Especially to be avo ided is th e con fo u n d in g o f th e u n co m m itted a p p ro a c h to th ings and events w ith th e fa tu o u s in tu itions o f T h o m as R eid’s com m onsense spiritism. I f o n e can n o t forego calling every k ind o f ph ilosophy m etaphysics, a t least on e m u st d istinguish betw een good an d b ad m etaphysics. W hoever is p ro n e to fall in to th e sem an tic p red icam en t m u st be cau tio n ed n o t to call a s to n e m ason a so rt o f psychologist because he is a non-psychologist.

(^Further to elucidate the n a tu re o f philosfiphy we m ust no te th e u n p ara lleled im portance o f assum ptions, w hich co n stitu te the fo u n d a tio n o f o u r in tellectual behav io r^ Indeed , a n u n d erstan d in g o f a ssu m p tio n s is the essence o f science. A ssum ptions in itiate an d shape hypotheses an d theories a n d m ake possible th e system atic o rg an isa tio n o f investigations a n d ^ findings. A ssum ptions know n, u n d ersto o d , an d form alized in propositions constitu te th e postu lates an d p ostu la te system s o f all th e sciences, including

v m athem atics.N o w we m ust d ifferentiate betw een in stitu tional an d opera tio n a l atti-

c—S'

.c .:

J See Chapter I.

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T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L Dtudes. In stitu tional a ttitu d es a re historical constru c tio n s w hich have beco m e form alized an d crystallized, th a t is have ta k e n o n th e ch a rac te r o f things. T hey have becom e institutions, cu ltu ra l fixtures. O ne o f the best exam ples is the tran scen d en t spiritism w hich com prises the Ju d a e o - C hristian basis o f o u r culture. T h is type o f cu ltu ra l ph ilosophy is the m atrix " o f the accepted d ichotom ies o f spirit an d m atte r, an d m ind an d body. A m ong th e m o re m in im al a n d localized ph ilosophical institu tions is to be num bered th e belief th a t the b ra in is th e o rgan o f soul o r m ind.

O pera tional a ttitu d es constitu te assu m p tio n s developed while observing a n d investigating events. O n the w hole they are n o t universalized, as a re the assum ptions o f conven tional ph ilosophy, th o u g h the p roduc tive m echanism m ay a p p e a r sim ilar. S om e o f the best exam ples o f o p era tio n a l assum ptio n s are the ax io m s an d postu lates o f m athem atics, a n d the hypotheses an d theories o f science.

P lease no te, institu tional a ttitudes are n o t ipso facto w rong an d harm ful. B ut there is n o question th a t the spiritistic in stitu tion has been extrem ely pernicious ever since it was developed. N o t on ly has it led to th e falsification o f the w orld o f n a tu re , b u t it has also spaw ned th e ridd les w hich serve to separate th inkers from the events su rround ing them .

X A typical m etaphysica l riddle is to ask w hat w ould t h i n g be like if they were no t w h a t they are b u t som eth ing else? W e h ea r it asked: ho w w ouldth e w orld be described if m en h ad evolved differently, w ith o th e r organs an d capacities? S u ch q uestions typify th e van ity an d triv iality o f spu rious ph ilosophy. T hey m ay be traced back fa r in to th e d im past. F o r exam ple, X enophanes o f C o lo p h o n in th e six th cen tu ry B. C . a ttem p ted to refute som e undesirab le n o tions cu rren t in his day, a n d said,

Yes, and if oxen and horses or lions had hands, and could paint with their hands and produce works of an as men do, hones would paint the forms of the gods like horses, and oxen like oxen, and make their bodies in the image of their several kinds.3

M an y centuries la te r S a in t A ugustine criticized a n answ er th a t was given to th e im pertinen t question , “W h a t d id G od b efo re he m ad e heaven an d earth?” T h e an sw er w as, “ H e w as preparing hell fo r p ryers in to m ysteries.” S a in t A ugustine d id n o t app rove o f this answ er, since he accepted as valid inquiries in to G o d ’s behavior, so his reply to the q uestion w as “ I know no t.” A cu rren t ridd le is, how can m ind know m a tte r o r h ow c a n o n e m ind know an o th e r m ind, w h ether th a t o f a ra t, a m ouse, o r a m an. In general, w e have here th e puzzle o f th e non-in tercom m unicab ility o f psychic co n ten t, w hich

* Burnet, J„ Early Creek Philosophy, London, Black, 1948, p. 119.

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is sim ply a perversion o f th e fact th a t each event is a un ique occurrence. All such u n ad u lte ra ted verb igerations preven t us fro m lo o k in g u p o n philoso p h y as a n a tte m p t to becom e orien ted to the com plex ities o f th e events o f n a tu re a n d th e contingencies o f social life. T h ey m u st be rega rd ed as pathologies o f im ag ination an d speech. ''

~~ S ince o u r in terest in pm losophy hinges u p o n its influence fo r g o o d o r evil u p o n science, I m u st rem ind you o f the baleful d o m in a tio n o f cu rren t ph ilosophy by the sp iritistic institu tions o f o u r cu lture . D ualistic attitudes- vitiate o u r ph ilo sophy o f science, an d also m isconstrue the events and theories o f science. T h ey m anifest them selves in the p ractically universal accep tance o f psychophysical assum ptions. H ere is the reason w hy scientists w ho wish to fo ster science m ust reject conven tional ph ilosophy.

T h e pern icious influence o f spiritistic ph ilosophy on science is effectively illustra ted by the co n tin u ed presence o f transcenden ta l fac to rs in p ractically all psychological descrip tions, though we m ust lim it ourselves to two

(j) o u ts tan d in g exam ples: one, the cu rren t doctrin e o f percep tion , a n d die o th e r, th e doctrin e o f th e biological basis o f behavior. W e ex am in e first the

it, ’ cu rren tly accepted m odel o f sensory events w hich holds th a t w hen an o rgan ism d iscrim inates betw een objects, their qualities are pro jec ted to the source o f stim ulation , as in the follow ing quo ta tio n .

The external ear delivers sound waves through the external auditory canal to the middle ear, and thence they pass to the inner ear. There in the cochlea, the sensory (ells of the organ of Corti are stimulated and initiate nerve impulses in the fibers of the auditory nerve. The impulses pass through a series of nuclei and fibertracts in the medulla and midbrain to the auditory area of the cerebral cortex: and there so m e h o w they generate the sensations that we know subjectively as “sounds". (Italics ours?)*"-------

T h e fo llow ing q u o ta tio n s supply the full flavor o f the m etaphysics o f cu rren t psychology.

When we say we hear, we mean, usually, that we experience sensations which have been produced by the excitation of the auditory mechanism. These elementary experiences, by means of which we are aware of so much with regard to the external world, through which we can receive the thoughts of others, and which contribute so largely to our esthetic enjoyment of life through poetry and music, are called sounds. Yet such sounds have no objective existence: outside ourselves all is quietness. Externally there arc simply bodies in vibration.4 5

4 Davis. H„ “The Psychophysiology of Hearing and Deafness." in Handbook o f experimental psychology (S. S. Stevems. cd.). New York. Wiley. 1951. p. 1116.

5 Banister. H.. "Hearing I." in The Foundations o f Experimental Psychology (C. Murchison, ed.). Worcester, Mass.. Clark Univ. Press. 1929. p. 273.

I ll

T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L DT he philosopher W hitehead has punctuated the essence o f the current

doctrine w hen he rem arked , “N atu re is a dull affair, soundless, scentless, colourless; m erely the hurry ing o f m aterial, endlessly, m eaninglessly.6

T he rest o f the m ythology, o f course, concerns the in terre lating of sensations w ith im ages to create percepts o r objects. H ere is a basic psychological doctrine w hich is in no sense derived from observations and experim ents. R ather, it is the vaporing o f historical m etaphysics.^C urrent sensory science in term ixes spiritistic philosophy with questionable physiology^) -

It is instructive here to glance fo r a m om ent a t th e agonized plaints o f generations o f neuro logists th a t they can n o t conceive how sensationsTthat is. sp iritual essences, can be p roduced by the m ateria l b rain . H ere are two o f these agonized cries, th e first o f w hich was published by the em inent Sherrington,

But indeed what right have we to conjoin mental experience with physiological? No scientific right. . . To many of us a mere juxtaposition of the two sets of happenings proclaims their disparity. On the one side changing electrical potentials with thermal and chemical action making a physiological entity held together by energy relations; on the other, a suite of mental experience, an activity no doubt, but what if any relation to energy?7

R anson says,I shall leave out of account entirely the most difficult part; how when these propagated

disturbances reach the brain they give rise to conscious sensation, which appears to be something of an entirely different order than a neural activity. I can not understand how such a thing as a sensation of warmth makes its appearance as a result or a concomitant of the activity of certain nerve cells in my brain. I can only admit the fact and leave to the future, perhaps the far distant future, the problem presented by the relation of brain and mind.8

D espite the spiritistic basis o f cu rren t sensory doctrines these doctrines f persist. It is a curious circum stance th a t generations o f psychologists accept

the trad itional m odel o f sensory an d perceptual events w ithou t realizing its antiscientific nature . A nd yet, a glance at the origin an d developm ent o f the m odel a t once dem onstrates its basis in gross ignorance, an d in the m etaphysics o f so u l

T o evaluate the curren t sensory m odel we need only trace it back to the w ork o f Locke and N ew ton and th e ir epistem ological d o c trin e o f ideas, and in general th e influence o f the co rpuscu lar ph ilosophy in m odern

''Whitehead, A. N„ Science and the Modern World. New York, Pelican Mentor, 1948, p. 56. ’Sherrington, C. S., The brain and its Mechanisms. Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1933,

pp. 23-24.* Ramon, S. W„ "Cutaneous sensation,' Science. 1933, 78, 395-399.

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I N T I M A C Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C EE u ro p ean th ink ing . W e all know how L ocke a ttem pted to soften the ph ilosophical influence o f the trad itio n a l unified soul by m aking it in to a b lan k receiver o f im pressions instigated by u n k n o w n ex te rn a l pow ers. S u ch im pressions w ere to be assoc ia ted to constitu te the objects o f know ledge. As we know , to o , th e g reat N ew ton supplied a m odel o f this know ledge m echan ism w hen he exp la ined how a prism separates th e diversely refrangib le rays o f light, each o f w hich produces a different co lo r w hen its effects u p o n an etherial m ed ium reach the b ra in o rsenso rium . I q u o te from N ew to n T 2 3 rd query in his fTUfTOptics.

Is not Vision performed chiefly by the Vibrations of this Medium excited in the bottom of the eye by the Rays of Light, and propagated through the solid, pellucid and uniform Capillamenta of the optick NervesuSto the place of SensatioifTAnd is not hearing performed by the Vibrations either of this or some other Medium, excited in the auditory Nerves by the Tremors of the Air, and progagated through the solid, pellucid and uniform Capillamenta of those Nerve^fnto the pjace of Sensation?^nd so of the other Senses.’

•7

Is it n o t plain th a t N ew to n b eq u ea th ed to p resen tday scho lars a m odel w hich he did not derive from valid know ledge o f the p lace o f light in vision, n o r from a com peten t acq u a in tan ce w ith biology, but from th e m etascientific treasu ry o f religious lore? It is as th o u g h N ew ton’s hypotheses non fingo a pplied only to m echanics. N o te th a t w e d o n o t fau lt N ew to n fo r living in th e seventeenth cen tu ry , b u t w e should po in t o u t th a t em an c ip atio n from trad itio n a l p h ilo so p h y w ou ld be o f g reat service in u n d e rs ta n d ing events today.

2, ■ W e tu rn now to the second illu stra tion o f th e d evasta ting influence o f dualistic ph ilosophy o n science. T h is is the no to rio u s doctrine especially prevalen t am o n g self-styled scientific psychologists th a t m en ta l processes, th o u g h occult an d p rivate , a re vouched fo r an d su p p o rted by th e nervous system . E ssentially th is d o c trin e tran sfo rm s th e brain , w hich is a biological o rgan , in to a su rro g a te fo r th e soul. T h e d octrine takes o n v ario u s form s:(a) th e b ra in is m ade in to a general seat o r locus o f m ind o r consciousness;(b) various po rtio n s o f the b ra in are p resum ed to subserve specific m ental “functions" o r “experiences;" a n d (c) th e nervous system is regarded as the basis o f behavior.

Even ph ilo sophers w ho d is ta in dualism justify these p ropositions o n the g ro u n d th a t the e q u a tio n o f th e b ra in an d th e m ind, o r so m ehow to com m ix them , m inim izes th e influence o f spiritism . B ut w h a t ac tually h appens is the m isconstruction o f the ana to m ica l s tructu res o f th e o rgan-

’ Newton, I„ Opticks, New York, Dover, 1952, p. 533.113

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f

. £ * ■■ f r

* * ? *

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ism an d th e effects o f m u tila tio n s o f vario u s so rts . A critical ex am in a tio n o f th e d o c trin e o f th e b io logical basis o f co m p lex behav io r, how ever, ind icates conclusively th a t there a re n o d a ta to su p p o rt it. T h ere is on ly evidence th a t th e ancien t d ich o to m y o f soul an d flesh holds sway. T here is g o o d reason w hy the fruitless search for th e en g ram continues. M eanw hile, th e bra in is g roundlessly endow ed w ith all varieties o f psychic pow ers, m ost o f w hich were historically allo tted to the soul. T h e b ra in is m ade in to a perceiver, a d iscrim inato r, a m em ory sto rer, a ju d g e , an d a reasoner. W hen th e psychic pow ers are stressed we recognize here the venerable faculty p sycho logy . O n th e o th e r hand , w hen th e b ra in is stressed, we h ea r a n echo o f trad itio n a l m ateria lism , w hich has never been an y th in g b u t a one-sided dualism . In these days o f co m p u te r techno logy even e lab o ra te electronic m achines are sim ilarly spiritized. v'P' P&'-fr, ■

N ow n hvinuslv a psychological event is a t th e sam e tim e a biological and a p hysiochem ical event. T h u s a com prehensive d escrip tion o f a n y ac t o f an o rgan ism shou ld include biological an d chem ical co m p o n en ts . B ut we m ust~3ifferentiate elem ents presum ed to su p p o rt an d determ ine n o n m echanical, non-b io logical, an d non-chem ical “processes” from the ac tu a l biological and physiochem ical partic ipan ts in a large g lobal event.

Because ph ilosophy an d psychology a re inseverably related we find, o f course, th a t th e baleful influence o f ph ilo so p h y o n psychology is fully rec ip roca ted by th e dep lo rab le service w hich a sp iritistic psychology renders as the h an d m aid o f m etaphysics. P h ilo sophers have m ad e cop io u s use o f the p erd u rin g an d creative m ind to co n stru c t th e ir m etaphysica l system s o f idealism , ex isten tialism , critical realism , a n d the like. P rob lem s like the ex istence o r non-ex istence o f an ex te rn a l w o rld , th e co n tra s t betw een thesubjective and o bjective orders, an d th e unreso lvab le opposition o f ex is ts ence and values have been based o n a specious ph ilo soph y . .

It is alw ays in teresting to study th e b irth o f a cu ltu ra l institu tion such as sp iritism o r dualism . But in the presen t case it is a n ab so lu te necessity if we a re to u n d ers tan d th e ph ilo sophy o f science a n d its relevance fo r ph ilosophy in general.

D ualism m ay be traced b ack to th e H ellenistic e ra o f o u r history . A t th a t tim e th ro u g h th e specula tions o f th e early ch u rch fa thers, th e neop la ton ic ph ilosophers like P lotinus, an d la ter S a in t A ugustine, th e “ideal" w orld w as construc ted to co n tra s t w ith the o rd in a ry everyday one. A nguished by the d es tru c tio n o f th e g ran d a n d g lo rio u s G reek a n d R o m a n w orlds they crea ted th e e ternal w orld o f spirit. In th a t tran sc en d en ta l w orld w as co n cen tra ted all th a t w as u ltim ate , tru ly real, indestructib le a n d perfect.

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M oreover, th e transcenden t w orld afforded a n escape from evil and th ra ldom . T he voluble m en o f the Hellenistic period and beyond m ade full use o f th e ex trap o la tiv e function .o f speech to recreate the w orld to m atch their heart’s desire. S tuden ts o f philosophy are aw are o f the successive tran sfo rm ations o f cosm ic sp irit in to individual soul, w hich th ro u g h various m etam orphoses becam e m ind , self, th e unconscious, the transcenden ta l unity o f ap percep tion , the ap percep tion mass, consciousness, sensation , em otion , m ental state, m ental im age, and so on.

T he persistence o f philosophical institu tions is tru ly rem arkab le . W hen ph ilosophers recently increased their app recia tion o f th e futility o f the

1 venerable m etaphysics w hose speculations have n o secure sta rtin g place, n o r any a tta in ab le goal, they d id no t liquidate that-m etaphysics b u t instead developed a varian t o f it in the guise o f analytical an d linguistic p h ilo so p h y . '^ A nalyticpR iTosophers institu ted a scrutinizing searchintoT the language o f ph ilosophy fo r w ays a n d m eans o f d iscovering th e in trinsic m ean ing o f w ords and phrases. B ut they retained the old a ssu m p tio n s o f universality, abso lu teness, certa in ty , ap rio rity , and the m ind-body d icho tom y . Forgetting th a t te rm s o r w ords are artifacts p roduced by vario u s in terac tions o f p articu la r persons, they reify them an d endow them w ith transcenden ta l “m eaning.” W h at they overlook is th a t m eanings are properties o f w ords only a fte r they have been so endow ed th ro u g h various specific activities in p artic u la r situations. I f the w ord “bachelo r” does n o t refer to m arried m en it is only because th is w ord has been developed in a p articu la r linguistic o r social s itua tion and now operates only in sim ilar situations, excep t indeed w hen the w ord is a lso applied to wom en.

T h e im plied transcendence here is perhaps better seen w hen analy tic ph ilosophy is carried over in to the psychological field. W e can n o t m iss the fan fare th a t is now being heard in the do m ain o f psycholinguistics. P erhaps the loudest noise is m ade by those w ho seek a m ystic source fo r the behavior o f ch ildren w hen they learn to speak an d con tinue the behav io r

/hftl w hen they becom e adu lts . I t is loudly proclaim ed th a t the speak ing process ’ 'is n o t a m a tte r o f learn ing a t all b u t th e innate o p era tio n o f soul. S peak ing

correc tly o r g ram m atica lly is a pow er innate in th e m ind. F o r c o rro b o ra tio n they reso rt to the w ritings o f early ph ilosophers w h o tau g h t the do c trin e o f psychic in tu ition in the seventeenth century , fo r exam ple, D escartes, an d the C om m onsense Realists o f the e igh teenth cen tury , for exam ple, T h o m as R eid and his followers.

N ow , w ho can ignore the fact that a radical revolu tion is in o rder? If we h o p e to develop an au then tic philosophy, the so rt th a t is basic to a valid

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• logic o f science and w hich can serve as a n a id to th in k in g scientific psychology, we m ust destroy the old transcenden ta l way o f th ink ing , an d rep lace it w ith a valid p h i l o s o p h y . I v e n t u r e t n p r o p o s e s o m e c p p i r i f i r a t i n n c

for such a philosophy.A n au th en tic philosophy, consists exclusively o f a ttitu d es based on

observations o f things and events existing an d occurring in various specific #£ milieu. T his restriction is in ac tuality a g lorious po ten tia lity affording

access to everything on land , sea, an d the vast reaches o f astronom ica l space. C onfron tab le th ings an d events, o f course, m ay include one’s ow n behav io r o r reactions to th ings a n d events, including persons. F u rth e rm ore, th e w idest reaches o f ph ilosoph ical specu la tion belong definitely in

' the co n tin u u m o f hum an con tac ts w ith th ings based on w onder, curiosity, an d th e urge to control.

T echnical philosophy, accordingly, has th e sam e subject m a tte r as the special sciences. It is concerned w ith the sam e concrete th ings a n d events as an y scientific discipline p rio r to the app lica tion o f specialized constructs. Indeed, it is on e o f the functions o f scientific ph ilosophy to reject all construc ts th a t a re illegitim ately im posed u p o n observed events. T he fallacious belief th a t philosophy lacks a distinctive subject m atte r stem s from the failure to notice th a t philosophyzing behavior, like all o th e r kinds, consists o f in teractions with stim ulus objects.

N ow , a lthough technical philosophy as theoretical science does n o t have any different field o f operations from the special sciences, it does have its ow n unique tasks w hich can be categorized u n d er three heads, (a) m onitorial, (b) coordinative, and (c) sem antic.

^ \)T h e m onito ria l task o f ph ilosophy is to exam ine an d critically analyze propositions w ith respect to their origin an d validity. S uch a n ex am ina tion o f credentials is contro lled by tw o rules, (a) construc ts m ust be derived from con tac ts w ith events, and (b) entangling cu ltural institu tions m ust be suppressed.

Q ) P h ilosophy coordinates the findings and in terp re ta tions o f the special sciences. T hus the propositions o f physics an d chem istry m ay no t co n tra dict the propositions o f biology and psychology, and reciprocally the propositions o f biology o r psychology m ay n o t g o co u n te r to the valid fo rm ula tions o f physics o r chem istry. F u rth e rm o re , the findings o f one science m ay n o t overshadow those o f o th e r sciences, as in various form s o f reductionism , o r where the assum ptions o r conclusions developed in one science a re im posed u p o n th e d a ta o f an o th er. F o r exam ple , findings reached in neurology m ay not be im posed u p o n psychological events. In

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I N T I M A C Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C Egeneral, ph ilosophy im plies cross referential s tudy as in in terd iscip linary coo rd ina tion . p

( 3 ) S em antic supervision is the th ird task o f philosophy. T h e guideline is the \ forestalling o f the m any gross erro rs constan tly com m itted by scientists \ because o f th e way certa in term s are used. A ny term , o f course, is subject to \ p ro p e r and im p ro p er usage depending upon ac tual con tac ts w ith things an d events referred to o r designated . A n ou ts tan d in g exam ple o f gross m isusage is th e havoc w rought by em ploying th e w ord “experience.’’ In psychology th is usage has helped to perp e tu a te psychic entities a n d p ro cesses. T he term “process" itself, as well as the term “event,” has helped to m ain ta in m ystic notions. To speak o f m ental “events" o r psychic “energy” is, o f course, to trad u ce scientific term inology. A n o th e r frequently troub le- lsom e term is “function ,” w hich has burdened science and ph ilosophy w ith A num erous ineptitudes o f description an d in terp re tation . 1

It m ust n o t be assum ed th a t these tasks are in no wise th e responsibility > o f th e specialized scientist. T h a t assu m p tio n im plies a non ex is ten t d isjunctio n betw een th e assum ptive an d o th e r aspects o f scientific w ork. R ather, it is a m atte r o f g reater o r lesser em phasis. ^

A side fro m th e varia tion in tasks, technical ph ilo sophy differs som ew hat fro m the special sciences in a n u m b er o f o th e r particu la rs; fo r exam ple, it encourages a grea te r relative freedom w ith respect to d a ta . T h e specializatio n o f the sciences lim its them to localized p ro b lem s an d to investigative techniques associated w ith specified technological cond itions. In this sense ph ilosophy ca n be m o re speculative an d m ore com prehensive th a n any particu la r science. T h e scientific ph ilo sopher is generally m ore inclined to w ard w ider interdiscip linary coopera tion . A lso he is m ore interested in th e o rgan iza tion an d system ization o f findings th a n in th e im m ediate d iscovery o f th e tra its o f th ings a n d the in teractions o f the co m p o n en ts o f events. In o th e r w ords, he stresses in terp re ta tions m o re th a n descriptions.

G ran tin g the validity o f the p roposed ph ilosophy o f science, it is adm itted ly difficult to establish it, because it dem ands th e rep lacem ent o f venerable in tellectual institu tions. H ow ever, in view o f th e reciprocal relations betw een ph ilo sophy an d science, th ere exists a g reat po ten tia lity th a t a naturalistic psychology can co n trib u te a great dea l to th e desired result. A ccordingly, we consider briefly th e tra its o f a scientific psychology.

T h e first an d fo rem ost characteristic o f a scientific psychology is th a t all its descrip tions an d in terp re ta tions a re developed from orig inal interbehaviors w ith the activities o f organism s as they in teract w ith o th e r organism s o r o th e r objects. T h u s scientific psychology s tan d s in s trik in g c o n tra s t to

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T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L Dtrad itional psychology, which is built up by encapsulating pristine behavior in historical constructs.

Scientific psychology implies a dense in terbehavioral continuum . The m ost abstrac t behavior o f a scientist in fo rm ula ting a law based on contacts w ith field o r lab o ra to ry events represen ts e labo ra te an d refined action sim ilar in all respects to the crude an d sp o n tan eo u s in teraction o f reflexes o r biological adjustm ents. N ow here in th is co n tin u u m is there any place for m en tal states o r processes o f “consciousness" th a t have to be m aterialized by anatom ical an d physiological supports.

Scientific psychology con trasts greatly w ith transcenden tal psychology in its ap p ro ach to specific d a ta ; fo r exam ple, it does no t differentiate betw een sensing and perceiving, w hich are only sim pler and m ore com plex in teractions w ith things. M ore im portan t, scientific psychology does not regard the con fron ta tion o f individuals w ith the ir environing objects and

. persons as th e creation o f those stim ulus objects. T h e existence o f the • properties an d qualities o f pristine stim ulus objects are to be explained by their chem ical, biological, and m echanical structu res, an d th e interactions o f these factors. O f course, it is possible, in fa rt inevitable, tha t hum an ') o rganism s should respond to objects co n tra ry to their pristine properties. ( ; But this is to be accounted fo r exclusively by individual an d social contin- r gencies occurring during p rio r con fron ta tions o f organism s w ith particular J

, objects. ■F o r scientific psychology the effective descriptive m odel is the evolution

o f in terbehav io r as observed in th e psychological developm ent o f a neonate. In studying th e con tinuous m atu ra tio n a l process we observe the inaugura tion and perfection o f ad justm en ts to th ings by th e infant as it m atures biologically. W e see how and w hen the in fan t develops differentia ting responses to the qualities o f objects, an d skills fo r m anipulating such objects. W e observe also how th e in fan t bu ilds u p an d im poses tra its upon things u nder th e influence o f social and cu ltu ra l conditions.

T h e in teractional principle operates in every type o f psychological event.If we analyze w hat happens w hen the ind iv idual im agines o r rem em bers som ething, we find him in teracting w ith d irect an d substitu te stim ulus objects. T o rem em ber is to have a substitu te stim ulus facilitate an interaction w ith som e other object, event, o r situation .

A lw ays the em phasis is on i nteraction . T h e psychological event involves the presence o f an o th er organism o r object. It is this field o r situational m ode o f descrip tion o f psychological events th a t releases the hold o f trad itional m ental constructs on psychology. F u rth erm o re , a psychology

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I N T I M A C Y O F P H I L O S O P H Y & S C I E N C Eth a t s ta rts w ith such a c o n fro n ta tio n a l basis has n o need fo r such analogies o r do d g es as th e su rro g a tio n o f m ind o r consc iousness by a b ra in o r nervous system . It is on ly such a psychology th a t m ak es possib le a valid an d significant ph ilosophy.

I co nc lude th is d iscussion w ith a few sum m ariz ing sentences. I assum e th a t it m ay n ow b e agreed th a t, psychologists w h o cu ltiva te th e ph ilo so p h y o f science m ay h o p e to im p ro v e th e ir d iscip line, a n d in tu rn , en h a n ce th e value o f th a t ph ilosophy , b u t only u n d e r ce rta in s trin g en t cond itions, (a) T h e ex am in a tio n o f th e tenets o f ph ilosophy m ust be critica l in th e ex trem e. Every a tte m p t m u st b e m ad e to d istingu ish betw een p ro p o sitio n s derived fro m c o n tac ts w ith co n fro n tab le events a n d th o se derived fro m verbal trad itio n , (b) T h e possib ility m u st exist th a t psychologists c an free th em selves fro m tra d itio n a l ax io m s a n d a d o p t m o re a d e q u a te ones to m a tch investigative o p era tio n s. E n co uragem en t to believe th a t th is possib ility d oes ex ist is a ffo rded by recen t ach ievem ents in fo rm u la tin g a va lid ph ilosoph y as well as a scientific psychology.

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C H A P T E R 12

THE BIRTH OF EPISTEMOLOGY AND ONTOLOGY

KNOW LEDGE A N D EXISTENCE

S o o v erw helm ed have been th e p h ilo so p h ers o f h is to ry w ith th e im m ensity a n d th e a p p a re n t hostility o f th e ir env iron ing w orlds, th a t they have qu a iled in tensely a n d so u g h t m eans to lessen th e ir o w n im po tence . F ro m th is c ircu m stan ce has arisen the tw o subdiv isions o f ph ilo sophy called Epistem ology a n d O ntology. Because ph ilosophers h av e lacked know ledge availab le to scientific psychologists a n d an th ro p o lo g is ts , they have resorted to ab so lu tism a n d abstrac tion ism . T h u s they have d ich o to m ized th e w orld a n d them selves an d inconsequence have been deeply tro u b led by p rob lem s o f know ledge a n d existence. A lth o u g h h u m an beings a re phases o f n a tu re , th in k ers have co n stan tly m ade them selves ob liv ious to th e o b v io u s fact th a t p h ilo soph ical o rien ta tio n is co n tin u o u s w ith all o th e r a d a p ta tio n s o f o rganism s to th e ir environing th ings an d events. A ccordingly it is the height o f red u n d an cy to invent psychic w orlds to exp lain h u m a n ex istence w ith all its com edies a n d tragedies.

KNOW LEDGE AS A D A PT A T IO N A N D O RIENTATIO N

T h e ex istence o f o rganism s is evidence o f b io logical a d a p ta tio n . T h a t an o rgan ism m ain ta in s itself signifies th a t it is in in tim ate re la tionsh ip w ith am bien t cond itio n s including a tm osphere , ino rgan ic th ings, an d o th e r organism s. T h e sim plest organism s such as sessile p lan ts an d an im als evolve a nd rem a in in reciprocal re la tionsh ip w ith su r ro u n d in g th ings an d even ts in a m o re o r less passive ad a p ta tio n . But w ith fu rth e r evo lu tion o rgan ism s becom e discrim inative a n d selective in th e ir in tim ate an d m o re independen t re la tionsh ips. H ere th e ad a p ta tio n becom es com plex an d o rgan ism s a tta in in tim ate know ledge o f th e d im ensions, p roperties, q ualities, an d re la tionsh ips o f things. W ith the evo lu tion o f h u m a n o rgan ism s -> an d th e ach ievem en t o f a sufficiency o f ind iv idua l security a n d n u trim en t w ith a su b seq u en t developm ent o f cu ltu ra l institu tions so th a t th e abstraction istic an d reflective tendencies a re a tta ined , then o rien ta tio n becom es i specialized in to technical epistem ology.

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E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D O N T O L O G YFRACTIONATION O F A D A PT A T IO N S TO EVENTS

T h ro u g h o u t th e post-G reek h istory o f ph ilosophy , th in k ers ad o p ted a d is to rted view concern ing th e ir ad a p ta tio n to th ings a n d cond itions and th u s sep a ra ted them selves from th e ir su rro u n d in g s, so th a t o n one hand th ey em phasized th e ac tivities o f thgm selves as over ag a in s t th e th ings they in te rac ted w ith , a n d called th a t know ledge ep istem ology , w hile th e th ings k now n as item s o f existence o r being they p laced u n d e r a ca tego ry nam ed

"ontology. In th e course o f tim e, how ever, th e difficulties o f d ea ling w ith d y n a rn ic a n d changing events forced philosophers a n d scientists to integ ra te observers an d observed, an d they a d o p ted -th e slogan th a t th e o b server is p a r t o f the observed.

EPISTEM OLOGY

E pistem ology is conventionally regarded as th e b ra n ch o f ph ilosophy w hich is concerned w ith p rob lem s o f know ledge. O ver th e years na tu ra lly views have diverged a b o u t th e n a tu re o f know ledge b u t in general episte-

Ijm ology m ay be traced b ack to the cu ltu re periods in w h ich the th inkers o f / th e tim e w ere influenced by th e idea o f soul. S o u l w as reg ard ed as the

invisible an d intangible aspect o f h u m an beings. A ccordingly , th e p roblem s arise; can th o u g h t o r know ledge be co nnected w ith ta n gible th ings, o r

"m aterial th in gs tem pered w ith spirit o r sp iritual essences? T h is d ich o to m y as co m m o n ly know n is a dualistic c o a t o f m an y co lo rs. S o fa r as persons w ere concerned they were frac tionated in to m ind a n d body.

T h ro u g h o u t all th e centuries th ro u g h w hich ep istem ology flourished d o w n to th e p resen t it has been a n d rem ains sh o t full o f co n trad ic tio n s, im probab ilities, an d irra tiona lity . A lw ays there is a n un forg ivab le rejection

, o f observ a tio n an d observab le things. E pistem ological th in k in g gives rise to m any inanities, fo r exam ple, “ D o o th e r peop le have m inds?" K now ledge is Solipsistic. E pistem ology m akes everything including o th e r persons and

' all th ings exist only in th e “m ind" o f a know er.from th e lack o f a

valid psychological basis. I t is clear th a t discussions o f a n epistem ological so r t a re based o n m ind-body principles. S ince u n fo rtu n a te ly th e m ental featu res th a t a re th e fo u n d a tio n o f epistem ological studies are invalid , the resu lts reach ed in an y o f th e epistem ological d iscussions are there fo re invalid.

I w an t to m en tion p rim arily th e fallacious use o f su ch co n struc ts as senses a n d understanding .

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a. The SensesT h e senses as they are trea ted in trad itio n a l ph ilo sophy have n o existence

w hatsoever. A t best they are construc ted o n th e basis th a t there are sense o rg an s such as th e recep to rs o f m o d ern physio logy , th a t is, re tinas, cochleae, sk in recep to rs, and so on . A t once w e n o tice th a t the n o tio n o f sense o rgans th ro u g h w hich know ledge is first s tim u la ted is n o t tru e to observation , o r the existence o f th e in terre la tions o f o rganism s an d stim ulus objects. T h e fact is th a t sense o rgans are sim p le featu res o f a n o rgan ism sensitive to certa in sorts o f energy o r pressures. N ex t it follow s tha t the idea o f know ledge being initiated th ro u g h sense o rgans does n o t co m p o rt w ith th e fact th a t it is alw ays a n o rgan ism th a t is in teracting w ith stim ulus objects. T h e essential fea tu re o f sensing is th a t th e energies o r th e pressures th a t inhere in the theory o f senses are m eans fo r the con tac ts o f o rganism s w ith objects. F o r exam ple, in the case o f v isual in teractions w ith objects, th e light w hich strikes the re tin a is n o t a stim u lus o r inciter o f m en ta l sta tes

^ r processes in th e m ind o r the b rain~ b u t r a th e r th e m eans by w hich the ' o rgan ism can inte rac t w ith th e objects. S im ilarly th e a ir w aves w hich are p resum ed to act exactly like th e light rays a re sim ply au d ito ry m ed ia. T hey m ak e it possib le fo r the o rg a n ism to react to sounds. Inc iden tally there is im plied here th e view th a t sensing is a definite m a tte r o f in teracting w ith objects. T h e trad itio n a l view w hich m ay be traced b ack to N ew ton’s ex p e rim en t th a t co lor, fo r exam ple , is som e so rt o f psychic process in th e so-called sensorium should no t be invoked. W h a t th e organism s o r persons

| in terac t w ith a re ac tua l ob jects w ith the ir v a rio u s qualities a n d p roperties I w ith in a co o rd in a te space tim e system.

✓

b. The UnderstandingBy th e sam e to k en the un d erstan d in g w hich ep istem ologists m ake use o f

does n o t acco rd w ith th e facts o f psychology. In this case as in th a t o f th e senses w ha t really is being observed and discussed is the behav io r o f o rgan ism s w ith respect to objects. U nd erstan d in g is a m ode o f in teracting w ith objects based on , in m ost cases, m any prev ious co n tac ts w ith objects. A t first som e object w hich m ay be called new an d stran g e to an organ ism is little u n d ers to o d . It is m erely seen, th a t is, perceived. If th e o rgan ism perfo rm s la te r reactions to th e sam e object w h e th e r m erely observing w hat h appens to it w hen in co n tac t w ith a n o th e r ob ject, o r th e result o f th e organ ism ’s m an ipu lation o f th e object, then th e later reactions m ay be called understand ing .

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E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D O N T O L O G YONTOLOGY A N D EXISTENCE

C oupled w ith th e vagaries o f ep istem ology is th e ph ilosophical discipline nam ed on to logy . D irectly in co rrespondence w ith the epistem ological trad itio n a ro se n u m ero u s specu la tions a b o u t th e n a tu re o f being. C o n so n a n t w ith th e spiritistic p resuppositions o f post-classical th ink ing , philosophers w restled w ith such p rob lem s as “Is th ere a n ex ternal world?" “W h a t is it like?" a n d “ H o w can such a w orld be know n?" P ro m in en t in these specu la tions is th e concep t o f Reality as co m pared w ith th e criterion o f T ru th x T h e p rim ary q u estio n is how to d ifferen tiate betw een ap p earan ce an d reality?) O bviously th ere ex ist m an y a n d effective p o ten tia lities for question ing how well know ledge is confirm able w ith th e tra its o f observed th ings an d events.

B asic to all versions o f on to logy are th e im ped ing b locks o f trad itio n a l ph ilosophies, su ch as assu m p tio n s o f abso lu teness, ab strac tion ism s as over ag a inst th e p reo ccu p a tio n w ith concrete an d co n fro n tab le objects, persons, o rganism s in general, an d terrestria l cond itions o f various sorts, geological, geographical, b io log ical, psychological, an d cu ltu ra l. F o r the m o st part on to logical p rob lem s a re spu rious an d definitely verbal.

T o bring trad itio n a l on to log ical p rob lem s in to co n tex t w ith th e N ew ton ian experim en t it is instructive to see how tra d itio n a l beliefs ou tw eigh events in th e th eo ry o f co lo r. C o n fro n tab le even ts in th e s itu a tio n are describab le a s a b eam o f light en tering th ro u g h a sm all a p e rtu re w hich is in tercep ted by a glass p rism w ith an o b lo n g sp ec tru m o f co lo rs ap p earin g o n an availab le surface. In th e in terp re ta tion , how ever, th e co lo rs w hich are n o t co n ta in ed in th e differentially refrang ib le light a re asse rted to be ap p aritio n s in a nonex isting m ind o r sensorium .— F o r a scientific ph ilosophy , on to logical p ro b lem s are confined entirely to th e d e te rm in a tio n o f th e n a tu re a n d p ro p ertie s o f th ings a n d ev en ts as based o n p ro p e r a ssu m p tio n s, w hile s tric t use is m ad e o f processes o f analysis, synthesis, d issection, an d o th e r technical processes.

C o lo rs, as well as all o th e r p roperties, characteristics, a n d re la tionsh ips o u g h t to be regarded as existing an d con fro n tab le things. In psychological te rm s they consist o f stim ulus objects to w hich o rgan ism s resp o n d and a d a p t them selves in v arious p ro p e r an d im p ro p er wavs. In n o w av does the individual w ho reacts to stim ulus objects create th e m . W h a t he creates is

/ m erely his verbal d escrip tion o f th em o r his desiring, o r p a in tin g o f w h a t he reacts t o. H ere is a typ ical s itu a tio n in w hich co n stru c ts m u st be sharp ly differentiated fro m pristine th ings an d events. C o n stru c ts can only be identified w ith constructs.

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T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L DT h e h isto ry o f ph ilo sophy is very instructive con cern in g th e n a tu re o f

on to logy . In th e early objective period o f ph ilo sophy A risto tle p roposes a fo rm o f specu la tio n a b o u t being w hich clearly is m erely ex tra p o la tio n from co n fro n tab le s itua tions. T h o u g h chem ical analysis w as lacking h e th o u g h t to m ak e ab s tra c tio n s a b o u t things in o rd e r to a tta in know ledge a b o u t the n a tu re o f su b stan ce s an d how they cam e to be w ha t they are. D esp ite the p rim itiv ity o f th e know ledge o f th e tim e, A ris to tle a ttem p ted to specify the n a tu re o f cause an d change, o f th e re la tion betw een substances an d a ttributes, o f po tency and actuality , o f tem pora lity an d perm anance .

W hat differentiates the early objective specu la tions a b o u t being is th e increased d e p a rtu re from things an d events and reliance u p o n verbal co n stru c tio n s. C om plex sy stem sjo f arg u m en ts .h av e been P iganized_to p rove th e existence o f th in g s jiev e r a v a ila b le fo r o b serv a tio n o r even any a u th e n tic inference from confron tab le evidence. T h ere is a sh a rp differentia tio n betw een ac tu a l in teractions w ith th ings com posed o f pristine su b stances an d th o se consisting only o f assertions o r verbal u tterances.

E arly on , o f course, all such questions w ere read ily answ ered by the religious ph ilosophers w ho resorted to G o d to aid th em in all th e ir p ro b lem s an d so lu tio n s. A lj theyj e e d e d to d o was to invoke a su p rem e c re a to r w h o cou ld {provide ^ s u b s ta n tia l o r gossam er un iverse, a n d w ho c o uld endow th in k ers w ith in tu itive pow ers ad lib to accom plish w h a t was

'd e s ire d , la ter w ith th e a d v a ncem ent o f science a tte m pts w ere, m ade .to p u t o n tb T o in ^ ^ p m b le m s on a m ore_naturalistic basis. T h e n arose th e g rand tra d itio n w hich is sym bolized by the K an tian d o c trin e o f th e D in g a n S ic h .^ T o a g rea t e x ten t th e th ing-in-itse lf so lu tio n o f o n to log ica l p rob lem s ? served to bring ep istem ology and on to logy closer th a n w as the case h ith erto bu t n o im provem en t w as m ade in th e underly ing philosophical assum p tio n s. T h e sam e old su pernatu ra lism prevailed un til ph ilo sophers a ttem p ted to overcom e trad itio n a l m etaphysics by tu rn in g to linguistic m atters.

D esp ite all th e d isputes a n d d isagreem ents a b o u t th e n a tu re o f know ledge it is a sim ple m atte r to account for th e persistence o f Epistem ology- O n to logy as w as no ted above. O riginally it w as only th e oppressive pow er o f cu ltu ra l institu tions, th a t is, the beliefs fro m th e age o f fa ith th a t held m en captive. It was essentially th e pow er o f religion. W ith th e g row th o f science an d its enchainm en t by the bonds o f sp iritualism the pow er o f ep istem ological verbalism w as streng thened by ce rta in experim en ts. I p ro p o se to a ttr ib u te th e pow er o f spiritistic ph ilosophy am o n g scientists an d their

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E P I S T E M O L O G Y A N D O N T O L O G Yinfluence u p o n ph ilo soph ical th o u g h t to th e su p p o rt received fro m such scientists as G alileo an d N e w to a

M ATH EM ATICS AS AN ONTOLOGICAL PROBLEM

r T h e ch a rac te r o f m odern on to logy is excellently reflected in th e rela tion o f m athem atics an d th e sciences. O ne party declares th a t eq u a tio n s can be b u ilt in ivo ry tow ers b u t la te r discovers th a t they describe events in na tu re . T h e o th e r p a rty argues th a t scientific equa tions can only be d e lv e d from

j ia tu ra l events, and th e ir valid ity stem s from observations. {C o n sid e rab le light is cast u p o n this deba te by consu lting th e findings

concern ing th e n a tu re o f m athem atics and o f the psychology o f discovery.

a. What is Mathematics?A s to m ath em atics it is advisab le to tak e acco u n t o f th e fact th a t it is a t

th e sam e tim e (1) a language, (2) a calculus, (3) a n a rt, a n d (4) an in d ep en d en t science.

1. Mathematics as Language. A s a language, m athem atics can serve to describe w h a t scientists d iscover o f th e re la tionsh ips o f v arious fac to rs in a co m p lex event. S u ch eq u a tio n s as P = y /d o r F = M , M j/S x d o indeed en ligh ten readers as to the variables involved in an event a n d th e ir relative influence o n th e co m p o sitio n an d p roperties o f th ings a n d events. T his linguistic aspect o f m athem atics is excellently illustra ted in th e large n u m b e r o f instances in w hich new processes in m ath em atics have been o rig inated o r cu ltivated because o f p rob lem s first encoun tered in physics.1

2. Mathematics as Calculus. D espite th e in tricate in terre lationsh ips o f th e v ario u s aspects o f m athem atics it is n o t difficult to in su la te th e ca lcu lus aspect. H ere m ath em atics is clearly an aspect o f scientific w o rk a n d th u s the m ath em atic ian is closely in con tac t w ith th ings an d events.

3. Mathematics as Art. M an y m ath em atic ian s look u p o n th e ir w ork as sim ply th e co n stru c tio n o f pa ttern s an d re la tional s truc tu res designed for p ersonal edification o r the exercise o f a rch itec tu ra l b eh av io r in b ring ing w o rk s o f a r t in to existence. E q u a tio n s an d system s they insist a re beautifu l a n d to be co m p ared to a pain ting , piece o f sculpture, o r m usical score.

4. Mathematics as Science. O f great significance is m athem atics as science. A lth o u g h it does n o t ap p e a r as w idely recognized o r acknow ledged, m ath em atics ac tu a lly is a specialized m em b er o f th e scientific

'See Bell, E. T„ The Development o f Mathematics. New York, McGraw-Hill, 1940.

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fra tern ity , w ith abstrac t and concrete re la tions o f m any so rts as subject m a tte r. S om e evidence o f this fact is d iscern ib le in the insistence th a t m athem atics is logic o r derived from logic.2

PSYCHOLOGY OF DISCOVERY

Scientific psychology m akes p lain th a t the classical views ab o u t bo th on to logy and epistem ology were badly m isconceived, since they are based u p o n fallacious views o f psychology an d the w ay individuals perform ed creative and o ther form s o f behavior.(§ecause the no tion has long prevailed th a t persons are doub le beings m ade up o f m inds and bodies, th e m ental or soul p a r t was regarded as free an d a u to n o m o u s and th u s capable o f creating a w orld and all it con ta in s) W hat was flagrantly overlooked was th a t no psychological action o r perfo rm ance does o r can o ccu r except as an in teraction w ith som eth ing in the am bience o f a p erfo rm ing individual. T h a t so m eth in g could be oneself as well o r ill, erect o r p rone , an o th e r person o r o th er organism , or im aginary object o r quality o f a n object. D ue consideration o f psychological behav io r leaves no ro o m fo r the dichotim i- za tion o f epistem ology and onto logy , except as referential term s fo r o rg an ism s an d their ac tions in co rresp o n d ence w ith th ings an d events. I nvestigatio n o f the n a tu re o f things can only be perfo rm ed by th e critical tech n iques o f the special sciences. T h ere can be no m ore general disciplines n o r m ore valued o r precise ones.

; R u s s e l l , B ., Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, L o n d o n . A l le n a n d U n w in . 1 9 19 .

C H A P T E R 13

EGOCENTRIC KNOWING VERSUS COGNITIVE FIELDS

SPIRITISTIC PH ILO SO PH Y D O M IN A T ES T H E SCIENCE

O F KNOW ING

O ne o f the m ost dep ressing events re la tive to b o th ph ilo sophy an d science is th e im position o f th e m etaphysics o f m ind an d body u p o n the scientific trea tm en t o f know ing behavior. T h is c ircum stance has exerted a pow erfu l(m aleficen$ influence u p o n th e th e o ry an d p rac tice co ncern ing perceiving, th in k in g , an d o th e r so-called cognitive activ ities as well as th e scientific views concern ing philosophy an d science in general.

T h e h isto ry o f th e conquest o f science by m etaphysica l a n d m ythical princip les is m ost in teresting in th a t em inen t an d ex trem ely cap ab le scientists serve as unw ittin g agen ts in tu rn in g science in to m isleading an d fru s tra tin g pathw ays. W e begin th is u n p lea sa n t s to ry by th e view s o f G alileo concern ing the basic know ledge n am ed perceiving.

GALILEO SP1RITIZES KNOW ING

In co n n ec tio n w ith his th in k in g a b o u t th e p ro b lem k n o w n as p rim ary a n d secondary qualities he discusses the n a tu re o f heat a n d o th e r qualities o f things. I q u o te from the treatise II S ag g ia tu re as tran sla ted by B u rtt.1

. . . I want to propose examination of that which we call heat, whose generally accepted notion comes very far from the truth if my serious doubts be correct, inasmuch as it is supposed to be a true accident, affection and quality really residing in the thing which we perceive to be heated. Nevertheless I say, that indeed I feel myself impelled by the necessity, as soon as I conceive a piece of matter or corporeal substance, of conceiving that in its own nature it is bounded and figured in such and such a figure, that in relation to others it is large or small, that it is in this or that place, in this or that time, that it is in motion or remains at rest, that it touches or does not touch another body, that it is single, few, or many; in short by no imagination can a body be separated from such conditions: but that it must be white or red, bitter or sweet, sounding or mute, of a pleasant or unpleasant odour, I do not perceive my mind forced to acknowledge it necessarily accompanied by such conditions; so if the senses were not the escorts, perhaps the reason or the imagination by itself would never have arrived at them. Hence I think that these tastes, odours, colours, etc., on the side of the object in which they seem to exist, are nothing else than mere names, but hold their residence solely in the sensitive body; so that if the animal were removed, every such quality would be abolished and annihilated. Nevertheless, as soon as we have imposed names on

1 Burtt, E. A., The Metaphysical Foundations o f Modem Science, Garden City, Doubleday, 1954.127

T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L Dthem, particular and different from those of the other primary and real accidents, we induce ourselves to believe that they exist just as truly and really as the latter.

I think that by an illustration 1 can explain my meaning more clearly. 1 pass a hand, first over a marble statue, then over a living man. Concerning all the effects which come from the hand, as regards the hand itself, they are the same whether on the one or on the other object—that is, these primary accidents, namely motion and touch (for we call them by no . other names)—but the animate body which suffers that operation feels various affections according to the different parts touched, and if the sole of the foot, the kneecap, or the armpit be touched, it perceives besides the common sense of touch, another affection, to which we have given a particular name, calling it tickling. Now this affection is all ours, and does not belong to the hand at all. And it seems to me that they would greatly err who should say that the hand, besides motion and touch, possessed in itself another faculty different from those, namely the tickling faculty; so that tickling would be an accident that exists in it. A piece of paper, or a feather, lightly rubbed on whatever part of our body you wish, performs, as regards itself, everywhere the same operation, that is, movement and touch; but in us, if touched between the eyes, on the nose, and under the nostrils, it excites an almost intolerable tickling, though elsewhere it can hardly be felt at all. Now this tickling is all in us. and not in the feather, and if the animate and sensitive body be removed, it is nothing more than a mere name. Of precisely a similar and not greater existence do I believe these various qualities to be possessed, which are attributed to natural bodies, such as tastes, odours, colours, and others.

** But that external bodies, to excite in us these tastes, these odours and these sounds.demand other than size, figure, number, and slow or rapid motions, I do not believe; and 1

i judge that, if the ears, the tongue, and the nostrils were taken away, the figure, the numbers,and the motions would indeed remain, but not the odours nor the tastes nor the sounds, which, without the living animal, I do not believe are anything else than names, just as tickling is precisely nothing but a name if the armpit and the nasal membrane be removed;

"I . . and turning to my first proposition in this place, having now seen that many affections& which are reputed to be qualities residing in the external object, have truly no other

existence than in us, and without us are nothing else than names; I say that I am inclined sufficently to believe that heat is of this kind, and that the thing that produces heat in us and

yg makes us perceive it, which we call by the general name fire, is a multitude of minutecorpuscles thus and thus figured, moved with such and such a velocity;. . . But that besides

^ their figure, number, motion, penetration, and touch, there is in fire another quality, that isji heat—that I do not believe otherwise than I have indicated, and I judge that it is so much

due to us that, if the animate and sensitive body were removed, heat would remain nothing more than a simple word.

W hen we analyze G alileo’s th ink ing here we m ust ap p lau d his enlistm ent in th e b a ttle ag a in st the m edieval inventions o f forms, qualities, and properties as p u re existences independen t o f ac tu a l th ings th a t can be trea ted by th e m athem atica l opera tions o f coun ting , m easuring , and weighing. N evertheless, we ca n n o t overlook the ho ld u p o n him o f the transcend en ta l in stitu tio n s w hich serve as an in tellectual c u r ta in betw een him and concre te th ings a n d co n d itio n s except p erh ap s body a n d m o tio n . A s a consequence o f this cap tiv ity he unw ittingly re ta ined th e n o tio n o f the innate an d independen t existence o f som e properties an d qualities w hich he

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K N O W I N G V S . C O G N I T I V E F I E L D Scalled th e p rim ary so rt. T h u s he misses the n a tu ra lis tic ph ilosophy w hich is based o n th e o b serv a tio n an d analysis o f th ings and events ju s t as they occur, excep t as he is in terested in practical o p era tio n s like testing m aterials, bo ring can n o n s an d o th e r techniques re levan t to a V enetian arsenal.

W hat is o f cou rse no t to be expected even o f th e g rea test scientists o f the f seventeenth cen tu ry is an ap p recia tio n th a t in m a tte rs o f cogn ition and

psychological events in general, sim ilar field events prevail as in the astro - L nom ic an d k inem atic dom ains. T he sam e scientists w ho have established

the C opern ican field o f H eliocentric m otion; the K eplerian field o f eliptic m o tion o f p lanets relative to the sun with p roportionalities o f tim e and d istance; th e G alilean field o f falling bodies; and finally the N ew ton ian field o f universal a ttra c tio n o r g rav ita tion could n o t u n d ers tan d th a t psychological events likewise occu r jn fields w ith responses o f o rgan ism s in reciprocal ac tio n w ith stim ulus ob jects.

T h a t G alileo was u n ab le to a tta in to a field co n stru c tio n in psychology was u n d o u b ted ly ow ing to his ab so rp tio n o f the n o tio n th a t the soul is the seat an d locale o f seco n d ary p roperties and qualities. W hen G alileo assum es th a t tick ling is n o t a p ro p erty located in th e fea ther bu t in th e o rgan ism , really its sou l, he is firm ly ensnared in th e m eshes o f th e m in d -m atter trad itio n o f dualistic philosophy.

T h a t G alileo is m o re influenced in his th ink ing by philosophical trad itio n th a n by ac tu a l co n tac ts w ith events is evident fro m his fa ilu re to differentia te betw een heat as a n event o f m olecu lar m o tio n , an d as p a r t o f a b io logical an d psychological event in w hich an o rgan ism is reacting to a cond ition to w hich it is sensitive, an d by w hich it is in jured , cu red , o r destroyed . T h e pow ers o f dualistic institutions m ad e it im possible fo r the g reat fo u n d e r o f dynam ics to appreciate the differences betw een (o) varian t reactions o f o rgan ism s to things and th e ir qualities, and (b) the existence o f a psychic receptacle fo r secondary properties different from shape, size, and con tac t, a lth o u g h dynam ics consists essentially o f system s o f in teractions o f th ings a n d events. O f course, heat is n o t a m edieval substance bu t it is an event o r a co n d itio n , say, a rapid ag itation o f m olecules, w hich p lainly is a fa c to r in su ch relatively larger events as ox idations, w ork , explosions, ca lc inations, energy tran sfo rm atio n s, an d so on. A s a m an o f th e seventeen th cen tu ry it was n o t possib le for G alileo to an tic ip a te th e developm ent o f chem istry a n d th e o th e r sciences w hich allow co lo rs, tastes, an d o d o rs to b e reg ard ed as p ro p e rtie s o r qualities o f th ings w hich can be reacted to , evaluated , m an ip u la ted , im itated , and m easured.

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T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L DNEW TON’S COLOR EXPERIM ENTS SU PPO R T

M E N T A L IS T S SCIENCE

P hilosophers interested in naturalistic p ostu la tion for their discipline m ust be deeply im pressed w ith the en o rm o u s influence exerted by N ew to n ’s experim ents on sight and colors in m ain ta in ing supern a tu ra l and com pletely au tistic th ink ing in psychology an d ph ilosophy. S o eno rm o u s has been and still is the influence initiated by N ew ton’s in terp re ta tion o f the experim en t tha t it deserves full exposition . A ccordingly we present Newto n ’s artic le originally published in the P h ilosoph ical T ransactions o f th e R oyal Society in 1672 in the abridged and m odernized form o f L. W . T ay lo r.2

In the Year 1666 (at which time I applied myself to the Grinding of Optick Glasses of other Figures than Spherical) 1 procured me a Triangular Glass-Prism, to try therewith the

^ celebrated Phaenomena of Colours. And in order thereto, having darkened my Chamber,and made a small Hole in my Window-shuts, to let in a convenient Quantity of the Sun's Light, 1 placed my Prism at its Entrance, that it might be thereby refracted to the opposite

ijp Wall. It was at first a very pleasing Divertisement, to view the vivid and intense Coloursproduced thereby; but after a while applying myself to consider them more circumspectly, I became surprised to see them in an oblong Form; which, according to the receiv’d Laws of Refractions, I expected should have been circular. They were terminated at the Sides with straight Lines, but at the Ends the Decay of Light was so gradual, that it was difficult to determine justly what was their Figure, yet they seemed Semicircular.

Comparing the Length of this colour’d S p e c tru m with its Breadth, I found it about five times greater, a Disproportion so extravagant, that it excited me to a more than ordinary Curiosity of examining from whence it might proceed. I could scarce think, that the various Thickness of the Glass, or the Termination with Shadow or Darkness, could have any influence on Light to produce such an Effect; yet I thought it not amiss, first to examine those circumstances, and so try'd what would happen by transmitting Light through Parts of the Glass of divers Thicknesses, or through Holes in the Window of divers Bignesses, or

4 by setting the Prism without, so that the Light might pass through it, and be refracted,'‘ 1 before it was terminated by the Hole: But 1 found none of those Circumstances material.

The Fashion of the Colours was in all these Cases the same.Then I suspected, whether by any Unevenness in the Glass, or other contingent lrregular-

ity, these Colours might be thus dilated. And to try this, I took another Prism like the former, and so placed it, that the Light passing thro’ them both, might be refracted contrary ways, and so by the latter returned into that Course from which the former had diverted it: For by this Means 1 thought the regular Effects of the first Prism would be destroyed by the second Prism, but the irregular Ones more augmented, by the Multiplicity of Refractions. The Event was, that the Light, which by the first Prism was diffused into an oblong Form, was by the second reduced into an orbicular One, with as much Regularity as when it did not at all pass through them.. . .

Then 1 began to suspect, whether the Rays, after their Trejection through the Prism, did not move in curve Lines, and according to their more or less Curvity tend to divers Pans of the Wall. And it increased my Suspicion, when I remember'd that I had often seen a

JTaylor, L. W., Physics the Pioneer Science, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1941.130

K N O W I N G V S . C O G N I T I V E F I E L D STennis-Ball struck with an oblique Racket, describe such a curve Line. For, a circular as well as a progressive Motion being communicated to it by the Stroke, its Parts on that Side, where the Motions conspire, must press and beat the contiguous Air more violently than on the other, and there excite a Reluctancy and Reaction of the Air proportionably greater. And for the same Reason, if the Rays of Light should possibly be globular Bodies, and by their oblique Passage out of one Medium into another acquire a circulating Motion, they ought to feel the greater Resistance from the ambient Ether on that Side where the Motions conspire, and thence be continually bowed to the other. But notwithstanding this plausible Ground of Suspicion, when I came to examine it, I could observe no such Curvity in them. And besides (which was enough for my purpose) I observed, that the Difference betwixt the Length of the Image, and the Diameter of the Hole through which the Light was transmitted, was proportionable to their Distance.

The gradual Removal of these Suspicions at length led me to the Experimeruum Crucis, which was this. (Fig. 2). I took two Boards, and placed one of them close behind the Prism at

Fig. 2. Newton's “Experimentum Crucis" (Redrawn from the Opticks of 1704.)

the Window, so that the Light might pass through a small H ole, made in it for the purpose, and fall on the other Board, which I placed at about 12 Feet distance, having first made a small Hole in it also forsome of that incident Light to pass through. Then 1 placed another Prism behind t his second Board, so that the Light trajectcd through both the Boards might pass through that also, and be again refracted before it arrived at the Wall. This done, I took the first Prism in my Hand, and turned it to and fro slowly about it Axis, so much as to make the several Parts of the Image, cast on the second Board, successively pass through the Hole in it, that I might observe to what Places on the Wall the second Prism would refract them. And I saw by the Variation of those Places, that the Light, tending to that End of the Image towards which the Refraction of the first Prism was made, did in the second Prism suffer a Refraction considerably greater than the Light tending to the other End. And so the true Cause of the Length of that Image was detected to be no other, than that Light is not similar or homogeneal, but consists of difform Rays, som e o f which are m ore refrangible than others; so that without any Difference in their Incidence on the same Medium, some shall be more refracted than others; and therefore that, according to their particular Degrees o f Refrangibilitv, they were transmitted through the Prism to divers Parts of the opposite Wall.

I shall now proceed to acquaint you with another more notable Difformity in its Rays, wherein the Origin of Colours is unfolded: Concerning which I shall lay down the Doctrine

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T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L Dfirst; and then, for its Examination, give you an Instance or two of the Experiments, as a Specimen of the rest.

The Doctrine you will find comprehended and illustrated in the following Propositions.1. As the Rays of Light differ in Degrees of Refrangibility, so they also differ in their

Disposition to exhibit this or that particular Colour. Colours are not Qualifications of Light, derived from Refractions, or Reflections of natural Bodies (as 'tis generally believed) but original and connate Properties, which in divers Rays are divers. Some Rays are disposed to exhibit a Red Colour, and no other, some a Yellow, and no other, some a Green, and no other, and so of the rest. Nor are there only Rays proper and particular to the more eminent Colours, but even to all their intermediate Gradations.

2. To the same Degree of Refrangibility ever belongs the same Colour, and to the same Colour ever belongs the same Degree of Refrangibility. The least refrangible Rays are all disposed to exhibit a Red Colour, and contrarily, those Rays which are disposed to exhibit a Red Colour, are all the least refrangible: So the most refrangible Rays are all disposed to exhibit a deep Violet Colour, and contrarily, those which are apt to exhibit such a Violet Colour, are all the most refrangible: And so to all the intermediate Colours in a continued Series belong intermediate Degrees of Refrangibility. And this Analogy betwixt Colours

a and Refrangibility is very precise and strict; the Rays always either exactly agreeing in both,or proportionally disagreeing in both.

3. The Species of Colour, and Degree of Refrangibility proper to any particular Sort ofp! Rays, is not mutable by Refraction, nor by Reflection from natural Bodies, nor by any other

Cause that 1 could yet observe. When any one Sort of Rays hath been well parted from those of other Kinds, it hath afterwards obstinately retained its Colour, notwithstanding my

1 utmost Endeavors to change it. I have refracted it with Prisms, and reflected it with Bodies,ifli which in Day-light were of other Colours; I have intercepted it with the coloured Film of

Air, interceding two compressed Plates of Glass, transmitted it through coloured Mediums, and through Mediums irradiated with other Sorts of Rays, and diversely terminated it; and yet could never produce any new Colour out of it. It would by contracting or dilating

m become more brisk, or faint, and by the Loss of many Rays, in some Cases very obscure anddark; but I could never see it changed in Specie.. . .

7. But the most surprizing and wonderful Composition was that of Whiteness. There is no one sort of Rays which alone can exhibit this. T is ever compounded; and to its Composition are requisite all the aforesaid primary Colours, mix’d in a due Proportion. I

41 have often with Admiration beheld, that all the Colours of the Prism being made to*•' converge, and thereby to be again mix’d, as they were in the Light before it was incident

upon the Prism, reproduced Light, entirely and perfectly White, and not at all sensibly differing from a direct Light of the Sun, unless when the Glasses 1 used were not sufficiently

tQ| dear; for then they would a little incline it to their Colour.8. Hence therefore it comes to pass, that Whiteness is the usual Colour of Light; for

Light is a confused Aggregate of Rays indued with all sorts of Colours, as they were promiscuously darted from the various Parts of luminous Bodies. And of such a confused Aggregate, as I said, is generated Whiteness, if there be a due Proportion of the Ingredients; but if any one predominate, the Light must incline to that Colour; as it happens in the blue Flame of Brimstone; the yellow Flame of Candles; and the various Colours of the Fixed Stars.

9. These things considered, the manner how Colours are produced by the Prism is evident. For, of the Rays, constituting the incident Light, since those which differ in Colour proportionally differ in Refrangibility, they by their unequal Refractions must be severed and dispersed into an oblong Form in an orderly Succession, from the least refracted Scarlet, to the most refracted Violet.

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K N O W I N G V S . C O G N I T I V E F I E L D ST he N ew ton ian experim en t has exerted its banefu l influence th ro u g h the

fo rm u la tio n o f a m odel o f perceiving w hich becam e th e basis fo r con tinu ing the sam e d o c trin e o f th e religious trad itions an d th e p rim e source fo r the su pernatu ra lism o f know ledge and epistem ology.

In asm u ch as N ew ton ap p roached the p rob lem o f percep tion prim arily as a physicist he lim ited him self to the d iscussion o f visual perception , w hich he only occasionally com pared with au d ito ry perception . A fter all he was m ain ly in terested in light, and in colors on ly as they p erta ined to light. In fact, p rac tica lly all o f his w ork on co lors is involved w ith p rism atic phenom ena.

T he percep tion m odel o f N ew ton is constructed as follows. L ight rays w hich are in them selves colorless bu t differentially refrangib le im pinge u p o n th e eyes. F ro m the eyes the m o tion o f the rays are p ro p o g a ted to the “senso rium ” w here they excite “sensations” o f those m o tio n s un d er the “form ” o f colors. T h e follow ing q u o ta tio n from the Opticks illum inates N ew ton 's n o tio n concern ing co lo r apparitions, and th e accom pany ing d iag ram indicates well the m ain po in ts o f the m odel.

Fig. 3. Conventional Theory of the Function of the Brain in Mediating Between Physical Light and Mental Qualities.

If at any time I speak of light and rays as coloured or endued with Colours. I would be understood to speak not philosophically and properly, but grossly, and according to such conceptions as vulgar people in seeing all these Experiments would be apt to frame. For the rays to speak properly are not coloured. In them there is nothing else than a certain power and disposition to stir up a sensation of this or that Colour. For as sound in a Bell or musical

THE NEW TONIAN M ODEL OF PERCEIVING

L i g h t

R a y s

/

133


T

Ut'lJ

Uli•■an

Siring, or other sounding Body, is nothing but a trembling Motion, propagated by the Object, and in the Sensorium ’tis a sense of that Motion under the form of sound; so Colours in the Object are nothing but a disposition to reflect this or that sort of rays more copiously than the rest; in rays they are nothing but their dispositions to propagate this or that Motion into a Sensorium, and in the Sensorium they are sensations of those Motions under the forms of Colours.^

J u s t as N ew ton to o k over the dualistic ph ilo sophy w hich h e im poses u p o n his percep tual m odel, so in the sam e w ay he assu res the p ersevera tion o f th a t p h ilo so p h y w hich even now con tinues to influence scientists including s tu d en ts o f psychological events. T h is m odel w ith ce rta in m odifications a n d ad d itio n s is th e d o m in a n t one to d ay , th o u g h clearly it has n o t been derived fro m ob serv a tio n s an d th e analysis o f th e activ ities involved in reacting to color. W e proceed next to an analysis o f th e m odel in p re p a ra tio n fo r a critical eva lua tion o f it.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS O F NEW TON’S SEN SO R Y M O DEL

r - T h e first item to consider is th a t th e en tire m odel is con stru c ted o n th e basis o f light an d th e spec tra l co lo rs d ispersed by a p rism . W hile N ew to n ca n n o t be fau lted o n this basis, the ou tco m e resu lts in a generalized m odel

_ w hich does n o t m atch th e facts in th e case. A gain , th e fact th a t th e stim u la tin g rays a re co rrec tly described as colorless m akes w ay f o r a sea rch

' fo r co lo rs an d as w e have seen they a re localized in a sou rce w hich can have n o m an n e r o t ex istence in a n v scientific m ilieu. T h e h is to rica l fact is. how ever, th a t N ew ton’s au th o rity is tak en to be th e basis fo r em phasiz ing sp iritistic co n stru c ts th a t transcend tim e and space. T h e epistem ological view th a t th e m ind creates qualities a n d ob jec ts as L o ck e an d K an t developed it g row s d irectly o u t o f N ew ton’s m odel. T h e p h ilo sophers m en tio n ed m odified an d generalized th e m odel to stress th a t a ll so rts o f u n k n o w n en tities o r pow ers o p era te u p o n th e m ind to m ak e it experience o r kn o w a m an ifo ld w orld o f th ings an d th e ir qualities. In th e fo rm u la tio n s o f K an t th e ex te rn a l pow ers w ere bap tized as th ings in them selves (Dinge an Sich) w hich caused know n th ings to b e p ro jec ted fro m th e m ind . S ince K an t’s tim e th e u n k n o w n ex ternal pow ers becam e g rad u a lly tran sfo rm ed in to causal stim uli fo r sensations an d perceptions.

W hile N ew ton som etim es w rites o f th e b ra in as th e senso rium th ere is h ard ly a d o u b t th a t he regards the sensorium as on ly sea ted in the brain . B asically th e sensa tio n is fo r h im a psychic e n tity sub ject to n o n e o f th e characteristics o f a non-psychic brain . O f course, th e Opticks d a tes fro m a

JNewton, I., Opticks, New York, Dover, 1952, p. 108.134

K N O W I N G V S . C O G N I T I V E F I E L D Stim e w hen spirits were not a t all repugnant. H ow ever, N ew ton is ind isputably a link in the cha in w hich binds cu rren t psychologists, a lo n g w ith o th er scientists, to th e upho lders o f m entalistic doctrines developed in th e H ellenistic period o f o u r culture. C ertain ly sensations are p resum ed to be m ental e lem ents o r partic les w hich can in no w ay be co n n ec ted w ith th e b ra in o r any o f its conductive activities.

HISTORICAL CAREER OF NEWTON’S PERCEIVING M O DEL

W e have a lready m entioned th a t N ew ton’s psychophysical dualism has con tin u ed to influence w riters o n psychology and neuro logy from his time to the presen t. It is possible to trace this co n tin u ity in the w o rk o f p articu la r au thors. F o r o u r purposes it is sufficient to refer to a few o u tstand ing exam ples. F irst we m ay m ention D avid H artley (1705-1757) w ho pu b lished his Observations On Man in 1749. This physician d rew u p o n Locke’s specifically psychological version o f the co rpu scu la r ph ilo sophy and upon N ew ton’s v ib ra tional neuro logy as fou n d a tio n s fo r his ex p lan a tio n s concern ing the n a tu re an d destiny o f m an. Because o f his p resum ab ly scientific view ab o u t a neurological basis fo r m ental processes he has becom e celebrated as a fo u n d er o f physiological psychology. W hat im pressed H artley as well as m any o thers w ho follow ed in his foo tsteps was the ap p aren tly au th o rita tiv e pronouncem ents o f N ew ton as also the pu tative details he posited concern ing the v ibrations o r m o tions in the nerves.

T h o m as R eid (1710-1796) asserts th a t D r. W. Briggs (1642-1704) was N ew ton’s m aster in an a to m y an d the first p ro p o n en t o f th e view that nerves

“ w ere no t h o llow tubes w hich operated as condu its fo r an im al spirits, but ra th e r solid filam ents th a t like m usical cords v ib ra te differentially acco rd ing to th e ir leng th an d tension. N ew ton’s accep tan ce o f th e solid filam ent

v n o tion o f nerves is fully indicated in his Q uery 23 o f the Opticks,

Is not Vision performed chiefly by the Vibrations of this Medium excited in the bottom of the eye by the Rays of Light, and propagated through the solid, pellucid and uniform Capillamcnta of the optick Nerves into the place of Sensation? And is not hearing performed by the Vibrations either of this or some other Medium, excited in the auditory Nerves by the Tremors of the Air, and propagated through the solid, pellucid and uniform Capillamenta of those Nerves into the place of Sensation? And so of the other Senses.4

T h o u g h it was hard ly possible for N ew ton in his d ay to know m uch ab o u t neuro logy , nevertheless his au tho rity prevailed. H artley w ith great assu rance form ulated the tw o follow ing propositions w hich sum m ed u p his fundam ental neurological viewpoint.

* Newton, I., Opticks, p. 328.

135

T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L DThe white medullary substance of the brain, spinal marrow, and the nerves proceeding

from them, is the immediate instrument of Sensation and Motion.The white medullary substance of the brain is also the immediate instrument, by which

Ideas are presented to the Mind: or in other words, whatever changes are made in this substance, corresponding changes are made in our Ideas; and vice versa.5

R eid6 v igorously criticized H artley fo r trea tin g as facts w hat he h im self th o u g h t N ew ton presented only as hypotheses, still N ew ton’s m odel stood firm, an d in m odified fo rm is the p re d o m in a n t m o d el to d ay. Every iim p rovem en t m ade on the v ib ra tio n theory o f nerves a n d every su b stitu tio n , fo r ifT hecam e assim ilated to the orig inal m odel. W hen v ib ra tions and v ib ratiuncles gave w ay to im pulses th e la tte r becam e regarded as co rresponden ts to, and the bases of, sensations and ideas.

T h e fu rth e r ca ree r o f N ew ton’s p ercep tual m odel is affo rded us w hen we co m p are it w ith cu rren t descrip tions o f perceiv ing behav io r. N ew ton’s m odel h as influenced psychologists since his period to regard visual perceiving as som eth ing th a t occurs entire ly th ro u g h th e instrum enta lity o f th e eye as hearing does th ro u g h the ear. W hile th is a tom istic v iew poin t is widely accepted an d fitted in to a neat causal series, 1. stim ulus v ibrations, 2. effect o n nervous system , 3. m ental p ro jec tion o f things an d qualities, it does n o t co m p o rt w ith observations o f how psychological ad justm ents ac tua lly tak e p lace. T h e N ew ton ian m odel s tands stark ly over aga inst the bioecological fo rm u la tio n o f organism s ad justing them selves to the things they ac tua lly en co u n te r in their h ab itu a l su rro u n d in g s. T h e co lors o f objects w ith th e ir fo u n d a tio n in ino rgan ic a n d o rgan ic substances are im m ediately tran sfo rm ed in to ach ro m atic light partic les w hich cause co lo r ap p aritio n s to a p p e a r in consciousness o r the sou l.7

NEW TON’S BANEFUL INFLUENCE ON SCIENCE A N D PHILOSO PH Y

T h a t N ew ton o r N ew tonian ism exerted a pow erfu l influence on the h istory o f psychology is ind isputab ly confirm ed. It is ju s t as certain th a t this influence could n o t be m ore malefic. H is influence m ay be well cha rac te rized by th e considera tion th a t th ro u g h his p ercep tu a l m odel he im posed u p o n psychology a lasting d om ination o f transcenden talism .

N ew ton , viewed from the s tan d p o in t o f c u rren t scientific psychology, s tands as a co n tin u a to r o f the general an im istic v iew poin t p revalen t since

'Ibid.6 Reid. T., Essays on the Intellectual Powers o f Man (J. Walker, ed.), 6th cd., Boston, Phillips,

Sampson, I8SS, Essay 2, ch. 2.’Kantor, J. R., The Logic o f Modern Science, Chicago, Prindpia, 1953.136

K N O W I N G V S . C O G N I T I V E F I E L D Sthe A lex an d rian period . T h is is in now ise surprising since an im istic ways o f th ink ing have long constitu ted the institu tional substance o f E uropean culture. It w as u n d er such auspices th a t N ew ton cultivated his deep interest in phen o m en a by devising a perceptual m odel w hich helped to perpetuate the sp irit-m atte r an d m ind-body trad itions. Because o f his suprem e au th o rity as a scientist N ew ton influenced psychology adversely, a lth o u g h as a m athem atica l physicist in terested in light he was no t likely to analyze and describe adequate ly w hat happens w hen organism s in teract cognitively w ith things, bu t stressed only the pu tative effects o f v ib rations w hich im pinge u p o n the eye o r ear. Q uite innocently , o f course, considering the tim e and th e intellectual clim ate N ew ton’s m odel coincided w ith th e belief in the absence o f th ings an d their properties in n a tu re an d their creation in an d by th e m ind o r soul. S uch beliefs, o f course, were m ost congenial to N ew ton the theologian .

A fairly p recise ind ication o f the h arm w rough t by N ew tonian ism to m o d enT psychology is the w ide gap th a t now exists betw een experim ental

p ra c tic e an d m entalistic theory . Psychologists in terested in sensory events a lo n g w ith biologists w ho w ork in the d om ain o f sensory physiology accept the N ew ton ian m odel w ith all its m entalistic im plications. It is, o f course, tru e th a t m any psychologists w ho m ight be em barrassed by the psychistic im plica tions o f the m odel m erely rem ain silent ab o u t those im plications an d follow th e physio logists in cultivating the biological an d chem ical

ever. N ew to n ian ism is surely th e basis fo r th e sp lit betw een th o se w ho specialize in p ercep tual and o th er cognitive studies, an d the stu d en ts o f learn ing based on reflex cond ition ing. In a m ore o r less direct w ay N ew ton ian ism is thus responsib le fo r the scandalous sep ara tio n o f m entalistic___psychologists from behaviorists.

W e can n o t conclude th is b rief evaluation o f N ew ton’s dep lo rab le influence u p o n the cou rse o f psychological developm ent w ithou t repeating again th a t how soever dam ag in g th a t influence has been it does not represen t a personal failing bu t ra th e r an incident in the life o f a great intellectual institu tion . F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f th e history o f psychology the views o f N ew ton, H arvey , R eid , an d their long line o f successors are all doctrina l po in ts in th e co n tin u u m o f specula tion concern ing percep tion , m ind, and psychic processes w hich w as orig inated by the scho lars o f th e A lexandrian period . D espite detailed varia tions in th e fo rm ulations o f individual writers concern ing psychological activities, they all th o u g h t an d w rote in the dualistic trad itio n . A s is well know n, even B ishop Berkeley’s v igorous

*

137

T H E P H I L O S O P H E R A N D H I S W O R L Da ttac k on th e d istinc tion betw een p rim ary an d secondary qualities p layed a large p art in tran sm ittin g the transcenden ta l ph ilosophy to posterity .

SUM M A R Y

A lth o u g h it is n o t widely recognized, N ew ton an d o th e r scientists p layed an im m ense ro le o n the psychological stage. U nfortunate ly , how ever, his co n trib u tio n s to psychology and p h ilo so p h y in n o wise m atch ed his tre m endous a n d p erm an en t achievem ents in m athem atics, cosm ology, an d physics. O n th e co n tra ry , th e N ew ton ian influence h as been historically lam en tab le . N e w to n unw itting ly served as a n ag en t in p e rp e tu a tin g in psychology an d ph ilosophy view points an tag o n is tic to fa rt an d natu ra listic theo ry . I t m u st be po in ted o u t, how ever, th a t w h a t is deleterious in th a t influence stem s fro m th e developm ent an d ex istence o f in stitu tio n a l w ays o f th in k in g w hich have suffused th e scientific aspects o f m o d e rn cu ltu re as well as its m o ra l an d religious features^ N ew to n and o th e r scientists w ere all sw ept up in th e h istorical flood o f sp iritistic p h ilo sophy w hich has served as th e^p o stu la tio n al m atrix fo r th e special sciences. B ecause o f his g reat

"v ersa tility and b ro a d interests N ew ton happens to stan d o u t as th e fo rm ula- to r o f a n epistem ological m odel w hich h as exerted a banefu l influence prim arily u p o n psychology an d sensory physio logy, an d subsequen tly u p o n th e o th e r sciences. T h e spiritistic p o s tu la tio n a d o p ted by such em in en t m o d e rn physicists as B ohr, H eisenberg , S chroed inger, B ridgm an and

/ m any o thers, in h istorical perspective flows fro m th e sam e sou rce th a t ^ in u n d a ted th e th ink ing o f C opernicus, K epler, G alileo, an d N ew ton.

138

SECTION

IIIHuman Events

in Philosophical Perspective

C H A P T E R 14

LINGUISTIC EVENTS AS INTERBEHAVIORAL FIELDS

N ow th a t we have b ro u g h t in to relief th e essentials o f conventional ph ilosophy w ith its shortcom ings, and indicated an au th en tic replacem ent, we m ay now tu rn to th e trea tm en t o f selected p roblem s in hum an affairs by th e con trasted conventional an d in terbehavioral philosophyzing. I p ropose th a t the in terbehav io r postu lates an d in terp re ta tions will p rove ad v an ta geous in th e s tudy o f language, ethics, aesthetics, politics, religion, law, and history. I explore first linguistic problem s.

UBIQUITY O F LINGUISTIC BEHAVIOR

H o m o sapiens has so evolved biologically and cu lturally th a t he adap ts him self to his am bien t things and events in g reat m easure by referential and sym bolic behavior. H ard ly a w aking m om en t passes w ith o u t persons speaking to som eone ab o u t som ething, o r by failing to code o r decode sym bols fo r som e purpose . N o ad justm en t to o th e r persons o r th ings can be m ade w ithou t speech o r som e o th e r form o f com m unication o r vicarious ad ap ta tio n to one’s environm ents. T his circum stance is evidenced by th e num erous in tercom m unications an d the floods o f letters, m em oranda, an d books p ro d u ced an d read daily by th e m em bers o f a lm o st every g roup an d com m unity.

Stilj, such u b iqu itous events so open to observation are m isrepresented in th e ex trem e by linguists a n d ph ilosophers o f language because o f illicit ph ilosophical presuppositions. Speech is regarded as expressions o f m ental o r sp iritistic ideas by m eans o f w ords, gestures, o r som e type o f signs. But even w hen linguists o r ph ilosophers study tex tual m ateria ls an d n o t behavior, a lth o u g h th e fo rm er has originally been derived from in tercom m unicative speech, they still assum e dualistic a ttitudes, w hether they a re o r are no t aw are o f th e fact, a n d thereby miss a na tu ra listic m eth o d o f study . As a consequence they indulge in a m isleading philosophy o f language.

INTERBEHAVIORAL A N D TR A D ITIO NA L POSTULATION

Effective in the ph ilosophy o f language as in every o th e r facet o f philoso p h y a re specialized postu lates w hich p lay th e ir p a rt in th e e labo ra tion o f doctrine. Basically in terbehavioral ph ilosophy ab jures all com m erce with141

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Ementality or spiritism derived from religious sources and not scientifically based observation or inference from observed events.

-j' Traditional postulation for linguistics is excellently illustrated in the view of de Saussure who shared the doctrine that speech is a process of transforming ideas or psychic states of speakers into words and the reverse transformation of words into mental states of hearers. Though clearly the entire conception or model he used is mystical and purely autistic it is the standard way of thinking on the part of laymen and most linguists.

Fig. 4. De Saussure’s representation of the processes of transforming psychic states into words and vice versa. From the Course in General Linguistics, p. 11.

The accompanying diagram (Fig. 4), reproduced from de Saussure (1857-1913), represents the conventional idea of what occurs when persons speak. Notice that this conception implies that the “ideas” of A are somehow translated into words or are represented by words which are transduced to B as sound which must be transduced into ideas in B’s “mind.” B’s “idea” is then transduced or encoded into words which are transmitted to A who decodes it into or as “ideas.”

Interbehavioral philosophy departs radically from this type of postulation and draws its model from direct observation of speech fields.

LINGUISTIC FIELDS

T o overcome the invalid philosophy of language there is readily to hand the naturalistic analysis of linguistic fields. This consists of a triangular system of actions on the part of (1) speakers called references, (2) hearers called referee behavior, and (3) things spoken of called referents. The following diagram (Fig. 5) represents the basic speech events.

Here follows a description of the three factors.a. References. References are activities of persons as they refer to

persons spoken to about things, acts, or events of some kind. It is such142

L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D S

Fig. 5. Basic Linguistic Behavior

behav io r th a t is basic to all the tex tual m aterials available fo r s tudy an d for the lite ra tu re which m ay consist o f fables, legends, as well as accura te descrip tions o f things.

b. Things referred to. T he second o f the trian g u la r factors consists o f som e th ing o r event which is referred to by th e act o f th e speaker. S uch objects o r persons a re called referents in the speech o r linguistic situation .

c. The Referee. N o in tercom m unicative linguistic event occurs w ithoutthe th ird fac to r which is a person o r th ing spoken to o r in tercom m unica ted >w ith ab o u t th e referents which we have m entioned as th e second fac to r in a linguistic held. In d iagram (F ig. S) we present th e trian g u la r construc tion o f >linguistic events. j

Fig. 6. Hearer Becomes Speaker

d. Intercommunication. In in tercom m unicative situations the triangle a lternates betw een F ig. 5 and a n o th e r reciprocal Fig. 6 in w hich th e referee person becom es th e speaker and the original referring person becom es the referee in th e in terbehavioral interchange.

Speech it is clear constitu tes units o f ad justm en t o r ad ap ta tio n s to environing objects an d conditions exactly as in the case o f every o th e r type o f psychological perform ance. The fields in each case are m ore o r less un ique as affected by the circum stances prevailing a t the tim e.

'Cf. Kantor, J. R„ Psychological Linguistics, Chicago, Principia, 1977, also Kanlor, J. R.. An Objective Psychology o f Grammar, Chicago, Principia, 1936.

* ‘

U

V>1

l!H

143

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V ELINGUISTIC AND NONLINGUISTIC EVENTS

Im pressive aid is lent to linguistic p rob lem s in ph ilosophy by the considera tion o f the w ide gap th a t separates ac tu a l linguistic b eh av io r from behav io r th a t appears to resem ble th e fo rm er b u t is ac tua lly very different. A ccordingly we m ust d ifferentiate betw een fo u r types o f behav io ral fields as ind icated in th e accom pany ing tab le (F ig . 7). T h e-guiding princip le here is th a t, while all interbehavioral fields are ad justm en ts, no t all psychological ad justm en ts are jingu istic . A w ide gap separa tes au then tic linguistic fields fro m sem lo tic fields.

L i n g u i s t i c F i e l d sI.A

S e m i o t i c F i e l d s ,

1. Referential Behavior

2 . Symbolic Behavior

y .; • l \ '■ , ‘

1. Sign Behavior [ m .> . ‘ iV V V n-; "i »7 * . . 1

2. Signal Behavior \ \ ;. i ‘* a lJ ,/••t

Fig. 7. Comparison of Linguistic and Semiotic Fields

R eferential behavior, we have seen, consists o f th e behav io r o f individuals when referring som eone to som eth ing o r som e person w hich m ay be the speaker himself. A side from the em phasis th a t speak ing is a definite k ind o f behavior one m ust no te th a t it is a un ique a n d specific type o f ad justm ent. But it is no t necessary to expand u p o n th is descrip tion as everyone is fam iliar w ith actual referential speech as it goes on'.' -

. By con trast, sym bolizing behavior is a sim ple linear perfo rm ance w ith an,j I ob ject called a sym bol. T h is sym bol-ob ject serves as a sub stitute stim ulus

| fo r a reaction to an o th e r ob ject. T h e fo rm e r s tim u lus ob ject is th e stim ulus fo r a reaction to som eth ing sym bolized w h e th e r it is a thing, o rganism , o r a n o th e r sym boL Sym bolizing behav io r is re la ted to speak ing as b o th are definite culturo-psychologjcal actions. B u t b o th types o f behav io r m ust be sharp ly d istinguished from referent th ings. N otice, how ever, th a t sym bols m ay partic ipa te in linguistic s ituations by fu nc tion ing as a stim ulus object fo r e ither som e speech perfo rm ance o r som e o th e r type o f ac tio n , for exam ple, coding o r decoding som e ch a rac te r o r sign w hile perform ing sym bolizing actions.

N ow b o th au th en tic linguistic fields m u st b e d ifferen tiated fro m the \ sem iotic fields in which signs o r signals a re in teracted w ith as fairly sim ple 1 activities. 144

L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D SSPEECH AS THE M ATRIX O F LANG UAG E

A m o n g th e g ran d institu tions o f civilized living are the m an y lite ratures, the recorded and encapsu lated system s o f letters fo rm ula ted in th e interest o f egoistic boasting , as in the annals and inscrip tions o f kings an d o th e r rulers, as well as in th e sacred scrip tures o f religious sects, th e V edas o f the H indus, th e O ld T estam en t o f the H ebrew s, th e N ew T es tam e n t o f the C h ristians, th e K o ran o f th e M o h am m ed an s, th e revelations o f th e M o rm ons, and so on and on.

S uch lite ra tu res an d scrip tu res fu nc tion as references to o r sym bo ls for the things, persons, a n d events such as objects a n d the ir qualities, beliefs, th ink ing , o r o th e r ac ts o f persons sp o k en o f o r in terco m m u n ica ted . T he ph ilo sophy o f language is concerned w ith a g reat m ultip licity o f events all o f w hich a re derived in one w ay o r a n o th e r fro m th e m a trix o f in tercom - m unicative speech. L anguage an d lite ra tu re in all th e ir fo rm s evolve from in terbehav io ra l fields. T h e evo lu tion o f language an d lite ra tu re depends u p o n the am plification an d m u ltip lication o f com m unities from fam ilies to larger g roups, villages, provinces, states, an d em pires.

T h e accom pany ing d iag ram (Fig. 8) rough ly rep resen ts the process o f

Fig. 8. The Inverted Pyramid of Language

T h e significance o f th e inverted pyram id o f language is to indicate th a t a t th e b o tto m is th e adap tive behav io r o f ind iv iduals as they in teract w ith o th ers o r them selves by way o f referring to them selves o r o th e r organism s as well as re la ted th ings an d events. S u ch in te rb eh av io r constitu tes the m atrix an d orig in o f o th e r evolving facets o f language.145

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V ETHE EVOLUTION OF LINGUISTIC THINGS

W ith th e g row th o f populations and th e increased contacts o f individuals w ith o thers, plus th e m ultip lication o f econom ic, social, and political in terrelations, speech undergoes fixation w ith the evolution o f w ords as objects b o th originally based upon a n d la ter partially independent o f p a rticu la r individuals. F rom the early developm ent o f signs, pictures, and w ords arises th e increased capacity fo r e lab o ra te linguistic adjustm ents cu lm inating in the potentiality o f in tercom m unicating w ith persons and g roups a t long range and over long distances.

T h e crysta lliza tion o f linguistic th ings m arks the orig in o f cultural objects as enduring institutions. S uch-obiects-p lav .enorm ous roles in the developm ent o f civilization w h p se jtru c tu re and.lojageyity_rest u p p n such institu tions as solid, even j f slowly changing, fo u n d ations.

A s we have observed from the inverted py ram id , trian g u la r speech is the fu n d am en ta l type o f in tercom m unicative behavior. N ow it is in teresting to see how from speech is developed substan tive w riting and literature. T he first stage is reached when referential behav io r is inscribed in som e form . N ext th e inscribed o r w ritten p roduc t is fu rth e r crystallized by p rin ting or som e o th e r form o f reification. A fter th is p rocedure all sorts o f language th ings com e in to existence, business accoun ts, records o f various sorts, sacred texts, and so on.

W riters on sem asiography indicate how th e original transla tion o f speech in to w riting takes place. F o r exam ple, G elb2 indicates th a t first the th ings p roduced are descriptive, o r represen t som e act, thing, o r som e object. A n o th e r stage consists o f linguistic th ings produced to identify o th e r things o r assist in the recognition o f som e objects. H e calls this stage the identifying-m nem onic stage.

A fter sem asiography com es the stage o f p h o n o g rap h y w hich itself develops in th ree stages. ( I ) W ord syllabic stage as in S um erian , A kkad ian , E gyptian , H ittite , an d C hinese. A fu rth e r developm ent is th e syllabic stage an d th e exam ples given are the E lam ite, H u rrian , W est-Sem itic (P hone- cian , H ebrew , A ram aic), C ypriote, an d Jap a n ese languages. T he th ird developm ent in the series according to this a u th o r is th e alphabetic stage w hich o rig inated w ith the G reeks and includes a n u m b er o f different languages.

A cceptab le as th is process m ay be it still calls fo r p recau tionary differentia tion betw een the crystallization o f linguistic behav io r in to linguistic

’(iclb. I, ] . ,A Study o f Writing: The Foundalionx o f Grammalology, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago J’rcv.. 1952. 146


//' fA'

i*th ings an<i_the_developm ent o f sign behavior such as respond ing to the w ords, “N o trespassing,” “Bew are o f th e d o g ." a nd, te lephonic answ ering messages. Signs like d iagram s, statistical lines, and curves m ay be a u x ilia ry features o f ac tual speech an d w riting bu t things and behav io r m ust still be kept ap a rt in view o f their variable structures and functions.

TH E ADVENT O F LITERACY

O nce linguistic things get established as legends, fables, inscription, and general lite rary entities like records, inscriptional m onum ents, and tales for en terta inm en t as polite literature, novels, plays, etc., they ex p an d apace to enlarge th e d im ensions o f civilization. Political entities m ake o f letters the repositories o f com m ands, constitu tions, a n d law s fo r th e co n tro l o f persons an d g roups by various m eans. Religious g roups m ain ta in the ir un ity and identity by m eans o f verbal encapsulation o f op in ions, beliefs, rites, and practices in sacred books and o ther literary docum ents.

TH E DOM INATION OF LINGUISTICS BY W ORDS

S o im p o rtan t are w ord th ings that they in terpenetrate all phases o f social life th o u g h only a t tim es to the advan tage o f persons and groups. In m any w ays w ord things are inim ical to the well-being o f people w ith d ire consequences. T h e follow ing paragraphs indicate th e adverse aspects o f linguistic things.

What do you read, my lord?Words. Words, Words.

What is the matter that you read, my lord?Slanders, sir3

Yes, w hen we read , we a t first read w ords. W ords w ith m atter, o f course, b u t in som e sense w ords. T h is is true , a t least in som e language situations. B ut w hat ab o u t speaking? Is h u m an speech m erely the o rderly u ttering o f w ords? A lth o u g h studen ts o f language surely realize and frequently reiterate th a t speech o r language is action, since it is im possible to be obliv ious to th e d ra m a o f speech, an d dialogue, they a re still overw helm ed by the im posing presence o f letters an d libraries; in consequence the science o f linguistics is solidly welded to th e p o stu late th a t speaking consists o f u tte rin g s trin g s o f w ords o r sentences conventionally organized accord ing to th e g ra m m a r o r style o f speakers o f particu lar languages. A nd this despite th e fact th a t it is com m on know ledge th a t w ords are artifacts,

3 S h a k e s p e a r e , H a m l e t , A c t ii . S c 2 .

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

created by scribes an d com p o sito rs fo r w hatever benefits they could secure thereby for them selves o r the readers w hom they serve.

T h e techniques o f linguistics con trast m arkedly w ith basic scientific p rocedures, w hich begin w ith an in terest in p ristine events th a t a re subsequently analyzed, com pared w ith sim ilar an d dissim ilar objects, a n d finally described on th e basis o f the observational trea tm en ts m entioned. W hen describing speech, th e linguist repo rts no t th e characteristics o f th e d a ta but im poses u p o n them a priori tra its o f w ords, saying that a speaker u tters o r w rites syllables, w ords, and sentences as th e s truc tu ra l com ponen ts o f speech. In this way are perpetuated the institu tions th a t speaking o r w riting are constitu ted of abstractional utterances, th a t is, w ord things.

INTERBEHAVIORAL VS. CONVENTIONAL LINGUISTICS

T he con trast betw een the In terbehavioral and C onven tional philosophy o f languages can be well exhib ited by the con trasting a ttitudes each assum es tow ard linguistic events. T he tw o views can be readily sum m arized by the consideration o f the problem s o f g ram m ar in general and the im portan t phenom enon of m eaning.

a. Grammar4

F o r conventional linguistics g ram m ar is the abstrac tion istic descrip tion o f w hat is presum ed to be analyzed o u t o f w hat is regarded as s tan d ard speech, o r from tex tual m aterials. In general there a re presum ed to be four phases o f language— phonology , m orphology , syntax , an d sem antics. C learly th e basic p a ttern o f th in g language is reflected in th e trea tm en t o f sounds o r phones, the s truc tu re o f w ords, the in terre lations o f w ords, and finally the m eanings o f w ords so lo o r in sentence com binations. B ecause.of th e stru c tu ra l im plication language requires .“m eaning” functions to accoun t for references to objects spoken o f o r sym bolized.

In terbehavioral linguistics regards g ram m ar as th e style b o th o f com m unicative behav io r w hether o f so-called s tan d ard speech, any dialect, o r th e thing-language o f texts. In neither case, o f course, is th ere any ro o m for transcenden ta l factors. F o r the descrip tions o f an y linguistic style it suffices to rely on th e behavior o f persons in connection w ith stim ulus objects o f the trian g u la r o r linear type. T he styles in th e tw o cases o f course a re very different. T he g ram m ar o f speech is no t lim ited to u tterances b u t takes strict accoun t o f the specificities o f linguistic behavior, th e person speaking, the

• C f . K a n io r , J . R . . A n Objective Psychology o f G ram m ar, C h ic a g o , P r in c i p ia . ( 1 9 3 6 ) . I9 S 2 .

148


p erson listening, a n d th e th ings sp o k en of. W hile in terested in th ing language th e in terac tion w ith fixated w ords constitu tes a very different situation . All o f these points a re clarified in th e analysis o f m eanings.

b. MeaningC onven tional linguistics as descended from venerable philology is lim

ited to th e exegetical in terp re ta tion o f w ords w ithou t differentiating betw een w ord things a n d w ord action . A p ro m in en t s tu d en t o f sem antics asserts,the present book is concerned solely with the meanings of words.5 V - , ' '

F o r the conven tiona l sem anticist, m eaning is a n in tang ib le p ro p e rty o f w ords and it is his task to investigate those m eanings an d th e ir changes, and also to account fo r th e frequent m ultip lication o f m eanings associated with certa in w ords.

In view o f prevalen t intellectual institu tions, th e m eanings o f w ords are presum ed, by m ost conventional linguists, to consist o f transcenden tal processes o r entities “ localized” in the “ m inds” o f individuals w ho u tter w ords in various ways. C onventional linguists jo in to th e sounds o f w ords a co rrelate they call “in fo rm ation ,” “hearing,” o r “sense." It appears th a t th e re trea t th a t linguists..claim to have m ade from dead tex ts o r language- thinps tow ards ac tio n o r behav io r lands_them directly in to som e form o f psychophysical dualism . T his po in t is excellently illustrated by the well- know n triang le o f O gden and R ichards6 from w hich general linguists do n o t substan tially d epart. As indicated in Fig. 9, sym bols, w ords, o r nam es a re no t d irectly connected w ith their referents b u t alw ays th ro u g h the m edium o f “tho u g h t” o r “m ental reference.”

H ere it m ust be po in ted o u t th a t an occasional general linguist (e.g., B loom field7) m ay object to th e n o tio n tha t so m e so rt o f psychic process

’ U l lm a n n , S . , S e m a n t i c s : a n I n t r o d u c t i o n t o t h e S c i e n c e o f M e a n in g , O x f o r d , B la c k w e ll . 1 9 6 2 . '■ O g d e n , C . K . , a n d R i c h a r d s , I . A . , T h e m e a n in g o f m e a n in g , L o n d o n . R o u t l e d g e . 19 2 3 . ’ B lo o m f ie ld , L . , L a n g u a g e , N e w Y o r k , H o l t , 19 3 3 .

Thought or Reference

F ig . 9 . O g d e n - R ic h a r d s * C o n c e p t o f S y m b o l - R e f e r e n t R e l a t i o n

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m ust in tervene betw een w ords and th e th ings to w hich they refer. S uch a conven tiona l linguist w ould favor a m eaning m odel tha t directly connects w ords w ith things o r referents, as indicated in Fig. 10.

Symbol or Word Referent

Fig. 10. Bloomfield's Concept of Symbol-Referent Relation

It m ust be m ade clear th a t th e m entalizing o f m eaning is in no sense a perversity o n the p art of general linguists. T hey m erely adop t trad itional w ays o f psychological th ink ing w hich have dom inated scholars since the ancient C hurch Fathers. jn te rb eh av io ra] linguistics m ust .dispense with .m cntalisiic_psychology along with j t s n o tion o f m eaning a s t h e j s vchic coun terpart o f w ord-th ings o f every t ype.

M ean in g ' fo r th e psychological o r philosophical linguist is precisely opposite in charac te r from th a t o f the general linguist. Psychological linguists fashion their constructs directly from th e in tercom m unicative and sym bolizing behav io r w hich is open to th e ir observation .[M eanings for them are, literally, acts perform ed in direct con tac t w ith present o r absent things an d conditions by w ay o f influencing w hat the next act shall be in a ch a in m ak ing u p a m ore o r less e labo ra te language a d ju s tm en t^ F o r exam ple, in direct personal intercourse, th e person spoken to 8 m ust be alert to a n d understan d w hat is being said, th a t is, appreciate the referent, before an ap p ro p ria te response can be m ade. T o the inv ita tional stim ulus, '‘T ennis, anyone?” th e answ er m ay be “yes” o r “no” depend ing on w hether the question appears as a gatew ay to a p leasant in terlude, o r the nonperfo rm ance o f som e different im portan t action.

M eaning, then, in th e d o m ain o f natu ra listic linguistics, is a reaction system (rs)9 technically m ediating a fu rth e r reaction system , w hether correctly o r incorrectly, effectively o r ineffectively, depend ing u p o n the psychological fields in w hich it operates. T h e m odel m ay be constructed on the follow ing p lan (see Fig. 11).

C aveat lector. T h e statem ents ju s t m ade p resuppose a sharp distinction betw een trad itional dualistic psychology a n d objective naturalistic psychology. O nly the la tte r m ay be regarded as scientific psychology. Its d a ta

“ V a r io u s ly c a l le d t h e l i s te n e r , t h e h e a re r , o r t h e re fe re e ." F o r a n a m p l i f i e d d i s c u s s io n o f r e a c t i o n s y s t e m s c o n s u l t K a n t o r . J . R „ a n d S m i t h . N . W „ The

S a r n ie o f P .w thology: A n fn ierhehavioral S u rvey , C h ic a g o . P r in c i p i a . 19 7 5 .

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S t i m u l a t i o n R e s p o n s e S e q u e n c ei

“Tennis,Attending rs Perceiving rs Consummatory rs

anyone?” Stimulusalertness

Apprehendingmeaning10 11 Saying “yes” or “no”

F ig . I I . O b je c t iv e P s y c h o lo g y 's R e l a t i o n B e tw e e n L i n g u is t i c S t im u lu s a n d R e s p o n s e

consist alw ays o f m o re o r less com plex in terac tiona l fields. F o r scientific psychology, language o r speech behavi or consists o f a d ra m a of ad justm en t to one’s su rround ings. Scientific psychologists look u p o n verbo-vocal w ords as special types o f in tercom m unicative ad justm en ts o f persons w ith respect to o th e r persons an d things o r events in specific situations.

F o r th e clarification o f th e p rob lem o f m eanings it m ay be helpful to set u p a co n trastin g d isp lay o f th e views o f th e general linguist an d th o se o f th e psychological linguist (see T ab le 1).

>T a b l e I . C o m p a r i s o n o f C o n v e n t i o n a l a n d I n t e r b e h a v i o r a l V i e w s

C o n c e r n i n g M e a n i n g s

M e a n i n g s

For Conventional Linguistics" For Interbehavioral Linguistics

Identity of Essence of Word Things Type of Behavior •

Nature of Mental or Subjective Correlate of Words

Objective Responses to Language Stimulation

Function of Sensification of Words or Sets of Words

Actions That Influence Later Action

Conditions of Rules of Language System

Influenced by Language Situation

W e conclude these com m ents by the consideration o f three problem s th a t arise in th e study o f linguistic m eaning and g ram m ar.

1. Synonymity. W hen m eanings are trea ted as correlates o f w ords the p rob lem arises as to w hether different w ords ca n have th e sam e m eaning.

10I n c o m p le x s i t u a t io n s a n a d d i t i o n a l a n d s u c c e e d in g a u t o n o m o u s r e a c t io n s y s t e m o c c u r s .11 C o n v e n t i o n a l l i n g u is t ic s r e d u c e s l in g u is t ic s t o a m o r e c o m p r e h e n s iv e d i s c ip l in e v a r i o u s l y c a l le d

s e m a s io lo g y , s e m io s i s , s e m io t ic s , o r s o m e o t h e r c o g n o m e n .

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S o m e general linguists affirm and som e deny th a t au th en tic synonym ity is possible. In b o th cases there is built up a specialized prob lem o f verbal exegesis.

T h e psychological field theory , in con trast, liquidates th e p rob lem by p o in tin g o u t th a t th e various perfo rm ances o f different u tterances in the s a m e o r sim ilar s itua tions are m erely m atters o f style. T h e capacity fo r vary ing u tterances is sim ply a function o f th e educations an d general experience o f persons.

2. Polisemy. A re la ted prob lem in linguistics is th e m u ltip lication o f m eanings in particu la r w ords. F ro m th e sh o rte r O xford D ictionary , U llm a n n 12 q u o ted 10 uses o f th e w ord “eye" beyond th e o rd in a ry m ean ing o f th e eye as a n organ.

1. Center o f a flower.2. Leaf-bud o f a potato.3. Spot on a peacock’s tail.4. The opening through which issues the water o f a fountain.5. A central mass; the brightest spot (of light).6. The center of revolution.7. An aperture in a needle, tool, etc.8. A loop of metal; thread, cord, or rope.9. (In architecture): the center of a part, as the eye of a dome.

10. (In typography): the enclosed space in letters like d, e, o.

C learly there is here an d every o th er p lace m erely the u tte ran ce o f a w ord w hile referring to different objects o n th e basis o f individual a n d social usage.

3. Ambiguity. I t is widely held th a t w ords a re inevitably am biguous. But th is is th e case on ly fro m the s tan d p o in t th a t m ean ing con cern s w ords o r signs w hich shou ld sustain only a one-one re la tio n sh ip w ith m eaning. F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f ac tual in te rco m m u n ica tio n th e re is little o r no am biguity . W h a t m ay occur is th a t sp eak er a n d hearer m ay disagree in th e ir speech usages a n d in consequence fail in th e ir in tercom m unication . T h is is th e case w hen individuals o f different dialects first a ttem p t to in tercom m unicate . U sually th e vocal u tterances w ould be replaced by gestures readily understood .

U l lm a n n , S „ Sem antics: A n In troduction lo th e Sc ience o f M eaning.

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L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D SLINGUISTIC FUNCTIONS IN THE ANTHROPIC DOMAIN

,, A n acceptab le co rrec tion to the w idespread view, th a t speech is w hat v differentiates hum ans fro m o ther an im als, is th a t the cu ltu ra l evo lu tion o f

the an th ro p ic species is prim arily ow ing to linguistic functions. F o r it is such in terrelated functions th a t a re th e fo u n d a tio n o f cu ltu ra l institu tions, an d civilization in general.

a. Preseverative and Continuity Functions. It is by m eans o f w riting an d record ing th a t past events are preserved an d consequen tly p rov ide a m eans to in tegrate and con tinue th e living conditions o f ind iv iduals an d g roups. In th is w ay h istory is m ade possible as m ore o r less precise records as well as the guides to fu rther developm ents.

b. Abstractive and Relationalfunctions. O f th e g reatest im p o rtance fo r cu ltu ra l evo lu tion is th e linguistic func tion fo r th e en largem en t o f beh av io r an d th e p rovision fo r m odifying th e e n v iro n m e n t.b ey o n d th e n a rro w confines o f the biological sphere. A bstractive an d re la tiona l func tions m ake possib le calcu lations an d general m an ipu la tions o f m athem atica l science. A bstractive an d relational functions a re th e bases fo r m easu rem en t a n d th e substitu tion processes o f algebra an d all th e m ath em atica l analy tics concerned w ith relations.

T h e developm ent o f w ord th ings th ro u g h th e crysta lliza tion o f speech has supplied hu m an organism s w ith the to o ls an d bu ild ing b locks fo r all so rts o f abstrac tio n a l institutions. O n sim ple levels th ere is th e enab lem ent o f bu ild ing castles in S pain , an d th e m ateria liza tion o f ta les an d fables. In th e course o f events individuals so lo o r in concert erect m am m o th structu res fo r all varieties o f needs o r self-exaltation . T his includes the crea tio n o f huge system s o f p h ilo sophy each em bo d y in g the beliefs o f past ages in som e form .

c. Constructive and Ratiocinative Functions. In m an y ways th e constructive a n d ratiocinative functions are th e m ost s trik in g an d elevating o f all linguistic functions. T hey lift h o m o sap iens to the highest p o in t above the ir biological natures. By m eans o f linguistic beh av io r they ca n p erfo rm n o tab le a c ts o f c rea tio n in a varie ty o f fields, technologica l, aesthetic , an d ra tional. T echnology is im possible w ithou t p lans an d blueprin ts. L inguistic processes a re the very essential p rescrip tions fo r th in k in g an d reasoning behavior.

d. Righting and Regulating Functions. Li nguistic func tions play a large ro le in th e su b d o m ain o f h u m an quality behavior. T h is is a n eno rm ous d o m a in in com plex societies since it includes b o th eth ica l an d legal situations.

153

I n legal situations there are to begin w ith the codification o f the rules and regula tions fo r the perfo rm ance o f ce rta in behavior o r the con tra ry p roh ib ition an d inh ib ition o f actions. Law s an d constitu tions have to be codified an d stabilized and shielded aga inst m isunderstand ings a n d m isin terpretations. T h e sam e care as to significance m u st be tak en w hen precedents are followed.

W hile ethical situations m ay be very different from legal ones, linguistic functions still p lay a large p art in them . T h e sum m um bo n u m requires to be encoded to m ain tain its influence as an ideal o f good an d p ro p e r conduct.Evils to o m ust be m ade m anifest to be avoided an d w arned against. In general th e quality o f conduct requires re inforcem ent by m eans o f fixed term s.

W hile considering all sorts o f subtle activities like speculation, reasoning, an d logical system building, it is n o t possib le to proceed w ith o u t th e use o f

j yords a nd term s. T he roles o f these activities a re both good and bad. It is w orthw hile considering this type o f e labo ra te behav io r because it throw s light on the m ethods an d in ten tions o f th in k ers as ph ilosophers. H ere we w ant to indicate the use o f term s in the larger phases o f h u m an living such as the scientific activities.

Scientists, physicists, chem ists th ro u g h o u t the ages have em ployed such % term s as force, mass, valence, tim e, space, an d so o a In biology term s like ' life, entelechy, vitality have sim ilarly been effective in tu rn in g th in k in g in to . w rong channels. T he field o f psychology, p erhaps m o re th an th e o th e r % sciences has been influenced by th e use o f term s psychic, self, ego, consciousness, an d so on. T o a g rea t ex ten t in all th e sciences, th e term s th a t i.'j: have influenced th ink ing in im proper w ays have been used to designate ; - non-existent pow ers and agencies o f action . .... —

LINGUISTIC INFLUENCES ON PHILOSOPHYZING %

T h e exam ina tion o f com plex cu ltura l system s dem onstrates the pow er o f linguistic behavior in every phase o f h u m an intercourse. P erhaps because philosophyzing consists p rim arily o f such sub tle an d im p o rtan t activities as th inking, analyzing, an d reasoning, it is m ost affected by w ords o r term s. By the use o f w ords o r term s th inkers create system s o f th o u g h t o r existence w hich they regard as different o r superio r a n d som etim es inferior to th e w orld they ac tually live in. E xam ples o f such conven tional w ords o r term s a re Logos, D ivine, G o d , Idealism , R ealism , P an th e ism , Spirit, Universe, T ru th , C ertain ty , A bsolu te, Infinite, Evil, M orality , Reality,


154

L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D SU nderstand ing , E xperience, Im m ortality , R eason , an d innum berab le others.

In general such w ords a n d term s a re abstraction istic p ro d u c ts based o n processes o f ex tra p o la tio n from linguistic ac ts developed in everyday living conditions. F ro m th a t source arise the m an y h istorical an d trad itio n a l on to logies an d epistem ologies. T h e specific o p era tio n s em ployed in th e p ro d u c tio n o f ph ilosophical term s are reification, an d tran sfo rm a tio n o f given w ords o r term s. O u tstan d in g exam ples o f tran sfo rm in g term s are the re in te rp re ta tio n o f th e classical w ords m etaphysics, entelechy, psyche, an d the divine. T h e G reeks used these w ords as leg itim atereferences to n a tu ra l

i s t i c j^o cesses an d tilings' b u T th ro u g h , religious circum stances they have been tran sfo rm ed in to au tistic and n o n e x is te n t .categories.

R eification p rocedures a re clearly d em onstra ted w hen p articu la r acts o f inference, som etim es o f a n especially sim ple so rt, a re m ad e in to th ings o r qualities w hich th o u g h n o t existent becom e p revalen t a n d pow erful. T h e felt need fo r som e pow erful person to a id one in difficult situa tions results in an om niscient an d om nip o ten t G od. N oticing the fru stra tio n o f desires a n d ,,am b itio n a n d the inh ib ition o f activities th a t one w ould like to perfo rm leads to the invention o f freedom an d bondage. A gain , a n en tire unsatisfac- to ry am bience stim ulates the developm ent o f be tte r a n d m ore desirab le nphab ita tio n s like th e m yth ical an d su p ern a tu ra l G a rd en s o f E d en an d the E lysium Fields. F inally , unsatisfactory life cond itions lead to the concept .-an d te rm o f “ reality”, as o ver aga inst co n fro n tab le events and cond itions. '*

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY

F o r th e m ost p a r t we have been concerned in th is ch ap te r w ith th e ph ilosophy o f language, th a t is th e licit and illicit a ttitu d es to w ard th e all ^prevading linguistic phenom ena . In th e presen t section o u r in terest is in th e un iq u e type o f ph ilosophyzing in w hich th e em phasis is o n th e im provem en t o f ph ilo soph ical th in k in g by th e analysis a n d m o n ito rin g o f th e 1111language em ployed w hile developing system s o f a ttitu d es concern ing th ink ing o r the w orld th o u g h t about.

L ight is th ro w n u p o n the n atu re o f linguistic ph ilosophy by the conditions o f origin. P h ilo sophers in the 20th cen tu ry sensing th e futility o f trad itio n a l m etaphysics began to insist u p o n th e clarification o f th e referen ts fo r the term s an d sentences em ployed. T hey asked w hat is the significance o f su ch term s as “G o d ,” “F reedom ," an d “Im m o rta lity .” S o o n the question ex p an d ed so th a t various schools o f linguistic ph ilosophy arose

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Ew ith v aria tions concern ing the construc tion o f m eanings. V arious nam es w ere a d o p te d fo r th e different schools, A naly tic P h ilo sophy , L ogical P ositivism , Scientific E m piricism , L inguistic A nalysis, an d still o thers. O nce the general ph ilosophical m ovem ent gained su p p o rt the adh eren ts raised questions as to w hether philosophyzing cou ld proceed by the use o f o rd in ary language o r required special and ideal language.

M uch o f conven tional ph ilosophy is m ade up o f futile assertions and co n trad ic tio n s based upon the crea tion and use o f illicit verbal ab stractions. S am p les are “abso lu te verification," “u ltim ate tru th ," an d “un iversals.” O nce th e verbal ab strac tio n is ad m itted in to the ph ilo soph ic a ren a m uch a rg u m e n t and co u n te r-a rg u m en t is indulged in to th e u ltim ate resu lt o f u tte r obfuscation . Puzzles in p ro fusion are invented an d p ro p ag a ted to the everlasting glory o f nebulous rhetoric.

^ T h e en tire set o f verbal gam es serves as a pow erfu l m eans o f keeping a lo o f from th e ac tua l plenum o f concrete situations. V erbal gam es are effective too ls fo r escaping from the rigors o f everyday existence, a n d help to p ro v o k e the co nstruc tion o f system s o f gossam er to m ak e th e w orld nea rer to one’s heart's desire.

LINGUISTIC PHILOSOPHY AND THE WORLD OF EVENTS

P h ilo sophy being th e ep itom e o f observation and reflection requires the m ost ad e q u a te use o f language to refer to an d sym bolize the events th o u g h t ab o u t. O ne obvious guideline is to avo id confusing th e p ropositions fo r describ ing a n d in terp re ting events w ith th e events them selves. T his is the p ro ced u re o f th e idealists w ho verbally crea te a universe o f sense m ateria l an d consciousness w ith abso lu tes and deities o f various so rts as well as creative psychic powers.

L inguistic ph ilosophers as ob jecto rs to sp iritistic m etaphysics resort to th e n o tio n th a t ph ilo sophy has n o subject m atter. T h u s they tu rn to the a rg u m en t th a t the w o rk o f ph ilosophyzing is to analyze language. T his v iew poin t is illustrated by th e sta tem en t a ttrib u ted to P ro fesso r W isdom q u o ted in C h ap te r 8. A ccordingly, ph ilosophical lite ra tu re is replete w ith assertions an d debates ab o u t th e n atu re a n d m ean ing o f w ords, sentences, an d propositions.

Postulation. A critical exam ina tion o f linguistic ph ilosophy indicates the com pletely invalid prem ises u p o n w hich th e en tire m ovem ent is based. Specifically it is clear th a t linguistic ph ilosophy has been erected u p o n th ree false postu lates. First, up o n im p ro p er n o tions o f language; secondly there is ap p a ren t com plete m isunderstand ing o f psychology. M o d ern develop

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L I N G U I S T I C F I E L D Sm ents in psychology are com pletely opposed to the n o tio n that language consists o f w ords, sentences an d p ropositions w hich a re free-standing units and w hich have particu la r k inds o f functions. In the th ird place th e natu re an d developm ent o f philosophy is m isconstrued w ith re la tion to th e philosophyzing individual and th e plenum o f events.

Language. T he failure to recognize th a t language in all its various form s, as p roducts o f texts a n d philosophical systems, is based o n concrete hu m an behavior w hich consists o f ad justm en ts relative to an d reciprocal w ith events o f all sorts. A lthough som e linguistic ph ilosophers ind icate their ap p recia tion o f th e a ttitu d e hypothesis, they still find them selves im prisoned in the trad itio n a l institu tions ab o u t language. In stead o f ph ilosophy being confined to th e study o f language, perhaps because it does no t have its ow n particu la r subject m atter, its function ac tually is to becom e cogniz a n t o f w hat th e sciences d iscover a n d w hat persons can fo rm u la te in th e way o f understand ing o r appreciating events.

L inguistic factors in ph ilosophy a re o f its very essence, b u t can th e m eticulous use o f language by itself correct all th e evils o f ph ilosoph ical enterprises, will it m odify the th ink ing o f th e philosophers? P erhaps beyond the negative aim o f criticizing w rong th inking, language canno t im prove philosoph ical situations. W hat w ould be an indispensib le aid w ould be a m ore in tim ate acquain tance w ith things an d events.

Psychology. A fundam en ta l difficulty in the linguistic ph ilosophy is the em ploym ent o f a n invalid and useless view o f psychology. W riters on the

v . subject assum e t h a t sp_eakers o r hearers co n sis t o f abstrac tional m inds o r ^brains. T his m eans th a t th e entire view tow ard language will be mis

construed and misleading.T h e scientific view o f psychology is th a t psychological processes o r fields

constitu te reciprocal actions o f organism s o r an im als w ith objects o r conditions th a t they speak of. These are the referents w hich we have described above. It is no part o f scientific psychology to assum e o r deal w ith abstru se psychic processes o r b rains w hich are regarded as the seats and centers o f psychic existence and activity.

I t follows from this th a t speakers can only refer to co ncre te events w hich they con fron t as ac tua l adjustm ents. T here is no allow ance for su p ern a tu ral pow ers. A s we have indicated , w hatever th ings o r processes speakers refer to are ex trap o la tio n s from ac tua l con tac ts in in terbehav io ra l fields. It is obvious th a t hum an organism s can exercise th e ir im aginative o r creative processes an d say sentences ab o u t G ods, angels, heavens, and earths beyond all possibility w ithin actual interbehavior.

15 7

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V EPhilosophy. As co m p o n en ts in discussions o f linguistic ph ilosophy then

are m any concepts derived fro m trad itions, especially religious ones. Sc there are questions w h e th e r sentences o r p ropositions can concern abso lutes o f any so rt such as ab so lu te certain ty . It is a curio u s fact how hiehh

_ soph isticated philosophers^w ill allow in th e ir discussion infinities whicl derive from th e field o f m athem atics. O fc o u rse it is possible th a t m athem a

j ticians have been m isled in to the use o f such term s as absolutes anti !! infinities because o f th e religious trad itio n in w hich philosophy w as p ritnar

ily concerned w ith salvation .W h a t is clearly m issing in linguistic ph ilosophy is th e absence o f th

n o tio n th a t p h ilo so p h y is p rim arily a m a tte r o f intellectual o rien ta tio n ; E ither fo r som e o th e r o ccu p a tio n o r fo r sim ply evolving as h u m an being few if any linguistic ph ilo so p h ers o r ph ilosophers in general tak e in t:

^ accoun t th e fact th a t th e know ledge o r system s o f th o u g h t are simpl 'jU .m e a n s o f ad ju s tm en t to the th ings an d events w hich con stitu te th e i, ~ - inevitable an d p e rm an en t environm ents.

" T h e ob jec tion to h isto rica l and trad itio n a l p h ilo sophy is th a t littl cognizance is tak en o f th e ac tu a l processes o f ph ilosophyzing. F o r th e mo.< p a rt ph ilosophers deal w ith to ta l universes an d lim itless surrounding instead o f a p p rec ia tin g th e philosophies concerned w ith th e ac tua l thing and events th a t co n stitu te th e fairly lim ited w orld . T he only valid know edges are those gained fro m observation an d researches o f individuals bot laym en and ex p ert scientists. It is a sensible observ a tio n th a t valid know edge a n d inferences fro m observation a re extrem ely lim ited from tl s tan d p o in t o f an en o rm o u s p lenum so th a t know ledge is alw ays a m atter < step by step prog ress in dea ling with things a n d events. U n fo rtuna te ly eve soph istica ted p h ilo so p h ers a p p e a r to be u n aw are th a t th e only validity < ph ilosophical p ro p o sitio n s is based on keeping tho ro u g h ly in touch wit th e processes a n d ach ievem ents o f techno logy w hich is m erely elabora con tac t w ith elem ents a n d objects m ak ing up th e m ateria ls o f knowledj and understanding .

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C H A P T E R 15

PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN ETHICAL SITUATIONS

ISOLATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF MORAL SITUATIONS

-> T h e first step in th e investigation o f an y subject m a tte r consists o f its iso lation an d identification. T o specify the nature o f eth ical s itua tions it becom es a p rim ary requ irem en t to clear aw ay the thicket o f fallacious views tha t have been ham p erin g th e understand ing o f ethical co n d u c t and m oral situations. T h e en tire h isto ry o f eth ical ph ilo sophy bears w itness to th e d is to rtin g effects o f specious ph ilosophical d octrines a n d sp iritistic psychology. In general, e th ical s itu a tio n s have been trea ted as ab strac t, abso lu te , an d u n iv e rsa l.......

E thical ph ilosophy disp lays a great h iatus betw een the events stud ied a n d the descrip tions an d in te rp re ta tio n s fo rm u la ted ab o u t them . T his m ay be partia lly exp lained on th e g round th a t m oral b eh av io r an d eth ical s itua tions a re au fond cu ltu ra l an d w ith very little partic ipa tion by physiochem ical a n d biological com p o n en ts . A ccordingly, it is m ost necessary to keep close to the fields in w hich eth ical behav io r occurs.

D espite the fact th a t th e ph ilosophical subdiscipline o f ethics concerns th e conduc t o r b ehav io r o f hu m an individuals, conventional eth ical w ritings are replete w ith verbal abstrac tions. :A bsolu te answ ers a re sough t concern ing the natu re o f th e “g o o d ,” o r “o b lig a tio n ” w hence they generate, w hether they can be defined, o r w hether th ey concern m ain ly som eth ing in ternal o r ex ternal to “m in d s ." J

F ro m a n objective an d scientific point o f view a m oral s itu a tio n is essentially a specific b ehav io r event w hich involves a cho ice w hether a p e rso n shou ld o r shou ld n o t p e rfo rm a ce rta in ac t, because d o in g th e a c tis e ith e r righ t o r w ro ng, good o r bad , p ro p e r o r j m p roper. W h e th e r it is right o r w rong to perfo rm a certa in act depends, o f course, on a s tan d ard o r

- c rite rion . S u ch s ta n d a rd s m ay be th e ad o p ted p rescrip tions fro m a g ro u p req u irin g th e do in g o r n o t d o in g o f som e ac t, o r by the individuals ow n fo rm u la tio n o f a code o f behavior.

T h e co n tra s t betw een historical an d scientific philosophical views concern ing ethical s itua tions is clearly indicated by listing som e basic criteria o f m oral conduc t as in the accom pany ing table.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V ET a b l e 2 . S a m p l e s o f C o n v e n t i o n a l E t h i c a l C r i t e r i a

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Greatest Good of Greatest Number

G. E. Moore Indefinable GoodN. Hartmann Transcendent ValuesA. J. Ayer ) C. L. Stephenson f

Emotive Attitudes

Now it is undeniable that each of the traditional standards of morality has its appeal. Interesting also are some of the arguments for the proposed standards. But it is Questionable whether there is a single type of good thatis basic to ethical behavior. or to moral judgements about right or wrong

absolutistic presuppositions but does not strike the target of a scientific philosophy. All the traditional ethical systems incline strongly toward verbal arguments rather than the actual choice behavior, and the specific conditions that environ them. Certainly there is more attention centered on constructs than on the events which properly constitute their source and origin.

ETHICAL EVENTS AND ETHICAL CONSTRUCTS

For the proper appreciation of moral events it is imperative to make precise distinctions between actual ethical situations, and their description and interpretation. Because moral events are embedded in numerous complex affairs much opportunity exists for confusing them with some of their parallel and coincident circumstances. A proper analysis of moral conduct serves to separate the behavior of persons from the views of those attempting to describe and evaluate such events. To be stressed is the fact that the primary feature of a moral situation entails a choice interaction of a person with some other person or thing as stimulus object, in view of a code

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I S S U E S I N E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N So r s tan d a rd recognized by the p erfo rm ing person . M ora lity involves m any types o r classifications o f ac tio n , tim es o f perform ance, consequences, and circum stances o r auspices.

MORALITY: ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE

A long line o f ph ilo sophers have insisted th a t m orals an d eth ica l values are abso lu te and everlasting, an d th u s categorically im perative. A bsolutist s ph ilosophers bu ilt on theo logical o r religious fo u n d a tio n s in the w itting o r unw itting conviction th a t som e so rt o f deity issues co m m an d s which believers presum e to be s tab le and perm an en t rules, w hich can only be obeyed and no t questioned . F ro m such sources have arisen no tions of in trinsic o r abso lu te right an d w rong. Because evidence to ju stify such beliefs is lacking they w ere questioned and th u s arose a challenging g roup o f o p p o n en ts w ho p roposed a contingency view o f m orality . M o ra ls o r eth ical practices they held a re re la tiv istic jT hose w ho oppose the abso lu tis- * tic view o f m orals p o in t o u t th e v aria tions in ethical beliefs and practices in different cu ltural co m m unities an d also n um erous changes an d shifts in ' 4 ^ ' ' ethical attitudes.

A m ong the best exam ples o f abso lu tistic a ttitudes is th a t o f K an t w ho declares tha t,

It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will. Intelligence, wit, judgement, and any other ta len ts of the mind we may care to name, or courage, resolution, and constancy of purpose, as qualities of te m p e ra m e n t, are without doubt good and desirable in many respects; but they can also be extremely bad and hurtful when the will is not good which has to make use of these gifts of nature, and which for this reason has the term 'character' applied to its peculiar quality. It is exactly the same with g if ts o f fo r tu n e . Power, wealth, honour, even health and that complete well-being and contentment with one's state which goes by the name of 'happiness', produce boldness, and as a consequence often overboldness as well, unless a good will is present by which their influence on the mind — and so too the whole principle of action — may be corrected and adjusted to universal ends; not to mention that a rational and impartial spectator can never feel approval in contemplating the uninterrupted prosperity of a being graced by no touch of a pure and good will, and that consequently a good will seems to constitute the indispensable condition of our very worthiness to be happy.. . .

_ A good will is not eood because of what it effects or accomplishes — because of its fitness for attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone — that is, good in itself. "Considered in itself it is to be esteemed beyond comparison as far higher than anything it could ever bring about merely in order to favour some inclination or, if you like, the sum total of inclinations. Even if, by some special disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in power to carry out its intentions; if by its utmost effort it still accomplishes nothing, a nd only good will is left (not, admittedly, as a mere wish, but as the straining of every means so far as they are in our control); even then it would still shine like a jewel for its own sake as something which has its

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Efull value in itself. Its usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add to, nor subtract from, this value. Its usefulness would be merely, as it were, the setting which enables us to handle it better in our ordinary dealings or to attract the attention of those not yet sufficiently expert,

i but not to commend it to experts or io determine its value.1

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^E th ica l relativists a re to be app lau d ed in their a ttacks u p o n the ethical abso lu tes o f the a priori ph ilosophers. H ow ever, they to o rem ain a t fault in espousing universal an d ab s trac tio n a l views concern ing ethical situations. In this respect they stan d beside the absolutists. A lthough the relativists co rrectly asse rt th a t m o ra l co m m an d s derive from the practices o f cultural g roups an d th a t m oral rules are m an-m ade precip ita tions o f the custom s an d hab its as observed in p a rticu la r societies,[they still d o no t consider sufficiently the ac tua l life cond itions o f m oral b e h a v io r j T hey rem ain obsessed by th e com pelling abstrac tion ism o f w ords and established traditions. T h e p ro p o n e n ts o f NJoral R elativ ism are th u s carried fa r aw ay from ac tu a l m o ra l s itua tions. (^For one th in g the d iscussion cen ters a round • p rob lem s o f th e tru th o f ju d g m en ts , th en the questio n is ra ised a b o u t tru th o r belief criteria . In th e m ean tim e th e n a tu re a n d o p era tio n o f m oral s ituations are left hang ing .}

T h e p ro b lem o f m o ra l relativ ism is transferred to a conven tiona l fram ew ork. M o ra l relativism is ta k e n as a situa tio n in w hich there is no rational w ay o f decid ing betw e e n d if fe re n t m o ra l judgm ents.* T o analyze m oral s itua tions is to be concerned w ith actors facing choices o f behav io r on the e lab o ra te aw areness o f the alternatives involved an d the m eans o f perform ing o n e o r o th e r ac tio n o n the basis o f past cu ltu ra liza tion and accrued desires o r tastes.

I W hat is lacking in ph ilosoph ical literature is a th o ro u g h specification of w hat is involved in eth ical behav io r fields. T here is t o o m uch em phasis u p o n the construc t “ough t" as a universal force o r guide to action . F rom a scientific philosophical s tan d p o in t ough ts are the concrete c o n d it io n s o f behavior. T h ey vary fo r persons, and the p articu la r circum stances> sur-_ ro und ing the ethical field a t the time.-yW hen m oral relativists shy aw ay fro m a n analysis o f the m oral event o r

field, they tu m to the observer an d his jud g m en t. T hey discuss the existence o f criteria o r s tan d ard s an d the validity o f s tan d ard s altogether.

T h e fu n d am en ta l p ro b lem o f standards concerns on ly th e ir na tu re o r

1 Kant, I., Groundwork o f the Metaphysic o f Morals (H. J. Paton, trs.), London, Hutchinson’s Univ. Library, 1947, pp. 61,62.

5 Cooper. D. E.,"Moral Relativism," in Studies in Ethical Theory (P. A. French. T. E. Uehling. Jr.. H. K. Wettstcin, eds.), Morris, Minnesota, The Univ. of Minnesota, 1978.

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I S S U E S I N E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N Scharacter. O bviously there are s tan d ard s b u t t hey are not a priori o r intuitive. R a th e r they arise an d o p era te w ith in the boundaries o f specific^ fields as we have repeated ly described them.

MORALITY SITUATIONS DOMINATED BY INFALLIBLE PHILOSOPHY

T h e en tire p o la rity o f abso lu teness an d relativity is sym p to m atic o f the influence o f abso lu teness a n d certa in ty in philosophy. Few, if any philosophers are able to free them selves from dom ination by the assum ption that they are ab le to fo rm u la te abso lu te and universal p ropositions ab o u t the universe. (There is lack ing in m ost if n o t all philosophical system s the hum ility o f ap p rec ia tin g th a t universal system s a re really th e construc tions o f p a rticu la r persons w ith specific capacities a n d w ith a large o r sm all fund (%j o f un ique experiences th ro u g h o u t a particu lar behavior h isto ry .J

P hilosophyzing is a techn ical en terp rise and as such it is hedged in by the influence o f accepted an d valued trad itio n s w hich tend tow ard form ality a n d d ep a rtu re fro m a u th en tic observation . F o rm u la tio n being different

I from events fo rm u la ted , to u ch is lost w ith the actual facts o f life. A rb itra ri-iness, if n o t m ytho logy is th en given free play. Im perative a n d veridical becom e th e rules handed do w n from heaven, and the laws stru ctu red by venerated law givers. R ules o f conduc t are cherished though d ish o n o red by failure to practice w h a t they o rd e r to be do n e o r to be avoided . In the m ean tim e people behave in ac tu a l living, in trade , an d in all so rts o f in terre lations w ith o th e r persons in ways th a t can n o t be procrustean izcd to con fo rm with form ulations.r~ It is hard ly necessary to a d d here th a t n o m oral considera tions are app licab le to th e beh av io r o f m an y persons w ho live am o ra l lives, th a t is, 40 ? persons ex isting beyond good an d evil, and w ho neither think n o r u nderstand any th ing beyond th e ir daily rounds o f w ork and play. T h e oughtness

; o f th e ir living does no t ex ten d beyond the conti nuance o f their existence o r \ its pecuniary im provem ent.

PROMINENT MISCONCEPTIONS IN ETHICAL THEORY

W riters on m oral sub jects n o t only include in their theories various fallacies arising from th e d o m in a tio n o f abstractiona) ph ilosophy , but in ad d itio n also espouse fallacious presuppositions, especially erro n eo u s constructs ab o u t psychology an d psychological behavior. O u tstan d in g exam ples are the p reoccu p a tio n w ith such pseudo-problem s as F reed o m , C o n science, Personality , an d In trinsicality o f M oral Behavior.

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0 a . Freedom of the Will. A m ong the perennial problem s in the philosophy o f ethics is tha t o f th e freedom o f th e will. T h is h istorical p roblem involves m etaphysical entities o f zero substan tiality w hich b linds th inkers to the ac tual probabilities and lim itations o f concrete h u m an affairs./ S c ien tifirp sy ch o lugy is UTtarnbiguOus m T trdec la fa tib fT that there is no ^

j such en tity as a will an d so there can be n o legitim ate question a b o u t the ( freedom o r d e te rm in a tio n o f th e will/T h e will construc tion derives directly

from faculty psychology w hich is, o f course, m e n ta lis ts an d theistic. Will w hether free o r determ ined stem s from soul psychology an d n o t from any o bservation o f h u m an beings an d their behavior, (in o rd e r to achieve a p roper ph ilosophic a ttitu d e tow ard m oral questions, it is necessary to abide by a naturalistic view point concerning h u m an n a tu re ./ '

T h e futility o f the freedom p rob lem in its negative and positive versions is clearly d em o n stra ted in th e co n tra s t displayed betw een th e abstrac t m etaphysica l version a n d w hen it is p u t in th e fo rm o f th e concrete . question , “C an one d o w hat one w ould like to do?” T h e latter entails a not to o sub tle adm ission th a t th e will p rob lem m ust refer b ack to the actual beh av io r o f persons in specific situations. T he fact th a t there are lim itations to th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f ce rta in actions com pletely excludes p rob lem s o f #

"n o n ex is te n t will. In m any circum stances individuals ca n n o t perfo rm w hat they w ould like to do . F o r exam ple , one can n o t travel to a d is tan t but a ttrac tiv e city because o f th e lack o f funds. It is futile fo r a d o c to r to tell the penniless consum ptive patien t th a t he should m ove to a n elevated infirm ary in Sw itzerland. X can n o t hope to en ter Y m edical school w hich he intensely

j j w an ts to do because he d id n o t ea rn th e h igh grades w hich he cou ld have { 'earned w ith som ew hat less in terest in ath letics. A nyone in terested in

prob lem s o f ab ility o r inab ility to d o som e chosen an d highly desirable activity can refer to an in n um erab le set o f such inhibiting situations. The fo llow ing exam ples o f h u m a n circum stance m ay be the sources o f inhibitions o f ac tion , o r in favo rab le circum stances th e fac ilita to rs o f specific instances o f m oral an d im m oral behavior.

a. P resence o f Specific C u ltu ra l Institu tionsb. E conom ic, Political, and Social S itua tionsc. Societal C ontro lsd . Psychological T ra its developed in fo rm er times.

In stead o f dea ling w ith inventions o f psychic entities it is surely m ore j profitable to ap p ro ach m oral s itua tions as the behav io r o f persons with i respect to personal o r co m m u n al criteria o f p roprie ty . I t is on such a

164

I S S U E S I N E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N Snatu ra listic and cu ltu ra l basis th a t m oral situations ca n be p roperly an a lyzed an d assayed as well as d ifferentiated from o rd in ary custom s an d from legal in junctions and social con tro ls . ^

b. Conscience. A m o n g th e serious ethical m isconceptions d irectly ow ing to the espousal o f sp iritistic psychology, stands p ro m in en tly th e construct o f conscience o r m o ra l sense. E ssentially^conscience" is regard ed as a faculty_of sou l o r m ind wh ich gu ides the ind iv idual to a ct m orally o r in conflict w ith his ow n criteria o f p ro priety.

N o tio n s o f conscience a n d m o ra l sense have no m an n e r o f credibility w hen envisaged as faculties o f an a rb itra rily conceived m ind o r soul. N o such facu lty o r psychic m a trix can be derived from a n y observ a tio n o f persons in the p e rfo rm an ce o f th e ir individual o r co m m u n a l activities w ithin the am bience o f ac tua l living conditions.

It is a fa ir assu m p tio n th a t th e persistence o f such a term a s conscience reflects a con fusing o f vocabu laries. A side from th e use o f the term to refer to an in n a te psychic en tity the te rm is also em ployed as a p ro p e r descrip tion o f th e behav io r o f persons in u nusual o r critical c ircu m stan cesfP ro p erly to use the term conscience in co nnection w ith ethical p rob lem s is to look u pon it as a definite so rt o f behav io r w hich varies in specific s itu a tio n s an d w ith in teraction w ith p articu la r objects in given circum stances])

c. Self-Ego. W e have already p roposed th a t a p ro p e r psychological basis fo r the study o f eth ical questions is to possess a n ad e q u a te appreciatio n o f h u m an natu re . H ow ever, conven tiona l ethics is replete w ith co n stru c ts based m ore o n trad itio n a l lore th a n o n observ a tio n s o f ac tua l persons as they ac t privately o r in concert. C onsequen tly ethical w ritings featu re p rom inen tly concep tions o f self personality o r ego as cen tral to v irtues an d vices.U ’he g o o d o r th e m oral life is to co n tro l o r deny the p ropensities o f th e ego o r selpV ices, o r im m oral behav io r spring from the n a tu ra l assertiveness o f one’s ego o r self. V irtues consist o f the realization o f th e self th o u g h th is view is devoid o f all specification as to a p ro ced u re o r end to be a tta in ed fo r a nonexisten t entity.

N o tions o f self, selfishness, ego, a n d egoism co n tra s t strik ingly w ith scientific psychology w hich d ep a rts radically from theories o f in ternal entities w hich exist beside th e ac tual behav io r and exigencies involved in such ad justm en ts to behav io ral conditions. H ence eth ical behavior like all

, behav io r consists o f the ac tiv ity o f particu la r ind iv id u a lsu n d er the auspices o f m any an d diverse crite ria . T echnically , how ind iv iduals ac t under vario u s circum stances m ay well be categorized a s instances o f personality ad justm ents.

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Every individual is a unique personality. This signifies th a t in his past experience dating from infancy he has built up a repertoire o f action with respect to particular things, so that at any given time he is equipped with ways o f acting o r habits. Such actions o r habits perta in to specific stim ulus objects, for exam ple, persons, things, conditions, o r change in circum stances. T o study personality in the way we are suggesting, rules ou t once and fo r all tim e every no tion o f internal subjective entities. In all cases scientific psychology is concerned exclusively and invariably with personality traits o r habitual ways o f acting.

d. Intrinsicality. Finally we consider processes o f inevitable m oral behavior because o f the intrinsicality o f certain forces innate in the character o f individuals, o r in cond itions surrounding an individual and his behavior.

f it is said th a t th e re~are such Q u a lif ie s in things ancfactions as in trinsic ( goodness o r ev il.rW hile the im proper construction o f such forces o r

conditions is no t entirely psychological, still because o f the topic o f ethical behavior this term finds its place in a discussion o f ethical situations. O ur point can be well m ade w hen we contrast the idea o f intrinsicality with the construction o f spatio tem poral circum stances which form the fram ework o f hum an behavior.

r One o f the best exam ples o f philosophical intrinsicality is provided by the em inent English philosopher G. E. M oore w ho proposes to correct all writers on ethics by featuring tw o questions. T he first is “W hat kind of things ought to exist fo r their ow n sakes?” and the second is “W hat kind of actions ought we to perform?"3

^ He tries to show,exactly what it is that we ask about a thing, when we ask whether it ought to exist for its own sake, is good in itself or has intrinsic value; and exactly what it is that we ask about anaction. when we ask whether we ought to do it, whether it is a right action or a duty.4

Again he writes,If I am asked ‘What is good? my answer is that good is good, and that is the end of the matter. Or if I am asked 'How is good to be defined?' my answer is that it cannot be defined, and that is all l have to say about it. But disappointing as these answers may appear, they are of the very last importance. To readers who are familiar with philosophic terminology, lean express their importance by saying that they amount to this: That propositions about the good are all of them synthetic and never analytic; and that is plainly no trivial matter. And the same thing may be expressed more popularly, by saying that, if I am right, then nobody can foist upon us such an axiom as that 'Pleasure is the only good' or that The good is the desired’ on the pretence that this is The very meaning of the word.’’

* Moore, G. E., Principia Eihica, Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press, 1929. Pref. p. viii.•Ibid., preface, p. viii.5 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 166

I S S U E S I N E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N SETHICAL PROBLEMS AS LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS

A ntim etaphysica! p h ilo sophers w h o wish to shun the fallacies an d the irrelevancies o f trad itio n a l m ystical an d supernatu ra l speculations fo rm u late the p roposition th a t p h ilo sophy consists entirely o f t rue p ro positions a b o u t the w orld . A ccord ingly they envisage the eth ical aspects o f the universe as m atters o f valid sentences ab o u t the construct o f “g o o d .” In this w ay they ho p e to avo id th e ab so lu tism o f h istorical ph ilo sophy such th a t du ties an d rules o f co n d u c t ex ist even if there is no h u m an being to k now or to con fo rm to them . E ssentially then , d o ’s an d d o n ’t’s are fo r them m atters o f language.6

Because com peten t linguistic analyses invariably m ust reach back to ac tion o r behavior, som e linguistic analysts have proposed th a t by con trast w ith scientific language w hich is descriptive o f events, ethical language is em otive o r pleasing. T h is view, even if it erases m etaphysical n o tio n s fails u tterly to take acco u n t o f ac tu a l events in w hich reacting ind iv iduals perform observable b ehav io r accord ing to som e accepted stan d ard .7 — Linguistic analysis o f ethics ap p e a rs to be a double shift from ethical events, th a t is, e th ical fields o f behav io r. F irs t there are sentences substitu ted for acts, and th en the sentences are m ade in to expressions o f feelings such as ap p ro v in g o r d isapp rov ing . T h e sentence “This is good” is declared to be transla tab le in to “ I ap p ro v e o r d isapprove o f this." B oth m oves shift problem s o f ethics fro m eth ical perfo rm ance to descrip tions o r com m en ts o f the onlooker.

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iPSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF ETHICAL BEHAVIOR

Since e th ica l b eh av io r is a fo rm o f psychological in terbehav io r, a m odel „o f ethical s itua tions sym bolizes a special type o f psychological field. A ccordingly, we can sum m arize psychological fields by ennum erating the co m ponen t factors w ith in th e b oundaries o f a unit m oral event. i

1. The behaving person. W hen we analyze a m oral situation it is necessary to tak e accoun t o f the n a tu re o f th e p articu la r p erson involved. It is valuable to know th e in te rb eh av io ra l h isto ry o f the ind iv idual. Such in fo rm atio n becom es im p o rtan t w hen questions are raised concerning * *du ties a n d conscience. As is well know n the p roper app rec ia tio n o f the observed person involves know ledge o f his fam ily background , the natu re o f his environing cond itions an d general m ode o f living. Especially im por-

* Ayre, A. J.. Philosophical Essays. New York. St. Martin's Press. 1954.’Cf. Stevenson. C. L„ Ethics and Language. New Haven. Yale. 1944. Also “The Emotive Concep

tion of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications.' Philosophical Review. 59.

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tan t is an ap p rec ia tio n o f the institu tions which influence the individuals behavioral h isto ry while developing standards o r criteria o f m oral behavior w ith o r w ithou t the in terven tion o f particu la r individuals.

2. Stimulus Object. N ex t we m ust tak e accoun t o f the eth ical stim ulus objects o r circum stances co n fron ting the reacting individual. Sam ples of such stim ulus ob jects consist o f persons in need o r great difficulty, prom ises to keep, o b liga tions to persons o r o rganizations, co n trib u tio n s of funds fo r ch a ritab le p u rposes o r fo r a id ing in th e salvaging o f environing cond itions, du ties required by p rio r self-com m itm ents o r by social obligations, individual an d social conflicts, an d so on and o n iW h a t constitu tes an ac tua l ethical stim ulus object is o f course a function o f the specificities of

l! particu la r behavioral s ituations^3. Ethical Media of Contact. E xtrem ely im p o rtan t in psychological

fields a re th e m edia w hereby th e reacting o rgan ism gets in to co n tac t with stim ulus objects. In general perceiving behavior the m edia are clearly air waves an d light ra y s .Jn eth ical behaviorjw hich is cu ltu ra j}he m edia consist

q \ o f general o b servation of h u m an events including the institu tions jdomi- han't ~m?speaH c societies an d effective in instructional and_educational experiences as weil as ad ap ta tiona! ad justm ents to specific societies^

4. Setting or Auspices o f Behavior. F ro m the s tan d p o in t o f scientific psychology th e ausp ices u n d e r w hich in terbehav io r occurs are o f the greatest im po rtan ce . T hey frequen tly influence w hether o r no t th e essential field is fo rm ed an d th e quality o f the in terbehavior. In m oral behav io r fields it m ay be th e setting w hich co lo rs th e facility with w hich th e behavior occurs as well as th e in tensity o f the action . W hether a person acts honestly, sym pathetically , cruelly, m agnanim ously , patrio tically , o r otherw ise depends u p o n w ho is presen t o r w hat the consequences m ay be to oneself or others. In th e lite ra tu re o f ethics, such auspices o r setting factors are categorized as m o tiv a tio n , b u t such charac te riza tion o f the conditions involved in m oral behav io r im plies som e fo rm o f m entalistic fram ew ork. E thical conduc t considered from the stan d p o in t o f scientific philosophy bears n o re lation to m entalistic no tions o f m otivation . T hey are excluded in co m p an y w ith all o th e r fo rm s o f m entalistic processes such as sensations, images, ideas, an d so on.

M ORALS A N D VALUES

f S tu d en ts o f the ph ilosophy o f m orals are p ro n e to co n jo in problem s o' \ values w ith those o f ethicsj T hey assum e th a t a m oral ac t is a n act of valui

o r 'a f leasT conform s to values o r con tribu tes to the realm o f values. Th<

168

S S U E S I N E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N Squestion arises w he th e r p rob lem s o f value are ipso fac to connected w ith p rob lem s o f m oral behav io r. T o clarify th is q u estio n it is d esirab le to co n sid er th e n a tu re o f values a n d h o w they m ay relate to eth ical situations.

A to n c e we m ust reject an y a p rio iT o r m etaphysical no tio n o f values. A typical abstrac tion istic sta tem en t ho lds that,There is a pure valuational a priori, which directly, intuitively, emotionally permeates our practical consciousness, our whole conception of life, and which tends to everything that falls within the range of our vision the mark of value or anti-value.8

O f course no t all ph ilosophers w ould accep t the H a rtm a n n style o f sta tem en t th o u g h th ey do n o t escape the m ythology ev ident in the quo ted sta tem en t. V alue is o ften regarded as a pow er, a source o f good , an ideal, a goal o r an end to be reached.

F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f scientific_Dhilosoohv_values are in trinsic or a ttrib u ted p roperties o f acts o r th ings an d events. In the fo rm er case objects o r co n d itio ns prove to~be su itab le ajid som etim es necessary in particu la r situations. F o r exam ple , it is en tire ly p ro p er to regard th e physiochem ical qualities o f w ood o r e a rth as va luab le fo r th e co n stru c tio n o f d am s by beavers o r h u m an organism s. A ttrib u ted p ro p e rties in general consist in values o f th ings as im posed by th e eva lu a to ry processes o f o rgan ism s o r p e rso n s in an y "n u m b er o f s itua tions, industrial, com m ercial, m ilitary, perso n a l deco ra tio n , an d m a n y o th e rs . In n o sense m ay values be regarded as d iv ine .o rd ina tions o r abso lu te an d eternal creations.

All values o f w hatever so rt a re th en facto rs in the w ork an d p lay o f concrete situations. V alues th a t have becom e m ore o r less perm anen t features o f g ro u p s an d com m unities stem from cultural institu tions. Rules o f m orals a re form alized an d institu tionalized attitudes based o n observations b o th delibera te an d casual concern ing the behavioral practices o f ind iv iduals w hich a re ap p ro v ed o f by the so-called leaders o f various social system s.

STA N D A RD S O F MORALS

M o ra l beh av io r an d eth ical institu tions, as we have seen, a re closely in terre la ted with prob lem s o f criteria o r standards. T hese s tan d ard s are in general, o f tw o so rts . O ne , those in itiated an d fo rm u la ted by ind iv iduals d u rin g the course o f their in terbehav io ral careers, a n d the o th e r based m ainly o n cu ltu ra l o r social circum stances.

a . Societal Standards. O ne o f the clear-cu t ingred ien ts o f m o ra l stand-

* Hartmann, N., Ethics (S. Coit, trs.), Vol. I, London, Allen and Unwin, 1932, p. 177.

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ard s a re the co n tin u in g practices o f people over in tervals o f tim e, in som e cases over decades o r m any ages. S tan d ard s a re founded o n beliefs o r sensitive aw areness w hich becom e staticised as h ab itu a l w ays o f ac ting th a t have passed d o w n th ro u g h generations. T hereafte r such s tan d ard s becom e influential as crite ria fo r th e con tin u ed perfo rm ance o f ce rta in acts e ither as overt perform ances o r m ore sub tle beliefs an d ideas.

b. Personalistic Standards^ T h e basic psychological fact o f individual differences constitu tes a n effective basis fo r the developm ent o f private s tan d a rd s as c rite ria o f righ t o r w rong beh av io n ) A ttitudes in ethical s itu a tio n s a re developed in precisely th e sam e w ay as the developm ent o f a hab it, a p a rticu la r belief, o r o th e r id iosyncratic behav io r. A s a m a tte r of course private an d personal eth ica l s tan d ard s a re prim arily beliefs. ^

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MORALITY A d istinc tion o f co n sid erab le im p o rtan ce m u st be observed as betw een

w hat are called p rivate a n d pub lic m orality . T h e behav io r in each case m ay b ea r som e resem blance to th e o th e r b u t in essential details they are very different. A b rief com p ariso n dem o n stra te s this.

B ehavior referred to as public m o ra lity consists p rim arily o f conform ity o r shared behavior. T hey fit in to a system o f ac tion w hich sociologists call custom s, m ores, taboos, o r folkways. Sociologists9 d o n o t hesitate to say th a t it is m ores o r custom s th a t define w h a t is w rong o r righ t to do . F ro m a psychological p o in t o f view public m ora lity behav io r is in teractionsjw ilh. in stitu tional s tim ulus objects u n d e r rules as results o f cu lturalization .

^P ublic m o ra lity behav io r is th u s identified as i te m s o f social psychology.10By con trast w ith pub lic m o ra ls p rivate m oral ac tions m ay be regarded as

id iosyncratic o r ind iv idual b eh av io r w hich is reciprocal w ith occasional events, usually m ore serious a n d requisite o f g rea te r a lertness on the p a rt of th e reacting individual. C riteria in the case o f private m orality m ay differ from one person to ano ther.

*f<r M e n ta lis ts o r subjectivistic psychologists differentiate betw een public

(an d p rivate m orality on th e g round th a t p rivate m o rality is based upon individual conscience instead o f som e ex ternal ru le established by custom . T h is view ca n on ly be accep tab le if b y conscience is m ean t an inclination o r d isposition to perfo rm a n ac t o n the basis o f p rio r b ehav io ra l history . Here is an exam ple o f h o w the use o f ce rta in w ords can d is to rt an d mislead observation an d inference.

’Sumner, W. G.. Folkways: A Study o f the Sociological Importance o f Usages. Manners. Customs. Mores, and Morals. New York. Dover. I9S9.

,0Cf. Kantor, J. R., A n Outline o f Social Psychology, Chicago. FoUett, 1929.170

I S S U E S I N E T H I C A L S I T U A T I O N S

MORALITY AND LEGALITY

A n even g rea ter d iffe ren tia tion exists than the one betw een m orals and custom s; tha t w hich o b ta in s betw een m oral and legal behavior. In bo th types o f behav io r ac tio n s m ay be correc tly den o m in a ted as right o r w rong, p ro p er o r im proper, b u t fo r vary ing reasons. Legal behav io r is right o r w rong on the basis o f p ro h ib itio n s o r d em ands by an enacted s ta tu te o r co m m o n law, also by the ed ic t o f a religious organization . S uch ac tion influenced by legal system s w ith pow ers o f penalizing refractory individuals stresses ex ternal con tro ls. M ora l b eh av io r as we have seen em anates from the choice and c rite rion o f th e person himself. T he difference betw een m oral and legal b eh av io r is clarified w hen they are com bined in th e sam e act.

A sim ple exam ple o f b eh av io r w hich m ay com e u nder b o th o f the headings o f m oral and legal a c tio n is th a t o f calling a co n d u c to r’s a tten tio n to his fa ilu re to collect the fare tha t was owed to a tran sp o rta tio n com pany .F o r an individual it m ay be illegal an d im m oral bo th to w ithhold m oney ”d u e to the tra n sp o rta tio n co m p an y . It som etim es happens th a t the legal au tho rities are unaw are o f th e failure to pay the fare. H ow ever, so far as the Hindividual is influenced by m oral considerations, it is his d u ty to prevent hany lack o f paym ent to the co m p an y involved.

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C H A P T E R 16

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF POLITICS

HUMANITY AS COLONIAL ORGAN ISM S

Ju s t as h u m an beings can n o t ex ist in d ependen tly o f the ir terrestial and cosm ic environm ents, so they can n o t be free o f in tim ate relatedness w ith o thers o f their ilk. A ctually , h u m an beings, like co rals and o th er sim pler o rganism s, are colonial creatures, albeit w ith great differences in evo lu tionary origin, s truc tu re , function , a n d general behavior. M uch as h u m an beings are ind ividualists an d un ique they a re inescapably and invariably gregarious. N o p erson can o r does live w h o lly a lone, and th a t fact is the p rim ary basis o f political existence. As A risto tle has m ade clear in his expression Z o o n Politikon , h u m an beings a re social creatures. T his is the basis fo r the harm onies an d strifes am o n g individuals, p lus the conflicts, claim s, and benefits o f individuals relative to the au th o rity and co n tro l by societies and social institu tions.

HIERARCHY OF HUM AN GROUPIN GS

a. Community. All h u m an o rgan ism s a re m em bers o f a sm all o r large num b er o f in terrelated groups. S u ch g ro u p s co n stitu te h ierarchies o f o rgan iza tion . A m o n g sim ple peoples it is a t least a fam ily th a t in co rp o ra tes individuals in to an aggregate. Every h u m an ind iv idual even o f the sim plest cu ltu re o r civilization, fo rm s part o f a co m m u n ity o r social system , sm all as it m ay be. Social systems m ay include only a m ale a n d fem ale organism , w ith o r w ithou t progeny. S om ew hat m o re com plex g roupings consist o f the fam ily m em bers plus relatives o f th e sam e o r d ifferent generations. F u rth e r stages o f social h ierarchies consist o f triba l un its com prising several o r m any families w ith all the inheren t o r associated m em bers.

b. Proliferation. H u m an g ro u p h ierarch ies ex p an d in ch a rac te r an d com plexity w ith the m ultip lication o f m em bers an d th e presence o f favorab le circum stances. Beyond triba l g rou p in g s sim ple com m unities arise bevond bio logical re la tionsh ips to fo rm social un its b o u n d toge th er by ties o f m u tu a l a id , o r by co m m o n adven tu res such as hun tin g and J tshim L W hen a n u m b er o f such un its are located close to each o th e r w ith in a d ialectal system o r o ther style o f in terre la tionsh ip there are evolved villages172

A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C S

o r sim ple co o p era tiv e societies. G ro u p m em bers live close to g e th er as neighbors.

c. Cooperation. A h igher po int in the h u m an hiera rch y is re a ched when individuals a nd th e ir g roup ings co o p erate fo r co m m on purposes, such as carry ing on trad e o r b arte r. In such cases villages becom e cities with com plicated dw ellings an d g ro u p centers w ith n u m ero u s div isions and specialization o f lab o r. Sociologists m ake m uch o f the process o f u rban izatio n in w hich ind iv iduals a re jo in ed to g e th er in m any types o f subgroups. W hen th e stage o f u rb a n iz a tio n is reached , th e re develop very com plicated h u m an system s, w orkers, m anagers, rulers, an d th e ruled. T he m otives m ay be fra te rn a l o r fo r p u rp o ses o f securing fo r th e g ro u p a n d its ind iv idua l un its ce rta in advan tages w hich m ay o r m ay n o t be to th e d isadvan tage o f o th e r g roups. Cities m ay becom e political a n d sovereign system s as co lo nies, provinces, an d city states.

d . Statism. S ta tes as political institu tions co n stitu te th e peak o f h u m an groupings. M ore th an anv o th e r societal g roup , na tional un its d isplay m ost com plex o rg an iza tio n s. Invariab ly these c o n ta in m any subgroups, the n u m b er o f w hich depends o n the size o f the p rim ary unit an d th e m obility o f persons in ne ighboring s ta te units. L arge sta tes include m in o rity g roups o f varying n u m b ers w ith th e ir ow n language, d istinctive cu ltu re , an d m ores ranging from sim ple food an d dress styles to the m ost com plicated religious beliefs and practices.

e. Authority. T h e ph ilo sopher o f politics inquires in to the n atu re o f the un its m ak ing up to ta l na tions an d th e general re la tionsh ip w ith o ther n a tio n a l un its. In general the political system s center a ro u n d a leader, a president, head m an , o r king. P rob lem s arise as to the function ing m ethods o f kings o r d ic ta to rs , an d th e specific system s by w hich they becam e the leaders an d m ain ta in them selves even despite th e d issatisfaction o f som e individuals o r subgroups. N ational system s a re usually divisible in to a n u m b e r o f fac to rs o r variables, p ro m in en t a m o n g them a re p rob lem s o f sovereignty p o l i t i c a l system s vary as to the p o w er an d perm anency o f the g rea t leaders a n d th e processes by w hich they m ain ta in them selves o r are displaced by o th e r ind iv iduals o r g roups, fo r exam ple , m ilitary ju n to s as subun its in m o d em n a tio n s.)

VARIETY IN POLITICAL SYSTEM S

T h e g roupings called provinces o r states fo rm system s o f m an y sorts. M ost frequen tly such un its achieve unique form s with som e individual o ra g ro u p o f ind iv iduals serving as th e ruler o r gu ide o f the en tire system . T he173


obv ious exam ples o f course are m onarchies, em pires, o r dem ocracies w ith leaders an d ru lers stand ing on low er rungs o f political ladders such as presidents, governors, m ayors, an d so on. S uch political system s give rise to eva lu a tio n s as to the superio rity o r in ferio rity o f th e system an d as to the advan tage o r d isadvan tage o f the m em bership .

N o th in g is easier th an to b lueprin t a special type o f political system . T he differences betw een system s are frequently m anifested by the ir co n trasts an d conflicts. M onarch ists deride R epub licans an d vice versa. As a rule, all, system s a re go o d in b lueprin t th o u g h o ften they are qu ite bad in actual s tru c tu re a n d in practice . It is entire ly a m a tte r o f the k ind o f c rite rion ch osen as a m eans fo r decid ing th e su p erio rity o r in ferio rity o f a p a rticu la r

^ % system . Basically, the m erits o f an y system d epend u p o n th e initiative an d x th e b eh a v io r o f ce rta in m em bers o f th e co m m u n ity , fo r exam ple , in

A d em ocratic system s w here the leaders a re p resum ed to be th e choice o f the pub lic a n d th e w inner o f a m ajo rity o f electors’ ballo ts. H ow ever, in such

d em o cra tic system s circum stances m ay fav o r th e deve lopm ent o f political ""m ach ines by v irtue o f th e co n tro l o f ap p o in tm en ts an d th e bu ild ing u p o f

loyalties am o n g persons w h o profit by th e m achine . O n th e o th e r h an d , the leaders o f such m achines m ay win over the general public by dem o n stra tin g th e ir capacities to govern well an d build u p in s titu tio n s beneficial to the en tire constituency o f th e particu la r governm ental unit.

POLITICAL SYSTEMS AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

T h e g ro u p in g o f persons constitu tes th e raw m ateria l o r th e raw d a ta for the deve lopm en t o f philosophical hypotheses a n d theories concern ing the g reg ario u s aspect o f h u m an p o p u la tio n s. C u ltu ra l h istory is indeed replete w ith th e views o f ph ilosophers relative to the orig in an d n a tu re o f political system s. B u t here th e insistent questio n arises concern ing th e valid ity o f the specific fo rm ula tions offered. T h e critical mader-aslcs how well any particu- la r ph ilosoph ical a ttitu d e en te rta in ed by th e p h ilo so p h er o f politics confo rm s to th e ac tu a l o rgan iza tions o f peop le-M o re particu la rly p u t, w hat are th e basic assum ptions o r postu la tes underly ing th e descrip tions an d in te rp re ta tio n s o f the p articu la r philosophy? A re conventional philosophies based upon abstrac t a p rio ri co n stru c ts in stead o f th e ac tua l d a ta o f persons in association? lit m ay well be assum ed th a t th e ph ilosophy o f politics to be valid m ust oe based u p o n observ a tio n s o f concrete in teractio n s o f persons u n d e r econom ic, eth ica l, geograph ic , cosm ological, an d o th e r cond itio 174


_ E xtrem ely im p o rtan t to o is th e analysis o f political philosophies as to the_ psychological assum ptions u p o n w hich they are based. N o descrip tions o f the o rig in o r n a tu re o f co m m unities can be valid if based u p o n venerab le beliefs instead o f na tu ra listic events o f hu m an in terbehav io r. It is th e plan o f th is ch a p te r to glance at som e o f th e p ro m in en t h istorical philosophies o f politics an d to ascerta in th e ir values as dep artm en ts o f general ph ilosophy.

O f the n u m b er o f political ph ilosophers there is no end . T h ro u g h o u t the intellectual h istory o f the W est, observers o f every period have fo rm ula ted descrip tions o f the societies in w hich they lived o r read a b o u t an d thus p rovided successive views concern ing the social and political o rgan iza tion o f their ow n and neighboring groups. O ften they were in terested in the im provem ent o f these system s they described. O n the w hole it is the case th a t conven tional ph ilosophers have em ployed abstrac tions an d ultim ates as well as im p ro p er psychological views.

SPECIM EN S O F POLITICAL PH ILO SO PH IES

Political o rgan iza tions w ith th e ir com petitions, conflicts, a n d leaderships have alw ays been a favorite subject o f ph ilosophers. A lo n g w ith th e ir in terest in theology, cosm ology, epistem ology, an d psychology they have tak en no te o f m ank ind as un its in their various organ izations. T h e h istory o f ph ilosophy is replete w ith such w orks as P la to ’s Republic a n d Laws, A risto tles ' Politics, St. A ugustine’s City o f God, H obbes’ Leviathan, R o u sseau’s The Social Contract, an d innum erab le o thers in the ca ree r o f ph ilosophical specu la tion .1

A s ind icated in the nam es o f the treatises m en tioned the succession o f w orks rep resen ts various places and cond itions in w hich th e ph ilosophers w ere im m ersed and influenced by. T o a great ex ten t th e con ten ts o f the v a rio u s ph ilosophies o f politics suggest th a t th e in terest show n by the various ph ilosophers in their succeeding times was religious and ethical. L ater, o f course , the evo lu tion o f political w ritings definitely assum es an objective o r scientific tu rn . Political o rgan iza tions are trea ted m uch m ore o n the p lan o f describ ing briefly features o f views observed in various n a tio n s o r states. F o r o u r purposes w e presen t briefly a sam pling taken from th e line o f succession o f political ph ilosophy. O u r sam p lin g begins w ith th e seven teen th cen tu ry theorists w h o so u g h t a m o re n atu ra listic in terp re ta tion o f the g ro u p life o f peoples.

'Cf. Sibley, M. Q.. Political Ideas and Ideologies; A History o f Political n o u g h t, New York, Harper and Row, 1970. Also McDonald, L. C., Western Political Theory: The M odem Age, New York, Harcoun, Brace, 1962. 175


A. Divine and Human PhilosophyT h e philosophies underly ing political theories o f m o d ern tim es m ay be

conven ien tly d ivided inicTiwo d iv isions. T fiefirs t is p rim arily religious an d is directly traced back to th e clerics w ho d om inated the cu ltu ra l an d

IrTteTTedual d o m am T o rW este rn C ivilization a n d to a great ex ten t still d o . h 'ro m a p o llfic a l s tan d p o in t we observe th eco m p e titio n o f the great church system s d o m in a tin g an d th en com peting w ith the secu lar g ro u p system s. A n excellent sym bol o f the religious influence is the d iv ine rights o f kings an d em perors.

B. Philosophy o f Social CompactsP h ilo sophers o f th e seventeenth cen tu ry an d beyond assum ed th a t a

satisfactory correc tion to the divine rights view w as the no tio n o f a com pactbetw een individuals to jo in to g e th er fo r ce rta in specific ends. W e considerth ree versions o f th e com pact ph ilo so p h y .

, , , , , , . , ^«nk*re . . . . . .a. Hobbes and Leviathan. C o n so n an t w ith th e general p rocedure o f

f ph ilosophers to choose som e p a rticu la r aspect o f politics and inflate it to a general principle, H obbes (1588-1679) characterized th e en tire process o f po litical re la tionsh ip an d activities as th e selfish an d ab so lu te behav io r o f leaders o r governors o f all-inclusive g roups? ~

W hen we inquire in to th e ph ilosophical back g ro u n d o f H obbes’ variation o f th e social com pact view we find a n ex trem e abso lu tism . This ex trem ity how ever, represents a n a tte m p t by H obbes to leave behind m uch o f th e m edieval th in k in g w hich has ch a rac te rized p h ilo sophy even in to the seven teen th cen tu ry an d beyond . H o b b es m u s t be cred ited w ith a definite scientific in terest arising perh ap s fro m co n tac t w ith such scientists as G alileo, an d disciples o f D escartes as M ersenne, an d o thers d u rin g his travels to th e continen t. His th in k in g takes o n a d erided m echanical an d geom etric form . D eterm inism , pow er, an d m o tio n are p ro m in en t item s in his vocabulary.

F o r H obbes th e com p ac t p rinc ip le is s ta ted as a co n trac t o r covenan t m ad e by individuals w ho willingly a n d m u tually tran sfe r th e ir abso lu te righ ts fo r th e benefits o f h a rm o n y a n d safety.3 A n in teresting fea tu re oi H obbes’ ph ilosophy o f politics is h is b e lief th a t co venan ts a re reflections ol n a tu ra l laws;fhe subscribes to the view th a t all the m em bers o f a co m m onw ealth “confer all th e ir pow er an d streng th u p o n one m an" a lev iathan whc

J Hobbes, T., Leviathan (E. Rhys, ed.), New York, Dutton, (1651), 1950.1 Hobbes, T., Leviathan, ch. 14. 176


will p ro tec t them from all hazardsTjThe lev iathan becom es the abso lu te sovereign o f th e en tire co m m o n w ea lth .4 Sufficient here is th e co m p ariso n o f H obbesian philosophy o f politics with h u m an assoc ia tions as they ac tua lly exist. Is it reasonab le to reg ard h u m an beings as u tterly and inevitably savages living in an im ag inary s ta te o f b ru ta l natu re ; everyone endow ed w ith w arlike d ispositions to destroy the o thers? S o it seems m anifest to H obbes th a t w ithou t a com pact to create a leviathan with co m m o n pow er to keep everyone in aw e, w ar w ould exist w ith o u t a r ts and industry w ith the lack o f society in w hich the life o f m an is so litary , poo r, nasty, b ru tish , and sh o rt.5

b. Locke and his Compact. H istorians o f ph ilosophy credit L ocke with the estab lishm ent o f an em piristic ph ilosophy as o p posed to th a t o f the ra tionalism o f such figures as D escartes, an d Leibniz. A lthough Locke is also influenced by th e advancem ent m ade by scientists, he deviates from the form alistic an d m echanical n o tions o f his English predecessors!] Locke

£ em phasizes psychological o r subjectivistic fac to rs in the fo rm of sensations £ and thus gets aw ay from the form alistic an d m echanical no tions o f H obbes

and o thers w ho th in k a lo n g H obbes’ m echan ical m odel. In general. L ocke ap p ro ach es a m ore n atu ra listic fo rm o f psychology th an is tru e o f H obbes. H e treads th e w ay o f ideas, p u ttin g a g rea t deal o f em phasis u p o n the processes o f know ledge as over against a m ind alread y stocked w ith

✓ principles.Locke, how ever, n o less th an H obbes accepts the no tio n o f a com p ac t or

co n trac t as a fac to r in th e origin and estab lishm ent o f n a tio n s o r states. But, o f course, w ith different em phases. L ocke takes a m ore genteel a ttitu d e tow ard h u m an associations. H e does no t look u p o n g overnm en ts as escapes from b ru ta l an d dang ero u s situations. Social life fo r him does not requ ire an ab so lu te ru ler bu t stresses th e consen t o f the governed . Locke, too , relies on th e functions o f an elected parliam en t to guide the political system in the w ay it should proceed.

c. Rousseau and the Social Contract. T h e social co n trac t o f R ousseau is very m uch m ore like the com p ac t view o f L ocke th an th e m echanical com pact o f H obbes. [R ousseau lived in an age w hen particu la r h u m an beings w ere acco rded a larger p lace in a bo d y politic. T h e age o f R ousseau is the age o f revo lu tion , a tim e w hen persons carried g rea te r w eight th an in tim es o f kingly co n tro l an d d o m in a tio n . A ccordingly , his idea o f the social con trac t is p u t in to the fo rm o f a genuine coopera tive assoc ia tion w hich he

‘ /bid., p. 89. i Ibid., pp. 64-65.

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referred to as the G eneral W ilTjln m any wavs R ousseau’s version o f the co m p ac t idea represents an evo lu tio n o f the freedom o f persons as over ag a in st th e ir rulers and contro llers. O f course the type o f psychology th a t influences R ousseau ’s th ink ing is fa r from naturalistic . But his political ph ilosophy is m ore flexible and articu la tes b e tter with the actual b ehav io r o f individuals th an is the case o f the o th er tw o versions o f the co m p art idea.

T h e significance o f R ousseau’s G eneral Will is th a t while each person w ithdraw s from the full possession o f his liberty and transfers som e o f his sovereign rights to the group, he still does no t sacrifice all o f his rights bu t rem ains in con tro l as a partic ipant in the G eneral Will.6

R ousseau regards the social co n trac t as a m ethod o f associating w hich will defend an d protect, w ith all the collective m ight,Ihe person and property of each associate, and in virtue of which each associate, though he

7 becomes a member of the group, nevertheless obeys only himself, and remains as free as‘ before.7

C. Philosophy of Political UtilityT he philosophyzing o f D avid H um e m ay well be regarded as an ep itom e

o f conven tiona l philosophy in general. L ike all ph ilosophers H um e is addicted to the rigidity of absolutistic and universalistic principles. H ow ever, the analysis o f H um e's w orks indicates th a t he is. opposed to the rationalistic tendency prevalent in the n h ilosophvzine o f m ost th in k ers. H um ian philosophy in consequence clearly show s a decided m o dera tion o f h istorical ph ilosophy w hich appears as co n trad ic tio n b u t is ac tually 'indeterm ination . This indeterm ination show s itself clearly an d rather em p h atically in H um e’s philosophy o f politics. Before tu rn in g to his political theories it is well to consider his philosophical views as usually presented .

jjC H um e is generally considered to be a n cm piristic ph ilosopher, w ho stands in line o f succession from Locke an d Berkeley. Indeed he is engrossed in the em phasis o f sensations and association o f m entalities ra th e r th an reason bu t by differentiating betw een w hat is sufficient fo r the conduc t o f life ra ther than the reflections o f ph ilosophy, he leaves room for m uch am biguity and uncertainty. T hus he deem s it sufficient to explain the natu re and causes o f im pressions and ideas instead o f the real natu re o f things presented to the senses.1'

' R o u s s e a u . .1 I . Vw St mu / Cnntrutt ( W K e n d a l l . I r v ) . C h ic a g o . R e g n e r y , 1 9 5 4 , p . 4 2 .

Hud-, p IK.' H u m e . ! > . . / ! Ircultwnf Human XuiurtdI . . A . S e lb y - H ig g e .e d . ) . O x f o r d . C la r e n d o n . 1X96. h k I .

set 5

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A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C SH ow H um e’s indeterm inistic philosophy w orks o u t in practice is a ttested

by his den ial o f the existence o f a unified personality o r ego. He takes the s tan d th a t w hat has passed fo r a unified soul o r ego is n o th in g m o re th a n a series o f perceptions, yet his w ritings are replete w ith references to m indT an d how they opera te in know ledge an d feeling. A gain, th o u g h H um e’s m ind is th o u g h t to be free o f innate ideas, the presence o f propensities affords th em considerable substantiality .

H um e’s political ph ilosophy exemplifies a definite indeterm inism . H um e is opposed to the d ivine o rig in o f ru lers b u t h a rb o rs n o tio n s o f necessity w hich suggest abso lu tism an d universalism . S till w ith respect to the origin o f governm en t H um e ad o p ts a principle o f u tility . T h a t persons can live together in peace an d o rd e r they m ust enjoy th e benefits derived from governm ent. O nly governm en t can p ro v id e the great necessity o f justice. But, to assu re th a t justice will prevail rulers in the guise o f m agistrates, princes, kings, are required . T h e existence o f governm ents d em o n stra te s the benefits to be derived from the existence o f rulers. H e w rites th a t,Nothing appears more surprising lo those who consider human affairs with a philosophical eye than the easiness with which the many are governed by the few and the implicit submission with which men resign their own sentiments and passions to those of their rulers.9

W hen th e question is raised as to the quality o f governm ent, H um e’s an sw er is utility. In th e light o f his ph ilosophy u tility is reduced to op in ion .

| H e holds th a t only u p o n op in ion is governm ent founded . In general he l believes th a t there a re th ree form s o f op in ion . T hey are pub lic in terests, the

righ t to pow er, an d th e right to p ro p e rty . S ince F o rce is a lw ays o n th e side o f th e governed, the governors have no th ing to su p p o rt them selves but op in ion .

H o w H u m e sw ings from necessity o r universality to specificity is well indicated in the follow ing q u o ta tio n concern ing the values o f various system s o f governm ent.

It is a question with several, whether there be any essential difference between one form of government and another? and, whether every form may not become good or bad, according as it is well or ill administered? 10 Were it once admitted, that all governments are

’ Hume, D., “Of the First Principles of Government,” Essay 4 in The Philosophical Works. 4 vols., Edinburgh, Black-Tail, 1826, vol. 3, p. 31.

10 He quotes Pope:For forms of government let fools contest Whate’er is best administered is best

Essay on Man. bk. 3 quotedin Hume, D.,"That Politics may be reduced toa ScienceEssay 3 in The Philosophical Works. 4 vols., Edinburgh, Black-Tait, 1826, vol. 3, p. 14.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Ealike, and that the only difference consists in the character and conduct of the governors, most political disputes would beat an end, and all Z ea l for one constitution above another must be esteemed mere bigotry and folly. But. though a friend to moderation, I cannot forbear condemning this sentiment, and should be sorry to think, that human affairs admit of no greater stability, than what they receive from the casual humours and characters of particular men. 11

[j\.n o u ts tan d in g feature o f H um e’s political theories is his com plete and final objection to and criticism o f the th eo ry o f com pacts^H e advances a n u m b er o f arg u m en ts against the co m p ac t idea o f orig in o f governm ents. A lthough H um e o f course was not co n v e rsan t w ith m odern an th ro p o lo g ical views w hich w ould ipso facto rule ou t any such no tion as com pacts, he advances reasonab le objections. F o r exam ple , he assum es th a t w hen governm ents were form ed the prim itiv itv o f the h u m an pop u la tio n a t th a t tim e m ade it u n reasonab le to su p pose th a t they cou ld form co m p ac ts . Also he relies on the fact th a t neither he n o r an y b o d y else could cite a case o f a governm ent being form ed on the basis o f the consen t o f the people form ing the n ation o r state. In general H um e th inks th a t no th ing is a clearer p ro o f

\ tha t the social con trac t theory is e rro n eo u s th an th a t it leads to “paradoxes repugnan t to the com m on sentim ents o f m an k in d , and to the practice and opin ion o f all nations and all ages."12

I). Religious Philosophy and Political Revolutiona. Hegel: Absolute and Universal Spirit. T h e ph ilosophy o f politics

takes on a very unique aspect in the idealistic ro m an tic period o f G erm an speculation . T h ro u g h the efforts o f K arl M arx with F riedrich Engel’s co llab o ra tio n a special type o f political system cam e in to being. W hat is especially novel ab o u t M arxian politics is th a t it was founded no t in co n fo rm ity with a certain ph ilosophical system b u t bv inverting one and se tting it on its head , as M arx said. W hile M arx grew up and ab so rbed H egelian spiritism he later partia lly rejected it in his political an d econom ical thinking.

r- T h e philosophy o f Hegel represen ts an e lab o ra tio n an d a fulfillment o f the P o st-G reco -R o m an religious w ay o f th ink ing . C onversely to w hat Hegel h im self w ould agree to , he do es aw ay com pletely w ith the natu ra l w orld o f th ings and conditions. He w ould say th a t he glorifies the external

, w orld by p u tting it squarely in to consciousness, a n o th e r nam e fo r spirit. I Specifically, he invented a com plete to ta lita rian system in w hich the cu-

" Hume. I).. - 1 hat Polities may be reduced to a Science." p. 14.' Hume. I) . “Of the Original Contract," Essay 12 in The Philosophical Works, 4 vols. Edinburgh.

Illack-1 ail. IK2h. vol V p 5.11 I

180

A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C S; m ulative co n tin u u m o f th ings and events is tran sfo rm ed in to abso lu te

spirit. T o a certa in ex ten t the abso lu te spirit o f Hegel is an om niscient and om nip o ten t G od w ho con tains w ithin him self everything tha t is, becom es, o r could be.

Needless to say th e en tire p hilosophy o f Hegel is o n e stream o f w ords w ithou t an y p ro p e r associa tion w ith n a tu ra l th ings an d n a tu ra l p rocesses.As is well know n Hegel invented a dialectical system m odeled analogically to history. Every th ing, person , or con d itio n represen ts an un fo ld ing o f sp irit fro m a n indefinite s ta te to any th ing th a t one m igh t k n o w ab o u t. Basically th e H egelian abso lu te is a n au tis tic c rea tio n w hich bears no resem blance to every th ing th a t exists, o r o rgan ism s d o o r re fra in from doing . It is no t incorrect to th ink o f it as a cancerous epistem ological g row th th a t can only a rb itra rily an d verbally be related to the ac tu a l w orld and the events th a t occur w ith in it.

A selected passage from the Phenomenology o f Mind illustra tes well the style an d th e con ten t o f Hegel’s system o f th e A bsolute.

. . . I is merely universal, like Now, Here, or This in general. No doubt I “mean" an individual I, but just as little as I am able to say what I “mean" by Now, Here, so it is impossible in the case of the 1 too. By saying “this Here," “this Now," “a n individual thing,” I say all Thises, Heres, Nows, or Individuals. In the same way when I say “1,"“this individual I," I say quite generally “all Ps," every one is what I say, every one is “I," this individual 1 . When philosophy is requested, by way of putting it to a crucial test—a test which it could not possibly sustain—to “deduce," to “construe," “to find a priori," or however it is put, a so-called th is th ing , or th is p a rticu la r m a n , it is quite fair to ask that this demand should say w h a t “this thing," or w h a t “this 1" it means: but to say this is quite impossible. 13

I T h e ph ilosophy o f Hegel m ay p roperly be considered as a m ode o f / egoistic o r p a ran o iac inflation o f th e o rd in a ry aw areness behavior. T o .

know a th in g is fo r h im to be th a t th ing . F o r being is th o u g h t14 in th e wav th a t G od is u ltim ateT ie ing .15 A typical H egelian s ta tem en t m irro rs this inflation.

With self-consciousness, then, we have now passed into the native land of truth, into that kingdom where it isat home. We have to see how the form or attitude of self-consciousness in the first instance appears. When we consider this new form and type of knowledge, the knowledge of self, in its relation to that which preceded, namely, ihe knowledge of an other, we find, indeed, that this latter has vanished, but that its moments have, at the same time, been preserved; and the loss consists in this, that those moments are here present as they are implicitly, as they are in themselves. The being which “meaning" dealt with, particularity and the universality of perception opposed to it, as also the empty, inner region of

IJ Hegel, G. W. F., The Phenomenology o f Mind{ J. B. Baillie. trs.), London. Sonnenschein, 1910, p. 96.

'•Ibid., p. 53.» lb id „ p. 61.

181

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Eunderstanding—these are no longer present as substantial elements ( W esen), but as moments of self-consciousness, i.e. as abstractions or differences, which are, at the same time, of no account for consciousness itself, or are not differences at alt, and are purely vanishing entities ( H/esen ).“‘

b. Marxism and Economic Determinism. A study o f the political w ritings o f K arl M arx stim ulates th e w o n d er th a t a m an o f his intellectual pow er, an d concern fo r the welfare o f people o f all classes w ould be taken in by such nonsense as Hegel p erp e tra ted . Y et th e record show s th a t as a y o u n g s tu d en t K arl M arx , like so m an y o th e r s tuden ts o f his day , was fascinated by the religious ph ilosophy o f Hegel. H ow ever, M arx d eterm ined th a t the best he cou ld d o w ith H egelian ph ilosophy w ould be to tu rn it o n its head. A nd so, tho u g h M arx never cou ld rid him self com pletely o f his early spiritistic teachings, he becam e w hat the h isto ry books call a m a teria lis t. In th e course o f tim e he developed an an tip o d a l type o f ph ilosophy w hich he em ployed as a fo u n d a tio n fo r his w ork in econom ics an d in politics. H is a ttitu d e tow ard th e ph ilo sophy o f his day an d o f the days past is well ind icated by his co m m en t pub lished in F ried rich Engel’s b o o k on L udw ig F euerbach . A t the end o f th a t b o o k K arl M arx published a series o f theses o n F euerbach . As n u m b er eleven, th e last o f th e series, he said,The philosophers have only in te rp re te d the world in various ways; the point however is to ch an ge U P

T h e basic significance o f M arx ’s a ttitu d e is th a t o f a re tu rn to actual events such as an econom ist and a rebel ag a in st im p ro p rie ty an d injustice can deal with.

T here is good evidence ex tan t in the w ritings o f K arl M arx and F riedrich Engels th a t th e ir political ph ilosophy is a negative one. S o im pressed are they with the adverse conditions o f th e p ro le ta ria t in historical developm ents an d in th e cu rren t cond itions o f th e ir d ay th a t they seem to have developed a decided negative a ttitu d e to w ard the state. O ne o f the o u ts tand ing bits o f evidence is the ir doctrine o f th e w ithering aw ay o f th e state.

By increasingly transforming the great majority of the population into proletarians, the capitalist mode of production creates the force which, under penalty of its own destruction, is compelled to accomplish this revolution. By increasingly driving towards the transformation of the vast socialized means of production into state property, it itself points the way to the accomplishment of this revolution. The p ro le ta r ia t se ize s s ta te p o w e r a n d to beg in w ith tra n sfo rm s th e m ea n s o f p ro d u c tio n in to s ta te p ro p e r ty . But it thus puts an end to itself as

'* Ibid.. p. 165.’’Marx, K„ “Theses on Feuerbach," in Marx, K.. and Engels, F., Feuerbach: Opposition o f the

Materialist anil Idealist Outlooks. London. Lawrence and Wishart, 1973, no. XI, p. 95.

182

A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C Sproletariat, it thus puts an end to all class differences and class antagonisms and thus also to the state as state. . . . The first act in which the state really comes forward as the representative of the whole of society — the taking possession of the means of production in

~the name of society — is at the same time its last independent an as a state. The interference of the state power in social relations becomes superfluous in one sphere after another, and then dies away of itself. The government of persons is replaced by the administration of

1/ things and the direction of the processes of production. The state is not ‘'abolished," it w ith ers a w a y .18

In connection with M arx’s attitude toward the Hegelian religion or Absolute it is well to note how utterly opposed he was to the Hegelian religion or any type of religion. Writers of all sorts_QUQte hiS-Comment that religion is the opium of the people. T o religion Marx attributes many of the evils which are suffered by people in general and especially the so-called lower or economic classes. Not the least of the evils consist of the poverty of the working people and the oppression of persons at the hands of the rulers of political systems.

W h at M arx retains o f the H egelian system is the em phasis o f change in p olitical o r o th e r h u m an affairs. T o this m ay be ad d ed tw o o th e r ten d en cies. O ne is th e no tio n o f hom ogeneity o f h u m an events so tha t societal an d political circum stances are all assim ilated to the all-pervading consciousness. T he o th e r is th a t w hile the resem blance o f M arx ’s views to H egel’s ph ilosophy m ay a p p e a r as only a reflection an d no t an ac tuality , no d o u b t exists a b o u t th e b o rrow ing from Hegel o f th e principle o f conflict. It is qu ite likely th a t M arx ’s stress o f class o r social conflict is a ca rry -over from Hegelism ra th e r th a n from the observation o f th e co n trasts and struggles o f

^ the bourgeois and the p ro letarians.T h e o u ts tan d in g fea tu re o f M arx ’s political p h ilo sophy is its decided

econom ic aspect. T h is no tio n ad u m b ra tes M arx ’s dualism o f society an d the state. Politics fo r M arx perta ins to society w hich is so different from the sta te , so th a t the la tte r m ay be expected to w ither aw ay a lo n g w ith the capitalistic fo rm o f its econom ic organization .

M arx d ifferen tiates betw een the sta te w hich com prises m ain ly th e governm en ta l ap p a ra tu s a n d th e com m unity o r society w hich has to d o m ainly w ith the con cre te affairs o f h u m an o r social living. T h e la tter fo r M arx is co n cen tra ted on m ak in g a living by m eans o f p roductive p rocesses.M acx!s separa tio n o f state and society reveals a royal road to thp d ivision betw een sp iritistic p h ilo sophy an d th e practicality o f o rd in a ry ex istence an d surviv-_ . al. As in all h u m an situ a tio n s the concern w ith concre te events im plies a

' ‘Engels, F., Socialism: Utopian and Scientific. Peking, Foreign Language Press, 1975, pp. 93.94.

183

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V EN ame N ationality P ublications19 Basic P rin ciple

P. V. Proudhon (1809-1865)

French W hat is P roperly? Property is Theft

W. Godwin (1756-1836)

English E nqu iry concern ing P olitica l Justice

Continual seeker after personal freedom.

G. Sorel (1847-1922)

French Illusions d u pro g res; R eflex ion s su r la violence; M a teria u x p o u r une theorie d u p ro le ta r ia t

Propagator of effective violence

M. A. Bakunin (1814-1876)

Russian The P o litica l P h ilo soph y o f Bakunin: Scien tific A n arch ism : S ta tism a n d A n a rch y

Perennial Rebel against established Authority.

M. Stimer (1806-1856)

German The E go a n d H is O w n Supreme Anti-social Egoist.

J. Most (1846-1906)

German Scien ce o fR evo lu tio n a ry W arfare

Preacher of political rebellion and revolution.

P. Kropotkin Russian K ro p o tk in 's R e vo lu tio n a ry P am ph lets: A C ollec tion o f W ritings; Ethics. O rig in a n d D eve lo p m en t; M u tu a l A id . A F actor o f E vo lu tion

Individual liberty through mutual and sympathetic support.

A. Blanqui (1805-1881)

French l a C ritiqu e S o c ia l IndividualisticRevolutionary

E. Goldman (1869-1940)

Russo-American M y D isillu sion m en t in Russia; L iving M y L ife

Social Improvement by Violent Action

Chan I. Samples of Persons Listed as Anarchists

''•Proudhon, P. .1. M-'Anl n Pru/tern 'A n enquiry mm the Principle o f Right ant! Government (B. R. lucker, trs). New York. II. Fertig, IWi.

(iodwin. W . I.itquin m ntvrnini1‘olilital Justice am! its Influence on General i'irtue and llup/nnew (K. A. Preston, cd). 2 vols„ New York. Knopf, 1926.

Sorel. <i . Illusions duprugres. 2nd ed.. Paris, Marcel Riviere, 1911...................Ktflexiuns stir la violence. Paris. Marcel Riviere, 1972.

_____ . Mulenaux pour one tliruric do proletariat. Ird ed., Paris. Marcel Riviere. 1929.

184

A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C Slicense to speak a n d speculate a b o u t “ex p lan a tio n s” an d “a ttrib u tio n s” o f fabu lous an d im aginary principles a n d causes.

E. Materialistic Philosophy and Anarchical Societya. Statism vs. Freedom. A lthough persons are invariab ly an d indef

initely un its in political system s they are perennially irked by th e co n stra in ts involved in political an d o th e r g ro u p m em bersh ip . W h a t persons find u n sa tisfac to ry is th e a p p a ren t loss o f freedom , p lus th e lim itations b y . a u th o rity a n d the law s. It is the d isharm ony betw een the ind iv idual w ith his necessities an d his desires, plus th e p ro h ib itio n s o f th e various g ro u p ^ institu tions m ak ing up the state, th a t engenders the political doctrines and < an tis ta te practices o f anarchists.

A narch is ts are alw ays m inorities b u t th e w idespread an a rch ic o r an ti- s ta te beliefs are ind iv idualistic an d v arious. S o m e o f th e an a rch is ts a rc active an d p ro m o te d istrubances, rebellions, an d general violence th o u g h o thers a re passive believers an d go n o fa rth e r th a n an tis ta te and personalistic g rum bling . In th e accom pany ing ch a rt we ind ica te a sam pling o f persons w ho ado p ted the ro le o f anarch ist in one fo rm o r other.

A s we have ind icated above, the te rm a narch is t refers o n ly to the a l t i tu d e— o fflissatisfac tion a n d rebellion aga inst som eth ing identified w ith a political •system o r som e fea tu re .o f it as a ho ld ing g ro u p . In d iv id u a l an a rch is ts are u n h ap p y a 6 o u t general oppression, ex p lo ita tions, o r ind iv idual restra in ts o f a n econom ic , dom estic na tu re , tax a tio n , o r co m b in a tio n s o f such lacks o f spon taneity and freedom .

Bakunin, M.A., The Political Philosophy o f Bakunin: Scientific Anarchism (G. P. MaximofT, ed.), Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1953.

______________, Sialism and Anarchy (C. H. Plummer, trs., J. F. Harrison, ed.). New York, Revisionist Press, 1976.

_______________ The Confession o f Mikhail Bakunin (R. C. Howes, trs.). Ithaca, New York, CornellUniv. Press, 1977.

Stimer, M., The Ego and His Own (S. T. Byington, trs.). New York, Benj. R. Tucker. 1907.Most, J., Memoiren. erlebtes, erforschtes und erdachtes, New York, Selbstverlag des Vcrfassers,

1903.Kropotkin, P. A., Kropotkin’s Revolutionary Pamphlets: A Collection o f Writings (R. N. Baldwin,

ed.). New York, Dover, 1970.---------------------- Ethics. Origin and Development (L. S. Friedlartd and J. R. Piroshnikoff. trs.). New

York, Dial Press, 1924._____________ _ Mutual Aid. A Factor o f Evolution (P. Avrich, ed.). London. Penguin Press. 1972.Blanqui, A., Critique sociale, Paris, F. Alcan, 1885.Goldman, E„ My Disillusionment in Russia. Garden City, New York, Doubleday. Page. 1923.---------------------- Living My Life. New York, Knopf, 1931.185


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IC4

INDIVIDUALS VERSUS PO LITICA L SYSTEM S

N o person can exist ou tside the po litica l h ierarch ies yet none can be entirely h appy w ith in them . Political system s com prise in ad d itio n to the g ran d p eriphera l sta te the m any v arious g ro u p s o f o th e r persons do w n to o th e r single persons o f a fam ily, club o r any o th e r vo lun tary association. T h e po ten tia lity fo r d issatisfaction w ith th e ac tions o f o thers is greatly increased w ith the com plexity o f social an d political o rganizations o f the h ierarch ica l m em bers. It is such d isharm on ies th a t lie a t the basis o f the m axim , de gusiibus non est disputandum.

W h at is o f special im portance here a re th e sec tarian ism s o f every sizable p o p u la tio n . S uch segregations occur w ith respect to religion, education , a n d social classes o f every descrip tion . E very m acropo lis becom es the ho m e o f n u m ero u s m icropolises. A fine illu stra tion o f th e developm ent o f m an y su b g ro u p s is availab le in the w ritings o f H e rb ert S pencer u n d er the general title o f Man versts the S ta ie .;olw h a tev e r m av be th e cond itions for theTorm alion-O Lspecific political institu tions it ap p ears inevitable th a t no t a l lo f th e m em bersh ip is e q ually satishe'dlvitlf th F leadership^and.the_res]jJtS-- o f th e ir governm ental contro ls. F o r one th ing, sta tes alw ays signify various restric tions oRThTfreedom o f th e individual. P e rh ap s it is inevitable tha t o rgan iza tions should have to set up rules o f con d u c t and p ro m o te various so rts o f in stitu tio n s such as tax a tio n , w hich m ay n o t be to the entire satisfaction o f certain individuals!]

T h e la tter p a rt o f the tw entieth cen tu ry is w itness to the num erosity and pow er o f m icropolitical g roups. Since th e second W orld W a r there has been a steady grow th o f nationalistic developm ent w ith num erous splin ter g roups p laying large parts in th e process. T h e m ost spectacu lar o f such subgro u p s have been an d still are th e guerillas w ith the ir terro rism and tu rm oil. K ings and ru lers not on ly lie uneasy b u t regicide, violence, strikes, and general m urder, m ark the new style in g ro u p living an d in in ternational relations.

SPECIFIC POLITICAL PROBLEM S

T h e versatility and con tro l analysis o f ph ilosophy is n o t lim ited to the overall ph ilo sophy o f states o r o th e r m a jo r political un its, b u t ex tends also to th e details o f h u m an association. T h u s im p o rtan t p rob lem s exist w ith reference to th e descrip tion and in te rp re ta tio n o f such features o f gregar-

Spencer, H., The Man t'enus the State (T. Beale, ed.). New York. Kennerly, 1916.

186

A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C Sious living as sovereignty, au th o rity , freedom , justice , an d equality . In the follow ing p a rag ra p h s we consider briefly som e o f these societal items.

a. Slavery. A s a ru le, w riters o n the subject o f slavery lim it them selves to the m ost o b n o x io u s experiences o f g rea t and sm all states, o r o th e r political com m unitie s by re ferring to co m p u lso ry la b o r an d th e enslavem ent o f m em bers o f po litica l un its.[It is the b lam e-w orthy h is to ry o f m any highly refined g ro u p s th a t they relied to a g rea t ex ten t u p o n slave lab o r, u p o n slaves variously derived , fo r exam ple , fro m co n d e m n a tio n by co u rts o r by s tea lth an d im p o rta tio n o f ind iv iduals fro m m o re o r less b ack w ard co m m u n i t i e s ^ is hard ly necessary to rem ind the read er th a t g roups asp iring to the m ost ad v an ced ideals o f th e b ro th e rh o o d o f m an have to le ra ted the enslavem ent o f people tak en by force from th e ir h o m e com m unities and sold fo r co m m o n gain as th o u g h they w ere th ings o r co m m odities o f som e sort.

H ow ever, slavery o f th e k ind m entioned is only the m ost strik ing o f the d o m in a tio n re la tion . T h ere a re m an y o th e r fo rm s o f ow nersh ip and c o n tro l o f p erso n s by o th e r persons, o r by reg u la to ry in stitu tions. Law s an d custo m s serve effectively to force o r inh ib it th e b eh a v io r o f persons. O bvious exam ples o f political slavery are the tax in g procedures? ' a n d the legal co n tro ls w ith respect to housing , food an d d ru g use, m arriage, ab o rtio n , an d m an y o th e r facto rs. A t once it m ay be ad d ed th a t h u m an bondage m ay be beneficial as well as harm ful to the persons located a t the various stages o f th e general political h ierarchy . T h e benefits o f b ondage a re n o d o u b t ow ing to such lack o f cu ltu re an d know ledge in the illiterate and ill-th ink ing p o p u la tio n th a t the states, governm ents, o r local agencies m ust serve as guard ians.

b. Sovereignty. T h e p rob lem o f sovereignty like all the o th er p rob lem s in th is series has a long h isto ry w ith a great varie ty o f in te rp re ta tio n s. P robab ly th e earliest in te rp re ta tio n o f sovereignty was religious in nature . U nder th e feudal w ay o f th ink ing , kings an d o th e r rulers were sovereign abso lu tely because o f th e assignm ent o f the deity. S ince th a t tim e sovereign ty has becom e m ore an d m o re a m a tte r o f con cre te social c ircu m stan ces. B ut even in the m ost recent tim es there is som e so rt o f m etaphysical assum ption underly ing th e ph ilosophy o f sovereignty.. /F r o m the s tan d p o in t o f in terbehav io ral ph ilosophy sovereignty is

sim ply a m a tte r o f p o w er based o n econom ic , dom estic, o r som e o ther social c ircum stance. T o d ay we are becom ing ex trem ely fam iliar w ith the

Jl The power lo tax is the power to destroy.

187

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Eten ta tive an d transitive sovereign pow er o f ru lers w hether kings o r em perors. W e are w itnesses o f the ru th less m ak ing an d un m ak in g o f presidents even in governm ents tha t a re presum ed to be dem ocratic in s tructu re an d function . C ou p s are everyday occurrences and in som e cases it is oppressed m asses o f people w ho decide an d effect the destru c tio n o f the sovereignty o f rulers o f p articu la r parties and political tendencies.

^ T he sovereignty prob lem obviously includes the pow er no t only o f ind iv iduals an d th e ir en tourages bu t o f states, nations, an d governm ents. W hat is to be stressed is th a t in the case o f political entities o r in th a t o f individuals sovereignty concerns pow er wielded against m em bers o f the g ro u p o r un it o r o th er state units. A pertinen t question concerns the source o f a challenging pow er. Is it localized in a single person o r in a sm all o r large g ro u p such as an arm y u n it, o r in a self-nam ed te rro ris t g roup w ith political goals, m onetary advantages, o r o th er specific dem ands? In general, sovereignty m ay prove to be a nebulous item.

c. Authority. Every governm ental system includes personalities w ho fu nc tion in the o rganization an d co n tin u a tio n o f the group . It is such m anagers w ho presum ably provide fo r the safety o f the g roup as well as ca rry ing the responsibility fo r the p ro p e r o p era tio n o f the different dep artm en ts o f governm ent.

A u th o rity is a t bo ttom the pow er fo r the o pera tion an d con tro l o f the existence an d behav io r o f a political in stitu tion . A n analysis o f the political unit reveals m any loci o f this pow er as well as the specific form s it takes on. U sually th is au th o rity is believed to reside in an individual w ho occupies the suprem e position as king, em peror, o r president. A m ore critical analysis, how ever, indicates p lainly th a t it is m ost likely to be d istribu ted am o n g a n u m b er o f persons. Russell22 cites the case o f the period o f Kaiser W ilhelm II, w hen B aron H olstein the p erm anen t head o f the G erm an F oreign Office exercised im m ense power.

P articu la r types o f au thority depend upon the specific characteristics o f the society o r state. A u tho rity m ay be placed in a p a rticu la r person an d his follow ers w hich eventuates in a d ic ta to rsh ip o f a sh o rt o r lasting period. In so-called d em ocratic states o r societies a u th o rity is p laced in a set o f persons called representatives, legislature, o r congress elected in som e fash ion an d em pow ered to m ake laws an d regula tions fo r the co n d u c t o f ind iv iduals an d institutions. Such au th o rity m ay be la ter abused w ith m arked difficulties for the governm ent w hich au th o rity is presum ed to

"Russell. H.. I'tnwr: A new Stniul Anatv\i\. New York, Norton. I9.1K, p. 4X.

188

A S P E C T S O F P O L I T I C Sdirect. S hakespeare has described such an ind iv idual in the follow ing term s,

But man, proud man,Drest in a little brief authority.Most ignorant of what he’s most assur’d,—His glassy essence,— like an angry ape.Plays such fantastic tricks before high Heaven,As make the angels weep.33

d. Justice. N o prob lem o f political life b e tte r d em o n stra te s the failings o f ab strac tio n a l th ink ing in philosophy th an the m atte r o f justice. T h ro u g h o u t the h isto ry o f ph ilosophy th in k ers o f m any persuasions have sough t to discover th e n a tu re o f justice as th o u g h it were som e single type ot

-essence o r existence. T h e p a tte rn o f this m o d e o f th ink ing is excellently T epresen tecfin tfie~first b o o k o f P la to ’s R epub lic . T h e questio n , W hat is justice? receives m any answ ers; it is paying debts, speaking the tru th , usefulness, in terest o f the s tronger,24 excellence o f the person , fairness.25 E ach period o f ph ilosophical reflection has its ow n definition w hether of justice o r an y o ther construct a b o u t politics.26

P ro b a b ly th e only singularized d escrip tion one can give o f justice is th a t j it is a personalized re la tion , an event involv ing th e sa tisfac to ry b eh av io r o r condition o f individuals w hen in teracting w ith o th er individuals o r with social institu tions o f various sorts. ------ '

W hile observing ju s t events o r reflecting u p o n them it is advisab le to d ifferen tiate betw een the great variety o f s itu a tio n s w hich are classed as justice . A t once one considers the p ro p er trea tm en t o f ind iv iduals fro m the s ta n d p o in t o f th e sta te com plex bu t there a re m any c ircum stances w ith in the g rea t com plex w hich m ust be separated an d ta k e n acco u n t of. Basically we have here the p rob lem o f abstrac tion ism versus concrete events o r situ a tio n s in w hich persons are involved u p o n vario u s levels. It m ight be a d o m estic p rob lem o r o n e involving tax a tio n o r still m ore a p rob lem o f ju stify in g som e ac tion such as self-defense w hen a ttack ed . O f one th in g we m ay be ce rta in an d th a t is d o in g ju stice to ju s tic e d em an d s the critical analysis o f innum erab le specific events and n o t be m isled by the use o f a

, w ord.e. Freedom. Very often political and religious freedom s are prom ised in

the co n stitu tio n o f a p a rticu la r state o r n a tio n . F o r th e m ost p a r t the

33 Shakespeare. W„ Measure for Measure, act ii. Sc. 2.“ Thrasymachus, in Plato, Republic, bk. I.“ Rawls, J., A Theory o f Justice, Cambridge, Mass.. Belknap Press, 1971.“ Cf. forexample. Barker, S.. The Principles o f Social ami Political Theory. London. Oxford Univ.

Press, 1961, p. 13.

189

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E\rV

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K■x

rhe to ric o f co n stitu tio n s w hether o r no t it ac tually reduces restra in ts im posed on persons, refers to freedom g ran ted by th e agencies o f a governm ent. A ccordingly, the te rm “freedom ” is a universal abstrac tion rem ote from actual societal s itu a t io n s ^ V h e n we concern ourselves w ith sperificcircum stances it is~Im possible fo r a n tn d ividual to b e politically ffeeT^' A m ong the m ost com pelling exam ples are~tfie im possibility fo r a n individual no t to conform to the im position o f taxes, to evade being d rafted for m ilitary service, to p rod u ce an d consum e certa in beverages, o r to w ear certa in clothes.

■^4-To avoid m etaphysical p rob lem s is to eschew all specula tion ab o u t general freedom o r coercion . W h e th e r a person is free to d o som e act o r to reTrairTTrom acting is en tire ly .a .m a tte r o L p articu lan c ircu m stances. They m ay depend up o n legal in junctions, econom ic o r dom estic cond itions, and frequently m atters o f health.

W hile considering problem s o f political freedom it is well to em phasize th a t it is the state, na tion , o r o th e r governm en ta l agency th a t is in co n tro l o f the pow ers an d forces to com pel conform ity . In m any o th e r cases there is a p robab ility o f perform ing certa in acts originally stim ulated by private considerations. In m ost d em ocratic o rg an iza tio n s there is little com pulsion to go to the polls to vote. In o th e r m ore d ic ta to ria l system s there is no choice an d there fo re no freedom in this respect. T h e com parison o f the tw o types o f s itua tion ad d s to the u n d ers tan d in g o f th e prob lem s o f freedom in political life.

f. Equality. M any political co n stitu tio n s fea tu re the general princip le o f equa lity , b u t in no case can equa lity consist o f an y a rb itra ry abstractive quality . F o r exam ple, a congress o r parliam en t can declare th a t an y person bo rn in the co m m u n ity is eligible to p a rtic ip a te politically , to vote, to run fo r office. In view, however, o f th e sta tu s o f ce rta in racial m em bers, w om en, o r re lig ious affiliates w ho are n o t trea ted as citizens, it is q u ite a futile and Active p rop o sitio n th a t all persons are c rea ted equal. E quality is a sta tu s a lw ays allow ed o r cu ltivated by an agency o f g o vernm en t an d therefo re m ust accord w ith the rules o f th e g o vernm en t.

T h e local d iscordance m entioned sym ptom izes th e great difference be- / tw een conventional an d in terbehav io ral ph ilosophy . A ccord ing to conven- / tional ph ilosophy o f politics each individual is g ran ted equal pow ers and ) capacities ju s t because he is a person. A ctually , how ever, th a t equa lity is \ sim ply an abstrac tion , a statistical num ber, a n average. T h e in terbehav- ( ioral view regards equality o r inequality as concrete and specific qualities ( an d potentialities. W hether o r n o t A is equal to B is evaluated on the basis

190

A S P E C T S o f p o l i t i c so f precise crite ria o f definite legal, cu ltu ra l, econom ic , in tellectual, political, an d social situations. A a n d B m ay be equal legally bu t n o t econom ically o r socially. C an d D m ay be equal in tellectually bu t n o t econom ically o r socially. E very possible com b in a tio n exists an d any single equa lity m ight be th e sole equality on th e basis o f law o r o th e r criterion .

g. Liberty. I f ju stification is requ ired fo r trea ting the p rob lem o f political liberty a lo n g w ith th e p ro b lem o f freedom , w e can find it in th e a ssu m p tio n th a t liberty consists in allow ing persons to exercise th e ir n a tu ra l rights.

^ A t once, how ever, th e serious question arises w hether there a re rights, rqua lities, o r privileges inhering in persons d e rived fro m n a tu ra l condit i o n s o r w h e th e r th e n o tio n o ^ n a tu r a l r ig h t s ) 5 sim ply a n ap p ro v ed ' sentim entality . -------------■p O nly conven tional ph ilo sophy allow s the possib ility th a t th ere are any

n a tu ra l rights. T h is is because conven tiona l ph ilo so p h y o pera tes o n the basis o f au tis tic co n stru c tio n s instead o f observab le events. E ven conventio n a l p h ilo so p h ers a p p e a r to questio n th e existence o f na tu ra l rights, fo r exam ple, S tu a rt H am p sh ire and H . L. A. H art. T h e la tte r writes,

1 shall advance the thesis that if there are any moral rights at all it follows that there is at least one natural right, the equal right of all men to be free.27

- F ro m the s ta n d n o in t o f In terhehav io ral p h ilo sophy th e assertion o f the existence o f an y n a tu ra l rieh t rep resents a c o n fusion betw een w hat one w ould like to have hap p e n w ith the absen ce o fJ h a t h ap p en in g in actuality . __ I t is im possib le to su p p o r t su ch a co n ten tio n as th e ex istence o f n a tu ra l rights o f an y descrip tion w ith evidence. It has o ften been said on the basis o f in fra h u m a n an im als th a t n a tu re is red in b eak an d claw. B ut if th a t p ro p o sitio n is co rrec t o n the basis o f observ ing th a t o rg a n ic beings destroy o th e r an im als, it does n o t im ply a great difference betw een different families o f o rgan ism s so th a t h u m an an im als possess n a tu ra l rights. C e rta in it is th a t the b elief in th e ex istence o f p ro p e r righ ts is a tr ib u te paid to aspects o f cu ltu ra l existence. It is to p resum e th a t social existence brings to the front in stitu tions o f m u tu a l aid and a general respect an d regard fo r o th ers un d er p a rtic u la r c ircum stances. A t an y rate it is clear th a t righ ts a re established by cu sto m aris in g from th e circum stance o f p erso n s living to g e th e r w ith a com plem ent o f pa rticu la r institutions.

27 Han. H. L. A., "Are there any Natural Rights?" in Poliiical Philosophy l A. Quinton, ed.), New York, Oxford Univ. Press. 1967, p. 53.

191


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PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS O F POLITICAL PHILOSOPHYT h ro u g h o u t this ch a p te r we have ind icated th e ro le o f ab strac tio n ism in

the conven tiona l philosophies o f politics. N o w we m ust tu rn to the quest i o n how psychological views have influenced political th in k in g. Since

politics basically concerns people, it is only to be expected th a t psychology shou ld play a large p a r t in political ph ilosophy . Philosophical a ttitudes involving co rrec t n o tions o f h u m an psychology m ust obviously be m ore serviceable th an incorrect ones. In fact e rro n eo u s assum ptions ab o u t m em bers o f political associations are liable to be d isastrous bo th theore tically an d practically . U nfortunately , trad itio n a lly political ph ilosophy has been construc ted up o n psychological principles com pletely ou t o f accord w ith the events o f political o r o th e r h u m an behavior.

— I n o rd e r now it is briefly to co m p are tw o types o f psychological fo rm ulation , only one o f w hich influences favorab ly political th ink ing while the o th er ham pers progress in that area o f ph ilosophy. T h e fo rm er we ca tegorize as scientific psychology, an d the la tter as h istorical psychology.

a. Historical psychology. Political ph ilosophy based u p o n the no tion th a t m entality is som e so rt o f psychic substance correlated with the physical su b stan ce o f body inevitably d isto rts political o bservations an d in te rp re ta tions. T o th in k in term s o f ego o r m ind as fixed, blinds one to the in tim ate a n d in trica te ac ts an d tra its o f persons in political s itua tions. T o neglect ac tua l psychological events is to be im poten t to ad a p t to the b ehav io r o f d issidents, revolutionaries, an d general d istu rbers o f the usual stable o perations o f political units. It is hard ly necessary to expa tia te up o n the e rro r o f regard ing political affairs as consisting only o f ex ternal cond itions like geographic, econom ic, and social conflicts.

b. Scientific Psychology. F ro m the s tan d p o in t o f scientific psychology, m entality is a type o f ad justm en t o f o rgan ism s to their env iron ing things an d events. Each an d every psychological item consists o f in teractions o f persons w ith o th er persons, objects, cond itions, o r events o n the basis o f developm ents in p rio r confron ta tions. C om plex political behavior is developed in a behavioral h istory which we m ay call cu ltu ra l psychology. Psychological behavior w hether sim ple sensory d ifferen tiation o r e laborate ideas a b o u t m an , governm ent, social system s, and so o n is influenced by societal circum stances. W hatever tra its individuals d isp lay in their political beh av io r have been orig inated an d developed u n d er the influence o f cultu ra l cond itions. N o person is a m onarch ist, d em o cra t, republican , o r an a rch is t w ith o u t the in teractions o f the individual w ith particu la r c ircum stances which favor the developm ent o f such attitudes.

192


H ow to acco u n t fo r the political b eh av io r o f persons o r g ro u p s is g reatly a id ed by re so rt to scientific psychology .[inquiry in to the ac tions o f people a n d th e ir m o tiv a tio n is to exam ine th e back g ro u n d o f th e ir in terbehav io ral h istory as well as th e cu rren t fields o f ac tio n in w hich they are involved. In th is w ay o n e can d eterm ine w hether ac tio n s a re pa trio tic , crim inal, concerned, o r indifferent, an d so on. It is know ledge o f th e personality evolutio n o f persons th a t allow s sound in te rp re ta tio n o f w hy any p a rticu la r person believes his political system is su p erio r to all o thers o r th a t it is in need o f to ta l re v o lu tio n ]

W h e th e r an y political system is sufficient an d effective is a m a tte r o f the intelligence an d th e ed u ca tio n o f th e p a rtic ip an ts in th e system . S ince scientific psychology is clear th a t the qualities an d sta tu s o f persons are all developed, th e im po rtan ce o f setting u p p ro p e r institu tions favo rab le as env ironm en ts fo r engendering p a rticu la r k inds o f a ttitu d es c a n n o t be overestim ated . O f course, th e re are m any im ped ing c ircum stances to w arn us ag a in s t th e evo lu tion o f accep tab le c itizens th a t will m a k e fo r a po litical system sufficient an d p e rh ap s su p erio r to o th e r n e ighboring system s. O ne o f th e g reatly im peding circum stances is th a t every society is replete w ith in stitu tions a n d c ircum stances th a t cou ld p reven t th e deve lopm ent o f satisfac to ry m em bers o f a n ideal com m onw ealth .

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C H A P T E R 17

PHILOSOPHY AND ECONOMICSECONOM ICS IN PH ILO SO PH ICAL PERSPECTIVE

O bservers o f the econom ic scene a p p e a r to face m ore in h eren t am bigu ities th a n stu d en ts o f m ost o th e r discip lines, w hether o f th e h u m an an d societal realm s, o r inquiries in to events o f na tu re . T h u s th e philosophical analysis o f econom ics entails g rea t difficulty. E conom ic even ts are clear-cut w ith in the fram ew ork o f observable events, while econom ic th eo ry consists to a great ex ten t o f o p in ions, beliefs, a n d verbalism s w hich induce scepticism and dow nrigh t denials o f th e very ex istence o f m any types o f h u m an affairs. M anifestly , th e re is a trem en d o u s h ia tu s betw een econom ic events a n d th e descrip tions a n d in te rp re ta tio n s o f them . T h is g rea t gap is filled u p w ith verbal ab strac tio n s w hich fo rm b arrie rs betw een events a n d valid propositions. A s P ro fesso r K night says,

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. . . all ‘economic' theory in the proper sense of the word, is purely abstract and formal, without content. It deals, in general, with certain formal principles of ‘economy* without reference to what is to be economized, or how; more specifically, price-economics deals with a social system in which every individual treats all others and society merely as instrumentalities and conditions of his own Privatwirtschaft, a mechanical system of Crusoe economies.1

T h e n u m ero u s difficulties o f th e eco n o m ic field are n o t to o difficult to acco u n t for. T o begin w ith, econom ic situ a tio n s a re om n ipresent a n d tou ch im m ediately the very being o f all concerned w he the r observed o r observ- tng. M oreover, econom ic situa tions a re co n stan tly changing , in tricate, and superlatively in terre lated w ith th e even ts o f o th e r types pf_discipiines, political, societal, an d psychological.

n o th e r obvious feature o f econom ic situa tions is th e ir eno rm o u s variety . T here are so m any types o f econom ic system s, som e p erta in ing to sim ple local hab ita tions, while o th ers co ncern g ro u p s o f com plex p o p u la tions su ch as provinces, states, coun tries, o r geograph ic regions. O u ts tan d in g are th e differences betw een eco n o m ic system s o f prim itive o r an th ro p o lo g ica l g roups as com pared w ith p o p u la tio n s o f highly developed cu ltu res, ju s t as great differences can be fo u n d as betw een capita listic and socialistic system s in different political en tities an d com m unities. W ith in g iven g ro u p s the v aria tions o f d a ta m ay be based o n u rb a n o r rural

1 Knight, F. H„ Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, New York, Kelley, (1921), 1964, p. xii.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C S

situations. T h en there a re p rob lem s as to the divisions o f labo r, som e p a r t o f p o p u la tio n s perfo rm m enial tasks w hile o thers w ork a t m ore refined professions o r businesses.

F inally , econom ic events an d p ro p o sitio n s are heavily involved with psychological factors b u t eco n o m ists are b u rd ened w ith trad itio n a l views th a t serve to set th e d iscip line o f econom ics u p o n goalless o r m isleadingp a th s !™ “ ...... ....... '

ORIGIN A N D N A TU RE O F ECONOM IC EVENTS

T he s tu d y o f econom ics, like every o th e r discipline, dem an d s th a t one be clear an d positive a b o u t the n a tu re o f the d a ta o r sub ject m a tte r to be investigated. S tu d en ts o f econom ics can n o t, therefore , fo rego basic ana ly sis o f econom ic in stitu tions a n d econom ic practices d o m in a tin g h u m an existence an d living. It is such analysis th a t p ro m o tes expertness o f observatio n a n d in te rp re ta tio n , a n d affords credence to final accom plishm ents.

O f co nsiderab le aid in ap p rec ia tin g th e n a tu re o f econom ic events is to p ene tra te deeply in to origins and roo ts. D o in g so prevents getting lost in the w ilderness o f no tio n s concern ing the highly evolved techniques an d practices o f p a rticu la r econom ic s itu a tio n s. E conom ics is n o t m erely con-

' cerned w ith the w ealth o f n a tio n s, vested in terests o f individuals, o r eom - i m ercial statistics o f p ro d u c tio n an d d is trib u tio n o f goods, bu t w ith all these

d a ta a nd o th ers involved in e lab o ra te eco n o m ic system s. E conom ic p rac tices an d theories find a fu n d am en ta l sou rce in th e fact th a t o rgan ism s an d th e ir env ironm en ts constitu te a single com plex system o f m etabolic in teractions w ith food m ateria ls th a t, in p a rt a t least, becom e assim ilated to the o rgan ism . S uch is th e elem enta l co n tac t o f o rgan ism s w ith th e ir su rro u n d ings th a t eventually evolves to becom e com plex ac tions o f an egocentric, social, an d in tercom m unal type.

E conom ists a re bio logical o rgan ism s w hich evolve first th ro u g h sim ple bio logical stages an d even tua lly develop by m o re an d m o re com plica ted in terac tions to becom e in tricate econom ic theorists. S im ple m etabolic in terbehavior w ith its elem entary needs becom es am plified to w ants, desires, an d preferences th a t m ake up com plex econom ic events. S uch am plifications genera te p roblem s o f supply an d d em an d , m onopo lies o f goods an d services, as well as ju s t exchanges o f goods, th e p ro d u c tio n and destru c tio n o f co n su m er goods to co n tro l sales, prices, a n d general advan tages o f salesm en a n d the d isadvan tages o f consum ers.

— ^ T h e_grow th o f p o p u la tio n s in p a rtic u la r cen ters results in increased p roduc tiv ity an d surpluses o f p ro d u c ts fo r b a rte rin g o r o th er exchange.

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W ith fu rth e r co n cen tra tio n s o f p o p u la tio n arises m o re in tricate g ro w th o f w an ts an d econom ic exchanges. T h e developm ent o f tow ns a n d u rb an izar tio n in general is based o n the need a n d desire to b u y a nd sell a n d generally to p ro m o te in terchange o f goods an d services. U rban iza tion p rom otes the tran sfo rm a tio n o f land fo r g ro u p uses, w hile th e g rea t co m p lica tio n o f industria l p ractices an d com m ercial tran sac tio n s as betw een individuals an d individuals, an d betw een ind iv iduals an d g roups, becom es a strik ing an d co m m an d in g featu re o f h u m an existence.-y A t th e peak o f econom ic events is the o u ts tan d in g p lace w ealth an d the

rV f th e rich an d th e p o o r, an d the m o n e ta ry s tan d ard s w h ich influence <, a lm o st every in stan ce an d level o f ind iv idual an d g ro u p activ ity . In m an y

cu ltures, even the w orld o f spo rts , in general public an d restric ted academ ic situ a tio n s, have been influenced an d som etim es co n tam in a ted by pecuniary considerations. n J / )

acqu isition o f econom ic substance and p o w er occup ies in co m m u n ities and g T oupsin^ very ty p e o f civillzati o iT F ro m th is has arisen th e d ifferen tia tion

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C RUCIAL PROBLEM S IN ECONOM IC A N A L Y SIS

Because o f th e ub iqu ity , com plexity , an d variab ility o f econom ic events__ .the ph ilo sophy o f econom ics faces a n u m b er o f crucia l p rob lem s centered a b o u t th e valid ity o f descrip tions an d in te rp re ta tio n s co ncern ing econom ic d a ta^ Basically these p rob lem s arise from the ad h erence to invalid philosophical assu m p tio n s an d foundations. T h e result is a n inh ib ition o f critical analysis. In general, th e ph ilosophy o f econom ics is based o n an abstraction istic and universalistic set o f a ttitu d es a lo n g w ith a fa llacious psychology. In th e p resen t c h a p te r we exp lo re th e co n sid era tio n s w hich m a rk off a n ad e q u a te fro m an in ad eq u a te a ttitu d e to w ard econom ic events. F o r exam ple , un iversa l econom ics is regarded as a subjectivistic and n o t an objective discipline. T h e econom ic phase o f h u m a n society involves con crete events o f persons ac ting a n d m ateria ls acted u p o n , b u t th e theories are encased in to vacuous abstrac tions frequently o f a su p ern a tu ra l com plexion .2 E conom ics is m ade in to a d ism al science instead o f a dep iction o f com plex h u m an living.

EXCESSIVE ABSTRACTIO NISM IN ECONOM ICS

C om plexities o f econom ic d a ta follow fro m excessive abstraction ism . F irs t there are prob lem s arising from the econom ics o f th e u n it a t large as

2 Invisable hands, divine ordinations, and so on.

1 96

P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Sover ag a in st th e econom ics o f specialized sub -g roups o f persons. M ore generally th ere is a d ifferen tiation if n o t o p p o sitio n betw een th e sta tistica l g ro u p in g o f econom ic events as aga inst the ac tua l specific b eh av io r an d tran sac tio ns o f econom ic s ituations.

N ext there is the unw itting ad m ix tu re o f theoretical p resuppositions w ith the basic d a ta o f ac tu a l econom ic events. P e rh a p s even m o re th a n G o e th e3 in tended to assert, events o r facts a re a lready theories. Even perceiving even ts bespeak p r io r in terbehaviors a n d th e assignm ent o f p roperties to stim ulus objects.

T he conclusion is inescapable th a t econom ic descrip tions and in terp re tations a re heavily charged w ith suppositions derived from such sources as one’s general W eltanschauung , na tion , and c o u n try lived in, social s ta tus, and period o f study.

ECONOM IC CONSTRUCTIONS AN D ECONOM IC EVENTS

C ritical analysis o f econom ic situations d em ands an expert differentiatio n betw een the descrip tions a n d in te rp re ta tio n s o f p ro d u c er and co n su m er perfo rm ances. T h e activities o f b o th a c to rs in econom ic s itu a tio n s a lo n g w ith the activities o f in tervening persons are definitely observable affairs, b u t they a re very' different in theory . T h e abstrac tio n is tic p rincip le influences econom ists to overlook the dynam ic characteristics o f such b eh av io r so they fit co m fo rtab ly u n d er ce rta in s tan d ard categories. M o m en tary a n d frequent occurrences are m ade in to tim eless entities. P alpab le transactions are tran sfo rm ed into invariable exchanges.

A t th e basis o f confusing construc tions w ith d a ta lies th e conventional hab it o f overstressing statistical generalizations. O f course, one sw allow does n o t m ake a sum m er, b u t on the o th er h a n d, it is advisab le n o t to squeeze o u t all substance from a n average o f unit opera tio n s. It is incalculable how m uch a n event is transfo rm ed w hen reduced to a n ab strac t num ber. By abstrac tly add ing together in to o n e unit ten purchases o f a p a rticu la r object o n e m ay lose the know ledge inheren t in th e specific instances, on ly som e o f w hich m ay coincide in significant details.

TH E LAW OF SUPPLY AND DEM AN D

Scientific ph ilo sophy finds m uch g round fo r criticizing the trad itional a ttitu d e o f econom ists to w ard the princip le o f supply an d d em an d . N o one

' Das Hochste wa re: Zu begrcifen. das altes factische schon Thcorie ist. Ma ximen und Reflexionen. No. 575.

1 97

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Ecan im peach th e circum stance th a t the availab ility o f ce rta in goods m ust affect th e price charged to th e consum er. S carce supplies co m m an d h igher prices. Rut wfrpt u thp ..status o f th e supply? C o n su m ers m ay well ask w hether th e sunn lv o f ce rta in goods is con tro lled by ac tu a l co n d i t io m s u c f u as c ro p failures, tra n sp o rta tio n a c ciden ts , a n d so o n , o r by a r tif ic ia lm a n ip ^ - u la tions, th a t is, go o d s a re w ith held fro m c o nsum ers in o rd er to e x a f it h igher prices a lthougli~ the g o o d s concerned m ay b e in ac tually g o o d _ su pply. It is obv ious th a t supp liers o f goods needed o r w an ted are equally fac to rs in econom ic tran sac tio n s as the co n su m er, re ta ile r, o r o th e r in te rm ediary . T h ere is alw ays the q uestion w hether th e supp lier o f necessities p erfo rm s well o r ill w ith respect to ag ricu ltu ra l o r in d u stria l com m odities an d th e ir sale.

SPECIFICITIES IN T H E ECONOM IC CO M PLEX

a. Macroeconomics and Microeconomics. S o m ultip lex are the specificities o f econom ics th a t these term s have been p ro p o sed to sim plify the discipline. M acroeconom ics is p resum ed to rep resen t the w ork ings o f the econom y as a w hole while the la tter te rm sim ilarly func tions to represent tran sac tio n s o f a sim pler type, fo r exam ple , tra d e in single particu la r com m odities. T o a certa in ex ten t m icroeconom ics is devo ted to the p rac tical o r concrete d a ta o f econom ics, the n u m ero u s ind iv idual transactions w ith o th e r persons, an d b eh av io r w ith respect to m ateria ls fo r p roductive processes. W ith reference to b o th m acro an d m icro econom ics we m ay regard the fo llow ing list as sam ples o f th e sub ject m a tte r o r c o n ten t o f econom ic situations, p ro d u c tio n , co n su m p tio n , trad e , cap ita l, in terest, conversion o f na tu ra l m aterials, b rokerage , designers an d constructo rs, engineers, sellers o f various grades, ind iv idual jo b b ers , w holesalers, specialists, an d a h o st o f purveyors o f services, an d so o n .

b. Regularities and Irregularities in Economic Situations. T h a t econom ic s itua tions are extrem ely com plicated is a tr ite observation . T he basic re la tio n s betw een p roducers o f goods, th e vario u s d ea le rs o r suppliers, and th e u ltim ate consum ers a re greatly involved. E ach aspect o f p ro d u c tio n , exchange, a n d final consum ption , m ay be in teg ra ted w ith n u m ero u s o th e r processes. R aw m ateria ls m ay require a series o f trea tm e n ts before becom ing finished p ro d u c ts ready fo r use o r sale. M an u fac tu re rs m ay be m erely assem blers o f parts supplied by n u m ero u s orig inal p roducers. M akers o f p a r ts them selves m ay be lesser assem blers o f p a r ts supp lied by o th e r subproducers. M an ufactu re rs m ay be salesm en a s well a s bankers. S uch p roducers m ay deal only w ith w holesalers, jo b b e rs , o r dealers. T h en there198

P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Sare o th e r subfunctionaries o r fu rther in term ediaries w ho are exclusively in con tac t w ith p u rchasers as consum ers. T hese a re o n ly suggestions o f the in tricacies th a t even tuate from the accum ulated gregariousness o f h u m an beings. T h e agg regation o f such com plexities typifies the increasingd im ensions o f com m unities from families to states a n d em pires.

All such a rtic les a n d particularities o f econom ic s itua tions sym bolize the regularities o f econom ic c ircum stances. C oinciden ta lly eco nom ic situations are rep lete with irregularities as is the invariab le co n d itio n o f hum an b e h a v io r in ind iv idual o r g ro u p circum stances. E xam ples are the m any

~ d is^ rd erly an cT m p ro perTela tions hi ps betw een supp liers a n d consum ers. It is a w ell-know n strategy o f trade rs to m onopo lize m ark e ts for necessary item s, o r in general fo r all supplies required by purchasers w hether sub o rdinate trad e rs o r particu la r individuals.

It is beyond the scope o f th is w ork to m ultip ly exam ples o f the w orkings o f the intensely com plica ted tran sac tio n s and co n d itio n s o f the econom ic w orld . But we can n o t resist the tem p ta tio n to suggest t he m any types o f irregularities tha t characterize the econom ic d o m ain . S u flicert to m ention th e g rand se r ie s ltf pH ariW s~vm h the rich at o n e pole an d th e p o o r a t the opposite pole, even the m ost destitute, aga in there are the polarities separa ting th e econom ic m asters from the subjects, th e ow ners from the w orkers, the rights o f m en and w om en, an d so on and on.

c. Legal and other Influences in Economics. It has a lready been intim ated how econom ic aspects in terpenetrate all th e o th e r features o f cu ltu ra l existence. T h is in terd iscip linary in te rp en e tra tio n op era tes by w ay o f .. reciprocal influence o f one type o f social event u p o n an o th e r. T h u s econom ic affairs a re influenced by legal cond itions w hile the particu larities o f la w .a r^ e ffe c te d b y e c o n q rh T c ^ q n s id e ra t ib T i^ A h ^ x tre m e ly ih te re T tr r^ exam ple o f how econom ic affairs influence laws is found in the process by w hich b ankers contrive to have laws m ade to favo r them instead o f their custom ers. T h is is true o f airlines, hotels, and m an y o th e r enterprises. T he m ach inery em ployed in bringing such effects a b o u t consists o f lobbies that invade th e halls o f legislative institu tions. B anks, co rp o ra tio n s , an d o ther business o rgan iza tions exert consid e ra b le pow ers over s ta te legislatures a n d federaLcongresses.to_secure a d vantages fo r th e ir pa rticu la r enterprises.

^ C on sid e r h o w b an k s an d savings societies" a r e 'a b le toT nfiuenoT Iaw m akers to en ac t laws favoring them selves as o ver ag a inst depo sito rs and those w ho ow e the ban k , also m oney savers. O f assu rity it is necessary th a t there shou ld be laws enacted in o rd e r to p ro d u ce som e so rt o f civility and h a rm o n y as betw een th e parties im plicated in eco n o m ic situations. H ow -

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Eever, th e q u estio n arises w hether laws shou ld be equally in the interest o f b o th lenders an d bo rrow ers , b an k e rs an d c lien ts . P e rh a p s it is to o m u ch to expect th a t such co m plicated s itu a tions as a re the.econom ic ones sh o uld be_ o rgan ized o n th e basis o f eq uity and-the.com m Q n.go.odj3fallm em .bgrs o f a _ p o p u la tio n instead o f be ing s lan ted bad ly t o w ard an exclusive accum ula- tiori b rp fo f its b v -^ r ta in individuals an d com panies.__

d. Constancy of Economic Changes. M u ch o f th e regularities and irregularities in econom ic s itua tions a re clearly ow ing to the co n stan t changes in h u m a n circum stances. E co n o m ic s itua tions are in co n stan t flux, new o rgan iza tions a re periodically appearing , there are n um erous novel w ays o f d o in g th ings. M any o f th e changes are d irectly re la ted to h ap p en ings in n a tu re , such as floods, d ro u g h ts , to rn ad o es , ea rth quakes w hich b rin g a b o u t changes in econom ic b eh a v io r and in econom ic situa tions. All these are paralle led by a n en o rm o u s n u m b e r o f m an -m ad e m odifications, som e related to cosm ic cond itions, b u t o th e rs concocted fo r th e personal o r p rivate benefit o f econom ic m an ip u la to rs .

e. Obsolescence and Seasonality. A very in teresting featu re o f econom ic life arises w hen th e c rite rion fo r econom ic processes is th e profits o f a p ro d u cer in stead o f th e advan tages o f the consum er. O u ts tan d in g here is th e p ro b lem o f obsolescence an d seasonality . In general it is assum ed th a t in o rd e r to p roduce profits m anu fac tu re rs have to intensify the ir m odes o f p ro d u c tio n . T h e ir rem edy is to build obso lescence in to th e ir p ro d u c t w ith th e consequen t estab lishm ent o f th e in stitu tion o f seasonality . In the m ore advanced coun tries this process is easily an d w idely observed in the p ro d u c-

(i tio n a n d sale o f m o to r cars. M an y peop le co m p ly w ith the seasonality \ in s titu tio n a n d ex change cars each year even if they d o n o t use th em so far ju as to p roduce faults w ith the m achinery . H ow ever, the m o to r ca r exam ple

1 is only one o f very m any. T h e sam e th in g is tru e o f fash ions in c lo th ing an d ' | in o th e r m arke tab le goods.

A sim ilar type o f obsolescence is observed am o n g con su m ers w h o m ay n o t w ish to bo th e r w ith sm all repairs to appliances w hich becom e in need o f rep a ir, b u t im m ediately tu rn to th e shops a n d rep lace th e d iscarded articles w ith new ones a t a large profit to the p ro d u c er an d seller.

f. Idiosyncracies in Economics. P u rsu a n t to th e prob lem s ju s t m entioned w ith respect to the d ifferen tia tion betw een econom ic events o f the p o p u la tio n a t large a n d o f th e specific eco n o m ic sections, is the p ro b lem o f th e rela tion o f persons to o th e r persons an d to th e institu tions. By econ o m ic id iosyncracies we refer to th e re la tio n sh ip s betw een ind iv idual persons an d g roups o f persons w ith re la tion to o th e r groups. In com plex

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Ssocieties we find th a t p ersonal in terest loom s large w ith re la tio n to o th e r persons a n d g roups a n d th e larger com m unities to w hich th e individual belongs.

S ingle persons m ay find them selves w ith serious p ro b lem s w ith respect to th e p ro d u c tio n a n d d is trib u tio n o f goods. A s an o u tg ro w th o f the in s titu tio n o f slavery ind iv iduals in such situations have n o resources w ith w hich to en force th e ir c laim s to a p ro p e r share o f the w ealth o f th e large com m unity . B ut w hen the econom ics o f a co u n try o r a specific g roup consists o f a n u m b er o f persons d o in g sim ilar w o rk o r co n trib u tin g to the p ro d u c tio n o f a ce rta in k ind o f goods, th en they can jo in to g e th e r to m ake d em ands a n d to en force th e ir claim s to im p ro v e cond itions. T h u s in p erhaps all com plex econom ic s ituations there arise un ions o f persons w ith the result th a t they create special facilities fo r fo rm u la tin g the ir dem ands, an d m ake th em k n o w n by lobbies in legislative in stitu tions, an d fu rther, im plem enting their d em ands by strikes o r cessation o f w ork .

TH E DOGM A O F PRICE

By far th e stro n g est evidence o f the rep le tion o f econom ics w ith ab s tra c tions is th e em ploym en t o f trad itio n a l dogm as like price, supply an d dem and , equilib rium , an d so on.

T h e p rice th eo ry o f value has so lo n g persisted and bad ly served econo m ic th eo ry th a t it has sh u t off fro m view th e ac tu a l d a ta o f econom ics, nam ely , th e w ays o f people deriv ing th e ir m eans o f existence, th e ir p ro d u ctivity, th e ir co n tro l ov er th e ir consum ption , b a r te r o r trad e , p ro fits an d losses, and so on. Every th ing perta in ing to the c o ncrete ex p eriences o f d a ily

. living has been oversha d o w e d b y price theo ry . W ealth o r m oney in its func tion , increase o r decrease, exchange an d m ethod o f exchange, is regarded as the key to the o p era tio n o f th e to ta l econom ic system . C an an a b s tra c tio n be m o re p o ten t a n d a t the sam e tim e m ore irre levant? N evertheless, the price theo ry o f value continues to influence econom ic th ink ing a lth o u g h it has been pow erfully a ttacked . W e p o in t to the cam paign o f Veblen an d his follow ers in the Institu tional trad ition . V eblen and the institu tionalists endeavored to replace th e price theo ry with d a ta observed in the p ractices o f th e in d u stria l a r ts a n d in the in stitu tions o f o rganized society.

— ^ N ow we m ust re iterate th a t an y onslaught u p o n ab strac tions m ust itself n o t be irresponsibly abslractiveTThere are tw o preventives. In the first place one m ust, n o t .confuse co n structs and events, n o r avoid relevant ab stractions. P ro p e r abstrac tio n a l construc tions are o f value in science, an d in

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Esystem atic th in k in g in general. T h e second p reventive is to construct. ab s trac tio n s exclusively from concre te events. C o n stru c tio n s underived from events are dogm as. ~

SUPPLY AND DEM A N D AS DOG M AS A N D AS EVENTS

A n excellent exam ple o f th e o p era tio n o f ab strac tio n s an d universals in econom ics cen te rs a ro u n d th e d o g m a o f supp ly an d d em an d . S upp ly and d em an d a re obviously concre te events in eco n o m ic situ a tio n s, bu t they are m ad e in to ab s tra c t princip les in econom ic th eo ry to d is to rt ac tu a l h ap p en - ings a n d to falsify th e ir descrip tion .

T h e supp ly o f certa in goods m ay be lim ited because o f unavailab ility in n a tu re o r difficulty o f tra n sp o rta tio n , as well a s v arious accidents. H ow ever, all types o f scarcity can be overcom e by su b stitu tio n , chem ical synthesis, o r som e o th e r m eans o f ad a p ta tio n to conditions. T h e m ost flag ran t m an ip u la tio n o f supp ly circum stances is fo u n d in com m ercial s itu a tio n s. P ro d u c tio n o f goods in m an y respects ca n be lim ited in o rd e r to ex ac t h igher prices, o r they m ay sim ply h o ld th e ir in ven to ry un til th e d em an d results in h igher prices.

EQUILIBRIUM IN ECONOM ICS

T h e co n stru c t o f equilib rium in econom ics provides a perfect illu stra tion o f an illicit ab strac tio n . W hether it refers to a n eq u ilib rium o f su p p ly and d em an d , o f savings and investm ents, th e equivalence o f the m ark e t ra te o f in terest to th e n a tu ra l rate, o r th e equa lity o f em ploym en t an d unem ploym ent, o r som e o th er econom ic situa tion , it im m edia tely suggests fixity and finality ra th e r th an th a t changes are constan tly tak ing place. A ccordingly, it rep resen ts well the h iatus betw een 1) ac tu a l econom ic tran sac tio n s and o th e r eco n o m ic events, a n d 2) the co n s tru c tio n o r d escrip tion o f econom ic events.

T h e principle o r law o f econom ic equ ilib rium is in general a questionab le one. T his is evident in th e co n sid era tio n o f Say’s (1767-1832) law o f m ark e ts accord ing to w hich there can be n o general o v e rp ro d u c tio n o r u n d erconsum ption .4 Surely the equ ilib rium princip le is a n a rb itra ry cons tru c tio n w ith little basis in econom ic fact.

4 Ayres. C. E., The Theory o f Economic Progress, Chape) Hill, North Carolina Press, 1944, p. 267.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C SCAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM AS VARIANT ECONOM IC SYSTEM S

T h e eco n o m ic system usually referred to as cap ita lism m ark s a definite m ovem ent aw ay fro m th e concrete affairs o f econom ic living tow ard the ab strac tio n ism o f w ealth a n d pecun ia ry fu n d s ._The m a in em phasis o f cap ita lism is th e accum ulation o f m oney th a t can be used fo r carry ing o u t various econom ic en terp rises. This m ovem ent signifies th a t th e goal o f econom ic tran sac tio n s is p rim arily the benefits o f en trep reneu rs. In a genuine sense cap ita listic econom ics tends to w ard th e co n tro l o f econom ic processes by specific individuals w ho have an effective capacity to con tro l th e funds necessary fo r do ing things w hich c a n n o t be accom plished by ind iv idual laborers o r g roups o f w orkers. In m an y w ays it is tru e tha t cap ita listic econom ics leaves behind th e particu la rs concern ing w orkers in fav o r o f th e co n c en tra tio n o f econom ic assets an d co n tro l in the han d s o f bankers an d m anagers instead o f the p roducers o f th e goods created fo r use an d exchange.5

By co n trast socialistic econom ics tends in the o pposite d irection . T he stress is to w ard co ncrete affairs in w hich th e w orkers o r p ro d u cers o f ponds, have som e sh a re IrTThe co n tro l o f econom ic p rocesses. In a definite w ay socialistic econom ics as it is described in th e lite ra tu re a lso preserves a form o f undesirab le abstraction ism , despite the tren d o f profitab ility favoring the aggregate p o p u la tio n . It is in teresting to no te th a t th e specific processes o f socialistic en d eav o r are sim ilar to those o b ta in in g in cap ita listic econom ics. F o r exam ple , ind iv iduals u n ite to fo rm un io n s w hich in th e aggregate assum e pow ers sim ilar to th a t o f th e m anagers o r cap ita lists. U nionism has its definite a rm o r in th e s tra tegy o f lax ity in w ork ing , a n d strik ing . By these u n io n s have developed a large m easure o f co n tro l an d pow er ov er econom ic situations.

BUSINESS AN D PUBLIC W ELFA RE

W hen em in en t econom ists assert th a t “econom ics is a science o f h u m an behav io r,” they d o n o t overlook the existence o f econom ic institu tions,6 a lth o u g h they m ay n o t realize fully th a t in stitu tions are them selves phases o f h u m an b eh av io r. In s titu tio n s fun c tio n in the ro le o f stim u la tio n s and setting fac to rs J n th is section, then , o u r em phasis will b e o n the correctness o f th e psychological prem ises w hich are used in th e d iscussions o f econom ic

’Among the prominent authorities to be consulted are, Marx and Engels. T. Veblen. and R. H. Tawney.

'■Cf. Mitchell, W. C.."The Prospects of Economics," in The Trend o f Economics (R. G. Tugwell. ed.). New York. Knopf. 1924.

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situations. Scientific psychology, w hich shou ld be helpful fo r the u n d ers tan d in g o f econom ic d a ta , instructs us th a t psychological behav io r is alw ays in terbehavior. P sychological events consist o f fields in w hich o rganism s in terac t w ith stim ulus objects such as social in stitu tions u n d er specified conditions.

, - ^ N o w in com plex econom ic s itu a tio n s a n invariab le an d om nipresen t type o f in stitu tion is th a t called business enterprises. S uch enterprises exist an d o pera te as aggregates o f persons in partnersh ips, o r co rp o ra tio n s for the pu rp o se o f p ro d u c in g o r d is trib u tin g g o o d s a n d services fo r profit. It is such institu tions th a t invoke th e d ich o to m y o f p o p u la tio n s in to business an d general w elfare an d force to th e fro n t th e conflict betw een th e general welfare o f people as over against th e excesses o f business enterprises.

Business o f course tak es on m any fo rm s such as the ow nersh ip o f the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n , an d banks as the so u rce o f cap ita l ou tlays based on th e savings o f th e general public. B ecause o f th e fun d am en ta l in terre la tionsh ip o f w elfare prob lem s and th e success o f business m any p rob lem s arise such as the superio r claim s o f business tran sac tio n s over th e needs o f individuals. A ccordingly , businesses o f v ario u s so rts such as m an u fac tu ring an d foreign trad e claim adv an tag es su ch as freedom from all o r p a r t o f tax es th a t m ight be levied on th e ir buy ing a n d selling. Specific industries claim p ro tec tio n from th e im p o rts b ro u g h t in fro m o th e r coun tries. H ere arises a p rob lem o f g ran ting o r deny ing benefits to individual consum ers arising from th e im p o rta tio n o f goods from coun tries w here costs o f m anufactu re a re low er. O n th e o th e r h an d , m anu fac tu re rs o r im porters claim th a t in th e first p lace they m u st h ave th e ad v a n ta g e o f tra d e p ro tectio n , as w hen local industries fa lte r o r fail th e n prices w o u ld rise anyw ay.

A unique a n d c m c ia l p h ase o f th e co nflict betw een business an d w elfare is the struggle.betw een th o se jy h o wouFd m odify the env ironm en t (as in destroy ing forests o r strip m ining) fo r p ro fit^ a n d J h o s e jy f iq jw s h j to preserve the forests an d o th e r n a tu ra l am enities. C o n stan t w arfare exists betw een lum berm en w ho w S H lo d en u d e th e forests a n d th o se opposed to th e destruction . Sim ilarly, coal op era to rs ba ttle w ith env ironm enta l p rotecto rs fo r th e privilege o f strip m in ing fo r coal. H e re it m u st be no ted th a t th e co a l dealers arg u e th a t n o t on ly is p rice a n d profit involved in th e ir operations, b u t also the need to ad d to th e cu rren t supply o f energy.

ECONOM IC CONFUSIONS: CAUSES A N D R EM ED IES

O bservers o f th e econom ic scene c a n n o t b u t co nc lude th a t the discipline is replete w ith uncertain ties an d confusions. A w ide g ap separates eco

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Snom ic trea tises from the events w ith in their purview . It is a n urgent p roblem to c lear u p th e confusion , if a t all possible. W e illustrate w ith a few instances.

a. Excessive Specializations. Every com plex econom ic system exh ib its a p ro fusion o f specialists. In the d o m ain o f p ro d u c tio n there a re o f course, th e laborers, to w hom are added the supervisors, th e tim e keepers, an d th e paym asters. In ad d itio n are th e func tionaries o f th e u n ions in the ir various levels. In d is trib u tio n there are tran sp o rte rs , salesm en o f all sorts, retailers, w holesalers, jo b b e rs o f several varieties. C o o p era to rs vie with single ow ners. In th e hea lth services a re to be m en tioned the docto rs, dentists, nurses, and th e ir m an y aids and supporters . T he rule is to function m ore and m ore intensely in narro w er and n a rrow er enclaves. T he result is a cum ulative re treat from the cen ter o f th e lives an d func tions o f patients. M edical services m u st be carried o n by coo rd in a tio n an d consu lta tion instead o f in tim ate acq u a in tan ce w ith the ad ju stm en ts and general m odes o f living o f those w ho require a tten tion . ✓

b. Advertising. O riginally th e basis fo r the im m ense industry o f advertising w as the sim ple an n o u n cem en t th a t certa in craftsm en have fo r sale certa in artic les o f th e ir ow n m anufactu re . F ro m this sm all beginning the econom ics o f advertising has reached en o rm o u s scope,7 one o f th e w orst features o f w hich is th e ag gressive b ehav io r o f in d ucing persons to buy ce rta in Things m any o f w hich they do n o t n e e d o r w ould n o t w an t orHm arily. T h e advertising type o f influencing persons reaches trem en d o u s im p o rtance w ith all sorts o f im m oral and illegal side issues. It is well know n that various legislative agencies have a ttem p ted to p roduce regula tory laws such as for exam ple T ru th in A dvertising. H ow great this in stitu tion o f advertis-

j ing has becom e is ind icated by the fact th a t o f the m an y cars th a t are p roduced , every o ne is the best. Savings in stitu tions assert th a t their p articu la r co m p an y is th e p ro p e r place to save despite th e fact th a t various governm ental agencies set lim its to w hat the institu tions can offer and g ran t, so th a t it is very difficult to d iscover in w h a t superio rity , if any , a particu la r savings association lies.

c. Intensive Competition. T h e excessively com petitive and aggressive processes o f com plex o r highly industrial system s bring in their train institu tions o f cu n n in g an d deceit. T h e d rive fo r profits and eco n o m ic pow er generates swindles o f all sorts. E xam ples o f the m odera te so rt arc the

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’"In 1974. American business spenl $26 billion dollars on advertising." according to Attiych. R.. Back. G. H.. and Lunsdcn. R.. Basic Economics: Theory aiul Cases. Englewood Clifls. 1977.

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m ethods o f pricing goods. N oth ing costs $10,000, bu t ra th e r “9,999.00.” Sm aller articles are n o t generally priced a t $20.00, b u t a t $19.99. M o re serious sw indles concern th e provenience o f m anufactu re , th e im itation o f goods, an d th e substitu tion o f inferiority for p e rfec tio a

S uch are som e o f th e im proprieties th a t m ak e fo r confusions and m isunderstand ings in econom ic situations. T he clarification and rem edy apparen tly does not reside w ith in th e am biance o f p roduc tion , d istribu tion , and consum ption .

S ince it is th e case th a t econom ics is th e d o m a in o f h u m an b ehav io r, it ap p ears th a t im provem ents m ay follow from im provem en ts in h u m an behavior. This is a psychological p roblem and w hat seems to be called fo r is an effective scientific psychology. S uch a psychology is well equ ipped w ith know ledge fo r b ring ing im provem ents a b o u t in h u m an u n d ers tan d in g and ways o f ad ap tin g to unsatisfactory circum stances.

INTERRELATIONS O F PH ILOSOPHY AND ECONOM ICS

S ym path izers w ith scientific ph ilosophy need hard ly be rem inded o f the o bv ious fact th a t philosophies are greatly influenced by econom ic events as by o th er circum stances o f hu m an living, n o r th a t the influence is reciprocal. E conom ists erect the ir theories an d m odels u p o n prevailing philosophies. A strik ing ex am p le o f th e early days o f m o d ern econom ics is the su p p o rt S ir W illiam P e tty (1623-1687) received from th e ph ilosophical view s of T h o m as H obbes (1588-1670). P h ilosophical influences o n econom ists and th e ir w orks a re a t tim es d irec t an d ov ert as in th e case o f th e classical econom ics o f S m ith (1723-1790) and R icardo (1772-1823) influenced by L ocke (1632-1704) an d H um e (1711-1776), an d the M arx ian econom ics based o n H egel (1770-1831). In m any o th e r cases the influence is covert as in m ost orig inal w riters on econom ic subjects.

W hat m ay be a un ique feature o f the in terre la tionsh ip o f ph ilosophy and e c o nom ics is th a t even in covert circum stances ph ilosoph ical a ttitu d es, com prise th e unw ittingly em ployed hypotheses a n d postu lates o f econom ic fo rm ulae , m odels, an d theories. W riters on econom ics m ay stress m ainly th e universalism o f th e general philosophical trad ition , o r som e individual doctrine . T h u s the h istory o f econom ics is a record o f the ad o p tio n o f specific abstractions such as labor, value, exchange, equilib rium , w ealth , o r welfare. A s evidence o f the in terre lationsh ip o f ph ilosophy and econom ics we consider som e ou ts tan d in g historical an d recent econom ic m ovem ents in w hich m ore o r less unique fo rm ulations stand out.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C S1. Continuity of Economics

Inasm uch as econom ics includes the elem entary life processes o f o rganism s as they m ain ta in them selves by in teracting w ith th e ir biological and social environm ents as well as th e pecuniary circum stances o f com m unities, there exists a co n tin u u m in th e attitudes s tu d en ts o f econom ics fo rm ula te concern ing the econom ic activities perform ed by ind iv iduals an d groups. B ut w ith in this con tinuum there is a succession based upon th e varia tions in econom ic s itua tions occurring in different cultures, geographical centers, nations, and o th er political groupings.

2. Economics in AntiquityT he sto ry o f th e beginnings o f the discipline o f econom ics m ay properly

be localized in G reek tim es w hen well fo rm ula ted philosophies becam e availab le despite th e com parative sim plicity o f econom ic situations then prevailing. It is tru ly said th a t am o n g the G reeks, includ ing the em inent P la to and A risto tle , econom ics a re m erely househo ld system s by co n tra s t w ith th e m o re general econom ics o f la te r na tio n s o r cu ltu res. A s it m ust be w hen intellect uaFdisciplines are only partia lly specialized the econom ics of th e g reat ph ilosophers are only incidental to political an d eth ica l doctrines. A ncient econom ic transactions and general econom ic events are treated from th e s tan d p o in t o f ethical and political p rop rie ty and n o t so m uch on the basis o f effective ad ap ta tions.

H ow soever sim ple an d frag m en tary G reek econom ics m ay be, to it belongs the glory th a t it co rresponds to an objective an d naturalistic philosophy. G reek philosophical a ttitudes are firm ly cen tered u p o n actual events observed and speculations based u p o n construc tions free o f a rb itra ry an d personal assertiveness, o r m ystical trad itions. A ncient m inieconom ics confined itself to ac tual occurrences o f p ro d u c tio n , co n su m p tion, com m odities, and interchanges o f various sorts.

Transcendental EconomicsA s we learn from the h istory o f philosophy an d from social h istory in

general, the objective cu ltu re o f p rechristian days was follow ed by a period in w hich ph ilosophy becam e entirely sa tu ra ted w ith no tio n s o f a pu tative fu tu re and better life to com e. T h e ac tual w orld was regarded as unreal and only a co rrid o r to the real supernatu ral heaven o f G od and th e angels. O n the basis o f such a ph ilosophy n o regard needs to be had fo r the cond itions

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o f w an t an d necessity fo r G od m akes p ro v is io n fo r all living th ings so no treasu re was to be laid up on ea rth b u t on ly in heaven.

B ut as their p resen t w orld h ad to be lived in an d ad ju sted to , econom ic practices had to be perform ed. A ccordingly, th e C h u rch F athers w ho cared fo r the sp iritua l an d w orldly affairs o f peop le set up rules and regulations fo r all transactions. T h u s from the tran scen d en ta l period stem the n o tions o f ju s t price, th e p roh ib ition o f interest o r u sury, a n d o th e r theologically based p rincip les.

Protosecular EconomicsBy th e 16‘h an d 17Ih centuries th e cu ltu re o f W estern E u ro p e reached a

h igh p o in t in th e evolution aw ay from th e d o m in a tio n o f th e ch u rch and the su p ern a tu ra l. P rom inen t in th e general cu ltu re o f th e tim e is the grow th o f secu lar states w ith the change in p rob lem s o f living, an d in the th ink ing o f th e ph ilosophers o f the tim e. A typical in stance is the th in k in g o f H obbes (1588-1670) w hich stressed the abso lu teness an d th e ind ispu tab le sovereign ty o f un it states, a lth o u g h the basic su p ern a tu ra l ph ilo so p h y o f the tran scen d en ta l period was m ain ta ined . S tu d en ts o f econom ic affairs how ever, paid increasing a tten tio n to p a rticu la rs o f p ro d u c tio n an d co n su m p tion as concrete experiences m ultiplied.

A bove all the present period was m ark ed by th e g reat burgeon ing o f science. T h e achievem ents o f C opern icus (1473-1543), K epler (1571-1630), a n d N ew ton (1642-1727) w ere recorded in th e anna ls o f science. G reat em phasis was being placed o n the ascerta in ab le laws o f na tu re w hich could m inim ize th e om niscience an d o m n ip o ten ce o f a sup rem e law giver an d ruler. ...

P ro to secu la r econom ics usually called p lercantilism )is_p ro b a b ly the beginning o f m odern o r professional econom ics, its p rim ary characteristics a re su m m arized by R oscher ( 1817-1894) as show ing th e influence o f an estab lished sta tg-Q m ation ,.m anufacture processes, foreign trade , em phasis o f m o n e y js w ealth, an d a suprem e in terest in m etals.8

A n o u ts tan d in g tra it o f th is p eriod is th e tu rn in g tow ard quan titive aspects o f econom ic affairs, th a t is, eco n o m ic events an d processes becam e expressed in term s o f num ber, w eight, o r m easu re as W illiam P e tty said in his Political A rithm etik.

•Cf. Johnson, E. A. J., Predecessors o f Adam Smith, New Vork. Prentice-Hall, 1957, p. 3.

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Instead of using only comparative and superlative words and intellectual arguments, I have taken the course. . . to express myself in terms of n u m b er, w e ig h t, or measure-, to use only arguments of sense, and to consider only such causes as have visible foundations in nature.9

A s to specific econom ic views o f Petty , he w as o f cou rse keen o n the adv an tag es fo r th e s ta te , favo red ad e q u a te ta x a tio n fo r th e needs o f the state, also he regarded value to be based o n labor. M ainly , how ever, he lent his ta len ts to th e cause o f econom ic ad v an cem en t by ad v o ca tin g th a t w riters be gu ided by th e leads p rov ided by science a n d its m ethods. H istorians o f econom ic ideas refer to his w ork as m ercantilism w hich w ith th e w ritings o f the physiocra ts , fo r exam ple Q uesnay (1694-1774) an d T u rg o t (1727-1801), represen t th e presen t period.

A . Mercantilism. T h e o rig in an d g row th o f th e m o d ern system s o f econom ics co incide w ith th e developm e n t o f cap ita lism in th e 16<h cen- tujry.10 T h e earliest o rgan ized th eo ry is th a t o f th e M ercan tilists w ho stressed the econom y o f aggregates such as n a tio n s as o ver against th e m edieval in terest in th e eth ica l life an d w elfare o f individuals. A ccord ing to A dam S m ith , m ercan tilism is a theo ry o f res tra in t a n d reg u la tio n .11 W h a t \ they ab s trac ted as im p o rtan t fro m th e econom ic p lenum w as the en largem ent o f the g ro u p s’ p o p u la tio n , a favorab le balance o f trad e , low in terest J and wages, an d sim ilar adv an tag es for th e n a tio n a l w ealth a n d w e ll-b e in g /

B. Physiocratism. T h is n am e o r its alternative , th e A gricu ltura l System , is given to th e doctrines o f a g ro u p o f F ren ch w riters w ho stressed problem s centered a b o u t th e p rim ary ag ricu ltu ra l aspects o f th e ir na tio n . A cco rd ingly, they held th a t it is land an d its po ten tia lities th a t a re the sou rce o f all econom ic values an d processes. T o the physiocra ts it ap p eared th a t land ancTthe p ro d u c ts derived from it p rov ide th e on ly solid basis fo r all th e law s and regu la tions o f econom ic system s. All co n su m p tio n a n d d is trib u tio n , they believed, depend u p o n th e p roductiv ity th a t th e land provides. P hysiocracy clearly overem phasizes one o f th e basic fea tu res o f th e econom ic com plex , a n d th u s m inim izes th e ap p rec ia tio n o f th e m an y o th e r facto rs in econom ic system s. T hey d id , o f course, allow fo r values in o th e r th ings insofar as they were coup led w ith th e facilities necessary to d istribu te the agricu ltu ral p ro d u ce derived from the cu ltivation o f th e land . Incidentally

’ Petty, W„ quoted in Spiegel, H. W., The Growth o f Economic Thought, Englewood Cliffs, N. J„ Prentice-Hall, 1971. p. 122.

l0Hcckscher, E. F„ Mercantilism, (E. F. Soderlund. ed.. M. Shapiro, trs.). 2 vols., 2nd rev. cd„ London. Allen and Unwin, I9SS.

"Smith. A.. A n Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations, vol. 2, Everyman ed„ 1937, p. 157.

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th e overem phasis o f ag ricu ltu re a n d th e land led th e physio cra ts to an exaggera tion o f the im portance o f private p ro p erty in th e ir econom ic theory .

5. Classical Experiential EconomicsA n eno rm o u sly great im provem ent in econom ic h istory is identified with

the B ritish trad itio n o f th e experien tialists L ocke (1632-1704), Berkeley (1685-1753), an d H um e (1711-1776). I t is th e p rim ary th in k in g o f their ph ilosophies to em phasize the experience o f individuals in developing a ttitu d es tow ard th e w orld and its detailed happenings. T h e basic views o f th is tra d itio n stem from Locke’s w ay o f ideas. T h e u p sh o t o f such th ink ing was th e em ergence o f a type o f universal subjectivity w hich was to stand opp o sed to th e ra tiona lism an d in tu ition ism o f the C on tinen ta l philosophers such as Leibniz (1646-1716) dow n to K ant (1724-1804).

C lassical experien tial econom ics has been m ain ly p ropagated by schola rs o f th e E nglish em p irical ph ilosoph ical trad itio n . T h e o u ts tand ing eco n o m ist(X d a rn S m iT h js w idely acclaim ed as th e cen tra l figure in th e m ovem ent asThe^IItT iorof the Wealth o f Nations, tho u g h he shares honors w ith M althus (1766-1834), Jam es M ill (1773-1836), J o h n S tu a rt Mill (1806-1873), an d D avid R icardo (1772-1823), am o n g others. It is one o f the fu n d am en ta l tenets o f the classical g ro u p th a t econom ic processes o f every descrip tion are governed by available n a tu ra l laws.

A n o u ts tan d in g tra it o f the Wealth o f Nations is its em phasis o f the individual an d his con trib u tio n to the welfare o f the entire com m u n ity in

' w hich he partic ipa tes. It is in this m ood that S m ith is so an tag o n is tic to m ercantilism because o f its res t ra in ts a n d regu la tions.12 It is estim ated th a t S m ith devotes a b o u t one fou rth o f his b o o k to a relentless criticism o f the com m ercial o r m ercantile system .13 E co n o mics is fo r S m ith a laissez faire,

A m o n g th e specific ideas o f th e Wealth of Nations is first an d fo rem ost th e em phasis o f persons. S o lab o r as th e source o f w ealth is p rom inently featu red . C h ap te r one trea ts o f th e im p o rtan ce o f th e division o f lab o r w hile th e th em e o f th e welfare o f persons is stressed th ro u g h o u t. N o r is the m a tte r o f self-interest neglected in any o f the p roposals o r descriptions.

P ro m in en t am o n g the m em bers o f th e classical experien tial g ro u p is D avid R icardo . A lthough he was n o t a p rofessional academ ic, b u t ra th e r a

Smilh, A., the Wealth o f Nations, vol. 2. Everyman cd . p. 157. "Heckvcher. E. F.. Encyclopedia o f the Social Sciences. vol. 10, 1937.

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business m an w ho h ad accum ulated a large fo r tu n e in s to ck b ro k in g as a y o u n g m an, a n d w ho retired a t the age o f 44 years, he becam e ex trem ely in terested in theories concern ing econom ic events. H is econom ic conclusions he published in a vo lum e entitled Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, in 1817. It is generally conceded th a t R ica rd o w as ex trem ely theo re tica l an d abstraction istic , a lth o u g h he d rew u p o n his experiences as a business m an an d m em ber o f P arliam en t. T h e ab s trac tio n is tic tendencies in R icard o a re illustra ted by his pow erfu l a tta c h m e n t to th e lab o r th eo ry o f value. B ecause he stressed single factors he h ad to face in superab le difficulties an d m an y ob jections in a m u ltifac to r eco n o m y .14 H e, how ever, never d e p a rted fro m th e basic principles o f th e English em piristic schoo l o f philosophy.

R icard o a tta in ed a n excep tional p o p u la rity am o n g econom ists o f his day a n d later. Still a nu m b er o f his doctrines w ere singled o u t fo r criticism a n d em endations. A m o n g his critics w ere M althus, Jam es M ill, Jo h n S tu a r t M ill, M cC ulloch (1789-1864),15 S en io r (1790-1864),16 an d m any o thers. B ut since it w as the ab s trac t principles th a t un ited R ica rd o a n d his critics, th e la tte r cou ld on ly m o u n t serious criticism s a b o u t details.

6. Marginal Utility and Subjective ValueS o fa r in o u r sam pling o f econom ic system s we have o n ly touch ed on

F ren ch p h ysiocra tic econom ics. B ut w h a t ou tw eighs this single schoo l o n th e co n tin en t a re several system s stem m ing fro m G erm an ic ph ilosoph ical sources. W e tu rn now to the ph ilo sophy o f th e em inen t K a n t a n d his C op ern ican revolu tion , acco rd ing to w hich m an gives law s to natu re . Thisra tionalistic 'v iew poin t has p layed a great p a r t in K an t’s th in k in g th o u g h it is som ew hat balanced by H um e’s influence. So fa r as concerns the eco n o m ics stem m in g fro m this idealistic ph ilosophy , th ere is the p ro m in en t n o tio n o f u tility as decided by ind iv iduals, an d in general the subjectiv ity o f value. T h e influence o f th e K an tian ph ilo sophy o n econom ics is well illu stra ted by th e system w hich C arl M enger (1840-1921) an d his disciples B ohm -B aw erk (1851-1914) a n d von W ieser (1851-1926), w ho rep resen t w h a t has been called th e A ustrian school, have constructed .

M arg inal u tility theo ry is an excellent exam ple o f an ab strac ted fac to r generalized as a basic principle o f econom ic phenom ena . T o select utility

14Cf. Spiegel, H. M., The Growth in Economic Thought, Englewood Cliffs. New Jersey, 1971, p. 336.

15 McCulloch, J. R., The Principles o f Political Economy, Edinburgh, Tail, 1843.16 Senior, N. W., author of an Outline o f the Science o f Political Economy, London, Allen and

Unwin, 1938.

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an d to glorify it is no t an unexpected o u tcom e o f dealing with econom ic m atters , since utility is so m arked a featu re o f consum ption , trade , and o th e r types o f transactions in the hom e and m ark e tp lace .17 A ccordingly, we are no t surprised to notice tha t the basic philosophical fo u nda tion o f the com pleted m arg inal utility doctrine is a co m b in a tio n o f B ritish u tilitarian th ink ing and the subjectivistic ph ilo sophy o f C on tinen ta l th inkers. We recall th a t utility doctrines were developed in E ngland by Stanley Jevons (1835-1882), while in fact credit m ust be given to Jevons for the earlier fo rm u la tio n o f the m arg inal utility theo ry . In a letter to his b ro th e r concern ing his “T rue T heory o f E conom y" he writes.One of ihe most important axioms is. that as the quantity of any commodity, for instance, plain food, which a man has to consume, increases, so the utility or benefit derived from the last portion used decreases in degree. The decrease of enjoyment between the beginning and end of a meal may be taken as an example. And I assume that on an average, the ra tio o f u tili ty is some continuous mathematical function of the quantity of commodity."'

M arg inal utility theory gained influence an d was cultivated by the A ustrians, M enger, B ohm -B aw erk , an d von W ieser. O n the w hole the m arg inal utility g ro u p ad o p ts the p la tfo rm o f utility ra th e r th an value derived from labor. It is a no to rious p a rad o x o f econom ics tha t a discipline developed from such obvious concre te circum stances as th e ingestion o f food , the bartering o f objects fo r o th e r objects, the provision o f services, shou ld generate so m any diverse and often co n trad ic to ry constructions in the form o f hypotheses, selection, an d in te rp re ta tio n o f events. A clue to this s ituation may be found in J. B. S ay ’s com m ent in his Treatise art Political Economy.

In political economy, as in natural philosophy, and in every other study, systems have been formed before facts have been established; the place of the latter being supplied by purely gratuitous assertions.1''

T he A ustrian econom ists m entioned above indicated their adherence to ra tionalistic ph ilosophy su p p o rted by C atho lic fo unda tions by assum ing radical abstraction istic in terp re ta tions o f econom ic events. M enger a p pears to have overem ployed the role o f m oney in econom ic situations while he and his followers B ohm -B aw erk an d von W ieser sharp ly a ttack ed the n o tion o f lab o r as the prim ary basis o f value. V alue accord ing to A ustrian

1 Kauder. I... in his of Murytnaf Ihtfin flivorv, Princeton. Princeton tJniv. Press, 1965,carries lhe theory back lo Aristotle.

■' fjuotcd by Keynes, J. M.. in and Skvicfw\ in Hinyruf>h\. New York, Meridum Books.I ‘>V, p 142

"Say. I II . A frpuuw on Vohtuaf hotu*m \; nr the Pnafuttnm, fhstrihuftnn. untl ( onxuntfnion •d Wraith l( K Prinscp. trs |. Philadelphia, (iri^g and Mliot. IX.V*. p. xvii.

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theory is n o t an inheren t p roperty o f goods, b u t is im puted to them on the basis o f subjective decisions and evaluation o f satisfaction.

A n o u ts tan d in g result o f th e p reoccupa tion o f econom ists w ith value theo ry is the m athem atica l trea tm en t o f d a ta on the g round of m easuring values. Fo llow ing th e w ork o f Jevons and th e A ustrians there is a long record o f q u an tiza tio n a ttem p ts dow n to econom etrics w hich is referred to below.

/ '^ G r a n t i n g th a t the M arginal Utility econom ics like the o thers o n o u r list j d em onstra tes extensive ab strac tion ism , there is still to be no ted th a t it does

I n o t om it an equally ob jectionab le psychology. T he en tire n o tio n o f subjec- [ tive eva lua tion hin ts a t som e in ternal princip le based on m ind-body - trad itio n .________________

7. Neoclassical EconomicsT he neoclassical econom ics o f the C am b rid g e S choo l offers a n in fo rm

ing exam ple o f the co n tin u ity o f th ink ing in th a t discipline. T h e analysis o f th e w ork o f A lfred M arshall (1824-1942) dem o n stra te s the m odification o f earlier views to form a new er system w hich assum es stability and p o p u la rity before it is fu rth e r rehabilitated . M arsha ll’s trea tise The Principles of Economics d o m in a ted th e econom ics a tm o sp h ere o f E nglish-speaking n a tio n s fro m a b o u t 1890 to th e 1930’s in co n n ec tio n w ith th e experien tial econom ics o f A dam S m ith , D avid R icardo , an d J o h n S tu a r t Mill as based o n the associa tion istic ph ilosophy , b u t it then becam e rebo rn by reaffirm atio n and ex tension .20 A lth o u g h M arshall, an d the m em bers o f th e C am bridge school, reacted aga inst the ab so lu tea n d universal fo rm o f theorizing o f the ir predecessors, they d o n o t really d ep a rt from those questionable characteristics. W hat M arshall aim s a t, how ever, is a g re a te r em phasis o f th e details o f eco n o m ic tran sac tio n s irisT reasonab le to trace b ack this a sp ec to T M arsh a irs theories to his m athem atica l back g ro u n d and training. A n o th e r basis p erhaps fo r his em phasis o f details an d m athem atica l presen ta tio n is th a t his am biance is the scientific env ironm en t o f C am bridge U niversity. In favo r o f the cha rac te riza tion o f C am b rid g e econom ics is M arshall’s close in tellectual re la tion w ith R icardo . F o r exam ple, he asserts th a t value is de term ined by th e equilib rium o f supply and dem and . A ccordingly, his theories are ra th e r rem ote from specific circum stances. His great service to econom ics is to be m easured by his clear an d definite statem ent of econom ic events an d the o rgan iza tio n o f a definite system o f econom ics.

20Cf. Burtt, E. G., Jr., Social Perspectives in the History o f Economic Theory, New York, St. Martin’s, 1972, pp. 201 f.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V EW e have a lread y suggested th a t the fo u n d a tio n o f his th in k in g w as m a th em atica l an d th a t u n d o u b ted ly has been a fac to r in his c lear-cu t p resen tatio n o f his ow n views and criticism o f th e views w ith w hich he, at least on the surface, objected to.

I ne launch ing ot tne econem etncsT novem ent in the 20th cen tu ry m arks th e m a tu ra tio n o f th e q u an tita tiv e ph ilo so p h y w hich has been g radually deve loped since the evo lu tion o f science and scientific a ttitu d es in the 17‘h cen tu ry . F ollow ing the lead o f the so-called n a tu ra l scientists, w riters on econom ic subjects have th ro u g h o u t the th ree centuries m en tioned , realized the necessity o f in troducing num bers, a n d in general statistical m ethods, in th e ir studies o f such h u m an events as th e p ro d u c tio n an d d is trib u tio n o f goods. It is in no sense m isleading to look to th e th in k in g o f D escartes (1596-1650) as the ph ilosopher w ho p ro posed m athem atica l m ethods w hich could be app lied to all so rts o f situa tions. It m ust be recalled tha t D escartes w as so closely identified w ith the inven tion o f analy tic geom etry , and so to him can be traced the efforts to p ro d u ce d iag ram s and eq u a tio n s fo r purposes o f th row ing light on econom ic processes. M ath e m atical econom ics im m ediately suggests the nam es o f P etty , Q uesnay, C o u rn o t, W alras, Jevons, Keynes, an d m any others.

T h e th eo ry o f econom etrics o r th e m athem atica l aspect o f econom ics ■jsj n o n f a th eo ry c o n c m u n g p resen ta tio n m ethod ra th e r than th e descript i o n an d inteTpretatiofToftH e basic d a ta o f econom ics. W hat the econom etric ians assert is th a t p ropositions o f ec o n o m ics should be m ost p roperly m ad e iTTmaTherfiatical term s. T he quan tifica tion o f econom ics n o t only p rov ides g o o d m eth o d s o f han d lin g econom ic d a ta , b u t also aids in describ ing an d in terpre ting the basic d a ta o f econom ics.

Like o th e r theories in econom ics th a t are abstraction istic , econom etric m ethodo logy is a special fo rm o f abstrac tion ism . A fu ndam en ta l question co ncern ing m athem atica l econom ics is how p roduc tive it is fo r th e u n d ers tan d in g o f econom ic processes. T h e p ropositions o f econom ics surely acqu ire ce rta in definite qualities such as precise access to fundam en ta l re la tionsh ips, th o u g h on the o th er h an d , they tend to tu rn the econom ist aw ay from the ac tua l behav io r o f p ro d u c tio n , exchange, and values.

It is in fo rm ative to note here the a ttitu d e o f M arshall, h im self a m ath em atician , co ncern ing the excessive em plo y m en t o f m athem atics to the d e trim en t o f econom ics.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C S. . . I had a growing feeling in the later years of my work at the subject that a good mathematical theorem dealing with economic hypotheses was very unlikely to be good economics: and 1 went more and more on the rules —( I) Use mathematics as a shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep to them till you have done. (3)Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples that are important in real life. (5)Bum the mathematics. (6) If you can't succeed in (4) bum (3). This last I did often.21

Communistic EconomicsO ne o f th e m o st s trik ing re la tionsh ips betw een econom ics a n d philos

o p h y is th a t w hich ob ta in s in com m unistic econom ics. In stead o f philoso p h y ap p earin g as th e basis o f econom ics, it appears as iden tical w ith econom ics. T h e ex am p le is th e M arx ia n rev o lu tio n ary co m m u n ism in its c o m b in a tio n w ith th e R o m an tic p h ilo sophy o f Hegel. If we cen te r o u r o b serv a tio n u p o n K arl M arx we ca n n o t o m it th e d irect connection o f this rev o lu tio n ary th in k e r w ith H egelian teachings. Be it recalled th a t K arl M arx g rew up in tellectually in the density o f th e H egelian ph ilo soph ical a tm o sp h ere . In his y o u th he revealed his e n a m o r o f H egel’s th in k in g as indicated in this s ta tem en t th a t, ; i

The outstanding thing in Hegel’s Ph'anom enologie is that Hegel grasps the self-creation of man as a process. . . ; and that he therefore grasps the nature of la b o u r and conceives the object man . . . as the result of his own labour. 22 11

T h e rep u ted tran sfo rm atio n o f H egelian th ink ing an d th e conversion o f 1 1th e relig ious transcenden ta lism o f H egel in to p rob lem s o f econom ic cond i- ttio n s a n d class conflicts basically m irro rs H egelian p h ilo so p h y as fused w ith econom ics. A s a m a tte r o f fac t. K arl M arx w as u n ab le to reject |1 fH egelian ph ilosophy because he cou ld no t m ove aw ay fro m th e prevailing it isp iritistic ideas, a lth o u g h th ere is a gap betw een his ph ilo soph ical a ttitu d e s „ ,an d his in terests in social revolu tion . ||.

T h e sa lien t fea tu re o f H egelian p h ilo so p h y is o f co u rse th e un iversa lity o f consciousness as com prised in the A bso lu te o r G od. A nd fu r th e r there is the dialectic o f th e th ree stages: thesis, antithesis, an d synthesis w hich is |>»usually a ttr ib u te d to H egel th o u g h den ied by som e w riters in fav o r o f a d ialectic o f q u an tita tiv e changes end in g in a qualita tive change.2*

O n th e basis o f th e dialectic o f Hegel, K arl M a rx e x p a tia te d u p o n the com plete u p h eav a l a n d rev o lu tio n in social system s. A lso h is n o tio n o f class conflict referred b ack to the dialectic leading to th e A bsolu te. T h e

21 Memorials o f Alfred Marshall (A. C. Pigou, ed.), London, MacMillan, 1925. p. 427.** Quoted from Karl Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy (T. B. Botto-

more, and M. Rubel, eds.). New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964, p. 2.a Spiegel, H. W., The Growth o f Economic Thought, p, 463.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Ep rim ary n o tio n o f M arx ’s econom ics is th e econom ic in te rp re ta tio n of histo ry . T h is fo rm u la m arks a w ro n g em phasis o f th e econom ic phases o f TTvmgand a su p p re s s io n o f.th e .m any o th e r fac to rs th a t co n d itio n the lives oT p e o p le. M arx ism illustrates th e m ost ex trem e ab strac tio n ism an d universalism o f an y econom ic system .

C o m m u n is tic econom ics is th e converse o f C ap ita listic econom ics o f w hich m an y system s a re ex tan t. T h e la tte r is p resum ed to be o f benefit to a select class o f persons, C om m unistic th eo rie s o r system s tak en collectively a re all characterized as u to p ian in the sense o f im prov ing h u m an social ex istence. H ow ever, m an y o f th e specific theo ries sim ula te closely suggestions ava ilab le in the o th e r types o f theo ry . In general, it m ay b& 5aid_thai- m ore th a n a n y o th e r theo ry socialistic econom ics stresses special persons, the cap ita lis ts , th e ow ners o f th e m eans o f p ro d u c tion. It is the cap ita lists w ho co n tro i econom ic s itua tions including co m m o d ity a n d lab o r values. Socialist o r co m m u n is t econom ics is a im ed a t th e co rrec tio n ot tne evils cen te rin g a ro u n d th e co n tra s t betw een th e rich a n d th e p o o r a n d destitu te . C o m m u n ist w riters h o p e to c o n tro l eco n o m ic processes in such a w ay as to d estro y th e pow er o f m asters w ho m istreat w orkers. A lthough all econom ic schools an d theories m ust tak e in to ac co u n t th a t they deal w ith lim itations o f political system s, u to p ian econom ics a tte m p ts to d o aw ay w ith th e tw o level system o f m asters and slaves, o f bourgeo is and p ro letarians.

In his Capital M arx fash ions his en tire system u p o n the co n d em n a tio n o f th e class system a n d class conflicts. H e presen ts vivid descrip tions o f w h a t goes on in the p rodu c tiv e process, th e ex p lo ita tio n o f ch ild ren as well as th e ir paren ts . H e cites the p ligh t o f ch ild ren as yo u n g as fo u r to six years engaged in w ork ing fo r a p ittance. N o r d o es he o m it to recoun t the pitiful s to ries o f w orkers an d their fam ilies w ho are unem ployed an d th u s have not th e m ean s even o f ac q u irin g the m eag e r food they need , th e while cap ita lists accum ulate the ir w ealth .24

A g ood ex am p le o f socialist econom ics is ex h ib ited by th e R ussian rev o lu tio n an d the Soviet U nion . In stead o f basing th eo ry o n th e histo rica lly estab lished u p p e r a n d low er classes including hered ita ry rulers, socialist econom ics in tends to acco u n t o n ly fo r so ld iers an d w o rk ers . But since th e d ifferen t nam es are a b s trac tio ns, th e ac tu a l co n d itio n s o b ta in in g m the_S oviet O nion a re very d ifferen t in fact. A ll observed ec o n o m ic- processes are concre te and specific and th e ir circum stances d o n o t m atch the abstrac tions.

■ ' Marx. K.. Capital: A Critiqueo) Political hUtmomy.vcA. 1: The Process o f Capitalist Production (h Engels. cd.. S. Moore and E. Aveling. trv). New York. International. 1967.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C SW ith respect to the details o f eco n o m ic system s C om m unistic th eo ry

favors a n ex trem e em phasis o f the p roduc tive process. T h is is in line w ith the stress o n the w o rk e r. T h ro u g h o u t the w hole system there seem s to be a g reater fea tu ring o f w orkers th a n in o th e r system s an d the im pression c a n n ot be av o ided th a t a lL -w ealih .and .all p rocesses o f exchange cen ter a round p ro d u c tio n. F acto rs o f d is trib u tio n it is im plied d o no t incline tow ard the w orkers b u t to w ard the m asters, th e o w ners of the m achines an d o th e r p a rap h en a lia o f p rodu c tio n . T he ph ilosoph ical principle im plied in th is view o f econom ics in the light o f the fusion o f ph ilosophy and econom ics is indicated by the fam ous sta tem en t o f K arl M arx to the effect th a t , ----------------- -------— -------------------------------------------------------- —the philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point, however, is to

v change it.25 26 v--------------—--------------- -------- ----------- -— ----------- —----------------- ---- -

C o n so n an t w ith the co m m en t we have p rev iously m ad e concern ing the c o n s tan t repetition o f doctrines by th e vario u s schools o f econom ics, the C om m unistic em phasis o n the lab o r th eo ry o f value is n o t their exclusive doctrine , it has been held by o th e r econom ists. H ow ever, m ost o th e r w riters have held th a t the lab o r theo ry o f value is a feature o f th e ir doctrines b u t the p ro m o te rs o f th e com m unistic system m ake th a t p rincip le the essential basis o f the w hole system.

10. Welfare EconomicsW h at ap p ears to be a u n iq u e system o f econom ics goes by th e nam e ju s t

ind icated . W hat m arks it as un ique is th e a tte m p t t o get do w n to the particu la rs o f individual existence a n d ind iv idual econom ic ad ju stm en ts to

j he co n d itio n s o f pecun iary existence. W hile insisting u p o n the inadequacy o f the o rd in ary system s, H obson (1858-1940)“ an d P igou (1877-1959)27 w ith th e ir in terests in the w elfare o f people seem to be leaving the d o m ain o f ab s trac t th eo ry to get close to the needs o f people an d to suggest m eans o f relieving them .

A ra th e r sym pathetic a ttitu d e tow ard H o b so n is d isplayed by M itchell.28 In his treatise entitled , Types of Economic Theory th is a u th o r suggests the

25 Marx, K„ “Thesis on Feuerbach," in Marx, K., and Engels. K.. Feuerbach: Opposition o f the Materialist and Idealist Outlooks, London. Lawrence and Wishart. 1973, p. 95.

26 Hobson, J. A.. I Fork and Wealth: A Human Valuation, London. Allcnand Unwin, rev. cd., 1933, p. 34.

" Pigou. A. C., Wealth and Welfare, London, MacMillan, 1912.a Mitchell, W. C„ Types o f Economic Theory from Mercantilism to Institutionalism(J. Dorfman,

ed.), 2 vols.. New York. Kelly, vol. I, 1967, vol. 2, 1969.

217


basis fo r H o b so n ’s heresies from the conven tiona l treatises o f econom ics. He says th a t H o b so n w as no t a conven tiona l o r technical-ceenom ist but ra th e r a jo u rn a lis t an d sociologist. F o r th e m ost p a r t jH o b so ru v a s no t a p rofessional econom ist occupying a conven tional ch a ir in a university. For. exam ple. H obso n d id no t accept the conventional view that th rift is o f great im portancF m the eco n om ic life o f in d iv id u a lsan d groups. H e criticized the

" process o f o versaving a n d u n d e rco n su m p tio n im t declared th a t the accum u lation o f w ealth-is.oLnQ.gcea t ad v an tag e to nations and the individuals m aking up the pop u la tio n o f the nation .

T h e great significance o f w elfare econom ics, o r th e j ie re s ie s ^ o ^ lo b s c ^ is the covert a ttitude th a t a th in k er o r observer o f econom ic m atters shou ld be free to shift postu la tes from established system s and to p ropose new assu m p tio n s an d new goals fo r eco n o m ic theories. T h e w ritings o f H obson suggest th a t econom ists o r econom ic th eo ry should d raw m ore on the ac tua l events and processes o f p roduc tion , exchange, an d consum ption instead of o p era tin g o n the ab s tru se level o f theory . If we characterize such w orks as econom ics o f d istribu tion , p roblem s o f poverty, physiology of industry , and o thers o f H obson’s w ritings we m ust still tak e no te th a t His w ritings are afte r all abstrac t as all theoretical w ritings m ust be bu t we m ust cred it H o b so n with a different kind o f em phasis up o n abstraction ism . T here are different ranges o f con tacL w ilh ac tu a l econom ic events, and certaTnf T T o b so rf 'g e ts closer to ac tua l occurring events th an d o such econom ists as em phasize m a th em a tical ca lcu lations. H ere it is app ro p ria te to refer to a passage frorrTH obson’s w ork en titled , Work and Wealth. He says.

Our aim will be to set out, as well as we can, reliable rules f or examining the productive and consumptive history of the various sorts of concrete marketable goods, so as to discover the human elements of cost and utility contained in each, and by a computation of these positives and negatives to reach some estimate of the aggregate human value contained in the several sons of commodities which form the concrete income of the nation and this income as a whole.M

A s M itchell po in ts o u t30 this q u o ta tio n sim ulates B en tham ’s talk in term s o f pleasures an d pains except th a t H obson speaks ab o u t costs and utilities. A n o th er sim ilarity is th a t B entham used the term ‘felicific’ calculus while H o b so n speaks o f co m p u ta tio n . A s M itchell says, B entham never really calculated; and H o b so n never com pu tes. N evertheless we can n o t su b trac t from the w elfare econom ics th e in ten tio n to get dow n to specific

Hobson. J. A.. Work anti Wealth, p. 34.u,Milchcll, W. C . TvfH's o f Economic Theory from Mercantilism to Institutionalism, p. 496.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Seconom ic activ ities, even th o u g h w e th in k o f the change as be ing m erely one o f degree ra th e r th a n k ind.

A lth o u g h it is ev ident th a t econom ists custom arily on ly present varying views co n cern ing eco n o m ic events, since they all s ta r t from even ts, the ir o rigm auty to discovery. T h u s the econom ics o f W elfare fo rm u la ted by P igou varies som ew hat fro m th a t o f H o b so n o r indeed fro m th e classical views o f P e tty , A d am S m ith , R icard o , an d J . S. M ill. A ll o f these predecessors o f P ig o u w ere concerned w ith p rob lem s o f th e n a tio n a l incom e o r na tio n a l d ividend.

I t m ay safety b e said th a t fo r a ll econom ists in terested in w elfare there is a definite reference to e th ical circum stances. P ig o u equ a tes w elfare w ith good a n d follow s M o o re in asserting th a t th e te rm ca n n o t be defined. B ut these p ropositions a b o u t w elfare can be laid dow n:

a. W elfare includes states o f consciousness on ly and n o t m ateria l th ings o r conditions.

b. W elfare can be b ro u g h t u n d er the category o f g rea te r a n d less.c. E conom ic W elfare is one p a r t o f w elfare in general.31 iP igou’s special c o n trib u tio n is to em phasize the re la tionsh ip betw een

private incom e a n d th e general g roup div idend . S u ch s tu d y partia lly opens th e d o o r to co n cre te eco n o m ic events. T o q u es tio n w h e th e r o r n o t th e pwelfare o f ind iv idua ls alw ays coincides w ith th e general w elfare suggests gth e study o f specific de ta ils o f p ro d u c tio n a n d d is tr ib u tio n o f go o d s an d services. 0

B ut P ig o u rem ains a conven tional econom ist. O n th e one h an d h e pregards econom ics as th e s tu d y o f consciousness, th a t is, n o n ex is ten t „entities, b u t m u st reg ister his co n tra d ic tio n w hen he ta lk s o f q u an tity o r m easurem ent. A t th a t p o in t th e crite rion has to be m oney, a tangi ble fac to r in th e p rocess o f exchange, trad e , o r increase o r decrease o f w elfare o r *good. T h u s there is m u ch confusion o f th ings an d te rm s an d no d im in u tio n o f abstraction ism . ,

1I. Institutional EconomicsIn stitu tio n a l econom ics is p rim arily a system th a t has h ad its orig in and

p ro p a g a tio n in th e U nited S ta tes an d it m ay be charac te rized as a n a ttem p t to abo lish m an y o f th e econom ic system s based o n the em phasis o f price in all econom ic transactions. G enerally speak ing , institu tional econom ics bears considerab le sim ilarity to C om m unistic econom ics, b u t w ith deep

31 Pigou, A. C., Wealth a n d Welfare, p. 3. 219

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T ]ro o ts in th e C ap italistic cu lture . A ccordingly, in stitu tional econom ics le an tagon ism tow ard to tal political system s, especially political uprisi an d revo lu tions in o rd e r to accom plish pecuniary im provem en ts econom ic welfare for the m asses o f popu lations. Nevertheless institutic econom ics is characterized by an em phasis on welfare. M uch m ore t C o m m u n istic system s, in stitu tional econom ics is entitled to the appelai o f welfare econom ics.

F rom the ph ilosophical s tan d p o in t in stitu tional econom ics has gre o u t o f a very d ifferent k ind o f ph ilosophy th an is the case w ith o econom ic systems. In stitu tional econom ics is w 'ithout d o u b t influence!

p rag m atic ph ilo so p h y has been th e ex trem e desire o f thinkers~tcTm aw ay f ro fru ra d it io n a h n a a p h y s ic a l systerffSTtHCn as those oi H eg e ir

'o th eF sy s tem so T the E u ro p ean t radTuFn?”AT5o ve alfFp ragm af Tsm'ma";J I descrihed as an a tte m n U o d en a y ffro m thF on to log ies ahdTnTsfem dlo

o f trad itional philosophical system s.A p o p u lar n o tion o f p ragm atic ph ilosophy is to d ep a rt from globs

b lock universes in o rd e r to ap p ro ach closer to ac tu a l experience: particu la r persons. R ecorded in th e lite ratu re o f p rag m atic p h ilo sop l considerab le d iscussion o f th e n a tu re o f T ru th an d Existence. F o r exam it is alleged by p ragm atists th a t conven tiona l p h ilo sophers ho ld l generalized and ab strac t tru th w hich really has no c o u n te rp a r t in ac sit uations. Instead the p ragm atists w an t to keep tru th in the ac tua l worl w hich p ropositions can refer to actual things an d events.

S im ilar com m en ts can be m ade a b o u t the p ragm atic n o tio n o f ontoh P ragm atis ts d isdain the co n stru c tio n o f reality as som eth in g larger m ore im p o rtan t th an the activities o f th e w o rk sh o p an d business organ tion . T his m eans th a t they w ould like to abo lish abso lu tes an d per nances such as K ant’s th ings in them selves.

As a p rom inen t m em ber an d even in s titu to r o f institu tional econon Veblen has urged a n u m b er o f basic m odifications in econom ic theory , fu ndam en ta l criticism is th a t econom ics has indulged excessively in superficial abstraction ism o f classification instead o f analyzing th e ac life processes o f people. E conom ics he wished to tu rn in to an interdisc nary co m p an io n sh ip w ith a n th ro p o lo g y and sociology. In general he appalled at the m isin terp re ta tion o f persons as m oved m erely by th e di for p leasure an d for the avoidance o f pain. H e wrote,The hedonistic conception of m an is that o f a lightning calculator o f pleasures and p who oscillates like a homogeneous globule o f desire of happiness under the impul

2 2 0

P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Sstimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact. He has neither antecedent nor consequent. He is an isolated, definitive human datum, in stable equilibrium except for the buffets of the impinging forces that displace him in one direction oranother. Self-imposed in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about his own spiritual axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, whereupon he follows the line of the resultant. When the force of the impact is spent, he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before. Spiritually, the hedonistic man is not a prime mover. He is not the seat of a process of living, except in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations enforced upon him by circumstances external and alien to him.,:

In his various w orks V eblen m o u n ts pow erfu l a ttac k s o n the m ores and custom s o f th e established social system s as view ed b y conven tiona l econom ists. He d ifferen tiated betw een ow ners o f business enterprises a n d the m eans o f p ro d u c tio n an d the w orkers, an d stressed th e differences betw een the functions o f engineers and th a t o f salesm en o r m erchan ts.

12. The Keynesian RevolutionT h e philosophy o f econom ics in the 20(h cen tu ry ap p eared to undergo a

rad ical revo lu tion th ro u g h the w o rk an d influence o f J . M . K eynes w ho p ro p o sed w hat seem ed like rad ical d o c trin a l changes. T hese changes focused u p o n m o netary theory , governm en t in terven tion and governm ent expen d itu re , tax a tio n , pub lic policy, em ploym ent, a n d in terna tional trad e an d finance. T h e su rp rise and acclaim o f th e K eynesian revo lu tion together w ith Keynes’ acknow ledgem ent o f m any fo re ru n n ers finally m ade th e w ork o f Keynes o ne o f th e m any types o f a ttitu d es th a t reflected the events observed at various tim es and by d iverging analyses. It appears , then, th a t the K eynesian revo lu tion was au fond an item in the evo lu tion o f econom ic d o c trin e , an d n o t a com plete a n d co m p reh en siv e d e p a rtu re fro m ex tan t econom ic theories. As K lein says, “ K eynes was alw ays a classical eco n o m ist."33 U nlike th e M arx ia n revolu tion K eynes alw ays rem ained w ith in the capitalistic fram ew ork.

W h en we inq u ire in to th e ph ilo soph ical b ac k g ro u n d o f K eynes we run d irectly in to th e analy tica l th ink ing o f R ussell, M oore , W hitehead , and o th e r C am b rid g e p h ilo so p h ers w ho believed th a t ph ilo sophyzing was reducible to the abstrac tion istic processes o f logic and m athem atics. Inso far as Keynes exh ib ited the influence o f his ph ilosoph ical tra in ing , he p ro d u ced an intu itive th eo ry o f P ro b ab ility .34 K eynes’ p h ilo sophy was

Veblen. T.. “Why is Economics not an Evolutionary Science?" in The Place o f Science in Modern Civilisation and Other Essays, New York, Viking. 1942, pp. 73 f.

*> Klein, L. R.. The Keynesian Revolution, New York. MacMillan. 1947, p. I. u Keynes. J. M„ A Treatise on Probability. London, MacMillan, 1921.

221

H U M A N ’ E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Idecidedly ab strac tio n a l. F o r h im p ro b ab ility has only to d o w ith p ro p tions and their re la tion . A p ro b ab ility re la tion is sym bolized a/h - i w hich h sym bolizes a set o f p ro p o sitio n s an d a a set o f conclud ing p rop tio n s " then , if a know ledge o f h justifies a ra tiona l belief in a o f degree a say th a t there is a p ro b ab ility -re la tio n o f degree a betw een a and /j .”35 N th a t a ra tio n a l belief is involved in th e conclusion , Keynes defini excludes the term event from his descrip tion o f th e probab ility re la tion far we m ay regard K eynes’ p h ilo so p h y as in tu itive as he relates it to ra tio n a lism o f L eibniz th o u g h he does assert th a t he con tinues in em pirical succession o f Locke, Berkeley, H um e, Mill, a n d Sidgw ick.

T h ro u g h o u t his econom ics career Keynes reflects his intu itive and piric m ix tu re o f ideas. T h e in tu itive fa c to r is d isplayed in his freedo r differ from his predecessors an d com peers. T h e E m pirical fac to r is sh< in his w ritings concern ing th e specific econom ic co n d itio n s ex isting ir ow n governm ent an d general in terna tional relations.

As th is w ork is n e ith er a h is to ry o f econom ics n o r a h isto ry o f econc analysis it is beyond its sco p e to re ta il the p articu la rs o f K eynes’ o p in an d changes o f op in ion . In th e accom pany ing table, I indicate som e ol co n trasts betw een w hat K eynes calls the classical views an d his ow n ir G eneral T heory volum e. T h e follow ing au th o rs describe his spe doctrines critically o r sym pathetically : K lein,36 Spiegel,37 S chum pet H a rro d ,30 B u m ,40 H arris,41 an d D illard .42

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF ECONOMICS

Since econom ics is p rim arily concerned w ith the a d a p ta tio n s o f per to their environing c ircum stance as self an d societal m ain tenance, inevita ble th a t psychology shou ld p lay an im m ense role in econom ic th a n d practice. But as we have seen econom ical science is as bad ly ham p by faulty psychological view s as by in ad eq u a te philosophy. It is no order, then , to ex am in e th e psychological p rob lem s th a t are o f ad v a r an d d isadvan tage fo r the p h ilo sophy o f econom ics.

" Keynes, J. M.. ihul.. p. 4.'' Klein. I.. R.. Op Cil."Spiegel. H. W.. Op Cil."Schumpeter. J. A.. History of Ectuumuc Analysis. New York. Oxford Unis'. Press. 1954wHarrod, R. F„ The Life o f John Maynard Keynes, New York, Harcourt. Brace, 1951.

Burn. E . .1., Si null Perspective in the History o f Economic Theory. New York, S t . Martin’s1972.

11 Harris. S. E .. the Sew Economics. New York. Knopf, 1947.*- Dillard. I)., The Economics o f John Mavnard Scenes: The Theory of a Monetary Ec<.

New York. Prenticc-llall. I94X.

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P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C ST a b l e 3 . K e y n e s i a n H e r e s i e s

C la ssical D o c tr in e K eynes Va r ia tio n 43

Laissez faire government controls free play of economic forces

Parsimonious SavingsExcessiveness of

Capital

Opposition to inequalities of Wealth

Free spending

Favors inequalities and rejects abstinence of the wealthy

Favor high interest rates as inducement to save

Scale of investment promoted by low rate in full employment

International trade a desperate expedient to maintain employment at home

Should be a willing and unimpeded exchange of goods and services in condition of mutual advantage

Vested interests dangerous for good or evil

Ideas, not vested interests dangerous

Unemployment cured by reduction in wage rates

Unemployment overcome by increase of effective demand

Interest a reward for saving Interest a premium for surrendering Liquidity Preference

Pleasure pain psychology Psychology of expectations and motivations

Favor Gold Standard Opposed to Gold Standard

Thrift an Economic Virtue Thrift not economically advantageous

4> Mainly from Keynes, J. M., General Theory o f Employment, /merest and Money, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1936.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I VFiret and forem ost ic the_gnpstion o f a n ad e q u a te a ttitu d e to w ard

psychological com p o n en ts in econom ical th in k ing. Surely it is a h a rrr a ttitu d e to ap p ro ach econom ical s itu a tio n s w ith in ad eq u a te views a b th e na tu re o f h um an organism s. F o r the econom ic theorist p sycho log obviously ind ispensable. P e rh a p s even w orse th a n s tudy ing ccononr w ith o u t the benefit o f psychology is to em ploy a n in ad eq u a te psycholo as fo r exam ple trad itional subjectivistic o r m entalistic systems.

As M itchell has po in ted ou t44 there have been three vary ing views econom ists tow ard psychology. ( I) E x p lan a tio n s in term s o f p leasure-p princip les (B entham , R icardo , Jevons, J . S. M ill, etc.), (2) the exclusior psychology-in-favQ L_oLprice.( 1. F ischer, and H. J . D av en p o rt), an d basing value p rinciples entirely on vo litional psychology IF. A . Fetter;

H ow harm fu l it is to fo llow trad itio n a l views o f psychology is a p p a r w hen we exam ine the asse rtio n s o f classical econom ists w ho dea lt w p leasure-pain o r general hedon ic principles. It is clear th a t a psycholoj concerned w ith inexistent in te rn a l subjective processes can be o f n o ben in such com plex s itua tions as m o d em living presents. W hat value ju d g m en ts an d evaluations based on a hedonic calculus?

A glance over the succession o f psychological views held by eco n o m reveals a num b er o f fa llacious a ttitu d es such as the n o tio n o f intuit faculties an d instincts. T o persons a re a ttrib u ted propensities to exchai o r b a r te r goods and services, to be aggressive, o r to seek profits an d gene adv an tag es in dealing w ith o th e r persons. T h en there is th e p o p u la r viev th e irksom eness o f lab o r an d th e co n tra ry instinct o f w o rk m an sh ip . Ag it is n o t surprising to find the a ttitu d e am o n g econom ists th a t there e: m en ta l pow ers th a t a lo n e regard less o f o th e r fac to rs can ach ieve an efl live, if no t an affluent econom ic system . A ll such views im p ly a n obliv io ness concern ing the m any fac to rs th a t co n trib u te to th e ex istence com plex econom ic events.

A n o th e r very co m m o n view point a m o n g econom ists is th a t all difficulties o f th e econom ic realm a re ow ing to the unspecified faults h u m an n a tu re . S om e eco n o m ists are convinced tha t m em bers o f gi’ econom ic g ro u p s c ither are unab le to m ake p rovision fo r all th e peopli the com m u n ity o r else the leaders th ro u g h incom petence o r crim ina becom e efficient agen ts fo r the p erp e tu a tio n o f econom ic inequalities z econom ic hardsh ips. H ere a co m p e ten t psychologist can be relied upon

44 Mitchell. W C V I he Prospects of Kconomics," in Tugwcll, R. G., The Trend o f tuononiics. * York, Knopf. 1924. p. 16.

224

P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C Ssuggestions, n o t necessarily a b o u t eco n o m ic princip les, b u t a b o u t general intelligence an d com petency fo r m odification o r change.

H u m an beings are no t by n a tu re unable to achieve a p ro p e r o rgan iza tion o f econom ic system s o r o f im proving the p ro d u c tio n o f p ro d u ce or m an u fac tu red goods in sufficient quan tities to su p p o rt a n en tire popu la tio n . All necessary psychological capacities can be developed by ind iv iduals while perfo rm ing ad justm en ts to the s itua tions in w hich they find them selves. A ssum ing the variab le evo lu tion o f o rgan ism s in th e ir philogenetic an d on togenetic histories, the inequalities o f people a re ow ing to accidents o f biological and cu ltura l d ifferentiation o f individual developm ent.

S u ch high peaks of developm ent have been reached by even the earliest g ro u p s o f the h um an species in the d om ains o f a r t and technology th a t we m ust conc lude th a t it is on ly specificities o f d eve lopm en t th a t b ring a b o u t the d ifferences betw een those w ho deserve m o re an d those w ho have m ore th an they deserve.

CRITICAL OVERVIEW OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF ECONOMICS

A s we co nc lude o u r b rie f survey o f eco n o m ic a ttitu d e s w h e th e r in a p a rticu la r co u n try o r locality, o r in a w ider perspective o f com m unities o r n a tions, we ca n n o t avoid th e p a rad o x m en tioned earlier, th a t the econom ic d o m ain so essentially the concrete particu la rity o f h u m an existence a n d survival shou ld be overlaid w ith universal a n d ab so lu te hypotheses a n d theories. T heories an d m odels a re co n stru c ted a s th o u g h th e co n stan t changes o f econom ic practice a n d process d id n o t occur.

G ra n te d th a t a so lu tio n to the p a ra d o x is d esirab le , it is suggested th a t a rem edy is to be fou n d in the a d a p ta tio n o f a m o re scientific ph ilo so p h y and psychology. B etter a ttitu d es in econom ics a s well as in o th e r d ep a rtm en ts o f cu ltu re can readily elim inate th e p a rad o x . F o r o n e th ing, th e d o m a in o f econom ics can be freed from abso lu tes a n d ab s tra c tio n s by considering th a t th e descrip tions a n d in te rp re ta tio n s o f econom ic events should be o rgan ized w ith a d e a r view o f the changes th a t o cc u r in th e lives o f individ uals an d com m unities because o f increases o f popu la tio n s, advances in techno logy , m odifications in social p a tte rn s , a n d in te rco m m u n ity relations.

A s we have ind icated , th ro u g h o u t th e d ev e lopm en t o f econom ic th eo ries, w riters a d o p t an abstrac tio n a l p rocedure in th e ir descrip tions and in terp re ta tions. A n excellent sam ple is the trea tm en t th a t econom ists have accorded to th e concept o f value. A n in fo rm in g illu stra tion is p rov ided by A yres (1891-1972) w ho is a d evo tee o f p ro g ress in eco n o m ic th eo ry a n d a

2 2 5

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Ip ro m in en t advocate o f scientific m e th o d in econom ics; w ho asserts value is th e to ta lity o f eco n o m ics, “econom ics is no th ing if it is n o t a sci o f value.” T he crite rion o f value, h e asserts, is the co n tin u a tio n o f thi process— keeping th e m achines running .45

W hat seem s to be m issing in Ayres* in te rp re ta tio n is th e en o rm o u s rem arkaBle'specificity o f s itu a tio n s inwhichvalue an d th e valuab le p' n a r t-A c tu allv there is n o en tity o r q u a lity su ch as ab s trac t and genera value. The c rudesL things.and^obiects m ay have value in p a r tic u la r s tions o r they m ay be valuab le fo r certain .persons or.partic.uJaLCQmnmi an d n o t others, as A yres h im self suggests.

T h e H isto ry o f E conom ics p o in ts to a series o f in tervals each repre ing a d ifferent type o f reflection an d specu la tion a b o u t p ro d u c tio n , coi sion, th e buying an d selling o f goods, an d so on. T h e fo llow ing set

lfi suggests th e natu re o f this succession since th e 17»h century .All persons an d their b eh a v io r a re confined an d influenced, ir

fo rm ed , by the cu ltu ra l in s titu tio n s th a t su rro u n d them . T h o se institu include th e cu rren t d octrines o f ph ilo sophy an d psychology. It is a nr o f historical inevitability th a t theories o f econom ics shou ld b e shap«

Ifjjj cu rren t m istaken views concern in g h u m a n n a tu re as well as by th e kircond itions o f w ar and peace th a t th e theorist has to con tend w ith.

I01 A p ro m in en t p o in t o f ev a lu a tio n o f the various system s in c lu d e d :,p> h isto ry o f econom ic theo rie s is th e lack o f ag reed -u p o n finding

. com plicated are the d a ta as econom ic events, tha t it is easy, w hen sui^ ries are a ttem pted , to select a n d em phasize som e one o r m ore o f the10 aspects o f the com plex as key d a ta . B ut w hat is o f g rea te r im portancei«r particu la r choice o f salien t features. S om e stress the goods trea ted ,I'u the reactions o f persons involved, an d so on.

T hose w ho cleave to a na tu ra lis tic ph ilosophy a n d psychology^ fro m the observation o f tB esim ilarities betw een the doctrines o f hist

1 *' and cu rren t econom ists. T h a t is th e tribu te th a t econom ists p ay t o ;econom ic events. A sam pling o f th e a d a p ta tio n of la te r w riters o f the o f earlier ones substan tia tes the sh arin g o f views w hen events force v to d o so. S trik ing exam ples a re Keynes go ing b ack to C an tillo n < 1734)46 an d to Q uesnay (1694-1774) fo r views on saving.47 A gain , K w ho is d isdain fu l o f w h a t he calls the classical econom ics still fl

*5 Ayres. C. E., The Theory o f Economic Progress, Chapel Hill. Univ. o f North Carolir 1944. ch. 10.

“ Schumpeter, J. A.. Ten Great Economists, From Marx to Keynes, New York, Oxfot p. 276.

» Ibid., p. 282. 226

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C hart 2. Ec o n o m ic O pin io n s I7™-19,h C enturies

T o pic P roponent Basis

Adam SmithMalthusRicardo

Value JevonsMcCulloch

u iility of an object, or purchasing power purchasing powerCost of production including labor and profits utility, scarcityReal value: quantity of labor required for production Relative value: purchasing capacity

Mengcr Imputation, Zurechnung, no inherent quality

Adam Smith Malthus Ricardo Lauderdale

Wealth Slorch

Say

accumulated land or labor necessary, useful, or agreeable material objects increased revenue or diminished consumption all that man desiresmaterial products with exchangeable value

natural wealthsocial wealth: objects of exchange

TorrensMcCulloch

articles of utility produced voluntarily

material products with exchangeable value

Adam Smith Ricardo

l^tbor Storch

Say Jevons

basis of value; productive and nonproductive labor determining factor in value of commodities Paction des facultes humaines dirig£e vers un bOt utile

not sole source of value Opposed to labor theory of value

Adam Smith Fixed capital: machinery, shops, improvements of land, skil Circulating capital: money, provisions, unfinished

manufacturing matterMalthusRicardo

Capital Storch SayTorrens

possessions employed for profit wealth employed in productionun fonds de richesses destine a la consomption improductive machinery, materials

objects labored upon destined to acquire other objects of utility

McCulloch portion of produce supporting human existence or production

Mill produced object used as means of further production

228


T o pic P roponent Basis

Adam Smith payment to use landMalthus excess of price above wages and profits

Ricardo payment to use landStorch le prix qu'on paye pour 1‘usage d'un fonds de terre

RentSay le profit resultant du service productif dc la terre

Torrens produce given for use of landMcCulloch produce given for use of landSismondi* la pandela recolieannuelledu sol qui revientau proprietaire

aptes qu'il a acquitte les frais qui Font fait naitreMill difference between most and least productive portion of

capital

Adam Smith price of laborMalthus remuneration of the laborerRicardo laborer's portion of produceStorch le prix du travail

Wages Say Ic prix dc Fachat d'un service productif industrielTorrens wealth received by laborerMcCulloch laborers compensationSismondi Ic prix du travailMill price of laborer’s share

Adam Smith revenue derived from stockMalthus differences between advances and value of produced objectRicardo Capitalist's portionStorch circulating: remuneration for use of capital and trouble

Profit Say la portion de la valeur produitc, retiree par le captalisteTorrens surplus after cost of productionMcCulloch excess produced over expendituresSismondi la valeur dont Fouvragc acheve surpasse des avances qui Font

fait faireMill Portion remaining after rent and wages

2 2 9

a

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V I

profitable to rehabilita te M althus concern ing underem ploym ent equili b rium and general glut, while also referring sym pathetically to the m ercan tilists as possessors o f elem ents o f scientific tru th .48 O ther exam ples o an tic ipations are G alliani’s (1728-1787) distinguishing value in use fro r value in exchange;49 M alth u s suggests the need fo r using the calculus;5 M enger’s co-discovery o f the m arg ina l princip le an d the subjective th e o r o f values;51 G ossen an tic ipated the utility theory o f Jevons an d Walras.-* A lso, it is indicated th a t A dam S m ith tou ch ed u p o n Say’s law .53 A gain , it i rep o rted th a t J . B. C lark d iscovered the subjective theo ry o f value an d th m arg inal u tility theo ry .54 T h en o f course there is the enco u rag em en t c Bernoulli (1700-1782) th e m ath em atic ian to show the m athem atica l w ay c presenting d a ta and theories o f econom ics.

A n a ttem p t to sum m arize the h isto ry o f econom ic ph ilosophy reachc the p roper conclusion th a t econom ics ad u m b ra tes an evo lu tionary proces: W ith the developm ent o f h u m an societies including p o p u la tio n sizes, an d is trib u tio n in various geograph ic locations, there even tua ted a n apprecit tio n o f hum an individual an d g ro u p events cu lm inating in an econom i discipline. A uthentic progress m ay be discerned in the observations an d th th ink ing o f econom ists in the course o f th e evo lu tion o f the discipline. St charts o f econom ic opinions.

P rogress in econom ics parallels closely the th rea d of progress in person; freedom o f th ough t an d ac tion in m o d em society.55 K eeping close to th princip le o f specificity we see a lo n g w ith the tu m u lt, d iso rg an iza tio n , an om nipresen t violence som e progressive elem ents in governm ent, religioi education , and o th er societal c ircum stances. S o in econom ic evolutic there is discernible som e p rogress in the understand ing o f econom ic pri cesses. In industrial com m unities econom ists tak e accoun t o f the m o v m ents aw ay from the w ealth o f na tions and m anagers to the w elfare i ind iv idual w orkers an d th e ir un ions. C h ild ren a re sen t to schoo ls n< factories, an d w om en are m o re and m o re regarded as persons an d n< chattels.

4" Keynes. J. M„ The General Theory o f Employment, Interest and Money. New York, Harcoi Brace. 1936, p. 395.

“ Spiegel. Op. Cit., p. 204.* Ibid., p. 205.>' Ibid., p. 530.” Ibid., p. 512."Ib id ., p. 254.54 Bunt, E. J., Jr., Social Perspectives in the History o f Economic Theory, New York, St. Marti

Press, 1972, p. 199.” Cf. Bury, J. B., and Blackham, H. J., A History o f Freedom o f Thought, London, Oxford Ur

Press, 1952.

2 3 0

P H I L O S O P H Y A N D E C O N O M I C SBut it is inescapable th a t econom ic doctrines are still in a n im m atu re

stage. W e have been co n stan tly p o in tin g o u t w hat a p p e a r as the im pedim ents to a reaso n ab le o n w ard m o tio n an d a d im in u tio n o f repetitions and regressions. T hey are the p ro lo n g a tio n o f tran scen d en ta l ph ilosophical a ttitu d es an d the cleaving to fa llacious psychological principles in terrelated w ith unscientific ph ilosophy.

T he revo lu tionary com plex ion o f econom ics w hich V eblen fostered m irro red the ac tu a l econom ic co n d itio n s w h ich prevailed prim arily in the U .S .A . A t any ra te the recogn ition o f w h a t w as go ing o n in th a t g reat d o m a in o f ag ricu ltu ra l, industria l, an d com m ercia l events forced the p reo ccu p a tio n w ith business details ra th e r th an w ith the abstraction istic subjects o f w ealth , labor, rent, an d sim ilar subjects.

R epresen ting the new in stitu tio n a l view a p p e a r the nam es o f M itchell (1874-1948), C o m m o n s (1862-1945), A yres (1891-1972), an d a n u m b er o f o th e rs w ho co n trib u ted to T u g w e ll’s The Trend o f Economics?* M itchell becam e ab so rb ed in p rob lem s o f business o r trad e cycles though he w orked a t o th e r p rob lem s to o .37 C o m m o n s m ad e h im self m aste r o f lab o r eco n o m ics w ith ad d itio n a l in terests in the legal fo u n d a tio n s o f cap ita lism .311 A yres specialized in the general theories o f econom ics an d the re la tions betw een econom ics and ethics.

The Trend of Emm units (R. C. Tugwell. cd.). New York. Knopf. 1024 ' ' Mitchell, W. C.. thinness Ci t ies: Vie Problem and its Seitinn. New York. National Bureau of

Economic Research. 1127.'"Commons. .1. R., InslilulionalEconomies, its/’lacein Political Ecomnnv, New York. MacMillan.

19.14.

231

C H A P T E R 18

PHILOSOPHY OF ART AND AESTHETICS

PARLOUS CONDITIONS O F AESTHETICS

N o d ep a rtm en t o f ph ilo sophy s tan d s in such need o f clarification ai p ro p e r u nderstand ing as the d o m ain o f the a rts and aesthetics.

In the whole area of philosophic studies there is probably no other topic which is marked so much unclarity and so little unanimity as is exhibited by the subject of esthetic theor

In p a r t th is is true since du ring the perennial in terest in such m atters the has resulted a g rand am alg am a tio n o f facts, partia l tru th s, an d utl m isin terpretations. T h e ph ilosophical literature o n a r t a n d aesthetics im m ense a n d the w riters w ho devo te tim e to the form al studies o f a r t ai aesthetics have p roduced innum erab le doctrines all based o n transcende generalizations, as well as fa llacious view s of psychology. It is in o rd e r th to analyze a n d fo rm ula te the field o f a r t an d aesthetics w ith stric t regard the things an d events available in tho se aspects o f hu m an living.

D espite the fact th a t in n u m erab le p erso n s neither app recia te n o r val beau ty o r a rt, and w hen they d o they p u t such things a t the b o tto m o f t list o f values, the aesthetic aspects o f hu m an cu ltu re m ust be regarded a: p rom inen t phase o f intellectual interest. T he recent slogan th a t a r t is go< investm ent does no t conceal th e existence o r in terest in aesthetic objec w hether o f natu re o r o f h u m an contrivance.

ART TH RO U G H THE AGES

A nthropo log ists and p reh istoric archaeologists have long been aw j th a t prim itive people o f even tw enty th o u san d years ago, while con tend i w ith the m ost m eager living cond itions, p roduced in caves an d rock shelti w orks o f a r t o f the highest s tandards. A s m ore an d m ore aesthetic d iscov ies a re m ade, it becom es inescapable th a t h o m o sapiens is no t on ly ho r faber, b u t a lso an ap p rec ia to r o f b eau ty an d perfection. F u rth e rm o an th ropo log is ts rep o rt how th e dwellers in th e sim plest social grou d eco ra te them selves an d th e ir hum ble possessions with co lors, figures, a w ith various designs beyond utility o r necessity.

1 Lewis, C. I.. An Analysis o f Knowledge and Valuation, LaSalle, Illinois, Open Court, 1947, p. 4.

2 3 2

A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C SP roperly to app recia te the natu re o f A rt an d A esthetics on e m ust be alert

to th e con tinu ity an d variability in the evo lu tion and progress o f the sources o f aesthe tic life an d lore th ro u g h the h is to ry o f civilization. It is fa ta l to overlook the developm ent o f a r t by the S um erians, A ssyrians, Egyptians,H ittites, G reeks, R om ans, Chinese, and o th e r groups. T hose are the veritab le sources o f the cu ltu re o f today . F u rth e rm o re , the view is inescapable th a t the m ost m odem and cu rren t aesthetic disciplines have grow n and evolved from the ac tual w ork and p rod u c ts o f one o r o f m any creative individuals. T h a t is a cond ition o f origin an d survival o f all the intellectual in stitu tions o f every ex isting cu ltu ra l system. T h ro u g h o u t the records o f history we observe the practice o f the m any types o f art: m usic, painting, sculpture, and so on.

EVOLUTION OF AESTHETICSI

A long w ith the general evo lu tion o f ph ilosophical co n tem p la tio n there developed in the h isto ry o f ph ilosophy n u m erous constru c tio n s a b o u t a r t o f all types. T heories ab o u n d concerning taste, rhetoric, m usical com posi- ,!tion, pain ting an d sculpture, and the nature o f beauty in general.

a. Informal Aesthetics. T he philosophical in terest in A esthetics devel-oped o f course pah passu w ith theories p ro p o u n d ed by scho lars in terested ^in the v arious a r t departm en ts, fo r exam ple, lite rary critics, pa in ters, p>sculp tors, com posers, an d so on. But w ith the increase o f know ledge ab o u t a r t practices a n d th e m ultip lication o f expertness concerning the reactions to the p ro d u c ts o f various types o f artists, there developed a definite ?professional aesthetic discipline.^Aesthetics then becam e technical w ith the »partic ipa tion o f the resources o f ph ilosophers, psychologists, sociologists, t .an d o th e r intellectual w orkers. In general the scope o f aesthetics becam e b ro ad er and m ore form al.^ *

b. Modern Formal Aesthetics. T he origin o f aesthetics as a technicaldiscipline is conventionally traced back to the w ork o f A lexander G ottlieb aB aum garten (1714-1762), a disciple o f J o h a n n C hristian W olff (1679-1754), w h o sought a basis fo r inquiries in to th e realm o f sense percep tion such as logic m ade available fo r ra tional know ledge.2 Because B aum garten was reared in the R ationalistic trad ition o f Leibniz and Wolff, he could only th ink in term s o f the abstruse an d abstrac t institu tions o f the C on tinen-

1A gigantic paradox overshadows the origin of aesthetics as a formal discipline. The effective originator of the term “aesthetics’' and erstwhile student of an and beauty was less concerned with the origination of a special department of philosophical scholarship, than the advancement of the rationalistic philosophy of his immediate intellectual forebcarers.

2 3 3

»

IHl-

tiH U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V

ta l E urope o f the 18th cen tu ry . A esthetic theo ry was a t hom e w ith si categories as o rder, perfec tion , un ity , an d certain ty . T h e en tire L eibr W olff p h ilo sophy was based o n the assu m p tio n th a t in the soul in h e re series o f faculties som e o f w hich , th e petites perceptions, were a m o n g sim plest an d lowest, while the intellectual facu lty was th e highest and m ost capable an d effective.

A link in the ch a in o f faculties is im ag ination , w hich is confused sensi It is th a t m iddle ru n g ab ove s im ple sensing w hich represen ts th e area beauty . B eauty fo r L eibniz an d fo r B aum garten is th e perfectibility phenom enal appearances. F ro m the stan d p o in t o f m o d em philosophy.' psychology, the en tire ra tio n a lis tic system is h a rd ly an y th in g b u t a m as m yths fo rm u la ted on the m o d el o f th e theo logical soul. It is im possibl- b ring such constru c tio n s in to the a rea o f aesthetics as it shou ld ex ist toe

H ow ever bizarre ap p ears th e aesthetics o f a B aum garten , th e nam< p roposed fo r the d iscipline th a t trea ts o f the beau tifu l in n a tu re a n d in to o k ro o t w ith m odifications. A s in so m an y o th e r in tellectual situatio r discipline has developed w ith little resem blance to the earlier phase o existence. S o aesthetics to d a y m ay be regarded as exp lo ring prob lem a r t and beauty beyond its early deve lopm en t from in terest in v a r cognitive faculties. W h a t ap p ears as a g ian t n ex t step in the developm ei aesthetics m ay be tak en to be K an t’s developm ent o f transcende aesthetics.

By th e tim e o f K an t (1724-1804), aesthetics h ad becom e som ew hat n e lab o ra te an d system atic, th o u g h n o t w ith o u t am biguities. W hile Kanl w as im prisoned in th e R atio n a listic trad itio n , he had a lso com e unde: influence o f the B ritish E m piristic tra d itio n an d could get so m ew h at cl to aesthetic th ings a n d n o t rem a in com pletely tied to the soul’s intuit: K an t en larged the n u m b er o f psychic faculties ad d ing to the facu lti cognition a n d will, a lso the facu lty o f feeling. T h u s he w as enab led to acco u n t o f the p leasure fac to rs (hedo n is tic entities) w hich th e Bi Em piristic w riters in tro d u ced in to th e ir reflections concern ing th e beai an d th e taste form o f ap p rec ia tio n o f a r t objects.

As a link in the ch a in o f ae sth e tic system s K an t p ro p o sed a n em p u p o n fo u r m om ents o r d e te rm in an ts o f the beautifu l. T hese a re 1) disi estedness w hich is ind icated in the ju d g m en t, “th a t is beautifu l v pleases w ithou t in terest,” 2) un iversality , w hich is rep resen ted b; assertion , “th a t is beau tifu l w hich is the subject o f universal pleasup p u rp osive fo rm as represen ted in th e sta tem ent, “th a t is beautifu l v pleases w ith o u t concep ts.” H ere the focus is o n the ob jects w h ich ca

2 3 4

A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Sthe ju d g m en t o f beauty . It is fo rm no t co n ten t w hich is im p o rtan t in the adm ired objects. A nd finally there is 4 ) . necessity. Like the m om ent o f universality , necessity presum es a consensus o f all persons w ith respect to the quality o f objects.

N o tw ithstand ing all th e e rro rs K ant has com m itted o r is accused o f com m itting in his ph ilosophy o f aesthetics, s tu d en ts o f the history o f aesthetics as well as the h isto rian s o f general ph ilosophy can n o t be in e rro r in placing K ant in the very cen ter o f the m odern philosophical trad ition .N ot only did his system atic treatises b ring to g e th e r in one unity m ost o f the ex tan t so lu tions o f philosophical p rob lem s o f the en tire trad ition , b u t they also p rovided excellent arch itec ton ic s tru c tu re to the to tality o f doctrines.A bove all p erhaps his fam e is assu red by his valian t a ttem p ts to harm onize the opposed sectarian views am o n g them selves, b u t also to b ring into co n tac t the findings o f the burgeoning science o f his day. A lthough K ant ttclung to the triune peaks o f m etaphysics: G o d , F reedom , an d Im m ortality , he d id envisage the task o f ph ilo sophy to d ep a rt theoretically from the trad itio n a l theological beliefs by setting u p a d uality o f R eason an d P ractice. S ym bolically K an tian ph ilosophy is a n am alg am a tio n o f the A Priority an d the / I S IF of the spiritistic trad ition . |

W rite rs o n the ph ilosophy o f aesthetics a fte r K an t are unab le to proceedw ith o u t d irec t reference to som e phase o f his ph ilosophy e ither by accept- P*ance o r by m odification . But it is to be n o ted th a t aside from the use o f the term “science” none o f th e successors ofJK ant really to o k advan tage o f his h ints to deal w ith aesthetics on the basis o f persons interacting w ith the ^beautifu l in n a tu re and in art] W hether o r n o t K an t is held responsible fo r a *»'m odified aesthetic discipline, it m ust be po in ted o u t th a t aesthetic th in k in g jf*<

becam e en larged after his tim e to acco m m o d ate such factors as feeling, >und erstan d in g , ju d g m en t, taste, p leasure, as well as in tu ition . T he en tire subject o f aesthetics, how ever, was allow ed to rem ain in the upper regions o f the ethereal.

W h atever the m erits o f the K an tian cu ltivation o f aesthetics his successo rs d id no t fail to criticize his views in w hole o r part. A specific exam ple is Hegel’s ob jection to K an t’s dualism o f fo rm an d m atte r in aesthetics, as well as the sep ara tio n o f reason from sense. Hegel (1770-1831) espouses a unified abso lu te, a religious ra th e r th an a scientific type o f m etaphysics. M any o th e r less to talistic criticism s have been p roposed by the ph ilosophical successors o f K ant. O f especial no te are the aesthetic views o f H erbart (1776-1841) w ho with his realistic bent d istinguished betw een aesthetics as concerned with pure beau ty as over against a rt. H erb art has been credited

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as b ring ing aesthetics so m ew h at closer to ac tu a l th ings th o u g h he rep resen ts no d e p a rtu re from the m etaphysics o f abstrac tio n ism , verbiage, artificiality, an d purely im ag inary no tio n s o f abso lu tistic an d transcendental ph ilosophy . It is tru e th a t th ro u g h his follow ers, especially Z im m erm an (1814-1898), aesthetics becam e a definite form al discipline.

ISSUES IN A R T AND AESTHETICS

Because o f the w ide p revalence a n d vastness o f the aesthetic dom ain , ph ilosophers an d o th er scho lars have fo rm ula ted a large n u m b er o f issue* concern ing the essential n a tu re o f aesthetics and the things an d even ts ir th is field. A side from p rob lem s a b o u t the general n a tu re o f beauty , ques- l ions are raised a b o u t criteria fo r the a rts and ,aesthe tic qualities.

a. Intrinsicality of Art and Aesthetic Quality. A rt and aesthetic quality are frequen tly characterized by ae s th e tic ian sas intrinsic. B eauty fo r exam pie is w hat it is an d it is n o t v a lued fo r an y o th e r fa c to r o r featu re . Fo: exam ple , a r tis tic w ork a n d its p ro d u c ts a re d ifferentiated from all thing: useful an d p ractical. W hile we m ay c o u n t as a m erit the a ttem p t to sugges th e specificity o f b eau ty an d aesth e tic qu a lity , th is is n o t to co n d o n e th* p rim ary fallacy o f o v erlook ing th a t b eau tifu l th ings m ay obviously tx useful, w hereas objects th a t a re p rim arily useful m ay also p a r ta k e o f th< qualities o f beauty . T o tak e co ncre te situa tions in to accoun t dem o n stra te the advisab ility o f considering the circum stances in w h ich a rt a n d it p ro d u c tio n fun c tio n in the lives o f artists. It is m isleading to leave o u t an reference to decorative a r t an d its m any uses.

b. The Principle o f Aesthetic Experience in Art. A n o u ts tan d in g exam pie o f the em ploym ent o f fa llacious psychology by conven tional philos o p h ers interested in aesthetic even ts is the co n stru c tio n o f a specif p rincip le called aesthetic experience . M an y w riters on aesthetics assert tha the response to aesthetic ob jects involves a special kind o f psychic stat u sually o f som e affective q u a lity calledffa ) em o tio n o r 'fee lin g ,? (b) a a tten tio n process,3 4 o r (c) in ten tio n , a n d n u m ero u s o thers. E qually qualifie w riters deny the ex istence o f a n y special tra its o f feeling o r em o tio n i aesthe tic s itua tions, bu t insist th a t a n o th e r type o f psychic princip le opei ales. T he follow ing p a rag ra p h s m en tion som e o f the m ore p ro m in en t viev th a t fill the pages o f aesthetic literature .

3 Dewey, J., A rt as Experience, New York, Minton Balch, 1934; and Prall, D. W., Aesthei Judgm ent, New York, Crowell, 1929.

4 Vivas, E.,M A Definition of the Aesthetic Experience,*' Journal o f Philosophy, 1937, 34,628-63

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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Sc. Psychic Distance. As B ullough5 describes th is princip le, the fa rther

; one is rem oved from a d an g e ro u s fog a t sea the m o re one can en joy thescene, ju s t as a m o u n ta in clim ber can relish the experience the m ore he d isregards the lab o r an d the danger. So the sep ara tio n o f objects from one's ow n self finds its basis in the various form s o f a r t an d provides a crite rion o f ^ the beautiful.

d. Empathy. A p o p u la r ch a rac te riza tio n o f a m en tal principle in aesthetics has been nam ed em p ath y , a tran s la tio n o f th e G erm an w ord EinfUhlung that T h e o d o r Lipps used fo r the psychic state. T he p rim ary n o tio n ab o u t this princip le is th a t one ex periences certa in feelings a b o u t objects, as fo r exam ple the rising up o f arch itectu ra l co lum ns o r the bend ing o f bu ild ings one sees. A m ong the v aria tio n s in the ap p lica tio n of em p a th y are ind ications o f in tro jections o f the m ind in to all so rts o f aesthetic objects. S an tay an a 's in teresting definition o f beauty is a particu la r version o f em pathy . “ B eauty is pleasure regarded as the q uality o f a thing.*'*’

H ow ever great the detailed differences betw een the various versions of the aesthetic principles none of the sponsors rejects the w rong psychological p rincip le o f psychic sta tes. T h e top ic o f aesthetic experience is o f course localized in the general d o m a in o f dualistic psychology. T h e entire deba te concern ing the ex istence o r nonex istence o f special types o f experience in aesthetical s itu a tio n s rests u p o n a m ythical view o f experience. It is assum ed th a t experience is som e so rt o f subjective m entalistic process.7 All the versions co n tra s t w ith a naturalistic explica tion o f experience.

It is evident th a t th e deba te ab o u t aesthe tic experiences concerns the in terac tion o f persons w ith objects. T his is a definite so rt o f in terbehavioral event w hich ca n n o t be ad equate ly trea ted w ithou t th e cen tral facto rs o f b eh av io r o f persons as a lso th e behav io r o f the stim u lus object in the behav io ra l field. T he event consists o f J o h n S m ith look ing a t D a Vinci’s p o rtra it o f M ona Lisa.

N ow o f course every type o f in terbehav io r is unique w ith characteristics o f its ow n. T o in terbehave with tools, m achines, anim als, o r scu lp ture or p a in tings is to engage in specialized form s o f ac tion , each w ith a different descrip tion and analysis. O ne event is too l-using o r craftsm ansh ip , an o th e r is enjoying, adm iring , o r eva lua ting a pain ting , sta tue, o r o th e r beautiful

s Bullough, E.. “Psychical Distance as a Factor in Art and an Aesthetic Principle,” British Journal o f Psychology. 1912.5. 87-98.

f Santayana. G.. The Sense o f Beauty. Being Outlines o f Aesthetic Theory, New York. Scribner’s. 18%.

1A most elaborate chapter bearing on the problem of aesthetic experience is a variable in Kovach. K J., Philosophy o f Beauty. Norman. Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1974, ch. 12.

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object. T h u s the uniqueness o f the aesthetic experience is o n ly the un iqueness o f any behav io r event as co m p ared w ith a n y o ther. In all cases experience is on ly a n am e o r synonym fo r the con tac ts o f o rgan ism s with things, events, conditions, and so on.

e. Art as Illusion. A esthetic ians and especially a r t h isto rians search foi the so lu tion o f the riddle o f style an d its changes. W ollheim* p u ts the m atte: well w hen he asks,. . . Why has representative art a history? Why did Duccio and Rubens. Van Eyck am Monel, Uccello and Watteau, all of whom, it must be granted, were interested in depictin; the visible world, depict it in such different, such bewilderingly different, ways . . . ?

A s the h isto rians observe th e m any p ro fo u n d varia tio n s in th e wa; ob jects are depicted in different tim es o r in co n tem p o ra ry schools, the; bask in the aid and com fort they receive from a perverted style o f psychol ogy. They accept the prem ise th a t a r t is a th ing o f th e m ind th o u g h scientifi psychology has no p lace fo r su ch a perversion o f the ac tu a l activ ity o pain ters, sculptors, o r d raugh tsm en .

T o observe th a t th e p a in tin g o f a Chinese landscape varies radically fro r a D u tch , F rench , o r English one is indeed th e beginning o f aestheti w isdom . B ut shou ld such variab ility be reduced to p ro b lem s o f im prope rep resen ta tion? T o d o so is ta n ta m o u n t to v ictim ization by th e crudest an m ost deceiving philosophy. It is to m isin terp ret th e d a ta an d in te rp re ta tio o f perceiving, th ink ing , an d o th e r fo rm s o f o rien ta tio n o f o rgan ism s t th e ir environing w orlds. A rt as Illusion is an ou tg ro w th o f a spiritist: psychology.

M istakes, falsifications, e rro rs, an d m isin terp re ta tions are fo rm s o f it te rac tio n o f persons a n d th ings.9 W hat lends su p p o rt to th e view o f a r t j illusion is the obvious fact th a t o rgan ism s a n d persons differ in the perceiving responses to the sam e o r sim ilar objects.

O n e o f the m ost persisten t u pho lders o f the view th a t a r t is illusio published a large w ork ex p o u n d in g th is a ttitu d e .10 In this w o rk the a u th t h as m ustered a list o f testim on ia ls fro m professional psychologists an ph ilosophers w ho believe th a t ac ts o f perceiving consist o f a m ind projec ing qualities in to the n eu tra l sources o f stim u la tio n by energy. T1 m em bers listed d o n o t d iscrim in ate ag a in s t Berkeley and his follow ers.

* Wollheim, R., “Art and Illusion," in Aesthetics in the Modern World (H. Osborne, ed.), Ne York, Wcybrighi and Talley, 1968, pp. 235-36.

«Cf.ch.8.10 Gombrich, E. H ..Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology o f Pictorial Representation, Ne

York, Pantheon, 1960.


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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C S

psychology based on such fo u n d a tio n s can only be gossam er su p p o rt fo r the illusion doctrine.

W hat the illusion no tio n im plies is th a t there are no th ings o r their p roperties bu t th a t stim ulus objects are com plete creations o f im aginary m inds. F ro m the aesthetic stan d p o in t W ollheim 11 has severely and p ro p erly condem ned the illusion notion . But the transcendental psychology em ployed by the illusionists requires m ore radical exorcism .

A s ind icated above, G om brich as an illusionist has sough t ou t a n um ber o f spiritistic psychologists w ho indeed furnish h im with ghosts, an d spooks, before they them selves discover their errors. In the m ean tim e he bases his en tire bo o k on the them e that all a r t in its v a rio u s fo rm s is illusory. A n interesting con trad ic tion in his views is to m ake use o f the am biguous d u ck -rab b it figure and o thers to prove the nonexistence o f objects in the perceiving interaction.

A v arian t o f the illusion doctrine d irectly from spiritistic philosophy is the version o f A lexander12 w ho treats o f the “object o f a r t.” Briefly he asserts th a t there is a g reat difference betw een w hat a n artist pu ts u p o n a pain ting and w hat the beholder sees there. A rt then fo r him is illusion. T he significance o f a beautiful object is supplied , a t least in part, from the artis t’s m ind.

Z iff13 from the s tandpo in t o f ra tiona l aesthetics has com pletely dem olished the spiritistic doctrine o f tw o objects, one o f w hich the canvas con tains and the o ther, w hat the observer sees, a long w ith the discrepancies betw een them . Scientific philosophers an d psychologists go even farther an d uncover the delusion in the illusion doctrine . T hey are appalled by the d isto rtio n s im posed u p o n the obvious lessons o f daily experience, by reducing artists to inexistent m inds w ith pow ers to p roduce w orks o f a r t ou t o f b rush strokes an d a variety o f pigm ents.

It is basically a m ystery how a ph ilo sopher can overlook the com plex aesthetic situations, those involving the technique o f p roducing all sorts o f objects w hich o thers interact with by way o f perceiving paintings, m usic, o r o th er a r t objects, judg ing and evaluating them , and in m any o th er ways. As Z iff pu ts the m atter, w hen som eone sees d ep th portrayed on a canvas no one is deceived in believing they can w alk th ro u g h the canvas.14

F rom a scientific standpo in t the term “ illusion” describes in teractions» Op. Cil.. pp. 235-263.11 Alexander, S„ Philosophical and Literary Pieces. London. Macmillan. 1939. p. 259.llZilT. P., “An and the ‘Object of Art'.- in Aesthetics and Language (W. Elton, ed ). Oxford,

Blackwell. 1967. ch. II.'"Ziff. Ibid., p. 174.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I

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w ith th ings con trarily to th e ir ac tu a l qualities and properties. There am b ig u o u s figures a n d o th e r ob jects an d they serve to am plify the u individualistic m an n er o f in terac ting w ith things. There are alw ays corn cond itions tha t a cco u n t fo r the specificities o f perceiving as well as all o psychological events. Scientific psychology can in principle analyze p articu la r circum stances fo r usual and unusual behavior. A m o n g : c ircum stances m ay be n um bered the ap p ro ach to things w ith som e pre position , the influence o f prev ious experiences, and o f course, the prin co n d itio n m ay be som e usual o r u n u su a l p ro p erty of the things them se an d a lso the setting o r au sp ice o f the in teraction , (jt is a p ity tha t illusionist does no t take ac co u n t o f the round q u arte r-do llar w hich is as elliptical from certain angles o f v is io n .^

f. Absoluteness and Abstractionism. It is one of the tasks o f sciei ph ilosophy and psychology to co rrec t the e rro r o f conventional a e s tb o f cultivating abso lu tes a n d abstrac tions. T h e literature o f theore aesthetics has run m uch m ore on the tracks o f w ords and sentences i u p o n the basis o f describ ing an d in te rp re tin g the actual behav io r o f ci ing an d app recia ting pain tings, sculptures, o r the beautifu l in nat Scientific ph ilo sophy and psychology s tand firm in the d em an d to m ore w ith events th a n w ith fo rm ulae . T his developm ent o f the analys objects an d behav io ra l fields ra th e r th a n h istorical theories is o f co facilitated by the ev o lu tio n o f m o re ad eq u a te ideas o f the n a tu r reactions as well as a new er ap p rec ia tio n o f the tex tures, form s, a n d gei s tructu re o f things an d events.

It is only the reso rt to m etaphysics o f the w orst so rt to use the v “beau ty” as a basis fo r seeking som e sp iritual quality fo r aesthetic the T h is is exem plified in the s ta tem en ts o f C a rr itt15 concerning the gre difficulty o f aesthetics beyond th a t o f logic an d religion. As a spirit p h ilo sopher he says, “ W e a re investigating aesthetic experience, not n a tu re o f things." A esthetic lite ra tu re is replete w ith alternate ab s tra c t like in tu ition , vision, fancy, co n tem p la tio n , im ag ination , em o tio n , an on.

)ir T he verbalistic ph ilo sophers, fo r exam ple R y le,16 to u ch on the absi tion istic erro rs in aesthetics in m ak in g the w ord “feeling” so p rom ine fea tu re . H e indicates th a t there are jn a n y usages o f the term so tha t im p ro p er to connect feeling o r em o tio n w ith aesthetic situations, encourag ing to observe the critical a ttitu d e tow ard absolutism a n d absi

’’Canitt, E. F„ The Theory o f Beauty, 601 ed., London, Methuen, 1962, p. 3.“ Ryle, G., “Feelings," in Aesthetics and Language (W. Elton, ed.), Oxford, Blackwell, 1967,

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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Stion ism , how ever, it m u st be no ted th a t a basic requ irem en t is th e positive investigation o f genuine aesthetic in terb eh av io r w ith effective analyses of the ac tu a l com p o n en t fac to rs p artic ipa ting in such in terbehaviors.

g. Expressionism in Aesthetics. T h a t co nven tiona l aesthetics stan d s o u ts ide the ran g e o f concre te events is s trong ly d em o n stra ted by the expression ism so p ro m in en tly fo rm u la ted an d defended by th e Ita lian aesthetic ian C ro ce .17 E xpression ism carries th e full significance o f spiritistic ph ilosophy. T h e beau tifu l acco rd ing to C roce is en tire ly subjectivistic and egocentric . In effect expression ism does aw ay w ith the objects w hich d isp lay the b eau ty o r o th e r aesthetic q uality by reducing them to psychic expressions. “T h e beau tifu l is n o t a physical (n a tu ra l) fact, it does no t belong to th ings, b u t to th e activ ity o f m an , to sp iritua l energy.” 18 P rop erly to ap p rec ia te th is w ayw ard view is to connect it w ith th e en tire g rand trad itio n o f p o s t K an tian R o m an tic ph ilosophy . A s is well k n o w n , C roce is a fa irly d irec t descen d en t o f H egel, th a t m eans he c a n p lay fast an d loose w ith th e b eh av io r o f ind iv idua ls a n d th e ob jec ts w ith w h ich th ey in teract, b o th in aesthetic an d n onaesthe tic fields. T h e essential antiscientific n a tu re o f C roce’s ph ilo sophy an d psychology is well ind icated by his co m m en t th a t “even the rep resen ta tions th a t we have fo rg o tten persist som ehow in o u r sp irit, fo r w ith o u t th is we could n o t exp la in acqu ired hab its and capacities.”19

H ow soever fallacious an d degenera te the H egel-C roce ph ilo sophy an d psychology m ay be it still has genera ted a n aesthe tic trad itio n . F o r e x a m ple, C a rr itt20 an d C ollingw ood a re expressionists. Especially th e la tte r has p layed a p ro m in en t p a r t in aesthe tic circles. A s we w ou ld expect h is b o o k 21 is som ew hat m odern ized to the effect o f specifying th a t a r t expresses em o tio n . H o w obv ious it is th a t C o llingw ood know s little o f scientific ph ilosophy o r psychology.

In co n n ec tio n w ith his criticism o f C o llingw ood, D ickie sum m arizes the p rim ary assu m p tio n s o f his a rg u m e n t in the n ea t series o f th e follow ing five points.

1. A rt has som eth ing to d o w ith em otion .2. A rt m ust e ith er evoke em o tio n o r express em otion : there a re only tw o

possibilities.

17 Croce, B„ Aesthetic: as Science o f Expression and General Linguistic (D. Ainslie, trs.), 2nd ed., London, Macmillan, 1922.

>* Croce, Ibid., p. 97.19Croce, Ibid., p. 96.“ Carritt, E. F„ Op. Cfi., ch. 12.11 Collingwood, R. C., The Principles o f A rt, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1958.241

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T3. A rt is not craft.

— '■* 4. A rt canno t arouse em o tio n because if it did it w ould be craft.5. A rt is the expression o f em otion .

T h is sum m ary indicates how radically C ollingw ood avoids a n y an; based o n actual observations o f aesthetic events.23

h. Indeftnabilii v of Aesthetic Data. W hat has fo r cen turies blocke ^ progress o f aesthetic ph ilosophy has been th e effect o f th e tw o philos< 'i cal d o g m as so often m entioned in this w ork (a) absolutism and abstrac'• ism . p lus (b) soul psychology. It is these d ogm as w hich interfere w p ro p e r a ttitu d e tow ards definition. C onsequently aesthetic lite rati

N replete w ith the assertion th a t beauty , sublim ity, and o th e r qualities ca s be defined.

D efinition in aesthetics, as in every o th er in tellectual field, is act ( ^ d e s c r ip t i o n . Influenced by the fallacious philosophy o f essentiality, ae

ticians th ink o f defin ition as a series o f verbal item s s tru n g toge H ow ever, from the s tan d p o in t o f a natu ra listic ph ilosophy , defir consists o f constructing a d escrip tion o f som e object o r event. Whih type o f descrip tion m ay som etim es be represented by a verbal com pie? n o valid definition th a t d o es no t keep close to som e th ing o r event tl

v being described.P roperly to u nderstand the n a tu re o f b eau ty we m ay need to resc

co m p ariso n s o f th ings o n e o f w hich is beautifu l the o th e r no t, o r wre have to resort to a scale o f m ore o r less beautiful. W hen we con- beautifu l w ith n onbeau tifu l th ings and events we have no proble devising scales fo r d ifferen tiating betw een the presence o r absent qualities o r properties o r to indicate the varia tions betw een things o basis o f certain criteria. F o r nonaesthetic objects criteria m ay consi w eight, shade , taste quality , lastingness, rate o f increase, o r deteriora S im ilar features, cond itions, an d rela tions can be fou n d fo r beai things.

i. Aesthetic Reality. Because th e ph ilo sophy o f aesthetics is subjt th e general on to logy an d ep istem ology o f its devotees, aesthe tic the a re fo rm ula ted on th e basis o f the reality assum ptions held by th e sp ph ilosopher. T hus, th e question is raised w hether aesthetic objects events ac tually exist, an d if th ey do , in w hat w ay. A n excellent illustn o f th is issue is ind icated in H um e’s essay en titled , T he S ta n d a rd o f 1 H e writes, 22

22 Dickie, G„ Aesthetic*: an Introduction, Indianapolis. Bobbs Merrill, 1971. p, 88.

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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C S(^Beauty is no quality in things themselves: it exists merely in the mind which contemplates

them: and each mind perceives a different beauty] One person may even perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. To seek the real beauty, or real deformity, is as fruitless an inquiry, as to pretend to ascertain the real sweet or real bitter. According to the dispositions of the organs, the same object may be both sweet and bitter, and the proverb has justly determined it to be fruitless to dispute concerning tastes. It is very natural, and even quite necessary, to extend this axiom to mental, as well as bodily taste: and thus common sense, which is so often at variance with philosophy, especially with the sceptical kind, is found, in one instance at least, to agree in pronouncing the same decision.'1

S ince scientific ph ilosophy is concerned exclusively w ith the ac tu a l ac tiv ities o f p ersons in co n tac t w ith the m a teria ls o f a r t an d a finished p ro d u c t o r the ob serv a tio n an d a d m ira tio n o f n a tu ra l b eau ty o r sublim ity , it does n o t requ ire o r indulge in such issues as w hat is o r is n o t reality. I n the acco m p an y in g tab le aesthetic situ a tio n s a re ind icated in term s o f the in te rb eh av io r o f persons w ith aesthetic o r nonaesthe tic objects.

T a b l e 5 . A e s t h e t i c S i t u a t i o n s

Type or Style of Art Processes Involved Products

Fine or Sophisticated Arts

Constructive or Appreciative ActsInteractions with Beautiful Things

Artistic Objects

Crude or Primitive Art Exercise of Skill Imitations of Art

Nonart Amorphous Things Misnamed Things

j . Aesthetic Enjoyment. A th in g o f b ea u ty is a jo y forever. T his is a poet’s w ay o f referring to th e very p o p u la r n o tio n th a t b eau ty is so m eth in g th a t pleases. T h is view is und o u b ted ly based u p o n th e general idea th a t w hat is n o t beautifu l does no t furnish the beho lder an y pleasure. M oreover, it is a lso suggested th a t ugly th ings o r ugliness in general can on ly call o u t a feeling o f d isp leasure. N ow obviously these view s in th e ir vario u s fo rm u la tions ind icate th e ex trem e subjectivity o f aesthetics. T h e su b stru c tu re o f such views consists o f egocentric dualistic psychology, w hich is fu rth e r based o n som e so r t o f sp iritistic view o f psychologica l b eh av io r an d so com pletely c o u n te r to the n a tu ra lis tic field view o f psychology. T h ere is no d o u b t th a t a t least som e beautifu l things p rov ide p leasure to the observer,

“ Hume, D., “The Standard of Taste,” in Essays. London. Routledge. n.d., pp. 167-68.

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H U M A N ' E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C Tbu t p leasurab le reactions co rre la te w ith m any different kinds o f stii objects. Y achtsm en m ay get m uch m ore pleasure from look ing at boat th an while co n tem p la tin g a p a in ting o f C ezanne o r B ottice fisherm an m ay be m ore g rea tly pleased while hand ling his new rod 01

th an being in visual co n tac t w ith som e great w ork o f art.Aside from v iolating th e principle o f ra tional and natu ra l science

cen tric sp iritism is ou t o f the range o f ac tua l happenings, in whic behav io r event, w hether aesthetic o r nonaesthetic, includes a re; person w ho is in d irect o r ind irect co n tac t w ith actual objects co m p o particu la r sorts o f form an d content.

POLARITIES IN ARTISTIC AND AESTHETIC SITUATIONS

a. Aesthetic Qualities in Nature and in Art. M any w riters o n aesl limit them selves to w orks o f a r t in d isregard o f aesthetic qualil natu re .34 O th er w riters, how ever, a re just as certain tha t the ae; qualities in art are sim ply a reflection o f the beautiful and o th er val nature . An o u ts tan d in g devotee o f the beau ty o f the entire m aterial was M ichelangelo w ho no t only ad o red n a tu ra l things but studied scientifically. As his poetic w orks show , despite his religion and neopl philosophy, he though t th a t only by im agination can an artis t attai beauty above tha t o f na tu re . T he paradox ical natura lism of Michel; is revealed in his view th a t only the h u m an figure is divinely beau O th er aesthetic ians also declare th a t the hum an form is the m ost be; thing, next of course to th a t o f G o d .36 This ex a lta tion o f the hum ai m ay be an exaggera tion o r a personal w him , still it im plies the qua beauty as it exists in objects o f na tu re . N ot all adheren ts to the view glory o f the hum an form are influenced by th e divine com parison .37 is also a p ro m in en t a tt i tu d e th a t w hen a w ork o f a r t exh ib its ae qualities the artis t has a ttem p ted to pu t into his w ork som e quality l has previously observed in natu re .

F ro m the stan d p o in t o f scientific ph ilosophy it is certain th a t the \ on aesthetics w ho a ttem p t to localize the beautiful exclusively in art exclusion o f n a tu re a re grossly in erro r. T hey surely overlook tf

!* Hepburn. R. W.. "Aesthetic Appreciation in Nature," in Aesthetics in the Modem W Osborne, cdt. New York. Weybright and Talley. 1968.

" Cf Blunt. A., Artistic Theory in half. I4SO-IAOO. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1966. ch. * Winckelmann. J. J„ Geschichie tier Konst des AItertums (W. Seff, ed.). Weimar. Bbhfe

p. 130.J: Parker, D. H„ The Principles o f Aesthetics. New York, Silver, Burdett. 1920, p. 282.

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quality o f beauty , how soever it is described o r exp lained , m ay inhere in all kinds o f objects. It m ay well be tru e th a t co n tem p o ra ry w ritings on aesthetics a ttend alm ost exclusively to the a r ts an d very rarely to n a tu ra l beauty , bu t this only indicates a m yopic cond ition . A esthetics is som etim es defined as philosophy o f a r t o r the ph ilosophy o f criticism , bu t this is no s tronger evidence th an th a t m uch quo ted an tho log ies o f aesthetics con ta in no study o f na tu ra l beauty . Few aesthetic ians m ay be seriously concerned with n a tu re because the developm ent o f science has resulted in a lack o f , in terest in n a tu ra l things except those th a t have to be in teracted w ith by s m eans o f m icroscopes an d telescopes. H ow ever, those w ho agree th a t • beau ty is a quality o f th ings ca n n o t be so in to le ran t as to deprive n a tu r a l : things o f aesthetic qualities and values.

b. Objective versus Nonobjective Art. A recent w idespread m ovem ent in the aesthetic w orld consists o f the p ro d u c tio n o f pain tings and sculptu res w hich a re n o t rep resen tative o r figurative. A rtists refrain from p a in ting scenes o r objects such as still lifes, o r landscapes and seascapes, an d so on. T h e pain tings p roduced consist m ain ly o f lines, p a tte rn s, co lo r co m b inations, and d istribu tions o f various sorts. C ertain ly the galleries w hich specialize in nonobjective o r nonfigurative a r t d isplay different k inds of artistic objects from the o lder type o f objective art. T heoretically , how ever, there is no basic difference in the psychological processes o f th e artis ts and th e ir w ork . It should be recalled th a t psychologically speaking in each case a person called a n artis t p roduces an object, a p icture o f a definite sort. N o psychologist could su p p o rt the view th a t th ere is n o object on the canvas, bu t o f course, th ere is o r m ay be a great difference betw een figurative and nonfigurative p roduc tions. In b o th cases th e w ork p roduced m ay o r m ay no t be beautifu l. If no t, the p ro d u c tio n m ay still fall w ith in the range o f aesthetics.

In connec tio n w ith th e p rob lem o f nonob jective o r nonfigurative a r t it is essential to avoid the fallacious view th a t th e sim ple m an ipu la tion o f a rt m ateria ls, canvases, b rushes, p igm ents, m arb le , chisels, and so on, o r the exercise o f n im ble craftsm ansh ip m ust ipso facto be a r t o r artistic. T he objects p roduced m ay be very useful an d im p o rtan t to the m aker o r o ther person , b u t in the in terest o f precision th e differences in the range o f aesthetic things m ust be realized and appreciated .

c. Seeing versus Knowing. A n in teresting form o f pseudopsychology is exh ib ited by those stu d en ts o f aesthetics w h o jo in in the d eba te as to w hether nonobjective o r nonfigurative pain ting is o r is no t art. Such w riters p ro p o se th e view th a t nonobjective pain tin g as opposed to figura-

2 4 5

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live p ain ting can be accoun ted fo r on the basis th a t the fo rm er i: p ro d u c t o f purely sensory faculties w hile figurative pain ting involves i lectual processes.

N ow no such o p p o sitio n is possib le from the s tan d p o in t o f scie psychology. W hether perceiving o r know ing ac tion is perfo rm ed ' a lw ays is in terac tion betw een in tegral o rgan ism s o r persons an d the tl to w hich such persons in te rac t. T hese nam es “seeing” an d “know ing” refer to com plex activities o f ind iv iduals so th a t seeing involves kno \

1 an d know ing, o f course, basically orig inates in perceiving, th a t is, con w ith objects directly o r by m eans o f substitu te o r aux iliary stim ulati

T he o pposition betw een seeing an d know ing is based on a confusec irra tio n a l no tio n o f senses versus th ink ing o r know ing. T he o rig in o: d ifferen tia tion o f activities rests on the fact th a t o rganism s a re disst in to special o rgans so th a t the ac tio n s o f the eyes, ears, nose, an d hand separa ted ou t from the to ta l o rgan ism w hich ac tually is alw ays a unit) ac ts as a unity. T h is po in t does n o t efface the fact tha t ac tions perform t individuals are pa tterned so tha t one m ay tru ly say that they are prim a visual, aud ito ry , o r tac tua l reaction .

d. Invention and Imitation. T he lite ra tu re o f aesthetics featu p ro m in en t opposition betw een (a) the p roduc tion o f an orig inal ol th a t is, a pain ting , a m usical com p o sitio n , o r a piece o f scu lp tu re , an the im itation o r depiction o f an object in nature .

P robab ly the on ly m erit o f this o p p o sitio n is tha t it does suggest, long distance, th a t objects exist w hich are reacted to by the artist, there is a t least a fa in t rea liza tion th a t aesthetics does concern itself concrete situations, and no t ju s t em pty abstractions. H ow ever, those m ake use o f this d istinc tion d o so w ith in the fram ew ork o f an unsati to ry n o tio n o f psychology an d the w ay a rtis ts operate . F o r them psy- ogy concerns a m ind o p era tin g w ith different faculties. O ne they m im etic o r m atch ing facu lty as in copying som e ex ternal object o r c< tion .(T he o ther m ental facu lty is in terna l in tu ition by w hich som ething cou ld be created independen tly o f an y a lread y existing m ateria l. C or tional w riters on aesthetics bypass entire ly the ac tual processes opera ti the appreciation o r creation o f aesthetic objects^)

RANGE OF AESTHETIC QUALITIESA esthetics bo th as an in fo rm al an d form al discipline cen tered p riir

on beau ty and the beautifu l as subject m atter, a circum stance th a t be< m odified ab o u t the e igh teen th cen tu ry w hen sublim ity becam e very pr

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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Snent as an aesthetic quality . It was no t su rp ris in g then th a t aesthetic ians also becam e involved in the qua lity o f ugliness as the negation o f beau ty a lth o u g h m an y aesthetic ians objected to a l lo t in g a place fo r ugliness in the aesthetic field. O u t o f the con ten tions th u s generated the net result w as the rea liza tion th a t aesthetics was a discipline devo ted to the investigation o f a range o f qu a lity vary ing f ro m lh e su p erio r to the in ferio r an d the relative opposites. D oub tless aesthetic b eau ty to p s the list w ith sublim ity as m ore lim ited in provenience and quan tity . T h e fo llow ing p arag rap h s are devoted to a sim ple ch a rac te riza tion o f the m ost p ro m in en t aesthetic qualities in the aesthetic range.

a. Beauty. D espite the fact th a t b eau ty is th e m ost p ro fuse an d best k now n o f th e aesthetic qualities, there is h ard ly any consensus as to its existence, n a tu re , and descrip tion . A t fau lt o f cou rse is the ad h eren ce to som e fo rm o f m etaphysical abstraction ism . A s we shall note in the follow ing section, concep tions o f b eau ty vary trem en d o u sly and in fact the term s “b ea u ty ” an d “beau tifu l” are app lied to all so rts o f th ings an d in all so rts o f m anners.

T h e n o tio n is w idespread th a t b eau ty is indefinable . A nd so it is if one is dea ling w ith ab s trac tio n a l w ords w hich obv iously d o n o t articu la te w ith ac tu a l aesthetic situations. W hat is required is ostensive definition; the o b serv a tio n an d descrip tion o f objects an d cond itions. F o r one thing, b eau ty is n o t a m ystic essence o r som eth ing in the m ind o r psychic experience.

L ike all existing an d occurring th ings an d events, b eau ty is a relative p ro p e rty o r quality o f things. F low ers, an im als, stones, o r houses are m ore o r less beautifu l in the low est o r highest degree to a zero p o in t in the scale. T h ere is n o ab so lu te o r P la to n ic quality , on ly excellence in fo rm , function ,

9 an d ap p earan ce , fittingness an d h a rm o n y w ith o th e r features an d c ircum stances in a r t o r natu re ; n o t excluded is a stim ulating capacity fo r the p leasure and ad m ira tio n o f the observer.

b. Sublimity. T he quality o f sublim ity is generally availab le in the im m ensity an d m agnificence o f h igh m oun ta in s, th e vastness o f oceans, an d sim ilar objects o f na tu re . A nyone sym pathetic to m o d em objective psychology c a n n o t to le ra te such a view as K an t’s egocentric subjectivity, an d projective faculties o f m ind o r soul, w hich is represented in his com m ent.

Sublimity, therefore, does not reside in anything of nature, but only in our mind, in so far as we can become conscious that we are superior to nature without us.M

3 Kant, I., Critique o f Judgment (J. H. Bernard, trs.), London, Macmillan, 1931. p. 129.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T IAll this hard ly ap p ears ad e q u a te in view o f the m assive and overwhe

ing A lpine m o u n ta in s o r o th e r g ran d and en o rm o u s objects o f n a tu r in teractional stim uli fo r aesthetic judgm en t.

c. The Grotesque and Ugly. N o aesthetic ian can fail to take accoun th e gro tesque and ugly in a r t o r n a tu re , p erhaps because such d a ta inescapable, so m uch m o d ern a r t is likely to be g ro tesque and u g ly , . a lso because th e co n tra s t w ith th e beautifu l is so striking. C onsider s d is to rted , g ro tesque, and ugly pain tings and statues as those producec P icasso, C hagall, an d S a lv ad o r D ali, and m any o th e r schoo ls.29 exam ples o f ugly a rch itec tu re B eardsley20 offers several V ictorian G o m onstrocities as C anonchc t, th e S p rag u e house at N arragannsett, and C arso n house a t E ureka, C alifo rn ia . H e adds also the Soviet-bu ilt Pal o f Science an d C u ltu re in W arsaw an d quo tes Louis M um ford c o n c e rt the library o f the U niversity o f Pennsylvania.

No one ever did more to turn ugliness into a positive principle during the Br Decades.31

A n im p o rtan t co n sid e ra tio n here is to no te th a t an ugly ob ject o f tak en as a w hole m ay be ex trem ely ugly, b u t details as analyzed m ay m ost beau tifu l. T h e aesthe tic q u a lity m ay inhere in th e co lo r, foi pattern ing , h arm ony o f item s, an d so on.

* d . Literary Aesthetics. L oyalty to aesthetic things an d events p rom. the discovery o f aesthetic q u a lity in th e literary aspects o f art. Yet i

difficult if no t im possib le to set up definite crite ria fo r b eau ty in liter, p roducts. T h is difficulty is o f cou rse m itigated in the case of p o e try a

* m odera tely m odified in prose w orks. In bo th cases there is available* quality o f excellence and su p erio rity as the basis o f aesthetic quality .

A n im p o rtan t co n sid e ra tio n here is th a t p oetry m ay be p roperly cal verbal m usic.22 T here is m elody, m eter, rhym e, an d rhy thm . L ike musi com positions there m ay be fitting s tru c tu re and orderly pattern ing . Ct

t s ider the language o f S hak esp eare , G oethe , and o thers. O n a m ore m odscale high aesthetic qua lity is a lso p resen t in various literary productic w hether plays, dep ictions o f trag ic o r com ic scenarios, o r even pi; discourses on neutral subjects.

e. Grace and Elegance. A s a final exam ple o f excellence and superioi

NCf. Winkler. W„ Psychologie der Modernen Kunst. Tubingen, Alma Mater. 1949. Beardsley. M. C., Aesthetics: Problems in the Philosophy o f Criticism, New York. Harco

Brace, 1958, p. 384." Beardsley. Ibid., p. 546.

Schoen. M.. Art amt Beauty, New York. Macmillan. 1932, p. 109.

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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Sin aesthe tic objects we m en tion g race an d elegance w herever we find it in ob jects, fo r exam ple , th e gazelle, o th e r an im als , an d som e persons, as well as in m ovem ents such as runn ing , d an c in g , especially in th e ac tions o f ballet groups.

"BEAUTY”: UNIVERSAL A PPLIQ U E

T h ro u g h o u t the h isto ry o f aesthetics the te rm “beau ty” has been a p rim ary item o f a useful vocabulary . B ut it a lso becam e a term o f p o p u la r in terest and usage. A ccord ingly , th ere are tw o very d ifferent em ploym ents o f th e term . O n one h an d the term “beau tifu l” becam e a key item in the vocabu lary o f aesthetics w ith reference m ain ly to a r t objects, w hile on the o ther, th e term becam e sy n o n o m o u s w ith th e w ords “perfectib ility ,” “com pleteness," “desirability ," “expertness,” an d m any others. T o be alert to this app roved o f duality o f reference is o f benefit to s tuden ts o f aesthe tics. H ence th e follow ing exam ples from the large collection o f nonaesthe tic em ploym ents o f the nouns and adjectives “b eau ty” an d th e “beautifu l.” •

A. The beauty o f things and events

the beautifu l fa te o f scientific research33beautifu l s tu d y 34 4beautifu l resu lts35 #m athem atics . . . possesses . . . suprem e b eau ty 36 beautifu l com plex o f logical re la tions37beautifu lly acu te ‘Fragm ent*38 tbeautifu l and extensive theories o f pure m a th em atics39 <f. . . law s o f p laneta ry m o tion a re . . . beau tifu l40 beautifu l expressions41

M Reichenbach, H.. Atom and Cosmos: the World o f Modern Physics (E. S . Allen, trs.). New >York, Braziller, 1957, p. 103.

“ Sigerot, H. E., A History o f Medicine. VoL II, Early Greek. Hindu, and Persian Medicine, New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1961, p. 100

15 Thomson, Sir W„ and Tail, P. G., Elements o f Natural Philosophy, pi. 1, Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1873.

* Russell, B„ Mysticism and Logic, and Other Essays, London, Allen and Unwin, 1950, p. 60.” Hardy, G. H., “The Theory of Numbers." Science, 1922, 56. p. 405.M Vossler, K., The Spirit o f Language in Civilisation (O. Oeser, irs.). New York. Harcourt. Brace.

1932, p. 56 n.wMoore, C. N .,“Mathematics and Science,"Science. 1935, 81, 28."Sullivan, J. W. N., The Limitations o f Science, Mentor ed., 1950, 13.41 Courant, R„ and Robbins, H., What is Mathematics? An Elementary Approach to Ideas and

Methods, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1941, p. 300.249

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Ibeautiful experiments42 beautiful idea43 beautiful theory44beautiful simplicity of animal economy45

B. The Beauty o f Processes

beauty and logical consistency of these methods46 beautiful way these could be explained47 beautiful manner48beautifully enlightens our observations49 beautiful demonstrations50 beautiful discovery'51 beautiful conclusion52 beautifully simple explanation53

AESTHETIC BEAUTY IDENTIFIED AND DEFINED

Granting the difference between the aesthetic and nonaesthetic usaj “beauty” the question arises as to the identity and definition of the aest properties or qualities of the beautiful. There are many definitio beauty and the beautiful as indicated by Kovach's54 assemblage i recent volume entitled. The Philosophy o f Beauty. So variable ar definitions as to reach the zero point that the aesthetic is independt

*'■ Rutherford. E.,“The Theory of Atomic Structure “ in Background to Mintern Science (Ne and Pagel. eds.). New York, Macmillan, 1940, p. 69.

4>Faraday, M.. Experimental Researches in Electricity, 3 vols., London, Taylor and 1 1839-1855. vol. 1 p. 248; also

Jourdain. Philip E. B., The Nature o f Mathematics. London. Jack, 1919. p. 75.44 Eve. A. S. Rutherford, Being the Ufe and letters o f the Right Honorable Lord Rathert

A/., New York, Macmillan, 1939, p. 219.4! Bell. Ci. J.. in Charles Bell, Expression: Its Anatomy and Philosophy, New York, Well:

pref.4, Bohr. N.. Atomic Theory and the Description o f Nature. Cambridge, Cambridge Univ

19.34, p. 14.4" Darwin, C. G.. “Logic and Probability in Physics." Pinto soph i o f Science. 19.39, 6. 55.44 Jevons. M. S.. The Principles o f Science. London. Macmillan. 1924. p. 764.4'1 liadamard. J.. An Essay on the Psychology o f Invention in the Mathematical Field. Ne'

Dover. 1954.Vl Cohen, M R .. Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning o f Scientific Method. Ne*

Harcourt. Brace. 1931, p. 202." Wertheimer. M„ Productive Thinking, New York. Harper. 1945, p. 115.

Davis, H. T., Philosophy amt Modern Science, 2nd ed., Bloomington, Principia, 1953."Taylor. L. W„ Physics. The Pioneer Science, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1941. p. 81u Kovach. F. J . Philosophy o f Beauty. Norman. Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1974.

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A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Sbeau ty b u t signifies only w hat craftsm en produce. D ucasse asserts “th a t a r t ^ can n o t possibly be defined in term s o f beauty .”55

T h e significance o f the nega tion o f beau ty as a n im p o rta n t an d p ro m inent p h ase o f aesthetics is the an a rch y an d inchoateness th a t is in troduced in the aesthetic sphere. E m phasis is placed on construc tions no m atte r how b izarre o r inept. So-called artis ts a re filling a r t galleries and public spaces with pieces o f m etal, pipes, rods, gears, ra ilro ad tracks, and so on , all stuck together in various w ays by m eans o f w elding opera tions. It is c la im e d Jh a t, persons w ho m ak e such th ings_are artis ts because o f th e ir c reations,

. a lth o u g h it is d ifficult to trace in th eir w ork o r p ro d u c ts an y beau ty o r o th e r a esthetic quality . B ut even w ith respect to the m ore conventionable w orks o f a r t, th e varia tio n s o n the them e o f beau ty d isp lay m ost rem ark ab le differences as the follow ing display o f definitions dem onstrates.

T h o m as M u n ro . “B eauty is m any different things, no t yet well u n d e rstood , to w hich the nam e “beauty" has been applied .”56

J. J . W incke lm ann an d A. R . M engs. “ L a bellezza e Topposito della b ru tezza .”57 A negative ind ica tion th a t it is easier to say w hat beau ty is n o t th an w h a t it is.

H aro ld O sborne . “B eauty itself is sim ply th e ex tension o f tha t princip le o f em ergent percep tual configuration im m ediately apprehensib le by unreflective in tu it io n . . ,58

H o ra tio G reenough. “ I define beau ty as the prom ise o f function ."59V an M eter A m es. “B eauty is value co n tem pla ted .”60W illiam D avid R oss, “b eau ty is n o t a fo rm o f in trinsic value, bu t on ly

the pow er in a n object o f evoking som eth ing th a t has value, the esthetic e x p e rie n c e .. . .”61

S. A lexander. “ B eauty is the expression no t o f a n y an d every feeling b u t specifically o f the esthetic feeling.”62

» Ducasse. C. J.. The Philosophy o f Art, New York, Dial Press, 1929, p. 16.* Munro, T., Toward Science in Aesthetics, Indianapolis, Bobbsand Mercill. 1956. p. 265. •’Winckelmann, J. J., Geschiehte tier Kunst des Alteriums, 2nd ed., Leipzig. Dtlrr. 1882, p. 105; also

Bell.C. Expressionism: Its Anatomy and Philosophy, New York, Wells, 1873, p. 23; and Mengs. A. R„ Ubcr Schonheit undguten geschmack in der Malerei, Zurich, Orell el at. 1774, cited by Kovach. Op. cit., p. 143.

••Osborne, H„ Theory o f Beauty. London, Koutlcdge and Kegan Paul, 1952. p. 122. ’’Greenough, H„ in Form and Function (H. A. Small, ed.). Univ. of California. 1947, p. 71, 79. “ Ames, Van M., Introduction to Beauty, New York. Harper, 1931, pp. 5, 171. 205.61 Ross, W. D„ The Right and the Good. Oxford, Clarendon Press. 1930. pp. 70. 127.M Alexander, S., Beauty and Other forms o f Value. London, Macmillan, 1933. p. 132.

251

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C TMichelangelo. “ Beauty is the reflection of the divine in the ma

world."63Richard Payne Knight. “The word beauty is a general term of appi

tion. . . applied indiscriminately to almost every thing that is plet either to the sense, the imagination, or the understanding.. . "M

G. E. Moore. “It appears probable that the beautiful should be de as that of which the admiring contemplation is good in itself.”65

C. Wolff. “True beauty arises from perfection. Apparent beauty apparent perfection."66

PARAESTHETIC BEHAVIOR

The large range of aesthetic qualities and the great variations i concepts of beauty suggest the corresponding acts of creation and ap ation of aesthetic objects. It is in order now to consider variatio reactions and to differentiate between central aesthetic behavior:

* peripheral activities in aesthetic situations. We examine a few specimc paraesthetic responses of persons.

a. Aesthetic Tastes. As a feature of aesthetic situations tastes are esting and important. For example, a gallery may be hung with the

* specimens of paintings yet some individuals may pass them by wi interest or appreciation. Such persons lack aesthetic taste for a particular types of art. Again tastes may be high or low, good oi though not absent all together. In general, individuals vary frot

* standpoint of particular standards. Aesthetic standards are of c9- cultural in character and they mark off the backgrounds or experien

different persons.* Now the question arises as to the basis for the variations of indi'

behavior in given aesthetic situations with respect to the same or simii objects. A common tendency exists to assume that aesthetic last-

somehow inborn. But this is obviously a confused and false notion.

'‘'Michelangelo. Irom a sonnet to lomnwsso Cavalicri. 1436-12:‘Nowhere does God. inh reveal himsell to me more clearly than in some lovely human form, which I love solely becau mirrored image of Himself.- In Blunt. A.. Artistic Theory in hair. MStl-IMKI. Oxford, t'l. I’ress. 1962. p. 69. n. 2., Cf. also p. 62.

,J Knight. R. I’.. An Analytical Inquiry mm tlic t'rimiptes <>/ Taste. 4"’ ed.. London, Pa White. IWW. p 9

“ Moore, ti F , 1‘rineifua t.ihtia. Cambridge. Harvard liniv. Press. 1962. p. 201.MW o lff. t\ . / ’>!( Imlnyta Emptrna. Hildcshcim. (irorg Olm s. I96X reprint of l.eip/ig. I* 546

252

A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Sin the 18,h cen tu ry indicated th a t p ro p e r tastes depended u p o n p ro p er teaching. He w rote,

. . . for my part. 1 am convinced that the method of teaching which approaches most nearly to the method of investigation is incomparably the best; since, not content with serving up a /few barren and lifeless truths, it leads to the stock on which they grew; it tends to set the \ f reader himself in the track of invention, and to direct him into those paths in which the author has made his own discoveries, if he should be so happyas to have madeany that are valuable.67

b. Aesthetic Preferences. A m o n g the p eriphera l responses in aesthetic situa tions individual preferences assum e a p ro m in en t position . O f tw o persons equally alert to the specificities o f aesthe tic objects a n d aesthetic c ircum stances, equal, to o , as ex p e rts in m a tte rs o f a r t, one m ay p refer certa in k inds o f a r t p roduc tions, say , ce rta in styles o f pain tings, m usical com positions, an d so on. N o q u estio n need b e raised as to w hether these preferences im ply su p erio r o r in ferio r reactions o r objects. W e m ay be sure th a t th ey are d isp lay ing individual differences bu ilt on th e ir respective in terbehavioral histories.

C losely related to preferen tia l b eh av io r a n d partia lly to its base a re the responses o f liking an d dislik ing p artic u la r w orks because o f som e c o m p o nent aspect o f the integral object o r stylistic trea tm en t.iO b jec tio n m ay be m ade to subject, type o f rep resen ta tion , co lo r, tex tu re , o r o rig inality o f conception.~ |

c. Aesthetic Judgment and Evaluation. A esthetic ians as well as laym en in a r t a n d aesthetics d isp lay a range o f ju d g m e n ts an d ev a lu a tio n s o f aesthetic objects bo th in n atu re an d in art. H ere again is revealed the results o f individual differences in in terbehav io ral h isto ry in personal and social am biance. Because o f th e differences in b ack g ro u n d a n d tra in in g aestheticians will be m ore o r less expert, they will have m ore o r less w ide experience, an d in general som e are m ore capab le th an o thers in ju d g in g an d evaluating aesthetic objects. W ith in recent tim es, tbe en tire p ro b lem o f ju d g in g an d ev a lu a tin g objects o f a r t has been com plica ted by th e in tro d u c tio n o f econom ic factors in to eva lua to ry situa tions. It m ight be said th a t the process o f ju d g in g and evaluating w orks o f a r t . has been, p o llu ted , by eco n o m ic factors. It is to the cred it o f aesthe tic ians an d a r t judges w ho co n tro l econom ic factors so th a t they can co n cen tra te on the specific factors o f w orks o f art.

6’ Burke, E.,"On Sublime and Beautiful," in The Works o f the Right Honourable Edmund Burke. vol. I, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1920, p, 67.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C TINTERBEHAVIORAL PSYCHOLOGY IN AESTHETICS

Since th ro u g h o u t this c h a p te r we have em phasized the need fo r su psychological fou n d a tio n s fo ra reasonable aesthetical discipline, it is I to enlarge som ew hat u p o n the natu re o f scientific psychology ai bearing up o n aesthetic issues.jScientific psychology with its assim ilat the cu ltu ra l aspects of m o d ern an th ropo log ica l w isdom has m uch tc aestheticsTjThis en largem ent o f the horizon an d scope o f psycholog resulted in an increased app recia tion o f the natu re o f m an an d his ■ o pm en t o f cu ltural characteristics. Im plied o f course is a m ore soj ca ted aw areness o f beau ty and the o ther aesthetic qualities an d > trea ted in the h istory o f a r t and general aesthetics.

It is o f great adv an tag e to the understand ing of the place o f psych an d cu ltu ra l an th ro p o lo g y in the field o f aesthetics to observe th a t ps; ogy has becom e m ore a n d m ore a definite science instead o f dealinj such ab strac tions as soul, m ind, consciousness, an d o ther supern. entities. P sychology has tu rn ed to w ard a field theo ry in w hich the ii tance o f psychological events is ind icated by the reciprocal behav things and o rganism s in m utual in terbehavior. O bjective psych stands em ancipated from w hat a re in principle unobservable entit processes, trad itional soul, self, m ind , sensations, an d psychic facul

As indicated by the d iag ram in Fig. 12, the ac tion o f an organi >< reciprocal in teraction w ith a stim ulus object m ay be described :, p rim ary factors o f a behav io ral unit. These are aided by a m edium , s

light fo r visual, o r a ir fo r a u d ito ry behavior. T hen there are m any s *' factors th a t con tribu te to the detailed quality o f the in teraction and

results from it.

ANALYSIS OF AESTHETIC FIELDS

Better to understand th e psychology o f aesthetic events, it is advist analyze the factors tha t m ak e up aesthetic fields. S ince aesthetic fiel specific types o f general psychological fields, the o u tcom e o f articu aesthetics with scientific psychology is th a t aesthetics can become m ore scientific th an has heretofore been the case. P ropositions in aes' can now claim to be scientific in a legitim ate sense o f that termj^W now th ink o f aesthetics as an effective study o f n a tu ra l and cu lti artificial objects to the end o f determ ining the relative qualities o f thin, thus achieve valid,ideas o f beau ty and its nature , as well as solve pro relative to the developm ent o f artis tic o r aesthetic ju d g m en ts cone

254

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SH U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I

the app recia tion o f aesthetic objects an d s itu a tio n s lln th e follow ing a m en ts are enum erated som e p articu la rs concern ing the interbehavi. factors in aesthetic situations.

A. The Artist

W hether the aesthetic situ a tio n cen te rs ab o u t aesthetic objects o f nal o r art, it m ust obviously include an in terac ting a rtis t o r viewer, the form creato r, and the la tter an observer. In the case o f a r t p ro duc tion it is o f g: im portance to specify the tra its an d activities o f the w orker, th a t is, developm ent o f aesthetic capacities an d in terests essential fo r pain t poetizing, m usical com posing , an d so on . C learly , one o f the ou tstanc characteristics o f an a rtis t is the uniqueness o f his o r h er developm en becom e an o rig in a to r and n o t sim ply a p roducer o f objects categorized pain ting , sculpture, o r m usical com position .

A n in teresting feature o f aesthetic s ituations concerns the individi w ho can technically rep ro d u ce even g reat w orks o f a r t b u t w ho could orig inally produce such w orks. T his false aestheticism covers th e realn fakery w hich includes the com m erce in forgeries such as indulged in M eegeren, the fo rger o f V erm eer pain tings, an d D ossena w ho speciali in fake sculptures. O f the m an y m em bers o f th is fra te rn ity w ho m anul tu re false art objects fo r m useum s an d archaeological displays, none sho

\ on account o f their lack o f originality be num bered as artists.681. Cultural Background. O f g reat effectiveness in the determ ina tio i

the natu re and p roperties o f aesthetic s itua tions are the specific culti cond itions u n d er w hich a rtis ts w ork. C u ltu ra l cond itions constitu te global civilization o f h u m an organism s th a t influences all th e ir developm a n d living beyond th e ir pure ly biological sta tus. T hen there are locali: an d particularized cu ltura l c ircum stances th a t influence th e w ork o f ir v iduals and g roups to p roduce the varieties o f a r t objects w hether painti draw ing, sculpting, poetry, arch itectu re , personal decoration , an d so c

2. Personal Evolution. A natu ra listic analysis o f aesthetic situati reveals the specific learn ing and tra in ing o f artists and nonartis ts . I th ro u g h these processes th a t ind iv iduals acquire the ir tastes, skills, cap; ties and aesthetic judgm en ts. It is learn ing an d tra in ing w hich results in differences betw een au th en tic artists an d pseudoartists.

A n im p o rtan t question arises here as to th e v arian t qualification* artis ts and a r t w ork. S om e a r t m ay m erely m anifest the teachings o f an

“ Arnau, F.. The A n o f the Faker: Three Thousand Tears o f Deception (J. M. Brownjohn. I Boston. Little, Brown. London. Cape, 1961.

256

A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Sschool w ith o u t excellence o r orig inality , excep t fo r choice o f subject. T he en tire tu te lag e m ay be confined to techn iques w ith o u t enhancing the aesthetic capacities o f the studen t. W e m ust, how ever, guard aga inst illicit no tio n s o f innate powers. M oods o r o th er feelings greatly affect aesthetic situations. T his is tru e also to th e hygienic co n d itio n o f persons in aesthetic situations.

3. Hygienic Factors. Hygienic s itua tions include health , fatigue, a n x ieties, w orries, an d o th er affective circum stances. S uch circum stances are r ' them selves influenced by socioeconom ic events an d cond itions. E conom ic c/S« . ' f ‘ i'con d itio n s as well as conform ity o r d issent in social an d political circum - / stances m ay have either good o r evil influences o n aesthetic p roduc tion . It is im possible to underestim ate the influence o f life cond itions o n aesthetic b eh av io r w hether productive o r appreciative. Social, econom ic, o r political c ircum stances w hich influence aesthetic b eh av io r m ay co rresp o n d to types o f cu ltu ra l conditions as fo r exam ple, eras o f sacred versus secular a r t.

B. The Appreciator or ObserverM o st o f w h a t we have ind icated a b o u t th e a rtis t applies equally well to

the ap p rec ia to r o r ju d g e o f the w orks created by the a rtis t o r his im itators.T h e ap p rec ia to r, o f cou rse m ay be a n a r tis t to o , a n d n o t ju s t a d a u b e r o r am ateu r. A ccordingly, the p rim ary cond itio n s regu la ting th e behav io r o f the observer p o in t to p rob lem s o f b ack g ro u n d a n d artistic developm ent.M any o f the sim ilarities o r d issim ilarities betw een the a rtis t a n d the o b server dep en d u p o n th e ir in terb eh av io ra l h istories. A n o th e r set o f facto rs influencing observers in th e ir ev a lua tions a n d ju d g m en ts is the well know n fact th a t every a r t object as well as every o th e r k ind o f ob ject is differently in terac ted w ith by d ifferent persons o n th e basis o f the p resuppositions w hich they develop. This fac to r m ust be looked to w hen the g lobal question arises as to w hether a ce rta in w ork is o r is n o t a n item o f a r t. V isitors to a r t galleries if they are o f W estern E u ro p ean cu ltu re m ay tu rn aw ay com pletely from the a rt o f the O rien ta l cu ltures such as Ind ia , C h ina, a n d Ja p a n . Such differences in ju d g m en t an d eva lu a tio n m ay also affect th e reactions to ob jects o f different styles in the sam e cu ltu re . T h u s the subjects, techniques, an d styles in pain tings o r scu lp ture m ay be highly o r lowly evaluated .W h e th e r we a re considering an a r tis t o r m ere ly a n a p p re c ia to r o f a r t, th e in te rb eh av io r w ith given objects will o f cou rse be d ifferent if there is o r is no t a n em phasis upon o r a prejudice against sacred subjects.

Scientific ph ilo sophy o f aesthetics w arns ag a in s t th e eva lu a tio n o r even d escrip tion o f observers o r critics o n the basis o f p referred abstrac tions

2 5 7

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Iw h eth er o r n o t d ra w n fro m ac tu a l s itu a tio n s. E xam ples o f th e disregai th is w arn ing are th e p ro m o tio n o f theories ab o u t fo rm in a r t as agi o th e r fac to rs includ ing co n ten t. A n exaggera ted version o f this abstract ism is exem plified by th e expressive o r significant form o f such w rite C live Bell,*9 R oger F ry ,70 a n d m any o thers.

C. The Interbehavioral ObjectIn all aesthe tic in te rb eh av io rs th e ob ject in terbehaved w ith m u.1

regarded as o f eq u a l im p o rtan ce w ith th e w o rk o f the a rtis t o r observer th is em phasis o n th e in terre la tionsh ip o f th e item s in psychological s tions w hich allow s fo r th e natu ra lis tic in te rp re ta tio n o f aesthetic evei

Be it observed th a t the charac te ris tic s o r tra its o f aesthe tic ob jects ex ist in com plete independence o f a n y a r tis t o r beho lder o f a r t obj O bviously this is th e case w hen th e in terbehav io r concerns objec natu re . It is a co m m o n m isin te rp re ta tio n o f aesthetic s ituations whei fac t o f crea ting objects su ch a s pain tings, scu lp tu re , m usical co m p o sit ind icates a n exclusive d ep endence o f the ob ject p rod u ced o n th e ere ab ility o f th e artis t. C erta in ly it is th e case th a t finished aesthetic object p ro d u c ts o f artists, b u t based o n th e tra its o r characteristics o f th e mat( used , as well as th e object in its v ario u s stages o f com pletion . L igh t i: o n this p o in t w hen one considers th a t p rim itive artists w ere dependei n a tu ra l m ateria ls su ch as o ch re , m anganese , fa t, an d b lood in o rd e r to th e w herew ithal to rep resen t a n an im al, o r a g ro u p in a h u n tin g scei

A s to finished p ro d u c ts a n analysis brings to light th e re p resen ta tl ideas o r concep tions b o th in trinsic a n d ex trinsic to aesthetic thing! techn iques o r m eans used , a n d th e m ateria ls em ployed , as well as su depicted , also the design a n d co m p o sitio n , the co lo r an d tex ture pa tte rn in g o f so u n d o r sight, an d finally th e orig inality o f the w hole

A bove all any analysis o f a n aesthe tic ob ject m ust n o t be confused reactions to it by a n o n lo o k e r o r critic w h o m ay regard it as du ll o r ti superb , m ajestic, o r stately .

D. Setting or Auspice

A s we have seen in o u r d iscussion o f a r t as illusion, the varia tia aesthetic styles over p eriods o f tim e can be accoun ted fo r o n th e b a changes in the env iro n s o r au sp ices u n d e r w hich a r t w orks a re createi

“ Bell, C., A rt, London, Chatto-Windus, 1916.’OFry, R., Vision and Design, New York, Brentano, 1925.258

A R T A N D A E S T H E T I C Soutstanding, well-know n, exam ple is the religious influence u p o n painting in the Ita lian prim itive period. But this is only one out o f m any types of varia tion in the auspices of painters, sculptors, com posers, and so on. Every one will be im m ediately rem inded o f the influence o f the general cu lture o f a nation o r o ther social com m unity. Even elem entary aestheticians are experts in locating the provenience o f Chinese or In d ian a r t as over against W estern E uropean a r t o r local geographic o r an thropologic productions. It m ust be noted th a t the factor o f setting is a necessary feature o f an aesthetic field.

RECAPITULATION

A n expedient way to sum up the p rim ary features o f a naturalistic trea tm en t o f the aesthetic d o m ain is to review som e salient problem s incurred while surveying the aesthetic field. T he following exam ples serve to m irro r the conten t o f the present chapter.

1. The Orientation Problem. T he hum anistic disciplines o f an th ropo logy and archaeology unite in the observation th a t h u m an o rganism s, even those o f early evolutionary periods, have cultivated arts of various sorts. T hus philosophers discovered a ready field a b o u t w hich to develop attitudes o f an aesthetic variety. A s the h istory o f aesthetics dem onstrates, s tuden ts o f aesthetics shaped th e ir a ttitudes in conform ity w ith their philosophical beliefs; som e keeping close to observations, while o thers clung to the trad itions fram ing their speculative horizons. It is the m ark o f the present chap ter to pay extrem ely critical regard to conventional theories

~wH IF treating aesthetic th ings and eventsexclusi veiy as existing and occur- ' ring entities.

2. The Problem of Axioms. Since aesthetic a ttitudes and doctrines are fo rm ulated by philosophers an d artists o f different backgrounds under varying conditions, it is vitally im p o rtan t to be alert to the ax iom s o r the basic assum ptions th a t lead to their descriptive an d exp lana to ry propositions. M ost philosophical judgm ents and evaluations are definitely derived from theological o r religious sources. They have to d o w ith invisible and intangible things an d processes available only by m eans o f w ords and sentences. In the present chap te r it is easily seen that there is a thorough an d com plete dep artu re from the ontologies an d epistem ologies o f trad itional philosophical history. T he positive stress is then u p o n concrete situations pertaining to bo th things o f nature and o f art.

3. The Specificity Problem. Eschewing all absolutes and abstractions,

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I 'th e study o f aesthetics bears heavily o n specificities concern ing th e dat< th e ph ilosophy o f aesthetics. Q uestions arise concerning the precise p rim ary d a tu m o f aesthetics, w hether b eau ty is a n object o r the p ro pert; objects, w hether it exists mrerum natura, an d how it func tions in n a tu n a r t. In th e im m ense collections o f aesthetic literature there ap p ear m an y divergences o f v iew point. W h a t a re the bases fo r th e confusii T h ro u g h o u t this ch ap te r we have con trasted the m ethods o f m etaphysi as over aga inst th e natu ra listic trea tm en t o f aesthetics an d have clung th e la tter persistently. A s to th e p rim ary d a tu m o f aesthetics, the analysi: th e w ork o f craftpersons, h isto rians o f a rt, an d the ju d g m en t o f a r t indicates th a t the theoretical an d practical nucleus o f m ost aesthetic sit tions is beauty.

»yr A ssum ing th a t th e beau tifu l constitu tes one o f the basic aesthetic ca gories we face the p rob lem o f the specific co m ponen ts o f beautifu l th ir w hether in n a tu re o r in the atelier. I t m ay be said th a t th e beautifu l is m ain crite rion fo r the pain tings, d raw ings, m usical com positions, danci a n d o th e r p ro d u c ts o f aesthetic behavior. C reative su b stitu tio n s berefl b eau ty m ay be useful, successful, an d ap p lau d ed , b u t they fall ou tside range o f aesthetics.

4. The Psychological Problem. A s we have insisted th ro u g h o u t t ch a p te r an d book , we m ust n o t on ly reject fau lty ph ilosophy , b u t a

)# fau lty psychology. In general th is signifies a com plete rejection o f tratio n a l psychology w hich cu ltivated n o tions o f m ystical processes a p ro p ertie s o f an inexisten t m ind . A s we have po in ted o u t in th e sectior th is chapter, called “In terbehav io ra l Psychology in A esthetics,” the psyd

i*1 logical trea tm en t o f aesthetic things m ust be in term s o f specific conciin terac tions o f persons called artis ts o r appreciato rs. A natu ra listic p cho logy eschews all questions as to th e existence o f the aesthetic date w h e th e r we th ink o f the qualities o r p roperties o f objects o r th e form

i * w hich organism s in terac t w ith th e ac tua l objects fo rm ing au th en tic featuo f aesthetic in terbehavior.

Illustrative o f the views rejected by natu ra listic psychology is th e di trin e o f H u m e an d o th e r E m piricists th a t th e qualities o f objects, 5 ex am p le b eau ty , d o n o t reside in th e ob jects in teracted w ith, b u t i exclusively con ta ined in som e so rt o f process in the m ind . In som e o f t o th e r item s o f this recap itu la tio n w e shall refer to p ropositions w hich i based o n spiritistic doctrines n o t cen tered on an y ac tual event.

5. The A bstraction Problem. A esthetic lite ra tu re suggests th e exister o f tw o fo rm s o f exposition , one ab strac tion istic and the o th er concn260


descrip tive. N atu ra listic ph ilo sophy o f aesthetics insists th a t we deal w ith aesthe tic situa tions and not verbal o r sym bolic abstrac tions. F o r exam ple, b eau ty , sublim ity, and o th er aesthetic categories a re regarded as properties o f things. T h e problem o f aesthetics is sim ilar to th a t o f physics w hen it was necessary to d istinguish betw een m ass an d ac tion as events instead o f forces o r pow ers influencing things.

F ro m the s tan d p o in t o f n a tu ra listic aesthetics the ac tual p roperties o r qualities ind icated in n u m ero u s descrip tions are bu ilt u p o n the basis o f o b servations o f actual events. A ccord ingly , it is possible to build up a list o f p ro p ertie s w hich in co m b in a tio n in specific ob jects go to m ake up the aesthe tic objects. W e m ight m en tio n unity , p ro p o rtio n , sym m etry , design, co lo r, am o n g m any others.

6. The Subjective-Objective Problem. A fallacious psychology allow s the co n stru c tio n o f doctrines in w hich aesthetic subjects a re reduced to subjective processes w hile o thers em phasize ex ternal s i tu a tio n s jF ro m the s tan d p o in t o f na tu ra listic psychology b o th o f the types o f d o cm n es ju s t m entioned m ay be in terpre ted as stressing e ither the organism o r subject in the in te rac tio n a l s itu a tio n o r th e stim ulus ob jec t^T h ere is no o th e r w ay acco rd ing to the v iew point o f this w ork th an to trea t the in teracting organ ism o r person as a definite biological, psychological, an d an th ro p o logical being and the object in teracted w ith aesthetically as an ino rgan ic or o rgan ic object existing independen tly o f th e p a rticu la r aesthetic in teraction , b u t as we have noticed in a n ac tual aesthetic in terbehav io r there is a reciprocal an d m u tual ac tion betw een the tw o phases of a n in terbehavior, the stim ulus and response o f th e behavioral field.

7. The Unity - Plurality Problem. N o ph ilo sophy o f aesthetics can avoid the un ity idea w hich is genera ted by tam p erin g w ith abstrac tions, o r the p lu rality idea as the accu m u la tio n o f m u ltifa rious views concern ing aesthetic situations. N ow since b o th o f these categories are in tim ately integ ra ted w ith th e abstrac tions o f trad itio n a l philosophy, they are set aside com pletely and are found unnecessary w hen dealing with concrete facts o f ind iv iduals w hile creating pain tings, pieces o f scu lp tu re , m usical com posing, dancing , and o th er aesthetic practices such as p roduc ing decorative objects.

8. The Linguistic Problem. A t various po in ts in this ch ap te r we m entioned the large place th a t linguistic m atters occupy in aesthetic situations. In general, o f course, ab strac tio n s from existing events, an d beliefs ab o u t nonex isting things, can only be su p p o rted by w ords and sym bols. Intellec-261

tu a l a ttitudes can best be e lab o ra ted an d com m unicated w hen encode w ords an d sentences. N a tu ra listic aesthetics w arns ag a in st m ak in g us term s o r w ords in illegitim ate w ays, fo r exam ple , using the sam e term s d ifferent th ings o r processes, o r em ploy ing different te rm s fo r the s; th ings w ith resulting m isunderstand ings and confusions.


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C H A P T E R 19

EDUCATION IN PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE

EDUCATION AND HUMAN M ATURATION

Q \s a general object o f investigation, ed u ca tio n is, o f course, a great com posite o f in terrelated institu tions and events'}C onsequently , it can be ap p ro ach ed from a n um ber o f different angles— social, political, religious, econom ic, psychological, pedagogical, philosophical, an d so on.

W h e th e r we consider individuals as a u to n o m o u s un its o r m erely links in a co m m u n al chain , there a re urgen t p roblem s o f personal m a tu ra tio n and o f becom ing a fit p a rtic ip an t in the various phases o f h u m an ex istence th a t m ake ed u ca tio n a basic in terest fo r ph ilosophical reflection. B ut it is ob v io u s tha t th e ph ilosophical m atrix m ust constitu te a defensib le discipline. H ere as elsew here the study o f philosophy m ust be com pletely free from au tistic abso lu tes an d universals. In th is ch ap te r ed ucational institutions an d practices are exam ined in the perspective o f scientific ph ilosophy.

CONVENTIONAL THEO RIES O F EDUCATION

G enerally speaking, education concerns the events in terre lated w ith the process o f h u m an o rganism s co n tin u in g th e ir developm ent beyond their biological gestation to societal adu lthood .

D epend ing u p o n the type o f ph ilosophy serving as basic p ostu la tion , w riters fo rm u la te p ropositions concern ing the goals and objectives o f education . A m ong the objectives m en tioned one finds self-realization, good citizenship, personal com petence, in itiation , an d m any o th ers .1 U nfortunate ly , fo r the m ost p a rt the goals to be reached are premised u p o n in ad eq u a te an d even fallacious ph ilosophical a ttitu d es. A n exam ina tion o f the lite ra tu re in the ph ilosophy o f education p roduces the im pression that conven tiona l ph ilosophy is concerned p rim arily w ith the con tro l and m anagem en t o f organized ed u ca tio n a l in stitu tions an d system s in w hich ch ild ren are m olded to becom e m em bers o f th e com m unities in w hich they a re b o m . C onsequently , the problem s th a t a re em phasized a re curriculum s and school facilities. All this in term s o f fixities and finalities.^

1 Cf. Wynne, J. P., Theories o f Education: an Introduction to the Foundations o f Education. New York. Harper and Row. 1963.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T 1EDUCATION AS PERSONALITY EVOLUTION

F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f scientific ph ilosophy , education p ro p e rly visaged consists essentially o f the processes o f developing the beha poTentialities o f individuals fo r effective o rien ta tion to th e ir various e ronm en ts, b o th as cu rren t ad ju stm en ts and as general psychological c« cities. A ccordingly, educational events m ust feature th e developm en persons o f all ages no t only in specific s itu a tio n s w ith p redeterm ined gc b u t including also situ a tio n s th a t a re them selves open to advancem en t novelty. E duca tion , then, is personality developm ent.

TW O PHASES O F PERSONALITY D EVELOPM EN T

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a. Casual Personality Development. Schools and cu rricu lum s coi tu te only one phase and basically a m in o r one in personality evolut P ersona lity developm ent p roceeds in the m ain from a n ind iv idual’s ( experience with various so rts o f stim ulus objects w ith w hich he o r in teracts. Briefly, ad ju stm en ta l g row th is casual as co m p ared w ith contrived developm ent o f organism s.

b. Contrived Personality Development. C on trived developm ents ind iv idua ls are perm anen tly an d in tim ately identified w ith and influen by th e ir fam ilies, guard ians, o r teachers, an d by th e ir d ialectal, religit political, an d o ther in stitu tio n s o f th e ir com m unities. It is the con triva phase o f personality deve lopm ent th a t p ro m p ts questions as to w ho a n d w ho should be educated , even w ith respect to the sim ple capacitie read in g an d w riting. It is a co m m o n belief th a t ce rta in b iologically soi ind iv iduals o r groups are uneducab le o r sharp ly lim ited in their intellect capacities. A lso there still ex ists the im plicit assu m p tio n th a t univei

. e d u c a tio n an d the d iffusion o f know ledge a re dan g ero u s to a sta te oi \ ru le rs an d th a t ed u ca tio n shou ld be con tro lled indoctrination . S uch

v su m p tio n s govern the n a tu re o f th e ed u ca tio n th a t is allow ed o r foster w he th e r teaching an d learn ing are free o r restricted by th e needs o f co m m u n ity , its technological s ta tu s , o r the w him s o f the rulers. In an y i every case, n o one can challenge the relevance o f scientific p h ilo sophy the understand ing o f^ d u c a tio n despite th e m an y problem s involved.

— > C onsideffsom e p rob lem s o f school education . A n exam ple concerns dev e lo p m en t o facfiirdT n s c h o o l!^ is well know n th a t m an y schools are over p o p u la ted as to obviate m uch if a n y con tac t betw een th e person be: ed u ca ted an d the ed u ca to r. [A definite d raw b ack to schoo l life is i

, v io la tion o f the psychological princip le th a t each person m ust develop

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E D U C A T I O N I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V E

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his o r h er ow n w ay an d not be categorized either as a so-called gifted individual o r a backw ard oneT^

F u rth e rm o re , it is questio n ab le w he the r schools can d o as m uch as is expected o f them . T here is the p rob lem o f a h a rm o n y o f school and hom e o r fam ily life. In som e cases there is a conflict o f o pportun ities. T h e h om e life o f ch ild ren negates the results o f w hat the schools are in tended to d o . A case in po in t is th a t o f paren ts w ho live o n a fairly low cu ltu ra l level but w ho are am b itio u s eno u g h fo r th e ir ch ild ren to com pete w ith ch ild ren o f m ore favo rab le living cond itions. F o r exam ple , the paren ts realize tha t their speech hab its a re in ferio r to those o f be tter educated people. But how can the schoo ls help w hen the hom e speech is in ferio r to w hat the school tries to teach? O bviously ch ild ren w hose fam ily cu ltu re harm onizes w ith the ideals an d goa ls o f the school reap the ad v an tag e o f fam ily back ing an d su p p o rt fo r educational developm ent.

N o th in g is easier th an to uncover serious w rongs in the o rg an iza tio n , p ro cedures, an d results o b ta ined by school system s. F o rm al educational en terp rises in p o p u lo u s and developed n a tio n s are so gigantic, expensive, an d various in the educational popu la tion th a t erro rs an d shortcom ings are glaring. B ut still there is no denying th a t e duca tiona l in stitu tions, like.. schools have their ow n un iq u e virtues a nd potentialities fo r im provem ents a n d increased serviceabilities. C ertain ly there is no possib ility fo r rejecting schools a lto g e th er an d destroy ing th em as Iv an Illich has recently been advocating .2

S chool, Illich defines “as the age-specific, teacher re la ted process requ iring full-tim e a tten d an ce a t an ob ligato ry curricu lum ,"3 an d th en m o u n ts a nihilistic a tta c k u p o n schools. W ith o u t a d o u b t m any of the ind ictm ents he fo rm ula tes o f school system s are well au th en tica ted b u t the alternatives th a t he offers m itigate his w holesale a tta c k an d d o no t offer justification fo r th e vehem ence w ith w hich he b o m b ard s schools. N o m issiles he d irects a t the target o f schools no t a id ing pupils to th ink a n d develop equ ipm ent fo r p ro p er ad justm en ts to their persistent and variable environm ents.

N u m ero u s reviewers* have co u n te ra ttack ed Illich w ith d u e credit fo r accep tab le views th o u g h they d o n o t stress sufficiently the fact th a t since ed u ca tio n is p ersonality d eve lopm en t m an y pup ils are n o t h arm ed by the

3 I l l ic h . L , D eschooling Soc ie ty , N e w Y o r k , H a r p e r a n d R o w , 1971.1 Ib id ., p . 2 4 -2 5 .4 F o r e x a m p l e . B o w e n . J . , " C o m m e n t a r y o n I l l ic h .’' in B o w e n , J . a n d H o b s o n . P . R . . Theories o f

Education, S y d n e y . W i le y . 1 9 7 4 , p p . 3 9 V 4 0 2 . P e t r i e . H . G .. E ducationa l Theory, 2 1 . 1 9 7 1, p p . 4 6 9 -1 7 8 . G in t i s , H . . “ T o w a r d s a P o l i t i c a l E c o n o m y o f E d u c a t i o n ; A R a d i c a l C r i t i q u e o f I v a n l l l i c h 's l i e s c h o o l

in g S o c ie ty ," H arvard E duca tiona l Review, 4 2 , 1 9 7 2 . 7 0 -9 6 .

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T 1

schools since they becom e sa tisfac to ry achievers afte r school life. In gen th ere is little m eticulous reference to th e com plexities o f societal events facilitate o r im pede th e careers o f persons.

EDUCATION DESCRIBED

T he first step in defining o r describ ing a n educational event is to difTe tia te betw een (a) the conven tiona l s itu a tio n o f public o r p rivate school including form al appren ticesh ips, an d (b) the m ore general an d ca processes o f personality dev e lo p m en t th ro u g h innum erab le indivii experiences.

j- In b o th types o f situa tion we m ust tak e acco u n t o f th ree outstani factors: (a) th e p erso n concerned , (b) th e th ings an d co n d itio n s w ith w he interacts, and (c) th e situ a tio n o r auspices under w hich he in teract

W ith respect to the person , in fo rm atio n is required ab o u t his past p resen t circum stances, including as m an y developm ental facts as poss It is such in fo rm atio n th a t a id s in u n d ers tan d in g the psychological d« o pm en t o f persons an d in the im provem ent o f m easures taken to pror. personality developm ent in fo rm al education situations.

N o less im p o rtan t a re the p a rticu la r objects, persons, an d c ircum sta w ith w hich ind iv iduals com e in to co n tac t. H ere m ay be m entioned

* socioeconom ic sta tu s o f fam ily an d com m unity . C learly, such opportut„. fo r co n tac ts w ith th ings an d co n d itio n s is very different as betw eei

passing th ro u g h a school system o r (b) developing as a p a rticu la r indi ual. In all s itua tions the specific changes an d cond itions used m us

•»' inquired into. F o r exam ple, school situations m ay em ploy radio , televit•*' charts, d iagram s, and the function ing o f co m pu ter m echanism s.

P aren ts, teachers, school au th o rities , an d social institu tions are regai as parts o f the educational setting so th a t th e ir personality equ ip ir train ing , and general com petence m ust be exam ined fo r th e ir influe

**• u p o n educational situations. In a genuine sense it is these persons whcresponsible fo r setting up the goals o f th e educational process. F o r ex pie, the a im o f ed u ca tio n m igh t be th e d em ocratic one o f m ak ing per: alike in som e w ay o r in every w ay, o r facilitating the ac tua liza tio potentialities created by earlier developm ents o f p articu la r individual

T he descrip tion o f ed u ca tio n a l fields clearly po in ts u p the in terbe ioral processes specified by scientific psychology. This is the case whe we stress personality deve lopm ent o r ju s t env ironm enta l ad a p ta ti school curricula, educational fashions, o r rights and privileges o f teacl T o regard the educational process as exclusively affecting the re spon

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> individual is to open the w ay to a belief in all sorts o f m ythical pow ers andconditions. Such an exclusivist view brings in its tra in instincts, innate pow ers, and in general serious m isin te rp re ta tio n s o f psychological events.

In terbehav io ra l ph ilosophy places teachers in p ro p e r perspective w hen they are considered as p a rt o f the setting o f educational situations. They p rovide specific favorable o r unfavo rab le c ircum stances fo r the advantage o r d isadvan tage o f acquiring reactions, accom plish ing tasks, and setting up o p portun ities fo r developm ent. N o t only are teachers peripheral factors in learn ing s itua tions, bu t they can on ly o p e ra te in co n ju n c tio n w ith back ground and foreground features su rro u n d in g the m odification o f the taugh t. T eachers are guides as well as stim u la to rs . O th e r peripheral facto rs m ay be located in the attitudes o f paren ts w ith respect to schools.

A n in teresting o b servation concern ing p aren ts as peripheral facto rs in educational situa tions is th a t o f paren ts w ho them selves are w ithou t form al education bu t w ho are stim ulated to w an t th e ir children to receive such an education . T heir am b itio n is s tim ulated by em u la tio n , a desire to stand ou t in the com m unity , an d the hope f o r a rise in the socioeconom ic scale. The range o f m otives fo r sending children to school ex tends dow nw ard from ac tua l personal im provem ent to the use o f schools as custod ial locales for b o thersom e children , w ith a m idpo in t in the com pliance w ith the laws of the com m unity .

EDUCATION IN INTERRELATION

E d u ca tio n an d its p rob lem s obv iously d o no t exist in a vacuum . Indeed, ed u ca tio n a l events are in tim ately in terre lated w ith all sorts o f factors that influence its n a tu re and operation . S om e o f the in terre lating facto rs favor the o p era tion o f educational processes while o thers ap p ear as hindrances an d interferences. In bo th cases the in terre la ting fac to rs perfo rm as co n tro ls an d guides o f individual developm ents. T h e influences m ay be categorized as D irect o r as Peripheral. T hey influence b o th form al an d casual developm ents.

a. Direct Influences. D irect influences u p o n casual personality developm en ts a re clearly illustrated where educational facilities an d procedures are hedged ab o u t by social, political, an d econom ic factors, with a resulting neglect o f in trinsic individual differences engendered by varia tions in the con fron ta tions o f persons in different hum an situations.

D irect h indering fo rm al educational processes a re exem plified by the difficulties experienced by educato rs w ith teacher-pup il ratios, the overcrow ding o f classroom s, an d the m ore serious p rob lem s o f stand ard iza tio n

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Iby the subjection o f ind iv iduals to religious o r secular curricula. 1 general effect o f such co n stra in ts is, o f course, to reduce ac tual o r poteni originality.

b. Peripheral Influences on Personality Development. Indirect interf ence with personal developm ent is well illustrated by the objective circu stances o f fam ilies an d com m unities w hich preclude th e u n d esirable tra L ight is th ro w n up o n this c ircum stance by the co n tra ry situa tion in wh unrestric ted ind iv iduals build up m any types o f b ehav io r bo th a p p ro ' an d d isapproved o f by the com m unities in w hich they live.

G enerally speaking, educational con tro ls, while they som etim es p m o te advan tageous personality developm ent, m ore o ften clash w ith scientific psychological rule o f ind iv idual differences. T o ab ide by th e r elim inates co n stra in ts u p o n the educatee an d allow s fo r the possible fr d o m and spon taneity o f behav io r th a t he m ay display. It is to loosen barriers o f biological age. It is co un ted as educational research to determ h o w m any syllables a re best a llow ed fo r each age g ro u p in read ing boi fo r children . A sim ilar co n tro l over individual differences is to lim it read ing o f ch ild ren to certa in grades o f boo k s according to their ch rono l ical ages. It is an in teresting q u es tio n h o w m uch a rb itra ry co n tro ls con ti u te to the re ta rd a tio n o f ch ildren’s developm ent.

T o con fo rm to scientific ph ilosophy , the ed u ca tio n o f ind iv iduals m l*' be considered as dynam ic processes, since the individual will grow becai o f th e possibilities o f con tac ts w ith all so rts o f novel objects an d conditio

H ere th e suggestion is to d eve lop m ean s o f in terac ting w ith new situati< ' a n d objects on a personal o r ind iv idual p lan . S im ply to be aw are o f pres

th ings is n o t enough . T o develop personal efficiency, it is requ ired develop com parisons, evaluations, analyses, an d criticism s. Im plied her

..a th a t effective ed u ca tio n requ ires th a t even fro m early ch ildhood on , f curiosity shou ld be k ep t alive an d th e child be encouraged to interbeh;

'* " w ith th ings w ith in his capacity an d o p p o rtu n ity a t th e tim e.

f EDUCATION IN T H E PERSPECTIVE O F SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOt

Since the central d a tu m in educational situations, nam ely, the evolutioi personalities, perta ins to psychological p roblem s, m uch o f the philosoi o f education hinges u p o n the psychological processes involved in learn a n d general behav io ral developm ent. T h is is n o t to exc lude o r even m m ize the presence an d o p era tio n o f th e setting factors in psychologi situations. N o psychological s itu a tio n exists w ith o u t th e co-presence num ero u s biological, social, an d econom ic com ponents. G roup-rela

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E D U C A T I O N I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Eed u ca tio n com prises techniques fo r inducing individuals to acqu ire such tra its o f behav io r as ap p ear to th e ir biological and societal forebears as necessary o r desirab le fo r m em bersh ip in their p a rticu la r com m unities. A utodidacticism , too , p rom otes the personality-build ing process, th o u g h the goals are au to g en o u s and highly variable. W h ether ed u ca tio n is id io syncratic o r social, psychology plays a great p a rt in the theo ry an d practice o f education .

A lthough it is understandab le th a t those w ho live in com plex industrial and technological societies should view ed u ca tio n as a g ian t system o f organized m echanism s fo r the conversion o f incom ers in to a g ro u p ’s citizenry and usually to m old offspring on th e p a tte rn o f th e ir p rogen ito rs, ed u ca tio n is certain ly m uch different from that. A s we have a lready indicated , education consists o f the inevitable process o f evolving individuals beyond th e ir b io-em bryological status. E ducational processes constitu te the m etam orphosis o f o rganism s from m ore o r less purely biological beings in to m em bers o f the hu m an o r cu ltu ra l popu la tion . T h e m echanism s o f conven tional education , including schools, an d their financing, curricu la, teaching system s o r m ethods, and techniques, a re im p o rtan t and frequently indispensable b u t still are aux ilia ry an d peripheral factors. W hen accoun t is taken o f the educational processes o f the sim pler com m unities and cultures as well as o f m ore com plex societies, strik ing differences are observed as betw een regulated education an d the m ore general psychological developm ent o f persons a t all stages from infancy to ad u lthood and beyond.

It is surely su pererogato ry to m ention th a t it is the province o f psychology to analyze a n d characterize th e behav io ral n a tu re o f organism s. O bviously , it is to psychology th a t we reso rt fo r expertise respecting the m odification o f behavior, th e potentialities an d lim its o f the developing and learning process, the p roblem o f capacity w hether innate o r acquired , the ab ility periodically to reperform previously acquired reactions, the basis fo r apply ing acquired skills, in fo rm ation , and m odes o f ad ap ta tio n to environing things and conditions.

U nfortunately , psychology itself can n o t be universally regarded as a / n a tu ra l science. It is still co n tam in a ted with trad itio n a l spiritistic notions.

Like all the sciences which are the w orks o f hum an individuals, psychology also operates in the shadow o f cu ltu ra l institu tions, including trad itional ph ilosophy . O nly by ex tru d ing m isco n structions o fan tiq u a te d philosophy

^ can psychology becom e serviceable, in.s.upport o f education .In sum , in o rd e r to achieve a p roper philosophical overview, educational

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I Vth ink ing requires tha t a scientific psychology provide dependable p o stu tio n fo r the observation o f educational p rocedures and practices.

T h e first step in the eva lua tion of psychology as a science is to determ i w hether o r no t the discipline operates entirely o n the basis o f observing t in terbehav io r of o rganism s as they evolve in constan t an d m ore o r 1< effective in teraction with th ings and events o f their environm ent. It is or such activities tha t con fo rm to the ca n o n s o f n a tu ra l science. W e ad o p t t nam e “in terbehavioral” for such a psychological discipline.

T o adhere to the study o f concrete in terac tions is to d ep a rt radica from the im position o f trad itio n a l constru c ts u p o n events. In terbehav io psychology, as a scientific discipline, has no place fo r the im aginary cc structs o f soul, m ind, consciousness, o r such oppositions as “m ind-boc o r “natu re an d nu rtu re .” P sychological in terac tions o r in te rb eh av io r m be regarded as evolutions an d e lab o ra tio n s o f the biological interactio: P ro b ab ly the m ost effective ap p ro a c h to psychological events is to th ink th em as resulting from a fo u rth evo lu tion follow ing: (a) the inorgai evo lu tion o f physiochem ical elem ents, co m pounds, an d processes, w: la ter in teractions leading to the developm ent o f the sun an d p lanets a galactic system s, (b) the phylogenetic b iological evolu tion , an d (c) t ontogenic biological evolution .

SEQUENTIAL O RD ER IN EDUCATIONAL DEVELOPM ENT

Because personality evolu tion is cum ulative an d often progressive, f< low ing an d paralleling b iological m atu ra tio n , it varies som ew hat o n t

m basis o f age an d m ore definitely u p o n ad a p ta tio n s to social c ircum stanc•p O n the w hole, the greatest n u m b er o f new tra its a re m ore easily an d me

rapid ly developed in the ea rlie r life o f individuals. In fan ts an d ch ild r 8* m ust develop reactional eq u ip m en t in o rd e r to becom e orien ted a:

ad justed to novel an d d em an d in g en v iro n m en ts an d a t the sam e tim e n u be ham pered by a p rio r accum ulation o f behavioral equipm ent. It is tl

early developm ent o f hab its, inclinations, likes, and dislikes w hich reg lates and facilitates fu tu re developm ent in p articu la r directions.

By co n tra s t with the ease a n d sm oo thness o f tra it developm ent in you persons, ad u lt trait developm ent in m ore com plex circum stances is com p cated by problem s o f d irection , ob ligation , responsibility, an d du ty . O n t o th e r hand, o f course, the a d u lt period m ay be m arked by know ledge ai w isdom w hich favor particu la r lines o f fu tu re grow th.

T h e sequential o rd e r o f ed u ca tio n o r personality developm ent can effectively observed in the ac tu a l psychological deve lopm ent o f persons.

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E D U C A T I O N I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Ethe earliest stage the en tire behavioral reperto ire is cen tered on in terbehav io r w ith the m o th er an d is g radually en larged th ro u g h con tac ts w ith o th e r m em bers in the family. In la ter con tac ts w ith a g rad u a lly expand ing w orld , the individual becom es behaviorally better equ ipped , m ore o r less independen t o f the fam ily, and increasingly ad a p te d to the social cond itions in w hich he lives.

CONTINUITY OF EDUCATIONAL PROCESSES

G ran tin g th a t edu ca tio n is a process o f perso n a lity building, it m ust be looked upon as a co n tin u o u s process. D espite the g reat differences between fo rm al educa tio n (schooling and tu to ria l experiences) and th e general evo lu tion o f an individual o r personality , th e basic developm ents are located on a single con tinuum . P aralle ling the biological m a tu ra tio n stages o f the individual, an evolution o f ac ts and tra its begins u n d er fam ily auspices and con tinues th ro u g h o u t school a tten d an ce and la ter vocational o r dom estic careers. T h ro u g h con tac t w ith m any k inds o f persons, episodes, an d institu tions, the individual becom es culturalized, m olded, and m odified.5

SOME PROBLEMS IN EDUCATIONAL SITUATIONS

E duca tiona l procedures and processes involve a num ber o f general p roblem s w hich the philosophical observer m ust consider and analyze.

a. The Ordinary and the Elite. O vershadow ing all the prob lem s an d p rocedures o f education is the fact o f ind iv idual differences. N o tw o persons are com pletely alike, n o t even identical twins. T his fact influences all the features o f h um an developm ent. S uch influences vary o f course w ith th e d im ensions o f the com m unities in w hich ed u ca tio n a l processes occur. C om plex com m unities face a n u m b er o f p rob lem s w hich are no t evident in sim pler com m unities. G enerally speaking, sim ple com m unities consist o f sparse p o p u la tio n s and are uncom plicated by m any varieties o f institu tions. In such com m unities the educational process is p rim arily casual and apprenticelike. C hildren sim ply ad a p t them selves to the circum stances o f local living as they grow capab le o f p artic ipa ting in the w ork and cerem onies o f th e ir particu la r tribes.

In m o re com plex com m unities the p o p u la tio n s are large and range from p o o r socio-econom ic levels to various degrees o f affluence. O ne o f the o u ts tan d in g differences betw een th e com plex a n d the sim ple com m unities

3Cf. Kantor. J. R., An Outline o f SoriaI Psychology. Chicago, Principia, 1929.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I -is th a t edu ca tio n a l processes o f th e fo rm er becom e form alized an d in m; cases com pulsory . U n d er such cond itio n s there arise system s o f pu education , th a t is, the sta te o r o th e r g ro u p o rgan ization provides soui a n d resources fo r educa tin g th e p e rso n s w ho are com pelled to unde public education . F ro m such c ircum stances arise p rob lem s o f dem ocr o r au th o rity . T he q u es tio n becom es p o ig n an t w hether all the m em ber: th e com m unity are equa lly cap ab le o f partic ip a tin g in the educatio processes set up by the sta te o r o th e r govern ing agency. A m o n g th e seri. p roblem s there is th e question o f w hether it is possible in all facets < sections o f the com m u n ity to p rov ide equal o r even effective tu ition .

A n o th e r serious p ro b lem em erges, th a t o f elitism . It is im possible ignore the prob lem o f d ifferential o p p o rtu n ity an d p rep ara tio n fo rc o m | ing w ith o th e r m em bers o f th e g ro u p th a t have h ad different o p portune in the early days o f th e ir living. D em ocracy con tends w ith elitism a lth o i th ere is n o question here o f a n y in n a te su p erio rity o r inferiority . It is a m a tte r o f fam ily s ta tu s w h ether one grow s up in poverty a n d d ep riva tio r in econom ic affluence an d p len itu d e o f advan tages. E ith er socioeconoi c ircum stance m ay p rove ad v an tag eo u s o r d e trim en ta l, depending specificities.

EDUCATION VERSUS TRAINING

A co n stan t bone o f co n ten tio n in educational circles is th a t w hich divii those w ho differentiate strik ingly betw een general o r liberal education a voca tio n a l tra in ing , fro m th o se w ho regard all education as voca tio r T h is p ro b lem is p erh ap s m o re a p p a re n t in the u p p er g rades o f schooli say in college; som e ed u ca to rs assert th a t th e ir colleagues are w rong separa te education from voca tion . F o r exam ple, one p a r ty claim s tl college edu ca tio n shou ld be q u ite d ifferent fro m voca tiona l educatii w hile th e ir o p p o n en ts say th a t, fo r exam ple , the s tu d en ts m ajo rin g language d o so fo r th e m o st p a r t because they seek a technique teaching.

O n the low er levels the d ifferen tia tion betw een general education a voca tiona l education is said to be based on the fact th a t som e c h ild re n ; u n ab le to m aster a cu rricu lum fo r general education , and so they have to tau g h t som e so rt o f h an d ic ra ft o r c ra ftsm an sh ip th a t will b e o f use to th« in their econom ic ad justm ents.

A generous ph ilosophical a ttitu d e w ould b e to a ttem p t to im prove i p e rso n a lity tra its o f yo u n g ch ild ren w ho even ap p e a r to be incapab le m astering the o rd in a ry cu rricu lu m . T h e effect w ould b e th a t in th

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E D U C A T I O N I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Em atu rity even as c raftsm en they w ould have su p erio r a ttitu d es to w ard s the w orld they live in an d th e co m m u n ity they reside in, th a n w ould o therw ise be the case. S ince it ap p ears a t p resen t inevitable th a t there should be im m ense differences betw een personalities, ce rta in stan d ard s o f excellence in people w ould be a target to a im at. Inc identally , even if the ex ternal cond itions o f life ca n n o t be con tro lled o r m odified, it w ould ad d to the quality o f com m unities fo r each individual to be educated as well as trained fo r som e vocation .

EDUCATION IN SIMPLE AND COMPLEX CULTURES

Scientific psychology differentiates betw een the educational processes localized in different m ilieux. A ccordingly , the psychologist observes the v aria tion in the process as practiced in the sparsely pop u la ted sim pler cultures as com pared with thickly p opu la ted an d com plex groups. In the sim pler societies personality developm ent is p rim arily casual an d m ore o r less h ap h azard , th o u g h no t w ithou t the effectiveness o f ad ju stm en t required by m em bersh ip in a p articu la r com m unity . T h e casual-contrived d istinc tion derives, o f course, from the general psychological d ifferen tiatio n betw een the ad v en titio u s accu m u la tio n o f tra its in a d ju s tm e n ta l s ituations an d the contrived behavior developm ent constra ined an d ruled by societal trad itio n s an d m anagerial au thorities. A good exam ple o f casual b eh av io r d eve lopm en t is th e free an d easy w ay y o u n g ch ild ren acq u ire foreign speech by m ere con tac t w ith native children. S o sim ple an d effective is the process th a t w riters have invented instincts o f language an d innate language capacities.

EDUCATIONAL GOALS AND VALUES

P rob lem s o f goals an d values to u ch u p o n b o th the psychological center a n d the cu ltu ra l periphery o f the ed u ca tio n a l process. S ince edu ca tio n a l p rocedures are in tim ate ly cond itio n ed by th e cu ltu ra l in stitu tions o f co m m unities, w hat individuals learn an d how are pow erfully influenced by local cu ltu ra l in stitu tions v ia the agencies o f school au thorities, teachers, a n d parents.

N ow , obviously , ed u ca tio n a l “goals” m ay be p ro p e r an d ad v an tag eo u s o r im p ro p er and d isadvan tageous a n d thus in separab le from prob lem s o f value. I t is th e varia tio n in values th a t d ictates th e developm ent o f p aroch ia l schools alongside the public institu tions. S chools in a n a tio n o r com m unity estab lished o n th e basis o f a sep a ra tio n o f sta te an d ch u rch em phasize the

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three R’s, while parochial institu tions aim a t the cultivation o f m ora religious traits. F u rtherm ore , it m ay be the educational goal o f a com r ty to require new com ers to ad a p t them selves to local trad itions conditions w ithout question as to the propriety o f existing institut O ther goals m ay be to cultivate individuals to w orsh ip econom political success a t any cost, o r to becom e “leaders” even by aggressii chicanery of any sort.

In general, the problem o f educational goals runs directly inu relations o f individuals and the g roups in w hich they are ensconced. \ it is true th a t individuals are dom inated by groups, it is also true individuals by their inventions, productiv ity , and general creativity- powerful influences upon the com m unities am ong w hich they live o thers related to them . A lways there rem ain the facts o f individual d ences w hich the exigencies o f individual and social living inevitably duce. Such are the exigencies o f hum an living th a t they result it developm ent o f m any varieties o f personality. C riteria are no t lackin the categorization o f som e as inferior and som e as superior. T he cri invoked range in value fo r tra its o f knowledge, skills, creativity, aflecti and so on.

Clearly, the influences o f g roups upon individuals and individuals i groups are invariably reciprocal. This fact th row s considerable light o problem o f elitism and its value fo r social life. T hough we banisf fallacies o f innateness, it can n o t be denied tha t the developm ent o f sup' and inferior personalities carries m any potentialities for social d isharn and conflict. However, it is still p robable th a t the em phasis upon ex ness, knowledge, good judgm ent, valid reasoning, individualism inste; mass conform ity, as well as sensitivity to na tu ra l and artistic beauty have a salu tary influence upon the condition o f m an and his civilizat

TECHNOLOGY AND ENGINEERING IN EDUCATION

As a final item in the philosophical exam ination o f the educati process, we glance briefly a t the technological and engineering aspec educational events.

O urs is an age o f technology. W e can m ove m ountains, pu t m en oi m oon, d irect missiles to d istan t lands capable of annihilating entire pof tions, and produce com puters that sim ulate com plex intellectual feats, small w onder that m achines are w orshipped as m odem golden calves th a t ap p ara tu s is devised fo r the educational province o f o u r culture.

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E D U C A T I O N I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Etask , then , is to consider th e n a tu re o f techno logy an d its applicability to education .

T echno logy is essentially a n en terp rise o f ex tend ing an d am plify ing h u m an pow ers o f coping w ith difficult s itu a tio n s by devising an d inventing to o ls a n d m achines to p ro d u ce effects n o t possib le w ith o u t such aids. A lth o u g h techno logy should n o t be reg ard ed as lim ited to w ork w ith ino rgan ic o r physiochem ical m ateria ls, it is such th ings as levers, wheels, w ires, cogs, an d electrodes th a t m ost read ily illu stra te engineering activities.

F unctionally , all technological processes a re v arian t m eans to w ard ends, w hich are o therw ise set up. T h e applicab ility a n d value o f engineering ac tions an d too ls p resuppose specifications fo r the purpose fo r w hich they are fash ioned a n d im proved . In m ost instances technologica l designs rep resen t accre tions o f a lready ex isten t things. This is n o t to deny tech n o logical invention , b u t the th ings dea lt w ith a n d the results accom plished are o n the w hole fixed and determ ined .

T echnological functions being strictly lim ited to the m echanical a n d relatively sta tic have little relevance in edu ca tio n a l s ituations. A t best they relate to the very early periods o f in terbehav io r, as, fo r exam ple , in p rim ary a n d secondary schools. In such s itu a tio n s the eng ineer can exercise his ta len ts in the p ro d u c tio n an d use o f visual aids, television, rad io , teach ing m achines, an d p ro g ram s o f v ario u s sorts, includ ing those fo r co m p u te r operations.

In such definitely contrived situations, technologica l aids prove to be of g reat value. E duca tiona l m ach inery m ay conserve tim e and effort an d som etim es accelerate the d ev e lopm en t o f sim ple types o f b eh av io r b u t d o n o t advance th e developm ent o f m o re significant b eh av io r tra its o f individuals. It is ce rta in th a t even in sim ple s itua tions the em ploym en t o f technological im plem ents benefits m o re the teachers and ad m in is tra to rs th a n the pupils.

F ro m o u r review o f th e sp o n tan e ity o f com plex in terbehav io r, it is clear th a t techno logy is hard ly app licab le to the events o f biology o r psychology. T h a t is w hy technology in ed u ca tio n is lim ited to th e learning o f sta tem en ts an d sentences, the spelling of w ords, an d sim ilar m in o r tasks th a t c an be reduced to m echanical sim plicity. W hen personal in te rb eh av io r and hab its o f social p ro p rie ty are concerned , n o th in g o f a technologica l n a tu re is even th o u g h t of. T h a t is, b eh av io r b o th in th e case o f ch ild ren an d ad u lts is developed in the casual m an n er we have discussed in the early p a rt o f this chap ter. In th is connection , a tten tio n m ay be d irected to a recent in terest-

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ing letter in Science6 w hich co n tra s ts th e k ind of technologica l act sufficient fo r the fan tastic feat o f p u ttin g m en on the m o o n with th e cu unyield ing search for the n a tu re an d conquest o f cancer. N ow that possible to cultivate a psychology free from the m ystifications now in ing the disciplines, it is n o t difficult to conceive a biological a n d me education th a t will p rove effective fo r the understan d in g o f norm al m alignant tissue an d their grow th.

SUM M ARY

T w o prim ary postu lates underlie the present chap ter. T he first is educational processes a re fu n d am en ta l fo r the existence an d vale h u m an beings an d the ir civilization. E duca tion is assum ed to be the gei process by w hich biological o rgan ism s are tran sfo rm ed into cu ltu re persons; it is not ju s t school learning.

T he second postu la te is th a t since educational in stitu tions rest up psychological fo u n d a tio n , a na tu ra lis tic an d scientific psychology special significance fo r edu ca tio n a l th eo ry and practice.

Scientific psychology w ith its in terd iscip linary tangentia l affiliates, ogy and an th ro p o lo g y , light up g laringly the processes o f educai Indispensable for ed u ca tio n a l theo ry and practice is a psychology rooti the study o f in terbehav io r, instead o f verbal fo rm u lae concern ing f m ind, o r o th er psychic processes. O nly in terbehav io ral psychology nishes p roper answ ers to the questions concern ing the n a tu re and met o f learn ing and its im p ro v em en t as well as co n trib u tes to th e ger u n d erstand ing o f tra it deve lo p m en t fo r effective ad justm en ts to inter sonal s itua tions as well as to n o n h u m a n env ironm en ts. Specifically in terbehavioral psychology is cap ab le o f offering verifiable d e sc rip to r personality and various types of p erfo rm ance such as rem em bering, ing, perceiving, reasoning, an d understanding .

Because o f the close in terd iscip linary re la tion o f psychology an d l ogy, psychology receives s tro n g su p p o rt from biology in counteracting trad itio n o f m ultip le species o f m en, and thus can topple the ax io m o f r w ith d ifferent capacities fo r learn ing and education . T h e sam e m ay be a b o u t all the specious views a b o u t th e b ra in being a m aster o rg an re j w ith nonspatial capacities to store ideas and fitted w ith the powe rem em ber, th ink, and reason. S im ilarly , cu ltura l an th ro p o lo g y m ak great con trib u tio n to the psychology o f ed u ca tio n by p rovid ing psychol

' f .lias. II.. “Cancer Kcsviirch." V o w r. 175. 1972. 1712

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with d a ta co ncern ing the stim u la tional basis fo rin te rb eh av io ra l ac tion and its co n d itio n s. A s th e s tu d y o f th e vary ing b eh av io r o f persons w ith o th er persons, ob jects , an d in stitu tio n s o f p a r tic u la r g ro u p s o f people, it c o n trib utes im m ensely to o u r know ledge o f the o rig in an d changes o f personality tra its u n d e r th e influence o f different e thn ic system s.

In th e la tte r p a r t o f th is chap te r, th e w riter analyzed various phases o f the ed u ca tio n a l en terp rise in o rd e r to co n sid er a t w hat p o in ts the in terbehav - io ral h ypo thesis cou ld increase th e efficiency an d the value o f the effort. A m ong the situ a tio n s considered w ere the re la tions betw een teachers and those they tau g h t, the difference betw een casual an d contrived behav io r deve lopm ent, th e goals o f ed u ca tio n , an d the in tro d u c tio n o f technological m ethods. T h e im p lica tion w as suggested th a t the in terbehav io ra l h y p o th esis ad eq u a te ly assessed th e need fo r changes in b o th th e th eo ry an d practice o f education .

A t th is p o in t th e q u estio n arises: Even if in terbehav io ra l science is an im pro v em en t o ver those now p revalen t, w ould it be feasible to p u t it in to force? It m ust be adm itted th a t since ed ucational m atters are only co m p o nents in g rand societal com plexes, m any social, political, an d econom ic o b stru c tio n s stan d in th e w ay o f im plem enting w hat m ay a p p e a r as a desirab le intellectual revo lu tion o r even an unrealizab le ideal. But g rea t as the difficulties m ay be, th e co u n te rq u estio n arises: A t w hat p o in t can lim its be set to the freedom o f d iscovery an d th e cu ltiv a tio n o f h u m an ingenuity?

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C H A P T E R 2 0

P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L IG IO N

ISOLATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF RELIGION

Extrem ely w idespread is the op in ion am o n g ph ilosophers as v laym en th a t religion is a un ique type o f phen o m en o n universal a m ank ind . R eligion is one they believe w hether o f persons o r g ro u p s . ' because o f a faulty generaliza tion by. ph ilosophers o f som e fo rm o: scendence. A ctually the term “religion” is used to refer to a vast var related and relatively unre la ted activities an d institutions. S o pre indeed are various specialized beliefs, practices, an d rituals am oi peoples o f particu la r civilizations tha t clarity m ust be achieved au th en tic religious traits. T h e question em erges, w hat so rts o f dat. reasonab ly be classified o r ca tegorized as religious? A ccordingly, the o f religion m ust be preceded by an iso lation an d identification o f a i subject m atter.

WHAT IS RELIGION? VARIOUS DEFINITIONS

A lthough it is futile to describe o r define religion by a sim ple al fo rm ula, still m any intellectuals from different points o f view have au ed to d o so. Here are som e exam ples.

M y religion is now as ever the p rogress o f reason; in o th e r wor progress o f science. (R enan)

All tha t is fine in m an. (P asto ra l precepts)Religion is the op ium o f the people. (M a rx and others)T he essence of religion, is a faith which, independen t of, nay in s{

sense and reason, enables m an to apprehend the infinite. M uller)

T he essence o f religion is the belief th a t all th ings are m an ifesta tio pow er that transcends o u r knowledge. (Spencer)

Religion is a feeling of dependence. (Schlcirm acher)Religion concerns the highest hum an values. (Am es)R eligion and no t science first inspired m an to try to unify al

experiences. (O m an)Religion is illusion caused by feeling. (F euerbach)Religion the consciousness of A bsolute Being. (H egel)

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P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O NR elig ion is em otion resting on a conviction o f a h a rm o n y betw een

ourselves an d the universe a t large. (M cT aggart)T h e heart o f religion is not an op in ion ab o u t G od , such as philosophy

m ight reach as the conclusion o f an a rg u m en t; it is a personal re la tion w ith G od. (W illiam Tem ple)

R elig ion is the vision o f som eth ing w hich stands beyond, beh ind , and w ithin, the passing flux o f im m ediate things; som ething w hich is real, an d yet w aiting to be realised; som eth ing w hich is a rem ote possibility, an d yet the greatest o f p resen t facts; som eth ing tha t gives m eaning to all tha t passes, and yet eludes app reh en sio n ; som eth ing whose possession is the final good , and yet is beyond all reach; som eth ing w hich is the u ltim ate ideal, and the hopeless quest. (A . N. W hitehead)

VARYING TYPES OF RELIGIOUS DATA

a. Public and Private Religion. A n im p o rtan t distinc tion m ust be m ade betw een religion as th e behav io r (beliefs, rites, rituals, an d so on) of individuals, an d the gross institu tions o f v a rio u s national, cultic, o r o th er co m m u n al entities. T h e clarity o f this d istinc tion is ev ident fro m the considera tion o f various h istorical m ovem ents in w hich C hristians, for exam ple , as in the C rusades fighting ag a in s t S aracens, o n the p re tex t o f recovering the locus o f C hrist’s activities. O th e r strik ing exam ples are fu rn ished by the various religious w ars in w hich m em bers o f certa in cults, say, C atholics a ttack P ro tes tan ts an d vice versa. In the case o f public religion the em phasis is no t u p o n private faiths, b u t upon a political or m ilitary basis.

P riv a te religion as we have in tim ated consists o f the in tim ate personal beh av io r o f particu la r individuals w ho have developed religious attitudes in th e ir hom es, churches, o r o th e r fo rm s o f social o rgan ization . N o d o u b t m ay be en terta ined as to the d ifferen tia tion betw een personal and g ro u p religions. But in practice it is im possib le com pletely to separate the two fo rm s o f religion, the one em phasizes individual behavior, while the o ther consists o f institu tional structu res o f various styles o f com m unal w ays of living. O n the whole, in this chapter, we shall em phasize religion as th e„ behav io r o f individuals in re la tion to the env iron ing religious in stitu tio n .

b. Sacred and Secular Religion. A lth o u g h religious system s are based on m ysticism a n d su pem atu ra lism , the en tire set m ay be frac tionated on the basis o f w hat m ay be called religious purity , th a t is, degree o f belief a b o u t th e universe an d the sup ern a tu ra l. H istorically , this varia tio n an d

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m odification in religion h ad tak en o n the form o f social service, tha t personnel o f the religious co m m u n ity (priests, rabb is, m ullas, and i u n d ertak e to alleviate poverty , tak e care o f the sick, and com foi bereaved. In recent tim es m an y relig ious g ro u p s w hich have already c oped build ings fo r w orsh ip have ad d ed to their edifices o f w orship facilities fo r w hat they reg ard as cu ltu re an d recreation . T o a great e the changes in this d irec tion have served as an argum en t for m ainta the church as a religious system by persons w ho are no t very sym pathy the original religious function . O ne o f the less a ttrac tive features o f reli system s is lh e p ro p ag a tio n o f political arid com m ercial m o v em en ts ,. often been observed th a t b an k ers , o th e r businessm en, and politi strive, an d often succeed, to be vestry-m en, deacons, and o th e r cl functionaries.

c. The Plurality of Religions. B ecause h u m an beings alw ays ex g roups there is alw ays th e possibility th a t religion should be impli w ith facto rs o f sta te , a n d g ro u p co n tro l w ith the result th a t religious fo rm com m unities called “fa ith s,” o r “cults,” o r “churches." It is na tu ra l, then , th a t there shou ld be so m any different sects o r un its in religious system . S om etim es the o rg an iza tio n is on a h ierarchical basi som etim es o n the basis o f a d em o cra tic system o f equal au th o rity by a m em b ers/O n e o f the m ost strik ing illustrations o f chu rch m embers: the m ultiplicity o f s e a s in the p ro testan t Christian religion. These c ences m ay arise first on th e basis o f beliefs w hich canno t be altog shared by all the m em bers, o r it m ay be th a t som e aggressive an d sir individual will construc t p ro p o sitio n s o f governm ent o r doctrine and will enlist a nu m b er o f disciples o r s e a a r ia n m em bers.

The d ivision o f religion an d ch u rch is closely related to the divisi private an d public religion. C hurches and church m em berships ten w ard public system s while religion m ay rem ain concerned with the fi

i m ental beliefs based o n in to le rance o f ex ternal conditions, the faith in j savior o r redeem er an d the hope o f be tter things in the life to com e.

Incidental to public o r ch u rch relig ion is the con tro l o f persons in religious and o ther form s o f activity , fo r exam ple, the problem o f com tious o b je a io n to w ar or som e o th er function o f a state m ay result in h an d infidelity w hich can be ap p reh en d ed and punished by th eau th o ril the church system.

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P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O NIDENTIFYING ASPECTS OF PERSONAL RELIGION

a . . Religion as a Parapet yfDefense. R elig ions considered as pervasive cu ltu ra l beh av io r consist o f system s o f defense aga inst the evils o f h u m an existence b o th cosm ic an d cu ltu ra l. By bu ild ing up m ysteries an d fables ind iv iduals ho p e to escape the rigors o f land , air, an d sea, as well as the dangers from o ther individuals and groups.

F o r m ost o f m an k in d , sheer living is heavily freighted w ith hardships, frustrations, d isappo in tm en ts, an d insufficiencies. H ence s tim ula tion for im agin ing a person o r pow er— a G od o f T ru th an d R ighteousness, w ho will help to b ea r the weighty b u rdens a n d allo t rew ards in a n o th e r and better life. Parad ises in plenty are thus invented to assauge the pains o f living. R eligions are m uch m ore cu ltivated in poverty th an in riches, in sickness th an in health , in slavery th a n in m astery . S om etim es, of course, the gods are favo rab le to elect the rich to co n tro l w ealth no m atte r how obtained.

b. Religion as Unification o f Experience. A n o th e r p ro m in en t assu m p tion ab o u t religion is th a t it serves to unify w hat is regarded as the experience o f the p rac titio n er o r p a r tic ip a to r in a religious com m unity .R elig ious scholars assert th a t even before ph ilosophy , religion was devoted to the o rg an iza tion an d unification o f experience, th a t is, the ideology o f th ink ing persons ab o u t the w orld o r the universe in general.1

c. Religion as Basis o f Self Identification and Adulation. It is a un ique n o tio n o f religion as a cu ltu ra l institu tion th a t it provides fo r its partic ipan tsa sense o f definite belongingness an d even self-adulation . It.m akes possible t (the illusion o f being am o n g those chosen, a n d at the sam e tim e fortifies the belief o f possessing the sterling qualities o f ideal values and su p p o rts the p e rso n a l can d id a tu re fo r soul salvation . G re a t s to re is placed up o n being a i 1m onotheist, an d a sh a re r in the glories o f th e h ighest ap p ears a w itting o r unw itting a ttitu d e o f self flattery o f the m em bers o f various cults. ( ,

d . Religion as Creation. A fu n d am en ta l fea tu re o f religion is the p ro d u c tio n o f religious objects and in stitu tions o f m any sorts. P ersons invent o m n ip o ten t an d om niscien t gods, places like heaven an d hell, an d codes o f superio r m oral practices. All the beliefs an d fa iths are presum ed to alleviate oppressive an d in to le rab le cond itions, an d p rov ide a m ore com fortab le c ircum stance fo r th e ir existence. W h en the p ro d u c ts becom e diffused am o n g m em bers o f com m unities organized religious institu tions arise.

1 See Oman, J., "The Sphere of Religion," in Religion, and Reality (J. Needham, ed.). New York,MacMillan, 1925.

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VARIOUS TYPES OF RELIGIOUS BEHAVIOR

a. Religion as Compliance. W h en religious in stitu tions are created o r w ithou t one deity or m any deities, n um erous individuals partic ipat' becom e disciples w ho p ractice th e tenets o f the particu la r religion. Pri instances o f such p artic ipa tion in religious practice are based on accep o f prom isFs~6rrew afds in Heaven o r in som e afterlife. Specific exam pli the activities in dan g er a n d defeat o f the h ap p y w arrio rs w ho an tic com pensa tion fo r their u n to w ard cond ition in their present activiti p o p u la r sym bol o f such com pliance is the p o p u la r expression “ pie i

' sky w hen you die."b. Religion as Criticism. A un ique subsystem o f religious though

practice concerns the accep tance o f the particu lar religion, fo r cxai T ao ism , Ju d a ism , B uddhism , C hristian ity , and M oham m ed an ism . A good exam ple o f w hat goes on in th is p a rticu la r d o m ain of religion skeptical o r question ing s ta tem en t th a t while it is difficult to accep p ro position"thaT C hnst w as b o rn in B ethlehem , m uch stronger evidei required to wip credence fo r the n o tio n th a t Jesus literally rose fror dead on the third day .2

c. Religion as Contention. T h e great abu n d an ce o f religious gr each w ith m any subcults b rings to the fore all sorts o f con ten tions a details o f beliefs o r p ractice. T h is s itu a tio n is m ore o r less inevi considering tha t persons w ho m ay be united in the accep tance o f a ce cu lt o r system o f religion still m ay develop individual differences o f t!

, in g an d ritua l with respect to item s in the religious system . It is a node*fact tha t great difficulty arises w hen a p roposa l is m ade fo r religious cu system s, w hich are very close in m any particu la rs, to unite in an oecur

» cal system . O f course, facto rs o f au th o rity and com petitive loyalties minvolved in such situations. C erta in types o f practices o r sacrament.*

i even the em blem s an d slogans m ay m ore o r less interfere with cohesioiunity.

d. Religion as Entrepreneurism. A definite aid in understand ing gious da ta is to distinguish betw een s tandard , cultural beliefs and ritual the m onetary system s and o rgan iza tions established a ro u n d religio personal profit and self-aggrandizem ent. In general, s tan d ard cul religions im ply mysteries, m iracles, an d superstitions o f various t P ecuniary religions relate to com m ercial an d e x p lo ra to ry en terp A dvertisem ents in public p rin ts offer p riesthoods in p rivate church gr<

'Kaufman. W„ Critique o f KctiKum amt Philosophy, Garden Cily, Doubleday, 1961, p. I


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P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O Nw ith privileges o f conferring p riesthoods o n o thers an d , w ith great ad v an tages fo r avo id ing tax a tio n , all for the m agnificent sum o f ten dollars.

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RELIGION AND THEOLOGY

N o tw ith stan d in g the nontheo log ical religions an d the m odification o f religions to becom e m oralistic o r otherw ise tran sfo rm ed , an d in full view of the m ystic ism , supersensualism , su p em atu ra lism , m iracles, a n d theology o f religion in general, the m ost typical d a tu m o f religion i s a j jo d o r gods. O f all the objects a n d cond itions th a t transcend concrete experience, gods are o u tstand ing ! T heo log ians con tend w ith each o th e r w ith a rg u m en ts an d schem as to b o ls te r their belief o r fa ith in the ex istence o f deities th a t existbeyond the w orld o f au thentic co n fro n ta tio n s wkhthi.ngs_and events. In the follow ing parag rap h s we consider som e sam ples o f the w ay the ex istence of deities is affirm ed. /•;/,'//;•;/ />•

a. Experience. A co m m o n theological a rg u m en t is th a t persons experience a god an d his qualities even th o u g h there is n o t possible an y sensuous co n tac t w ith a tran scen d en t deity . It is th ro u g h th is ex tra o rd in a ry experience it is said th a t m an really m akes con tac t w ith a transcenden t being. T h e m a tte r is pu t in the w ay th a t persons d o have experience o f G o d ’s presence.3 T hey m ay ad d th a t m an does n o t d iscover G od , b u t th a t G od discloses h im self to m an.4

In th is connec tio n it is significant th a t th is unusual type o f experience is ' exp lained by saying th a t a fte r all theo logy is on ly the theo logians w ay o f ! ta lk ing a b o u t G od .5

b. Commitment. A fam iliar arg u m en t a b o u t belief an d fa ith in an u n k n o w n G o d is exp la ined by the process o f co m m itm en t. F o r som e th eo lo g ian s it seem s sufficient to establish the ex istence o f G od by the view th a t p e rso n s a re so com m itted in th e ir fa ith o r belief th a t th ere m ust be som e evidence ol "the existence o f the G od they b elieve in . A ctually o f course psychology does no t offer an y su p p o rt fo r the objects o f belief o n the basis o f som e so rt o f fan tasy o r delusion.

c. Truth. T he construc ts o f tru th are used by m any theo log ians to estab lish th e ir belief an d faith in a deity . C learly th is is a n a rb itra ry in te rp re ta tio n o f tru th . T heo log ians sim ply construc t a n expedien t in the fo rm o f a com plete ab s trac tio n w ith o u t regard to the fact th a t tru th is a

} 0

3 Waters, F. W„ The Wav in and the Way Out: Science and Religion Reconciled, T oronto. Oxford Univ. Press, 1967. p. 235.

‘ Waters. Ibid, p. 255.’Waters, Ibid., p. 240.

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re la tio n o f validity w ith respect to a n asse r tio n a n d a palpab le obj co nd ition . It m ust be no ticed , how ever, th a t the qualities asserted al deity represent inventions by am plification o f qualities and conditii co n fron ted things a n d events. T h e tra its o f com passion , helpfulness, t tion , a n d forgiveness stem fro m th e observation o f behav io r o f . persons.

d. Reality. T heo logy as concern ed w ith unknow n yet know n pers ties requires an au tis tic in te rp re ta tio n o f reality. It is a rg ued by theo|< th a t rea lity Js so e n o rm o usly e x tended as to include b o th sen su o i supersensuous experiences so th a t there is ro o m en o u g h fo r transce beings an d behav io r a l o n g jv i th na tu ra lis tic b eings, a n d behavior, place g rea t sto re on th e whole o r total reality. It is c h a ra c te rs theo logians to accept as real w hat th e ir verbal construc tions assert.'

P robab ly the best w ay to ind icate the essentiality o f theological ty religion is to consider the doctrin es w hich T ertu llian m ade fam ou q uo te once m ore his basic religious a ttitu d e w ith respect to the Ch: type o f religion.. . . can any of them be so foolish as to believe in God who was bom. bom moreo virgin, bom with a body of flesh, God who has wallowed through those reproa nature?

The Son of God was crucified; lam not ashamed- because it is shameful. The Son died: it is immediately credible-because it is silly. He was buried, and rose again: it is- because it is impossible.’

RELIGION IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

a. Primitive and Sophisticated Supernaturalism. E xtrem ely intei p rob lem s arise from the co n sid e ra tio n o f religion as the an th ropo l study it. G enerally speak ing th e ir basic d a ta consists o f various p n observed by resident observers. D epending upon their intellectual g rounds, an th ropo log ists differ in the way they in terpre t w hat they o t A co m m o n view is th a t relig ion is u niversalistic, t hat is, th a t the religi prim itive people an d those living in highly d eveloped in d u sTHal grou s im ija ro ra t least com parab le . O thers assum e th a t there is a great d iff Between the da ta"of prim itive g ro u p s and those o f m ore advanced cu S om e an th ropo log is ts insist th a t prim itive religion w ith its magic, m ysterious aspect is not relig ion a t all as com pared w ith the sophist religions o f advanced com m unitie s o r peoples. It is highly questit

' Waters. K W„ Op. 07 . pp. 127-13.1.’Tertullian, On the Flesh o f Christ - Pe Carne Chrisli. E. Evans. Tertullians Treaiis

Iniamatum. London. S. P C. X.. 1956. ch. 4. 41-43 and 4. 23-26.

V

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C 1

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P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O Nw h eth er th e pow ers sp o k en o f o r m en tio n ed in prim itive religious groups a re in an y w ay related to the gods o r c rea to rs in m ore co m plica ted types o f religion. It is undeniab le tha t there are som e definite sim ilarities betw een prim itive and soph isticated re lig io n s/ln b o th cases a valid in te rp re ta tio n is

, that there is som e form o f a lienation . M oreover, b o th types o f const ruc tion '‘m ay be entirely verbal.^

T h a t soph istica ted types o f re lig ion m ay be w idely d ifferent fro m those o f prim itive popu la tions o r g roups is instructively po in ted o u t by the defin ition o f religion as fo rm ula ted by G eertz. H e writes a religion is:

(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (S) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic.®

W e have a lread y referred to th e in teresting specu la tion , w ith respect to prim itive an d highly developed religion, as fou n d in the vario u s views o f m o d ern scholars w ith respect to G reek R eligion.9 A d ialog is availab le in w hich o n e side declares th a t th e G reeks w ere en tire ly ra tio n a l an d it is p o in ted o u t th a t th e gods they have p laced o n M o u n t O lym pus are delibera te ly fan tastic . B ut o n the w hole it is claim ed th a t the G reeks were highly ra tio n a l an d did n o t have an y m ysterious spiritistic features in their cu ltu re an d in th e ir religion. T he o th e r side po in ts ou t th a t th e G reeks really w ere ir ra tio n a l a n d th e evidence is offered th a t they d id indulge in speculations a b o u t m ysterious entities and pow ers. N ow the evidence offered is highly questionab le . C ertain ly there was b eh av io r in a b u n dan ce am o n g the G reeks th a t was n o t r a t i o n a l w ith n a tu ra l things.B ut th a t m erely p laced th e G reeks in a class tha t.in c lu d ed m o d e rn po p u lations in w fech m ysticism and_ sp iritism .is_rife._

T h e en tire polem ic w ith respect to G reek religion p o in ts to a lack o f p ro p e r un d erstan d in g o f psychology a n d psychological behavior. F u rth e rm ore, it is p lain th a t th e po lem ic is sy m p to m atic o f fau lty know ledge concern ing th e facts o f w orsh ip , poetic d escrip tions o f events in general life, m ixed w ith im p ro p er p o stu la tio n co ncern ing religion as a fo rm o f h u m an behavior. M any instances o f sim ple ritu a l a re ca tegorized as religion. N ow it is perm issib le w ithin lim its to classify ce rta in k inds o f b eh av io r as religious, th o u g h they d o no t seem to be o f the caliber o f activities w hich

•Geertz, C., "Religion as a Cultural System," in Anthropological Approaches to the Study o f Religion (M. Banton. ed.). New York, Praeger, 1966, p. 4.

9 C f . C h a p t e r 2 , p . 16. 285

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C Tspaw n m ysterious inven tions o f spiritistic entities, and the perform a: m iracles o f all sorts. A cts o f m ere com pliance w ith established trad itii n o t essentially religious.

RELIGION AND SCIENCE

A n a lm o st inevitable c ircum stance it is th a t religious w riters shot aw are o f the great deve lopm ent o f science an d o f its em phasis u p o n ki edge based on general co n fro n ta tio n with th ings and th e investigati such things. It is a lso to be expected th a t religious w riters should b e ; th a t th e natu ra listic a ttitu d e o f science m ay ap p e a r to be in conflict wi doctrines and d o g m as o f religion. A m ong religionists w ho take an in in the g rea t strides o f science som e tak e the a ttitu d e o f a ttem p tin g t- som e h a rm o n y betw een religion an d science. O th e r religionists simpl; th e h igh-handed view th a t religion stands far and aw ay above scienc cu ltu ra l in stitu tion . A favo rite s ta tem en t o f w riters on religion is religion an d even certa in types o f religion are so elevated as to be g su p erio r to science. T hey claim th a t religion is an en terp rise fc ascerta inm ent o f abso lu te tru th , w hile science operates in local arena deals w ith p articu la r problem s.

R elig ionists w ho en te rta in a favo rab le n o tio n o f science assum i know ledge is o f tw o basic kinds. T h ey b o th com pete fo r th e increi know ledge, bjut o f cou rse th e religious type o f know ledge is to in tim acy w ith a n o th e r w orld , o n e w hich as W hitehead says “s beyond, beh ind , th e passing flux o f im m edia te things. W hat re lig io n ' to know ab o u t is the real w hich is w aitin g to be realized. S o m e th in g \ is the u ltim ate ideal and th e hopeless quest.”10

•J- T he religious arg u m en t is o f course based on a shadow y view th; w ritings o f bo th science a n d relig ion are construc tions. T h e difle how ever is ex trem ely g reat, fo r as we have indicated so often , th e con* tions o f science are descrip tio n s and ex p lan a tio n s o f observable th ing events while the religious co n stru c tio n s are autistic , called o u t b general h u m an circum stances o f helplessness, evils, disease, an d difficulties. T he N irvana o f the H indus “suggests th a t it is possib le w orld o r a cond ition to exist w hich neutralizes all the difficulties o f pe<

T he p h en o m en o n o f p ra y e r w hich is so consp icuous a feature o f i religions indicates b eh av io r w hich is alien to h u m an activ ity in ge because there is no in terac tion w ith an y subject fo r d ialog .^For the

"• Cf above, p. 279.

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P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O Np art th e co n ten ts o f p ra y e r are sim ply wishes o r hopes fo r changes in in to lerab le s i tu a tio n s .!

Scientists in their capacity as investigato rs of things and events occurring in the im m edia te tim e-space situa tions ob ject to the religious type o f know ledge an d the efforts to justify the belief on the g ro u n d s th a t the belief and fa ith in tran scen d en t constru c tio n in terfere w ith the p ro p er ad ju stm ents o f h u m an beings to the ac tua l am biance, including persons and v a rio u s th ings occurring in nature . Evidences fo r the views o f scientists can co n stan tly be m ustered by such cases as the cu ltists refusing to m ak e use of m edical know ledge an d skills in o rd e r to cu re obviously lethal diseases.

T h e g rea t p revalence o f religious in stitu tio n s based as they are o n the re ta rded s ta te o f all hu m an popu lations, reveals itself in m yths, supersensuous realm s, an d so on. But o f course there are individual differences so th ere ex ists a range o f ph ilosoph ies a m o n g ind ividuals. In som e th ere are

, signs o f m atu rity , o f an a ttach m en t to m aterialistic influences.A t the basis o f such views is the p h en o m en o n o f fa ith w hich sidesteps the

ac tu a lly are th e en v iro n m en ts o f persons. It m ay be add ed here th a t the obv ious th ing th a t o pera tes is th e efficiency o f ind iv iduals to fo rm u la te m etap h o rs an d legends w hich in m an y cases go d irectly c o u n te r to the events w ith w hich they ac tually are in con tac t.

a. Science and Supernaturalism. R elig ious lite ra tu re w h ich is basically theological is replete w ith illum inating case histories w hich reveal the m oods an d th e m otives o f believers w hether w ith little o r m uch know ledge o f science.

- t ' A n excellen t ex am p le is R u s t11 a fo rm e r s tu d en t o f science bu t w ho shifted over to the B aptist m inistry and religious teaching. T h o u g h a fo rm e r s tu d en t o f science, he undervalues scientific w ork an d concludes, because it is lim ited to things an d events o f the n a tu ra l w orld , th a t it is

it1' there fo re incom plete. H e seeks, as is characteristic o f religious th inkers, y/ som eth ing beyond science. A s it is o u r in ten tion to m ake use o f this w riteri:'-" as only a n exam ple , we regard his views w hich ac tually are repeated in

m any o th e r w riters , as co m m o n an d generalized . All such w riters w ho stand firm ly on sp iritistic g round"appear to accep t the factitious rule th a t if there is so m eth in g lack ing in scientific w ork it is p ro o f o r p ro b ab ility th a t th e spiritistic po in t o f view is correct.

11 Rust, E. C., Science and Faith: Towards a Theological Understanding o f Sature. New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1967.

facts an d co n d itio n s o f specific co n tac ts w ith th ings an d events w hich

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T IO ne o f the m ost effective su p p o rts fo r som eone w ith a partia l scici

back g ro u n d is to p a rad e the nam es o f the g rea t scientists, m any o f t physicists, w ho have been co m p eten t in their scientific w ork bu t w h o a sam e tim e insisted up o n the value an d the perfection o f the sp iritual lift nam e som e o f the personalities in th is ca tego ry is to m en tion Milli C o m p to n , A. H .; W h ittak e r; an d m any m ore . T he fallacy o f th is r t ev ident an d from a scientific s ta n d p o in t m erely em phasizes th e ia c tih ; p e rso n s a re m u ltip le in th e ir p ra c tic a l c a p a c it ic s _ a n (L lh e ir_ t philosophies.

COMPARATIVE PHILOSOPHIES OF RELIGIONA ssum ing th a t we have iso lated the p rim ary events co nso lida ted u

the ca tegory of religion, we are ready to select fo r exam in a tio n the esse featu re o f th is com plex h u m an phenom enon .

A fa ir evaluation o f the essence o f religion is th a t it is a com] com prehensive s tru c tu re erected fo r the aid an d co m fo rt o f people wh- facile in inventing m eans fo r escap ing from the in to le rab le ex igenc i hum an living.

D issatisfaction w ith cond itions as they are stim ulates th e constructii !^a better w orld separa te from ac tua l p resen t c ircum stances. O f coui

m ust be hereafter, in a tim e to com e, and in a w orld different fron presen t one. O nly som e u to p ias a re co n stru c ted w ith m ateria ls o: p resen t w orld . T hose a re the m oral re ligions based u p o n th eco n v ersit m ank ind to crea tu res capab le o f m u tually ad van tageous ad justm P erhaps m ost o f the system s built a re fash ioned from im m aterial stances such as m ind, consciousness, the psyche. T h e p ro d u c ts are j angels, dem ons, gardens o f E den, gardens o f bliss, hells, and o th e r ■ tions.(Scientific psychology can specify the process. It is basicallj am plification o f the linguistic cap ac ity o f m ank ind . By m eans o f syn an d language, stories can be m ade beginning w ith m etaphors, an a lo and su p e rs titio n s .^

A s a ph en o m en o n m cu ltu ra l evo lu tion , the fan tastic features o f reli represen t a decided qu irk in cu ltu ra l evo lu tion . A s com pared w ith ex] sive and ex p ert technological advances, th e religious life o f h o m o sapie a h uge re ta rd a tio n . It is as if there w as a p la teau in civ ilizational deve m ent. Even if o th e r phases o f cu ltu re show lack o f progressive changes could not com pare with the relig ious phases in utility an d u tter significa

■ T h e m ost serious criticism o f the o th e r w orldly and verbally co n stru| religion is its in terference an d inh ib ition o f the evo lu tion o f n a tu ra l

288

P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O Nin stitu tions. O rg an iza tio n s o f h u m an ind iv idua ls o f every so rt w ith m any e lab o ra te institu tions o f the political, econom ic , an d aesthetic types are su p erio r and b etter a d a p ta tio n s o f h u m an beings to o th er persons, and env iron ing circum stances. T h e sam e m ay b e said o f the in terre lations of com m unities w ith respect to econom ic an d social circum stances. Sufficient evidences are available in cu rren t sa tisfac to ry , ac tu a l, and poten tia l co o p erative w orks an d institu tions to encourage confidence in peaceful and effective in terrelations betw een nations, s ta tes, an d o ther g ro u p s of people.

COMPARATIVE PSYCHOLOGIES OF RELIGIONBecause w riters on psychology o f religion all a re ensconced in the

dualistic type o f p h i l o s o p h y and psychology, they place great em phasis on w hat they regard as psychological aspects o f religion. A n ex trem ely good ex am p le is th a t o f W illiam Jam es the em in en t A m erican psychologist who w rote the fam ous book entitled , The Varieties of Religious Experience. His entire series o f lectures sum m arizes various no tions o f ab n o rm a l behavior on the part o f various individuals. A s is well know n, Jam es was quite sym pathetic w ith the w ork o f investigators o f psychic research an d in general he was deeply interested in the im provem en t o f psychology on the basis o f connecting the m ind o r self w ith the organism . In his exposition he cites num erous cases o f unusual experience by persons w ho were intensely affected by trances o f various so rts w hich led to the construction o f the R eality o f the U nseen. A m ong the lectures he delivered in the series called the G ifford lectures on natu ra l religion he m en tions besides the religion o f

, healthy m indedness the peculiar experiences o f the sick soul, the divided \ self, an d religious conversion. A n o th er set o f favorite topics are saintliness an d mysticism.

W hat is p rom inen t in Jam es’ exposition , an d in m ost o th er w riters on the subject o f the psychology o f religion, is the absence o f the ac tua l fields in w hich the religious experiences occurred . O ne can n o t g leam from his w ritings anyth ing ab o u t the reactional h istories o f the persons th a t he writes abo u t. F o r exam ple, the q uestion arises w hether individuals w ho are not im bued w ith no tions o f superhum an an d supernatu ra l circum stances w ould partic ipa te in trances an d in the feelings o f personality division w hich form the basis o f the various religious experiences.

It is a d istinct failing on the p a r t o f w riters in psychology an d religion to limit th e psychological aspects to individual abnorm alities. W hile unusual reactions even to trances d o con stitu te features o f religious perform ances, they d o no t exclude m any o th er so rts o f psychological experience. W hat is

289

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C Tm issing in general a re analyses o f persons and their behav io r v includes o ther form s o f psychological events.

O n the whole, w riters on the psychological aspects o f religious e rience rem ain in the circle o f con v en tio n a l m ind . F requen tly they ref F reud and Ju n g , persons w ho w ere n o t basically psychologists b u t r« psychological laym en. C erta in ly th e ir con tac ts w ith patien ts were people w ho were ex trem e in their psychological behavior bu t they opei o n the basis o f m entalistic principles w hich did no t very closely ide w ith psychological processes.

’ Psychology, useful fo r th e ap p rec ia tio n o f the natu re o f religion, sh j be based on the na tu ra lis tic in te rb eh av io r o f persons w ith d istin | reactional histories. W hen it is ask ed how it is possible fo r sophistic

people, som etim es persons w ith effective know ledge o f scientific m attei • m ain ta in an d arg u e fo r th e m o st ab stru se an d som etim es im pos

spiritistic no tions, th e answ er is th a t they have cu ltivated spiritisti religious a ttitu d es in the w ay, as we have p o in ted o u t before, they a

1 habits o f speech w hich belong to certa in un ique groups." Ju s t as individuals g row ing u p in p a rticu la r local g ro u p s sp eak a cei

language as th o u g h they w ere to ta lly u n fam iliar w ith an y o ther dialec individuals grow ing u p an d b eing subjected to various rites c a n n o t es th in k in g an d in genera l be ing cu ltu red in particu la r sects. A t th is po in in teresting to note how persons b ro u g h t up as p articu la r religious se ians deliberately choose, w hen they a re paren ts, to have th e ir chil assum e the sam e p a tte rn o f th in k in g a n d o ther types o f action . It is this o f s itu a tio n th a t is responsib le fo r th e n um erous schools an d coll bearing th e m arks o f ce rta in re lig ious sects, to w hich p aren ts can send ■ children to be indoctrinated as they them selves were form erly.

T h e psychological fo rm u la tio n o f tra its in general, an d religious trai p articu la r, escalates in to the great religious w ars in h istory. T o hav in terbehav ip ral h isto ry lim ited to ce rta in cu ltu ra l institu tions an d cc tions results in trem en d o u s differences betw een g roups so tha t the var m em bers o f the group's c a n n o t app recia te th e value o r the sim ilarit o th e r g roups. A ccord ingly , they will be willing to an n ih ila te th e m em o f o ther sects and them selves d ie fo r the true an d reliable beliefs.

A naturalistic view o f psychology can n o t b u t p o in t o u t the peculiar v o f those w ho w rite o n the subject o f religion. A n ou ts tan d in g charac te i o f such w riting is the irresponsib le w ay in w hich con trad ic tions a re s t a n d in general how fa r th e w riters m ove aw ay from th e estab lished ir m ation ab o u t psychological processes. F o r a fine sam ple o f con trad ic t

290

P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O Ncon sid er th e w ritings o f Hegel, one o f the g rea t sources o f religious attitudes.. . . We cannot know God as object, or get a real knowledge of Him, and the main thing, what we are really concerned about, is merely the subjective manner of knowing Him and our subjective religious condition.15

But in a n o th e r place in the sam e series o f lectures he says:. . . The aim of philosophy is to know the truth, to know God. for He is the absolute truth, inasmuch as nothing else is worth troubling about save God and the unfolding of God's nature. Philosophy knows God as essentially concrete, as spiritual,. . , 1J

It is qu ite ap p a ren t tha t w riters on religion assum e great liberties in dea ling with psychological processes o f know ledge, arg u m en ts w here faith and belief are concerned . A lthough theologians have to say th a t G od as the subject o f th e ir studies can n o t be know n a n d so they m ust assum e a type o f negative theology, still a ttr ib u te nam es an d ch arac te riza tio n s to w hatever god they like to describe; fo r exam ple they speak o f F irs t C ause, Infinitely W ise, Infinitely G ood , C rea to r Exnihilo , E ternal Purpose. T hey assert, then, tha t they are no t u tte rin g linguistic con trad ic tio n s and puzzles because “T heology is a fte r all o u r way o f talk ing ab o u t G o d .14

A n exam ple o f the freedom s assum ed by theo log ians concerns their m ode o f argum ent. F o r exam ple W aters declares tha t.To say that man is made in the image of God is to affirm that it belongs to man's nature to know God and enter into personal relation with Him.15

DOMINANCE OF SPIRITISTIC CULTURE

H ow soever em inen t a person m ay be in som e practical field o f endeavor o r in scientific studen tsh ip , he m ay a t the sam e tim e be b linded to the ac tual co n d itio n s p erta in ing to religion and science. It is o f the greatest im p o rtance to u nderstand th a t sp iritism is a charac te ristic o f cu ltu re or civilization th a t exercises a trem en d o u s influence up o n the th ink ing and p ractice o f individuals. T o quo te em inent scientists w ho have been exponen ts o f sp iritistic th o u g h t, it is essential to app recia te th a t en tire cu ltures and civilizations can be com pletely im pregnated w ith spiritistic notions. Scientists m ay be ab le to exercise th e ir functions well in th e ir particu la r scientific

Hegel. G. W. F.. Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion together with a Work on the Proofs o f the Existence o f God {E. B. Spcirs, and J. B. Sanderson, trs.), vol. 2, London. Routledgeand Kegan Paul. 1974. p. 331.

11 Hegel, Ibid., vol. 3. p. 148.14 Ramsey, I. T., Religious language, quoted by Waters. F. W. in The Way in and the Way Out:

Science and Religion Reconciled. Toronto, Oxford Univ. Press. 1967, p. 239.'’Waters, Ibid., p. 227.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Istudies, bu t they still unw ittingly d isp lay the effects o f a spiritistic sys w hich dom inates the lives o f m any persons in a n y com m unity . A signifu illu stra tio n o f this so rt o f c ircu m stan ce is ind icated by a scho lar w h o w physician an d experim en tal scientist in psychology w ho inevitably fi th a t experim ents show the existence o f individual souls o r psyches.16

Incidental to the subject o f science an d religion is the view point w hile h u m an beings are physio logical an d an a to m ica l m achines, they endow ed w ith spiritistic p roperties. T h is view can o f course be traced b to theological origins.

W hat m ay seem a g rea t p a ra d o x is th a t a person w ith consider! aq u a in tan ce w ith scientific issues sh o u ld still en terta in a religion basec doctrines o f In carn a tio n an d R esurrection . T h e p a rad o x is resolved w we consider the pow er o f cu ltu ra l in stitu tions o n th e beliefs an d th ink in ind iv iduals w ho accept such beliefs as are co n tra ry to every observat

a n d every experience o f peo p le an d m ust be looked u p o n as ac ts o r tr i w hich are acquired in early life, so th a t a n ind iv idual believes such impc

*■ V bilities as events ju s t as he becom es invariab ly a speaker o f a p a r tio' dialect cu rren t in his hom e an d com m unity .

a. God: Creator or Creation. Scientists an d laym en alike appea: assum e th a t G od is the crea to r o f the w orld an d the m aster o f all th e pov

i assigned to him by w ritten o r spo k en dogm as. T h ro u g h o u t the h is to rw estern religion innum erab le a ttem p ts have been m ade to specify n a tu re an d functions o f G o d including his pow ers o f creation , bu t op

' nen ts concen trated in a g ro u p favoring negative theology have w arned ihi th is is an im possible th in g th a t no category , n o descrip tion , no in te rp rin t io n is possible. T h ere seem s to be lack ing th e re a l jz a t io n jh a t th e er

G o d co m plex is a constru c tio n by ind iv iduals in the in terests o f som e * o f im m unity from difficult an d suppressing conditions. T here is 1

apprec ia tio n o f the fact th a t all god o r sp iritistic religion is based u; hi cf n o th in g m ore th an th e capacity to use w ords o r sym bols to m ake

m etaphors an d com plete doctrines. V arious w riters have po in ted ou t anom aly o f m ak ing G o d in to a m ale, a co n d itio n w hich m ay be m odi w hen w om en achieve g rea ter recogn ition in th e various com m unities.

A n interesting side light o n the p rob lem o f G o d as c rea to r o r creatic to be found in the widely prevalen t n o tio n th a t if there is no p ro o f o f existence o f G od , there is a t the sam e tim e no p ro o f o f th e nonexistenc such a being. This ridd le flies in the face o f th e fact th a t hard ly a n y tl re la ting to evolu tion an d an th ro p o lo g y is m ore definitely established t

14 Moore, T. V., Cognitive Psychology, Philadelphia, Lippincott, 1939.

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P H I L O S O P H Y O F R E L I G I O N

th e know ledge o f th e origin o f gods an d th e ir co n stru c tio n by fa ith and assertion . Even an im perfect u n d erstan d in g o f h istory is well confron ted by th e cond itions in w hich no tio n s o f g ods are developed a n d the legends d istribu ted w ith respect to gods o f d ifferent centers o f civilizational developm ent.

W hen H am let said ‘doub t tru th to be a liar,’ he m ust have assum ed th a t n o th in g was as stab le and invariab le as the tru th . H ow ever, w hen we consider th ings and events in a natu ra listic way, we see how tru th s can be so perverted as to be l i e s jn . th e con tex t, o f science an d religion, it is highly in fo rm ative to observe how m uch estab lished know ledge o f events is

\ re ferred to in satisfactory s ta tem en ts co ncern ing h u m an beings, the ir .an a to m ica l o rgan ization and physiological functions. M oreover, th e tru th m ay be fold ab o u t the ad justm en t o f o rgan ism s to the ir environ ing circum stances, b u t all this is usually in terp re ted to ind icate th a t o rganism s are inevitably characterized by innate or in tu itive pow ers to believe an d to act as th o u g h spiritism was an existential an d objective entity.

/ RELIGION AND VALUES

It is a co m m o n practice to associate values w ith religion. A long historical trad itio n has it th a t religion is concerned w ith th e highest values o f ind iv iduals and societies. T he earliest records o f religious th ink ing and in stitu tions show th a t the religious life an d tho u g h t w hich deal w ith the tran scen d en ta l are p resu m ed to_be g reatly su p erio r to th ings o f the ac tual w o rld ly situa tion . G reat sto re has been laid on the irra tiona l, th e unknow n , an d the unknow able. Scientific ph ilo sophy in no w ay shares any o f these ideas. W hen values are exam ined it alw ays tu rn s o u t th a t they concern the concre te behav io r o f individuals in p a rticu la r g roups. In th e fo llow ing sections the value problem is considered in an em pirical m anner.

a. Values and the Valuable. T h e value p rob lem m ay be effectively trea ted in tw o different ways. In the p resen t case th ings o f value a re o f p rim ary interest. All sorts o f objects are localized on the scale ranging from th e least to th e m ost valuable . Specific exam ples m ay be m en tioned in w hich the m ost valuable feature is localized in the particu la r objects, d iam o n d s, ce rta in stocks o r bonds, relics, m etals, an d m any o th e r k inds o f things th a t are desired, collected, and conserved.

H igh values and low values are placed on th e activities o r behav io r of persons an d g roups, fo r exam ple th e w o rk o f people m ay be g raded as low o r o f high value. P rofessional b eh av io r is regarded com m only as o f a higher value th an m echanical skills.

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A special criterion fo r objects o f value is allo ted to them on the basis o f the ir fittingness for ce rta in purposes. T o o ls an d ap p a ra tu s m ay be very highly evaluated for professional o r scientific w ork.

b. Values and Evaluation. A d istinctive d ep a rtm en t o f values is th a t w hich stresses the activity o f ev a lu a tin g o r assaying things, behav io r, and events. In m any cases the eva lu a tio n p hase o f values appears closer to the activities o f persons an d th ere fo re ph ilosophically m ay be called m ore em pirical th an is the case w ith m an y th ings regarded as valuable. T he poin t is th a t it is easier to observe values in a func tiona l sense. H ere values can be traced to desires, tastes, an d o th e r fo rm s o f beh av io r w hich can be a ttr ib uted to the learning o r educational h istory o f the individuals concerned. ■

c. Values, Absolutes, and Empirical. A very in teresting phase o f value study form s th e way to d ifferen tia te betw een values th a t a re regarded as innate o r inheren t in th ings as o ver against values th a t are seen to be allo ted by persons in specific situations. R elig ious values are m ore o ften th a n no t envisaged as abso lu te an d universal. T h is is tru e prim arily because religious values belong m ostly to in stitu tions developed in p as t ages w hereas re la tivistic values a re seen to be developed in p a rticu la r situations on the basis o f directly observed circum stances.

A m o st in teresting p hase o f values is th a t m en tioned above in w hich th e g reatest superstition is labelled as the m ost ideal value in th e p erson ’s experience. A m ong the be tte r exam ples here are the beliefs th a t go co u n te r to scientific observation , such as we have ind icated above in th e a ttitudes o f T ertu llian w ho exclaim ed th a t th ings a n d events th a t are im possib le and even silly are features o f th e h ighest ideals w hich can serve as guidelines fo r th e m ost cherished behavior an d situations.

d. Religious Values and Scientific Values. It is qu ite ap p aren t th a t w riters o n religious values a re influenced by universalistic principles an d by nonscientific psychology. H ence th e e lab o ra te a rgum en ts an d m isin terp reta tio n o f values, valuations, an d th e critical analysis o f value situations.

By co n tra s t a scientific trea tm e n t o f values d ispenses entirely w ith universals an d trea ts the p rob lem s o f values o n th e com plete basis o f observations o f value situations th a t a re co n stan tly a t hand . A scientific trea tm en t o f values takes in to accoun t the com m ercial values w hich m erchan ts offer to induce sales, values o f th ings a n d events usable fo r particu la r purposes as well as in terp re tations o f transcen d en ta l values as constructions o f philosophical thinking.

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RELIGION A ND M ORALS

A n exceedingly am b ig u o u s re la tionsh ip is th a t w hich connects religion and m orals. In the first place, natu ra listic religions are regarded as lacking no tions o f gods, angels, and spirits o f various sorts, as over against religious institu tions w hich em phasize spirits, c rea to rs, and dem ons. O n the o th e r hand , ra tio n a l religions are held to include only eth ica l princip les an d ethical behavior. T h e religion called B uddh ism for exam ple is coun ted as free from deities o r spirits, a lth o u g h th e view also prevails th a t th e tra n scendent princip les are sim ply suppressed a n d not m entioned , bu t n o t elim inated.

A n im p o rtan t exam ple o f this p rocedure to avoid supernatu ra l an d supersensuous assertions is th a t o f P ro fe sso r B raithw aite w ho com bines m o ralistic religion w ith linguistic analysis. H e accepts th a t the p rim ary question concern ing religious belief is no t w h e th e r a religious s ta tem en t as th a t a personal god created the w orld is tru e o r false, but how it could be know n to be true o r false.17

B raithw aite then sets up th ree clear classes o f tru th-telling sta tem ents as follows.

1) Statements ab o u t p articu la r m atters o f fact2) Scientific hypotheses an d o th er general em pirical s tatem ents3) Logically necessary statements o f logic and m athem atics an d

contrad ictionsH e th en asserts th a t religious statem ents, as they are norm ally used, have

no place in this tricho tom y . B ut he does no t re trea t from religious beliefs. H e finds a w ay to m ake them verifiable by subsum ing verification to a princip le o f use, so th a t religious s ta tem en ts becom e em piristic. H is a rg u m ent is th a t the m ean ing o f a s ta tem en t is how it is used. M ora l beliefs and assertions ind ica te an in ten tio n to behave in a ce rta in way. M o ra l assertions then refer to a ttitu d es o f the ind iv idua l an d no t to ex ternal acts o f right o r w rong. Religious sta tem ents th en a re to be replaced by m oral

1 statem ents. S o religious beliefs are saved by logical procedures.A n in teresting item in the co n tex t o f relig ion an d m orals stem s from the

ph ilosopher’s desire to escape from the supernatu ra lism s o f conventional religion. A case in p o in t is D ew ey w ho a t the age o f 75 published a book

11 Braithwaite, R. B„ An Empiricist's t'iew o f the Nature o f Religious Belief, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1955, p. 3.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T 1 V )

en titled , A Common Faith™. In th a t w ork D ew ey asserts th a t he w ould us th e w ord “g o d ” as an active re la tion betw een the ideal and ac tual. A b o tto m the religion of Dewey stresses values an d m orals. By a d istinctio he m akes betw een religion (n o u n ) and th e religious (adjective) he believe th a t he cou ld d ispense w ith a ll supernatu ra lism and still re ta in the pr< fo u n d co m m o n experience “th a t lend deep an d enduring su p p o rt to tl processes o f living.” 19 B ut th e q uestion arises w hether the science ■ psychology can in terp re t this faith as a long range a ttac h m e n t to tl d ogm as o f the great past.

A critic o f D ew ey's ph ilosophy o f religion, R om anell,20 assum es tl p o p u la r view th a t religion is in sep arab le from o ther-w orld ly doctrines at beliefs, th a t “ m an does n o t need religion to be good , he needs it to ho ly .”21 A gain he says we shou ld go to religion fo r the teachings ab o destiny .22

RELIGION AN D POLITICS

U n d er th is title we consider the highly organized religious institu tic th a t ex ist an d operate a long w ith the econom ic, social, an d m ilitary entit o f n a tio n a l, ethn ic and o th e r groups. E xam ples are n u m ero u s a m o n g t religious system s, the Islam ic religion o f various M iddle East states, i C hristian religion o f E urope and the W estern hem isphere, S hin to is H induism , an d T ao ism o f th e F a r East.

Political religions th o u g h they are based like all o th e r religions on b eh av io r o f individuals, fun c tio n in q u ite a different w ay. T hey cm phas th e political significance o f various com m unities th o u g h they m ay diffe th e ir languages, a r ts , general social o rg an iza tio n , an d so o n . N atu ra lly , transcenden ta l and th e political aspects o f religion can n o t be separated , th e relig ion o f v ario u s g ro u p s o p era tes especially in the case o f wai political entities tha t serve to identify an d indicate the belongingnes; peoples as over against o th e r g ro u p s th a t are fough t w ith , conquered annexed . Sym bolic is the record o f th e sw ord o f Islam w hich in its co n q u ered a large n u m b er o f sta tes an d in w hich Islam ic relig ion still p : a great part.

•* Dewey. J., A Common Faith. New Haitn, Yale Univ. Press. 1934.MDewey, J., Ib id . p. 15.“ Romanell, P., “Religion from a Naturalistic Standpoint," in Religion in Philosophies

Cultural Perspectiw: A New Approach to the Philosophy o f Religion through Cross-Discipi Studies (J- C. Feaver and W. Horosz. eds.). Princeton. New jersey. D. Van Nostrand, 1967.

Jl Romanell, P„ Ibid., p. 63.2 Romanell, P„ Ibid., p. 68.

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A n o th e r well know n exam ple is the o p e ra tio n o f E u ro p ean nations in the form o f C ru sad e rs w ho w aged e lab o ra te w a r w ith Islam ic religionists, in som e cases, on the p re tex t o f recovering the holy places o f C hris tian origins. T h e ir banners b o re the m o tto In H oc S igno Vinces.

A side from the in terna tional political o p e ra tio n s o f various religious in stitu tions, they also p lay large roles w ith in p artic u la r g roups. T he various sectaries influence in trasta te cond itions. Industria l an d com m ercial o rgan iza tio n s d iscrim inate against persons w ho p ro fess ce rta in re ligions sim ply because they are categorized as m em bers o f such entities a lth o u g h p erson ally the ind iv idua ls concerned do no t p rac tice the rituals o f such institu tions. In Iran the present ru lers d o no t to lera te th e B ahaists th o u g h they are Iran ian s. In th e U nited S ta tes it only becam e possib le recently fo r a C ath o lic to be elected to the Presidency.

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C H A P T E R 21

PHILOSOPHY OF LAW

LAWS IN PH ILO SO PH IC A L PERSPECTIVE

C onsidering th a t laws are so u b iq u ito u s a featu re o f com plex societ system s it is anom alous tha t law s are so indeterm inate a top ic in ph ilosop ical contexts. Laws are o f g rea t varie ty b o th in structu re an d function ai differ in stability an d p roneness to change. P rob lem s concern ing la' p e rta in bo th to events in n a tu re an d to events o f hum an behav io r and soc relations. F o r exam ple, a re law s o f n a tu re like o r different from th e rules social regulations? As to laws o f n a tu re a re they aspects o f objective even o r only nam es o r term s im posed u p o n events? A gain , a re laws sym bols m arkers ab o u t actual events o r sim ply a rb itra ry projections?

H ow ever am biguous the ph ilo so p h y o f law m ay be, th a t very fact poi to the conso lato ry circum stance th a t p rob lem s o f law cast considera light on a num ber o f general ph ilosoph ical issues. N o tab ly theclarificat: o f th e issue o f universality an d abso lu teness versus concrete events, z also the in terrelations o f au th en tic psychology w ith events o f every tyj

LAWS O F NATURE AND O F SOCIETY

T o identify and analyze th e n a tu re an d o pera tions o f law o r laws, f essential to be alert to the existence o f the grand division o f laws in to law

n a tu re an d social an d political laws. B o th types o f laws are m e m b e rs ' class o f construc tions co ncern ing observed events. D espite the s im ila r betw een the tw o classes o f law s, it is a n inducem ent to clarity to distingi betw een them as in the follow ing schem a.

T a b l e 6 . S c h e m a o f L a w C o n s t r u c t i o n

Scientific Laws Societal Laws

Subject Matter Events of Nature Events of Social Interaction, Cu

Methodology Emphasis o f Events Emphasis of System (Interpreta

Durability Slow Changing Rapid Changing (local conditic

Validity VerifiableExperiments

Consensus

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P H I L O S O P H Y O F L A W

VARIOUS PH ILO SO PH IES O F LAWS

It is only to beexp ec ted th a t definitions o r in te rp re ta tio n s o f laws should be different in accordance w ith the differences in philosophical view points o f those d iscussing problem s o f law. These differences m ay be categorized as A bsolutistic, Relativistic, and Scientific.

a. Absolutistic Laws. Individuals inclined tow ard an abso lu tistic form o f ph ilosophy hold to laws as abso lu tistic an d to a ce rta in ex ten t independent o f th e constructive activities o f ph ilosophical w orkers. G enerally speaking, then , such in te rp re ta tio n s o f law w ould be rem ote from the actual cond itions o f science o r governm ental con tro l. A n excellent illustration o f th is type o f th ink ing is tha t o f M oore (1873-1958) th e English ph ilosopher w ho asserted th a t the term “good” as applied to ethics is essentially im m une to defin ition and analysis, good is good and there is no prob lem o f why, w hen, o r w here.1 In this m atte r p ro fesso r M o o re reso rts to absolutistic princip les so tha t his insistence up o n the abso lu teness o f the good is in line w ith philosophical views w hich include the im m utable , the incontestable, and in trinsic qualities o f th ings and assertions. T h e abso lu tistic a ttitude m ay well be traced to religious sources, p e rh ap s there is here an unw itting association with the widely prevalent institu tion o f n a tu ra l rights.

b. Relativistic Laws. R elativistic ph ilo sophers w ho d o no t m ain ta in no tions o f abso lu te idea, abso lu te rules o f conduc t, in terpret laws w hether in ethical o r o ther situations, as relativistic. T hey fo rm ulate definitions o f law as d ependen t u p o n particu la r c ircum stances w hether stable o r changeable. But the en tire a ttitu d e rem ains ab s trac t and verbal, an d does no t reach dow n to concrete events o f everyday experience.

c. Scientific Laws. Scientific ph ilosophy d ep a rts radically from bo th o f the types o f th ink ing m entioned, it ho lds th a t all laws are construc tions and a re no t p a r ts o f events n o r principles o f ab so lu te in tu ition , o r o th e r sim ilar types o f epistem ological th inking. T h e problem s o f law alw ays lead to questions o f the sources o f laws, o f the specific s itu a tio n s in w hich rules participate.

W hile analyzing the tw o fo rm er types o f in terp re ta tion o f laws, one d iscerns the fu tility o f ho ld ing to conven tional ph ilosophical view's. M oreover, it is easily seen th a t b o th views a re based on unscientific psychological principles. In neither case does it seem th a t the in terp re ter constru c ts his views ab o u t law s on the basis o f the observation o f the m any situations in w hich laws are fo rm ulated and im plem ented.

1 Moore. G. E.. Principia Ethica. Cambridge. Cambridge Univ. Press. 1903.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V

A. NATURE O F LAWS IN SCIEN TIFIC CONTEXTS

G ra n tin g the sim ilarity o f the laws in the various b ranches o f science, v m ay now consider th e n a tu re o f those laws. It is necessary to establish wh. scientific laws are an d how they o p era te in scientific situations. This inqui will lead to the com parison o f th e vary ing philosophies o f science th a t s e r as th e m atrices o f the d ifferent theories a b o u t laws. T o begin this inqu iry \ glance at som e available theories a b o u t laws.

a. Varying Conceptions Concerning Laws. E ven a casual glance a t t w ay various scientists conceive o f laws offers a valuable lesson in sem antii C o n stru c tio n s differ acco rd in g to the type o f events w orked w ith as well the ph ilosophical b ias o f the co n stru c to r . A t one end o f the scale is the vit th a t laws in science a re m erely ind ica to rs o f observed results. T his view w a ttrac tiv e to C am pbell.2 A t th e oppo site pole a re m any v a rian ts o f t fam o u s p ro n o u n cem en t o f K a n t th a t m an is th e lawgiver o f n a tu re so u rce from w hich springs un fo u n d ed beliefs a b o u t in tu itions, a prioi universal an d abso lu te laws.

Between these ex trem es a n u m b er o f v a rian t m odels have been c< structed w ith a lesser o r g rea ter inclination tow ard the opposing poles. K a n to r3 has po in ted ou t, som e w riters have likened laws to postu lat hypotheses, o r theories, th a t is, o p era tio n a l aids, while o thers hi regarded them as ax io m s in the sense o f finalistic ex p lan a tio n s im posed events.

W hatever n o tio n o f law s is held, all a re shaped by th e philosophy science w hich constitu tes th e ir fo u n d a tio n an d back g ro u n d . In tu rn , course , ph ilosophies o f science a re on ly aspects o f general ph ilosoj w h ich w orkers en te rta in as p a r t o f the ir cu ltu ra liza tion— in m an y a w ith o u t being aw are o f the cu ltu ra l in stitu tions w hich influence scien

f w ork .b. Laws Genuine and Spurious. C ognizance o f the vary ing theo

* a b o u t law s in science clearly d em an d s critical selection to sep ara te vfro m invalid laws. I p ro p o se th a t law s in science be considered as co n st d o n s based solely u p o n events an d th e ir observation . Im plied is th e \ th a t laws a re precise p ro p o sitio n s concern ing th e events stud ied in p a rt la r disciplines. Law s are n either ab so lu te p ronou n cem en ts based on ini pow ers o f “m ind ," n o r cap ric ious assertions built upon inexpert an d ca acqu a in tan ce w ith events. A nd above all, on ly those laws o r fo rm al

JCampbell, N. R., Physics: The Elements, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 1921.’Kantor. J. R., The Logic o f M odem Science, Chicago, Principia. 1953; and Interbeht

Psychology: A Sample o f Scientific System Construction, Chicago, Principia, 1959.

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sta tem en ts are valid th a t a re as free fro m cu ltu ra l an d a u th o rita r ia n influences as possible. Because the sciences are corrigible, depending upon b o th observationa l exigencies involving technological facilities an d m odifications in events, laws are no t im m utable b u t only tem porarily stable.

Philosophical Roots o f Law TheoriesInd ica ted ab o v e is th a t the ev a lu a tio n o f laws in science can be m ad e on

the basis o f the underly ing philosophy. It m ay be well then to com pare m etaphysical and scientific philosophy.

a. Metaphysical or Transcendental Philosophy. T his way o f th ink ing consists o f views developed afte r the G reco -R o m an age. T ranscen d en ta l ph ilo so p h y either ignores ongoing events o r transla tes them in to ex tra sp a - tial entities o r processes by exclusively verbalistic m ethods. It divides the universe in to cru d e m a tte r an d spirit while persons are d icho tom ized in to spirit an d flesh, sou l and body, o r m ind and body. Being oblivious to occurring events m etaphysical ph ilosophers seek abso lu te reality an d the arcane m ysteries o f the supernatu ral.

H ow scientific w orkers infected with transcendental ph ilosophy unw ittingly d is to rt their discipline is well exemplified by the psychologist S perry w ho insists that psychology should no t dispense with “conscious m ind" and “th e sp iritual co m p o n en ts o f h u m an natu re , including the im m orta l soul" an d “free will.”4 T h is w riter goes so far as to declare tha t those w ho abjure m etaphysical ph ilo sophy in favor o f the scientific type “can be accused o f having deprived the th in k in g m an o f his “ F a th e r in heaven a lo n g w ith heaven itself.” 5

T h a t on ly physics and no t psychology construc ts laws is a p roposition o f transcenden tal philosophy. F reedom from such a philosophy indicates th a t despite all the differences betw een physics an d psychology both a re en terprises o f persons engaged in the investigation o f varying sorts o f interbehavior. T h e p rim ary difference betw een the tw o disciplines is tha t the psychologist chooses to w ork with events in w hich one o f the in terbehaving entities is invariably o rganic in nature.

O ne o f the card inal e rro rs o f m etaphysical ph ilosophy is the acceptance by its p ro p o n e n ts o f a sp iritistic psychology w hich endow s philosophers w ith pow erful im aginations, om niscient in tu itions tha t can con ju re with absolutes, ultim ates, and transcenden tal values.

‘Sperry, R. W.. Mind. Brain and Humanist Values, in New Views o f the Nature o f M an li. R. I’lall. cd.). Chicago. Univ. of Chicago Press. 1965.

’Sperry. R. W„ Ibid., p. 73.

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b. Scientific philosophy. T h e o u ts ta n d in g tra it o f n a tu ra lis tic p i ophy is its co n stan t an d exclusive p reo ccu p a tio n w ith th ings an d e' th a t h u m an beings e n c o u n te r in th e ir ac tu a l living a n d learning, p ro p o sitio n s fo rm u la ted in scientific ph ilo sophy are n o t au tistic bee there is n o need to escape fro m u n b ea rab le co n d itio n s o r sim ply to inc in the sp inn ing o f in tellectual webs. Especially to be m en tioned is scientific ph ilosophy is free from the delusion th a t it can transcend tra r ing events.

In so far as scientific laws a re concerned , to d ifferentiate betw een thi types o f ph ilosophy helps to ac co u n t fo r the vary ing form s they assur well as th e p rob lem o f exclusive possession o f laws by a ce rta in ty; discipline. S ince th e n a tu ra lis tic ty p e o f p h ilo sopher su p p o rts th e viev law s in science are generalized desc rip tio n s o f single events o r cons tio n s o f events as they have been observed an d m easured u n d e r sp con d itio n s, there is no h in d ran c e to the deve lo p m en t o f law s in scientific discipline.

Laws in Scientific PhilosophyW hen science is freed fro m antiscien tific ph ilosophies and th e ir unc

ing spiritistic postu lates, th ere is n o d ea rth o f po ten tialities fo r law stru c tio n . S ince scientific law s p e r ta in to d a ta , investigative operatio : well as to predictive an d co n tro l possib ilities, I ap pend a re levant sam j five types o f scientific laws w ith com m ents.

1. Laws o f Events. A ll scien tists select o u t o f the event p le n u r m u tu a l an d reciprocal in te rb e h a v io r o f th ings an d events w ith o th e r t a n d events u n d er specific cond itions.

C o m m e n t . W hereas n on psychological scientists study th e in terbeh o f as tro n o m ic bodies, chem ical reagen ts, an tigens and an tib o d ies , c in te rb eh av io r o f p ro to n s , e lec trons, m esons, an d so o n , the p sycho stud ies th e in te rb eh av io r o f h u m a n a n d n o n h u m an an im als. S u ch int h av io r ranges from co n d itio n ed ac tio n s to com plex social behav io scientific events are th u s d irec tly o r indirectly co n fro n tab le an d cle m yths an d fantasies.

2. Laws o f Origin and Evolution. W ith in the range o f science scientifically based p h ilo so p h y observed th ings and events a re st regarded as o rig inating a n d evolving fro m sim pler th ings an d even strik ing exam ple is the tran sfo rm a tio n o f h yd rogen in to helium an fu rthe r evo lu tion o f all com p lex th ings a n d events from less th an a hui sim pler elem ents. S im ila r d ev e lo p m en ts o f com plex m o tio n s a n d ei

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tran sfo rm atio n s m ake up the events o f physics. It is a legitim ate generalization th a t the subject m atters o f all scientific disciplines are derived in this m anner. A n exam ple from the m ost com plica ted levels is the evolution of psychological in terbehaviors from biological ad a p ta tio n s though the fo rm er are very different from th e latter. C o n sid e r th a t the extrem ely com plex societal behav io r is in a definite sense traceab le to elem entary biological or biochem ical forerunners.

C o m m e n t . T h e essential traits o f scientific orig ins and evolutions are excellently illustrated in the general re la tions betw een psychological and biological events. A lthough psychological events a re partia lly derived from and ac tually a re a t the sam e tim e biological, they differ greatly. Biological events consist prim arily o f cell and tissue structu res in in terbehavior with elem entary ecological circum stances, while psychological in teractions con sist o f m ore com plex fields including to ta l o rganism s and such intricate stim ulus objects as cu ltural institu tions. W hen psychological in terbehaviors o ccu r biological com ponen ts partic ipa te in bu t d o no t dom inate the en tire field.

3. Laws of Investigation. S ince scientific events consist o f o rganism - object in terbehaviors, they are in principle alw ays available fo r investigation by m eans o f varying strategies. T h e range o f such encoun te rs includes sim ple observation , historical analysis, m anipulative inspection an d analy sis u n d e r usual env ironm enta l cond itions an d by lab o ra to ry con tro l. Investig a tio n law s ap p ly to all research in every discipline. N o exception is perm issib le in the case o f psychological o r an th ropo log ica l disciplines. T hey app ly as well to scientific ph ilosophy since ph ilosophy is concerned w ith the sam e con fro n tab le experiences as the various scientific disciplines.

C o m m e n t . Investigative laws exclude all im position o f in ternal m ysterious pow ers up o n events stud ied , fo r exam ple , abstruse determ iners o f a genetic o r m ental faculty type. W hatever effects the biological structures an d functions exert on psychological in terb eh av io r such as species evolution , m alfo rm ations o r m utilations, they are all setting o r auspice factors no t determ iners w hether regarded as phylogenetic o r ontogenetic.

4. Laws of Explanation. Because scientific ex p lan a tio n s consist of precise descrip tions o f observed events, ex p lan a tio n s only specify the conditions u n d er which the in teraction o f things an d events occur.

C o m m e n t . Rejected is the ob jectionable p rocedure o f inventing autistic principles such as forces, occult pow ers, in terna l states o f consciousness, psychic properties, conscious qualities, and sim ilar verbalism s to account fo r the in terb eh av io r o f energies, objects, m ovem ents, organism s, o r cultures.

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5. Laws of Scientific Cooperation. A s a m em ber of the scientific frate n ity n o discipline can ignore th e m eth o d s and findings o f o th e r w orker T h e psychologist shou ld be aw are of w hat the biologist, psychologist, a r physicist can con tribu te to th e understan d in g o f philosophical thinking.

C o m m e n t . W orkers in every scientific discipline m ust be a lert to know edge achieved by neighboring sciences. It is im p o rtan t, how ever, fo r each i be su re o f w hat has actually been discovered by physicists, psychologist chem ists, an d biologists. F o r exam ple , a psychologist m ust questic w hether light in visual d isc rim in a tio n is a s tim u la to r o f occult m ent qualities o r a m eans o f co n tac t betw een o rganism s and objects. S im ilarl all scientists m ust be aw are o f w hat th e neuro log ist ac tually discover! a b o u t the b ra in and the rest o f th e nervous system , o r the geneticist ab o the re la tio n o f p rogen ito rs an d offspring. Law s o f interdisciplinary’coope a tio n im ply th a t physicists an d bio logists learn fro m the psychologist th th e ir doctrines m ay be suffused w ith q u estio n ab le principles no t derivi fro m free contacts w ith events.

B. LAWS AS SOCIETAL INSTITUTIONS

Legal Philosophy Extremely AbstractionisticT h e dom ain s o f ju risp rudence an d the general ph ilosophy o f law a

p ro b ab ly m ore th an o th e r in tellectual d o m ain s ex trem e in their abstra tion ism an d abso lu tism . T h is is u n d o u b ted ly the case because legal rul

r a n d decisions concern au th o rita tiv e a n d finalistic transactional behav io rex trem ely variab le situations. T o achieve o rd e r an d co n tro l in hum . affairs fo rm ulae , analogies, m odels are construc ted , o ften w ith little o r i

t re la tion to events. It is th is sam e circum stance w hich acco u n ts fo r the fath a t th e ph ilosophy o f law is so closely in tertw ined w ith psychologic

a . views which are seriously confusing an d basically w rong.

Nature of Societal LawsS ocietal laws are conven tionally described as au th o rita tiv e rules fo r t

c o n tro l o f behav io r by co m m an d in g an d lim iting ac tion o n the p a rt persons an d groups. T hey are th en acco rded a s ta tu s o f du rab ility so th can be applied to specific instances o f legal claim s an d conflicts. Laws, the m ay be regarded as instrum ents o f social policy.6 U nfortunately , howevi

6 IJodenhcimer, E„ Jurisprudence: The Philosophy and M ethod o f the Law, Cambridge, Harv Univ. Press, 1974, pref.

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the events o f dom estic , industria l, an d com m ercial s ituations d o n o t com p o rt w ith a ca lm a n d peaceful d escrip tion so th a t d o u b ts and den ials are n u m ero u s concern ing th e n a tu re and func tion o f legal law s in ac tu a l life cond itions.7

V erbal fo rm u la tio n s d o n o t ind ica te the im m ense scope o f societal laws. F o r one th ing, they d o no t acco u n t fo r the varieties in laws such as exist in non-cen tralized legal system s in m any n a tio n s .'A s it h ap p en s in the U nited S ta tes, laws a re p ro m u lg a ted by th e federa l congress, s ta te legislatures, co u n ty com m issioners, city a lderm en , an d so on. C ivil an d crim inal laws n o t on ly govern b eh a v io r b u t a lso regu la te the vario u s types o f ta x a tio n as set by various au tho rities. Incidentally , to o , governm en ta l laws d o no t m erely serve as guides to pub lic con d u c t, b u t also help to confer advan tages u p o n ce rta in persons o r g ro u p s as co m pared w ith o th e r individuals. A ntho log ies o f ju risp ru d en ce a n d the ph ilo so p h y o f law a re replete w ith inn u m erab le v a ria tio n s concern ing th e essential n a tu re o f laws an d the ir o p e ra tio n .8 A ccord ing ly , s tu d en ts o f ju risp ru d en c e a re tro u b led by huge p rob lem s concern ing th e n a tu re o f laws.

a. Uncertainty and Indefiniteness o f Law. I t is a basic m y th says Je ro m e F ra n k 9 th a t it is the law yers th a t a re responsib le fo r the vagueness and uncertain ties o f the laws. F ra n k believes firm ly th a t it is the n a tu re o f h u m a n in terre la tions th a t m ak e laws u n certa in a n d indefinite. H e quo tes O liver W endell H o lm es (1841-1935) to the effect th a t “general p ropositions d o n o t decide concre te cases.” A p p a ren tly F ra n k is a lert to th e influence o f abstrac tions as they fun c tio n in com plex h u m an situations.

b. Legal Realism. S tu d en ts o f ju risp ru d en ce em p lo y the te rm legal realism fo r th e m ost abstrac tio n is tic view th a t law s are sub stan tia l entities existing in th e ir ow n righ t an d th a t ju d g es m ust find an d ap p ly th e law s in specific litigation. T h e em inen t B lackstone (1723-1780) regarded societal laws as in acco rdance w ith th e laws o f n a tu re d ic ta ted by G o d .10 A judge’s task , B lackstone th o u g h t, is on ly to find a n d ap p ly laws an d never to m ake an y law.

O p p o n e n ts o f legal realism are m o re p rag m atic th a n the realists a n d rely

7 Cf. for example. Holmes, O. W., The C om m on Law, Boston, Little, Brown, 1881; also. Holmes, O. W., “The Path of the Law," in Collected Papers, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1920.

•For example, Cohen and Cohen's Readings in Jurisprudence and Legal Philosophy (P. Schucb- man, ed.), Boston, Little, Brown, 1979; also Kent, E. A., Law and Philosophy: Readings in Legal Philosophy, New York, Appleton, Century, Crofts, 1970.

•Frank, J., Law and the M odem Mind, New York, Brentanos, 1930.10 Benditt, T. M„ Law as Rule and Principle: Problems o f Legal Philosophy, Stanford, Stanford

Univ. Press, 1978.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C

m o re o n o b se rv a tio n th a n o n a p r io r i reaso n in g . T h u s H o lm es decla law is n o t a “b ro o d in g o m n ip re se n c e in th e sk y ,"11The common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voia sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified; although some decisions with have disagreed seem to me to have forgotten the fact.

A s a n o p p o n e n t o f th e legal re a lism p h ilo so p h y , F . S. C o h e n reft a s “tra n s c e n d e n ta l n o n se n se .” 12 O th e r o p p o n e n ts o f th e P la to n ic i legal rea lism even d en y th e ex is ten ce o f a sch o o l o f rea lists a n d p ro p c a p ro p e r p h ilo so p h y o f law m u st b e based o n th e flux o f legal ev en ts i necessity fo r ju d ic ia l c re a tio n o f la w ,13

Scientific Philosophy and Societal Laws

D e sp ite th e w id e -sp read view th a t n a tu ra l a n d socie ta l law s a re m en ta lly d ifferen t, scien tific p h ilo so p h y in sists th a t th e d ifferences a m a tte rs o f w h a t k in d s o f ev e n ts a re re fe rred to by ac cep ted o r wai p ro p o s itio n s . A ll law p ro p o s it io n s w h e th e r v a lid o r inv a lid a re n a tu a s th ey a re c o n s tru c tio n s o f p e rso n s a b o u t a c tu a l th in g s a n d eve fa b u la te d au tistica lly .

All law s a re c o n s tru c tio n s ju s t a s a ll fab les , ta les, a llego ries, met< m od els , b lu e p rin ts , a n d s o o n a re . H en ce th e o b se rv e r o r re a d e r v a r io u s p ro p o s itio n s is a d v ise d to c o n s id e r th e d iffe rence b e tw e en w law o f un iv ersa l g ra v ita tio n o r th e law o f th e rm o d y n a m ic s sets fo r th a g a in s t ju r id ic a l p ro n o u n c e m e n ts w h e th e r fo rm u la te d b y a d ic ta to r , leg isla to r, o r c o n q u e ro r . T h e c o n s tru c tio n a l p rin c ip le is su b stan tia te - w e c o n s id e r th e e c o n o m ic law o f s u p p ly a n d d e m a n d w h ich is so flaj m an ip u la ted .

Sources o f Societal Laws

S o c ie ta l law s m a y b e tra c e d b a c k in so m e in s tan ce s to c u s to n so m eh o w becam e c ry s ta llized a n d p e rh a p s re co rd e d . B u t th a t is i o n ly w ay law s arise . In c o m p le x c o m m u n itie s law s m a y b e d ev e lo ju d g es w h o dec ide w h a t is th e law a n d h o w it sh o u ld b e im p lem en ted excellen t ex a m p le o f th e v a r io u s so u rc e s o f law w e c o n s id e r n ex t,

" Holmes, O. W„ dissenting opinion in Southern Pacific Co. vs. Jensen. 244 U S. 205. 1"Cohen, F. S., "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," in C ohen am

Readinx* in Jurisprudence a n d te g a l Philosophy (P. Schuchman.ed.), Boston, Little, Browi 2K8.

"Cf. Llewellyn, K., “Some Realism about Realism," H arvard Law R eview 44. 1931, Llewellyn, K„ The C om m on Ixtw Tradition, Boston, Little, Brown, I960.

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a. Anglo-Saxon Common Law and Statute Law. Law s deriving from cu sto m and ancien t usage are generally referred to as co m m o n law. T he p rim ary o p era tio n o f such laws consists o f th e ju d g m en t o f judges w ho are p resum ed to be experts in co m m o n law a n d w h o ind icate how it should be in terpreted and im plem ented in specific cases.

S ta tu te law by co n trast w ith u nw ritten co m m o n law , w hich is presum ed to be know n by records o f decisions, consists o f ac tu a lly form alized rules established by legislatures and confirm ed by th e h ighest au thorities in a p articu la r legal system . In the U nited S ta tes th e P resident m ay veto the laws w hich the H ouse o f R epresentatives an d th e S enate approve o f and p ropose as law.

b. Enactments and Evasions. Suggestive o f the nonabstrac tive and viable ch a rac te r o f legal affairs is the w ide g ap w hich separates the a ssu m p tion ( I) th a t laws invariab ly con tro l the ac tions a n d in terre lations o f people an d (2) w hat ac tua lly h appens in legal s itu a tio n s. A ny m echanical ab strac- tional view o f law m ust be m istaken in view o f the ac tu a l operations o f legal enactm en ts and evasions. As in every h u m an s itu a tio n it is a fte r all persons w ho enact, im plem ent, an d evade laws. F o r exam ple , laws certain ly o f a com m ercial so rt are enacted no t fo r the benefit o f th e public at large, b u t for som e advan tage to p articu la r ind iv iduals o r institu tions. In an earlier part o f th is book I have referred to the fact th a t b an k ers m ay co n tro l the enactm ents o f laws w hich m ainly p ro tec t them selves to the d isadvan tage o f the general public o r the persons w ho d ep o sit th e ir m oney in their banks.

It is n o t a n idle s ta tem en t th a t there are p len ty o f brillian t law yers w ho can an d do evade som e o f the best co n struc ted laws. In general, all laws m ay becom e p lay th ings in the h an d s o f o p p o sin g lawyers, each side o f w hich can m ake up a rg u m en ts to evade laws o r to preserve them . T h e co n trast m entioned above is frequently sta ted as th a t betw een conventional logic and w hat goes on in cou rts o f law. A p p ro p ria te here is the com m en t o f the A u tocra t o f the B reakfast tab le w ho said,

You can hire logic, in the shape of a lawyer, to prove anything you want to prove.

c. IVho benefits by Laws? L ight on th e co n tra s t betw een fo rm ula ted rules and ac tua l legal practice is th ro w n by the p resen t question: If law s are ac tually con tro llers o f behav io r an d o p era te im partia lly then they m ay answ er to the con tro l descrip tion . H ow ever, as we have seen there are o th e r functions served by various laws o f any com m unity .

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E K S P E C T U

Laws: Natural or FunctionalT h e question w hether law s are n a tu ra l o r ju s t socially functional a

illum inates the ch a rac te r o f societal laws. W riters influenced by a b s tr tio n a l ph ilosophy argue th a t laws are n a tu ra l an d different from rules o rd in ary practice w hile practical p rocedures them selves are n a tu ra l. 1 co m m en ts o f P ollock (1845-1937) th a t C o hen quotes illustrate th is polai a tion . C o h e n 14 quo tes Pollock as follow s,natural law either does not exist or does not concern lawyers more than anyone else.

But tw enty years later he is aga in q u o ted by C o hen as follows,

some English writers half a century behind their time still maintain the absolute Bcnthan aversion to its name (natural law). Meanwhile our courts have logo on making a great c of law. which is really natural law. whether they know it or not. for they must find a solut for every question that comes before them, and general considerations of justice i convenience must be relied on in default of positive authority.

T he conclusion to be d raw n from th e indicated discussion is the necess to consider specific circum stances as na tu ra l law. Judicial decisions p suppose ad eq u a te a tten tio n to prevailing situations since inevita changes in h u m an cond itions weigh heavily as against fo rm ulae set up different tim es. T here can be n o abso lu teness in law as there is none any th ing else. S ta tu tes are n o t perpetual, im m utable, o r sacred, a lthou the serviceability o f codified rules c a n n o t be m inim ized.

Semantics and the LawIn all literary cultures, m an y p rob lem s arise from the presence

recorded an d codified rules co ncern ing the rights, duties, an d privileges the m em bers o f specific com m unities. T h e p rob lem s m entioned perta in am biguities concern ing the m e tam o rp h o ses of h um an affairs, the natu re psychology, an d the views en terta ined ab o u t language.

a. Metamorphoses of human affairs. T ranscribed legal docum ents ex tw o kinds o f influence on th e b eh av io r and general style o f living particu la r independen t o r sovereign com m unities. O n one hand they pi vide palpable institu tions w hich play significant parts in p articu la r politic units. O n the o ther h an d , how ever, th ey m ake it possible fo r the rules a laws to induce a certa in kind o f iso lation . In general established laws a codifications ap p ear to be rem o te fro m the p articu la r m em bers o f t political g roup , they require law yers in o rd e r n o t to breach the laws, o r

“ Cohen. M. R., N ea u m a n J Saturc, New York, Harcourt. Brace, 1931, p. 406.

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be freed from the responsib ility o f hav ing d o n e so. T h u s a sizable gap separates persons from the legal institu tions o f their com m unities.

But even in the case o f w ritten constitu tio n s questions arise as to the in ten tio n o f th e law m akers in fo rm u la tin g the language o f th e bills designed to be en ac ted in to law. In general, how ever, th e w ords describ ing o r represen ting s itua tions o f co m m an d o r inh ib ition o f ac tion a re always subject to in te rp re ta tio n by th e listener o r read er o f th e w ord . V agueness in w ords is a lm o st im possib le to avoid . As is well know n th e re is alw ays a g ap betw een w hat w riters o f lite ra tu re w rite an d w h a t the readers o f th e sam e lite ra tu re u n d ers tan d concern ing w hat is w ritten . It is well know n, to o , th a t a g rea t am o u n t o f litigation hinges u p o n the relative in te rp re ta tio n o f the atto rneys fo r o r ag a in st an offender o r a civilian argum ent.

b . Codified Aspects of Law. In com m unities w here the law s are codified, it is no t as difficult fo r laws to regulate th e behav io r o f citizens as w here unw ritten law s prevail. This is m ore tru e th a n o therw ise w hen the codes are clear a n d leave n o place fo r am biguity . It is p la in o n th e w hole from the existence o f w ritten constitu tions th a t o rd in ary individuals m ay be expected to be m ore fam iliar w ith laws th an w hen constitu tions are no t explicit an d no t even w ritten . A n in teresting observ a tio n is th e co m m en t th a t the an th ro p o lo g is t R u th Benedict reports ab o u t the occasional sayings o f A m erican Ind ians,

In the old days, there were no fights about hunting grounds or fishing territories. There was no law then, sc everybody did what was right.15

Psychological Aspects o f Societal LawA long w ith co rrec tions in philosophical views concern ing laws it is

essential to d o the sam e fo r th e psychological aspects o f societal law. A ny n o tio n th a t there is a m ental o r spiritistic en tity in w hich processes happen e ith er en tire ly au to n o m o u sly o r in connection w ith happen ings ex ternal to the m ind o r sou l m u st be erad ica ted . S u ch a psychistic view is held by P rofessor B in g h am .16 A s C o h en says th is view is old p o p u la r m etaphysics.17 P h ilo so p h ers o f law app recia te well th e psychological aspects involved in litigation an d p ro p o se a n ex p lan a tio n o f the psychological aspects o f ju d ic ia l ac tion , especially decision m aking. U nfo rtunate ly the rem edy they app ly is to invoke a questionab le if n o t w holly false psychological system . F o r exam ple , F ra n k proposes to exp la in ju d ic ia l behav io r on

■’Benedict, R., Patterns o f Culture, New York. Houghton Mifflin, 1934, p. 252.16Bingham, J. W., “What is the Law?" Michigan Law Review, II, 1912, 1-25, 109-121.17Cohen, M. R-, Law and the Social Order, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1933, pp. 208-214.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C

the basis o f F reu d ian fan tasie s .18 F ra n k m akes a g rea t deal o f au th o rity , F a th e r w orsh ip , an d in general influences o f unconscious pies. In th e follow ing p a rag rap h s 1 illustra te th e func tion o f psycho everyday law situa tions a n d in the cou rts o f law.

Ignorance o f the law excuses nobody . It is a p resupposition m akers an d law ad m in is tra to rs th a t o rd in ary citizens shou ld be respi fo r know ing the law s a n d ab id in g by them . B ut ac tually even codifk are n o t p a rt o f th e everyday acq u a in tan ce o f p rivate citizens. U sual are busy and com pletely occupied w ith all sorts o f affairs o f an econc dom estic type. T h e rem oteness o f p rivate citizens from the business an d its co m m an d m en ts is m easured by the m ag n itu d e o f the popula various legal units.

T he m ore serious p ro b lem o f psychology and th e law concei b eh av io r o f judges as they m ake th e ir decisions. T h e so-called reali B lackstone (1723-1780) assum e th a t judges a re sim ply seekers an d < erers o f independent, objectively existing, self-sufficient, entities. < o th e r h an d , th e m ore p ra g m a tic legalists like G ray (1839-1915), f (1841-1935), F ran k ( 1889-1957), an d o thers regard th e law as m ade judges. A s G ra y 19 pu ts th e m atte r, “all law is jud g e-m ad e law .” T h e p here bespeaks a fallacious view o f psychology. Scientific psychology pre ts jud icial decisions as invariab ly in terbehav io ral processes. T h a t m ake decisions a t all depends u p o n their acq u a in tan ce w ith the mv o f ascerta inable factors in cu rren t specific situations. Ju d g es are o r be learned in th e law, th a t is, experienced w ith respect to the co n d itio n s prevailing fo rm erly an d curren tly . P receden ts m ay be vi o r nonrelevant. Evidence opens th e way to p ro p e r u n d e rs ta n d ^ eva lua tion o f events and a rg u m en ts ab o u t them . Judges shou ld be r o f probabilities.

Scientific psychology insists th a t all legal events m u st be baser occurring activities o f persons in in teraction w ith o ther persons, thin; events in their am biance. N o m etaphysical principles shou ld be a lio d is to rt the behav io r o f ju d g es o r th e th ings and even ts they encc A ppeals, reviews, and reverses rep resen t non-infallib le checks a r ances. T hey supply the stan d ard s an d criteria th a t regula te affairs pr< fo r adjudication .

Frank, J., Law and the M odern M ind, New York, Brentanos, 1930.’’ Gray, J. C., The Nature and Sources o f the Law, Boston, Beacon. 1909, p. 125.

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Natural Rights and Positive LawO n e o f the m o st instructive lessons co n cern in g societa l a n d even scien

tific law s is fu rn ished by the trad itio n o f ina lienab le n a tu ra l rights. Law s concern ing th e rights o f persons to life, liberty , an d th e p u rsu it o f happiness are p resum ed to be essential d em an d s o f cosm ic n a tu re . T h e essential p o in t a b o u t n a tu ra l rights is th e belief th a t in ju rio u s trea tm en t o f persons is w ro n g an d sh o u ld be p roh ib ited . C erta in ly th e re a re ad m irab le tra its exh ib ited by tho se w ho w ish to ab o lish in ju ry an d suffering o n the p a r t o f m istreated persons. N evertheless, it is p u re sen tim en ta lity to assum e th a t n a tu ra l law s exist co n d em n in g transg ressions o f th e n a tu ra l righ ts o f ce rta in individuals. M oreover, th e n o tio n o f n a tu ra l rig h ts reflects th e a ssu m p tio n th a t n a tu ra l events include invisible pow ers an d sanc tions to justify th e inalienable cond itions o f p a rtic u la r persons. T h e th eo ry o f n a tu ra l rights suggests a definite sim ilarity to the invisible h an d in econom ic th eo ry a n d to th e invisible and su p rem e ru le r o f th e un iverse in theology. F u rth e rm o re , th e n o tio n o f n a tu ra l rig h ts ind ica tes a g rea t p ow er o f the unknow ab le . Ind iv iduals w ho hold to the n o tio n o f n a tu ra l rights a p p e a r to d isvalue th e processes an d the th eo ry co n cern in g the co n stru c tio n o f cu ltu ra l institu tions. O nly in positive law d o they seem to believe in th e co nstruc tiona l aspect o f social th ings and events because o f the obv ious processes o f estab lish ing a n d codify ing legislative law. W ith o u t a d o u b t the th eo ry o f n a tu ra l rights is in definite conflict w ith h is to ry an d th e processes o f cu ltu ra l evolution . T h e ho lders o f the p rincip le o f n a tu ra l righ ts overlook the fact th a t different cu ltures develop different n o tio n s a b o u t “n a tu ra l righ ts.” S o m e cu ltu res m ay ascribe th e p rincip le to very different types o f trea tm en ts o f individuals, and to diverse fo rm s o f privileges an d ad v a n tages. S o m e cu ltures m ay even igno re en tire ly an y p rincip le o f inalienable rights.

Judicial Review and Modification o f LawA m o st in teresting bit o f evidence against the abso lu teness an d universal

ity o f positive law s is p rov ided by th e chan g e o f view co ncern ing th e A m erican co n stitu tio n . A t one tim e it seem ed th a t th e p rovisions o f the co n s titu tio n w ere im m u tab le an d unchangeab le , b u t th is view was m in im ized by J o h n M arsha ll (1755-1835), th e ch ief ju stice , in his ju d g m en t re la tive to M arb u ry vs. M adison . P ro fesso r E d m o n d C a h n (1906- )offers a n a ttrac tiv e s ta tem en t o f th e changes th a t M arsh a ll ratified in 1803.

311


H e indicates th a t th ere w ere m odifications as to objective, as to coi an d as to sanction , as in the accom pany ing table.

T a b l e 7 . C o n s t i t u t i o n a l M o d i f i c a t i o n

As to Objective As to Content As to Sanction

from perpetuity immutability appeal to Heaven

to efficacy adaptation appeal to the courts

In M arb u ry vs. M ad iso n M arsh a ll fo rm alized the pow er and prest the w ritten constitu tion as over aga inst the force o f congressional It tio n o r s ta te laws. B ut th e q u es tio n arises as to th e p erm anence • decision. T here a re ob jec tio n s fo rm u la ted as to the efficacy o f th e dec P ro fessor J . P. F ran k is o f the o p in io n th a t so fa r as basic liberti concerned noth ing re levant has been a tta in ed .21

Paradoxes in Legal PhilosophyIf laws are tak en to be sets o f ru les fo r the regulation o f the intercoi

persons w ith o th e r persons, an d w ith things, it im plies s tan d ard s, an d guides. But fixity a n d p erm anence are n o t tra its o r characteris an y events especially n o t o f th e fleeting occurrences o f h u m an rel: H ere is the p a rad o x o f legal ph ilosophy o r science. C ard o zo (1870 has attractively discussed th is paradox ical situa tion th o u g h in term s relative abso lu teness o f science. H e bew ails the absence o f logarit legal s itua tions a n d th e p recision an d finality o f th e bridge-bi engineer.22

a. Paradoxy and Orthodoxy in Law. W hat ap p ear as p a rad o x e law w hen carefully analyzed are sim ply th e consequences o f philosi paradoxes. T he ph ilo sophy underly ing the no tio n o f p arad o x es in consists basically o f a im s to w ard certa in ty an d abso lu teness. F r stan d p o in t o f scientific ph ilo sophy th e paradoxes d isappear beca attitudes involved a re derived from events in the first place, and th t plainly display differences. In terre la tionsh ips betw een persons sha

BCahn, E„ “An American Contribution,” in Supreme Court and Suprem e Law (E. C Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press, 1954. p. 3.

21 Frank, J. P.,“Reviewand Basic Liberties," in Suprem e Court and Suprem e Law { E. ( Bloomington, Indiana Univ. Press, 1954. ch, 5.

“ Cardozo, B. N., “The Paradoxes of Legal Science,” in Selected Writings o f Benjam Cardozo {M. E. Hall, ed.). New York. Fallon Publications, 1947.

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m inim al sim ilarities w ith the facto rs in civil engineering. T h e ph ilo sopher o f law can exercise his calling only if he is free to tak e acco u n t o f events as they occu r so he can d ifferentiate betw een th e d ifferent varieties an d not evaluate them on the basis o f trad itio n al them es.

Societal Laws Not Laws of NatureJu d g es a re no t civil engineers an d have to deal w ith rap id ly chang ing and

volatile m ateria ls as co m pared w ith so-called physical technologists. Ju d g es m ust op era te w ith different p o stu la tes an d un ique aim s. Law yers are n o t scientists desp ite the views o f L angdell (1826-1906), A m es (1846- 1910), Kelsen (1881-1973), and m any o th e rs th a t ju risp ru d en ce is a science, o r th a t,the work of the scientist and the work of the lawyer can be reduced to . . . a common denominator.”

a. Natural Science and Legal Science. W h en the qu estio n is asked , is there a legal science?, there are tw o answ ers. O n one hand , w hen science is tak en in the abstrac t so th a t the science o f n a tu ra l an d the science o f societal laws are equated , the n o answ er prevails. B ut on the o th er hand , w hen the q u estio n im plies the existence o f a d iscip line tra in ed in the d irec tion of observ ing and describ ing legal p rocedures a n d legal s itua tions the reply is in th e affirm ative. H ow ever, in the la tte r case there a re excluded all n o tions o f ab so lu teness an d th e assu m p tio n o f d u a lism w h e th e r o f soul and m atte r o r m ind an d body.

b. Authentic Legal Paradox. A n au th en tic legal p a rad o x is th a t th e laws and co u rts o p era te as well as they d o in th e light o f th e p rob lem s an d difficulties they confron t. Legal s itua tions an d legal procedures w ork o u t as well as can be expected . D espite th e co n trad ic tio n s , th e bickerings, the schem ing, an d o th e r h ind rances a fa ir m easu re o f social h a rm o n y does ex ist in p a rtic u la r c ircum stances. W hen ju s tic e is so u g h t, it very o ften is a tta in ed . It is folly to expect m ore w hen th e u n to w ard deve lopm ent o f persons and societal g ro u p s are considered. C om m ercial transactions are fairly well analyzed. W ron g d o ers a re investigated fo r in ten tions and am b ien t circum stances. T h e princip le o f specificity func tions tho u g h ph ilo sop h ica l theo rie s are faulty . H o m o sap iens m ay be m ostly h o m o faber, his ach ievem ents m ay be g re a te r in techno logy th a n in p ro p e r ph ilosophy , but events a n d co n d itio n s as they a re have n o t yet given w ay com pletely to idle fantasies.

21 La iv and the Social Law o f Science (H. W. Jones, ed.), New York, Rockefeller Univ. Press. 1966.

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T o follow th ro u g h cases o f stric t liability in the crim inal law . th- enforcem ent o f com m unity s tan d ard s, th e du ty to render aid, the prosecu tio n o f the conscientious, preferentia l trea tm en t in hiring, en ro llm ent ii schools, an d plea bargain ing is to observe how m uch hum ane considera tio n can be found along w ith m iscarriages o f justice.24

National and International LawA bstrac tion ism in legal ph ilo sophy p ro m o tes the lim ita tion o f leg2

theories and legal events to in tran a tio n a l affairs a n d the neglect o f interna tional laws. T his is to forget the num erosity o f branches o f the philosoph o f law , and failure to tak e acco u n t o f the influence o f law on how nation behave. As studen ts o f in terna tional law suggest, in tern a tio n al law detei m ines, governs, o r m odifies th e policies o f governm ents in ad d itio n to th behav io r o f nations tow ard each o th e r.25

T h e position here tak en is th a t societal laws m ay definitely be regarded z o f tw o quite different varieties. W hereas national laws concern the relatioi sh ip o f individuals an d the ir executives o r representatives, in ternation ; law concerns th e in terre la tionsh ip o f sta tes o r n a tions all o f w hich claii sovereignty fo r them selves. In in terna tional law o rder an d peace d o nc depend u p o n a superio r en tity o r sovereign pow er th a t is capab le ( enforcing ac tions on th e p a r t o f th e assum ed m em bership . T h e regulatio o f behav io r on the p art o f individual n a tions o r states, m ust be a m a tte r c vo lun tary accord by m eans o f treaties. S uch treaties are p resum ab form ed and m ain tained o n the basis o f equal and ju st advan tages on tl p a r t o f the co n trac tin g parties. U nfo rtunate ly , such treaties are subject 1

m isin terpretation and o f course ab rogation .a. Basic Problems o f International la w . Because o f the tra its o f intern;

tional law deep shadow s d o en sh roud the subject. O ne o f the m ost serioi p rob lem s is th a t o f its existence altogether. G rave d o u b ts have bet expressed w hether there are in te rn a tio n a l rules an d regulations whit m ai ntai n o rd e r and ju stice am o n g the natio n s o f th e w orld. P ro fessor H . I A. H art adds tha t d o u b ts ab o u t in terna tional law are supported byihc absence of an international legislature, courts with compulsory jurisdiction, and ce (rally organised sanctions.-’'’

See for example. Kipnis. K., Philosophical Issues in I a w : Cases and Materials. Englewood Cli New Jersey. Prentice-Hall. 1977.

11 fo r example. Henkin. I... Him Malians Behave: law and Foreign Policy. New York. Colum Univ. Press, 1979.

Hart, H. I.. A., The Concept of law, Oxford, Clarendon, 1961, p. 209.

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P ro b ab ly th e m ost s trik ing evidence fo r th e existence o f in te rn a tio n a l ju risp ru d en ce is the b reach o f observance as in recent events like the Suez affair, th e E ich m an n ab d u c tio n , th e E n tebbe a irp o rt rescue, an d th e A m erican hostages in Iran.

F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f scientific p h ilo sophy w ith its fo u n d a tio n in co n fro n tab le events the question o f th e existence and o p era tio n o f in ternational law is to be answ ered on the basis o f events. R igh ts and obligations a re na tionally p rom ulgated by p a rticu la r n a tio n s an d enforced as against som e o r all o th e r nations. A good ex am p le is th e setting up o f fishing zones an d the trial and penalization o f offenders by un ilateral co u rts and arm s.

Jurisprudence as Interdisciplinary PhilosophyJu risp ru d en ce as the discipline stressing the b ehav io r and in terre la tions

o f persons m ust o f necessity be in terdisciplinary. T h e study o f laws canno t fail to be in touch with events of organic , inorganic , an d an th ropo log ica l specialization . In this section we p lan to ta k e acco u n t o f the re la tions betw een law and logic, law and ethics, and law an d psychology.

a. Law and Louie. C onven tional ph ilosophy devo ted to the existence an d pow er o f reason connects law an d logic very closely. But the connectio n is no b e tte r th a n its w eakest link. It is obv ious th a t reason is tak en as a te rm o r ab s tra c tio n and th u s ju risp rudence is better cleared from such co n stru c tio n s. But w hen logic is described as the process o f system building27 it is well said th a t laws fo rm ula ted system atically are su perio r to those h ap h azard ly organized. In o ther w ords th e m ak ing o r accepting laws and th e decisions based on them should be in accord w ith the social, econom ic , political, an d scientific cond itions prevailing at th e tim e and place o f o p era tio n . D oub tless it is in this sense th a t H olm es asserted in his m uch qu o ted sta tem ent,

The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.-’'b. Laws and Morals. As in strum en ts o f o rd e r an d peace in societies,

laws shou ld , o f course, be in accord w ith the m oral p rincip les21* prevailing at the tim e. H ow ever in the in terest o f ph ilosophical clarity the processes o f law fo rm u la tio n an d o pera tion shou ld be analyzed a lo n g w ith the natu re and o p era tio n o f ethical behavior. O n ly so can the rela tionsh ip betw een th e tw o be p roperly assayed. E thical rules and b ehav io r prescrip tions occur in

!,Cf. Kantor, J. R., Psychology and Logic, Chicago. Principia. 1945-1950. * Holmes. O. W„ The Common Law, Boston. Little. Brown. 1881, p. 1. ’’ Hart. H. L. A.. The Concept o f Law, p. 109.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T 1 '

every type o f behav io r s itu a tio n ;30 b u t th e is o f law in terest shou ld not confused w ith the ought o f ethical perform ances.

Ju s tice is a bridge erected to link law an d m orals . F irst it is asserted th ju s tic e is a m oral value and th en every v io la tion o f a law is in terp re ted injustice. W hatever difficulty there m ay be in seeing the differences ai sim ilarities as betw een ju stice an d m o ra lity o r eth ics and law in general, ow ing to the neglect to analyze specific situations. C om plex situatio w hether investigated from the s ta n d p o in t o f legal justice o r m orals cons tu te fields.

In the case of law o r ju risp ru d en c e the em phasis is on decisions whi- m ay be ju s t o r un just b u t in acco rd an ce w ith precedent o r sta tu te . W h m oral situations are in view, ac tio n is furthered o r im peded on the basis o self-form ulated rule o r social conven tion . In each case the in terre lation ju stice o r law and m o ra ls is a m a tte r o f p a rtic ip a tio n o f v arian t fac to rs ir to ta l com plex, and not a m a tte r o f con jo in t presence o f tw o nonidentical p artia lly sim ilar entities. T h e ex trem e case o f p o la riza tio n o f ju stice ai m orals m ight be the princip le Ig n o ran tia legis n o n excusat.

c. Laws and Psychology. T h e psychological co re in the m ak ing o f la> an d their applica tion to innu m erab le phases o f h u m an situations needs i special m ention. S ince laws are so in tricately involved w ith persons t re la tionsh ip o f psychology w ith laws is pa ten t and subject to ready observ tion . But w hat m ust be b ro u g h t to th e surface is the necessity to have ra tio n a l and scientific ap p rec ia tio n o f th e n a tu re o f psychology. U nfort na te ly this is not frequen tly th e case. W riters on law a d o p t ideas o f cu rre appeal by som e people o r pass off as psychological, no tions th a t th fo rm ulate fo r them selves. M oreover, th e law situations they concern thei selves with are consequently n o t in good order.

A n exam ple o f the m istaken trea tm e n t o f the re la tionsh ip betw een la and psychology is the follow ing. A lth o u g h in terna tional law perta ins to t behav io r o f states and no t o f ind iv iduals the a ttem p t is m ade to descri an d exp lain in te rn a tio n a l law o n the m odel of individual psychology. Su< descrip tions are presen ted in b o o k s p resum ed to be trea ting in ternation law and psychology31 b u t display a futile a ttem p t to “exp lain” in ternation re la tions on the basis o f F reu d ian Psychoanalysis. W e have alreat referred to Je ro m e F ra n k ’s a tte m p t to ap p ly psychoanalysis to the in terpi ta tio n o f legal problem s.

“ Pound, R., Law and Morals. 2nd ed„ Chapel Hill, Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1926.11 For example, West, R., International Law an d Psychology, Dobbs Ferry, Oceana Publicatic

1974.

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C H A P T E R 22

PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF HISTORY

AM BIGUITIES CONCERNING TH E PH ILO SO PH Y O F HISTORY

A m ong the topics trea ted by philosophers, h istory is one o f the m ost am b ig u o u s and difficult. W riters o n the ph ilo sophy o f h isto ry face serious p ro b lem s concern ing the natu re a n d value o f h isto ry as a subject, as well as a b o u t th e ava ilab ility o f historical events an d co n d itio n s fo r investigation an d in te rp re ta tio n . T his s itu a tio n hinges o n th e fact th a t h isto ry concerns th ings an d events o f the past, a n d the difficulty o f achieving reliable know ledge a b o u t som eth ing th a t no longer exists. Sm all w on d er then , th a t w riters a b o u t h isto ry vary from th e one ex trem e that h istory is th e m ost essen tial subject fo r the ph ilosopher, C o h en ;1 to the o ther, th a t ph ilo sophy has n o th in g to d o with history, E lton .2 Ind iv idual ph ilosophers an d h isto rian s each in the ir ow n discipline differ radically and co n trad ic t each o ther. T his is a na tu ral consequence o f clinging to cer tainties a n d absolutes in ph ilo sophy , an d to o bso lete psychological p resuppositions w hich .d istort p rob lem s o f know ledge and existence.

H ISTORIO GRAPH Y EM EN D ED x

It is one o f the p rim ary con ten tions o f this w o rk tha t th e am biguities an d co n trad ic tio n s o f conven tiona l ph ilo sophy o f h isto ry can be clarified by a critical ex am in a tio n o f its postu lates an d practices. It is necessary th a t ph ilo sophers and h istorians exam ine carefully the basic characteristics o f b o th ph ilosophy and psychology.

a. Scientific philosophy. A s we have co n ten d ed th ro u g h o u t this w ork, ad e q u a te ph ilosophyzing m ust d ispense w ith no tio n s o f a b so lutes, etern ities, and certain ties w hich in effective analysis consist o f no th ing m ore th an verbal ab s tra c tions. T o d o so is to p reoccupy oneself w ith concrete things a n d events w hich include th e a ttitu d es o f th inkers w ith respect to their env iron ing w orlds o f n a tu re and culture.

b. Scientific psychology departs radically from the trad itional assum ption th a t o rgan ism s o f an y species consist o f tw o types o f factors, th e

■Cohen, M. R., The Meaning o f Human History, Chicago, Open Court 1947.; Elton. G. R.. The Practice o f History, London. Sydney Univ. Press. Methuen, 1967.

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psychic an d th e biological. I t rests u p o n the obvious fact th a t psycholo j events exclusively com prise o rgan ism s in terbehav ing w ith stim ulus obj w h ether o th e r organism s, ino rgan ic th ings, o r cu ltura l cond itions m al u p a un ique field. A specific ex am p le o f w hat scientific psychology esch in the usual d iscussions o f historical p rob lem s is the n o tio n o f a n it w orld o f consciousness o r m ind an d a n o u te r w orld m ostly createc m ind. T h e classic exam ple o f this type o f th ink ing is Hegel’s verbal a b o u t th e “A bsolute Idea” o r “S pirit” w hich creates th e universe in al m ultip le details.1 * 3

HISTORY AS EVENTS AND AS CONSTRUCTS

A s a first step in th e effort to co rrec t som e e rro rs in th e co n v en tk ph ilo sophy o f history , it is h ighly desirab le to be fully aw are o f an im | ta n t d istinction betw een th e p as t events w hich a re d en o m in a ted hist< a n d the construc ts w hich consist o f descrip tions an d in terp re ta tio n s a t th o se events also referred to as h istory . P h ilo so p h ers o f h isto ry occasi ally call a tte n tio n to th e differences betw een H istory] as events a n d 1 to ry 24 as th e study o f events.

In the term s o f the scientific psychology u p o n w hich scientific ph iloso is based, the processes o r specific happen ings w hich are cu m u la ti’ referred to as h isto ry co n stitu te stim u lus objects fo r the e lab o ra te reacti called descrip tions an d in terp re tations.

Q i N ow scientific ph ilo so p h y v igorously rejects any in te rp re ta tio n o f to ry as a universal process. Eschew ed th en are such in terp re ta tio n s as I h isto rical events a re th e w orks o f a deity w ho creates th em fro m tinu tim e th ro u g h o u t th e cou rse o f h istory . A p o p u la r version o f th is typi in te rp re ta tio n is tha t h istory consists o f th e creations o f a n A bso lu te Ide; deity such as Hegel invented. S im ilar universalistic in te rp re ta tio n s m ak the course o f historical events a general abstrac t evolu tion , so th a t unive h istory becom es very rem ote fro m concrete events.

O p p o n en ts o f the universalistic view o f h isto ry in terp re t h istorical ev< as a series o f discrete acciden ts w ith o u t a unify ing princip le, pu rpose

1 Hegel, G. W. F., The Philosophy o f History ( i . Sibree, trs.), New York, Wiley, 1944. To a sciit is astounding how popular and sympathetic the vaporings of this religious romantic are athistorians.

4 Cf. Atkinson, R. F., Knowledge and Explanations in History: An Introduction to the Philos o f History, Ithaca, Cornell, 1978.

318

A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R Yan y sim ila r source o f even t connection . T h e E nglish h is to rian F isher w rites. . . Men wiser and more learned than 1 have discerned in history a plot, a rhythm, a predetermined pattern. These harmonies are concealed from me. I can only see emergency following upon another as wave follows upon wave, only one great fact with respect to which, since it is unique, there can be no generalizations, only one safe rule for the historian: that he should recognize in the development of human destinies the play of the contingent and the unforeseen. This is not a doctrine of cynicism and despair. The fact of progress is written plain and large on the page of history; but progress is not a law of nature. The ground gained by one generation may be lost by the next. The thoughts of men may flow into the channels which lead to disaster and barbarism.9

T h e w ritings o f K arl M arx an d F ried rich Engels a re ex trem ely in structive co ncern ing th e subject m a tte r o f history. T hese w riters assert the necessity o f tran sfo rm in g historical studies to elim inate conventional histo ry a n d to in itia te new h isto rio g rap h ic d irec tions. O n e im p o rtan t target is th e tu rn in g aw ay fro m th e greatly inflated sp iritism o f H egel an d the su b stitu tio n fo r it o f concrete m aterialistic ideas bearing especially u p o n the lives an d activities o f th e p ro le ta rian masses.

W ith respect to H egelian spiritism M arx writes,H e g e ts conception of history presupposes an A b s tra c t a t A b so lu te S p ir it which develops

in such a way that mankind is a mere m a ss that bears the Spirit with a varying degree of consciousness or unconsciousness. Within em p ir ica l, exoteric history, therefore, Hegel makes it sp e c u la tiv e , esoteric history, develop. The history of mankind becomes the history of the A b s tra c t S p ir it of mankind, hence a sp irit f a r r e m o v e d from the real man.6

F o r his ow n p a rt M arx believes he is th ink ing scientifically an d basing h im self o n natu ra listic g round . H u m an beings m ust have food , d rink , and shelter, an d o f course the freedom to ad a p t them selves to the ir n a tu ra l and cu ltu ra l environm ents. But h isto ry deals m ostly w ith the leaders w ho d o m in a te over o thers and deprive them o f th e ir m ateria l an d m o ra l rights an d prerogatives. As a h isto rian an d critical observer M arx favors changes in h u m an affairs. In the C o m m u n ist M anifesto he and Engels disclose th e ir confidence th a t the p ro le ta ria t will inherit the earth in the future.

H ow soever m uch one w ay sym path ize w ith M arx ia n political and econom ic sen tim en ts and h o p e fo r the ir eventual fulfillm ent, the com m u nist h isto riog raphy ca n n o t conceal its shortcom ings. T he em phasis o f p ro p a g an d a , th e basic dualistic psychology exhib ited an d the to ta lita rian rem n an t o f Hegel d o no t really ad d up to an au th en tic scientific history.

’Fisher, H. A. L„ A History o f Europe, London, Arnold, 1936, preface, p. v.6 Marx, K.. and Engels, J., The Holy Family, or Critique o f Critical Criticism: Against Bruno Bauer

and Company (R. Dixon and C Dutt, trs.), Moscow, Progress, 1975. p. 100.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V 1

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in metaphysics Marx was not a simple materialist, but a supporter of the theory t emergent evolution, according to which conscious life has developed from conditions whic were at first wholly material.’

Prom inent am ong the negative historians is N am ier (1888-1960) wh takes the position th a t history is necessarily subjective and individua conditioned by the interest and vision o f the historian.8 Also Beard (1 87< 1948) thinks of science as only the “natural" sciences, and is im bued wit the spiritistic metaphysics to regard history as “contem porary thougl ab o u t the past,”’ so w ritten history is an act o f faith not a science, an art, theology, philosophy, o r a b ranch o f literature. T here are m any others, ft example, D ray 10 (1921- ), T revor-R oper" (1914- ), to nam e onlyfew. Each o f the pros and cons is based on particular assum ptions o f tl writers.

W hat is lacking in all these writers is the anti metaphysical view thi science is an institutional form o f occupation, the aim and purpose < which is to procure and organize inform ation abou t things and events < interest to som e or all the members of cultural populations.

CAN HISTORY BE A SCIENCE?

This question is the them e o f m any debates am ong historians. Son taking the position that history can be scientific while others are j u s t ; certain that it is not possible. A m ong those w ho take a positive view on th question, Fustel de Coulanges declares that “history is and should be science,"12 while Bury in agreem ent says history “is simply a science, no le and no more.” 13 Similarly Collingwood in no uncertain term s asserts th “science is finding things out; and in th a t sense history is a science.” 14 Othe take the position that history is m ore like literature or poetry and c i te . examples the works o f E. H. C larendon, T. Carlyle, T. B. M acaulay, G. ft Trevelyan, and E. Gibbon.

’Walsh, W. H., An Introduction to Philosophy o f History, London, Hutchinson Univ. Libra 1958, p. 159 n.

•Namier, L. B., “History and Political Culture,’ in The Varieties o f History (F. Stem, ed.), N York, Meridian. 1957, pp. 371, 386.

9 Beard, C. A., “Written History as an Act of Faith," American Historical Review, 39.2,219-210 Philosophical Analysis and History (W. H. Dray, ed.), New York, Harper and Row, 1966.

__ 11 Trevor-Roper, H., Historical Essays, London, Macmillan, 1957.•i Fustel dt Coulanges, “An Inaugural Lecture," in The Varieties o f History, (F. Stem, ed.), N

JYork, Meridian, 1957, p. 178.15 Bury, J. B., “The Science of History," in Selected Essays, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Pn

1930, p. 3-22.’ “Collingwood, R. G., The Idea of History, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 1946, p. 9.

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A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R YO f course, the debates depend up o n vary ing p o stu la tio n s o r basic

assum ptions^T he negative position is assum ed m ostly by those w ho regard the events o f history as m erely creations o f the h isto rians^T hey rely upon a type o f philosophical and psychological assum ption accord ing to w hich th ings an d events m ay be regarded as p ro jec tions o f the m ind w ithou t independent reality.

T he en tire deba te o r dialogue loses its m erit com pletely in the perspective o f scientific ph ilosophy. N otice th a t the d eba te begins w ith a problem , for exam ple, concern ing w hat erro rs N apoleon m ight have m ade in 1813 or the identity o f those w ho slew Ju liu s C aesar. It is possible th a t som e situation o r circum stance th a t has been w ritten ab o u t did not occur at all.15 Then, there is no stim ulus object for analysis an d descrip tion . But this happens in the case o f any d ep artm en t o f science in w hich som e event is p resupposed

V w hich does no t exist at all, bu t is the result o f som e so rt o f e rro r o f j observation . A strik ing exam ple is the case o f the F rench physicist B lond- s lot. This physicist reputed to be qu ite com peten t becam e so excited ab o u t s th e discovery o f X -rays, th a t he th o u g h t he had discovered a n o th e r type o f f rays which he called N-rays. A lthough som e F rench colleagues also

“observed” such rays, it tu rned ou t th a t n o such rays ex isted .16 H ere it is interesting to no te th a t E lton asserts tha t there is a g reater objectivity fo r h istory o r historical s tudy .17 In this connection also we note th a t H eisenberg and colleagues proposed a principle o f uncerta in ty fo r m odern physics.

It has long been a trad itio n th a t hu m an events are in principle different from the events o f physics an d chem istry so th a t there has grow n up a barrier betw een the so-called n atu ra l and the social sciences. It is certainly clear, how ever, th a t this d istinction is a rb itra ry an d baseless, except tha t the upho lders o f this view derive com fort from a m entalistic o r subjectivistic type o f psychology o f h um an-na tu re .1*

ANALYSIS OF SCIENTIFIC ENTERPRISES

Helpful fo r deciding w hether o r no t historical w ork can be scientific is the analysis o f scientific enterprises accord ing to scientific philosophy. Such analysis can only be based upon observations o f the w ork do n e by scientists

l s C f . M o m ig l i a n o , A . D . , “ H i s lo r i a e A u g u s t a e ,” in S tu d ies in H istoriographv. a n U nsolved P roblem o f H istorical Forgery: The Scrip tures. N e w Y o r k . H a r p e r a n d R o w . 1 9 6 6 . c h . 9 .

"■C f. T h o m p s o n . J J . , Recollections a n d R eflections. N e w Y o r k . M a c m i l l a n . 19.17.17 E l to n , G . R . , O p. cit.. p . 52 .'" C f . K a n to r . J . R . . “ S e g r e g a t io n in S c ie n c e : A n H i s to r i c o - C u l lu r a l A n a ly s is ," P su h o lo g tta l

R ecord . 2 3 . 3 3 5 -3 4 2 .

321

H U M A N E V E N T S I N’ P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T Iin a ttack ing their p roblem s an d a ttem p tin g to solve th em .1’ Generali; least six facto rs go to m ake u p a scientific situation . T hey m ay be liste follows.

1) The scientific worker2) Things worked with3) Scientific operations4) Facilities and Aids

5) Auspices under which Scientific enterprises are conducted

6) Products of Historical Work

1. The scientific worker. A u th en tic scientific w ork depends, o f co u p o n the com petence o f th e w orker. T h e value o f h istorical investig: involves an expertness o f u n d ers tan d in g o f th e situ a tio n before him , a essential fo r tak ing the p ro p e r m easures fo r proceeding w ith the v C om petence on every level is the function o f the experience o f the w< w hich varies w ith th e p rob lem s to be w orked at. A t the ou tset, noth) m ore im p o rtan t th a n the ax io m s o r assum ptions w hich supply the g lines fo r the investigation. T h e m assacre of S t. B artho lom ew becomes different a t the h ands o f a C ath o lic o r a H uguenot. In the historical do it is also im p o rtan t to u n d erstan d the goal o f the investigator. ' m otivates a h istorian to en te r u p o n an d con tinue his w ork? T h e liter o f the ph ilosophy o f h istory indicates tha t h istorical w ork and its pn are b etter o r w orse fo r th e p resu p p o sitio n s o f the w orkers, an d thest trem endously. H erodo tus u n d e rto o k his historical recordsin the hope of thereby preserving from decay the remembrance, of what men have do of preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks and Barbarians from their due meed of glory; and with all to put on record what were their grounds of

T hucyd ides21 w ro te on th e sam e basis. O th e r h istorians em phasizi uses o f history fo r purposes o f avoid ing the errors o f the past ai ga ining som e w o rth y ob ject in the fu ture . A n o th er in terest o f hisi w riters is the value o f h isto ry fo r ed u ca tio n an d general literary enjo> They assum e that it is w orthw hile to know w hat has happened in the | satisfy th e curiosity o f th e read er o r to teach him w hat has happened past as a m odel fo r fu tu re behavior.

2. Objects Interacted with. I f an d w hen historians incline tow a view th a t h istory is scientific they m ust lim it their activities to even have ac tually happened . In o th e r w ords great em phasis m ust be up o n the p rio r existence o f p ast events w hich the w riter know s

" C f . K a n lo r , J . R . , The Logic o f Modern Science, C h ic a g o , P r in c ip ia , 1953.20 The History o f Herodotus ( G . R a w l i n s o n , t r s . ) , N e w Y o r k . D ia l , 1928.11 T h u c y d id e s , The History o f the Peloponnesian War ( R . C r a w le y , t r s . ) , L o n d o n , D e n t ,

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A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R Y

perh ap s from h isto riog raph ica l trad itio n . W hat is envisaged as the object w orked u p o n m ay be th e w ar betw een A th en s and S p a rta , revo lu tions in F rance, A m erica, and Russia.

W hat the h is to rian w rites ab o u t depends u p o n the im portance o f the events an d th e value such events have fo r h istorians. T hey m ay confine them selves to political events o r w h a t h appened in the succession o f ph ilosophical doctrines, an d perh ap s m ore specialized so rts o f subject m atter. It is a com p ara tiv e ly recent c ircum stance th a t h isto rians have been urged to w rite a b o u t social and econom ic m atters. T his so rt o f co n cen tration o n subject m a tte r is a function o f th e h is to riog raphy o f a particu la r tim e o r p erio d .(H isto ry w ritten w ith a concern fo r social an d econom ic cond itions inclines h isto ry aw ay from th e in terest in heroes and royal personages in o rd e r to tak e acco u n t o f the people o f given popu la ted co u n trie s.^

3. Historiographic Operations. S ince h isto riog raphy invariab ly perta ins to happen ings in the past, th e w o rk o f th e h isto rian in general is either to refer to the p as t o n th e basis o f p resen t evidence o r, as it is im properly pu t, recreate th e events o f the past. In so fa r as free creation is indulged in, such h isto rical w o rk does no t m atch scientific rules. H istorical w riting p ro d u ced by free im ag ination p a r ta k es m ore o f the quality o f literature. Such lite ra tu re consists o f fictions th a t w riters m ay regard as valuab le for som e purpose.

T o respect th e guidelines o f scientific h isto ry the h is to rian m ust o f course be as m eticulous as possible to in teract w ith the evidences o f the past events, he m ust re s tra in an y urge to endow these events w ith p roperties o r qualities no t observed o r inferred from reliable evidence. But o f course as N am ier po in ts o u t22 the func tion o f the h isto rian is ak in to th a t o f the p a in te r an d no t o f the p h o tog raph ic cam era.

T h e w ork o f the h is to rian it is agreed by m any w riters d em an d s expert selection an d o rg an iza tion in o rd e r to avoid triviality an d to induce significance.

4. Facilities and Aids for Historical Research. It has been said th a t h isto ry does n o t deal w ith the past at all, bu t on ly its p resen t relics o r traces left from the past.23 T his view goes co u n te r to scientific psychology acco rd ing to w hich events o f the past are the stim ulus objects th a t h istorians refer to o r react to . N ow it is a p rincip le o f scientific psychology th a t definite

22 N a m ie r . L . B ., “ H i s to r y a r id P o l i t i c a l C u l t u r e . " in The Varieties o f History ( F . S t e m , e d .) . N e w Y o r k . M e r id i a n . 1 9 5 7 . p . 37 9 .

» E l to n . G . R . , Op. Cit.. p . 9 .

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psychological events im ply in te rb eh av io r w ith som e object. T h e relics traces left from the past consist o f substitu te stim ulus objects fo r t originals w hich m ay n o t exist an y lo n g er afte r m any centuries. T here i m any types o f substitu te stim uli, fo r exam ple, in historical s itua tions t stim ulus functions m ay inhere in d o cu m en ts o r inscrip tions m ade on sto o r clay o r they m ay be m ore recent an n a ls , inscrip tions, an d o th e r sub: tu tes fo r events th a t have tran sp ired befo re w ritten h is to ry .^ h e conclusi reached here is th a t it is im p ro p er to say th a t h is to ry does n o t deal w ith • p ast at all. Unless h istorical m ateria ls are p u re fab rica tions instead sym bols o f past events, we accept th em as evidence for events o f the p

JnotO • w hen they can be verified in w hole o r part, h e p ro p e r a ttitu d e to ti tow ard the so-called relics o r traces is th a t they a re instrum ents o r aids describing past e v e n ts ^ MA'jBE

Since h istorians usually ho ld to a m etaphysical a n d pseudosciem psychology, they raise various questions ab o u t h istorical events. They w hat, w hen, and w here are they? A n in teresting answ er to the w hereabc o f h istorical events is Becker’s assertion tha t h istorical facts a re in so one’s m ind o r they are now here.2*

Surely th e position assum ed is ex trem ely rem o te from an y so rt o f ev It appears as a perversion o f a ttitu d es to w ard tim e an d its success M oreover, Becker seem s to be o u t o f the range o f scientific psychoh hence he m isunderstands the event o f persons in terac ting w ith p as t si tions by m eans o f presen t in terac tions w ith stim ulating substitu te o b ; w hether o ra l conversation o r sym bolic representatives o f past things.

5. Auspices or Settings o f Historical Events. A fun d am en ta l featui h istorical study is the analysis o f th e in terre lationsh ip o f any given w ith o th e r p rio r, s im ultaneous, a n d succeeding th ings an d event.' general, such related fac to rs in h istorical s itua tions consist o f the circ stan ce u n d e r w hich events occur. O ften the sources o f in fo rm atio n a h istorical events, th e annals, inscrip tions an d archaeological retrii w hich serve as indexes to p as t events a lso p o in t to the auspices o r set fo r h istorical situations.

In n a tio n a l h istories the circum stances a ttend ing the policy o r behj o f a specified cou n try m ay consist o f th e recent o r prospective in terrela o f neighboring countries. S u ch setting facto rs m ay a p p e a r as th e k sim ilar s itua tions th a t m ight o ccu r in the fu ture . In m o d e m tim es go

54 B e c k e r , C . L . , “ W h a t a r e H i s to r i c a l F a c t s T The Western Political Quarterly. 1 9 5 5 , 8 . 3 r e p r i n t e d in The Philosophy o f History in our Time ( H . M e y e r h o f f , e d . ) . G a r d e n C i t y , D o u 1 9 5 9 .

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A S P E C T S OF H I S T O R Y

m ents em ploy historical w riters p resum ably to tell w hat has happened in th e case o f conflict an d w ar, bu t perhaps no t w ith o u t an ink ling o f how su p erio r the p a rticu la r na tion is com pared w ith o th e r nations.

F requen tly th e in terrelationsh ips o f item s in h istorical s itua tions are tak en to be causes o r exp lana tions o f specified events. T h u s historical lite ra tu re records th e faulty causation o f geographical, b iological, clim atic, o r salubrity o f localities on historical events.

Pertinen t here is the no tion o f “co lligation” w hich W alsh has borrow ed from W hew ell the h is to rian o f science. T h e po in t is th a t different item s o f h istory ap p ear to be closely related as they are observed to happen .25

6. Products of Historical Work. T h e p rim ary p ro d u c ts o f historical s tu d y m ay be envisaged as m ore o r less ce rta in know ledge o f events considered valuable fo r various purposes. A n o th er type o f p ro d u c t consists o f au th en tica ted articles o r treatises. T o begin w ith , su ch secondary functions m ay serve as m edia o f in fo rm ation concern ing past events. A ssum ing th a t the w ritings consist o f verifiable references to the objects o r events that h isto rians have w ritten ab o u t, they satisfy cu riosity o r p rov ide som e useful lesson fo r ra tio n a l behavior in the fu tu re . T here is on ly one restriction and th a t is tha t th e w ritings o r reports bear as close a re la tionsh ip to the original even t as has been possible u n d e r given circum stances. A m ost singular p ro d u c t o f h istorical w riting is, accord ing to T oynbee, w hen h isto ry passes over in to theology.26

ONTOLOGICAL ASPECTS O F HISTORY

A reading o f a collection o f various volum es in the ph ilosophy o f H istory suggests th a t the w riters base them selves upon conven tional philosophical assum ptions. T rad itio n a l assum ptions then cond ition their interests and how they ca rry th em ou t. P ro m in en t in the various ph ilosoph ies o f history a re p rob lem s ca tegorizab le as ontological and epistem ological. W e find it convenient, then , to discuss a num ber o f related and unre la ted historical problem s u n d er these rubrics.

a. Progress and Regress in History. A m o n g the p o p u la r bu t question ab le views o f h isto riography is th a t o f progress in the sense th a t history show s a unified d irec ted m ovem ent tow ard a final o u tco m e o r end. O ne of the best exam ples o f this sort o f theological m isin te rp re ta tio n o f history is

” W a ls h , W . H „ An Introduction to Philosophy o f History, L o n d o n . H u t c h i n s o n U n iv . L ib r a r y ,

1 9 5 8 . p p . 5 9 f.“ T o y n b e e , A . J . , Civilization on Trial. L o n d o n . O x f o r d U n iv . P r e s s . 1 949 , p r e f .

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th a t o f H egel.27 T he tran sp a ren t fallacy o f this view is seen in the fact that Hegel, regarded the situation in the G e rm an y o f his tim e as the culm ination o f th e general progressive m ovem ent o f history. W hat is a troc ious in this style o f w riting is the au tistic invocation o f verbal abso lu tism and universality, th e w hile one’s back is tu rn ed to w ard the ac tua l events tha t are ap p a ren tly being w ritten ab o u t. But w h a t is m o re a tro c io u s still is tha t so m any w riters on the philosophy o f h is to ry seriously accep t this type o f fundam en ta listic religion in defiance o f all rules o f reasonable observation a n d au th en tic inference.

— A m o n g the philosophers o f history w h o see in historical events som e sort o f theologically based abso lu tism and universality m ay be listed Karl M arx ( I818-1883)2K, C roce (1866-1952)2’ . a n d m any o thers w h o em phasize the d eg rad a tio n o f na tions and civilizations, as fo r exam ple, A. T oynbee ( 1889-1975)». O. Spengler (1880-1936).’1

C oncern ing T oynbee. Geyl writes.

To survey history as a whole, to discover trends in its movement, to seek out its meaning—Professor Toynbee is not the first to undertake the attempt. He joins the company of St. Augustine and Bossuet. V'oltaire, Hegel. Marx. Buckle. Wells. Spengler; nor is he the least among them.'2

In co n tra s t to th is exam ple o f universal h istory , scientific philosophy offers an effective an tid o te in its p rincip le o f specificity. W hen we consider ac tu a l historical events great p rogress we find fo r exam ple in technology, in th e arts, an d scientific knowledge. B ut w hen we look a t o th er features o f h u m an developm ent we clearly d iscover great an d sm all de terio ra tions in th e events o f history. U pon considera tion o f the changes th a t have taken p lace in th e e v o lu tio n jof m a n k ind, th e re is as m uch regressiveness as

j>rogressL T h e rise an d fall of p a rticu la r cuiturcs"o?Tiiaficmsforces a conclusion that statistical curves o f hum an evolu tion show peaks and valleys in equal num bers and in equal height.

b. Constancies and Change. F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f scientific philosophy , h istorical events in general m ay be charac te rized as a gross con tinu ity b u t w ith m any specific an d p a rticu la r changes w ith in the large fram ew ork. H isto rians w ho take the position th a t h isto ry is m erely som eth ing that h istorians construc t assum e fu rth e r th a t h istorical events a re single un its o f

27 Hegel, G. W. F., The Philosophy o f History (J. Sibree, irs.), New York, Wiley. 1944.M a rx a n d linnet*: Basil W'tilings o n Politics a n d P h ilo so p h y ( L . S . F e u e r , e d . ) , G a r d e n C i ty .

D o u b le d a y . 1959.•'‘ C r o c e . B .. History as the Story o f Utterly (S . S p r ig g e . I rs .) . N e w Y o r k . W . W . N o r to n , 1911.“’ l o y n b e e . A .. A S tu d y o f H istory. lO v o ls . , O x f o r d , O x f o r d U n iv . P r e s s , 1 9 3 4 -1 9 5 4 ." S p e n g le r . ( ) . . The D ecline o f the W est <C . F . A tk i n s o n , t r s . ) . N e w Y o r k . K n o p f , 1926., J C icyl, I*.. D ehates n i j / i H istorians, G r o n in g e n . W o l le r s , 1 9 5 1 , p . 9 1 .

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a un ique so rt w hich d o no t repeat them selves. B ut from th e s tan d p o in t of objective ph ilosophy, h istorical events, especially those tha t indicate co m paratively few changes, d isp lay a definitely con tin u o u s process. T his is in keeping w ith fo r exam ple, th e evolu tion o f astronom ica l system s an d the o rgan ic bei ngs th a t p o p u la te th o se bodies favo rab le fo r such developm ent. T h e con tinu ity o f evolu tion includes num ero u s cycles, all o f w hich are concrete n a tu ra l events an d n o t p u re constructions.

T he con tin u ity o f variable events strongly su p p o rts the view that au th en tic h isto ry concerns preexisting events th a t h isto rians describe. C learly any scepticism a b o u t the em pires o f o ld, th e P ersian , the H ittite , th e G reek, the R om an , the B ritish, o r questions o n the evidence furnished by an n a ls and o ther reco rds reveals m etaphysical p resuppositions concern ing know ledge and existence.

c. Human and Nonhuman Events Contrasted. A m o n g the m ost p o p u lar h isto riog raph ica l theories is th a t h is to ry to be an accep tab le discipline m ust d istingu ish betw een the so-called exact sciences like physics and chem istry an d th e study o f h u m an affairs. S o m e s tu d en ts o f h isto ry regard it as a decisive a rg u m en t th a t h istory n o t only m ust deal w ith d a ta o r subject m atte r, bu t a lso w ith th e views o f h is to rian s as to w h a t th e d a ta signify.33 T h e plea is th a t h istorical events are un ique an d unrepeatab le , con tingen t an d no t de te rm in ed . N ow it is obv ious th a t theories o f th is general type a re based o n im p ro p e r prem ises as to the n a tu re o f theory , science, an d especially psychology.

S tu d en ts w ho a p p ro ach events w ith o u t m entalistic o r universalistic prejudices, induced by trad itio n a l epistem ological institu tions, can describe hu m an events as they occur an d can be observed, in th e sam e w ay as so-called n a tu ra l scientists do . F o r exam ple , events stud ied by physicists o r chem ists are all un ique h ap pen ings ju s t as m uch as the even ts o f h u m an affairs. I t is on ly a rb itra ry prejudices ab o u t events th a t m ak e special p rob lem s fo r h istorical events. T h e pau c ity o f evidence w hich m akes inferences necessary exists in all d e p a rtm en ts o f science. C learly it is the invariable func tion o f science to concern itself w ith w hat is originally u nknow n an d in general it is tru e th a t w hat is know n by scientists w hether physicists, chem ists, b io logists, is only a sm all p a r t o f the p h en o m en a in w hich they a re interested. W hat scientists w ork at an d try to d iscover is p a rt o f a g reat p lenum , m etaphorically they only becom e m asters o f in fo rm ation ab o u t the tips o f icebergs. It c a n n o t be repeated to o often th a t it is only

11 C f . f o r e x a m p le , L e ff , 0 . . History and Social Theory, A l a b a m a . U n iv . o f A l a b a m a P r e s s 1 9 6 9 , p . 3 .

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the persistence ofdualistic institu tions th a t helps to instigate futile problem s an d questions. O n the w hole it m ay be said at th is po in t th a t even the m ost scrup u lo u s h istorians w riting a b o u t h u m an events m ake a rb itra ry assertions bearing only a rem ote connection w ith events tha t are being described o r explained.

d. Cyclisnt in History. A p rom inen t speculation o f philosophers of h isto ry is that h istorical events tak en in their to tality are cyclic in nature. P h ilosophers o f various nationalities, for exam ple, Bodin the F renchm an , Vico the Ita lian , N ietzsche an d S peng ler the G erm ans, have assum ed that th e rise and fall of states, nations, and civilizations d em onstra te an inheren t p a tte rn o f h u m an affairs. C learly th ere is an escalation o f the p rincip le o f universalism and absolutism . T h e consideration o f the specificities o f rise an d decline of states o r cu ltures serves to an n u l the iron laws of hum an cycles w hether d raw n from the biological facts of b irth and d ea th o f organism s or the constancy o f changes o f all things.

e. Historical Inevitability and Contingency. T h e perennial urges to generalize and absolutize in h isto riograph ica l th ink ing have th row n up the co n tra stin g an tinom y o f inevitability an d contingency. H isto rians w ho fav o r the idea o f inevitability assum e th a t h istorical events represent units in som e gran d system , perhaps the w ork o f a deity o r the unfolding o f som e m ystical an d unknow n force. But those h istorians m ore sensitive to events an d m ore a lert to the observation o f the w ork o f h istorians stress w hat they th ink o f as chance. In a rgum en t the contingen tists po in t to specific events tha t are apparen tly isolated and not im m ediately observed as organized in to a larger system.

T he ob jectionable feature o f b o th parts o f the present an tin o m y is the basic prem ise o f an independen t process o r entity called h istorical fact. T here is how ever no alternative to the view th a t historical study is concerned with concrete things and events im bedded w ithin specific hum an situations.

A m ost in teresting exam ple o f how absolu tes and generalities con tam inate historical writings concerns the condem nato ry attitudes tow ards R anke’s form ula o f historical research o f events as they actually were. T ak en in abstract the form ula appears qu ite a reasonable one, certainly in the con tex t o f scientific history.

But a close analysis reveals th a t th e R an k e form ula com prises som e o f the m ost irra tiona l features. As Beard (1874-1948) po in ts ou t in his article entitled , “T h a t N oble D ream ,” R an k e conceived history as a “revelation o f

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g od” an d as ‘‘d er gang G o ttes in d er W elt.”34 O n this basis, o f course, R anke ca n n o t be to o m uch criticized.

S ince h is to rian s are pred isposed tow ard universa lism an d abso lu tism , th e a ttack s o n R an k e’s H istoricism resulted in a n o th e r abso lu tism called H isto rica l R elativ ism . A s in m ost cases ab so lu tes a re based o n inflated p a rtic u la rs so the o p p o n en ts o f R an k e based them selves on the fact tha t econom ic cond itions played a decisive role in h istorical situations.

f. Causation in History. H istorians, w h e th e r o r no t believers in con tin u ity and o rd e r in h istorical events, w restle w ith the p ro b lem o f cause. T h o se w h o believe th a t h istorical events are sim p ly h ap h a za rd happ en in g s

Reject cau sa tio n as a fac to r in the pa tte rn in g o f events. T h e ir o p p o n en ts w h o accep t in ex o rab le law as th e gu ide to h isto rical events insist upon specific d e te rm in ers o f th e incidents o f the past. B oth cau sa tio n is ts and noncausa tio n is ts d isplay in their a rgum en ts a n insufficient app rec ia tio n o f th e n a tu re o f cau se . E ither they are influenced by dualistic m etaphysics o r genera] ph ilosophical abstraction ism , and som etim es bo th .

In general causation ists reach o u t fo r so m eth in g u ltim a te an d ab so lu te fo r the d escrip tion o r in te rp re ta tio n o f h u m an events. It is the ab so lu tis t's a ttitu d e w hich influences h isto rians to p ro m o te prob lem s o f inevitability. It w ould be a co nsiderab le service to h is to rio g rap h y to d istinguish betw een th e scientific and m etaphysical views a b o u t cause. C au se scientifically envisaged refers to the fo rm a tio n o f an event field. W h a t is falsely called a cause is th e s im u ltan eo u s presence o f one o r several co m p o n en ts o f an event. F o r exam ple, fire o r co m bustion occurs w hen oxygen is copresen t w ith th e su rro u n d in g tem p era tu re having reached a ce rta in po in t. T o say th a t th e ligh ted m atch is the cause o f the b u rn in g o f the gas is a v io la tio n o f th e ac tua l descrip tions o f the situation . T his colligation o f fac to rs in a field is sim ilar in the h u m an o r social s itua tion as it is in th e in teraction o f chem ical c o m p o n en ts in th e so-called n a tu ra l s itu a tio n . In general it m ay be safely asserted th a t the n o tio n o f m etaphysical cause is derived originally fro m theolog ical d iscussions and th ere fo re d o es n o t ap p ly to an y so rt o f ra tio n a l o r na tu ra lis tic view a b o u t h isto rical events o r an y o th e r type . C au sa tio n in in tellectual h isto ry is certain ly derived from descrip tions and e x p lan a tio n s o f fields as ind icated . T hey certa in ly are n o t ow ing to th e activities o f any deity o r m ystical pow ers o p era tin g in the realm o f concrete occurrences.

M B e a r d , C . A „ “ T h a i N o b le D r e a m ," in The t'orielies o f History ( F . S l e r n , e d . ) . N e w Y o r k . M e r i d i a n , 1 9 5 7 .

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A com p arab le use o f m etaphysical cause in biology an d psychology th row s som e light o n the cause p roblem . W hen the q uestion is asked as to th e resem blance o f o rganism s ac ro ss generations, a com m on , though m istaken , answ er is given th a t it is hered ity w hich causes it. The sim ilarity betw een the tw o situations is strik ing in the tu rn ing aw ay from actual events tow ard m etaphysical fantasies. O ne is rem inded here o f the o p p o sing views represented by G enesis as over ag a in st the observations o f evolutionists.

g. Objectivity of Historical Events. A s a fitting conclusion to this section we p o in t o u t the confusion o f a ttitu d es b ro u g h t a b o u t by the conven tional ph ilosophy concern ing objectivity.

P h ilosophers o f H istory th o ro u g h ly ensconced in trad itions o f m ind and ex ternal reality toss back and fo rth th e ir ind iv idual views as to th e objectivity o f historical events. C o n fo u n d in g ep istem ology and onto logy they occupy them selves w ith all so rts o f a rg u m en ts as to the objects o f history . Q uestions are raised as to the prim acy o f events o r o f in terp re ta tions. A n in teresting p icture o f the polem ics con cern in g objectivity in h istory is pain ted by P assm o re35 in his artic le in w hich he discusses eight criteria for th e view th a t h istory does o r does no t deal w ith reality. In teresting here are the four facto rs w hich W alsh suggests as the basis fo r the assu m p tio n that h istory m ay be m ade by the h isto rian .36

T o m ove on from conventional ph ilo sophy tow ards a naturalistic a ttitu d e to w ard h istory and its investigation is to liqu ida te the questionab le p rob lem o f objectivity o f historical events. It is to be noted tha t the question o f objectiv ity is sim ply one o f a h igher degree th a n o bservation and in te rp re ta tio n of events. N o com p eten t h is to rian w ould care to study and repo rt u p o n any th ing but d a ta w hich are clearly p resen t in his intellectual env ironm ent. It w ould be a ca ricatu re o f D escartes’ no tion o f d o u b t to raise q uestions ab o u t the existence o f H am m u rab i, A lexander, Ju liu s C aesar, C yrus, th e P eloponnesian w ar, and the R o m an em pire. W ith o u t fa ith in the existence o f an Egyptian em pire, an A ssyrian em pire, o r any o f the m yriads o f historical events, there cou ld be no history. T h ere are to o m any archeological rem ains to serve as ev idence fo r descrip tion an d in te rp re ta tion to m ake plausible serious basic d o u b ts . W hat h istorians m ay differ ab o u t are som e detailed re la tionsh ips o f the facto rs in the events o f long ago. E vidence m ay be lacking in sufficiency o r clarity bu t in n o case need

" J ’a s s m n r c . V . A ., “ I h e O b je c t iv i ty o f H i s t o r y ” in Philosophical Analysis anil History ( W . H . D r a y . t d ) , N e w Y o r k . H a r p e r a n d R o w , l% f>

' W a ls h , W . H .. A n In troduction to P h ilm o p h t- o f H isto ry . L o n d o n . H u tc h i n s o n . 1952.

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the question o f objectivity arise in any n atu ra listic ap p ro ach to historical events. As we have seen it is only by indulg ing in fantasies ab o u t m inds o r consciousness w hich is the basis fo r p ro b lem s o f objectivity; a natu ra listic ap p ro ach to psychology m akes such questions com pletely irrelevant.

T his sec tion m ay well be concluded w ith th e suggestion th a t the avo id ance o f e r ro r and m isunderstand ing in h is to riog raphy can be effectively b ro u g h t a b o u t by em phasiz ing concrete happ en in g s in stead o f relying on ab strac tio n s su p p o rted only by the ph ilo so p h y o f the h is to rian an d the pow er o f venerab le intellectual institutions.

EPISTEM IC ISSUES IN H ISTO RIO G RA PH Y

P hilosophers o f H isto ry in the ir epistem ological reflections p erh ap s even m ore th a n in th e ir on to logical discussions d isp lay an a liena tion from concrete th ings and events. W hen they occupy them selves w ith th e p ro b lems o f m ethod , descrip tions, in terp re ta tion , an d exp lan a tio n , they o f course ca n n o t d ep a rt fro m their p articu la r varie ty o f etheria l generalizations. T h e pow er o f cu ltu ra l institu tions holds ph ilo sophy o f h isto ry in an iron grasp . M ostly they cling to religious d o g m as as th e ax iom s o f their th ink ing . O f course, they assert th a t they w ish to preserve th e ideals o f m ank ind , th e u ltim ate values, and the in terests o f hum an ity . Incidentally , o f course, they avoid th e v irtues o f scientific th in k in g an d practice, o r try to assim ilate them to th e ir ow n nonscientific o r antiscientific a ttitudes. T hey display th e ir loyalties to positivism , idealism , p ragm atism , o r realism . Such back g ro u n d in terests influence the accep tance o r rejection o f laws in history, the verifiability o f p ropositions o f history.

a. Positivism and Laws in Historiography. E pistem ic issues in historiography m ark a shift from prob lem s a b o u t the subject m a tte r o f h istory to p rob lem s ab o u t the construc tions erected by h istorians w ith respect to the subject m a tte r o f history . D epend ing u p o n the b ack g ro u n d and the intellectual s ta tu s o f p a rticu la r h istorians, vary ing polem ical app roaches are m ade to w ard historical events. G eneral questions are raised a b o u t the possibilities o f dealing with absen t objects and s itua tions, an d m o re particu la r ones ab o u t th e in ten tions and m o tiva ting co n d itio n s o f p articu la r ind iv iduals a n d th e ir behavior. F o r exam ple , m an y w riters are n o t con ten t to describe how C rom w ell, N apoleon , o r F rederick the G reat conducted them selves an d th e ir na tions, b u t persist in search ing fo r underly ing m ysteries o f w hy they d id w hat they did.331

H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V EA m ost im p o rtan t a ttitu d e to w ard h isto rical events is to believe an d

assert th a t th e re are general laws tha t govern the details o f historical events. P o p u la r exam ples are the views o f P o p p e r37 and H em pel3* th a t all events are so in te rre la ted th a t general laws can be fo rm u la ted to connect events in p a tte rn s as exp lan a tio n s and predictions.

In his vo lum e en titled . The Logic of Scientific Discovery. P opper illustrates the laws necessary fo r dealing w ith causal exp lanations. A ctually he assum es th a t tw o types o f laws are necessary— universal and singular ones. His views are sta ted in the follow ing.

To give a ca u sa l ex p la n a tio n of an event means to deduce a statement which describes it, using as premises of the deduction one or more u n iversa l la w s, together with certain singular statements, the in itia l co n d itio n s . For example, we can say that we have given a causal explanation of the breaking of a certain piece of thread if we have found that the thread has a tensile strength of 1 lb. and that a weight of 2 lbs. was put on it. If we analyse this causal explanation we shall find several constituent parts. On the one hand there is the hypothesis: ‘Whenever a thread is loaded with a weight exceeding that which characterizes the tensile strength of the thread, then it will break': a statement which has the character of a universal law of nature. On the other hand we have singular statements (in this case two) which apply only to the specific event in question: 'The weight characteristic for this thread is 1 lb .’, and 'The weight put on this thread was 2 lb s .’.*

B oth P o p p e r and H em pel w rite as logicians b u t differ som ew hat as to specific situ a tio n s. P o p p e r is m ore general w hile H em pel w rites as follows.

We have tried to show that in history no less than in any other branch of empirical inquiry, scientific explanation can be achieved only by means of suitable general hypotheses, or by theories, which are bodies of systematically related hypotheses. This thesis is clearly in contrast with the familiar view that genuine explanation in history is obtained by a method which characteristically distinguishes the social from the natural sciences, namely, the m e th o d o f e m p a th e tic u n d ersta n d in g : the historian, we are told, imagines himself in the place of the persons involved in the events which he wants to explain; he tries to realize as completely as possible the circumstances under which they acted, and the motives which influenced their actions; and by this imaginary self-identification with his heroes, he arrives at an understanding and thus at an adequate explanation of the events with which he is concerned.*1

T he P opper-H em pe! covering law th eo ry has n o t gone w ithou t criticism . A n o u ts tan d in g instance is the ob jections m ad e by D o n a g an 41 but there are o th e r criticism s as fo r instance those o f D ray ,42 M and e lb au m ,43 and others.

*’ Popper, K. R„ The lo g ic o f Scientific Discovery, New York, Basic, 1959.“ Hempel, C. CL, "The Function of General Laws in History,” Journal o f Philosophy. 1942, 39,

35-4K.w Popper, K. R.. Op. at., pp. 59 f *■ Hempel, C. G.. Op. at., p. 44.41 Donagan. A.. "The Popper-Hempel Theory Reconsidered,'' in Philosophical Analysis and

History ( W. It. Dray, ed ). New York. Harper and Row, 1966.

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A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R YEspecially in teresting are th e com m ents o f B erlin w hich a re prefaced by the fo llow ing critical statem ent.

The notion that history obeys law. whether natural or supernatural, that every event of human life is an element in a necessary pattern, has deep metaphysical origins: infatuation with the natural sciences feeds this stream, but is not its sole nor, indeed, its principal source. In the first place, there is the teleological outlook whose roots reach back to the beginnings of human thought. It occurs in many versions, but what is common to them all is the belief that men, and all living creatures and perhaps inanimate things as well, not merely are as they are, but have functions and pursue purposes. These purposes are either imposed upon them by a creator who has made every person and thing to serve each a specific goal; or else these purposes are not, indeed, imposed by a creator but are, as it were, internal to their possessors, so that every entity has a ‘nature’ and pursues a specific goal which is ‘natural’ to it, and the measure of its perfection consists in the degree to which it fulfils it.41 * * 44

C lear it is th a t th e inclination to w ard ab so lu te covering laws reflects h istorical m etaphysics. It is evident th a t such h isto riography is extrem ely rem ote fro m ac tua l h istorical situations an d th e ir investigation.

Scientific ph ilo sophy as free from th e confusions o f ep istem ology differentia tes betw een laws regarded as fac to rs in th e fields o r processes o f events an d as constru c tio n a l features. Law s are p ropositions o r co nstruc tions developed as validated o r confirm ed descrip tions o f events. A u then tic laws are derived from a n d m irro r precisely th e com position , opera tion , and in terre la tionsh ip o f th ings an d events. A m o n g the list o f spu rious laws are those w h ich reveal th e bias o f the co n stru c to r, th e g ro u p am o n g w hich he lives, an d in general his d istance aw ay from th e events h e presum es to treat.

b. Idealism and Empathy. A pow erful view opposing the law theo ry holds th a t h istorical events can n o t be o rgan ized by law principles b u t m ust be trea ted as un re la ted ind iv idual contingencies. S uch w riters as D ilthey,45 W indelband ,46 R ickert,47 W eber,48 an d C ollingw ood49 object to th e im plica tio n o f universal objectivity b u t also deny th a t historical events can be

41 Dray, W. H., Philosophy o f History, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1964.4> Mandelbaum, M., “The Problem of'covering laws,’ " in The Philosophy o f History (P. Gardiner,

ed.), London, Oxford Univ. Press. 1974.44 Berlin, I., “Historical Inevitability," in Four Etsays on Liberty, New York, Oxford Univ. Press,

1970, p. 51.45 Dilthey, W„ “The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Life-Expressions," in Theories o f

History (P. Gardiner, ed.), New York, The Free Press, London. Collier-MacMillan, 1959, pp. 2 13-225.46 Windelband, W„ “Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft." in Praludien: Aufsatze und Reden zur

Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte 5 '11 ed., vol. 2, Tubingen, Mohr, 1915, pp. 136-160.47 Rickert, H„ Die Problemeder Geschichtsphihsophie: Eine Einfiihrung 3rd ed., Heidelberg, Carl

Winters, 1924.44 Weber, M.. The Theory o f Social and Economic Organization (A. M. Henderson and T. Parsons,

trs.), New York, Oxford Univ. Press, 1947.4,Collingwood, R. G., The Idea o f History, London, Oxford Univ. Press, 1946.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Etied together. T h ey rely on a princip le o f subjective em p ath e tic u n d erstan d ing. T h e co n tra s t o f views is well ind icated by H em pel’s statem ent,

. . .Thus, whether the historian is or is not in a position to identify himself with his historical hero, is irrelevant for the correctness of his explanation; what counts, is the soundness of the general hypotheses involved, no matter whether they were suggested by empathy or by a strictly behavioristic procedure.. . . In history as anywhere else in empirical science, the explanation of a phenomenon consists in subsuming it under general empirical laws; and the criterion of its soundness is not whether it appeals to our imagination, whether it is presented in suggestive analogies, or is otherwise made to appear plausible—all this may occur in pseudo-explanations as well—but exclusively whether it rests on empirically well confirmed assumptions concerning initial conditions and general laws.50

P ro fesso r H em pel adds,. . . Much of the appeal of the ‘method of understanding' seems to be due to the fact that it tends to present the phenomena in question as somehow‘plausible' or‘natural' to us; this is often done by means of attractively worded metaphors. But the kind of‘understanding’ thus conveyed must clearly be separated from scientific understanding.51

D ilthey steeped in a different m entalistic view from th a t o f H em pel supposes th a t all h istorical know ledge is distilled fro m psychic processes o f understand ing . A ccordingly h istorical events a re in terna l to p articu la r individuals a n d can only be organ ized th ro u g h a h idden process o f inductio n to fo rm a unity . B ut w hile th is w o rk o f u n d e rs ta n d in g is co m m o n to n a tu ra l science an d h u m an studies, th e la tte r differs from th e fo rm er in th a t no general law is ex trac ted from an incom plete series o f cases. T h e D ilthey d o c trin e is typ ica l o f a ph ilo so p h er w ho speaks o f Schelling a n d H egel as “o u r nations” greatest th inkers.52

C learly epistem ological p rob lem s in h is to rio g rap h y arise from th e fact th a t h isto rians operate on the basis o f a fa llacious psychology. W riters on the ph ilo sophy o f h istory follow ancien t psychological doctrines. A n excellent exam ple is C ollingw ood’s s ta tem en t in his book , The Idea o f History. He writes,

Psychology is thought of the first degree; it treats mind in just the same way in which biology treats life, it does not deal with the relation between thought and its object, it deals directly with the thought as something quite separate from its object, something that simply happens in the world, as a special kind of phenomenon, one that can be discussed by itself.53

T o w rite o f h istory as reliving, reenacting , re th ink ing , reexperiencing past events is to ad o p t the theological m etaphysics o f soul. It is entirely

v’Hempel. Op. Cil.. p. 45.51 Hempel. Ibid.!! Dilthey, W„ "The Dream,” in The Philosophy o f History in our 7Jm<>(H. MeyerholT.ed.). Garden

City. Doubleday. 1959.’’Collingwood, R. G.. Op. cil., p. 2.

i 334

A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R Yunnecessary in o rd e r to u n d erstan d , in terp re t, o r ex p la in a n event to h ark back to anc ien t soul-flesh dogm as. T h e basic events a n d im plicated intentions and co rre la ted cond itions can be satisfac torily trea ted by m eans o f substitu te stim uli o f various sorts.

c. Historiographic Description. T h e events o f h isto ry and th e ir study alm ost invariab ly b ring up th e p rob lem o f descrip tion . S ince epistem ological p rob lem s in h is to riog raphy arise from th e espousa l o f dualistic psychology, h isto rians concern them selves w ith q uestions o f ce rta in ty and value o f observations. I t is generally held by p h ilo sophers o f h isto ry th a t th e g reat difference betw een states o f m ind a n d observed events m akes a m atch o f know ledge w ith the qualities o r essences o f events difficult. It follow s th a t fo r th em historical descrip tions are fairly well co n tam in a ted w ith im ag inary fac to rs w hile such scepticism is the basis fo r verbalistic universals.

T h e situ a tio n ind icated above is excellently illustra ted by the w itticism s exh ib ited by h isto rian s a t th e fam ous expression o f R anke, “ W ie es eigent- lich gew esen.” O f cou rse despite the a p p a ren t scepticism a b o u t the certa in ty o f ex istence o f h istorical events, h is to rian s have to believe th a t those events have existed. In this co nnection Leff asserts th a t, “h isto ry is to discover h o w w hat happ en ed d id happen .”54 All th e views fo r an d against the n o tio n o f the existence o f h istorical events bring u p th e p rob lem o f description.

F o r th e m o st p a r t p ro b lem s o f descrip tion arc tied in w ith questions o f in te rp re ta tio n an d exp lan a tio n , a lth o u g h M an d e lb a u m 55 refers to P assm ore’s view th a t m uch o f the tim e the h isto rians task is really n o t one o f exp lain ing a t all, b u t is m erely th e one o f describ ing , i.e., o f telling “how ,” n o t exp lain ing “why.”

W hy there shou ld be such a question is clearly ow ing to no th in g else th a n th a t epistem ic questions arise from th e fact th a t conven tional h istory w riting in all its phases bo th as h istory and as ph ilosophy o f h istory goes back to sp u rious generalizations and false no tio n s o f psychology. These false no tions constitu te a com pelling influence even th o u g h the w riters m entioned m ay be ig n o ran t as to th e ir ow n views a n d the n a tu re o f cognitive processes o f an y sort.

F ro m the s tan d p o in t o f scientific ph ilosophy o f history , w hich does not go beyond th e p erfo rm ances o f in tegral persons w ith respect to events, no

M Leff, G., History and Social Theory, p. 53. u Mandelbaum, M., Op. cit., 60 n.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Eprob lem o f historical descrip tion is d ifferent from prob lem s o f descrip tion in any o th e r field. M any cases o f precise an d satisfac to ry descrip tions are av a ilab le th ro u g h the m ed ia tion o f records an d d o cu m en ts o f a credible so rt. S ince psychological descrip tions in general vary w ith different indiv iduals, descrip tions th a t they m ak e o f h isto rical events differ an d form a series, som e o f w hich a re m uch m o re ex ac t an d m u ch b e tte r th a n o thers. It is such varia tions in observation an d descrip tion th a t lead to the prob lem o f in terp re tation .

d. Historiographical Interpretation. In te rp re ta tio n in h istory is based on v aria tio n s in the o b serv a tio n a n d desc rip tio n o f h istorical events. G enerally in te rp re ta tio n consists o f th e im position o f subjective o r personal views b o th w hen they are regarded as them selves subjective o r objective. All com plex events lend them selves to legitim ate in terp re ta tions w hich m ay vary w idely. T h a t indicates v aria tio n s in a p p ro a c h to the s itua tions u nder d iscussion. N o co n d em n a tio n a ttaches to such varia tions n o m atte r how w idely they differ from each o ther. B ut th is co m m en t includes the objective in te rp re ta tio n s based o n the w o rk o f co m p e ten t h isto rians w ith respect to sufficiently know n happenings.

e. Historiographical Evaluations. V arious evaluations are m ade by histo rian s concern ing th e n a tu re o f h isto ry in general, o f h isto ry as a universal process, an d historical investigation. A n ex trem e instance is th a t it is nonsensical. T h e subject m a tte r o f h isto ry is ta k e n to be som eth ing not am enab le to direct observ a tio n an d there fo re w hatever one does in the way o f theoriz ing an d evaluating the g lobal d o m ain o f h isto ry is o f n o value. T h e view ju s t m en tioned is in d irect co n trad ic tio n w ith the view th a t h istory is an ex trem ely im p o rtan t discipline. V arious types o f praise are accorded to h isto ry o n the basis th a t it is p leasan t to co n tem p la te an d m ight even have som e im p o rtan t uses. A d istinctive ju d g m en t a b o u t h isto ry is th a t it p roduces an en ligh ten ing effect, a reader o f h isto ry becom es know ledgeable, an d it even perfo rm s a m o ra l fun c tio n in th a t the cu ltiv a to r o f h istory m ay im prove his ow n behav io r as a consequence o f his acquain tance w ith good exam ples.

Illogical o r illegitim ate in terp re ta tio n s are those tha t assum e th a t there are in ternal forces o r cond itions w hich add to an d enhance the original da ta th a t a re th e h istorical happenings. T hey are based p rim arily on varia tions in th e assay ing o f the im po rtan ce o f particu la r fac to rs in the com plex h ap pen ing th a t is being in terpreted . Basically such in terp re ta tions are founded u p o n faulty ax iom s o r hypotheses perta in ing to som e aspects o f th e h istoriographica l s ituation .

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A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R YH isto rian s p o in t o u t how dep lo rab le it is th a t so m an y different in terp re

ta tio n s ex ist o f w hy ce rta in observab le events occur. B u t there is som e co n so la tio n in th e th o u g h t th a t one m ay presum e th a t all recognize th a t there is som e event to differ ab o u t. W hy th e in te rp re ta tio n s v ary m ay be ow ing to the fact th a t h is to rian s select different aspects o f even ts an d s tan d a t different po in ts o f view from w hich to exam ine h istorical events.

f. Historiographical Explanation. C onven tional h isto rians d ifferentiate betw een in te rp re ta tio n an d ex p lan a tio n , a lth o u g h there m ay b e very little basis fo r the d istinc tion from the ang le o f trad itio n a l p h ilo sophy and psychology. F ro m th e s tan d p o in t o f scientific ph ilo sophy , ex p lan a tio n differs fro m th e o rd in ary d escrip tion an d in te rp re ta tio n exclusively o n the basis o f p articu la r phases o f the h istorical situa tion . T his am o u n ts to the fact th a t p a rticu la r events can be observed to be in terre lated w ith o th er events. I t is th e o b serv a tio n o f th is in te rre la tio n sh ip w hich constitu tes th e ex p la n a to ry fea tu re . I t m ust be tak en in to acco u n t th a t am o n g the indefin ite n u m b er o f types o f h istorical s itua tions som e types are n o t definitely in te rre la ted w ith o th e r types, b u t in m any o th er s itu a tio n s th is in te rre la tion sh ip ad d s considerab ly to the descrip tion an d in te rp re ta tio n o f events. N ow it m ust be specified th a t there is n o co n v en tio n a l cause-effect im plied here. T h e event system is m erely m ore am p le th an the co m p o n e n t un its. In cases w here no obv ious in terre la tionsh ip is available as betw een un it events n o ex p lan a tio n m ay be necessary o r desirab le in depicting th e situation .

H isto rians w ho find good in h istorical s tu d y em phasize its usefulness an d m ak e o f h istorical s tu d y a discipline n o t on ly well w o rth cu ltivation o n its ow n account b u t also serving useful purposes fo r th e s tuden t.36

A m o n g the in teresting ju d g m en ts a b o u t h isto ry it is in teresting to n o te th e artic le by B u rc k h a rd t57 en titled , “O n F o rtu n e an d M isfo rtu n e in H isto ry .” H e w rites, “we . . . ju d g e as follows,

It was fortunate that the Greeks conquered Persia, and Rome Carthage; unfortunate that Athens was defeated by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War; unfortunate that Caesar was murdered before he had time to consolidate the Roman

Empire in an adequate political form;unfortunate that in the migrations of the Germanic tribes so many of the highest creations of

the human spirit perished, but fortunate that they refreshed the world with new and healthy stock;

fortunate that Europe, in the eighth century, on the whole held Islam at bay; unfortunate that the German Emperors were defeated in their struggle with the Papacy and

that the Church was able to develop its terrible tyranny;

“ Cf. Butterfield, H., Moral Judgments in History and Human Relations, London, Collons, 1931. 51 Burckhardt, J., “Fortune and Misfortune in History," in Force and Freedom ( J . H. Nickels, ed.),

New York, Pantheon, 1943, p. 274.

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H U M A N E V E N T S I N P H I L O S O P H I C A L P E R S P E C T I V Eunfortunate that the Reformation triumphed in only half of Europe and that Protestantism

was divided into two setts;fortunate that first Spain, then Louis XIV were eventually defeated in their plans for world

dominion, etc.

T h e em inent tw entieth cen tu ry h isto rian M einecke58 approves o f the evaluation o f history as a science especially as th a t evaluation is alloted to h istory by R anke and others. H ow ever he disagrees if scientific is equated w ith causality exclusively. W hat M einecke insists is th a t instead o f overvaluing causation , a conspicuous place m ust be given to values. T he entire h istorical dom ain is decidedly infiltrated w ith spiritual values. They are inextricably interm ixed with causality. “N o causality w ithout values, no values w ithou t causalities." “T he search fo r causalities in h istory is im possible w ithout reference to values.”

A lthough M einecke is m ost o u tspoken in his em phasis o f values in history, he is not alone in this evaluation. It is said that D ilthey, R ickert, an d W eber all in their different ways stressed value and purpose in opposition to m ere actions.59

W hat M einecke writes indicates clearly the influence o f spiritistic m etaphysics u p o n the m ost com petent historians. By “values” they, o f course, d o n o t refer to such relations as the value of particu lar soil and clim ate for vegetation, the fittingness o f age, health , and height fo r m ilitary service. Spiritual values are w ords only and no t descriptions o r evaluations o f events o r objects.

RANGE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

W ith the banishm ent o f absolutes, universals, and ficticious psychology from the philosophy o f the historical dom ain , the way is opened to the scientific consideration o f H istoriography . T he n atu re and processes o f h istory an d historians can be analyzed and described on the basis o f observing actual historical events as stim ulus objects w ith w hich h istorians in teract. W e analyze tw o im portan t issues, the con tinu ity principle and the range o f history.

a. The Continuity Principle. M any o f the problem s and frustrations connected w ith conventional h istoriography arise from the attitude th a t the en tire accepted subject m atter o f h istory is located in a rem ote space-tim e difficult to observe. This em phasis on the pastness o f events results in a false

5" Meinecke, J.. “Hisloricism and its Problems.” in The Varieties o f History (F. Stern, ed.) New York, Meridian. 1957, pp. 268-288,

** LcfT, G., Op. Cit.. p. 32.

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A S P E C T S O F H I S T O R Ya p p ro ach to history. O n e ob jection to th is a ttitu d e is th a t w hile it is tru e th a t in som e h istorical s itua tions the h is to rian deals w ith a relatively iso lated perso n o r event, th is is invalida ted by th e fact th a t even so-called iso lated things o r events m u st be considered in the light o f copresent events.

-T he m ain th ru s t o f o u r ob jection is th a t h is to rian s overlo o k th a t in m any cases th e events s tud ied a re co n tin u o u s th ro u g h tim e an d m u st be regarded as n o d a l p o in ts in a very long linear succession. W h a t th e h is to rian exam ines m ay be som e event th a t rep resen ts a change in a series o f changes ru n n in g th ro u g h past tim e, the present, a n d w ith ind ications th a t they will co n tin u e to a n indefinite p o in t in th e fu tu re . A p p aren tly , then , a tten tio n m ust be d irected to th e specific events stud ied . T h is is o f course evident w hen universal h isto ry o r th e h isto ry o f n a tio n s o r civ ilizations is in question . T h e con tinu ity princip le b ro a d en s in to th e dynam ic aspects o f na tio n a l an d political events.

Basic to the con tinu ity princip le is th e a b a n d o n m e n t o f conven tiona l n o tions o f causation . E vents an d th e ir changes o cc u r and can on ly be described in term s o f th e in terre lationsh ip o f un it events.

In th e close considera tion o f th e con tinu ity princip le it is wise to consider the re la tionsh ip betw een h istory an d preh istory . I t m ay b e legitim ately considered th a t ju s t as conven tional h isto ry o r lite rary h isto ry follow s and m u st b e based u p o n events occurring p r io r to literacy, so th e events and changes in w ritten h isto ry ind icate less rad ica l changes fro m tim e to tim e. T h e co n tin u ity p rincip le becom es c lear in th e co n sid e ra tio n o f the range o f h istorical subject m atter.

b. The Range of History. U sually o n e th in k s o f h isto riog raphy as lim ited to one o r few in terests o r types o f study. This does n o t co m p o rt w ith fact. H isto rical events co n stitu te an en o rm o u s p len u m o f th ings and events an d th e ad ju stm en t o f individuals an d g roups to them . H isto rical treatises m ay b e ca tegorized on th e basis o f th e p a rticu la r type o f events fo rm ing the subject m a tte r o r stim ulus objects. T o th e te rm s “h isto ry of,” m ay be a tta c h ed th e nam es o f coun tries o r n a tio n s a n d th e ir in terrelations, o r p a r tic u la r w ars o r w ars in general, varie ties o f po litics, in stitu tio n s o r b eh av io r o f social life, relig ion, science in general, o r specific disciplines, a n d so o n . T h u s p a rticu la r w riters iso late a n d select fo r s tu d y the speciality o f th e ir interests. I f they a re ph ilosophers, they m ay w rite a b o u t the to tal g ra n d p lenum , a n d p ro p o se th e ir specula tive ideas a b o u t it. H ere m ay be cited p rob lem s a b o u t th e m ean ing o f h isto ry , th e o rig in o f civilization, the value o f h istory , an d so on.

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EPILOGUE

In th e preface to this vo lum e I have follow ed th e custo m ary practice o f in troducing th e postu lates and supporting p ro g ram o f the present project, w hich has occupied m e for several years. I have long en tertained the assum ption th a t conventional ph ilosophy is seriously defective and calls fo r a com plete reconstruction . 1 subm itted th a t th e v iew point nam ed In terbehav io ra l Philosophy constitu tes a n adequate replacem ent fo r the historical dualistic and absolutistic systems.

N ow th a t th e p roduc t o f my w o rk is availab le fo r perspectival observation and evaluation, tw o fundam ental questions m ay be posed,

1. H ow sound are the foundations o f In terbehaviora l Philosophy?2. H as the con ten t o f the b o o k p rovided sufficient su p p o rt fo r the

prem ises and conclusions o f the proposed In terbehav io ra l Philosophy?A s to these questions, I am satisfied th a t a fa ir consideration o f the

vo lum e will dem o n stra te the perennial necessity fo r reconstruction in ph ilosophy, and also th e reasonableness o f the p roposa ls offered fo r the im provem ent o f philosophical situations. S o g reat is the need fo r the em endation o f philosophical th in k in g th a t th e huge problem loom s o f how to becom e em ancipated from the au tistic th ink ing w hich developed over the centuries follow ing the G reco -R o m an period o f W estern E u ro p e an history.

OUTSTANDING FAULTS O F CONVENTIONAL PHILOSOPHY

T he critical faults o f conven tional ph ilo sophy m ay be sum m ed up in the tw o follow ing objectionable items:

1. T h e b ifu rcation o f th e universe in to the dualism o f reality and appearance, m atte r and spirit, and in general p ro p ag a tin g a cosm ic m etaphysics consisting m ainly o f verbal u tterances and venerable scrip ture. In consequence there is the preclusion o f the actual n a tu re and descrip tion o f things and events.

2. T he second fallacious aspect o f trad itio n a l ph ilosophy is the division o f h u m an beings in to m ind, soul, consciousness, plus m ateria l body.

It is these au tistic perversions o f the th ink ing o f trad itional philosophies th a t have effectively form ed a speculative b arrie r betw een th inkers an d the worlds bo th o f natu re and o f culture.

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THE FLIG H T FROM THE TRUE, THE BEAUTIFUL, AND THE GOOD

In th e period o f classioal ph ilosophy, th e o u ts tan d in g sym bols fo r reflection an d eva lua tion w ere the true, the beautiful, an d the good. P hilosophy w as cultivated by elite th inkers w ho selected the know ledge o f n a tu ra l th ings an d events, th e beauties o f nature , an d th e virtues o f h um an behav io r fo r their s tudy and evaluation o f their w ay o f existence. B u t since the d estruc tion o f th e glories o f G reece and the g ra n d eu r o f R om e the clerics replaced them by th e invention o f a m onotheistic o r trin ita rian creato r, an d a pale reflection called soul. W ith these aids they supplied a hereafter and a heaven to com pensate fo r th e evils suffered in th e only ac tual w orld o f the present. T h e system s th e clerics bu ilt ignored the actualities o f th ings an d events, the reality o f factual re la tions o f th ings and events, the b eau ty o f persons, anim als, p lan ts an d scenery, as well as the goodness o f h u m an behav io r an d h u m an interrelations. T h e philosophical system s th e clerics created w ith the em brasure o f transcenden tal ideas constitu te a flight from the ac tual objects and events met w ith in the natu ra l w orld. P robabilities, erro rs, o r evils they a ttem p ted to com pensate fo r by autistic verbalism s.

T he goal o f in terbehavioral ph ilosophy is to achieve a p ro p er o rien tation w ith respect to things an d events as they ap p e a r in purview an d as they can be revealed by relevant inferences from observation . H ence th e philosophical sym bols m ay still be the true, th e beautifu l, an d th e good although they are know n to be only p a rts o f a logo sim ilar to th e caduceous that identifies a physician. It is the quality o f effectiveness o f the o rien ta tion o f an observer o r th inker th a t gives th e pow er to predict o r contro l events.

It is evident th a t philosophyzing in general and th e p roblem o f type and traits o f all philosophical p ropositions center a ro u n d psychology. In terbehavioral philosophy is based u p o n in terbehavioral psychology which eschews all sp irit-m atter dualism and is concerned exclusively w ith the in terbehav io r o f organism s w ith o ther organism s, things, a n d conditions. S uch a reasonable an d factual psychology can be useful in dealing w ith all the problem s o f tru th , beauty, an d goodness.

BENEFIT CLAIM S O F INTERBEHAVIORAL PHILOSOPHY

P hilosophy to be valid an d useful should be analyzed an d evaluated on the basis o f availab le evidence. T h ro u g h o u t this w ork the valid ity o f the basic p ropositions w as guaran teed by a strict lim itation to th ings and events ac tua lly m et w ith in n o rm al experience, and in scientific research

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an d discovery . N o p lace w as given to tran scen d en t o r su p ern a tu ra l entities. B asically th e in terest is know ledge an d in tellectual o rien ta tio n n o t fa ith o r re lig ious salvation . N o genuine value o r u tility ca n be claim ed fo r n o n n a tu - ra listic ph ilosophy . T h e fo llow ing item s a re p ro p o sed as su p p o rtin g benefits claim ed fo r in terbehavioral ph ilosophy.

Fig, 13. Reciprocal Influence of Culture upon Individuals and Vice Versa.

1. Interbehavioral Philosophy a Complete Reconstruction. O f the recen t a ttem p ts to reconstruct p h ilo sophy n o n e h av e g one bey o n d som e d o c trin a l changes w ith o u t m odify ing th e basic a b s trac tio n a l an d dualistic founda tions. F o r exam ple, m any ab le ph ilo sophers have tu rn e d aw ay from m etaphysical cosm ology and ep istem ology to tu rn to p rob lem s o f language suitable fo r the advancem ent o f th inking. O th ers have em ployed m ath em atical m odels fo r th e im provem ent o f ph ilo soph ical d iscussion. B ut these strategies d id n o t bring a b o u t m uch change in th e basic assum ptions o f ph ilosoph ical th ink ing . T here is n o d o u b t th a t th e succession o f ph ilo so p h ical system s th ro u g h o u t th e ages clearly show s im provem en ts o ver p revious system s. H ow ever, the ph ilosophical succession did n o t usher in any process by w hich ph ilo sophers describe a n d evaluate th ings and events in

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th e ir respective am biances. T he sam e m ay be said concerning the natu re an d behav io r o f the philosophers them selves an d the ir re la tion to o ther th inkers and to the com m on culture.

T h ro u g h o u t this volum e the view has been em phasized th a t th e required reconstruction o f ph ilosophy is no t a m ere m a tte r o f m odifying and correcting doctrines but a com plete change o f intellectual culture. The prim ary intellectual assum ptions require radical change.

T hat m eans rebuilding the foundations o f th ink ing an d re a s o n in g - changing the system o f postulates w ith respect to m an an d his relations to the cu ltural m ilieu in which he finds himself. T he positive acceptance o f the trad itional institutions m ust be given up for the critical understand ing and evaluation o f the heritage o f beliefs and practices ex tan t, and by which parents insist upon their children’s indoctrination and fidelity.

T he process o f culturalization suggested here is indicated by the accom panying diagram , (Fig. 13).

As the d iagram indicates, the intellectual developm ent o f a n individual is the final result o f having been culturalized by contact w ith institutions developed on the basis o f general civilizational cond itions localized in particu la r countries o r nations. H ence intellectuals a re basically o f religious, political, econom ic, an d o th er persuasions accord ing to the general o r specific cultural systems in which they are b o rn an d live. S o ingrained are the tra its o f persons as to m ark the ir en tire lives a n d even willingness to die fo r their abso lu te principles.

2. Philosophy: A Human Enterprise. Philosophyzing is the w ork o f h u m an individuals. A ccordingly the thinking and reasoning o f particu lar ph ilosophers o r schools o f ph ilosophers will be influenced by the cu ltu re o r civilization in w hich they live, the results they achieve will bea r the s tam p o f the econom ic, political, an d religious atm ospheres o f th e ir cu ltura liza tion an d technical training. Individual philosophers m ay be concerned with observations o f things and events confronted by rational and scientific th inkers, o r speculations ab o u t the unknow able, the c rea to r o f the universe, o r an afterlife. In the latter case, o f course, ph ilosophy consists o f verbigeration an d th e fan tasy w hich corrup ts attitudes an d th e functions o f language.

Philosophyzing as a ttitu d e form ulation by persons with respect to their surroundings and experience can be widely spread th roughou t a given population , bu t o f course little can be said ab o u t the low er levels th a t lack com plexities o f adjustm ent. However, such problem s as those ab o u t the existence an d efficacies o f gods o r absolutes as are cu rren tly debated by

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professional ph ilosophers can n o t be g raded h igher th a n the th ink ing o f uneducated an d unin fo rm ed persons.

By co n tra s t th e views an d p ropositions o f professional ph ilosophers p resum ably cover the range o f all know ledge an d research. In transcendenta l p erio d s the view receives currency th a t ph ilosophy , as over against the special sciences, has no subject m a tte r o f its ow n. T h is is clearly false from th e s tan d p o in t o f natu ra listic ph ilosophy even if th e view tru ly evaluates all transcenden ta l subject m atters as zero.

In terbehav io ra l ph ilosophy, as natu ra listic a ttitudes, articu lates w ith all th e resources o f the special sciences a lo n g w ith general experience. T he difference betw een ph ilosophy an d science, then , as we have indicated in ch a p te r 11 is sim ply a m a tte r o f organizing all know ledge, the philosophical co m p o n en ts tend ing tow ard m ore ad eq u a te criticism an d evaluation . T his o rgan iza tion includes the co o rd in a tio n o f th e findings o f the various special sciences by way o f perfecting one’s general ph ilosoph ical position .

3. Constructions and Events. O ne o f th e o u ts tan d in g m erits o f interbehav io ra l p h ilo so p h y is its em phasis o f th e d iversity betw een (1) objects an d events, an d (2) constructions (descrip tions an d evaluations) m ade ab o u t them . E xam ple, an individual is observed to differentiate betw een a red ripe s traw berry an d an un ripe green one b u t trad itio n a l ph ilo so p h y w ould have it tha t th e respective colors are in a nonex is ten t m in d instead o f being based o n th e chem istry o f th e berries in th e ir v a rio u s stages o f biological m a tu ra tion . S uch a trad u c tio n o f events, consisting o f persons in teracting w ith objects, o th e r persons, an d environing cond itions, is a cen tra l fea tu re o f the subjective an d spiritistic ph ilosophies in w h ich so-called ex te rn a l objects including persons a re crea tions o f gods, abso lu tes, a n d personal spirits. V arian ts o f conventional ph ilosophical system s conceal the grossness o f such th in k in g b u t still re ta in th e false in te rp re ta tio n o f ex isting events concern ing w hich they speculate ab o u t.

4. Philosophy: A Constructional Product. P h ilo soph ica l system s are alw ays th e construc tiona l p ro d u c t o f p ersons w ith g re a te r o r lesser capacity to observe freely an d evaluate th e th ings a n d events th a t h ap p en in th e ir su rro u n d in g s, a n d have com e to th e ir notice. T h u s a critical observer can readily differentiate betw een (1) ph ilosoph ical system s w hich depict th ings and even ts as they a re observed to happen , o r in ferred from relevant events and (2) verbal system s autistically invented by ana logy and legend. In terbehav io ral ph ilosophy obviously belongs to th e g ro u p described in (1).

5. The Specificity Principle. By co n tra s t w ith conven tiona l ph ilosophy which im plies abso lu tes, to talities, an d universes, scientific ph ilo so p h y is

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concerned with particu lar events and particu lar issues. H ere is the safest m eans o f com ing in to contac t with things, events, and conditions, and avoiding verbal absolutes as well as souls, m inds, reason, universals, ultim ate reality, eternal truths, and infinities.

All confronted an d actually know n things and events consist o f m ultiple particular participating interacting units. Invariably, then, complexities o f every sort should be analyzed as to their actual com ponents. Even chemical purity includes traces of contam inating elements. In terbehavioral philosophy advises tha t w hen questions arise as to the identity and quality o f persons, institutions, religions, universities, answers should be based on specific details. All persons com prise variant traits based on specific situations. Universities can only be properly judged by departm ents o r even particular professors. In general the ordering and classifying of things and events are p roper o r im proper in the m easure o f the specific details o f which use is m ade. W hen learning o r behavioral developm ent is studied, account m ust be taken o f (1) the observed organism , (2) the objects with which it interacts, and (3) the specific circum stances un d er which the interactions take place.

T he significance o f the specificity principle is exhibited w hen one considers its im portance in analyzing the basic constructs o f philosophical system s, fo r exam ple, logic. Instead o f blandly accepti ng the vie w th a t logic is a m ode o f reasoning one notices th a t logic is a m ode o f system building which results in a product o f a specific so rt.1 T he systems produced vary from m athem atical abstractions, verbal propositions, o r any o ther type o f m anageable object.

SPECIALIZATION PROBLEMS IN PHILOSOPHY

A unique problem o f one and m any is presented in naturalistic philosophy. Specialization in every discipline is inevitable. Accordingly, philosophy is specialized in to particu lar studies such as ethics, aesthetics, politics, logic, and so on. But still there is a certa in philosophical unity, there are basic postulates, propositions, rules, an d conclusions. A s a specialized unity philosophy is a discipline corresponding to the specialization o f science.

T he apparen t parad o x is easily resolved. T he validity an d approval of naturalistic philosophy certainly result from the exploration o f the various special fields o f philosophy such as aesthetics, economics, politics, science,

'< 3 . K a n to r , J . R „ Psychology and Logic. C h ic a g o , P r in c ip ia . 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 0 .

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and so on. T here is a definite reciprocal re la tionsh ip here, o n one hand au thentic philosophical p ropositions are developed from the observation o f w hat happens w ithin the specialized fields o f science and general experience, while o n the o th er the fo rm ulation o f attitudes, view points, and theories developed on the basis o f such ex p lo ra tio n can be used as theories and postu lates fo r the investigation o f the various special philosophical fields. A strik ing exam ple is the great im provem ent in physics, chemistry, and psychology by the abandonm en t o f transcendental factors.

CAN CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS BE CHANGED?

G ranting the need to erase trad itional philosophical institutions, can this be accom plished? T he answ er is com plex an d am bivalent. C onsidering the constan t superficial cu ltu ra l m odifications, changes o f styles, seasonal variations, and trade cycles, the answ er is o f course affirmative. But w ith respect to fundam ental intellectual institutions only a qualified affirmative is possible. T h a t is to say, while every in stitu tion is subject to change in principle, in practice com prehensive changes are difficult

W ith respect to philosophy, however, an optim istic view m ay be possible if the following conditions are m et. (1) P ro p er appreciation o f the value o f trad itional system s, and their avoidance, (2) a v iable differentiation betw een events an d constructions, and (3) the developm ent o f a critical attitude . W ith o u t these cond itions there can be n o au then tic philosophy a t all. A nd w ith them a philosophy w orthy o f th e nam e is possible.

A careful d istinction m ust be m ade here betw een the philosophy o f an individual an d o f a com m unity . E ach has problem s o f its ow n. F o r the individual, changes in general a ttitu d e a re sim pler an d m ore easily b rough t ab o u t th an the im provem ent o f com m unity cultures. T h e individual p ro b lem is clearly a m atter o f personal intelligence a n d education though there is always the fact o f being o u t o f step w ith one’s class o f colleagues.

Societal revolutions are m ost difficult b u t n o t im possible. T h e changes needed m ay require generations and resolute individual th inkers to set them selves a goal and to w ork persistently tow ard it. In th is case, to o , the basic p roblem is the m odification o f individual intelligence by educational m eans. T h e longevity o f social o r cu ltu ra l institu tions depends u p o n the behav io r o f persons. It is this fact th a t supports th e hope o f atta in ing a naturalistic philosophy.

W hat m akes p lausible a fundam ental reconstruction o f philosophy is th a t reflection an d speculation are acts o f m atu re beings w ith respect to

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their na tu ra l surroundings. Fallacious ph ilosophy is th en m isin terpretation o f self an d o th e r things and events. A w areness o f objects encountered is m isin terpreted as consciousness, and soul, called m ind, is accepted from religious sources as a storehouse o f m em ories an d o th e r m ental entities. Inspection o r observation o f one's behavior is spiritized to becom e in trospection. Scientific psychology does no t have room fo r this verbalization procedure w hich violates the above described derivation o f constructs from events. As a fitting conclusion to this epilogue I claim th a t this treatise has a t th e very least m ade available a docum en t fo r a com parison o f (I) a scientific m ode o f philosophyzing, with (2) various h istorical system s com prising transcendental thinking.

347

S U B J E C T I N D E X

Absolute first cause. 39Absolute idea or spirit. 180. 319: in aesthetics.

240; in history. 318; in law, 299. 304 Absolutes, in philosophy, viii Absolutistic laws. 299,304 Abstractions. 31.33.160; verbal, 156; as ampli

fications of linguistic capacity. 288 Aesthetic beauty identified. 250 ff.Aesthetic data, indefinability of, 242 Aesthetic enjoyment. 243 Aesthetic fields, analysis of. 254 f.Aesthetic judgment and evaluations. 253 Aesthetic preferences. 253 Aesthetic qualities in nature and in art. 244 Aesthetic reality. 236.242 Aesthetics, absoluteness in. 240; abstractionism

in. 240; expressionism in. 241; evolution of. 233; informal. 233: modern formal. 233 ff.; philosophy of. ch. 18; settings or auspices in. 258 f.; the interbehavioral object in. 258; the problem of abstraction in, 260

Ambiguity. 152. 317 Analysis of aesthetic fields, 254 f.Anarchists, 184Anthropology, cultural, contribution to educa

tion. 276 f.Appreciator. the, or observer. 257 Art. aesthetic qualities in. 244; and aesthetic qual

ities. inlrinsicality of, 236: and aesthetics. 233; and craft. 242; and emotion. 242; and philosophy of aesthetics, ch. 18; as illusion. 238 f.; crude or primitive. 243: fine or sophisticated. 243; objective versus nonobjective. 245; through the ages. 232

Artist, the. 256 Authority, 188 Autistic philosophy. 4 Axioms, problem of. in aesthetics. 259. 276

Beauty. 240.247.249; aesthetic, identified. 250 IT.; as perfectibility of phenomenal appearance. 234; as spiritual quality. 240; universal applique. 249 f.

Bifurcation of universe. 340 Brain, specious views of. 276

Categories. 19.22.23.25.27.29.30.3 1. 3 4 . 35.36.37. 38. 155; of Aristotle. 34 fi; of Kanl. 34

Categorization. 21. 22. 23 Causation in history, 329, 332. 339

Church Fathers. 5. 45 City of God. 175 Colligation in history. 325 Communist manifesto, 319 Compact philosophy of Locke. 177 Comparative philosophies of religion. 288 ff. Confrontation interval, ch. 3 Constancies and changes in history, 326 Contract, the social. 175 Conventional and naturalistic attitudes in his

tory. 330Conventional philosophy, as autistic verbalisms.

341; as bifurcation of organisms and persons into mind and body. 340; faults of. 340

Crude or primitive art. 243 Cultural anthropology, contribution to educa

tion. 276 f.Cultural institutions, can they be changed?. 346 Culturalization. 104 Cyclism in history. 328

Destiny. 296Dualism, mind and body. vii. viii. ix, 5. 16; of

society. 183 Dualistic systems. 5

Econometrics. 214. 227 Economic determinism. 182 Economics, excessive abstractionism in. 196; idi

osyncrasies in. 200: institutional. 219; obsolescence and seasonality in. 200; philosophy and, ch. 17; welfare. 217

Education. 9; and human maturation. 263; as personality evolution. 264; contribution to. of cultural anthropology. 276 f.; conventional theories of. 263; described. 266 f.; direct influences. 267 f.; goals in. 273; in philosophical perspective, ch. 19; in simple and complex cultures. 273: peripheral influences of. 268; versus training. 272 f.

Educational development, sequential order. 270 f.

Educational goals and values. 273 Educational processes, continuity of. 271 Education situations, problems of. 271 Ego. 154, 165Empathy. 237; and idealism. 333 Equality, 190Epistemic events and underlying mysteries of his

tory. 331

3 4 9

I N T E R B E H A V I O R A L P H I L O S O P H YEpistemic issues in historiography. 331 Ethical behavior, psychological model of. 167 Ethical events and constructs. 160 Ethical problems as linguistic analyses, 167 Ethical standards. 169 Ethical theory, misconceptions in. 163 Ethics. 8; and morality, absolute and relative.

16 1; and morality and legality. 171; and morality, public and private, 170: and morals and values. 168; isolation and identification of moral situations. 139; philosophy of, 139

Excessive abstractionism in economics, 196 Existence. 31Experience and theology, 283 Expressionism in aesthetics, 241

Fine or sophisticated art, 243 Fortune and misfortune in history, 337 Freedom. 6, 189; from absolutes. 96: from meta

physical institutions, 93; from universalism, 96; of the will, 164

Functions, abstractive and relational. 133; constructive and ratiocinative, 153; preservative and continuity, 153; righting and regulating. 153

Goals in education. 273God. City of, 173; freedom and immortality. 6,

235God(s), vii, 6,35.39.42,95.154,153, ch. 20.292 f. Grammar. 148 Greek philosophy. 16 Grotesque, the, and the ugly. 248

Historical enterprise analyzed, 321-325 Historical inevitability and contingency, 328 Historical products, 325 Historical psychology, 192 Historiographical evaluations. 336 Historiographical explanations, 337 Historiographical interpretations. 336 Historiography, emended, 317; epistemic issues

in. 331History, absolute idea or spirit in. 318; absolutism

in. 318; as events and as constructs. 318; as noble dream, 328; as objective study, 321; as science. 320; as subjective and individual, 320; as the play of the contingent and the unforeseen, 319; causation in, 329, 332. 339; colligation in. 325; constancies and changes in. 326; contradictions in philosophy of. 317; conventional and naturalistic attitude in. 333; cychsm in. 328; essential for philosophy. 317; fortune and misfortune in. 337; independent of philosophy. 317; philosophical aspects of. 3 17; philosophy of. based on certainties and absolutes. 317; universalism in. 318; values in, 338

Humanity, as colonial organisms, 172Human nature, 101

Idealism and empathy, 333 Idiosyncrasies in economics, 200 Illusions as interactions. 239 f.Immortality, 6. 155. 235 Indefinability of aesthetic data. 242 Infallible philosophy. 163 Inference. 33 Infinite, the, 53. 154 Institutional economics. 219 Institutionalization, 104 lnterbehavioral linguistics, 148 Intcrbehavioral object, the. in aesthetics, 258 lnterbehavioral philosophy, how sound?, 340 Intcrbehavioral psychology in aesthetics, 254 Intrinsically, of art and aesthetic qualities. 236;

of ethics, 166Invention versus imitation. 246

Judicial review and modification of law. 311 Jurisprudence, as interdisciplinary philosophy,

315Justice, 189

Keynesian revolution. 221 Knowing. SI f.Knowledge, as adaptation, and as orientation.

120

Language. 157, ch. 14Law. absolutism in. 299,304; and semantics. 308;

common and statute. 307; its uncertainty and indefiniteness. 305; modification of. and judicial review. 311; national and international. 314; theories, metaphysical roots. 301; theories, philosophical roots. 301; theories, scientific philosophy of, 302

Laws, absolutistic.299.333;and morals, 315; and psychology, 316; as societal institutions. 304; codified and uncodified. 309; enactments and encroachments. 307; in historiography. 331; in philosophical perspective. 298; in scientific philosophy, 302; natural or functional. 308; nature of, in scientific contexts, 300; of events, 302; of explanation, 303; of investigation. 303; of nature and of society, 298, 300 If., 313; of origin and evolution, 302; of scientific cooperation, 304; paradoxy and orthodoxy in, 312; scientific. 299; societal, and customs. 306; societal, and scientific psychology. 306; societal, nature of. 304; societal, sources of. 306; universal. 332

Legal philosophy, extremely abstractionistic. 304 Legal realism. 305 Leviathan, Hobbes'. 175 Liberty. 190.191

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S U B J E C T I N D E X

Linguistic analysis, ch. 8 Linguistic influences on philosophyzing. 154 Linguistics, interhchavioral. 148; valid. 98 Linguistic, the. problem in aesthetics and philos

ophy. 261Literacy, advent of. 147 Logos. 154

Macroeconomics, 198 Marbury versus Madison. 311.312 Marginal utility. 211 Marx's, Karl, theses on Feuerbach. 182 Materialism, nature of. 54;, .radox of. 54; sym

bol of enlightenment. 55 Materialistic interval, ch. 6; significance of. 65 Mathematics. 8. 125 Meaning, 149, ISO. 158 Mercantilism. 209Metaphors. 16. 288; of mind, consciousness as

religious products. 288 Metaphysics. Greek. 29. 30. 31,39 Microeconomics. 198 Middle Ages. 5Mind. 16; and body, dualism, vii. viii, ix, 5 Mona Lisa. 237Morality, public and private. 170 Morals and values. 168Moral situations, isolation and identification of.

159Moral standards. 169 f.Mysticism, 289

Natural rights and positive law. 311 Nonfigurative painting. 245

Objective versus nonobjective art. 245 Objectivity of historical events. 330 Observational aspects of philosophy. 4 Obsolescence and seasonality in economics. 200 Ordinary, the, and the elite in educational situa

tions. 271Orientation problem in philosophy. 259

Paradoxes in legal philosophy. 312Paradoxy and orthodoxy in law. 312Paraesthetic behavior. 252Personality development, two phases of. 264 f.Pctites perceptiones. 234Philosophical intervals. 18Philosophical systems, informal interval. 15;

formal and systematic interval. 16 Philosophies of science, valid and invalid. 8 Philosophy. 158; absolutes in. viii. a human en

terprise, 343; as queen of the sciences. 3; as religion. 3; as stage in intellectual evolution. 3; as systems of assumptions or beliefs. 3; as web spinning. 3; autistic. 4 f.; conventional. 9. 340. 341; Greek. 16; handmaiden of theology. 3;

history of. 5; human and divine. 176; identity of. 3: infallible. 163; interbehavioral. 3; legal, paradoxes in. 312: observational. 4; of an and aesthetics, ch. 18; of ethics. 159; of history, contradictions of. 317; of history, based on certainties and absolutes. 317; scientific. 5

Philosophyring. 3.4. 16. 95; eight specifications for, ch. 9; linguistic influences on. 154; significant, specifications for. 95

Physics. 8 Physiocratism. 209 Physis. 20.21Political systems, variety in. 175 Political utility philosophy. 178 Politics, and humanity as colonial organisms.

172; and hierarchy of human groups, 172: of Aristotle, 175; philosophical aspects of, 172; philosophy of. 178: problems of. 186: specimens of. 175

Polysemy. 152 Positivistic interval, ch. 7 Postulation(s). 156; definite. 23: naive. 19 Price, as dogma, 201 Primum mobile. 39Problem, of abstraction inaesthclics. 260; of axi

oms in aesthetics. 259; of orientation in philosophy. 259; of politics of specificity in philosophy. 259 f.; subjective-objective, in aesthetics and in philosophy, 261; the linguistic, in aesthetics and philosophy, 261

Problems, of educational situations. 271; specific political. 186: unity-plurality, in aesthetics and philosophy. 261 f.

Proletariat, the. 182Proliferation, of human groups. 172Psyche. 155. 288Psychic atoms. 48Psychic distance. 237Psychic faculties. 234Psychic powers. 16Psychic research. 289Psychic synthesis. 49Psychological aspects of political philosophy. 192 Psychological model of ethical behavior. 167 Psychological problems in philosophy. 260 Psychology. 102. 104, 105. 157. 192; and psycho

logical behavior, 285; historical. 192; inlerbe- havioral. in aesthetics. 254; scientific. 105. 192; valid. 98

Reality. 7. 154; and religion. 284; of knowledge and thinking. 50

Relativistic laws. 299Religion. 16. 76; and morals. 295; and politics.

296 f.; and reality. 284; and science. 286: and theology. 283; and truth. 2831; and values. 293 IT.: as contention. 282; as creation. 2XI. as criti-

351

I N T E R B E H A V I O R A L P H I L O S O P H Y

Religion (Continued)cism, 282; as cntrepreneurism. 282 f.; a parapet of defense. 281; as unification of experience. 281; behavior, various types, 282; comparative philosophies of. 288; comparative psychologies of. 289 ff.; definitions of. 278; Greek. 37. 38. 39; in anthropological perspective. 284; isolation and identification. 278; of Plato. 28; philosphv of. ch 20; plurality of. 280; public and private. 279; sacred and secular. 279 f.

Saintliness. 289 Scholastics. SScience, and religion. 286 f.; intrudes upon faith.

ch. 5; philosophies of. 8 Scientific laws, 299 Scientific philosophy. S Scientific psychology. 105. 192. 288 Seeing versus knowing. 245 f.Self. 6. 154. 165 Semantics. 7; and the law. 308 Settings or auspices in aesthetics. 258 f. Significant philosophvzing. 95; specifications for.

95Slavery. 187 Social contract, the. 175 Societal laws, and customs. 306: and scientific

philosophy. 306; nature of. 304; not laws of nature. 313; sources of. 306

Soul. 4. 16, 28; sick. 289. 341; source of knowledge. 48

Sovereignty. 187Specificity, principle. 344; the. problem in philos

ophy. 259 f.Specific political problems. 186Spirit. 6. 7, 154; absolute and universal, 180Spirit-matter dualism. 341Spiritistic culture, dominance of. 291

Spiritistic variants in conventional philosophy. 6 Spiritual life. 288 Spurious laws. 333 Sialism versus freedom. 185 Subjective-objective, problem in aesthetics and in

philosophy. 261 Sublimity. 243. 247 Substances in psychic synthesis. 49 Supernaturalism. 287 Superstition. 288 Supply and demand. 197 Syllogism. 33 Synonymity. 151

Tastc(s). aesthetic, 252: standard of, 243 Technology and engineering in education. 274 f. Theology, 5; and experience. 283; and religion.

283Transcendences, withdrawal from. 97 Transcendental interval, ch. 4 Transcendentalism, 41; ch. 4 True. the. beautiful, and the good. 341 Truth. 154; and religion. 283 f.

Unity-plurality, problem inaesthetiesand philosophy. 261 f.

Univcrsalism in history. 318 Universalistic attitude. 16 Universal spirit. 180

Valid, linguistics. 98; psychology, 98; thinking. 95 Value(s). 16. 211: and tiie valuable. 212, 293; and

virtues, as transcendental abstractions, 7; in education. 273: in history. 338; subjective. 211

Welfare economics. 217Words, domination of linguistics by. 147

Zoon Politikon. 172

352

N A M E I N D E X

Alexander, S„ 239, 251 Altenburg, M„ 32 Ames, H, S., 278 Ames, J. B., 313 Ames, V. M„ 251 Anaxagoras, 23 Anaximander, 20 Anaximenes, 20 A pell, O., 30, 34, 35Aristotle, 16 ,17 ,19,24,25,26,28.42,54,160.175 Amau, F., 256 Atkinson, R. F„ 318, 326 Attiyeh, R„ 205Augustine, St„ 43, 44. 110. 114. 175, 326 Ayer, A. J„ 78, 160, 167 Ayres, C. E„ 225, 226,231

Bakunin, M. A., 184, 185Banister, H„ 111Barker, S„ 189Baumgarten, A. G„ 233, 234Beard, C. A.. 320, 328, 329Beardsley, M. C., 248Beck. G. H„ 205Becker, C. L„ 324Bell, Charles, 250. 251Bell, Clive. 258Bell, E. T„ 125Bell, G. J„ 250Benditt, T. M„ 305Benedict, R.. 309Bentham, J.. 160, 218, 224. 227Berkeley, G„ 52,54,70,72,107,108,137,210.222Berlin, 1„ 333Bernoulli, D.. 230Bingham. J. W„ 309Blackham, H. F„ 230Blackstone, W„ 305, 310Blanqui, A„ 184, 185Bloomfield, L., 149, ISOBlunt. A.. 244. 252Bodenheimer, E.. 304Bohm-Bawerk, E. von, 211, 212.227Bohr. N„ 106, 138, 250Boole. G„ 85Born, M„ 106Bossuet, J. B„ 60. 326Botticelli, S„ 244Bottomorc, T. B„ 215Bowen. J„ 265Braithwaile. R. B„ 295

Bridgman, P. W„ 69, 72, 106, 138Briggs. W„ 135Buckie, H. R„ 326Buchner, L., 64Bullough, E„ 237Burke, E., 253Burkhardt, J„ 337Burnet, J„ 20Bum, E. A„ 127Bum, E. G„ 213Bum, E. J„ 222, 230Bury. J. B„ 230, 320Butteifield. H . 337

Cabanis. P. J. G„ 60. 61 Caesar, J., 321, 330 Cahn. E„ 311, 312 Campbell, N. R„ 300 Cantillon, R„ 226, 227 Cardoro, B. N., 312 Carlyle, T„ 320 Carnap, R„ 7, 74 Carr, G„ 56 Carritt, E. F„ 240 Cassirer, E„ 26 Cezanne, P„ 244 Chagall, M„ 248 Clarendon, E. H„ 320 Clark. J, B . 230 Clifford. W. K„ 73 Cohen, F. S„ 305. 306 Cohen, H„ 22Cohen, M. R„ 250, 305, 308, 309. 317Collingwood. R„ 241, 320. 333, 334Commons, J. R„ 231Compton, A. H„ 6. 258Comte, A.. 67, 68, 69Condillac, E. B. de, 56Conford, F. M„ 21,23. 26Cooper, D. C„ 162Copernicus, N„ 6, 138, 208Courant, R„ 249Croce, B„ 241, 326Cromwell, O., 331Cushman, H. E„ 26Cuvier. G. L. C. F. D.. 17

Dali. S.. 248 Darwin. C.. 17 Darwin. C. G„ 250 Davenport. H. V„ 224

353

i n t e r b e h a v i o h a l p h i l o s o p h y

Davis, H.. I ll Davis, H. T., 250 Democritus, 54 Descartes, R., 48,107, 176 Dewey, J., 92,236,295, 296 Dickie, G„ 241,242 Diels, H„ 21 Dillard, D„ 222 Dilthey, W., 333,338 Dingle, H., 69 Dodds, E. R., 16 Donagan, A., 332 Dossena, A., 256 Dray, W. H„ 320,332, 333 Ducasse, C. J., 251 Duhem, P.. 86

Ebbinghaus, H., 108 Eddington, A., 6,106 Einstein, A., 8,9 Elias, H., 276 Elton, G. R., 317,321, 323 Elton, W., 239Engels, F„ 182, 183, 203,216,217,319, 326 Euclid, 8 Eve, A. S„ 250

Faraday, M., 250 Fetter, F. A., 224 Feuerbach, L., 63, 278 Fischer, I., 224, 227 Fisher, H. A. L., 319 Frank, J., 305, 310, 316 Frederick, The Great, 331 Frege, G., 85 French, P. A., 162 Frisch, R., 227 Fry, R., 258Fustel de Coulanges, N. D., 320

Galiani, F., 230Galileo, G .,6 ,47 ,50 ,128,129, 138Gardiner, P., 333Geertz, G , 285Gelb, I. J., 146Geyl, P„ 326Godwin, W., 184Goethe, J. W., 197, 248Goldman, E., 184, 185Gombrich, E. H., 238Gray. J. C.,310Greenough, H., 251Gregory, 42

Hadamard, J., 250 Hamilton, W., 52

Hamlet, 147, 293 Hammurabi, 330 Hampshire, S., 191 Hardy, G. H„ 249 Harris, S. E., 222 Harrod, R. F., 222 Han. H. L. A„ 191,314,315 Hanley, D., 135 Hanmann, E., 39 Hartmann, E. von, 20 Hanmann, N., 160, 169 Harvey, W„ 137 Heckscher, E. F., 209,210 Hegel, 63,180 f.. 182,183,215,235,241,278,291.

318,319, 326Heisenberg, W„ 6. 106, 138Helmholtz. H„ 108Hempel, C. G., 332, 334Henkin, L.,314Hepburn, R. W„ 244Heracleitus, 22, 26Herbart, J. F„ 51. 108, 235Herbertz, R., 21Herodotus, 322Hertz, H., 67Hesiod, 20Hippocrates, 54Hobbes, T„ 54, 175, 176,208Hobson, J. A., 217,218.219,227Holbach, P. H. T., 55Holmes, O. W., 305,306,315Holstein, F. von, 188Homer, 20Hume, D„ 52,54,70,72,107,108,178,179, 180,

210, 243

James, W„ 289 Jeans, 106 Jerome, 42Jevons, 224, 227, 228, 230.250 Johnson, E. A. J., 208 Johnston, M., 6 Jones, H. W., 313 Jourdain, P. E. B., 250 Justi, J. H. G„ 227

Kant, 6,9,27,30,34,39,49,51,54, 85,108,160, 161, 162, 210, 211, 234,235, 241, 247,300

Kantor, J. R„ 7, 80, 84, 87, 136, 143, 148, 150, 271,315, 321,322

Kauder, E., 212 Kaufman, W., 282 Kelsen, H.,313 Kent, E. A., 305 Kepler, J., 47,129, 138,208 Keynes. J. M., 212,221 ff, 226,227, 230

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N A M E I N D E X

Kipnis, K., 314 KirshofT, G. R.. 67 Klein, L. R„ 221, 222 Knight, F. H., 194 Knight. R. P.. 252 Kovach, F. J.. 237, 251 Kropotkin. P„ 184, 185 Kiilpe. O., 108

La Mettrie. J. O., 58 f„ 64 Langdell, 313 Lange, F. A., 54.63 Laplace, P. S.. 6 Lask, E„ 35 Lauderdale, J. M., 228 Leif, G.. 327, 335, 338Leibniz, G. W.. 48. 53. 54, 107, 210, 222, 233Lenin, N„ 227Levy-Bruhl, L., 60Lewis. C. ]., 232Liebig, J., 63Linnaeus. C„ 17Lipps, T„ 237Livingstone, R. W., 37. 38Llewellyn, K., 306Locke, J., 48. 54, 70, 72. 107, 108, 177. 210, 222 Lucretius, T„ 19, 54 Lunsden, R.. 205

McCulloch. J. R„ 211,228,229 McDonald, L. C., 175 McTaggart, J. M. E„ 279 Macaulay, T. B., 320 Mach, E., 67, 71, 72, 86 Malthus. T. R.. 210. 227. 228, 229 Mandelbaum, M., 333, 335 Marshall, A., 213. 214, 227 Marshall. J-, 311Marx. K., 182 L. 203,215.216.217.227.278.319,

326Mead, G. H„ 38 Meinecke, J., 338Menger, C., 211. 212, 227, 228. 229, 230Mengs, A. R„ 251Mersenne, M„ 176Meyershoff, H.. 324Michelangelo, 244, 252Mill. J., 210,211Mill. J. S„ 160, 210, 211,213,219,222,224,228,

229Millikan, R. A.. 288 Minucius, Felix, 42Mitchell, W. C„ 203, 217, 218.224, 227.231 Moleschott, J., 63 Momigliano. A. O., 321 Moore. C. N„ 249

Moore, G. E„ 160, 166, 219, 221, 252, 299Moore, T. V., 292Most, J., 184, 185Muller, M„ 278Mun. A. A. M.. 227Munro, T„ 251Murray, G„ 43

Nagel, E., 74 Namier, L. B.. 320, 323 Napoleon, 321, 331 Natorp, P„ 22. 27, 28Newton. 6,47.49.50, 53.113, 130,131.132, 133,

134, 135, 136, 137, 138,208

Ogden. C. K.. 149 Ogle. \V„ 17 Oman. J. W.. 278, 281 Osborne. H.. 238. 251 Ostwald, W„ 70

Parker, D. H„ 244 Parmenides, 22, 26 Passmore, J. A., 80, 91. 330, 335 Paul. St., 43 Pea no, 85Pearson, K., 69, 71, 72 Petrie. H. G„ 265 Petty, W.. 208. 219. 227 Picasso, P., 248 Pigou. A. C . 215, 217,219 Planck, M„ 6, 70Plato. 16, 19, 24. 25. 26, 28. 29. 39.41. 160. 175,

189Plotinus, 42, 114 Poincare, H„ 86 Pollock. F.. 308 Popper, K. R.. 332 Pound, R., 316 Prall, D. W„ 236 Proudhon, P. V., 184 Pythagoras, 19, 21, 22, 26

Quesnay, F., 209, 226

Radin, P„ 15Ramsey, 1. T., 291Ranke. L. von, 328, 329, 335. 338Ranson, S. W., 112Rawls. J., 189Reichenbach, H„ 249Reid, T.. 51, 52. 53, 109, 115. 135. 136. 137Renan, E„ 278Ricardo. D.. 210. 213. 219. 224. 227.228, 229 Richards, I. A., 149 Rickert, H., 333 Robbins, H., 249

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I N T E R B E H A V I O R A L P H I L O S O P H YRomancll. P., 296 Roschcr, W„ 208 Ross. W. D„ 251 Rousseau, 55, 175, 176, 177. 178 Rubel. M.. 215Russell, B.. 77, 126, 188, 221, 249 Rust, E. C.. 287 Rutherford, E„ 250 Ryle, G., 94, 240

Santayana. G„ 237Saussure, F. de, 142Say, J. B„ 212, 228. 229Schelling, F. W. V., 63Schleirmacher, F„ 278Schoen. M„ 248Scholastics, 89Schopenhauer. A., 7Schroeder, E„ 85Schrodingcr. E..7, 18, 106. 138Schumpeter, J. A„ 222, 226Senior. N. W.,211Shakespear, 147, 189,248Sherrington, C. S., 6, 112Sibley, M. Q„ 175Sidgwick, H„ 222Sigcrist, H. E„ 249Sismondi, J. C. L„ 229Smith, A., 209 f.. 213, 219, 227, 228, 229, 230Smith. N. W„ 1,87, 150Socrates, 19, 24, 25Sophists, 19Sophocles, 43Sorel, G„ 184Spencer, H„ 186, 278Spengler. O., 326Sperry, R. W„ 301Spiegel, H. W„ 209, 211. 222Spinoza, B„ 46, 54Stephenson. C. L„ 160, 167Stem, F„ 320Stewart, J. A., 27Slirner, M., 184Storch, H. F. von, 228, 229Sullivan, J. W. N., 249Sumner, W. G., 170

Tail, P. G„ 249 Tawney, R. H„ 203 Taylor, A. E., 33, 36 Taylor, L. W„ 130, 250 Temple, W„ 279 Tertullian, Q. S. F„ 42, 284

Thales, 20 Thomas, St., 44 Thompson, J. J„ 321 Thompson, W., 249 Thrasymascus. 189 Thucydides, 322 Tinbergen. 227 Torrens, C. R.. 228. 229 Toynbee, A. J., 325. 326 Trevelian, G. M., 320 Trevor-Roper, H.. 320 Tucker, T. G.. 38 Tugwell, R. G.. 203, 231 Turgot, R. J„ 209, 227

Uebcling, T. E., 162 Ullmann, S„ 149, 152

Veach, H. B., 78 Veblen, T„ 203, 221, 227 Vermeer, J„ 256 Vivas, E., 236 Vogt, K. C.. 63, 64 Voltaire, F. M. A„ 326 Vossler, K„ 249

Walras, L„ 230 Walsh, W. H., 325, 330 Waters. F. W„ 283, 284, 291 Weber, M.. 333 Wertheimer, M., 250 Wettstein, H. K„ 162 Whitehead, A. N„ 112, 221, 279 Whittaker. W. H„ 288 Wieser, F. von, 211, 212 Wilhelm II, 188 Winckelmann, J. J., 251 Winckler, W„ 248 Windclband, W„ 22,25, 26, 29. 333 Wisdom, J„ 78 Wittgenstein, L„ 77 Wolff, J. C„ 233 Wollheim, R„ 238, 239 Woodbridge, F. J. E„ 23 Wundt, W„ 108 Wynne, J. P., 263

Xenophanes, 110

Zeller, E., 29, 37, 40 Ziff. P„ 239 Zimmermann. F., 236

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INTERBEHAVIORAL PHILOSOPHY - Conductitlan

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